Carla Schraml

The Dilemma of Recognition

Experienced Reality of Ethnicised Politics in Rwanda and Burundi

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The sociologist moves in the common world of men, close to what most of them would call real. The categories he employs in his analysis are only refinements of the categories by which other men live – power, class, status, race, ethnicity. As a result, there is a deceptive simplicity and obviousness about some sociological investigations. One reads them, nods at the familiar scene, remarks that one has heard all this before and don't people have better things to do than to waste their times on truisms – until one is suddenly brought up against an insight that radically questions everything one had previously assumed about this familiar scene. This is the point at which one begins to sense the excitement of sociology (Berger 1979: 33).

Preface: Caught in a Trap – Speaking as (neither Rwandan nor Burundian) 'Scientific Interpreter' about Ethnicised Politics in Rwanda and Burundi

I had barely arrived on an eight-month stay in Rwanda and Burundi, during which I intended to conduct interviews for my PhD project, when one of my very first interviewees gave me a hard thought. The project has the aim to analyse how Rwandans and Burundians experience social and political exclusion, strongly assuming that ethnic categories (i.e., Hutu and Tutsi) might play an important role. He told me:

> Alors, il y a une chose que je voulais te dire. C'est que…souvent les occidentaux qui viennent au Rwanda viennent avec cette idée Hutu Tutsi. C'est vraiment gênant. J'ai accueilli un journaliste… qui m'a demandé: «Celui à gauche, c'est un Hutu ou un Tutsi?» Moi, j'étais comme…quoi? «Ils sont ensemble, comment?» Donc, il est venu avec cette idée […]. Laissez nous battre avec cette… mais on voulait pas que vous vous en mêlez. Considérez nous comme Ruandais, chaque personne comme une personne avec sa capacité, c'est tout (interviewee R8).

He asked me – as someone coming from the 'West', hence, not being Rwandan – not to focus on ethnic categories and the social conflicts potentially aligned along them. According to him, many people from the 'West' come with these ideas about Hutu and Tutsi in mind, intending to analyse and capture the relationship. But, as he reminded me, this is none of 'Western people's' business. They, as Rwandans, will sort out the problem themselves. Obviously, due to my research interest in ethnicised politics (i.e., the interpretation of exclusion based on ethnic categories), I did not want to follow his request. I acknowledge, however, that my project, which touches such a highly sensitive, complex and, above all, political issue conducted by a person not living in Rwanda (or in Burundi), implies strong difficulties. Especially in Rwanda and Burundi, where Europeans highly influenced the notion of ethnicity (with major consequences for Rwandans and Burundians), as a "scientific interpreter" (Schütz 1972: 9) coming from the 'West' one has to critically review his or her own project. In particular, I consider my project to be caught in a trap between the intention to focus on potentially conflict-prone ethnic interpretation of social and political exclusion, on the one hand, and the reification of ethnic categories and ethnicised politics, on the other hand.

Reification means the treatment of 'ethnic groups' as "substantial things-in-the-world" that "call[s] them into being" (Brubaker 2004b: 10). As Rogers Brubaker (2004b: 10) notes, "it is central to the practice of politicised ethnicity". Conversely, unlike in the practice, which might even intend to politicise ethnic-

ity, the analysis of politicised ethnicity[1] has to avoid its reification. This is especially true within the scope of my analysis, which places emphasis on knowledge that is assumed to constitute reality. In this sense, it is crucial not to evoke and manifest problems, which I as 'scientific interpreter' intend to analyse (Brubaker 2004b: 10).

Having said this, it is crucial to avoid speaking about Hutu and Tutsi as 'ethnic groups' struggling for political power, as e.g., Michael Mann (2005) does in his book *The Dark Side of Democracy. Explaining Ethnic Cleansing*. He constantly speaks about 'the Hutu' and 'the Tutsi' – reifying 'ethnic groups' as "internally homogeneous, externally-bounded groups, even unitary collective actors with common purposes" (Brubaker 2004b: 8). More important, by using these notions, he describes a very ethnically dichotomised political world in Rwanda and Burundi:

> Both have formed viable states in both countries, the Hutu by weight of numbers, the Tutsi by superior political and military organisation. [...] The Hutu see themselves as an oppressed *proletarian nation*, demand majoritarian democracy, and defend it from all threat. The Tutsi, as a former *imperial nation*, now challenged by democracy, feel threatened [...]. *They both have rival plausible and achievable claims to their own state over the same territorial area* (Mann 2005: 431, emphasis added).

Quoting Gérard Prunier (1997: 9/10), he adds before the previous passage: "For Tutsi the motto is 'We have our backs to the wall. Unless we maintain absolute control they will finish us the next time', while Hutu say, 'We only have to wait, numbers will play in our favour'" (Mann 2005: 431). Mann draws the picture of two collective actors with mutually excluding purposes: Any of the two 'ethnic groups' (he even speaks about "nations" evoking more strongly the idea of political entities) 'the Hutu' and 'the Tutsi' appear to have the aim to get into or stay in political power. This is fundamentally crucial in order to avoid being politically and consequently socially excluded or even exterminated. This obviously ethnicised way to interpret politics – more precisely, political struggle and political and social exclusion – is what I intend to analyse, since I assume it to be highly political and, hence, potentially conflict-prone. The difficulty, though, is (due to the very same reason) not to reify ethnicised politics while analysing it. This is especially difficult, since, as Craig Calhoun (1993: 214) reminds us,

> Many of the categories and presumptions of this discourse [*about nations,* author's note] are so deeply ingrained in our everyday language and our academic theories that it is virtually impossible to shed them, and we can only remind ourselves continuously to take them into account.

1 Later on, I distinguish between ethnicised politics and politicised ethnicity. To put it roughly, ethnicised politics refers to exclusion interpreted based on ethnic cleavages, whereas politicised ethnicity refers to inclusion. For now, both terms can be synonymously understood.

Having had this in mind, I felt guilty after I had spoken to the Rwandan priest because I knew I did not want to ignore the issue of Hutu and Tutsi. In contrast, it particularly provoked and still provokes my interest. However, I tried to take my interviewee and his advice seriously and not interfere too deeply – as he asked me to do. Hence, I focus more on the question of how Rwandans and Burundians (i.e., "those living in that world" (Schütz 1972: 9)) conceive of ethnic categories (i.e., Hutu and Tutsi), political and social exclusion, and political claims and representation. In other words, following Peter Berger (1979: 33) cited above, I intend to work with the categories "by which other men live – power, class, status, race, ethnicity".

However, the trap one is caught in as 'scientific interpreter' when analysing ethnicised politics is not that easy to avoid as one might think so far. The complexity of analysing ethnicised politics exceeds the notions taken for granted in our daily language and academic theories. And even focusing on the notions taken for granted by 'those living in that world' does not ensure the entire escape of the trap. This can best be exemplified by Joe Feagin's research about the "white racial frame" in the specific context of the U.S. He broaches a similar issue by adopting a similar perspective to mine in that the "white racial frame" is described as an "overarching worldview, one that encompasses important racial ideas, terms, images, emotions and interpretations" (Feagin 2010: 3). In the preface, he writes about the presidential election of Barack Obama and the assumption based thereon that the U.S. had entered a post-racial period. He heavily doubts that "this election really signal[s] a major decline in racism in the United States" (Feagin 2010: vi/vii). In order to challenge this assertion, he explains that "if it had been only to the white voters, Senator McCain would have become the 44th U.S. president" (Feagin 2010: vii). By analysing the political situation in this way, Feagin himself has to (in order to reveal ethnic interpretations) adopt a perspective that is based on the assumption that the white people voted for McCain due to his whiteness. In order to grasp racial interpretations, the situation must be interpreted based on racial categories. In doing so, a racial interpretation is reproduced.

Relating to my own research, this implies that the adoption of a focus on ethnicised politics is a necessary condition. There is no question that *these* patterns of interpretation would not have been an issue (at least not in this book) if I had not placed emphasis on these patterns. The interpretation of politics in ethnic terms is only one perspective one can adopt. Moreover, the general concept of the study assumes that ethnicity, i.e., being Hutu or Tutsi, is a relevant criterion that influences whether Rwandans and Burundians experience politics as inclusive or exclusive. At the same time, though, this very concept makes it

possible to challenge this very assumption and, in this sense, to help dissolve the notion of ethnicised politics.

Intending to challenge ethnic categories as taken for granted – i.e., legitimate and, hence, powerful – notions I have to use an ethnic interpretation myself. Hence, I remind myself as author, as well as the readers, of the book that the present analysis of the situation in Rwanda and Burundi is not meant to further promote a dichotomic and politically charged interpretation of ethnicity in Rwanda and Burundi. Particularly as an 'outside' (scientific) interpreter who does not have to live with the tragic and far-reaching consequences that such an interpretation might have, I hope to avoid this. Taking Calhoun's concerns seriously, I am trying to escape my own way of thinking about ethnicised politics in Rwanda and Burundi that is based on categories and presumptions that are 'deeply ingrained in our everyday language'.

However, after having analysed the interviews and finished the book, I assume these interpretations to be important and powerful ones for the moment. As Nigel Eltringham (2004: 4), discussing ethnicity in Rwanda, puts it: "The concept of ethnicity is out of the box and no longer under the control of the analyst." Hence, Rwandan and Burundian as well as 'outside' (scientific) interpreters should take ethnic interpretations into account. Focusing on ethnic interpretations of social and political exclusion and assuming it to be an important problem to overcome, on the one hand, and intending to avoid the reification of the ethnic interpretation of social and political exclusion, on the other hand, constitute the trap from which there is no simple escape.

1 Introduction: The 'Dilemma of Recognition'. On the 'Experienced Reality' of Ethnicised Politics in Rwanda and Burundi

> La plus grande ressource, […] ça soit au Rwanda ou au Burundi…le chemin le plus sûr et le plus rapide d'avoir accès aux ressources, c'est la politique. Donc, automatiquement, les gens vont étiqueter…Qui fait quoi? Quelle est son appartenance ethnique? Parce que c'est devenu une forme de compétition, ...de règle de compétition. […] les politiciens voudront toujours croire qu'ils représentent une parti de la population. C'est ça qui les légitime, qui les rend légitimes. Mais dans la pratique ce n'est pas ça, je ne vois pas par exemple, pour un Hutu paysan […] j'étais politiciens, je ne voyais pas ce que je faisais pour lui (interviewee R11).

How can (conflict-prone) salience[2] of ethnicity in Rwandan and Burundian politics be overcome? How can this salience be approached analytically? And why, precisely, is it that it is potentially conflict-prone? These questions drove my research and my interviews (their analysis and production) conducted with Rwandans and Burundians from September 2007 to May 2008. For one of these interviews, I contacted the former deputy cited above. I met him in Butare, the second largest town in Rwanda, located in the south, where he lives. When he came up with his explanations expressed in the quote, I felt vaguely satisfied, since what I had decided (more or less consciously by then) to focus on comes close to these interpretations. In this sense, the quote can be read as a rough answer to the questions just raised. What he mentions and what seems to be crucial to me is, broadly speaking, the general presence of ethnicity in politics. According to him, politics provide the fastest access to resources in Rwanda and Burundi. Hence, the people are labelling: Almost automatically, they are asking

2 The contributions to this discussion are diversely labelled as contributions to "politicisation of ethnicity" (Kandeh 1992; Wimmer 2002), "ethnic politics" (Chazan 1982; Chazan, Lewis, Rothchild, Stedman, and Mortimer 1999), or "Ethnisierung des Politischen" (ethnicisation of politics) (Büschges and Pfaff-Czarnecka 2007a). Since later on I analytically distinguish between politicised ethnicity and ethnicised politics, for now I speak about salience of ethnicity in politics.

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for the ethnic[3] affiliation. This is because ethnicity has become a rule of competition in politics. Consequently, the politicians want to believe that they represent one part of the population because it makes them legitimate. It makes them legitimate, although, as he finally adds, he does not see that a Hutu farmer benefited when he as Hutu still worked as politician.

Against the background of the ideas I had in mind when I listened to his explanations, I roughly interpreted his quote in the following way: When he spoke about automatically labelling with and asking for ethnic categories he drew my attention to taken for granted notions that relate ethnic categories to politics. Accordingly, ethnicity self-evidently works as political legitimisation. His doubts regarding the practical implications of ethnic political representation, however, made me especially aware of the power implied in notions taken for granted.

The 'institutional engineering'-debate, to which the present analysis aims to contribute, of course, gives answers to the question of how conflict-prone salience in politics is to be overcome. However, it neglects the questions of how salience in politics is to be conceived of and why it is seen to be potentially conflict-prone. In principle, the implementation of institutional systems is seen to enhance conflict management and political stability (Esman 2004: 203; Norris 2002: 206; Reilly 2001: 105). For this purpose, it is pivotal to overcome the salience of ethnicity in politics. A great deal of the debate is dedicated to the question of whether an institutional system denying ethnic categories (majoritarian democracy) or one sharing power along ethnic categories (consociationalism) is more suitable to overcome the salience of ethnicity in politics and, hence, to implement conflict management and political stability (Horowitz 1985: 567; Nordlinger 1972: 117; Van den Berghe 1981: 82; Zartman 1990: 525). The arguments implied in the 'institutional engineering'-debate draw upon a notion of institution, which, independently of the historical context, produces the same effects. I agree up to a point; however, I argue that ethnicity in politics – more precisely, ethnicised politics and politicised ethnicity, as I shall later analytically distinguish – are to be approached based on what "those living in that world" (Schütz 1972: 9) experience as real. Put differently, I approach institutions as well as ethnicity in politics on what 'those living in that world' know and take for granted: i.e., what is real.

Without following Alfred Schütz into a phenomenological analysis of life-world, I use his term 'those living in that world' in order to acknowledge the

3 Based on a general social constructivist perspective I understand 'ethnic' to be the same as 'ethnicised'. The term 'ethnicised' emphasises the general assumption of social constructedness. I use the two words synonymously.

epistemological understanding he introduces: namely, that the social world "far from being homogeneous […] is given to us in a complex system of perspectives" (Schütz 1972: 8). Unlike Schütz, however, I understand these perspectives, or the knowledge, as I call it, following Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1991), to be collective and supra-individual. More precisely, as will be discussed later in more detail, this collective and supra-individual knowledge is defined by social cleavages. In this sense, meaning is understood as not individualised but socially objectified (Keller 2001: 118). Accordingly, knowledge is seen to be historically produced (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 72).

Arguing in this way, the present analysis mainly follows Berger's and Luckmann's line of reasoning expressed in their seminal work *The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise of the Sociology of Knowledge* (1991), which places emphasis on knowledge, i.e., taken for granted and self-evident concepts in order to conceive of institutions. For analysing the institutional order, the knowledge of its members has to be taken into account (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 82).

Having said this, I simply assume that how 'those living in that world', i.e., Rwandans and Burundians, experience their social world as meaningful might differ from how I as observer would interpret it. This is not to say that "scientific interpreters" (Schütz 1972: 9) do not experience their social world as meaningful or that 'those living in that world' do not theorise (see Nordstrom 1997: 27) and definitely not that 'those living in that world' cannot be 'scientific interpreters'. Neither does the research project qualify to dissolve the power relations, which due to a specific political history potentially exist between me and my interviewees. As Hito Steyerl (2007) clearly asserts in the preface to the German translation of Gayatri Spivak's seminal work *Can the Subaltern Speak?* (2007), it is not enough to hold a microphone in front of the mouths of the excluded, since "its 'speaking for oneself' is really only the lip-syncing of the 'experts'".[4] I simply assume that approaching the social world based on the meaning experienced by those one speaks about as 'scientific interpreter' sheds new light on questions one is trying to answer. This is clearly true for the 'dilemma of recognition' focused on in the present analysis.

Focusing on the knowledge of Rwandans and Burundians, it becomes possible to show how in Rwanda as well as in Burundi, regardless of different political institutional models, one that denies ethnic categories and one that officially shares power along ethnic categories, ethnicity is salient in politics. More precisely, the analysis reveals how Rwandans and Burundians self-evidently interpret political and social exclusion along ethnic cleavages and, accordingly,

4 For the translation into English, see Steyerl 2010.

take it for granted that rights, political claims, and political representation are based on ethnic categories. Moreover, diverging knowledge is present in any of the two countries. In this respect, the analysis focuses on ethnicised knowledge that yet answers the question, 'Which 'ethnic group' is exactly excluded?' in different, even contradictory ways. This roughly constitutes "the dilemma of recognition" (De Zwart 2005) I shall specify shortly, which the 'institutional engineering'-debate faces when opting for either 'denial of' or 'power sharing along' ethnic cleavages in order to overcome the salience of ethnicity in politics and, hence, violent ethnic conflict.

To begin with, however, I want to point out in more detail three analytical foci that are crucial to my analysis. These foci imply answers to the questions of how salience in politics is to be conceived of analytically and why it is seen to be potentially conflict-prone. Setting these foci is necessary in order to finally make the 'dilemma of recognition' conceivable and to make clear in which way my answer to the question of how salience of ethnicity in politics is to be overcome differs from the answers the 'institutional engineering'-debate provides. In doing so, I refer to the quote of the Rwandan former politicians and the ideas implied: First, the focus on what 'those living in that world' take for granted and, hence, what is real. In particular, I am interested in taken for granted concepts that concern the notional relatedness of ethnicity and politics. More precisely, I place emphasis on, second, how ethnic categories are taken for granted as a basis for *inclusion*, i.e., rights, political claims, and political representation. Third, this conversely implies the focus on how social and political *exclusion* is self-evidently interpreted based on ethnic categories.

First, the interviewee implicitly mentions knowledge, which is *taken for granted* and self-evident. Literally, he says, 'The people are *automatically* labelling and asking who is doing what? What is his ethnic affiliation?' According to the ideas of Berger and Luckmann, notions "those living in that world" (Schütz 1972: 9) take for granted, i.e., knowledge, constitute (their) social reality (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 15). The present line of reasoning illustrates social realities based on knowledge by 'those living in that world', i.e., by Rwandans and Burundians. In doing so, emphasis is placed on the legitimacy and, hence, the power implied in concepts that are taken for granted. In this sense, concepts that are taken for granted are understood as legitimate concepts (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 112).

Having said this, I hope that by moving "in the common world of men, close to what most of them would call real", this book will make the reader not only "nod at the familiar scene" and "remark that one has heard all this before". Ideally, the reader will be "brought up against an insight that radically questions everything one had previously assumed about this familiar scene", which is how

Berger (1979: 33) describes the (desired) effect of sociological investigations in the first quote of his book.

The second and third foci that are pivotal to reproducing my argument can best be introduced together. Both imply taken for granted notions that are related to the idea of the modern nation state. Due to this idea, it is taken for granted, i.e., legitimate that inclusion and exclusion are structured along ethnic categories. More precisely, it is seen as legitimate that social, political, and legal closure, i.e., exclusion and inclusion, is structured along the modern nation state (Bös 1993; Wimmer 2002: 57). Nation states themselves are ethnic (Bös 2008: 69).[5] Accordingly, e.g., the legitimate rule in the modern nation state is the "rule by our people, that is, rule by people who are *like us*, people of our nationality" (Ringmar 1998: 534, emphasis added). In this sense, being part of an ethnic category (i.e., having a certain ethnic affiliation) entitles one to (political, social, and legal) rights (Wimmer 2002: 1). To illustrate this point, under current U.S. law, children of U.S. citizens born abroad can most often become U.S. citizens and in the view of most legal scholars should even attain the status of 'natural born citizen' needed to be eligible for Presidency. For instance, although not uncontested, John McCain, born in the Panama Canal Zone in 1936 became a 2008 Republican candidate. The law itself, however, defining 'natural born citizens' to be eligible for the office of President and excluding those who became citizens by naturalisation (Article 2, U.S. Constitution) reflects that ethnicity (i.e., common descent) is understood as a relevant criterion to represent the American political community.[6] Although undoubtedly representing a nation state, which is comparatively inclusive in terms of the possibilities for those not born as U.S. citizens to become U.S. citizens, these laws clearly reflect the idea of a political community, which is (amongst others) defined by descent. Being part of this community defined by ethnicity, e.g., entitles one to rights and, hence, structures inclusion and exclusion.

As the Rwandan former deputy clearly points out, he does not see in which way a Hutu might have benefited from his political presence being a Hutu. However, interestingly, the very idea of ethnic representation functions as political legitimisation: According to him, ethnic affiliation is exactly what legiti-

5 Of course, nation states follow different ideas about inclusion and exclusion and apply different practices in order to organise inclusion and exclusion (see Thomas 2002). Usually, the academic discussion distinguishes between ethnic and political conceptions (Eley and Suny 1996; Kohn 1944; Smith 2003; Thomas 2002). Moreover, ethnic boundary mark is socially contested. Accordingly, ethnic boundaries can be challenged, changed and become meaningless (Eder, Rauer, and Schmidtke 2004b: 35).

6 By the way, the Burundian and the Rwandan law also require the president to be Burundian by birth (Article 72, Burundian Constitution) and to "be of Rwandan nationality by origin" and to "have at least one parent of the Rwandan nationality by origin" (Article 99, Rwandan Constitution).

mises politicians. In this sense, he describes the taken for granted notion that political representation is (to be) based on ethnicity. This implies that rights and political claims are thought up based on ethnicity, too. This taken for granted notion that ethnicity makes up the basis for rights, political claims, and political representation is what I call politicised ethnicity. Politicised ethnicity is the second focus crucial to my line of reasoning.

To the third focus, he drew my attention by saying that ethnic categories have become 'a rule of political competition'. In the context of the quote, I understand 'rule' as meaning the pattern by which political competition is interpreted in Rwanda and Burundi. Put differently, Rwandans and Burundians interpret political struggle as being a struggle between 'the Hutu' and 'the Tutsi'. If one 'ethnic group' is in power, the other is thought to be not in power and, thus, (politically and, consequently, socially) excluded. The interpretation of political and social exclusion based on ethnic categories is what I call ethnicised politics. Relating the notion of ethnicised politics to the modern idea of nation state, which I will do in more detail shortly, it becomes obvious that exclusion based on ethnic categories might be especially legitimate (as just described above) but, conversely, also especially non-legitimate and, hence, highly political and potentially conflict-prone.

Implied within the description just given of ethnicised politics and politicised ethnicity, the notion of 'ethnic group' will be equally focused on within the scope of the analysis. It will become obvious how crucial the notion is for ethnicising politics and politicising ethnicity. Following Rogers Brubaker (2004b: 8), the notion of 'ethnic group' (this is also true for the notion of 'the Hutu' and 'the Tutsi') implies the idea of "internally homogeneous, externally-bounded groups, even unitary collective actors with common purposes".[7] Exclusively arguing based on this notion of a collective actor with common purposes, the idea of rights, political claims, and political representations based on ethnic categories makes sense. Conversely, the interpretation of exclusion along ethnic categories is necessarily based on the idea of a collective actor who pursues an ethnically defined interest (which is not realised when he is not politically represented).

But why are these three foci important at all? Revealing knowledge of 'those living in that world' is first and foremost a general interest leading my research, and, accordingly, my analytical approach to ethnicised politics and

7 By using these terms I intend to highlight this very notion of 'ethnic groups', 'the Tutsi' and 'the Hutu', which are assumed to have common purposes and, hence, to be collective actors. These assumptions have far-reaching implications, e.g. that political exclusion necessarily implies the social exclusion of an 'ethnic group'.

politicised ethnicity. Ethnicised politics and politicised ethnicity, though, are crucial to understanding ethnic conflict in modern nation states.

Ethnic categories are per se politicised in that they appear to be a particularly legitimate basis for political representation and organisation. In this sense, ethnic categories are especially powerful categories, which explains whether and why the salience of ethnicity in politics (either by interpreting inclusion or exclusion, i.e., politicised ethnicity or ethnicised politics) is highly political and potentially conflict-prone.

Of course, which ethnic categories are taken for granted as the basis for inclusion and exclusion and which are not depends on the historically produced knowledge of 'those living in that world'. Put differently, the national self-concept defines the idea of legitimate membership (Eder, Rauer, and Schmidtke 2004a: 11). The Rwandan government and probably many of the perpetrators took the category 'the Hutu' for granted as the basis for rights, political claims, and political representation in 1994. Claiming the Rwandan state for 'the Hutu' in 1994 (Des Forges 1999: 73) was done by depicting Tutsi as foreigners not belonging to Rwanda (Uvin 1997: 93) and denying them even the legitimate right to live in Rwanda. In doing so, the different ethnic origin of Tutsi was emphasised by pointing to the ostensible origin of Tutsi in Ethiopia (Des Forges 1999: 34; Strizek 2006: 74). This clearly reveals the relevance of the notion of ethnicity (a category that is defined by common descent) (see 5.3) for making inclusion and exclusion plausible and legitimate.

Legitimate inclusion and exclusion depend on the national self-concept. However, the example shows that ethnicised politics constitute an important resource for accomplishing and legitimising political ends (Büschges and Pfaff-Czarnecka 2007b: 8). In this sense, ethnicised politics and politicised ethnicity have the power to influence "the distribution, maintenance, or transfer of power" (Weber 2004: 33) of a given form of political representation and organisation, and they are political.

Exclusion interpreted based on ethnic categories not coinciding with the nation state questions the given political representation and organisation (and the implied given inclusion and exclusion). Hence, exclusion along ethnic categories is potentially 'conflict-prone' in that the given political representation and organisation is challenged based on notions that are taken for granted and, thus, powerful.

Having said this, ethnicised politics challenge the given political organisation and representation within the modern nation state and, hence, are political

and potentially conflict-prone.[8] This argument corresponds to the largely accepted assumption that exclusion along ethnic categories (not coinciding with the nation state, of course) increases the propensity of further violent ethnic conflict (Brass 1985; Gurr 1993; Gurr 2002; Hechter 1999; Hechter 2004; Horowitz 1985; Snyder 2000; Wimmer 1997; Wimmer 2002). These assumptions are also reflected in analyses explaining mass violence in Rwanda and Burundi (Byanafashe 2003; Lemarchand 2004; Lemarchand 2006c; Ndikumana 1998; Uvin 1998).

In order to highlight the relevance of the notion of the modern nation state implying certain ideas of social justice for the present line of reasoning, I use the term 'recognition'. Following Nancy Fraser (2003), the term 'recognition' captures notions and claims that refer to and are based on the current idea of social justice. Conversely, to clarify this point, 'misrecognition' is understood as a violation of justice (Fraser 2003: 33). These ideas of social justice, including the central principles of equality and likeness already mentioned above, are related to the idea of the modern nation state. Hence, the term 'recognition' is crucial to presenting the line of reasoning in that it places emphasis on the idea of the modern nation state.

Having roughly clarified the analytical approach to salience of ethnicity in politics and its conflict propensity, the question remains, how, exactly, does the 'dilemma of recognition' appear? Explaining ethnic conflict against the backdrop of the idea of the modern nation state, ethnicised politics and politicised ethnicity become crucial concepts in order to prevent further violent ethnic conflict. This leads back to the 'institutional engineering'-debate introduced at the very beginning that my analysis aims to contribute to. This debate, in turn, aims at developing:

> rules of the game structuring political competition so that actors have *in-built incentives* to accommodate the interests of different cultural groups, leading to *conflict management, ethnic cooperation and long-term political stability* (Norris 2002: 206, emphasis added).

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8 I do not assume a direct relation between ethnicised politics and violent ethnic conflict. The discussion analysing political salience of ethnic cleavages, which leads to instable democracy and "ethnic political conflict" (Rabushka and Shepsle 1971: 461), refers mostly to non-Western, post-imperial societies still in the process of nation state building (Wimmer 1997) and democratisation (Snyder 2000). I focus on societies, in which the political history (including large-scale massacres) is ethnicised in that it is interpreted by heavy reference to ethnic categories. In general poverty and economic underdevelopment as well as lack of democracy (e.g., political and civil rights, mechanism for the peaceful adjudication of disputes) (Sambanis 2001: 266/7) play a major role for the propensity of further violent ethnic conflict. For assessing the propensity of violent ethnic conflict all these criteria are to be taken into account.

Hence, conflict management and political stability are assumed to be reached by 'rules of the games', hence, political institutions. In principle, following the ideas of 'institutionalism' institutions are assumed to have *in-built* incentives shaping social action (Hasse and Krücken 1999; Schneiberg and Clemens 2006) – more precisely, leading to conflict management and political stability.

Two different concepts currently dominate the 'institutional engineering'-debate. The model of consociationalism introduced in 1967 by Arendt Lijphardt and Gerhardt Lehmbruch, on the one hand, implies the representation of ethnic and ideological cleavages in the political institutions. In contrast, the model of majoritarian liberal democracies, on the other hand, is based on the political representation of individuals and their (allegedly individual) interests (Phillips 1996: 141; Van den Berghe 2002: 436). Since the analysis clearly focuses on the aspect of ethnicised politics and its conflict propensity, I chose labels that directly describe dealing with ethnic cleavages, referring to them as 'denial of' (De Zwart 2005) and 'power sharing along' (Lijphart 1979: 500) ethnic cleavages. The discussion about divided societies and the institutional effects on them assumes a direct relationship between institutions, incentives inherent to them, and social actions (Barnes 2001; Congleton 2000; Horowitz 1998; Mozaffar 1995).

In contrast, it is to be emphasised again that following Berger and Luckmann (1991), I conceive of institutions as 'experienced reality', which is to be analysed based on the historically produced knowledge of 'those living in that world'. Thus, "the analysis of […] knowledge will be essential for the analysis of the institutional order" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 82).

In respect to the analysis of ethnicised politics and the aim (due to its conflict propensity) to overcome ethnicised politics, this notion of institution leads to interesting considerations: First, based on a similar (historically produced) knowledge, the two opposing political institutional models might be experienced in a similar way. Second, based on diverging (historically produced) knowledge in any of the two countries, any of the two political institutional models might be experienced in ethnicised yet diverging ways. Due to the conflict propensity of ethnicised politics, I place emphasis on interpretations of social and political exclusion based on ethnic categories. Showing how politics are ethnicised in the model denying ethnic cleavages as well as in the one sharing power along ethnic cleavages, on the one hand, as well as how the question of 'Which 'ethnic group' is excluded?' is answered in ethnicised yet different terms, on the other hand, makes the 'dilemma of recognition' apparent.

For illustrating the 'dilemma of recognition' Rwanda and Burundi seem particularly suitable. René Lemarchand (2006a: 4) asserts that "no other two states in the [*African*, author's note] continent are more alike in their ethnic

map". More precisely, both are assumed to be composed of 85 per cent Hutu, 14 per cent Tutsi, and 1 per cent Twa.[9] Even more importantly, ethnicised politics are especially strong in both countries due to a political history that is interpreted based on ethnic categories, namely Hutu and Tutsi: Political and social exclusion and even massacres and violent conflict are seen to have been aligned along ethnic cleavages (Lemarchand 2006c: 35). The climax of these violent conflicts was reached in Rwanda with the genocide of Tutsi in 1994 and the preceding war from 1990-94, and in Burundi with the systematic killings of Hutu in 1972 and the Tutsi pogroms of 1993. The ambitions to overcome ethnicised politics are the aftermath of these very violent and cruel massacres.

Accordingly, both of the two countries I focus on, Rwanda and Burundi, aim at overcoming ethnicised politics. The Burundian constitution prohibits the exclusion of any Burundian due to his ethnic affiliation (Article 13, Burundian Constitution), while the Rwandan constitution states that all Rwandans are "free and equal in rights and duties", which includes the non-discrimination of Rwandans on the basis of their ethnic origin (Article 11, Rwandan Constitution). Aiming at overcoming ethnicised politics, both the countries opted for opposing political institutional models.

Rwanda introduced a system that I call 'denial of' ethnic cleavages, and Burundi opted for a system I call 'power sharing along' ethnic cleavages: Agreements in Arusha (2000) and in Pretoria (2004) led to an officially elected Burundian government in 2005. The constitution (also approved in 2005) provides ethnic quotas of 40 per cent Tutsi and 60 per cent Hutu in the government, the legislation, and the administration, as well as quotas of 50: 50 in the military (Reyntjens 2006a). In contrast, in Rwanda after the military victory of the FPR (Front Patriotique Rwandais)[10] in 1994, the decision was taken to avoid any ethnic representation in the political institutions; "the existence of separate ethnic identities is officially denied" (Lemarchand 2006b: 7). Laws were even passed in order to ban the reference to ethnic categories in the political and public discourse (Lemarchand 2006b: 7). Susanne Buckley-Zistel (2006a: 102) speaks about a "form of *de-ethnicisation*".

The empirical background just given, allows an enhanced understanding of what I conceive of as a 'dilemma of recognition'. Ethnicised politics, understood as exclusion along ethnic cleavages, are assumed to be potentially con-

9 The percentages are based on a population census conducted during colonial times (Lemarchand 1994a: 6).

10 The former military organisation and today's ruling party in Rwanda is often also referred to as RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front), since originating in Uganda it is (until now) rather Anglophone than Francophone. Yet, due to the predominance of French denominations in the political party system in Rwandan and in Burundian, I use the French names.

flict-prone. Consequently, Rwanda and Burundi aim at overcoming ethnicised politics. For this purpose, they opted for different political institutional models, namely 'denial of' and 'power sharing along' ethnic cleavages. Focusing on the knowledge of 'those living in that world', I illustrate based on qualitative interviews, conducted from September 2007 to May 2008, how Rwandans and Burundians – given two opposing political institutional models pursuing the same aim – interpret political and social exclusion based on ethnic categories (i.e., Hutu and Tutsi). Moreover, I illustrate diverging knowledge (hence, diverging realities) of ethnicised politics. More precisely, based on ethnic categories the question of 'Which 'ethnic group' ('the Hutu' or 'the Tutsi') is excluded?' is interpreted in different, even somewhat opposing manners. Given the conflict propensity of ethnicised politics, I assume this to constitute a dilemma, which the 'institutional engineering'-debate faces, when opting between 'denial of' and 'power sharing along' ethnic cleavages.

In doing so, I argue that the institutional (re)organisation in both states is challenged by a 'dilemma of recognition'. Both forms of dealing with ethnic cleavages – that is, 'denial' in Rwanda as well as 'power sharing' in Burundi – are subject to ethnic interpretations of social and political exclusion (ethnicised politics). Put differently, the project reveals how Rwandans and Burundians experience social and political exclusion along ethnic categories. Unlike very important and prominent analyses (Byanafashe 2003; Lemarchand 2004; Lemarchand 2006b; Lemarchand 2006c; Ndikumana 1998; Uvin 1998), I do not give an answer to the question of who, either 'the Hutu' or 'the Tutsi', is socially and politically excluded in Rwanda and Burundi. If anything, I intend to challenge the ethnic categories, on which these analyses are based.

In summary, my argument goes that societies with a heavily ethnicised political history, where political and social exclusion is interpreted based on ethnic categories, are confronted with a 'dilemma of recognition'. As the cases of Rwanda and Burundi are meant to show neither 'denial of' nor 'power sharing along' ethnic cleavages can prevent ethnicised politics.

2 The Cases: Rwanda and Burundi

> Once described as 'the false twins', Rwanda and Burundi have travelled along radically divergent paths in dealing with ethnic conflict. No other two states in the continent are more alike in their ethnic map, and none are more unlike each other from the standpoint of their emergent polities after a decade of bitter civil strife (Burundi) and one of the most appalling bloodbaths of the last century (Rwanda) (Lemarchand 2006b: 4).

Although Rwanda and Burundi might be adequately described as "*false* twins", (Lemarchand 2006c: 4, emphasis added) they share similarities in terms of the "ethnic map" (Lemarchand 2006c: 4) and the very violent conflicts in post-independence political history that in both cases evolved along ethnic cleavages. The two countries opted for different political institutional models to overcome these cleavages (Vandeginste 2006: 27). While Rwanda introduced a political system that I label as 'denial of' ethnic cleavages, Burundi opted for a system called 'power sharing along' ethnic cleavages.[11] In this respect the two countries are, as René Lemarchand (2006b: 4) puts it, most "unlike each other from the standpoint of their emergent polities". Intending to contribute to the 'institutional engineering'-debate about which of the two models is appropriate to overcome ethnic cleavages and reach a stable and peaceful society (see 4.2), I selected these two countries.

More precisely, I chose Rwanda and Burundi as empirical cases in order to learn more about ethnicised politics in different political institutional models. Therefore, I illustrate an ethnic interpretation of politics and political power, namely ethnicised politics, in both political institutional models by means of qualitative interviews with Rwandans and Burundians. In doing so, I introduce a new concept of institution into the 'institutional engineering'-debate opposing the one that predominates currently. According to Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, institutions are to be analysed against the background of the historical processes that produced them (see 4.3). Having clarified this, it is the ethnic

11 Within the 'institutional engineering'-debate the two systems are referred to as consociational or majoritarian democracy. Since my analysis clearly focuses on ethnicised politics and its conflict propensity, I chose labels that directly describe the dealing with ethnic cleavages.

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interpretation of political history in Rwanda and Burundi that constitutes the starting point of my analysis.

Therefore, the present chapter aims at introducing three aspects of Rwanda and Burundi that are crucial to grasp the subsequent line of reasoning. Each aspect helps to ensure a basic understanding of the two cases and the academic debate surrounding them. In addition, the following depictions point to aspects that are central within the scope of further analysis.

In the framework of my analysis that focuses on ethnicised politics, I approach the theoretical knowledge concerning ethnicity and ethnic conflict (see 5) as well as the one of 'those living in that world' regarding ethnicity (see 8). However, to begin, I describe the predominant perspectives in the academic debate on ethnicity and ethnic conflict in Rwanda and Burundi (2.1). Two perspectives prevail in the general discussion and specifically about Rwanda and Burundi: essentialism (or primordialism) and social constructivism.[12] Yet, a clear predominance of the social constructivist understanding can be observed.[13] This social constructivist line of reasoning refers partly to a specific understanding of Hutu and Tutsi (and Twa)[14] as sharing the same language, beliefs and customs. In doing so, not only ethnic categories in other contexts (outside Rwanda and Burundi) are essentialised but, based on this understanding, the ethnic categories often are conceived of as not real, invented and, therefore negligible. This specific line of reasoning as well as some main ideas about the ethnic categories is necessary to understand the interpretations of Rwandans and Burundians and their relevance for academic discussion.

Since the political post-independence histories of both countries are interrelated (especially when focusing on their ethnic interpretation), they are discussed jointly in the second section (2.2), where it becomes clear that although we might want to, it is very difficult to escape an ethnic interpretation of the political history of independent Rwanda and Burundi. Political and social exclu-

12 Constructivism does include very different approaches to ethnic categories (see Fearon and Laitin 2000: 850). In this respect, I refer to an approach that highlights either the invented or the instrumentalist aspects of ethnic categories and the aspects of choice and flexibility. On the contrary, other constructivist approaches (including my own line of reasoning (see 5.3)) "locates the action at a level of supra-individual things like discursive formations or symbolic or cultural systems that have their own logic or agency" (Fearon and Laitin 2000: 851). Accordingly, the present analysis does not focus on the flexible and situational aspects of ethnic categories.

13 That is why I refer to the debate in the media to illustrate an essentialist understanding of these categories despite my intention to depict the academic discussion. The essentialist understanding is hardly represented in the academic discussion. Nonetheless, the social constructivist academic debate refers to it to define its own approach.

14 My analysis focuses on the ethnic cleavage between Hutu and Tutsi. In both countries, Twa have been politically and socially neglected. Therefore, this category barely plays a role for the interpretation of the political history of the two countries.

sion is oriented along ethnic categories, and these ethnicised politics are referred to predominantly to explain the (violent) political histories. The interpretation of Rwandans and Burundians, i.e., their knowledge, is assumed to be historically influenced (see 4.3). Therefore the ethnicised political history was relevant for the selection of the two countries as cases for my analysis. Put differently, the selection of the two countries is based mainly on the ethnic interpretation of political post-independence history.

The third section discusses the second reason why the two countries have been selected: opposing political institutional models in Rwanda and Burundi that officially have the same intention to overcome ethnicised politics (2.3). Rwanda is described as a system of 'denial of' ethnic cleavages (2.3.1) and Burundi as a system of 'power sharing along' ethnic cleavages (2.3.2). Interestingly, in former times the two countries opted for the respective opposite system (i.e., Rwanda had quotas until 1994 and Burundi banned ethnic cleavages from political institutions and discourse until 1993). Since exclusion along ethnic cleavages, or ethnicised politics, is assumed to be influenced not only by the political institutional system but also by the democratic practice, the question of democracy in both countries and the related assessments (of some prominent academics) concerning exclusion in both political institutional models are discussed briefly. However, these assessments and the question about democracy in Rwanda and Burundi already touch the core issue of the work at hand, i.e., ethnicised politics, which I discuss based on the knowledge of 'those living in that world'. Correspondingly, these issues are not conclusively discussed in the following sections.

2.1 Approach to Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict in Rwanda and Burundi

According to Peter Uvin (1999: 254), the "outside specialists of the region" do not agree on the nature of the differentiation between Hutu, Tutsi and Twa. Whether "they are distinct ethnic groups, even races [...] displaying major physical differences and historical origins" or "socioeconomic groups, akin to castes, or even classes" is debated. The question about the role of the colonial powers (also not conclusively discussed) is therefore related:

> Did colonization, first by Germany and then by Belgium, create ethnicity *ex nihilo*, turning socioeconomic stratification into essentialised ethnicity? Or did it simply codify an already highly unequal and differentiated relationship between Tutsi and Hutu (Uvin 1999: 254)?

It may be right to assert that there is "no scholarly consensus" to these questions, as Uvin puts it. Nonetheless, between the two perspectives I observe a clear dominance of the so-called social constructivist perspective in the aca-

demic, socio-scientific field highlighting the changing character and, therefore the influence of the colonial powers and underlying socio-economic distinctions (elsewhere Uvin equally describes the dominance of this thinking (see Uvin 1997: 93)). However, there is no doubt that the primordial thinking and writing about ethnicity and ethnic conflict in Rwanda and Burundi was not uncommon until the 1970s and lasts until today, especially within the media's coverage of the conflicts.[15] Therefore, social constructivist arguments have come a long way. Currently, a constructivist perspective dominates the academic discussion about Hutu, Tutsi and Twa.

The following description is first and foremost meant to introduce the reader – not necessarily very familiar with the region – to the two predominant perspectives on Hutu and Tutsi (and Twa) in the academic discussion. Moreover, as it will become clear within the general discussion about ethnicity (see 5) analytical problems are related to a specific social constructivist argument that refers to an essentialist understanding to define one's own approach. Due to a specific understanding of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa sharing the same language, belief and customs the reference to presumably objective criteria, i.e., essentialist lines of reasoning, in order to depict these ethnic categories as socially constructed is especially strong.

Essentialist Thinking about Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict in the Discussion about Hutu and Tutsi

Influenced by the general thinking about ethnicity, the debate about ethnicity in Rwanda and Burundi has not always been as clearly dominated by a social constructivist perspective as it is today. While the Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa were predominantly thought of as static in the 1960s, the thinking in the 1970s and 1980s evolved toward a concept that focused on the polyvalent meanings of these categories (Eltringham 2004: 13). For example, Lemarchand, currently a resolute proponent of the social constructivist perspective (see Lemarchand 1994a), conceived Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa in Burundi as “three separate racial entities” in 1966 and described them as follows:

> The Tutsi, who constitute approximately 15 per cent of the total population, distinguish themselves from the other groups by special physical and cultural characteristics. Of Hamitic origins, generally tall and tubular, they share the way of other pastoralist tribes associated with the so-called complex-cattle culture. By contrast and according to the usual

15 The books *Invention of Tradition* by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger and *Imagined Communities* by Benedict Anderson, both first published in 1983, and their consequent discussion constitute a clear turning point (see 5.2).

> stereotype, the Hutu, who represent about 80 per cent of the population, are short and stocky, and are primarily engaged in agricultural activities (Lemarchand 1966: 404/5).

This definition based on physical differences and, in particular, mentioning the 'Hamitic origin' clearly points to a biological and essentialist understanding of Hutu and Tutsi. A biological conception emphasises their persistent (not socially influenced and constructed) character. Nearly thirty years later, however, Lemarchand (1994b: 588) states that a consideration of Hutu and Tutsi as "immutable givens" can only lead to misinterpretation and confusion.

This essentialist perspective on Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa that stresses specific physical attributes and relates them inherently to specific occupations such as pastoralism, horticulture and hunting, has been very common among "European observers" (Newbury 2001: 258). This understanding not only largely reflects the intellectual atmosphere of Europe particularly in the 1920s, but also has been introduced by Briton John Speke and dispersed by the German Hans Meyer (Des Forges 1999: 36; Rutembesa 2004: 132; Strizek 2006: 31). Accordingly, the same focuses of observation, images and judgments prevail within the colonial descriptions of the Rwanda and Burundian population, such as of the physical beauty (Rutembesa 2004: 132).

As first quote of Lemarchand illustrates, the notion of racial entities in Rwanda and Burundi has been and is commonly related to the 'Hamitic hypothesis' stating that Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa are "the local representatives of three major population groups, the Ethiopid, Bantu and Pygmoid" (Des Forges 1999: 36). Twa are believed to be the indigenous residents that lived in the area before the Hutu arrived. Tutsi supposedly arrived last, descending from the north using "their superior political and military abilities to conquer the far more numerous but less intelligent Hutu" (Des Forges 1999: 36). Not aiming to evaluate the validity of the Hamitic thesis, the present argument focuses on its political implications. The Hamitic thesis is itself a racial model explaining the history of the region (Rutembesa 2004: 134). During the uprisings in 1959 in Rwanda, partly referred to as the 'Hutu revolution'[16] Tutsi were labelled as an "alien group of questionable legitimacy" (Young 2006: 309). In 1988 an article in *Jeune Afrique* still described the pre-colonial relationship between Hutu and Tutsi in the following way:

> Les Tutsi, Nilo-Hamitiques issus des hauts plateaux de l'est africain, éleveurs arrivés entre le XVe et le XVIIIe siècle, régnaient en maîtres absolus sur les Hutu, d'origine bantoue, agriculteurs sédentaires, plus anciennement établis dans la région (Biloa as cited in: Chrétien 1997: 12).

16 Whereas some Rwandans call the events in 1959 a social revolution, others see it as the "overture of the later genocide" (Young 2006: 310).

Hutu and Tutsi are respectively categorised as ‘Nilo-Hamitique’ and ‘Bantu’, stemming from different racial origins. The propagandists during and before the genocide in 1994 built on the idea that Hutu and Tutsi are representatives of the Bantus and Nilo-Hamitics and that the Tutsi as “Nilotics” do not have a right to live in Central Africa (Des Forges 1999: 74; Strizek 2006: 34). In this vein, Léon Mugesera, the vice-chairman for Gisenyi prefecture of the ruling MRND (Mouvement Républicain National pour le Développement) at the time, who was later trialed as one of the main instigators of the 1994 genocide, said in a speech in November 1992 at an MRND meeting: “I am telling you that your home is in Ethiopia, that we are going to send you back there quickly, by the Nyabarongo” (Des Forges 1999: 85). The subtext of the message was more cruel, since it called for assassinating ‘the Tutsi’. Their bodies were supposed to be thrown in the Nyabarongo and Akagera rivers that presumably lead through the Nile to Ethiopia (Des Forges 1999: 85; Pottier 2002: 9).

However, even after the genocide, the extension of Bantu (read Hutu) control and the elimination of the ‘Hamitic race’ (read Tutsi) remain a strong political issue in the Great Lakes Region (Hintjens 1999: 249). Tutsi are seen as foreigners who for centuries implemented a system of oppression (Uvin 1997: 93). Despite the genocidal propaganda in Rwanda referring to the Hamitic thesis, this same idea about the different origins of Hutu and Tutsi is still repeated today, albeit in a less inciting manner. Acknowledged experts of the region write, “Yes, our feeling is that the Tutsi have come from outside the area of the Great Lakes and that it is possible they were initially of a distinct racial stock” (Prunier 1995: 16).[17]

When it comes to understanding ethnic conflicts, descriptions in politics and the media (re)produce clear primordial pictures evoking the idea of tribal resentments as the source of violence and conflict, especially in Rwanda (Des Forges 1999: 20; Pottier 2002: 9). The media were so blinded by their categorical ethnic reading of the situation in 1994 in Rwanda (apparently assuming ethnic affiliation as the only decisive criteria) that Reuters, for instance, labelled one of the first prominent victims, Prime Minister Agathe Uwilingiyimana, as Tutsi, although she was Hutu (Reyntjens 1996: 247). The violent crises in 1988 in Ntega-Maraganra in northeast Burundi have been described in the media as a “combat ancestral” between “esclaves et seigneurs“, “les courts et les longs” or

17 Remarkably, the Burundi information web page of the German Department of Foreign Affairs describes Hutu as traditional Bantu farmers and Tutsi as Nilotes who later immigrated from northeast Africa and traditionally traders and stock farmers (AA 2010). Original text: “Ethnische Zusammensetzung: Hutu (traditionell Bantu-Bauern) über 85%; Tutsi (später als Hirten aus dem Nordosten Afrikas zugewanderte Niloten, traditionell Viehzüchter und Händler): 10-14 %.”

