5

The Impact of the 1894–95 Sino-Japanese War on Japanese and Chinese Textbooks: A Comparative Analysis

Limin Bai

1 Introduction

The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 was one of the key events in the history of both Japan and China. Through an examination of the depictions of the war in Japanese and Chinese textbooks in the decade following the war (1897–1907), this study aims to demonstrate how the war was exploited as an educational instrument to stimulate a spirit of nationalism in both countries.

Textbook research is an emerging field in recent China scholarship. Many old textbooks have been collected and reprinted, and scholars have begun to examine textbooks from the past in all subject areas and from various perspectives (see Wu 2008, 52). Recent publications in the subject area include Shi Ou and his research team's series of studies of Chinese textbooks of the past century (Shi and Wu 2009; Shi et al. 2012; Shi 2013, 2015). In Chinese scholarship, the 1890s are

L. Bai (✉)
Victoria University of Wellington, Wellington, New Zealand
e-mail: Limin.Bai@vuw.ac.nz

E. Roldán Vera and E. Fuchs (eds.), *Textbooks and War*, Palgrave Studies in Educational Media, https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-98803-0_5

considered the emergent period of modern Chinese textbook development. During this period the survival of China was a major theme for textbooks in the subjects of language, history, human geography and self-cultivation (similar to ethics education today). The Sino-Japanese War was regarded as a critical turning point in modern Chinese history which, in the writings of late Qing reformers and in textbook curricula, was translated into calls for reforms.

In Japan a comprehensive series of studies on Japanese textbooks was published in the 1960s. The series included reprints of textbooks of the past century with detailed bibliographical information and scholarly analyses (Kaigo and Naka 1961–67). The studies of Meiji textbooks show how education in Japan changed during the Meiji Restoration (1868–1912) (Kaigo and Naka 1969). Many late Qing reformers, both officials and scholars, attributed the achievement of Meiji Japan to its successful fusion of Confucianism and practical learning from the West. In their opinion, Meiji Japan was an ideal model for China. This view was prevalent among many official- and scholar-reformers of the time. It is against this background that this study evaluates the narratives of the 1895 Sino-Japanese War in Japanese and Chinese textbooks.

Methodologically, this study adopts a comparative approach. First, it investigates how the war was depicted in Chinese and Japanese textbooks through a textual comparison. Based on the findings of this comparison, the study then analyzes the effects of the Sino-Japanese War on the content of textbooks and textbook writing practice. Between 1890 and 1905 at least forty publishing houses were established in China in response to the demand for new textbooks; most of these publishers were non-governmental. In the wake of the 1900 Boxer Rebellion, the Qing government was forced to carry out reforms. As a result, the textbook market flourished. The textbook series published by Shanghai Commercial Press in 1903 was regarded as China's first modern textbook series intended for the modern school system (Wang 2008, 21; Reed 2004). In this study a Chinese history textbook for elementary school, first published by Shanghai Commercial Press in 1903, is selected to compare with the *Jinjō shōgaku tokuhon* (Japanese Reader for Regular Elementary School). The *Jinjō shōgaku tokuhon* was chosen for

the comparison because it was also published in 1903 and designed for elementary schooling. Most importantly, both textbooks contain lessons on the Sino-Japanese War. The textual comparison will demonstrate that the narratives of the war in the textbooks of the two countries differed in language, tone and focus. There was also an enormous disparity between the Japanese and Chinese accounts of the events that led to the war. This will illustrate how textbooks were used as effective agents through which to promote a certain version of the war and thus to construct historical memory for educational and ideological purposes.

The educational and ideological use of textbooks in China has been noted by scholars in the West, who have examined the role of textbooks in the transformation of Chinese society, citizenship education and the formation of the modern nation. Studies have covered the late Qing (see Judge 2001, 1–40) and republican periods (Culp 2001, 2007; for a recent study of both periods, see Zarrow 2015), with some focusing on history education in particular (Zarrow 2007, 21–54; Hon 2007, 79–107; Ching 2007, 55–78). Such works have shown how textbook production reflected the sociopolitical changes of the time and demonstrated how textbooks played a pivotal role in the development of a modern school system and curriculum, exerting considerable influence on the construction of a new knowledge framework, the training of citizens to meet the needs of a transformed China and the reshaping of society and politics. Against this background, this study goes on to analyze Chinese textbooks produced between 1897 and 1907 to elucidate how Chinese reformers and textbook writers employed this disastrous war to address China's crisis and to advocate for the use of the Japanese model in the implementation of China's reforms. In this process, Confucianism functioned as the intellectual framework which provided the foundation for China's adoption of the Japanese model and its subsequent absorption of Western ideas via Japanese sources. From this perspective, this study will argue that although Meiji Japanese and late Qing Chinese narratives of the war differed significantly, compilers in both countries employed textbooks as tools with which to create their versions of the war in order to convey official ideology and build patriotic nationalism.

2 Background and Timeline of the 1894–95 Sino-Japanese War

Historically, Korea had long been a tributary state to Chinese empires. The rise of Meiji Japan forced China to surrender its exclusive influence over Korea in 1885 when the Tianjin Convention (*Tianjin tiaoyue*) was signed between China and Japan, following the 1884 Gapsin Coup. The coup was initiated by a group of pro-Japanese Korean reformers, who were attempting to eliminate social distinctions and modernize Korea through the implementation of reforms. The Qing government sent Yuan Shikai (1859–1916) to suppress the coup. Yuan's success, however, heightened tensions between Qing China and Meiji Japan. Consequently, Itō Hirobumi (1841–1909) and Li Hongzhang (1823–1901) negotiated the Tianjin Convention, by which both Japan and China agreed to withdraw their troops from Korea and to refrain from sending troops to Korea without giving prior notice to the other side. The outcome of this treaty was that Qing China had to share its sphere of influence with Japan. This was recorded in Chinese history textbooks for elementary education. The following lesson, entitled *Chaoxian xin jiu dang zheng* (The struggle between the conservative party and the reformist group in Korea), is from a 1903 edition of *Zhongguo lishi jiaokeshu* (*Chinese History Textbook*) for senior primary schools. After explaining how in 1884 the "young and energetic" reformists tried and failed to assassinate a member of the Korean Queen Min's clique and then tried to detain the king and queen with the help of Takezoe Shinichiro, the Japanese minister to Korea, the textbook describes what happened next:

