

Culture, Mind, and Society



***Advances in Culture
Theory from Psychological
Anthropology***

Edited by Naomi Quinn



Culture, Mind, and Society

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*This book is dedicated to the memory of our friend and teacher
Roy D'Andrade
whose final publication appears in these pages
and whose influence lives on in us and many others*

SERIES EDITOR'S PREFACE

Psychological Anthropologists study a wide spectrum of human activity: child development, illness and healing, ritual and religion, personality, political and economic systems, just to name a few. In fact, as a discipline that seeks to understand the interconnections between persons and culture, it would be difficult to come up with examples of human behavior that are outside the purview of psychological anthropology. Yet beneath this substantive diversity lies a common commitment. The practitioners of psychological anthropology seek to understand social activity in ways that are fitted to the mental and physical dimensions of human beings. Psychological anthropologists may focus on emotions or human biology, on language or art or dreams, but they rarely stray far from the attempt to understand the possibilities and the limitations of on the ground human persons.

Here Naomi Quinn has gathered contributions from psychological anthropologists who trace the implications of their study of on the ground human persons for the sorts of explanations used in the broader field of cultural anthropology. In the thorough and ambitious conclusion to the volume, Quinn and her co-authors effectively synthesize the wide variety of empirical studies presented, pointing to progress on a number of key issues in anthropological theory. The authors in this collection refuse to be satisfied with some assumptions that are taken for granted in much of anthropology, assumptions that have to do with how culture can at once characterize whole groups of people yet also embrace the complexity of thought and activity that characterizes any community.

Two concepts prove especially important in revising those assumptions, namely “lifeworlds” and “internalization.” These ideas go a considerable distance in helping us to theorize those on the ground situations mentioned above, for they allow us to think both about how elements of culture are distributed in a social group and how they are differently assimilated by different persons.

Tulsa, OK, USA

Peter G. Stromberg

PREFACE

The death of the senior-most contributor, Roy D'Andrade, during the preparation of this volume occasions its preface. This is an opportunity to reflect on Roy's contribution to this project and what he meant to us all. The preface then closes with some words about the other volume contributors and their varied connections to Roy and to one another.

IN MEMORIAM

We hope that readers will understand the somewhat personal tone and content of this section. The gap in psychological anthropologists' research and theorizing about the many facets of culture is all the more unfortunate because the discussion lost Roy D'Andrade to cancer shortly before his 85th birthday, and before this volume in which his chapter appears was to see publication. Of the remaining contributors to this volume, Naomi and Bambi were both students of his. Claudia had co-edited an important book with him (*Human Motives and Cultural Models*, 1992), in the sequence of such volumes on the emergence and application of cultural schemas (much more about the latter in the Conclusion). Peter was a longtime friend for whom his ongoing intellectual conversations with Roy are dearly missed, as they are by Bambi and Naomi and others who were party to these regular engagements—Allen Johnson, April Leininger, Kim Romney, and Aaron Cicourel among them. Roy was interlocutor to many of us. Long after he had been her

graduate school advisor, Naomi used to consult him about problems having to do with academic politics that she was encountering at her institution. Finally, there is no one among the remaining three contributors who has not been more or less deeply influenced by Roy's ideas and published work in cognitive anthropology.

When Naomi, the editor, asked Roy to contribute to this volume on culture theory, he was already ill. Nevertheless, he worked valiantly on his chapter. Allen wrote her in September 2016 that

It seems that over the last year the paper for your collection was the most important thing he wanted to talk about. He was giving it a great deal of thought, and by the time I read the latest draft, I had heard all of it in bits and pieces as he was getting his thoughts together. I am glad you are pleased with it. Unless something changes unexpectedly, that will be his last professional piece of writing.

And so it was to be.

When all Roy's friends and children put our heads together we came to realize that four or five chapters existed of the book on which Roy had been working for some time but had been unable to finish. The draft chapter he had sent to Naomi marshals some of that writing, and probably also exhibits an effort on Roy's part to jam as much of his thinking from the unfinished book into the chapter as he could. The result, as Allen pointed out to him, had not yet fully cohered. He tried, but was unable to do the final editing that the chapter needed. Finally, Roy returned the original draft he had sent, with instructions that he was open to any changes Naomi wanted. But then came the codicil, "You will have to make the changes yourself." And so she did, giving new meaning to the expression, "a labor of love." She was careful not to change Roy's thinking in any substantive way, simply adding a few connecting sentences here and there and reorganizing the overall argument a tiny bit so that, hopefully, it fell together a little more cohesively. Reading Allen's e-mail about how preoccupied Roy was with finishing the chapter led Naomi to worry that she had pushed him too hard to write it. At the same time, she hopes that his involvement with completing the chapter, as Allen reported, may have taken Roy's mind off the constant pain he was in during the last months of his life.

ABOUT THE OTHER CONTRIBUTORS

That a plurality of contributors to this volume can trace one kind of relationship or another to D'Andrade should not lead to the conclusion that, collectively, we represent a small, exclusive sub-set of scholars coming out of some one program. Far from it. All the contributors received their PhDs from different institutions, with the exception of Quinn and Stromberg, both from Stanford, but Stromberg well after D'Andrade and the rest of the “ethnoscience” faculty that had taught Quinn had dissolved and left for elsewhere.

Quinn, the volume editor, who selected all the other volume contributors, had encountered each of them at entirely different times and places. She had first bumped into D'Andrade long ago in Palfrey House—then the well-known site of the Whittings' Six Culture Study and other programs—when she was still an undergraduate and he a graduate student. She remembers him explaining the Guttman Scale, which she then used in her honors thesis, to her; that would have been sometime around 1960. Later, when she went to graduate school, he became her advisor. Only Chapin and Quinn were actually students of D'Andrade's, and that in wholly different eras and even institutions (Quinn at Stanford in the early sixties, Chapin years later at UCSD). Indeed, Quinn did not know of Chapin at all until she heard her deliver an impressive paper in a session of a biennial meeting of the Society for Psychological Anthropology, after which she made a point of introducing herself to her. That would have been sometime in the mid-2010s. It is also true that Quinn and Strauss have published jointly—their most ambitious project having been their 1997 book. However, the two never knew each other, or fathomed their common interests, before Quinn was the senior-most member of a “best paper” award committee who happened to be in attendance at the biennial SPA meeting at which Strauss was scheduled to receive the award. Quinn was therefore recruited to present it to Strauss. The two literally met for the first time onstage; sometime in the early 1980s. At some point thereafter, Quinn had occasion to introduce Strauss to D'Andrade and subsequently to instigate their collaboration on the 1992 book they co-edited.

Aside from these two, Quinn had never co-authored before this time with any of the remaining contributors. She went and read Paul's most recent book when he recommended it to her, judging it relevant to a presentation of hers that he heard at another SPA session—sometime not

too long after the 2015 publication of that book. (Cultural anthropology is a small field, though. She had known Paul since he was a boy, his father having been one of her teachers in graduate school, and his mother a valued friend as well.) Quinn and Sirota first met at a UCLA-sponsored conference, probably in the early 2000s, Quinn intrigued by Sirota's intelligent way of blending methods and theory from psychological and linguistic anthropology. Subsequently the two crossed paths as contributors to a special issue of *Ethos* and to several SPA meetings panels and sponsored panels (some of which also involved Chapin). They, Quinn and Sirota, have had multiple occasions to pursue ongoing, wide-ranging discussions on several theoretical topics. Quinn had also reviewed submissions for Lowe while he was editor of *Ethos*, the journal of the SPA. (Lowe was also someone whom Sirota had gotten to know earlier, when he was a postdoc and she still a graduate student at UCLA.) Finally, Quinn knew Stromberg only casually when they crossed paths at the biennial meetings, by reputation, and from reading publications of his.

The Society for Psychological Anthropology is a small but thriving intellectual assemblage, now a section of the American Anthropological Association. The society brings together psychological anthropologists of all stripes, including so-called "cognitive anthropologists," "psychoanalytic anthropologists," and those of us who study children and childhood (including even a few developmental psychologists with cross-cultural penchants). Ultimately, if there is any thread that ties all of us contributors together, it appears to be this society. It is not a stretch to say that the SPA should be credited with incubating the intellectual progress that resulted in this volume. Whatever lack of sustained, profound intellectual interchange, to which we confess in the Introduction, may have characterized our interactions there, the society at least threw us into the same venues, making us enough aware of each other and some of our work that we were drawn together in the current effort.

Of course, Quinn (herself a former president of the SPA), the one who had chosen all the other contributors from among this mix, exercised her own tastes and biases, and her selections certainly reflect her own personal sense of the field's current direction and potential achievements. It is relevant to note however, that each contributor was instructed to write anything s/he wished about culture theory. It was up to the Introduction and Conclusion co-authors and other contributors, in subsequent discussions, to find coherent themes or cross-cutting ties

among the submitted chapters. This we have aspired to do, as is briefly summarized in the volume Introduction to follow, and expanded upon in its Conclusion.

Durham, NC, USA

Naomi Quinn

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CHAPTER 1

Introduction: How This Volume Imagines Itself

Naomi Quinn, Karen Gainer Sirota and Peter G. Stromberg

An Introduction to an edited volume such as this might reasonably be expected to signal a complete synthesis of the volume contents—a whole new theoretical departure. This case is a little different. For one thing, the terrain covered by theories of culture is disconcertingly vast—well beyond the expertise of any one small group of scholars such as the three co-authors of this Introduction and Conclusion. More importantly, a synthesis of this developing theory would be premature. If this is so, why not wait awhile, until the pudding has set, before putting together a volume such as this? It is because psychological anthropologists have offered some promising, challenging, if distinct, proposals for theories of

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culture, each seeming to go off in its own direction. It is time to push for a rapprochement among these theoretical strands, to force the issue a bit, to nudge the enterprise along. It has been a good while since the theoretical contributions of contemporary psychological anthropology to our thinking about culture have been treated to such an effort—perhaps since D’Andrade’s now-classic 1995 volume, the *Development of Cognitive Anthropology*, appeared, and even longer, a good three decades, after publication of the 1987 collection edited by Richard Shweder and Robert LeVine and entitled *Culture Theory* (Shweder and LeVine 1987). So, such an assessment is timely. Our caveat is this: If the ultimate goal is a synthesis that would incorporate each contribution herein into one grand theory, it is too early for that. Instead, this volume offers a snapshot of present time theoretical developments in progress—and of collegial interchange in pursuit of these.

WHAT THIS VOLUME IS (AND IS NOT)

This last disclaimer should not be read to mean that this collection is in any way superficial or aimless. Rather, like all scientific endeavors most of the time, this one is in mid-stream, where these chapters catch it. Moreover, what has emerged so far, and what the Introduction will raise and the Conclusion will endeavor to consolidate, are real accomplishments, already, in the areas of culture theory demarcated herein. Here are the main such areas. The first of these is in beginning to specify institutional attributes of culture, and the constraints that led to these institutions, both in complex societies like our own and in other organizationally less complex ones. This effort, while unfinished—indeed, barely begun—points the way to the kinds of institutional structures and human proclivities we should be exploring to identify further such attributes and constraints. The second of these accomplishments and further directions lies in delineating the psychological processes, both cognitive and more generally embodied—including but hardly limited to psychodynamic ones—by which cultural understandings are internalized (our definition of which term is to come). Finally, a third signal contribution of this volume is in the adaptation of ethnographic approaches for studying both these processes. Indeed, it should become apparent in the course of what follows that psychological anthropology is among the most fruitful and important of all the conceptual forays into culture theory in the social sciences today. This success is attributable in large part to psychological anthropologists’ willingness to go in whatever

interdisciplinary direction seems necessary, and in particular to entertain useful approaches from psychology, biology, and neuroscience, combining insights from these fields with long-standing ethnographic methods from the parent discipline of cultural anthropology.

We say a few words about what this volume is, beginning with what it is not. It is not a compendium, nor is it intended to be. Therefore, it does not address, and the contributors do not hold themselves responsible for, every prominent issue in our subdiscipline of psychological anthropology, nor in cultural anthropology. There are volumes and volumes, articles and articles, devoted to such issues as mental health, morality and ethics, and ethnography and related methods. Indeed, this volume editor herself has also edited an entire other volume (Quinn 2005) on methods for recovering culture from interviews and other discourse. Also deserving mention, D'Andrade (2008) and Strauss (Strauss and Friedman 2018) have both written about cultural values, he reporting on his cross-cultural study of values in three societies, she co-authoring a book about the values and morality that motivate political activism. This qualification, that this volume does not address every possible anthropological subject, does not mean that it never touches upon topics of broad anthropological interest. We take up these topics as they become relevant. For example, Strauss considers the implicit attitudes and explicit beliefs her interviewees hold about race, ethnicity, class, gender, and much more. Paul addresses a range of social organizational adaptations to the male tendency toward violent competitiveness—a topic related to both gender and power if there ever was one. Sirota worked on the UCLA/Sloan Center on Everyday Lives of Families study directed by linguistic anthropologist Elinor Ochs, from which comes the discourse Sirota analyzes in her chapter; Sirota regards language socialization as central to the approach taken up in her chapter. Chapin has published one of the most stellar recent ethnographies of childhood (Chapin 2014), material that her chapter in this volume reworks. But these far-flung topics are not the primary concerns of this volume. Culture theory is. In this sense, the volume is narrow, and intentionally so. The chapters herein provide a serious look at several promising new lines of advance in this theory.

Perhaps a fitting metaphor, one that guides the co-authors of this Introduction, is that of a jigsaw puzzle—maybe one of those thousand-piece ones. Each of the contributors to this volume has been intent on piecing together one part of the puzzle—maybe the sky, or the foliage,

or the snow, or the people in the forefront of the scene. We will consider plausible connections among these different parts—finding out if and how pieces might fit together. And, just as importantly, what pieces might be missing. We tackle these goals in the Conclusion to this volume. To extend the metaphor even further, the Conclusion will also search for the puzzle’s straight-edged pieces and fit together as many of these as possible, working toward a common frame for all these separate efforts.

As we work on this puzzle, we accumulate a record of where psychological anthropology is today with regard to a theory of culture. We also provide a resulting projection of the issues and problems, arising from this version of contemporary culture theory, that psychological anthropology is poised to address next. Where it is today, in the words of one of this volume’s reviewers, is “full of vitality and promise.” And where it should go next is the topic at the volume’s center—what it is *about*. This coherence, what the chapters all have in common, may not be immediately obvious to the reader. Perhaps this is an instance of that hoary parable about the blind men feeling different parts of the elephant. Ultimately, though, there are common themes to be discovered, lying beneath the surface of its apparent diversity of interests. Hopefully, identification of these commonalities will inspire continued focused exchanges among psychological anthropologists, as well as between them and allied scholars. Leading to still further progress.

In our progress toward answering the question of where culture theory should be headed, we offer solutions to the theoretical limitations with respect to culture theory that today characterize much of the parent field of cultural anthropology. In anthropology today, culture as it is conceptualized is by-and-large devoid of any serious consideration of individuals’ experience-near cognitions, motivations, and emotions (cf. Levy and Hollan 1998). This explanatory deficiency is often accompanied by a radical cultural relativism—to be discussed further in the Conclusion. This cultural relativism inclines toward a studied disregard for explanations of any kind, including and perhaps most notably psychological ones—a specific inclination to which we also return in the Conclusion.¹ This stance evinces itself as well in misapprehension of the terms these cultural anthropologists themselves use—even such psychologically loaded ones as “subjectivity” or “selfhood”—as being inherently a-psychological in their meaning. The inherent psychological meaning of such terms needs to be unpacked, not denied (a point to which, once again, we return in the Conclusion).²

We offer this volume as a corrective to cultural anthropology's difficulties in developing a thorough-going theory of culture, and, not unrelatedly, its relative neglect of things having to do with psychology, including psychological anthropology. We are not only alive and well and dynamic. We also have something worthwhile, even crucial, to contribute to culture theory. Anybody who cares about culture, whether their disciplinary affiliation is inside or outside of anthropology itself, will want to read this book and consider how to integrate its exciting offerings into their own thinking on this subject.

BACKGROUNDS AND INTIMATIONS OF WHAT IS TO COME IN THE VOLUME

One interesting reflection of the diversity of viewpoint among we volume contributors is the minimal degree of overlap in the background literatures cited by each as the inspiration (either positive or critical) for their chapter. As a first step in characterizing the contributions to this volume, we start out with a brief acknowledgment of these different sources in which each of the various chapters is grounded—in the order in which they appear.

Roy D'Andrade begins his chapter with a critique of earlier failed attempts to resolve what he calls the “category problem”—that is, to distinguish between what is culture and what is social structure. Rather than offering his own solution to this enduring problem in anthropology, D'Andrade advocates an approach in which social structure and culture are bound up together, “making,” he says, “the category problem disappear.” To this end, he adapts phenomenologists' idea of *lifeworlds*, a concept about which we will have quite a bit more to say in the Conclusion.

D'Andrade draws as well on evolutionary theorists' idea of *niche construction*, including contributions to this concept by Peter Richerson and Robert Boyd (2006). Volume contributor Robert Paul cites an entirely different aspect of Richerson and Boyd's work—the main topic of their 2006 book—situating his own argument in their Dual Inheritance Theory. After these authors, Paul refers to the two kinds of inheritance as two different forms of information transmission—genetic and cultural. However, he critiques their theory for its lack of recognition of the inherent conflict between the two, and he develops the cultural side of the equation in a way that these biologically oriented evolutionists are unequipped to do.

Edward Lowe's analysis rests, first, on the notion of Status Function Declarations developed by philosopher John Searle. Searle's writings, we might add, cited in their chapters in this volume by D'Andrade and Paul as well, have obviously had an outsized influence on some in psychological anthropology, serving as a starting point for their thinking about culture. In this instance, Lowe finds that such declarative knowledge, verbal and embodied, while requisite is not enough to explain the depth of a community's commitment to shared goals and purposes. To finish his argument, Lowe turns to the idea of internalization developed by Melford Spiro (1987, 1997)—putting to use a framework also used by D'Andrade in his chapter.

The next contributor, Claudia Strauss, works from a cognitive schema theory perspective, interested in the degree to which people seem able to hold disparate and often conflicting schemas simultaneously. Naomi Quinn, too, is a cultural schema theorist, but as Strauss notes in her chapter, Quinn has always been attuned to cultural sharing rather than to cultural variation as is Strauss—not to say that either researcher would deny the other alternative, just that it has not been the focus of her interest. (Strauss attributes this difference between the two of them to their respective academic generations, hers having followed Quinn's.) Thus, Quinn's chapter focuses on a widely shared cultural schema—that of marriage. While Paul, in his volume chapter, has something to say about marriage cross-culturally—which he understands to be an institutional strategy (widespread but not universal) for legitimating the relationship between a sexually reproducing pair—Quinn's is an analysis of that institution in one society. She compares her analysis of the domains of American marriage and marital love with a sociological one driven by "tool kit" theory and finds the latter approach to be lacking.

By contrast, it is the body of anthropological research on children, going back to the work of Margaret Mead, Ruth Benedict, and Cora DuBois, and extending forward to the current resurgence of interest in the anthropology of childhood, that Bambi Chapin finds stimulating. Karen Sirota, whose chapter explores children's cultural learning, meanwhile, takes her inspiration from linguistic anthropology's language socialization framework and from the configurational approach of the Gestaltists—the latter having influenced early anthropologists, among others, but having been overlooked in anthropology more recently.

Peter Stromberg takes a wide-ranging and critical look at the literatures both on embodied cognition—including simulation theory—and

on what he calls the “classical” approach to cognition, favoring a hybridization of the two. Lowe, too, is an advocate of approaches that not only stress embodiment, but also include enactment. It is important to realize, Lowe goes on to observe, that the propositional nature of Searle’s Status Function Declarations “is not always given in explicitly verbal form, but can be performed through non-verbal embodied means.” His general approach builds upon Bourdieu’s notion of *habitus*, which Lowe (this volume) characterizes as an “embodied habitus.”

Given this evidence for the diversity of approaches represented in this volume, what might be the nonmetaphorical areas corresponding to sky, foliage, snow, and so forth in the jig-saw puzzle metaphor? The first and largest division to be noticed is that between two sets of chapters. First and most broadly, the theoretical forays in these chapters fall into two categories: those that explore the biological and social worlds that shape culture, versus those that plumb the depths of the mental world where cultural constructs are represented in some fashion.³ Immediately must be added the caveat that “mental” is to be understood expansively, as including not only thought, but also emotion and motivation, among which are psychodynamic motivations. Moreover, as Stromberg’s volume chapter so vigorously reminds us, not only cognition, emotion, and motivation, but also such further processes as movement and proprioception must be included. This and several other of these chapters represent the more general disciplinary attention nowadays to such concepts as “embodiment,” “enactment,” and “the extended mind,” as these have played out in psychological anthropology.

Very soon evident is that most of the chapters in this volume sit on the second side of this divide; they are intent in spelling out processes having to do with the remembering, transmission, configuration, coherence, inconsistency, or some other feature or features of cultural knowledge as this is evinced in persons. The first concern, with the way the outer world of human biology and social institutions constrains culture, is represented most squarely in the two chapters by D’Andrade and Paul. That only a few chapters take as their central question how this outer world informs culture reflects a gap in culture theory and the research that supports it more generally—a missing piece in our puzzle to be sure. Yet, the two, outer and inner, are not unrelated or unbridgeable. As we shall argue more fully in our Conclusion, the chapter by Lowe, which sits between the first two chapters and the rest, offers insight into how this gap might begin to be bridged. In the end, we think the volume as

a whole contains the seeds of an argument for how external and internal cultural worlds not just meet, but interact.

Undeniably, though, there is a crying need for more of a theoretical and research focus on the institutional context for cultural knowledge. As D'Andrade (n.d.: 50–51) has elsewhere written, “Unfortunately, institutions are badly theorized in the social sciences, especially in anthropology. Cultural anthropologists seem to think they do not need to differentiate institutions from cultural cognitions, meanings, understandings ...” Perhaps D'Andrade's own career-long interest in institutions dates from his engagement, as a graduate student in the interdisciplinary Harvard program in Social Relations (known to all as Soc Rel), with the thinking of sociologist Talcott Parsons. Other psychological anthropologists, with our concern for what is going on *inside* people, are not exempt from his criticism about a more general disciplinary neglect of institutions.

It should already begin to be evident, and will be developed further in our Conclusion, that all of the volume contributors—even the eldest of us, D'Andrade, with his signal idea of lifeworlds—are pushing beyond older ideas and considering more closely and more fully how culture is organized and how it comes to inhabit individuals. These questions may have been with us from the beginning of psychological anthropology, but our answers are new.

CULTURAL EVOLUTION AND INSTITUTIONALIZATION

We return to D'Andrade's chapter first. He points out that, just as the molecules composing organisms interact to create life, and the synapses in the brain interact to yield cognition, so individual cognitions interact to produce culture. Thus, institutions, one important organizational form of culture, need to be clearly differentiated from individual cognition. As D'Andrade summarizes it, after the hierarchically arranged levels of physical stuff such as fundamental material, whatever that turns out to be, causes protons and neutrons, at the next level, these then combine to produce molecules, which combine at a new biological level to make organisms, which then at a bio-psychological level grow neurons, enabling some organisms to have conscious minds. “None of this is controversial,” he says, adding that “What is controversial is the idea that there exists a level of collective mental states on *an even higher ontological level* than individual mental states” (D'Andrade, this volume, italics in

original). Paul, in the next chapter (also this volume), puts a little more historical meat on D’Andrade’s bare-bones assertion of an independent cultural level, pointing to the skepticism of evolutionary thinkers about the reality of culture. These two contributors thus start with the same assumption that, as Paul (this volume) puts it, cultural “symbols are just as real as DNA.”

D’Andrade (this volume) further illuminates this discussion in terms of non-eliminative reductionism, of which culture is one instance. This version of reductionism is

not just a matter of little things making up bigger things. Objects at each higher level must be characterized by having causal powers that things at lower levels do not have, causal powers that are due to the interaction of things at the lower level.

Culture, in this way of thinking, is an emergent property of individual cognition, which exists at the level below it.

The theoretical story begun by D’Andrade and Paul in this volume is inherently evolutionary. If, as the biologist Theodosius Dobzhansky (1973) famously said, “Nothing in biology makes sense except in the light of evolution,” then this is a good time to state our own cultural anthropological version of this truth: “Nothing in culture makes sense except in the light of evolution.” However, as Paul takes particular pains to insist, while it is partly a product of biological constraints, culture itself is not only real, but has its own evolutionary capacities and consequences. Paul—in the important longer book (2015) on which his chapter in this volume is based—provides us with an excellent example of such a cultural evolutionary approach. There he traces how one universal human proclivity, namely men’s propensity to compete fiercely for mates, has led to the evolution, across societies, of a variety of different institutional solutions for controlling this otherwise violent and hence disruptive tendency.⁴

Another candidate for such a universal tension, possibly also traceable to a biological propensity, is proposed in Lowe’s volume chapter. Lowe counters the current anthropological fashion for conceptualizing cultural issues in terms of globalization and hybridization, asking instead a question about cultural reproduction. Specifically, he explores why funerary rites have been such enduring practices on the Micronesian island of Chuuk. A lead comes from Lowe’s observation that Chuuk

people oftentimes seem torn between the commitment that they feel to the whole (collective or “we” intentionality,” the latter term borrowed from John Searle) and to more localized groups to which they belong. This concern may be expressed in conflict, say, between the “agenda” of one’s employer and that of one’s lineage, or between the demands of one’s immediate extended family and those of one’s village or church congregation. Commitment to the whole community, which Chuuk people describe as having “one will,” and much admire, has a special resonance for them. Such a person learns “a preoccupation with one’s self-fashioning as a moral member of the networks of kin in which one is enmeshed,” based on “a general, diffuse embodied sense of one’s moral standing as a ‘good’ member of the kin group” (Lowe, this volume). Paul (also this volume) might view this Chuuk conflict as just a singular example of the universal one between the “higher natures” of humans and their “more self-serving but forceful impulses.” In Chuuk society, the former, moral sense of oneself is channeled into “a yearning for reunification” or what Victor Turner famously called “*communitas*.” What funerary rites achieve, Lowe concludes, and why they continue to be such a compelling, enduring tradition in Chuuk, is that they provide an occasion for *communitas*—“to become united again in a single, collective state of mind.” While Searle’s idea of “status functions” takes him to this point in his argument, Lowe recognizes that the philosopher does not carry him all the way. This is the point at which, we will see, Lowe calls upon Spiro’s account of internalization.

Here are a couple of additional relevant proposals that these authors have noticed in the literature. Notably, these proposals, including Paul’s and Lowe’s just described, represent quite singular efforts on the part of different researchers, as yet disconnected from one another (but see Whitehouse 2004: 16 for a wave in the direction of recognizing efforts, similar to his own, to chart the universality of religiosity). Another intriguing idea of this general sort has been proposed by Richerson and Boyd (1999). Given their orientation to cultural evolution, it is no accident that both Paul and D’Andrade find these authors’ ideas about cultural evolution to be useful departure points for their own thinking. In this case, Richerson and Boyd suggest that humans are ill-adapted to today’s complex societies, beginning with the advent of larger, more densely populated agricultural ones. The supposition is that, instead, we humans have a social psychology adapted to life in small foraging societies. Examples of this psychology would be our egalitarian impulses and

love of autonomy, and our penchant, not only for kin selection, but also for cooperation with a somewhat larger group of familiar others who may or may not be kin. The subsequent increase in the scale and complexity of human societies occurred so rapidly that it has not been met by a biological adaptation of these social instincts. Instead, cultural solutions have evolved, in the form of what these authors call *work-arounds*. These are smallish, face-to-face groups simulating those of our ancestral foraging societies, but embedded within today's complex ones. Examples would be households, work groups, or divisions of larger organizations (the authors' illustration being the German army in WWII, which was hierarchically organized, but into fairly autonomous units).

A stunning illustration of a successful work-around recently reported on (Lewis-Kraus 2016) is the team at Google—at first less than ten people but eventually around a hundred, outgrowing successive quarters in which Google housed them—that resurrected a neural networks approach to the way the human brain works. Previously this promising way of thinking had been soundly rejected, its further consideration stopped short, in academic circles, where passing fads and exclusionary practices often rule. As the article goes on to describe this group at Google, tellingly, “it often feels less like a department within a colossal corporate hierarchy than it does a club or a scholastic society or an intergalactic cantina” (Lewis-Kraus 2016: 24).

There are sure to be other such biologically based preoccupations, some with equally profound consequences for the institutional and other cultural solutions that have evolved in human societies to manage them. Another, very different, account of how a human proclivity might affect human societies is put forward in the lead author's own theoretical piece with Holly Mathews (Quinn and Mathews 2016). These authors argue that culturally distinctive selves are everywhere constructed out of experiences that are not only shared but also emotionally arousing, and that some similar such experiences are to be found across most, if not all, societies. One obvious example would be the way in which male initiation rites, in societies where these are held, are designed to be extremely emotionally arousing for participants, thus cultivating a certain brand of male selfhood.⁵ (See Whitehouse 2004 for a broader interpretation of the role of emotional arousal, not just in initiation rites but in religious thought of all kinds, in the mode that he distinguishes as “imagistic.”) The Chuuk funerals that Lowe investigates pose another instance of emotional arousal—working to heighten, in this case, as we will see in

the Conclusion, a sense of the collective good. We argue that what is at work in both the cases of funerals and male initiation rites is the tendency of emotional arousal to augment syntactic plasticity in such a way as to make even occasional neural associations (or, in the limiting case, just one very arousing one) highly durable and deeply motivating.

A final example is Paul's notion of the "public arena," where social activity is conducted for all to see—individuals playing their culturally prescribed roles and being evaluated by their fellow community members. Here, Paul (this volume) proposes, are enacted those many cultural practices that insure the reproductive success, not of individual members of a group, but

of the sociocultural system itself and the symbols that constitute and enable it. Among a whole host of cultural phenomena in this category, which are almost absent completely even among our close primate relatives, are such things as prestige, honor, shame, "face," guilt, pride, envy, reputation, gossip, rumor, scandal, and many others.

While it is difficult, obviously, for such a singular common space to be recreated in highly complex societies in the way work-arounds can be, the public arena still characterizes small face-to-face groups, whether these be extant foraging societies or small tight communities that are part of larger ones: Paul gives convincing ethnographic cases of each. In bigger, more complex societies, of which Paul also gives an ethnographic example, this public arena may be more virtual than actual. The Conclusion will have more to say about this and other features of a public arena, and how this idea fits into the larger frame in which culture is being cast.

Readers may know of and be partial to other examples of the ways that innate human traits play out in human societies. Together with others of this kind as yet to be identified, these cases may eventually account for a goodly amount of the shape taken by these societies. We cannot afford to overlook this biology/culture interface. Paul's detailed analysis, in his 2015 book, of cultural adaptations to potentially disruptive male competition for mates demonstrates that this human inclination alone has had quite far-reaching consequences for the social organization of groups. We have mentioned a few other more modest efforts in this direction. Nevertheless, the hole in needed research and theory into other biological candidates for such effects remains a deep one. For reasons too

extraneous to address here, contemporary cultural anthropology has been averse to anything that smacks of biological propensity—with unfortunate theoretical results.

As D’Andrade goes on to explain, culture is realized institutionally in lifeworlds. Herein lies the challenge laid down in this initial chapter of the volume. We will have occasion to return, in the volume’s Conclusion, to D’Andrade’s important delineation of lifeworlds, and how it helps to situate—or, in the jigsaw puzzle metaphor, to frame—the arguments of the rest of us.

INTERNALIZATION

Besides suggesting a new way of thinking about the relation between brain and everything in the outer world, this volume advances an expanded theory of how what is in the brain gets there—in current vernacular, how culture is “internalized.” D’Andrade, in his chapter, does not go on to describe in any detail the processes that are necessary to recruit individual cognition into “collective cognition.” He does point to some of the crucial evolutionary components of these processes, notably the capacity for communication made possible by language, and that for joint intentionality, which depends on an understanding of the other person as having intentions and goals like oneself.

As Strauss notes in her chapter, there is still considerable squeamishness among mainstream cultural anthropologists about even acknowledging an “internal side to culture.” This is decidedly untrue of psychological anthropologists like the ones contributing to this volume. Only some of the volume contributors use the term *internalization*, yet all of us occupied with the mental side of culture are concerned with this process in some way.⁶ Here, at the outset, is what we mean by *internalization*. We do not dabble in the distinctions psychoanalytic theorists are inclined to make among, for example, incorporation, introjection, and identification (see, for one well-developed discussion on these distinctions, Schafer 1968). Instead, we opt for the plain vanilla meaning of this term, as it is so frequently used by psychological anthropologists and, indeed, often by other anthropologists and social scientists.⁷ This is what Spiro (1997: 4) defined as that which is “taken to be true,” and as what one of the present volume contributors, Strauss (1992: 1) once characterized with the question, “How do cultural messages get under people’s skin?” Strauss (1992: 11) went on to lay down the following challenge:

“It is not enough to know *what* information people are exposed to; we also have to study *how* they internalize that information.” To date, this challenge has not been fully met.

The history of the concept of internalization in psychological anthropology bears a brief (if truncated) recounting. Culture and personality theorists who explored interrelations between individuals and culture, and who were influenced by the psychoanalytic theory of their day—such as Ruth Benedict and Margaret Mead—might have been expected to be concerned with the question of how this culture was internalized in these individuals. However, their quest to discover cultural patterns stopped short of attending to how these different patterns are internalized. Nor, long before the cognitive revolution, could they have been concerned with examining the part played by neurobiology in internalization. Edward Sapir (1934: 413–414), always ahead of his time, called out for further inquiry on these counts:

It is strange how little ethnology has concerned itself with the intimate genetic problem of the acquirement of culture ... [I]t is precisely the supposed “givenness” of culture that is the most serious obstacle to our real understanding of the nature of culture and cultural change ... [E]lements of culture that come well within the horizon of awareness of one individual are entirely absent in another individual’s landscape ... It may be proper for the systematic ethnologist to ignore such pattern differences as these, but for the theoretical anthropologist who wishes to place culture in a general view of human behavior, such an oversight is inexcusable.

This sharp complaint that little thought has been given to “the acquirement of culture” (cast by Sapir then as a “genetic problem”) is as true today as when Sapir lodged it. So, here is another obvious theoretical gap in past and current anthropological theory, leaving unanswered the question of how culture gets inside people.⁸

We would be remiss not to acknowledge one recent effort to address this topic. In his influential 1995 book, D’Andrade (1995: 227–229) devoted a section—entitled “Internalization”—of one chapter to the concept. He wrote, in very general terms, “The term *internalization* is common in psychological anthropology, where it refers to the process by which cultural representations become a part of the individual; that is, become what is right and true.” True to its reporting and summarizing mission, most of the rest of this brief section of D’Andrade’s book

is devoted to a recounting of Melford Spiro's (1997) widely cited outline of four levels at which cultural knowledge comes into the awareness of individuals (a theoretical scheme taken up in Lowe's chapter in this volume).⁹ Following Spiro, D'Andrade treats only the last two of these levels as defining internalization: Beliefs have become internalized when believers are not merely acquainted with them (level 1), or hold them as cultural clichés (level 2), but only beginning at level 3, when they actually feel the beliefs themselves to the point of being motivated to enact them (D'Andrade 1995: 228). (At a belief's fourth and final level, the believer "not only internalizes it, but has a powerful emotional attachment to it, so that its psychological salience is especially strong," Spiro 1997: 9 explains.) Spiro's exclusion of mere acquaintance with beliefs and cultural clichés from what is to be considered internalized is one with which, as we will see, Strauss (this volume) disagrees, preferring to treat all of these levels as forms of cultural internalization, though she attends to the important differences among these levels. For reasons we explain in the Conclusion, we side with Strauss. Here, it need only be said that Spiro's and D'Andrade's formulation did not really unpack this process to allow a better understanding of how the internalization of culture actually occurs.

The volume Conclusion will summarize the headway we think we have made in conjecture about this process of internalization. To begin with, one very general feature of the way the brain works, synaptic plasticity (along with the effect on this plasticity of emotional arousal, as already described), will serve as the basis for our expanded explanation of how internalization comes about. As further explained in the Conclusion, two related pathways lead to the internalization of culture. Firstly, the same experience may simply be shared, not by anyone's plan or design and indeed, often by the happenstance of just being in the same place at the same time. This is the kind of internalization of cultural knowledge to which Strauss and Quinn (1997) have drawn attention. The other pathway, simply a subcategory of the first, and resting on the same assumptions about synaptic plasticity as does Strauss and Quinn's earlier version of cultural schema theory, but neglected by them, is what we might term cultural *transmission* from one person to another—or as Drew Westen (2001: 37), who makes the same distinction, refers to it, being "intentionally inculcated by socialization agents" (though, of course, some side effects of such inculcation need not be intentional). The only difference is that, in this latter case, these agents of socialization

contrive or engineer the experiences from which cultural schemas are derived by those they are socializing.

Several caveats are in order. In many instances, these two processes are intertwined. For example, the latter form of transmission may involve participants (e.g., parent and child, therapist and client) who also share many other experiences, unrelated to what is being intentionally transmitted, in common. Another illustration of this point comes from initiation rites. While these may be designed to teach initiates the lessons they will need in adulthood, and, further, to frighten them into remembering these lessons, they may also have other incidental outcomes. Initiates may establish life-long bonds with their age-mates simply as a consequence of undergoing this experience together, for example, or they may all learn stoicism as a cultural value—both unintended side-effects of their initiation.

Secondly, to be absolutely clear, the kind of internalization of culture that we are calling *transmission* (sometimes also referred to as *acquisition* or *cultural acquisition*, or, as in the quote from Westen above, *socialization* or *inculcation*) is not confined to childhood as might be the implication of such usages. Indeed, the ethnographic illustration of such inculcation that Westen uses is that of the La Llorona myth described by Mathews (1992), a cautionary tale told to newly and about-to-be married young adults in the mestizo Mexican community where she conducted fieldwork. The chapter by Stromberg in this volume offers another example of cultural transmission to young adults, in that case dynamic therapy sessions with them.

Thirdly, by “direct sharing of experience,” we are intending to embrace all experience, including that, such as rituals and, historically more recently, films, which contrive to highlight central values and beliefs by institutionalizing and symbolically emphasizing them, and thus naturalizing them and infusing them with emotional salience. The Chuuk funerals that Lowe describes are a prime example. Clearly, such public events have an effect on those who imbibe them not unlike the more direct engineering of experience by the word or deed of socialization agents. And both can be highly emotionally arousing. Some anthropologists, including co-author Stromberg as well as another chapter contributor, Lowe (personal communication), may prefer to distinguish these latter kinds of internalization drawn from witnessing or actually participating in public events as belonging to a separate third category. Regarding this stance taken by Lowe and Stromberg, the other co-authors of this Introduction have no objection to a distinction between public enactments such as rituals and the kind of cultural transmission

exemplified by child socialization. Indeed, we are all aware that there may be still other kinds of internalization that we do not address here at all. We hope only to make a beginning at thinking about what processes are involved in how *anything* gets to be represented inside someone, and as a consequence, becomes a felt part of that person.

We will stop here and let each chapter to follow speak for itself. The Conclusion will undertake the effort at synthesis that we have promised.

NOTES

1. Such a stance against any ethnographic generalization has been vigorously defended, in one case, on the grounds of rejecting existing ethnographic practice wholesale, since ethnographies that have been produced to date offer a skewed picture with regard to women and their domination by men (Abu-Lughod 1991).
2. The same reviewer's comment on this point is worth quoting: "The ignorance and/or denial of psychology is a pervasive weakness of contemporary sociocultural anthropology ... that this entire volume exposes to critical examination." The reviewer goes on to describe being struck, in searches for faculty positions ostensibly in psychological anthropology in which she or he has participated, by the fact that "the vast majority (maybe 90%) of applicants have no background in psychological anthropology whatsoever," but "seem to think that in talking about things like hegemony or multivocality they are being psychological, but they aren't." It would seem that the perspective from psychological anthropology is no longer even being taught in most anthropology departments.
3. Should anyone want to protest that this is just another "dualism," the answer would be that this one is entirely an empirical matter, the processes going on inside and outside the skull and the rest of the body being arguably distinguishable from one another.
4. This claim, we hasten to add, does not foreclose the possibility of females also competing for mates. It is only because male competition so often leads to such unbridled violence that it is problematic for society, and ways must be found to contain it.
5. Paul (this volume) interprets men's houses, found in so many societies, as prototypical examples of institutions designed to convert the violent competitive urges so much more common in men into male solidarity by means of "shared participation in their own symbolically constructed public arena set aside for them." He would presumably agree that the male initiation rites typically required as qualification for entry into these men's houses, and so much more common the world around than such rites for females, serve (among other possible functions) some of the same purpose.

6. The generality of this question of how internalization works was first pointed out to the lead author by Allen Johnson. Thereafter, co-author Karen Sirota schooled us all in some of the background to this concept and the different uses of it. Indeed, a little, intermittent e-mail group grew up around our conversation about internalization.
7. The reader is taxed to notice the many times this gloss, *internalization* or its grammatical cognates, crops up without further analysis in his or her anthropological and related readings (for the case of sociology, see Quinn's chapter in this volume). As it turns out, it is not only anthropologists but also, e.g., sociologists and clinicians, who are likely to use this term without providing any clue to how it happens.
8. This gap persists even as recognition of the need to consider culture is gaining prominence in disciplines such as cognitive biology, social psychology, sociology, linguistics, and philosophy—as the appearance of new subfields with labels such as cultural psychology, cultural sociology, and cultural linguistics formally attests.
9. The alert reader may wonder how Spiro's (1997) argument regarding internalization could have found its way into D'Andrade's (1995) book, before it had itself appeared in print. D'Andrade, a close colleague of Spiro's at the University of California, San Diego, appears to have had access to a pre-publication manuscript of the latter's book, which Spiro reports "was mostly completed in 1990" (1997: xvii).

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CHAPTER 2

Reflections on Culture

Roy D'Andrade

The history of anthropology I tell in the beginning of this chapter is a series of frustrated attempts to find a set of theoretical categories that will adequately distinguish between what has been thought of as social structure and what has been deemed culture. I call this “the category problem.”

Roy D'Andrade: Deceased.

The University of Chicago Press has generously permitted the reproduction here of a discussion originally published in Cassaniti and Menon's 2017 edited volume, *Universalism without Uniformity*. That discussion occurs in the sections of his chapter (D'Andrade 2017) about lifeworlds: the final paragraph of “The Formation of Cultural Values” and the three sections to follow, “How Many Lifeworlds in a Society?,” “Civil Society, the Covering Lifeworld,” and “Lifeworld Colonization.” This editor did not realize this duplication until she happened to read the earlier essay of D'Andrade's in the other volume, when that book saw publication during preparation of this one. D'Andrade has never before, to this editor's knowledge, published the same words in two different places. This departure from his usual practice must have been due to the exigencies of his illness, which, as we tell in the Preface, included pain, memory loss, and inability to work.

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Next, I explain what I think the problem is. I illustrate my explanation with a reanalysis of some of my own research, on values in three countries. My initial error was to conflate individual values and cultural values. The latter are values that have become institutionalized. In this way of thinking, culture, including cultural values, is an emergent property of individual minds—just as the rigidity of an iron bar is an emergent property of atoms and their interactions.

Values inhere in many different institutions, and can differ across these, and so there is a need for a systematic description of the institutions in which values are embedded in a given society. To this end, I introduce the idea of lifeworlds, complexes of values, norms, institutions, practices, and sanctions along with representations of these shared by members. Such an approach abandons altogether the attempt to divide up social structure and culture, which are inextricably bound up in a life-world, making the category problem disappear. In any complex society, there are many such lifeworlds, members of the society typically belonging to multiple ones of these. This idea of the way societies are organized has further interesting causal implications, which I will discuss.

IT'S JUST A POINT OF VIEW

Gregory Bateson saw the problem clearly. In *Naven*, his ethnography of the Iatmul, Bateson describes how he tried to test the validity of the major theoretical categories he had brought to his ethnographic task. First, he selected three “bits of culture”: (1) a mother’s brother giving food to his sister’s son, (2) a man scolding his wife, and (3) a man marrying his father’s sister’s daughter. Next, he selected three of his major theoretical categories: (1) the *pragmatic*—satisfying the needs of individuals or contributing to the integration of society; (2) the *ethological*—part of a patterned expression of emotion; and (3) the *structural*—the rules or premises of the culture, which he thereafter referred to as its “premises.” He then set up a three by three matrix. Each of the rows of the matrix was labeled with a “piece of culture,” and each of the columns with one of his categories. He went on to explain,

Then I forced myself to see each bit as conceivably belonging to each category. I found that it could be done.

I found that I could think of each bit of culture *structurally*; I could see it in accordance with a consistent set of rules or formulations ... Equally,

I could see each bit as “*pragmatic*,” either as satisfying the needs of individuals or contributing to the to the integration of society. Again, I could see each bit *ethologically*, as an expression of emotion.

This experiment may seem puerile, but to me it was very important, and I have recounted it at length because there may be some among my readers who tend to regard such concepts as “*structure*” as concrete parts which “interact” in culture, and who find, as I did, a difficulty in thinking of these as labels merely for points of view adopted either by the scientist or by the natives. It is instructive too to perform the same experiment with such concepts as economics, kinship and land tenure, and even religion, language, and “sexual life” do not stand too surely as categories of behaviour, *but tend to resolve themselves in labels for points of view from which all behavior may be seen.* (Bateson 1958: 262; italics added)

Bateson assumes that the reader understands what the problem will be when any “piece of culture” can equally be seen as pragmatic, or ethos, or structure. Nothing is gained by identifying any aspect of Iatmul culture as one or another. Whatever identification is made, it is merely a “point of view.” Nothing about culture has been explained. Or, to put it another way, if our categories of behavior are just “labels for points of view from which all behavior may be seen,” then using these categories can tell us nothing about the world but only about our own points of view.

Bateson’s insight notwithstanding, over the years, category problems involving the distinction between culture and social structure did not reach a solution. At the annual meeting of the American Anthropological Association in 1959, there was a well-attended session on the topic, in which ensued a lively and scholarly discussion about the difference between *culture* and *social structure*. At the end of the session, it was generally agreed that not much progress had been made.

Culture, as subsequently described by Clifford Geertz (1973), was interpretation of texts—having nothing to do with social structure. Schneider’s (1968) work on American kinship was restricted to an analysis of symbols, with the result that investigations of kinship among Irish, Italian, English, and other ethnic groups yield almost identical accounts. Schneider recognized that it was the cultural norms that were different across these groups, and he deliberately excluded these norms from his analysis, to support his account of an “American” kinship. Current practice in leading cultural anthropology journals is to handle the conflict about the term *culture* by not using it.

In fact, recent articles in *Ethos* and *Cultural Anthropology* rarely use any of the theoretical anthropological terms of the pre-postmodern period: i.e., *role, norm, structure, culture, class, group, collective, personality, motive, belief, expectation, goal, market, artifact, system, function, internalization, acculturation, enculturation, material culture, drift, superstructure, lexeme, and syntax*. This is not to say that contemporary anthropologists are no longer grappling with the same old problem, albeit in new terminology. Witness this excerpt from the flyer for an international conference on *Affective Relationality* held in April, 2016 at the Freie Universität in Berlin, and attended by this volume's editor: "... affects have to be conceptualized as a dynamic relationality that traverses between and across individuals, and not as inner 'mental states'."

EARLY ATTEMPTS AT RESOLUTION

One answer that British social structuralists gave to the *culture* versus *social structure* problem was to reposition culture by saying that it referred to *nothing but* things like cooking recipes and pottery. By restricting the definition of *culture* to odd bits, there was no danger of *culture* being conflated with *social structure*. But Bateson's problem remains: When an ethnographer does a study of, say, Western Apache kinship, is that a study of Apache culture or Apache social structure? And, if both, which is a part of which?

A different tactic was adopted by sociologist Talcott Parsons. For Parsons, a human society is constituted by the interaction between and within the *cultural system, social system, personality system, and biological system* that make up society. The *cultural system* consists of the interrelations of symbols, while the *social system* consists of the relations of persons in roles and collectives. The *personality system* consists of a system of motivations and values, while the *biological system* consists of the interaction within the actual physical body (Parsons and Shils 1951). Parsons did not worry if the same item was part of more than one system. What made it part of any system was the *causal* relations this item had with other items in that system, not anything intrinsic about the item. That sounds good at the theoretical level. But it still does not answer the question about Apache kinship. Nor did it please anthropologist Clyde Kluckhohn.

Kluckhohn's dissent was presented in a signed footnote to "Some fundamental categories of the theory of action: A general statement," the introductory chapter of the edited volume *Toward a General Theory of Action*,

co-authored by the contributors to this collection, Kluckhohn among them (Parsons and Shils 1951: 3–29). His objection concerned the boundaries that Parsons drew around the concept of *culture*. Kluckhohn felt that their statement did “not give full weight to the extent to which *roles are culturally defined, social structure is part of the cultural map, the social system is built upon girders supplied by explicit and implicit culture*” (Parsons and Shils 1951: 26–27, fn. 31; italics added).

Parsons’ response, given in a memorial volume for Kluckhohn, was that only special aspects of the social structure are parts of the cultural map. For Parsons, the “exigencies of interaction in social systems” and the “analytically defined interests of acting units” are independent of cultural factors (Parsons 1973: 55). Parsons said that, in this case, the *system of social relationships* and the *system of kinship symbols* are in a zone of *interpenetration*. *Interpenetration* was a frequent term in Parsonian theory. It seems to me that calling the overlap between categories “a zone of interpenetration” is really an admission as to the nondistinctness of these categories.

A more procrustean move was made by Cornelius Osgood, who was Curator of Anthropology at Yale University and a leading ethnographer of the cultures of the Arctic, China, and Korea. He divided his ethnography of an Alaskan group called the Ingalik into three separate publications, on Ingalik material, social, and mental culture, respectively. For Osgood, it was *all* culture, differing only in descriptive content. In a review of the last of these three volumes, *Ingalik Mental Culture* (1959), in the *American Anthropologist*, Edmund Carpenter commented on the novelty of Osgood’s solution to the category problem:

This three-fold division is not the traditional economy–society–religion one, but rather a very precise effort to clarify the nature of such data by correctly categorizing them. Thus, each volume is both an ethnographic report and a theoretical adventure. (Carpenter 1961: 848)

While from one point of view the controversy about how to define *culture* and *social structure* is a minor quibble, to those who spent their adult lives thinking and wondering about how *social structures* work, or how *cultures* are organized, the issues were anything but trivial. Moreover, while this is a hoary problem with a long history in anthropology, it persists into the present, to plague even contemporary researchers such as myself.