"les peuples aussi différents que les Finnois et les Siciliens" (Chrétien 1997: 11).[18]

Therefore, ethnic affiliation and traditionally persistent hatred between ethnic groups, it is suggested, are the main factors for explaining violence in Rwanda and Burundi. The differences regarding the physical appearance are stressed and Hutu and Tutsi are conceived of as different people.

In this vein, stressing essentialistically understood differences, *Le Monde* described the Angolan and Zimbabwean military intervention in 1998 in the war between the DRC and Rwanda/Uganda on the Congolese side as "une alliance bantoue dirigée contre les régimes tutsi au pouvoir en Ouganda, au Rwanda et au Burundi" (Chrétien and Prunier 2003: V). A putative antagonism between Bantu ('the Hutu' also are assumed to be part of) and Tutsi (seen as Hima) is invoked to explain the armed hostilities in the DRC in 1998. Although the statement does not refer directly to antagonism between Hutu and Tutsi, it assumes an almost natural antagonism between Bantu and Tutsis, reproducing implicitly the idea of the Hamitic thesis and the idea of an antagonism between Hutu and Tutsi.

In conclusion, conceiving of Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa in an essentialist way implies that these categories are biologically defined. Therefore, physical appearance and other criteria are understood as being intrinsically related to these categories. Within the scope of this understanding, the Hamitic thesis highlighting the different (racial) origins of Hutu and Tutsi plays an important role. This thesis has larger implications because it is also used to interpret violent conflict in the region and ensuing cross-regional intervention. Generally, essentialist thinking depicts the violence as a traditional antagonism between essentially defined, physically different groups. While an essentialist understanding has not been uncommon until the 1970s in the academic debate, essentialist ideas are still reproduced in the media and politics. Therefore, the non-essentialist, social constructivist perspective on ethnicity and ethnic conflict in Rwanda and Burundi has come a long way, but has not yet reached all the people thinking and writing about those issues.

Constructivist Thinking about Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict in Rwanda and Burundi

The social constructivist perspective currently dominates the thinking about ethnicity, namely Tutsi, Hutu, and Twa in Rwanda and Burundi. To underpin the socially constructed, fluid and changeable character of these categories,

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18 Those depictions have been used in *The Washington Post* (21 August), *The Economist* (27 August) and *Le Monde* (20 August).

many of the lines of reasoning refer to the lack of linguistic differences and visibly distinct features as well as common intermarriages in Rwanda and Burundi:

> The literature pointing out that ethnic groups are a social construction has a particular salience in discussion of identity in both East and Central Africa. As numerous authors have noted, there are in fact few linguistic, phenotypical, or social differences between Hutu and Tutsi. Indeed, as all acknowledge, there has been substantial intermarriages, particularly in Rwanda (Waters 1995: 343).

As highlighted in the discussion about the categories Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa, the population of Rwanda and Burundi speaks one language and no major cultural differences are remarkable along these categories (Chrétien 1997: 13; Lemarchand 1994b: 588). That Hutu and Tutsi used to marry each other and still do it today, especially in rural areas, is a regularly mentioned aspect (Scherrer 2002: 18; Waters 1995: 343). The German and Belgian colonial powers have played a major role in strengthening the ethnic categorisation by allocating the Rwandans and Burundians to fixed categories of Hutu and Tutsi, which were then recorded in writing (Chrétien 2000; Scherrer 2002: 21; Young 2006: 309). In the pre-colonial era, the preceding categories were understood as fluid and flexible as well as conceivable only in relation to each other (Eltringham 2004: 14; Hintjens 1999: 250). The actual academic discussion about ethnicity in Rwanda and Burundi commonly acknowledges that the categories Hutu and Tutsi (and Twa) have not always had ethnic connotations (Lemarchand 1994a; Chrétien 1997: 13; Kadende-Kaiser and Kaiser 1997; Newbury 2001; Young 2006: 308).

Often the argument goes that the current predominating notion of the social categories of Hutu and Tutsi does not correspond to presumably objective markers (such as language, culture, and physical appearance) of 'ethnic groups'. As Christian Scherrer (2002: 25) puts it: "The crucial determining criteria for an ethnic group are lacking." Therefore, Hutu and Tutsi (and Twa) often are not considered to be 'ethnic groups' (see Chrétien and Prunier 2003: V; Scherrer 2002: 26), but are often thought as historically and socially constructed, unlike other 'ethnic groups' or categories such as clans. It is presumed that since the objective criteria, e.g., different languages and cultures, are not fulfilled, Hutu and Tutsi are not really ethnic (Hofmeier 2005: 2). Like the quote at the beginning, the following example demonstrates this line of reasoning common in the discussion about ethnicity in Rwanda and Burundi:

> From one viewpoint, Burundi offers a clear example of the constructivist perspective on ethnicity. Cultural homogeneity across the ethnic groups appears to challenge the degree to which they were historically mutually exclusive. Because the social categories known as Tutsi, Hutu and Twa shared a common culture, language and belief system, attributing

> primordial roots to the differences that are apparent today appears problematic (Daley 2006: 663).

This conception referring to objective ethnic criteria (being based on an essentialist understanding of ethnicity) such as language, intermarriage, and culture in order to deconstruct ethnicity in Rwandan and Burundi imply some analytical problems. Often the discussed notions of Hutu and Tutsi are not based on a general conception of social reality, but on the observation that those categories do not correspond to ethnic makers, such as language, culture etc. That not only promotes a primordial understanding of ethnicity (referring to contexts beyond Rwanda and Burundi), but also makes it more difficult to grasp an appropriate understanding of ethnicity in Rwanda and Burundi. As this argument refers to typically essentialist criteria such as language and customs, the ethnic categories of Hutu and Tutsi appear to be less ‘real’ than ethnic categories (complying with these criteria such as different language and customs) in other contexts:

> It is often stated that Hutu, Tutsi, and Twa are not, ‘in reality’, ethnic groups because they do not conform to the ‘conventional’ definition of such entities: they do not speak different languages, practice different religions, eat different foods, and reside in different territories (Eltringham 2004: 6).

The idea persists that ethnicity in Rwanda and Burundi is ‘invented’ and deniable, since no assumed objective criteria are compiled. “If ethnicity [*in Rwanda*, author’s note] is an invention” – as Catharine Newbury and David Newbury (1999: 294) describe this way of reasoning – “then it can be abolished or ignored”.

Having clarified the latter, this argument might not grasp ethnicity in Rwanda and Burundi in an analytically appropriate way. Trying to avoid an essentialist perspective, persistent in media coverage, and referring to objective markers, the discussion attempts to conceive of ethnic categories as analytically negligible. Moreover, the academic discussion (referring to objective categories based on an essentialist understanding) promotes essentialist thinking about ethnicity (in Rwanda and Burundi or elsewhere), despite the intention to advocate the constructivist thinking.

Other academic observers argue that Hutu and Tutsi were once fluid identities. However, they highlight that they became rigid and essentialised identities in particular due the politics of the colonial and post-colonial time as well as the perpetrators of violence (Kadende-Kaiser and Kaiser 1997; Nimubona 2003). Or, as Newbury (1998b: 83) describes it for Rwanda:

> Here as elsewhere, ethnic identities are not rigid, unchanging, or universal categories. But neither are they entirely ephemeral, fluid, and individual; they are socially produced categories, not identities freely chosen.

This concept, arguing on a general understanding of reality that applies to different contexts and focuses on the actual, context-dependent understanding of ethnicity, is discussed in more detail in Chapter 5. It constitutes the theoretical basis for the analysis of the interviews (see 8).

The predominant discussion about ethnic conflict labelled as social constructivist perspective is based on the implicit argument that it takes into consideration reasons other than ethnicity to explain recurring violence in Rwanda and Burundi. Often the subject of academic debate, the causes of the genocide in 1994 in Rwanda have been analysed in depth. They include unquestionable obedience to authority, material interests, overpopulation, and economic pressure due to the drop in coffee prices, outside pressure for democratisation and the reactions of the elites trying to hold onto power (Hintjens 1999; Newbury 1998b; Prunier 1995: 353; Uvin 1999). In addition, the report of the 'Commission Nationale pour l'Unité et la Réconciliation' about *Le Conflit Rwandais* by Anastase Shyaka identifies the legacies of the colonial time, including the Hamitic thesis and practice of 'divide and rule' as generating factors of the genocide (Shyaka n.s.).

Within the scope of the causes and underlying factors of recurring violence in Burundi, social and economic inequality across 'ethnic groups' and regions and discrimination (Ndikumana 2000; Strizek 1998) as well as the attempt of the elites to hold onto power (Ndikumana 1998; Uvin 1999) are identified. With respect to both countries, ethnicised politics, namely exclusion along ethnic lines are predominantly discussed as explaining factors of the violent crisis (Byanafashe 2003) (see 2.2).

Analyses of the violent conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi often refer to a primordial understanding that is particularly strong in the media's coverage of the violence as "'ethnic' or 'tribal' warfare" (Reyntjens 1996: 246). In doing so, this line of reasoning conceives of the conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi as non-ethnic. Filip Reyntjens (1996: 244), for example, describes the genocide in 1994 as not "ethnic but rather political". Similarly, Newbury (1998b: 76/77), analysing the violent conflicts in Rwandan history, asserts: "When fighting did occur, it did so because the antagonists were in competing dynasties, not because they were from different ethnic groups, these were political conflicts not ethnic conflicts." Likewise the Rwandan genocide is described as different from "the result of spontaneous fighting between [...] two ethnic groups" (Hintjens 1999: 247). In this vein, Leonce Ndikumana (2000: 431) describes "the causes of violence in Burundi" as going "beyond the alleged 'age-old' animosities between the Hutu and the Tutsi". Floribert Ngaruko and Janvier Nkuruziza (2005: 56) argue that "If the motivations of the different combatants go beyond ethnicity, these wars [*in Burundi*, author's note] are not fundamentally ethnic". Their

argument addresses the “ethnic hatred explanation” (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2005: 56).

These discussions define violent conflict in Rwanda and Burundi as non-ethnic by contrasting their concepts with a clearly primordial one. In this sense, non-ethnic violence means that it is not induced by the simple existence of ethnic groups, or by traditional hatred between them. The problem is that this line of reasoning misses the ethnic connotation of the violent conflicts in Rwanda and Burundi.

Trying to grasp the ethnic dimensions of violence, however, is all the more important, because simply rejecting a primordial view without trying to capture the ethnic dimension of violent conflicts might lead to an essentialist way of arguing when ethnic aspects come into play. An extreme example is when John Mueller (2000: 42) delineates his own approach to ethnic conflict through a concept that implies “a war all against all and neighbor against neighbor” and “ancient hatred”. He describes the 1994 genocide in Rwanda “when ethnic Hutus engaged in genocidal massacres of ethnic Tutsis” (Mueller 2000: 43) as follows: “In recent history that is probably the instance in which the Hobbesian all-against-all and neighbour-against-neighbor idea of ethnic warfare is most likely to hold” (Mueller 2000: 43). Since approximately 800,000 people were murdered in a very short period of time, according to Mueller (2000: 59), the Rwandan genocide comes close to a war of “all-against-all”. Getting back to the very essentialist concept of ethnic war to depict the Rwanda killings in 1994, Mueller – although that is not his intention – evokes an even more essentialist picture of the Rwandan genocide.

Currently, both the notion of Hutu and Tutsi (and Twa) and recurrent violent conflict defining these categories is influenced predominantly by a social constructivist understanding. The adoption of a social constructivist perspective often rejects and deconstructs a clear essentialist understanding. This is done either by focusing on reasons that do not correspond to essentialist concepts of ethnic or tribal warfare or by referring to essentialist, objective criteria meant to define ethnicity. This reference is especially strong in the discussion about the categories of Hutu and Tutsi since they do not correspond to objective criteria (e.g., language, customs, and belief). This notion of ethnicity and conflict implies two main problems: first, the essentialisation of ethnicity and ethnic conflict as general concepts (for contexts beyond Rwanda and Burundi); and second, the simple rejection of ethnic aspects that hampers a proper understanding and analytical conception of ethnic conflict and ethnicity in Rwanda and Burundi. These problems also are reflected in the general discussion (see 5.2). Furthermore, this section was meant to ensure the reader’s understanding for the

specific lines of reasoning discussed by the interviewees, which are based on the specific understanding of the categories Hutu and Tutsi (see 8).

2.2 Ethnicised Post-Independence Political History in Rwanda and Burundi

Focusing on political institutions and conceiving of them as constituted by the historically influenced knowledge of the members of the institutional order, the interpretation of political post-independence[19] history in Rwanda and Burundi is (besides the opposing political institutional models they opted for) one main starting point of my analysis. In doing so, I refer to the political history from political independence in Rwanda and Burundi in 1962 to the large-scale massacres in Burundi in 1993 and Rwanda in 1994.[20] The present section aims to illustrate the academic interpretations that refer to ethnic categories, namely Hutu and Tutsi, and to political and social exclusion along these lines in order to explain the post-independence political history of Rwanda and Burundi. Based on this interpretation and the assumption that it is reflected in the knowledge of 'those living in that world' I chose to focus on ethnicised politics, i.e., political and social exclusion interpreted in ethnic terms (see 6.2) in the analysis of the interviews.

To begin, Lemarchand, an expert of the region, provides an overview of the two countries' post-independence history, stressing the importance of political exclusion along ethnic categories:

> The theme of exclusion runs like a red skin through the history of the Great Lakes. It lies at the heart of the 1959-1962 Hutu revolution in Rwanda; thirty years later it served as the propelling force behind the 1990 invasion of Rwanda by the Rwanda Patriotic Front (RPF). Barely concealed by the ban of the ethnic labels, ethnic discrimination has since emerged as the hallmark of the Kagame regime, to an extent unprecedented in the history of Rwanda. Burundi is another case in point: political exclusion is the obvious explanation behind the Hutu insurrection of 1972, in turn leading to the first genocide recorded in the annals of the Great Lakes region (Lemarchand 2006c: 34/5).

Social and political exclusion along ethnic cleavages, i.e., ethnicised politics, is a common explanation for political post-independence history. Violence and conflict is explained in relation to ethnic exclusion, which is always political

19 This is not to disclaim the influence that the colonial period had on the post-independence history, most obviously regarding the codification of ethnic differences and the ethnicised politics by the applied practice of divide and rule. The strong interrelation of the two countries originated in the colonial period. The former two kingdoms of Rwanda and Urundi were integrated into one administrative unity, Rwanda-Urundi, when after World War I the German colonial power was to hand over power to the Belgians, who administered the two kingdoms on behalf of the League of Nations and the United Nations after 1947 (Strizek 2006: 153-160).

20 For the political history from 1994 to date, see 2.3.

(Lemarchand 2004: 62) (see 6.3). Likewise, referring to the politically charged terms of "minority" and "majority" to depict historical power configurations in Rwanda and Burundi and equating ethnicity to political majority is very common in academic discussion (see Lemarchand 1994a: xiv; Ndikumana 1998: 30; Prunier 1995: 60; Scherrer 2002: 37). These depictions are based on an 'ethnic map' assumed in both countries to be composed of Hutu (approximately 85 per cent), Tutsi (approximately 14 per cent) and Twa (approximately 1 per cent).[21] Although not mandatory and explicitly describing exclusion, it is always implied in the terms of minority and majority.

In the following, I illustrate the academic discussion about the political post-independence history of both countries that refers to ethnic categories. It will become apparent that it is difficult to interpret the political history in Rwanda and Burundi without considering ethnic categories and, hence, being political – most explicitly by referring to minority and majority. Focusing on the role of ethnic categories, the political post-independence history of those two countries are best to be understood in relation to each other (Lemarchand 1994b: 585). Most crucial for my analysis, the reference to social and political exclusion along ethnic categories is strong in the interpretation of political post-independence history in both countries:

The first two Rwandan republics (1964-1994) are described as having been built on "the ideology that political majority rule equals ethnic majority rule, implying that democracy mandated the empowerment of Hutu leaders and the exclusion of Tutsis from all positions of government" (ICG 2001: 3). Against the background of a colonial policy "equating Tutsi identity with ruling status" (Jones 1999: 57) and within the scope of the decolonising movement, "the Tutsi dominance" was used as "a focal point for generating political support" (Jones 1999: 57). In Rwanda the so-called "1959 social revolution" (ICG 2001: 3) overthrew the colonial balance of power and implemented a Hutu dominated regime under Grégoire Kayibanda, MDR (Mouvement Démocratique Républicain). Accordingly, the revolution is seen to have reversed power configurations previously dominated by 'the Tutsi':

> La révolution de 1959 était interprétée comme le renversement des anciens rapports de force et l'instauration d'un processus devant exclure les Tutsi du pouvoir qu'ils avaient monopolisé (Rutembesa 2004: 136).

This interpretation promoting the Hutu/Tutsi antagonism can be found within political documents of the time. The *Manifeste des Bahutu*, published on 24

21 The percentages are based on a census conducted during colonial times (Lemarchand 1994a: 6). They give the reader a rough idea about the proportions that explain, e.g., the lasting reference to 'minority' and 'majority.' The exact numbers are not essential for my argument.

March 1957, interprets the political situation (still under the colonial regime) as follows:

> Le problème est avant tout un problème de monopole dont dispose une race, le Matutsi; monopole politique qui, étant donné l'ensemble des structures actuelles devient un monopole économique et social; […] au grand désespoir des Bahutu qui se voient condamnés à rester d'éternels manœuvres subalternes (cited in: Byanafashe 2003: 103).

Highlighting the political and social dominance of the Tutsi over the Hutu, depicted as eternal subordinates, this assessment gains a specific political charge. The subsequent revolution did have violent and cruel consequences. From 1959 until 1962 approximately 10,000 Tutsi were massacred – Scherrer (2002: 37) speaks of approximately 14,000 in December 1963 and Newbury (1999: 16) speaks of approximately several thousand in 1964 after a attempted coup of Tutsi guerrillas – and more than 100,000[22] went into exile, most often to neighbouring Uganda (Jones 1999: 59/60; Ndikumana 1998: 34; Scherrer 2002: 37). The elections resulted in a government, which included only a small number of Tutsi in parliament and cabinet (Newbury 1998a: 16). According to International Crisis Group (2001: 3), the regime under Grégoire Kayibanda (which seized power after the revolution) pursued the systematic exclusion of Tutsi while explicitly claiming to implement the policies of "the 1959 social revolution". Scherrer (2002: 37) perceives the "policy of 'ethnic discrimination' against the Tutsi" at that time as comparable to the "colonial policy directed against the Hutu".

In Burundi the monarchy lasted until 1965 when a military coup brought a Tutsi dominated regime headed by Michel Micombero (1965-76) into power (Lemarchand 1994b: 583/4). Lemarchand (1994a: xiv) speaks about "the capture of the state by the Tutsi minority, followed by the more or less systematic exclusion of Hutu elements from all positions of power". Likewise, Scherrer (2002: 37) says in reference to this period of time: "[T]he Hutu majority [...] was scarcely represented in the military, and remained underrepresented in the political life." This exclusion induced an insurrection led by Hutu, which, in turn, was followed by a "'partial genocide' of Hutu" in 1972[23] (Lemarchand 2006b: 27) that took the lives of approximately 100,000 to 200,000 people (Lemarchand 1994a: xi). These events were influenced by the events of 1959-1962 in Rwanda, because they accentuated the ethnic cleavages and enforced "a nightmare vision of Hutu power" cultivated by the Tutsi elite (Lemarchand 2006b: 35; Ndikumana 1998: 34). Whereas "du côté Tutsi" the Rwandan model

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22 Gérard Prunier (1995: 62) speaks of more than 336,000 exiles until 1964.

23 Elsewhere Lemarchand (1998: 5) speaks of the massacres of Hutu lasting from April to November 1972 in Burundi as "forgotten genocide".

was feared, “les Hutu” were incited to recognise themselves as “peuple majoritaire” (Rutembesa 2004: 137). In the aftermath of the 1972 genocide in Burundi the discrimination against Hutu increased. “From then on, the Hutu were described as a ‘lost generation’ (Elias 1995), bound together in hatred for the dominant group” (Scherrer 2002: 37). The Hutu elite was excluded from political power and targeted by oppression; access to education, the military and administrative positions were reserved for Tutsi (Ndikumana 1998: 34). With strong reference to ethnic categories, Scherrer (1997: 37) compares the Burundian to the Rwandan situation: “In Rwanda, the same applied, but with the ethnic banners reversed.”

The killings “of Hutu carried out by the Tutsi minority” (Prunier 1995: 60) in 1972 in Burundi had a major impact on the political atmosphere in Rwanda; vigilant committees scrutinizing ethnic quotas in schools, the university and civil service were established. People were killed and emigration of Tutsi reoccurred (Prunier 1995: 60/1). Lemarchand (2006b: 40) speaks about “violent anti Tutsi pogroms”. Although Kayibanda intended to enforce and use this atmosphere to consolidate his power, Juvénal Habyarimana overthrew the regime of Kayibanda in 1973. The coup was induced by power struggles between the Hutu elite (ICG 2001: 3). He retained the quota policy[24] and the “ideological slogan of ‘rubanda nyamwinshi’ equating demographic with democratic rule” (Prunier 1995: 75) and, therefore, equating political with ethnic majority. Yet, daily life for Tutsi in Rwanda first improved under the regime of Habyarimana, under which they were left in peace as long they did not get politically involved (Prunier 1995: 76).

The 1972 killings in Burundi enforced an atmosphere of distrust and fear among Hutu and Tutsi, not only in Rwanda, but also obviously in Burundi. “This history of fear and distrust” (Ndikumana 2000: 434) among ‘the Hutu’ and ‘the Tutsi’ decisively influenced the ethnic crisis 1988 in Ngozi and Kirundo when the killings of Tutsi by Hutu were violently repressed by the military that killed mostly Hutu. Shortly afterward, a democratisation process in 1992 induced by the international community started culminating in multipartism in 1992 (Ndikumana 2000: 434). The first competitive presidential and parliamentary elections followed in June 1993, which Melchior Ndadaye and his party, FRODEBU (Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi) won. After Michel Micombero (1965-76); Jean-Baptiste Bagaza (1976-87) and Pierre Buyoya (1987-1993), all members of the party ‘Union pour le Progès National’ (UPRONA), Ndadaye “was to become the first Hutu […] president in the history of the country” (Ndikumana 2000: 434). On 20 October 1993, Ndadaye

24 Several sources state that Juvénal Habyarimana introduced the quotas (ICG 2001: 3).

was assassinated by the military. In reaction to his assassination, killings of Tutsi started, followed by the violent repression and killings of Hutu by the military. Up to 150,000 people were killed by the military and tens of thousands of people were killed by their neighbours, 700,000 people fled the country and 600,000 were internally displaced (Scherrer 2002: 48).

Ndadaye's assassination in October 1993 and the following large-scale massacres "ushered an immediate and drastic radicalization of anti-Tutsi sentiment" (Lemarchand 2006b: 40) in Rwanda that was used by the génocidaires in spring 1994. Moreover, the political situation in Rwanda in the early 1990s was defined by external pressure for democratisation; in Rwanda and Burundi the claim for democratic change supported by the international community grew stronger (for more details, see Scherrer 1997: 45/6). In autumn 1990, when Habyarimana's regime seemed to respond to the claims for a multiparty system in Rwanda, the 'Front Patriotique Rwandais' (FPR)[25] attacked on 1 October (Des Forges 1999: 47). The FPR had been composed by Rwandans, mainly Tutsi, who were descendants of the "1959ers", the first wave of refugees (Jones 1999: 58). Democratisation and civil war induced internal tensions as rivalling political parties emerged while several massacres of Tutsi occurred (for more details, see Prunier 1995: 127-142). In 1992 the 'Mouvement Révolutionaire National pour le Développement' (MRND) had to share power with other political parties for the first time and a cease-fire agreement was signed with the FPR (for more details, see Prunier 1995: 144-186). The political hardliners feared that Habyarimana would accept a compromise on essentials such as "the 'sociological majority' principle of the 1959 revolution, ensuring systematic dominance for Hutu in all spheres of life" (Prunier 1995: 161). Indeed, the Arusha Accords finally were signed in August 1993 basically providing for a transitional government sharing power among the MRND, the FPR and the block of 'Mouvement Démocratique Républicain' (MDR), 'Parti Social Démocrate' (PSD), and 'Parti Libéral' (PL), with the addition of the 'Parti Démocratique Chrétien' (PDC) (Des Forges 1999: 124). On 6 April 1994 the airplane carrying Habyarimana and the president of Burundi, Cyprien Ntaryamira, was shot down. The plane was coming from a regional summit meant to facilitate the implementation of the Arusha Accords. Habyarimana reportedly had committed himself to implementing the power sharing agreements in the Arusha Accords (Scherrer 2002: 93). The Accords were opposed heavily by the radical forces (for more details, see Des Forges 1999: 125/6). "The radios told the Rwandans that 'their

25 The former military organisation and today's ruling party in Rwanda is often also referred to as RPF (Rwandan Patriotic Front), since originating in Uganda it is (until now) rather Anglophone than Francophone. Yet, due to the predominance of French denominations in the political party system in Rwandan and in Burundian, I use the French names.

president was killed by the Tutsi' and that they had to take revenge" (Scherrer 1997: 94). The genocide began immediately after the crash of the airplane. Approximately 1,000,000[26] Rwandans, mostly Tutsi, were killed from the second week of April to the third week of May 1994 (Scherrer 2002: 95).

As Lemarchand (2004: 63) asserts in respect to this time period, "Until then [*1994*, author's note], the principal victims of political exclusion were the Tutsi of Rwanda and the Hutu of Burundi".

Emphasising the political and social exclusion along ethnic categories is not to say that the regional categories are not an important aspect to be considered in post-independence political history in Rwanda and Burundi. Whereas Grégoire Kayibanda's regime, originating from the south, is seen to have monopolized the political power in southern Rwanda (Des Forges 1999: 90; Pottier 2002: 35), Juvénal Habyarimana is seen to have been "backed by northern Hutus" (Hintjens 1999: 259; Jones 1999: 60; Pottier 2002: 35). When the FPR overthrew the government of Habyarimana in 1994, more regional and language cleavage came into play: the rebel movement originating from Uganda not only strongly increased the influence of the English language, but also established a new dominance of an elite coming from Uganda. Likewise in independent Burundi, people from the south, especially from Bururi and the Makamba provinces, controlled military and government (Ndikumana 1998: 37).[27] The ruling party since 2005, the 'Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces de Défense de la Démocratie' (CNDD-FDD) is backed by the north, in particular because current President Nkurunziza comes from Ngozi (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2005: 49).

Providing an overview of the post-independence political history of the two countries was meant to show that ethnicised politics is an intrinsic part of the (academic) interpretation of political (post-independence) history in Rwanda and Burundi. Approaching the analysis of political institutions against the background of their history, it is the ethnicised political history of both countries that constitutes the starting point of my analysis.

Moreover, the academic descriptions of ethnicised political history reveal their political charge. The recurring reference to 'minority', 'majority', Tutsi or Hutu dominance and the interpretation of political and social exclusion along ethnic cleavages makes the academic discourse itself very political. Against the background of the idea of the modern nation state (see 6.1) calling Tutsi a minority undermines the legitimacy of a Tutsi-dominated regime (since according

26 For more details in respect to the numbers of people killed, see Prunier 1995: 261.
27 The dictators Michel Micombero (1965-76), Jean Baptiste Bagaza (1976-87) and Pierre Buyoya (first time: 1987-1993) are Tutsi from Bururi provinces (Scherrer 2002: 47).

to the principle of politicised ethnicity it is assumed that Hutu are politically and socially excluded). Likewise naming Hutu a majority also implies the claim for political majority. Ngaruko's and Nkurunziza's (2005: 57) statement exemplifies this political charge: "Many Hutu in Burundi interpret democracy in terms of numbers: They believe that their numerical majority should give them de facto right to govern the country."

In the academic interpretation the image of two 'ethnic groups' – 'the Hutu' and 'the Tutsi' – struggling for political power becomes very strong. Therefore, the idea of two collective actors struggling for political power and resources is reproduced. The exclusion from power of the one 'ethnic group' implies their social marginalisation. Consequently, it is assumed that the political representation of interest is to be based on ethnicity. This kind of interpretation touches the core issue of my analysis of the interviews as it reflects politicised ethnicity (see 6.2). For now, it suffices to note that within the interpretation of post-independence political history in Rwanda and Burundi, a strong reference to ethnic groups and the struggle for political power and against social exclusion among them prevail. Against this background, I selected Rwanda and Burundi and chose to focus on ethnicised politics by analysing the political institutional models in both countries.

2.3 Two Options, One Intention: Political Institutional Models in Rwanda and Burundi Today

"Au Rwanda [*et au Burundi*, author's note], les objectifs proclamées sont les mêmes: promouvoir la paix et le développement pour tous" (Vandeginste 2006: 27). The declared objective in Rwanda and Burundi is the promotion of peace and development. More precisely, both constitutions aim to overcome ethnicised politics, i.e., political and social exclusion along ethnic categories. This purpose is stipulated in the two constitutions in the following ways: the Burundian constitution prohibits the exclusion of any Burundian due to his ethnic affiliation (Article 13, Burundian Constitution) while the Rwandan constitution states that all Rwandans are "free and equal in rights and duties", which includes the non-discrimination of Rwandans on the basis of their ethnic origin (Article 11, Rwandan Constitution). In order to do so, different political institutional models were introduced; while Burundi opted for a model in 2005 that can be described as consociationalism, the Rwandan system introduced in 2003 corresponds with criteria of the model of majoritarian democracy.[28] In terms of the way they deal

28 In 2005 in Burundi and in 2003 in Rwanda the first elections took place on the basis of the new constitutions, which were respectively approved in 2005 and 2003. The constitution of the transition period in Burundi introduced in 2003 also took ethnic quotas into account. In Rwanda ethnic quotas

with ethnic cleavages, I label Rwanda and Burundi respectively as 'denial of' and 'power sharing along' ethnic cleavages.

Interestingly, discussing power sharing agreements and their prospects of success and failure in the African context (e.g., in the DRC, 2002; Liberia, 2003; Sudan, 2004), the political histories of the two countries allow insight into the complexities related to this difficulty. While the Burundian power sharing system agreed on for the first time in 2000[29] seems to work so far, the power sharing agreement introduced in 1993 in Rwanda and in 1994 in Burundi has been less successful (see Rothchild 2005: 261-5).[30] Moreover, the Burundian choice comes quite close to the Rwandan ethnic quotas under Habyarimana's regime that have, at least initially, partly integrated the interest of Hutu and Tutsi (Strizek 1998: 107) and have helped overcome the existing ethnic discrimination (Guichaoua 2007: xi). As Chrétien (2000: 136/7) describes it: "Les quotas ethniques évoqués dans les négociations pour le nouveau Burundi sonnent étrangement comme un retour au modèle de la république hutu rwandaise sous Habyarimana." Likewise, the Rwandan choice after 1994 is discussed with respect to the Burundian experience under the first regime of Pierre Buyoya (1987-1993), that acted on the assumption "that by eliminating all public references to ethnic identities, ethnic discrimination will no longer matter as a policy issue or a source of intergroup conflict" (Lemarchand 1994a: 9).[31] Until the late 1980s, ethnic division in Burundi, similar to today's Rwanda, had been excluded from the official discourse and conceived of as the creation of (neo)colonialism (Ndikumana 1998: 32). Julien Nimubona (2003: 201) warns: "La deuxième République du Burundi avait adopté la même stratégie, mais la négation des ethnies et l'imposition de l'identité nationale n'a pas empêché le pouvoir de sombrer dans l'ethnisme, le régionalisme et le clanisme."

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were abandoned in 1994 after the FPR seized political power. The political period directly after the genocide is referred to as "Burundisation" implying abandoning the ethnic quotas (Reyntjens 1997: 3).

29 Donald Rothchild (2005: 262) refers to the transitional constitution that took ethnic quotas into account, like the current Burundian constitution.

30 The Burundian agreement could not contain the rising ethnic violence and ended with a coup d'état of former president Buyoya. The agreement put into place in 1993 between Rwanda's President Habyarimana and the attacking 'Rwandan Patriotic Front' ended with Habyarimana's assassination and the extermination of Tutsi and moderate Hutu (Rothchild 2005: 261-5).

31 In order to illustrate his argument, Lemarchand describes that Pierre Buyoya who after the massacres in August 1988 has been asked how many Hutu and Tutsi have been killed, answered: "We are all Barundi" (Lemarchand 1994a: 9).

The failure of the two opposing systems that existed before 1994 in Rwanda and before 1993 in Burundi might have different[32] and specific[33] reasons that are not issues in the scope of the present argument. Next to the diverging cessation of war in Rwanda and Burundi[34] a peek into the history of the two countries might help to understand the different choices Rwanda and Burundi made (Lemarchand 2006b: 4).

However, I focus on the political institutional models introduced in Burundi in 2005 and in Rwanda in 2003 to reveal ethnicised politics in both systems.

2.3.1 Rwanda: 'Denial of' Ethnic Cleavages

Since its seizure of power by military force, the FPR has declared to follow up the objective to establish a "true democracy", understood as "political majority rule based on a genuine program uniting all Rwandans" (ICG 2001: 3). The official main aim is the eradication of ethnicity from public life (ICG 2001: 3). Susanne Buckley-Zistel (2006a: 102, emphasis added) describes these intentions as follows: "In an effort to construct a collective identity, and to unite Rwanda after the genocide, governmental nation-building takes the form of *de-ethnicisation.*" Rwanda seeks to establish the Rwandan identity on "a legalistic understanding on citizenship as having equal rights" (Buckley-Zistel 2006a: 102). Every Rwandan has to be part of Rwanda as Rwandan (Shyaka 2003: 213). This is to avoid fixing the individual to his "communauté immédiate" and hampering the emergence of citizens (Rutembesa 2004: 143). The formal acknowledgment of ethnic identities before the genocide, which facilitated it, entails the emphasis placed on citizens independently of ethnicity, as Nimubona (2003: 200) highlights.

In order to overcome the ethnic division and promote national unity, Rwanda implemented what is commonly called majoritarian, liberal democracy. The model ideal typically implies a focus on individuals as opposed to collectivities as the bearer of rights, and government-versus-opposition-pattern and winner-takes-all character of majority rule (see 7.1). The principles dominating the Rwandan constitution revolve around:

32 Lemarchand (2006b) analyses the power sharing attempts in Rwanda, Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo by integrating the socio-political context. For an analysis of the failure of the power sharing system in Burundi in 1993, see Sullivan 2005.
33 See Sullivan 2005.
34While the FPR occupied the country and ended the war and the genocide, the military stalemate between CNDD-FDD and troops of the Burundian government enabled negotiations between the warring parties (Nimubona 2007: 502).

> Equitable power sharing, establishing the rule of law aimed at improving social welfare and social justice, a pluralist democratic system, fighting the ideology of genocide and all its manifestations, eradication of any identity-based divisionism, promoting national unity, equality of Rwandans among men and women and the constant quest for solutions through dialogue and social consensus (Ankut 2005: 24).

Concerning the concrete institutional implementation, Rwanda is a presidential parliamentary whose legislature is composed of two chambers, the senate and the chamber of deputies, with 80 and 26 members respectively who are partly elected and partly appointed (Article 76 and 82, Rwandan Constitution). Despite the clear decision to not represent ethnicity in the political institutions, the Rwandan constitution provides for power sharing mechanisms focusing on political parties instead of ethnic aspects (Nsabimana 2005: 36). According to Article 58 the president of the republic and the speaker of the chambers of deputies are to be from different political parties. The political affiliation of the quite powerful speaker of the senate, however, remains undefined (Nsabimana 2005: 8).[35] Furthermore, Article 116 stipulates that a political organisation holding the majority of seats in the chamber of deputies may not exceed 50 per cent of all the members of the cabinet. The chamber of deputies, which in total has 80 members, is mandated to be made up of 24 women, two members elected by the National Youth Council and one member from the Federation of the Associations of the Disabled (Article 76, Rwandan Constitution).

The political institutions aiming at the "eradication of ethnic, regional and other divisions and promotion of national unity" (Article 9, Rwandan Constitution) come along with "censorship and self-censorship" concerning issues related to the violent past (Buckley-Zistel 2006a: 112) that, in turn, strongly implies ethnicity. Discussing ethnicity has become a 'taboo' (Burnet 2007: 11). Ethnic identities are officially denied and "denying their non-existence involves severe penal sanctions" (Lemarchand 2006b: 7).[36] This is enforced by the very broad definitions of "divisionism" and "genocide ideology" that refer to ethnicity and the history of the genocide (HRW 2008a: 36).[37] In 2002, 'divisionism' was made a crime, defining it as: "A crime committed by any oral or written expression or any act of division that could generate conflicts among the population or cause disputes" (HRW 2008a: 34). According to Reyntjens (2006c:

35 He is to replace the president of the Republic in case of his death, resignation and permanent incapacity (Nsabimana 2005: 8).

36 For an account of the official FPR version of ethnicity and thereto-related political history in Rwanda, see Pottier 2002.

37 Human Rights Watch gives the example of a priest who was sentenced to 12 years' imprisonment in September 2006 for minimizing the genocide because he officially suggested it was wrong to call persons who participated in genocide "dogs". The prosecutor reportedly said that those should indeed be called "dogs" (HRW 2007: 2).

1107), the definition of 'divisionism' implies "being in opposition to or even simply expressing disagreement with government policies". On this basis, every political reference to ethnic cleavages risks prosecution under the inculpation of 'divisionism' (Vandeginste 2006: 27). In 2008, 'genocide ideology' was made a crime punishable with 10-15 years in prison (Reyntjens 2009: 4), but already has been persecuted on the basis of the constitution (Article 13 and Article 33, Rwandan Constitution) and a law punishing genocide since 2003 (implying revisionism, negationism (denial) and minimisation of genocide) (HRW 2008a: 35). After admitting that it is not "easy to give it a systematic definition", a study compiled by the Rwandan Senate (2006: 16) defines "genocide ideology" as "a set of ideas or representations whose major role is to stir up hatred and create a pernicious atmosphere favouring the implementation and legitimisation of the persecution and elimination of a category of population".

Since the broad definition of both crimes allows it to be used politically to suppress critical voices (Burnet 2007: 2; Reyntjens 2004b: 184), it might reinforce the hesitations of Rwandans to refer to ethnicity, even in their daily life. This denial of ethnic identities might be difficult to accept for people "whose day-to-day life is informed by the past" (Buckley-Zistel 2006a: 112) and who live in a country, in which, after the genocide, the massive victimisation shown on a daily basis in the courts is based on ethnic identities (Vandeginste 2006: 27).[38] Although the fight against 'genocide ideology' is justifiable, it defines what is true concerning Rwanda's past, present and future. Accordingly, "le contrôle du discours est ainsi devenu un important instrument politique" (Reyntjens 2009: 2).

The approach to implementing a national identity transcending and including potential identity is mainly a top-down process (Buckley-Zistel 2006a: 110). Pursuing this programme, the FPR set clear limitations for the democratic and voting processes. After the FPR defeated the Rwandan government army in July 1994, it put in place a new government that officially reaffirmed its commitment to the spirits and terms of the 1993 Arusha Accords (see 2.2). Apart from the political parties closely identified with the 1994 genocide, which were banned, as the former single party MRND and the extremist Hutu party, 'Coalition pour la Défense de la République' (CDR), all the other parties took up the seats in government and parliament that were negotiated within this scope. Political parties based on ethnicity or religion are generally prohibited in Rwanda (Freedomhouse 2008). Likewise designated by the Arusha Accords, a Hutu

38 Hutu citizens feel targeted by the Gacaca jurisdiction. Moreover, as the Gacaca courts are not appointed to prosecute crimes committed by the FPR or the Rwandan Defence Forces (RDF) they are partly perceived as "victor's justice" (Burnet 2007: 11).

from the MDR, Faustin Twagiramungu, became prime minister (Reyntjens 2006c: 1105). Nonetheless, as Reyntjens (1997: 3; 2006c: 1105) describes, some amendments were introduced on 17 July 1994 that induced "a strong executive presidency, imposed the dominance of the FPR in the government, and redrew the composition of parliament". During the 2001 and 2002 local elections the candidates were not allowed to compete as representatives of political parties and the activities of political parties were limited to the national level (HRW 2003: 4). In 2002, the largest part of politically crucial positions were held by FPR members, including the president of the Republic, twelve out of fifteen ministers, and the chief judges on the Constitutional Court and Court of Cassation (HRW 2003: 2).

The first elections on the national level took place in 2003 after the transition period was extended again in 1999 (Reyntjens 2004b; Reyntjens 2006c: 178). In a report published in 2002 before the first national elections, International Crisis Group (2002: i) deplores the political situation:

> There are multiple restrictions on political and civil liberty and no sign of any guarantee, or even indication, in the outline of the constitutional plan that the political opposition will be able to participate in these elections on an equal footing with the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF).

The opposition's restricted participation includes a ban of the main opposition party, MDR, for spreading divisionism ahead of the elections (Reyntjens 2006c: 1107). The elections resulted in the FPR retaining political power (Burnet 2007; Reyntjens 2004a).

Regarding 2007-2008, the year in which I conducted my field work, the political situation was marked by continuity regarding the firm grip of the political regime on state and society (Reyntjens 2008). Since the political space is highly controlled by the FPR, visible repression is secondary for the Rwandan regime in order to control and maintain political power. The civil society and the media are subject to auto-censorship (Reyntjens 2009: 20). Nonetheless, Human Rights Watch (2008b) reports harassment, detention and interrogation of journalists critical of the government.

In 2008, Freedom House assessed the political situation in Rwanda as "not free", despite some improvements in political rights in 2007. Pasteure Bizimungu, President of the Rwandan Republic from 1994 to 2000, was released after serving 5 years in prison. In 2004, he was convicted of anti-state activities and sentenced to 15 years in prison. Furthermore, the ban on political parties' activities at the local level was lifted in June (Freedomhouse 2008). The legislative elections in 2008 resulted in a clear dominance of FPR candidates (79 per cent). Observers of the European Union asserted, despite progress since the 2003 elections, that there were irregularities in more than half of the polling

stations (HRW 2009). Consequently, Freedom House (2009b) categorises Rwanda as not being an electoral democracy since “the 2003 presidential and 2003 and 2008 parliamentary elections, while administratively acceptable, presented Rwandans with only a limited degree of political choice”. While Rwanda’s performance is above the Sub-Sahara average in domains of governance such as government effectiveness, control of corruption and rule of law, the country performs below the Sub-Sahara standard when it comes to “voice and accountability” (Marysse, Ansom, and Cassimon 2006: 26).

According to the World Bank (2011b), Rwanda has experienced steady economic growth of about 7.5 per cent per year between 2005 and 2009. However, an estimated 57 per cent of the Rwandan population live below the poverty line, with about 37 per cent being extremely poor. In 2000, the degree of inequality in the distribution of family incomes measured by the Gini index was 46.8, which made Rwanda number 35 of 135 unequal countries in the world (CIA 2011). In addition, 75 per cent of the Rwandan labour force is unskilled, and less than 10 per cent of its working population has had more than primary education (World Bank 2011b).

Concerning the ethnic composition of government institutions, Hutu are part of the Rwandan government, including Prime Minister Bernard Makuza (Freedomhouse 2008). On 1 April 2008, out of twenty-two ministers in the Rwandan government, ten were Hutu. Four of five governors are Tutsi, two of three presidents of the highest three juridical institutions are Tutsi (Marysse, Reyntjens, and Vandeginste 2009: Annex II). Tutsi dominance is perceived in the rural areas. This comes along with the Hutu’s feeling not being adequately represented politically (Ingelaere 2007). After French judge Louis Bruguière issued indictments for the Rwandan political elite, including Rwandan President Paul Kagame, Spanish judge Fernando Merelles issued indictments for forty senior officers of the RDF, formerly members of the Rwandese Patriotic Army (RPA), in early 2008. This increased tension in the political elite and the country itself (Reyntjens 2009: 1).

Even today political tensions are still noticeable. On 14 April 2010, the two politically oppositional newspapers, *Umuseso* and *Umuvugizi* were banned for six months and subsequently were asked to close down indefinitely, with the consequence that they would not be able to report on the run-up to the presidential elections in August 2010 (HRW 2010e; Soudan 2010: 47). Journalists of the two newspapers were threatened, arrested randomly and sentenced to prison. One journalist working for *Umuvugizi* was assassinated on 24 June 2010 (HRW 2010e). The Rwandan government denied Human Rights Watch representatives a work visa. The denial is seen as demonstrating “a pattern of growing restrictions on free expression [...] ahead of the August presidential elections”(HRW

2011). The leaders and representatives of several opposition parties such as 'PS-Imberakuri', 'FDU-Inkingi' and the 'Democratic Green Party of Rwanda' were harassed, arrested and beaten up. Bernard Ntaganda, leader of the opposition party, 'PS-Imberakuri', and Victoire Ingabire[39], leader of the 'FDU-Inkingi', were reported to be particularly targeted (HRW 2010c; HRW 2010e). Eventually, none of the three parties that openly criticized FPR policies – the 'Democratic Green Party', 'FDU-Inkingi' and 'PS-Imberakuri' – were allowed to take part in the elections in which Paul Kagame was re-elected as president (HRW 2010d).

Against this general political background, the FPR regime in Rwanda often has been deeply criticised and the regime is perceived and depicted as mainly Tutsi dominated (Strizek 1998: 166/7). Regarding the political events in 1996-1997 in Rwanda, Reyntjens (1997: 3) speaks about a "Tutsisation de l'Etat". In 2006, Lemarchand (2006b: 4) described it as "a full-fledged Tutsi dominated dictatorship, which denies altogether the existence of ethnic identities". Reyntjes (2004b: 177), along with Newbury and Newbury (1999: 315), draws parallels of the regimes before and after 1994 in terms of ethnic discrimination, and stated in 2004 that, "Ten years after the 1994 genocide, Rwanda is experiencing not democracy and reconciliation but dictatorship and exclusion". The question about ethnic exclusion is an important one that addresses conflict management and political stability in Rwanda (see 6.3, 7.2). Yet, I do not want to enter this discussion on the basis of the academic literature as, similar to the ethnic interpretation of political history, it touches the core issue of the interviews conducted, namely ethnicised politics. Without a doubt, and as the analysis of the interviews will show, the denial of ethnic cleavages makes the Rwandan government very vulnerable in respect to those accusations. However, the analysis of the interviews will show an ethnic interpretation of political and social exclusion also in Burundi.

2.3.2 Burundi: 'Power Sharing along' Ethnic Cleavages

Unlike in Rwanda, the option to resolve the conflict by negotiation and the option of power sharing emerged in Burundi because both conflict parties were convinced that neither could win the conflict by force (Nimubona 2007: 502). "Both sides knew that military victory was impossible" (Uvin 2009: 18). Accordingly, Burundi's present institutions are "as close as any African state has come to implementing Lijphart's consociational formula" (Lemarchand 2006b:

39 She became known by claims that according to *Jeune Afrique* are highly provocative, such as asserting in front of the Genocide Memorial that "Il y a aussi des Hutu qui furent victimes de crimes contre l'humanité et de crimes de guerre, qui ne sont pas evoqués ni honorés ici" (Soudan 2010: 46).

7). The Burundian constitution adopted in 2006 is described as "markedly" and "largely consociational" (Reyntjens 2006a: 119; Vandeginste 2006: 4), since "classical instruments, such as minority over-representation, quota, and minority veto" are applied (Reyntjens 2006a: 119).

The war broke out in 1993 and lasted until spring 2009 when the FNL (Forces Nationales de Libération) ceased fighting. In 2002 Burundi had been reported to have 390,000 internally displaced persons, by then the largest concentration in Africa (HRW 2002: 2). During the entire period civilians, especially in rural areas, were threatened by death and exploitation by government soldiers and rebels of FNL and FDD (Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie), active until 2003 (HRW 1998; HRW 2002; HRW 2004; HRW 2006). However, peace negotiations officially started in 1998, first with the mediation of Julius Nyerere and later of Nelson Mandela[40] and finally facilitated a transitional government in 2000 under the presidency of Pierre Buyoya (UPRONA) and from 2003 on under the presidency of Domitien Ndayizeye (FRODEBU) (Nimubona 2007: 499; Reyntjens 2006a: 118; Vandeginste 2006: 13).[41] The negotiations were based on ethnicity and representation of ethnicity as the political parties regrouped themselves by ethnicity. The group called G10 was composed of ten parties predominantly Tutsi and the group called G7 was composed of seven political parties, predominantly Hutu. Therefore, the political actors based their strategies on the 'recognition' of the ethnic identities Hutu and Tutsi (Nimubona 2007: 497). "Chaque champs chassait sur le […] terrain de l'ethnicité", as Nimubona (2007: 499) puts it. Moreover, the division between the G10 and G7 was a constant issue, since the predominantly Tutsi parties demanded taking into account political-ethnic affiliation. Unlike the designations in the interim constitution and Pretoria agreement in 2004, they did not want to accept Tutsi representing Hutu parties (Reyntjens 2006a).[42] Consequently, the negotiations stressed and strengthened the ethnic cleavages (Nimubona 2007: 500).