> Takezoe and his Japanese soldiers occupied the palace. The Min clique then appealed to the Qing government for help. Yuan Shikai led his troops to Korea, suppressed the coup and restored the government of King Gojong. Takezoe and the Japanese army retreated to Jinsen; the pro-Japanese faction failed to achieve its objective. The Japanese government sent its foreign minister Inouye Kaoru to Korea asking for compensation. In 1885 Itō Hirobumi conferred with Li Hongzhang in Tianjin [and they agreed] that both countries withdraw their troops from Korea. It was also agreed that in the event of any disturbance requiring

> the dispatch of troops to Korea, each nation must inform the other of its intention in advance. This agreement was the Treaty of Tianjin. (*Zhongguo lishi jiaokeshu* 1903, 2:17; unless otherwise noted, all translations my own. Cf. Li 1956, 132–33; Seth 2010, 238–39)

The treaty proved ineffective: the Qing government appointed Yuan Shikai as Resident General in Korea, while Meiji Japan continued to covet Korea (Akagi 1979; Auslin 2004; Beasley 1987; Paine 2003). In 1894 the first Sino-Japanese War broke out.

In 1894 the Donghak Peasant Revolution broke out in Korea. The frightened Korean royal family asked the Qing government to help suppress the rebellion. As a result of this request, the Qing government dispatched 2700 soldiers to Korea. This military action angered Japan, which accused China of violating the Tianjin Convention and sent a military force of eight thousand to occupy the Royal Palace in Pyongyang. By helping the pro-Japanese faction form a new government, Japan obtained the right to expel the Chinese troops while shipping more troops to Korea. The Qing government was furious and rejected this new government as illegitimate. The Battle of Fengdao, or Asan, on July 25, 1894, marked the beginning of the war, although officially war was declared on August 1. The war ended with the signing of the Treaty of Shimonoseki on April 17, 1895. China ceded Taiwan and the Penghu Islands to Japan and was required to pay Japan two hundred million silver Kuping taels (about two hundred forty million troy ounces) (Table 1).

Table 1 Timeline of the Sino-Japanese War, August 1, 1894–April 17, 1895

Dates	Battles
July 25, 1894	The Battle of Fengdao or Asan—the first naval battle
July 29, 1894	The Battle of Seonghwan—the first major land battle
15 September 1894	The Battle of Pyongyang
17 September 1894	The Battle of the Yalu River
24 October 1894	The Battle of Jiuliancheng—invasion of Manchuria
21 November 1894	The Battle of Lüshunkou (Port Arthur)
Fall of Weihaiwei	The Battle of Weihaiwei (20 January–12 February 1895)
23 March 1895	Japanese forces attacked the Pescadores Islands
17 April 1895	The Treaty of Shimonoseki signed

3 A Comparison of the Narratives of the War

The two textbooks selected for the comparison both detail the major battles that marked the three stages of this nine-month war: the Battle of the Yalu River (Korea), the Battle of Port Arthur (China's Liaodong Peninsula) and the Battle of Weihaiwei (China's Shandong peninsula). The comparison of the lessons in the two textbooks will demonstrate any disparities in the narratives of the course of the war. A further analysis will reveal differences in language, style and focus between the Chinese and Japanese textbooks.

3.1 The Course of the War

The Japanese narrative blames the Qing government for the war:

> Of all the countries in the world both Korea and Qing China are the closest neighbours to our country. Our country had been in a harmonious relationship with these two nations. However, in 1894 (Meiji 27) the [Donghak] Rebellion took place in Korea and the Qing government broke the agreement with our country and sent the Qing army to Korea, assisting the Korean government without informing Japan. The Qing even opened fire on our fleet near Feng Island [or Pungdo], provoking the war with Imperial Japan! (*Jinjō shōgaku tokuhon* 1903, 6:73–74)

In this lesson the Japanese author accuses the Chinese government of violating the Tianjin Convention and indicates that the Qing navy triggered the war by firing at the Japanese fleet.

The Chinese textbook states:

> In 1894 the Donghak Rebellion broke out in Korea. [The Korean king] asked Yuan Shikai, China's commissioner of commerce and the resident official in Korea, to suppress the rebellion. The Qing court dispatched its troops to Korea. Japan immediately followed suit and sent its force to sail directly to Seoul. [As a result] the Donghak disappeared, and China asked Japan to withdraw its troops from Korea simultaneously with the Chinese forces. However, the Japanese refused China's request by proposing

> that both nations come to an agreement on how to reform Korea. The Qing government rejected this suggestion. At that time Yuan Shikai was recalled to Beijing. The Japanese forces then forced the Korean king to accept their reform plan. Still, the war between the two nations had not broken out at this point. However the Japanese suddenly attacked China's warships at Asan Bay, and fired upon the Chinese troop transport ships *Kowshing* and *Tsao-kiang* at Pungdo [Feng Island]. (*Zhongguo lishi jiaoke-shu* 1903, 2:17a–b)

This Chinese lesson counters the points made by the Japanese, in that it states that the Chinese sent the troops to Korea at the request of the king of Korea to suppress the rebels; that Japan refused to withdraw its military forces from Korea after the Donghak Rebellion was suppressed; that the Japanese forced the king of Korea to accept the reform plan; and that the Japanese attacked the Chinese warships at Asan Bay and fired on the Chinese troop transport ship. The key issue is who first opened fire. Both Japan and China accused the other party of starting the war. Unfortunately to date there is no decisive evidence to resolve this historical dispute.