ONTOLOGICAL LEVELS AND REDUCTIONISM

The different approach to the relation between social structure and culture that I want to propose requires a short detour into some basic assumptions underlying my proposal. Fundamental to the modern worldview is the idea that there is a hierarchy of ontological levels. At the bottom of the hierarchy are the most basic things, the things that cannot be further subdivided. According to the standard theory in physics, there are a few forces (gravity, the electromagnetic force, the weak force, and the strong force) along with a few fundamental particles (bosons, quarks, and leptons) that make up the most basic stuff of the world. If string theory proves to be true, then there exists an even more basic level, composed of n dimensional strings or loops from which the fundamental particles are formed. Higher in the hierarchy are protons and neutrons, made from combinations of quarks, and at an even higher level, there are atoms, made of electrons and protons and neutrons. The next higher level consists of molecules, composed of combinations of atoms, able to form solids, liquids, and gases. These three levels constitute the physical stuff of the world.

The next two levels are the biological and the psychological; the level of living things and the level of things that have minds and are conscious. None of this is controversial. What is controversial is the idea that there exists a level of collective mental states on *an even higher ontological level* than individual mental states.

An ontological hierarchy is not just a matter of little things making up bigger things. Objects at each higher level must be characterized by having causal powers that things at lower levels do not have, causal powers that are due to the interaction of things at the lower level. Physicists call these new causal powers *collective effects* or *emergent properties*. A simple example of an emergent property is the rigidity exhibited by an iron bar. Thousands of individual atoms of iron, taken each by each, do not have rigidity. The collective effects of rigidity are created by *interactions* between the atoms, interactions that are a result of intrinsic properties of these atoms. Due to these interactions, atoms of iron form a lattice structure that gives the interconnected atoms properties of *rigidity*—something no single atom of iron has.

Accounting for upper level collective effects by understanding how lower level entities interact is one kind of *reductionism*. This is called *non-eliminative reductionism* because, unlike *nothing-but reductionism*,

it does not *eliminate* the properties of the upper level. The upper level properties are genuine new causal properties that do not exist at the lower level. *Non-eliminative* reductionism attempts to account for upper level properties by showing how the entities at the lower level, in interacting with each other, form new entities with new causal properties. A well-known example of non-eliminative reductionism is the reduction of the properties of life to the interaction of certain molecules. Life, instead of being some strange causal force, or *élan vital*, as it was once termed, turns out to be the emergent effect of certain molecules interacting in certain ways. The great story of the discovery of the double helix and the unraveling of the genetic code gives us an account of how the high-level collective effect of life is produced by the lower level interaction of molecules. *This does not mean that life is nothing-but molecules.* Molecules are not alive, nor can they grow, reproduce, and die. Life, growth, reproduction, and death are properties of living things, not molecules.

Eliminative reductionism is not always wrong. A case of eliminative reductionism that turned out to be right was the reduction of heat to *nothing but* the motion of molecules. Heat, instead of being some kind of special causal stuff, as those who believed in phlogiston thought, is nothing but molecular motion, and anything that can be said about what heat does can be restated without loss of information in terms of the effects of the motions of individual molecules, taken one by one. Heat has no causal powers that molecular motion does not also have.

In some cases, it is not clear whether non-eliminative or eliminative reductionism is the correct view. For example, while there are people who believe that consciousness is a kind of special thing never to be understood in terms of reductionism, most psychologists believe that consciousness will ultimately be seen to be an emergent property caused by the interaction of certain kinds of cells—neurons—with each other and the environment, and nothing more. How this emergent effect comes about is not yet known. In fact, at present, there is hardly a good idea about how it could happen. Unraveling the mystery of consciousness is one of the great puzzles of science for the twenty-first century.

As we will see, however, the case that we are addressing here is a clear one of non-eliminative reductionism. The explanation for how individual mental states lead to collective mental states is a matter of emergent properties.

MENTAL STATES AND THE COLLECTIVE CONSCIOUSNESS

Just as life is puzzlingly different than ordinary matter, so mental processes are puzzlingly different than ordinary cells. How can cells—a network of connected neurons, for instance—be conscious, or know things, or want things, or have feelings? Yet, human life is based on the emergent causal powers of the human mind; that people can perceive, reason, remember, want, feel, and intend to do things. Cultural and social processes require the existence of minds. Of course, these processes require bodies too—complexes of living cells—and the cells that make up the body must be made of molecules, and so on. But the causal powers of culture, society, and psyche are based on *mental causal powers*. Without minds and their causal powers, there would be no culture and no society as we know it.

And just as networks of neurons interact to form the collective effect or emergent property of consciousness and mind, so minds interact to form higher level *collective mental states*. A norm is a collective mental state—a collective agreement that something should be done in a certain way at a certain time by certain people. It is *intersubjectively* shared; that is, in the relevant group, we each know that everyone knows about this norm, and everybody knows that we know it.

Collective mental states can do things that individual mental states cannot. A basketball team can only play because the members of the team jointly share the cultural model of basketball and its norms. The teams have “*collective intentionality*” (Searle 2006) or what we might call “*we-intentionality*.” Cooperative team sports are vivid examples of the emergent property of cultural norms. Collective mental states can create coordinated action, group obligations and interpersonal commitments, and institutions. Singular individual beliefs and actions cannot do this. It is emergent collective mental states that make the order of society possible because without a collective mental state, norms and institutions are impossible. Collective mental states have extraordinary and ubiquitous causal powers (Searle 1995). Of course, collective mental states can always be reduced in a non-eliminative way to individual mental states, but collective mental states are *not* nothing but individual mental states. *The interaction of minds creates a new thing—a collective mind made of minds.* This is because, while we cannot share bodies, we can share minds, and hence have collectively shared understandings, agreements, and goals and obligations. Culture is constituted by collective minds.

Unlike iron bars, which are made up of *physically* connected atoms, the connection between humans is based primarily on *communication*—the contact of minds through *language*. We share minds because we can talk to each other. This is a central fact about human existence. In fact, it can be argued that one of the most distinctive thing about humans, which is their very large brain, came about *because* of language. A number of experts on early human origins find physical evidence from the larynx and related structures that spoken language began before two million years ago with australopithecines and homo erectus, when the human cranial capacity was not much larger than that of a modern-day ape. But once a very rough and rudimentary way of sharing information about the world through spoken words began to develop, humans could *share* their minds, giving a powerful selective advantage to having large brains that could store the enormous amount of information that could be learned from other humans. The brain of a chimpanzee can only hold something around 500–1000 words, while human vocabularies are as large as 50,000 words or more (D’Andrade 2001).

As this excursus on collectivities, we-intentionality, intersubjectivity, and ontological levels shows, an answer to the question about the nature of the agreement that underlies things like *norms* is not simple. None less than eminent social theorist Jon Elster is stymied by the problem. In his book *Cement of Society*, he frankly admits:

I shall argue for the autonomy of norms and their reality ... I cannot offer a positive explanation of norms. I do not know why human beings have a propensity to construct and follow norms, nor how specific norms come into being and change. (Elster 1989: 125)

Elster is driven to this conclusion because he does not want to make an ontological commitment to collective mental states. Thus he goes on to say, “There are no societies, only individuals who interact with each other” (Elster 1989: 248). Elster is a true individualist. However, without the ontological commitment to anything *collective* that he is unwilling to make, it is impossible to account for norms, which are *collective* agreements about how things should be done.

THE DECONSTRUCTION OF CULTURE, SOCIETY, AND PERSONALITY

Following Bateson, as part of an attempt to deconstruct the ideas of *culture* and *society* and *personality*, I broke these three global terms into more specific constructs, such as *institution*, *motive*, *value*, and *norm* (D'Andrade 2006). Consider the following matrix of columns and rows:

Personality is made up of:	Motives	Ideas	Values			
Culture is made up of:		Ideas	Values	Norms	Institutions	
Society/social structure is made up of:			Values	Norms	Institutions	Practices

There may be disagreement about which constructs belong in which rows but there will be no disagreement about the fact that *psyche*, *culture*, and *society* are composed of overlapping elements. Looking at this high degree of overlap, one wonders how personality, culture, and society could ever have been defined as distinct things.

What makes these three concepts different, instead, is the way in which elements are organized. What is different about the organization of *culture* and *psyche* is that *culture* refers to the mental contents (symbols, meanings, models, ideas, etc.) that *flow* across persons and over time, while *psyche* refers to the *organization* of mental elements *within* individual minds. Just as *culture* is composed of elements that move across place, person, and time, so *psyche* can be thought of elements such as ideas, motives, feelings, and values that are organized within a single person. *Society* exists because practices do what they do—the bread gets to the table, the business produces products, the schools teach, the churches minister to their congregations, and so forth. These practices are organized in human societies by complexes of institutions, norms, and values. *Culture*, *psyche*, and *society* have become the source for a century of confusion because they have been used as if they were names for different kinds of *stuff*. But these nouns are, instead, necessary words for different kinds of causal *processes*.

By defining *culture* as process, one can both accept the omnibus definition in which *culture* contains almost everything—artifacts, institutions, symbols, ideas, and tea at the Savoy, and also regard *culture* as a causal force or causal power. For example, the activity of typing that I am now doing, plus the computer I am using and the English language in which I am writing are all linked to the past, and to me and other

people and our pasts, through a long chain of historical causal processes. These skills and artifacts did not just appear out of nowhere. I am *typing* because (among other reasons) typing is part of my *culture*, I am using a *computer* because (among other reasons) computers are part of my *culture*, and I am *writing in English* because (among other reasons) English is part of my *culture*. *Culture* in the sense of a historical causal process of the transmission of ideas, norms, values, and institutions has enormous power; it has brought us most of what we do and have. The main problem with the notion of *culture* is that it is too general and too various to serve as a good explanation of anything in particular; but it is essential for understanding human life overall.

Cognitive learning is quick and what needs to be learned can effectively be taught by being formulated and communicated in natural language. These abilities result in cognitive models that are easy to pass on to others, and hence to become culture. But for values to function as *felt evaluations*, not just thoughts about what is good, and for norms to function as *felt shoulds*, there must be some degree of internalization (Spiro 1984). Internalization typically requires socialization, which is why values do not generalize as easily and extensively as cognitive models. Many more Americans know about civil liberties than care about them. Motives and sentiments are even less often part of a cultural heritage because they are even harder to teach and transmit. But for some people, the motivation called *patriotism* is part of their culture.

MY OWN TACTICAL ERROR AND ITS CORRECTION

It seems clear that values are part of *personality* as well as being parts of *culture* and *society*. But because I did not fully recognize that values function at distinct levels, I made a tactical error in a study of American, American Vietnamese, and Japanese values (D'Andrade 2008). Viewing values as primarily a personality characteristic, I developed a questionnaire that asked each respondent to rate how *personally important* (not at all, a little, moderately, quite a bit, extremely) 328 value items were (e.g., having peace and quiet, being one of the elite, living a life of adventure). Translations and back translations were carried out for Japanese and Vietnamese. American, Japanese, and Vietnamese-American respondents were asked to rate all items in their native language. Principal components analyses were carried out on the data, separately for each group and jointly for all.

When the data from the three cultures were analyzed, it was a surprise to discover that each of the cultures displayed almost identical bipolar dimensions for the first three components (D'Andrade 2008: 7–20). No more than these three components could reliably be identified. Labels and representative items for the three dimensions are *Individualism* (trying out new things, sexual freedom, and living a life of adventure) versus *Collectivism* (preserving the family name, defending my country, and maintaining old traditions); *Altruism* (protecting the environment, treating people equally, and protection of minority rights) versus *Self-Interest* (having social status, having great wealth, and being one of the elite); and *Industry* (thinking up ways of doing things, having self-discipline, and science) versus *Leisure* (taking it easy, sleeping, and watching TV).

While the conceptual organization of these three dimensions is quite interpretable, the dimensions are actually not strong, accounting for only slightly more than 10% of the total variance. The same organization was found by Shalom Schwartz, a social psychologist based in Haifa, Israel, who analyzed data from 75,000 respondents in 200 samples taken from 67 nations. Most importantly, not only were the dimensions for all three cultures virtually the same, *the ratings of value items for all cultures were almost identical* (Schwartz and Bardi 2001). These results are an impressive demonstration of the universality of a pan-cultural value profile that shows a high evaluation for treating others well, being self-directed, and treating others equally, but a lower evaluation for being power oriented, stimulation seeking, and being traditional.

These overwhelming similarities between values of different cultures create severe problems on several levels. Empirically, these results contradict decades of ethnographic research. Methodologically, these results from survey questionnaires are different than the results from participant observation, leaving the choice of methods uncertain. Theoretically, if every society's values are almost identical to every other society, there would seem to be little to cause or sustain cultural differences. Overall, this finding of strong value similarity between societies seems implausible. But that is what these data show.

One resolution to this conundrum can be found in the linkage between norms and values. For example, consider the conflict in the U.S. between abortion (pro-choice) and anti-abortion (pro-life) groups. Both groups agree about the value of preserving life, but this value is linked to different outcomes in each group. The pro-life groups sees abortion as the destruction of life, which directly contravenes humanitarian norms and values.

The pro-choice group does not count the fetus as a real person and typically feels that, in some situations, bringing the fetus to term can result in an impoverished or depleted life for child, mother, or both. So the pro-life group wants the establishment of a norm prohibiting abortion under most or all conditions while the pro-choice groups wants the establishment of a norm leaving the decision to the mother. Each group sees the other group as having different values but what they really disagree about is the way in which abortion is *linked* to the value of life. The point, once made, is obvious. *Most values are relatively abstract schemas and very different actions can be framed as fulfilling or not fulfilling them.* Each group makes its own *interpretive linkage* about which values apply to which norms, and typically assesses cultural groups in which other linkages are made as lacking good values. In my experience, *the big differences between cultures are not in high-level values, but in the interpretations of what-counts-as-what.*

Another surprising finding of my value study was that the Japanese data did not display a high level of *collective* values. Extensive ethnographic work by Ruth Benedict, Chie Nakane, Takie Lebra, and Ronald Dore (see D'Andrade 2008: 106) has documented persuasively that Japanese social groups—university departments, businesses, and schools—display solidarity and group cohesion with strong social control. In my value study, the Japanese were only slightly higher than the Americans with respect to *collectivism*. This contradiction between ethnographic data and questionnaire data does not appear to be the result of different links between norms and values, as was the case in my hypothetical example about pro-abortion and anti-abortion groups. Rather, it seems to be the result of cultures containing two different kinds of values—*personal* values and *cultural* values (Kitayama 2002). This could explain the differences between the personal values found on the Japanese questionnaire and cultural values described in Japanese ethnography. But this explanation raises another question. It is hard enough to find out what someone's personal values are. How can one find out in a systematic way when a respondent gives some characteristic a high value whether the respondent is rating a *personal* value or a *cultural* value?

My solution has been to define *cultural* values as values that are *institutionalized*, and that, at the same time, may be more or less internalized. Take the role of the DOCTOR as an example. If one is a *doctor*, then one *should* have the competencies of a *doctor* and care about the things that *doctors should* care about. *A value is institutionalized in a role* if there are norms sanctioning role behavior that meets (or does not meet) this value

criterion. For example, doctors are supposed to value helping patients, not just earning money. If they pursue monetary gain to the neglect or maltreatment of their patients, they will be frowned upon by others in their profession, and may be formally sanctioned or even de-licensed.

Using this definition of an institutionalized value, I next developed a questionnaire to identify American values institutionalized in various roles. Undergraduates were given twelve common roles (DOCTOR, EMPLOYEE, TEACHER, BUSINESS PERSON, STUDENT, GOVERNOR, FATHER, MOTHER, SON, DAUGHTER, FRIEND, and LOVER) along with SELF and TYPICAL AMERICAN, to be rated on 43 value items. Questionnaires were organized so that every role was evaluated on all value items by 20 respondents. I should add that, typically, judgments about established cultural understandings do not require large samples because of the strong homogenizing effects of cultural consensus (Romney et al. 1997). While the sample was small, the average alpha for each role was 0.97.

The 43 value items fell into two groups: those values that were generally the same across all roles *versus* those values that were generally different across different roles. The value items that tended to be the same across all roles were *be responsible, be honest, persevere to overcome difficulties, treat others well, have self-control, be independent and self-reliant, work hard, and be knowledgeable* (D'Andrade 2008: 131–132). These values have a Puritan flavor, high on *altruism* and *industriousness*. Be a good person, self-directing and competent no matter what your role—*sister or governor*.

The remaining seventeen items did discriminate among roles. Correspondence Analysis (Romney et al. 1998) was used to display both roles and value items in the same space. Both the *individualism/collectivism* and *altruism/self-interest* dimensions were apparent and emerged without rotation. SELF falls close to the center of the graph, indicating that respondents placed themselves neutrally with respect to the two dimensions. The values of being both *individualistic* and *altruistic* are perceived as important values for the roles of LOVER and FRIEND, while being *collectivistic* and *altruistic* are important for the roles of FATHER, MOTHER, SON and DAUGHTER. Being *self-interested* is described as important for the TYPICAL AMERICAN, and both *collectivism* and *self-interest* values are important for the role of GOVERNOR. Being almost purely *self-interested* is important for a BUSINESS PERSON, while the both *self-interest* and *individualism* are important for the roles of EMPLOYEE, TEACHER, and DOCTOR.

If someone uses the value item *well-organized* as important for the role of an EMPLOYEE or that of a MOTHER, this does not mean that this person rates *himself* or *herself* as *well-organized*, whatever his or her anticipated life trajectory. The fact that the value of *being well-organized* has been institutionalized for the role of the EMPLOYEE or the MOTHER is a fact about American *culture*, not necessarily a *personal* value.

THE FORMATION OF CULTURAL VALUES

The questionnaire described above finds values that are important to holding various roles. But values are embedded in many institutions besides roles, including rituals, laws, organizations, conventions, myths, art, and games, to name just a few. Given the huge number of institutions in any society (Searle 1995), if cultural values are to be studied, some systematic way of grouping institutions needs to be formulated.

A family, for example, has its own action systems consisting of things people in the family do, its own material culture, collective representations, norms, institutions, and its own roles and social network. The major institutions of families are the institutions of marriage and descent, with their corresponding kinship roles. The norms that apply to these roles change as the members of the family grow and age, but the core family values of love, care, and intimacy are unchanging (Quinn 1987). To describe a family is to describe a culture, or more specifically, to describe a cultural formation within a larger cultural formation.

One perspective for describing these cultures within a culture is through the concept of a *lifeworld*. Phenomenologists—Aaron Cicourel, Harold Garfinkel, and Alfred Schütz, for example—treat the lifeworld as the everyday ordinary world that is pervasively intersubjective and socially constructed, without which communication would be impossible. Such an intersubjectively shared lifeworld is transparent to its members, but full of meaning and consequence. It should be noted that the construct *lifeworlds*, as defined here, differs somewhat from its usage by Alfred Schütz (Schütz and Luckmann 1973, 1989) or Jürgen Habermas (1984), its two most famous proponents. For them, the lifeworld concept focuses on the *total* background (Searle 1995) which is necessary for human communication. In this chapter, by contrast, *a lifeworld* is treated *as an interconnected functioning complex of values, practices, norms, sanctions, institutions, and representations intersubjectively shared by a recognized collectivity*.

In this view, the lifeworld of American family life contrasts sharply with the lifeworld of an American business office. A striking example of the home/office difference can be seen in the comparison between the trading floor of a large investment bank and an American family. Michael Lewis's 1989 book *Liar's Poker* contains a striking description of the trading floor of Solomon Brothers, a Wall Street investment bank in the 1980s. Solomon Brothers was divided into two departments: equities (stocks), and bonds. A series of governmental regulations in the 1980s changed the selling and buying of bonds from a relatively sedate activity to a rapid high-stakes market involving truly huge amounts of money, where the conditions of uncertainty created much risk. Bond traders came to glorify risk taking, along with the development of aggressive interpersonal competition, and ruthless, cut-throat behavior. According to Lewis, the top traders in the bank engaged in huge bets on the movement of bond and stock prices, consumed gross amounts of food and drink, bullied lesser traders, swore constantly, and frightened the personnel assigned to assist them. This lifeworld glorified risk taking and the power that comes from the personal accumulation of wealth. Solomon Brothers in the 1980s is an extreme example, but business worlds generally contrast with American families (but not families everywhere) in having a strong hierarchy (various levels of bosses and workers). In this hierarchical system, rewards are based on values concerning minimizing costs and maximizing profits as well as evaluating the skill, efficacy, responsibility on which the business depends. There is a New Yorker cartoon that mocks this kind of value difference. In the cartoon, a conference table of business men are listening to their boss, who begins the meeting by saying "Before we discuss destroying the competition, screwing our customers, and laughing all the way to the bank, let's begin this meeting with a prayer."

HOW MANY LIFEWORLDS IN A SOCIETY?

What is unclear is how fine the classification of lifeworlds should be. Very fine lifeworld discriminations would capture how different every family is from every other family, and even from itself every few years. On the other hand, less differentiated lifeworld categories would distinguish only between the strikingly different lifeworlds in a society. For example, there is some agreement that for many societies *kinship*, *religion*, *politics*, and the *economy* are distinctive enough to often require separate chapters in an ethnography.

Lifeworlds are subsidiary cultural worlds that exist within the larger collectivity of some society. The lifeworlds of a modern society are much more numerous than the lifeworlds of a tribal society. For an extreme example of the latter, Allen Johnson, who worked among the semi-foraging, semi-horticultural Matsigenka of the Amazon basin (Johnson 2003), found a simple, family-based society that has no institutionalized politico-religious leaders comparable to the chiefs or big men typically found in such societies. The family is perhaps the only significant lifeworld among the Matsigenka (A. Johnson, personal communication). By contrast, it would be impossible to describe all the lifeworlds of American society—business worlds, military worlds, legal worlds, neighborhood worlds, educational worlds, and so forth. Such an ethnography would run to many thousands of pages.

CIVIL SOCIETY, THE COVERING LIFEWORLD

This observation raises the further question about whether in a modern society of such complexity there is a lifeworld that corresponds in some way to the *whole society*. This covering lifeworld would include almost everyone in a society, even if the roles, norms, practices, etc., that apply to the full collectivity are relatively small in number. Cultural sociologist Jeffrey Alexander (2006) argues that there is such a lifeworld, which he calls *civil society*. For Alexander, American civil society is a *sphere* of actions, institutions and ideas, values, and norms that the typical American knows and assumes that other people know. Intersubjectivity includes mutual knowledge of a variety of topics—current national political issues, current facts about war and peace, current candidates for political office, major sporting events, reported disasters, issues concerning public debt and finance, statuses of and relations between ethnic and racial groups, positions of various religions on moral and spiritual matters, and more. This information is provided by the media such as newspapers, TV, and radio, and by the structure of the public world more generally, but also by interpersonal contacts such as family, friends, respected others, and like people. In a modern society, this huge and constantly shifting mass of information is presented continuously and redundantly to the average citizen.

Civil society contains a loosely defined role structure: *citizen, voter, pundit, media consumer, activist, public official, reporter, columnist, publicist, spin doctor*, and so forth. Most of these roles involve the production, consumption, and evaluation of information about the society. Alexander (2006)

presents a comprehensive analysis of the binary discourse code that he finds to be used in civil society. Claims and counter-claims are made in a binary logic concerning *responsibility* versus *irresponsibility*. *Irresponsibility* covers a multitude of sins—for some examples, *misuse of funds, stupidity, theft, lying, cheating, being biased, immaturity, lack of moral sense, and incompetence*—and myriad related ways of failing civil society. Alexander calls this covering lifeworld a *sphere* of society. He gives markets, states, political parties, churches and sects, patriarchal and other kinds of families, and groups based on ethnic, racial, and regional ties as examples of other spheres of modern society.

LIFEWORLD COLONIZATION

Most people seem able to move from one lifeworld to another without even noticing. This non-awareness is aided by the fact that some values are important in both lifeworlds. Being responsible and honest, for example, are salient across a wide variety of lifeworlds—as indicated by the results of the questionnaire described above. But sometimes people experience strong conflict when different values are salient in different lifeworlds. Michael Lewis writes, for example, about how hard it was for him to make an advantageous sale in the trader's lifeworld where he had to *not* divulge to his buyer how bad the bonds he was recommending really were (Lewis 1989). He soon left his job as a bond trader with a strong feeling of relief and some lasting guilt.

Personal dilemmas like Lewis's are not the only way conflicts in values come about. Another striking form of value conflict occurs when the values of one lifeworld *colonize* another lifeworld. The use of this term is borrowed from Habermas. For Habermas, colonization occurs when an autonomous subsystem of the society infiltrates a lifeworld from the outside, "like colonial masters coming into a tribal society" (Habermas 1984: 355). The term is used here to refer also to a situation in which some value, central in one lifeworld, begins to become more dominant in a different lifeworld. For example, in the United States, the value of acting in accordance with the business morality of making decisions primarily on the basis of the 'bottom line' has partially colonized other lifeworlds such as that of higher education.

Such lifeworld colonization can be very upsetting. It is most distressing to academics when the administration of a university begins to shift its primary decision criteria from achieving academic excellence to purely

monetary considerations such as maximizing the number of undergraduate enrollments. Around the world, this type of conflict is not rare. In the now defunct Soviet society, the great colonizing value was that of unstinting support for the communist party, which was supposed to take priority over family or business values. In much of the Middle East, the great colonizing values are Muslim religious values, which the people of many Middle Eastern countries believe should trump family, business, and national political values. In Italy, it is said that, conversely, family relationships trump business relationships and even enter into the “business” of crime (A. Cicourel personal communication). One can see the Mafia as an example, in which fellow criminals are ritually incorporated as family members because it is only family that one can trust.

EVOLUTION

Social evolution refers to the cultural evolution of whole societies, including the cultural norms and practices that organize resources, labor, economy, trade, kinship, political power, warfare, and so forth. Much of the current work on human evolution is concerned with selective pressures on groups, not selective pressures on individuals. A comprehensive model of this type for the evolution of human societies has been presented by Johnson and Earle (2007). The central selective pressures these authors identify are population growth, technological development, and environmental constraints, from which they trace out development from family-group societies to nation states, combining a “multilinear theory of alternative lines of development arising from unique environmental and historical conditions” (Johnson and Earle 2007: 27).

Among nonhuman species, selective pressures are marked by natural events such as competition with other species or changes in the environment. But it is possible for human cultures themselves to act as a selective pressure too. An example, presented above, is the effect of language on the human brain. Once language became a part of human culture, humans could do a new thing: *share information*. Then, the practical usefulness of sharing information created a selective pressure for larger brains, which could learn and remember greater amounts of information (D’Andrade 2001). Another example is the evolution of the human hand. The human use of sharp stones as tools and weapons evolved through external environmental selective pressures. Once created, stone tool use asserted selective pressure for a change in the structure of the thumb and

fingers of the hand so that the object, say a stone, could be held in a precision grip between an opposable thumb and the other fingers. This process, by which an organism changes its environment and thus alters the selective pressure on itself, has been thought of as evolutionary *niche construction*. The niche model has been developed by John Odling-Smee and others (Odling-Smee et al. 2003). Culture is not the only example of such a niche. A few other kinds of environmental changes effected by organisms themselves, that then exercise selective pressure back on the original population, are beaver dams, termite mounds, and bee hives.

The niche model has been used by Peter Richerson and Robert Boyd to explain a variety of human instincts. Such a model is needed because genetic theory alone cannot account for a variety of human characteristics. The niche model untangles the complicated relations between genetic evolution and cultural evolution. For one example, most evolutionary theorists agree that genetic selection alone cannot account for the widespread occurrence of human cooperation. Alone, genetic selection on individuals would not be powerful enough to winnow out uncooperative persons because it is too slow and because it is subject to dilution by free riders and immigration (Richerson and Boyd 2005: 203). Richerson and Boyd conclude that human cooperation would have to have been a cultural intervention into human life. In their analysis, many of the distinctive characteristics of humans compared to primates are the result of cultural evolution due to selective pressures from norms such as that exacting cooperation from group members. They speculate that intergroup competition gave rise to culturally transmitted cooperative and other group-oriented norms. This set of norms became a niche, individual selection then favoring psychological dispositions that make individuals more likely to confer, and want to gain, social rewards for following a group's norms for cooperation and the like, and to impose, and want to avoid, social sanctions for disobeying them (Richerson and Boyd 2005: 195–196).

As a result of these processes of niche construction and adaptation to the new niche through natural selection, people are endowed with two sets of innate predispositions or “social instincts.” One set is composed of ancient genetic instincts shaped by kin selection and reciprocity, complex family life, and a potential for strong bonds of friendship characteristic of the primate lineage, predispositions we share with our primate ancestors. The other set of genetic instincts, which Richerson and Boyd call “tribal” instincts, enabled humans to interact cooperatively with large, symbolically defined groups of people. About the conflict between the two, they say:

These new tribal social instincts were superimposed onto human psychology without eliminating those that favor friends and kin. Thus, there is an inherent conflict built into human social life. The tribal instincts that support identification and cooperation in large groups are often at odds with selfishness, nepotism, and face-to-face reciprocity. (Richerson and Boyd 2005: 215)

These tribal instincts evolved within the world of latter day australopithecine and early homo erectus populations, as improved technology made possible larger and more stable groupings and a finer grained division of labor. A good example of the “inherent conflict” Richerson and Boyd allude to is Robert Paul’s (2015) hypothesis of a universal conflict between men’s urge to compete for mates and the collective need to suppress any such violent competition in the interests of in-group harmony and tranquility. As symbolically marked collectivities develop strong in-groups and out-groups, the importance of symbols and humanly constructed meanings increases.

For the psychologist Michael Tomasello, as for Richerson and Boyd, the most crucial human adaptation, one that nonhuman primates have to only limited extent, is “the understanding of conspecifics as intentional beings like the self” (Tomasello 1999: 56). While this capacity might have involved a number of different cognitive modules, Tomasello hypothesizes that this capacity to understand others as intentional mental agents like oneself was key to human evolution. This mental capacity, Tomasello supposes, is necessary for collaboration in the hunt, such collaboration being a forerunner of group cooperation. Tomasello’s and Richerson and Boyd’s competing explanations for why cooperation was initially adaptive for human groups are just two of several (for another scenario, see Burkhardt et al. 2009).

This cognitive capacity does not emerge all at once in development, but first appears around nine months of age. Human infants at this age, unlike the young of other primates, engage in “proto-conversations” with caregivers that involve face-to-face looking, touching, and vocalizing with clear turn-taking and mimicry of body movements. From nine to twelve months, a new set of behaviors emerges, called “joint attention.” Joint attention is when the infant alerts another to an object by pointing, eye-gaze or other signaling. At about the same age, a whole suite of other behaviors begin, including imitation of both instrumental and arbitrary acts and use of imperative gestures. Tomasello argues that joint

attentional behaviors are not just isolated, independently learned behaviors, but rather reflect the infants' overall understanding of other persons as having perceptions and goals, like themselves (Tomasello 1999: 64).

For Tomasello, these and other human social behaviors that distinguish human children from nonhuman primates are a result of the selective pressures in the cultural niche that surrounds human infants and children.

Human beings are designed to work in a certain kind of social environment, and without it developing youngsters ... would not develop normally either socially or cognitively. That certain kind of social environment is what we call culture, and it is simply the species-typical and species unique "ontogenetic niche" for human development. (Tomasello 1999: 78–79)

Thus, Tomasello uses the evolutionary niche model to trace out the interacting genetic and cultural processes in human development. As humans made culture, culture made humans.

A fairly large number of human propensities have been proposed to have been shaped by culture. As Richerson and Boyd say:

Tribal social instincts evolved in social environments shaped by cultural processes. This new social world, a result of rapid cultural adaptation, drove the evolution of novel social instincts in our lineage ... Such environments favored the evolution of a suite new social instinct suited to life in such groups, including a psychology which 'expects' life to be structured by moral norms and is designed to learn and internalize such norms; new emotions, such as shame and guilt, which increase the chance norms will be followed; and a psychology that 'expects' the social world to be divided into symbolically marked groups. (Richerson and Boyd 2005: 214)

They continue:

Eventually human societies diverged from those of other apes and came to resemble hunting-gathering societies of the ethnographic record. We think the evidence suggests that about one hundred thousand years ago, most people lived in tribal scale societies. These societies were based on in-group cooperation where in-groups of a few thousand were marked by language, ritual practices, dress, and the like. Social relations were egalitarian, political power was diffuse, and people were ready to punish transgressions of social norms, even when personal interests were not directly at stake. (Richerson and Boyd 2005: 214)

These authors conclude with a view of the human tragedy that occurs as new tribal social instincts compete with old primate instincts. This competition creates an inherent conflict in human life. Tribal instincts that are involved in identification and cooperation in large groups conflict with ancient genetic instincts toward selfishness, nepotism, and face-to-face reciprocity. Deep loyalty to family and friends conflicts with loyalties to tribe, caste, and nation. Increasingly, as societies become more complex, groups of elites are able to reward themselves disproportionately from public resources.

POWERS OF CULTURE

This chapter has been an attempt to identify processes that illustrate the powers of *culture* as causal forces. Despite the richness of this old hypothesis, it seems to have fallen out of favor. As recounted at the beginning of this chapter, even the use of the word *culture* is now avoided by many of those writing in anthropology journals. But culture can hardly be left out of the equation.

The account presented here does include culture, and demonstrates the explanatory powers of doing so. Here, culture is super-organic; contains values that can be cultural while not personal; is embedded in various lifeworlds which are not the same as the general culture; is a major evolutionary force through gene-culture interaction in cultural niches; is responsible for creating the modern psychological dispositions of humans, resulting in a moral-norm-governed world; and engenders conflicts, for example when lifeworlds are colonized or when contradictory psychological dispositions come into play.

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Culture from the Perspective of Dual Inheritance

Robert A. Paul

INTRODUCTION

Humans achieve fully realized maturity through a process of self-creation guided by two sets of information.¹ One is innate, transmitted through the genes (and associated material in the gametes), arrayed in a particular pattern on the molecule DNA bequeathed to new humans in the act of reproduction by their parents. The other is acquired in the course of their lifetimes through processes variously called enculturation, socialization, or just “learning.” Both types of information transmission are essential to the growth, survival, and flourishing of a human person: a human begins life as a fertilized egg and constructs itself starting with embryonic development through a process prescribed in the DNA, though guided as well by epigenetic processes that influence the timing of expression or suppression of the genetic instructions replicated in the nucleus of each new cell. But well before birth, environmental factors also influence the developing human, mainly via the mother’s metabolism as well as through her actions and vocalizations. After birth, the

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genetically guided development continues apace, while enculturation more and more shapes and adds to the innately prescribed but necessarily incomplete and mutable growth trajectory. Humans cannot, and do not, grow to maturity without interactions with more mature others, from whom knowledge and skills crucial to survival and participation in the environment, human and nonhuman alike, are acquired.

It is certainly the case that animals of other kinds besides humans acquire some skills through imitation of conspecifics in the process referred to as “social learning.” However, in no other animal is this dimension of life so highly developed as it is in humans, nor, more importantly, is it the case in any other species that without the learned behaviors, an individual animal simply could not live. The degree to which humans depend on extragenetic sources of knowledge is nicely illustrated in a thought experiment imagined by Joseph Henrich, in which he asks us to imagine a “Survivor” game placing fifty humans and fifty capuchin monkeys in the jungles of Costa Rica, without equipment of any kind, and seeing who did better at the challenge of coping after two years.

Who would you bet on, the monkeys or you and your colleagues? Well, do you know how to make arrows, nets, and shelters? Do you know which plants or insects are toxic ... or how to detoxify them? Can you start a fire without matches or cook without a pot? Can you manufacture a fishhook?

.... Let’s face it, chances are your human team would lose, and lose badly. (Henrich 2015: 2)

Without the technical products and know-how afforded us by inherited culture, humans would probably lose badly to the point of dying; Henrich offers several historical examples of this actually happening to fairly savvy explorers, with the counterexample of a lone Native American woman who survived on an island off the coast of California for eighteen years, thanks to the accumulated cultural knowledge she had acquired growing up there before all the other inhabitants of the island were evacuated and she was accidentally left behind. We are, as Freud nicely put it, “prosthetic gods.”

“Dual inheritance” refers to the simple empirical fact that humans require information provided both by genetic inheritance and by cultural inheritance. But how are these two forms of information transmission related to each other? While the theory called “Dual Inheritance

Theory” (DIT), originally formulated by two biologists, Robert Boyd and Peter Richerson (1985), and taken up by numerous scholars in various fields, postulates that the two channels of inheritance are in principle quite (though not completely) independent as replicators, in practice, most such thinkers assume that the cultural channel, while external to the biological process of genetic reproduction, serves for the most part to enhance adaptive advantage, understood in terms of the usual evolutionary standard of inclusive genetic reproductive fitness.

While agreeing with many of the arguments in the now quite rich literature on DIT, I also have a fundamental disagreement with an important aspect of this line of thinking, in that I see the relationship between the two forms of inheritance as necessarily in some degree of conflict with each other because they intrinsically possess quite different characteristics and agendas. This conflict leads to a distinctively divided human condition, which shows up both in individuals and in the forms taken by the actual human sociocultural systems documented in the vast ethnographic literature. It was based on the analyses of examples drawn from this vast fund of data that I put forward a different understanding of dual inheritance in my book, with a title conveying in two words the burden of my argument: *Mixed Messages* (2015). My view stems from a different idea about what culture is and how it works than the one prevalent among even the most culturally sophisticated DIT thinkers.

ARE CULTURES “POPULATIONS?”

Just at the historical moment when many cultural anthropologists were falling all over themselves to disavow the concept of “culture” that had been until the 1990s the cornerstone and key symbol of the field of anthropology itself, many biological thinkers were coming up against the conundrums of human life and its relations to the rest of living nature and rushing to join the culture club. DIT was one manifestation of this trend (I have outlined its genealogy in the first chapter of my book). Another impetus came from students of animal behavior, who, eager to erase any line separating humans from other living beings (often for reasons more philosophical and political than scientific), wanted to show that many animals, too, had culture, and therefore humans could not claim some kind of unique and special status in the universe. As Kim Hill (2009: 272) writes, “Biologists have been particularly enthralled with social transmission of feeding techniques and technology, from the

milk-bottle-opening titmice to sponge using dolphins and tool-wielding great apes.” But when they turned to anthropologists to find out what culture was, at just the moment at which the anthropologists were jettisoning the whole idea, the best they could usually do was to turn to Sir Edward Tylor’s (1871) classical “complex whole”; now well into its dotage, or to Alfred Kroeber and Clyde Kluckhohn’s (1952) legendary two hundred plus definitions of culture, or to introductory textbooks each of which provide a different definition of culture.² Recoiling in dismay and confusion, many then made up their own definition of culture according to which their favorite animal species could be shown to have it. The usual definition from the biologists was some version of culture as “socially transmitted information.” Hence, “social learning” emerged as the key concept said to unify animal and human cultural phenomena. In this perspective, social learning is defined in opposition to individual learning from lived experience: in social learning, a behavior is copied from one individual by another.

The new theories that thus arose had as a common denominator the fact that they were formulated either by biologists, or by scholars in other fields (including anthropology) whose primary orientation was biological and evolutionary. The result has been that, as was only to be expected, these thinkers relied on firmly established scientific principles from the “Modern Synthesis” of evolutionary theory, which had proven so useful in the understanding of nonhuman organisms, when concocting their own theory of culture and how it works. Primary among these principles is thinking of groups as “populations” of individual organisms. Since natural selection is, in the Modern Synthesis, only thought to occur through the relative reproductive success or failure of genetic alleles distributed among individual organisms in a population, this outcome could be modeled and measured by statistical and other mathematical techniques that proved to have strong predictive value. According to this view, alleles associated with traits that bestow inclusive reproductive fitness on phenotypic organisms will spread through the population at the genetic level, thus continuously shaping and altering the composition of the collective gene pool.

By analogy, such thinkers reasoned, “culture” too could be thought of as a collection of traits which, like genetic traits, could spread or decrease in a given population, depending on their successful transmission through social learning from one individual to another. These traits would then reproduce themselves, it was argued, just as genes do—not through biological reproduction and the resultant rates of birth and

mortality of individuals in a population, but rather through sharing knowledge of how to perform a particular cultural trait, such as how to make a bow and arrow, or choose a marital partner, across a population through repeated acts of social learning. These acts of learning, being cultural, need not occur between genetic kin, and so they constitute a second track or channel of information transmission in a group.

DIT further specifies that because genetic and cultural traits are, or at least can be, transmitted by different means along different lines, there is room for cultural traits to diverge from the service of adaptive fitness of individuals, because one of the key determinants of the flow of a trait in a population will be evolved individual preferences about whom one should imitate in learning a new behavior. But choosing to copy the traits exhibited by a successful, powerful, or prestigious individual does not guarantee biological reproductive success, since these traits may be idiosyncratic and in any event, traveling along cultural rather than genetic lines, may endow one with cultural, but not genetic, “fitness.” Thus, a person may have gained prestige in society by remaining celibate, or by sacrificing him- or herself for the group, but imitating that person is clearly not going to lead to genetic reproductive success. This consideration, among others, raises the question of whether the population model is the best way to think about humans and their culture. I will argue that it is not.

CULTURE AND SOCIETY

So far, I have not distinguished between the general human capacity for transmitting necessary information across generations by nongenetic means, and the fact that there is wide variation in the actual information that is transmitted. Whereas there is a basic uniformity in the human genome that assures that we are all, despite minor physical differences, one species, there is no overarching human “culture”; rather, there are a great many widely varying ensembles of nongenetically transmitted information: Bororos do not learn how to build and paddle kayaks; Inuit do not learn how to make and use blowguns. Furthermore, whether or not one is comfortable thinking of aspects of learned information as “traits,” the assemblages of what one needs to know have seemed to anthropologists, at least those of past generations and mainly in America, to be distinctive of particular groups of people, and these clusters are to be thought of as “cultures” with an “s”. It is this latter use of the term “culture” that has recently gone out of favor in the field, for a whole

host of reasons that are beyond the scope of this paper. (It will readily be seen that I do not agree with these criticisms.)

Cultures are thus closely linked with particular groups of people who, however, do not constitute mere collectivities of individuals, comparable to herds or flocks, but are members of “societies.” This term (favored by British anthropologists in preference to “cultures”) implies a level of internal organization, coordination, and cooperation among the members of the group that makes their group life truly “social.” It is one of the premises of my book that the two concepts—culture and society—are inseparable. Cultures do not hover free-floating in the air; they are aspects of human societies, and indeed it is they that, as I will show, enable distinctively human societies to form. And since human societies are made possible by culture, the two, often separated for analytic purposes, in fact depend upon and entail each other. Therefore, as I see it, the entities anthropologists have studied in their ethnographies are best thought of as “sociocultural systems.”

Now many nonhuman organisms, from ants to porpoises, also live in groups that we can characterize meaningfully as societies, in that there is some degree of cooperation and coordination among the members of the group. Some kinds of animals, especially our primate relatives, can, as Frans deWaal (2016) argues, cooperate, feel empathy for conspecifics, and act on the basis of what we can interpret as a sense of justice and fair play. Animals as different as wolves, wild dogs, hyenas, chimpanzees, and killer whales can all hunt cooperatively and with something like organized coordination. Elephants are capable of long-lasting ties of kinship and friendship, show concern for other herd members, rear young with a degree of cooperation, and seem to mourn their dead.

However, there is one fact that stands out among all the nonhuman social animals in contrast to humans: with the exception of chimpanzees, all this good social behavior and collective hunting takes place in societies that separate (or otherwise control) unrelated sexually mature males from continuous participation in a group centrally formed by females and their immature young. This is because the males’ competition for mating opportunities with the females would be too disruptive to the group. Thus, the lovable bonobos and the ferocious hyenas both live in matriarchies in which the males are subordinate to the alpha females who form coalitions to keep the individual males in line. The highly prosocial elephant herds consist only of females and their immature offspring, while the males either form bachelor herds or live as solitaries; the same

is true of humpback whales. Killer whales are unique, in that they live their entire life in the matrilineal group into which they were born, and males do not transfer out as is the common higher mammalian pattern. Mating occurs only between individuals of different pods, which congregate periodically to render such unions between unrelated males and females possible.

Chimpanzees, which live in multimale, multifemale groups in which the members are not closely related genetically, are among the few exceptional species in which females rather than males transfer out, and the males can form coalitions to achieve power and status in the dominance hierarchy, hunt together, and form “war parties” that take on other groups. As our closest relatives, along with the bonobos, it makes evolutionary sense that chimpanzees share with humans the ability to form long-lasting, effective, cooperating groups of unrelated males. But what no species besides humans can do, however—even chimpanzees—is live in a society in which mating is internal to the group, with unrelated males forming dyadic bonds with unrelated females for the purpose of reproduction, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, forming both dyadic and more generalized bonds with unrelated others as fellow members of the larger group.

So, the question arises as to how and why only humans have this capacity, which has given human societies their distinctive form, and which has proved so enormously adaptive (as well as enormously destructive) for our species and for the rest of the realm of nature on earth. The answer, as I have proposed, is to be found in the fact that human societies are formed on the basis of culture. The potential for destructive rivalry among males for access to the females for purposes of reproductive success is offset among humans by at least a minimally effective sense of group solidarity with other males made possible by conditions that can only be achieved once human-type culture has evolved. What is it about human culture that enables it to perform this amazing feat?

HOW HUMAN CULTURE ENABLES HUMAN SOCIETY

Animals other than humans are able to form societies in the face of destructive male mating competition because of two key facets of reproductive life. One is that commonality of interest is possible between and among those individuals related to each other as parents, children,

or siblings, i.e., on the basis of the principle of inclusive fitness, because they have many genes in common. Therefore, serving the interests of the closely related other individuals enhances the reproduction of copies of the same genes that they also need to disseminate themselves in order to achieve reproductive success. The other factor is whatever it may be that achieves the suppression of potentially fertile copulation between these same close genetic relatives. It does not matter whether we think of this suppression as innate or caused by environmental factors, or both; the effect of it is to allow cooperation among related males without any squabbling over copulation rights within the society. Thus, among killer whales, both the male and female offspring can live and cooperate together in a single matrilineal unit for life because they are all siblings descended from the same mother. Since such matrilineal units share a single dialect or variation on killer whale vocalization, it might be postulated that there is innate inhibition of mating with individuals who sing the same songs, while mating occurs only with those who vocalize differently.

The first aspect of human culture that overrides these two principles, which together limit cooperation to closely related kin, is the institution of marriage. Like any institution, as John Searle (2010) has argued, the setting up of a rule can only be achieved once a species has language (and other symbolic systems) with which to make declarative statements. Only humans have language, though many cetaceans have complex systems of acoustic communication.³ A marriage rule is one whereby people can be named and placed in kinship and/or marriage categories that determine whether they are suitable mates for any particular individual. Thus, Vernon Reynolds (1994), after showing that nonhuman primates have kinship groupings and lineages and can recognize kin, argues that “the main departure from the primate model in human evolution came with the establishment of marriage systems” (137). This concept he in turn attributes to Meyer Fortes (1983), who, like Searle, places the emphasis on the ability to create “rules” such as, for example, in the anthropological context, those prescribing or enjoining cross-cousin marriage. As Claude Lévi-Strauss argued (1969), the rule of incest suppression or inbreeding avoidance (the prevalence of which in the nonhuman world was not sufficiently understood when he wrote) is the reverse side of the institution of spouse exchange. This key human achievement is to be itself understood on the basis of the profound insight of Marcel Mauss (1990) about the elementary nature of human exchange

in general. (Mauss's concept, in turn, has been reinvented within evolutionary biology by Robert Trivers (1971) in the theory of "reciprocal altruism," whereby unrelated individuals, including males, human and nonhuman alike, can agree to be altruistic with an unrelated other if there is a reasonable expectation that the favor will be returned. This is said to allow for the expansion of social interactions beyond the immediate circle of genetic kin.)

Marriage rules regulate the distribution of spouses so that, in principle, each male gets one (or a few—Levi-Strauss thought that men were inherently polygynous, and only practiced monogamy in elementary societies due to the scarcity of women). The existence of such rules already implies that of language and symbolic thought. Once these marriage rules are in place, people can, by means of culture, create what is often called "fictive kinship" whereby people are related not only to immediate genetic kin, but also to relatives of the second, third, fourth, and *n*th degrees, or to genetic kin of their spouses, to their relatives' spouses, or to "clan" members with no demonstrable real genetic or affinal tie to them. But culture does not stop at designating as kin many people who have only a tenuous or nonexistent genetic connection, but proceeds further by including all sorts of people with no known or real relationship of descent or affiliation, thus extending the categories of marriageable partners as well as of those with whom "incest avoidance" is the norm or practice.

The principle enabling the decisive move whereby culture gains its ascendancy over the imperatives of the genetic program (which is, to repeat for emphasis, devoted to the pursuit of inclusive reproductive fitness augmented by reciprocal altruism) is a different one than "inclusive fitness" in evolutionary terms. The biological evolutionary understanding of the nonhuman world allows one organism to act as though the fortunes of those bearing significant amounts of copies of its own genes are congruent with its own interests. Actions that further the fitness of one's genes are favored by natural selection whether executed by oneself or by a close kinsperson. At the social level, this means that one identifies with kin because they share one's genes, rather than competing with them as one does with non-kin. Close kin are thus to a degree identical as far as genetic reproduction is concerned.

But humans are able to create an alternative form of identification, or "kinship" with others that does not depend on shared genes, but rather on shared aspects of culture. Humans, by virtue of having a rich shared

symbolic life epitomized in language and pertaining to a particular social group, are informed by the same information at the cultural level, just as genetic close kin are at the genetic level. That is, through this identification with their cultural group, they can form stable relationships among themselves far beyond the range of close genetic kin, of a kind that eludes almost all other creatures. There is nothing “fictive” about such cultural kinship. Symbols are just as real as DNA, and create the same kind of shared interest through shared information guiding or setting the terms for one’s actions.

But how can mere linguistic signs and symbols regulate and hold in check the impetuous inner forces that impel organisms, including humans, to try to mate and if necessary to engage in fierce, even lethal competition with others striving for the same “selfish” goals? The answer lies in the differences in the intrinsic nature of the two channels of information transmission that are requisite in human life.

THE KEY DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TWO MODES OF INFORMATION TRANSMISSION

Genetic information reaches any new organism coming into existence in sexually reproducing species by the union of sperm and egg cells, and, in humans, as in most other higher animals, this occurs through copulation.⁴ In copulation, males implant cells from their store of reproductive gametes in the ova released from their inherited store by the females. This process takes place inside the body of the female. The resulting zygote then proceeds to multiply cells bearing in their nuclei the same strands of DNA in a developmental process, leading to the formation of a new phenotypic individual. The information encoded in the DNA is thus transferred from two parents to one (or occasionally two or more) offspring at a time. Because creating such offspring, bearing copies of one’s own and one’s sexual partner’s genes, is the ultimate (and really the only) goal of life according to the Modern Synthesis of evolutionary theory, it follows that from the perspective of the genetic system, fertile copulation occupies the highest rank in the evolutionary scale of value.