Based on the Arusha Accords signed in 2000 and the Pretoria power sharing agreement in 2004, a constitution was worked out and approved by referendum on 28 February 2005. It takes into consideration the ethnic affiliation of the

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40 When Julius Nyerere died in October 1999, Nelson Mandela reluctantly agreed to take over (Reyntjens 2006a: 118).

41 Cease-fire agreements with the important rebel movements as well as a protocol on power sharing, defence and security were signed between the government and the CNDD-FDD in Pretoria in 2003. In the following Pierre Nkurunziza, the leader of the CNDD-FDD, became minister of state in charge of good governance and the general inspection of the state. The interim constitution was adopted by parliament in October 2004 and by referendum in February 2005 (Reyntjens 2006a: 118/9). For more details about the transitional process, see Reyntjens 2006a.

42 That was the reason due to which the legislative elections designated for 2004 were postponed to 2005 (ICG 2004).

members of government, parliament, senate, military and police. The distribution of the ministerial portfolios and the places in the National Assembly is 60 per cent Hutu and 40 per cent Tutsi, whereas in the Senate Hutu and Tutsi hold equal numbers of seats. Three Twa are included. In the Defence and Security Forces there is parity. Thirty per cent of the members of government have to be women. The two vice–presidents of the Republic are a Hutu of a predominantly Hutu party and a Tutsi from a predominately Tutsi party. On the local level a maximum of 67 per cent of mayors may be from one 'ethnic group' (Lemarchand 2006a; Reyntjens 2006a).

In general, the Burundi power sharing system is assessed in a rather positive way, e.g., as "un exemple pour la région et au-delà" (cited in: Vandeginste 2006: 5). In principle, the reconciliation of the rights of the Tutsi minority with the demands of the Hutu majority is seen to be a positive evolution (ICG 2005; Lemarchand 2006a: 4). Comparing Burundi to Rwanda, its system is described as "multipolaire", as opposed to Rwanda's "unipolaire" system. The political power is shared, whereas in Rwanda it is taken by one actor (Reyntjens 2006b: 25). Correspondingly, the UN Security Council (2005) encouraged the Burundian government to continue "to follow the path of dialogue, power sharing and consensus".

The critics of the decision in favour of a consociational regime refer mainly to its similarity to the ethnic quotas introduced by Habyarimana in 1973. Remembering the ethnic quotas under Habyarimana and their consequences, Chrétien (2000: 138) expressed his lack of understanding for the Burundian decision for "le fétichisme ethnique" just in the moment when Rwanda opted for the opposite way and, even more important, by ignoring the failure of the Rwandan regime. Similarly, Nimubona (2007: 511) describes the Arusha Accords as "le triomphe de l'idéologie ethniste". Gervais Rufyikiri, President of the Burundian Senate, publicly criticised ethnic representation in the public institutions "since it limits Burundians from achieving total peace and economic development" (Buyinza and Muramila 2008). Less surprisingly, Servilien Sebasoni, Speaker of the Rwandan FPR, perceives the Burundian choice as "anti-modèle regrettable" (cited in: Vandeginste 2006: 5).

While the choice for a power sharing system is predominantly assessed in a positive way, the general situation of democracy is perceived more critically. The legislative elections in 2005 were seen by international and domestic observers as "legitimate and reflective of the people's will" (Freedomhouse 2009b) as well as "globalement honnêtes et transparentes." (Reyntjens 2009: 2). At the beginning of the legislative period, the newly elected government of the

CNDD-FDD[43], and especially Pierre Nkurunziza, the newly elected President, enjoyed high public confidence and raised high expectations. "In the eyes of many of his followers he stood as the man who spoke truth to power, who fought tooth and nail to wrest power from the Tutsi oligarchs, and who did not shy from wrestling his internal enemies to the ground" (Lemarchand 2006a: 16). During the legislative period, however, the reputation of the government declined. Only one year after the elections in 2006, International Crisis Group (ICG) published a report titled 'Burundi: Democracy and Peace at Risk'. It points out the "deterioration in Burundi's political climate" (ICG 2006: i). ICG reports the arrest of opposition politicians accused of initiating a coup plot, human rights violations including arbitrary arrests, torture and summary executions and corruption. These human rights violations occurred partly in the scope of military operations against the still-active rebel movement FNL[44] and partly dissidents have been targeted (ICG 2006: 4).

In 2007-2008, when I conducted my interviews, politics were dominated by a struggle among high-ranking members of the CNDD-FDD and resulting political blockages (Reyntjens 2009: 8). Hussein Radjabu, President of the CNDD-FDD until February 2010, was accused by "atteinte à la sûreté de l'État", arrested in April 2007 and sentenced to 13 years in prison in April 2008 (Reyntjens 2009: 9). Consequently, the CNDD-FDD split into two factions composed of members loyal to Hussein Radjabu and members loyal to Pierre Nkurunziza. Approximately twenty deputies or "Radjabistes" left the parliament where the CNDD-FDD did not have a political majority until a new government was assigned in November 2008 (Reyntjens 2009: 9). In February 2008 the work of the National Assembly was blocked again since Alice Nzomukunda, the Second Vice–President of the country, was excluded from the party and removed from her position during an extraordinary congress of CNDD-FDD (Reyntjens 2009: 10). After a struggle that lasted for several weeks, Alice Nzomukunda was replaced in her function although in an anti-constitutional

43 The rebel movement CNDD (and its armed branch FDD) was founded by a number of leading FRODEBU members after the assassination of Melchior Ndadaye in 1993. Leonard Nyangoma, the Interior Minister of Ndadaye's cabinet, has been the Chairman of both organisations (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000: 381). The CNDD has been estimated to have 1,000 combatants and the FDD is estimated to have 10,000 combatants (HRW 2002: 2; Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2005: 49). In 1998, the CNDD-FDD split from the CNDD (frequently referred to as CNDD–Nyangoma) (HRW 2010f).

44 'Forces Nationales de Libération' initially referred to the armed wing of the rebel movement Palipehutu (Parti pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu) that had been founded in the late 1970s in Tanzanian camps composed of Burundian refugees that fled the country in 1972 (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2005: 48). In January 2009, the Palipehutu-FNL changed its name to FNL (HRW 2010f: 1). The FNL is estimated to have between 2,000 and 3,000 combatants (HRW 2002: 2; Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2005: 49).

manner. One week later, several politicians sent a letter to Ban Ki Moon, the General Secretary of the UN, accusing the government of threatening them (Reyntjens 2009: 10). In the night of 8 March the houses of four deputies, including Alice Nzomukunda's, were attacked by grenades. Unlike in Rwanda the regime in Burundi is weak and highly fragmented, which is also why it cannot control the political opposition or the media (Reyntjens 2009: 8).

The credibility of the government has been compromised by continuing human rights violations, evidence for large-scale corruption and intimidation of the opposition (Lemarchand 2006a; Reyntjens 2009). The then Party Chairman Hussein Radjabu has been strongly suspected to be responsible for arrests as well as one of the biggest corruption affairs, the sale of the presidential plane, a Falcon 50 (Lemarchand 2006a: 18).[45] Political ineptness contributes to a situation of decreasing legitimacy of the CNDP-FDD as does the arrest of key personalities accused by an attempted coup (Reyntjens 2009: 8). International Crisis Group (2009b) reports that the FNL, the recently returned rebel movement, refused to hand in all their weapons and the ruling CNDD-FDD "seems ready to use even violence to win the 2010 elections".

Although the Palipehutu-FNL and the Burundian government signed a cease-fire agreement in September 2006, the rebel movement was active until spring 2009 (ICG 2009b). In early 2007, attacks and fighting between the national army and the rebels occurred regularly. After the FNL attacked Bujumbura on 27 April, the fighting between the government and the rebels lasted for one week, and hundreds of people in Bujumbura and Bubanza died (ICG 2009a: 9; Reyntjens 2009: 26). In response to a potential defeat, the FNL signed a new declaration to cease hostilities on 26 May 2008. In May, Agathon Rwasa, president of the FNL, returned for the first time to Burundi, which he left in 1988. In the scope of the Magaliesburg agreement signed in South Africa, the FNL and the government reached an understanding on recognizing the rebel movement as a political party and integrating its combatants into government forces (ICG 2009a: 10). Finally, the movement changed its name, which had been a major obstacle for implementing the cease-fire agreement of 2007, since Burundian law prohibits party names with an ethnic connotation and, hence, could not accept 'Parti pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu' (Palipehutu). Now the political party is called 'Forces Nationales de Libération' (FNL). Parts of the movement have been integrated into the security forces and high public positions, but the FNL did not turn in all of their weapons (ICG 2009b).

45 He is said to have turned down an offer of 5 million and instead accepted the offer of 3 million. The remaining of the difference is unclear (Lemarchand 2006a: 18).

Prior to the local, parliamentary and presidential[46] elections between May and September 2010, which the CNDD-FDD clearly won (Echos Grands Lacs 2010) political tensions rose as the ruling party was confronted with four to five strong opposition parties.[47] Since November 2009 violent clashes between party members, and in particular their affiliated youth organisations, were observed (HRW 2010a). Detentions and harassment of civil society members, journalists and oppositional politicians as well as the alleged mobilisation of the FNL are alarming observations (Freedomhouse 2009a; ICG 2010). Due to the continuously lacking appointment of the Independent National Electoral Commission (CENI), Burundi is assessed as "partly free" (Freedomhouse 2009a). In a report release in November 2010, Human Rights Watch observes the closing of the democratic spaces in Burundi, which has been constituted by an active civil society and media and a degree of political pluralism. But during the pre–election period the grip of the political party in power became stronger. Journalists, civil society activists and political opponents were facing surveillance, torture and death. At least three opposition party presidents, and several other high-ranking opposition officials, have left the country or gone into hiding. Armed groups emerged in the aftermath of the elections in regions formerly known as FNL whereabouts (HRW 2010b).

In 2009, according to the CIA World Factbook, Burundi had an annual economic growth of 3.5 per cent and a Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 300 US Dollar per capita (CIA 2011). The Country Brief of the World Bank speaks of "slow economic recovery with a 3 per cent average growth rate from 2001 to 2008" (World Bank 2011a). An estimated 68 per cent of the population lived below the poverty line in 2002. The degree of inequality in the distribution of family income measured by the Gini Index was 42.4 in 1998, corresponding to rank 52 out of 134 unequal countries in the world (CIA 2011).

I analyse ethnicised politics in two opposing political institutional models, 'denial of' and 'power sharing along' ethnic cleavages. In doing so, I approach (political) institutions based on the historically influenced knowledge of the members of the institutional order. Therefore, the ethnic interpretation of political history of Rwanda and Burundi, depicted in 2.2, is the starting point of my analysis. Furthermore, the choice for the two opposing political institutional models, introduced in 2.3, is crucial. In other words, I chose Rwanda and Burundi as empirical cases based on the ethnicised political history, on the one

46 While in 2005 the president was elected by the parliament, in 2010 he is elected by direct universal suffrage.

47 The CNDD-FDD was accused to have manipulated the communal elections in May. The opposition parties boycotted subsequent elections. Consequently, incumbent President Pierre Nkurunziza was the only candidate running in the presidential election in June (HRW 2010b).

hand, and on the different political systems aimed at overcoming the ethnic cleavages, on the other hand. In addition, the chapter introduced a specific social constructivist understanding of Hutu and Tutsi (2.1), which argues based on essentialist criteria.

3 Procedural Principals

> For in the simple process of living we directly experience our acts as meaningful, and we all take for granted, as part of our natural outlook on the world, that others, too, directly experience their action as meaningful in quite the same sense as we would if we were in their place. We also believe that our interpretations of the meaning of the actions of others are, on the whole, correct […]. For sociology's task is to make a scientific study of social phenomena. Now, if social phenomena are in part constituted by common sense concepts, it is clear that it will not do for sociology to abstain from a scientific examination of these "self-evident" ideas (Schütz 1972: 9).

It is this understanding of the task and challenges of sociology expressed by Alfred Schütz that guides my research. In this sense, I adopt the perspective of interpretative sociology (in German *Verstehende Soziologie*) that was assigned the task of interpretatively grasping subjective meaning by its founder Max Weber (1978: 4). This focus has been carried on by authors such as Schütz (1972: 9) that approach the meaning attributed to social phenomena by "those living in that world", i.e., social actors. In doing so, the sociologist focuses on the "'self-evident' ideas" and "common sense concepts" of these social actors, since they might experience social action and the interpretation of meaning of social action different than other social actors (including the "scientific interpreter") (Schütz 1972: 9). That is why the 'scientific interpreter' approaches meaning based on the "already constituted meaning of the active participant of the social world" (Schütz 1972: 10).

By approaching the meaning of social phenomena as a 'scientific interpreter', I already have ideas about *this* social world in mind. These ideas are the theoretical perspectives I explicate in Chapters 4-7. They define my approach to the knowledge of "those living in that world". Accordingly, I understand the meaning produced during the interviews as a construction influenced by my structures of meaning and those of my interviewees (Silverman 2006: 129). Understanding the production of meaning influenced by my notions, it is "imperative to make explicit the intentions and procedural principals that [...] [I] put into practice in the research project" (Bourdieu 1999c: 607). On this basis the reader will be able to "reproduce in the reading of the texts the work of both construction and understanding that produced them" (Bourdieu 1999c: 607).

Aiming at revealing the 'procedural principals' underlying my study I introduce an understanding of social reality as constituted by competing knowledge

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that relates to Schütz's notion of the social world constituted by meaning. The corresponding applied research methods and the theory driven sampling of the interviewees are pivotal to reproducing the construction of the following analysis.

The first section aims at conceiving social reality as competing, supra-individual knowledge influenced by social cleavages. Following Schütz, I understand social reality not as homogeneous, but instead as constituted by competing perspectives. Since I largely adopt the research focus of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann's sociology of knowledge, I assume social reality to be constituted by socially available, supra-individual and historically produced knowledge. Following Pierre Bourdieu, I assume different interpretations of social reality (i.e., knowledge) to be influenced by social cleavages (3.1).

Second, given my research focus on competing social realities, I introduce Brigitte Scheele and Norbert Groeben's method of semi-standardised interviews to reveal subjective theories (knowledge) and the method of content analysis developed by Philipp Mayring, which I applied during the conduction and analysis of interviews (3.2).

Third, I define the theory driven criteria for the selective sampling of my interviewees. According to my understanding of ethnicised politics, political cleavages play an important role; I consider being *oppositional* or *conforming to the regime in power* as well as *citizen* or *political elite* as crucial for the selection. Based on an ethnic interpretation of political history, ethnic cleavages correspond to these criteria; next to mainly regional cleavages, they are considered in order to define my interviewees. Eventually, my Rwandan and Burundian samples are described briefly according to these criteria, i.e., with respect to being *citizen* or *political elite* as well as *extremely conforming*, *rather conforming*, *extremely oppositional* or *rather oppositional to the regime in power* (3.3).

3.1 Competing Knowledge

As mentioned above, I rely on Weber's concept of sociology as "a science concerning itself with the interpretative understanding of social actions" (Weber 1978: 4). The aim of Weber's sociology is to "interpret the actions of individuals in the social world and the ways in which individuals give meaning to social phenomena" (Schütz 1972: 6). Following this research focus, authors such as Schütz, Berger and Luckmann are concerned with interpreting human action and thought (Schütz and Luckmann 1973) and, hence, with the "analysis of the social construction of reality" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 15). However, unlike

Weber[48], Schütz assumes the social world is not homogeneous, but is given to us in a complex system of perspectives (Schütz 1972: 8). This idea is hard to miss in the introductory quote where he reminds us that others might not experience the world "as meaningful in quite the same sense as we would if we were in their place" (Schütz 1972: 9). Quite the contrary, the (academic) observer has to work with coexisting, and sometimes directly competing points of views (Bourdieu 1999b: 3).

Berger and Luckmann describe how diverging knowledge constitutes coexisting and competing social reality. While reality is understood as "the quality appertaining to phenomena that we recognize as having a being independent of our own volition", knowledge is "the certainty that phenomena are real and that they possess certain characteristics" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 13). In this sense, knowledge implies objectivation (i.e., reality that exists independently of our volition, see also 4.3). Knowledge constitutes reality (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 15). Consequently, to grasp social reality, one has to consider knowledge.

Obviously, knowledge and social reality differ depending on social contexts. "What is 'real' to a Tibetan monk may not be 'real' to an American businessman. The knowledge of the criminal differs from the knowledge of the criminologist" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 15). Accordingly, knowledge is the product of history (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 72). In this vein, interpretations are understood as "the referral of the unknown to the known, of that which is apprehended in the glance of attention to the schemes of experience" (Schütz 1972: 84). Experience and a specific history built up the interpretative schemes (Schütz 1972: 84/5) or as Berger and Luckmann put it, the knowledge.

Understanding (competing) knowledge as produced by a historical context, Berger and Luckmann typically differentiate between a totally institutionalised society and a society where "almost no common stock of knowledge" exists (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 98). If no common knowledge exists, one has to think about what defines the distribution of knowledge in a society. Bourdieu (1999a) gives an answer; he conceives of patterns of meaning as influenced by social divisions defined by different forms of available capital, which he assumes to be "reproduced in thought and in language" (Bourdieu 1999a: 125). Having said this, I understand social reality as constituted of historically produced knowledge related to social cleavages and I account for social cleavages[49] in the selection of my interviewees. Following my definition of ethnicised politics, I consider my interviewees' positions of power (i.e., social cleavages) to be

48 According to Schütz (1972: 8/9), Weber took the social world as an intersubjective agreement that the interpretative observer can access based on his knowledge of the social world.

49 The term "cleavage" reflects a political connotation as they are understood as social structures that serve as basis for political action (Kriesi 1998: 167).

of special relevance. Accordingly, concerning the selection of my interviewees, I distinguish between *political elite* and *citizens* as well as *oppositional* and *conforming to the regime in power* (see 3.3).

Supra-individual Knowledge

While Schütz starts his phenomenological analysis from the subjective perspective of the social actors, Bourdieu, Berger and Luckmann conceive of the patterns of meanings as collective and supra-individual. More precisely, within the scope of the present analysis, collective and supra-individual knowledge is defined by social cleavages. Meaning is understood as not individualised but socially objectified (Keller 2001: 118). In this sense, the analysis is focused on the collective production of knowledge (Ebrecht 2004: 230; Jäger 2001: 117).

In this respect, language is of specific importance – at the same time, language expresses subjective meaning, but also goes beyond the immediate expression of subjectivity, since as any other sign language is "objectively available beyond the expressions of subjective intentions ‚here and now'" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 51). Language has its origin in the face-to-face interaction but is readily detached from it (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 52). It typifies and anonymises experience. In this sense, language is indispensable for the process of objectivation (Jäger 2001: 121): "The common objectivations of everyday life are maintained primarily by linguistic signification" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 51). Having said this, meaning expressed by language is not seen as "subjectivity 'here and now'" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 52).

Accordingly, the resulting interview material is understood to display "perspectives and moral forms which draw upon *available* cultural resources" (Silverman 2006: 144, emphasis added). I take my interview material as "a form to talk – a 'discourse', 'account' or 'repertoire' – which represents a *culturally available* way of packaging experience" (Kitzinger 2004, cited in: Silverman 2006: 129, emphasis added). The interview material is not assumed to answer questions concerning facts and events. Instead, the material is a representation or account of the experiences of the interviewee (Silverman 2006: 117). This understanding relates to an understanding of language as always expressing meaning that transcends subjectivity 'here and now'. I understand the text as representations of structures of meanings rooted in everyday knowledge, i.e., supra-individual patterns of interpretation that relate to social cleavages.

Placing emphasis on patterns of interpretation (i.e., socially available knowledge) as well as on positions of power points to a critical analysis of discourse. Analysing the social process of production of meaning, an analysis of discourse implies the contention of different collective actors about the gener-

ally accepted and binding interpretation of social reality and the varying power of collective actors (e.g., scientific disciplines, institutions) to define meaning (Jäger 2001: 123-6). Based on the concept of my research, however, it is not possible to analyse the collectively binding production of knowledge. In other words, the present analysis does not aim to assess (des)integration defined according to Berger and Luckmann by the 'common stock of knowledge' (see above). Instead, I intend to question an understanding of institutions common in the academic institutional engineering-debate (see 4.2). Coming back to Schütz's quote cited at the beginning of this chapter, I challenge the assumption that social actors experience social action and the interpretation of the meaning of social action in the same way. That is why I approach the self-evident and taken for granted ideas of Rwandans and Burundians based on interviews (Schütz 1972: 9). Nonetheless, I consider it to be of special interest to broaden the focus on the collective production of knowledge in Rwanda and Burundi. Given competing perspectives, it is of special interest to analyse which is collectively binding.

3.2 Revealing 'Subjective Theories'

Obviously, understanding social reality relates to an understanding of what kind of methods are to be applied to capture social reality. Focusing on the meaning of 'those living in that world', and, hence, their competing knowledge, I need to approach social reality based on "the already constituted meanings of the active participants of the social world" (Schütz 1972: 10). In the tradition of Schütz, Berger and Luckmann, Bourdieu argues that only the empirical analysis of the practical meaning of the social actors permits an analysis of the patterns of these meanings (Ebrecht and Hillebrandt 2004: 8). Accordingly, my research interest in competing knowledge points to the qualitative option of social research and qualitative interviews, which "generally examines people's words and actions in narrative and descriptive ways more closely representing the situation as experienced by the participants" (Maykut and Morehouse 1994: 2).

Reframing my research interest in knowledge with the terminology applied by Scheele and Groeben (2001), I focus on 'subjective theories'. Starting from a structural parallelism between research subject and research object, Groeben and Scheele conceptualise the everyday knowledge of the research object as "intuitive, implicit or 'subjective' theories" (Groeben and Scheele 2001). The 'subjective theories' (and scientific theories) explain, predict and are applied to solve any problem. Accordingly, subjective theories are "complex cognition aggregates of the research object, in which their cognitions relating to the self and the world become manifest and which show an at least implicit argumenta-

tional structure" (Groeben and Scheele 2001). Analysing 'subjective theories' corresponds to my interest in the "socially available stock of knowledge" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 82) on a predominantly pre-theoretical level. In this sense, I am interested in the 'subjective theories' of Rwandans and Burundians.

To study the everyday knowledge of interviewees, Scheele and Groeben developed the method of semi-standardised interviews. In the scope of these interviews, it is crucial that the interviewer and the interviewee communicate, since that enhances revealing the subjective and implicit theories (Groeben and Scheele 2001).[50] Furthermore, different types of questions are part of the semi-standardised interviews: Each subject area of the interview guideline starts with an open question, passes to theory-driven hypotheses-directed questions and ends with confrontational questions (Flick 2009: 156-7). The open questions aim at understanding the immediate knowledge of the interviewee. The theory-driven questions are meant to make the implicit knowledge more explicit: "The assumptions in these questions are designed as an offer to the interviewees, which they might take up or refuse according whether they correspond to their subjective theories or not" (Flick 2009: 157). Confrontational questions are competing alternatives to the theory the interviewee presented up to that point. For instance, I ask my interviewees if it is possible to be Hutu without having parents who are Hutu. I thought of the questions as confrontational and theory-driven since it conforms to my theoretical understanding of ethnicity (see 5) and opposes the official perspective in Rwanda that officially denies ethnicity (see 2.3.1).

To interpret the interviews I proceeded with the classical model of content analysis developed by Mayring (2000) that analyses the "manifest and latent content of a body of communicated material through classification, tabulation, and evaluation of its key symbols and themes in order to ascertain its meaning" (Webster's Dictionary of the English Language, cited in: Krippendorff 2004: xvii). Crucial for the procedure is to explicate what the researcher is doing and thinking in order to make analyses, assessments and conclusions comprehensible for the readers (Krippendorff 2004: xxii).

The method of content analysis as a standardised, deductive procedure suits the analysis of my interview material for different reasons: first, content analysis is based on categories that are derived mainly from theoretical framework and are not developed necessarily from the empirical material itself (Flick 2009: 323). The main part of my categories is theoretically induced; therefore I use the

50 Groeben and Scheele propose combining the method of semi-standardised interviews with the structure formation-technique (Heidelberger Struktur-Lege-Technik) used to reconstruct the structure of subjective theory. Due to the sensibility of my research subject and anticipated reluctance of my interviewee, I did not apply the structure formation-technique.

method of semi-standardised interviews based on my strong theoretical framework. Correspondingly, the application of content analysis is appropriate; second, the standardised procedure of content analysis facilitates comparisons of cases (Flick 2009: 328) as I aim to do by comparing the different points of view of Rwandans and Burundians as well as of Rwandans and Burundians among each other; third, I pursue an analytical reduction of my interview material. In doing so, I remain on the surface of the text. Not aiming at a distinctive case-oriented and more inductive procedure, the method of content analysis is applied (Flick 2009: 328). More precisely, I use the method of structuring content analysis mainly used to analyse viewpoints and texts that are collected with semi-standardised interviews and therefore mainly follow criteria defined in advance. In doing so, I structure the text in regard to content (Flick 2002: 193), and more precisely in regard to ethnicity, politicised ethnicity and ethnicised politics. I follow a "deductive category application", although I also inductively develop categories from the material (Mayring 2000).

3.3 Selective Sampling

Since I apply a qualitative research design, the interviewees are selected based on specific characteristics and their theoretically induced relevance for my line of reasoning. Therefore, I follow a "selective sampling" (Kluge and Kelle 1999: 47). The resulting sample aims at representing the maximal variation of cases (Kluge and Kelle 1999: 51), corresponding to my research interest in *competing* knowledge. In particular, I am interested in competing knowledge about ethnicised politics, i.e., interpretation of social and political exclusion based on ethnic categories (see 6.2). Since ethnicised politics reflect a certain distribution of power (i.e., social cleavages), I account for the distribution of political power. This relates to the general assumptions discussed above, according to which knowledge (or following Groeben and Scheelen the 'subjective theories') is socially available, supra-individual and defined by social cleavages (see 3.1).

Ethnicised politics reflect a certain distribution of power (i.e., social cleavages). The social cleavages considered in the present research are defined, on the one hand, as *oppositional* or *conforming to the regime in power* and, on the other hand, as *citizen* or *political elite.* In order to select my interviewees, the criterion of *political elite* (as opposed to *citizens*) is defined by holding an official political position at the national level. Conversely, *citizens* are defined as not holding any official political position on the national or regional level.

The political history of the two countries and, consequently, the change of power in 2003 in Rwanda and 2005 in Burundi are interpreted based on ethnic

categories.[51] In Rwanda, the FPR, a Tutsi-dominated rebel movement, militarily seized power in 1994 and was elected officially as a political party in 2003; in Burundi the CNDD-FDD, a former Hutu dominated rebel movement, was elected in 2005. Broadly speaking, Hutu dominate the government in Burundi and Tutsi dominate the government in Rwanda. The ethnic interpretation of political history and change of power serves as starting point for my research and, in particular, for the selection of my interviewees. More precisely, I assume that the criteria *oppositional* or *conforming to the regime in power* can be approached based on the ethnic cleavages of *Hutu* and *Tutsi*. According to the common interpretation of political history, *Twa* never played an important role in the power struggles of the two countries. Consequently, the characteristic *Twa* is not assigned to the criteria of *oppositional* or *conforming to the regime in power.*

The definition of the *political elite* as *oppositional* or *conforming to the regime in power* is based on their affiliation to parties in power/opposition as well as *Hutu* or *Tutsi.* Combining these four criteria, the interviewees are categorised as *extremely oppositional, rather oppositional*, *rather conforming* and *extremely conforming.*

To select *citizens,* I also considered ethnic categories. In order to avoid selecting interviewees exclusively based on ethnic criteria, I also took regional cleavages, including origin from neighbouring countries, especially for defining political cleavages in Rwanda and related language and economic cleavages, into account.[52] However, the categories *Hutu* and *Tutsi* are used to approach the criteria being *oppositional* or *conforming to the regime in power.*[53] The other regional cleavages are used to further define the interviewees as *extremely oppositional, rather oppositional*, *rather conforming* and *extremely conforming to the regime in power* (see cross tabulation below).

51 In both countries, the precedent regimes were destabilized and overthrown in the early 1990s. In the transition periods, the preceding regime gradually lost power in Burundi while the regime currently in power gradually gained power in Rwanda. In 2005 in Burundi and in 2003 in Rwanda, the first elections took place, based on the new constitutions approved in 2005 and 2003, respectively.

52 Ethnicity and regionality are systematically, while language and economic cleavages are unsystematically taken into account. In addition, I partly considered biographical aspects such as being demobilised, internally displaced, refugees, etc., to define my interviewees as *conforming* or *oppositional to the regime in power.*

53 In doing so, I argue and reproduce the assumption of politicised ethnicity (see 6.2), i.e.., taken for granted notion, according to which ethnic categories make up the basis for rights, political claims, and political representation. Selecting the interviewees based on this notion, however, enables the analysis to reveal interpretations of Rwandans and Burundians that explicitly contradict this notion (see 10).

Rwandan Sample

My Rwandan sample is composed of twenty-two interviewees. Fourteen interviewees are considered *citizens* and eight interviewees are *political elite* (i.e., they hold a political position at the national level).

More precisely, the *political elite* is composed of seven members of the Rwandan parliament and senate, as well as of the Governor of the Northern Province, which includes historically important regions around Ruhengeri and Gisenyi. Four of the eight interviewees fulfil their political task as members of FPR (Front Patriotique Rwandais), the political party in power.

Two of the four are Tutsi who are assumed to be *extremely conforming to the regime in power*. Two of the four members of the FPR are Hutu and therefore correspond to *rather conforming to the regime in power*. In addition, (although not systematically), I took regional and language cleavage into account, which came into play with the military victory of the FPR in 1994. The returnees coming back after 1994 from neighbouring countries such as Burundi and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) are Francophone. However, the new elite of the FPR mainly came from Uganda and is Anglophone (Hofmeier 2005: 9). Since the political takeover of the FPR, the English language has become more relevant[54]. Accordingly, I chose one person that is Anglophone and from Uganda. The others three interviewees are Francophone.

Three of the eight interviewees were members of the PSD (Parti Social Démocrate) and one of the PL (Parti Libéral). PSD and PL are the most important political parties of the opposition. I spoke to two Hutu corresponding to *extremely oppositional* and two Tutsi categorised as *rather oppositional*.

Fourteen interviewees correspond to *citizen* (i.e., not holding any official political position on the national or regional level). The ethnic criteria (i.e., *Hutu* and *Tutsi*) are used to further define interviewees as *oppositional* or *conforming to the regime in power*. Also, taking regional cleavages into account I intend to differentiate my sample so it is not based exclusively on ethnic cleavages. While Rwandans from the north are considered to correspond to the criteria *oppositional to the regime in power,* Rwandans from the south correspond to *conforming to the regime in power* (see 2.2). Subsequently, my sample is composed by four interviewees who are *extremely oppositional to the regime,* three interviewees that are *rather oppositional to the regime,* four interviewees that are *extremely conforming to the regime* and three interviewees that are *rather conforming to the regime.*

54 In 2008, the Rwanda government decided to introduce English as the exclusive official language of education and government. Since 1996, all three official languages, Kinyarwanda, French and English, have been used in education.

Burundian Sample

My Burundian sample is composed of twenty interviewees. Twelve interviewees are *citizens* (not holding any official political position on the national or regional level). Eight interviewees are classified as *political elite* since they hold an official political position at the national level.

Four of the interviewees included in the category *political elite* fulfil their political tasks as member of the CNDD-FDD (Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces pour la Défense de la Démocratie), the party in power. One is the President of the CNDD-FDD. The other three are members of the Burundian parliament (1) and the senate (2).

Two of the four members of the CNDD-FDD are Hutu and therefore correspond to *extremely conforming to the regime in power*. Accordingly, two Tutsi out of the members of the CNDD-FDD are categorised as *rather conforming*.

In addition, I talked to one politician representing the UPRONA (Union pour le Progrès National) and two politicians representing the FRODEBU (Front pour la Démocratie au Burundi) since they are the main political parties in opposition. The UPRONA was the ruling party until 2003 (the dictators Michel Micombero (1965-76), Jean–Baptiste Bagaza (1976-87) and Pierre Buyoya (1987-1993; 1996-2003) were Tutsi from Bururi provinces representing the UPRONA (Scherrer 2002: 47)), and FRODEBU briefly gained political power in 1993 before the military overthrew the government and assassinated President Melchior Ndadaye (see 2.2). I also spoke to one politician of the CNDD. These four interviewees included the President of UPRONA and the CNDD along with members of the Burundian parliament (1) and the senate (1). The CNDD split from the CNDD-FDD in 1998 reflects political struggles between the north and south. In this vein, the party also is frequently referred to as CNDD-Nyangoma since it is run by former rebel leader Leonard Nyangoma (HRW 2010f), who came from the south (Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2000: 384; Ngaruko and Nkurunziza 2005: 49). Conversely, the ruling party CNDD-FDD is associated with the north, which was neglected in economic and political terms before 1993. Since the CNDD-FDD took power, these regions have gained political importance, partly because Burundian President Pierre Nkurunziza is from Ngozi. Two of the four members of oppositional political parties are Tutsi corresponding to the criteria *extremely oppositional*. Two are Hutu that are categorised as *rather oppositional*.

Twelve interviewees correspond to the criteria *citizen*. Like the Rwandan sampling, in order to approach being *oppositional* or *conforming to the regime in power*, I referred to the ethnic cleavages (i.e., Hutu and Tutsi). Avoiding an exclusively ethnic criterion, I considered regional cleavages, too. Burundians

from the south are considered to correspond to the criteria *oppositional to the regime in power,* and Burundians from the north are considered *conforming to the regime in power*. Three interviewees that are *rather conforming to the regime*, three interviewees that are *extremely conforming to the regime*, three interviewees that are *extremely oppositional to the regime* and three interviewees that are *rather oppositional to the regime* compose the resulting sample.

In conclusion, the chapter is meant to introduce my understanding of social reality as composed by competing knowledge, i.e., notions taken for granted. According to this understanding and research interest, qualitative interviews are applied. More precisely, I use semi-standardised interviews and the method of content analysis to categorise the knowledge of Rwandans and Burundians selected and presented according to theoretically induced criteria.

Table I: Rwandan Sample

RWANDA (22)	Citizens (14)		Political elite (8)	
Hutu (11)	Extremely oppositional (4) NGO worker (Gisenyi) (R1) prisoner (Kigali) (R2) prisoner (Kigali) (R3) peasant woman (Kigali) (R4)	Rather oppositional (3) teacher (Kigali) (R9) NGO worker (Butare) (R10) former deputy (Butare) (R11)	Extremely oppositional (2) deputy, PSD (R15) senator, PL (R16)	Rather conforming (2) governor, FPR (Gisenyi) (R19) deputy, FPR (R20)
Tutsi (11)	Rather conforming (4) peasant/ survivor (Bugesera) (R5) unemployed jurist/ returnee (Kigali) (R6) NGO worker/ survivor (Gisenyi) (R7) priest/ survivor (Kigali) (R8)	Extremely conforming (3) businessperson/ returnee from Uganda (Kigali) (R12) peasant woman/ returnee Uganda (outskirts of Kigali) (R13) former FPR soldier/ returnee Uganda (Kigali) (R14)	Rather oppositional (2) deputy, PSD (R17) deputy, PSD (R18)	Extremely conforming (2) senator, FPR (R21) deputy, FPR (R22)

Table II: Burundian Sample

BURUNDI (20)	Citizens (12)		Political elite (8)	
Tutsi (10)	Extremely oppositional (3) displaced woman (Gitega) (B4) doctor (Bururi) (B5) military (Bururi) (B6)	Rather oppositional (3) NGO worker (Ngozi) (B10) mushingantahe (Bujumbura) (B11) peasant women (Ngozi) (B12)	Extremely oppositional (2) President of UPRONA (B15) deputy, FRODEBU (B16)	Rather conforming (2) senator, CNDD-FDD (B19) senator, CNDD-FDD (B20)
Hutu (10)	Rather conforming (3) teacher (Bururi) (B1) unemployed (Kamenge, Bujumbura) (B2) partisan FNL (Kamenge, Bujumbura) (B3)	Extremely conforming (3) demobilised soldier (Gitega) (B7) NGO worker (Ngozi) (B8) mushingantahe (Bujumbura) (B9)	Rather oppositional (2) President of CNDD (B13) senator, FRODEBU (ex-President of the Republic) (B14)	Extremely conforming (2) President of CNDD-FDD (B17) senator, CNDD-FDD (B18)

4 Institution and 'Institutional Engineering' as 'Experienced Reality'

> It is important to keep in mind that the objectivity of the institutional world, however massive it may appear to the individual, is a humanly produced, constructed objectivity. The process by which the externalised products of human action attain the character of objectivity is objectivation. The institutionalised world is objectivated human activity, and so is every single institution (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 78).

Of course, as most of today's sociologists would acknowledge, institutions are "objectivated human activity". Hence, "however massive it may appear to the individual", it "is a humanly produced, constructed objectivity" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 78). Moreover, following Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, I conceive of institutions not only as objective, yet socially constructed, but also as "experienced reality" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 77), being the product of a specific history (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 72). Consequently, for approaching and analysing an institutional order, the historically produced knowledge of its members must be taken into consideration (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 82).

This concept decisively differs from those dominating the discussion about 'institutional engineering'. The general assumption is that by implementing certain institutional structures a specific desired output can be achieved: namely, conflict management, political stability and democracy (Esman 2004: 203; Hechter 2004; Norris 2002: 206; Reilly 2001: 6). The potential to achieve the desired output is assessed exclusively in relation to the institutional structures and their presumably (ahistorical) in-built incentives. Conceiving of institutions as 'experienced reality', as is the aim of the present chapter, introduces a general perspective on social reality following which ethnicity, ethnicised politics and politicised ethnicity are approached and, finally, the 'dilemma of recognition' becomes graspable.

Discussing the democratic management of violent conflicts in the introduction to the book *The Architecture of Democracy* (2002), which reassembles the opinions of influential scientists in the field, it is asserted that "in divided societies institutional design can systematically favour or disadvantage ethnic, national and religious groups" (Belmont, Mainwaring, and Reynolds 2002: 3). In order to strengthen the argument, the authors give the example of a first-past-

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the-post electoral system, which "systematically and profoundly disadvantage[s] large minority groups", inhibiting the building of loyalty to the system (Belmont, Mainwaring, and Reynolds 2002: 3).

I agree with this argument in that it focuses on exclusion in order to discuss the potential management of conflict (see 6). Yet, following Berger and Luckmann (1991), the present line of reasoning places emphasis on the historically produced knowledge of "those living in that world" (Schütz 1972: 9) (see 3.1) instead of assuming a causal and universally valid relationship between a specific institution (first-past-the-post electoral system) and a certain (ahistorical) outcome (i.e., lacking loyalty to the system and the related impossibility of democratic management). Conceiving of institutions as 'experienced reality', this project aims to offer a new perspective to the 'institutional engineering'-debate. For promoting this broader notion of institutions, the argument follows three steps.

The first section introduces 'institutionalism' as an approach that relates social action to institutional structures and their in-built incentives. A currently predominating approach called 'new institutionalism', however, partly shifts the focus to interpretations, routine of action and taken for granted concepts (4.1). The notions of '(new) institutionalism' are crucial for the present line of reasoning in the following two respects: First, in principle, the assumptions leading the discussions subsumed under the label of 'institutionalism' constitute the general frame, of which the 'institutional engineering'-debate is a part. Second, the currently present arguments labelled as 'new institutionalism' are important in order to contextualise the argument of Berger and Luckmann (1991) equally focusing on knowledge, i.e., taken for granted notions, that the members of the institutional order hold.

Within the 'institutional engineering'-debate, though, the role of taken for granted concepts and interpretations is rather neglected. The predominant understanding of institutions assumes a universally valid, generalisable and partly causal relationship between political institutions and the desired outcome of conflict management, political stability and democracy (4.2).

In contrast, the notion of institutions proposed by Berger and Luckmann in their well-known book *The Social Construction of Reality. A Treatise in the Sociology of Knowledge* (1991) focuses on knowledge the members of an institutional order have in order to discuss its integration (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 82). Relating this understanding to the 'institutional engineering'-debate the emphasis is placed on historically produced knowledge (4.3).

4.1 '(New)Institutionalism' and the Notion of Institution

Institutionalist approaches focus on institutions and their relevance in order to explain social action and the development of societies (Hasse and Krücken 1999: 7). As Marc Schneiberg and Elisabeth Clemens (2006: 195) put it: "The behaviour of actors […] is attributed […] to its context or to higher-order factors." In doing so, approaches subsumed under the label of 'institutionalism' generally share the central assumption that the social choice of social actors is shaped by institutions (Brubaker 1994: 48).

Similarly, the so-called 'new institutionalism' describes institutions and rules of actions (Senge 2006: 44). Unlike precedent institutionalist approaches, however, the "taken for grantedness" and "unreflectivity" of social action are highlighted (Senge and Hellmann 2006: 14): Analysing cognitive institutions in order to understand structures and processes in organisations, 'new institutionalism' shifts the focus from rationally induced action to action routine and concepts taken for granted by social actors (Senge 2006: 40). In doing so, the deterministic impact of institutions becomes less crucial for the analysis (Senge 2006: 40-44). Unlike older 'institutionalism' the analysis of "the choice of a course of action" is based on "the *interpretation of a situation* rather than on purely instrumental calculation" (Hall and Taylor 1996: 8, emphasis added). Whereas older 'institutionalism' assumes rational and hence predictable action, 'new institutionalism' takes the interpretations of social actors and their action routine into account. In this respect, 'new institutionalism' is strongly influenced by Berger and Luckmann and their conception of institutions and institutionalisation (Senge 2006: 37). Concerning the analysis of politics, e.g., sociological 'new institutionalism' highlights the symbolic and legitimizing aspects and stresses the social embeddedness and structuring of organisations (Hasse and Krücken 1999: 26).

Yet, whereas the focus on "symbol systems, cognitive scripts, and moral templates" providing "the 'frame of meaning'" is well-established in sociological 'new institutionalism', it is less acknowledged in other social sciences (Hall and Taylor 1996: 13). For instance, the 'new institutionalism' discussed in political sciences and economics "retain[s] strategic and utility-maximizing models of action" (Schneiberg and Clemens 2006: 196) and focuses on "formal rules, procedures or norms" (Hall and Taylor 1996: 13).

Moreover, even analyses focusing on informal rules and action routine most often conceive of institutions as including formal, rationally induced, as well as informal rules of actions based on routine. Richard Scott (2001), e.g., assumes regulative institutions such as the law to work due to rational action, like the

avoidance of negative sanctions, and cognitive institutions due to routines of action and the "taken for grantedness" of social action (Senge 2006: 38-40). Correspondingly, several inconsistent expectations are assumed to coexist, deriving from contradictory formal and informal institutions (Hasse and Krücken 1999: 10/1).

Concluding, although the understanding of institutions promoted by this project can be found in concepts labelled as 'new institutionalism', depending on the discipline, the concept of institutions is very narrowly focused on formal institutions and rational action induced by in-built institutional incentives instead of on interpretations and taken for granted concepts. The 'institutional engineering'-debate, in particular, is subject to a rather narrow concept of institution.

4.2 The 'Institutional Engineering'-Debate and the Notion of Institution

The aim of 'institutional engineering' is "to develop rules of the game structuring political competition so that actors have *in-built* incentives to accommodate the interests of different cultural groups, leading to *conflict management, ethnic cooperation and long-term political stability*" (Norris 2002: 206, emphasis added). Aiming at the management or prevention of intra-state and violent conflicts "institutional forms, rules and practices" are assumed to have implications for the evolution of "ethnonationalist violence" (Hechter 2004), conflict management and ethnic cooperation as well as for the democratic process (Reilly 2001: 6) and political stability.

Hence, basically similar to 'institutionalism', the 'institutional engineering'-debate addressing the management of (violent) conflicts argues on the assumption that institutions shape human interaction and behavioural incentives (Esman 2004: 203; Reilly 2001: 5). Taking this assumption to an extreme, Donald Horowitz (1990: 452) describes ethnic conflict as an equation of ethnic cleavages and institutional structure that together determine the output:

> Ethnic conflict is not just a function of the raw materials of cleavages and antipathy […] but it is also a function of the institutional structure in which conflict and restraint find expression.

Conversely, the argument goes that ethnic conflict is inhibited or enhanced depending on the institutions. The applied metaphor of a function that always produces the same output depending on the input highlights the idea of institutions that invariably shape the same incentives and, thereby, the same behav-

iour. Accordingly, Horowitz (2004) introduces the model of Alternative Vote[55], which he assumes to provide incentives for "the 'ethnic parties' to behave moderately and to compromise on disputed ethnic issues" (Horowitz 2004: 250). He goes on to generally assert that "ordinary democracy [...] is inadequate to produce inter-ethnic conciliation" (Horowitz 2004: 250).

This understanding of institutions and in-built incentives enhances the idea that the assessed impacts of institutions are universally valid and generalisable. In this vein, power sharing agreements are generally assumed to reassure minorities and ethnic communities about their security and well-being (Esman 2004: 206; Rothchild 2005: 261) as well as to "provide for collective self-management and an equitable distribution of opportunity" (Esman 2004: 206). The presumably generalisable, deterministic impact of institution is especially strong reflected in arguments based on assumed rational agency (see Congleton 2000: 25).

In short, the 'institutional engineering'-debate argues based on the assumption that, regardless of the historically produced context, the same institutions, such as federalism – more generally, power sharing, or the model of Alternative Vote, induce the same incentives and, hence, the same outcome, namely, conflict management, political stability, and democracy.

The same institutions, however, do have ambiguous effects, which are part of the debate about consociational and majoritarian democracy (see 7.1), and which can be exemplified by quoting the examples of federalism. Federalism might exacerbate or inhibit conflicts or might not influence them at all. Hence, "the relationship between federation and ethno-nationalist conflict is highly contentious" (Hechter 2004: 287). Based on empirical observations, Michael Hechter challenges the idea that theories acting on the assumption of rational action can provide the framework for discussing institutions and their impact on containing ethnonationalist violence (Hechter 2004: 287).

Against this background the present argument aims at directing the 'institutional engineering'-debate to the interpretations of 'those living in that world' or – to say it in the vein of Berger and Luckmann – to the knowledge of the members of a given institutional order. Contrary to the arguments presented above, I assume that the "integration of an institutional order" (Berger and Luckmann

55 Alternative Vote is a preferential electoral system, in which (given more than two candidates) the voters list their preferred candidates in order. A majority of votes is required to win the election. If no candidate draws in a majority of votes, the candidate who got relatively less votes is eliminated. His votes are redistributed according to the second preferences. This process is repeated until one of the candidates draws in a majority of votes (Horowitz 2004).

1991: 82) cannot be assessed and discussed without taking these interpretations into consideration.

4.3 Institution as 'Experienced Reality'

In the tradition of Max Weber and Alfred Schütz and, of Berger and Luckmann, the present analysis focuses on the meaningful structure and (competing) knowledge constituting social reality. Correspondingly, institutions are what is "experienced as possessing a reality" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 76), and "the integration of an institutional order can be understood only in terms of the knowledge that its members have of it" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 82). Its integration, then, is defined by the "common stock of knowledge" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 98) that, in turn, influences the legitimacy of an institutional order (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 110). For the analysis of the institutional order, hence, the analysis of such knowledge is essential (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 82). Accordingly, the functioning and malfunctioning of institutions can be understood only based on what people know about institutions – in Berger and Luckmann's terms, "the socially available stock of knowledge" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 82). This knowledge refers neither exclusively nor primarily to complex theories, but mainly implies the pre-theoretical knowledge.

As just said institutions are what is "experienced as possessing a reality" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 76). More precisely, Berger and Luckmann hold that institutions are understood as "reciprocal typification of habitualized action" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 72). What exactly does it mean to conceive of institutions as "reciprocal typification of habitualized action"? Berger and Luckmann explain that it refers to "constructing […] a background of routine" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 75) that ensures stability and predictability. Habitualisation means that frequently repeated actions "become cast into a pattern" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 70). In doing so, the meaning of the action becomes "embedded as routines in [...] a general stock of knowledge" of the individual (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 71). Due to the habitualisation of action, not every situation has to be defined anew.

Having said this, institutions imply objectivation. In Berger and Luckmann's words, institutions "are experienced as possessing a reality on their own, a reality that confronts the individual as an external and coercive fact" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 76). Thus, the institutionalised world is characterized by an objective and compelling reality and – in this sense – becomes "the world" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 77). Yet, this experienced objectivity, with which any individual is confronted, is the product of social action (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 78).

Put differently, institutionalisation describes the process in which typification and habitualisation attain the quality of objectivity. The term objectivation, then, describes the process in which the human product attains the character of objectivity (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 75/6). Within the process of objectivation, the world "becomes real in a more massive way and it can no longer be changed so readily" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 77).

Arguing in this way, reciprocal typifications, thus, institutions are seen to be the product of a common history (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 72). Consequently, as Berger and Luckmann assert, institutions cannot be understood without understanding the historical processes that produced them (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 72).

Given that institutions are always the product of a specific historical and social context, it becomes possible to analytically differentiate between totally institutionalised societies and societies where "almost no common stock of knowledge" exists (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 98). Analysing whether there is an encompassing integration of meaning within the society is important in that it comes along with (de)legitimisation of the institutional order (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 110). Since institutions appear simply as a fact, no further legitimisation, i.e., explaining and justifying is necessary (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 11). Conversely, institutions are legitimate if they are taken for granted and self-evident (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 12). In this sense, a lack of a 'common stock of knowledge' challenges the taken for grantedness and, hence, legitimacy.