3.2 The Tone of the Narratives

This Japanese lesson depicts the Battle of the Yalu River, or the Yellow Sea, of September 17, 1894:

> Soldiers were all confident and energetic, shouting: "Once we see the enemy we'll immediately attack them and won't let them escape! We'll hit them as hard as we can until they are all sunk!" At that moment twelve navy cruisers of the Qing came into our sights, with the *Dingyuan* and *Zhenyuan* leading the way. Once they saw us they became so scared that they fired at us from a considerable distance. We, in contrast, calmly sailed towards the enemy, and aimed at them when they were within range. As soon as we heard the order "fire!" we fired at the enemy's warships in unison. Of course the enemy fought back. Once the battle started one could only hear the loud roaring of guns on the Yellow Sea, as loud as a million thunderclaps occurring at once, shaking the sky and sea. One could see nothing but the smoke that completely covered the

> entire sea. The battle continued for five hours. In the end our Imperial navy sank three and destroyed four warships of the Qing. The Qing navy was defeated and retreated hurriedly. Our heroic naval fleet then left the Yellow Sea triumphantly. This is the Battle of the Yellow Sea, a glorified legacy in our history. (*Jinjō shōgaku tokuhon* 1903, 5:53–55)

The lesson clearly emphasizes the triumphant Japanese victory. In comparison, the description of the Chinese textbook is less emotional and focuses on the sequence of battles:

> The Qing court was furious and declared war on Japan, dispatching troops led by Generals Zuo Baogui (1837–94) and Wei Rugui, who attempted to help defend Pyongyang. However, the Qing army was defeated by the assault launched by the Japanese troops, which seized the city. As a result, the Qing forces withdrew from Korea. In the Battle of the Yalu River [or the Yellow Sea], China was again defeated by the Japanese and lost several warships. The Japanese forces then crossed the Yellow Sea, pushing north toward Manchuria. In order to defend the crossing of the Yalu River, Generals Wu Dacheng (1835–1902) and Song Qing (1820–1902) were sent to lead the Chinese soldiers fighting the Japanese troops. However, the Chinese forces were defeated and China lost control of the Liaodong peninsula after Lüshun (Port Arthur), Niuzhuang and Weihaiwei successively fell into the hands of the Japanese. The Qing government appointed Li Hongzhang as Plenipotentiary Minister, who travelled to Japan to negotiate for peace with Itō Hirobumi. Russia, France, Germany and Britain all sent envoys to mediate between the two nations. The Treaty of Shimonoseki was finally signed, and consequently China had to pay Japan an indemnity of two hundred million taels, and cede Taiwan to Japan. (*Zhongguo lishi jiaokeshu* 1903, 2:17a–b)

Instead of giving the battles in chronological order, the Japanese lessons are structured to legitimize the entry of the Japanese military forces into Korea first:

> [Prior to the Battle of Fengdao (Pungdo)] our navy almost defeated the Korean army, but then the Qing government forces intervened in the

> battle, which forced us to send a large military contingent to Korea and declare war on the Qing.
>
> The Imperial Japanese Army was commissioned by [the new] Korean government, which begged us: "Please help us expel the Qing army!" It was because of the commission that we first defeated the Qing army in Seonghwan, and then trounced them in the Battle of Pyongyang. After the Pyongyang battle, our Japanese forces advanced north to the Yalu River. The Battle of the Yalu River, as described in an earlier lesson, took place on the second day of the Battle of Pyongyang. The Qing navy was defeated in the battle and subsequently retreated to Weihaiwei. (*Jinjō shōgaku tokuhon* 1903, 6:73–77)

This is Lesson 18 in volume 6 of *Jinjō shōgaku tokuhon* (Japanese Reader for Regular Elementary School) which covers the first stage of the war. It should be noted that the "Korean government" here is the pro-Japanese government set up after the Japanese military forces seized the Royal Palace. The writer outlines a Japanese version of the historical context of the war, aiming to justify Japanese military action in Korea. A lesson on the Battle of the Yalu River, however, is included in the fifth volume of the same series.

The next lesson in the same volume contains an account of the second and third stages of the war:

> Meanwhile, our Japanese government sent forces to attack the city of Lushunkou (Port Arthur) of the Qing. Port Arthur used to be known as a position that was "easy to defend and hard to attack". However, it only took our Japanese army one day to seize this hard-to-attack city. From then on the morale of the Qing army declined rapidly and became so weak that it no longer posed a threat to our Japanese forces. After seizing Port Arthur effortlessly, our navy decided that this was the time to advance our victory, so joined the Japanese Army to destroy the Qing fleet, which had retreated to Weihaiwei after its defeat at the Battle of the Yalu River. In Weihaiwei we destroyed the Qing forts and sank their warships; wherever we went the Qing soldiers surrendered. Our Imperial Army also continued to advance on the capital city of Qing China—Beijing. By then the Qing government was so scared that its envoy was sent to beg us: "please let us make peace!" With its plea the Qing

> government offered Imperial Japan a financial indemnity and ceded a large island called Taiwan. Based on such offers Imperial Japan thus forgave Qing China and endorsed the peace treaty. (*Jinjō shōgaku tokuhon* 1903, 6:77–80)

The last part of the lesson relates this war to the role Japan played in suppressing the Boxer Rebellion in 1900, highlighting the significance of the Sino-Japanese War in the history of Japan: it marked the rise of Japan as an international power.