Cultural information, by contrast, is not transmitted by means of copulation, but is passed among individuals in the realm of the senses. When I imitate or learn from someone, it is because, for example, I can see what they are doing, or hear their instructions delivered verbally, or see,

touch, and feel the results of their labors, or adopt a certain body hexis because they have guided my body in a certain way, as when an instructor teaching me tennis actually moves my arm for me with his own hands. Social learning via imitation of, or more strongly put for humans, via identification with, the “teacher” (who, of course, may or may not be intentionally trying to teach) certainly plays a considerable role in the transmission of cultural knowledge and skill. But humans also possess a more potent system of information transmission that runs parallel to, but is different from and independent of, the genetic system. Humans participate in a collective system of shared symbolic codes, of which the prime exemplar is language (though there are a great variety of modes of symbolic communication, beyond language, including such things as music, art styles, body adornments, village layouts, house design, rituals and ritual objects, and so on). What makes all these things “symbolic” is that they are examples of intentionally shaped aspects of the material world, whose significant form communicates meaning to those who are able to interpret them, because their own being has been “informed” by the codes in which they are registered. Thus, to use language as the example, the code consists of sound waves that have been modified by the human vocal apparatus to create meaningful contrasting elements that, when combined at higher levels, are capable of conveying a vast range of information. Enculturation involves learning this code so that one can also receive any information that is encoded in it, then being informed by that information.

If culture is in large measure, though by no means entirely, a set of systems of symbols in this broad sense, as was proposed most forcefully and eloquently by Clifford Geertz (1973),⁵ the first thing to clarify about it is that it is real; it exists in the same way other things exist. This assertion is necessary because it has been common, both within anthropology and among scholars in other disciplines, including among many evolutionary thinkers skeptical about the importance of culture, to assume that culture is not a thing that exists, but rather an abstraction made by the ethnographic observer, or else something that exists in the realm of the “ideal” or “immaterial.” Since in the modern scientific view that (rightly) rejects Cartesian dualism there is no immaterial realm, to place culture in that status is to deny its existence. I will cite only two very brief but clear and illustrative examples.

W. Penn Handwerker, in a recent book on the evolution of human culture, writes: “Until recently... people who sensed the power of cultures

could not explain how cultures - *which, as Ward Goodenough pointed out, consisted of nothing more substantive than abstractions produced by the ethnographer* - exerted coercive force" (2015: 17, my emphasis). And Michael Carrithers, in a book called *Why Humans Have Cultures*, writes that the emphasis on culture "fails fully to accept that humans, in the first instance, relate to each other, not to *the abstraction of culture*" (1992: 35, my emphasis). Carrithers continues, rebutting Leslie White's idea of the importance of symbols in culture, "On this showing the only significant, the only really real, features of the human species comprise 1) each individual alone, 2) the world of objects, and 3) *that immaterial object, the veil between them, culture*" (1992: 36, my emphasis).

Contrary to the position taken by these two anthropologists, symbols are neither abstractions invented or imposed by the ethnographer nor immaterial; they are material phenomena to which has been given significant form, to use Susanne Langer's (1957) apt phrase; they are just as real as genes, and in a very analogous way, in that they are able to use a code to receive, store, and transmit information. D'Andrade (this volume) too, like Geertz before him, asserts that symbols and the culture they constitute exist on a distinct ontological level.

The passage from Handwerker cited above alerts us to a second key feature of human culture: it consists in large measure and to a crucial degree in elaborate and vastly generative systems of symbols that are "shared." Let us contrast them with the genes: In any given human society, the genes that allow close relatives to cooperate, despite the competitive imperatives of genetic inheritance, are shared only within the first degree of biological relatedness. Their "inclusive fitness" effect wears thin rapidly beyond the immediate nuclear family (which is presumably why people practicing real cross-cousin marriage were not selected out). This fact is what limits many nonhuman societies in size and scope. Wolf packs, for example, consist of a single mating pair and their partly grown but not fully sexually mature offspring.

But the essential feature of the symbols that are part of a viable sociocultural system is that they are shared if not universally, then very widely far beyond the range of those related by genetic kinship. And, as I argued above, those that share identical information, whether genetic or symbolic, identify with each other as being the same in the sense of having the same long-term goals. Thus, as Joan Silk and Robert Boyd write, "Although other animals can be altruistic, our species is unusual because our altruistic impulses extend to people who lie outside the circle of close kin and beyond networks of

reciprocating partners” (2010: 223). Cultural symbolism, available to and thus shared by many or all in a society, creates a different and far more inclusive set of individuals than those who fall within the range of inclusive genetic fitness.

In his contribution to a collection of essays on the question of animal “culture,” Kim Hill—the sole author in that book to have actually done extensive ethnographic field research (among the Ache of Paraguay)—describes how he was led to abandon his former commitment to the idea that human groups, like nonhuman groups, were shaped by adaptive responses to the environment alone, and to accept the idea that “human culture should be considered in all explanations of intergroup behavioral variability in humans” (Hill 2009: 270). One of the main reasons for his change of heart was his realizing on the basis of an analysis of his own comparative database that

the strongest predictor of almost any hunter-gatherer pattern, whether it be polygyny level, infanticide rates, warfare, food taboos, post-marital residence patterns, child-rearing practices, puberty rituals, or body piercings, was “ethnolinguistic membership.” Groups from the same language families were often remarkably similar in some dimensions and in improbable ways even when they lived in different ecologies and somewhat distant from each other... I began to recognize that most of my colleagues who had studied human behavior from an adaptive perspective (behavioral ecologists and evolutionary psychologists) had mainly avoided the issue of “culture”. (Hill 2009: 271)

In other words, Hill discovered that contrary to his own and his colleagues’ expectations about behavior being simply “adaptive” and thus deeply and exhaustively connected and responsive to environmental conditions, the characteristic of shared symbolic forms—“ethnolinguistic membership”—of different “cultures” overrode the effects of environmental determinism.

The conclusion is this: Among most species, genetic reproduction can produce small family-sized groups, or larger ones on the condition that unrelated males are either excluded or allowed access only on a short-term seasonal basis for mating, or are dominated by the females and prevented from forming coalitions. Among humans, however, because of the characteristic of symbol systems that they can be shared by many people whether genetically related or not, culturally coded information can override, counter, or modulate practices consistent with the genetic program.

Such practices include otherwise destructive male–male mating competition, which plays a central role in the argument of my book. Norms, values, regulations, and the like are not vague free floating wraith-like entities or inventions of the ethnographer; they exist and are conveyed to individual actors by means of a replicating code that other animals do not possess—symbolic culture.

Furthermore, because it is precisely one of the tasks of human culture to regulate mating by means of linguistically and otherwise symbolized marriage rules in order to maintain social harmony in a group containing many genetically unrelated males and females, it is a crucial aspect of cultural symbols that unlike genetic instructions they are not conveyed by sexual means. A society needs new generations to populate and thus recreate itself across time, certainly; and, since the most obvious and common way to do this is through sexual reproduction within the group,⁶ copulation cannot be dispensed with. But it must be kept within cultural guidelines to ensure a degree of lasting harmony. There is thus implicit within this arrangement a devaluation of sexual reproduction as something “animal like,” in the sense of “unregulated,” that must be kept under cultural control.

This, then, was the other reason Hill rejected his former strictly ecologically deterministic beliefs about human society: The hunter-gatherers with whom he was personally familiar, as well as the ones he encountered in the literature, were insulted by any suggestion that humans were like animals, and for a very specific reason:

Mardu Australian Aborigines were reported to identify with animals but viewed them as beneath humans because they copulated incestuously and failed to adhere to the laws of kinship. The Hiwi of Venezuela pointed out that it was offensive to suggest that humans were “just another animal” because “animals have no shame” (i.e. guilt associated with breaking social rules). (Hill 2009: 270)

Because of the different modes by which cultural and information traverses generations, therefore, two different types of groups are to be found in human societies: One is the group of a sexually reproducing pair, usually (though not universally) joined by some legitimizing institution we call “marriage.” The other is the more inclusive group that encompasses these smaller reproducing units and is held together by shared symbolic systems, including codes for conduct, that bind people

into wider and more complex societies. The reach of “altruism,” that is, identification with others to the point of seeing their interests as equal to or even overriding one’s own, can thus extend beyond nepotism based on genetic kinship and include all individuals who have learned the same symbolic code in the course of their enculturation. At the same time, potentially fertile sexual activity is first of all regulated by marriage rules, and secondly devalued and stigmatized unless regulated by clearly understood symbolically encoded norms, and even then commonly confined to a separate sequestered reproductive realm within which copulation, otherwise banished from social life, is permitted.

This does not mean, of course, that the individuals comprising a society are all alike and that society is thus harmonious, though its official presentation of itself to itself may insist that this is the case. For one thing, the symbolic systems themselves are often contradictory, and besides, knowing the rule and obeying it are two very different kettles of fish, as Melford Spiro (1997) has emphasized. There are usually many and often contradictory codes in circulation in any human society. In particular, and importantly, the self-serving imperatives, and the powerful imperatives of sex and aggression humans have evolved to serve the genetic program, ensure that there is always a conflict between what we sometime think of as our “higher natures,” that is, our adherence to wider societal norms, and our more self-serving but forceful impulses.

Jonathan Haidt (2012) expressed the dual nature of human beings and of human societies pithily when he wrote that humans are 90% chimps and 10% bees; that is, that we live governed by both within the narrower confines of the genetic program, rather like the chimpanzees, and also to one degree or another, but never totally or even very consistently, by the wider group identification afforded via the cultural program and its moral system, like a hive of bees.

The novelist Boris Akunin nicely captured this picture of the human situation in a passage describing life in a fictional Russian village on the Volga:

Well, people are only people. Although Christ told us to love all alike, that is something of which only the holy hermits are capable, but ordinary mortals have friends and relatives – and one good turn always deserves another.... In these parts, too, people “look after their own” and oppress their enemies when they get the chance, and scratch the back of the person who scratched theirs. (Akunin 2007: 140)

Or, in other words, we pay lip service to our altruistic group ideals, and occasionally even live by them, but in the everyday world, we commonly operate on the basis of inclusive fitness and reciprocal altruism.

CULTURE AND THE PUBLIC ARENA

So far, I have said nothing that I believe is incompatible with DIT as formulated by its principal exponents. The sharing of cultural symbolism can clearly be conceptualized, as it is by most DIT theorists, as a dyadic exchange of information, just as is fertile copulation; if enough such dyads reproduce the cultural symbols simultaneously, then there is the potential for the kind of symbolic mutual identification I have discussed above. And as I have also pointed out, DIT recognizes that cultural information transfer need not be, and often is not, dyadic: both the teachers and especially the learners can be multiple for the same transaction, as when an orator speaks to an audience, or an individual composes a new song which she or he then teaches to many comrades who then also sing it; or many other such possibilities which it is easy to call to mind. But even with this in view, there is a dimension of sociocultural life that is not addressed in the standard DIT formulation. This is that culture is a collective phenomenon, and thus a characteristic of groups of individuals, not of individuals (though, of course, individuals actively participate in and constitute and create it). Here is where population thinking seems to me inadequate, since it does not account for the fact that a sociocultural system is composed of individuals, but is not reducible to the actions and choices of those individuals, any more than the actions of an organism can be adequately described as the summed actions of its constituent individual cells. In both cases, there are relations among the parts and a degree of organization at the collective level that makes it possible to identify the collective entity as something in its own right with its own distinctive features, relationships, rules, and organization.

It is doubtless the case, as DIT theorists argue, that cultural information exists in individual minds, encoded in some way in neural structures (though no single individual can encompass all the information in a cultural system in his/her mind). But that is not the only place that cultural information is encoded: as I have explained and emphasized in my book, symbols exist in the material world outside of human minds, as significantly formed material entities, that can be perceived by the senses. Thus, to take language again as a case, language exists as patterned,

structured, and organized fluctuations of sound waves in the external world. And—crucially—it exists in that form before it gets into any individual’s brain. A human infant enters the world with whatever genetic equipment it requires to learn a human language, but it only learns the language because that language is already being spoken all around it. The language is thus in this very real sense out in the world in structured material form before it makes its way into anyone’s brain (the adults speaking the language that the infant learns were of course once infants themselves, after all).

A unique feature of human life is best explicable with this observation in mind. This is that whereas one may describe the behavior patterns of most nonhumans in terms of their function in leading to survival and reproductive success, there is a wide range of human phenomena that do not conform to this expectation, and often seem to defy it outright. These phenomena lead not to the genetic reproductive success of individuals in the society, but rather to the reproductive success of the sociocultural system itself and of the symbol systems that constitute and enable it. Among a whole host of cultural phenomena in this category, which are almost absent completely even among our close primate relatives, are such things as prestige, honor, shame, “face,” guilt, pride, envy, reputation, gossip, rumor, scandal, and many others. What is common to them all is that they are aspects of life in the public arena, largely constructed in the collective speech of the community.

The public arena is that space, partly real, and partly virtual or even imaginary (though nonetheless “real” for all that, existing both in the symbol systems and in people’s neural systems) in which social activity is carried out. It is created by what may be called the cultural program, enjoining therefore a separate set of actions from those serving the “genetic program” that are by convention excluded from it. (I hasten to stress that the activities confined to the private reproductive sphere are, of course, themselves construed in cultural forms different from and often conflicting with the discourse appropriate to the public arena; they are not simply unmediated emanations of our biology, though they have the “biological” goals of the genetic program at their root.)

In this public arena, individuals are on public display in roles, assigned or assumed, that give them a part to play in the larger sociocultural system and its constituent institutions, such as the system of economic production, the market, politics, ritual life, war, games, and so on. These roles they may perform well or badly, and publicly recognized value is

assigned to their performance. The institutions and the roles individuals play in these institutions are “culturally constructed,” and the parts played in them by individuals vary along such dimensions as age and gender, in the most elementary case, but reach greater and greater degrees of complexity, up to the vast multitude of competing roles composing contemporary societies. One of the most elementary forms of activity in the public realm that we have understood since Emile Durkheim (1915) to play a key role in creating group cohesion, is the coordinated performance of dance and music, which is such a vital and widely practiced dimension of social life. Another such public activity is ritual. Indeed, insofar as ritual is a precisely coordinated and stereotyped collective activity performed largely for its own sake, it may be described as the place where the sociality of a sociocultural system recreates itself: rituals are the reproductive organs, so to speak, of human societies.⁷

Evolutionary thinkers have twisted themselves into pretzels in efforts to explain how these phenomena could be explained by more or less fanciful evolutionary just-so stories that try to show how despite appearances, they somehow serve to enhance the genetic fitness of individuals after all, or at least once did in the evolutionary past before they devolved into “symbolic” markers that no longer signal the adaptive advantage they are once supposed to have conferred. How much easier life would be for them if they were to just recognize that the cultural channel of information flow is a new and separate one that follows its own logic, dictated by the character of that system and its purposes and effects in human life as I have sketched them here! It emphatically does not necessarily have anyone’s genetic reproductive advantage as its reason for being—though it usually does in fact accomplish that, if indirectly. On the contrary, it is due to its ability to inhibit and counteract the genetic imperatives of sex and aggression that culture plays such a pivotal role in the construction of human societies. It was presumably for that very reason that it was evolved by natural selection in the first place. Cultural society is humanity’s most adaptive asset, and in order for it to exist, a counterfoil to the genetic program had to have been developed.

For individuals to become “enculturated” or “socialized” does not simply mean imitating the actions of others, though it does also involve that; it means coming to be able to participate more or less well in the already ongoing operation of the institutions always already present in the public arena, by assuming a place in the symbolic systems that constitute these institutions. It is not only the genes that reproduce themselves

in individual organisms; the symbolic system and the social system in which it is embedded also reproduce themselves over time, despite the mortality of individuals who compose this sociocultural system, by recruiting new members into itself. These are typically ones who have been produced for the group by means of sexual reproduction between group members linked in some sort of recognized “marriage,” and who are then inducted into the sociocultural system in the course of the processes of enculturation and socialization.

Therefore, one might propose that individuals are, by analogy, like the phenotypes produced by a genotype, only at the cultural level: they embody the cultural symbols and can perform or enact them, or work with them, and they can also pass them on to subsequent generations by turning from learners to teachers as they mature. But the difference between the gene pool and the symbolic system is that before the individual comes into existence, the gene pool consists of the sum of genetic information housed in the bodies of the individuals within the population, whereas the symbolic system precedes the individual by existing both in the brains of others, to be sure, but more importantly, in the public arena, as patterned or structured material forms that can inform many people up to and including the entire group. The obvious case is that of the shared language they all need to have learned in order to enter and be able to competently act in that arena. These symbols have a double life, as Bradd Shore (1996) has argued, in individual minds but also in interactions with others in an external realm constituted by and saturated by symbols that give meaning to the actions taking place within it. It is these symbols and the social institutions, norms, and values they construct that survive the death of the individuals in each generation, as the genes survive the death of the phenotypes that bear them.

Thus, individual human actions, far from simply conferring inclusive reproductive advantage on individuals in some “Machiavellian” way, also serve the opposing cultural goal of controlling, regulating, and where necessary or expedient suppressing the genetic program so as to allow an otherwise fractious group of individuals to maintain themselves as a functioning sociocultural system. Symbols get shared by virtue of being “out there” in the public arena, where new individuals confront and then internalize them. In this way, the desired cultural kinship that makes social harmony possible can be achieved and maintained over time, in the face of the impetus of the genetic program to set individuals against one another in the quest for genetic reproductive success. Furthermore,

because violent competition is much more likely among the males in many, indeed most, sociocultural systems, there are very commonly institutions within the wider society that are designed specifically for men, to create solidarity among them by shared participation in their own symbolically constructed public arena set aside for them. The men's house, with its associated ritual symbolism, so widely reported in one form or another in world ethnography, is a prototypical example of such a male institution.

ETHNOGRAPHIC EXAMPLES

I will give a few brief illustrations, taken from the ethnographic literature, of the life and role of the public arena, which, before the advent of modern long-distance travel and communication, was in most instances an actual public space in which the drama of social life got enacted. Thomas Gregor's account of the Mehinaku people of central Brazil is explicitly based on a "dramatistic" approach derived from thinkers such as G.H. Mead, Kenneth Burke, and Erving Goffman: a section heading in his book describes the Mehinaku village as "a Theater for Social Life." There he writes:

The area just in front of the men's house, in the geographical center of the village, is stage center for spectators. In fact this area of the plaza...is used as a stage for major public events, including daily wrestling matches, rituals, and public speeches...It is virtually impossible to walk across the plaza without being seen. People enjoy keeping an eye on the plaza because that is where the action is. Not only is the plaza center stage in being highly observable but it is also the interactional hub of the village. (Gregor 1977: 64-65)

This passage illustrates a couple of different and important aspects of the public arena. One is that it is literally where social interaction takes place; another is that everyone sees and knows what is happening there, with the implication that people's performances on this stage are always being observed, talked about, and evaluated. It is also the place where activities that promote solidarity, especially among the men, such as ritual, wrestling, and oratory, are performed.

Of another sociocultural system from a different part of the world, and at a different level of complexity, Clifford Geertz writes that Balinese

social life is “at once a solemn game and a studied drama ... Daily interaction is so ritualistic and religious activity so civic that it is difficult to tell where one leaves off and the other begins” (1973: 400). The regulating emotion of social interaction, *lek*, is what Geertz translates as “stage fright”:

Whatever its deeper causes, stage fright consists in a fear that ... an aesthetic illusion will not be maintained, that the actor will show through his part and the part thus dissolves into the actor... When this occurs ... the immediacy of the moment is felt with an excruciating intensity, and men become unwilling consociates locked in mutual embarrassment, as though they had inadvertently intruded upon one another’s privacy. (Geertz 1973: 402)

Actually, as it turned out, what all the renowned Balinese artistic ceremoniousness in the public arena was warding off, as we learned in the genocide of 1965, was not just the embarrassing failing of the public persona and the revelation of the private person, but the fact that this private person was entirely capable of murdering his consociates in their thousands if the usual public decorum was held in abeyance and open season was declared. Geertz’s (1973: 412–453) famous description of the Balinese obsession with cockfighting showed us the potential for violence inherent in the (male) group that was being contained not only by ritualized social interaction but also by formalized and displaced lethal competition enacted on behalf of men by their prized fighting cocks.

The public arena is not only a place where rivalry is expressed, whether in status blood-baths like cockfights or in nonlethal sporting competition such as the daily wrestling matches of the Mehinaku, but also the locus for the transmission of the collective shared information encoded in symbols. This transfer takes place even in the absence of any formalized institution, such as school, specifically designed for instruction in the group knowledge system. Thus, Philip Lewis writes of the Gnaou of Papua New Guinea that

When I questioned people about how they had learned or failed to learn about something, for example a myth, genealogies, or the meaning of some ritual action, they sometimes mentioned individuals who told them...or they said it was the sort of thing men used to talk about in the evening in the [men’s house] when they were lying on their beds before going off to sleep, or on rainy days when they hung around by the fireside. (Lewis 1980: 50)

In this instance, the public space is the men's house which is saturated with talk constructing, recalling, and imparting the central aspects of information that maintain the groupness of the group. Each of the men in the men's house being recipients of the same information, they become cultural kin who can identify with one another. The kinds of things talked about in the men's house are the building blocks of the wider social arena and the life within it; they do not put a stop to the pursuit of personal advantage, but, to some extent, they are able to transcend and limit it to maintain ongoing social harmony.

Finally, in Andalusia, in the south of Spain, as David Gilmore describes it, there exists a relatively atomistic society of in-turned family households loath to trust their neighbors and, despite their unfailingly polite public demeanor, one composed of individuals in constant more or less covert combat waged through the medium of speech. This speech takes place in the public arena—in “the street” or “the village”—which through constant gossip and rumor acts like a ubiquitous monitor of everyone's rising or falling reputation for either maintaining or violating community norms and expectations. Like the stock market relentlessly charting the ups and downs of companies and their shares, the “street” is constantly and publicly rating everyone in a competition for advantage in the arena of prestige and reputation. Like Gregor and Geertz, Gilmore employs a theatrical metaphor:

Each person in the Andalusian pueblo feels himself alone on center stage of a theater of personal accounting. All eyes upon him, a man, as head of an independent household and its public representative, must uphold his good name by the strictest conformity to shared values ... The criticism of his fellows has a habit of spreading by osmosis into a river of abuse ...⁸

The audience here which determines his fate is ever watchful, unforgiving, exacting. It is everyone and no one ... a single collective organism: the entire community acting as one ... *la gente* (the people), *el pueblo* (the town). (Gilmore 1987: 33)

The key social regulator is thus “*lo que diran*” (what they will say). The “they” who will gossip and bring down a suspected or accused violator of norms through malicious talk and backbiting is the generalized other of G. H. Mead, *das Man* of Heidegger, Lacan's “Big Other”: a collective entity greater than any individual and capable of constraining any individual by its superior power. No formal institution—the

state, the church, or a civic organization—has comparable influence in the Andalusian pueblo. Order is maintained by the ubiquitous controlled aggression inherent in the public judgment of the word on the street.

The one great communal event in an Andalusian village that publicly presents the entire village to itself, the annual Carnival, is not only a time for masked license in general, but more especially a festival of broadsides, scurrilous poems, and sung denunciations aimed at perceived violators of the social code of norms. As the Spanish proverb Gilmore (1987: 53) quotes has it, “the tongue has no teeth, but bites deeper.” Thus the symbolic system, epitomized by speech, is indeed able to wield enormous power because it seems to represent the collective will and opinion of the whole community in which one must live and be judged. It appears to emanate not from a single antagonistic other, but from an entity greater than the self that cannot be opposed without dire cost. It achieves this power not by sitting in anyone’s brain, though of course it does reside there as well, but because it is first of all quite literally “in the air.”

CONCLUSION: THE THREE-FACETED NATURE OF THE SOCIOCULTURAL SYSTEM

The picture of human social life that has become canonical in the mainstream evolutionary literature is that human culture is a higher development of capacities and features already present at least in rudimentary form elsewhere in the animal kingdom, and most particularly in those representing our recent primate heritage. These capacities and features include social learning, subspecies variation in community traditions, communication via vocalizing and gesturing, cooperation, reciprocity, empathy, a sense of fairness, and fellow feeling sometimes able to transcend the limits of close genetic kinship. I have no reason to quarrel with this picture, as far as it goes. Indeed, to deny that such precursors of human sociocultural life existed in the nonhuman realm would be a far less plausible position than the reverse.

DIT as practiced by many of its exponents amplifies this picture by proposing that thanks to an enhanced capacity for social learning, the human capacity for culture has created a second channel for the transgenerational transmission of information. This creates the possibility of multilevel selection, in which not only individuals but tightly knit groups of individuals compete for advantage (Wilson 2010).

In this view, genes, with the aid of cultural information that is generally adaptive and passed from one individual to another in social learning, are able to reproduce themselves by creating individuals who successfully compete for inclusive reproductive advantage and repeat that process over generations. In this picture, there are genes, and there are individuals—the genotype and the phenotype—and there are occasions of information transmission from one brain to another. But there is still no such “thing” as “culture.” I believe, this view is empirically incomplete and inadequate to account for human social life because it fails to recognize the existence of a track of encoded information that is as real as DNA, and just as vital to the very existence and survival of a human organism, that is, shared information encoded in cultural symbol systems, including not only language but all forms of significantly shaped, meaningful communication between and among people. This extragenetic code is in turn capable of creating societies that exist at a level of organization above the individual that is more inclusive than any individual within it.

If we acknowledge the reality of the cultural system as something that exists externally in the form of cultural symbolism, and has a level of internal organization separate from the internal organization of individual humans due to its essentially collective, communal nature, then an alternative, competing perspective comes into view. That is, just as genes, using skills inculcated by culture, create individuals who then reproduce these genes in new individuals, so cultural symbol systems, using human organisms constructed by means of genes, also reproduce themselves across generations. The reproduction of the cultural system (usually) requires the genetic production of new generations of recruits to populate it, but its “goals” are not identical with the goal of the genetic system. So, we can say that the cultural system retains the need for genetic reproduction to the extent that it needs it to populate itself over time, but that it also has its own agenda in which genetic reproduction is a problem to be managed, not the predominant goal. That goal is, like that of the genetic system, its own survival and reproduction.

Finally, of course, if we turn the multifaceted sociocultural system yet another way, a different facet reveals itself: human individuals too, once having come into existence, are, of course, not mindless puppets manipulated by two competing puppeteers, genes and cultures. Using both the genetic and cultural information bequeathed to them in the course of their ontogenesis, they alone actually live and reproduce themselves, either genetically or culturally (or both). Through the abilities they have

thanks to genetic and cultural inheritance, humans strategize actively and sometimes creatively to negotiate the social and environmental situations in which they actually find themselves.

Thus the tripartite formula for a complete picture of the interaction of genes, culture, and individuals is this:

- Genes use people informed by culture to reproduce themselves
- Culture uses people created by genes to reproduce itself
- People use information from genes and culture to live and reproduce themselves.

Any system of thought that seeks to reduce any of these facets of the human sociocultural system to the other(s), or ignores the irreducible necessity and often incompatibility of all three, seems to me to fall short of serving as a full account of the human condition. It is only in the complex interaction of these three dimensions that we find the key to understanding the totality of the human predicament.

NOTES

1. I use the word “information” in the ordinary language sense, not as in “information theory”; “instructions” would also be a good designation for what I mean.
2. What is frequently neglected in discussions of Kroeber and Kluckhohn’s book is that after reviewing a long list of definitions of culture, they did in the end formulate their own definition, which seems to me quite serviceable to this day: “Culture consists of patterns, explicit and implicit, of and for behavior acquired or transmitted by symbols, constituting the distinctive achievement of human groups, including their embodiment in artifacts; the essential core of culture consists of traditional (i.e., historically derived and selected) ideas and especially their attached values; culture systems may, on the one hand, be considered as products of action, on the other hand, as conditioning elements of further action” (1952: 357).
3. I have no investment in defending the uniqueness of human culture, which I see as an empirical fact, not a value. If on the basis of further research it can be shown that killer whales, for instance, have something resembling real language, then my assertions here will, of course, require modification. That, however, would not change my characterization of what human culture is and how it works.

4. This is, of course, no longer exclusively the case, thanks to new reproductive technologies; I can leave these very recent and localized developments to one side in the context of the present exposition.
5. Quite clearly on the model of Kroeber and Kluckhohn's definition, cited in footnote 2.
6. I have discussed some alternative ways to repopulate a sociocultural system in my 2015 book.
7. It is of interest to note that among some dolphins, males may synchronize such behaviors as surfacing in unison when they are consorting with a female. It has been suggested that such displays of synchrony are vital to mating, and "may act, for example, to reduce tensions between alliance members, which explains why the displays are more intense when there are females about, because both males are hoping to get lucky, and this creates some tension between the friends that needs diffusing" (Whitehead and Rendell 2015: 121).
8. Probably the best evocation of this ever-growing torrent of abuse, incidentally set in Andalusia, is Don Basilio's aria "La Calunnia" (calumny) from Rossini's *The Barber of Seville*.

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Kinship, Funerals, and the Durability of Culture in Chuuk

Edward D. Lowe

This chapter asks what processes might contribute to the historical durability of cultural beliefs and practices over time. This is not a new problem in anthropology. It reflects an enduring, if often neglected concern among psychological anthropologists with processes of cultural reproduction (e.g., D'Andrade 1992; Sapir 1924; Spiro 1987, 1997; Strauss and Quinn 1997). However, I find that studies of cultural reproduction have been largely displaced in recent decades in favor of a renewed interest in cultural diffusion, understood in terms of the accelerated globalization of cultural forms, and the proliferation of cultural hybrids of various kinds (Appadurai 1996). This renewed emphasis on the historically particular flows and entanglements of culture through time and space does not illuminate much in terms of how culture as a conceptual system connects to the beliefs and motivations of social actors who participate together in social practice (Spiro 1997; Strauss and Quinn 1997; Searle 1995, 2010). Also, it tells us little about why some publicly trafficked symbolic representations never really “make

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sense” or “catch on” among people as they go about their daily lives while others rapidly become the basis of strong convictions about what members of a community believes to be true, intend to do, or desire will (or will not) become true in the future (Spiro 1997). The emphasis on cultural flows and hybridity also leaves unsettled questions of how and why new generations continue to adopt the strong convictions regarding certain cultural representations as their parents, even as accelerated cultural flows present a host of potentially attractive alternatives.

I became interested in cultural reproduction partly because of an encounter with funerary rituals in the Micronesian islands of Chuuk Lagoon where I have been conducting fieldwork off and on since 1995. In 2012, I spent one month doing fieldwork with the initial idea of trying to understand how new communication technologies might matter for the ongoing production of kinship in the newly emerging diaspora of Chón Chuuk (“people of Chuuk” in the language of Chuuk Lagoon) that had grown rapidly since the mid-1990s. Upon arriving that June, I was thrust into a series of encounters that led me to quickly put aside my original plan, for I had arrived at a time of intense participation in funerals.

Immediately upon my arrival at the airport, members of my adoptive kin group picked me up and—realizing I was quite tired from my two-day journey—dropped me off at the local boat pool where their fiberglass skiff was moored and which would take us back later that day to the nearby island where they lived. They sped off in their pickup truck to “pay their respects” at the ritual that preceded the burial (*peeyas*¹) of one of their “mothers” (*iin*) in their father’s adoptive matrilineage. This was the second major funeral in which members of this kin group had participated in recent weeks. Over the course of the next three weeks, we would attend four more funerals. Another took place just a few weeks after my departure—a total of seven in just over two months. Funerary observances last anywhere between 6 and 10 days, so my entire field visit was overtaken by preparations for and attendance at various funerary events. Since funerals are the realization of principles of kinship in ritual form (see below), and provide a major vehicle for enacting kin ties distributed broadly in the emerging Chón Chuuk diaspora, I shifted my original research plans to gather ethnographic data about contemporary funerary rituals in the increasingly transnational space of Chón Chuuk kinship.

Once I was back in the United States, I began working through my fieldnotes from this trip and from earlier rounds of fieldwork to document the contemporary practices and shared understandings associated with funerals. I was also interested in understanding how the patterns I documented compared to those recorded by earlier ethnographers. There is a rich ethnographic literature for the islands of Chuuk Lagoon (formerly “Truk”) dating from the last decades of the nineteenth century to the present (e.g., Bollig 1927; Caughey 1977, 1980; Dernbach 2005; Gladwin and Sarason 1953; R. Goodenough 1970; W. Goodenough 1978; Kubary 1895; Lowe 2002, 2003; Lowe and Johnson 2007; Marshall 1977, 1978; Rubinstein 1995). After reading these ethnographic records carefully, I was surprised to find that a remarkably durable pattern of cultural practices remains.

My discovery led me to ask in this chapter “how and why such historical durability in funerary beliefs and practices is possible?” After all, the Chón Chuuk had endured successive waves of economic globalization, Westernization, and colonization since the late nineteenth century (Gladwin and Sarason 1953; Hezel 1983, 1995; Marshall 1978; Petersen 2009). As such, “culture” in Chuuk Lagoon might be expected to consist of a tangle of hybrid forms—ever shifting cultural “-scapes” (Appadurai 1996). And yet, certain central domains of belief and practice, such as those associated with funerary rituals, continue to be reproduced with only modest embellishments and amendments that incorporate elements of the global into locally meaningful and enduring forms.

To address the question of cultural reproduction, I draw on two theoretical frames: Searle’s (1995, 2010) theory of the creation and maintenance of social institutional reality and Spiro’s (1987, 1997) theory of cultural reproduction. Searle (2010) argues that three conditions are needed for the construction and maintenance of social institutions. The first is a language, rich enough to enable a class of speech acts Searle describes as “Status Function Declarations” (to be defined a bit further on), which can both assign status functions to persons or objects and relate these to “deontic powers” or the moral propositions that define the rights, duties, obligations, etc. associated with the status function so assigned. The second is the ritual enactment of status functions and associated deontic powers granted to the institution in question through Status Function Declarations. Third, there must exist in the members of

a community psychological states of “collective intentionality” that allow for the collective recognition or acceptance that institutional realities created through Status Function Declarations are legitimate, even if this is only done so begrudgingly.

In his most mature work on cultural reproduction, Spiro (1997) takes up many of the same themes as Searle. But, Searle focuses primarily on developing a theory of how language and speech acts create and maintain social institutional realities, offering only a sketch of a theory of mind that makes collective intentionality possible. Spiro (1997) theorizes processes of cultural internalization, the outcome of which corresponds well with Searle’s notion of collective intentionality. Spiro offers a more sophisticated account of internalization and collective intentionality (note: Spiro does not use this latter term), in which one can see levels of collective intentionality ranging from mere recognition of cultural propositions or acceptance as cliché with little emotional attachment to emotionally powerful convictions that certain cultural propositions are true and morally correct, along with strong motivations to engage in actions to uphold them.²

Given these points, I argue in this chapter that the historical durability of culture requires three things. First, it requires the ongoing availability of cultural propositions in a community that provide for the meaningful assignment of status functions associated with social institutions, with their deontic powers. Since funerals in Chuuk are public enactments of cultural understandings and sentiments associated with kinship in Chuuk, I outline in the first section below the cultural propositions associated with kinship in Chuuk. I specifically elaborate those cultural propositions associated with Searle’s notions of status functions and their associated deontic powers.

Second, the historical durability of cultural forms requires repeated Status Function Declarations (capitalization is used in the style of Searle 2010) that assign status functions of kinship to actual people and objects. Declarations are an important feature of ritual practice, which I will describe in relation to the historical durability of the ritual process associated with funerals in Chuuk. Funerals both allow Chón Chuuk to create an institutional reality that conforms to ideas and expressions of sentiment associated with kinship and to simultaneously represent this reality to others. In so doing, funerals become a key site for the social transmission of these cultural propositions. They are simultaneously important sites for the psychological acquisition and deeper internalization of these propositions.

Third, in an era where waves of (post)colonialism and globalization provide ready alternatives to locally traditional cultural propositions, people must not only continue to collectively accept or recognize the legitimacy of local cultural propositions, but these must also be related to powerful motivations. In other words, there must exist historically robust local processes for their deep internalization, such that active participation in the ritual practice allows for the fulfillment of needs or the expression of powerful sentiments (Spiro 1997). So, in the final section of this chapter, I will describe those historically enduring processes of internalization that make participation in funerals so emotionally compelling for many Chón Chuuk.

CULTURE DESCRIBED: THE ENDURING LANGUAGE FOR THE INSTITUTION OF KINSHIP IN CHUUK

In this section, I describe some important aspects of the linguistically elaborated cultural domain of kinship that are reproduced through funerary practices in Chuuk. These cultural understandings of kinship relate kinds of people (living and non-living), objects, land and reef, labor, objects, commodities, and substances together into a system of mutual relations that have long been the subject of anthropological studies of kinship (e.g., Goodenough 1978; Carsten 2004; Sahlins 2013).

As noted earlier, I find Searle's (1995, 2010) theory of human social ontologies useful (see also D'Andrade 1992, 2006, this volume; Durkheim 2001; Tomasello 2009, 2014; Turner 1969). Searle (1995, 2010) begins with the widely accepted claim that humans depend on each other for the satisfaction of their material needs. In order to meet the needs of a society's members, labor, distribution and exchange, and consumption are organized into social institutions (Durkheim 2001). One of the things culture does as a conceptual system is to elaborate ideas that define the various institutional statuses that people and objects can possess or occupy in this cultural system for meeting various needs, and their associated functions. Searle (2010: 94) calls these "status functions," which he defines as

a function that is performed by an object(s), person(s), or other sort of entity(ies) and which can only be performed in virtue of the fact that the community in which the function is performed assigns a certain status to the object, person, or entity in question, and the function is performed in

virtue of the collective acceptance or recognition of the object, person, or entity as having that status. (Searle 2010: 94)

Searle is describing the processes whereby humans create institutional realities from cultural propositions (D’Andrade 2006, this volume; Spiro 1997), by imposing “functions on objects or people where the objects and the people cannot perform the functions solely in virtue of their physical structure” (Searle 2010: 7). Status functions are created through cultural propositions that establish constitutive rules, often of the form X counts as Y, in the context of C. For example, there is nothing about the physical properties of the man who carries the title of *samon* or “local lineage chief” in Chuuk specifying that he should function as the leader of a kin-based local matrilineal group known as the *eterekes*. Indeed, the same could be said for the *eterekes* itself.

One way that the persons, objects, or other entities who are assigned social statuses gain their functions is through the further cultural elaboration of the “deontic powers” associated with those statuses (Searle 2010: 8). As already stated, by deontic powers, Searle (2010: 9) means moral propositions that define how a social status functions relative to the “rights, duties, obligations, requirements, permissions, authorizations, entitlements, and so on” that they carry. As moral propositions, deontic powers provide reasons for “acting that are independent of our inclinations and desires” (ibid.: 9). Psychological anthropologists have discussed the deontic powers of culture in terms of its “directive force” (D’Andrade 1992; Goodenough 1978; Strauss 1992). Deontic powers are not sufficient for governing people’s actions in society; we are as yet missing individual volition.

Goodenough (1978: 92–119) described the social organization of kinship in Chuuk similarly. He first presented kinship as a terminological system or a “set of relationship categories, designated by appropriate [categorical] terms, and rules [or propositions] by which membership in each category is determined.” In other words, as a system of social statuses that categorizes the possibilities of relatedness among kin along a number of dimensions. These categories distinguish types of kin and create the locally recognized possibilities for bringing people and things into conventionally recognized forms of kinship, or what Sahllins (2013: 2) describes as “mutuality of being.”

The contours of these understandings of kinship can be outlined as follows. First, people in Chuuk recognize two fundamental forms of

kinship relation, one is either *mwirimwir* (a matrilineal relation) to another kinsperson or *éfékúr* (related as a child of the male members of a matrilineal group, the matrilineage's "heirs" should the lineage's members die out) to that person. Matrilineal kin are further organized into a nested set of matrilineal kin groups. The most basic and intimate group is the *owunnun* or *fameni* (a term borrowed from the German *familie* and introduced by the German administration between 1903 and 1917). The *owunnun* includes a woman, her unmarried biological or adopted children, and her husband and is the group that is primarily responsible for everyday household production. The next larger group is the sibling-set (Goodenough called it a "sub-lineage") or *inepwiinénw*—i.e., mother (*iin*), adult same-sex siblings (*pwii*), and their children (*naaw*). Members of the sibling-set are often the most solidary and supportive group beyond the *owunnun*. Sibling-sets are organized further into local exogamous landholding matrilineal groups known as the *eterekes*, which Goodenough labeled the lineage. Members of an *eterekes* are the matrilineal descendants of a known ancestress or local lineage founder (*pwunefás*). The parcels of land belonging to the lineage are owned by all members equally as a corporate group. The *eterekes* provides one of the main traditional political officers in Chuuk, the lineage "chief" or *samon*, typically the oldest son of the oldest living woman in the *eterekes*. At the most expansive level, Chón Chuuk share membership in named, exogamous matrilineal groups known as *eyinang*, with their members widely dispersed among the islands and atolls of the greater region. People are also considered *éfékúr* to their father's *eyinang*, although in this case, there is nothing that they might inherit. People rarely interact with all members of their *eyinang*, particularly when these kin might live quite a distance away. However, as we shall see, funerals are a significant exception.

In addition to the organization of kin into kin groups, institutional relations of kinship are established through terms of reference that are used to distinguish one's consanguineal and affinal relatives. These terms are differentiated with reference to generation, sex of the relative referred to, and sex of the speaker (Goodenough 1978: 94). Kin terms include *iin-* for any woman of a higher generation that the speaker and *sam-* for any male of a higher generation. *Pwii-* is applied to anyone of one's own generation that is the same sex as the person, *feefin-* to any female who is of a male's own generation, and *mwongey-* or *mwááni-* to any male who is of a female's own generation. *Naaw-* is used for anyone of a lower generation. Affinal kin are termed similarly except for members of one's

own generation. So, relatives of one's spouse who are of a higher generation are termed *iin-* for women and *sam-* for men and the lower generation one's *nowu-*. But, among one's own generation, cross-sex affines are termed *pwínúwa-* ("spouse") and same-sex affines are termed *éss-*.

Goodenough (1978: 111–119) described the deontic powers associated with different kin terms and kin relationships with regard to respect behavior and sexual distance, depending on the context of how they are related to the speaker. For example, respect behaviors that indicate status differences include pro- and prescriptions for whether or not one could use "fight talk" (*fóósun fiyuuw*) or hard words (*fóós péchékkun*), was permitted to refuse a request, was expected to generally avoid the other in public settings, or was expected to lower oneself by physically stooping or crawling in the presence of the other in public, or to say *fááy-iro* or *tiiro* when crossing the other's path. The more of these behaviors that one is obligated to display in the presence of another (e.g., one's older brother, any brother of a woman or sister of a man, or a chief), the greater the status difference in the relationship. The most respectful relationships in Chuuk, those where most of these behaviors are expected even today, are between a brother and a sister and between chiefs and their non-chiefly kin.

Other deontic powers are associated with one's status vis-a-vis the matrilineal kinship groupings. For example, members of an *eterekes* have exclusive rights to the land and reef holdings of the *eterekes*, including to their agricultural and fishery products (Goodenough 1978). Non-members may only access these lands via special permission from the *samon* of the *eterekes*, typically after being given assent from all adult members of the lineage. Violating these rights and obligations is a significant source of inter-group conflict in Chuuk to the present. Lineage members are also prohibited from any sexual relations with one another.

There are also deontic powers associated with clanship or sharing membership in the same *eyinang*. Clan or *eyinang* members may not marry one another, for example. In addition, during times of extreme hardship such as that caused by typhoons or periods of drought that are endemic to the region—or after defeat in times of war in earlier eras—Chón Chuuk generally expect that they could rely on their connections to *eyinang* members on other islands with whom to take refuge until they could return to their own land, and these distant kin are morally obligated to take them under their care and protection (Goodenough 1978, 2002; Petersen 2009).

Again, what is important in each of these cases is that the cultural propositions that define the ranges of deontic powers associated with the different statuses in the system of kinship provide reasons for action (i.e., moral reasons) that are independent of people's inclinations or desires. The obligation to help a kinsman in need, or to avoid violating the taboos associated with the persons or resources of non-kin, are expected to be followed even if someone does not particularly feel like observing these obligations or taking advantage of their rights.

The sketch I present above reflects an available collection of cultural propositions that most adults articulate regularly in everyday conversation, and in more focused interviews. As I noted, the enduring availability of these propositions over time is an important part of the historical durability of kinship in Chuuk, and as I will describe below, an important part of how kinship is enacted through funerary rituals. In the next section, I will address the second major claim in my argument: By providing a venue for Status Function Declarations associated with kinship, funeral rituals allow Chón Chuuk to simultaneously create a reality that conforms to key ideas and expressions of sentiment associated with kinship, and represent this reality to others. In so doing, funerals become a key site for the social transmission of these cultural propositions and for their psychological internalization both at a cognitive level and in terms of the development of an embodied habitus.

CULTURE DECLARED AND TRANSMITTED: FUNERALS AS VENUES FOR ENACTMENT AND ACQUISITION OF KINSHIP

In this section, I describe kinship for the Chón Chuuk as it is publicly instituted through funerary practices. More specifically, funerary rituals include the (re)enactment of a complex network of a class of speech acts Searle defines as “Declarations”: a class of speech acts that changes reality to represent the propositional content of the statement while simultaneously representing reality as being so instituted (Searle 2010). It should be noted that these are Declarations specific to social institutions, a type Searle describes as “Status Function Declarations,” and through which, he (Searle 2010: 13) argues, “all human institutional reality is created and maintained in existence”. So, when a large group of people who understand themselves to be related to one another through various principles of kinship cooperatively participate in funerary rituals as described below, they create a reality that fits the proposition “We are

one kingroup (*Kich, sia eew chó*),” while simultaneously representing, to each other and to a broader public, their shared reality as being so changed. Finally, it is important to recognize that the propositional structure of Status Function Declarations is not always given in explicitly verbal form, but can be performed through non-verbal embodied means, through the way people interact with artifacts, and as a combination of these, as we will see in the case of funerals.

Status Function Declarations as expressed through ritual practice can institute (i.e., create as social reality) cultural propositions only if the participating members of a community or larger society share collective intentionality that enables them to recognize and accept, however, willingly or unwillingly, their propositional content (Searle 2010). What is collective intentionality? In general, intentionality can be defined as “that capacity of mind by which it is directed at, or about, objects and states of affairs in the world, typically independent of itself” (Searle 2010: 25). As such, intentional (or volitional) states have two components, a general psychological state such as believing, desiring, hoping, fearing, etc. and some propositional content such as “it is raining”. So, an intentional state would take the form of something like, “I (believe, hope that, fear that) it is or will be raining” (Searle 2010; see also Spiro 1997: 74–89 for a similar account of volitional action).

Intentionality is often understood in terms of *individual* beliefs, desires, and intentions, often rendered as “I” intentionality, as the previous example suggests. But the actual production of social institutions in social life requires a different sort of intentionality: collective or “we” intentionality (Searle 1995; Tomasello 2009, 2014). These are intentional states associated with planned or ongoing social actions that require, as do all human institutions from marriage to money, a collective “we” to realize. Again, institutions require collective intentionality because their social realization depends on collective acceptance of the way actual persons or objects possess or acquire the status functions associated with these institutions (Searle 1995, 2010). So, in order for the publicly expressed belief statement, “that man there is *samon* of our *eterekes*” to reflect a socially accepted institutional fact, there must also exist among those participating in this statement a broadly shared state of mind that provides both a complex, logically elaborated set of propositions about how a person becomes “*samon*” of an “*eterekes*” as well as belief states about the fit between the contents of mind and the actual conditions of the world among those who receive this statement.

Absent such a state of collective recognition and acceptance, such a statement will not be meaningful to a receiving audience and thus will not allow for the co-creation of the associated institutional fact.

Searle does not develop an account of how collective intentionality comes about as a psychological capacity shared among individuals cooperating in the social production of institutional reality. However, Spiro (1987, 1997) has developed just such an account in his theory of cultural reproduction. Spiro recognizes that cultural reproduction involves two distinct mechanisms, *cultural transmission* (a “social transaction *between* actors”, Spiro 1997: 3) and *cultural internalization* (“a psychological operation *within* actors”, Spiro 1997: 3). Social processes of cultural transmission aid cultural reproduction because they establish the conditions through which novices can acquire the cultural propositions that are necessary to produce collective intentionality. Psychological processes of internalization aid cultural reproduction because they determine the strength of individual conviction and motivation associated with different cultural propositions once they have been acquired, and therefore, the likelihood of their accepting Status Function Declarations as true, morally correct, and desirable as well as their motivation to institute such Declarations through forms of practice in the future.

Spiro (1997: 8–9) identified a four-step scale for the levels of conviction associated with cultural acquisition. The first is when individuals are acquainted with a cultural proposition, but not yet assenting to it, remaining indifferent to it or rejecting it altogether. At the second level, a cultural proposition is accepted as cliché, accepted but honored more in its breach than in its observance. The third level of conviction is when a cultural proposition is cognitively and emotionally salient. Spiro (1997) claims that at this level, the proposition is “internalized.” It is at this level that the proposition affects one’s sense of self and how one acts in the world (Hallowell 1955). At the fourth level, the proposition is not only internalized, but the individual has a powerful emotional attachment to it and is highly motivated to arrange her or his life around its content, either in the pursuit of the fulfillment of needs or the expression of sentiments attached to the cultural proposition or in the avoidance of the arousal of these (Spiro 1987). It is at this level that we might say culture has become deeply embodied, a significant part of a person’s habitus (Bourdieu 1977).

Searle’s discussions of collective intentionality overlap with this scale of internalization. On the one hand, Searle (2010: 57, emphasis in the original) notes that “institutional structures require *collective recognition*

by the participants in the institution in order to function, but particular transactions within the institution require *cooperation*” in which the members engage in different tasks in the service of achieving a jointly-shared goal. This distinction is important for my argument here because, as Searle (2010: 57) claims, “full blown cooperative collective intentionality ... is often necessary for the creation of the institution”. In other words, the internalization of a cultural proposition would need to include how it relates to one’s sense of self from the standpoint of one’s cooperative (or non-cooperative) engagements with other persons, objects, and entities as they are elaborated through a cultural system of status functions and associated deontic powers (e.g., Hallowell 1955). The acquisition of cultural content occurs upon a bedrock of preexisting psychological processes, some innate and phylogenetically derived, and others developed through the individual’s social experiences, as these are socially organized and culturally shaped beginning in infancy and early childhood (Spiro 1997). A significant proportion of these experiences are highly cooperative in nature (Tomasello 2009, 2014).

In Chuuk, discussions of the way culture is internalized are part of everyday conversation and the ethnopsychological concepts that inform it (Caughey 1980). For example, people can be forgiven for not participating in important cultural events if they do not know (*sineey*) what those events are, why they are important, or how to comport oneself when participating. This is particularly the case with very young children and foreign visitors. But those who are expected to know these things about events, but do not attend or participate in them, are understood to lack the intentionality, will, or desire (*tiip*) to do so. Of interest for our discussion is the importance given to having a single, collective will which is described as having “one will” (*tiipeew*). It is interesting in the context of the above discussion of collective intentionality that the Chon Chuuk think of will or desire (*tiip*) in collective terms, that a collectivity can have one will, a shared set of goals and purposes, and a shared desire to pursue them, often expressed in public discourse as “we must have one will or shared purpose together” (*sipwe tiipeew fengen*) and in that collective state show generosity (*kissássew*) and compassionate caring love (*ttong*) for each other, particularly those who are materially needy or physically or emotionally suffering (e.g., Lutz 1988). But a single intentionality requires an additional motivational standpoint on the part of a person: They should be “low” (*tekisón*) and humbly respect the desires of others (*sufenuti*) as opposed to having a “high attitude or comportment”

(*namanam tekia*), which is to say they should not be self-centered and arrogant (Caughy 1980). As I have argued elsewhere (Lowe 2002), enactments of humble, nurturing care of others is a central feature of self-fashioning for the Chon Chuuk as a “good person” (*aramasééch*).