The notion of institutions as introduced by Berger and Luckmann forms the basis of the analysis: I focus on the knowledge of the members of the institutional order. In order to analyse 'experienced reality' or – as Berger and Luckmann also refer to it – 'the objectivity', patterns of interpretation, collective and supra-individual, i.e., objectively available knowledge (see 3.1) is to be analysed.

This chapter was meant to show that although the understanding of institutions advocated in the present chapter can be found in the concepts implied in the discussions labelled as new institutionalism, depending on the discipline, it is yet very narrowly focused: i.e., on informal or cognitive institutions. Formal institutions are often considered to work based on in-built incentives of institutions. In particular, the 'institutional engineering'-debate is subject to a rather narrow concept of institutions. Broadly speaking, its arguments are mainly based on the assumption that the same institutions, such as federalism, power sharing, and Alternative Vote, independently of the historically produced context and, hence, knowledge of 'those living in that world' induces the same

incentives and, hence, the same outcome: namely, conflict management, political stability, and democracy.

In contrast, I apply the notion of institutions of Berger and Luckmann to the ‘institutional engineering’-debate. Its focus is replaced by that on the knowledge of the members of the institutional order, which must be analysed in order to analyse the institutional order itself. Having said this, first, the recurring usage of the term ‘institution’ points to the relevance of objectivity and taken for grantedness experienced by ‘those living in that world’. Second, acting on the assumption that Rwanda and Burundi correspond to the definition of weakly institutionalised societies lacking a ‘common stock of knowledge’ the relevance of diverging interpretations becomes apparent (see 3.3). Concluding, based on the notion of institutions as experienced reality, emphasis is placed on (diverging) taken for granted notions, i.e., knowledge, in order to discuss institutions and their ability to manage violent conflicts.

5 Ethnic Categories: Institutions Defined by Descent

> The problem with myths is that, once created they have a tendency to live a life of their own, as Mary Shelley's Frankenstein poetically demonstrates. In Rwanda, by 1940, the myth had become reality. Tutsi and Hutu conformed to the images which had forcefully been projected on them. They behaved according to their 'traditional' patterns, obeyed their 'ancestral customs' and probably felt their feelings appropriate to their position in life. Tutsi even those who wore rags [sic!][…] had become haughty lords […] and the Hutu mass felt – and was – oppressed. This is why, although the 1959 revolution was a fake, it was nevertheless a fake based on truth (Prunier 1995: 347).

Gérard Prunier (1995) describes how the (violent) Rwandan political history has been driven by the ideas (he calls them "myths") about Hutu and Tutsi and about the relationship between them. Although very few Tutsi were haughty lords in 1940 in Rwanda, as he asserts, the social category Tutsi relates to the idea of oppressors that were a long time in power and could potentially seize power again. In this sense, Tutsi "had become haughty lords", and Hutu were oppressed (Prunier 1995: 347). "They behaved according to their 'traditional' patterns, obeyed their 'ancestral customs' and probably felt their feelings appropriate to their position in life" (Prunier 1995: 347). In 1959[56], Rwandans acted based on the notions they had of the ethnic categories of Hutu and Tutsi. In this sense, "the myths had become real" and the fake of the 1959 revolution is "based on truth" (Prunier 1995: 347). Arguing according to the approach of Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann just introduced (4.3), it should be added that myths are real in that they are *experienced* as real.

Having said this, the objective of this chapter is to argue for an analytical approach to ethnicity in Rwanda and Burundi that is based on taken for granted and self-evident notions of 'those living in that world'. In doing so, radical constructivist and essentialist approaches are referred to; not only because the present approach results from these arguments, but also because they (and their theoretical shortcomings) are especially present in the debate about ethnicity in Rwanda and Burundi (see 2.1). Furthermore, lines of reasoning of Rwandans and Burundians are analysed in terms of essentialist and constructivist notions

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56 From 1959 until 1962, approximately 10,000 Tutsi were massacred and over 100,000 went into exile, most often to neighbouring Uganda (Jones 1999: 59/60; Ndikumana 1998: 34; Scherrer 2002: 37).

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(see 8). The difference between essentialist and constructivist categories is important for my general argument since essentialistically defined categories imply "qualitative [*as opposed to quantitative*, author's note] judgments of otherness" (Sutterlüty and Neckel 2006: 808) and, in this sense, imply exclusion. Constructivist categories are seen to be less exclusive, as they are understood as being changeable and, hence, as quantitative differences "associated with acquired attributes such as income, education and professional status" (Sutterlüty and Neckel 2006: 808).

Ethnic categories are to be conceived of as 'experienced reality', i.e., as institutions (see 4). More precisely, I understand ethnic categories to be defined by a "subjective belief in [...] common descent" (Bös 2005: 322; Bös 2008: 57; Weber 1978: 389). This concept reflects a common understanding of ethnicity in today's academic debate (see Bös 2005; Brubaker 2004b; Fearon and Laitin 2000). Hence, ethnic categories are not to be defined by the "scientific interpreter" (Schütz 1972: 9), e.g., by means of observable, ostensibly objective criteria not uncommon in the so-called essentialist approach, conceiving of ethnicity as having genetic foundations (Harvey 2000: 40). One should overemphasise the aspect of neither choice nor flexibility as do some constructivist approaches, which focus on the aspects of 'invention' and instrumentalisation of ethnicity.[57] In doing so, an understanding is promoted that (implicitly) conceives of ethnic categories as being either negligible or replaceable by other categories, e.g., class, football clubs, and sport teams (see Chazan et al. 1999; Hardin 1995: 53; Mueller 2000: 62). In contrast, the description of Hutu and Tutsi as ethnic categories as well as of the killings and massacres in the Rwandan and Burundian political history as 'ethnic' or as 'ethnicised'[58] is to be based on the knowledge of Rwandans and Burundians.

The recurring debate between essentialism and constructivism restrains the analytical conception of ethnicity as well as of ethnic conflict. In order to conceive of violent conflicts as not 'ethnic' the discussion refers to an essentialist understanding. A common argument in this respect is if causes other than ethnic ones – and ethnic is to say 'ancient hatred' – contribute to an adequate understanding and explanation of conflict, conflicts are not to be called 'ethnic' (see

57 In this respect, I refer to an approach that highlights either the inventedness or instrumentalist aspects of ethnic categories and the aspects of choice and flexibility. In contrast, other constructivist approaches (including my own line of reasoning (see 5.3)) "locates the action at a level of supra-individual things like discursive formations or symbolic or cultural systems that have their own logic or agency" (Fearon and Laitin 2000: 851).

58 Based on a general social constructivist perspective, I understand 'ethnic' to be the same as 'ethnicised'. The term 'ethnicised' emphasises the general assumption of social constructedness. I use the two words synonymously.

Gilley 2004: 1160). However, this has serious drawbacks, since it hampers the (academic) observer's understanding that "the presumably 'socially constructed' differences between Hutu and Tutsi have become a legitimate reason for murdering one's neighbours" (Waters 1995: 343).

In principle, it is not necessary to get deeply into the discussion between constructivism and essentialism (or primordialism), which are the two predominant perspectives mapping the terrain of the academic debate about ethnicity. Even more so, as these categorisations rather serve to delineate and justify research projects and perspectives; hardly any author contributing to the debate about ethnicity and ethnic conflict fits neatly into one of those two categories. Thus, based on Rogers Brubaker's (2004a: 31) analytical differentiation between 'category of analysis' and 'category of practice', I assert that essentialism is an empty 'category of analysis' (5.1).

Yet, constructivist approaches keep on referring to this perspective. Some of these approaches developed by delineating from essentialist understandings do not go beyond the strong emphasis on the (broadly speaking) social constructedness of ethnic categories. Put differently, these lines of reasoning especially prominent in the 1980s and 1990s miss out on defining ethnic categories (as opposed to other social categories) and ethnic conflict. Likewise, the emphasis on 'inventedness' evokes the idea of categories, which are artificial and, therefore, less real. Hence, ethnic categories appear as analytically negligible and replaceable (5.2).

In contrast, I follow an understanding that conceives of ethnic categories as institutions defined by descent (5.3). That understanding stresses the constructed, yet objective and particularly the 'experienced reality' of ethnic categories. Consequently, the question of whether it is appropriate to speak about ethnic categories and ethnic conflict is to be approached based on the knowledge of 'those living in that world'.

5.1 Essentialism as an Empty 'Category of Analysis'

Like any other academic field, the debate about ethnicity underwent different attempts of categorisation whereof the categories of essentialism (and more often primordialism) as opposed to constructivism have been the most prominent ones. As Henry Hale (2004: 459) puts it: "Analysts have typically lumped these richly diverse perspectives [*on ethnicity*, author's note] into two supposedly opposing camps, usually dubbed 'primordialism' and 'constructivism'." As he adds, this categorisation has made the debate about ethnicity more confusing and hindered the understanding of ethnicity. This is the case despite the fact that

"few scholars in practice adhere to either the primordialist or the instrumentalist pole tout court" (Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 9). Regardless of the weak acceptance especially true for essentialist approaches within the socio-scientific discussion, these categorisations persist. In this sense, I call essentialism an empty 'category of analysis'. Referring to Brubaker's (2004a: 31) analytical distinction between "categories of practice" and the experience-distant "categories of analysis" meant to theoretically approach ethnicity (see 5.3), the label stresses the missing social analyst who bases his or her line of reasoning on essentialist arguments. On the contrary, I assume essentialist everyday experience (implied in my understanding of ethnic categories defined by common descent) to be common.

The labels of essentialism and primordialism point to two important aspects of this putative approach.[59] The term primordial describes ethnicity as having always been there. The label of essentialism points out that ethnicity is of an essence that is not changeable, i.e., existing independently of the historical contexts. Primordialists are assumed to conceive of ethnicity as blood–related and eternal, having even genetic foundations (Harvey 2000: 40). However, there are very few authors contributing to the discussion who assert that ethnicity has a biological basis (Hale 2004: 460). There are almost no authors writing about ethnicity who do not take social context and ascriptions into account. Even Pierre Van den Berghe who is often seen as the only 'true' primordialist as he refers to 'extended kinship' in order to conceive of ethnicity (Hale 2004: 460; Hutchinson and Smith 1996: 8), includes socially produced aspects such as preferential endogamy and inbreeding into his analysis (Van den Berghe 1981: 22).

Nonetheless, primordialism is the main target of constructivists in discussions about ethnic categories. The same is true for discussions about ethnic conflict and ethnic violence (Fearon and Laitin 2000: 849). In this respect, primordialists "are said to believe that conflict between two ethnic groups, A and B, is inevitable because of unchanging, essential characteristics of the members of these categories" (Fearon and Laitin 2000: 849). The proponents of this line of reasoning are fairly missing in the socio-scientific discussion. Similar to the discussion about ethnic categories, essentialism mainly serves as a starting point to develop other perspectives on ethnicity. Primordial concepts of ethnicity, however, are frequently found outside the academic field as in the media and in political debates (Brubaker 2004b: 9; Varshney 2001: 4810). Against this background, the reference to and the delineation from an essentialist notion of ethnicity might be justified. However, it needs to be highlighted that a primordial

59 I use the two terms synonymously, as do most of the authors contributing to the debate as well.

view on ethnicity and ethnic conflict is barely present in the socio-scientific discussion. That is why I call essentialism an empty 'category of analysis'. Nonetheless, a lasting reference to and delineation from this concept is observable. Furthermore, as the analysis of the arguments of Rwandans and Burundians will show (see 7), essentialist concepts depicting Hutu and Tutsi as defined by descent, birth, biology, genes and, hence, physical traits are implied.

5.2 Ethnic Categories as 'Invented' and Negligible

The Invention of Tradition, written and published by Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger in 1983, is the most well known and used point of reference within the constructivist discussion about ethnicity and nation (see Conzen, Gerber, Morawska, Pozetta, and Vecoli 1992; Hanson 1989; Spear 2003; Van Schendel 1992). The argument mainly refers to European nation state building (as does the equally well known analysis of Benedict Anderson *Imagined Communities* first published in 1983), although Ranger also focuses on *The Invention of Tradition in Colonial Africa*. Concerning ethnic categories, the emphasis placed on 'invention' or 'creation' (as in the book *Creation of Tribalism in Southern Africa*, edited by Leroy Vail (1989)) challenges the ostensible timelessness of these categories, particularly in Africa (Spear 2003: 4). Furthermore, conceiving of categories as 'invented', which previously had been understood in an essentialist manner, contributed decisively to the increase of the general awareness of the world's social constructedness (Sollors 1989: x). Nonetheless, arguments conceiving of ethnicity as constructed or 'invented' *without* conceiving it as part of a socially constructed world remain present within the discussion about ethnicity (and nation). Implicitly, they emphasise the 'unrealness' or falseness of ethnic categories. Craig Calhoun (1993: 222) precisely describes this line of (implicit) reasoning (although referring to nationalism):

> Whenever traditions can be shown to be created and/or recent they must be false. This is the implication of Hobsbawm & Ranger's (Hobsbawm 1990; Hobsbawm and Ranger 1983) treatment of nationalism, in which they argue that because the 'traditions' of nationalism are 'invented' they are somehow less real and valid.

Evoked by the notion of 'invention' nationalism is thought to be opposed to the real world, and, consequently, appears to be less real and valid and, hence, false. Although the lines of reasoning of Hobsbawm and Ranger does not necessarily imply this (Sollors 1989: xv), the notion that 'inventedness' is the same as being less real and valid occurs within arguments adopting these concepts. For instance, Ernst Gellner (1965: 169, emphasis added) speaks about nations that are 'invented' "where they do not exist". In doing so, he suggests that 'invention'

should be understood to be the same as ‘fabrication’ and ‘falsity’ (Anderson 2003). Likewise, referring to Hobsbawm’s concept, Goeff Eley and Ronald Suny (1996: 7) describe the character of nineteenth and twentieth-century nationalities as “artificial” and “manufactured”. Lisa Wedeen (2002: 724), discussing the concept of ethnicity opposes “’constructions’” and “imaginings” to their “objective existence”. She reasons: “Put more radically, ethnicity may be less objectively real, or more variable, than some researchers tend to assume.”

The discussion about ‘invention of tribes’ in colonial Africa partly suggests that ethnicity is ‘artificial’. Referring to “the fact that new ethnic groups were suddenly appearing under colonial rule – sometimes in rural areas, but more inexplicably, in the towns” (Eller and Coughlan 1993: 188) “ethnic groups” are discussed as *not* “based on the relatively predetermined concept of kinship” and, hence, as *not* fixed (Bayar 2009: 1643). This line of reasoning suggests that besides the ‘ethnic groups’ that are suddenly appearing, mostly in towns, ‘ethnic groups’ exist that are based on a more predetermined concept of kinship and, accordingly, more fix. In this vein, it is assumed that ethnicity in Ghana (as opposed to ethnicity in Southern Africa) is not “simply an ‘invention’ of the colonial period” (Lentz and Nugent 2000: 2), implicitly arguing that ethnicity in Ghana is more real than the one in South Africa. By opposing the ‘invented’ ethnic categories to less ‘invented’ ethnic categories, so to speak, or those that are based on a predetermined concept of kinship and, hence, more fixed, ‘inventedness’ seems to refer to ethnic categories as being less real than other categories. The same is true for the use of terms like ‘artificial’, ‘manufactured’ and imagined, especially by opposing them to terms like ‘(objectively) real’ and ‘existent’. These extreme examples seem to ignore the idea that social reality, as well as ethnicity and nations as being part of it, is always constructed.

Generally, the idea of ‘invention’ points to the “power of the agent of invention” (Desai 1993: 121). In doing so, it neglects the historicity of ethnic categories and the complexity of the interpretative process (involving, e.g., also the social actors being subjects to these inventions) (Spear 2003: 4). René Lemarchand (1999: 5) notices that “to speak of an invented tradition does little to illuminate its ideological orientation or normative underpinnings”. Accordingly, ethnic categories seem to appear ‘out of nothing’ if powerful agents want them to appear. In this sense, ‘invented’ ethnic categories are implicitly conceived of as artificial and less real.[60]

60 By the way, in subsequent analyses Ranger (1994: 25) acknowledges the implications of the overemphasis of ‘invention’: "I have been changing my mind away from the notion of ‘invention’ and toward the notion of ‘imaginations’. I like the word ‘imagining’ because it lays stress upon ideas and images and symbols.”

This notion of ethnicity comes quite close to the one promoted by the instrumentalist discussion: Ethnicity and 'ethnic groups' are discussed as being socially constructed by elites (Sambanis 2001: 236). This common perspective strongly evokes the idea of a "manipulative inventor who single-handedly makes ethnics out of unsuspecting subjects" (Sollors 1989: xi). In doing so, these arguments suggest the idea of "false consciousness", implying that "subalterns are manipulated and duped by the elites" (Pieterse 1996: 28). The ideas and views of the "subjects" in this respect appear as being irrelevant in order to understand the manipulation of these categories (Pieterse 1996: 28). Similar to what I have just said regarding the idea of 'invented' ethnicity, instrumentalised ethnicity appears to be less real in that it is merely dependent on the agency of powerful agents. In this sense, ethnicity is understood as '*false* consciousness'.

Having said this, 'ethnic groups' are merely seen as one form of interest group and resource mobilisation (Pieterse 1996: 27). Correspondingly, ethnic categories are conceived of as being equivalent to social categories such as class (Chazan et al. 1999; Elwert 2002) or – very popular comparisons – football clubs (Mueller 2000: 62) and sports teams (Hardin 1995: 53). Definitions of ethnic categories become replaceable by definitions of sex or class (Bös 2005). In short, following these arguments, it is not necessary to have a specific analytical category in order to describe *ethnic* categories.

The previously predominant assumption of the essentialist nature of ethnic categories involve the emphasis on their 'inventedness' (Sollors 1989: x). Accordingly, instrumentalist authors start partly from a primordial understanding of ethnicity in order to define their own perspective (see Elwert 2002, Hardin 1995). In consequence, the discussion is often limited to stress that ethnic categories and ethnicity are not essential, but changeable and context-dependent and does not go beyond that point to ask how ethnic categories (as opposed to other social categories) are defined. Or, as Jan Pieterse (1996: 27) describes the limitation of the literature on ethnicity, "it critiques the primordialist view without taking the next step of theorizing the politics of subject formation". Hence, the discussion avoids approaching ethnic categories (and their potential appeal) analytically. In this sense, the mere "recurring argument about whether ethnic identities are essentially primordial or situational" does not contribute positively to the attempts to conceptualise ethnicity (Levine 1999: 165).

The conceptual problems induced by a specific understanding of the social constructedness of ethnic categories are reflected within the discussion about ethnic conflict, too. Hal Levine (1999) rather cynically describes the tendency in the academic debate to conceive of ethnic categories as *mere* inventions and to lose track of the objectivity these categories might have: "The news are full of

ethnic cleansing and genocide while the anthropologists stress that ethnicity is 'invented' and set out to 'decentre' the notion" (Levine 1999: 166). In doing so, "the constraints people face, in terms of identity choices or other courses of action, are not sufficiently analysed" (Levine 1999: 167). This is enhanced by the lasting reference to the idea of unchanging, essential characteristics and of conflicts that are caused by them for introducing constructivist positions (Fearon and Laitin 2000: 849). Researchers define their own projects by saying, e.g., that "ethnic conflict is not caused directly by inter-group differences, 'ancient hatreds' and centuries-old feuds" (Lake and Rothchild 1996: 41) or is not to be understood as "war all against all and neighbor against neighbor" (Mueller 2000: 42). Authors such as Bruce Gilley (2004) challenge the concept of ethnic conflict based on its primordial understanding, saying that the concept would be appropriate only when the motivation of conflict-prone agency or the direct causes underlying the contention are ethnic (Gilley 2004: 1158/9). Gilley goes on to argue that ethnic war does not occur due to "ancient hatred" and "fixed and non-negotiable" identities (Gilley 2004: 1160). This kind of argument has to conclude that "ethnic war *essentially* […] does not exist" (Mueller 2000: 42). Hence, enforced by the reference to an essentialist concept of ethnicity and ethnic conflict, instrumentalist lines of reasoning or those focusing on 'inventedness' tend to neglect the relevance of analytical categories meant to capture ethnicity or ethnic conflict.

In conclusion, it is obvious that the recurring debate between essentialism and constructivism hampers the conception of ethnic categories and ethnic conflict. Emphasising the non essentialist character of ethnic categories and conflict, some lines of reasoning do not go beyond that point to describe how ethnic categories are defined instead. Many approaches stressing the 'invented' or instrumentalist character of ethnic categories in order to delineate them from an essentialist concept result in analytical categories, which are undefined and replaceable by any other social categories, such as class and sports teams. In general, the emphasis placed on the agency of very powerful elite enhances the idea of ethnic categories as any category that serves for mobilisation. At the same time, ethnic categories appear to be easily constructible and manipulable and, hence, less real and artificial. Arguments referring to the concept of invention especially evoke the notion of unreal or less real, and partly even negligible ethnic categories. Having said this, these lines of reasoning do not see the necessity to distinguish *analytically* ethnic categories from other social categories. Without referring to, e.g., the concept of "ethnic conflict", however, it is difficult to understand that although, of course, not "everyone in one ethnic group becomes the ardent, dedicated, and murderous enemy of everyone in another group" (Mueller 2000: 42), violent agency might be oriented along ethnically

interpreted criteria and categories. As Carola Lentz and Paul Nugent (2000: 4) put it:

> Even if today social scientists and historians would like to discard 'ethnicity' as an analytical category, its currency in the 'world out there' [*i.e., the world outside the academic debate*, author's note] means that they have no choice other than confront it.

In this sense, assuming that ethnic categories are real 'in the 'world out there'' and, hence, intending to capture them on an analytical level, I conceive of ethnic categories as institutions defined by descent.

5.3 Ethnic Categories as Institutions Defined by Descent

Following an approach of interpretative sociology, it might be hardly possible to leave out Weber and his notion of ethnicity. The essential aspects of the approach taken in the present work can be found in his famous book *Economy and Society: an Outline of Interpretative Sociology*, first published in 1922. Defining "ethnic groups" Weber (1978: 389) stresses the "subjective belief in [...] common descent" existing independently of "an objective blood relation". This criterion of "subjective belief in [...] common descent" defined by Weber is still seen to be crucial for defining ethnic categories (Bös 2005: 322; Bös 2008: 57).

Some other classical authors writing about ethnicity theoretically underpin this approach. Although he is better described as "real-world primordialist" (Hale 2004: 461), Clifford Geertz is often referred to as a primordialist, while Frederik Barth's analysis of boundary making is seen to be one of the very first constructivist line of reasoning (Bös 2005; Levine 1999: 296; Brubaker and Laitin 1998: 438). Most importantly, however, in his world–famous book *Ethnic Group and Boundaries* (1969) his concept of ethnicity places emphasis on the perceptions of the social actors. Barth argues that "objective differences" (1969: 14) somehow exist. However, relevant and decisive for the analysis are the subjectively ascribed significations (Barth 1969: 14). Being less concerned with the "actual common blood histories and absolute cultural bonds" but focusing more on the perception of the social actors, as "these perceptions have real implications for the behavior" (Hale 2004: 460), Geertz and Barth in this respect share a research focus. Following Weber, Geertz (1973: 5) is interested in the "web of significance he himself [*man*, author's note] has spun". Although this web of significance is socially produced by men, they are exposed to the significance of these givens. Accordingly, he conceives of ethnicity (or "primordial attachments" as he calls them) as the *assumed* givens that "stem from being born into a particular religious community, speaking a particular language, or

even a dialect of a language, and following particular social practices". The bondage to one's kinsmen is mostly a result of the importance "*attributed* to the very tie itself" (Geertz 1973: 259, emphasis added). This focus on subjective beliefs and the socially contested relevance of physical and cultural features is emphasised by Weber, Geertz, and Barth. In particular, Geertz (referring to Weber) makes clear that despite the social constructedness of social reality and, accordingly, ethnicity, the social actors are yet exposed to it (hence, cannot change it without experiencing any constraints). In this sense, assumed givens are yet givens. In principle, this notion of ethnicity (clearly diverging from the ideas just described, see 5.2) has been taken up in the current discussion. Authors such as James Fearon and David Laitin (2000), Brubaker (2004b), and Mathias Bös (2005) elaborate on this notion of ethnicity primarily introduced by Weber in 1922.

Fearon and Laitin (2000: 848) introduce the term "everyday primordialism" into the discussion. It refers to the beliefs "that certain categories are natural, inevitable, and unchanging facts about social life". Different from other social categories that are also assumed to be natural and given, such as sex, ethnicity is determined by what Weber (1978: 389) calls "a subjective belief in [...] common descent". Brubaker (2004b) takes a similar approach to ethnicity but discusses more explicitly the role of the academic observer. He argues that an academic analysis should not ignore what he calls "common sense primordialism", yet it should neither simply replicate it (Brubaker 2004b: 9). That is why Brubaker proposes the sharp distinction between "categories of practice" and "categories of analysis" (Brubaker 2004a: 31). In particular, he criticises that "nation", "race", and "identity" are often used analytically more or less in the same way "as they are used in practice". More precisely, these notions are used in an implicitly or explicitly reifying manner, i.e., implying or asserting that "'nations', 'races', and 'identities' 'exist' as substantial entities and that people 'have' a 'nationality', a 'race', an 'identity'" (Brubaker 2004a: 32/3). In doing so, he focuses explicitly on the essentialised notion of "groups". He critically questions the concept when used unreflectively in everyday talk, policy analysis, and media reports, but also "ostensibly constructivist academic writing" (Brubaker 2004b: 9) that reproduces "the imagery of discrete, concrete, tangible, bounded, and enduring 'groups'" (Brubaker 2004b: 11). Although the reification of ethnicity is to be avoided, it is, though, crucial to base the analysis on "vernacular categories" and "'participants' understandings" (Brubaker 2004b: 10). This is crucial in that it allows one to take into account the "cognitive models underlying ethnic actors' own ideas concerning the acquisition/transmission of an ethnic status" (Gil-White 1999: 789). In accordance with these arguments, I conceive of ethnic categories as institutions defined by descent. In this vein,

> We know we are witnessing instances of ethnicity when we observe people classifying people [*including themselves*, author's note] according to their origins. When the categories in use refer to something other than origins (e.g., sexual orientation, disability, etc.) they are not ethnic categories (Levine 1999: 168).

Against the background of what has been just said about the role of academic observers, I – as "scientific interpreter[s]" (Schütz 1972: 9) – use the term 'ethnic categories' for emphasising their social constructedness. The term 'ethnic group' is exclusively used in order to highlight the notion (expressed by someone else) of "internally homogeneous, externally bounded groups, even unitary collective actors with common purposes" (Brubaker 2004b: 8). Accordingly, I use the terms 'the Hutu' and 'the Tutsi' exclusively to describe the idea (again expressed by someone else) of 'the Hutu' and 'the Tutsi' "as if they were absolute corporate groups [...] [with] unchanging relationships to each other" (Newbury 1998b: 85).

Similar to the analytical approach to ethnic categories, my definition of violent ethnic conflict focuses on the interpretation of conflict as ethnic by 'those living in that world': "Violence becomes "ethnic" [...] through the meanings attributed to it by perpetrators, victims, politicians, officials, journalists, researchers, relief workers, and others"(Brubaker 2004b: 16).

The way in which the content of (ethnic) categories is constructed might yield violence (Fearon and Laitin 2000: 850). Accordingly, the interpretation of conflict as 'ethnic' might have influence on the agency and thinking of social actors, especially in the situation of violent conflict. A general feature of ethnic categories I focus on is that they are conceived of as being defined in terms of descent. Consequently, "people cannot lose and acquire ethnic statuses the way they might other kinds of statuses or 'identities'" (Gil-White 1999: 808). That might be relevant for understanding the dynamics of violent conflicts. Moreover, the notion of ethnicity relating to the notion of the modern nation state is crucial to explaining ethnic conflict. Given the modern idea of nation state, ethnic categories are symbolically unequal; thus, they *per se* imply exclusion (Sutterlüty 2006). Consequently, an ethnic interpretation of social and political exclusion has major implications for the conflict propensity: The question of "Who owns the state" (Wimmer 1997; Wimmer 2002) is a powerful one that heavily challenges the given political organisation and representation (see 6.3).

Concluding, I emphasise the analytical relevance of approaching ethnic categories and ethnic conflict based on the knowledge of 'those living in that world'. More precisely, ethnic categories are experienced as being defined by common descent. In principle, this understanding goes back to the definition already introduced in 1922 by Weber and is not uncommon within today's aca-

demic discussion. However, it was neglected – and still is neglected today – in the 1980s and 1990s when emphasis was placed on the instrumentalist and 'invented' character of ethnic categories. Although it is currently appropriate to describe the essentialist perspective as an empty 'category of analysis' in that almost no author contributing to the socio-scientific discussion adopts such an approach, it was more common in the 1960s.

Despite the lack of proponents of an essentialist understanding, a lasting reference to essentialist conception (often serving to develop constructivist concepts) is remarkable. This is important to note, since the recurring debate between essentialism and constructivism hampers the analytical discussion trying to capture ethnic categories and ethnic conflict. Some very famous lines of reasoning and their adoption (especially prominent in the 1980s and 1990s) strongly focused on the 'invented' and instrumentalist character of ethnicity, partly suggesting that they are artificial, easily manipulable and, hence, less real. In doing so, they do not go beyond the point to prove the essentialist character of ethnic categories wrong: This often results in notions of ethnic categories that are analytically undefined and replaceable by other categories. In contrast, since I assume ethnic categories as well as ethnic conflict to be real "in the 'world out there'" (Lentz and Nugent 2000: 4), I approach ethnic categories as 'experienced reality', hence, as institutions defined by descent. Based on a currently prominent understanding of ethnic categories the emphasis is placed on 'everyday primordialism' or 'common sense primordialism', i.e., the knowledge of 'those living in that world'.

6 The Institutions of Politicised Ethnicity and Ethnicised Politics: Inclusion and Exclusion Based on Ethnic Categories

> Ironically, the Rwandan genocide took place at a time when South Africans were freeing themselves from the last vestiges of apartheid and where differences were exalted in the notion of "rainbow nation". This irony, however, underscores an underlying truism – that the politics of identity can be both benign and malign (Solomon and Matthews 2001: 137).

The politics of identity have the potential to include and therefore to exclude. As the quote above exemplifies ethnicity in politics, as I call it for now (since I shall shortly distinguish between politicised ethnicity and ethnicised politics), excluded in Rwanda with most dramatic consequences and included in terms of exalting differences "in the notion of 'rainbow nation'" (Solomon and Matthews 2001: 137) in South Africa. Coinciding with the modern nation state, which currently represents the legitimate form of political representation and organisation (Barnes 2001: 86; Calhoun 1993), the *notion* of the 'rainbow nation', and in this sense, ethnicity[61] in politics, facilitated inclusion in South Africa. In contrast, the Rwandan example, in which the ethnic categories of Hutu and Tutsi *not coinciding* with the nation state were and are salient in politics, shows how prone to conflict exclusion along ethnic categories can be if these *do not coincide* with the nation state.

As extensively discussed in Chapter 5, by 'ethnicity' I understand the notion of common descent. Hence, in any nation state there are ethnic categories that coincide with the nation state and those that do not. On the one hand, this means that there was and is the potential for conflict-prone exclusion along ethnic categories that do not coincide with the nation state in South Africa. On the other hand, the attempts of the Rwandan government to promote a sense of

61 I speak about 'South African' as an ethnic category, as the category is seen to be defined by descent (see 6). For instance, "a child born outside South Africa and of which at least one of the parents was a South African citizen at the time of the child's birth has a claim to South African citizenship by descent" (Department of Home Affairs 2010).

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'Rwandité' (Buckley-Zistel 2009) aim to make an ethnic category salient in politics *that coincides* with the nation state.[62]

The focus of the present chapter is on exclusion along ethnic categories that do not coincide with the nation state and the conflict propensity this exclusion implies. For this chapter, as for the overall argument of this book, it is important that exclusion along ethnic categories is understood on the basis of an approach that sees ethnic categories as notions that are self-evident and taken for granted, i.e., knowledge of 'those living in that world'.

The notion of the modern nation state has strongly influenced thinking about ethnic categories, as they are seen to make up the basis for political claims (Wimmer 2004: 45). Inclusion and, hence, exclusion in the modern nation state are self-evidently interpreted based on ethnic categories, as will be shown in this chapter. According to Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann, legitimacy is constituted by notions that are taken for granted and self-evident (see 4.3). Against this background, the legitimacy and, accordingly, the power implied in politicised ethnicity and ethnicised politics becomes obvious. Ethnicised politics and politicised ethnicity seen as notions taken for granted have the power to influence "the distribution, maintenance, or transfer of power" (Weber 2004: 33) of a given form of political representation and organisation, and they are political.

The example of Rwanda in 1994 shows that exclusion (and, hence, inclusion) interpreted based on ethnic categories not coinciding with the nation state, is highly political and potentially conflict-prone.[63] According to the argument presented in this chapter, this is because exclusion along ethnic categories not coinciding with the nation state questions the given political representation and organisation (and the implied given inclusion and exclusion). What I mean by 'conflict-prone' is that the given political representation and organisation are potentially challenged based on notions that are powerful, and, thus, taken for granted.

62 I speak about 'Rwandan' as 'ethnic category' in the sense of a category that is defined by the idea of common descent. Rwandan is somebody "whose one of his or her parents is a Rwandan" or who after five years of permanent residence has become Rwandan by naturalisation (Organic Law No 29/2004 on Rwandan Nationality Code).

63 I do not assume a direct relationship between ethnicised politics and violent ethnic conflict. The discussion analysing political salience of ethnic cleavages, which leads to unstable democracy and "ethnic political conflict" (Rabushka and Shepsle 1971: 461), refers mostly to non-Western post-imperial societies still in the process of nation state building (Wimmer 1997) and democratisation (Snyder 2000). I focus on societies in which the political history (including large-scale massacres) is ethnicised in that it is interpreted by heavy reference to ethnic categories. In general, poverty and economic underdevelopment as well as lack of democracy (e.g., political and civil rights, mechanism for the peaceful adjudication of disputes) (Sambanis 2001: 266/7) play a major role for the propensity of further violent ethnic conflict. For assessing the propensity of violent ethnic conflict, all these criteria are to be taken into account.

On the basis of my approach, I conceive of politicised ethnicity and ethnicised politics as *institutions*. In doing so, I stress my adoption of Berger and Luckmann's focus on the historically influenced notions that are taken for granted, i.e., the knowledge of 'those living in that world' (see 4.3), which constitutes their reality.

The chapter is structured as follows: First, I introduce the actual academic discussion explaining the salience of ethnicity in politics referring either to (structural) exclusion or to elite rivalry (6.1). Both emphases relate their argument to the general context of modern nation states and assume ethnicity in politics to be potentially conflict-prone. However, both fail to explain why inclusion and exclusion based on ethnic categories are highly political and, hence, potentially conflict-prone within the context of the modern nation state.

Second, the question of 'Why is exclusion and inclusion interpreted based on ethnic categories highly political?' is to be answered within the context of the *notion* of the modern nation state, which constitutes the currently legitimate form of political organisation and representation (6.2). In doing so, distinguishing between politicised ethnicity (the self-evident interpretation of inclusion, i.e., rights, political claims, and political representation based on ethnic categories) and ethnicised politics (self-evident exclusion interpreted based on ethnic categories) helps to underpin the notional relatedness of ethnicity and politics and, hence, the taken for grantedness and power implied in these notions.

Third, I conclude the chapter by turning back to the relationship between the notion of nation state and ethnicity, more precisely, the notions of politicised ethnicity and ethnicised politics, which together constitute the background, against which ethnic conflict can be explained (6.3).

6.1 Salience of Ethnicity in Politics

In order to approach the salience of ethnicity in politics, I draw on two emphases placed in the academic discussion: one focusing on the (structural) exclusion, the other focusing on instrumentalisation. The contributions to this discussion are diversely labelled as contributions to "politicisation of ethnicity" (Kandeh 1992; Wimmer 2002), "ethnic politics" (Chazan, Lewis, Rothchild, Stedman and Mortimer 1999; Chazan 1982), or "ethnicisation of politics"[64] (Büschges and Pfaff-Czarnecka 2007a).

The academic discussion analysing the political salience of ethnicity assumes it to lead to unstable democracy and "ethnic political conflict" (Rabushka

64 The original title in German is *Die Ethnisierung des Politischen*.

and Shepsle 1971: 461). In doing so, it refers mostly to non-Western post-imperial societies still in the process of nation state building (Wimmer 1997) and democratisation (Snyder 2000). The literature speaks about "multi-ethnic societies" (Brass 1985), "ethnically very heterogeneous societies" (Wimmer 1997), "plural societies" (Kuper 1980) and "pluralism" (Furnivall 1956) caused by colonial politics, and "New States" (Geertz 1973), as well as about the non European world (Büschges and Pfaff-Czarnecka 2007b: 8). Frequently, the analysis is based on empirical historical studies that retrace how ethnicity has come to play an important role in the politics of specific countries, typically in Africa (Ndikumana 2000; Lemarchand 2004; Kandeh 1992; Chazan 1982) or Latin America (Büschges and Pfaff-Czarnecka 2007a). The theoretical assumptions, on which these empirical analyses are based, are often not explained. Accordingly, there is little theoretical elaboration about what makes ethnic cleavages salient in politics and why. Nonetheless, it is possible to distinguish two main analytical approaches. Both (implicitly) refer to the finding that ethnicity is particularly salient and relevant within the context of the modern nation state, either when discrimination and exclusion occur along ethnic cleavages or when ethnic cleavages are instrumentalised for competition over resources (especially by the political elite) – or both. However, both approaches fail to explain why, specifically, salience of ethnicity in politics is conflict-prone within the context of the modern nation state.

Political Salience of Ethnic Cleavages as a Result of (Elite) Rivalry for Resources

The academic discussion often refers to the findings that ethnic cleavages are (empirically) important in order to organise the competition for resources in the modern nation state as well as to the high conflict potential that is implied (Brass 1985; Brass 1991; Chazan et al. 1999; Geertz 1973; Mann 2005; Wimmer 2002; Wimmer 1997). Clifford Geertz (1973: 270), e.g., highlights the importance of the modern nation state and its formation process in order to understand the salience of 'primordial sentiments' – as he puts it: "The formation of a sovereign civil state that [...] stimulates sentiments of [...] racialism [...] because it introduces into society a valuable prize over which to fight." Likewise, Andreas Wimmer (1997: 642) speaks about

> the conflictive charging of ethnic differences [which] is connected with the struggle for the resources of the modern state: Territorial sovereignty, protection from arbitrary violence, social and legal security, political representation.

The nation state is discussed as (opposed to previously existing forms) a political organisation in which accumulated and centralized resources are allocated.

Thus, ethnicity is a form in which to organise competition for resources (Chazan, Lewis, Rothchild, Stedman and Mortimer 1999: 112, Williams 2003: 105), leading to – what Susan Olzak (1983: 355) calls – "ethnic mobilization": "the process by which groups organize around some features of ethnic identity […] in pursuit of collective ends." 'Ethnic groups' are understood as interest groups defined by cultural markers and practices (Brass 1985: 17) and compared to class structures regarding their particular appeal and effectiveness in order to compete for public resources (Chazan, Lewis, Rothchild, Stedman and Mortimer 1999: 107/8).

Such a focus on the role of ethnicity in respect to its mobilising function for political ends has been very important in the so-called instrumentalist approach. This approach understands the salience of ethnicity as promoted by political rivalry (Williams 2003). Against this background, the role of the elite gains particular relevance: The role of "ethnic intermediaries" (Chazan, Lewis, Rothchild, Stedman and Mortimer 1999: 112) and of "elite competition" (Brass 1985) in respect to a lasting mobilisation is analysed. The analysis of several case studies of African countries points to the role of post-colonial, political leaders who exploited ethnic and cultural differences in an attempt to hold onto power. In Sierra Leone, Rwanda, Somalia, Liberia, Ethiopia, Uganda, and Sudan, the elite is seen to have instrumentalised social, often ethnic, cleavages, and thereby created a basis from which violent conflicts could evolve (Kandeh 1992, Ali and Matthews 1999).

Political Salience of Ethnic Cleavages as a Result of Discrimination and Exclusion

The second emphasis placed in the discussion about salience of ethnicity in politics assumes that inequalities and discrimination along ethnic cleavages within one state foster their political salience. In this respect, the thesis of *Internal Colonialism* (1999) by Michael Hechter is a very prominent one. Hechter starts from the unequal development and industrialisation within one nation state that leads to an unequal distribution of power and resources between the core and the periphery of that country. His analysis is induced by the observation that some previously existing cultures on the British Isles and Ireland merged with British culture, whereas Celtic culture continues to exist relatively less affected. Hechter explains these findings by pointing to the emergence of a "cultural division of labor" in the sense of a social stratification between peripheries and core, which, in turn, promotes distinctive ethnic identification when it coincides with cultural differences. His argument goes on, assuming that the

peripheral group would conceive of itself as the superior culture and eventually might seek independence (Hechter 1999). Similarly, Donald Horowitz (1985) describes the juxtaposition of backward and advanced 'ethnic groups', predominantly influenced by colonial policy, as the source of many conflicts in Africa, Asia, and the Caribbean States. Adding a psychological assumption, Horowitz identifies the desire to achieve "group worth" as the result of this juxtaposition. Consequently, this group worth is considered as the driving force of ethnic conflict, as "the unflattering images of group characteristic generated by the comparison gives rise to powerful efforts to use the political system for the confirmation of group worth" (Horowitz 1985: 167).

The idea of political and economic inequality along ethnic categories that induce ethnic conflict is also implied in the prominent academic discussion about "greed" and "grievances" (Collier and Hoeffler 2004; Nathan 2005; Wimmer, Cedermann, and Min 2009). While "greed" alludes to the ability to finance wars, "grievances" refer to inequality, political oppression, and ethnic and religious divisions as causes of conflict (Collier 2006; Collier and Hoeffler 2004). Thus, the argument emphasises political and economic exclusion as causes of political salience of ethnicity. Likewise, Michael Mann (2005: 6) identifies exclusion and discrimination as being crucial for the occurrence of ethnic cleansing: "Indeed, murderous cleansing does not occur among rival ethnic groups who are separate but equal".

Empirical analyses support this argument. For example, Naomi Chazan (1982: 463) describes "the rhythm of ethnic politics in Ghana" as "a function of state actions and of the fluctuations of state power". She conceives of ethnic mobilisation as the result of power constellations that have implemented "exclusionary strategies" (Chazan 1982: 463). The approach of explaining political salience of ethnic cleavages due to inequalities and from the resulting struggle over national resources is often associated with clientelism organised along ethnic lines that facilitates the distribution of the limited economic and political resources to privileged groups (Wimmer 1997; Chazan, Lewis, Rothchild, Stedman and Mortimer 1999; Rabushka and Shepsle 1971).

So far, two main emphases have been singled out, both explaining the salience of ethnicity in politics and assuming it to lead to ethnic (violent) conflict. Although they (implicitly) often relate and refer to each other, they are analytically distinguishable: One focuses on the structural discrimination (or exclusion) of 'ethnic groups' that leads to their mobilisation, while the other places emphasis on the instrumentalisation of those cleavages (often by the political elite) for the struggle over political and economical resources.

However, the question remains unanswered whether and, hence, why the strategic mobilisation of ethnic categories as well as the exclusion of ethnic

categories are highly political and potentially conflict–prone. By focusing on the relatedness of ethnicity and politics and introducing the distinction between politicised ethnicity and ethnicised politics, the following section helps to answer these questions.

6.2 Politicised Ethnicity and Ethnicised Politics

The present language and the difficulties of finding proper distinctions among nation, nation state, and ethnicity point to the historically produced relatedness of these concepts (Calhoun 1993: 215). The definition of nation present in the academic literature stresses different aspects. Some definitions do not require a state, describing "nation" as "distinctive people sharing a common culture [that] *may or may not* have its own state or even *aspire to statehood*" (Williams 2003: 36, emphasis added). This definition comes close to what other authors understand as ethnicity (see Barth 1969; Geertz 1973). Other definitions of nation consider the aspect of statehood as central: "A large, territorially bounded group sharing a common culture and a *division of labour*, and a common code of *legal rights and duties*" (Smith 1992: 73, emphasis added). "Nation" is applied to ancient city-states, modern European nation states, as well as to religiously or ethnically defined communities (Renan 1996: 42). Neither in the scientific nor in the daily language do shared, clear–cut conceptual differentiations exist among nation, ethnicity, and nation state. This is meant to show that the categories and the assumptions predominant in the discourse about the modern nation state are embodied in the language and the thinking of daily life as well as in scientific discussion (Calhoun 1993: 214). Accordingly, in the following, I focus on the notional relatedness among ethnicity, democracy and nation state.

Hence, the major intention of this section is, on the one hand, to depict the notional relatedness of the concepts of nation state, ethnicity, and democracy. In doing so, I intend, on the other hand, to illustrate (based on the theoretical knowledge) the notional background, against which politicised ethnicity, and ethnicised politics are to be captured. That is meant to depict ethnicity as a per se politicised concept in that it relates to the currently legitimate form of political organisation and representation: hence, exclusion and inclusion implied in the modern nation state. Conversely, this will explain why exclusion (and hence inclusion) interpreted based on ethnic categories (not coinciding with the nation state) constitutes a highly political issue. In this sense, there is no need to find a proper distinction between the concepts of nation state (implying democracy) and ethnicity. On the contrary, it is crucial to my further argument to make the elusive connotations relating these *concepts* explicit. Following Craig Calhoun

(1993: 235), I intend to highlight that it is impossible to dissociate the *notion* of nation state entirely from ethnicity (and vice versa).

The Nation State: A Legitimate Form of Political Organisation and Representation

The idea of the nation state is central to almost all definitions of legitimate political communities (Brubaker 1992; Calhoun 1993; Harris 1990; Mayall 1990; Wimmer 2002). This is exemplified by the observation made by Joel Migdal and Klaus Schlichte (2005) that even in the case of lasting civil war the idea of statehood as the legitimate form of political representation is not challenged. In case, in which parts of the population consider the existing political form of representation as non-legitimate, they usually have a political aim to create a new "nation state" and do not desire the alternative of statelessness (Migdal and Schlichte 2005: 17). Referring to this kind of observation Calhoun (1993) maintains that: "Nationalism has become the pre-eminent discursive form for modern claims to political autonomy and self-determination" (Calhoun 1993: 213). More broadly speaking, the understanding and the categorisation of the modern world are structured by this view of the world (Wehler 2004: 10-12). This "image of the state" comes along with "a popular discourse" portraying "the world map as, first and foremost, divided into territorial states" (Migdal and Schlichte 2005: 34). Wimmer (2002: 1) goes even further, finding that "modernity itself rests on a basis of ethnic and nationalist principle". Having said this, the nation state is currently the legitimate form of political organisation and representation. Reframing this idea with the concept of legitimacy introduced in the present book (see 4.3), generally speaking, it appears to be self-evident that the main point of reference for political representation and organisation and, hence, for inclusion and exclusion, is the modern nation state. As I will argue in the following sub-section, this self-evident *notion* of inclusion and exclusion is ethnically defined.

Related Notions: Ethnicity, Nation State, and Democracy

As Calhoun (2007: 151) points out, the term nation state already relates the modern political organisation to a community that has an ethnic connotation: "The hyphen in *nation-state* tied the modern polity to the notion of a historically or naturally unified people who intrinsically belong together." In other words, although the "principle of democracy" legitimates the representation of "what the people want" and the "principle of nationalism" legitimates the representation of "what the people is" (two claims that even happen to be conflictive), our modern concept of public sphere does not allow such a separation (Ringmar

1998: 545). Hence, as Eric Ringmar (1998: 545) figuratively makes clear, "if the people are to rule, they can be ruled neither by kings nor by foreigners".

The institution of the modern nation state made the question "Who belongs to this unity?" particularly relevant (Ringmar 1998: 534; Wimmer 1997: 634). Since the distinction "between conquerors and the conquered, between foreign rulers and autochthonous subjects" (Wimmer 2002: 53) dissolved, the "likes" became "equals": The principles of self-determination and self-domination were interpreted as "rule by our people, that is, rule by people who are like us, people of our nationality" (Ringmar 1998: 534). In this sense, the democratic thoughts of self-determination and sovereignty made the question of who belongs to 'the people' increasingly important.

Conversely, the idea of a democratic public sphere depends on the idea of a pre-politically given nation, which integrates class, religious and regional divisions (Calhoun 2007: 153; Ringmar 1998: 535): "Imagining democracy requires thinking of 'the people' as active and coherent" (Calhoun 2007: 151). The national idea made it possible to think of 'the people' and thereby has been constitutive for ideas such as the sovereignty of the people and self-determination: Thus, "nationalism was crucial to collective democratic subjectivity, providing a basis for the capacity to speak as 'we the people'" (Calhoun 2007: 153). The idea of democracy implies in a very substantial way the idea of 'the people', which is naturally unified and who intrinsically belong together. The ethnically defined arena of the state is where people "who are both equal and alike" (Wimmer 2002: 55) meet in order to make demands for their civic rights. More precisely, the idea of liberal individuals that are all equal and entitled to make demands for universal rights is enabled by the nations as a form of political organisation (Calhoun 2007: 154).