> Because the Japan-Qing China war started in 1894 (Meiji 27) and ended in 1895 (Meiji 28), we named it the War of Meiji 27–28. After this war, in 1900, a great rebellion broke out in northern China, which was recorded as the "rebellion of Qing China in Meiji 33". Japan, along with the army of other Western powers, suppressed the rebellion in Qing China. It has been acknowledged that Japan made the greatest contribution to the suppression of the Qing rebellion with her most strictly disciplined army. Japan gained a reputation as one of the international powers after the 1894–95 war with Qing China and its performance in the suppression of the Chinese rebellion in 1900. (*Jinjō shōgaku tokuhon* 1903, 6:80)

In comparison, Chinese textbooks, especially history textbooks, produced between 1897 and 1907 all narrated the Boxer Rebellion in great detail after the lessons on the first Sino-Japanese War. The final lessons in these textbooks all provided an account of the outcome of this movement: the suppression of the uprising by the forces of the Eight-Nation Alliance and the return of the Qing Imperial Court to Beijing.

It is possible to distinguish differences in language, style and focus between the narratives of the Chinese and Japanese textbooks. The Japanese lessons contain detailed descriptions of the battles, and a triumphal tone is used to depict Japanese soldiers as heroes who brought glory to their nation. The Japanese military forces are praised in order to highlight the fact that their efforts in the war with Qing China and later in the war against the Boxers provided the foundation for Japan to rise as the dominant power in Asia. The Chinese lessons instead focus on the historical context of the war and its aftermath, listing the battles of

the war itself sequentially. The narrative emphasizes China's defeat and the humiliations China suffered as a result. The detailed accounts of the Boxer Rebellion and its consequences further highlight China's crisis by revealing its helplessness in the face of the international powers. Such narrative differences will be discussed further in the following sections.

4 Aftermath of the War: Reflection and Reaction

Defeat in the Sino-Japanese War was a wake-up call for China. Scholar-reformers such as Kang Youwei (1858–1927) and Liang Qichao (1873–1929) used it to persuade the young Guangxu Emperor (1871–1908) to initiate reforms. As a rising leader in this reform movement, Liang Qichao argued that countries from Peter the Great's Russia to Prussia had been transformed through reform (Liang 1936). Meiji Japan, however, was his most powerful evidence.

Liang argued that China and Japan had previously shared a position of humiliation, but emphasized that Japan quickly transformed and became one of the international powers by implementing reforms. He pointed out that before the Meiji Restoration, when Japan was under the rule of the Tokugawa Shogunate (1603–1868), Japan had been forced to sign infamous "unequal treaties" with the United States (1854), Russia (1855) and Germany (1861), and as a result the country was almost destroyed. It was the emperor Meiji who changed the fate of Japan. After thirty years of reform, Japan was transformed from a small, weak country into a strong nation with military power. Liang then catalogued Japanese aggression towards China after its rise: in 1879, the Meiji government annexed the Ryukyu islands, and then it began to covet Taiwan (Liang 1936, 1:3). China's defeat in the Sino-Japanese War, Liang argued, was the result of Japan's reform and transformation. Liang then delivered a powerful conclusion:

> Being defeated itself is not a big disaster. The real disaster is that a country, when defeated, still does not act to strengthen itself. (1:8)

At that time Liang's understanding of Japan originated from his teacher Kang Youwei, who had presented his own work on the reform of Meiji Japan, *Riben bianzheng kao* (An examination of the political changes under the Meiji emperor), to the Guangxu Emperor prior to the 1898 Reform. Kang also compiled a *Catalogue of Japanese Books* (*Riben shumuzhi*), based on his daughter's translations of Japanese books that he had purchased (Shen 2003, 51–68). To the Chinese people, acknowledgement of Japanese superiority was more painful and humiliating than defeat by Western powers. However, defeat in the Sino-Japanese War forced the Chinese people to face this reality. Liang used this situation to create more anxiety over the fate of China and thus create a powerful call for reform. He also warned that if China still did not act quickly following its defeat by Japan, China would be colonized like India, Poland, Vietnam, Burma and Korea (Liang 1936, 1:2).

Along with the Japanese case, Russia and Germany were also used as examples by Liang Qichao to support his argument that China could become as strong as these three countries if reform measures were implemented immediately. Liang expounded on the Russian case by focusing on Peter the Great, who travelled to other countries to study new technology and then implemented reforms on his return. The reforms changed the fate of the country, turning a weak Russia into a strong and powerful nation and extending its territory by thousands of miles (Liang 1936, 1:2–3).

In the case of Germany Liang briefly mentioned how Prussia was defeated by the French in the French Revolutionary Wars and the wars of Napoleon, and became a virtual dependency of France. At this low ebb, Prussia started social and economic reform, and laid the groundwork for a universal education system. These reform measures helped modernize Prussia and its army. Then in the Franco-German War (1870–71), the French were defeated by the Prussians. This victory over the French signalled the rise of Prussian militarism and imperialism. But in the eyes of Liang Qichao, this was an exemplary case of how a country could rise from its defeated status and eventually gain supremacy (Liang 1936, 1:3).

Liang also compared the Kangxi Emperor (1654–1722) and the Yongzheng Emperor (1678–1735) to Peter the Great, Germany's

Wilhelm I (1797–1888) and Meiji Japan's Mutsuhito (1852–1912). These five emperors, in Liang's opinion, were great leaders of reform through whom their countries became united, strong and prosperous. He also used cases from Qing history, such as the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion and the Tongzhi Restoration, to induce the Guangxu Emperor to change China's course through reform (Liang 1936, 1:5).

The introduction of social Darwinism in China also helped Liang Qichao to use the Japanese example, in particular in his advocacy for reform. Liang asserted that changes were inevitable, but there was a crucial difference between self-reform (*zibian*) and forced change (*daibian*). Japan, a successful example of *zibian*, soon rose from its weak status to become the most powerful country in Asia, because it implemented reforms based on its own initiatives. Countries that did not take the initiative to change were forced to change by foreign encroachment, as in the colonization of India by Great Britain and the partition of Poland by Russia, Prussia and Austria. These cases enabled Liang to relate the issue of reform to the serious matters of saving China (*baoguo*), the Chinese race (*baozhong*) and Chinese faith (*baojiao*). If China did not act quickly, Liang warned, Chinese people would meet the same fate as the Jewish people or African slaves (Liang 1936, 1:8).