I will now describe the funerary rituals for the Chón Chuuk as a complex of socially instituted Status Function Declarations of kinship, drawing on my own data collected in Chuuk between 1996 and 2012 and published reports based on ethnographic fieldwork reports that date from the first decade of the twentieth century (Bollig 1927; Dernbach 2005; Gladwin and Sarason 1953; Goodenough 2002; Lowe 2002). I organize my description according to the four main stages of these funerary rites and observances that have remained remarkably constant throughout the recent historical period. These are preparing for death (for which there is no single linguistic label), the *néénap* (funeral), *peeyas* (burial), and the period of prescribed mourning and final release of both the departing good spirit of the deceased and of her or his mourning kin—the *roro* and *érek* rituals. Across these phases of this ritual process, we can see how different categories of kin cooperate in the performance of distinct statuses relative to each other and the deceased, making Status Function Declarations of kinship relations as well as producing intentional states of different affective intensity and character. As such, funerals are sites, not only for the social institution of kinship, but also for its psychological acquisition and, through cooperative participation and an intensely emotional series of ritual events, for its deeply embodied internalization.

Preparing for Death

The connection between death and kinship is well established in the ethnographic literature for Chuuk. When one is dying, establishing connections of care and comfort to one’s closest kin and the land to which they are collectively associated is particularly important. Goodenough (2002: 134), citing Bollig (1927), reports that “People did not like the prospect of dying away from home and family. They wished to die, if possible, in the arms of their closest female relatives. ... people’s children and sub-lineage mates had the responsibility for caring for them in their last illness.” This was still very much the case in my own observations (see also Quinn 2013 for a similar observation on Ifaluk). Often when they had moved to other villages or islands in Chuuk, people who were gravely ill might return to their local lineage (*eterekes*) or to

their sibling-set, sublineage (*inepwiinowu*) homesteads if death seemed imminent. If their illness made travel impossible, close female members of their lineage (e.g., lineal “mothers” (*iinenap*) or “sisters” (*feefin/pwii*) or “children” (*nowu*) would travel instead to care for their sick relative where the sick person was staying, and hold vigil there if the person seemed close to death. In the contemporary milieu, this travel to care for the gravely ill can include staying on the main, urban island of Wééné in the only state hospital for Chuuk State (see also Bautista 2010: 92). Or, in an even sharper reflection of the Chón Chuuk diaspora, a close female relative may fly to Guam or Hawaii, or even to the mainland U.S., to care for their sick relative, especially when death seems imminent.

Upon death, the women who are attending to the person, typically very close matrilineal kin of the deceased, begin immediately to keen and wail in a characteristic outpouring of grief and loss. In my own fieldnotes and in the historical record, these expressions of grief are particularly acute among one’s closest kin associated with the *faameni* (*owunnun*) or sibling-set (*inepwiinéw*) who know the deceased more intimately. However, the way grief is expressed is different for men when compared to women and children. Gladwin and Sarason (1953: 157) described women’s expressions of grief well: “the mourning wail of a Trukese woman is dramatic and often chilling, rising from a moan to almost a scream and falling again while she sways back and forth clutching her head or pounding the ground.” Women’s keens are highly stereotypical, and often have a content today that is like that recorded by Bollig (1927: 15, cited in Goodenough 2002: 135) a century ago, “Oh, truly you are dead, and I am utterly bereft, surviving you. There is no one any more to care for me, surviving you, now that you have died and left me.” Children and younger adolescents of both sexes will also cry openly, often in the company of their lineal mothers, and no attempt is made to quiet them or send them elsewhere. Men typically react stoically, they may tear up and look on silently in apparent sadness, but they do not cry, keen, or wail.

These close kin are also responsible for preparing the body for the funeral ritual. Shortly after death, if the person has died in the lineage or sublineage meeting house (*wuut*), those close relatives in attendance at the time of death will prepare the body. The body will be tenderly stripped, cleaned, and dressed in new clothes. Traditionally, it would be laid out on a new pandanus sleeping mat (*kiki*). Since the early twentieth century, however, the body is placed in a coffin, often one that

has been made locally or purchased in the urban center on the island of Wééné. Once in the coffin, the body is placed on the floor of the meeting house and women who are closely related to the deceased will stay next to the body to fan it as they continue to keen and wail.³ After the body is prepared and placed in the *wuut* for the ensuing funeral rituals, more kin begin to arrive. These will invariably be members of the deceased's *eterekes*, close kin of their spouse, or members who are *éfékúr* to the deceased's *eterekes*. Among these, kinswomen will typically also come to care for the mourners, sing hymns, and lead prayers. The next day, the funeral (*néénap*) will take place.

Néénap

A person's death in Chuuk is understood to be a calling for kin and others who had some relationship to the deceased during her or his life (e.g., coworkers, close friends, fictive kin) to assemble. This calling is reflected in the term used to refer to the body of the deceased during the funerary period, *kkóniuro* (literally the "assembly" (*ro*) of *kkón* or pounded breadfruit, long a symbolically important food staple in Chuuk). The first gathering of kin is in a funeral ritual called the *néénap*. The general features of the *néénap* are as follows: As the body of the deceased lays in state in the center of the lineage meeting house, more distantly related real or fictive kin, as recognized through the principles outlined above, arrive to pay their respects. Those visiting the deceased are obliged to bring a small gift (*oowun meyimá*) for the dead person and none attend without such a gift. Visitors enter the funeral site and leave their gift next to the body of the deceased. In my own observations, a plastic tub or other durable container is set at the foot of the deceased's coffin in which to place these gifts.⁴ As visitors exit the *wuut* after presenting their gift, they are given a small package of food and drink. Aside from the occasional wailing and keening of women attending the body, this phase of the funeral is emotionally muted. As Gladwin noted, "none of the visitors, nor anyone in the household, offered any expressions of sympathy or the like" (Gladwin and Sarason 1953: 163). Which is true also today.⁵

After several hours, and once enough of the kin who will stay to attend the burial have arrived, a formal program is called by a representative man of the lineage (*eterekes*) that is hosting the funeral program. The program is often led by the lineage chief or *samon* or by another senior man (*sam-*) of the lineage designated to "emcee" this portion of

the *néénap*. The speakers, all older men, include senior representatives of the hosting lineage (*sam-*), political office holders, and often a very senior man who is considered to have some expertise in local traditional lore and ritual knowledge (*itang*). These speeches rarely mention the deceased, but instead typically call on the assembled kin to renew their commitments to each other as a single, related people or *chó*.

The speeches are followed by a final return of attention to the deceased before the burial and the emotional crescendo of the funeral. It is at this inflection point in the *néénap*, during the transition toward the burial or *peeyas*, that a condition of liminality emerges (Turner 1969). Here, liminality can be understood in terms of a ritually instituted site of cultural practice characterized by the nearly complete flattening of the status distinctions that are typically given in social institutions and many of their associated normative expectations in more secular contexts. Each member of the relatively numerous assembled kin group will approach the body of the deceased to say their final goodbyes to the deceased by touching or kissing him or her one final time. The emotional outpouring by the assembled group is quite intense and it is here that one readily observes Turner's *communitas*: an emotionally intense and deeply involving "unstructured or rudimentarily structured and undifferentiated communion or community of equal individuals devoid of judgementality" (Olaveson 2001: 104). In this case, liminality and *communitas* involve the whole assembly of broadly related kin of various sorts in attendance. The following entry from my fieldnotes for a funeral of a 17-year-old youth, who died suddenly from a brain aneurism, gives a sense of this:

Saying goodbye to the young man at the end was particularly emotional. Nearly 200 people crowded into the *wunt* with many people crying over the body. It was sweet the way person after person would come to the casket, bend over the body and kiss the dead boy and say their final farewells. Several women keening and wailing grievously and the final farewell ceremony (*kapwong*) proceeded. As this portion of the event went on, more and more people came to tears, including several young men and teen aged boys, with more than a few men allowing tears to come to their eyes. The scene itself was quite moving, with most the assembled singing hymns as the procession of persons coming to say farewell carried on. Their voices adding a stoic unity as a counterpoint to the grief-stricken crying and wailing. During it all, the boy's father stood beside his wife and the other women minding the casket, looking on stoically as each member of the procession came to say goodbye. As the last one to say goodbye, he went

over and looked down on his son's face for a good two or three minutes. Finally, he took a kukui nut necklace that the boy's cousin (his father's sister's son) had brought and bent down to place it on his neck. Then he took the sunglasses that the man had on his head and bent down to place them on the boy's face. After this, the officiant announced that the burial ritual (*peeyas*) would begin.

Frankly, reading this description again and recalling the event as it happened gives me the chills to this day, a testament to its emotional intensity and enduring effects on at least one participant.

Peeyas

The burial (*peeyas*) takes place on the same day as the funeral (*néénap*). The speeches by senior men mark the end of the *néénap* ritual, and the burial or *peeyas* ritual follows. In 2012, the shift from the *néénap* to the *peeyas* rituals included the officiation of catholic clergy (the local deacon and a catechist in the case of the Roman Catholic villages where I worked). Quite often, in my observations, the catechist is either a member of the lineage of the deceased or married to one of the women in the lineage. After the very brief prayers and a short sermon by the religious officiants, the coffin is lifted by a group of men related to the deceased, and carried as part of the procession to the grave site, located on lineage land or land owned independently by the sublineage or individual who had died. After a few words, prayers, and hymns at the grave site, the body is lowered into the grave, a few burial items such as articles of clothing of the deceased and some burial gifts that kin had brought are thrown in with the coffin, and then these are covered in dirt.

The burial ritual marks a final transition of the deceased from the domain of living people to that of beneficent or good spirits/souls and malevolent or bad demons/souls. This distinction is still maintained despite the nearly universal adoption of Christianity early in the twentieth century. Goodenough (2002, citing Bollig 1927) reports that the grave was covered with light-colored sand, a post driven into the center to allow the "good spirit" of the deceased to come and go, and a small altar or shelf was erected where kin could place fragrant flowers, or other small offerings at the grave site in the days following the burial. Gladwin (Gladwin and Sarason 1953), observed similar practices, with the additional placement of a wooden cross at the head of the grave.

In my observations, graves are covered nowadays with rectangular concrete caps and concrete crosses. These are then tended regularly by close relatives, who would leave woven garlands of fresh flowers and other fragrant plants. Several people in Chuuk reported to me that their care of the burial site is also intended to signal to the good soul of the deceased that they remain an important and beloved member of the lineage (*eterekes*) or sublineage (*inepwiinénw*).

Roro and Érék

Once the burial is concluded, the ritual observances associated with the deceased as the *kkóniuro* shift to the *roro* ritual or the continuing assembly of those mourning kin who were closest to the deceased, typically members of her or his *faameni* (*owunnun*), sibling-set (*inepwiinénw*), and some members of the lineage (*eterekes*). The more distant kin and funeral attendees return home after the *peeyas*. These close kin will stay together in the *wuut* where the funeral took place in observance of a prescribed mourning period of between three and nine days.⁶ The *roro* is another liminal phase, but this time only for kin closely related to the deceased. Those who attend are expected to stay in the *wuut*, visit together, and visit the grave site. They do not to do any work, including food preparation. In my observations, kin who were more distantly related (often affines and *éfékúr*) would prepare food (notably *kkón*) for the mourners and deliver it to them through a formal procession to the mourning site, as part of a ritual of sympathy known as *áámwáám*. These processions also include speeches from a senior representative of each group, offering expressions of nurturing love (*ttong*) and reassurances of kin group unity and collective intentionality (*tiipeew fengen*).

Unless there is a novena, the *roro* concludes on the fourth day, according to custom, with a final ritual, the *érék*. This ritual event quite explicitly emphasizes the local value placed on the cultivation of collective intentionality and *communitas* as a critical feature of kinship for the Chón Chuuk. This ceremony involved the final gathering of the lineage (*eterekes*) members and their spouses. The assembled group traditionally ceremonially burned some of the personal effects of the deceased in a ritual known as *fírowurowu*, after which it was thought that the deceased's good spirit would follow the rising smoke and ascend to the place where all good spirits reside, known as *náán* or *nááng* (Goodenough 2002), which is now equated with the Christian

heaven. The *érek* also provides members of the lineage an opportunity to openly express hurt feelings or grievances with various members of the kin group, regardless of their normal status relations to each other. People can apologize (*omwusomwus*) for these, and then recommit their shared feelings of unity and common purpose (*tiipeew fengen*). The *érek* concludes with a large meal or feast in which all share. After the *érek*, mourners can return to their normal lives, visiting the gravesite of the deceased more occasionally.

To summarize this section, one of its main aims has been to describe the historically enduring features of the ritual process for funerals in Chuuk. We saw in this description many ways that kinship is socially instituted through a networked series of verbal and non-verbal Status Function Declarations specifying that the people, objects, and other entities so assembled cooperatively enact the funerary observances as one kin group (*eew chó*). The deceased thereby transitions from the world of the living to the realm of the spirits, and simultaneously represents this reality to others as a collectively realized symbolic act. Instituting kinship in this way provides for the social transmission of many of the cultural propositions associated with it in Chuuk and the means of their acquisition by novice members, particularly at the level of embodied practice. A key point here is not only that certain explicit propositions regarding important values of kinship are publicly expressed and attended to, but also that these propositions are also performatively enacted in the distribution of responsibilities for different members of the kin group. This includes distinctions made between near and distant kin, lineage (*eterekes*) and non-lineage members, older women (*iin-*) and men (*sam-*) as opposed to more junior members, and so forth. Each plays a different, fully embodied role in service of the larger goal of assisting the transition of a relative from the realm of the living to that of the spirits. In this manner, explicit cultural propositions are not only transmitted and acquired, but also become an associated habitus through embodied participation from the standpoint of different relations of kinship (e.g., Toren 2015). One may estimate there to be well over one hundred such funerals in the first few decades of life.

In the next section, I argue that the historical durability of funerary practices is also a reflection of the way the cultural propositions associated with funerary practices continue to be deeply internalized. They are not only highly cognitively and emotionally salient; Chón Chuuk attaches strong psychological motivations to these propositions and the place of funerals as the venue of their enactment.

CULTURE MOTIVATED: ALIENATION AND COMMUNITAS

The preceding section documents that many if even most Chón Chuuk adults (and many who are younger) find participation in funerals to be highly cognitively salient and emotionally involving. This level of collective and emotional salience was recognized by Gladwin and Sarason (1953: 156), based on Gladwin's observations in 1947. They wrote

Death is a catastrophe to the Trukese, as it is to most people. In the face of the irretrievable loss of one of its members the lineage responds in a body to a degree not found in any other normal context. Not only must the actual members of the lineage participate in expressing their bereavement, but also their spouses and the children of the male members of the lineage.

My own observations over the decades of the 1990s and 2000s are consistent with this claim. But, what motivates such active and emotionally intense participation?

Answering this question requires describing briefly the theory of psychological motivation and volitional action used in this section of this chapter. Spiro (1997: 74) defines volitional action as “motivated by the [conscious or unconscious] desire to fill a need or else to express, or avoid the arousal of, a sentiment.” A “need,” he goes on to say, refers to “any event, condition, or state of affairs that an actor feels is necessary for physical or psychological well-being” (Spiro 1997: 74). A “sentiment” is an object-directed emotion, such as grief over the loss of a loved one, or compassion for someone who is grieving. To explicate his theory of volitional action further, Spiro (1997) adds the concepts of “wishes” and “aims” to needs and sentiments. A wish refers to the particular event, condition, state of affairs that an actor desires to achieve. An aim refers to a desire to perform some act. So, volitional action can be understood as the mental or behavioral implementation of an aim that fulfills a wish that, once fulfilled, will satisfy a need and/or allow the expression of a sentiment.

In human societies, the satisfaction of needs and/or the means to express or avoid the expression of sentiment are culturally and socially mediated (Spiro 1997). The fulfillment of a need or expression of a sentiment is mediated by our transactions with other people and objects. Therefore, as people become enculturated within social milieus, the persons or objects with which one might transact and the specific actions that characterize these transactions becomes constrained to those that are collectively accepted or recognized.

Rituals become particularly important venues for the possibility of the fulfillment of needs and either the expression of sentiments or the avoidance of their arousal—particularly needs or sentiments that cannot find fulfillment, expression, or avoidance in more mundane circumstances (Kracke 2003; Turner 1969). It follows that the level of emotional investment members of a community or larger society place on forms of ritual practice reflect, in part, the way that such practice allows for a collectively recognized and accepted means of action that thereby permits either the fulfillment of a wish that might satisfy some conscious or unconscious need, and/or the expression of some sentiment, and/or avoidance of its arousal.⁷

Ritual processes such as the one described above are complex. So, it is likely that people's shared motivations to participate in them reflect equally complex configurations of need and sentiment, which we can label "motivational configurations" (see Sirota's chapter in this volume for a related idea). Such motivational complexity might further reinforce the historical durability of culture and its associated forms of ritual practice (Spiro 1997). One could identify multiple motivational configurations in the ethnographic descriptions given in the preceding section. For example, one might explore those motives associated with the loss of attachment objects and associated processes of grieving (Bowlby 1988; Fraley and Shaver 2016; Quinn 2013). However, a full analysis of all motivational configurations is beyond the scope of this chapter. I will instead focus on motivational configurations associated with Victor Turner's (1969) notion of the structure-antistructure dialectic. Turner described this as a dialectic present in social life that alternates between the alienating qualities of everyday secular life as organized by mundane social structures and the collectively reinvigorating qualities of *communitas* generated through active, engaged participation in sacred or religious ritual (see also Durkheim 2001; Olaveson 2001).

To explain this dialectic further, many human psychological needs and associated emotions are innate and evolutionarily derived (e.g., hunger, security, aggression, sex, attachment); however, many others are socially derived. The needs and sentiments associated with Turner's (1969) structure-antistructure dialectic are socially derived and are generated because of the alienation a person experiences while fulfilling her or his status functions within a society's institutional structures. These experiences are alienating in two ways. First, by enacting one's status functions in everyday life one contributes one's part to the collective needs of the

larger group or society. In doing so, one meets some of one's own personal needs, but at the cost of not fulfilling or frustrating other personal needs (see also Freud 1930). Second, enacting one's status functions as a part of a symbolically elaborated system of separate statuses that together perform the everyday work of society alienates those members of society from one another, often leading to social segmentation, division, inequality, and exploitation.

Turner (1974: 274) claimed that the alienation experienced in everyday pursuits situated within the deontic, jural-political order of social structure generates a motivational configuration he labeled *communitas*: "the desire for [an emotionally intense] total, unmediated, relationship between person and person, a relationship which nevertheless does not submerge one in the other but safeguards their uniqueness in the very act of realizing their commonness" (see also Ingold 2015). This need for *communitas* motivates a wish for the realization of a condition under which such a need is fulfilled, and aims to implement actions that would allow such a condition to happen. Typically, implementation involves leaving the everyday secular domain of social structure and entering a sacred, ritual process, which affords a phase of liminality: a phase in which people withdraw from the everyday world to a ritually delimited one, and categorically elaborated social relationships are greatly simplified while myth and ritual practice are highly elaborated (Turner 1969). It is inside of such liminal spaces that experiences of *communitas* are possible. Following Durkheim (2001), Turner argued that rituals, liminal phases, and experiences of *communitas* are necessary to revitalize people's commitments to their everyday individual pursuits within the moral order of society. They do so, in my view, by allowing the simultaneous public Declaration of collectively recognized ideals while also allowing the fulfillment of wishes, the expression of sentiments or the avoidance of their arousal as these are associated with the cultural ideals so Declared. The combination of these two symbolic poles make genuine participation in rituals emotionally intense and meaningful (Turner 1969). Without such ritually realized renewal, the constant tension between personal and collectively desired ends would exhaust a person's emotional investment in the artificially constructed moral norms and values of society.

One can use a psychoanalytic lens to develop Turner's model further (Kracke 2003).⁸ As Spiro (1997: 114) notes, when internalized moral prescriptions conflict with a wish, people may experience a range of

painful sentiments (e.g., guilt, anxiety, anger). People may deploy primary psychological defense mechanisms and repress the wish and avoid the arousal of these painful sentiments. But repression can lead to frustration, as the wish continues to unconsciously press for fulfillment, continually threatening to reenter consciousness and arouse painful sentiments. The constant frustration of the wish can promote depression and despair (i.e., exhausted emotional investments in social life). Spiro (1997: 114) continues, “to cope with these painful affects, the unconscious wish ... may be subjected to a second type of defense mechanism, which admits them into consciousness in symbolic disguise” and, when attached to aims and their implementation, provides some measure of wish fulfillment and emotional release. Rituals provide a collective venue for the enactment of cultural defense mechanisms promoting shared experiences of wish fulfillment, even if these are symbolically disguised, and emotional release.

An example of this conflict and how participation in funerals are understood to be a means of the fulfillment of a wish for *communitas* that is otherwise frustrated in one’s everyday pursuits is given in the following exchange I had with a man in Chuuk in 2012. In that encounter, this man explained the meaning of the deceased’s calling kin (*kkóniuro*) to participate in the funeral (*néenap*), the burial (*peeyas*), and the liminal mourning period (*roro*). During our conversation, the man reflected on the meaning of *kkónirow*. He started with a description of the single family or household portion (*mwatún*) of pounded breadfruit (*kkón*) that is used in Chuuk to send to relatives after the breadfruit has been prepared at a shared cookhouse. Preparing *kkón* to be shared with close relatives in this way is a typical bi-weekly feature of young men’s everyday routines. When presented as a *mwatún*, the *kkón* is smooth and well mixed. But, he continued, *kkón* comes from the breadfruit tree. *Kkóniuro* has a metaphoric meaning, provided by the growth pattern of this tree. The breadfruit starts from a single trunk, representing the extended kin group and all of their relationships. As the branches separate out from the trunk, so do the single lines of relationship that connect people to each other. He then discussed how the different branches represent the households of the kinship group that had gathered together to observe *kkóniuro*. As people go about their daily business, they become separated/differentiated (*ra sakufesen*) in their ideas and in what they think the family should do. This can lead to bad or disjointed intentions (*tiipengngaw*) among the kin group’s members.

But, he stated, when there is a death, then there is a *kkónirow*. This is when the fruit of the breadfruit tree is harvested from the many different branches, and then cooked and pounded into *kkón*. As the cooked breadfruit pieces (*tipen*) are mashed together into a single smooth *mwatún* or portion of *kkón*, the people become as one again. For *kkónirow* gives kin the opportunity to throw out any bad feelings and to become united again in a single, collective state of mind (*tiipeen fengen*).

The metaphor, of the kin group being a breadfruit tree with its many fruit bearing branches reflecting the individual households of the kin group, is telling. On the one hand, the tree itself reflects an abstract whole, a reality made possible only through the status functions given in the institutionalized, collectively held ideas, norms, and values that allow kinship groupings to come into existence. But belonging to such a collectivity is abstract and, while a significant source of a person's sense of "me-as-we," difficult to realize in everyday life. Yet desire for enactment of this more general "we" is no less a part of that everyday experience, possibly leading to a general condition of yearning for reunification. This is a condition created by the disjunction between the internalization of the cultural propositions that conventionally describe the ideas, norms, and values for kinship for these adult Chón Chuuk, and the more personal or small-scale pursuits of everyday life, which undermines these cultural ideals. Funerary rites are compelling for these adults, then, because they allow the creation of a venue for the fulfillment of a wish for unity to come into being as *communitas*, both at the point at which the kin group assembles as a unified unit to bid a final farewell to the deceased and during the final *éruk* ritual.

People in Chuuk described other conventional symbolic resources that I believe help them to cope with the structure-antistructure conflict. One is reflected in the cultural value placed on the cultivation of skill as a mature social actor who can effectively strike a balance between meeting collective demands and satisfying more personal desires. For example, an admirable, mature (*miriit*) person is one who more expertly and ethically knows when and when not to adhere to collectively recognized rights and obligations. This is quite often the case when the agenda of a larger group, say the village, the lineage, or the church congregation, interferes with the more immediate needs of one's multigenerational nuclear family. It is also often the case when the agenda of one's employer interferes with the agenda of the lineage group.

Such ethical situations often came up in discussions concerning funerals. For example, in cases where there have been many funerals in a short period and lineage members' household budgets are strained, people will decide to make a smaller, cheaper offering of food (such as a single baked roll) as opposed to a plate of rice, meat, and other prepared foods for kin who come to "pay respects." Such decisions can easily be fit into the larger cultural logic of being a "good person" in the ways described above. While showing generosity to kin attending the funeral can be a demonstration of the unified will of the kin group in their ability to muster the resources to host a more extravagant funeral, a humbler offering can evoke in attendees' feelings of love/compassion (*ttong*) regarding the apparent material hardship (*osupwang*). As it was explained to me by several older men and women in Chuuk, a person who is *miriit*, would understand when and why it would be best to deploy these different strategies of representation in different contexts for the greatest effect.

Finally, vigorous participation in funerals may be a means of collectively avoiding the arousal of guilt and anxiety associated with the possibility that one had failed to observe their duties as kin, particularly when caring for their now deceased kinsperson during her or his illness. One way these anxieties manifest is through concerns regarding threatening community gossip. Many Chón Chuuk worry that members of the community or the wider kin group will spread gossip that they had been negligent of their duties. Such accusations can evoke intense sentiments of shame and resentment. Therefore, during the funeral itself, people aim to engage in actions that would counter or displace these threats and avoid the arousal of the associated sentiments. Goodenough (2002: 135) writes,

These kin, therefore, had reason to make a significant display of how much the deceased meant to them, how much they were going to feel the loss, and how much they cared for him or her. They also had reason to make public show of their intention to honor the deceased's wishes regarding place of burial and the disposition of property.

In so doing, people might forestall any community gossip and the arousal of painful sentiments such gossip might generate.

People also expressed concerns about failing to be good kin as a collective kin group and the threatening role spirits play in these circumstances. For example, Goodenough (2002: 135) reported,

Surviving close kin did not want to have the good soul of the deceased angry with them for their neglect. Its anger could lead it to inflict illness and possible death on one or more of them. The mourning and bringing of gifts that characterized the proceeding immediately following death were also intended to make the deceased's good soul well-disposed to surviving kin.

People in Chuuk described to me several episodes in which a close member of their kin group had been possessed by the good spirit of the deceased during the funeral as a means of articulating the spirit's anger at his or her surviving kin for not being united and caring of one another (see also Lowe 2002). In these ways, active participation in funerals may reflect the implementation of an aim that can satisfy the desire to avoid the arousal of angry or critical sentiments in others and guilty or shameful sentiments in oneself.

In this section, therefore, I argue that funerary rituals in Chuuk provide collectively recognized venues for the expression of volitional states associated with several motivational complexes. The reproduction of funerary observances continues to be compelling to Chón Chuuk partly because they provide collectively recognized means of satisfying a desire to counter alienation with experiences of *communitas*. But this reproduction is also compelling because it provides a means to avoid or displace the arousal of painful sentiments associated either with their failure to live up to the collectively held expectations of being a good kinsperson or to accusations from others that they were negligent in their care of the deceased.

CONCLUSION

This chapter takes up the question of cultural reproduction that has been an important site of inquiry among psychological anthropologists for nearly a century (e.g., Sapir 1924). The problem of cultural reproduction has received little attention among culture theorists in recent decades, as interest in theorizing globalizing cultural flows and tangled webs of cultural hybridity has become dominant. While this shift in emphasis has reflected some important criticisms of the culture concept prevalent inside and outside of anthropology in the middle of the last century (Abu-Lughod 1991; Clifford and Marcus 1986; Marcus and Fischer 1986), it has also fed into the impression that processes of cultural

reproduction somehow are irrelevant to the development of culture theory or to the way we encounter and understand our interlocutors in the conduct of ethnography.

This was certainly my expectation when I began to conduct research in Chuuk in the 1990s. Returning there every few years over the course of nearly two decades, though, I had documented in my notes both ways not only that certain features of everyday life in Chuuk were changing as new technologies, media, ideas, and forms of practice circulated in, among, and out of the islands of Chuuk Lagoon, but also important cultural propositions, features of both everyday life and ritual observances, that remained remarkably durable. Returning to the body of ethnographic literature for Chuuk that spans over a century reinforced my sense that important domains of culture have endured. Among these, funerary rituals in Chuuk have been among the most historically durable.

Thus, my aim in this chapter was to take up the question of cultural reproduction anew and draw on a range of theoretical sources, from among psychological anthropologists and other scholars, to craft an explanation for the patterns of durability in funerary rituals I had documented in Chuuk. As I have argued above, such durability requires three conditions to persist over time. First, cultural reproduction requires that the relevant cultural propositions continue to circulate in the community. Although a great number of alternative ideas, norms, and values have entered and circulated through Chuuk via processes of colonialism, Western imperialism, and economic globalization, the Chón Chuuk have been able to hold onto key domains of traditional cultural knowledge, of which the cultural understandings for kinship have been particularly robust.

Second, it is not sufficient that cultural propositions continue to circulate through forms of social discourse, but there must also be venues for their psychological acquisition and internalization by members of the community. Many aspects of the system of kinship are acquired and internalized by Chón Chuuk through their everyday participation in the existing secular social institutions into which they are born as novice members (Lowe 2002). But, as I have argued here, funerary rituals are also sites for the transmission and embodied enactment of many central beliefs, values, and norms of kinship as a cooperative endeavor, with different members enacting their roles in the larger cultural understandings of kinship to achieve a collective end. Given that one might attend a dozen or more of these events in any year, perhaps hundreds in the course of just a few decades, it is reasonable to claim that these

cultural propositions derived from them inform a well-developed adult habitus. This habitus is characterized by a preoccupation with one's self-fashioning as a moral member of the networks of kin in which one is enmeshed (see also Keane 2016). Through regular participation in funerals and other more mundane aspects of kinship, Chón Chuuk develop a general, diffuse embodied sense of their moral standing as a 'good' member of the kin group (Lowe 2002).

Finally, the reproduction of cultural practices is more likely in those cases where participation in them satisfies other important psychological needs, allows the expression of sentiments, or enables those who participate to avoid the arousal of sentiments. In other words, participation in ritual practices such as those I have described is likely to endure if people are highly motivated, as opposed to merely obligated, to do so. I have argued that two related motivational complexes are particularly relevant to such high levels of participation in funerary rituals among the Chón Chuuk. These motives reflect the likely universal need for *communitas* to counter the otherwise alienating experiences of everyday life as organized by social institutions. At the same time, people are motivated to participate because of their desire to avoid the arousal of sentiments associated with those episodes when they may have failed to live up to the deontic expectations as defined within those same social institutions.

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NOTES

1. In this chapter, I follow the orthography given in Goodenough and Sugita (1980: xiv–xvii). The interested reader can find explanations for how to pronounce the Chuukese words given in this chapter by consulting this source.
2. In this chapter, I agree with Spiro (1997: 6) who, following Parsons, defines culture as referring to a “subset of ideas, norms, and values which are found in social groups as a consequence of social transmission and hence socially shared in various ways.” Moreover, culture is often transmitted in public discourse in the form of propositions (e.g., “The earth is the center of the universe”; “Catholics do not eat meat on Fridays”, “the unexamined life is not worth living”). But even in the case of embodied cultural knowledge learned through observation and participation in cultural practices, culture still has a propositional form and is represented propositionally in the mind (Spiro 1997: 7; Searle 2010: 61–89). Cultural propositions should not be equated with beliefs, as the latter term reflects an intentional state that is added in the mind to propositions that have been acquired and internalized by individuals (Searle 2010: 25; Spiro 1997).
3. In the contemporary context of the rapidly growing Chón Chuuk diaspora, if the person died in the hospital or off island in Guam, Hawaii, or the mainland US, they are attended to by whatever local mortuary services are offered in those locales. The body will then be transported to the village where the funeral rites will take place. When funeral and burial takes place after death has always been somewhat of a variable. Goodenough (2002, again citing Bollig 1927), reports that in the early twentieth century the funeral and burial might take place within a few hours after death, after a few days, or even up to a year or more after death. In my own observations, the funeral took place anytime from within a few hours to several days after death, depending on how soon funeral arrangements could be made and when relatives, including many living in Guam, Hawaii, or the mainland US could travel to Chuuk to attend the funeral.
4. While the obligation to bring a small gift has remained a constant over the last century, the nature of the gifts themselves, unsurprisingly, has changed. In the early twentieth century, gifts were locally crafted personal items and “consisted entirely of things [like] turmeric sticks and perfumed coconut oil; loom-woven skirts, poncho-like shirts, and loincloths; shell-bead belts, necklaces, and other items of personal adornment” (Goodenough 2002: 136). By 1947, Gladwin reported gifts that included imported mass-produced items like “towels, pieces of new cotton cloth, perfume, and the like” (Gladwin and Sarason 1953: 163). In the 20 years that I observed funerals in Chuuk, the *oowun meyimâ* was almost invariably a single US dollar bill (although visitors were free to leave larger bills). In my own observations, people might bring other gifts for the deceased. For example, relatives brought a necklace of

kukui nut lei from Hawaii to be given to a deceased young man at his funeral. Before the shift to the use of dollar bills as funerary gifts, many of these gifts would be buried with the dead's person's body. However, some might be distributed to close kin as well after the burial (Gladwin and Sarason 1953).

5. In the contemporary milieu, the *néénap* proceeds for hours with little activity other than the coming and going of visiting kin who are paying their respects, the rising and falling intensity of the keening and wailing of women who sit next to the body to fan it, and occasionally the hymns or prayers led by other women who sit inside the *wuut*. For much of the time, the atmosphere is rather casual, if somber. People dress in rather casual clothes, not their Sunday finest. Those who are not attending to the body directly or leading hymns and prayers, sit along the periphery just outside of the *wuut*, drinking sweetened coffee, bottled water, or soft drinks that might be tendered, and chatting about various things. Just after midday, a package of prepared food will be offered (including cooked rice, cooked chicken or turkey tails, some pounded breadfruit pudding (*kkón*), tapioca, and some local fish).
6. Goodenough (2002) and Gladwin and Sarason (1953), and my own interlocutors reported that traditionally these kin would stay together for a period of three nights. However, Catholics might stay together for nine nights to conduct a novena and recite the rosary each night. Bollig (1927: 22) reported that the *kkónirowu* might last anywhere from two to seven nights in the early twentieth century. But all sources report that three nights was the preferred length.
7. In stating this, I should note a couple of things. First, while this framework shares some similarities with Malinowski's (1922) psychological functionalism, the claim here is not that the ritual practice exists because it satisfies some innate or socially derived psychological need. Rather, the argument here is that when presented with a historically emergent range of options for volitional action, individuals operating within a social milieu over time will tend to become emotionally invested in those options for action that are both collectively recognized and accepted. This allows for the cooperative implementation of aims, the collective fulfillment of wishes, and the expression or avoidance of sentiments (Spiro 1997). Second, Chón Chuuk individuals who participate in funerals bring with them to this experience a whole range of individually held beliefs, desires, and intentions that may or may not reflect or agree with those that are held collectively. But, these diverse, conflicting and varied states of individual or "I" intentionality are not likely to be a reason for the historical durability of funerary practices, which is the central problem of this chapter.
8. The reader should note, however, that the psychoanalytic frameworks used in anthropology are varied and complex (see Hollan 2016; Gammeltoft and Segal 2016). Here, I present only a working framework for the purposes of furthering my argument.

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The Complexity of Culture in Persons

Claudia Strauss

One of my favorite works of culture theory, Ulf Hannerz's *Cultural Complexity* (1992), begins with the following observation about the two locations of culture, in persons and in the publicly observable world:

[C]ulture has two kinds of loci, and the cultural process takes place in their ongoing interrelations. On the one hand, culture resides in a set of public meaningful forms, which can most often be seen or heard, or are somewhat less frequently known through touch, smell, or taste, if not through some combination of senses. On the other hand, these overt forms are only rendered meaningful because human minds contain the instruments for their interpretation. The cultural flow thus consists of the externalizations of meaning which individuals produce through arrangements of overt forms, and the interpretations which individuals make of such displays... (Hannerz 1992: 3–4)

In other words, there is a constant interaction between culture in the world and in people. I will call these external and internal culture, or public culture and culture in persons.¹ Hannerz's main interest in the book is in external, publicly observable culture and the way transnational

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media, power differences, urbanization, and other features of complex societies complicate its distribution. Yet, he also stresses that the variable distribution of culture “necessarily brings people back in” (p. 16), people whose personal perspectives shape the way they interpret and create external culture. The result is that there is not a simple, straightforward relationship between public culture and culture in persons.

My argument in this chapter begins from the same assumptions as Hannerz, but unlike him, I study the internal side of culture. I claim that complexity in external culture, and complexity in the way humans internalize culture, lead to six interesting features of culture in persons. Although other scholars and I have written about these aspects of culture in persons previously, there has been no summary of all of them.

Complicating culture in persons may help dispel the squeamishness many contemporary anthropologists display when discussing the internal side of culture. There are examples of such squeamishness in Handler’s (2004) otherwise stimulating afterword to a collection of *American Anthropologist* articles reworking Boasian anthropology for the twenty-first century. Handler argues that “culture as acquired knowledge is not best imagined ‘inside’ people” (p. 491). Drawing upon Whorf’s discussion of the effects of language on thought, he states, “SAE [*Standard Average European*] speakers imagine their skulls as containers that stop up thought” (Handler 2004: 491). In other words, the idea that culture is inside people is just a secondary rationalization of the ways speakers of European languages tend to think due to their language-induced container-plus-contents image of reality. Furthermore, “the image of group mind molding individual minds ... comes a bit too easily to us moderns” (p. 493). In other words, anthropological theories about the interaction of external and internal culture reflect (as Tocqueville observed in the second volume of *Democracy in America*) American assumptions about the “pressure of the mind of all [*public opinion*] upon the individual intelligence” (Tocqueville 1945 quoted in Handler 2004: 493).

The problem is that this formulation leaves us with a contradiction. If American anthropologists imagine culture as inside people because of their ingrained ways of thinking, have not those anthropologists internalized a certain mode of thought? Handler may realize this, because in summing up his approach, he claims that for “an adequate theory of cultural order,” we need to realize that

Creatures of culture, we create the world as “culture” ... But we do not create it each moment *de novo*. Humans carry about with them (“in mind” and, perhaps, in “embodied” forms as well) ordering schemes, which are sedimented out of history ... and which allow them to respond to (to interpret, to learn about, to understand) the ordering schemes of the other humans they encounter ... The stabilized results of human semi-otic productions (speech and texts but “material culture” and landscapes as well) have orderliness built into them, and at the same time seem to elicit or trigger alternative ordering schemes from other humans who encounter them. (Handler 2004: 493)

Thus, in the end, Handler arrives at the same place where Hannerz and I started. Meanings are in public semiotic productions such as speech, texts, material culture, and landscapes. They are also sedimented into “ordering schemes” carried about by people. However, his discomfort with saying ordering schemes are in people lingers, reflected in the scare quotes around “in mind” or the alternative of “‘embodied’ forms.”

Why the inconsistencies and scare quotes? Handler and other culture theorists’ objection to talk of culture in persons rests on a variety of arguments, most of which I have addressed and rebutted previously (Strauss and Quinn 1997, Chapter 2). As we discussed there, some anthropologists will argue that Geertz (1973) definitively established that “culture is public because meaning is” (p. 12); private meanings cannot be cultural. Our answer is that Geertz and his expositors conflate different meanings of *public* and *private*. *Public* can mean out in the world and perceptible or it can mean shared. Public and private have other meanings as well, but those are the most important ones for this discussion. There is no contradiction between a meaning being shared (public in that sense) and internal (private in a different sense), just as speakers of the same language have much the same shared, internalized knowledge of it.

One of Handler’s concerns, as noted already, is one others have voiced as well that the boundaries between “inner” and “outer” or between “individual” and “society” are ethnocentric Western constructs. It is true that Westerners often imagine a more firmly bounded self (e.g., Geertz 1983) or are more likely to see individuals as oppressed by society (Benedict 1934, quoted in Handler 2004: 492) than do members of many other societies. However, it appears that every language has a way of referring to a person considered as a stable entity (Wierzbicka 1993: 211;

Goddard and Wierzbicka 2007). Furthermore, as far as we know, there is no society that fails to recognize a distinction between an inner realm of thought/feeling and a world outside of persons, although that inner realm is not necessarily conceptualized in the same way as in Western ethnopsychologies (Spiro 1993; Strauss and Quinn 1997: 29–31).

There is another way to interpret Handler's (2004) concerns, as well as those raised by other culture theorists. The real issue is not whether theories of culture should recognize its location in persons as well as its external side. The greater concern is how to model the relationship between culture in persons and culture in the publicly observable world. Handler criticizes what he calls "mechanistic" theories of the relation of culture to personality: "a psychology in which culture, especially in the form of 'child-rearing practices,'² determined personality, and then personality reproduced culture" (Handler 2004: 492) creating distinctive national characters that are taken to be natural kinds. Those of other theoretical persuasions have raised yet different objections. For example, theorists with a performative approach to identity believe that interiority implies coherence and fixity (e.g., Butler 1990). Practice theorists are concerned that positing internalized culture ignores people's ability to interact with other people and objects or adapt to particular contexts (e.g., Lave 1988).

All of these are important concerns, but the response must be better models of culture in persons, not rejection of the whole idea of culture in persons (Strauss and Quinn 1997). No one would want to replicate the excesses of mid-twentieth century national character studies or ignore the criticisms that many psychological anthropologists raised at the time that some of these studies ignored intracultural variation. I share Handler's concern that culture should not be reified or bounded. I also share his admiration for a Boasian theorist who avoided such cultural reification: Edward Sapir. Handler approvingly quotes Edward Sapir's statement, "the true locus of culture is in the interactions of specific individuals and, on the subjective side, in the world of meanings which each . . . may unconsciously abstract for himself from his participation in these interactions" (Sapir 1949: 515, quoted in Handler 2004: 492). Handler's singling out of this comment for his agreement is surprising because in that essay and many others, Sapir stressed that individuals and their subjective meanings are quite real and what is called culture is "something of a statistical fiction" (Sapir 1949: 516). Sapir particularly emphasized the intracultural variability that is the result of each person's process of

making sense of their social interactions: “For each individual, the commonly accepted fund of meanings and values tends to be powerfully specialized or emphasized or contradicted by types of experience and modes of interpretation that are far from being the property of all men” (Sapir 1949: 517). The way individuals abstract frameworks of meaning from experiences, some of which are shared and others not, is what we need to understand.

The purpose of this paper is to demonstrate that a careful study of culture in persons leads away from cultural reification toward a more interesting way of thinking about culture in persons and its relation to publicly observable culture.

MOVING AWAY FROM SIMPLISTIC MODELS OF CULTURE IN PERSONS

The body of this paper presents my findings of the way Americans living in suburbs and exurbs of California, North Carolina, and Rhode Island discuss topics such as work, immigration policies, and their goals in life. In other words, I study the effects, not the processes, of internalization. (For studies of processes of culture learning, see the papers by Chapin, Quinn, Sirota, and Stromberg in this volume.) Nonetheless, I begin with background assumptions about public culture and the way it is learned, which it is useful to explain.

Two Background Assumptions

In setting out these principles and in the observations reported below, I focus on difference and disruption rather than consensus and continuity. In *A Cognitive Theory of Cultural Meaning*, which I co-authored with Naomi Quinn (1997), we labeled these the centrifugal and centripetal aspects of culture, respectively. Socialized as we were in different anthropological generations, I find the centrifugal side more compelling, while she is more struck by centripetal processes. By combining our perspectives, we reached a good balance. I continue to find centrifugal processes more interesting and hope tilting in that direction here will be of interest to readers as well. However, I also aim, if not to recreate the equal balance of Strauss and Quinn (1997), at least to keep in mind the larger truth of competing centripetal and centrifugal processes.³

Principle #1: Public culture is complex. If we know nothing else at this point, we know that public culture is complex. Dominant national discourses are countered by alternative global and local discourses; public representations of culture are contested; institutions, values, and beliefs change; people migrate or are exiled or flee persecution or intermarry, sometimes inventing hybrid cultural practices in the process. Some of these public cultural forms get labeled and seen as the group's culture; others do not; about others, there is disagreement. These are all examples of centrifugal cultural processes, and research about them is too vast to cite. Yet, on the centripetal side, there are also what Handler (2004) terms "historically sedimented systems" of meanings (p. 489). Public contests over meanings, movements of peoples, and shifts in identities are layered over commonalities in assumptions so ingrained that they are beyond contesting. Thus, public culture is doubly complex. There are the conflicts and changes that bedevil reductive attempts at cultural description, coupled with a deeper layer of at least partial continuity and tacit agreement. Furthermore, although this is less often discussed (but see Bourdieu 1977), public culture takes different forms. As I will discuss, of particular interest for an understanding of culture in persons are the differences among (1) public culture that is fully articulated in explicit statements of rules or values or narratives (see Stromberg's chapter in this volume), (2) concepts implied by what is said, and (3) regularities of experience that are not verbalized but are still a source of culture learning. Culture learning, then, is not simple, because what is being learned is so complicated.

Principle #2: The processes by which public culture is learned are not simple. The flow from public culture to culture in persons is complex as well, as several of the other papers in this volume attest. The term "internalize" can be misleading because it suggests swallowing whole. Even centripetal processes of cultural reproduction are not simple (see Quinn 2005 and Chapin, Quinn, Sirota, and Stromberg's chapters in this volume). Sometimes material and social reward structures produce compliance rather than wholehearted commitment. For example, in a capitalist society, even those with explicit anti-capitalist values may still subtly nudge their children to consider the earning potential of their passions. I will focus on complexities in how ways of thinking are constructed.

First, people's mental frameworks are drawn from patterns in their own experience, not from patterns that an outsider might observe generalizing over many people or drawing upon the parts of public culture

particularly striking to them. A person forms schemas based on the regularities they encounter; those schemas then can lead to reconstructing memories or even perceptions to fit the schemas (Koriat et al. 2000).⁴ In processing information, details that are irrelevant to the schema are ignored and forgotten; information that is missing or ambiguous is filled in or resolved based upon what is expected based on the person's current schemas.

Often, two people living in similar circumstances will acquire similar schemas. These shared cultural models, because of the way they direct attention and resolve blurry perceptions and memories, contribute to culture reproduction. However, members of a society, even members of the same family, do not have identical experiences. Differences in their experiences lead to some differences in their schemas; differences in their schemas later lead to differences in how they process new information, driving further differences in how they interpret public culture. Emotions and motivations are relevant as well. People have better memories for what is relevant to their goals or what evokes strong emotions than for what it is of little affective or motivational significance (Koriat et al. 2000: 512). What people extract from public culture also depends on its personal relevance for them. Thus, it is not only that the division of labor in society leads to a differential distribution of specialized cultural information, with farmers knowing more about plants and animals and beauticians more about techniques and styles of hair, skin, and nail care. Even two people exposed to the same public culture will attend to different aspects of it and recollect different things.

Not everything people experience is simplified or distorted to fit schemas. While schema-irrelevant information is quickly forgotten, schema-inconsistent information "is often remembered better than schema-consistent information" (Koriat et al. 2000: 494). There is no cultural filter in perception and memory that keeps people from awareness of strong counterexamples to their beliefs, creating the possibility of challenges to these beliefs and change in them.

Attitudes are complex as well. Psychologists have found that there can be discontinuities between implicit attitudes (reflected in speed of categorizing words that fit a stereotype versus ones that do not) and explicit attitudes (what people believe they think). Merely considering a negative social stereotype can strengthen implicit negative associations with the stereotyped group even if one disagrees with it (Devine 1989, cited by Bohner and Dickel 2011: 399). Those associations can lead to

re-enacting those disavowed attitudes when snap judgments are made, as we have seen too often in recent years when police officers in the United States, even African American police officers, kill African Americans by whom they felt threatened, even if they had no objective basis for feeling that way.

Six Features of Culture in Persons

These complexities in public culture and in culture learning are responsible for six interesting features of culture in persons that I explain and illustrate in the rest of this chapter. The aspect of culture in persons that is my focus is what Malinowski called “the native’s point of view... *his* vision of *his* world” (Malinowski 1961: 25). Studying the native’s point of view, he said, is the goal of ethnography. Points of view are not all of culture or even all of culture in persons. Another important aspect is “embodied” procedural knowledge, such as what gestures to make in different situations or how to drive a car. However, the cognitive aspect of culture in persons that Malinowski discussed—people’s understandings of what is and what ought to be—is what I know the most about. All of us are natives of some place. Malinowski’s admonition to study the native’s point of view keeps individuals in the picture. He does not advise that we study culture but rather people and their vision of their world. The only problem is the generalization implied by “the native.” Do all of the natives of any place, even the Trobriand Islands, have the same vision of their world? Does each person have an internally consistent vision of their world?

POINT 1: PEOPLE’S INTERPRETIVE FRAMEWORKS ARE COLLECTIONS OF SPECIFIC, SOMETIMES CONFLICTING, SCHEMAS

To say that people’s ideas of what is and what ought to be consists of cognitive schemas implies something different than to say that people’s ideas consist of ideologies or themes. In writing cultural descriptions, we anthropologists notice repeating themes both in public symbols and institutions and in typical comments people might make or ways they act. We might sum up those themes with a shorthand like “individualism.” That does not mean, however, that people have internalized an individualism schema. What they have learned are many specific schemas that,

because they are learned from living in a certain sociopolitical order, share many features. People can form generalizations from similar kinds of experiences. Chapin's chapter in this volume gives the example of the variety of experiences that lead Sri Lankan Sinhala children to form the expectations that their parents will anticipate their needs and that young people should defer to elders. Children can also learn that disparate experiences that are treated as similar by caregivers (that is, labeled with the same terms, similar emotional and behavioral reactions) belong to the same category. However, what outsiders see as a theme may not be so treated by members of the society. Moreover, as discussed above, sociocultural complexity often leads to children learning other schemas that do not fit the theme.

To illustrate the way people's interpretive frameworks are cobbled together from specific schemas, consider the way the native-born African American and white North Carolinians I interviewed in 2000 talked about immigration from Latin America. Between 1990 and 2002, North Carolina had the largest percentage increase in the U.S. in its Latinx population (U.S. Census Bureau 2000).

When I raised the topic of immigration with Daniel Shane, a white small business owner in his early 30s, he admitted to some discomfort with the larger numbers of Hispanics in his area:

At times I feel I've become a minority, and I'm sure it's nothing compared to ways black men have felt or black people, or other people, but it's a strange feeling, you know. It's just uncomfortable. I think probably the main group it comes from is Hispanics coming over. What do you do to stop it? The government's not going to do it.