Moreover, the notional relatedness among ethnicity, democracy and nation state is reflected in very practical implications concerning the organisation of the state: Belonging to a specific national or 'ethnic group' determines access to the rights and services the modern state is supposed to guarantee (Wimmer 2002: 1). Hence, (legitimate) inclusion and exclusion (to social, legal, political, and military rights) in modern societies is structured along ethnicity (Wimmer 2002: 58).

On the one hand, democratic ideas shifted the focus to the 'people' and its definition. On the other hand, the idea of a bounded collectivity – that is, a nation – is not only constitutive for democratic interaction of equals and alikes but also for the organisation of access to political and economic rights of equal individuals. Having said this, an ethnically defined people is crucial for modern

thinking about political organisation and representation, i.e., democracy and nation state.

As a matter of course, the understanding of nation state, especially concerning its relatedness to ethnicity (i.e., the idea of common descent), changes over time and depends on geographical contexts. From a historical perspective, nationalism, for example, lost some of its "progressive" and democratic characteristics during the nineteenth and at the beginning of the twentieth century and became more archaic (Eley and Suny 1996: 5). This nationalisation of the notion of people hood in Western Europe turned back toward a stronger emphasis on the civic definition of membership in the 1970s (Wimmer 2002: 56; Wimmer 2004: 55). At the same time, especially for the 'non Western' world, a series of nationalising (as opposed to civic, liberal) states was observed, which evolved after the decline of the communist empire (Wimmer 2004: 55). Likewise, today's concepts of nation state and, hence, political membership vary among different countries (Brubaker 1992; Greenfeld 1992; Thomas 2002). Exemplifying the prototypes of two different concepts of nationhood and citizenship – Germany and Eastern Europe, on the one hand, versus France and the United States, on the other hand – are frequently quoted (Brubaker 1992; Wimmer 2002: 56). Whereas the so-called Eastern conception is described as "organic", the so-called Western one is seen to be "political" (Eley and Suny 1996; Kohn 1944; Smith 2003; Thomas 2002).

In principle, however, the ideas of nation state and of the modern political form of representation and organisation are (more or less) related to ethnicity, i.e., the idea of common descent. Most apparently, this is reflected within the idea of citizenship. Citizenship is commonly thought of as being achievable by descent: "The form of ethnic self-definition may differ between different nation states, but all nation states have ethnic components within their nationality law" (Bös 2000: 24).[65] For instance, the French notion of citizenship, prototypically referred to as a civic conception as opposed to an ethnic one, includes aspects of 'jus soli' as well as of 'jus sanguinis' (Bös 2000: 24; Brubaker 1992: 186).[66] Also referring to France and Germany understood as "ethnic" and "civic" nations, Calhoun (1997: 89) asserts that "France and Germany, and all of Western and Eastern Europe, have been shaped by the international discourse of nationalism – including both ethnic claims and civil projects of popular political par-

65 For critical remarks regarding the use of rules of categorization for newborn children as indicators for ethnic ideas or their expression, see Bös 2000: 23/4.

66 The Ministère des Affaires Etrangèrees et Européennes distinguishes between the possibility to become a French citizen on the basis of "droit du sang" and "droit du sol". The "droit du sang" is applied when one of the parents of a child is French at the moment of his or her birth (Ministère des Affaires Etrangères et Européennes 2011).

ticipation". To further illustrate this point, under current U.S. law, children of U.S. citizens born abroad can most often become U.S. citizens and in the view of most legal scholars should even attain the status of 'natural born citizen' needed to be eligible for Presidency. For instance, although not uncontested, John McCain, born in the Panama Canal Zone in 1936, became a 2008 Republican candidate. The law itself, however, defining "natural born citizens" to be eligible for the office of President and excluding those who became citizens by naturalisation (Article 2, U.S. Constitution), reflects that ethnicity (i.e., common descent) is understood as a relevant criterion to represent the American political community. Although undoubtedly representing a nation state, which is comparatively inclusive in terms of the possibility for those who are not descendants of U.S. citizens to become U.S. citizens, these laws clearly reflect the idea of a political community, which is (amongst others) defined by descent. By the way, being Rwandan and Burundian is equally defined by the idea of common descent (i.e., ethnicity). In Rwanda, nationality by origin is granted to "any child whose one of his or her parents is a Rwandan". A person applying for naturalisation must have lived at least five years in Rwanda (Organic Law No 29/2004 on Rwandan Nationality Code). In Burundi, the main mode to acquire citizenship is by descent. A necessary condition to get Burundian citizenship by naturalisation is permanent residence in Burundi for 10 years (Loi No 1/013 du 18 juillet 2000 portant réforme du code de la nationalité).

Put differently, the references to territory as well as to blood relationship are legal codes that are part of the notion of modern nation state (Bös 2000: 24). Although the ethnic or political connotation of different conceptions of nation state and consequently the praxis of inclusion and exclusion might diverge, the *notion as such* is linked to the idea of 'the people' and that in turn is to some extent ethnically defined: Myths of origin, tales about heroes and prosperous times, typical dishes, and public holidays help to propagate the ethnic communitisation. In this sense, nation states themselves are ethnic (Bös 2008: 69). For the further argument, thus, it is crucial to keep in mind that "most nations are defined in ethnic terms and [...] even the most civic nations are 'coloured' by ethnic references" (Wimmer 2004: 41).

Politicised Ethnicity and Ethnicised Politics

Although "there is no zero hour of the politicisation of ethnic differences" (Wimmer 1997: 633), the notion of the modern nation state has strongly influenced thinking about ethnic categories, as they are seen to make up the basis for political claims (Wimmer 2004: 45). Over the course of the last 200 years,

membership to (European) nation states has been increasingly defined by ethnic affiliation (Bös 1993). Today, it is seen as legitimate that social, political, and legal closure, i.e., exclusion, is structured along the idea of the modern nation state (Wimmer 2002: 57). Accordingly, nationalism that is intrinsically linked to ethnicity and the idea of "a people" is the predominant idea on the basis of which rights of legitimate rule are claimed and territories are demarcated (Calhoun 1993: 235). This implies a "theory of political legitimacy, which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones" (Gellner 2006).

Put differently, exclusion and inclusion along ethnic cleavages are seen to be legitimate and powerful, since "politics has become a matter of representing an ethnically defined people" (Wimmer 2002: 212). The concept of ethnicity intrinsically relates to modern thinking about legitimate political community, on which the organisation of the allocation of resources and the entitlement to rights are based. Accordingly, ethnicity legitimises the rule in modern nation states. As shown by the U.S. law cited above, by the Burundian law that requires the Burundian president to be Burundian by birth (Article 72, Burundian Constitution), and by the Rwandan law that asks the candidate for Presidency to "be of Rwandan nationality by origin" and to "have at least one parent of the Rwandan nationality by origin" (Article 99, Rwandan Constitution), it is taken for granted that political representation must be based on ethnicity. Accordingly, the idea of nation state comes along with a self–evident, i.e., legitimate idea of rule: Likes should rule over likes who at the same time are equals (or, as Ringmar (1998: 545) puts it, who are neither kings nor foreigners).

By speaking about legitimacy, I refer to the approach of Berger and Luckmann, according to which institutions are legitimate if they are taken for granted and self-evident (see 4.3). Hence, ethnicised politics and politicised ethnicity are to be understood as legitimate notions, since it is taken for granted that ethnic categories make up the basis for inclusion and, accordingly, for exclusion.

Consequently, it becomes clear that ethnic categories are per se politicised in that they appear to be a particularly legitimate basis for political representation and organisation. In this sense, ethnic categories are especially powerful categories, which explains whether and why the salience of ethnicity in politics (either by interpreting inclusion or exclusion, i.e., politicised ethnicity or ethnicised politics) is highly political and potentially conflict-prone.

Of course, which ethnic categories are taken for granted as the basis for inclusion and exclusion and which are not depends on the historically produced knowledge of 'those living in that world'. Put differently, the national self-concept defines the idea of legitimate membership (Eder, Rauer, and Schmidtke 2004a: 11). The Rwandan government and probably many of the perpetrators

took the category 'the Hutu' for granted as the basis for rights, political claims, and political representation in 1994. Claiming the Rwandan state for 'the Hutu' in 1994 (Des Forges 1999: 73) was done by depicting Tutsi as foreigners not belonging to Rwanda (Uvin 1997) and denying them even the legitimate right to live in Rwanda. In doing so, the different ethnic origin of Tutsi was emphasised by pointing to the ostensible origin of Tutsi in Ethiopia (Des Forges 1999: 34; Strizek 2006: 74). This clearly reveals the relevance of the notion of ethnicity (a category that is defined by common descent) (see 5.3) for making inclusion and exclusion plausible and legitimate. Legitimate inclusion and exclusion depend on the national self-concept. However, the example also shows that ethnicised politics constitute an important resource for accomplishing and legitimising political ends (Büschges and Pfaff-Czarnecka 2007b: 8), since the violent exclusion of 'the Tutsi' was meant to contribute to the stabilisation of the Habyarimana regime. In this sense, ethnicised politics and politicised ethnicity have the power to influence "the distribution, maintenance, or transfer of power" (Weber 2004: 33) of a given form of political representation and organisation, and they are political.

Ethnicity is a "deep symbolic dimension of inequality", as Ferdinand Sutterlüty (2006: 186) states. By analysing the situation between Turks and the "autochthonous population" in two German towns in the Ruhr region, he finds that there is an "implicit stock of knowledge" according to which the Turks are seen to be unequal (as not having the same blood) and the "autochthonous population" does not wanted them to transcend this inequality (Sutterlüty 2006: 186). As he further reasons, "according to this deep-rooted idea of kinship, individuals are only responsible for members of their own ethnic group, and it is only to them that they are obliged to show solidarity" (Sutterlüty 2006: 179). This reasoning becomes evident when one considers the notion of modern nation state and the notion accordingly taken for granted that inclusion and exclusion are based on ethnic categories.

6.3 Ethnic Conflict within the Context of Politicised Ethnicity and Ethnicised Politics

For grasping the power and conflict propensity of ethnicised politics and politicised ethnicity (not coinciding with the nation state), these notions have to be analysed within the context of the idea of the modern nation state. Many authors explain ethnic conflict in relation to its democratic, i.e., modern context (see Mann 2005), focusing on exclusion as a relevant factor for ethnic conflicts (Snyder 2000; Gurr 2002, 1993) and stressing the "ideology" (or concepts that

are taken for granted) applied in ethnic conflicts (Williams 2003: 93) – as do the lines of reasoning mentioned above (see 6.1).

Whereas many authors conceive of ethnic conflict as inherently modern, implicitly relating them to the idea of nation state (implying democracy and ethnicity), Wimmer's understanding suits my line of reasoning particularly well, as he *explicitly* conceives of ethnic conflict against the backdrop of the *notion* of the modern nation state. According to him, the idea of nation state is relevant for the analysis of ethnic conflict, as

> the formation of the nation state and the rise of nationalism and ethnicity are the products of the fundamental reorganisation of the main modes of inclusion and exclusion, of a reordering of the basic principles of membership and identity along national and ethnic lines (Wimmer 2002: 42).

As extensively discussed above, ethnic categories make up a basis for inclusion and exclusion that is taken for granted. In this sense, as argued above, ethnicity is a 'deep symbolic dimension of social inequality'. Accordingly, it is self-evidently assumed that the 'ethnic' who is excluded is neither like nor equal to those who are included. This taken for granted notion becomes clear when the Rwandan regime is seen to be non-legitimate because it is dominated by Tutsi, although it is ruling over a country which is in majority composed by Hutu. According to the implicit reasoning, the regime is non–legitimate (i.e., contradicts notions that are taken for granted) not only because it excludes a great share of its population in economic and social terms, which, hence, is not equal but also because this great share is ethnically defined and, hence, is not *like* the rest of the population. The inclusion is ensured when 'the Hutu' are in power to represent 'the Hutu' interests; a notion that becomes evident in the argument of René Lemarchand (2006b: 7), who states that Burundi's ethnic quotas are "a necessary condition to reconcile minority rights with the claims of the majority". 'The Hutu' who are politically and, hence, socially excluded (i.e., exclusion interpreted based on ethnic categories), contradict both ideas, the one of a "community of likes" as well as the one of "community of equals" constituting the national principle (Wimmer 2002: 53). In this sense, exclusion interpreted based on ethnic categories not coinciding with the nation state questions the given political representation and organisation (and the implied given inclusion and exclusion). Hence, exclusion along ethnic categories is potentially 'conflict-prone' in that the given political representation and organisation is challenged based on notions that are taken for granted and, thus, powerful.

Wimmer (2002; 1997) speaks about a struggle over "Who owns the state?", which is induced by unequal distribution of resources, services and costs along ethnic cleavages. According to his line of reasoning, ethnic conflict is concerned with the political, legal, and moral goods of the modern nation state (Wimmer

2002: 100). To be clear, my argument is mainly concerned with the moral goods in the sense of what 'those living in that world' take for granted and real and, hence, what is seen to be legitimate.

In doing so, I do not assume a direct relationship between ethnicised politics and violent ethnic conflict. As already mentioned, the discussion analysing the political salience of ethnic cleavages, which leads to unstable democracy and "ethnic political conflict" (Rabushka and Shepsle 1971: 461), refers mostly to non-Western post-imperial societies still in the process of nation state building (Wimmer 1997) and democratisation (Snyder 2000). In this context, I specifically focus on societies in which the political history (including large-scale massacres) is ethnicised in that it is interpreted by heavy reference to ethnic categories. However, for assessing the propensity of (further) ethnic conflict, other aspects come into play. For instance, poverty and economic underdevelopment as well as lack of democracy (e.g., political and civil rights, mechanisms for the peaceful adjudication of disputes) (Sambanis 2001: 266/7) are to be considered to assess the propensity of (further) violent ethnic conflict. Put differently, the idea of the modern nation state characterised by ideas of equality and likeness is an "idealization[] that [is] rarely, if ever, fully actualized" (Riggs 1998: 272). Nonetheless, these dimensions bear the potential to generate ethnic conflict if they are not fully actualized (Riggs 1998: 272).

In conclusion, I aim in this chapter at describing ethnicised politics and politicised ethnicity as highly political notions that are potentially conflict–prone. In doing so, I share, on the one hand, a focus with the current discussion on (broadly speaking) ethnicity in politics, which also assumes it to be conflict–prone. On the other hand, I have tried to theoretically underpin the question of 'Why is exclusion interpreted based on ethnic categories highly political and potentially conflict-prone?' In doing so, I refer to notions that are taken for granted, which are – according to Berger and Luckmann – legitimate. Arguing based on a notion of the modern nation state that is intrinsically intertwined with the idea of common descent, i.e. ethnicity, ethnic categories are shown to be per se politicised: They appear to be a basis for political representation and organisation and, hence, for social and political inclusion and exclusion that is particularly legitimate, i.e., taken for granted. In this sense, ethnicity is a 'deep symbolic dimension of social inequality'.

Of course, which ethnic categories are taken for granted as a basis for inclusion depends on the self–definition of the nation. For example, Turks and de-

scendants of Turks are more self–evidently an ethnic category that needs to be included in Germany than French and descendants of French.[67]

Hence, exclusion and inclusion interpreted based on ethnic categories is political in that ethnic categories are seen as a legitimate basis for political and social inclusion and exclusion. Having said this, ethnicised politics constitute an important resource for accomplishing and legitimising political ends (Büschges and Pfaff-Czarnecka 2007b: 8). In this sense, ethnicised politics and politicised ethnicity have the power to influence "the distribution, maintenance, or transfer of power" (Weber 2004: 33) of a given form of political representation and organisation, and they are political.

67 For instance, the nomination of Aygül Özkan as the Minister of Integration and Social Affairs of Lower Saxony in spring 2010 and the reaction of the media that discussed her role as the first Muslim Minister and a descendant of Turks suggest this.

7 'Denial of' versus 'Power Sharing along' Ethnic Cleavages: Ethnicised Politics and the 'Dilemma of Recognition'

> Misrecognition can be redressed in more than one way: by universalizing privileges now reserved for advantaged groups or by eliminating those privileges altogether; by deinstitutionalizing preferences for traits associated with dominant actors or by entrenching norms favoring subordinates alongside them; by privatizing differences or by valorizing them or by deconstructing the oppositions that underlie them. Given this plethora of possible interpretations, the institutional implications are no longer so clear. Which remedies for [maldistribution and] misrecognition should proponents of justice seek to effect (Fraser 2003: 73)?

My overall argument that is meant to explain the 'dilemma of recognition' comes close to Nancy Fraser's (2003: 73), as she stresses that institutional implications are "no longer clear". This contradicts the 'institutional engineering'-debate, which assumes that the same institutions always have the same implications regardless of the historical context that produced the institutions (see 4.2). As Fraser (2003: 73) asserts, "misrecognition can be redressed in more than one way". The choice among different institutional options is to be made depending on the context constituted by a specific history, collective identities, and traditions (Fraser 2003: 73). Reframing her considerations in the terms used so far in this book, she points to the importance of focusing on the historically produced knowledge of 'those living in that world' (see 4.3), i.e., what members of the institutional order take for granted and as real.

Fraser implicitly refers to two political institutional models by using the terms "deconstructing" and "deinstitutionalizing", on the one hand, and "favoring" and "valorizing" differences, on the other hand. These two models are labelled in the following discussion as 'denial of' and 'power sharing along' ethnic cleavages. Within the 'institutional engineering'-debate, to which the present argument intends to contribute, the two models – referred to as consociational or majoritarian democracy – dominate. As the general analysis will show, 'misrecognition' is not automatically redressed by either of the two political institutional models.

I use the concept of 'recognition' to highlight the relevance of paradigms of social justice. In this sense, 'recognition' is defined by democratic thoughts and

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the related claims (Taylor 1994: 38). Hence, the term captures, on a more general level, what was introduced in Chapter 6 in terms of the notion of the modern nation state as a community of equals and likes and, accordingly, ethnicity as taken for granted, i.e., a legitimate basis for inclusion and exclusion.

What Fraser describes on a more general level in the quote suggests for my analysis the possibility that ethnicised politics remains the 'experienced reality' of 'those living in that world' even if they live under political institutional models that explicitly intend to overcome ethnicised politics. Ethnicised politics contradict the paradigms of social justice (or, as I have argued so far, the idea of a community of equals and likes) and, hence, implies 'misrecognition' and conflict propensity. Conceiving of ethnicised politics as 'experienced reality' makes it possible to think that none of the political institutional systems avoids ethnicised politics and, hence, 'misrecognition'. This is what I call the 'dilemma of recognition', assuming that political institutional models have to ensure 'recognition' in order to avoid potential further violent conflict.

I intend to shift the focus of the 'institutional engineering'-debate, first, to the problem of ethnicised politics (conceived of as patterns of interpretation) and, second, to the resulting 'dilemma of recognition' when the decision is to be taken between 'denial of' and 'power sharing along' ethnic cleavages. In order to do so, I argue as follows:

To begin with, 'power sharing along' (consociational model) and 'denial of' ethnic cleavages (majoritarian model) are placed in the larger context of the 'institutional engineering'-debate (7.1). Subsequently, I briefly describe the main characteristics of both models.

Second, the mutual criticism of the proponents of the two concepts is briefly retraced. In doing so, I focus on identified shortcomings, which (implicitly) refer to ethnicised politics (7.2). My illustrations focus on missing explications of the assumptions that relate any of the two political institutional models to ethnicised politics and to a specific conflict propensity.

In the third step, I explain what I understand as 'recognition' and, consequently, as 'dilemma of recognition' (7.3). Focusing on ethnicised politics as patterns of interpretation, which contradict the current paradigms of social justice and in this sense, imply 'misrecognition', the 'dilemma of recognition' becomes conceivable.

7.1 'Denial of' versus 'Power Sharing along' Ethnic Cleavages

Regarding political reconstruction in post conflict societies, one can choose from a given set of different forms of representative government (Barnes 2001: 86). Consociationalism, implying 'power sharing' between and 'accommoda-

tion' of the conflict parties, dominates the discussion about the choices among different political institutional settings (De Zwart 2005: 141; Rothchild 2005: 247). Since the model was introduced by Gerhardt Lehmbruch and Arend Lijphart in the late 1960s in order to explicitly accommodate social divisions (Lijphart 1977), it constitutes an important point of reference in the discussion about 'institutional engineering': either for refinement and confirmation (Lehmbruch 1967; Lehmbruch 1991; Lijphart 1990; Lijphart 1999; Lijphart 2002; Nordlinger 1972) or for critics (Horowitz 1985; 2002; Van den Berghe 2002). Hence, René Lemarchand (2006b: 1) asserts, with reference to the efforts to regulate conflict undertaken in Rwanda, Burundi, and South Africa: "Since its formulation by Arend Lijphart in the 1970s, few theories have had a more enduring impact on the thinking of analysts and practitioners of democratic governance than the consociational model." The introduction to the book *The Architecture of Democracy* (2002), which reassembles very prominent authors in the field of 'institutional engineering', confirms the predominant consensus in this respect: "We believe that some mechanism of power sharing, some institutions to promote what Lijphart (1984, 1999) called 'consensus democracy' are important in most divided societies" (Belmont, Mainwaring, and Reynolds 2002: 3). By its promoters, the model is seen as the only solution (besides partition and secession) to ethnic division and strife (see Lijphart 1990: 493). Other authors more open to other solutions yet describe it as the "logical responses to the need for ethnic self–determination and fair representation" (see Rothchild 2005: 260).

The model of consociationalism is seen to be opposed to the model of majoritarian democracy that *denies* ethnicity (Zartman 1990: 524/5). Majoritarian, liberal democracy "fits the dominant political philosophy", especially in countries such as France and the United States (De Zwart 2005: 141), and is – at least in a historical perspective – "probably the most successful approach" to solving "ethnic problems" (Zartman 1990: 525). According to Donald Rothchild (2004: 226), "liberal internationalists" are "committed in many instances to majoritarian democracy as a preferred regime type".

Despite the clear dominance of the consociational model – explicitly thought up to accommodate social divisions – both political institutional models are discussed as possibilities to face ethnic cleavages. In this sense, both models constitute a predominant point of reference for the discussion about 'institutional engineering'.

'Denial of' Ethnic Cleavages

Majoritarian democracy can best be understood as "the opposite of consociational democracy" (Lijphart 1979: 500), and the concept of consociationalism can best be captured in contrast to the concept of majoritarian democracy. Majoritarian democracy, as opposed to consociational democracy, typically implies a government-versus-opposition-pattern and a winner-takes-all character of majority rule (Lijphart 1979: 500/1). The system implies as well that "civil and political rights are vested in individuals not in collectivities and the state is an impartial enforcer and protector of those rights" (Van den Berghe 2002: 436). Accordingly, "the representatives" are not required to "'mirror' the characteristics of the persons and people represented" (Phillips 1996: 141). The ideal typical liberal state – at least formally – does not represent any collectivities. Elected individuals, independently of their presumed affiliation to collectivities, represent the interests and needs of any equal individual. Frank De Zwart (2005) refers to this conception, which does not recognise or benefit any particular group, as "denial". Lemarchand (2006b: 7) states in respect to the Rwandan regime that "the existence of separate ethnic identities is officially denied". I adopt the term 'denial' in order to emphasise my focus on ethnicised politics. Hence, the crucial criterion for my analysis is that the institutional system (at least officially) does not consider ethnic categories in order to organise political representation and the allocation of resources. The concrete institutional implementation of the ideal typical majoritarian democracy is secondary to my argument.

'Power Sharing along' Ethnic Cleavages

The model of consociationalism was introduced by Lehmbruch and Lijphart 1967 at the World Congress of the International Political Science Association (McRae 1990: 94). Many others (see McRae 1974; Nordlinger 1972) have contributed to the concept, referring to it with different terms: 'proportional democracy', 'segmented pluralism', 'Proporzdemokratie', 'Konkordanz- demokratie' and 'politics of accommodation' (Lijphart 1979: 500). Consociationalism is understood as a specific form of consensual democracy that applies to deeply (whether ethnically, linguistically, or religiously) divided societies (Barnes 2001: 97; Schneckener 2002: 204). Lijphart identifies four main criteria that have to be fulfilled in a consensual democracy: the mutual veto, proportionality, grand coalition, and segmental autonomy (Lijphart 1977: 25). Of course, those elements do not have to be applied altogether; their impacts are also discussed as isolated measures (see Nordlinger 1972). Defining the concept of consociationalism or power sharing in contrast to all other empirically emerging political

systems is not necessary. On the contrary, it is crucial to state that a consociationalism democracy – as opposed to the majoritarian system – recognises its citizens not only as individuals but also as members of collectivities (Van den Berghe 2002: 436). It implies the political representation of officially defined groups as well as the proportional allocation of state resources to those groups (Van den Berghe 2002: 436). In this sense, it is called the principle of power sharing (Lijphart 1979: 500).

7.2 Ethnicised Politics: 'Power Sharing' versus 'Denial'

Currently, the academic discussion favours power sharing and accommodation measures (De Zwart 2005: 141; Rothchild 2005: 247; Walter 2002: 80). Nonetheless, the model of consociationalism faces critiques, particularly, regarding technical aspects and its applicability: more precisely, regarding its inefficiency and democratic transparency as well as its applicability in "Third World countries" (McRae 1990: 96/7) and its limited applicability to situations in which "a conflict is probably already on the wane" (Horowitz 2002: 23).

Rather than analysing these (dis)advantages, the present work focuses on ethnicised politics (always implying politicised ethnicity, see 6.1) and the assessed capacity to overcome ethnicised politics. Placing emphasis on ethnicised politics, I draw on arguments that are (implicitly) present in the discussion about 'denial of' and 'power sharing along' ethnic cleavages.

Eric Nordlinger (1972: 117), e.g., states that "an exclusive reliance upon majoritarian institutions and practices does not facilitate conflict regulation, and may even contribute to conflict exacerbation". In doing so, he clearly makes an argument for consociational elements in order to mitigate conflict (Nordlinger 1972: 117). Arguing in a similar manner, Lijphart (1977: 24) highlights the danger of replacing "segmental loyalties by a common national allegiance", since he assumes the eradication of "primordial loyalties" to stimulate "intersegmental violence". Since the consociational model avoids such a danger, he asserts it to be "a more promising method for achieving both democracy and a considerable degree of political unity". Donald Horowitz (1985: 567) follows the same argument by stressing the point that the non-recognition of ethnic cleavages can make those very cleavages salient: "The stroke-of-the-pen or crack-of-the-whip measures they used proved not only ineffective but counterproductive, tending to exacerbate what they sought to eradicate". He refers to the measures undertaken by the regimes of Kwame Nkrumah in Ghana and of Milton Obote in Uganda, which were counterproductive, as they tried to replace and outlaw ethnic organisations and thereby exacerbated ethnic cleavages

(Horowitz 1985: 568). William Zartman (1990: 525), who assumes that the non–ethnic model is historically probably the most successful one, admits that "when the solution [*i.e., majoritarian model*, author's note] does not work, by definition, it becomes the cause for the very ethnic problems that it seeks to cure". Although they explain the conflict propensity of 'denial of' ethnic cleavages, the explicit assumptions on which the lines of reasoning are based are neglected. However, concerning their conclusions, they correspond to arguments that describe in more detail their underlying assumptions. Different relationships are yet assumed, implying ethnicised politics, i.e., social and political exclusion along ethnic cleavages. In liberal democracies, e.g., one 'ethnic group' is said to tend to seize a "disproportionate if not exclusives share of power" (Van den Berghe 1981: 80). Reversing the argument, especially weaker conflict parties allegedly want to be reassured that they are part of the government: Power sharing arguments respond to a weaker party's felt need for participation in affairs of state (Rothchild 2005: 248/9). Correspondingly, 'ethnic accommodation' is assumed to make the allocation of political power and economic resources more ethnically sensitive and, hence, to prevent "ethnic politicization" (Chazan 1982: 484; Wimmer 1997: 646). In this vein, it is stated that some groups, and especially the minorities, might feel that their 'ethnic heritage' is suppressed and that they are disadvantaged in that they cannot compete under the same conditions as the other nationals, due e.g., to previous histories of deprivation and discrimination (Esman 2004: 206).

Despite a clear tendency to favour power sharing, the model is (implicitly) criticised in respect to ethnicised politics, i.e., social and political exclusion along ethnic cleavages. A very crucial point concerning this problem is the political institutionalisation of ethnic cleavages (Van den Berghe 1981: 82). Next to essentialist assumptions that are seen to underlie this argument supporting political institutionalisation (Benhabib 2002: viii), in particular, it is criticised that ethnicity comes to play a major role in politics and its organisation. For instance, Horowitz (2002: 22) points to the potential danger of playing the ethnic card in order to be elected. Ethnic affiliation might become or remain the reason as well as the justification for being elected or for electing someone. Generally, ethnic conflict might be encouraged "by explicitly recognizing the legitimacy of ethnic groups and by making them stronger, more cohesive, and more distinctive" (Lijphart 2002: 45). When ethnicity remains an issue as well as an organising principle, the system is always at risk for more radical counter–elites to emerge who refer to ethnicity in a more radical and exclusive way (Horowitz 2002: 21). In this sense, politicised ethnicity, i.e., claim making based on ethnic categories, is promoted, implying and reproducing ethnicised politics (i.e., exclusion interpreted based on ethnic cleavages) (see 6.2).

Having said this, the discussion about 'power sharing along' and 'denial of' ethnic cleavages places emphasis on ethnicised politics, i.e., social and political exclusion along ethnic cleavages (and on politicised ethnicity implying and reproducing ethnicised politics). It is assumed that ethnicised politics are potentially conflict-prone. Arguments criticising 'denial of' ethnic cleavages imply the idea that specific 'groups' might not seize 'proportionate' shares from political power. In consequence, they might not feel they are politically represented. That implies that their interests – assumed to be group–specific – are not represented either. In a more general perspective, implying the symbolic dimension of political institutions, liberal democracy is accused of being blind to ethnicity or difference in general (Phillips 1996; Taylor 1992: 339). Lines of reasoning arguing against 'power sharing along' ethnic cleavages mainly focus on the competition over political power, which is assumed to be likely to develop along ethnic cleavages. Political programmes might be dominated by 'ethnic issues', and the idea is reproduced that ethnic categories are to be represented on a political level. In principle, that is what I understand by the term politicised ethnicity.

Intending to contribute to the debate about 'institutional engineering' and, more precisely, about ethnicised politics in different political institutional models, I draw on arguments reflected in the discussion about 'denial of' and 'power sharing' along ethnic cleavages. More precisely, I adopt the assumption that ethnicised politics and politicised ethnicity (i.e., exclusion and inclusion based on ethnic categories not coinciding with the nation state) are to be overcome in order to avoid further conflict. At the same time, however, these lines of reasoning do not explicate the assumed relationships among a specific institutional model, ethnicised politics, and a specific conflict potential. They lack explication of 1) how ethnicised politics (politicised ethnicity) is to be approached systematically and analytically and 2) how, accordingly, the relationships between ethnicised politics (politicised ethnicity) and any of the political institutional models is to be seen.

Against the background of a broader understanding of institutions, conceiving of them as 'experienced reality' (4.3) and having a more specific understanding of ethnicised politics and politicised ethnicity as patterns of interpretations (Chapter 1), it becomes possible to assert that both models might face ethnicised politics.

7.3 The 'Dilemma of Recognition'

Relating to De Zwart's (2005) argument describing a "dilemma of recognition" when choosing between "accommodation" (i.e., power sharing) and "denial" in "socially and culturally diverse societies", I assume that we are facing a 'dilemma of recognition' when choosing between 'denial of' and 'power sharing along' ethnic cleavages in order to overcome ethnicised politics. Yet, unlike De Zwart, who finally opts for 'denial' and Charles Taylor who – asserting a conflict among diverging forms of 'recognition' (see below) – finally argues for 'multiculturalism' (De Zwart 2005: 159; Taylor 1994), I am willing to give neither a clear nor, especially, a general answer with respect to the dilemma; at least no answer that opts for one of the two political institutional models. On the contrary, conceiving of institutions as 'experienced reality' to be approached as the historically produced knowledge of their members as well as ethnicised politics as patterns of interpretation, I argue that neither 'denial of' nor 'power sharing along' ethnic cleavages is an option to overcome ethnicised politics. In this sense, one is confronted with a dilemma opting between 'denial of' and 'power sharing along' ethnic cleavages.

Following Fraser and using the concept of 'recognition', I intend to highlight notions related to the paradigms of social justice (defined by the idea of modern nation state). More precisely, I focus on the notions of equality and likeness implied in the idea of legitimate political organisation and representation, i.e. the modern nation state (see 6.2). Hence, the notion of 'recognition' and the related claims of social justice are analysed against the background of the idea of the (democratic) nation state.

Analysing the rise of "identity politics" and, accordingly, the shift from redistributive political claim making to claims for 'recognition', Fraser uses, first, the term 'recognition' in order to describe political claims of groups that are defined in terms of nationality, ethnicity, gender, and sexuality instead of class (Fraser 1997: 2). Accordingly, the "struggle for recognition" is seen to be the "paradigmatic form of political conflict in the late twentieth century", which politically mobilises groups that are defined in terms of ethnicity, nationality, gender, and sexuality (Fraser 1997: 11). Fraser (2003: 11) understands "recognition" (as well as "redistribution") "as ideal typical constellations of claims that are currently contested in public spheres".

Accordingly, the assumed opposition between 'recognition' and redistribution is mitigated "by construing misrecognition as a violation of justice […]. In other words, 'recognition' is assigned to the universally binding domain of deontological morality, as is distributive justice" (Fraser 2003: 33). Hence, '(mis)recognition' (as well as redistribution) reflects and frames notions and

claims that refer to and are based on the current idea of social justice. In political terms, they are not clearly distinguishable since ‘recognition’ and redistribution “refer to families of claims raised by political actors and social movements in the public sphere” (Fraser 2003: 9). As a proponent of the critical theory, Fraser intends to elaborate a normative founded understanding of how claims of ‘recognition’ and redistribution are to be faced. In this sense, she assumes that both express a distinctive perspective on social justice (Fraser 2003: 12). In contrast, from an exclusively descriptive point of view and using ‘recognition’ as an analytical category in order to describe (contradictions to) paradigms of social justice, I assume that the claim for redistribution always implies the claim for ‘recognition’ (and vice versa) (Benhabib 2002: 71).

Likewise, Fraser (2003: 64) speaks about “the practical entwinement” of the two notions. As the term ‘recognition’ reflects more obviously a normative dimension whereas redistribution directs our attention to the pure material aspect that I do not want to focus on, I opted to use the term ‘recognition’. In doing so, I place emphasis on the idea of the modern nation state within the scope of analysing ethnicised politics and politicised ethnicity (see 6), since the term ‘recognition’ points to the paradigmatic ideas of social justice (defined by the idea of the modern nation state).

According to Fraser, ‘misrecognition’ is always a political issue and implies the political struggle for ‘recognition’ (Fraser 1997: 11). In terms of what I have argued so far, especially in Chapter 6, that is to say that ethnicised politics and politicised ethnicity seen as notions taken for granted have the power to influence “the distribution, maintenance, or transfer of power” (Weber 2004: 33) of a given form of political representation and organisation, and they are political. Contradicting paradigms of social justice, more precisely, the generic and central principles of equality and likeness, I assume ethnicised politics to be political. In Fraser’s terms, it implies ‘misrecognition’.

With Taylor, who reflects on the different forms of ‘recognition’ implied in the two models of ‘politics of difference’ and ‘politics of universalism’, as he puts it, ‘recognition’ can be defined more specifically. Those two models underlie two interrelated as well as opposing concepts of ‘recognition’. In order to show this, Taylor retraces their historical origin and reveals the historical relatedness to nation state and democracy. He relates the idea of ‘recognition’ to the evolution of democratic thoughts, the decline of a hierarchical understanding of societies, and the simultaneously evolving ideas of individualism and universalism: Every individual is entitled to be recognised in an equal manner. The concepts of ‘authenticity’ and ‘identity’ evolved against the background of this way of thinking. The pretension to recognise individuals as well as groups emerged

in this historical context (Taylor 1994: 38), *both* referring to the ideas of universalism and the 'recognition' of individual identity. In this sense, 'recognition' reflects the paradigms of social justice, clearly influenced by the idea of the modern nation state.

As he continues, Taylor's understanding of the 'dilemma of recognition' becomes apparent. Liberal democracy and 'politics of differences' conceive of discrimination and non-discrimination, i.e., exclusion and inclusion, in contradictory terms (Taylor 1994: 40). These two modes of politics, both based on the notion of equal respect, then come into conflict. In one mode, the principle of equal respect requires that we treat people in a manner that is blind to differences. The fundamental intuition that humans command this respect focuses on what is the same in all. In the other, we have to recognize and even foster particularity (Taylor 1994: 43). Hence, both concepts harbour the idea of universalism and equality that are inherently related to the modern idea of nation state. That, in turn, means that exclusion is inherent to both concepts depending on the idea of discrimination that is referred to.

In contrast, De Zwart (2005: 137) understands the "dilemma of recognition" as a concrete "policy dilemma in socially and culturally diverse societies" that emerges when specific groups are recognized and accentuated by being targeted by a group-specific policy meant to mitigate social divisions and, hence, conflict. Conceiving of the 'dilemma of recognition' not as theoretical contradictions in the field of moral philosophy but as a concrete dilemma that policy making faces, De Zwart comes quite close to my understanding of dilemma. Both models might create inequality, i.e., exclusion and emphasis on ethnic categories in the political struggle (De Zwart 2005: 138). Eventually, however, it is not clear which underlying assumptions relating political institutional model, exclusion, and conflict help to capture the dilemma. In contrast, the 'dilemma of recognition' I focus on is implied in the argument that ethnic categories might be a point of reference in both political institutional models in order to interpret political and social exclusion.

Concluding, the focus of my analysis, the 'dilemma of recognition', which one confronts when deciding for either 'denial of' or 'power sharing along' ethnic cleavages, became apparent. The discussion asking which of the two systems is to be implemented in ethnically divided societies (implicitly) focuses on the relevance to overcoming ethnicised politics, assuming it to be potentially conflict-prone. Sharing this focus (analysed in more detail in 6.3), I yet assume it to be necessary to explain how ethnicised politics are to be approached analytically. Given my understanding of ethnicised politics as patterns of interpretation, the dilemma of 'recognition' appears slightly differently than has been previously discussed in the literature: I simply assume that ethnic categories

might be in both political institutional models a point of reference in order to interpret political and social exclusion. In this sense, ‘recognition’ refers to current paradigms of social justice: more precisely, the central principles of equality and likeness. Focusing on ethnicised politics in both political institutional models, accordingly, ‘misrecognition’ in terms of contradictions to these principles occurs in both models. These interpretations or knowledge of the members of the institutional order constitutes the ‘dilemma of recognition’.

8 Experienced Constructed and Essentialist Ethnicity

> These ethnographic examples underscore what a troubled conceptual vehicle "identity" still is, even when the more obvious essentialisms have been leached out of it […]. That many people (scholars included) see identity through this lens of essentialism is a cultural and political fact to be recognized. But this does not mean that our analytical tools must take this form. It [*identity*, author's note] is a creolized aggregate composed through bricolage (Malkki 1992: 37).

Comparing accounts of Hutu refugees living in a camp or in the township of Kigoma after fleeing from Burundi and the massacres in 1972 to Tanzania, Liisa Malkki (1992) "examines forms of Hutuness – *various* ways in which semiotic practices (narratives of identification and everyday activities) register experiences of belonging that are not captured in standard categorizations of ethnicity". Some experienced themselves as "*'pure'* Hutu" and others not as "*essentially* Hutu" (Wedeen 2002: 724, emphasis added). In analogy to Malkki's observations, my analysis based on the knowledge of Rwandans and Burundians illustrates ethnic categories as a "creolized aggregate composed through bricolage" (Malkki 1992: 37).

Placing the focus on knowledge of 'those living in that world' suggests that the knowledge about ethnic categories is contradictory. In the everyday world, ethnic categories are only partly valuable, challenged and even refused (Müller and Zifonun 2010: 13). More precisely, ethnic categories are shown to be experienced as constructed reality *and* essentialist reality at the same time.

What relevance does it have for the overall argument of the book that I depict the understanding of ethnic categories, i.e., Hutu and Tutsi, by Rwandans and Burundians as constructed and essentialist at the same time? According to Chapter 5, essentialist notions of social categories entail "qualitative judgments of otherness" (Sutterlüty and Neckel 2006: 808) (as opposed to a constructivist understanding that assumes changeable and therefore quantitative differences). Having said this, essentialistically defined categories are per se more exclusive than categories that are defined as socially constructed and changeable (see 5).

Especially in terms of Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi that do not correspond to presumably objective criteria assumed to define ethnic affiliation (e.g., language, custom, belief), it is often argued that Hutu and Tutsi are no

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ethnic categories (see Chrétien and Prunier 2003: V; Daley 2006: 663; Hofmeier 2005: 2; Scherrer 2002: 26). Consequently, the categories are neglected in analyses (Eltringham 2004). My analysis will show that ethnic categories are categories taken for granted by Rwandans and Burundians and in this sense not negligible for analysis.

As shown in Sub-section 2.3.1, the current Rwandan government pursues a "unification policy" that mainly intends to overcome the dichotomous relationship between Hutu and Tutsi (Buckley-Zistel 2009: 33). Enforced by laws persecuting diffusively defined 'genocide ideology' and 'divisionism', ethnicity is denied in Rwandan politics and society (Buckley-Zistel 2006a: 112; Burnet 2007: 11; Lemarchand 2006b: 7; Pottier 2002; Vandeginste 2006: 27). Burundi, in contrast, "explicitly recognizes ethnic differences" (Lemarchand 2006b: 7). In this respect, the government is blamed for institutionalising the ethnic differences (Nimubona n.s.: 2). Against this background the question of how Rwandans and Burundians conceive of ethnicity – in a more constructivist or essentialist manner – seems of special interest.

Like Malkki and the predominating academic discussion, I do not follow an essentialist understanding of ethnic categories. Rather, I conceive them of as institutions defined by the idea of common descent. In this sense, I assume ethnic categories to be understood as naturally given and biologically determined from the perspective of 'those living in that world' (Bös 2005; Brubaker 2004b; Fearon and Laitin 2000). Based on this definition, it is possible to reveal that ethnic categories are experienced as essentialist as well as constructed, sometimes even at the same time. The existence of strongly contradictory notions points to the missing legitimacy of these concepts when arguing based on the notions taken for granted by 'those living in that world'. In this respect, the lines of reasoning that despite their rather superficial declaration of their socially constructivist understanding of ethnic categories essentialise these very categories are of special interests. They are particularly relevant for the present analysis, since – as just said – essentialistically defined social categories are per se exclusive.

To study the complex and contradictory interpretations of ethnic categories I present two categories:

The first category is called *Essentialising Deconstructivism* (8.1). It includes quotes that refer either to shared culture and language, politics, social and political narrations or to physical traits that do not fit into the scheme. In doing so, on the one hand, ethnic categories are depicted as non essentialist. On the other hand, they replicate an essentialist understanding of ethnic categories (i.e., Hutu and Tutsi) by relating them to descent, birth or physical traits.

The second category, *Deconstructing Essentialism* (8.2), includes statements that deconstruct ethnicity in a historical perspective (mentioning historical, political, cultural aspects to illustrate the social construction). Yet, they admit that ethnic categories (i.e., Hutu and Tutsi) in present Rwanda and Burundi are real categories in terms of being taken for granted, and being related to massacres and killings. It happens that constructivist interpretations essentialise other (ethnic) categories (in other contexts) at a second glance. In this sense, these lines of reasoning imply essentialist notions.

8.1 Essentialising Deconstructivism

All statements presented in this chapter comprehend essentialist and constructivist notions of ethnicity. Yet, the statements included in the present category and depicted in the present section by the quotes of two Rwandans and two Burundians have (despite constructivist aspects) a strong essentialist notion because they refer to biological aspects in order to describe ethnicity; in order to conceive of ethnicity they refer either to physical appearance or descent and ancestors. Despite these strong essentialist notions, strong typical constructivist assumptions are part of the interpretations as well, such as the aspect of individual choice, politics, social narrations and the general flexibility of ethnic categories, for example. Moreover, the statements essentialise the notion of ethnic categories they intend to deconstruct. In doing so, *real* descent and intermarriages are quoted to challenge essentialist understandings. Therefore, the two contradictory perspectives are not integrated into a *consistent* view on ethnic categories. Consequently, the essentialist notion of ethnicity lasts and the constructivist understanding appears superficial as the contradiction between the strong essentialist notion and the constructivist notion remains unresolved. In this sense, the plausibility of these lines of reasoning is weak. The plausibility of concepts, however, implies legitimacy (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 110).

This *Essentialising Deconstructivist* understanding is especially strong in the first statement that I quote here. The Burundian interviewee is a deputy. Our dialogue starts with my question of what she understands by an ‘ethnic group’. She immediately refers to physical traits. According to her, it is not always easy to tell the affiliation to Hutu and Tutsi on that basis. Apparently, she intends to deconstruct an essentialist notion of Hutu and Tutsi as defined by physical differences. In doing so, she replicates this very essentialist notion. This becomes even more explicit in the second part of the dialogue when I ask her if it possible to be Hutu without having parents who are Hutu:

> Interviewee: C'est difficile en tout cas, c'est difficile de trouver les différences entre...pourquoi on est appelé Hutu pourquoi les autres sont appelés Tutsi? Moi, franchement, lorsque je vois une personne il m'est difficile de dire c'est un Hutu ou c'est un Tutsi. On nous a dit les Hutu sont de petite taille. Les Hutu ont un nez qui est épaté. Mais vous pouvez aussi trouver des Tutsi qui sont de plus petite taille que d'ailleurs les Hutu et qui ont des nez plus épatés que ceux des Hutu. Mais en général les Tutsi sont de grande taille – ce qu'on nous a dit […].
>
> Author: Est–ce qu'on peut être Hutu sans avoir des parents qui sont Hutu?
>
> Interviewee: Ici notre société est patriarcale. Si votre père est Hutu et votre mère est Tutsi, on dit que vous êtes Hutu, on ne dit pas que vous êtes Tutsi alors que votre mère est Tutsi. Soit Hutu, soit Tutsi, on ne peut pas être entre les deux, on ne peut pas dire que vous êtes entre les deux. L'ethnie est déterminé ici dans notre pays par l'ethnie du père (interviewee B16).[68]

The interviewee questions the conception she has been taught, that being Hutu and Tutsi corresponds to a different physical appearance. However, when asked about her understanding of 'ethnic groups' she nonetheless quite self–evidently relates the two categories to physical appearance. She refers to physical aspects such as a flat nose or the height of a person to depict the common understanding. Furthermore, although she partly (but not fully) rejects this notion of ethnicity, she suggests that there might be some truth about it. As she says, based on physical appearance one might guess the incorrect ethnic affiliation, but generally speaking Tutsi are taller than Hutu. Consequently, she finds it remarkable that there are Tutsi who are shorter than Hutu. This essentialist understanding of ethnicity becomes more explicit within the course of the dialogue. When I ask her if somebody can be Hutu without having parents who are Hutu she takes the defining criteria of descent as granted; she immediately refers to the patriarchal understanding, according to which the ethnic affiliation of the father is decisive. In doing so, she strongly relates the notion of Hutu and Tutsi to descent. Intending to challenge an essentialist notion, the deputy replicates in various aspects the notion that these categories are defined by physical appearance and descent. In this sense, Hutu and Tutsi are adequately described as ethnic categories. Interestingly, by deconstructing an essentialist notion of Hutu and Tutsi, the interviewee reproduces it.

Similar to the previous interviewee, the next one quoted refers to physical appearance to define Hutu and Tutsi. He even mentions it explicitly. At the same time, according to him, Hutu and Tutsi are not ethnic since any differences

68 See Chapter 3.3 for the criteria that have been considered for the selection of my interviewees. These criteria are defined by social cleavages that are assumed to play a role in interpreting social and political exclusion, i.e., ethnicised politics. Since they are not presumed to be decisive for the notion the interviewees have of ethnic categories these criteria are not cited.

regarding the culture, language and habitude exists in Rwanda. The interviewee is a Rwandan jurist. The following dialogue starts with my question about what he understands by ethnicity:

> Interviewee: Ethnicité, je comprends, je comprends ça comme différences de langue, culture et habitude. C'est ce qui me fait dire qu'au Rwanda normalement ce ne sont pas d'ethnies. […]
>
> Author: Comment vous expliqueriez le clivage entre Hutu et Tutsi?
>
> Interviewee: Le clivage entre Tutsi et Hutu ça existe surtout au niveau …je dirais physique, même quelque part au niveau du comportement. J'allais dire psychologique, mais pas vraiment…tellement…c'est vraiment au niveau de comportement comme être introverti ou extroverti, être brutal ou…ça existe et c'est visible même.
>
> Author: Alors ce n'est pas possible d'être Hutu sans avoir des parents Hutu?
>
> Interviewee: C'est pas possible d'être Hutu sans avoir des parents Hutu, oui.
>
> Author: Et on ne peut pas changer les catégories?
>
> Interviewee: On ne peut pas changer les catégories, c'est ça qui crée pour le moment les problèmes pour ceux qui sont appelés les Hutsi. Les Hutsi c'est le mélange, c'est le mélange entre les Hutu et les Tutsi. […]…ce qui crée des problèmes pour les mélanges parce qu'ils sont refusés partout (interviewee R6).