In the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War, Liang's fears seemed to be confirmed as Germany, Russia, France and Britain all demanded a piece of China as a reward for their roles as mediators between China and Japan. This is also recorded in the Chinese textbooks:

> In 1897 Western powers such as Russia and France demanded compensation for mediating between China and Japan. Meanwhile, in Zhangjia Village of Juye County, Shandong Province, two German missionaries were killed. The German Empire used the incident as a pretext to seize Jiaozhouwan, expelling Chinese officials and soldiers. Not long after the Treaty of Shimonoseki was signed, Russia demanded that Port Arthur and Dairen be rented to her for twenty-five years. The British were rivals of Russia, so they immediately followed suit by demanding the same lease term for Weihaiwei. France then demanded Guangzhouwan and Germany demanded Jaozhouwan. (*Zhongguo lishi jiaokeshu* 1903, 2:17b)

Other textbooks of this period suggested that the survival of the Chinese was threatened by the "white race"(*baizhongren*). For example, the following passage is from the *Mengxue duben quanshu* (Textbook for elementary education):

> Asia is the largest of five continents. Its southeast is surrounded by sea, its north is connected with the Arctic Ocean and its west is bordered by Europe. Asia was the earliest established continent, with the oldest civilization of the five continents. In the last hundred years, Russia became powerful in the north, Britain became competitive in the south and other powers, such as Germany and France, also cast their greedy eyes on Asia. The power of the white race has gradually extended to the continent of East Asia. What a precarious situation the Asian continent is in! (Yu et al. 1902, 3:19a–b)

Late Qing textbooks also indicated that the powerful white race was aggressive towards Asia and China. In lesson 33 of the same textbook, the author comments:

> Europe is the smallest of five continents; its east is bordered by Asia, its south is connected with Africa, its west is surrounded by the Atlantic Ocean. There are nineteen countries in this continent, and the powerful countries are Russia, Britain, France and Germany. The peoples in these countries are persistent with determination and dedication, and they became competitive with the development of new knowledge. This is why Europeans became the only powerful race in the world. (Yu et al. 1902, 3:22b–23a)

The *Mengxue duben quanshu* (Textbook for elementary education) was created by Yu Fu (1866–1930), Ding Baoshu (1865–1936) and other staff of the Wuxi Sandeng School, which Yu established in 1898. They were not government officials but scholar-reformers who devoted themselves to the development of a new type of education during the 1898 Reform Movement. When the school was first established, there were no appropriate textbooks available, so the teaching staff created one lesson each day. In 1902 Yu Fu founded his own commercial publishing house, Shanghai Wenmin shuju, and printed the lessons they produced

between 1898 and 1902 in seven volumes (Zhou 1934, 134; see also Wu and Weng 1934, 1–2; Ding 1935, 8, 11). This was one of the earliest sets of literacy textbooks compiled in China in this period. As this discussion reveals, these textbooks echoed Liang Qichao's argument that China was under threat from the rise of the European powers, and in so doing endorsed his idea that there was a close link between reform and the survival of China, the Chinese race and Chinese faith. Many textbook writers of the time also echoed Liang Qichao's view, emphasizing loyalty to the emperor as an essential ingredient of patriotism. They supported the Japanese version of patriotism, where the emperor would be the facilitator of reform measures, and to support the emperor was to support one's own country.

5 Patriotism and Education: Modelling Chinese on Japanese Textbooks

While late Qing reformers such as Liang Qichao used the Meiji Japanese model to inspire the Qing government to initiate reform, Chinese educators noticed that the spirit of nationalism permeated Japanese elementary textbooks in the subjects of language, history, geography and ethics. This was then taken as a key principle in their compilation of Chinese textbooks. The *Mengxue duben quanshu*states clearly that it will follow the Japanese example:

> Japanese textbooks eulogied the virtues and achievements of Emperor Jimmu and Toyotomi Hideyoshi (1536–98), who unified Japan and is also known for his invasion of Korea. The aim of these Japanese textbooks was to instil patriotism in the minds of children. This textbook, by following the example of Japanese textbooks, contains the history of the Qing, with a line from the establishment of the Qing Dynasty to the suppression of the Taiping Rebellion, and then to the Tongzhi Restoration. When students read this textbook they will feel grateful for blessings and protections from the emperor, and gather all their courage [to do whatever they can] for their beloved country. (Yu et al. 1902, preface to vol. 3)

A similar acknowledgement of Japanese influence can be found in the *Mengxue chuji shūshin shu* (*Junior Primer for Moral Education*), which was intended for the first three years of schooling. Jiang Fu (1866–1931), the author of this set of textbooks, was one of the partners of Luo Zhenyu (1866–1940), both in scholarship and in the introduction of Japan's modern education system into China. Luo Zhenyu was a politician, philologist and antiquarian, and essentially a Qing loyalist, who first visited Japan in 1901 to study the Japanese educational system (see Yang and Whitfield 2012). In his preface, Jiang stated that while his set of textbooks followed the format of Japanese textbooks for moral education, the content was based on good deeds and wise advice from Chinese history and well-known contemporaries; there were also some stories of foreigners (Fu 1901, 1a).