These comments express a Whites are Becoming a Minority schema about immigration, albeit one softened a bit by Shane's acknowledgment that whites are not a minority in the same sense that blacks have been. (Nor were whites even close to being a numerical minority in North Carolina, including in his county.⁵) Despite that concession, Shane takes the next, one could say white nationalist, step of saying that if whites are becoming a minority, that trend should be stopped. ("What do you do to stop it? The government's not going to do it.")

But in his very next sentence, without pause, Shane expresses a more welcoming attitude:

Daniel: What do you do to stop it? The government's not going to do it. Who pulls the rug under them? Should you deny people an opportunity? You know, should you say, 'Look this is ours, just stay out?' It's a touchy situation. It's hard to say. Everybody deserves a chance ... I guess []. Does that make sense?

Claudia: Yeah, I can see.

Daniel: You probably have to be a strong racist or something to have a dead-set answer to be on one side of the fence or the other. But I think, you know, everyone should have an opportunity...⁶

These comments express a completely different schema that all people, regardless of race or nationality, should have the same economic opportunities and it is wrong to say, "Look this is ours, just stay out." It is consistent with what we could call a Land of Opportunity schema, the basic point of which is that the U.S. should be open to anyone who wants to get ahead through hard work or to escape political repression.

The Whites are Becoming a Minority schema and the Land of Opportunity schema are just two of 23 specific schemas about immigration my participants expressed.⁷ As I explain in Strauss (2012), their comments did not reflect a single theme like humanistic values or white nationalism, but instead were strung together from a variety of schemas. Most of the time, their collection of schemas did not reflect a consistent positive or negative attitude.

That is not to say that ideologies have no influence on the way people think. For example, many of the participants in my studies have been devout Christians. Christianity fits what I mean by an ideology: a wide-ranging, explicitly articulated set of value-laden ideas. Learning from a source like that can increase coherence among many of a person's schemas. However, as is well known, the particular ways people internalize Christianity may leave many gaps and inconsistencies. For example, although about half of my North Carolina interviewees attended church regularly, only one spoke of Biblical teachings commanding that "you shall love the alien as yourself" (Leviticus 19:33–34). That is not to say the others lacked pro-immigration schemas, but their positive schemas were secular ones like Land of Opportunity, or Nation of Immigrants, or Immigrants' Work Ethic. Even in the Bible Belt, religiously based humanism was almost completely absent (Strauss 2012: 187–188). Although the Bible is clear, what matters more is how Christians hear it applied. Perhaps the public discourse in their congregations and among devout people they knew did not refer to that aspect of Biblical teaching.

POINT 2: SCHEMAS GO BEYOND THE INFORMATION
GIVEN, WHICH CAN LEAD TO DIFFERING INTERPRETATIONS
OF SHARED EXPERIENCES

One of the most fundamental features of cognitive schemas is that they shape the way experiences are processed. As explained earlier, someone with a well-learned schema will attend to schema-relevant information more than information irrelevant to their schemas, will resolve ambiguous information to fit their schemas, and will reconstruct memories to better accord with their schemas. This automatic tendency of people to “go beyond the information given” (Bruner 1973) is what first led researchers to posit the existence of schemas.

For cultural anthropologists, the fact that learned frames of interpretation shape attention, perception, and memory is not surprising. What is interesting, however, is that this aspect of schemas can create differing interpretations of public culture.

Consider interpretations of the Occupy Wall Street movement. I began interviewing unemployed southern Californians in the fall of 2011, coincidentally, the same time as the Occupy Movement took to the streets to protest the systemic political and economic failures that had led to the Great Recession. Everyone I talked to who knew anything about Occupy understood the main message was about the state of the economy. Many of them associated “99%” with the movement (from Occupy’s slogan, “We are the 99%”). Beyond that agreement about the point of the movement, however, I found that their own political and economic schemas often shaped the way they understood Occupy’s message. Some blamed the recession on individuals’ failings; they were more likely to see Occupy’s message as being about bringing particular malefactors on Wall Street to justice. Others interpreted Occupy as expressing their own beliefs that more financial regulations or higher taxes on the rich were needed. Still others were distrustful of the whole political establishment, both Democrats and Republicans. They believed *that* was the point of Occupy Movement: a complete rejection of the political establishment, not just reform legislation. Moreover, some people added further meanings that were not part of Occupy’s message at all. For example, one working-class African American man in his early 50s, Carl Mathews, was very enthusiastic about the Occupy protests. As he kept talking, he referred to clashes between demonstrators and police and said, “You can only teargas and mace people so long, but let’s face it

we got more people out here with guns than police officers. Police got it good because people like me and you choose to not hurt no one. When the people change their heart, then they need to watch out.” I was surprised because the Occupy Movement espoused and practiced nonviolence. I asked, “So you think people might actually start demanding their rights with guns?” He replied,

Most things don’t dissolve easy. It takes struggle on both ends until something pops and breaks and then you have to restructure everything. Then after that it calms down. Just like with the Watts riots. [del.] Blacks didn’t hardly have jobs, when after the Watts riots they were hiring people that couldn’t even hardly speak or even had education because they was black.

Carl did not say that the Occupy movement preached armed resistance, but seeing televised images of police officers facing off against Occupy demonstrators brought to his mind his schema for effective political protest, which he thought of as militant protests or riots like those that took place in 1965 in the Watts neighborhood of Los Angeles. His interpretation of the Occupy protests was also guided by his anger at police harassment of African Americans. Our interview took place before the Black Lives Matter movement began, but blacks who grew up in Los Angeles, as Carl did, did not need that movement to be aware of the long history of brutality by Los Angeles police officers against communities of color. As a result, the presence of conflict between police and demonstrators was more salient to him than to others of my participants, very few of whom commented on the role of the police when we talked about the Occupy Movement (Strauss 2018b).

The Occupy Movement attempted to channel public anger about gross economic inequality. Some scholars worry that the wrenching changes from mid-twentieth century forms of industrial capitalism that relied on relatively high wages and consumer spending, to the current insecurity of work and incomes under flexible capitalism (Harvey 1989), has left members of the public without interpretive schemas to comprehend their lives. For example, Anne Allison (2013), writing beautifully about contemporary Japan, notes the way insecurity in jobs spreads, becoming “a widely shared uneasiness over an instability and insecurity in life; not having a place that feels steady, not being in a temporality that makes sense” (2013: 17). (See also Berlant 2011; Jameson 1984; Sennett 1998.)

Another possibility, however, is that some people will have schemas capacious enough to make sense of social change. Their conceptual framework gives them a way to comprehend social disruption; for them, social instability does not mean a loss of meaning. That is what I found when I interviewed a white woman in her early 60s, Krystal Murphy, who lost her job as an administrative assistant at a financial institution in 2011 and was not able to find another position. I interviewed her a few months after she lost the job when she had no income because she was initially deemed ineligible for unemployment compensation. Both Krystal's father and her ex-husband had worked in a California steel mill with good wages and benefits. That steel mill closed in the early 1980s, she became the primary breadwinner with much lower wages, then she and her husband separated. She went from a secure family income to near-poverty level wages even when she was working; she has lived the changes in the U.S. economy. Yet, Krystal was not suffering from anomie or lack of a schema to interpret her much more precarious finances. Instead, she said she had never had high expectations for her life because her severe learning disabilities had kept her from pursuing her dream of being a veterinarian. This is the wisdom she imparted to her teenage daughter: "I'm telling you, you can make all the plans you want in life and unfortunately shit happens." Nor are her memories of the days when the mill was operating more positive. Yes, her father earned good wages and benefits, but his need to support his family trapped him in a miserable job: "He hated that job every day he had to go there. He hated it. But he knew that that's the best he could do for our family." Her schema that the world will probably not give you what you want led her to see continuity where others saw discontinuity (Strauss 2018a).

These examples show that people's schemas differ, with the result that they do not interpret public culture in the same ways.

POINT 3: SELF-IMAGE, EMOTION TRIGGERS, AND MOTIVATIONS ARE KEY IN CONSTRUCTING ACTORS' POINT OF VIEW

Schemas differ not only in their contents but also in their connections to a person's self-image, learned emotion triggers, and personal motivations. Krystal Murphy has a younger sister, Summer Carrington, whom I interviewed at the same time. Summer lost her job at the same financial institution on the same day as Krystal and was not able to find another

stable job thereafter. Unlike Krystal, Summer's response was anomic. She became deeply depressed. Part of the problem was that she believed the dominant American schema that her life situation was the result of her voluntary choices and that she could change her circumstances with talent and hard work. This was not a belief she held in a detached way; it was important to her self-image to take personal responsibility for her actions. Summer's voluntarist schema of economic individualism had corresponded with her experiences in the past, but in her late fifties, faced with the paucity of jobs in the poorest large urban area of the United States (Nisperos and Hagen 2013) and one of the worst hit by the Great Recession (Adams 2011), she lost a way to comprehend her circumstances and respond in a way that fit her values.

Why did Summer and Krystal, sisters who spent a great deal of time together as adults as well as when they were growing up, apply different emotionally and motivationally imbued schemas to understand their economic circumstances? Krystal Murphy traces her philosophy of limited personal agency ("you can make all the plans you want in life and unfortunately shit happens") to her struggles with schoolwork when she was young. There was little help for people with severe dyslexia then, and no matter how hard she tried, she still got bad grades. For Summer, on the other hand, schoolwork was easy, and she was also very popular. Bright and attractive, she grew up feeling that the only thing holding her back was her choices. When I asked what social groups they belonged to, Krystal said she was "lower middle class," but Summer replied, "I belong everywhere I chose to be." Summer married a musician who became a substance abuser, earned little, and implicated her in his legal and financial troubles, but she only blamed herself for choosing to marry him. Even the way they recounted some family stories differed, with Summer stressing her father's poor choices and Krystal stressing their limited income. Although Krystal also believed in personal responsibility for one's actions, and Summer also had more cynical interpretations of workplace politics, those perspectives were less emphasized when we talked (Strauss 2018a). Thus, even people with the same repertoire of schemas do not necessarily find those schemas equally relevant for their own lives.

Or consider the differences in the political views of Carl Mathews and Terrance West. Terrance, like Carl, is an African American man who also spent part of his childhood in Los Angeles before his family moved east to the city of Rialto. Terrance brought up the topic of the Occupy

movement before I raised it, and he, like Carl, discussed Occupy protesters' confrontations with the police. Unlike Carl, however, Terrance defended the police and had mixed feelings about Occupy:

Terrance West: I also felt really strongly about the Occupy movement that was taking place.

Claudia: Oh, yeah? What did you think about that?

Terrance: I felt like I was on both sides of that. The reason why I'm saying that is because I understand the anger and the hostility towards the bad economy and some of the folks that we believe may have had a part to play in that, but then again, there was a lot of property damage that cost millions of dollars. [*A few lines in which he elaborates were deleted here.*] I liked the way the police department handled it because they were being understanding but being firm at the same time. On a personal level, I was upset because they destroyed the lawn at City Hall and L.A. City Hall is one of the most spectacular landmarks in L.A. and I hate that they messed up a part of what makes L.A., L.A. I hated seeing people getting beat in the other cities like in New York and in Oakland and in Boston because we're all Americans. We're all suffering through the same bad economy and the cop that might've been out there beating that protester is probably only a paycheck or two away from being out there *with* that protester, so that's why.

For Terrance, cops were just working men like him, and he highly disapproved of the damage Occupy LA caused to the grounds of the Los Angeles City Hall.

Why the difference between Carl Mathews' and Terrance West's interpretations of Occupy? In part, they are due to their different repertoires of self-relevant schemas. Carl was born in the early 1960s. Although he was a child during the Watts Riots and the heyday of Black Power discourse in the U.S., it was a greater part of his lived experience and that of others with whom he interacted (relatives, slightly older peers) than for Terrance, who was born in the early 1970s. More relevant, however, were significant differences in their identities and life goals. Terrance's faith in the political establishment is closely tied to his ambition, when he was younger, to become a mayor "running some city and doing some good for a lot of people." One of his heroes was Tom Bradley, who served five terms as mayor of Los Angeles when Terrance was growing up and was the first African American mayor of a large city with a majority white population. Terrance was appointed to a city

commission in Rialto when he was eighteen. Terrance's earlier political ambitions were related to his belief that the political system generally works for the good of the community; therefore, he is not favorably disposed toward challenges to the political order. That belief may help explain why he was especially upset by Occupy LA's unsightly encampment around City Hall.

By contrast, a middle-class lifestyle is central to Carl's self-image. When I asked him what social groups he belonged to, he said, "I'm not poor, I'm not rich but I am middle class, and hopefully still try to retain that status." When we first met, he had been out of work for a year and without unemployment compensation because he had been fired. He was embarrassed about his old clothes and old car, close to losing his home, and angry that his bank had never let him modify his mortgage. Anger at his bank made Carl particularly receptive to the Occupy Wall Street movement, and the experience of meeting other homeowners of diverse ethnicities in the same predicament gave him a personally relevant, memorable example of shared interests among the 99%. Terrance, by contrast, had never owned a home, and considered himself a worker rather than a consumer. He could understand why others were angry at big banks, but it was not relevant for him (Strauss 2018b).

People can share emotion-laden, identity-relevant, and goal-directed schemas. Indeed, as Quinn (2005) stresses, culture learning is often engineered to connect shared schemas to motivations, emotions, and identities. However, as I have illustrated, affectively charged and goal-directing schemas also vary, even among people from the same demographic group or even, as in Krystal and Summer's case, the same family.

POINT 4: MEANINGS ARE SITUATIONAL; SCHEMAS SHIFT MORE SLOWLY

Schemas are mental frameworks of interpretation. They change slowly over time. Meanings are not the same as schemas; instead, they are the actual interpretations that arise for actors when they apply their schemas to people, objects, and events at a particular time (Strauss and Quinn 1997). Because people typically hold sets of disparate schemas (Point 1), different combinations can be activated at any given time. That explains why culture in persons is compatible with reactions that will vary depending on the situation.

For example, compare two stories Terrance West narrated about his reactions on election night 2008, when Barack Obama was elected president. He told the first story during my first interview with him, in 2012:

I was crying and happy, just a flood of emotion and when I got home—at the time me and my mom were roommates. I’d get home and my mom is in her room with the door open. CNN is blasting on her TV and she’s shaking her head and she’s like, “Oh, my God. I don’t believe it. I don’t believe it. I didn’t think that this was gonna happen in my lifetime.” I said, “Mom, I didn’t think it was gonna happen in my lifetime.” I just remember this overwhelming pride, but then I sat there and I thought about what it – it meant more than just a black dude in the White House. What it means to me is that anybody of any race could sit in that seat. It meant that we could have a President Gonzales. We could have a President Wong. We could have a President whoever now, you know?

In the fall of 2013, I re-interviewed Terrance. In July 2013, a jury acquitted George Zimmerman of second-degree murder charges for shooting and killing an unarmed African American teenager, Trayvon Martin, who had walked through Zimmerman’s neighborhood. That decision began the social media campaign that, with further police killings of African American men, developed into the Black Lives Matter protests the following year. Terrance had been moved by President Obama’s personal reaction to the acquittal. With these fairly recent events on his mind, Terrance’s narrative of his feelings the night Obama was elected changed a little:

I couldn’t believe it because I’ve always heard all my life, “We’re never going to have a black president. Never going to have a black president,” and I remember driving home from the polling place that night, it was like 9:30, ten o’clock and I’m like, “Wow, really? I can’t believe this.” I got home—at the time my mom and I were sharing an apartment. I got home and my mother was in her room with CNN on and she was in tears. She’s like, “I don’t believe it. I don’t believe it.” It was really emotional. I remember going to sleep that night and I’m thinking, “Wow, I cannot believe we actually are going to have somebody that is new and kind of young and kind of different in the White House. And it’s somebody that I can look in the mirror and say I actually kind of look like the president a little bit. I can’t believe it. It was relatable to me. It was an overwhelming pride. I had similar pride when he got re-elected.

The facts Terrance tells are almost identical. In both narratives, he comes home from working at the polls, his mother is watching the television, and he and his mother are thrilled that a black man was elected president given their expectation it would never happen in their lifetimes. But his narrative evaluations—the meanings he assigns to those facts—are a little different. In 2012, he adds that what the election “means to me is that anybody of any race could sit in that seat. It meant that we could have a President Gonzales. We could have a President Wong.” During our 2013 interview, by contrast, his black identity was heightened by talking about President Obama’s public comments after Zimmerman’s acquittal for killing Trayvon Martin, which led Terrance to recount examples of racial discrimination he had faced. With all of this in mind, he subsequently retold his election night story with the emphasis on his own racial pride.

This shift does not mean that Terrance has lost his concern for other socially disadvantaged groups. He is gay, and his boyfriend is Mexican-American. On Facebook, Terrance continues to repost memes reflecting his concerns for all ethnic minorities. Terrance has stable schemas, but these schemas interact with current events to produce situational meanings.

Carl also made comments that seemed to express widely differing attitudes on different occasions, but that were traceable to more stable schemas. Carl is a socially conservative evangelical Christian. In our follow-up interview in 2014, he criticized Obama’s eventual support for same-sex marriage and said lesbians and gays should be barred from running for president. Yet, when he was talking about the Occupy Movement in 2011, he said with approval, “it’s not a racially motivated thing, it ain’t black, it ain’t Mexican, it ain’t Jews, ain’t homosexuals, it’s *everybody*, holding hands, fighting for the same thing, the 99 percent.” Why this particular selection of social groups? Furthermore, Carl seems to be homophobic; why was he talking about holding hands with homosexuals?

A clue to the explanation lies in the fact that Carl also mentioned Jews and Mexicans. All are groups that, at some point during our three lengthy interviews, he spoke of as Others. For example, he asked me if I was Jewish. When I confirmed that was my ethnic heritage, he said he had to be nice to me because “you guys are the ‘chosen people.’” Although Jews are not as problematic for him as gays, they are still quite distinct. He also discussed Mexican Americans. On the one hand, he mentioned similarities in the way Mexican men and black men are

treated by police, but on the other, he blamed undocumented Mexican immigrants for his difficulty in finding another job and said they should be deported. I believe that precisely because he did see Mexicans, Jews, and homosexuals as Others that these were the groups that came to mind when he wanted to express how the Occupy Movement was creating solidarity that transcended other lines of difference. Earlier in that interview, he had said that with the middle-class disappearing, soon the main lines of division would be the rich against everyone else, “which is going to be the new racism. It ain’t going to *be* all this prejudice against, black against white, and Chinese against Japanese and Mexicans against everybody—ain’t going to be none of that.” With that schema salient in his thinking, he applauded political solidarity among all the groups that he saw as different from him (Strauss 2018b). As I noted earlier (Point 1), general labels for others’ views are not helpful for understanding the specific schemas a person holds and the ways those schemas shape their actions in a particular context.

POINT 5: BELIEFS ARE INTERNALIZED IN DIFFERENT WAYS

As the examples above are intended to illustrate, beliefs are complicated. Another complication is that the form of beliefs in persons varies.

Some of people’s beliefs seem to be internalized in a highly verbal way. That was the case for the 23 schemas about immigration I found when I discussed that topic with ordinary North Carolinians. The Land of Opportunity schema, for example, was typically expressed with the catchphrase, “a better life,” as the following examples (among many others) show:

I don’t have a problem with people wanting to come to the United States to have a better life. (Lea Taylor)

They’re just doing what our forefathers did. They’re coming and looking in search of a better life. (Paul Davis)

Everybody came here originally for a better life. (Maggie Hughes)

I have termed a shared, often repeated schema like Land of Opportunity a “conventional discourse” (Strauss 2012). The kinds of beliefs expressed in conventional discourses are evidently learned from others’ words.

Their canned quality suggests that people hear or read others' opinions, chunks of which are internalized nearly verbatim. Beliefs formed in that way are learned as nearly complete sentences. A person's outlook in those instances looks a lot like belief defined as "conviction of the truth of some statement" ([merriam-webster.com](http://www.merriam-webster.com)).

Culture in persons, however, consists of much more than explicit statements. There are also implicit beliefs. Implicit beliefs, as philosophers define that term, are not ones that a person holds but that are "swiftly derivable from something one explicitly believes" (Schwitzgebel 2015). I am convinced of the truth of many statements that I had never considered or learned, but I would assent to if I were asked. For example, I do not think the moon is made of green cheese, cheddar cheese, strawberries, or any other food. I do not need to have previously learned the statement, "The moon is not made of strawberries" to instantly agree with such a statement if it ever came up. While that example is trivial, consider instead more consequential cultural assumptions so taken for granted that they do not need to be stated. My participants, whether themselves immigrants or native-born, took for granted that the world consists of nation-states with fixed borders separating those who belong from those who do not (cf. Billig 1995). For example, Jorge Paiz, an undocumented immigrant from Guatemala who later obtained a green card and U.S. citizenship, discussed which undocumented immigrants should be deported and which should be allowed to stay. He thought that immigrants who were hard workers and good people should be allowed to stay. Under President Obama "most of the people that are getting deported is because you know, they did something bad,"⁸ and he agreed with this policy although he recognized it had deleterious effects on the Central American countries where many of the young deportees were sent. Implicit in his comments is the assumption that the world is carved up into countries with a natural right to expel those who do not belong or are considered undesirable. Jorge Paiz probably has not internalized a statement like, "The world is divided into countries that have a right to expel foreigners." Instead, it was a reality of the difficult trip he made on his own as a teenager from Guatemala to Mexico to the United States. Currently it is the tacit assumption behind all the discussions he hears about deportation policies. Still, we could say that Jorge holds that belief in the sense that it is an implicit presupposition of other beliefs he holds explicitly.

An even more complicated example of beliefs not learned from explicit statements are ones that the speaker would deny if asked. As was discussed in the introduction, psychologists have found that someone could sincerely disavow sexist, racist, or other prejudiced views, but their implicit attitudes turn out to be at odds with their explicit ones. An interesting example is the implicit association of males with science (Nosek et al. 2009). Volunteers in 34 countries were given an implicit association task online in which they were to press one key if they saw the words for he, boy, physics, chemistry, etc. and another key if they saw the words for she, girl, arts, history, etc. Either before or after that task, the same participants pressed keys with the instructions reversed so that the feminine words were associated with the sciences and the masculine words with the humanities. More than 70% of participants more quickly followed instructions if the male terms were associated with the sciences and the female terms with humanities than the reverse, revealing implicit gender stereotyping of the disciplines. Participants who completed the implicit associations task were also asked for their explicit views with questions in which they rated both “Science” and “Liberal Arts” on scales ranging from “strongly male” to “strongly female” (Nosek et al. 2009). The correlation between their explicit attitudes and implicit associations was not very strong ($r = .22$). It seems that their assumptions about the gendering of science are not a belief in the Merriam-Webster sense of “conviction of the truth of some statement.” They do not hold that belief in the form of a statement, but rather as strong associative links. Probably they abstracted the pattern that science teachers and famous scientists are typically men. Verbal commentary about scientists may contribute, but such commentary does not need to include explicit statements about the typical scientist’s sex. For English speakers, using masculine pronouns when talking about scientists would be sufficient to create the association.⁹

Whether we call them “full-blown beliefs” or not, such implicit associations have important effects. Nosek et al. (2009) found that the average association of science with males varied considerably. It was smallest among participants from Jordan, Moldova, Macedonia, and the Philippines and largest in Tunisia. These differences in implicit gender stereotypes were significantly related to the difference between 8th grade boys’ and girls’ science scores on standardized tests in those countries. In fact, in Jordan, Moldova, Macedonia, and the Philippines, girls’ science test scores were better than the boys’ (Nosek et al. 2009, figure 1; see

also Mukhopadhyay 2004 on India). Explicit attitudes expressed in average ratings of the gendering of the sciences did not independently contribute to prediction of national achievement gaps in science, but average implicit attitudes did (Nosek et al. 2009). It seems that, at some level, participants had assumptions about the maleness of sciences that may have reduced adults' encouragement and girls' motivation to study hard, or that may have created a stereotype threat (Steele and Aronson 1995) that interfered with the girls' performance. These cultural associations are as significant, if not more so, as explicit beliefs.

These different forms of cultural learning are not equally accessible to the person's consciousness. Beliefs learned verbally and remembered in large verbal chunks like conventional discourses are easy to bring to mind and recognize as one's view. (Although people are not always aware of all the conflicting conventional discourses they hold. Frequently those are compartmentalized, with only some coming to awareness in a given context, Strauss 2012.) The implicit presuppositions behind what one believes are less often voiced and recognized, for lack of normal occasions to do so, although they could be recognized in the right context. Implicit associations, especially those at odds with a person's explicit attitudes, are hard to recognize and, if they conflict with shared explicit beliefs, are readily misrecognized (cf. Bourdieu 1977).

POINT 6: BELIEFS VARY IN BEING SEEN AS CULTURAL

A final way in which culture in persons is complicated is in meta-understandings linked to ideas. Not only do ideas vary in being typically recognized, unrecognized, or misrecognized, they also vary in being recognized *as* cultural. Those seen as cultural are not taken to be natural or universal. Instead, they are tagged as held by some kinds of people but not by other kinds. To put it another way, these ideas have social indexicalities. To continue with the example of the gendering of science, such a meta-understanding might be the view that the sort of person who believes that the sciences are a male field is an old-fashioned sexist. To explicitly reject such beliefs is a way of claiming a certain kind of identity (not sexist or old-fashioned).

Linguistic anthropologists and sociolinguists have terms for such meta-understandings. For example, Labov (1971) distinguished *indicators* (dialect features that occur with higher frequency in some speech communities than others but are not usually noticed by speakers

themselves) from *markers* (dialect features that speakers recognize as typical of their group or another group) and *stereotypes* (dialect features used to typify a group). Speakers can deliberately play with stylistic variation in their adoption of markers or stereotypes to highlight or downplay certain identities (Eckert 2008; see also Silverstein 2003 on indexical orders).¹⁰

Similarly, among people's sociocultural understandings, some are mentally associated with meta-understandings about what sort of person holds that view but others are not. The standard account of modern Westerners is that they embrace a notion of unfettered personal agency (e.g., Shweder and Bourne 1984: 192). But in what way do Westerners embrace voluntarism? Is it completely taken for granted or is it seen as one possible framework among others? There are some realms (e.g., responsibility for choosing one's spouse) in which most Westerners are unselfconsciously voluntaristic. When Summer rues her choice of a spouse, she takes for granted that whom she married was her choice. Love marriages, for Americans like her, are not held up as a cultural artifact, unlike in societies like India where arranged marriages are common and love matches are outside the norm. By contrast, in the United States, there are alternatives to voluntaristic ways of attributing responsibility for one's economic situation. Those non-voluntaristic frameworks could certainly have been invoked in Summer and Krystal's case. They were fired because Summer used Krystal's employee password to make an online request on Krystal's behalf that she be allowed to take a personal day to visit her son-in-law in the hospital. Employees were not supposed to share their password, but this was a particularly inhumane application of that rule. Their difficulties in finding another job could be attributed to the terrible economy in their area and, in addition, to age discrimination (Neumark et al. 2015). Summer was aware of these structural conditions, but when I asked Krystal and Summer whether "it's fair what you went through," Summer replied, "I don't want to sit here and look at it, 'It's not fair.'" Her point is that she did not want to be the kind of person who complains about life being unfair. Instead, she wanted to be the kind of person who takes personal responsibility for what she called "all the mistakes you've made in life," whether it was breaking the rule about not sharing passwords or marrying a man who turned out to be a feckless cheating drug abuser. Thus, she made a choice to be the sort of person who believes in the power of one's choices, in full awareness that there are other ways one could think about one's situation. (See Strauss 2007 on defensive voluntarism.)

Elsewhere I have delineated gradations in the *cultural standing* people attribute to their views, ranging from ones they see as controversial, to ones they see as under debate in their opinion community, to ones they see as the common opinion in their group (but not in other groups), to ones they just take for granted and do not recognize that they hold (Strauss 2004). U.S. Americans I have interviewed are careful to voice an opinion in a way that shows their awareness of its cultural standing. One of the valuable contributions of Handler's (2004) discussion of culture theory is his reminder of Tocqueville's observation that there is cultural variability in the extent to which people are concerned about public opinion. Perhaps in the France of Toqueville's day, all the variations in what I am calling cultural standing were not so clearly marked in speech. Nonetheless, ethnographies I have read suggest that people in every society are aware that social groups differ in their outlooks. Those meta-understandings are another important aspect of culture in persons.

TOWARD A BETTER UNDERSTANDING OF "THE NATIVE'S POINT OF VIEW"

In comments about "the native's point of view," Geertz (1983) distinguished between locals' own "experience-near" concepts (e.g., the concept of love) and observers' "experience-distant" concepts (e.g., the psychoanalytic concept of object cathexis).¹¹ He added that experience-near concepts are used unselfconsciously:

People use experience-near concepts spontaneously, unself-consciously, as it were colloquially; they do not, except fleetingly and on occasion, recognize that there are any "concepts" involved at all. That is what experience-near means—that ideas and the realities they inform are naturally and indissolubly bound up together. What else could you call a hippopotamus? Of course the gods are powerful, why else would we fear them? (Geertz 1983: 58)

In Quinn and Holland's (1987) groundbreaking discussion of the shared cognitive schemas they termed cultural models, they made a similar point about the "transparency" of such beliefs:

Our cultural understanding of the world is founded on many tacit assumptions. This underlying cultural knowledge is, to use Hutchins's (1980: 12) words, "often transparent to those who use it. Once learned, it becomes

what one *sees with*, but seldom what one *sees*.” This “referential transparency” (ibid.) ... causes cultural knowledge to go unquestioned by its bearer. (Quinn and Holland 1987: 14)

Quinn, Holland, and Geertz are not saying that tacit assumptions or naturalized conceptual systems are all there is to culture, but they do highlight this one kind of culture in persons, the kind that is mostly implicit and not seen as cultural.¹²

Unselfconsciousness and referential transparency do characterize the way actors hold some of their cultural views. Describing and questioning the naturalness of such assumptions are still some of the most important things we do as anthropologists. My point is not that we should stop conducting such cultural analyses, but rather that completely unselfconscious, commonsensical experience-near constructs are only part of the native’s point of view.

Eighty-five years ago, Sapir made the same point. He stressed that “the true psychological locus of a culture is *the individual* or a *specifically enumerated list of individuals*, not an economically or politically or socially defined group of individuals.” Then he explained that the individual includes a “total world of form, meaning, and implication of symbolic behavior which a given individual partly knows and directs, partly intuits and yields to, partly is ignorant of and is swayed by” (Sapir 1949: 517–518). That compact formulation nicely captures some of the different ways people relate to their beliefs as I explained above (Point 5, about how beliefs are differently internalized, and Point 6, about how they vary in being seen as cultural).

Complicating our understanding of culture in persons has implications for how we ought to study culture. It requires attention to all the levels of what is said, implied, and misrecognized; variations in cultural standing; differences not only between people but also within them (Strauss 2005); and the contextual variation that is the result of people’s ability to hold a variety of possibly conflicting schemas.

Recognition of complexity of culture in persons is also important for understanding others in our own society. I am writing this in 2017, shortly after the election in which Donald Trump became president. Those who voted against Trump may wonder how so many of their fellow citizens could condone his remarks about Mexicans, Muslims, women, and other groups he stigmatized. Yet, as my examples illustrate, people are complicated. Like Daniel Shane, they may

sound anti-immigrant at one moment and welcoming of immigrants a moment later. Or like Carl Mathews, they may disapprove of gays and lesbians, but be open to solidarity with them and other outgroups in order to fight economic injustice. On a more pessimistic note, they may consciously subscribe to unprejudiced views, but unconsciously take the dominance of whites, men, and the native-born as the norm (see also Hochschild 2016). A better theory of culture in persons is a practical, not just theoretical, necessity.

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NOTES

1. In Strauss and Quinn (1997), we used the terms “extrapersonal” and “intrapersonal.” External and internal are a little snappier.
2. Notice, again, Handler’s insertion of scare quotes around “child-rearing practices” in the quote above. Is he questioning the observable fact that there are differences, across space and time, in the way people bring up children, differences that have consequences over the life course? (See Chapin in this volume for a striking example.)
3. See Sökefeld (2007), who insightfully questions whether my emphasis on differing cultural models is consistent with the explanation of culture in Strauss and Quinn (1997).
4. That does not mean that schemas should be taken to be bounded mental representations. Instead, I conceive of them as the learned tendency of groups of neurons to be activated jointly (Strauss and Quinn 1997).
5. In 2000, Hispanics were only 4.7% of the total population of North Carolina. In Wake County, where Daniel Shane lived, whites were 72.4% of the population, Hispanics only 5.4% (<http://censusviewer.com/county/NC/Wake>, accessed January 13, 2017).
6. My transcription conventions are as follows: [del.] = deletion; ... = pause; [] = unintelligible; italics = speaker’s emphasis; [italics] = added by the author for clarification.
7. In Strauss (2012), I described a Racial Differences/Cultural Inferiority schema instead of Whites are Becoming a Minority.
8. This is his wife’s translation of his comments in Spanish.

9. According to Schwitzgebel's (2015) overview of epistemologists' analysis of *belief*, "it remains controversial to what extent [*implicit attitude*] tests of this sort reveal subjects' (implicit) *beliefs*, as opposed to merely culturally-given associations or attitudes other than full-blown belief," and that Gendler (2008) "suggests that we regard such implicit attitudes as arational and automatic *aliefs* rather than genuine evidence-responsive *beliefs*." Thus, Schwitzgebel distinguishes *implicit associations* in the field of psychology from *implicit beliefs* in philosophy.
10. See also Agha on enregisterment (Agha 2003, 2005). Enregisterment is the historical process by which some group comes to recognize a language variety as indexing a particular persona, i.e., a certain social type (Agha 2005: 38).
11. Interestingly, Geertz took these terms from the psychoanalyst Heinz Kohut (1971).
12. This is despite Quinn and Holland's cognitive anthropology being at odds with Geertz's interpretivist anthropology in other respects (Strauss and Quinn 1997).

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CHAPTER 6

An Anthropologist's View of American Marriage: Limitations of the Tool Kit Theory of Culture

Naomi Quinn

I have been sitting on this critique for a long time. In September, 1986, Ann Swidler and I both participated in a conference on *Love in Social and Historical Perspective*, held at University of Virginia. I had not yet fully completed the project on American marriage that was the subject of my over-long and under-analyzed conference paper. However, I clearly remember, even then, being struck by how diametrically opposed were the explanations Swidler and I gave for Americans' understanding of marital love. An exploration of this difference, which I will go on to describe, is at the heart of this paper. Having thought long and hard about this matter for all this time, I am now ready to cast our different explanations of marital love in terms of sharply different theories of culture and methods for reconstructing it. I will not only be defending my view and arguing for the limitation of hers, but also trying to interrogate the assumptions and practices on which the difference between us rests.

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THE CHOSEN FOCUS OF MY CRITIQUE

I have chosen Swidler's work on marital love to critique for three simple reasons. First, the theory on which it is based, the so-called "tool kit" theory, privileges strategies of action on which individuals draw as needed from a repertoire provided them by their surrounding cultural world, while denying or downplaying anything like stable cultural meanings as motives for such action.¹ While I certainly do not rule out people's capacity for strategic behavior, I add to the account of marriage a critical component from a very different tradition which assumes that individuals, much of the time, enact stable representations, many of these culturally shared.

My interest in critiquing Swidler's theory is further prompted by its seemingly wide and relatively unquestioned acceptance in her home discipline of sociology (see, e.g., Vaisey 2009: 1679–1680; 2010: 76).² That is not to deny the history of the study of culture in that field, and the expansion of this area of study over the past decades (see, e.g., Hays 2000: 596), nor to dismiss the fact that culture has most recently become a topic of vigorous discussion and debate in sociology. Many have now called for the incorporation of culture into sociological theory—recognizing "the cultural turn in sociology" (Friedland and Mohr 2004)—to the point where there now exist a distinct school of "cultural sociology" and two journals by that name. Even so, with few exceptions, sociologists have proposed no alternative theory that might compete with tool kit theory.³ In sociology, it has become very much the default theory of culture.

Lastly is the striking match between her study of marriage and my own, analyses of which offer an incomparable opportunity to get to the bottom of our different theories and methods. The parallel between our two studies will take me into a close consideration, which I hope will not unduly burden the reader, of the differences between them. This list of three considerations, all outgrowths of my ongoing research interests, should make clear that, in offering my critique, I am not targeting Swidler personally.

One exception to my observation that sociologists have not come up with alternatives to the tool kit theory is Stephen Vaisey, who offers a "dual-process model" of culture (Vaisey 2009) that pairs Swidler's idea of how culture is deployed with something more like that proposed by cognitive anthropologists (including Claudia Strauss and myself; Strauss and Quinn 1997).⁴ That is to say, in addition to the "bits and pieces

of culture” that, according to tool kit theory people “draw on strategically (say, to win an argument)” (Vaisey 2009: 1686), we build up out of our experience more enduring internalized structures, or “deeply internalized schematic processes” (Vaisey 2009: 1687) that are the primary drivers of action. To clarify, when Vaisey and Swidler herself use the term “internalized,” they simply mean that a schema or representation, cultural or not, is inside someone’s head or brain (with Swidler consistently dismissing any such internalized cultural understandings) and I will follow their usage.⁵ Vaisey’s distinction between “dual processes” is compatible with my own thinking. However, as I will discuss in detail later, his distinctively sociological approach to motivation fails to serve my anthropological needs.

I will now be more specific as to the nature of my initial recognition that our two interpretations of marital love are diametrically opposed. Swidler sees American ideas about love as deriving from the structure of American marriage, while I see the structure of marriage as deriving from that of love. Sociologists have hit this nail on its head before me. Complaining that Swidler “denies culture autonomous causal power,” Isaac Reed (2002: 794) in an early review of *Talk of Love*, asks “whether the institution of marriage exists, in good part, because of the mythic discourse of love, as well as the other way around.” Likewise, in their Introduction to a collection devoted to cultural sociology, *Matters of Culture*, Roger Friedland and John Mohr comment, “In America, it may be the value of love as much as the material exigencies of reproduction and intimate sociality that accounts for the institutional structure of marriage” (Friedland and Mohr 2004: 17). Animated by the new cultural sociology, these writers are intent on opposing an older sociological tendency to treat culture as the outcome of material conditions, and never as an independent cause of these conditions (Alexander 2003: 5; see my endnote no. 3). However, their alternative interpretations to Swidler’s go unelaborated. These authors do not offer any theoretical basis for their claim that love may structure marriage; that I will try to do.

I do not take Swidler’s view of how individuals strategically deploy their cultural knowledge to be wrong. In fact, psychological anthropologists have gone down the same path, represented in our field by an approach called “person-centered ethnography,” in which “an effort is made to represent human behavior and subjective experience from the point of view of the acting, intending, and attentive subject...” (Hollan 2001: 48–49). However, as this author continues, after a comma, “...to actively explore

the emotional saliency and motivational force of cultural beliefs and symbols...” There is recognition, often explicit, by these anthropologists that the basis for such “saliency” and “force” is the widely shared meanings on which subjects cannot help but draw for the knowledge that they then strategically deploy. (See, for recent treatments of such cultural models as complementary to person-centered ethnography, Chapin 2014: 11–13, 19–20; Strauss 2012: 60–61; Strauss 2018; Lowe 2018)⁶ Swidler, by contrast, forcefully denies the existence of any such shared system for the meaning to Americans of their marriages and marital love. This is where I think she goes wrong.

I hope to persuade some sociologists, through a comparison of Swidler’s analyses of marriage and marital love and my own, that what is wanting is not just a theory of culture that acknowledges the independent causal force of internalized, motivating cultural schemas, as Vaisey argues. What is wanting is a theory of culture that explains, moreover, the depth that such motivation can have, as in the case of marriage and marital love—and what kinds of prior shared experiences give rise to such powerful motivations. Critical to this discovery must be methods capable of reconstructing both such cultural schemas and their motivational force, from what people say. In my efforts to provide methods of reconstruction equal to such a challenge, I aspire, as does Vaisey (e.g., 2009: 1707), to breach the disciplinary boundary that separates our two fields when it comes to discussions of culture. If successful, our endeavors will encourage more interdisciplinary effort.

OPPORTUNE PARALLELS

Let me start by establishing some coincidental but opportune parallels between Swidler’s work and mine on American marriage. Happily, she and I collected our interviews on this topic at almost exactly the same time, I in 1979–1980 and she in 1980–1981. Although we did so on opposite coasts, she in northern California and I in central North Carolina, what her interviewees and mine had to say about marriage was remarkably similar in some respects. The first hint of this similarity came from the very few interviewees quoted in the earliest publication of her results in Bellah et al. (1985: 85–112). In her subsequent (2001) book, *Talk of Love: How Culture Matters*, Swidler is not much more generous with actual quoted interview excerpts. Instead, much of the evidence she assembles for her reconstruction of Americans’ understandings of love

and marriage is summarized in the surrounding analyses she supplies. Nonetheless, the book offers many useful observations. And the parallels between what some of her interviewees had to say about marriage and what some of mine had to say on the same topic remain striking—so much so that as I read her book I kept experiencing *déjà vu* with regard to my own research.

Here is just one fresh example that struck me forcefully because of how very alike these interviewees were, in spite of differences in the language used, in their critiques of American marriage in their time. The first excerpt is from one of Swidler's interviewees, quoted in her book, and the second and third are from two of mine:

I guess in the divorce rate the biggest thing there is commitment. A lot of people are just taking it too lightly. That's an offshoot, I think, to the large extent that our American society is becoming very self-oriented, or very individual-oriented. What's in it for me? How much do I get out of it...? People don't look at the repercussions of their individual actions outside of themselves. The divorce rate, sexual behavior today...people's attitude towards war, attitudes toward each other, I think they're all largely interrelated. (Interviewee Les Newman, quoted in Swidler 2001: 140)

It seems to me that for the past ten years or say fifteen years maybe, people are much more individualistic and they're much more I-oriented. And when people feel that they have to put their own needs at such a high level, it seems to me it's awfully hard to think of a marriage as—and all that goes with it as being compatible with that because you do have to do some submerging, that's all there is to it. There's—it may be that you do yourself an injustice to some extent by doing it but I think that these are somewhat mutually incompatible and it's a matter of degree. I mean if you're willing to submerge the "I" a little bit for the "we" then the marriage will win and if you're not willing to do that for whatever reason, I think that that is very hard on a marriage. (Quinn interviewee 10W-1)

And in analysis you have to deal with a hundred percent of yourself, me. You know, the "me" generation is often brought up, and one of the things that's brought up is the—a lot of analysis, a lot of these "the importance of looking out for Number One" type concepts. Well, that's what analysis is to a great degree. You're really going after yourself and your analyst is always saying, "You have a right to this, you have a right to that, you have a right to..." You know, "Other people have no right." Well, that really works very well when you're in analysis. It doesn't work very well when you're in the middle of a marriage; because a marriage is not that.

A marriage is something else. It's something where you have to be—have to give away part of this right to always react, certainly. And that can be difficult for people and it can lead to the need for this type of—you know, for analysis and for a chance every once in a while to go all out on, you know, “Let me have a chance at me. Let me have a weekend, an encounter weekend or something where I get to know me. Let me have a...” And if the weekend becomes habit-forming, I don't think you have a marriage anymore. (Quinn Interviewee 6H-4)⁷

This last husband actually insisted that his wife end her therapy. In a subsequent section, I will return to this trio of quotations, which is especially apt because the common sentiment expressed across these passages illustrates a theme that looms large in Swidler's interpretation of her interviewees' marriages. For the time being, my original point in introducing the three passages stands: Swidler's interviewee and the two from my study, among others I could produce, were expressing very similar thoughts about marriage in the era in which they lived.

With regard to data collection, too, Swidler and I employed similar interview strategies (see Swidler 2001: 224–229; Quinn 2005a: 41–43). For one striking convergence, in the methodological appendix to her book Swidler reveals,

To understand more deeply how people used ideas, I often responded to statements of general principles (“Honesty is the most important thing in a marriage”) by asking for examples, to clarify what grounded the principle's meaning. When people talked in specifics, I often asked for a generalization, to see how they might extend the construction they made of the concrete case. (Swidler 2001: 221)

That is exactly what I did too. This interview strategy was, for me, part of an effort to frame questions as minimally as possible, and thereby to avoid influencing what interviewees had to say, so that they could and would express their own independent thoughts. More generally, both of our sets of interviews, departing radically as they both did from what Swidler (2001: 3) refers to as “the standard social-scientific survey” with its pre-set questions, produced the rich material susceptible to what I have called cultural discourse analysis (see Quinn 2005b).

In spite of the coincidence of the historical time frame within which our research was conducted, sometimes striking similarities between what our interviewees had to say on the interview topic, and our

methodological approaches to interviewing them, Swidler and I arrived at the opposed explanations I have already described, for marriage and the causal relation between it and love. The parallels that I have highlighted between these two research projects make an inquiry into our different conclusions especially meaningful. How did we reach these very opposite conclusions?

MY ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN MARRIAGE

Let me go back to the beginning, first summarizing my interview-based analysis of American marriage, and then, in the next section, comparing Swidler's. My interviewees were 22 husbands and wives in 11 marriages. Each spouse was interviewed separately for an average of 15–16 hours, typically one hour-long interview a week. All interviewees were residents of the same mid-sized southern city; all were native-born Americans who spoke English as a first language. All were married at the time interviewed, all in first marriages. Beyond these commonalities, they were selected to maximize diversity with regard to such obvious differences as their regional origins, religious affiliations, ethnic identities, occupations, educations, and the age of their marriages. It is this diversity that authorizes my conclusion that there is one widely shared model of marriage among Americans. Of course, there may be other kinds of marriage, and other models of it, within United States borders—especially among recent immigrants from very different societies who have not abandoned the cultural traditions they brought with them. I take the cultural model I have reconstructed to be the dominant one by far.

Some readers may also want to argue that my sample of interviewees was just too small to support any such conclusion. Anthropological samples like this one tend to be small for a reason. Let me recapitulate what Roy D'Andrade has to say on this issue in his volume chapter, supported by research on consensus analysis by Kim Romney and his colleagues. D'Andrade reminds us that “typically, judgments about established cultural understandings do not require large samples because of the strong homogenizing effects of cultural consensus (Romney et al. 1997).” So it is with the American cultural model of marriage. Moreover, and importantly, as I will argue when I present my analysis in more detail, the metaphors and other discourse features that I will be considering, not the individuals who speak them, are the true units of analysis, and their sample size is large.

What initially caught my analytic attention were the many metaphors my interviewees used to talk about marriage—their own marriages, those of relatives, friends, and acquaintances, and American marriage more generally. A systematic analysis of over four hundred of these metaphors revealed the following pattern: Virtually all fell into just eight classes, which I dubbed LASTINGNESS, MUTUAL BENEFIT, SHAREDNESS, COMPATIBILITY, DIFFICULTY, EFFORT, RISK, and SUCCESS.⁸ I should add that marriages were as readily cast in opposite terms; that is, metaphorically speaking, some marriages did not last, were not mutually beneficial, failed rather than succeeding (ended in divorce, that is), and so forth. When such opposites arise, I indicate them thusly, using ~ to signify the negative: ~LASTINGNESS, ~MUTUAL BENEFIT, ~SUCCESS, and the like. I took these eight metaphor classes, shared by this diverse group of interviewees, to reveal a common American model of marriage (see Quinn 1991). One caveat: That Americans by and large understand marriage in terms of this overarching cultural model does not preclude variation, as we will see later when we consider the openness to such marriage-by-marriage variability of COMPATIBILITY and other terms in this model.

I next had the idea of examining the reasoning about marriage that interviewees did, in order to reconstruct how the eight concepts that seemed to define marriage for these interviewees, as reflected in their metaphors for it, might hang together. Their reasoning, often but not always in metaphorical terms, uncovered the following story: Americans expect marriage to be lasting, shared and mutually beneficial. However, in their marriages they inevitably encounter difficulties, typically caused by incompatibilities between spouses. Such incompatibilities are pre-ordained by the way in which Americans like my interviewees marry, which is to fall in love and get married, sometimes within a relatively brief time frame and often with only sketchy knowledge of one's future spouse—or, as one interviewee put it, “with our eyes closed” (Quinn interviewee 4W-1; see Quinn 1996). The important factor in the decision to marry someone is that you be in love with them, not that you necessarily know them well and intimately.⁹ The resulting unanticipated incompatibilities between the two deprive one or both spouses of the benefits they expect from marriage. As much as they want their marriages to last, contemporary Americans also expect to benefit mutually from marriage in the sense of both being fulfilled by it. If they are not

so fulfilled, they should end their marriage.¹⁰ This poses a fundamental contradiction in their thinking about marriage. This discursive description, including this contradiction, provides a rough delineation of the American cultural model of marriage for which evidence is to come in the following sections.

The difficulties inherent in marriage invoke a very general cultural template, one that Americans recognize as the appropriate response not just to these but to all manner of difficulties: That is, they should make an effort to overcome them. In D'Andrade's (this volume) terms, this cultural understanding is widespread across many "lifeworlds," probably both because it engages a deeply held American attitude about the world—a cultural theme—and because it is such a handy task solution in a wide variety of situations. In any case, if a couple succeeds in their effort to resolve their incompatibilities, and hence overcome their marital difficulties, then the marriage will succeed. Of course, there is always the risk that all such efforts will ultimately fail; and hence, the marriage itself will fail.

I will give one quick example of an interviewee reasoning about marriage, one that I have used before because it is brief yet illustrative. This wife, commenting on the marriage of her brother and sister-in-law, first wondered why they were still married, given the bickering between them (characterized by this Southern interviewee as one spouse "picking at" the other) that she had witnessed. Then she qualified this first observation, going on to say, "I'm sure they must have something good in their marriage, or they wouldn't still be together" (Quinn interviewee 1 W-3).¹¹ In this last assertion, the "something good in their marriage" is a metaphor for marital BENEFIT, which, as this wife's use of the plural pronoun exposes, she assumes is, or should be, mutual.¹² (This expectation regarding the mutuality of marital benefits, often left implicit in this way, is made absolutely explicit by the three interviewees quoted earlier, who point to the potential for imbalance in the marital benefits received.) At the other end of this wife's sentence, "still be together" is a relational metaphor for marital LASTINGNESS. The premise behind her reasoning can be summarized as *X or not-Y* (MUTUAL BENEFIT *or*~LASTINGNESS). Systematic analysis of this and many more instances of my interviewees' reasoning about marriage, both replicating and overlapping with this one, supports the larger reconstructed story I have outlined, a longer sequence in which the last wife's assumption that a lasting marriage requires mutual benefit

is embedded. While interviewees do not typically string together more than two or three assumptions at a time in their reasoning about marriage, the entire sequence can be reconstructed from the many overlapping assumptions in their discourse and that of other interviewees (see Quinn 2005a: 66–71).

SWIDLER'S ANALYSIS OF AMERICAN MARRIAGE COMPARED TO MINE

Now I am in a position to address Swidler's analysis. As I will show in this section, she overlooks plentiful fragments of the kind of evidence, in what her interviewees have to say, that would have led her to reconstruct their shared model of marriage, had she heeded this evidence. As a result, I will argue in the next section, she overplays differences in her interviewees' views of marriage, to the point of overlooking the common cultural model underlying these views. Even further, as I will detail in the section to follow, she dismisses the possibility of such internalized cultural models altogether.