He argues that due to the same culture, language and habitude there are no "ethnies" in Rwanda. When I ask him how he explains the cleavage between Hutu and Tutsi, he refers to physical differences. Differences regarding behaviour such as being introverted or violent can also contribute, he adds. He accentuates this essentialist picture of ethnicity within the course of our dialogue. When asked if it is possible to be Hutu without having parents who are Hutu, he said no. An essentialist understanding is strongly revealed again when he describes Rwandans having Tutsi and Hutu parents (he refers to them as "Hutsi" who are rejected by both sides) as a "mélange". The notion of mélange is based on a biological understanding of Hutu and Tutsi. They have one Hutu parent and one Tutsi parent; therefore, they themselves are *composed of* Hutu and Tutsi. Arguing in this way, he conceives of being Hutu or Tutsi as something that is not socially ascribed but that is defined by blood or genes (or anything else that is biologically transmitted without being influenced by the social context). Hence, although he assumes it is wrong to speak about ethnic categories in Rwanda, he gives a clear essentialist notion of Hutu and Tutsi. In this respect, typical constructivist arguments referring to common culture and language can exist next to strong essentialist notions. Both have to be taken into account in order to adequately describe Hutu and Tutsi and to discuss whether they are appropriately

described as non–ethnic categories. The lines of reasoning shown juxtapose strong essentialist notions of ethnic categories referring to descent to constructivist arguments. Thus, the constructivist argument appears less self-evident and taken for granted than the essentialist argument.

The next statement shows equally an essentialist (biological) understanding of ethnic categories. Moreover, however, it quotes essentialist arguments in order to deconstruct the very essentialist notion of ethnic categories. The interviewee is a Burundian medical doctor. In the following, he answers my question of whether people know the ethnic affiliation of politicians in Burundi. Although he stresses the aspect of choice when he continues, his quote suggests a concept of ethnicity as depending on descent:

> Ceux qui s'intéressent à la politique, oui, ils connaissent toutes les appartenances ethniques des politiciens. Mais encore une fois: personne ne sait qui est Hutu qui est Tutsi en vrai, en réalité. Personne ne connaît son arrière père alors personne ne le sait. Mais parfois même dans certaines familles tu peux voir un frère qui est Hutu, l'autre frère est Tutsi. Même père, même mère ils ont fait un choix (interviewee B5).

According to the interviewee, nobody can *really* know the ethnic affiliation, i.e., Hutu or Tutsi, because nobody *really* knows the ancestors. Taking it for granted, as he does, that ethnic affiliation is defined by descent has a very strong essentialist connotation. Although he describes the flexibility of the affiliation by depicting the case that two brothers might have chosen different ethnic affiliations, the essentialist understanding lasts strongly. Eventually, the *real* ethnic affiliation is defined by the ancestors and therefore is neither selectable nor changeable. The apparent contradiction between stressing the aspect of choice and given descent from ancestors is not resolved. Apparently intending to emphasise a constructivist aspect (i.e., the impossibility of knowing ethnic affiliation), the interviewee essentialises the notion of Hutu and Tutsi. Referring to the aspect of choice, he gives typical constructivist explanations of ethnic categories. At the same time, the medical doctor essentialises the very notion he intends to deconstruct. Similarly, the next interviewee deconstructs the categories of Hutu and Tutsi by pointing to their essentialist understanding.

She is a Rwandan peasant woman, living in the outskirts of Kigali. In the following, she describes Hutu and Tutsi as categories that are changeable over time and ignorable for the moment. In doing so, however, it becomes clear that she understands Hutu and Tutsi as being defined by descent. At the beginning of our dialogue, I ask her what she understands by ethnicity. She answers:

> Interviewee: Depuis longtemps, il y a eu une politique qui disait que les Tutsi sont des gens de longue taille, avec un beau visage et qui étaient riches! Le Hutu était laid, gros et pauvre! Le Twa était potier et n'était même pas connu! Ce que je veux te dire c'est que

> dans 10 ans il n'y aura ni Hutu ni Tutsi au Rwanda parce que les mariages mixtes sont nombreux actuellement! […]
>
> Author: Est-ce que c'est possible d'être Hutu sans avoir des parents Hutu?
>
> Interviewee: Si une femme Hutu se marie à un Tutsi, et que leur enfant ressemble beaucoup plus à la famille de sa mère, il est Hutu parce qu'il ressemble à la famille de sa mère!! (interviewee R13)

The interviewee asserts that the categories of Hutu or Tutsi will disappear within the next ten years. That clearly describes Hutu and Tutsi as categories that are not going to last forever and points to a constructivist and non essentialist understanding. Accordingly, she understands ethnicity as not directly defined by descent. To my question of whether it is possible to be a Hutu without having Hutu parents, she implicitly answers yes. Hence, Hutu and Tutsi are described as categories that are changeable. At the same time, however, she refers to the physical appearance of the child in order to define its affiliation to Hutu and Tutsi. If the child looks like the family of the Hutu mother, he is Hutu even though the father might be Tutsi. Similarly, she reasons that the frequent intermarriages between Hutu and Tutsi are the cause for the disappearance of Hutu and Tutsi. That implies that Hutu and Tutsi are categories defined by descent or blood, since she assumes the married couples have children together that are neither Hutu nor Tutsi but both. This implicit reference to descent and physical appearance points to an essentialist understanding.

The statements of this category and the following category comprehend essentialist and constructivist notions of ethnicity. Ethnic categories are deconstructed and essentialised at the same time. The juxtaposition of seemingly mutually exclusive essentialist and constructivist aspects can be found as well in the following category. What sets the present category, *Essentialising Deconstructivism,* apart from the following category is that the essentialist notion of ethnicity last strongly *although* the interviewees clearly also hold a constructivist view. Either the constructivist perspectives depicted by the interviewees replicate a strong essentialist understanding of ethnicity or the deconstructivist perspective does not refer to or, in this sense, does not integrate the strong essentialist notion of ethnicity into one consistent version of ethnicity. The essentialist notion remains implicit and the contradiction to the promoted constructivist perspective is unresolved. Referring to physical appearance, *real* descent and intermarriages to sustain arguments that are meant to question the definition of Hutu and Tutsi based on physical appearance and descent essentialises these categories, despite their presumably intended social deconstruction. Similarly, the unsolved contradiction is particularly apparent within statements that con-

ceive of the affiliation to Hutu and Tutsi as defined by descent. The constructivist arguments are put next to these strongly essentialist arguments but are not really integrated into one notion of Hutu and Tutsi. Hence, they appear less plausible and less legitimate. In this sense, approaching ethnic categories based on self-evident concepts, i.e., knowledge of 'those living in that world', reveals the relevance of taking essentialists' notions into consideration in the analysis. In other words, it is not sufficient to simply avoid ethnic categories based on its essentialist conception in the general debate or in the specific one about Rwanda and Burundi. The quotes included in the next category integrate the two perspectives into one more or less consistent, constructivist perspective.

8.2 Deconstructing Essentialism

On the one hand, the interviewees included in the category *Deconstructing Essentialism*, which in the following section is presented by two quotes by Rwandans and two quotes by Burundians, share the same approach to ethnic categories (i.e., Hutu and Tutsi) as I have (see 5.3): ethnic categories are understood as socially constructed and socially changeable categories. In order to describe their *non*–essentialist character, the interviewees point to economic differences, the colonial powers and the reality of clans. The constructedness, however, does not imply that these categories are ignorable. Quite contrary, the categories of Hutu and Tutsi are understood as constructed but real. Some of the statements describe these categories further as being *socially defined* by descent. On the other hand, this analysis contradicts my theoretical approach, since 'those living in that world' (i.e., Rwandans and Burundians) have a clear social constructivist perspective on ethnic categories (i.e., Hutu and Tutsi). They describe ethnic categories as *not* depending on descent, birth or physical traits. Like the previous category, both constructivist and essentialist aspects are reflected within the statements. Unlike the previous category, the statements integrate both aspects in a more consistent constructivist understanding of Hutu and Tutsi. Nonetheless, some of the statements replicate an essentialist image of ethnicity in general (i.e., referring to contexts beyond Rwanda and Burundi).

The first statement that illustrates an interpretation of Hutu and Tutsi, which assumes these categories are socially constructed but nonetheless real, is made by a Rwandan teacher. I ask him about the most important cleavages in present Rwanda, and he replies:

> En fait, ce sont les clivages ethniques. Boah, entre guillemet parce que ce qu'on appelle ethnique, ce n'est pas l'ethnie, ethnie. […] le clivage principal existe entre les deux groupes principaux: Hutu et Tutsi… le clivage se trouve au niveau de la période que moi j'ai décrit: de '59. Parce que c'est en fait le début de l'extériorisation de ce clivage. Le clivage était toujours motivé par des différences, d'abord des différences économiques, mais

> poussé par les colonisateurs. Ils voulaient exploiter ces différences, justement pour les mettre en profit de leur intérêt (interviewee R9).

According to the teacher, the social cleavage between Hutu and Tutsi is the most important one in Rwanda. In this respect, he identifies 1959 as a crucial moment. By then the cleavage became externalised for the first time. Yet, the cleavage always has been fuelled by economic differences and pushed by the colonial powers that exploited the social difference. In this sense, he describes Hutu and Tutsi as socially constructed, yet real. At the same time, he describes ethnic categories in Rwanda and Burundi as not *really* real; you could call them ethnic cleavages with quotation marks to distinguish them from the real 'ethnies' (that he calls "ethnies ethnies"). Thus, he essentialises the notion of ethnicity in other contexts beyond Rwanda since he evokes the idea that, unlike in Rwanda where the label 'ethnies' has to be put into quotation marks, ethnic categories can be adequately applied to other contexts.

This perception of Hutu and Tutsi as social categories that exist in present Rwanda is also reflected in the next statement. More precisely, the interviewee refers to the genocide. She is a senator. In the following, I ask her if she thinks there are people who do not feel represented on the political level. She says:

> It is a process, I can't say it is gone; it can't, because the systems here, the religion, the church, the schools, the parents at home they were all teaching about this bad ideology, about discrimination and hate. So you can't just say it's gone…there was a genocide. The genocide which killed about 1.000.000 people – Tutsi mainly – was like, yeah, we are different. […] the difference Hutu Tutsi used to be superficial but with the genocide, when someone would go and kill the wife... If a Hutu was married to a Tutsi wife, he would go and kill her. The husband would kill the wife. And if a Tutsi married to a Hutu, he will kill the child. The father would kill the child. So it became very dangerous…, so it became much deeper. The genocide has complicated our relationship, you cannot avoid that. So now you have to deal with healing the wounds. A Tutsi who was killed by a Hutu you are not going to tell them that Hutu and Tutsi are brothers …he say no…he has killed my child, because I am a Tutsi. So it's not easy to say there is a history, there is colonialism, there is new colonialism, there is the bad leadership…you can't explain that to a person who is not educated, what they know is that somebody killed their child…and normally if it is a Tutsi, he will say, yea, Hutu killed him (interviewee R21).

She says that the difference between Hutu and Tutsi was superficial but then became real with the genocide. Therefore, the cleavage became much deeper and complicated the relationships between Hutu and Tutsi. Moreover, even before the genocide Rwandans were taught about discrimination and hate. Due to these historical events, the social difference between Hutu and Tutsi is real. As she puts it, "it is a process". Therefore, "you can't just say that it is gone". Conversely, this assumption implies that the possibility exists that the cleavages have become less real. Interestingly, she refers to aspects that are typically cited

to explain the ethnic cleavages in Rwanda such as history, colonialism and bad leadership. Although she acknowledges them as causes for the horrible event, she does not assume that they make it less real for the people concerned (i.e., for the Rwandans and especially for those who lost their relatives). She describes Hutu and Tutsi as socially constructed categories that are real for Rwandans, who might not know about their constructedness. Yet, she does not explicitly describe Hutu and Tutsi as ethnic categories or as defined by descent. Illustrating the deep cleavage between Hutu and Tutsi, it becomes clear that descent plays an important role. As she says, Hutu married to Tutsi killed their children and Hutu killed the children of Tutsi because they are Tutsi.

The next interviewee, a Burundian, juxtaposes clan affiliation to the categories of Hutu and Tutsi. In doing so, he assumes clan affiliation to be realer (in terms of an 'anthropological reality') than ethnic affiliation. He is mushingantahe, a traditional mediating authority in Burundi. In the following statement, in which he answers my question of what he understands by ethnicity or an 'ethnic group', he emphasises the powerful realness of 'ethnies' in Burundi:

> Aujourd'hui est-ce qu'on peut nier l'existence réelle des ethnies? Je pense après ces violences cycliques que nous avons traversées, les Burundais ont déjà intériorisé leur appartenance ethnique pour avoir été victimes justement de ces clivages. Il serait donc difficile aujourd'hui d'affirmer que les gens n'ont pas cette conscience d'appartenir à une ethnie […] donc, ce n'est pas du tout une réalité anthropologique, notre réalité anthropologique est surtout clanique, mais nous avons les ethnies comme une stratégie de l'instrumentalisation des composantes sociales du Burundi en défendant… de se maintenir au pouvoir. Mais la conscience ethnique commence à s'implanter après ces crises cycliques que nous venons de vivre (interviewee B11).

The interviewee assumes ethnic categories as induced by instrumentalisation that aims at staying in power. Nonetheless, the *real* existence of these very ethnic categories cannot be denied. Due to the violent and cyclic crisis, ethnic affiliation is part of the consciousness of Burundians. He juxtaposes the reality of the ethnic categories to the reality of the clan membership that is, as he put it, an anthropological reality. Describing clan membership as part of human being (as anthropological reality), he essentialises it. The ethnic categories, in contrast, are not an anthropological reality. The reality of ethnic categories in Burundi persists due to the recurrent crises. Therefore, by comparing the ethnic reality to the essentialist reality of the clans, he deconstructs it. At the same time, he emphasises the influence of ethnic consciousness and ethnic categories in Burundi.

His colleague, another mushingantahe that I interview, implicitly describes Hutu and Tutsi as well as a reality in Burundi. Although he does not assume that clans are 'realer' than Hutu and Tutsi, he says that the clans existed before. Due to the instrumentalisation the clan members have been regrouped as Hutu and

Tutsi. I ask him if it is possible to be Hutu or Tutsi without having parents who are Hutu or Tutsi. He answers:

> Non, c'est impossible parce qu'avec l'instrumentalisation il avait une catégorisation sociale qui consiste à regrouper les clans dans des grands ensembles qualifiés d'être Hutu ou Tutsi […]. Il y a des clans qui ont des dénominations et qui doivent être perçus comme étant composés des Hutu et des Tutsi (interviewee B9).

He clearly denies the possibility to be Hutu or Tutsi without having parents of the same ethnic affiliation. Thus, he acknowledges a concept of ethnicity that is based on descent. Yet, he sees this concept as induced by instrumentalisation that regrouped existing clan memberships into 'ethnic groups'. Hence, he describes being Hutu or Tutsi as an essentialistically defined (i.e., defined by descent) category that is socially constructed.

The statements included in the category illustrate a notion of Hutu and Tutsi that, on the one hand, acknowledges these categories as constructed reality in Rwanda and Burundi. On the other hand, they do not imply that this reality is essentialist, i.e., existing and persisting independently of the social context. Referring to different aspects such as the reality of the clans, instrumentalisation to gain political and economic power for different leaders (e.g., the colonial powers), events such as the genocide or the 'Rwandan revolution' in 1959, the statements question the persistence and essentialist reality of ethnic categories in Rwanda and Burundi. Nonetheless, Hutu and Tutsi are described as categories that are ethnic or, more precisely, defined by descent; either the categories are simply referred to as ethnic or it is made clear that in Rwanda and Burundi the affiliation to these categories is given by birth. Moreover, it is emphasised that these categories are real in terms of being known and taken for granted and constituting social categories related to killings and massacres. Having said this, the understanding implied in the statements describes Hutu and Tutsi as essentialistically understood categories that exist due to a specific social context. Accordingly, I categorised them as *Deconstructing Essentialism*.

By deconstructing the categories of Hutu and Tutsi, some lines of reasoning oppose them to other ethnic categories (in other contexts). Most often they depict the clan reality as real (i.e., persistent and essentialist) or they implicitly assume ethnic categories in other contexts are different from those constructed realities in Rwandan and Burundi. Within the scope of my analysis, the essentialisation at a second glance highlights again that contradictory aspects of essentialist and constructivist interpretations persist next to each other.

In conclusion, my analysis can be exemplified by David Newbury's (1998b: 83) description of ethnicity in Rwanda: In Rwanda as elsewhere, "ethnic identi-

ties are not rigid, unchanging, or universal categories. But neither are they entirely ephemeral, fluid, and individual". This is true, as I argue, because Rwandans and Burundians themselves (not any outside interpreter) do conceive Hutu and Tutsi in this way. Following the theoretical approach of James Fearon and David Laitin (2000), Rogers Brubaker (2004) and Mathias Bös (2005) and the empirical approach of Francisco Gil-White (1999)[69] and Mary Waters (1990: 13) asking for the implicit conceptions "potential ethnics" have about their ethnicity, ethnicity in Rwanda and Burundi can be described as constructed, i.e., fluid and changeable, and essentialist, i.e., rigid and unchanging.

For the overall argument of the book, the distinction of essentialist and constructivist arguments is important since essentialist concepts, i.e., ascribed characteristics, as opposed to constructivist concepts, i.e., acquired characteristics, are assumed to be more exclusive. Analysing exclusion along ethnic categories, i.e., ethnicised politics that are constitutive for the 'dilemma of recognition', the essentialist concepts of ethnicity of Rwandans and Burundians are crucial for the analysis. Of great interest in this respect are the arguments categorised as *Essentialising Constructivism* in which an essentialist understanding remains strong due to strong assumptions or essentialising arguments meant to deconstruct ethnic categories. The statements categorised as *Deconstructing Essentialism* integrate the two notions into a more consistent constructivist point of view. However, the essentialist and constructivist notions are not always fully integrated. Some lines of reasoning essentialise other categories such as clan membership and ethnicity in other contexts (beyond Rwanda and Burundi), in order to deconstruct the affiliation to Hutu and Tutsi.

These contradictions could be interpreted in different manners. In respect to Rwanda it is assumed that different parts of the society might have different interest in essentialist or constructivist versions of ethnicity (see Burnet 2007: 2; Reyntjens 2004b: 184). "It has [...] been argued that the government's endorsement of an all-Rwandan citizenship, or Rwandité, serves to mask the monopoly by Tutsi military and political power" (Buckley-Zistel 2009: 43). In this vein, the discourse about essentialist or constructed ethnicity in Rwanda is explicitly related to ethnic categories. The essentialist notions are represented by Hutu and called "the official Hutu discourse", whereas the "current, Tutsi-dominated, post-genocidal government" and "Tutsi point of view" coincides with the constructivist discourse (Mamdani 2002: 499; Uvin 2001: 76).

69 He asked Torguud nomadic pastoralists in Western Mongolia amongst others the question: "If the father is Kazakh and the mother Mongol, what is the ethnicity of the child" (Gil-White 1999: 795)? I adopted the question by asking my interviewees whether it is possible to be Hutu (Tutsi) without having parents who are Hutu (Tutsi).

According to my understanding of the interview material as taken for granted notions, the contradictory notions simply point to missing legitimacy for those ‘living in that world’. In this respect, the powerful position of the current Rwandan government that enforces a non-ethnic interpretation of Rwandan society (Buckley-Zistel 2009: 47) suggests that Rwandans adapt to the official view, although ethnic affiliation does still play a major role in their own life (PRI 2004: 38). The analysis shows that essentialist arguments are part of the understanding of ethnicity of Rwandans and Burundians. Hence, these lines of reasoning might be interpreted as an enforced, superficial copy of the official Rwandan discourse. However, it is also part of the understanding of Burundians and ‘scientific interpreters’ (see 2.1).

My understanding of these interpretations points to the necessity to work on a more constructivist notion of ethnicity that is *taken for granted by Rwandans and Burundians*. In this respect, I agree with Susanne Buckley-Zistel (2009: 48) who, discussing the top-down strategy of the Rwandan government, recommends, “To avoid future conflict, instead of glossing over the past and pretending that Rwandans are beyond any conflicts, a more situated version of the past is required in which all members of society may recognize themselves”.

If not, the “chosen amnesia”, as she refers to this way of dealing in another article, may risk not challenging “the social cleavages that rendered the genocide possible, which obstructs their transformation in the future” (Buckley-Zistel 2006c: 131).

Reformulating her recommendations with respect to the present focus of research on essentialist notions of ethnicity and achieving a less essentialist version of ethnicity in Rwanda and Burundi, it is necessary to begin with the notions that Rwandans and Burundians take for granted. Instead of simply stating that Hutu and Tutsi and ethnic categories do not exist in Rwanda, the essentialist notions of Rwandans and Burundians are to be taken into account. These notions must constitute the starting point when the aim is to dissolve the essentialist notions of Hutu and Tutsi in Rwanda and Burundi.

9 Politicised Ethnicity as 'Experienced Reality'

> It is the institution of modern democratic state that first raises the question who may belong to its nation, because that state embodied the idea and the practice of national sovereignty: the state should so to speak, be dyed by a nation's color and designate 'the people' in whose name it rules over the territory (Wimmer 1997: 634).

When introducing the concepts of nation state and ethnicity (see 6.2), I have focused on their historically interwoven connotations in order to conceive of politicised ethnicity. Politicised ethnicity describes the taken for granted notion implied in Andreas Wimmer's quote that a nation state is to "be dyed by a nation's color and designate 'the people' in whose name it rules over the territory" (Wimmer 1997: 634). Elsewhere Wimmer (2002: 212, emphasise added) is even more precise, arguing that against the background of the notion of modern nation state, "politics [...] become[s] a matter of representing an ethnically defined people in whose interest the state is supposed to act". In other words, ethnicity constitutes a taken for granted basis for political rights, claims, and representation, i.e., inclusion (see 1.1). Arguing in a similar way, Mahmood Mamdani (2002: 495) describes the idea, which for him is a colonial legacy, "that ancestry [*i.e., according to the present definition: ethnicity*, author's note] should be the basis of rights" as common sense taken for granted in the Great Lakes Region in Africa, to which Rwanda and Burundi belong.

I argue that this notion derives from the general thinking about the modern nation state, but ethnic categories (as defined by descent) *that do not coincide* with the modern nation state are also part of this thinking. The Rwandan and Burundian laws defining citizenship and the people entitled to rule the countries as president by descent (see 6.2) clearly imply the idea of inclusion based on ethnicity. However, the following interpretations define inclusion based on the ethnic categories of Hutu and Tutsi. Both notions, although they are contradictory in respect to the ethnic categories they refer to (i.e., Burundian and Rwandan or Hutu and Tutsi), interpret inclusion based on ethnicity and, in this sense, reflect the idea of the modern nation state.

Chapter 8 depicted the thinking about Hutu and Tutsi as essentialist and constructed, which is also relevant for the analysis of the 'dilemma of recognition' because categories that are essentialistically defined are per se more exclusive than categories that are defined as socially constructed. Ethnicised politics

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and politicised ethnicity, i.e., inclusion and exclusion self–evidently interpreted based on ethnic categories, however, constitute the 'dilemma of recognition', whose illustration is the main focus of the present book. Ethnicised politics imply politicised ethnicity. Furthermore, the general idea of inclusion based on ethnicity, which is constitutive for the idea of modern nation state, is reflected in these notions.

According to my understanding, the legitimacy of ideas is implied in their self evidence and taken for grantedness (see 4.3). The illustration of politicised ethnicity aims at revealing the legitimacy and, hence, power of this notion.

Institutions are always the product of a specific historical context (see 4.3). Given that the Rwandan and Burundian contexts have been characterised by violent conflicts aligned along ethnic cleavages and an ethnic interpretation of post-independence political history, I assume the 'experienced reality' is different from other contexts that did not have such a history.[70] More precisely, I consider the relatedness of ethnicity and politics to be especially strong. Nonetheless, this relatedness reflects the general modern thinking about political organisation and representation (see 6.2). In this sense, analysing the notional relatedness of ethnicity and nation state reveals and challenges, on a more general level, the notions that are taken for granted and constitute social reality.

For illustrating politicised ethnicity, i.e., the taken for granted notion that ethnic categories make up the basis for rights, political claims, and political representation, I present three categories developed based on the knowledge of Rwandans and Burundians. The statements show how Rwandans and Burundians relate the notions of nation state, democracy and ethnicity to each other.

The first category, *Equation of Political and Ethnic Majority,* includes statements equating political with ethnic majority (9.1). The idea of political representation based on ethnic categories is evident in these statements. The political charge related to the numerical relations in Rwanda and Burundi (approximately 14 per cent Tutsi and 85 per cent Hutu) becomes evident in the assumed taken for granted notion that the ethnic majority should be the political majority.

The second category, *Political Representation of Interests Based on Ethnicity,* illustrates the notional relatedness between political representation of *interest* and ethnicity (9.2). The idea that political *interest* should be represented based on ethnicity (i.e., by somebody who is part of the same 'ethnic group') is replicated. This idea is implied in prominent concepts such as the one of self-determination that presumes that likes should be ruled by someone alike, or,

70 Although this question is very interesting from the perspective of the sociology of knowledge (see 3.2), it is not a question I can address within the scope of my research design.

interpreted in ethnic terms, that an 'ethnic group' is to be ruled by somebody of the same 'ethnic group' (because he is assumed to represent the ethnically defined interest).

The third analytical category underlines the argument that ethnicity is a very self-evident form of political representation (9.3). The statements included in the category, *(Re)interpretation of Ethnic Affiliation Based on Political Affiliation,* reveal a way of thinking that interprets ethnic affiliation in political terms. They conceive of ethnicity as depending on specific political ideas. In doing so, ethnicity itself is described as a political programme or vision. Put differently, ethnic affiliation is interpreted based on party affiliation or political attitude.

9.1 Ethnic and Political Majority

In general, but especially with regard to Rwanda and Burundi, ethnic majority is a self-evident point of reference that is taken for granted in the discussion about democracy and politically legitimate representation (see 2.2). Within the context of the idea of modern nation states, political and social inclusion are thought of as based on ethnicity (Eley and Suny 1996: 11; Wimmer 2004: 41). Thus, it is taken for granted that the ethnic majority has to constitute the political majority. Consequently, the ethnic majority gains a particular legitimacy. In this sense, this idea of ethnic and political majority reflects the taken for granted notion that inclusion is based on ethnic categories. Similarly, Mahmood Mamdani (2002: 505) asks, "if we redefine political identities, do we not move away from defining the rights of existing minorities to changing the very definition of who is a majority". Hence, when we aim at defining inclusion in non–ethic terms, the majority also has to be defined in non–ethnic terms.

The idea of democracy further reinforces the idea of a politically represented ethnic majority because it provides a legitimate connotation to claims for political representation of the ethnic majority. Political claims referring to political representation of 'the people' or to self-determination, for example, are essentially democratic – 'the people' of a nation are to be represented. Against this backdrop, it is appears to be self-evident that the ethnic majority constitutes the political majority. If 'the people' of a nation state are ethnically defined, the ethnically defined majority has to be represented.

Accordingly, the presumably democratic equation of political and ethnic majority was an important justification for the 'Rwandan revolution' in 1959. Later, it was one of the most prominent pieces of rhetoric in the genocidal propaganda relating to the 'revolution'. As Alison Des Forges reports, Rwandan singer Simon Bikindi used one of his most famous songs to emphasise the im-

portance and benefits of the revolution in 1959. RTML (Radio-Télévision Libre des Milles Collines), the most influential channel of the genocidal propaganda, endlessly repeated the song (Des Forges 1999: 77). He sang,

> ...the servitude, the whip, the lash, the forced work that exhausted the people that has disappeared forever. You, the great majority [rubanda nyamwinshi], pay attention and, descendants of Sebahinzi, remember this evil that should be driven as far away as possible, so that it never returns to Rwanda (Des Forges 1999: 77).

The song describes the ethnic majority as the stronghold against the Tutsi–dominated monarchy that opposed the period before the revolution when whip, servitude and forced work reigned (Des Forges 1999: 77). Precisely because the song is clearly propagandistic, it gives insight into the political charge of the terms (ethnic) minority and (ethnic) majority that occurs against the background of the modern idea of taken for granted political organisation and representation.

In the following, I quote two Rwandans and two Burundians. Their statements equate ethnic to political majority and therefore are included in the category *Equation of Political and Ethnic Majority*. The quotes in this category take it for granted that either the ethnic majority is the political majority or the ethnic majority should be the political majority. The taken for grantedness of this equation, in turn, reveals the strong notional relatedness between ethnicity and political representation. Some of the statements explicitly refer to the idea of democracy that is realised by the political representation of the ethnic majority. This reference makes the political charge of the idea of ethnic majority and its political representation even more evident. Against this backdrop, the political power of these concepts is clear: 'ethnic minority' or 'ethnic majority' cannot be pronounced without being political.

The following statement interprets the rule of the majority implied in the notion of democracy as the rule of the ethnic majority. The interviewee used to be an officer in the Burundian army. He presents himself as quite satisfied with the regime before 1993, especially with the one run by Jean-Baptist Bagaza (Burundian president from 1976-1987). He contrasts the present regime and its perceived suboptimal performance with the performance of Bagaza's regime. Against this background, he criticises the idea of democracy that he understands as the political representation of an ethnically defined majority:

> Les pays de l'Europe qui sont à l'origine de ce problème qui sont arrivés au Rwanda qui voulaient favoriser l'arrivée de la majorité au pouvoir….avec l'histoire de '59 au Rwanda. C'étaient les Belges qui ont convaincu leurs collègues européens…c'est la minorité, il faut que la majorité passe au pouvoir….mais sous des conditions qui….vous savez la démocratie chez vous, vous savez ce que ça a coûté d'arriver à une véritable démocratie. […] Mais chez nous, on a programmé la démocratie, et la démocratie ne se programme pas. Et le ré-

> sultat c'est ça. Une fois que la minorité était partie, maintenant c'est la majorité, la majorité entre eux …regardez ce qu'ils font (interviewee B6).[71]

He deplores the present situation in Burundi where the ethnic majority rules after the minority left, as he puts it. Nonetheless, he conceives of democracy as a concept that is based on the political representation of the ethnic majority. Although he thinks that democracy in Burundi (and in Rwanda) came with many problems due to that very claim of the political representation of the majority, he understands democracy to be exactly that. He even refers to the "véritable democratie" whose implementation costs Burundi dearly. The idea of 'veritable democracy' was brought by the colonial powers to Rwanda and Burundi, thereby inducing "l'histoire de 1959 in Rwanda". Within the course of the interview he expresses even more clearly the idea that it is a legitimate (i.e., self-evident and taken for granted) claim of the ethnic majority to be politically represented. When answering my question of whether he would not agree that the quotas of 60 per cent Hutu and 40 per cent Tutsi are a good political instrument, he says, "On est tout à fait d'accord que la majorité aie les places qu'elle mérite, c'est tout à fait normal". He agrees that the ethnic majority should get the places it *deserves*. This suggests that simply being the ethnic majority constitutes a basis for political claims and representation.

Similarly, the next two Rwandan interviewees explicitly relate the idea of political representation of the ethnic majority to, as they call it, "the revolution" in Rwanda in 1959 and the realization of democracy. The first interviewee is accused of incitement of genocide and was imprisoned at the moment of the interview. In the following quote, she answers my question about the most important moments in Rwandan history. She mentions the colonial time and the moment of "the revolution", since the ethnic categories were created then.[72]

> At that time the minority was the bearer of power. The majority did not have any power. The colonial powers used the majority by directing their attention in a bad direction. They taught and nourished dissatisfaction until the moment of the revolution was reached (interviewee R3).

At the beginning of the statement she asserts that before the revolution the power was held by the minority and not the majority. It is quite evident to her that the revolution started on this basis after the colonial powers spread the

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71 For the criteria that have been considered for the selection of my interviewees, see 3.3. These criteria are defined by social cleavages that are assumed to play a role for the interpretation of social and political exclusion, i.e., ethnicised politics. Although it is not the focus in the present chapter, politicised ethnicity implies ethnicised politics.

72 I was not allowed to record, but I took notes in German and translated them roughly.

democratic ideology. She describes the revolution as induced by the colonial powers that instrumentalised “the majority”. Despite the instrumentalisation, the basic condition of the revolution that brought the majority into power was that the minority (and not the majority) unjustly was in power before 1959. In this sense, it seems to be obvious that the majority had to come to power.

The taken for grantedness of the idea that the ethnic majority has to constitute the political majority and its explicit relation to democracy is even stronger in the statement made by the next interviewee. He is also a prisoner accused of incitement of genocide. When asked about the most important moments in Rwandan history he describes (amongst others) the colonial time and the moment of independence:[73]

> The land has been democratized. A clash has occurred between the ruling class and the mass. These were ethnic groups. Before the Tutsi were the rulers, then the Hutu. The ruling class has been overthrown with certain violence. And it came along with the democratization. That is what is also called revolution of 1959. The minority of Tutsi has been overthrown in power and the majority of Hutu came into power. You know the numbers, there are about 15 per cent Tutsi and 85 per cent Hutu (interviewee R2).

The statement suggests that the ethnic majority, the masses, had to come into power within the process of democratisation. Explicitly placing the equation of ethnic with political majority into the context of the idea of democracy, the equation of ethnic with political majority (as well as the political claim behind it) appears to be self-evident and legitimate.

The interviewees more or less explicitly take it for granted that the ethnic majority has to constitute the political majority. Either they directly relate this idea to political claims or they say that others, e.g., ‘the Hutu’, base their political claims on this assumption. Even the interviewees, who do not agree with the political claims, take the underlying assumption itself as granted. In this sense, the statements illustrate the self-evident equation of political and ethnic majority. Hence, ethnicity is accepted as taken for granted, and thus, the legitimate basis for political claims and political representation.

The next interviewee uses this notion to justify the existence of his political movement. He is a partisan of the FNL (Forces Nationales de Libération). The FNL is a military organisation that was still fighting against the Burundian government at the moment of the interview. Describing the political past he deplores that although ‘the Tutsi’ constitute the minority they always dominated politically. In doing so, he suggests that the ethnic minority cannot build up the legitimate (i.e., self-evident) basis for political rule. This line of reasoning im-

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73 I was not allowed to record, but I took notes in German and translated them roughly.

plies that ethnicity and its numeric composition should be politically represented. The ethnic minority is not supposed to represent the political majority:[74]

> Our movement will fight, because the Tutsi left us to live in poverty. Even the simple Tutsi here have a good life. But the majority of Hutu does not. They dominated us for 40 years although it is a small minority (interviewee B3).

Complaining that 'the Tutsi' dominate politically even though they are a minority, he suggests the political dominance of the ethnic minority is not legitimate. Against this background, he justifies the movement of FNL and their military fight by referring to this political domination of an ethnic minority. Conversely, the claim for the political representation of the majority is implied. The taken for grantedness of such claims entail their legitimacy and their power.

The self evidence of ethnicity, and particularly ethnic majority, as a legitimate basis for political claims becomes particularly apparent by explicitly relating it to democracy and the realization of democracy. Democracy is understood as implying the idea of political representation based on ethnicity. On this basis, it is taken for granted that the ethnic majority deserves to be politically represented by the political majority.

In conclusion, the self-evident equation of ethnic and political majority reveals very clearly the idea that ethnicity has to be politically represented. Taking ethnicity for granted as a basis for political claims implies its political charge. This putative objectivity and taken for grantedness, strongly related to generally accepted democratic ideals, has a legitimising effect. In other words, speaking about ethnic majority is highly political since it implies a legitimate basis for political claims.

74 I was not allowed to record, but I took notes in German and translated them roughly.

9.2 Political Representation of Interest Based on Ethnicity

The presidency of Barack Obama and the ensuing media reaction to it in the U.S. and all over the world exemplifies the idea of political representation of interest based on ethnicity. African-Americans and people living in Africa act and are assumed to act as if Obama, as a descendant of Kenyans, can and will better represent their interests as Africans or descendants of Africans than other U.S. presidents. For example, one article published in the *New York Times* points out that Barack Obama has been to Kenya only three times in his life and that he neither knows his father nor his Kenyan relatives very well. Nonetheless, it argues,

> You might think that all Kenyans would be vigorously supporting Mr. Obama. But Kenya has been fractured along ethnic lines in the last two months, so now Mr. Obama draws frenzied support from the Luo ethnic group of his ancestors, while many members of the rival Kikuyu group fervently support Hillary Rodham Clinton (*The New York Times*, 24 February 2008).

This reasoning replicates the idea of political representation of interest based on ethnicity on two levels: first, by assuming that Kenyans might massively support Obama due to his father; second, by describing that only the 'ethnic groups' of Obama's ancestors support him. It is taken for granted that somebody with the same ethnic affiliation better represents one's own political interests and therefore is likely to be elected by those having the same ethnic affiliation. In doing so, the idea of an 'ethnic group' is replicated, i.e., the idea of a collective actor with common purposes. This idea of 'ethnic groups' is most apparently implied in the self-evident claim for self-determination that is realised when people with the same ethnic affiliation as the 'ethnic group' rule the 'ethnic group'. In this case the 'ethnic group' is assumed to *determine itself*. The given relationship between democracy, nation state and ethnicity presents the political claim for self-determination as an especially legitimate one.

In the following, I illustrate how Rwandans and Burundians conceive of the idea of *Political Representation of Interest Based on Ethnicity*. In order to present this category, I quote two Rwandans and two Burundians.

The statements in which the idea of *Political Representation of Interest Based on Ethnicity* is most explicit are those in which the benefit of the 'ethnic group' is related to power distribution interpreted in ethnic terms. The first interviewee quoted here is Rwandan. He lives and works as a car mechanic in Gisenyi. When I ask him if 'the Hutu' perceive themselves as being disadvantaged, he says:

> Mais bien sûr, ça se voit même. Normalement avant – tu sais que les Tutsi sont minoritaires ici – quand les Hutu avaient le pouvoir ils étaient défavorisés. Alors aujourd'hui, c'est le contraire. Hier c'étaient des Hutu, aujourd'hui ce sont des Tutsi (interviewee R7).

In his answer, he immediately relates the benefit of an 'ethnic group' (i.e., assuming a collective actor) to the political power of this 'ethnic group'. When 'the Hutu' are in power 'the Tutsi' are disadvantaged and 'the Hutu' benefit, and the other way around. Whereas yesterday there were 'the Hutu', today there are 'the Tutsi' who are in power as well as in an all-encompassing position of well being. Taking it for granted that one group benefits when it has political power clearly points to the notion of political representation of interest based on ethnicity (which implies the idea of 'ethnic groups').

Similarly, a Burundian interviewee refers to the numeric proportions given in the Burundian political institutions in order to support her assertion that neither Hutu nor Tutsi are disadvantaged. She is a deputy. In the following quote, she answers my question of whether there are any social groups that feel disadvantaged with respect to the actual policy:

> Je ne dirais pas que c'est être défavorisé si dans la politique, dans la constitution on dit que...c'est stipulé dans la constitution qu'au niveau du gouvernement, du parlement il doit y avoir 60% d'Hutu et 40% de Tutsi. Et au niveau du parlement on a fait les quotas de trois Twa. Dans la constitution on a tenu compte de l'effectif total de ces groupes. Je vous ai dit que les Hutu sont majoritaires suivis par les Tutsi et puis après les Twa. Je dirais pas que ça est être défavorisé (interviewee B16).

Answering my question she refers to the Burundian constitution, which stipulates that the Burundian political institutions are composed of 40 per cent Tutsi and 60 per cent Hutu. The constitution does even take the factual amount of the groups into account. Hence, according to the interviewee, none of the groups benefit most, since both 'ethnic groups' are politically represented according to their number.

Both the Burundian deputy and the Rwandan car mechanic answer the question about disadvantaged groups by referring to their assessment of power distribution between Hutu and Tutsi. The argument clearly implies that Hutu and Tutsi have distinguishable interests; hence, interest is based on ethnicity. Conversely, the political representation of these interests or rights is guaranteed by the political presence of members of the 'ethnic group'.

This line of reasoning is also implied in the next quotes. The Burundian interviewee cited in the following is a senator. I ask him if the Burundians know the ethnic affiliation of the politicians and if, according to him, it is important for them to know it:

> Quand il [*quelqu'un de la communauté Tutsi*, author's note] voit quelqu'un au niveau de la télévision qui est Tutsi, vraiment il en est fier. Il dit, au moins il y a quelqu'un qui peut défendre la cause de Tutsi […]. Ils en sont fiers. La même si un Hutu voit son frère s'exprimer à la télévision ou d'occuper un poste très important. Il dit, tiens, aujourd'hui quand même, c'est bien. Nous avons des Hutu qui peuvent évoluer qui peuvent occuper des postes très importants par rapport aux anciens temps. Ils en sont fiers. Vous voyez, les Tutsi sont une ethnie minoritaire, si ils voient qu'il y a un Tutsi qui est parvenu à pousser loin au niveau de pouvoir il croit ce Tutsi va défendre la cause de la minorité Tutsi….voilà. Le Hutu la même chose, il va dire, il y a long temps que nous étions dominés par des Tutsi, maintenant nous avons nos frères là-bas qui occupent des postes très importants, nous en sommes fiers (interviewee B20).

Twice the interviewee mentions "la cause de Tutsi" (the cause of the Tutsi) as if there was a specific interest of 'the Tutsi' that is different from the interest of other Burundians and, particularly, of 'the Hutu'. Therefore, he assumes 'the Tutsi' to be a collective actor with common purposes that apparently have to be defended by Tutsi. Hence, it is taken for granted that the interests of 'the Tutsi' are represented when a Tutsi is present at the political level (literally he says because 'they' are a minority and, hence, 'they' are proud if one of them is successful in politics). Similarly, the interest of 'the Hutu' is self-evidently thought of as represented when a Hutu is present at the political level (because 'they' have been dominated by Tutsi, hence, 'they' are proud if one of them is successful in politics). Since the interviewee does not really explain what defines 'the cause of the Tutsi' with regard to content, but explicitly assumes that the interest of Tutsi is represented by Tutsi, interest of 'the Hutu' and 'the Tutsi' appears to be realised when 'they' are politically represented. Therefore, he not only takes for granted that 'the Tutsi' are an 'ethnic group' sharing common interests that are represented when Tutsi are in power – it is also apparent that the interest of 'the Hutu' and 'the Tutsi' are dichotomic because both want to see their ethnically defined representatives in power (excluding the representatives of the other ethnically defined group).

Similar to the previous statements the next interviewee relates the political representation of interests to the presence of 'co-ethnics'. He is Rwandan and a jurist, but for the moment, he is unemployed. In the following, he answers my question about whether the social situation in Rwanda would be different if Rwanda would have introduced ethnic quotas as they did in Burundi:

> Quand je vois au Burundi comment ils utilisent les quotas et comment le système politique se base sur les ethnies, d'un part c'est bien puisque là c'est clair, c'est l'inclusion obligatoire, c'est inclus même dans la constitution. C'est qui veut que tu ne puisses pas faire quelque chose en oubliant l'autre parti (interviewee R6).

Like the female deputy, he equates the quotas introduced at a political level with the inclusion of the population. He speaks about 'the other part' that points to a

dichotomic understanding of Hutu and Tutsi. If both parts are represented, it is not possible to leave out 'the other part'. This argument assumes that each ethnically defined part has its own interests. By including people of each ethnically defined part, the representation of interest is assured.

In conclusion, the lines of reasoning reflected suggest, first, that 'ethnic groups' are collective actors with common purposes and that the 'ethnic group' has specific, ethnically defined interests. Second, inevitably, these purposes and interests are assumed to be represented when 'co-ethnics' are represented or are assumed to be in power. The statements assume political representation of interest is based on ethnicity. Having said this, ethnicity is thought of as the basis for political claims or more precisely, political representation, and as a politicised concept. Being taken for granted these understandings are especially legitimate.

9.3 Ethnic Affiliation Based on Political Affiliation

The same idea of political representation of interest based on ethnicity forms the basis for the statements in the category *(Re)interpretation of Ethnic Affiliation Based on Political Affiliation* (i.e., political ideas and ideologies). However, this reinterpretation takes the notional relationship between ethnicity and politics to an extreme. It is not only assumed that 'ethnic groups' have a common, ethnically defined interest, but, conversely, that affiliation to an ethnic group is defined by a specific political affiliation or ideology other than the common understanding as defined by descent (see 7). In order to illustrate this pattern of interpretation I quote three Burundians.[75]

An understanding of ethnic categories as being partially defined by specific political affiliation is implied in the first statement. The interviewee is a Burundian NGO worker. I ask him if it is possible to be Hutu without having parents who are Hutu. He replies:

> Génétiquement non, mais on peut épouser des tendances Hutu en étant Tutsi, et inversement. Par exemple le CNDD est un mouvement Hutu surtout, mais il y a des Tutsi qui sont dedans. Et la société burundaise les considère comme des Hutu si même génétiquement disant ils sont des Tutsi (interviewee B10).

The quote implies that there are Hutu as well as Tutsi 'tendencies'. Thus, political parties such as the CNDD represent distinguishable political ideas of Hutu. Although it is a Hutu movement, Tutsi might become a member. According to

75 These patterns of interpretation do not occur in the statements made by Rwandans. Since this way of interpreting politics and ethnicity is very interesting, I illustrate it based on statements made by Burundians.

the interviewee these Tutsi are considered as Hutu. Therefore, the ethnic affiliation is reinterpreted based on the political affiliation (related to political ideas). The ethnic affiliation that is first genetically defined is reinterpreted based on political ideas. In other words, the interviewee equates ethnicity with sharing political vision next to having similar genes. Against this backdrop, it is taken for granted that if one adheres to 'Hutu' political vision, he or she is considered Hutu.

The following interviewee interprets ethnic affiliation in a similar way. He works as a medical doctor in Burundi. I ask him if the quotas might assure the people (including the Tutsi) that they are represented on the political level. In his answer, he explicitly negates the possibility of considering a Tutsi who works for a Hutu government as Tutsi:

> Les quotas en tout cas on ne les suit pas. Ils sont là mais les quotas sont respectés pour les ministres, c'est tout. Et puis les quotas … si on met un Tutsi dans un gouvernement des Hutu c'est un Tutsi qui est pour les Hutu: ça sert à rien de le considérer comme Tutsi, il est pour les Hutu. Même si il vote, il ne vote pas pour les Tutsi il vote pour les Hutu, à quoi ça sert (interviewee B5)?

The interviewee says that it is not useful to consider a Tutsi who works in a Hutu government a Tutsi, since he is for 'the Hutu'. He or she might even vote for 'the Hutu'. He suggests that being Tutsi (or Hutu) depends on the political interest one represents. Being part of a 'Hutu government', a Tutsi cannot represent Tutsi interests and is not considered a Tutsi.

Another Burundian interviewee describes these very patterns of interpretation. The 'countries of the Great Lakes' are caught in a certain logic, according to which conclusions are drawn concerning the ethnic affiliation of a person based on his or her political affiliation or ideas. The interviewee is the president of the UPRONA (Union pour le Progès National). I ask him if it is possible to be Hutu without having parents who are Hutu and he answers:

> C'est une question extrêmement difficile! Aujourd'hui, il y a des aberrations dans les pays des Grands Lacs. La collusion avec une philosophie vous donne automatiquement une sorte de carte d'identité. Le combat politique s'est mené autour de l'ethnie. Il y a eu des partis qui ont eu des connotations ethniques. Si par exemple vous êtes Tutsi et que vous êtes au CNDD et qu'on vous met dans un poste, est-ce que vous pensez que dans les partis à sensibilité Tutsi ils seront contents? […] Par exemple à l'UPRONA il y avait des Hutu ministres, députés; quand le mouvement hutisant est venu il a dit que ce ne sont pas des Hutu! Vous voyez on vous refuse votre appartenance ethnique parce que vous n'épousez pas les mêmes pensées! Je vous dis cela parce qu'être Hutu c'est une affaire tout à fait biologique mais aujourd'hui ce n'est plus simple, il ne faut pas avoir seulement le sang Hutu mais il faut aussi avoir la pensée. C'est cela qui indique que c'est de la manipulation! On fait de cette philosophie ethniste ce que l'on veut suivant ce que l'on cherche (interviewee B15)!

He explicitly says that in the Great Lakes Region a certain philosophy and political thinking define ethnic affiliation. According to him that is due to the political struggle that always referred to ethnic affiliation. The Hutu ministers and deputies who were part of the government when the UPRONA was still in power and the CNDD-FDD ("le mouvement hutisant") was still fighting against it were not considered Hutu. The same is true for Tutsi working for the CNDD. Put differently, Hutu working for a Tutsi government were not seen as Hutu. Therefore, being Hutu is not only a question of biology but also of the thinking and ideas a person represents. That is what the interviewee calls manipulation: ethnic affiliation can be reinterpreted according to the needs a person has in order to achieve certain political aims.