In following the Japanese blueprint for teaching ethics and patriotism, Chinese textbook writers did not take into account the fact that native Chinese Confucianism and Japanised Confucianism differed significantly. Influenced by the *Kokugaku* movement, Japanese Confucianism was open to "the formation of national social rituals … that amalgamated Shinto and Confucianism" (Kurozumi 2002, 382). *Kokugaku* Shinto also contributed to the formation of the notion that Japan's imperial dynasty was everlasting, as articulated in the Imperial Rescript on Education (*kyōiku chokugo*). Chinese reformers of the time believed that the achievements of the Meiji Restoration were the result of successfully preserving Confucianism while also accommodating and developing Western learning. They did not realize that Meiji Confucianism developed on the basis of changes already made by thinkers of the Tokugawa period (Kurozumi 2002, 383).

This Japanized Confucian tradition became one of the key components of Meiji education. In the early Meiji period the government focused on Western technology and practical skills, which became central to school curricula. However, Western political theories, such as Samuel Smiles's *Self-help* and J.S. Mill's *On Liberty*, as well as the writings of Jean Jacques Rousseau, were also translated into Japanese. These Western political ideas became important as sources of the People's Rights Movement in the 1870s. Many scholars and former students of Chinese learning were involved in this movement, and

they found an echo of the ideal of primitive Confucianism in Western political ideas (Irokawa 1974, 190–201). This may explain why four-times Japanese Prime Minister Itō Hirobumi (1841–1909) blamed Confucianism for social discontent and political destabilization. In his view, education for ordinary people only needed to focus on practical knowledge, so politics could be left to the elite. Motoda Nagazane (1818–91), advisor to the Meiji emperor, however, disagreed with Itō's view and called for the establishment of "a national doctrine" embracing Confucianism and the "Shinto tradition of the emperors since antiquity", on which the national essence (*kokutai*) was built. Education was then to be used as the tool to implant this *kokutai* (Kurozumi 2002, 386–88).

Motoda wanted to promote his idea through both general education and higher education, but Japan, in order to build a modern nation, needed western political systems and knowledge, which were lacking in the integrated version of Confucianism and Shinto. Further, western sciences and practical learning in the early Meiji period prevailed and became the key component in the curriculum of high schools. This Motoda-designed nation could therefore only be promoted and diffused through general education at the elementary level (Kurozumi 2002, 388–89). This then required a change of emphasis in general education, and the relationship between Confucian ethics and practical learning was vividly illustrated in an analogy: ethics education, with the virtues of *zhong* (loyalty) and *xiao* (filial piety) at its core, was the roots of a tree and practical skills and knowledge were its leaves and branches (Kaigo and Naka 1969, 69). As such, in the revised education law of 1880, *shūshin* (ethics) took precedence over all other subjects. In 1890, the Imperial Rescript on Education (*kyōiku chokugo*) incorporated this idea into general education, placing the stress on cultivating virtues, especially loyalty and filial piety.

The Imperial Rescript was the work of Inoue Kowashi (1843–95), Yamagata Aritomo (1838–1922) and Motoda Nagazane. It was based on militaristic nationalism, Confucian virtues, and the modern values of constitutional government, utilitarianism and practical learning (Pittau 1974, 181). In this model, Confucian ethics were the foundation of education. The Confucian virtues of loyalty and filial piety

were integrated into one, so that the entire nation was a family and all Japanese people were children of the emperor. As such all the children were required by the emperor to fulfil their duties to the nation. This notion was at the centre of Japanese nationalism (Chen 2003, 399–437; see also Chen 2004, 219–23). Chinese reformers conducting an official study tour of Japan from 1895 onward noticed the change in Japanese textbooks. In 1907 Liu Tingchen (1867–1932) wrote to the Qing emperor to say that Japanese textbooks promoted the cultivation of morality, good behaviour, loyalty to one's sovereign and love of country. He was particularly impressed that Japanese officials from the Ministry of Education repeatedly stated that without a moral component education would be like a tree with leaves and branches but no roots (*Qing Guangxu chao zhongri jiaoshe shiliao* 1963, 2:1342).

Chinese elites like Liu Tingchen adopted the ideals of Japanized Confucianism; perhaps they thought that this would allow them to access Western knowledge while ensuring the continuity of Confucian tradition. In Chinese Confucianism, however, the combination of loyalty to the emperor and filial piety towards one's parents sometimes presented a dilemma, as sacrificing one's life for the emperor meant that the individual could not fulfil his filial duty to his own parents. This dilemma did not exist in Japanese Confucianism because of differences in the Japanese conception of the household (*i.e.*) and its relationship to the state. The Japanese *i.e.* was "not a lineage or household, but a corporate structure encompassing nonrelated retainers as well as those linked by blood". In other words, *i.e.* was "the house as a component of the larger social order" (Nakai 2002, 261). However, in Chinese Confucianism individual households (*jia*) and the state (*guo*) were two different entities which were related but never merged as one. The Japanese *i.e.* system allowed Tokugawa-era Confucians to replace the abstract concept *tian* (Heaven) with superiors, the emperor, or Amatsukami (god or *kami* residing in the Plain of High Heaven). In the second half of the Tokugawa period, *i.e.* and state were combined as *kokka* (*guojia* in Chinese). The ethic of loyalty toward superiors was then transferred to the emperor as head of the family (Kurozumi 2002, 379–80; see also Chen 2003).

In the aftermath of the Sino-Japanese War, it appears that neither scholar-reformers like Liang Qichao nor textbook writers showed awareness of these conceptual differences, as in their depictions Japan was both a gateway to the sciences and technology of the West and a successful example of the preservation of Confucianism. It was in this context that Confucianism formed a common ground for the Chinese to imitate the pattern of the Meiji reforms in this period.