More than occasionally, I have noted, interview excerpts, such as those that Swidler reproduced in *Habits of the Heart*, do capture fragmentary pieces of reasoning about marriage that I was able to make sense of in terms of my own analysis (Bellah et al. 1985: 85–112; Quinn 1997a: 183–184). Here is a single additional such illustration chosen at random, this time from Swidler's book, *Talk of Love*:

I think if you love someone enough and you commit your life to them in marriage you'd make it permanent. There will be times when you don't feel like you're in love, but since you've made a commitment and are willing to honor that commitment then you will work toward bringing back the love. (Interviewee Betty Dyson, in Swidler 2001: 115)

Here we find, among other shared understandings of marriage, the tacit assumption that if you want your marriage to be “permanent” then you will work—in this case, the particular work of “bringing back the love”—to make it so. In other words, *if* LASTINGNESS *then* EFFORT (since, conversely, effort is required for a marriage to last). This interviewee produces a somewhat more complicated story, adding the caveat that the work of making a marriage permanent demands (at least) two kinds of motivation, ongoing commitment, and sustained love.

These are references to the motivational states that marital effort is thought to entail—folk psychological underpinnings of the assumption that a lasting marriage requires effort. That is to say, the effort that people bring to their marriages is more than something expected of them; it is reinforced by their commitment and their love. These understandings about the motivations behind efforts to make a marriage permanent, like the template for overcoming difficulty with effort mentioned in the last section, are themselves drawn from full-blown cultural schemas. These other cultural models are tangential, however, to the current argument an interviewee may be putting forward about marriage. Thus in their talk about marriage interviewees, as does Betty Dyson in this last excerpt, often merely allude to such cultural understandings, rather than expanding upon them.

My interviewees frequently reason to this same conclusion as does Dyson, about the relation between effort and a lasting marriage. But this relation receives only marginal attention in Swidler's commentary on what Dyson says. She does observe with regard to this interview excerpt that marital love "involves hard work" and also "depends on such ordinary things as compatibility, sharing, and common interests" (Swidler 2001: 115)—COMPATIBILITY and SHARING, which can and often do involve common interests, being two components of the cultural model of marriage that I reconstruct. But she does not pursue these clues. Rather, for her, the passage is centrally about maturity and the deepening of what she calls "prosaic love" over time. I should make clear that I have no quarrel with this characterization of mature married love. Indeed, my interviewees echo Betty Dyson when they, too, talk of more or less successfully rekindling, later in marriage, the feeling of being "in love" that was such a powerful part of their early marital experience. I am just pointing out that Swidler misses the underlying model of marriage on which such "prosaic" features of married love as "compatibility, sharing, and common interests" are founded.

Many of Swidler's prose commentaries on her findings likewise supply fragments of the same model of marriage that I describe. For one other example, she captures the relations between the EFFORT required of marriage, the COMPATIBILITY that results, and marital LASTINGNESS when she says, "Through therapeutic effort, individuals can deepen their relationships, making them last not because they stabilize their selves but because they achieve a deeper communication that allows them continuously to adapt to each other"

(Swidler 2001: 143). Here, adapting to each other is a metaphor for COMPATIBILITY. So the chain of causality is EFFORT → COMPATIBILITY → LASTINGNESS.

Again, she writes elsewhere of “the difficulty people have in staying married,” adding, “The mundane problems of getting along in a relationship continually raise the more decisive question of whether the partners remain committed to work at getting along”—quoting one of her interviewees as stressing the need to “work at it to keep it going forever” (Swidler 2001: 122). These comments capture the lengthy causal relation between COMPATIBILITY (“getting along,” in Swidler’s terms), DIFFICULTY (also expressed here as “problems”), EFFORT (to “work at it” or, in this case, at the specific marital problem of not getting along, a rendition of ~COMPATIBILITY), and LASTINGNESS (“staying married” and wanting “to keep it going forever”). Thus ~COMPATIBILITY → DIFFICULTY, DIFFICULTY → EFFORT, and EFFORT → COMPATIBILITY → LASTINGNESS. As I have shown in my published work—with multiple direct excerpts from their discourse on marriage—this longer causal chain is well understood by my interviewees as well (e.g., Quinn 1997a).

For a final example, summarizing interviewees’ responses to set vignettes that she had them read, Swidler concludes, “Many interviewees responded to the vignettes by saying that a person should leave a relationship when it is no longer satisfying, as long as she or he has made honest efforts to work out the difficulties” (Swidler 2001: 123). This is exactly what my interviewees said, both metaphorically and non-metaphorically. If honest effort fails, they explained—perhaps because it is not forthcoming on the part of the other spouse, or because both *do* make the effort, but it proves insufficient to surmount the difficulty—then you should leave the marriage. Summarizing this causal chain in a more shorthand way (and once again using ~ to signify the negative), ~EFFORT → DIFFICULTY → ~MUTUAL BENEFIT → ~LASTINGNESS.

But Swidler does not sustain such insights into the causal relations among marital benefit, compatibility, difficulties, effort, and lastingness expressed both by her interviewees and in some of her own summaries of what they have to say, nor does she pursue the implications of these causal relations. Ultimately, and in spite of all evidence, Swidler forcefully rejects the possibility of such a cultural model. With regard to love and marriage, she purports instead to show “how culture is organized less

by what goes on inside people's heads as they analyze their experience than by the external contexts with which they have to deal" (Swidler 2001: 111). It is not that people have no culture inside their heads at all. Rather, she says elsewhere in the book, "My point is that both internalized schemata and public cultural representations are too multiple, too disorganized, and too fluid to structure experience and action" (Swidler 2001: 250). We diverge sharply on this point. I believe the evidence supports a shared, enduring, internalized model or schema of marriage that Americans know and act upon. Swidler has simply failed to identify this model.

UNTENABLE POSITIONS

Before going on to explore what I think is the cause of this blind spot in her study of American marriage and marital love, let me call attention to some untenable positions into which Swidler is forced by her refusal to entertain the possibility of a shared model of marriage.

Multiple Variants

One important interpretive consequence of Swidler not having identified the common model of marriage that Americans share is that she takes every variation on this model as evidence of separate variants. This is perhaps most striking in her treatment of a "Christian" versus a "therapeutic ethic" as distinct, opposed cultural ideals for marriage.

Recall the three interviewees quoted at the beginning of this paper. Swidler (2001: 143) takes this kind of critique of contemporary marriage as evidence of what she calls the "therapeutic ethic." She defines this therapeutic view as "one in which a marriage should be evaluated by how well it meets the needs of the married partners as individuals" (Swidler 2001: 17). All three interviewees, readers will remember, resisted what they saw as the then unbalanced version of this therapeutic ethic, worrying that the benefits demanded by one spouse might override those rightfully meant to accrue to both of them together—as might occur if that spouse were too "self-oriented, "I-oriented," or always "looking out for Number One." I believe that any of my interviewees (and hers) would have readily agreed with these three that extreme over-attention to one or the other spouse's individual needs is incompatible with marriage.

As I see it, the orientation to marriage in their time that is being reflected in these interviewees' talk about it is a historically and culturally specific sharpening of a standing tension between the principle of individualism and the demands of marriage—but not opposing models of marriage. Swidler (2001: 17–19) attributes what she identifies as a historically distinctive “therapeutic” view of love and marriage to the countercultural flowering of self-actualization thinking in the time period immediately surrounding her study. This is presumably the same historical movement that gave rise to the shared perception of the three interviewees, who also felt that they were experiencing the rise of what one of them called “the ‘me’ generation.” I think Swidler and the interviewees are right about this recent history. When Swidler, however, goes on to pose two different, alternative cultural “ethics” that coexist at this historical period, here I disagree.

Her argument is not supported by what her interviewees have to say. The opposition Swidler draws between religious and therapeutic views of marriage is introduced early in the book, illustrated with the contrasting positions of two women interviewees. Emily Trumbell is a devout Christian who rejects the position that she and her husband Frank should each be more independent, an idea urged upon her by the minister she goes to for marriage counseling and upon him by his therapist. Instead, they adopt the view that “marriage should come first” (Swidler 2001: 18), a dictum of the church-sponsored Marriage Encounter movement they have joined. For the other woman, Laura Martin, who is an actual therapist, “It is love that is ‘unreal’ and individual needs that constitute reality” (Swidler 2001: 19). Yet it cannot escape notice that both women are struggling with the same dilemma. As Swidler herself concludes, “Most men and women agree with the therapist’s view that love ‘is mainly hard work and partnership and getting some gratification’” (Swidler 2001: 14–15). Thus, even Emily says, “I knew that I wanted to be married to Frank, and I knew that I wanted to make it work” (Swidler 2001: 17); she is reasoning that EFFORT → LASTING → SUCCESS. To be sure, subcultural groups (as well as individuals) can and do vary substantially in such matters as the motivational basis for making the effort required of marriage. But making this effort—whether following the advice of a marriage counselor to do so or making a Christian commitment to do so—is central to the model of marriage that Emily, Laura, and other Americans all share.

The following conclusion Swidler offers regarding Emily and Frank is telling:

This “therapeutic” view of love—in which a marriage should be evaluated by how well it meets the needs of the married partners as individuals—was not really what Frank and Emily wanted to hear, so at one level, they simply did not listen. On the other hand, they wanted to improve their marriage, so they followed some of the marriage counselor’s advice. Frank “asserted” himself with Emily. “I was expressing my opinion and my view, and if I wasn’t satisfied with what was going on I said so.” They changed the “whole dynamics” of their relationship. But they embraced the therapeutic ethic only on their own terms. (Swidler 2001: 17)

But embrace it they did. Frank insisted on being “more satisfied with what was going on”—or, in my language, he figured out how to make his marriage more fulfilling and hence beneficial to himself as well as to his wife. Swidler seems bent on overlooking such common themes expressed by her interviewees.

Task Solutions

In other instances, taken from Chapter 7 of her book, Swidler again takes pains not to let the conclusion stand that her interviewees have a common underlying understanding of marriage. In the next case, she credits, instead, an external source of apparent coherence that

comes from the fact that people face consistent problems of action that drive them repeatedly to turn to similar sorts of solutions. When many people face the same action context the same coherent culture will reappear across many different individuals, even those who on the surface seem to have very different cultural assumptions. (Swidler 2001: 148)

Facing the same “action context,” people “turn to similar sorts of solutions.” I cheered inwardly when I read these sentences, for they seemed to bring Swidler’s position very close to my own.¹³ But there turns out to be a critical difference between our two positions. I assert, not that people repeatedly invent and enact similar solutions, which, therefore, converge, but that they draw on already existing common solutions, learned previously in various ways. As Strauss and I have explained, solutions to recurrent cognitive tasks “are invented once and thereafter culturally shared, rather than having to be invented anew each time they are needed” (Strauss and Quinn 1997: 128). This is so because such task solutions may be nonobvious and difficult to devise from scratch,

so that considerable cognitive efficiency is gained by having them ready at hand. Just so, the cultural model of marriage on which they draw affords Americans a ready-made solution to the contradiction they face between their wish for their marriages to last and their equally strong expectation that it will fulfill them. Faced with the marital difficulties that result from this contradiction, they rely on the available cultural response to all difficulties they encounter in life, which is to make their best effort to overcome them. They do not need to concoct new solutions to this and other recurrent problems as these arise. They have one already.

Cultural Logics

Swidler does acknowledge that interviewees can and do combine what she calls “cultural logics” (Swidler 2001: 136–146), which again might seem to imply that they share stable representations of some kind. But, as she goes on to characterize these, interviewees “easily mobilize more than one cultural logic when they need to” and “move among cultural logics with ease.” (Swidler 2001: 147). In the particular case of her interviewees’ Christian and therapeutic versions of marriage, she observes that many of them

combine elements of Christian commitment with a therapeutic understanding of how God’s love strengthens and opens the self. Judith Stacey, in *Brave New Families* (1990), a study of 1980s families in California’s Silicon Valley, points to this “recombinant” culture, in which fundamentalist Protestants assimilate new-age feminism, or an egalitarian feminist seizes on Christian faith as a way to stabilize her marriage. (Swidler 2001: 147)

And yet, Swidler (all too readily, to my mind) dismisses findings like Stacey’s as capturing just talk. Such talk is said to reflect speakers’ discursive efforts to “reach for coherent ways to think about what to do, to be, to feel” (Swidler 2001: 147). Each of these ways of thinking is “only one of many different resources that they draw on, recombine, or shift around to meet the varied circumstances in which they need to act” (Swidler 2001: 147–148), and that they may have to “trim” (Swidler 2001: 148) to fit existing action commitments. In my view, rather, Stacey is right in describing how one group of Christians subscribes to the American cultural model in which marriage must be not only lasting but also fulfilling to both husband and wife. She is also correct in

claiming that these Christians adapt this “feminist” version of mutual benefit to their own particular belief about religious commitment as being the foundation of marital lastingness. In Stacey’s view and my own, they pursue this quest for their own fulfillment not just in words, but in other actions as well.

The American Voluntaristic Ethic

Swidler extends her argument beyond marriage to address a different American theme, but one with implications for marital love and commitment. At first blush she might once again seem to be assuming that her interviewees share a model of this when she describes them as being “united...in a particular morality of the self,” a “voluntaristic ethic” that “commands individuals to do only what they can do willingly.” (The issue of “the self” will come up again in a later section on the missing motivation in Swidler’s rendition of marital love.) “The autonomous self must freely choose its actions” (Swidler 2001: 148, see also 151), including the choice to stay in a marriage or not, or to make sacrifices in its name. However, in her view, this “morality of the self,” too, ends up being nothing more than talk.

Swidler is insistent on this point. At the beginning of this chapter in which she discusses the ways people solve problems, use cultural logics, and express the American voluntaristic ethic, she asks rhetorically, “Does some deeper structure underlie the variegated culture that appears in people’s conversations? Given people’s different aspirations and purposes, why does voluntarist imagery seem so dominant?” And answers, “I shall try to demonstrate that even here, in what seems to be the deep structure of American culture, the encompassing institutional matrix rather than any simple unity of belief or cultural discourse accounts for the shared elements of a common culture” (Swidler 2001: 146).

In the end, I am arguing, this demonstration fails. This is so once again with regard to the voluntaristic ethic she identifies.¹⁴ This is so as careful as Swidler is to call this American turn “voluntaristic imagery,” “voluntaristic thinking” and “a sense of autonomy” rather than voluntarism or autonomy plain and simple, and to characterize it as a cluster of assumptions that have no influence over action beyond the mere fact that they “frame moral discourse” (Swidler 2001: 153). However, as even some of her own language, such as “the mandate to choose what one really wants” (Swidler 2001: 151), suggests, Americans’ preoccupation

with autonomous choice is unlikely to govern their talk without also guiding their other behavior.¹⁵ Swidler supplies plentiful evidence that this is indeed the way her interviewees talk, but no evidence at all that the voluntaristic ethic does not inform their non-discursive behavior as well. Nor does Swidler ever adequately explain why American voluntarism—any more than the therapeutic or Christian ethics she also identifies—should be so widely shared across living individuals and historical time, as contradictory as the existence of such common values might seem to the tool kit theory of culture.¹⁶

And yet, she is as adamant at the close of the chapter as at its outset that people's cultural understandings have no inherent coherence, but are instead organized by the structure of outside institutions:

This cultural structuring by institutions might be thought of as operating from the outside in, organizing dispersed cultural materials the way the field surrounding a magnet links iron filings or the way the gravity of the sun orients the planets. That is, as persons orient themselves to institutional demands and institutional dilemmas, they continually reproduce structured cultural understandings even when those structured pieces do not add up to an internally coherent whole. (Swidler 2001: 159)

The “thoughts and feelings of individuals,” she sums up, “are quite unsystematic” (Swidler 2001: 159).

Once again, we diverge sharply. Swidler dismisses her interviewees' discourse on an array of topics—their tasks solutions, their “cultural logics,” and their American “voluntaristic ethic”—as just talk. As I have said, I believe, rather, that people do not merely talk about these matters, but act upon them in other ways. I will consider this issue, of what one is to make of interviewees' talk, more generally in the penultimate section of my chapter, when I summarize my methodological argument.

TWO TREATMENTS OF MARRIED LOVE

In this section I conclude my analysis with one last comparison, of our two divergent treatments of marital love. It is in terms of an “internalized complex” of shared meaning, of the kind that Swidler rejects, that I interpret the way that Americans view married love. My take on marital love answers the question of why the cultural model of marriage I have described is so very motivating to those who subscribe to it. Without this

final piece of the puzzle, the aspirations and efforts Americans put into marriage, and their expectations that it be shared, fulfilling and lasting, defy explanation.

As the title of her book indicates, Swidler's main topic is love, but since most of her interviewees are or have been married, or at least are of marriageable age, this talk of love prominently features married love. As well, for her as for me, love and marriage are inextricably bound up together. Thus my interviews on marriage also included a good amount of talk about married love. As part of my analysis I systematically culled instances in which interviewees used the term *love* (excluding any irrelevant usages such as "I love my work" or "S/he was my first love," but including references to feelings and relationships of premarital or extramarital love when these obviously impinged upon marriage). Then, following my usual practice, I looked for patterns in usages of this key word.

I was surprised by what I found, namely that the structure of interviewees' ideas about love closely matched their expectations for marriage, described in an earlier section (Quinn 1997b). First of all, the emotional experience of love and the institutional status of marriage are aligned. That is to say, you are supposed to fall in love with that one other person and get married to them. Subsequently, if one or both spouses should fall out of love, the upshot is supposed to be divorce. The ideal, however, is to marry and stay married to the one person you love. Various further features of marital love provide additional evidence for the alignment of the two. So, for example, circumstances that violate this alignment, such as people falling in love but not getting married, staying married when they are not in love, or continuing to love someone they have divorced, earn reportability, as reflected in the stories interviewees told. That people are supposed to love the person they marry was an assumption that interviewees revealed in their very cautions that love might not be enough to sustain a marriage. That people are supposed to stay married as long as they remain in love explains why interviewees were prone to consult their own feelings to verify whether they still loved a spouse, in making decisions whether or not to leave them. Equally, this expectation explains why these interviewees looked to authentic acts of love on their spouse's part as proof that the spouse still loved them and hence would not leave them. In particular, it makes sense of why they viewed a spouse's extramarital entanglement as potential evidence to the contrary, that, having fallen in love with another person—under the assumption

that one's love is devoted to a single other person—the spouse would necessarily fall out of love with them and consequently leave them (Quinn 1997b: 198).

Secondly, and importantly for understanding the motivational force of this cultural model for Americans, this alignment between love and marriage is reflected in the motivational structure of love. To wit, if you love someone (1) you don't want to lose them; (2) you want to be with them; and (3) you care for them, in the sense that you fulfill their needs. This last condition is precisely what married people do—doing for, giving to, sharing with, and if necessary sacrificing for the other, and, as we have seen, expecting no less in return. Care of infants, by contrast, is inherently a one-sided affair. Otherwise, there is a fairly obvious correspondence between this set of three intentions—not to lose the person you love, to be with them, and to care for them—and the three fundamental expectations about marriage that I have outlined. that it be lasting, shared and mutually beneficial in the sense of fulfilling. Why this correspondence between the way Americans think about love and marriage? I have already hinted at my interpretation when I asserted that love “structures” marriage. What this amounts to is that the institutional structure of marriage has been “mapped onto” the motivational structure of love, the former drawing its motivation from the latter.

The motivational structure and force of love originate elsewhere. I posit that it, in turn, arises from early attachment experience. That is, the infant's main concerns are that the caretaker not abandon it, but stay with it and care for it. Further, I argue, these three concerns about loss (abandonment), proximity and care are universal among human infants (Quinn 1997b). It needs to be added here that while these concerns endure across the life cycle, they play out very differently in different societies with different cultural practices and beliefs. These include, importantly, the quite varied child rearing beliefs and practices that pertain worldwide, as well as the distinctive social contexts in which infants and children find themselves being reared. Such practices and beliefs also include the different cultural defenses in attempted resolution of what is a universal conflict between initial dependency and the later push for autonomy—a conflict the resolution of which follows individuals into adulthood. (See Quinn 2013 for analysis of how ifaluk Islanders confront this same conflict, employing an entirely different defense than that familiar to Americans.) For Americans, this conflict finds at least partial resolution and hence expression in marriage and other adult intimate

relationships.¹⁷ To be sure, the foregoing account of the origins of adult love in infantile attachment is based, not on systematic evidence, but on interpretation and comparison of two cultural cases only. Thus it must be considered provisional. Nevertheless, it lies at the heart of my argument about why marriage is so deeply motivating to Americans.

Swidler's interpretation, as we have seen, is opposite to mine. For her, the institution of marriage structures the feeling of love. To fully appreciate her argument, we must first consider her distinction between two views of love held by her American interviewees, the "mythic" and the aforementioned "prosaic." My interviewees confirm Swidler's assertion that these two kinds of married love represent a process by which the first gives way to the other in the course of a marriage.¹⁸ What Swidler calls mythic love characterizes courtship, including the whole experience of "falling in love," and the early stage of marriage, while married love, with its "prosaic" emphasis on getting along and its inflections of knowing someone well enough to be comfortable with their habits and accepting of their faults, gradually takes over as a marriage stabilizes.¹⁹

In any case, Swidler wants to argue that both views of love derive from the structure of marriage. As she (Swidler 2001: 117) says regarding the first kind of love she distinguishes, "The 'mythic' view of love is grounded, I believe, in a structural reality." She goes on to explain,

That structural reality is marriage. (Even for those who do not marry, or those like gays and lesbians who are denied the legal right to marry, the structural features of marriage provide the dominant model for love relationships ...). (Swidler 2001: 117)

As she continues, expanding upon the structural function for marriage of each kind of love:

The dual character of marriage lies behind the conflicting ways people use the concept of love. Much of the time, they use ideas of love to manage and interpret ongoing relationships. Here they employ a prosaic-realistic view, which is not realism in the sense of a neutral assessment of experience. It is shaped by conventional formulas and ideals, especially that of maturity.

But it does attend to psychological variability and to the ups and downs of daily life, more than does the mythic view. It is an ethic about *being* married (or "coupled"), offering suggestions about how to manage an ongoing relationship. The prosaic-realistic view has its own romantic

ideal—of down-to-earth, gradually evolving love. But its fundamental concern is with established relationships—describing how people can get along, understand each other, and work out their difficulties...

The mythic view persists because it answers a different set of questions—questions, I would argue, about a decisive choice, implicitly the choice of whether or not to marry, or stay married. It reproduces the institutional features of marriage, recasting them as matters of individual volition. (Swidler 2001: 118)

For Swidler, then, ideas about mythic and prosaic love arise because they answer persistent questions about marriage as an institution: first whether and whom to marry, and then how to be married. Her explanation that marriage structures both kinds of love, I would point out, is no less interpretive than mine in the sense of being only correlational and hence susceptible to alternative accounts. If I find it necessary to make this point at this juncture it is because, in many academic circles, including cultural anthropological ones, psychodynamic explanations of the kind I am advocating are treated with such extreme suspicion if not outright rejection.²⁰ In particular, as observed by one cited in endnote #3, sociologists generally are more familiar, and hence more comfortable, with structural explanations such as the one Swidler proposes.

This position, in which love arises from marriage, raises vexing questions. Why, if not for love, do people continue trying to form and sustain lasting marriages, even in the face of the high rate of divorce to which Swidler alludes? She has no answer to this. I do not think that her (Swidler 2001: 112–114) explanation that mythic love has simply come down to us from an earlier historical era—“To understand the inner dynamics of the romantic love mythology, it is valuable to trace its origins in European cultural history” (Swidler 2001: 112), she says—is sufficient. Romantic or mythic love, historically early that it may be, continues to be enormously motivating to Americans (and to many other people around the world today)—as anyone who has ever fallen in love can attest.

What does it mean that getting and being married are associated with the two different kinds of love that she calls “mythic” and “prosaic.” I can only guess. Perhaps mythic and prosaic love, and the sequence in which one transmutes into the other in the course of a relationship like marriage, replicate a core experience in which the infant’s first undifferentiated, overwhelming feelings of attachment become more manageable to the further developed child? If this interpretation be warranted,

it would flesh out my larger theory of how American-style love and marriage originate from early attachment. Moreover, it would make sense, in terms of that theory, of Swidler's finding of a distinction between these two kinds of marital love.

MISSING MOTIVATION

Not only can Swidler not explain the staunch American commitment to marriage, but she cannot account for the force and durability of the other expectations I have found my interviewees and hers to have, that their marriages should be not only lasting but also shared and mutually beneficial. She seems to glimpse the problem of how the expectation of mutual benefit might be motivating, but once again treats this as entirely a matter of historical change. She proposes that "in the current period, when divorce has radically altered marriage, a new culture of prosaic love," under which the mutual benefits of marriage are worked out, "attempts to bridge the gap between the persisting expectation that marriage should last and the increasingly insecure character of the marriage bond" (Swidler 2001: 158). Yes, this may be an important part of what "prosaic" love does—through, I have argued, addressing such matters as felt incompatibilities, perceived difficulties, unmet benefits, and the specter of divorce. The history Swidler gives, however, accounts for the motivational force of neither "the persisting expectation that marriage should last" nor the further expectation that it should be beneficial. Moreover, this latter belief that married people should find fulfillment in their marriage did not arise with the increased rate of divorce and the resulting insecurity of marriage. More likely this belief, so powerful for Americans, with its often so patently unequal application to wives, set the stage for an increase in divorce that the feminist revolution then authorized. The idea that marriage should be fulfilling to both partners can be traced to a much older and broader concept of the self as deserving of fulfillment, to which an array of institutions in many lifeworlds, and not just marriage, have responded.

For Swidler, beliefs about marriage are not only multiple, disorganized, and fluid, but also lacking in motivational force—except what force these beliefs might gain from their historical antiquity or current usefulness. As her fellow sociologist Vaisey has put it more baldly, Swidler has "declared that 'what people want...is of little help in explaining their action' (1986: 247)" (Vaisey 2010: 76) and that her "approach,

intentionally or not, rules out the possibility that cultural understandings or beliefs could be motives for action” Vaisey (2009: 1678). He goes on in this last article to make the following insightful comment:

In fact, there are promising hints in *Talk of Love* that Swidler understands motivation as somehow grounded in identity—“who [people] already think they are” (p. 87). Unfortunately, hints like these are not brought together in any systematic way, and—in this case, at least—they are ultimately contradicted when Swidler argues that the self is “one of many tools” a person may “pick up or put down” in the course of social interaction (2001: 24). Though she seems to realize that a needed account of motives is missing and regards “identity” as a potential way out, this possibility succumbs to the over-arching logic of the metaphor of “culture as tools”. (Vaisey 2009: 1678–1679)²¹

Perhaps the most telling word that Vaisey quotes Swidler as using is the “already” in her definition of identity, when she (2001: 87) says, “The fundamental notion is that people develop lines of action based on who they already think they are.” How did this idea of themselves, “already” part of adult Americans’ understanding, come about in the first place?

Ultimately, Swidler emphatically forecloses even the possibility that their selves or identities lend motivation to people’s actions. As she concludes, “the focus on a personal identity that contemporary Americans take for granted results from social codes and practices that define us to ourselves and others, not from anything inherent in individual personhood” (Swidler 2001: 87). In my very different view, people’s selves emerge from their experience, especially their emotionally arousing experiences (see Quinn and Mathews 2016). Distinctive cultural selves arise from those aspects of these arousing experience that are alike in a given group. Many of these experiences occur in infancy and childhood. A paramount such experience is that of infantile attachment. The long period of human immaturity is one of real vulnerability in the face of environmental dangers—a time in their lives during which infants’ and small children’s very survival hinges on the instinct to attach to caregivers, with its demands for proximity and care and its fear of abandonment. Early attachment is a profoundly emotional experience.

These deep concerns defining selfhood find reinforcement, it needs to be added, from other cultural models, drawing on other as yet uncharted sources of motivation. Two such, in the case under consideration, might be the American cultural models embodying (a) an unquestioned sense

that one is due fulfillment (in marriage perhaps especially but also more generally); and (b) a conviction that one is a person who doesn't give up (on marriage or anything else) without making an effort at redress. All these motivations inform not only interviewees' ideas but also their enactments of "who they think they are."

Whence does Swidler's resistance to motivation derive? Perhaps, like her take on cultural logic and the other untenable positions discussed in a previous section of this chapter, this resistance is dictated by her overriding commitment to the tool kit theory, with its vision of fluidity and fragmentation. Or, perhaps it simply has to do with her disciplinary background. As Vaisey comments, sociologists like Swidler "tend to assume a priori that the pressure to maintain particular beliefs is social, rather than intrapsychic" (Vaisey 2009: 1679–1680). This is an assumption not unrelated to the sociological penchant, already noted, for structural and material explanations rather than cultural ones (see the citation of Jeffrey Alexander's comment, in endnote #3.), which so often turn on believers' shared psychologies.

As I have already noted, Vaisey before me has rightly critiqued the missing motivation in Swidler's account of American love and marriage. As valid as is his critique, his own approach to the subject is, as I suggested at the outset of this article, not altogether helpful for my purposes. In all fairness, Vaisey regards the dual-process theory as being unfinished (Vaisey 2009: 1708), urging a stance that will "help move toward a more realistic view of the role of cultural meanings in human action" (Vaisey 2009: 1707). Moreover, he and I are simply intent on accomplishing two different ends. The approach he advances to motivation and cultural meanings is, in its own way, distinctively sociological, while mine is distinctively anthropological. I must caution immediately that, in highlighting the different disciplinary bases for our two approaches, as I will next do, I should not be taken as saying that one is better or more deserving than the other.

Specifically, Vaisey's approach is often correlational—as when he writes of "associations" between survey responses and "enduring, internalized cultural schemas" (Vaisey 2009: 1699). It makes sense for him to look for such correlations, because ultimately what he is trying to do is to predict behaviors from cultural meanings, and correlational findings test predictions. Another way to put this is that Vaisey's sociological curiosity points forward, to investigate the actions that a given motivation might influence. Thus he reports that on reading *Talk of Love* he "wanted to

immediately figure out how to measure individual differences in the salience of the romantic and prosaic-realist schemas and use them to predict later marital dissolution” (Vaisey 2014: fn. 6).

For a more substantive example, in one of his own studies Vaisey finds that American teenaged respondents exhibit four different moral inclinations. He labels these *expressive individualist* (Do what would make you feel happy); *utilitarian individualist* (Do what would help you get ahead); *relational* (Follow the advice of a teacher, parent, or other adult you respect); and *theistic* (Do what God or scripture tells you is right). He reports being able to predict the future behaviors of these youths, even 2½ years later. For example, those who had chosen the “theistic” response were less likely in the interim to have engaged in “deviant” behaviors, such as using marijuana, cheating on school assignments, cutting class, or keeping secrets from parents (Vaisey 2009). What we do not learn, but what I most want to know, is how these youths have come by these orientations in the first place.

As a psychological anthropologist, I am more inclined to look backward, wanting to trace the source of such motivation. This orientation reflects my interest in how culture itself is motivated, and how both cross-culturally variable and universal aspects of early experience might contribute to that motivation. The case of American marital love is particularly instructive in this regard. It not only tells a story about how one particular cultural model comes to have such force for Americans, involving as it does motivation that can be thought of, in psychodynamic terms, as “deep.” My orientation suggests further, where we might look for deep motivation—in emotionally arousing experiences of all kinds (Quinn and Mathews 2016). What makes this generalization about emotional arousal even more significant is the possibility that these kinds of arousing experience have cross-cultural analogs. For example, while not all societies have anything like marriage as Westerners know it, all may have their defenses, of which American marriage is one, against infantile feelings of dependency and attachment (Quinn 2013). As this last example foregrounds, my orientation and that of psychological anthropologists more generally, represented in this chapter and in others in this volume, admits of the kind of deep motivation arising from psychodynamic processes. Vaisey’s and Swidler’s sociological approach to motivation precludes consideration of such psychodynamics.

DIFFERENT METHODS

In the end, I want to argue that it is Swidler's method that accounts most fully for her failure to recognize Americans' cultural model of marriage as well as the source of this model's powerful motivation. My comparison of our two studies puts me in a particularly good position to bring home this methodological point. Throughout my re-analysis of Swidler's materials in this chapter, I have taken pains to point up how I think her original analysis missed discursive clues to a cultural model of marriage. Here in this final section of the chapter, let me summarize what I see as the two great problems underlying her methodological approach, that prevent her from reconstructing the model of marriage that Americans share.

I attribute the problems I am about to describe as at least partly due to sociologists being out of their methodological element. This generalization would include Vaisey's reliance on survey results that inevitably attenuate the meanings, including the cultural meanings, underlying these responses and lending them their motivational force; as well as Swidler's relative unfamiliarity with, and resultant lack of rigor in, the kind of analysis of interview discourse that she is conducting, and that could reveal these meanings and this force.²² Ultimately it is not clear whether the methods of discourse analysis Swidler adopts preordain her theoretical conclusions, or whether, the other way around, her theoretical inclinations influence her methods. Perhaps a little of both. I can say for sure, however, that my different methods both allowed me to reconstruct the shared model of marriage that my interviewees and hers rely upon, and led me to discover what I argue are the shared motivations behind that model.

Unsystematic Analysis

By my standards, Swidler's method is quite unsystematic. To begin with, as I have already indicated, she does not deliver many examples of the interview discourse she has collected, against which one could check her sometimes even lengthier interpretations. Moreover, her analysis is unconstrained. Anything her interviewees say, and any interpretation she chooses to make of what they have to say, can be as significant to her analysis as anything else.

As I have described, I began my analysis by looking at the metaphors interviewees used to talk about marriage. I culled all the unmistakable examples of these metaphors from the first ten interviews with each of my 22 interviewees. They were readily identifiable; once I was attuned to them, they were like red flags waving. And, since speakers so routinely use metaphors to talk about marriage (or anything else), there was a large sample of these tropes to work with. Indeed, as I have already indicated, one way to think about the size of my sample is in terms of, not the small number of interviewees, but instead the much larger number of metaphors—and the other features of discourse that I looked at—sampled from their talk. While it is true that the metaphors one interviewee used are not strictly independent (and some interviewees, to be sure, favored ones of a certain flavor, though never exclusively so), most represent new topics in a given interview, or even come from separate weeks-apart interviews, making them at least quasi-independent.

Of course, speakers do not have to use metaphors to express their understandings of their marriages, though they often do—apparently to dramatize and clarify the point they are making non-metaphorically, by reference to some cultural exemplar of, say, benefit or difficulty or lastingness (see Quinn 1997a: 140–148 for an expanded discussion of this point). It may occur to the reader that an examination of the non-metaphorical terms interviewees used to talk about marriage would have been equally revealing. Thus the woman quoted earlier as saying, “They must have something good in their marriage, or they wouldn’t still be together,” might have instead said something like, “They must find their marriage mutually beneficial, or they would have gotten divorced.” But analysis of metaphors had a great advantage. The systematic collection of these metaphors for marriage from my interviews captured the full range of statements, and only those statements, that my interviewees made about it. The metaphors thus served to define the extent and limits of a set of concepts relating to marriage.

What fragments of the larger cultural model that Swidler does detect never get assembled in the way I am able to assemble it from interviewees’ metaphors and reasoning. This is because she has no systematic constraint, such as the metaphors for marriage provided me, on the passages on which she focuses her analysis, or on the content of those passages upon which she chooses to comment. Just as often as she delivers unconnected fragments of what I argue is a larger cultural model, or obscures this underlying model that Americans share by accentuating differences

of emphasis or elaboration among interviewees, Swidler's prose discussion veers off in completely other directions.

For one example I have picked, again at random from those I might have chosen, Swidler quotes an as-yet-unmarried interviewee as describing "the kind of lasting, mutual relationship that can become a marriage":

When two people respect each other. They respect each other as people, as individuals. They don't stifle a person or try to possess a person. They just let the person be as they are. They don't try to change a person. They accept a person as they are, with faults, without faults. (Interviewee Jeannie Shore, quoted in Swidler 2001: 57)

About this interview excerpt Swidler (2001: 57) then comments that the interviewee "has made conventional cultural images her own. Even without direct experience, she has inserted an image of herself—her own likes and dislikes, her own imaginative anticipation of what love will be like—into her picture of love relationships." But this commentary, privileging as it does the interviewee's "own imaginative anticipation" of marital love, misses what I would argue are the culturally shared underpinnings of this person's musings, evident in this same passage. Let me repeat: It is not that Swidler's interpretation is wrong, it is that it is myopic. In zooming in on this interviewee's individual perspective on marriage, Swidler overlooks what the speaker shares with other interviewees.

Here is my own cultural interpretation of this same brief passage, which depends on the larger context of many such interview passages I have analyzed. The passage is about the necessity of accepting one's spouse "as they are," or, as the interviewee also puts it, respecting each other "as individuals." Such acceptance is but one way to foster marital compatibility, since accepting a person as they are, perceived faults and all, reduces the possibility of friction due to dissimilarities between the two that might otherwise be experienced as incompatibilities. This way of addressing incompatibility, then, lowers the expectations one might have had initially, conceding the other person's mismatches with oneself.

Some of my own interviewees, like this one Swidler quotes, did also talk about accepting their spouses. For one husband this acceptance takes on a decidedly anti-patriarchal tone when he says,

A marriage cannot be binding, like all-inclusive, you have to give your partner space to be their own individual person. It's very important, I think, for—in a marriage because you're living together in one house. You can't dominate the other person, I think that's what causes a lot of break-ups, one party trying to impose their attitudes or their beliefs on the other and just expecting them to follow along. There's a lot of male chauvinism that goes along this line. You know, not allow—"I don't want my wife to work," that kind of thing. (Quinn interviewee 3H-1)

Along the same lines, he later comments, "I wouldn't hold her in any chains" (Quinn interviewee 3H-9). It is clear, though, that this man, like Swidler's interviewee Jeanie Shore, is thinking of the dangers of not just a husband but either spouse being over-possessive, when in a still later interview he observes, "Two people can become so close, they can become obsessed with each other and get very possessive and that brings upon jealousy and other emotions which would be destructive, I think" (Quinn interviewee 3H-15). This warning marks the profundity of this man's concern for individualism.

Compatibilities and incompatibilities come in all shapes and sizes. So, for example, some of my interviewees envision, not a total acceptance of one's spouse whatever that may entail, but an "adjustment" of both spouses' expectations, to find a kind of middle ground. Thus another of the husbands I interviewed recalled,

I think Shirley and I got—married me thinking she was going to change me into a party person and I married her thinking I was going to change her into a bookworm. In the end, we both have made some adjustment toward, you know, both directions. (Quinn interviewee 6H-1)

Another husband expressed this same sense of adjustment more succinctly. He observed of his wife that, at a certain point in their marriage, it had come about that "she fit me so well."

Other couples define marital compatibility in other ways. They speak, for example, of teamwork (expressed metaphorically as, "We both can work together, and work as one"); of complementary strengths and weaknesses ("We have both looked into the other person and found their best parts and used those parts to make the relationship gel"); of common goals ("His dream now meshes with mine"); or a common value system ("We present a united front together"); of a feeling of oneness

(“We melded”) of the pragmatics of their daily lives (“Our existence is so intertwined”); or of their shared social standing in the eyes of the larger community (“We were a pair”). Incompatibility is equally readily expressed metaphorically, as in this comment,

But I feel like it’s possible that one person may reach a really different height of maturity and realize that a lot of things that they’re doing now and wanting and all their desires are elementary, you know. Whatever, you know, and like their change may be so much of a change that, you know, you don’t really fit into their life anymore. (Quinn Interviewee 2H-2)

And in this striking example:

I felt really prickly, that nothing he did could suit me or was nice. And I just pictured myself like a hedgehog almost. (Quinn interviewee 4W-8)

in Americans’ model of marriage, COMPATIBILITY can be thought of as a default value or place-holder, into which particular married people insert their own versions of it, suiting the way their own two personalities and personal preoccupations do or do not interconnect, hopefully to make their marriage successful. (Jeanie Shore, Swidler’s still-single interviewee, imagined how this would all work out in a future relationship.) That terms in the cultural model such as MUTUAL BENEFIT and COMPATIBILITY and DIFFICULTY are open to interpretation in this way accounts for considerable variability in how given people’s marriages play out. As I indicated earlier, such variations make each marriage distinctive.

On the other hand, and at risk of belaboring my point: Seeing patterns like talk of compatibility and incompatibility in extended discourse over different speakers required the systematic analysis of multiple instances of such statements, metaphorical and non-metaphorical. Without the larger framework of COMPATIBILITY and the shared cultural model of which it is a component, that emerged from my systematic analysis, Swidler has no basis for contextualizing interviewees’ comments, such as her interviewee Shore’s observation about accepting a person as they are. Instead, in each individual case she provides us with whatever interpretation occurs to her in that instance, leaving the impression she favors theoretically, that each understanding of marriage is concocted by that interviewee in the moment.

Moreover, identifying the classes into which these metaphors for marriage fell impelled me to ask, next, how these eight terms might be related. In the same way that metaphors were culled from this interview discourse, so too, in the next stages of this analysis, occurrences of interviewees' reasoning about marriage were identified. This meant searching out *all* instances (in the first ten interviews conducted with each interviewee) of this reasoning. Then, in the next analytic step, the same procedure was followed for occurrences of the key word *love* in the interviews. In each case, I sought patterns of usage. Certainly I would not have identified the mapping of love onto marriage, and infantile onto adult love, if not for my prior discovery of the patterned ways in which interviewees talked about both love and marriage, which then led me to the parallel between the two.

What my successive analyses revealed were highly regular, highly shared understandings of marriage and love discernible underneath variations. These included variation in language used, in feeling tone expressed, in interpretations of what components of the larger model meant to them, and also in specific marital experiences. Such experiences might include, for example, difficulties that had arisen in their own marriage, or the recent unexpected divorce of friends, or some other aspect of marriage—with which each individual interviewee was preoccupied at the time of the interview. Even had Swidler been looking for a shared framework beneath these variations in her interviewees' talk of love and marriage, her very method of analysis precluded her from detecting it.

Overt Versus Covert Content

It is not only the greater systematicity of my analysis of my interviewees' discourse that sets it apart from Swidler's analysis of hers. There is another equally critical difference. Swidler's approach captures the overt content of her interviewees' discourse on marriage—what the speakers meant to say, and knew they meant to say. By contrast, my choice to analyze metaphors, reasoning, and usages of "love" led me to uncover the covert framework my interviewees were assuming, if usually not even aware of, when they said these things about marriage. While Swidler's interviewees as well as mine expressed these covert assumptions, her method precluded her, not only from assembling the fragments of such evidence to be found in her interviews, but even from paying any particular analytic attention to these pieces.

In this matter I part company altogether with the position Vaisey has argued. My quarrel is with his claim that

[t]he unstructured or semistructured interview puts us in direct contact with discursive consciousness but gives us little leverage on unconscious cognitive processes. Discursive consciousness is incredibly good at offering reasons that may not be at all related to the real motives behind a person's behavior. (Vaisey 2009: 1688)²³

Therefore, he concludes, "Carefully constructed and implemented, forced-choice surveys may be better suited to the study of the culture-action link," presumably because respondents to the latter "rely more on heuristics and intuition than on deliberation" (Vaisey 2009: 1688). As will shortly become clear, I disagree with this characterization of interviews.²⁴ What you get out of interviews—either conscious or unconscious thought expressed in them, or both—depends entirely on what you look for.

Swidler is equally cautious about what is to be gained from interviews. Her caution, not unlike Vaisey's worry that people consciously fabricate reasons for their behavior unrelated to their real motives, seems to be colored by a typical distrust Americans (including American sociologists) have of what people say as distinct from what they do.²⁵ In a previous section, we saw how she dismissed various examples of interviewee's discourse as merely being their speakers' attempts to "reach for coherent ways to think about what to do, to be, to feel." Expanding on this position, Swidler declares that "coherence is imposed retrospectively (and sometimes retroactively) as people fit their understandings" to institutionalized conventions regarding biographical narrative and a coherent self. They do so because "they seek continuities that make sense of who they are as individuals, that seem to give their lives coherent meaning...It is in this sense that at least some people will claim a coherent philosophy of life, even when they routinely make ad hoc deviations from its logic" (Swidler 2001: 148).

Not only do interviewees sound coherent because they are trying to make sense for themselves of previous experience, but at the same time, Swidler argues, they are trying to offer the kind of thorough-going sense-making that they suppose that the interviewer is after:

Individuals in interviews often seem to know very well what they think, even when what they think seems quite inconsistent. One reason is that they are often responding not to an abstract question about some general

set of principles or beliefs (or even some fund of common sense or popular wisdom) but to their sense of what answer would make sense in the particular situation the interviewer's question suggests. (Swidler 2001: 180)

In spite of all these efforts to make sense, what interviewees think can still seem “quite inconsistent.”²⁶ As Swidler makes clear in closing the paragraph from which I have just quoted, she takes this inconsistency to be evidence for her position that interviewees' beliefs stem, not from what she terms internalized meaning “complexes,” but rather from the tool kit of diverse public knowledge on which they draw:

These interview responses seem incomplete or incoherent only because we are still too wedded to the view that what we are seeing when we observe culture is an internalized complex of meanings and practices, rather than people's knowledge of how a set of publicly available codes and situations operate. (Swidler 2001: 180)

I am indeed wedded to the view that Swidler rejects. I surmise that many, many opinions and beliefs that interviewees express derive from cultural models—although, as I have already suggested, these schemas may remain unelaborated in the course of an interview or in other discourse, in which ideas are frequently introduced in passing. It may even be the case that speakers have not thought much about these asides, and may have only sketchy, sometimes even erroneous, ideas of the cultural models behind them. These underlying cultural models might even sometimes rest on specialized expertise they do not possess. Many pieces of thinking that Swidler would characterize as “tools” in the cultural “tool kit”—ideas that pop up in her interviews and mine—are fragments of other American cultural models equally comprehensive as that for marriage, and deserving of exploration in their own right. These include not just folk psychological knowledge about motivational states such as commitment or love, such as we saw Swidler's interviewee Betty Dyson referencing, but notions as well about how divorce goes, how respect should be expressed, what happens in (psycho)therapy, and many others. We have simply not yet investigated those other shared meaning complexes, and so are not in a position to fully describe them (but see Quinn 1982 for a start on “commitment”), or to begin to know across how many lifeworlds they might have spread. Undeniably too, interviewees and other speakers may do the kind of after-the-fact patchwork, to bring greater coherence to what they are saying, that Swidler describes.

There is yet another bias in what people say, Swidler believes. Beyond just wanting to offer the interviewer a response that makes sense, she goes on to observe, interviewees will also be inclined to put their best foot forward:

Because I asked people to give an account of themselves, my interviews probably invoked an implicit distinction between good, ethical, worthwhile people and others. (Swidler 2001: 174)

That is undoubtedly true to large extent, and equally so of my interviews. Indeed, we can assume that all these interviewees went about painting not just themselves as better, but also their marriages as more successful, than they and their marriages may have actually been by some external measure. At the same time, a great deal of true confession happens. In the course of the long series of interviews conducted with each interviewee in my study, none seemed to have reservations about telling the interviewer, for example, how they had had to revise their first naïve understandings of marriage, or their subsequent and even current misgivings about theirs, however severe. This was so even if it seemed that the marriage might be hovering on the brink of divorce (and, indeed, four of the eleven couples interviewed, that I know of, did subsequently divorce). Indeed, they ultimately shared many dysfunctional and even disgraceful facts about their marriages and their marital behavior, including extramarital affairs and various other difficult periods and episodes in these relationships. To my mind this willingness to tell all is a countervailing motive to the desire to make a good impression.²⁷ It may be a distinctively American impulse, not found or not as compelling, or even rejected, elsewhere. Such openness is also a testimony to successful rapport-building over the course of multiple interviews with these Americans.

Here is my larger point, though, about all these instances that Swidler treats as mere discursive coherence-making, and dismisses as evidence of underlying complexes of cultural meaning. Extensive interviews are not just “conscious” or deliberative, as Vaisey would have it. Rather, the understandings on which they rely are so taken for granted by speakers, and they are so practiced at talking about them, that they do not even realize that they are making the assumptions they make when, for example, they select certain metaphors to describe marriage. Nor, I would add, do they often deliberately consider, let alone question, the causal

reasoning that they so nimbly employ to tie these assumptions together in order to reach conclusions about marriage. This is equally true for the ways they talk about marital love. Indeed, unaware as they are of the understandings of love and marriage that infuse their talk about it, and their presumption of the model of marriage that underlies them both, they are quite unable to deliberate on or inhibit their speech. In the metaphors for marriage that they select, the reasoning about it that they do, and what they have to say about the love they experience within it, any bias toward presenting themselves in a positive light such as Swidler anticipates ultimately eludes them.

Let me elaborate this point a little. Interview discourse, like any talk, requires the speaker to make, in quick succession, multiple “unconscious” or out-of-awareness mini-decisions about how to express what the speaker is intent on conveying—such as choices of causal links to tie together the argument one is constructing, metaphors to emphasize and clarify what one is saying, or stories that underline the point one is making (see Quinn 1997a, 2011). At this level of cognitive processing, speakers do not, indeed cannot disguise or twist, much less suppress, what they say and how they think about it. This task, of talking (and thinking of what to say) at the speed of speech, demands that we have assumptions at hand to contextualize our talk, making sense of statements and filling in unstated meanings as we go. Indeed, the constant task of talking about happenings in the world may be one important source of the pressure to invent and share cultural models of these events. In any case, interview discourse is indeed a rich source of what Vaisey calls “unconscious processes.”

As should now be apparent, anthropologists do not just have their own methods for analyzing interviews and other discourse; their whole approach to this task is unique to their discipline. As Strauss (2015: 392) has written of anthropological practice, and more particularly of the cultural models approach from cognitive anthropology on which we both draw, we tend to focus “on beliefs that have become so naturalized that they are not even seen as beliefs, the aspect of culture that Pierre Bourdieu (1977: 164) termed *doxa* rather than *dogma*.” These beliefs are likely to be so generally accepted that they form a body of presuppositions underlying what is ‘explicitly propounded’” (Strauss 2015: 392). Behind this methodological focus is a characteristically anthropological view of culture “as the water in which a fish swims, as what we ‘see with’ but do not see,” she says (Strauss 2015: 392). Strauss goes on to

caution, and her own body of work demonstrates, that more explicitly stated and debated cultural understandings are equally important to capture (Strauss 2015: 395; see also, e.g., Strauss 2004, 2012). For more on this issue of implicit versus explicit understandings, see Strauss's chapter in this volume, and the volume Conclusion. Here the lesson is that we should not ignore the overt content of what people have to say about marriage, which in the case under examination led Swidler to her finding of a distinction between "mythic" and "prosaic" marital love and to other valuable insights, not captured by my method, focused as it is on more implicit cultural understandings.