The *Reinterpretation of Ethnic Affiliation Based on Political Affiliation* takes the notional relatedness of ethnicity and politics to an extreme. According to the implied line of reasoning, Hutu or Tutsi is somebody who politically represents Hutu or Tutsi interests. Being Hutu and Tutsi implies, on the one hand, representing Hutu and Tutsi while, on the other hand, being represented by Hutu and Tutsi. Having said this, it becomes evident that ethnic categories are interpreted as the basis for political claims and rights. Above and beyond, one has to represent the defined interest of Hutu and Tutsi in order to be Hutu or Tutsi. This makes it very clear that ethnic categories have political meaning. These ideas reflected in the statements of this sub-section are strongly interwoven with the ideas reflected in the statements of the previous sub-sections; political representation and the political representation of interests are self-evidently thought of as being based on ethnicity. Political interests are defined by ethnicity and, hence, politics and political programme are thought of as defined by ethnic affiliation. Following this line of reasoning to its logical conclusion, the interviewees define ethnic affiliation based on party affiliation.

The chapter is meant to illustrate ethnic categories as a basis for rights, political claims, and political representation that are self-evident and taken for granted by Rwandans and Burundians. These three categories reveal patterns of interpretation that imply a strong notional relatedness between ethnicity and politics. In this sense, I speak about politicised ethnicity as the 'experienced reality' of Rwandans and Burundians.

The quotes included in the first category replicate the idea that the ethnic majority is represented and has to constitute the political majority. Some quotes put this notion into relation to the realization of democracy. Conversely, this argument implies that the interest, rights and claims of 'the people' in a democracy are represented based on ethnicity. This pattern of interpretation becomes more explicit in the second category. The argument goes that if the representa-

tives of an 'ethnic group' are in power, the group itself and its interest are automatically represented. In this sense, the statements included in both categories imply that an 'ethnic group' has a specific interest. The statements in the third category demonstrate very clearly that ethnic categories are taken for granted as a basis for political claims. Taking the ideas implied in the previous two categories to an extreme, ethnic affiliation is reinterpreted based on political affiliation and ideas. It is assumed that Hutu (or Tutsi) do not share the ideology of a regime that is seen as Tutsi (or Hutu). Ethnicity is implicitly equated to political ideas and affiliation. This line of reasoning reflects the idea that political interests are represented by ethnicity and that ethnicity is politically represented. Having said this, it is taken for granted that the ethnic majority is to be represented politically, that the representation of interests is based on ethnicity, and that ethnicity is (besides biology) defined by political visions. Therefore, ethnic categories constitute a basis for rights, political claims, and political representation that is self-evident and taken for granted. Generally speaking, talking about ethnicity is also talking about politics.

Within the scope of my analysis, politicised ethnicity is relevant since it explains the conflict propensity of ethnicised politics. More precisely, ethnicity as an inherently politicised concept, first, is necessary for the interpretation of social and political exclusion based on ethnic categories. To be clear, thinking of the representation of interest based on ethnic categories is necessary to interpret social and political exclusion based on ethnic categories. Moreover, politicised ethnicity reflects the thinking about modern legitimate political community, implying the principles of equality and likeness. In this sense, ethnicised politics contradicts the current paradigms of social justice, strongly implying politicised ethnicity.

10 The 'Dilemma of Recognition': Diverging Realities of Ethnicised Politics

> […] we must relinquish the single, central, dominant, quasi-divine, point of view that is all too easily adopted by observers […]. We must work instead with the multiple perspectives that correspond to the multiplicity of coexisting, and sometimes directly competing points of views. This perspective has nothing to do with subjectivist relativism […]. It is instead based on the very reality of the social world (Bourdieu 1999b: 3).

> It is politics that makes ethnicity significant not ethnicity that invariably defines politics. The paradox is that ethnicity was simultaneously the product of politics and, yet, at times, a powerful determinant of the shape of political culture (Newbury and Newbury 1999: 313).

Knowledge constitutes social reality (see 3.1). Based on this assumption, by shifting the "single, central, quasi-divine point of view" to the "multiplicity of coexisting" even "competing points of views" (Bourdieu 1999b: 3), diverging and similar realities become conceivable. These diverging and similar realities lead to the appearance of the 'dilemma of recognition'.

To be clear, as discussed in Chapter 7, conceiving of ethnicised politics as 'experienced reality' based on the knowledge of 'those living in that world', makes it possible to think that none of the political institutional systems avoids ethnicised politics and therefore misrecognition. This is what I call the 'dilemma of recognition', assuming that political institutional models have to ensure 'recognition' to avoid potential further violent conflict.

Within the 'institutional engineering'-debate, different streams of thought propose different models for overcoming ethnicised politics (and politicised ethnicity).[76] On the one hand, it is assumed that formal power sharing along ethnic cleavages guarantees the equitable representation of the population and its interests. The result is a politically stabilized society (Lijphart 1977; Nordlinger 1972). On the other hand, it is assumed that institutional structures explicitly ignoring ethnic cleavages help to overcome the predominance of ethnicity in politics, resulting in a politically stabilized society (Horowitz 2002; Van den Berghe 1981). In contrast, following Peter Berger and Thomas Luck-

76 In principle, politicised ethnicity and ethnicised politics describe inclusion and exclusion interpreted based on ethnic categories and, accordingly, are mutually dependent. For more details, see 7.

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mann (1991), the present argument focuses on the historically produced knowledge of the members of the institutional order.

Rwanda and Burundi opted for opposing institutional settings in 2003 and 2005, namely 'denial of' and 'power sharing along' ethnic cleavages, both aiming to overcome the ethnic cleavages (see 2.3).[77] According to Mahmood Mamdani, in order to avoid further violent conflict in Rwanda, political reforms that confront the question of who rules and through which institutions are necessary. Most importantly, the idea of rule simply based on the rule of the majority and the political identities of Hutu and Tutsi need to be dissolved (Mamdani 2001b: 276). "The idea that we must define political identity […] first and foremost in relation to indigeneity" (Mamdani 2005: 17) needs to be challenged.

To undercut the political identities of Hutu and Tutsi, the political monopoly of the minority must cease (Mamdani 2001: 281). A "broad base" that includes Hutu power is needed to bring stability to the post civil war context (Mamdani 2001: 278). This opinion is reflected in most of the assessments given by acknowledged experts of the region, stating that the political and social exclusion of Hutu by a Tutsi dominated dictatorship opposes a stabilisation of the country (Strizek 1998; Lemarchand 2006c; Newbury and Newbury 1999; Reyntjens 2004b). Accordingly, the assessments of the Burundian power sharing system are more positive (Vandeginste 2006; ICG 2005; Lemarchand 2006a; Reyntjens 2006b: 25) (see 2.3.1).

The present analysis could be understood as an attempt to analyse more precisely what it means when ethnicity defines the political culture (Newbury and Newbury 1999: 313) or that Hutu and Tutsi are 'political identities' that are to be dissolved in order to bring stability to the region, as Mamdani puts it. In doing so, I conceive ethnicised politics and politicised ethnicity as notions based on which exclusion and inclusion are self-evidently interpreted. This concept of ethnicised politics makes it possible to show that ethnicised politics are a reality in both countries, Rwanda and Burundi.

In order to illustrate what I call the 'dilemma of recognition', I show that 'institutional engineering' in societies, in which political history is interpreted based on ethnic categories, is confronted with the problem that power distributions are interpreted based on ethnic categories.

Moreover, the experienced ethnicised reality (i.e., reality interpreted in ethnic terms) does not always assume the same 'ethnic group' is excluded. While

77 In 2005 in Burundi and 2003 in Rwanda, the first elections took place on the basis of the new constitutions approved in 2005 and 2003. The constitution of the transition period in Burundi introduced in 2003 also took ethnic quotas into account. In Rwanda, ethnic quotas were abandoned in 1994 after the FPR seized political power. The political period directly after the genocide is referred to as "Burundisation", implying the abandonment of ethnic quotas (Reyntjens 1997: 3).

some interviewees described 'the Tutsi' as in power, others see 'the Hutu' as in power or at least not excluded from power. In particular, the reference to informal power opens up the potential for contradictory interpretations. Altogether, the analysis of the knowledge of Rwandans and Burundians points to a lack of a "common stock of knowledge" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 98).

To depict the 'dilemma of recognition', I introduce four categories developed based on the interview material:

First, I present the category of *Ethnic Interpretation of Formal Power*, which is meant to reveal that, despite opposing political institutional models in Rwanda and Burundi, both regimes are described based on ethnic categories (10.1). Often simply equating the regime to one 'ethnic group', the statements imply political exclusion of the other 'ethnic group'. In this sense, (formal) political power is ethnicised.

The second category, *Ethnic Interpretation of Informal Power*, contributes to a better understanding of the dilemma because it makes clear that, despite the acknowledgement that either Hutu or Tutsi are formally represented in the government, the 'real' (informal) power is possibly seen somewhere else (10.2). These interpretations particularly challenge the 'institutional engineering'–debate that is focused on formal institutions.

The statements included in the third (Interpreting Ethnic Interpretation of Exclusion as Political Strategy, 10.3.1) and fourth (Interpreting Nationalist Interpretations of Inclusion as Political Strategy, 10.3.2) categories refer to either nationalist or ethnic interpretations of politics in Rwanda and Burundi and interpret them as political strategy (10.3). Against the backdrop of the current idea of nation state and the related idea of legitimate (i.e., taken for granted) exclusion, 'nationalist' interpretations are inclusive, while ethnic interpretations are seen to be exclusive. The statements included interpret ethnic and nationalist interpretations of politics as diverging from reality, not taken for granted and self-evident and therefore as non-legitimate. On the one hand, the two categories aim to show that diverging interpretations can be interpreted in diverging ways. On the other hand, the quotes make the picture even more complex concerning the concrete assessment of power.

10.1 Ethnicised Formal Power

The following analysis illustrates how formal power distribution is interpreted based on ethnic categories. In most of the statements included in the category *Ethnic Interpretation of Formal Power*, the interviewee equates a regime with an 'ethnic group'. This implies the political (and social) exclusion of the other

'ethnic group'. Citizens of both countries make these statements equating formal power and one 'ethnic group'; Even though Rwanda and Burundi opted for different institutional systems, both meant to overcome ethnicised politics. The interpretation of the current Rwandan regime as being dominated by Tutsi is not uncommon (see the academic discussion in 2.2). Yet, despite the ethnic quotas implied in the power sharing system in Burundi, the regime in power is described as a Hutu regime.

In order to present the category, first, the statements of two Rwandans are quoted that, sticking to patterns of interpretation that refer to ethnic categories, provide different interpretations of the actual power distribution. Subsequently, the statements of two Burundians demonstrate that in spite of the opposing institutional model, the patterns of their arguments are similar to those of the Rwandans because they describe social and political exclusion, more precisely, power distribution, referring to ethnic categories. The Burundian and Rwandan interviewees, sticking to an interpretation that refers to ethnic categories, interpret the power distribution within any the two countries in different and opposing ways.

The first statement presented here is from a Rwandan. He is an NGO worker and Hutu. He lives in Butare, the regional capital of the southern region in Rwanda that, in general, is assumed to be rather moderate toward the present regime in power. When I ask him if the ethnic cleavages are still important, he says:

> [...] On confonde toujours les ethnies encore avec un régime. Quand on parle du régime de Habyarimana ce sont souvent les Hutu de qui on parle et quand on parle du régime actuel on se réfère à l'ethnie Tutsi. Alors, quand je suis devant une ethnie Tutsi je me sens insécurisé. Pourquoi? De tout ce que je vais parler je peux savoir d'être rapporté là et ça peut avoir des répercussions sur moi. Quand je suis devant quelqu'un de l'ethnie Hutu, c'est comme quelqu'un qui représente l'ancien régime, l'ancien pouvoir, alors il faut faire attention (interviewee R10).

The interviewee equates 'ethnic groups' with regimes that were in power in different times in Rwanda. As he puts it, the "ethnies" are still confounded with political regimes. In doing so, he establishes an explicit relationship between ethnic categories and formal political power. According to him, speaking about the political regime of Habyarimana is often understood as the same as speaking about 'the Hutu'. Correspondingly, speaking about the present regime implies speaking about "l'ethnie Tutsi". Conversely, 'the Tutsi' in former times and 'the Hutu' in the moment are seen as politically excluded. The interviewee emphasises the equation of a regime and an 'ethnic group' when he assumes that Tutsi (or Hutu) are going to collaborate with the regime in power only due to their ethnic affiliation. As he says, he feels insecure in front of somebody who is

Tutsi, since he might report what he says to the regime in power. Therefore, he equates the interest of any Rwandan who is Hutu (or Tutsi) with the interest (to hold on power) of a regime that is assumed to be Hutu (or Tutsi). In doing so, he reproduces the notion of 'ethnic groups' having common interests.

Similarly, the next interviewee reproduces an interpretation that puts regimes (i.e., political power) and political and social exclusion in relation to ethnic categories. Today 'the Hutu' are assumed to be excluded and 'the Tutsi' in power, but, implicitly contradicting the assessment of the NGO worker, he does not think that this is right. He is a businessperson and a returnee from Uganda. Giving this assessment, he answers my question of 'Which are the most important cleavages in present Rwanda?':

> [...] the government is promoting unity and reconciliation as a way of uniting people and good governance. But some people don't understand it like that. Some people are saying the Hutu are being oppressed. So they want the Hutu to take over and get liberated in inverted comma….and then they are also extremists…the Tutsi, they say, no these guys killed us for a long time, so it is our turn….so they have different ideologies. ....but the main [*cleavage*, author's note] is between those who want the Hutu to dominate, also want the Tutsi to dominate… and of course the government is pursuing…the government is saying we are all the same, we should manage the country without Hutu or Tutsi, they should have a co-participation…(interviewee R12).

He describes that other people take it as granted that 'the Hutu' are oppressed. In the moment they take over the government, 'the Hutu' would be liberated. 'The Tutsi', in contrast, think that it is "their turn". Especially by saying that there are "those who want the Hutu to dominate" and those "who want the Tutsi to dominate" he interprets formal power along ethnic cleavages. Accordingly, he also interprets political and social exclusion along ethnic cleavages. He reproduces, but also challenges ethnicised politics by suggesting, on the one hand, that 'the Tutsi' are in power and 'the Hutu' are excluded, and on the other hand, that the government is one which works to overcome exclusion along ethnic cleavages.

Like the previous statements by Rwandans, the following statements of two Burundians interpret the present political regime in Burundi based on ethnic categories. First, I quote an unemployed person who lives in Kamenge, a neighbourhood in Bujumbura that is assumed to support the FNL and, therefore to be rather critical toward the current government. He answers the question of 'What was the most important moment in Burundian history?' and depicts the political struggle of 'the Hutu' and 'the Tutsi'. He also interprets the present regime in power (i.e., formal power) based on ethnic categories:

> Il y avait donc des élections en 1993 où les Hutu ont emporté le pouvoir, c'était le président Ndadaye qui était au pouvoir, mais après trois mois on l'a tué. C'est pour ça que je dis il n'a pas eu des événements très importants…parce que chaque fois que les Hutu voulaient accéder au pouvoir… Et les Tutsi c'étaient eux qui étaient habitués à gouverner, c'est pour ça qu'ils n'ont pas accepté qu'un président Hutu gouverne […]. Dix ans après il y a eu un consensus entre les Hutu et les Tutsi…le gouvernement actuel ils ont pu quand même réussir, ils sont au pouvoir pour le moment, et je pourrais dire qu'on pensait qu'on va peut-être avoir les moments les plus importants. […] Parce qu'on pensait quand les Hutu ont accédé au pouvoir, on croyait qu'on va vivre bien, on croyait que la pauvreté allait diminuer un petit peu, mais ce n'est pas ça (interviewee B2).

According to the interviewee, 'the Tutsi' ruled before 1993. Consequently, they could not accept a Hutu president in 1993 as it implied that 'the Hutu' were going to rule. Every time 'the Hutu' tried to get into power, 'the Tutsi' refused it. He says that they always thought that once 'the Hutu' gained power, policies would change. However, now that 'the Hutu' are in power, it is not that the most important moments in Burundian history began. Policy did not change the way they expected because poverty was not reduced. On the one hand, he interprets the distribution of political power based on ethnic categories. Speaking about 'the Hutu' trying to get into power and 'the Tutsi' trying to avoid this, he evokes the idea of 'ethnic groups' that (in the case of 'the Hutu') are not only excluded from political power but are also consequently socially excluded. This idea is emphasised when he says that the social exclusion (i.e., poverty) was expected to change now that 'the Hutu' are in power. On the other hand, he challenges the notion of ethnicised politics by asserting that poverty was not reduced although 'the Hutu' came into power.

The reference to ethnic categories by interpreting political power distribution is more explicit in the next statement. He is a mushingantahe, i.e., a traditional mediating authority in Burundi. In the following quote, he answers to my question about the most important social cleavages in today's Burundi. He does not really refer to the question and instead expresses his lack of understanding for the lasting existence of the FNL.[78] The FNL is a rebel movement that, at the time of the interviews in spring 2008, has not laid down arms even though a cease-fire agreement has been in place since September 2006.

> Je ne vois pas donc aujourd'hui sur quelle base on se bat. […] Je ne comprends pas pourquoi le FNL se bat contre un gouvernement entièrement Hutu, un parlement quasiment Hutu, une administration quasiment Hutu. Et Palipehutu ça veut dire un mouvement qui a comme but de libérer les Hutu. J'ai dit, est-ce que les Hutu libèrent les Hutu contre les Hutu? C'est absurde, totalement absurde. La rébellion de FNL n'a plus le premier sens qu'on a voulu lui donner. La rébellion des Hutu était dirigée vers les Tutsi, soit disant qui

78 'Forces Nationales de Libération' initially referred to the armed wing of the rebel movement Palipehutu-FNL (Parti pour la Liberation du Peuple Hutu). In January 2009, the Palipehutu-FNL changed its name to FNL (HRW 2010f: 1).

> n'avaient pas de force économique et politique. A partir du moment où l'UPRONA ne gouvernait plus, la rébellion devait cesser, ce n'est pas le cas. Aujourd'hui la rébellion est dirigée contre un gouvernement Hutu, un sénat Hutu, un parlement Hutu, une administration Hutu…un pouvoir Hutu (interviewee B1).

Describing the government as a 'Hutu government', the senate as a 'Hutu senate' the administration as a 'Hutu administration' he establishes a strong relationship between an 'ethnic group' and political power. In doing so, he self-evidently describes the regime and 'the Hutu' as the same. As he finally concludes, according to him it is "un pouvoir Hutu". Based on this assessment he asks why the FNL still exists since its first aim was to liberate 'the Hutu' against 'the Tutsi' who have been said to have all the political and economic power. Overall, he strongly assumes "un pouvoir Hutu" that implies the political and social exclusion of 'the Tutsi'. Having said that, despite the clear formal regulations requiring all political institutions to be composed of 60 per cent Hutu and 40 per cent Tutsi (and in the military, a equal number of posts), both interviewee see the regime as Hutu, implying the exclusion of 'the Tutsi'.

In summary, the statements presented in this section show how Rwandans and Burundians interpret (formal) political power based on ethnic categories. The quotes establish a (more or less) direct relationship between a regime and an 'ethnic group' implying the political (and social) exclusion of the other 'ethnic group'. This interpretation persists even though the explicit aim of the political institutional models in place in both countries is to overcome an ethnic interpretation of formal political power. In 2008, the year in which I conducted my interviews, ten out of twenty-two ministers in the Rwandan government were Hutu. The prime minister was Hutu and the president of the republic was Tutsi (Marysse, Reyntjens, and Vandeginste 2009: Annex II). In the Burundian government, 10 out of 27 ministers were Tutsi. The president was Hutu and the two posts of the two vice–presidents were held by a Tutsi and a Hutu (Marysse, Reyntjens, and Vandeginste 2009: Annex I).

The interpretation of the Burundian model, even though it provides for official ethnic quotas, is even more striking than the interpretations of the Rwandan system that is also present in the academic discussion (see 1.3.1). Given an ethnic interpretation of political power in Rwanda and Burundi, the actual power configurations are assessed slightly divergently. While the regime in Burundi is interpreted as a Hutu regime, the regime in Rwanda is seen to be and *not* to be a Tutsi regime. This points to diverging realities. The assessed power distribution in Rwanda and Burundi, however, becomes more complex when considering statements that refer to informal political power or interpret ethnic and nationalist interpretations.

10.2 Ethnicised Informal Power

Unlike the statements included in the previous category that establish a relationship between *formal* political power (i.e., a regime) and ethnic categories, those that are included in the subsequent category, *Ethnic Interpretation of Informal Power,* interpret *informal* power as based on ethnic categories. Instead of simply equating Hutu and Tutsi with a regime, the statements (implicitly) affirm the *formal* presence of Hutu and Tutsi in powerful positions in the political systems but deny the relevance of this mere formal presence. The informal power is assumed to lie with the other 'ethnic group'. To present the category, two Rwandans and two Burundians are quoted.

In analogy to the previous category, the statements interpret informal power distribution, and therefore, political (and social) exclusion implied in both regimes in reference to ethnic categories (i.e., ethnicised politics). The concrete assessments of power distribution are more contradictory. For illustrating the 'dilemma of recognition' these contradictory assessments are crucial. Not only are opposing political institutional settings subject to similar ethnicised interpretations, any one of the two regimes are interpreted in diverging and, contradictory ways concerning the question of 'Which 'ethnic group' is excluded?'.

The first interviewee quoted is a partisan of the rebel movement FNL. In contrast to the mushingantahe quoted in the previous section that described the rebel movement as having no 'raison d'être' since 'the Hutu' were now in power in Burundi, the member of the movement interprets the political power and the implied exclusion in a very different way. In the following statement, the interviewee does not answer a specific question. After I described my research project and the purpose of the interviews, he starts talking:[79]

> The CNDD-FDD is infiltrated by the Tutsi. When they could, they joined the movement and they still hold the positions in the upper echelons of power. The Hutu might drive a big car. He is very satisfied that he is the president, but does he really have power? The most important positions are held by Tutsi. For instance, the Minister of Defence is Tutsi.

Subsequently I ask him what he thinks about the ethnic quotas. And he replies:

> The Hutu population is still suffering. The Tutsi are those who have had the chance to study. Hence, they have still the power to do whatever they want to do. And the Hutu who are allowed to participate in power, they adopted the ideas of the Tutsi. What do you expect from a Pierre Nkurunziza [*present president,* author's note] who works together with a Bagaza [*former president*, author's note], who massacred Hutu? He is going to continue to massacre Hutu (interviewee B3)?

79 I was not allowed to record, but I took notes in German and translated them roughly.

Although referring to the same political system as the mushingantahe, a system that is formally composed of 60 per cent Hutu and 40 per cent Tutsi, the FNL partisan interprets the power structure in Burundi in exactly the opposite way. According to him, ‘the Tutsi’ still have the political power in Burundi. He acknowledges that Hutu are present in the government and mentions Pierre Nkurunziza, the actual president of the Burundian Republic. He is Hutu and was one of the leaders of the former rebel movement CNDD-FDD that has become the dominant political party. Assuming ‘the Tutsi’ hold power despite the formal presence of Hutu in powerful positions, he interprets informal power distribution in ethnic terms.

Moreover, he challenges Nkurunziza’s competence to represent Hutu and Hutu interests by pointing out that he collaborates with Jean-Baptiste Bagaza (the president of the Burundian Republic from 1976 to 1987 and who holds a seat in the Burundian parliament at the moment of the interview). In doing so, he suggests that Hutu collaborating with Tutsi cannot represent ‘Hutu interests’. He explicitly says that ‘the Hutu’ who are in power adopted the ideas of ‘the Tutsi’. Therefore, he dissolves (by accepting that Tutsi adopt Hutu ideas) and reproduces (by accepting that Hutu have *their* ideas) politicised ethnicity, saying Tutsi collaborating with Hutu adopt Tutsi ideas. Having said this, the ethnic interpretation of informal power refers to and replicates politicised ethnicity.

The assessment of the Burundian power structures of the next interviewee comes close to the assessment of the mushingantahe. He works as a medical doctor in Bujumbura. His family comes from Bururi, a region that is considered to have been very powerful until 1993, since all the Burundian presidents before 1993 came from Bururi. The mother of the interviewee worked as a minister for the regime of Bagaza. In the following statement, he answers the question of whether there are also Tutsi in the present Burundian political regime:

> Oui, parce qu’on veut montrer …pour être agréé comme parti politique il faut un certain quota...c’est tout! Ils sont obligés de faire comme ça. Mais ils n’ont pas de pouvoir. On leur dit il faut mettre autant des Tutsi…oui ils sont là, mais ils sont jamais président du parti, ils ne vont pas avoir les grands ministères, c’est ça le problème (interviewee B5).

He admits that there are Tutsi holding positions in the present political institutions. Nevertheless, he insists that they are only there to fulfil ethnic quotas. According to him, Tutsi do not have any (informal) power in the current regime. The medical doctor refers to informal power when he acknowledges the presence and representation of Tutsi but claims that Tutsi do not have any political power. This reference to informal power is similar to the interpretation of the

partisan. Although sharing the same interpretation of political power, the two interviewees assess the power structure in Burundi in exact opposite ways.

The following Rwandan interviewee argues in a manner that is similar to the Burundian interviewees. He is an NGO worker living in Butare. He is speaking about the privileged situation of 'the Tutsi' and especially 'the Tutsi from Uganda' when I ask him if Hutu do not feel well represented at the political level. He answers:

> La représentation et l'égalité, ce sont deux choses, pour moi, nettement différentes. On peut être représenté sans bénéficier de la même manière, des biens, des profits que le pays offre. Je reconnais que dans le système politique, administratif au Rwanda les Hutu occupent des postes comme tant d'autres. Mais est-ce que ça permet aux gens qui sont classés dans cette catégorie, Hutu je veux dire, d'accéder dans la même façon que les autres? Est-ce que ça, ça le leur permet? Je ne crois pas. Je ne crois pas, donc…d'ailleurs il y a certaines personnes aussi qui disent que c'est tout simplement une représentation, comme je dirais, une représentation en fait…abstraite. Donc, qui est là, mais qui peut rien influencer, qui ne peut prendre aucune décision, tout simplement pour tromper […]. On peut donner l'exemple, l'ancien président, il était Hutu. Qu'est-ce qu'il faisait? […] Il ne pouvait prendre aucune décision. Oui, ça c'est un exemple typique (interviewee R10).

The interviewee acknowledges the equal representation of Hutu in the present administrative and political system in Rwanda, but as he distinguishes, formal representation is not the same as equality. According to him, formal power should not be confused with informal power. In this respect, he perceives Hutu as excluded because despite their political representation they do not have any real (informal) power. Consequently, Hutu cannot influence anything or make any decision. In order to make his point he mentions Pasteur Bizimungu, the first president after the FPR (Front Patriotique Rwandais) occupied the country in summer 1994. Bizimungu is probably the most frequently quoted example (as the interviewee himself puts it) to underpin this pattern of argumentation admitting that Hutu work in the Rwandan government after 1994 but claiming that they do not have any political power.

Another interviewee also cites this example. She is a peasant woman who lives in 'Kiyovu pauvre', a neighbourhood in Kigali. I ask her if a Hutu can feel represented by the FPR. She answers:[80]

> There are also Hutu in the government, but they are only puppets, they do not have any power. Like the former president Bizimungu. He has been only a puppet, and the vice-president Kagame decided. Myself, I am also member of the FPR. But I am only member because it makes it easier to find a job. In my heart, I feel different (interviewee R4).

Similar to the previous interviewee, she argues that 'the Hutu' with formal power are only a pretext to disguise the real power structures. The Hutu in

80 I was not allowed to record, but I took notes in German and translated them roughly.

power are only puppets. She describes these real power structures as dominated by Tutsi. In order to underline her argument, she refers to Bizimungu. Like the NGO worker, she assumes he does not have any political power and the real power is in the hands of the former vice-president, Paul Kagame.

The Burundian and Rwandan interviewees quoted in this section say that Hutu or Tutsi hold only pro forma positions in order to show that all Rwandans (or Burundians) are integrated into the government. While the Rwandan interviewees only apply this argument for Hutu, the Burundians question the informal power of Hutu and Tutsi. However, they perceive the informal power as being unequally distributed, which implies the exclusion of an ‘ethnic group’. In doing so, they interpret the (informal) power distribution based on ethnic categories. The statements reflect ethnicised informal power as ‘experienced reality’ of Rwandans and Burundians despite the opposing political institutional models of the two countries. Therefore, the reference to informal power strongly undermines the discussion concerning the question of which political model – ‘denial of’ or ‘power sharing along’ ethnic cleavages – is more suitable to prevent ethnicised politics. Neither the Rwandan model that aims at a non-ethnic interpretation of political power by avoiding any reference to ethnicity nor ethnic quotas in Burundi can deal with these patterns of interpretations referring to informal power. In other words, interpretations of informal power cannot be challenged by institutional regulations.

Altogether, the statements presented to illustrate the ethnic interpretation of formal and informal power point to different and contradictory interpretations of the power structures and diverging realities of Rwandans and Burundians. The Rwandan regime is interpreted as a ‘Tutsi regime’ (excluding ‘the Hutu’) and one in which Hutu hold political positions that are not powerful. The interpretation of the businessperson quoted in the first section, however, explicitly opposes this interpretation. The interpretations of (in)formal power structures are more contradictory in Burundi. One Burundian, referring to informal power, sees Hutu as acting in the interest of Tutsi, while the other interprets Tutsi in the regime as without power. ‘The Hutu’ and ‘the Tutsi’ are seen as powerful (and as being excluded).

In conclusion, the ethnicised patterns of interpretations referring to *both* systems point to the relevance of conceiving of institutions as ‘experienced reality’, and therefore, as the knowledge of ‘those living in that world’ that is to be analysed in their historical context.

10.3 Diverging Realities: Interpreting Interpretations

So far, the 'dilemma of recognition' has been illustrated by quoting Rwandans and Burundians who describe power distribution and social and political exclusion by referring to ethnic categories. In this sense, politics are ethnicised in both systems meant to overcome ethnicised politics. However, the descriptions of Rwandans were contradictory as were those of Burundians regarding the actual assessment of power distribution. These diverging realities become even more complex by accounting for the *interpretations of interpretations.* Analysing political institutions by asking how they are experienced, not only the interpretations of these institutions, but also *the interpretations of these interpretations* need to be considered because they constitute 'experienced reality'. Statements in the present section interpret ethnic and national interpretations of political and social exclusion as political strategy, either by explicitly denominating ethnicised politics as political strategy or by confronting them with a diverging reality.

The understanding of politicised ethnicity (and ethnicised politics) emphasises it as an important resource for accomplishing and legitimising political ends (see 6.2). Regardless of the intention of the interviewees, which I do not take into account, the (de)legitimising effect of ethnicised politics remains unquestioned. Legitimate social and political exclusion relates to the legitimate political organisation and representation of the modern nation state. Consequently, interpretations referring to ethnic, as opposed to nationalist, categories evoke exclusion while nationalist, as opposed to ethnic, categories suggest inclusion. Contradicting the paradigms of social justice, social and political (and therefore social) exclusion along ethnic categories not coinciding with the nation state implies misrecognition. Conversely, nationalist interpretations related to the taken for granted, i.e., legitimate, form of exclusion appear to be inclusive, implying recognition. Against this backdrop, the following statements interpreting politics either as ethnic (exclusionary) or nationalist (inclusionary) reveal the political charge implied.

To further depict the 'dilemma of recognition', the following section presents two categories: the first includes statements that describe an *Ethnic Interpretation of Exclusion as Political Strategy* and the second includes statements that conceive of a *Nationalist Interpretation of Inclusion as Political Strategy*.

10.3.1 Interpreting Ethnic Interpretations as Political Strategy

The subsequent statements are included in the category *Interpreting Ethnic Interpretation of Exclusion as Political Strategy*. They understand ethnic inter-

pretations of exclusion in Rwanda and Burundi as a political strategy. These statements predominantly describe ethnicised politics as an instrument applied to access or keep political power. In doing so, they contrast these interpretations with diverging realities or notions they take for granted or they explicitly describe these interpretations as strategic. In the following section, two Rwandans and two Burundians are quoted.

The first Rwandan interviewee presumes an ethnic interpretation of present political power in Rwanda as wrong. He is a priest and genocide survivor. When asked about the present social cleavages in Rwanda he speaks about ethnic cleavages that the present regime aims to overcome. Although the regime in place would make a real effort, as he argues, 'the Hutu' are not willing to acknowledge it:

> [...] Mais pour les Hutu qui ont perdu, ils disent, non, c'est inutile ce que vous faites, vous allez vous favoriser vous-même. Ca c'est clair. Ils écrivent ça, ils disent ça dans les journaux, dans la presse, il n'y a plus de places pour les Hutu. Dans le gouvernement je crois presque onze…plus de la moitié ce sont des Hutu, des ministres... On fait ça explicitement pour pouvoir dire nous essayons de dépasser ce clivage ethnique (interviewee R8).

The interviewee explicitly blames 'the Hutu' because they say that they are excluded even though they are not. In doing so, he suggests the ethnic interpretation of politics in Rwanda is a political strategy. As 'the Hutu' lost power, they say and write that they are politically not represented. They assume the government (presumably composed by Tutsi) will benefit itself (i.e., 'the Tutsi'). The interviewee, however, sees these accusations as false since 'the Hutu' make up more than the majority in the government. According to the interviewee, the government includes Hutu to show that it tries to overcome the ethnic cleavage.

Likewise, the following statement describes the ethnic interpretation of the FPR (that is the party in power in Rwanda) as a political strategy, which differs strongly from reality. The interviewee is a deputy representing the FPR. I ask him if the people know the ethnic affiliation of the politicians and he answers:

> Interviewee: Actuellement ça ne préoccupe pas les gens. Par exemple quand le FPR est entré dans le pays les gens disaient que c'est un parti des Tutsi et ça se comprenait parce qu'il venait de l'exil. Quand ils sont arrivés dans le pays ils ont intégré beaucoup de gens que ça n'a plus de valeur de dire que tel est ceci ou cela.
>
> Author: Alors, vous ne croyez pas que la perception actuelle du FPR est ethnique?
>
> Interviewee: Le FPR existe depuis longtemps. Même avant lorsqu'il était encore en conflit armé avec le gouvernement, il y avait des discours de diffamation comme quoi le FPR est comme cela. Ce n'est que quand le FPR est entré dans le pays avec les actions qu'il posait

> que la population a compris que c'était faux. Mais ça peut être utilisé politiquement pour dire que son président est Tutsi etc. Mais réellement quand vous allez dans les districts vous voyez qu'il y a un brassage (interviewee R20).

According to the interviewee, the FPR was seen as a party of Tutsi since it came from exile. The "discours de diffamation" existed then and still exist. He suggests that the ethnic interpretation (e.g., referring to the ethnic affiliation of the Rwandan president) can be used politically, even though it is wrong; on the contrary, Hutu and Tutsi compose the FPR. These interpretations of the FPR deputy and the priest interpreting ethnic interpretations of the current Rwandan regime and the FPR as political strategy clearly contradict the interpretations present in the previous section.

The next statement made by a Burundian interprets the assertion as marginalised (i.e., excluded) by Hutu as well as Tutsi as political strategy (he speaks about 'a political game'); it is made by the president of the UPRONA (Union pour le Progrès National), a political party in Burundi that has been in power for a long time, but which is in the political opposition at the moment of the interview. Answering my question of whether the ethnic cleavage in Burundi still influences social relations, he says that there are Tutsi and Hutu who manipulate these sensibilities by stating that they are marginalised. He classifies these manipulations, including the use of the label 'genocide', as a political strategy:

> Le jeu politique est difficile, il est bouillonnant, changeant! Aujourd'hui au Burundi il y a un pouvoir qui a une connotation ethnique! C'est que cette sensibilité ethnique est restée quelque part sous-jacente quelque part, vous trouverez certainement des Tutsi, politiciens ou non, qui manipulent cette sensibilité en disant qu'ils sont marginalisés! Vous trouverez aussi des Hutu qui disent la même chose! Dernièrement on a parlé sur les médias qu'il y a eu un génocide en rapport avec l'ethnie, à une certaine époque on a parlé qu'il y a eu la possibilité qu'il y ait un génocide politique Hutu. […] Vous voyez le jeu politique est changeant, je ne sais pas si on peut parler de clivage ethnique à ce niveau! Moi je parlerai de jeu politique (interviewee B15)!

He concludes that instead of speaking of an ethnic cleavage, he would rather describe what is happening as a political game. In doing so, he emphasises the political power of ethnicised politics, which are strategically deployed. Different actors claim to be marginalised due to their ethnic affiliation in order to manipulate the people. Also, he describes the ethnic interpretation of politics as a political tool used to strategically pursue political ends. However, he does not refer to any explicit party or movement and their presumptive intentions.

Unlike him, the next interviewee names specific actors, i.e., the colonial powers, who pursued this strategy intentionally. He refers to the Burundian political history and says that the colonial powers used an ethnic interpretation of political parties to delegitimize them. The interviewee is mushingantahe. In

the following, he answers my question about the most important moments in Burundian history:

> [...] Dans la perception des colonisateurs ce sont des partis Tutsi, ce n'est pas vrai. Si on voit les membres de l'assemblée nationale au Burundi, si on voit la composition du parti, si on voit le gouvernement 1961, le parti UPRONA n'est pas Tutsi, il n'est pas Hutu, il est nationaliste. Mais pourquoi ils cherchent tant à retrouver les Tutsi sur l'UPRONA? C'est parce que le conseil supérieur du pays qui était l'instance législative nationale consultative avant les partis politiques…cet organe là était occupé principalement par les Tutsi, au Rwanda et au Burundi. Et ces gens là ont contesté comme les premiers vigoureusement et violemment,… qui ont demandé l'indépendance. Mais pas fictive, effective (interviewee B11).

The interviewee suggests that the colonial powers described UPRONA as an ethnic party for a specific purpose: they wanted to avoid the real, effective political independence of the Burundian Republic. Therefore, they were trying to delegitimize the party by labelling it as Tutsi, although it was, according to the interviewee, neither Hutu nor Tutsi but nationalistic. By classifying the ethnic interpretation as a political strategy deployed by the colonial powers to pursue a specific political objective, the interviewee describes it as untrue, i.e., as diverging from reality.

The statements show *interpretations of ethnic interpretations* that uncover them as political strategies. In order to do so, they contrast the ethnic interpretations with a diverging reality. By depicting the ethnic interpretation as a political strategy that does not adequately describe the reality, it loses its legitimacy. It is seen as an untrue description of reality deployed to reach political objectives. The quotes by the Burundians describe ethnicised politics at a more general level and refer to colonial times as political strategy. Particularly regarding the assessed power configuration in Rwanda, however, the statements contribute to the illustration of contradictory and diverging realities. Both Rwandan interviewees, the deputy and the priest, describe either the present regime or the political party in power as non–ethnic or nationalist and inclusionary. They experience the ethnic interpretation of political power in Rwanda as political strategy, which, as the priest explicitly asserts, is applied by 'the Hutu' who lost power. Against the backdrop of these diverging, yet ethnicised realities, the 'dilemma of recognition' becomes conceivable. In this sense, the category *Nationalist Interpretations as Political Strategy* depicted in the following section contributes another aspect of the complex realities of ethnicised politics.

10.3.2 Interpreting Nationalist Interpretations as Political Strategy

The statements quoted in the following section examine interpretations of inclusion as political strategies. More precisely, they address nationalist interpretations of politics as diverging from reality. Put differently, the nationalist interpretations are questioned and are not taken for granted and, i.e., legitimate. They suggest that the nationalist interpretation of politics is a mere political strategy. They also directly contradict the statements quoted above. The category, *Interpreting Nationalist Interpretations of Inclusion as Political Strategy,* is illustrated by four statements, two made by Burundians and two made by Rwandans.

The first interviewee is the most explicit in this respect. He describes the nationalist interpretation of Rwandan politics as a mere political strategy that does not correspond to reality. At the moment of the interview he is a prisoner accused of inciting genocide. I ask him if he does not feel well represented as a Hutu at the political level. He replies:[81]

> Yes, that is right. They make up the majority. But those who are in power are there only as a pretext. In order to show that there are some, but in the background others have the power. Also in the administration…They are everywhere. They are the ruling class. All the rules saying that it is forbidden to speak about race and ethnicity disguise the reality. The Tutsi hold almost all the posts in the administration. They are always the boss. Also when you look on the officers, they are always from the ethnie that is in power (interviewee R2).

According to the interviewee, the law that restricts speaking about ethnicised politics (i.e., interpreting exclusion based on ethnic categories) exists in order to hide a reality, which differs from the official nationalist version that bans race and ethnicity. According to the interviewee, the nationalist interpretation of politics in Rwanda is proven false by the real power configurations in which ‘the Tutsi’ hold all posts in the administration and all political power. His line of reasoning is based on an ethnic interpretation of informal political power implying political exclusion; he asserts that despite the presence of Hutu in the government, ‘the Tutsi’ have the political power. By interpreting the nationalist interpretation of politics as a political strategy, he opposes the interpretation of the two Rwandan interviewees who consider the ethnic interpretation of the present regime a political strategy applied by ethnically defined actors (i.e., ‘the Hutu’).

The next interviewee also insists that the nationalist interpretation of present Rwandan serves the interests of the government. He is a returnee from the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). He is a jurist, but at the moment of the

81 I was not allowed to record, but I took notes in German and translated them roughly.

interview, unemployed. I ask him whether the social situation in Rwanda would be different if they had opted for the same political system as Burundi. He answers:

> Interviewee: [...] Et c'est là où je soutiens l'idée du Rwanda, de l'inclusion sans tenir compte de l'ethnisme. Mais le problème aussi du Rwanda c'est qu'il dit l'ethnie n'existe pas jusqu'à ignorer les ethnies. Le problème du Rwanda c'est d'ignorer cette…carrément. Cette notion des ethnies alors que ça existe. On devrait les impliquer, mais sans les impliquer en utilisant les quotas, mettre dans la constitution…mais inclure aussi les autres indirectement [...].
>
> Author: Est-ce que vous croyez qu'il y a des gens qui soupçonnent le gouvernement de ne pas tenir compte du clivage ethnique pour établir le propre pouvoir?
>
> Interviewee: Oui, moi-même. Je les soupçonne de dépasser ça pour leurs intérêts disant politiques, pour s'auto construire et construire, …renforcer le système politique sans pourtant renforcer la base sociale. Mais je le critique sur le fait que je dis c'est construit sur le sable, il n'y a pas de base. Un système politique il faut le construire sur une base, une base sociale qui est bien. [...] Au Rwanda on dit il n'y a pas d'ethnies alors que la méfiance qui règne c'est sur base des ethnies (interviewee R6).

In his first statement, the interviewee supports the idea of inclusion since he considers simply ignoring the ethnic cleavages dangerous. Although ethnic quotas might not be the right way, an unofficial representation and inclusion must be realised. Replying to my question of whether the official nationalist interpretation of power might be a political strategy of the Rwandan government to stabilise their political power, he confirms that the government pursues its political interests by using this strategy. He points out that it is said that "ethnies" do not exist despite the mistrust that exists between them. Altogether, implicitly in his first and more explicitly in his second statement, the jurist interprets the nationalist interpretation of politics as a political strategy that does not correspond to reality. This interpretation opposes the interpretation of the present Rwandan government as one of unity (reflected in the statements of the priest and the deputy of the FPR quoted in the previous section).

The next Burundian interviewee blames his own party, the Burundian CNDD-FDD, to pretend being nationalist but to be in reality a "Hutusan" party and therefore being exclusive with respect to specific ethnic categories. He is senator representing the CNDD-FDD. I ask him if he sees a strong relationship between the political parties in Burundi and ethnic affiliations. He answers:

> C'est criant, c'est criant, ça crève les yeux. Vous faites l'exercice. Vous me dites n'importe quel parti je vous dis Hutu ou Tutsi. [...] Ca n'a pas changé depuis, le CNDD-FDD .est venu, on a dit les ethnies on va oublier. [...]Malheureusement ce n'est pas ce que je vois. Je suis Tutsi dans ce parti, mais ce n'est pas ce que je vois. Le parti est Hutusan. La preuve, je peux vous montrer: le premier est Hutu, le deuxième est Hutu, le troi-

> sième au sénat il est Hutu, le deuxième de la République il est Hutu. Le premier vice de l'assemblée nationale elle est Hutu. Le premier Vice du sénat est Hutu, donc…Moi, je dis que c'est pas normal que nous sommes un parti nationaliste et l'autre au sein de la direction de ce parti est limité (interviewee B19).

He describes the discrepancy between his own party's self-description as nationalist and the reality, which is that it is a "Hutusan" party. He does not explicitly describe the nationalist interpretation as a political strategy, but within the statement it becomes clear that he believes the CNDD-FDD wants to be perceived as a nationalist political party that does not consider ethnic affiliation despite the fact that Hutu hold the politically important and powerful positions. He says that many politically powerful positions are occupied by Hutu. Accordingly, within the party the opportunities for Tutsi are limited.

The last statement made by a Burundian reveals the complexity of overcoming ethnicised politics by pursuing a nationalist interpretation. The interviewee describes the present politics in present Burundi as ethnic. He argues that since the CNDD-FDD, the political party in power, integrates Tutsi on purpose, they emphasise the ethnic cleavage and promote ethnicism. The interviewee is an NGO worker living and working in Ngozi. I ask him if it is important for Burundians to know the ethnic affiliation of the politicians. He replies:

> Oui…les gens de la base ne voient pas tellement de ces histoires d'ethnie… mais certainement ça reste encore, et pourquoi? Justement parce que pendant les élections au niveau de la campagne électorale…les politiciens mettent en avant ces histoires d'ethnies-là. [...] Même le parti au pouvoir, le CNDD-FDD, ils vont dire: nous avons gagné les élections, on fait l'intégration nationale, on va mettre celui parce qu'il est Tutsi. Ce sont eux qui mettent en avant l'ethnie, en disant ça c'est un Tutsi. Pour avoir les voix au niveau des Tutsi, pour dire, voilà on a mis des Tutsi, donc tu peux nous élire, il va te représenter, il va garantir ta sécurité, donc finalement ce sont les politiciens qui pendant la campagne mettent la question en avant (interviewee B8).

The statement reveals the problem one confronts when trying to escape an ethnic interpretation of political power. The interviewee complains about the way the CNDD-FDD has aimed to promote the integration of Tutsi. By explicitly selecting persons because of their ethnic affiliation as Tutsi, the interviewee thinks the CNDD-FDD emphasises the ethnic affiliation of politicians and reinforces "ces histoires de l'ethnie". This opposes the aim of national integration and representation of all Burundians. Having said this, he understands the actual Burundian policy as one that promotes ethnicised politics and challenges the legitimacy of this policy.

The statements presented in this section illustrate how both, the explicit reference to ethnicity and the explicit non-reference to ethnicity for interpreting social and political exclusion, is experienced as not legitimate, i.e., diverging from reality in Rwanda and Burundi. The juxtaposition of statements that iden-

tify an ethnic interpretation of political power as a political strategy with statements that identify a nationalist interpretation of political power as a political strategy reveals again the importance of approaching institutions as 'experienced reality'.

In conclusion, the chapter was meant to approach the 'dilemma of recognition' one faces discussing 'institutional engineering' in societies where the political history and inclusion and exclusion is strongly interpreted based on ethnic categories. Adopting the analytical perspective of Berger and Luckmann, who point to the relevance of the knowledge of the members of an institutional order, the interpretations of the two political institutional settings are the focus. Against the background of these (divergent) interpretations, the 'dilemma of recognition' is apparent. In Rwanda and Burundi, political and social exclusion is interpreted based on ethnic categories. *Both* opposing political institutional models meant to overcome ethnicised politics (see 2.3) are interpreted in ethnic terms.

Moreover, the statements included in the four categories depict a complex picture regarding the assessed power configuration. Diverging and contradictory interpretations of political and social exclusion in Rwanda and Burundi point to diverging and contradictory realities. The interpretations diverge regarding the question of whether 'the Hutu' or 'the Tutsi' are in power or excluded in Burundi. In Rwanda, 'the Hutu' are seen as excluded and are *not* seen as excluded. In turn, the interpretations that 'the Hutu' are excluded faces interpretations depicting it as a political strategy, partly as applied by ethnically defined actors ('the Hutu'). Yet, these nationalist interpretations are confronted with interpretations that depict them as political strategy, non-legitimate and diverging from reality.

On the one hand, the Rwandan regime has been interpreted predominantly as a Tutsi regime, politically excluding 'the Hutu'. On the other hand, this interpretation has been challenged by describing it *explicitly* not as a Tutsi regime, but as one that is described as Tutsi regime as a political strategy by 'the Hutu' who lost power. These interpretations have been questioned again by statements interpreting these very non-ethnic interpretations as political strategy and implicitly interpreting social and political exclusion again based on ethnic categories. More precisely, they assume 'the Tutsi' to dominate and 'the Hutu' to be excluded.