6 Concluding Discussion

In Meiji Japan textbooks were employed to convey official ideology and to build nationalism. Triumph in the Sino-Japanese War of 1894–95 was used to enhance patriotism and loyalty to the emperor and the empire. Accounts of the war in Chinese textbooks, on the other hand, centred on China's humiliation and the weakness of the Qing Empire in contrast to the prosperity of Japan. Chinese writers used defeat to address the national crisis and to push for political reforms. Defeat by Japan was a much greater humiliation than defeat by the West. From this perspective, defeat served as a wake-up call to the Chinese people. Paradoxically, China's humiliation at the hands of the Japanese fuelled China's interest in Meiji Japan, and the Japanese educational model in particular. In 1896, thirteen Chinese students journeyed to Japan in order to discover the secrets to Japan's success. This marked the beginning of the study-in-Japan movement (Chen 1992, 162; Sanetō 1970/1982). China's humiliation also served to fuel a sense of patriotism. Loyalty to the Qing emperor and urgent calls for reform were integral to the formation of an early form of Chinese nationalism. As such, Japan was presented both as a model for China to follow and as a mighty enemy. Lesson 2 in the *Mengxue duben quanshu* exemplifies the contradiction:

> Wishing our country be impregnable,
> transcend Europe, America and Japan.
> Both the army and navy be flourishing and blazing,

making the Qing dragon flag be shining in the world.
Imperialists are currently expanding their world,
we cannot wait and then feel sad when the nation is fallen.
India has been colonized, and Poland has lost its sovereignty too.
But look at our empire, it is like a sleeping lion
that will rise and roar loudly to shake the world. (Yu et al. 1902, 3:1b)

This text is in the form of children's poetry, designed to be suitable for children to read, chant and remember; like the Japanese lessons on the Sino-Japanese War, it was designed to promote nationalism. The Japanese belief that nationalism and patriotism should permeate textbooks on language, geography and history, as well as moral education, became the guiding light of the late Qing textbook compilers. Yu Fu and the other staff at the Wuxi Sandeng School said in a preface to one of their textbooks that all these subjects were actually relevant to each other: language was the tool and vehicle of study, and history could teach students the glory of China's past and awaken in them a patriotic fervour to wipe away the humiliations imposed on China by the imperialist forces of the West and Japan. Geography was also a critical subject because it could inspire students to love their country, and to understand the relationship between China and the world. By teaching students geography, the lofty aspiration of strengthening China and protecting the Chinese people would be instilled into their minds (Yu et al. 1902, preface to vol. 3).

Confucianism was used as a cultural conduit between the two nations, enabling Chinese reformers to import Japanese models of nationalism and loyalty to the emperor. Further, the terms *zhongjun* (*chūkun* in Japanese), *ai'guo* (*aikoku*), *guomin* (*kokumin*) and *guojia* were all directly copied from Japanese into Chinese textbooks and the writings of the intellectuals of the time. However, it seems that both scholar-reformers like Liang Qichao and late Qing textbook writers overlooked the fact that Japanese Confucianism had been amalgamated with Shinto. As a result, the late Qing imitation of the Japanese model failed to help China accomplish what Japan had achieved. On the other hand, however, China did not develop the blood-and-iron nationalism of the Japanese kind.

Textbooks Referenced

Fu, Jiang. 1901. *Mengxue chuji xiushenshu* [Junior Primer for Moral Education]. Vol. 12 of *Mengxue bao* [Children's Educator]. Shanghai: Mengxue gonghui.

Jinjō shōgaku tokuhon [Japanese Reader for Regular Elementary School]. 1903. Monbushō. Vol. 6 (8 vols). Osaka: Osaka Kaiseikan.

Yu Fu, and staff of the Wuxi Sandeng School. 1902. *Mengxue duben quanshu* [Textbook for Elementary Education]. Shanghai: Wenming shuju.

Zhongguo lishi jiaokeshu [Chinese History Textbook]. 1903. Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan (The Commercial Press). 2 vols.

Bibliography

Akagi, Roy Hidemichi. 1979. *Japan's Foreign Relations, 1542–1936: A Short History*. Washington: University Publications of America.

Auslin, Michael R. 2004. *Negotiating with Imperialism: The Unequal Treaties and the Culture of Japanese Diplomacy*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Beasley, William G. 1987. *Japanese Imperialism, 1894–1945*. New York: Oxford University Press.

Chen, Xulu. 1992. *Jindai Zhongguo shehui de xinchen daixie* [Changes in Modern Chinese Society]. Shanghai: Renmin chubanshe.

Ching, May-bo. 2007. "Classifying Peoples: Ethnic Politics in Late Qing Native-Place Textbooks and Gazetteers." In *The Politics of Historical Production in Late Qing and Republican China*, edited by Tze-ki Hon and Robert Culp, 55–78. Leiden: Brill.

Culp, Robert. 2001. "'China—The Land and Its People': Fashioning Identity in Secondary School History Textbooks, 1911–1937." *Twentieth-Century China* 26 (2): 17–62.

———. 2007. *Articulating Citizenship: Civic Education and Student Politics in Southeastern China, 1912–1940*. Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press.

Ding, Zhipin. 1935. *Zhongguo jin qishinian lai jiaoyu jishi* [Chronology of China's Education in the Past Seventy Years]. Nanjing: Guoli bianyiguan.

Hon, Tze-ki. 2007. "Educating the Citizens: Visions of China in Late Qing History Textbooks." In *The Politics of Historical Production in Late Qing and Republican China*, edited by Tze-ki Hon and Robert Culp, 79–107. Leiden: Brill.

Irokawa, Daikichi. 1974. "Freedom and the Concept of People's Rights." In *Modern Japan: An Interpretive Anthology*, edited by Irwin Scheiner, 190–201. New York: Macmillan.

Judge, Joan. 2001. "Gaizao guojia—wan Qing de jiaokeshu yu guomin duben." Translated by Sun Huimin as "Transforming the Nation: Late Qing Textbooks and Citizen's Readers." *Xin Shixue* 2 (12): 1–40.

Kaigo, Tokiomi, and Arata Naka, eds. 1961–67. *Nihon kyōkasho taikei: Kindai hen* [A Systematic Study of Modern Japanese Textbooks] 27 vols. Tokyo: Kōdansha, Shōwa.