LAST WORDS

The underlying cultural model of marriage that I have delineated exists. Marriage, as we have seen, may be conceptualized as a contract between spouses or a religious commitment, but it must still be satisfying in the sense of fulfilling the needs of both spouses—whatever these needs may be. Incompatibilities people perceive to jeopardize such mutual marital fulfillment, just like their understanding of this fulfillment itself, may vary widely, but couples must still face them, and overcome the equally varied difficulties that they cause. Learning to deal with these perceived incompatibilities, whether by accepting the immutable character of the other spouse, recognizing their rights as autonomous individuals, or making adjustments toward some intermediate compromise, are just some of the alternative ways of addressing them. These alternative ways of thinking about such matters as the benefits, incompatibilities, and difficulties of marriage account for considerable variation across the marriages of individuals all subscribing to the same overarching cultural model of marriage. American readers, having now considered my rather complex argument for this cultural model, are invited to consult their intuitions regarding their own knowledge and experience of marriage.

The cultural model that people have at hand frames and delimits all this individual variation. This is true of differences that may pertain across class, ethnicity, gender, and other social categories of people living in the same society (excepting many new immigrants). It is equally true of social change in people's beliefs and practices over time. To claim that cultural models are enduring is not to say that they cannot and do not change over more or less long periods of time. Historians have reconstructed such changes in American marriage (my favorite historical

account of this being Coontz 2005). However, this historical change is not unrestricted either. For one thing, it is sharply delimited by whatever cultural model of marriage existed at the start of it. History leaves traces; moreover, cultural change, like biological evolution, builds on what is already there.

Moreover, my analysis points to a more fundamental source of such change. Both historical change in the way we understand marital love and the persistence into the present of certain historically older ways of understanding this love depend upon these meanings of love, and consequentially adult relationships such as marriage, answering, and continuing to answer, deeply felt needs. This “love,” or something akin to it, in turn, can be expected to change in response to changes in child rearing practices and other cultural circumstances surrounding earliest experience. This is so even as, in new social circumstances, these understandings take on different emphases and elaborations—such as the post-1960s emphasis on self-actualization that Swidler addresses, the implications of which for marriage were of concern to both her interviewees and mine.

In the end, when we conclude as Swidler does that such a cultural model does not exist, there are untenable consequences. As I have shown, her stance leads to the misidentification of variation as wholly different complexes of ideas. Implausibly, too, this position implies the nonexistence of not just a cultural model of marriage, but of any enduring cultural models at all. This includes any stable understanding of selfhood, such as the obviously widespread and highly motivating American version, with its distinctive voluntaristic ethic, of Western individualism. It also denies culture one of its important cognitive functions, obscuring people’s reliance upon pre-existing cultural schemas to solve the tasks they encounter and, not just to make sense of, but to decide what to do about, real-world conflicts and other options of all kinds. Finally, it leaves unexplained how a cultural model such as that of American marriage can be so very motivating to those who subscribe to it. As should now be apparent, there are multiple theoretical costs associated with the tool kit theory of marriage.

Readers, especially if they are anthropologists, may have gotten to the end of this long chapter still finding themselves mystified if not troubled by how Swidler could even imagine such an eviscerated version, not just of marriage, but even more importantly, of the individual. It is true that those equipped with the tool kit she envisions are capable of both agency

and variation. Beyond that, however, these individuals are quite unfinished—denuded of selves of any kind, coherent or otherwise—including, as argued in the body of this chapter, the kinds of profound motivation that biology and experience will have conferred upon such selves. My best guess is that Swidler (along with the many sociologists who accept without question the tool-kit theory she offers) is such a committed institutionalist that, once she has assigned all explanatory value to marriage and the other institutions surrounding marital love, she is finished. The individual in this larger institutional matrix is but an unimportant detail. The culture theory espoused throughout this volume, and the cases supporting that theory, all argue for a better-rounded understanding of the individual. At the same time, the culturally variable institutional context in which a person lives and grows is certainly not lost, but is a theme running through the volume—one foregrounded by some contributors. Together, the chapters offer up various perspectives on the human being, steeped in culture, who is the missing piece in tool kit theory.

NOTES

1. Making this argument in starkly cognitive terms, one sociologist has flatly claimed about culture that “it is not in our heads” (Martin 2010: 240). Citing an unpublished paper by Swidler for corroboration, Martin asserts that the two theses,

culture as a complex web of meaning and culture as inside the minds of actors—cannot both be correct, for the simple reason that our minds are not good at holding lots of connected things in them. If one wants to define culture as something complex, then it is not going to be inside of people (see Swidler 2000), because people are extremely simple. (Martin 2010: 229)

He could not be more wrong on this point. In making it, he must be relying on research about short-term or working memory, which is far from all there is to human memory. Exactly what our minds are good at is remembering lots of connected things.

2. Swidler has also discussed her theory in other venues, most famously in a 1986 article, and has more recently defended it (see Swidler 2008). Summarizing the 1986 publication, Vaisey refers to it as “what has arguably become the most influential founding statement of the new sociology of culture” (Vaisey 2010: 76). For the sake of comparison with my own

- alternative interpretation of love and marriage, I will stay with her treatment of tool kit theory in her 2001 book, *Talk of Love*, which departs in no important way from her position published elsewhere, and provides abundant appropriate material for my critique.
3. So as not to further expand an already over-long chapter, I will not detail the history of cultural sociology here. Others, cultural sociologists themselves, have told this history more competently than I could anyway. These practitioners seem to agree that culture has been under-theorized in their discipline (e.g., Jacobs and Spillman 2005: 2); that there has been outright hostility to the study of culture in some corners of it (Friedland and Mohr 2004); and that these tendencies might best be explained by a sociological penchant for the structural and the material, and for explaining how these less “ephemeral” factors impinge upon cultural meanings rather than how the latter might influence the former (Alexander 2003: 5).
 4. The other exception is an article by Omar Lizardo and Michael Strand (2010) that similarly proposes a synthesis of tool kit theory, in this case with something they call “practice theory,” a broad compendium of approaches (including, again, the work of anthropologists Strauss and myself) that have in common the acknowledgement “that actors are ‘deeply’ and ‘lastingly’ modified by virtue of having a history of recurrent experiences in particular institutional and material environments” (Lizardo and Strand 2010: 213). Their thoughtful article contains many useful ideas. If I lean on Vaisey’s critique of tool kit theory in this chapter, it is only because his is more directly related to points I wish to make.
 5. See the larger discussion of internalization in the Introduction and Conclusion to this volume, as developed and elaborated in various other chapters.
 6. *Cultural model* is the label most often used by psychological anthropologists. In newer and more neuro-biologically friendly terms parallel to the usage of *schema* or *cognitive schema*, such a cultural model may also be called a *cultural schema*. I use both terms interchangeably.
 7. In the notation I routinely use, each interview couple is identified by number, H or W stands for husband or wife in that couple, and the number after the dash designates the numerical order of that interview in the series of all interviews with that person. Swidler instead has assigned her interviewees fictive names to identify them.
 8. There was a handful of possible exceptions, eighteen to be exact, most just too vague to be interpretable as to whether they fell into one of the eight classes or instead represented some inventive outlier.
 9. This is a sharp departure from nineteenth century American practice. Then, a long and probing courtship was the pattern (Lystra 1989). Serving a similar purpose today may be the increasingly popular American

practice of computer matching, which at least partially solves the problem of marital incompatibility that inevitably results from the vagaries of marriage by falling in love. Both these customs may be not dissimilar to arranged marriage in some other societies, in ensuring the pre-marital scrutiny of prospective spouses.

10. Sociologist Andrew Cherlin, writing a 2009 book on American marriage, cites Swidler's tool kit theory of culture as it applies to marital relationships, but seems wholly ignorant of my work on this same topic. This lapse is an illustration of the unfortunate insulation of the two disciplines from each other. Cherlin's neglect of my work is all the more remarkable because his account shares so much with my own. Witness this excerpt from his book's final paragraph, in which he declares that recent turbulence in American family life

reflects a cultural contradiction between marriage and individualism that most Americans carry around in their heads...One view emphasizes the desirability of marriage and, by extension, stable long-term relationships. The other emphasizes self-development and causes people to end relationships that no longer provide the benefits they think they need... (Cherlin 2009: 201–202)

This conclusion captures the very contradiction at the heart of the cultural model of marriage that I describe. Moreover, Cherlin's notion that this contradiction is carried around in American heads certainly has more in common with my approach than with Swidler's.

11. The interviewee continues on to entertain an alternative possibility, saying, "Who knows? They might be staying together for their little boy's sake but they...she [the wife] doesn't seem to be as happy as she could be." This perception of her sister-in-law not being happy (the emotional consequence of not being fulfilled, which interviewees sometimes use to stand in for this lack of fulfillment), coupled with the way she "picks at" her husband, led this speaker to speculate, in the first place, about why the two stayed together.
12. Evolutionary anthropologist Christopher Boehm (2012: 61–62) has made the interesting point that, even moreso than the cooperation required between subsistence partners in foraging societies, marriage and marriage-like partnerships are the relationships best adapted to reciprocal altruism.
13. Indeed, in the first pages of her book she cites Strauss and myself on this very point, saying that the vignettes she posed to her interviewees were intended "to explore the ways people put their ideas of love to use when they are trying to resolve problems (see Strauss and Quinn 1997)" (Swidler 2001: 4).

14. Orlando Patterson singles out a recent article of Swidler's (2013), based on new research, as representing "a full-throttle, volte-face return to the centrality of norms, values, and stable cultural knowledge structures in explaining social processes" (Patterson 2014). While I do not have space to fully dispute this claim here, I will just say that the Swidler article in question falls short of it. True, she writes of "a set of deeply embedded cultural schemas that people draw on in complex ways" (Swidler 2013: 323–324). Yet once again, just as in the case of American voluntarism, she supposes these cultural schemas to be "embedded," not in people's minds and psyches, but in institutions, which she views as the ultimate source of their stability.
15. Talk may sometimes contradict other action. Thus, for one everyday example, some Americans may complain about the plethora of consumer choices with which they are confronted, but enjoy shopping nonetheless. Others, though, may act on this perception, eschewing the shopping experience and going to stores only when they have a specific purchase to make.
16. I am grateful to Claudia Strauss (personal communication, 2014) for this last point.
17. This is a complicated story and one tangential to the argument being developed here. See McCollum (2002). For a brief summary of Chris McCollum's account, see Quinn (2013: 226–227).
18. I see my interviewees not as "lurching" between the two understandings of love, as Swidler (2001: 116) views hers as doing, but rather as shifting from one to another as the discursive context demands, and typically successively, with prosaic love being a later stage of marriage.
19. Paranthetically, but of possible importance to the distinction Swidler wants to maintain between the two, my interviewees disagree with her interpretation in one respect—that Americans decide whether or not to stay married in mythic rather than prosaic mode. They report explicit calculation of the "prosaic" costs and benefits of their marriages in deciding whether or not to end them.
20. In their introductory essay for a recent special issue of *Ethos* devoted to anthropology and psychoanalysis, two anthropologists (Gammeltoft and Segal 2016: 404–405) provide a brief but useful summary of anthropological hostility to psychoanalysis, in spite of what they detail as "a long history of fruitful engagements" (Gammeltoft and Segal 2016: 400) between the two.
21. Vaisey switches between "self" and "identity" in this paragraph—understandably so, since the two are closely related. For me, identity is simply the aspect of self that people label (see Quinn 2006). Such labelling is often due to identification with a group or a social movement.

22. It may seem ironic that I, an anthropologist, am accusing Swidler, a sociologist, of lack of methodological rigor. But we cultural anthropologists routinely conduct this kind of analysis, and have developed systematic methods for doing so (see Quinn 2005b).
23. When Vaisey speaks here of “discursive consciousness” and “unconscious cognitive processes” he simply means that which is out of awareness, not that which is actively repressed in the Freudian sense of “the unconscious” (S. Vaisey, personal communication, 2013).
24. Vaisey (2014) himself has more recently recanted this view of the limitations of interviews, in response to a critique of his position by sociologist Allison Pugh (2013).
25. Of course, as a linguist would immediately object, what people say has illocutionary force of all kinds and thus is part of what they do. Linguist Alan Rumsey (1990) posits further that the artificial ideological disjunction between talk and action derives from the opposition in English between wording and meaning, a distinction not made in all other languages (his counter-example is the northwestern Australian Aboriginal language Ungarinyin).
26. Anthropologist Claudia Strauss, who studies the inconsistencies in her interviewee’s talk, has shown that, over longer stretches of interview, this talk is in fact chock full of contradictions. However, Swidler’s and Strauss’s interpretations of these inconsistencies are different. Swidler takes them as evidence that the variant views expressed are not “internalized” but are rather variant “public codes.” Strauss instead assumes that people regularly internalize contradictory views, but finds that her interviewees are typically unaware of holding them simultaneously. How individuals manage these inconsistent views is the subject of much of her work (see especially, Strauss 2012).
27. Described so aptly by sociologist Wendy Luttrell (2005: 247) as interviewees’ “narrative urgency to tell it like it was.”

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Learning about Culture from Children: Lessons from Rural Sri Lanka

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In the early days of cultural anthropology, studies of children featured significantly in efforts to understand how cultural patterning and variation might come to be, given our foundation of shared human biology. Since then, important work with children has continued to be done, and Sirota's contribution to this volume is an excellent example of that. However, most theorists of culture have not closely attended to what we can learn about it from more recent research with children. In this chapter, I will use my own observations in rural Sri Lanka to argue that research with children has crucial lessons to teach us about how culture works, how individuals take it up and use it, and how it shapes us in culturally patterned ways.

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RESEARCH ON CHILDREN IN ANTHROPOLOGY

Early cultural anthropologists like Margaret Mead (1949 [1928], 1975 [1930], 1963 [1935]), Ruth Benedict (1946), and Cora Du Bois (1960 [1944]) understood the importance of looking at children in order to understand cultural variation and patterning. Along with others in the so-called Culture and Personality school, they looked to everyday activities—such as bathing and feeding—and to marked rituals and rites of passage through which children are taught foundational cultural lessons, and they saw how these experiences shape the ways that children develop. Later, the Whitings (1975) led a comparative ethnographic examination of children and childhood in six cultures. Although these systematic comparative studies as well as earlier work in Culture and Personality (cf. LeVine 2001) fell out of favor within anthropology, there is still much to be learned about culture from the study of children.

How and how much culturally patterned experiences shape children's development has continued to be a focus of study for some anthropologists, although this focus no longer takes center stage as it did in those early years of the discipline in the U.S. (LeVine 2007). Psychological anthropologists such as Briggs (1970), Levy (1973), Parish (1994), Spiro (1997), and Trawick (1992) have offered psychodynamically rich explanations for how people in particular societies are shaped through culturally patterned childhood experiences and the emotional conflicts entailed in these. Such studies have much to tell us about the work of culture more broadly. Research on language socialization, such as that included in Schieffelin and Ochs's (1986) classic volume, has focused on how language is used to transmit culture to children and to shape who they are. Others have focused on the ways that culture is transmitted through children's participation in formal and informal schooling (Lancy et al. 2001; Lave 2011, Rogoff 2003). Studies like Bluebond-Langner's (1978), in which she examined the lives of children in the U.S. with terminal illness diagnoses, shift the emphasis from how children's worlds are constructed by older people to how children themselves construct their own worlds, worlds from which adults are sometimes excluded. Others, like Huberman (2012) and Rae-Espinoza (2011), examine how children in particular places negotiate complex global flows of people and ideas about their own goodness and value. More recently, anthropologists like Clark (2017), El Ouardani (2017), and Sirota (this volume) have called attention to the bodily, sensorial dimensions of children's experience, which deeply

inculcate cultural understandings, values, and ways of being. This resurgence of interest in the anthropology of childhood across a range of sub-disciplines is reflected in cross-cultural compilations such as those by Lancy (2008), Montgomery (2009), Schwartzman (2001), and Stephens (1995), as well as in the establishment of the Anthropology of Children and Youth Interest Group within the American Anthropology Association.

This work with children tells us much about children's roles in a community's social life, how culture is transmitted, how motivations for cultural participation are established or shifted, how human development is shaped by cultural context, and how children's own participation and agency matter. When we think about culture among adults, we often talk about ideas and worldviews, values and discourses. We talk about the resources people have—culturally, socially, economically, psychologically—how they use these, and to what effect. But work with children reveals more about how people obtain their ideas and worldviews in the first place, why people value and want the things they do, and how they come to be shaped in cultural ways. Knowing something more about how people come to think and feel as they do gives us a deeper understanding of those thoughts and feelings, an understanding that is also crucial for explaining how these are sustained, challenged, or changed. In other words, research with children has much to tell us about culture.

LESSONS ON CULTURE

In this chapter, I describe pieces of my research among Sinhala speakers in a predominantly Buddhist village in central Sri Lanka over the past eighteen years. I do so in order to illustrate the following points about culture and its transmission, listed here with their significant subpoints indicated:

Lesson 1: Personal versions of cultural models (a) are developed, assembled, reinforced, connected, and altered in people's minds (b) through experience, (c) which is culturally patterned, (d) beginning in childhood (e) where it largely occurs in everyday interaction with important others.

Lesson 2: Emotions and motivations (a) are tied into these cognitive models (b) through the experiences in which they are developed and elaborated, (c) experiences which are culturally patterned.

Lesson 3: There are *psychodynamic underpinnings* for key pieces of culture (a) because of the cultural patterning of significant early and ongoing experiences, (b) giving unconscious motivational force to subsequent and ongoing engagement with culture.

Lesson 4: *The human developmental life course* (a) presents varying opportunities for cultural lessons to be learned differently, and (b) is, at the same time, fundamentally shaped by culturally patterned experiences.

Lesson 5: Understanding these lessons about how children acquire culture helps to explain both (a) *cultural patterning* and (b) *cultural variation and change*.

These lessons emerge from and offer explanations for my observations of family interactions in Sri Lanka. In turn, they support my more general argument for the importance of including research on children in the development of a more robust theory of culture.

LESSONS 1 AND 2: DEVELOPING CULTURAL MODELS AND LINKING EMOTION

One of the first significant sets of observations I made during my work in Sri Lanka centered on enactments of hierarchy between mothers and their children. These everyday enactments, I have argued, convey key pieces of a central cultural model of relationships to children and infuse those understandings and expectations with emotion and motivation.

One of the most robust and often noted cultural features of social life in Sri Lanka and throughout South Asia is an emphasis on hierarchy. This emphasis is built into systems of caste, patronage, gender, and family. It is something that scholars both within and outside of the region have written much about (see, for instance, Dumont's 1969 classic, *Homo Hierarchicus* [1980]). But it was not until I had started doing fieldwork with Sinhala families in Sri Lanka that I began to see a fuller, more culturally specific model of hierarchy. This model of hierarchy was evident in ordinary, everyday interactions that not only enacted the model but communicated it to children and linked it to powerful feelings they had.

This model of hierarchy, which I came to write about extensively (Chapin 2014), is something that patterns, for instance, the ways that mothers feed children by hand, rolling little balls of rice and curry together with their finger tips and popping them into the open mouths

of their waiting children. When mothers do this, they do not ask children which bits of curry they want next or even whether they are hungry. This was particularly striking in contrast to meal times with my own son who was four years old at the time. At meal times in our house, my son ate from his own plate while I talked with him about what he liked and did not like, trying to persuade him to “choose” another bite of one of his vegetables. The Sri Lankan children I observed waited patiently, passively for each mouthful of curry, maybe showing that they were indeed hungry with a little bit of extra focus, or that they were not by looking away or fidgeting. Mothers may see these signals and use them to adjust their feeding, but they did not typically call attention to those adjustments, let alone enter into extended verbal negotiations.

In such everyday interactions, key pieces of a cultural model of hierarchically ranked relationships are enacted and reinforced for all involved. For children, participating in these enactments prompts them to develop their own internal versions of this model, a process that others in this volume talk about as “internalization.” In this cultural model of hierarchy that children in Sri Lanka are deriving, good caregivers know what their children need and what is best for them, and good caregivers provide that. Good children trust their caregivers to know what they need better than they do themselves, and they wait for it to be given. In these encounters, it is not only food that is being provided, but nurturance, care, love, safety, and approval. In these everyday interactions, the particular model of hierarchy that is being conveyed to children does not only include roles and actions and ideas, but feelings and motivations as well.

However, parents in Sri Lanka do not, in my experience, think of themselves as teaching children about relationships in these episodes. They certainly do not talk about themselves as teaching children about social hierarchy, why and when it is just, and what the respective roles of parent and child should be. People are simply feeding children in ways that they themselves were fed, in ways children are fed all over the island, and in ways that feel good and right to the person doing the feeding.

Further, meals are not the only time this model of hierarchy is enacted with children, and they are not the only opportunities for children to derive this model of ranked relationships and associate it with feelings and value. For instance, when someone is holding a child who might have to poop or pee, the adult does not ask the child whether they have to go to the toilet, as is common in the U.S. They do not give them

stickers for going in the potty like a big kid or make it a game by floating Cheerios in the toilet for little boys to aim at, as I have known some U.S. parents to do. Instead, caregivers whom I have observed in Sri Lanka are attuned to subtle signs in babies' facial expressions and in the tensing of their bodies that indicate that a child is about to urinate or defecate. And then, without much verbalization, the adult will swiftly hold the undiapered infant out away from his or her own body. Imagine the embodied experience of the infant, jerked out into open space each time a feeling of needing to eliminate arises. Later, when children are a bit older and able to stand, they are swiftly placed over a gutter or taken to the toilet. In these everyday experiences, the hierarchy model is at play, as adults recognize and provide for children's needs without encouraging children to express or negotiate for those needs.

This model of hierarchy also shapes and is conveyed by how children in most Sri Lankan households get to bed each night. Rather than the elaborate bedtime rituals that Sirota describes for children in the U.S. (this volume), bedtime is not made into a big deal for the families I knew in Sri Lanka. Young children did not have a particular time when they had to go to bed or a separate bedroom to go to. The families I knew kept children in their parents' beds or at least their parents' bedrooms until the little ones were ten or so, or until they were old enough to join an older sibling or other relative. Dinners were late, served right before the family began to turn in for the night. Sometimes young children did not make it that late, falling asleep before dinner was ready and being carried to bed when the rest of the family was finished. Recently when I was in Sri Lanka, my friend's ten-year-old daughter, in her pajamas and with her homework mostly done, was dozing off over her dinner as her mother placed bites in her mouth. After a little while of the girl's soft whine and face scrunching, with her head resting sideways in her hand, the mother gave up and let the girl go to bed, where the father soon joined the girl and the mother followed after. As with the other family interactions I have described, adults do not encourage children to verbalize and negotiate for their desires. Rather, adults recognize the embodied demonstration of the child's needs and provide for those, actions which children passively but usually happily accept.

Each of these ordinary, everyday interactions—in Sri Lankan homes and in the U.S. homes I am contrasting them with—are patterned by taken-for-granted understandings about what children need, want, and are capable of, and about how parents and children should behave

toward each other. These cultural models shape how caregivers interact with children and, in so doing, set up the conditions within which children develop their understandings of the world, their expectations of others, the options they see for themselves, and their feelings of trust and basic goodness.

As Sri Lankan children grow, the more general model of hierarchy that they are assembling through these diverse everyday interactions will be enacted and experienced in still new ways. It will shape how schooling decisions are made for children and how marriages are arranged. Versions of this model acquired in the home will be enacted between teachers and students, employers and employees, religious experts and devotees, and doctors and patients. This core model of how ranked relationships are to be conducted will resonate as well with how caste and class are understood and enacted. Of course, this model is not learned all at once, nor is it identical in each domain of use or even in each enactment. Additionally, it is not the only model of ways of relating or being, but intersects with other cultural models and contingencies. However, by understanding how the model of hierarchy is enacted during *childhood* and derived from these childhood experiences, we can understand much more about the cultural model itself—about why it is so powerful and motivating for people, and about how it is reproduced.

It is one thing to say that hierarchy is an important value in Sri Lanka. But only by looking closely at daily interactions can we get a fuller, more culturally specific idea of what this “hierarchy” actually means and feels like to those who use it. We see that it is a nurturing kind of hierarchy. We see that hierarchical relationships are only justified when they operate with the consent of the junior person. However, the importance of consent does not mean that a junior person should insult a senior by asserting their own opinions or requests in a direct way. In my observations, when hierarchical relationships take this culturally valued form, they are not experienced as exploitive, but feel protective and satisfying for the junior person. And when hierarchical figures fail in their duty to be responsive to their juniors’ needs, this may be seen as an outrage and felt as a betrayal.

I present this description of how a cultural model of hierarchy patterns interactions between parents and children in Sri Lanka to advance the first few pieces of the argument I am making about the potential for research with children to tell us about culture. The first lesson that these observations suggest is about how culture is transmitted and

acquired: through ordinary, everyday, practical-seeming interactions with important others. As children experience these interactions with more fully enculturated others, they build cognitive schemas that represent those interactions, including their own roles and those of others. As these interactions reoccur in patterned ways, the pattern becomes predictable and expected to a child, inscribing the form of the schema more clearly and more deeply. As a child encounters similarly patterned interactions that evoke similar schemas, that child assembles these into more abstract and general schemas for relationships, valued ways of being, and potentials for variation and action. These general schemas or models in a child's mind are personal versions of more broadly shared and instantiated cultural models.

Further, the models a child is building are not only composed of ideas and understandings, but are also imbued with feelings and desires, which is the second lesson about culture that this set of observations about hierarchy suggests. Because these models are derived through experiences that, at least in early childhood, typically involve interactions with vitally important others on whom we depend, these models may be linked to powerful emotions and motivations. The schemas being developed during these interactions are necessarily associated with the feelings, dispositions, fears, and wants that are also part of the interactions.

But these are not the only lessons about culture that observations of children in Sri Lanka had to teach me.

LESSON 3: PSYCHODYNAMIC UNDERPINNINGS OF CULTURE

I returned to Sri Lanka the year after I completed my dissertation, which included my first pass at this argument about hierarchy. It was then that a series of new observations of children led me to a deeper appreciation of the potential psychodynamic registers of culture and its transmission. This started with my observations of a little two-year-old girl I call Rashika, who had been born to my best friend in the village soon after my doctoral fieldwork ended.

This little girl, whom I have by now written about quite a bit (Chapin 2010, 2014), surprised me. She was so different from the older Sri Lankan children I knew, who were remarkably self-restrained, undemanding, and deferential compared to the children I knew in the U.S. But this little girl was very demanding. What is more, whatever she

demanded, she got. If she wanted to be held, she was held; if she wanted to sit on the table, she sat on the table; if she wanted her older brother's new game, he was made to give it to her. If she wanted to sit up on the kitchen counter and cut okra with a sharp knife like her mother, then there she was.

At first I thought, "Oh, no, what is going to happen to this little girl?" I "knew," based on some of my own as-yet unexamined culture-bound theories of child development, that this kind of indulgence and "spoiling" would lead her to develop into a spoiled, unappreciative, selfish older child and eventually into a selfish and unappreciative adult. This would not be good in the U.S., but in Sri Lanka it was going to be terrible—especially for a woman. Although older children and adults in general were expected to show self-restraint and a sensitivity to social shame (*lajja*), this was essential to proper femininity.

Over time, however, I began to notice that this is how all young children that I saw in Sri Lanka were treated. In fact, it is how people reacted to any kind of request from anyone. Perhaps at first they might try to ignore, distract, or dissemble, but if those tactics did not work then, as people in Sri Lanka told me repeatedly, "We have to give."

I had not noticed this kind of demanding toddler behavior and caregiver indulgence during my first stay in Sri Lanka. Then I had lived in my own house in the village with my son and my then-husband. However, once I had noticed this pattern of behavior, I saw it everywhere. I even saw it in my fieldnotes from my earlier stay, although these observations had not meant much to me then.

So how did this kind of parenting move children from being the demanding toddlers I now noticed all around me to being the self-denying older children I was so used to seeing? The answer to this is complex and I have traced it out elsewhere, but basically what I think happens is that, when these Sri Lankan children do get everything that they want, it is usually not very satisfying. A demanded toy breaks, playing a game by yourself is no fun, eating your older brother's dessert while he sulks and your mother looks away in disgust makes you wish you had not insisted.

These experiences children have of getting what they want and then having that experience turn bad, I believe, encourages children eventually to stop asking. Moreover, it prompts them to mistrust their own desires. These everyday experiences, I argue, lead children to feel anxious about their own desires—especially in contrast to the kinds of satisfying

experiences I described earlier in which they wait for their parents and others to give them what those elders people think is best. One way to avoid this fear and anxiety about asserting their desires is to deny those desires to other people and, better yet, to deny them even to themselves. As nascent feelings of desire come coupled with feelings of anxiety, children are led to see feelings of desire as a threat, as not part of themselves, and to disavow them rather than having to experience them.

This psychodynamic resolution of a culturally patterned dilemma—a “drama” as Jean Briggs (1998) would call it—that is presented in early childhood is reinforced by larger cultural ideologies that these Sinhala children growing up in Sri Lanka will encounter later. When children who have experienced the destructive potential of their own desires encounter a religious ideology that says, “Desire is the root of all suffering,” a Noble Truth for the Theravada Buddhists I worked with, or when they hear ideas about the “evil eye” (*aes vaha*) that destroys a coveted object or person with a desirous gaze, they are likely to recognize these explicit cultural beliefs as deeply true and meaningful. As I wrote earlier,

these complex cultural models draw on understandings of desire that are consistent with the ways Sinhala children experience their own desires and those of their siblings in their early home life. Their experiences of their own desires as both irresistible to others and unpredictably destructive of the very things they want most may make these more explicit cultural models particularly resonant, meaningful, and right when children encounter them. This culturally normative orientation to desire is part of what children are assembling internally as they are developing in the context of a Sinhala family and in interaction with vitally important others. (Chapin 2010: 364)

Further, adults who themselves have been socialized in this way to mistrust and disavow their own desires, and who have had the moral dangers of desire reinforced by these more explicit cultural doctrines, are especially likely to be uncomfortable with a child’s naked demands for what they want. They are especially likely to want to do whatever it takes to stop that demanding and to pull away from the child who is doing it. At the same time, these adults may also be especially likely to want to see a child—especially one with whom they identify—get their desires met, desires that the adults routinely disavow in themselves. This may be especially powerful for mothers, who are typically the primary caregivers of young children in Sri Lanka (Chapin 2010: 365):

In their children's screams, mothers empathically experience what it is to feel strong and undisguised desire. This empathetic response has, I believe, a contradictory pull to their ordinary fear and avoidance of desire. They feel not only the fear of the consequences of desire but also the desire itself and the frustration of not having that desire met, frustration they normally ignore along with their desires. Having identified her own disavowed feelings in the infant, the mother wants to make the triggering stimulus stop, judges the desire expressed to be bad and dangerous, but simultaneously, if covertly, wants to have those desires met, thereby enjoying vicarious gratification through the child who has not so long ago been part of her. These multiple goals are pursued by the same course of action: give the child what she wants. Together they load interactions with demanding children in a way that is highly charged and multivocal and that leads to adult behavior that perpetuates the socialization of desire into the next generation.

These observations and analyses of culturally patterned responses to desire in Sri Lanka suggest that we need to consider the psychodynamic registers of cultural practice and explicitly held beliefs and values. During everyday interactions that children are having with important others, they are developing not only cognitive models and associated observable emotional orientations and motivations that I discussed under Lessons 1 and 2. They are also developing deeper psychodynamic responses and unconscious motivations. These psychodynamic formations may be culturally patterned to the extent that the experiences that prompted them are culturally patterned. As we see in this example, one source of patterning for those experiences, in addition to the shared cultural models of the participants, is the psychodynamic formations and responses of the adults and older children who participate in them, formations and responses which themselves may be culturally patterned. The patterned psychodynamic formations that children develop through these experiences may combine with more explicit cultural messages (such as desire being the root of all suffering) in ways that reinforce the truth of those messages. In turn, the layering of psychodynamic formation and explicit cultural ideologies may compel adults to behave toward their children in ways that reproduce the experiences in which they themselves were socialized.

Recognizing the ways that explicit, observable cultural understandings, practice, and experience may have deeper psychodynamic moorings adds an important layer to our understanding of how culture works and how it is transmitted. It may help to explain why people are drawn to and motivated by certain cultural practices, interpretations, and beliefs.

This analytic move gives us a way to think about potential unconscious motivational forces at work. It also demonstrates that, if we want to understand why people act and feel in culturally patterned ways, we cannot just ask them. All that is cultural is not conscious or verbalized.

LESSON 4: CULTURE AND THE LIFE COURSE

These observations about cultural models of hierarchy and desires within Sri Lankan families demonstrate a fourth point about culture and its transmission. In each set of observations, we see that the course of human development offers varying opportunities to draw people into cultural lessons. Further, as those cultural lessons are learned, they shape the course of that development.

Differing Opportunities for Cultural Transmission During Development

In my observations about what happens when small children in Sri Lanka scream for things they want, I have argued that children begin to link the *consequences* of their assertions of desires with the *feelings* of desire themselves. I have proposed that they notice both the unsatisfying material consequences (a toy is broken, a game is no fun by yourself) and the social disapproval and rejection (your brother glares at you, your mother pulls away in disgust). But I did not see evidence that these connections were being made by very young children. The child, Rashika, whom I first noticed being the recipient of this double message, was just two—a toddler or what Mead would have called a “knee baby”—and I do not think she was yet able to decode it. It was not until children were around five or six that these experiences seemed to begin to really have an effect—to produce the social or psychological disavowal of desire.

People whom I knew in the village also noted a marked change in children beginning around the age of five. This was the age when mothers in Sri Lanka told me that children stopped asking for things. According to the women I talked to, this was because at that age, children began to “understand” (*teereneva*). “What do they come to understand?” I would ask. They came to understand that it is “hard for their parents to give,” was the answer I often heard. The people I spoke with expected children—beginning around five years old, usually by eight, and certainly by ten—to have developed this capacity for understanding.

One might expect that changes in the ways children were being treated might be prompting this change in children's behavior. However, I actually did not observe any such change in caregiver behavior—nor did the mothers I talked to describe any particular change in what they did. As far as I could see, there was no categorical change in how people in Sri Lanka responded emotionally or materially to children's demands as they grew. As I have described in the previous section, people typically responded to demands from anyone with urgency, seemingly to get the demanding to stop, whether by ignoring or distracting or indulging. As they did so, they averted their eyes, pulled away from the child or the group, seemingly uncomfortable, tense. This adult response was consistent, no matter the age of the demanding child (or adult, for that matter). What I did see change dramatically, however, were *children's* responses to situations where they might want something, as I have described in the previous section. As they grew up, children stopped demanding on their own, without any noticeable change in how they were being treated by adults. This, of course, is in keeping with what the Sri Lankan mothers had told me.

One of the things that these observations demonstrate is the way that cultural lessons can capitalize on particular shifts in a person's development (see Chapin 2014, Chapter 7). As toddlers begin to explore their power in the world, they are receiving messages, not just about the ultimate disappointment of having gotten one's own way, but also about its danger and about their own unacceptability in insisting on it. As they are increasingly able to link their actions with the effects they have on the world, they can see their own role in causing their rejection. As they begin to be able to recognize other people as separate, as having their own thoughts and wants and perspectives, children can see their own words and actions and desires as making other people not like them. Indeed, a shift in children's capacities starting around the age of five—the age at which Sri Lankan mothers noted a change in their children—is something that people in societies around the world have also noticed and taken advantage of in particular cultural ways (see Rogoff 1996; Weisner 1996).

Later, when children in Sri Lanka get to school, they are taught more explicit lessons about, say, the Four Noble Truths in their Buddhist studies class. These are not lessons they would have understood as younger children. Now, not only can they understand them, they can add them to their earlier direct experiences of the various negative consequences of

pressing their own desires. As I have indicated above, the Noble Truth about desire being the root of all suffering takes on a culturally specific meaning for these Sri Lankan Buddhists. This meaning may be significantly different from what it might be in a different cultural context, heard by people with different childhood experiences. For instance, the Euro-American Buddhists I interviewed told me that desire caused suffering because there was always more to want, so one would never be satisfied—an understanding consonant with their own particular cultural experiences. Later in the life course, as people become parents, layered cultural understandings fuel their decisions to act in the world and their responses to others, including their own children. Thus, different pieces of culture are taken up, integrated, and put into action by people differently along their course of development.

Cultural Lessons Shaping Development

Of course, the entire life course is itself culturally and socially shaped. This means that culture not only takes advantage of a largely shared, evolutionarily selected course of human development; it is also shaping that development along the way. This is part of how culture works, how growing up in particular communities shapes people in culturally specific ways. One area from my own work in which this is apparent is in the development of attachment and autonomy. What academic psychology's standard theory of attachment would expect to be significant in terms of interactions, developmental windows, and challenges do indeed seem to be significant in Sri Lanka; however, they play out in divergent, culturally specific ways compared to the U.S. and elsewhere.

A few years ago, I was invited by Naomi Quinn and Jeannette Mageo (2013) to join a group thinking about how our ethnographic research with children in diverse cultural settings might contribute to a more critical understanding of the model of attachment that is dominant in developmental psychology. At this conference funded by the Robert Lemelson Foundation through the Society for Psychological Anthropology, I began to reconsider my observations about the hierarchy model that I saw patterning caregiving in Sri Lanka and establishing valued relationships and ways of being into adulthood.

The premise of attachment theory—that the quality of the earliest relationships a child experiences will set a pattern for their future participation in relationships and experiences of self in relation to

others—is borne out by what I observed in Sri Lanka. The idea that children develop a “working model” (Bowlby 1982: 354) of relationships through these early interactions with important others seems quite right to me. It also makes sense in terms of my data that among the key features of these interactions might be the sensitivity and responsiveness of caregivers to children’s needs. Further, it seems correct that these early attachment-type relationships shape how children develop a sense of themselves as separate from others.

However, the cultural specifics vary, and they do so in ways that make a difference in the kind of models of relationships children develop and in the kinds of people they become. In my work on hierarchy as it is experienced in the home, I described the ways that Sri Lankan caregivers, highly sensitive to children’s needs, anticipated those needs before they were verbalized and responsively met them. However, unlike the preferred middle-class pattern in the U.S. that underlies the model for attachment theory, Sri Lankan caregivers I observed did not encourage children to articulate or negotiate for those needs. In contrast to the ways the achievement of “secure attachment” has been formulated by attachment theorists, self-expression was not a culturally valued or pursued goal of the Sri Lankan childrearing I observed. In the Sri Lankan case, highly sensitive but less verbal caregiving produced attuned and trusting children, rather than the verbally self-expressive children valued in the U.S. As Sri Lankan children grow, they are expected to be more rather than less compliant with caregivers’ wishes, again contrasting with what has been considered optimal “autonomy” in U.S. parenting and in attachment theory. Rather than autonomy being manifest as self-assertion and divergence from parents as in the U.S.-based attachment theory, mature and autonomous Sri Lankan teens are expected to show self-control and the independent good judgment to choose to follow valued social norms.

In looking at attachment-type relationships and the ways caregiving interactions shape young people in this Sinhala village in Sri Lanka, I came to see that some key aspects of attachment theory appear, and appear to be important, particularly caregiver sensitivity and children’s achievement of self-governance. However, even these key aspects of attachment take different cultural shapes and lead to different valued outcomes than in the standard attachment theory narrative, discouraging the verbalization of desires and opinions and encouraging self-control and attunement to social expectations.

Looking at how children develop in a range of cultural contexts, rather than taking the middle-class preferences in the U.S. as the standard, is important for understanding how culture both shapes and takes advantage of human development. Through close, ethnographically rich examinations in particular places—whether Sri Lanka, Germany (LeVine and Norman 2001), or New Guinea (Barlow 2013)—we can develop a more finely tuned understandings of what aspects of caregiver arrangements and interactions matter for developing children and what kinds of outcomes might be achieved and valued in different contexts. Of course, attachment is only one aspect of human development. The kinds of cognitive and psychodynamic development that are involved in the socialization of desire discussed earlier are others. But there are countless other areas in which we can see culture and human development shaping each other.

By undertaking this kind of ethnographic study and comparison, we may develop a better sense of what might truly be universal in human development. More importantly to our efforts to develop a better understanding of culture, we can gain a better sense of how the course of human development is fundamentally shaped by culturally patterned practices and how, in turn, that life course provides different opportunities to participate in cultural learning and practice. By looking at children and childhood, we can better understand how cultural transmission can capitalize on developmental capacities, interests, and timing to convey important cultural lessons and shape peoples' development in particular, culturally resonant ways.

LESSON 5: CULTURAL REPRODUCTION, CHANGE, AND IMPROVISATION

The final point I want to make about culture that emerges from my work with children is that the same processes that account for cultural reproduction in its transmission also account for cultural variability and change. This is aligned with the argument Strauss and Quinn (1997) make that their model of culture as cognitive schemas developed through experience accounts both for cultural durability in individuals and in communities (what they call the centripetal features of culture) and for variations in the cultural schemas that people hold internally and across a group (what they call the centrifugal features of culture).

In watching how children are treated in everyday, ordinary ways as well as in more dramatic rituals, and how children make sense of and are shaped by those experiences, we get to see culture at work. We see how cultural understandings shape what adults do, and we see how those understandings are linked to their own emotional orientations and powerful motivations. We see that much of adult action is strongly patterned and shared with others in their social group, reflecting the endurance and pervasiveness of culture. We can also see how those adult actions are the result not only of cultural routines but of improvisation, done on the fly as people juggle multiple, often competing cultural models and individual motivations to navigate the circumstances in which they find themselves with the resources at hand.

Much of this ad hoc improvisation produces culturally similar behaviors and circumstances across individuals and households, since the adults share many of the core models that pattern even their improvisation. These circumstances form the contexts in which children themselves are assembling their own cultural models. As these contexts are similar, as they recur, and as they are infused with similar and recurrent challenges, children are led to develop cultural models and infuse them with emotional orientations and motivations that are similar to those of others in their social group. However, some of the improvisation also produces variation in the contexts of enculturation and development, creating possibilities for cultural disjunctions and shifts.

One source of variation in cultural transmission is variety the contexts in which children are socialized. In my work on how children's desires are socialized in Sri Lanka, one factor that produces variation in children's socialization experiences around desire is parents' material wealth and their consequent ability to give. What do children learn about their own desires in homes where it is not, in fact, "hard for their parents to give"? There are many other sources of such variation. One mother, for example, drew on the widely circulating idea that "being used to" things inclined one to seek them out, leading her to expose her son to "American" things so that he would be ambitious and perhaps find a career abroad. Several of the mothers in my study have talked about wanting to be more like friends to their children, to not have their children be scared of them, altering the kinds of ranked relationship experiences children had. Other parents talked about deferring to their young adult children about the paths they would follow because those children

knew more about the rapidly changing world than they did, again making shifts in the kinds of hierarchical relationships children experienced. In these ways, parents' own changing values, broadening experiences, and alterations in material resources may lead them to new ways of interacting with their children.

Other changes in the cultural lessons that children are taught may be more intentional, even broadly institutional and systematically implemented. However, these interventions, too, may lead to unintended effects on children's socialization, well beyond the change that was envisioned. Educational policy innovations made at the state level illustrate this potential for broader effect. For instance, many parents in Sri Lanka told me that they expected their children to learn proper fear of authority figures when they started school. They expected the teachers to use corporal punishment and shame to assert their authority, adding important pieces to the model of hierarchy that children were developing at home. However, new educational policies forbid corporal punishment and discourage shaming practices. Additionally, as the state reforms move schools away from rote memorization and teacher-centered techniques to more student-centered, activity-based learning, there may be deeper changes to the kinds of persons being cultivated. Children who routinely participate in elementary classrooms in which "students and teachers interact easily and feel at ease to share their views and opinion," where all students are treated equally "irrespective of sex, social-economic background, physical and learning ability," and where students participate "in classroom-based decision making process" as stipulated in the educational reform policies (SLMOE 2008, Criteria 3.2) will develop in a context very different from that of their older siblings. On the other hand, some of this change that the policies aim for may not happen, as older, durable patterns of interaction find ways to reassert themselves, something suggested by my observations and interviews in Sri Lankan schools (2014: 157–166).

In most of my work up until now, I have attended to robust cultural models and long-standing childcare practices. I have been interested in how seemingly ad hoc but robustly patterned practices work to transmit central cultural models to children, along with valued emotional, motivational, and psychodynamic orientations, leading people to want to participate in social interactions and cultural practices as they do. I have explored how this process shapes and is shaped by the course of human development in culturally concordant ways, with those pathways

differing across culture groups. In new projects on childrearing in the U.S. and Sri Lanka that I have recently begun, I am continuing to examine processes of improvisational caregiving and active cultural acquisition that link cognition, emotion, and psychodynamics over the life course. However, this time I am looking at messier fields, attending to the variation as much as the patterning. I am looking to see how parents interact with their children in ways that may draw upon multiple, often contradictory, models that are not as evenly shared with others in their social group, whether because of immigration, exposure to new ideas or people, changing economic circumstances, or state-led initiatives. With an eclectic set of cultural resources that parents are drawing on in interacting with their children, I am curious to see what kinds of cultural models, motivations, emotional and psychodynamic orientations, and senses of self those children are developing as a result. By attending to the ways that children are developing and assembling their own cultural models, emotions, and motivations in interaction with others, we can see how cultural transmission and variation are both outcomes of the same process.

LESSONS FOR CULTURE THEORY

In order to support my claim that ethnographic research with children has important things to tell us about culture, let me revisit the five lessons that I am proposing based on my work with children in Sri Lanka. The first lesson is that each of us, children included, develop and adjust our own cultural models throughout our lifetimes through everyday practices and interactions with important others. While important lessons are conveyed to children in marked rituals and formal schooling, much of what is most central to a cultural world view is embedded in and communicated through the patterns of our regular, mundane, and seemingly unimportant practices. For children, as for many of us, these everyday practices are full of interactions with important others.

In these interactions, culture is not just transmitted *to* children, it is taken up *by* them. Children are active in their own development of culture and in their use of it. Adults—in their everyday actions, in the institutions that they set up and maintain, and in the rituals and rites of passage that they oversee to mark important moments—set up contexts that prompt children to develop the understandings of the world and the

strategies for responding to it that they do. However, that work itself is done by and inside of children themselves, as they assemble their own internal versions of the more generally shared and instantiated cultural models of the groups in which they participate.

These groups range in size and type of interaction. For little children in Sri Lanka, the most significant group they participate in and come to share cultural models with is in their home, with their caregivers and other children. But these intimate interactions are framed by larger communities and institutions—village, schools, caste and class, employment opportunities, national policy, religion—as well as by exchange networks of globally circulating products and ideas. As children themselves grow, they will participate in these larger groups more directly.

The processes of internally assembling cultural models and modifying them to conform to experience does not stop in childhood, but continues over a lifetime. Adults themselves are continually reinforcing, shifting, and updating their own cultural models through new experiences. In turn, these shifting models held by adults may alter the contexts in which children are developing their own models, allowing for both the reproduction and variation (a point elaborated in Lesson 5).

The second lesson builds on the first, showing how cultural models may become imbued with emotion. Because these cultural models are derived through experience that is often emotionally salient, they can bind particular emotional orientations and senses of self into the cognitive schemas that people are assembling. In my observations of how hierarchy is enacted and learned in Sinhala homes in Sri Lanka, we see how the model that children assemble through interactions with important others not only includes *ideas*—about who does what and how—but is intrinsically bound up with *feelings*—of being cared for and known, nourished and nurtured. These emotional orientations, expectations, and senses of self are culturally shaped through and during the same process in which the more cognitive parts of culture are acquired.

The third lesson adds to the first and second, identifying ways that deeper, less consciously available beliefs, feelings, and motivations may be connected to and shaped by culture through early experience. In addition to consciously available understandings, feelings, and goals, culture and its transmission can include significant unconscious, psychodynamic dimensions. My analysis of how the indulgence of children's

demands can teach them to stop demanding relies on a recognition of the unconscious moves that children may develop in response to dilemmas presented to them and how those psychodynamic responses might intersect with other cultural lessons. Together, these conscious lessons and unconscious responses provide fuel for them, as adults, to present those same dilemmas to their own children. Here, we see that our resolutions to culturally patterned experiences might be themselves psychodynamically patterned, not just shaping our responses to future iterations of similar experiences, but also establishing deeper cultural patterns in our psyches.

The fourth lesson is related to this idea of how we are fundamentally shaped in cultural ways, highlighting the ways that culture takes advantage of and also shapes human development. Through our lifetimes, cultural lessons are learned in different ways and may mean different things to their learners. In turn, those cultural lessons have a chance to shape the course of our development, deeply forming us as cultural beings. The examples I offered of how cultural practices and beliefs around both the expression of desire and early attachment relationships in a Sri Lankan village are just two culturally specific examples of how culture and human development might intersect. It is in our early experiences with vitally important others that cultural meanings and models acquire some of their deepest motivating force, as culture takes advantage of a child's ongoing development and in doing so shapes that development. Although culture continues to enter into and shape our development over our lifetimes, it is in childhood that we can perhaps see and think about this dynamic process most clearly.

The fifth and final lesson is that this model of cultural acquisition laid out in the previous four lessons explains both how cultural patterns get reproduced and also how they can change. The contexts in which developing children derive cultural models, emotional and motivational orientations, and psychodynamic formations are largely patterned. There is patterning from the others in a situation, from common social arrangements, from consistent material resources, and from institutional structures. There is patterning from the existing cognitive models, emotional orientations, psychodynamic formations, and developmental resolutions that each individual brings to any interaction. But these features are all also moving, various, and sometimes in conflict. The same process of development that transmits culture also leads to

variation and divergence between people, between generations, over a lifetime, and within a single individual. Even in looking just at these limited examples of childrearing in Sri Lanka around issues of hierarchy, desire, and attachment, we see how complex and varied the cultural models are that adults have at their disposal and that children encounter and make sense of. We see that there are multiple pieces of culture that people hold, enact, and can draw upon. We see that not all of children's experiences or the models that people hold are congruent. Further, some of these are being intentionally changed by adults or by circumstances. Cultural models are themselves resources for change, as people draw on, combine, and prioritize them in different ways. By seeing improvised everyday interactions as the site of cultural transmission in which children assemble their own understanding through an array of experiences, we can understand more about both cultural patterning and variation.

In early experiences with vitally important others, cultural meanings and models are conveyed to children and acquire some of their deepest motivating force, as culture takes advantage of a child's ongoing development and, in doing so, shapes that development. Further, it is children themselves, as active meaning makers and developing selves, who achieve these understandings and ways of being in concert with their community, if never identically so. By looking closely at these interactions involving children and the meanings people make of them, we can build a richer theory of culture.

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How Children Piece Together Culture through Relationships

Karen Gainer Sirota

Before departing on her 1925 Samoan research expedition, Margaret Mead encountered Gestalt psychologist Kurt Koffka's (1924) pioneering book, *The Growth of the Mind* (cf. Mead 1959: 177), which advocated a holistic approach for understanding human development and learning. Mead recommended Koffka's book to Edward Sapir, and he in turn sang its praises to Ruth Benedict.¹ "I've been reading Koffka's 'Growth of the Mind' (Margaret's copy)," Sapir proclaimed in a letter to Benedict (2002: 121, n. 2). "It's the real book for a philosophy of culture," he averred, "and I see the most fascinating...possibilities of application of its principles, express and implied" (ibid.).