The interpretations of the Burundian system are even more contradictory. On the one hand, the most extreme interpretation asserts that 'the Hutu' have all the political power. On the other hand, the other extreme interpretation insists that 'the Tutsi' still have all the power, with both implying the political exclu-

sion of ‘the other’. Corresponding to the occurring interpretations in Rwanda, some Burundian interviewees describe nationalist and ethnic interpretations of exclusion (or inclusion) as political strategy. Altogether, despite a recurring ethnic interpretation, the concrete power assessments (and the question of ‘Which ‘ethnic group’ is excluded?’) diverge in the two countries.

Yet, as already noted with respect to the analysis in the former chapter, none of my interviewees described ‘the Tutsi’ as politically excluded in Rwanda, which might be influenced by the political institutional setting in which they live. At the same time, the very diverging and contradictory interpretations of the Burundians cannot be explained in reference to the power sharing system in place.

Again, although it is very interesting and a crucial question, my analysis does not find one of these interpretations as dominant in Rwanda and Burundi. Yet, it shows that institutions are to be conceived of as ‘experienced reality’ and challenges the predominant notion of institutions, neglecting the perspective of ‘those living in that world’.

Coming back to the analyses that implicitly assume the power sharing model in Burundi (as opposed to the system of ‘denial’ in Rwanda) to avoid ethnicised politics, the interpretations of Burundians are especially challenging. They show how complex and contradictory ethnicised politics can be; not only that both political institutional models are subject to ethnicised patterns of interpretation (which is not surprising in respect to the Rwandan system, according to the literature) but also that the same political institutional model is interpreted in contradictory manners.

In summary, the analysis of the interview material reveals the difficulties in overcoming notions taken for granted by ‘those living in the world’ through mere ‘institutional engineering’.

The interpretations of *informal* power reveal the inability of political institutions to overcome an ethnic interpretation of politics. While assessments referring to formal political power can be challenged by formal or informal institutional regulations, the reference to informal power fundamentally undermines the intention of ‘institutional engineering’. Regarding the discussion about the most suitable political institutional model in order to overcome ethnicised politics and establish a politically and socially stabilised society, it is clear that both models have difficulty coping with an ethnic interpretation of political power.

The complex and diverging realities that exist in the two countries point to the need to consider the knowledge of members of the institutional orders to avoid superficial analyses.

11 Concluding Thoughts: Why Ethnicity? Whose Recognition? What Dilemma?

> What are we to do? […] By demanding that each ethnicity also has its own state or native authority, as for example, in the new Ethiopian constitution? If so, do we not risk multiplying the problem, since the number of minorities will grow as do the number of ethnically defined states and native authorities? To oppose that demand, however, would be seen to be joining forces with ethnic chauvinists. Is there a way out of the dilemma? The only way out, […] is to challenge the idea that we must define political identity, political rights, and political justice first and foremost in relation to indigeneity (Mamdani 2005: 16/7).

How can (conflict-prone) salience of ethnicity in Rwandan and Burundian politics be overcome? How can this salience be approached analytically? And why, exactly, is it that it is potentially conflict-prone? These three questions have guided my analysis. Even the reader who only skimmed through the pages must have noticed that my starting point for answering these questions is historically produced knowledge in Rwanda and Burundi. In particular, I have focused on knowledge in the sense of notions that are taken for granted, i.e. that are legitimate, and that self-evidently relate ethnicity to politics and vice versa.

When Mahmood Mamdani (2005) discusses political identity and ethnicity in post-colonial Africa, he also identifies a dilemma in terms of dealing with political demands based on ethnicity. Following the idea that each ethnic group must have its own "native authority" − as it is the case in the Ethiopian constitution − is as problematic as to oppose these demands since it "would be seen to be joining forces with ethnic chauvinists" (Mamdani 2005: 17). According to Mamdani, the only way out of the dilemma is "to challenge the idea that we must define political identity [and] political rights [...] first and foremost in relation to indigeneity" (Mamdani 2005: 17). Introducing my concluding thoughts, Mamdani's observation exemplifies the overall argument of the present book: It is the self-evident interpretation of political and social inclusion and exclusion based on ethnicity, which is conflict–prone and thus constitutive for the dilemma one is confronted with when opting for either 'denial of' or 'power sharing' along ethnic cleavages.

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The dilemma I see is defined by conflict-prone salience of ethnicity in politics. Given the purpose to overcome conflict–prone salience of ethnicity, one could ask with Susanne Buckley-Zistel (2006b: 20), "how conflicts are unmade discursively?" In respect to the aspect of identity that she considers among others, she asserts: "Through altering the ways the parties see themselves as well as the former enemy, the exclusive structures which gave rise to the conflict are being renegotiated". The present book does not analyse the discourse about ethnicity and exclusion interpreted along ethnic categories in Rwanda and Burundi, but exemplarily illustrates different, sometimes contradictory, ethnicised interpretations. On this basis, I argue that it is crucial to challenge and to 'renegotiate' the notion of 'ethnic groups'[82] and the self-evident interpretation of social and political inclusion and exclusion based on ethnic categories in order to avoid violent ethnic conflict. To be clear, political and social exclusion must be interpreted in different, less conflict-prone categories.

My book illustrates a 'dilemma of recognition' constituted by the knowledge 'those living in that world' have. The illustrated dilemma challenges two ideas, one dominating in the discussion about 'institutional engineering', the other one present in arguments held by regional experts when assessing and discussing political and social exclusion in Rwanda and Burundi.

The general assumption, based on which the 'institutional-engineering'-debate argues (see 4.2), is that by implementing certain institutional structures and their in–built incentives, a specific desired output can be achieved: namely, conflict management, political stability and democracy (Esman 2004: 203; Hechter 2004; Norris 2002: 206; Reilly 2001: 6). Opposing this assumption, the present argument conceives of institutions as what 'those living in that world' take for granted and real. Showing that different political institutional models are both subject to ethnicised patterns of interpretation of political and social exclusion, points to the relevance of analysing institutional orders based on the historically produced knowledge of its members (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 82).

Within the discussion of regional experts about Rwanda and Burundi, power sharing is seen "as a recipe for peaceful cohabitation", "as exclusion [...] is the key factor behind most African conflicts" (Lemarchand 2006b: 2). Accordingly, the assessments of the Burundian power sharing system are positive (ICG 2005; Lemarchand 2006a; Reyntjens 2006b; Vandeginste 2006) (see 2.3.2), while the main argument held against the Rwandan system concerns the

82 This notion of 'ethnic groups' focused on in the analysis is discussed by Rogers Brubaker (2004b). He emphasises that the term evokes the idea of "internally homogeneous, externally-bounded groups, even unitary collective actors with common purposes" (Brubaker 2004b: 8).

risks which are related to the political monopoly of the minority (Lemarchand 2006b; Mamdani 2001b; Newbury and Newbury 1999; Reyntjens 2004b; Strizek 1998). A "broad base" including the Hutu power is needed to bring stability to the post civil war context in Rwanda (Mamdani 2001b: 278). Broadly speaking, according to their argument, power sharing avoids political and social exclusion along ethnic categories. However, my argument illustrates that political and social exclusion in Rwanda *and* Burundi is interpreted based on ethnic categories.

In this sense, ethnicity remains salient in politics in Rwanda and Burundi. In Burundi the negotiations aiming at reviving the cease fire agreement between the government and the FNL nearly failed because the FNL-Palipehutu (which stands for 'Party for the Liberation of the Hutu People') demanded to keep its name through the transition to a political party and for the contest in the 2010 elections. The Burundian government refused (ICG 2011). In Rwanda, Victoire Ingabire, who has been a candidate for Rwanda's August 2010 presidential elections − before being accused of ethnic divisionism, banned from running and imprisoned − implicitly claimed to represent 'Hutu interest' by, e.g., asserting in front of the Genocide Memorial that "Il y a aussi des Hutu qui furent victimes de crimes contre l'humanité et de crimes de guerre, qui ne sont pas evoqués ni honorés ici" (Soudan 2010: 46).

The FNL and Ingabire, both fighting for political power, take up notions that are taken for granted by my interviewees. Without a doubt, and as the analysis of the interviews shows, the 'denial of' ethnic cleavages makes the Rwandan government very vulnerable to the accusation that it excludes on the basis of ethnic categories. Interestingly, though, the conflict about the official name of the FNL exemplifies a central argument of the present book. It shows that even in a political system that shares power among Hutu and Tutsi, the representation of presumably neglected ethnically defined interests remains a relevant notion in political contest for power.

Having pointed out the overall argument of my book, the following section describes in more detail my analytical approach to ethnicity in politics. Subsequently, I focus on the conflict propensity of ethnicity in politics since it is constitutive for the 'dilemma of recognition'. Within the section, the questions prominently placed in the headline of this chapter, i.e., 'Why ethnicity?' 'Whose recognition?', and 'What dilemma?', help to reflect and underline the specific conflict propensity of ethnicity in politics. In the final section, I discuss how ethnicity in politics can be overcome. I use excerpts of the interviews in order to illustrate the 'dilemma of recognition' in Rwanda and Burundi and the potential I see to dissolve it. I conclude by reminding myself and other 'scientific inter-

preters' not to contribute to the reification of those notions that constitute the dilemma.

Approaching Ethnicity in Politics

The overall argument of the book is based on Peter Berger's and Thomas Luckmann's argument that knowledge constitutes reality (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 15). This is why, in a first step, taken for granted notions have been revealed: How do Rwandans and Burundians conceive of ethnicity and social and political inclusion and exclusion based on ethnicity?

Accordingly, my argument is concerned with a certain understanding of legitimacy that derives from this very taken for grantedness (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 12). This legitimacy implies power. Klaus Eder whose argument is also concerned with the nation as the self-evident point of reference for inclusion, makes clear that the power implied only becomes graspable in the moment, in which the concept is no longer accepted as a matter of course (Eder 2004: 280). Similarly, Ferdinand Sutterlüty (2006: 20, emphasis added) emphasises the "powerful effects of a familistic understanding of ethnicity [that] results from its very *invisibility*". To be clear, in the moment, in which the legitimacy, i.e., self evidence of politicised ethnicity, ethnicised politics and ethnicity becomes graspable, hence, when they lose their invisibility, they appear "as problematic as [...] influential" (Calhoun 2007: 152). In this sense, the analysis aimed at illustrating the taken for grantedness and legitimacy of essentialist concepts of ethnicity and political and social exclusion and inclusion based on ethnic categories.

In particular, the present line of reasoning focuses on taken for granted notions relating ethnicity to politics. Craig Calhoun (2007: 151) describes this notional relatedness vividly, when he refers to the "hyphen in nation-state [which] tied the modern polity […] to the notion of a historically or naturally unified people". Although he does not explicitly speak about ethnicity, but about a 'naturally unified people', one immediately gets an idea about what is meant by the notional relatedness between politics and ethnicity. The thinking about the modern polity is intertwined with the thinking about ethnicity. This is − although enhanced by the colonial powers and a specific post-independence political history in Rwanda and Burundi (Lemarchand 2004; Mamdani 2005; Uvin 1999) − due to the idea of the modern nation state.

More precisely, and as I argue, it is taken for granted and self-evident that ethnic categories make up the basis for rights, political claims, and political representation (inclusion and, hence, exclusion) within the modern nation state. In this vein, Mamdani (2002: 495) describes the idea "that ancestry [*i.e., ethnic-*

ity (according to the present definition), author's note] should be the basis of rights" as taken for granted common sense in the Great Lakes Region.

Political and social inclusion and exclusion is self-evidently interpreted based on ethnic categories. That is what I call politicised ethnicity, on the one hand, and ethnicised politics, on the other hand.

Analysing the knowledge the members of an institutional order have in order to analyse the integration of the order itself; in a second step, this approach defined by Berger and Luckmann (1991: 82) guides my research. Following them, I conceive of (political) institutions as 'experienced reality' not only in order to reveal powerful, taken for granted notions, but also to show how they are experienced in different, even contradictory ways. The knowledge of 'those living in that world' shows diverging realities and points to a lacking "common stock of knowledge" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 98) with respect to both political institutional models, in Rwanda and Burundi.

In order to approach the 'common stock of knowledge' I presume knowledge to reflect social divisions resulting from power distributions. Based on this assumption I selected my interviewees. More precisely, I distinguish between *political elite* and *citizens* as well as between being *oppositional* and *conforming to the regime in power* (see 3.3). Predominantly, the criteria of being oppositional or conforming to the regime in power have been approached based on ethnic categories of Hutu and Tutsi. In order to do so, the political history of the two countries and, thus, the change of power in 2003 in Rwanda and 2005 in Burundi have been interpreted in ethnic terms.[83] Whereas in Rwanda the FPR (Front Patriotique Rwandais), a Tutsi dominated rebel movement, militarily seized power in 1994 and was officially elected in 2003, in Burundi the CNDD-FDD (Conseil National pour la Défense de la Démocratie – Forces de Défense de la Démocratie) a former Hutu dominated rebel movement was officially elected in 2005.

Therefore, I made two assumptions, both reproducing the notion that political and social inclusions and exclusion are based on ethnic categories (politicised ethnicity and ethnicised politics): First Tutsi in Rwanda and Hutu in Burundi are assumed to be seen to dominate the government. Second, Hutu in Rwanda and Tutsi in Burundi are assumed to be rather oppositional and, respec-

83 In both countries, the precedent regimes were destabilized and overthrown in the early 1990s. Within the transition periods, the (precedent) regime gradually lost power in Burundi whereas the regime currently in power in Rwanda gradually gained power. In 2005 in Burundi and in 2003 in Rwanda, the first elections took place, which were based on the new constitutions equally approved in 2005 and in 2003.

tively, Tutsi in Rwanda and Hutu in Burundi are assumed to be rather conforming to the regime in power.

Based on these two simple assumptions reflecting the ethnic interpretation of political history it became possible to reveal quite more complex, yet, very ethnicised realities: In respect to the first assumption I can say that my interviewees do have a tendency to see the Burundian government as a Hutu dominated government and the Rwandan government as a Tutsi dominated government. In particular, regarding the Rwandan government these assessments come close to those given in the academic discussion (see 2.3.1). Conversely, nobody interprets the formal power in Rwanda to be held by Hutu or in Burundi to be held by Tutsi. However, the knowledge of 'those living in that world' is much more divers than that. Whereas 'the Tutsi' and 'the Hutu' are seen to be excluded in present Burundi (e.g., by referring to informal power), 'the Hutu' are seen to be excluded in present Rwanda. At the same time, the very same interpretation is identified as political strategy pursuing the exclusion of 'the Tutsi' in present Rwanda. Thus, very diverging, partly, even contradictory realities regarding the question of 'Which 'ethnic group' is excluded?' appear within the interpretations of 'those living in that world'.

Regarding the second assumption, again, a tendency amongst my interviewees is remarkable that Tutsi are rather oppositional to the regime in power in Burundi whereas Hutu are rather oppositional to the regime in power in Rwanda. The same is true for the preceding regimes, yet, with interchanged perspectives. This is most obvious in the most extreme, i.e., most exclusive, interpretations, such as the one made by the partisan of the FNL (Forces Nationales de Libération) and the mushingantahe in Burundi (10.2, 10.1) or the prisoner accused of incitement of genocide in Rwanda (10.3.2). I interpret these interpretations to be based on the assumption that a Tutsi (Hutu) regime represents rather the interests of Tutsi (Hutu). (Implicitly) following this line of reasoning, Tutsi are less oppositional to the regime in power in Rwanda, whereas Hutu are less oppositional to the regime in power in Burundi. At the same time, as a matter of course, it becomes clear that it is not as simple as that. Accordingly, a Hutu representing the ruling party FPR as a deputy in the Rwandan parliament deplores the defamation strategy, which describes his party as a Tutsi dominated one (10.3.1). Similarly, an unemployed jurist, being a Tutsi, accuses the present government to deny ethnic categories in order to stay in power (10.3.2). Hence, whereas the Hutu explicitly denies the exclusion of Hutu in the present Rwandan government, the Tutsi implicitly assumes it. In doing so, they exemplarily question the assumption that Tutsi are conforming and Hutu are oppositional to the regime in power.

My forty-two interviews were supposed to show the legitimacy and the resulting power of ethnic interpretations of exclusion (and, accordingly, inclusion). Nonetheless, given Berger and Luckmann's understanding of integration, it is relevant to analyse the 'common stock of knowledge' with regard to the question of how Rwandans and Burundians interpret political and social exclusion. Apparently, given competing perspectives on such a highly political and potentially conflict-prone issue, it is of special interest to analyse which is the interpretation that is collectively binding. This interest points to an analysis of the social process of production of meaning and, hence, of the contention of different collective actors about the generally accepted and binding interpretation of social reality and the varying power of collective actors (e.g., scientific disciplines, institutions) to define meaning (Jäger 2001: 123-6). Meaning expressed by my interviewees is not understood as individualised but as socially objectified (Keller 2001: 118). However, based on the concept of my research it is not possible to analyse the collectively binding production of knowledge.

Research exists that suggests answers to the question of what are collectively binding ethnic interpretations of political and social exclusions. Bert Ingelaere (2007: 5), who also deplores a "mainly top-down assessment of the Rwandan transition(s)" analyses how the political transition and the regime change in 1994 is perceived from below based on 400 life histories of ordinary Rwandan peasants. On this basis, he asserts a "reversal of perceived ethnic dominance". Broadly speaking, Hutu are seen to have dominated before 1994 and Tutsi after 1994. Conversely, Hutu feel less politically represented after 1994, whereas Tutsi score high for political representation after 1994 (Ingelaere 2007: 46/7). Similarly, in a "view from below" based on the perspectives of 625 respondents analysing the expectations of transitional justice in Burundi, Ingelaere (2009) reasons that Tutsi respondents have been more critical toward the government, which might be interpreted to be induced by Hutu political dominance.

Although these results do not systematically compare the views from below in Rwanda and Burundi, and do not focus on ethnic interpretations of social and political exclusion, they suggest – based on a much larger sample – an ethnic interpretation of both political institutional models, in Rwanda and Burundi. In this respect, they complement my analysis that clearly shows, both political institutional models are subject to patterns that interpret political and social exclusion based on ethnic categories.

My interview material is not assumed to answer questions concerning facts and events. Instead, the material is interpreted as a representation or an account of the experiences of the interviewees (Silverman 2006: 117). Thus, the present analysis does not aim at analysing if either 'the Hutu' or 'the Tutsi' are rather

oppositional or conforming to the current governments in Rwanda and Burundi. Nor, do I intend to show if the Rwandan or the Burundian government is predominantly seen as Tutsi or Hutu dominated by Rwandans and Burundians. In contrast, the present work considers it pivotal to reveal and, thus, challenge the taken for granted notion of 'ethnic groups' that are self-evidently seen to politically represent (ethnically defined) interests. Therefore, I find it problematic to argue that 'the Tutsi' dominate the government as this statement reifies this notion. The argument necessarily implies the idea of a group that is not only politically but also socially included – by excluding others or 'the other'. This is the reason why I did not interpret my interview material based on the ethnic affiliation of the interviewees even though their selection was based on an ethnic interpretation of political history. Following the logic of the present argument, it is rather crucial to demonstrate the power implied within interpretations asserting the political dominance of either 'the Hutu' or 'the Tutsi' than to analyse who sees whom to exclude whom.

In principle, I plead for taking into consideration the 'experienced reality', and, hence, the knowledge of 'those living in that world'. On this basis, the ethnic interpretation of different political institutional models as well as different yet ethnicised interpretations of the same political institutional model was illustrated. Having said this, institutions and, accordingly, social reality were to be introduced as experienced in different and even contradictory ways.

Understanding the Conflict Propensity of Ethnicity in Politics

Revealing the power implied in taken for granted notions and the diverging realities they constitute is meant to contribute to the understanding of ethnic conflict and of the dealing of political institutions with ethnicised politics that may lead to violent ethnic conflict. In doing so, I illustrate how Rwandans and Burundians, on the one hand, interpret political and social exclusion based on ethnic categories (i.e., ethnicise politics) in both opposing political institutional models aiming to overcome ethnicised politics. On the other hand, the analysis focuses on statements that answer the question of 'Which 'ethnic group' is excluded?' in Rwanda and in Burundi, in ethnic, although in different terms. These interpretations are crucial in that my understanding of ethnic conflict focuses on the current paradigms of social justice and, accordingly, on ethnicised politics contradicting these paradigms. The implied 'misrecognition' is seen to entail further violent ethnic conflict. The 'dilemma of recognition' is caused by these ethnicised interpretations of exclusion that imply 'misrecognition' and conflict propensity in both political institutional models.

This has been the main line of reasoning guiding my analysis of the 'dilemma of recognition'. Concluding, though, in order to make clear why ethnicity in politics is conflict–prone, it might help to touch briefly the questions prominently placed in the headline: First, 'Why does ethnicity lead to the dilemma?' Second, more generally speaking, 'Whose (mis)recognition gives rise to the dilemma?' Hopefully, the answers to the questions ensure a more profound understanding of, third, 'What exactly constitutes the dilemma?'

First, ethnic categories are most often conceived of as categorical (as opposed to gradual) classifications, which are – as Ferdinand Sutterlüty and Sighard Neckel (2006: 808) puts it – "qualitative judgments of otherness" (as opposed to quantitative differences). Hence, "particular characteristics are seen as equal or unequal, similar or different, and as qualifying individuals as insiders or outsiders". This qualitative judgment of otherness relates to the essentialist and ascribed character of ethnic categories. In this sense, ethnicity is a "deep symbolic dimension of inequality", and, hence, implies exclusion (Sutterlüty 2006). Having said this, the essentialist notion of ethnicity enhances its exclusive notion. Accordingly, categories are less exclusive if they are understood as quantitative differences, "associated with acquired attributes such as income, education and professional status". Importantly, "these attributes are most often seen not only as changeable, but also as negotiable in terms of social value" (Sutterlüty and Neckel 2006: 808). Although I conceive of ethnic categories as being defined by descent and, hence, per se being thought up as an ascribed attribute, very prominent research, e.g., by Herbert Gans (1979), shows how ethnic categories are lived and experienced as 'symbolic', 'situational' or 'emergent', hence, as "a more open, flexible, even changeable" category (Yinger 1994: 343).

Furthermore, the notion of ethnic categories points to the crucial backdrop, against which modern societies evaluate and, thus, legitimise social inclusion and exclusion. The ethnically defined nation state structures inclusion and exclusion in the modern society. Different forms of (legal, political, military, social) exclusion are organised along the same principle.

> In this manner, they reinforce each other, making the nationalist representation of the world more and more plausible, as if they were the natural way to think and speak about society, politics, laws and so forth (Wimmer 2002: 57).

Put differently, ethnic categories are taken for granted as the basis for rights, political claims, and political representation (i.e., politicised ethnicity). As extensively discussed, this notion implies conflict propensity in that it constitutes the necessary condition to think of ethnicised politics.

Hence, exclusion and inclusion interpreted based on ethnic categories is political in that ethnic categories are seen as a legitimate basis for political and social inclusion and exclusion. Having said this, ethnicised politics constitute an important resource for accomplishing and legitimising political ends (Büschges and Pfaff-Czarnecka 2007b: 8). In this sense, ethnicised politics and politicised ethnicity are political in that they have the power to influence "the distribution, maintenance, or transfer of power" (Weber 2004: 33) of a given form of political representation and organisation. Exclusion based on ethnic categories is conflict-prone when it challenges the given political organisation and representation. Therefore, exclusion along ethnic categories not coinciding with the nation state is highly conflict-prone: This is because the given political representation and organisation is potentially challenged based on notions that are taken for granted and thus powerful.

This taken for granted notion becomes clear when the Rwandan regime is seen to be non-legitimate because it is dominated by Tutsi, although it is ruling over a country which is in majority composed by Hutu. According to the implicit reasoning, the regime is non–legitimate (i.e., contradicts notions that are taken for granted) not only because it excludes a great share of its population in economic and social terms, which, hence, is not equal but also because this great share is ethnically defined and, hence, is not like 'the Tutsi'. Inclusion would be ensured only if Hutu are in power to represent Hutu interests.

This line of reasoning asserting the conflict propensity of ethnicised politics is implied in most of the current research analysing social and political exclusion along ethnic categories within the context of modern nation states (Brass 1985; Gurr 1993; Gurr 2002; Hechter 1999; Hechter 2004; Horowitz 1985; Snyder 2000; Wimmer 2002; Wimmer 1997). Political and social exclusion also play an important role for the analyses of mass violence in Rwanda and Burundi (Byanafashe 2003; Lemarchand 2004; Ndikumana 1998; Uvin 1998). In addition, widely known research in sociology (see Dahrendorf 1961: 224) relates the ascribed (i.e., essentialist) status of social categories to their specific conflict propensity if exclusion is aligned along them.

Having said this and relating to the question of 'Why ethnicity contributes to the assessed dilemma?' posed above, one has to recall that the dilemma occurs in that one intends to overcome potentially conflict-prone ethnicised politics. Hence, according to what has just been discussed, ethnic categories imply conflict propensity due to their essentialist character as well as due to their notional relatedness to politics, more precisely, their relatedness to legitimate inclusion and exclusion. Hence, for analysing and assessing conflict propensity of ethnic categories based on the knowledge of 'those living in that world' it fol-

lows that it needs to be approach empirically how 'they' conceive of ethnic categories and their relatedness to politics.

The second question of 'Whose (mis)recognition gives rise to the dilemma?' contributes to understanding the conflict propensity of ethnicity in politics on a more general level by placing ethnicity into the context of the modern nation state and the implied paradigms of social justice.

Recognition is often conceived of as being opposed to redistribution emphasised in models of liberal democracy. Whereas redistribution is difference-blind, recognition per se refers to the groups defined by nationality, gender, sex and ethnicity (Benhabib 2002; Fraser 1997; Fraser 2003; Phillips 1996; Taylor 1992). In other words, as Nancy Fraser asserts, in a common understanding recognition relates to politics of identity and multiculturalism whereas distribution refers to class interests and social democracy (Fraser 2003: 8). The notion of 'recognition' underlying the present line of reasoning confirms but also contradicts this understanding. Most importantly, '(mis)recognition' does not directly relate to any of the two political institutional models. The system of difference–sensible power sharing is seen to imply 'misrecognition', as does the system of liberal, majoritarian democracy. Furthermore, '(mis)recognition' is not necessarily limited to specific social categories, e.g., ethnic ones.

I use the term 'recognition' in order to explicitly point to the paradigms of social justice, which are currently defined by the idea of the modern nation state. In this sense, 'misrecognition' describes simply the contradiction of these paradigms. Depending on the interpretations of political history, any social category might become the basis for rights, political claims, and political representation. This is the prerequisite for interpreting social exclusion based on this category. Exclusion based on any social category contradicts the paradigms of social justice, and in this sense, implies 'misrecognition'. The term 'misrecognition' points to exclusion interpreted not in individual but in collective terms.

Broadly speaking, arguing in this way points to the argument made by Fraser (2003). Although speaking as moral philosopher, she claims for a critically oriented and empirically informed social theory, which intends to overcome injustice in a pragmatic way: who is seen to be misrecognised has to be recognised in order to establish justice. Accordingly, it is wrong that everyone needs to be recognised in his or her distinctiveness such as defined by ethnicity and sex because it is de-contextualised. Equally wrong is "that justice requires limiting public 'recognition' to those capacities all humans share" (Fraser 2003: 46), what exemplifies the difference–blind redistribution perspective introduced above.

Categories can differ regarding how they are thought of (e.g., essentialist or flexible) and how they are thought of in relation to the paradigms of social justice. In short, depending on the ideas about social justice and the social categories, which historically become salient in politics, i.e., based on which social and political exclusion is interpreted, any social category might imply 'misrecognition'. However, currently exclusion along ethnic categories contradicts particularly strongly the normative ideas of equals and likes implied in the modern nation state.

So, third, 'What exactly constitutes the dilemma?' The 'dilemma of recognition' occurs due to the given paradigms of social justice, which are related to the idea of the modern nation state that implies the idea of equality and likeness. Against this notional background, ethnic categories and exclusion interpreted based on ethnic categories not coinciding with the nation state become political and potentially conflict-prone. The 'institutional engineering'–debate is confronted with a dilemma when deciding between 'denial of' and 'power sharing along' ethnic categories since in both political institutional models political and social exclusion can be interpreted based on ethnic categories.

Following my line of reasoning, in societies, in which political history is strongly ethnicised, political and social exclusion is likely to be experienced as ethnicised as well. Consequently, the question of how 'those living in that world' conceive of the relation between ethnicity and politics becomes crucial for any empirically informed analysis. As just said, depending on the ideas of social justice, any social category, especially when it is conceived of as essentialistically defined, might imply 'misrecognition'. When 'those living in that world' interpret social and political exclusion based on this social category, one is confronted with a 'dilemma of recognition'.

In conclusion, ethnicity in politics is conflict–prone because of the notion of modern nation state, which currently defines our understanding of social justice. Against this notional background and the related idea of legitimate inclusion and exclusion structured along ethnic categories, the interpretation of social and political exclusion based on ethnic categories not coinciding with the nation state are political and conflict–prone. Having the purpose to overcome conflict propensity, the 'institutional engineering'–debate is likely to be confronted with a dilemma in case that political and social exclusion is interpreted based on ethnic categories. Hence, there is one simple answer to the questions of 'Why ethnicity?', 'Whose recognition?', 'What dilemma?' This answer is already implied in my general focus on historically produced knowledge: For assessing potentially conflict-prone ethnicised politics resulting in the dilemma, the notions about social justice of 'those living in that world' (that imply their notions

about ethnicity, ethnicity in politics and inclusion and exclusion) are to be taken into account.

Overcoming Ethnicity in Politics

One crucial result of my research is that Rwanda and Burundi are confronted with a ‘dilemma of recognition’ constituted by ethnicity, ethnicised politics and politicised ethnicity. It has become clear that ethnicised patterns are strong in the interpretation of political and social inclusion and exclusion. This observation empirically substantiates assessments of acknowledged experts of the region that ethnicity plays an important role in politics in Rwanda and Burundi (Lemarchand 2004; Mamdani 2001b; Mamdani 2005; Ndikumana 1998; Ndikumana 2000; Uvin 1999; Uvin 2009).

However, my argument differs from these assessments in one major point. Often it is argued that the divide between Hutu and Tutsi is diminishing in Burundi as a result of the political institutional model that shares power among ‘ethnic groups’ in Burundi. For instance, Filip Reyntjens (2006a: 132) asserts: “For its part, Burundi has ‘institutionalized the ethnic factor’. […] At first sight, this would seem to rigidify the ethnic divide, but the opposite appears to be happening”. Accordingly, he assumes that other divides than the ethnic one “come[s] to the fore” (Reyntjens 2006b: 132). In a similar way, Peter Uvin (2009: 172) explains the declining relevance of “the ethnic division” that used to be “*the* fault line of socio–political life” in Burundi with a “compromise–based and ethnically inclusive system of political governance”. Generally speaking, within the discussion of regional experts about Rwanda and Burundi, power sharing is seen as “as a recipe for peaceful cohabitation”, “as exclusion [...] is the key factor behind most African conflicts” (Lemarchand 2006b: 2).

The arguments of these regional experts draw heavily on the ‘institutional engineering’–debate that – as I have extensively criticised – generally assumes the same effects for the same institutions. This becomes especially problematic in the discussion about ‘denial of’ versus ‘power sharing along’ ethnic cleavages, both aiming at overcoming ethnicised politics. Despite a clear preference for the power sharing model (De Zwart 2005: 141; Rothchild 2005: 247), there are proponents of the model of ‘denial of’ (Rothchild 2004: 226; Zartman 1990: 525). However, although ethnicised politics play a major role for the arguments in favour or against a particular political institutional model, it remains unclear how ethnicised politics are conceived of analytically (see 7.2). Consequently, the arguments cannot convincingly explain why one model is superior to another for overcoming ethnicised politics. Without a clear understanding of what

exactly constitutes ethnicised politics, the discussion remains superficial when assuming that the structure of political institutions has inherent effects.

My analysis contributes to and relativises both, the discussion of regional experts and the 'institutional engineering'–debate, by showing that ethnicised interpretations of political and social exclusion persist in Rwanda *and* Burundi. To be clear, Hutu and Tutsi as political identities might well be influenced by how power is organised and which identities are recognised by the law, as Mamdani stresses in respect to the present Rwandan context (Mamdani 2001a: 22). According to his argument, the prerequisite for transcending the political identities is that the Tutsi leadership gives up its monopoly on power (Mamdani 2001a: 22). I agree with him and with the 'institutional engineering'–debate up to a certain point. However, I place emphasis on the role of historically produced knowledge, which is neglected by these discussions.

To be clear, I do not at all assume politics to be a "noncreative activity" as Mamdani reproaches the discussion about conflict in Rwanda (Mamdani 2001b: 265). On the contrary, the ethnicised interpretations of political history in Rwanda and Burundi have been the starting point of the present analysis. Nonetheless, my analysis shows that it is pivotal to take the historically produced knowledge of Rwandans and Burundian into account that interprets inclusion and exclusion based on ethnic categories. For overcoming ethnicised politics we have to work on the notions that are taken for granted by Rwandans and Burundians. Neither simply denying ethnic categories nor sharing power along them, is sufficient to overcome ethnicised politics.

I conceive of institutions not only as objective, yet socially constructed, but also as "experienced reality" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 77), being the product of a specific history (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 72). Consequently, for approaching and analysing an institutional order, the historically produced 'knowledge' of its members must be taken into consideration (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 82). Accordingly, challenging the institutions, hence, the 'experienced realities' of ethnicity, politicised ethnicity and ethnicised politics in Rwanda and Burundi, implies to challenge the taken for grantedness of these notions. In fact, overcoming the (socially available) taken for grantedness and self evidence of these categories solves the dilemma. According to Berger and Luckmann, language decisively contributes to the "objectivations of everyday life" (Berger and Luckmann 1991: 51). Therefore, one important contribution to challenging ethnicised politics and politicised ethnicity is to find other social categories than ethnic ones for the interpretation of social and political exclusion. Based on the research done and presented in this book, I will discuss in the following paragraphs how (1) ethnicity, (2) politicised ethnicity, and (3) ethnicised politics can be overcome in Rwanda and Burundi?

First, by approaching ethnic categories as knowledge of Rwandans and Burundians, I have shown that these categories are experienced as both, socially constructed and essentialist at the same time. On the one hand, a strong essentialist notion has been apparent in that the categories of Hutu and Tutsi are related to descent. This is most evident in the answers to the question of whether one can be Hutu (Tutsi) without having parents who are Hutu (Tutsi). Almost all of my interviewees denied it. On the other hand, though, strong social constructivist notions are present in the statements, such as the aspect of individual choice, politics, social narrations and the general flexibility of these categories. The analysis, however, focuses on notions that reveal an even more complex 'experienced reality' of ethnic categories in Rwanda and Burundi. It shows that social constructivist arguments imply and reproduce essentialist arguments (see 8.1). In contrast, other quotes integrate essentialist notions into a social constructivist perspective (see 8.2).

Altogether, the interviews show a constructed as well as an essentialist experienced reality of ethnic categories. In order to solve the dilemma, the exclusive character of essentialistically defined categories must be overcome. Hence, interpretations that essentialise the social categories of Hutu and Tutsi (either due to strong assumptions typically referring to descent or essentialising arguments meant to deconstruct ethnic categories) must be challenged. Furthermore, social constructivist lines of reasoning that ultimately leave essentialist notions uncontested and arguments essentialising other social categories, such as clans, need to be challenged. Intentionally developing and integrating the knowledge of Rwandans and Burundians in this respect and enhancing the social constructivist idea about ethnic categories are crucial for avoiding the exclusive thinking inherent to them.

It is difficult to say whether the Rwandan approach, officially denying ethnic categories (see 2.3.1), contributes to this aim. Essentialist ideas about Hutu and Tutsi, such as the notion widely taken for granted in *both* countries that ethnic categories are defined by descent, which per se implies an essentialist understanding, points to the importance to challenge the taken for granted and self-evident concepts that 'those living in that world' nonetheless have. At the same time, the knowledge regarding ethnic categories comprehends plenty of social constructivist facets, which point to a potential to advocate 'a common stock of knowledge' conceiving of ethnic categories as socially constructed. Clearly, the common understanding of ethnicity, which relates to a distinct culture, language and religion, enhances this potential since Hutu and Tutsi do not correspond to these 'markers'. Yet, one has to be aware that social constructivist

arguments referring to this lack of ethnic markers always imply and reproduce essentialist notions (see 2.1, 8.2).

Second, approaching politicised ethnicity as part of the 'experienced reality' of Rwandans and Burundians reveals how ethnic categories are conceived of as a self-evident and taken for granted basis for rights, political claims, and political representation. Quantitative research conducted during the elections in 2005 in Burundi supports the understanding that political representation is thought of in ethnic terms (Nimubona n.s.). Thus, Julien Nimubona, an acknowledged Burundian expert of the region, asserts for his country in 2005 that talking about ethnicity is also talking about politics (Nimubona n.s.: 2). In this vein, Mamdani (2002: 495) describes the idea "that ancestry [*i.e., ethnicity (according to the present definition)*, author's note] should be the basis of rights" as common sense taken for granted in the Great Lakes Region.

The (political) legitimacy of claims based on ethnic categories becomes especially apparent when it is set in relation to the realization of democracy as my interviewees do by discussing political and ethnic majority (see 9.1). The very radical ideas that gained political relevance in the 1950s that justify the right to rule by the superior number of 'the Hutu' reflect this notion (Young 2006: 310).

Politicised ethnicity is also exemplified by the notion of my interviewees that the interest of an 'ethnic group' is ensured when the 'ethnic group' or its representatives are in power. The reinterpretations of ethnic affiliation based on political affiliation, which occurred within the interviews (see 9.3), takes the idea that political interests must be represented based on ethnic categories and, consequently, that ethnicity has to be politically represented, to an extreme. Ethnicity is equated to having and representing political ideas. Thus, ethnic categories constitute a self-evident and taken for granted basis for political and social inclusion in Rwanda and Burundi.

However, several quotes reveal promising starting points for dissolving politicised ethnicity in that they clearly challenge the idea of political representation based on ethnic categories. The former deputy quoted at the very beginning describes clearly that he does not know how a Hutu peasant benefits from his mere presence as politician. At the same time, he highlights that ethnicity works to assure political legitimacy. Likewise the quote of the Burundian living in Kamenge exemplifies this conflict by describing, on the one hand, the assumption he had that once 'the Hutu' get into power, Burundi will reach the most important moments in its history and the contradictory assessment that since 'the Hutu' are in power nothing has changed. Clearly, he had assumed that 'the Hutu' might represent the interest of a greater share of the population. Quite contrary, now he observes that it does not depend on who is in power, but on what they do. Similarly, arguing in a very critical and ironical manner, one of

the mushingantahe expresses his doubts that the FNL (Forces Nationales de Libération) fights for the interests of 'the Hutu' although they claim to do so (10.1). Altogether, the quotes exemplarily point to the potential to work on and challenge the idea of politicised ethnicity in Rwanda and Burundi.

Third, it cannot be emphasised enough that social and political exclusion are self-evidently interpreted with reference to ethnic categories in both countries. Not only present but also historical power distributions and governments are interpreted in ethnic terms. In the academic discussion, too, it is not uncommon to interpret and explain political history with reference to 'ethnic groups', namely Hutu and Tutsi who fight each other in order to get into power and, hence, to avoid the exclusion by the other (see 2.2).

The interpretation of current power distributions and governments depicts complex, though, ethnicised realities (see 9): On the one hand, the Rwandan regime has been predominantly interpreted as a Tutsi regime politically excluding 'the Hutu'. On the other hand, this interpretation has been challenged by describing it explicitly not as a Tutsi regime. These interpretations have been questioned again by statements interpreting exactly these (non–ethnic) interpretations as mere political strategy and, hence, (implicitly) interpreting social and political exclusion again based on ethnic categories. Likewise, ethnic interpretations of social and political exclusion are, in turn, also interpreted as mere political strategy (i.e., diverging from reality). The interpretations of the Burundian system are even more contradictory: On the one hand, the most extreme interpretation asserts that 'the Hutu' have all the political power. On the other hand, the other extreme interpretation insists that 'the Tutsi' still have all the power. Both extremes imply the political exclusion of 'the other'. Corresponding to the interpretations in Rwanda, some Burundian interviewees describe nationalist as well as ethnic interpretations of exclusion (respectively, inclusion) as mere political strategy. Despite a recurring ethnic interpretation, the concrete power assessments (and, hence, the question of 'Which 'ethnic group' is excluded?') diverge massively in any of the two countries.

Despite the strong interpretation of political and social exclusion based on ethnic categories, the analysis also shows potential to challenge ethnicised politics in order to dissolve the dilemma. For instance, the Rwandan priest directly questions the interpretations of political and social exclusion along ethnic categories in present Rwanda when he mentions the common belief, according to which 'the Tutsi' currently in government benefit 'their owns', which he, himself, doubts. Likewise, the president of the UPRONA (Union pour le Progès National) sees the recurring interpretations of exclusion in ethnic terms in Burundi, stating that either 'the Hutu' or 'the Tutsi' are excluded, to be a political

strategy (10.3.1). In this respect, he concludes – as did many of my other interviewees – that it is a political game, which makes the ethnic cleavages salient. These interpretations exemplarily point to the potential to overcome ethnicised politics, i.e., exclusion interpreted based on ethnic categories.

Concluding, the knowledge of my Rwandan and Burundian interviewees shows, on the one hand, clearly ethnicised realities. Rights, political claims, and political representation, broadly speaking, interest and its political representation are interpreted in ethnic terms. Similarly, political and social exclusion are interpreted in ethnic terms. Furthermore, ethnic categories are thought of as defined by descent, i.e., in essentialist terms. Hence, the idea of 'ethnic groups' as collective actors with common purposes in politics, is present. At the same time, though, it has become clear that these taken for granted notions are not uncontested and implicitly or explicitly challenged. This is promising since ethnic boundaries can be challenged, changed and even become meaningless (Eder, Rauer, and Schmidtke 2004b: 35). Challenging these taken for granted notions is pivotal since they constitute the dilemma itself. In this respect, I agree with Mamdani who describes a dilemma in terms of dealing with political demands based on ethnicity in Rwanda.

As already mentioned in order to introduce my concluding thoughts Mamdani sees the possibility to dissolve the dilemma by challenging "the idea that we must define political identity, political rights, and political justice first and foremost in relation to indigeneity" (Mamdani 2005: 17). In this vein, Catherine Newbury states that "'managing' ethnic tensions requires transcending them and addressing other forms of social inequality as well" (Newbury 1998a: 18). In Rwanda and Burundi, where the income distribution is highly unequal (according to the CIA Wold factbook Rwanda and Burundi are ranked 35 and 52 out of 134 unequal countries in the world[84]), there is a lot of potential for addressing social exclusion based on other social categories than ethnic ones (such as rural/urban).

Prior to the large–scale violence in 1993 and in 1994, Rwanda and Burundi had similar structures of exclusion: In both countries there were "exploitative dictatorships" and "a small class of haves over the large majority of have–nots"(Uvin 1999: 266). Especially in Rwanda before 1994, "the dividing line between the haves and the have–nots was regional and social, not ethnic" (Uvin 1999: 266). Ethnic divisions were exacerbated by the elite to avoid democratisation and power sharing. Hence, Peter Uvin (1999: 266) concludes, "social structure does not explain everything. Content is needed". Within my

84 The list is based on the Gini index that measures "the degree of inequality in the distribution of family income in a country"(CIA 2011).

line of reasoning, this 'content' is the knowledge of 'those living in that world'. I argue that the ethnicised interpretation of exclusion he observes for both countries also for the period after 1994 and 1993 (Uvin 1999: 267/8), must be overcome.

I would like to stress two main arguments why the existing exclusion can and must be interpreted in other categories than ethnic ones. First, because, as Newbury (1998a: 19) notices with respect to ethnicity and politics of class in Rwanda, the problem of "focussing obsessively on ethnicity is that this may lead one to overlook questions of power and class". Second, because, the interpretations of inclusion and exclusion based on ethnic categories are especially conflict-prone − even more so in Rwanda and Burundi where large-scale violence was aligned along ethnic categories.

This political history not only defines ethnicised politics as an urgent problem to be overcome, but also makes it especially difficult. The accusation that the denial of ethnicity and the emphasis on non-ethnic interpretations of exclusion is a "typically Tutsi argument", position of "current, Tutsi-dominated, post-genocidal government" and "Tutsi point of view" applied in order to secure the monopoly on political power (Lemarchand 1994a: 162; Mamdani 2002: 499; Uvin 2001: 76) suggests the complexity of this purpose. As Uvin (1999: 267) states: "The denial and the affirmation of ethnicity is political." This makes clear that the dilemma in Rwanda and Burundi is constituted not only by the interpretation of social and political exclusion based on ethnicity, but also by the interpretation of political strategies in ethnic terms.

Nonetheless, and in a very first step, the knowledge produced by 'scientific interpreters' is to be taken into account. In this context, those interpreting political and social exclusion in Rwanda and Burundi should avoid the reification of 'ethnic groups', politicised ethnicity and ethnicised politics. As Rogers Brubaker asserts unlike in the political practice, which might even intend to politicise ethnicity, the analysis of ethnicity in politics has to avoid its reification (Brubaker 2004b: 10).

Therefore, as outside observers and 'scientific interpreters' we should be reminded that interpreting exclusion based on ethnic categories is part of the problem. Jack Eller (1999: 196) asks with respect to Rwanda and Burundi: "Why are we in the West so ready to perceive them as tribes and to perceive their struggle as a tribal struggle?" The answer he gives points to an important tendency "to see non-Western as nonmodern and therefore as tribal". By posing this question, "tribal" implies a primordial concept of ethnicity and an understanding of violent conflict that exists between these primordially defined groups "from time immemorial" (Eller 1999: 195). Of course, as shown in sec-

tion 2.1 the academic discussion does not recur to these concepts in order to explain neither ethnicity nor violent ethnic conflict.

However, academic observations reproduce ethnicised politics in that they interpret political and social exclusion based on ethnic categories. These interpretations suggest that this form of exclusion is especially non–legitimate yet in an undefined manner. As Mamdani (2001b: 276) states in respect to political identities in Rwanda, "nationalism has added the legacy of equating democracy with unqualified majority rule". In doing so, he points to an argument that has been prominent within the present analysis: the self-evident and taken for granted interpretation of political and social exclusion based on ethnic categories is implied in the notion of modern nation state. In this sense, interpreting political and social exclusion, we are confronted with the task to overcome the legacy of nationalism.

As long as the ethnic interpretation is such an appealing one, any (of the two) political institutional systems can be challenged based on ethnic interpretations. That is most obvious in the case of the Burundian system since it is commonly seen as ethnically inclusive. Yet, some interpretations of my Burundian interviewees question this assumption. As the president of the UPRONA argues, being Hutu or Tutsi in Burundi is not only a question of blood, but of what kind of ideas the person is representing. If he or she defends the alleged interest of 'the Hutu' he or she is a Hutu (9.3). His statements shows that the relationship between ethnicity and politics is strong and that it must be analysed based on the knowledge of 'those living in a world' – accordingly, political systems which are meant to overcome ethnicity in politics as well.

Institutions are what 'those living in that world' take for granted and real. Accordingly, in order to dissolve the 'dilemma of recognition' and to prevent further violent ethnic conflict, we have to focus on taken for granted and self-evident notions, i.e., knowledge of 'those living in that world'. This knowledge is influenced by the (political) history, which produces it, and needs to be approached empirically.

For the 'institutional engineering'-debate, and for the question of how (and whether) political institutions influence ethnicity in politics, my analysis suggests that: (1) more (large–scale) empirical research is necessary to assess the influence of institutions on the knowledge of 'those living in that world'; and (2) in order to guide the empirical research, a better understanding is needed of how institutions and ethnicity in politics can be approached analytically. In this respect, my approach and analytical distinction between ethnicised politics and politicised ethnicity could serve as a starting point for conceptualisation.

Applied to Rwanda and Burundi, i.e., to the discussion of regional experts, these recommendations imply (1) to approach the subject of ethnicity in politics

empirically, i.e., based on the notions and concepts of Rwandans and Burundians. (2) The assumption of a direct relationship between political representation of ethnicity through institutions and representation of interests should be avoided. In general, research discussing the role of ethnicity in social and political exclusion should be aware of the reification of 'ethnic groups', politicised ethnicity and ethnicised politics.

Furthermore, following my strongly interpretative approach focusing on knowledge, further research might consider the varying power positions different people hold to influence the collectively binding knowledge about ethnicity in politics. This implies further research on the question how notions taken for granted by 'those living in that world' can be dissolved.

In summary, ethnicised politics, politicised ethnicity, hence, the thinking of 'ethnic groups', is what makes up and defines the 'dilemma of recognition' that the 'institutional engineering'-debate is facing, when aiming to overcome violent conflict in ethnicised societies. Simply installing a specific political institutional model cannot assure that the dilemma is dissolved. It is at least as important to work on the notions taken for granted by 'those living in that world'.

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