———. 1969. *Kindai Nihon Kyokasyo Sosetu–Kaisetuhen* [A General Account of Modern Japanese Textbooks, Narration and Comments]. Tokyo: Kodansha.

Kurozumi, Makoto. 2002. "Tokugawa Confucianism and Its Meiji Japan Reconstruction." In *Rethinking Confucianism: Past and Present in China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam*, edited by Benjamin A. Elman, John B. Duncan, and Herbert Ooms, 386–88. Los Angeles: University of California: UCLA Asian Pacific Monograph Series.

Li, Chien-nung. 1956. *The Political History of China, 1840–1928*. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

Liang, Qichao. 1936. *Bianfa tongyi* [A General Discussion of Reform]. Vol. 1 of *Yinbingshi heji, wenji* [Collected Works and Essays from the Ice Drinker's Studio: Collected Essays]. Shanghai: Zhonghua shuju.

Nakai, Kate Wildman. 2002. "Chinese Ritual and Native Identity in Tokugawa Confucianism." In *Rethinking Confucianism: Past and Present in China, Japan, Korea, and Vietnam*, edited by Benjamin A. Elman, John B. Duncan, and Herman Ooms. Los Angeles: University of California Press: UCLA Asian Pacific Monograph Series.

Paine, S.C.M. 2003. *The Sino-Japanese War of 1894–1895: Perceptions, Power, and Primacy*. New York: Cambridge University Press.

Pittau, Joseph. 1974. "Inoue Kowashi (1843–1895) and the Meiji Educational System." In *Modern Japan: An Interpretive Anthology*, edited by Irwin Scheiner. New York: Macmillan.

Qing Guangxu chao zhongri jiaoshe shiliao [Historical Documents on Sino-Japanese Relations during the Guangxu reign of the Qing Period, 1875–1909]. Editor unnamed. 1963. 2 vols. Taipei: Wenhai chubanshe 2.

Reed, Christopher A. 2004. *Gutenberg in Shanghai: Chinese Print Capitalism, 1876–1937*. Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press.

Sanetō, Keishū. 1970. *Chūgokujin Nihon ryūgakushi, zōho* [History of Chinese Students in Japan]. Tokyo: Kuroshio Shuppan. Translated into Chinese by Ruqian Tan and Qiyan Lin as *Zhongguo ren liu xue Riben shi.* Hong Kong: Chinese University Press, 1982.

Seth, Michael J. 2010. *A History of Korea: From Antiquity to the Present*. Lanham, MD: Rowman and Littlefield.

Shen, Guowei. 2003. "Kang Youwei jiqi Riben shumuzhi" [Kang Youwei and His aatalogue of Japanese Books]. *Wakumon* 5 (51): 51–68.

Shi, Ou. 2013. *Bainian Zhongguo jiaokeshu lun* [A Centennial History of Chinese Textbooks]. Changsha: Hunan shifan daxue chubanshe.

———. 2015. *Bainian Zhongguo jiaokeshu yi* [A Centennial Memory of Chinese Textbooks]. Beijing: Zhishi chanquan chubanshe.

Shi, Ou, and Xiao'ou Wu. 2009. *Bainian Zhongguo jiaokeshu tushuo* [An illustrated centennial history of Chinese textbooks]. 2 vols. Changsha: Hunan jiaoyu chubanshe.

Shi, Ou, Xiaoou Wu, and Chengzhi Fang. 2012. *Zhongguo jinxiandai jiaokeshushi* [A History of Modern Chinese Textbooks]. Changsha: Hunan jiaoyu chubanshe.

Wang, Jiarong. 2008. *Minzu hun—jiaokeshu bianqian* [The Evolution of Chinese Textbooks]. Beijing: Shangwu yinshuguan.

Weifen, Chen. 2003. "Jingshang Zhecilang duiyu *'zhong xiao'* de yili xin quan—guanyu *Chiyu yanyi* de kaocha" [Inoue Tetsujiro's Interpretation of "Loyalty and Filial Piety": An Examination of the *Elaboration of the Imperial Rescript on Education*]. In *Tsing Hua Journal of Chinese Studies* 2 (33): 399–437. Also in *Mingzhi ruxue yu jindai riben* [Meiji Confucianism and Modern Japan], edited by Liu Yuebing, 48–87. Shanghai: Guji chubanshe, 2005.

———. 2004. "The Changing Face of Confucian Studies in East Asia: An Investigation of Japanese Sinological Terminology." *Taiwan Journal of East Asian Studies* 1 (1): 219–23.

Wu, Xiao'ou. 2008. "Jinnian lai Zhongguo jindai zhongxiaoxue jiaokeshu yanjiu zongshu" [A Summary of Recent Research on Modern Chinese Textbooks for Primary and Secondary Schools]. *Hunan shifan daxue jiaoyu kexue xuebao* 7 (3): 52.

Wu, Yanyin, and Zhida Weng. 1934. *Zhongguo zhi xiaoxue jiaoyu* [China's Elementary Education]. Shanghai: Shangwu yinshuguan.

Yang, Chia-ling, and Roderick Whitfield, eds. 2012. *Lost Generation: Luo Zhenyu, Qing Loyalists and the Formation of Modern Chinese Culture*. London: Saffron Books.

Zarrow, Peter. 2007. "The New Schools and National Identity: Chinese History Textbooks in the Late Qing." In *The Politics of Historical Production in Late Qing and Republican China*, edited by Tze-ki Hon and Robert Culp, 21–54. Leiden: Brill.

Zarrow, Peter. 2015. *Educating China: Knowledge, Society and Textbooks in a Modernizing World, 1902–1937*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Zhou, Yutong. 1934. *Zhongguo xiandai jiaoyushi* [History of Modern Chinese Education]. Shanghai: Liangyou tushu yinshua gongsi.