Koffka and other Gestalt scholars examine how people construct meaning through their encounters with the world. These theorists' phenomenological approach explores how organized patterns of perceiving, thinking, feeling, and behaving emerge from the flow of experience. Sapir, Benedict, and Mead found common cause with Gestalt scholars' search for a holistic understanding of how experiencing subjects interact

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with the surrounding environment.² They were also inspired by the Gestalt impetus to identify patterns in human lives.

In this chapter, I explore why Gestalt theory is pertinent to contemporary concerns in psychological anthropology. I first provide an overview of Gestalt theory and several of its key intersections with psychological anthropology. I then suggest how a Gestalt standpoint can enhance our understanding of how children piece together culture and make meaning amidst the relational contexts of their day-to-day lives. I outline how a Gestalt framework—and, specifically, what I term “configurational learning”—is helpful for understanding children’s acquisition of culturally valued ways of thinking, sensing, and doing. Additionally, I provide a comparative case study analysis that illustrates the utility of this Gestalt framework in addressing how cultural meanings, values, and dispositions are transmitted and shaped intergenerationally in the context of children’s cultural learning. I conclude with some final thoughts about the utility of Gestalt theory to contemporary psychological anthropology and allied fields.

GESTALT THEORY: AN OVERVIEW

Gestalt theorists follow after Johann Wolfgang von Goethe (1995 [1817]: 63) in using the term *Gestalt* to denote a dynamic configuration that is subject to fluctuation and potential change. The German word “*Gestalt*” approximates the English terms “form,” “figure,” and “shape.” However, it connotes a phenomenon that is both structured *and* dynamic; therefore, it refers to patterned arrangements as they develop over time. Gestalt theory was inspired by philosopher Christian von Ehrenfels’ 1890 classic essay, “Über “Gestaltqualitäten” [On “Gestalt Qualities”], which stresses the importance of relational processes in perception, cognition, and action. For example, Ehrenfels (i.e., 1937, 1960 [1890]) observed that a melody’s recognizable “essence” involves more than the mere sum of its individual tones. Rather, it inheres in the relationships between notes that together, as a whole, constitute the melody’s tonal pattern. Ehrenfels proposed that these Gestalt qualities facilitate our ability to recognize the same melodic contour or tune—even when it is composed of different individual notes, “as happens when the same melody is transposed into different keys” (1937: 521).

Gestalt theory contends that experience is configurational in that it emerges through a relational ordering of phenomena, relative to one

another, so that the world—as we apprehend it—coheres. As infants, we encounter “a world dense with phenomena” (Berger and Del Negro 2002: 71); that which William James (1890: 488) characterized as “one great blooming, buzzing confusion.”³ Sights, smells, sounds, tastes, feelings, thoughts, and other such things stimulate our senses and impress themselves upon us. Moment by moment, over time, we organize this panoply of information into “a dynamic structure of foreground and background” (Berger and Del Negro 2002: 71). Phenomenal patterns gradually emerge, and cohere, “mutually informing one another the same way that figure and ground do in painting” (*ibid.*).

Ehrenfels’ (1890) exploration of Gestalt qualities was prompted by his affiliation with the school of Franz Brentano, which aimed to shed light on the ontology of psychological phenomena. Ehrenfels and the Gestalt scholars who followed in his wake devised a phenomenological program to discover how comprehensible patterns of feeling and meaning emerge from the “motley of data” that raw experience comprises (Koffka 1935: 69).⁴ Their empirical investigations—which range from Wolfgang Köhler’s (1938 [1920], 1947 [1929]) experimental studies on perception and problem-solving to Koffka’s (1924, 1935) child-centered observational research—are directed towards the “qualitative analysis of experience” (Köhler 1938: x). Certain Gestalt principles have especially apt applications to psychological anthropology. These are further explored in the section below, which considers the intertwined relations between Gestalt theory and psychological anthropology that provide a foundation for my ideas about configurational learning and its role in depicting how cultural learning transpires.

PSYCHOLOGICAL ANTHROPOLOGY AND THE GESTALT FRAMEWORK

Gestalt theorists’ inquiries into the organization of experience sparked the interest of psychological anthropology’s founding figures, as both groups of scholars were conducting meaning-centered studies of patterns in human lives. Of particular note were Gestaltists such as Koffka (1924, 1935) who propounded a holistic view of human development and envisaged the human subject as “involved in, rather than separated from the world” (Ash 1995: 2). Gestalt scholars’ efforts to bridge the philosophical divide between realism—which emphasizes direct awareness of material properties in the outer world—and idealism—which emphasizes

mentally constructed representations of such—yielded an integrated perspective that, alternatively, regards the sentient individual and her stimulatory milieu as an interrelated whole, irreducible to its individual components. Gestalt theorists thus contend that perception and action are shaped interactionally in conjunction with one another and in relation to the material, cultural, and social environs.⁵ This holistic vantage point is compatible with anthropological inquiry, in that it provides an avenue for considering how psychophysical processes interdigitate with relevant aspects of the sociocultural milieu.

Koffka sought to discover how “configurations of experience”—as Sapir (1934: 410) termed them—contribute to culturally acquired ways of behaving, believing, and making meaning of the world. From a developmental standpoint, he speculated that configurational *Gestalten* begin to take shape as infants actively perceive—and respond to—the world’s “shifting stimuli” (Sullivan 2009: 232). Koffka’s (1924: 9) “experiential observation” methodology held particular appeal for Sapir, Benedict, and Mead, in that Koffka examined children’s naturalistic interactions with parents and attended carefully to experiential components of these lived processes in relationship with the contextual field in which they transpired. Koffka also stressed the importance of a comparative cross-cultural perspective for attaining a well-rounded picture of human development (Koffka 1924: 2). He championed a “comparative psychology” that was geared towards discovering how children’s developmental processes of perception, cognition, and action are shaped holistically in relationship to their surroundings (1924: 2). “Although two men are born into the same real world,” he observed, “its phenomenal aspects are not necessarily the same for each” (Koffka 1924: 127).⁶

Koffka (1935: 27–51) introduced the term “behavioral environment” to demarcate the interactive domain in which perceiving, feeling, and thinking subjects dynamically interface with the phenomenal world.⁷ This behavioral environment encompasses the world of commonsense experience, that which we perceive from our subjective vantage point. Irving Hallowell’s (1955) anthropological conception of the “behavioral environment” draws inspiration from Koffka’s Gestalt framework, as well as from Gestalt theorist Kurt Lewin’s (1935, 1951) related conception of the “life space” (cf. Hallowell 1955: 388, n. 33). For Hallowell (1955: 75)—as for Gestalt theorists Koffka and Lewin—the behavioral environment shapes “basic orientations that prepare the self for action in a culturally constituted world.” On this view, awareness, understanding, and

action are patterned in tandem with culturally constituted priorities and conventions. “Perception,” says Hallowell, citing the Gestalt psychologists Ittelson and Kilpatrick, “is ‘never an absolute revelation of what is’” (Ittelson and Kilpatrick 1951, cited in Hallowell 1955: 84). Rather, the tenor and contours of human awareness are formulated amid a broader interactional matrix in which culturally mediated “assumptions about the nature of the universe become...a priori constituents in the perceptual process itself” (Hallowell 1955: 84).

When Mead, Sapir, and Benedict encountered Gestalt theory, in 1925, the intellectual landscape was populated by modernist ideas about order, form, and system that had developed in conjunction with efforts to understand societal transformations in the wake of industrialization, urbanization, and rapid technological change (Goldenweiser 1927). For the era’s culture and personality scholars—as for Koffka and Lewin—efforts to identify patterning in human lives abounded. Benedict’s renowned work (1934: 46), *Patterns of Culture*, sought to identify “more or less consistent pattern[s] of thought and action” among members of the same cultural group. Benedict’s (1934: 50) analytic approach—which disparages “atomistic studies” in favor of examining “the whole configuration”—draws inspiration from Gestalt theory. However, her notion of culture as “personality writ large” (Benedict 1932, 1934) diverges from the thinking of Gestalt scholars due to her overambitious conflation between social and individual levels of analysis.⁸ Mead’s early culture and personality research (i.e., 1928, 1930), likewise, departs from the precepts of Gestalt theory because of the deterministic associations she draws between child-rearing patterns and manifestations of adult character.⁹

Alternatively, Sapir’s (1927: 343) notion that “social pattern, function, and associated mental attitude are independently variable” more closely accords with a Gestalt view. Gestalt theorists hypothesize that the mind possesses Gestalt properties as requisites for apprehending Gestalt features of the phenomenal world. Koffka and his colleagues surmised the existence of a mechanism comparable to neural interconnectivity, which facilitates our ability to perceive and make sense of relational qualities in the world—such as those that are instrumental in constituting multi-dimensional shapes, textures, melodies, and so forth (Koffka 1924, 1935; Köhler 1938, 1947 [1929]; Wertheimer 1925). However, Gestalt scholars expressly avoided speculating about the presence of isomorphism at broader levels of analysis. Koffka, for example, acknowledged

the role of individual agency and difference in producing intracultural variation among members of the same cultural reference group. He emphasized that “behavioural groups are, as a rule, not homogeneous” (Koffka 1935: 670). Importantly, as well, Gestalt thinkers subscribed to a “theory of dynamics” that afforded possibilities for transformation and change (cf. Köhler 1947 [1929]). Köhler was an early pioneer in introducing the distinction between closed and open (dynamic) systems into the biological sciences (i.e., 1938: 240–250).¹⁰ Lewin, in turn, integrated Köhler’s ideas about open systems into his scientific explorations about cultural dynamics and social change. Thus, according to Lewin: “In every process *the forces in the inner and outer environment are changed by the process itself*” (1935: 48; italics in original).

Lewin (1935) utilized the concept of “field,” which he adapted from the physical sciences, to delineate the dynamic, interdependent relationship between person and environment. Margaret Mead’s personal correspondence suggests that, by 1936, she had taken note of Lewin’s newly developing “field theory” (cf. Sullivan 2009: 235). Some years later, Mead and Gregory Bateson attended the Macy Conferences on Cybernetics (1942–1953) alongside Lewin and Köhler (cf. American Society for Cybernetics 2016). Mead and Bateson thus became increasingly familiar with the Gestalt framework and its systems-based applications in the social sciences.¹¹ Lewin (1935, 1951), for example, employed photographic and film recording techniques to document research participants’ interactional dynamics in naturalistic situations. Moreover, he employed these data to teach others about field theory’s salience for understanding human development. Psychologist Gordon Allport (1947: 8) recalled,

Easily the most exciting event of the International Congress of Psychology in 1929 at New Haven was Lewin’s simple and instructive film that showed an 18-month-old child learning to sit down on a stone. ... This ingenious film was decisive in forcing a revision of our own theories of the nature of intelligent behavior and of learning.

Lewin’s impetus was to shed light on the dynamic processes of human interaction in conjunction with the ecological contexts in which they transpired.

The methods and motivations of Mead’s collaborative research with Bateson have much in common with Lewin’s approach. Notably, in

contrast with culture and personality pioneers such as Benedict and Sapir, Mead directly observed children's interactions with caregivers. Bateson and Mead (i.e., 1942) utilized photo- and film documentary techniques to systematically record children's encounters, *in situ*, to ascertain how cultural patterns are experienced and shaped by children as they grow. Accordingly, they were attentive to the moment-by-moment processes that shape children's embodied relationships with the world around them. Mead's consequent ideas about the "mother and child as an intercommunicating system" employed Lewin's field theoretical view by heeding the culturally patterned interactive matrix in which children's cultural learning transpires (cf. Mead and Macgregor 1951: 210).¹²

Clyde Kluckhohn, who was an occasional Macy Conferences participant (American Society for Cybernetics 2016), also brought a field theoretical perspective to bear in investigating the intergenerational transmission of cultural patterns. Kluckhohn and his colleagues systematically observed children's naturalistic interactions with adults during their study of Navaho family life (i.e., Kluckhohn 1939, 1949; Leighton and Kluckhohn 1947). The researchers attended to the words, actions, and feeling tones associated with cross-generational encounters to determine how facilitating and frustrating interactions potentially contributed to "patterns in the development of Navaho children and in the transmission of culture in both its structural and affective aspects" (Kluckhohn 1939: 103).

These pioneering efforts by culture and personality scholars—which dovetail with Gestalt theorists' dynamic systems-based considerations of "processes of learning, of recall, of striving, of emotional attitude, of thinking, acting, and so forth" (Köhler 1947 [1929]: 179)—provide the background for the configurational learning paradigm that is detailed in the section below.

CONFIGURATIONAL LEARNING

As was outlined above, Gestalt theorists shared culture and personality researchers' concern with exploring how perception, cognition, and behavior are patterned in relationship with socio-culturally shaped considerations and concerns. Their inquiries into the organization of experience yielded a holistic framework for understanding the processes that facilitate individuals' sense-making capacities and their abilities to "act intelligibly in the world [they] apprehend" (Hallowell 1955: 89). During the decades that followed upon psychological anthropologists'

initial encounters with Gestalt theory, Gestalt scholarship also provided insights into the dynamic processes that contribute to intracultural variation and social change and that, accordingly, generate possibilities for conveying, constructing, and reshaping culturally informed inclinations and practices.

In the portion of the chapter that follows, I build upon these foundational ideas inspired by Gestalt theory to suggest how what I have termed configurational learning facilitates children's sense-making capacities as they piece together culture through relationships. This theoretical perspective incorporates Koffka's impetus towards ascertaining children's experiences via research that regards children "from within" as well as "from without" (1924: 6). Likewise, it follows upon Lewin's (1935) impetus towards understanding the situational field, as construed by the participants themselves. Thus it is important to closely document interactional encounters to ascertain how they shape children's capacities to apprehend the cultural worlds in which they live. Moreover, it is crucial to discern how children are explicitly and tacitly guided in becoming mindful of perceptually and culturally salient aspects of the social, emotional, and material environs.

I propose that configurational learning incorporates two interrelated Gestalt precepts that operate in tandem with one another and that yield emergent opportunities for the transmission and shaping of culturally informed dispositions, values, and interpretive capabilities. Configurational learning depends, first, on the cultural shaping of attentional processes as children are mentored into culturally recognizable ways of perceiving, feeling, and behaving. Concurrently, intersubjective attunement facilitates configurational learning. Caregiver and child thus orchestrate a consensually shared frame of reference that sets a feeling tone and moral valence for apperception, understanding, and action.

Configurational learning thereby involves a set of interrelated practices that facilitate children's apprenticeship into culturally resonant techniques for orienting their attentional processes. Children's *organization of attention* is primed through implicit and explicit means, as they are mentored into culturally consonant ways of noticing and arranging experiential phenomena in relation to one another. Accordingly, they learn to garner information culled through various sensory modalities and communicative channels into a comprehensible Gestalt—or "whole." Interrelations among words, actions, emotions, and bodily sensations

thus cohere into seemingly “natural” and taken-for-granted ways of perceiving, comprehending, and acting in the world. This necessitates discerning “figure” from “ground” in culturally intelligible ways, such that relevant information is coherently organized and harnessed to craft viable pathways of action and understanding (Köhler 1947 [1929]).¹³

Configurational learning is facilitated via an ongoing process of intersubjective attunement as caregivers and children work to establish and maintain a *mutually shared frame of reference* (Ruesch and Bateson 1949: 109; cf. Bateson 1955).¹⁴ This consensually validated sense-making frame generates interpretive resources that shape participants’ available *oeuvre* of culturally comprehensible actions vis-à-vis the situational field. Caregivers, in concert with children, thereby orchestrate a mutually intelligible “complex of experiences” (Sapir 1937: 870), which yields culturally recognizable motives, means, and ends. In conjunction with this process, mentors express affective stances that convey moral appraisals about actions, events, persons, and things (cf. Trevarthen 2011: 123). Hence, from early in life, children learn to carefully heed others’ emotions, which provide beneficial information about what is expected, valued, proper or improper, anxiety inducing or soothing. For example, as Sapir observes: “It may, and undoubtedly does, make a profound difference whether a religious ritual comes with the sternness of the father’s authority or with the somewhat playful indulgence of the mother’s brother” (1934: 414). Such an affectively mediated “interpersonal field” thus aids children’s acquisition of felt understandings about culturally meaningful ways of apprehending, being, and behaving; further, it shapes the cultural understandings they carry into subsequent interactions (Sapir 1934: 411–412; cf. Sullivan 1937, 1948).¹⁵

This set of social practices may be analogously regarded, from an allied Husserlian (1962) phenomenological perspective, as involving socialization into the “natural attitude” (cf. Duranti 2009). However, Gestalt theory is uniquely poised to highlight how “understandable relations” are forged between “experienced facts and experienced inner responses” as various facets of experience are relationally associated in conjunction with one another to form a culturally intelligible “whole” (Köhler 1947 [1929]: 332). These configurational learning processes are further illustrated in the following sections that provide a cross-cultural comparative analysis which examines the role of configurational learning in children’s acquisition of cultural lessons, as fostered in conjunction with sleep practices.

CONFIGURATIONAL LEARNING AND CHILDREN'S SLEEP PRACTICES: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS

Children's sleep practices provide opportunities for enculturation into culturally resonant bodily techniques, sensorial aesthetics, and interpersonal inclinations via configurational learning that incorporates the Gestalt principles outlined above. In the following sections, I provide a comparative analysis of configurational learning concomitant with children's sleep practices in two diverse cultural settings: the Beng people of the Côte d'Ivoire and middle-class families in Los Angeles, California.

Biological anthropologist Meredith Small (1998: 11) asserts that, "how we sleep, with whom we sleep, and where we sleep is molded by culture and custom." Small notes that "children's sleeping arrangements are cultural practices that reflect parents' ethnotheories about childrearing and childrearing values" (1998: 16). "Sleep," she avers, "is a model for life" (*ibid.*). Shweder and his colleagues stress that culturally patterned sleep practices instantiate "moral grammars" that embody "cultural preferences, values, and moral goods" (Shweder et al. 1995: 27). "The practice of determining who sleeps by whom in a family household," Shweder et al. (1995: 21) observe, "is a symbolic action, or non-verbal vehicle of action, that both expresses and realizes some of the deepest moral ideals of a cultural community."

For example, Morelli et al. (1992) compared the sleep habits of Guatemalan Mayan families with those of families in the United States. They found notable differences between the two groups. Mayan parents encouraged children's co-sleeping to foster their attachment to others, whereas American parents favored solitary sleep to promote children's independence. U.S. parents tended to ritualize children's bedtime practices, which included nighttime stories, baths, lullabies, and toys. In carrying out these cultural practices, parents purposively assisted children in learning to negotiate the embodied state changes required to fall asleep. In comparison, Mayan parents let children doze off to sleep unassisted and in accordance with children's own natural bodily rhythms and inclinations.

Comparative data such as these underscore the point that sleep practices are culturally variable and that bodily techniques of sleep are culturally conditioned and acquired. As Mauss (1935: 88) aptly emphasizes, social and cultural factors influence the transmission of "techniques of

the body” like sleeping.¹⁶ Mauss suggests that these *techniques du corps* instantiate and reflect deeply held cultural values and dispositions. Moreover, as I argue here, configurational learning plays a crucial role in how children are mentored into the culturally shaped practices associated with sleep.

Configurational Learning and Children’s Sleep Practices Among the Beng

Alma Gottlieb’s (2004) ethnographic research among the Beng people of the Côte d’Ivoire offers a detailed portrayal of the ways in which Beng infants and children are mentored into culturally preferred sleep practices. Gottlieb’s (2004: 166) contention that “sleep is a cultural construction as much as it is a biological experience” aligns with her argument that developmental practices and milestones during infancy and early childhood are shaped by an admixture of biology and culture. Gottlieb’s conclusions are based upon systematic, multi-method research. Gottlieb observed Beng babies’ daily rounds from daybreak until nighttime. Gottlieb’s continuous sampling research methodology allowed her to track babies’ “meaningful activities and emotional states” minute by minute, over extended stretches of time (2004: 19). Gottlieb also conducted formal and informal research interviews with parents, caregivers, and other pertinent community members. At the time Gottlieb carried out her research, a vast proportion of the Beng resided in small, rural enclaves. Moreover, they lived lives of relative material poverty. Although the lives of the Beng are materially sparse, Gottlieb nonetheless reports that they are filled with abundant spiritual and social riches.

The Beng carry on a vibrant spiritual tradition in which newborn babies are said to embody the spirits of reincarnated ancestors. Consequently, parents make concerted efforts to ensure that their infant’s earthly life is comfortable and inviting so the youngster is not inclined to return to his or her prior existence in the afterlife (known as “*wrugbe*”) (Gottlieb 2004: 87). The Beng cultural schema of child-rearing prioritizes the “rich inner life” of Beng babies—to which it is advised that caregivers stay attuned (2004: 57). “Because babies are beings from another level of existence,” Gottlieb (2004: 167) observes, “it seems appropriate that they should propose their own agendas and determine their own activities—including their own sleeping and waking

schedules.”¹⁷ Ongoing intersubjective attunement between caregiver and child is thereby a priority. This necessitates Beng caregivers’ careful attention to infants’ bodily signals and non-verbal cues. This “bodily based model of communication” (Gottlieb 2004: 55) requires assiduous efforts by caregivers to accurately discern youngsters’ needs and preferences and to, thus, facilitate Beng babies’ optimal development in their earthly lives. In a related vein, Gottlieb further notes:

During my fieldwork in Beng villages, adults told me that babies are driven to communicate, but that adults are too unenlightened to understand those attempts. Therefore, Beng parents are urged to consult diviners, who speak the language of babies through spirit intermediaries living in the “afterlife” from which infants are said to have just (partly) emerged. The babies enunciate their wishes, which diviners interpret to parents; in turn, the parents are obliged to fulfill these desires. (Gottlieb 2004: 53–54)

Child-rearing among the Beng entails widespread community involvement. It includes active participation by ritual specialists, such as diviners, and others. In conjunction with efforts to ensure Beng youngsters’ successful development, they are provided with an abundant social network. Their daily lives are filled with vibrant social encounters and a premium is placed on integrating them into the larger community group. “Beng child-rearing practices,” Gottlieb emphasizes, “actively promote multiple social interactions” (2004: 156). Mothers are urged to share their babies with others (relatives, villagers, long-distance visitors) soon after the baby’s birth as a sign of community involvement and good will (2004: 152–153). Moreover, babies and toddlers are carefully tended by multiple trusted caregivers, which include older siblings, neighbors, and extended family members. The economic necessities of Beng life contribute to the need for shared childcare while mothers work tending the fields:

In order to keep her household running and her share of the family’s food supply coming in, virtually every mother must arrange for either a single regular babysitter or a network of potential baby carriers who will provide dependable childcare. (Gottlieb 2004: 163)

The baby carrier’s role is to transport and hold the child, whether awake or asleep, in close physical proximity (2004: 172). Gottlieb reports that Beng youngsters spend much of their time in a vertical position

appended to caretakers' backs, "often napping" (2004: 137). Nearly two-thirds of naptimes observed by Gottlieb occurred while youngsters were being carried, with their bodies "attached to another person" (ibid.). This culturally shaped configurational framework socializes babies into the practice of sleeping in a variety of bodily positions (vertical and horizontal). Moreover, babies learn to associate sleep with the soothing rhythms of caretakers' bodily motions. Gottlieb notes that Beng youngsters "come to expect verticality and movement as modal napping circumstances" (2004: 173). Two-year-old Chantal, for example, readily informed Gottlieb that, "Little Mama [maternal aunt] will carry me on her back later while I take a nap in the afternoon" (ibid.). "Young as she was," Gottlieb observes, "Chantal clearly understood ... that for Beng babies and toddlers, napping is, often as not, an activity demanding a close physical connection with an older, moving person" (ibid.).

Gottlieb (2004: 170) also notes that virtually ninety percent of Beng youngsters' naps take place outdoors in the midst of village life. Children thereby learn to sleep soundly in the "relatively noisy company of others" as opposed to requiring a quiet, secluded space for sleep (2004: 172). In a similar vein, Beng youngsters, during their early years, co-sleep with their mothers at night (2004: 183). Girls typically sleep next to their mothers until they reach ten to thirteen years of age (slightly less so for boys, who sleep with their mothers only until sometime between ages nine and twelve) (2004: 323). These culturally informed sleep practices communicate to children that sleep is an essential part of the community's social life, rather than a solitary endeavor.

In addition, Gottlieb points out that Beng babies are not expected to sleep through the night. Nor do Beng parents concern themselves with establishing a predictable regimen for babies' sleep (2004: 167). Moreover—in contrast with U.S. parents—parents of Beng babies do not typically worry about whether their offspring are getting an adequate amount of sleep. For example, as one Beng mother emphasized in discussing her baby's sleep hygiene: "I'm not worried about the fact that he doesn't sleep much at all, because he's healthy. Indeed, he can chat nicely!" (Gottlieb 2004: 182). According to Gottlieb (2004: 177–178), "the importance of sleep as an abstract biological necessity is not really at issue" among the Beng; rather, the priority lies in how sleep activities interface with "social life in the Beng world." Gottlieb emphasizes that Beng sleep practices

teach early on the lesson that the most important thing about being alive is retaining and promoting firm social ties with a wide variety of people—especially one’s closest relatives, but many others as well, with flexibility to transfer affection and trust readily to others who reach out to support oneself—literally, through carrying. (Gottlieb 2004: 183–184)

For Beng youngsters, sleep is systematically paired with the physical co-presence of others. Sleep activities are thus shared with trusted, familiar members of family and community. These culturally shaped sleep practices are reflective of Beng ideology about the importance of close social ties with a wide variety of people. Moreover, sleep is regulated according to the rhythms of other necessary activities and in the midst of community social life.

In building upon Gottlieb’s observations, I contend that these culturally preferred Beng sleep patterns are mentored through configurational learning. Babies learn to associate sleep with the cadences of caretakers’ bodily motions, in tandem with the hustle and bustle of broader community routines. As Beng youngsters acquire proficiencies in how, when, and where to sleep, they are engaged in configurational learning. This process systematically associates embodied aspects of sleep with social mores and inclinations. Indeed, Gottlieb emphasizes that

What is important is that sleep activity be subject to a set of relativistic rules of engagement appropriate to social life in the Beng world. It would be considered far worse for a Beng baby to nap at the sociologically wrong time (such as when a relative is visiting from afar) than for that baby to go for a long period, perhaps even an entire day, with no nap whatsoever. ... What is critical is that babies nap regularly in the company of, and often physically attached to, others. Equally critical is that they *not* nap when certain people are present—people with whom they should be developing social relationships. In short, in the Beng world, napping is an eminently social activity. (Gottlieb 2004: 178, italics in original)

The intersubjectively shared frame of reference that facilitates this process of configurational learning reflects the socially patterned fabric of Beng life. For example, it regularly incorporates significant community members beyond the immediate caregiver-child dyad, such as diviners who play an active role in interpreting babies’ needs and in guiding suitable parental responses. For Beng youngsters, intersubjective attunement is also deeply embodied—as, for example, babies readily recognize, and

are soothed by, the rhythms of the carrier's walking. Beng youngsters' socialization into culturally resonant ways of organizing their attention is likewise reliant on non-verbal forms of communication and rhythmic coordination with caretaking others. Importantly, as well, these cultural aesthetics of sleep are implicitly acquired rather than being taught explicitly by cultural experts.

This process of configurational learning involves regularized conjunctions between words, actions, emotions, and bodily inclinations. Beng youngsters thereby learn to draw comprehensible associations between their embodied sensations, their socio-cultural and environmental circumstances, and the subjective meanings they piece together.

Configurational Learning and Children's Sleep Practices Among U.S. Middle-Class Families

The data examples that follow—collected in conjunction with the UCLA/Sloan Center on Everyday Lives of Families (CELf) study on Los Angeles area middle-class families—illustrate how configurational learning operates in the context of U.S. middle-class children's bedtime routines.¹⁸ CELf's multi-method data corpus includes videotaped, ethnographic observational and interview data that document the daily activities and cultural values of 32 ethnically diverse middle-class families. Research team members recorded three separate evenings of naturalistic videotaped bedtime data per family. The data examples detailed here are illustrative of robust trends that are evident in the CELf data corpus as a whole. Research participants' names have been changed to ensure confidentiality.

The cultural practices associated with children's sleep in this ethnographic setting contrast with those observed by Gottlieb among the Beng community, where sleep is regarded as a social activity. Rather, CELf research participants subscribe to cultural ideals that herald the benefits of children sleeping on their own. Parents invest valuable resources—time, money, and care—into the project of bolstering children's capacity to feel comfortable sleeping alone. Children's sleep proficiency is viewed as an achievement to be mastered, rather than as a naturally occurring process. Moreover, in this cultural context, parents actively mentor children into preferred bodily techniques of sleep.

These practices accord with the advice of eminent U.S. pediatricians and child psychiatrists. These experts recommend children's

solitary sleep as a means to develop culturally salient attributes, such as autonomy and self-reliance. For example, child specialists Brazelton and Sparrow (2003: 2) advise that, “for the baby, learning to sleep is part of becoming independent.” They further suggest that, “for a parent, teaching a child to sleep means being able to separate, and to step back and allow the baby to ‘learn’ to be independent at night” (Brazelton and Sparrow 2003: 2).¹⁹ U.S. pediatricians also are inclined to recommend a “special bedtime routine” as a means to assist children in mastering the embodied state changes required to fall asleep and rest soundly (Small 1998: 119).

For CELF study participants, bedtime routines provide occasions for configurational learning as parents guide children from a state of wakeful activity towards calmer, more sedate pursuits. Parents approach children’s sleep through the cultural lens of what sociologist Annette Lareau (2011) has termed “concerted cultivation,” whereby children’s capacities and skills are purposively “cultivated” through active intervention and guidance. Quiet, soothing activities—such as bedtime stories and parent-child heart to heart talks—bridge the energetic pace of daytime and nighttime’s more sedate rhythms. These bedtime activities proceed in a predictable step-by-step fashion intended to instantiate culturally preferred aesthetics of body, mind, and emotion.

For families participating in our CELF research, quiet calm environments and relaxed bodily sensations, paired together, are associated with bedtime. Mountains of soft bedclothes and cuddly plush toys welcome children with a warming embrace while they snuggle to sleep in warm, “comfy” beds. Children are urged to lie tranquil and still, in preparation for slumber. Six-year-old Becky Gruvich nestles amid a sea of stuffed animals as she gradually nods off to sleep. A similar scene unfolds in a house nearby, where five-year-old Hailey is comforted to sleep with cuddly plush toys in hand. Inside another home, five-year-old Virat’s mother, Shanta, encourages him to choose his favorite bedtime pillow on which to lay his head. She reads him a bedtime story, then dims the light and kisses him good night. Across town, two-year-old Tessa is adept at operating the tape player that is located nearby her crib. Each night she selects one of her favorite tapes to help soothe her to sleep. Tessa’s mother, Kelly, caresses her daughter’s cheek as she settles Tessa in her crib and places her stuffed animals beside her. Kelly hands one prized character to Tessa: “Elmo wants you,” Kelly murmurs. Tessa smiles contentedly as she holds Elmo close. In yet another household, eight-year-old Josh is surrounded by his favorite toy figures as he readies for sleep.

Soothing strains of American Indian flute songs accompany the bedtime scene. Josh's nightlight hangs above his bed and casts a gentle shadow across the room. The lamp's muted glow aids Josh's nightly transition into slumber. "When [the nightlight's] on, my eyes get really tired," Josh remarks. "It helps me to go to sleep," he proudly informs his mother.

Meanwhile, Pam Reis, a working mother of two, embarks upon saying goodnight to her eight-year-old daughter, Allie. She carefully arranges Allie's bedcovers and attentively fluffs Allie's pillows. "Yay!" exclaims Allie. "I get to lay down in my *comfy bed*," she says, smiling broadly.²⁰ Allie nestles comfortably among the soft bedcovers while Pam positions them to Allie's liking, just so. A dream catcher hangs strategically placed near the window behind Allie's bed. Allie's name, which is stenciled in large, brightly colored letters, graces a nearby wall. Images of familiar storybook figures—Winnie the Pooh and his trusted companion Piglet—adorn Allie's comforter and are close-at-hand. "I love you, *always* and forever." Pam chimes out their familiar nightly refrain. She tenderly tucks Allie into bed one last time and kisses her goodnight. "Want music?" Pam inquires. "Yes," Allie replies enthusiastically without skipping a beat. She peers over the side of her bed while Pam sets the radio to play Allie's favorite songs. As Allie settles down for the night, she is gently wafted to sleep by her favorite Disney melodies.

Inside another family household, two-year-old Reggie fusses while his mother Debra puts him down to sleep. Reggie stands upright in his bed and plaintively calls out to Debra. "*AHH, Mama*," he cries loudly. Debra promptly joins Reggie at his bedside. "What?" Debra inquires in a concerned tone of voice. "You *never* liked *bedtime*," she declares, without waiting for Reggie's response. In doing so, Debra glosses Reggie's discomfort in explicit terms, and identifies a presumed source of trouble. She also provides a culturally preferred remedy to ease Reggie's bedtime travail. Debra searches the area near Reggie's bed and soon retrieves a colorful stuffed snake. She deftly tucks it into bed alongside Reggie while she kisses him goodnight and settles him down in his bed. As Debra prepares to leave the room, Reggie intently grasps the toy snake and snuggles up beside it.

In a neighboring residence, a short distance away, ten-year-old Tim beckons his mother, Beth, to his bedside. "Give me a proper, proper, proper tuck-in," he implores. Beth positions the covers snugly around him. She leans in and affectionately draws her face close to Tim's. "Come here. I love you so much," she gently murmurs. Beth repeatedly

kisses him on the cheek. “You smell good. Nice and clean,” she pronounces. Tim reaches out and hugs his mother. He nestles towards her and luxuriates in her embrace. Tim’s sensations of feeling, being, and smelling “nice and clean,” fresh from an evening bath, co-mingle with the familiar, comforting scent of his mother’s perfume and linger on, after Beth, herself, departs.

These routine bedtime practices provide opportunities for configurational learning in which soothing tactile, auditory, and kinesthetic sensations are systematically associated with one another to evoke an ongoing sense of comfort and care. These configurational learning processes engage multiple sensory modalities: sight, smell, touch, and sound. Additionally, they transpire within an affectively charged interpersonal field as parents cue children’s minds, bodies, and emotions into culturally preferred constellations of sleep.

These bedtime practices also reflect and affirm research participants’ middle-class social and economic status (cf. Sirota 2006). It is important to note that families’ access to material wealth makes children’s solo sleeping arrangements possible. (For example, seventy-five percent of CELF research participants own homes that are large enough to provide an individual bedroom for each child.)²¹ Study participants’ concerted efforts to mentor children into the cultural “good” of sleeping alone ratify idealized U.S. middle-class cultural values of independence and self-reliance. Yet, it bears noting that children’s predilections for sleeping alone are mentored in conjunction with a larger suite of psychocultural dispositions that encourage children to feel relationally soothed in the midst of solitary sleep.

An Extended U.S. Data Example

The following data sequence details the configurational learning process that takes place as CELF research participant, Jeri Morgenstern, mentors her four-year-old son Nolan into culturally salient practices of sleep. This extended data example is closely examined, in detail, so as to provide a full-bodied, micro-ethnographic depiction of the moment-by-moment interaction as it transpires. As the interactional scene unfolds, Jeri approaches Nolan at his bedside as his appointed bedtime draws near. However, Nolan protests as Jeri dims the lights. “It’s nighttime,” Jeri announces to Nolan. “It’s time to be very *mellow*. And very *quiet*.” Jeri adopts a calm, muted voice and strikes a slow cadence while she speaks. When Nolan reports he’s “not tired,” Jeri responds by clarifying the matter further, “I know you’re not. But your *body* is,” she avers. Jeri leans in close to Nolan. He, in turn,

meets her gaze. “Remember, before you got into the bath, you were falling *asleep?*” Jeri inquires. “Let me bring you *back* to that time,” she suggests, as she gently strokes Nolan’s face. Jeri slows the cadence of her speech even further and she affects a deeply pitched vocal tone. Her exaggerated voicing evokes the persona of a stage hypnotist inducing a trance. “You’re *sleepy*. You’re *sleepy*. Go to *sleep*,” she implores. Jeri’s incantations are accompanied by shared laughter, smiles, and kisses between mother and son.

In the context of this parent-child interaction, configurational associations among words, actions, emotions, and bodily sensations entrain Nolan’s soma and psyche into preferred cultural aesthetics of “feeling sleepy” as a preamble to falling asleep. The interaction calls forth a jointly remembered, co-constructed past that transports particular, preferred embodied sensations into the here-and-now, so they are perceived to be close-at-hand. Jeri takes Nolan on an imaginative journey that awakens—and reinforces—sensorial memories, and that links aesthetic dimensions of “sleepiness” with positive affect, shared laughter, and kisses. By systematically pairing together soothing tactile, auditory, and kinesthetic sensations, feelings of comfort associated with Jeri’s loving care are extended in time and space beyond her immediate presence in the flesh. These configurational associations symbolically mediate a sense of security that is intended to remain with Nolan throughout the night, despite Jeri’s absence.

During this bedtime interaction, Nolan and Jeri establish a “mutual focus of attention and become entrained in each other’s bodily micro-rhythms and emotions” (Collins 2004: 47; cf. Goffman 1967). This interaction frame facilitates Jeri’s efforts to cue contextual parameters that are central to accomplishing the focal activity at hand. This calls upon Nolan to apprehend a rapidly shifting array of perceptual stimuli by tracking and piecing together—in time and space—relevant experiential components into a cogent, culturally attuned configuration or “whole.” It requires that Nolan attend to—and coherently interpret—situationally embedded contextualization cues (Gumperz 1992) that emanate from various sensory modalities, but that are juxtaposed in relation to one another through means of a culturally ordered attentional frame.²²

This dynamic interactive field has an emotionally salient impact on Jeri, as well. “I remember feeling worried as a child. Waking up in the middle of the night and feeling startled,” Jeri avers, “and it soothes me, too, every time I put Nolan to sleep.” Jeri’s affectively charged childhood memories are akin to those expressed by other CELF study participants—and they fuel Jeri’s resolve to mentor her son’s acquisition of

self-soothing capacities to aid his sense of comfort at night. For Jeri and Nolan, this affectively durable constellation of felt sensations holds motivational force intergenerationally.

Configurational learning that transpires in conjunction with U.S. middle-class bedtime practices forges psychoculturally meaningful and emotionally durable indexical associations that mediate children's embodied state changes. Much at the same time, such bodily techniques shape and affirm children's membership in a particular social class as configurational associations are drawn—and deepened, over time—among culturally salient bodily sensations, words, actions, emotions, and relational inclinations that link interpersonal connectedness with children's solitary slumber.

Discussion

The foregoing ethnographic data examples illustrate how children are mentored into culturally salient sleep practices through means of configurational learning. For Beng children, such as Chantal, sleep is associated with the co-presence of others and is regulated in tandem with the rhythms of Beng social life. By comparison, U.S. middle-class youngsters like Nolan learn to associate relaxed bodily sensations with quiet calm environments as a requisite for falling asleep alone. The children experience these situationally paired and regularly occurring inputs as a culturally meaningful configuration or whole. Interrelations among words, actions, emotions, and bodily sensations thus operate together—that is, configurationally—to shape and affirm these culturally constructed constellations associated with sleep and to make them seem “natural.” Accordingly, “the emphasis is not on the actuality of every bit of behavior, trait, or element, but on its position in relation to other elements” (Sapir 2002: 103).

These culturally shaped *Gestalts* foreground particular attributes while relegating others to the background. Caregivers furnish culturally patterned clues that direct children's attention—and that suggest what motivational and emotional sway be granted to these attentional priorities. For example, social solidarity and coordinated bodily rhythms are foregrounded among the Beng. By comparison, middle-class Americans foreground autonomy and the development of self-soothing bodily techniques. Configurational learning hence guides individuals in deriving culturally resonant solutions to existential concerns about “what matters?” and “why so?”

The Gestalt framework that informs this conception of configurational learning attends to both structure *and* process, as crucial aspects of “field organization and field reorganization through action” (Koffka 1935: 682).²³ This dynamic open systems perspective is well poised to illuminate the improvisational qualities of interaction that, at times, play a role in the transmission of cultural practices—such as those demonstrated by Jeri in her efforts to modify and playfully reframe her son’s bedtime encounters, so as to avoid the fearful aspects of such that she experienced when she was young. Mentors, in concert with novices, thereby contribute to cultural continuity and change as they orchestrate consensually shared experiential frames that engender, structure, and, at times, reconfigure participants’ inferences about the world in which they live (cf. Koffka 1935). This ordering of phenomena in consciousness is a social practice informed by local settings and the broader cultural milieu, yet also dynamically achieved through children’s active co-participation with caregivers.

As the preceding examples illustrate, configurational learning encompasses biological, psychological, social, and moral dimensions. Explorations of configurational learning thereby aim to shed light on the ways in which individuals’ subjective modes of perceiving, feeling, thinking, needing, and behaving are shaped via the interplay between environmental factors (such as cultural values and norms) and biologically endowed potentialities (such as Circadian sleep-wake rhythms). Importantly, as well, they resonate with Sapir’s call for research that explores how “patterns of behavior are understood emotionally” from the “vantage-point of the culture-acquiring child” (1934: 414). Moreover, an enhanced view of configurational learning holds promise to further elucidate how everyday experiences are organized, as culturally meaningful ways of appraising, apprehending, and acting in local worlds-at-hand are generated, reshaped, and renewed.

PIECING TOGETHER CULTURE THROUGH RELATIONSHIPS: SOME FINAL THOUGHTS

I first became acquainted with Gestalt theory in the context of my clinical social work practice, at much the same time that I learned about Gregory Bateson’s associated work in cybernetics and communications theory. My role as a child and family therapist afforded me the privilege

of being privy to intimately rendered interactions between children and parents from a diverse range of socioeconomic backgrounds, ethnicities, and geographic locations within the United States. These parent-child exchanges were characterized by a sense of musicality and rhythm. To my observer's eye, they constituted interactional "dances," of sorts, in which children and parents worked together to orchestrate a mutual alignment of perspectives. Children, in tandem with parents, established a shared interpretive frame that guided their understandings about each other and that rendered the world, as they knew it, mutually intelligible. Each multifaceted interchange required that participants attune themselves both to the *process* and *content* of communication. Time and again, I was struck by children's mastery of this intricate panoply of communicative genres. This entailed children's capacities for nuanced interpretation and performance, occasioned through subtle inflections of gesture, eye gaze, bodily position, vocal timbre and cadence, in combination with words. Moreover, children's interaction with parents involved patterned coordination that was transacted, moment-by-moment, to achieve an ongoing alignment of perspectives and to consensually affirm and reaffirm the local worlds they inhabited.

My subsequent role as an ethnographer affords me opportunities to consider children's interactions with parents, as well as with other family and community members, *in situ*, amidst naturalistic daily life contexts—and away from the structural confines of a circumscribed clinical setting. My ongoing interest in children's experiential worlds has led me to examine the psychocultural processes at work, as children are mentored into culturally relevant ways of sensing, thinking, feeling, acting, and remembering. By closely attending to how children make sense of their life encounters, we can begin to tease out how culture operates at the interface of psyche, persona, and purlieu. We also are well poised to explore culture's centripetal and centrifugal tendencies, as culturally salient ways of living are intergenerationally negotiated, sustained, and transformed. Moreover, in studying children's experiential life worlds, we become mindful of human predilections for pattern recognition and pattern seeking. These tendencies are manifest as children are mentored into drawing comprehensible associations between the life circumstances they encounter and the subjective meanings they generate and piece together.

In their efforts to address allied questions about how cultural priorities are transmitted from one generation to another, culture and personality theorists such as Edward Sapir and Margaret Mead drew inspiration

from the Gestalt scholars of their time. This “configurative point of view”—as Sapir (2002: 103) termed it—offered a useful conceptual frame for exploring how individuals’ lives “intertwine into a mutually interpretable complex of experiences” (Sapir 1937: 870). As such, he was interested in understanding the genesis of “meanings, patterns, and organization in the child’s experience” (LeVine 2007: 252). Sapir championed a view of culture as conceptualized through the lens of subjective experience. “The meaning of an act,” he proposed, “is not to be judged by its abstract content but by its placement in the life of a people” (Sapir 2002: 103). A thoroughgoing grasp of culture-as-lived thereby requires an appreciation of how cultural experience entails interrelationships in which each element informs another.

The seeds of Gestalt theory that inspired psychological anthropology’s progenitors hold relevance for contemporary pursuits in the field. Gestalt theory’s phenomenological, meaning-centered perspective accords with a recent burgeoning of interest in allied phenomenological approaches to the study of cultural experience (cf., for example, Desjarlais and Throop 2011). Recent scholarship in neuroanthropology that emphasizes “developmental dynamics”—and that aims to “illuminate the interaction of culture and the human nervous system” (Lende and Downey 2012: 7, 12)—also accords with a Gestalt perspective, which, likewise, is concerned with interrelations between socio-cultural conditions and the biological capacities that inform perception, cognition, and action. Current relational approaches to the micro-analytic study of mother-infant communication (e.g., Beebe 2014; Trevarthen 2011) also dovetail with ideas that emanate from Gestalt theory, inasmuch as they share a dynamic systems view that explores bidirectional interaction between children and caregivers along with the biopsychosocial implications of mutually achieved interactive patterns.²⁴ Language socialization scholars, as well, put forth aims that are compatible with a Gestalt theoretical view. The language socialization perspective builds upon Sapir’s and Mead’s impetus to ascertain how cultural novices—as active agents—muster semiotically mediated, socio-communicative resources for purposes of “predictability and plasticity” (Ochs and Schieffelin 2011: 6) amid the contexts of their daily lives. Both approaches strive for context-sensitive developmental understandings that consider the potential intersections between “micro-interactional and macro-societal” (Ochs and Schieffelin 2011: 1) spheres of endeavor.²⁵

In this chapter, I have put forth ideas about configurational learning that incorporate insights which flow from Gestalt theory to elucidate one feasible pathway that may facilitate children’s cultural learning. I contend that configurational learning is catalyzed in conjunction with affectively attuned interpersonal relationships, which foster consensually validated techniques for organizing, interpreting, and responding to the phenomena children encounter in their day-to-day worlds. Children are thereby mentored into culturally resonant ways of attending to—and aligning—various dimensions of experience in conjunction with one another. On this view, children actively piece together culturally salient information assembled—implicitly as well as explicitly—through heterogeneous sensory channels into an intelligible, culturally patterned “whole.”

The Gestalt framework that undergirds this conception of configurational learning posits dynamic, biopsychocultural interrelations between mind and world (i.e., Koffka 1924, 1935; Köhler 1938, 1947 [1929]; Wertheimer 1925). As was suggested above, Gestalt theory aligns with contemporary neuroscientific findings which suggest that neural activity is dynamically coordinated and context sensitive—and which indicate that processes of learning, thinking, and emoting are characterized by emergent, holistic properties (Malsburg et al. 2010).²⁶ Also of note are contemporary conversations about phenomenological attributes of qualia (Chumley and Harkness 2013; Wright 2008). Qualia, as neuroscientist Christof Koch (2004: R496) emphasizes, involve phenomenal aspects of felt experience; they comprise “elemental feelings and sensations” that serve as “building blocks” of consciousness. At stake, anthropologically speaking, are pragmatic concerns about how “experiences of qualities” are shaped subjectively and intersubjectively—and about how qualia become endowed with particular gradients and polarities of cultural value (Chumley and Harkness 2013: 4–7). Configurational learning with its Gestalt properties, I argue, holds potential to shed light on how qualia come to be experienced and perceived as children’s felt sensations—the qualia they apprehend—are distilled and refracted through a cultural prism that yields relationally associated constellations of understanding.

The anthropological study of configurational Gestalt processes may also provide insight into how cultural schemas (Strauss and Quinn 1997) are communicated and embodied in the context of children’s cultural learning. For example, Quinn (2011) argues that cultural schema acquisition is facilitated via organizing principles that temporally and causally link together salient aspects of lived experience.²⁷ Cultural meaning is

procured as children participate in culturally organized action sequences. These, in turn, are built up from “goal directed and otherwise meaningful chunks of experience” (Quinn 2011: 252–253). Through configurational learning, children, thus, link culturally informed event sequences with salient aspects of the material, social, and emotional environs. As they do so, they piece together, recognize, and deploy culturally resonant intentions, aspirations, and explanations.

Quinn takes note that human infants are equipped to discern configurational regularities within their environment. These consist of systematic co-occurrences of phenomena—such as “predictable clusters or sequences of features within the motion stream” that “coincide with movements linking the actor’s initiation and completion of goals, such as the change in gaze direction that precedes both direction of movement and contact with the new object targeted by gaze” (Quinn 2011: 253). Quinn and Mathews (2016: 359) further assert that cognitive schemas involve “clusters of strong associations” that are catalyzed through heightened emotions as—for example—are stirred in conjunction with morally valenced child-rearing practices. This view is consistent with principles of configurational learning in which morally charged affective stances are considered to be significant in shaping salient patterns of meaning in children’s experiential worlds.

Koffka and the other Gestalt scholars who inspired Sapir, Benedict, and Mead set out to explore how experiencing subjects construct meaning through their encounters with the world. Their insights are germane to current day inquiries into how culturally recognizable patterns of perceiving, thinking, acting, and feeling become tangible in children’s everyday lives and worlds. Gestalt scholars’ impetus towards holistic, phenomenological understandings of cultural experience is well articulated by Kluckhohn and Murray (1948: 59) who maintain that culture “structures the conditions under which...learning takes place.” In addition, however, Sapir aptly reminds us that, “in thinking configurationally, culture must not be [seen as] static—but as *possible events*” (2002: 120; italics in original). In conclusion, I argue that psychocultural Gestalt processes of configurational learning produce meaningful associations that link together interpersonal, situational, and structural components of children’s lived experiences in culturally meaningful ways. Thus, they are pivotal in composing culturally emergent selves and sensibilities, and are central to our understandings about how cultural practices operate from the ground up.

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NOTES

1. Mead recounts that Edward Sapir was “developing a new interest in pattern, an outgrowth of our interest in Gestalt psychology” (1972: 125). Koffka was mutually influenced by psychological anthropologists and cited their work in his later publications (e.g., 1935).
2. Franz Boas’ influence is also notable in this regard. Boas famously advocated a holistic view of culture that considered cultural elements in relationship with their configurational context.
3. Gestalt theorists’ multifaceted descriptions of experience hold some affinity with William James’ (e.g., 1890, 1925) views. Notably, however, Köhler (1947 [1929]: 339) critiqued James for “failing to recognize what we [Gestalt theorists] have called organization.”
4. It bears noting that Edmund Husserl’s (e.g., 1891, 1900–1901, 2005 [1890]) conception of “figural moments,” which he initially described using the terms *Gestalt* and *Gestaltmoment*, was developed by way of intellectual influences he shared in common with Ehrenfels. Both scholars sought to understand the interrelations among various components of mentation, which are intuitively grasped as forming a relevant whole. Nonetheless, it was Ehrenfels who thematized this topic and propelled its empirical study in a wide range of naturalistic, interactive settings (cf. Smith 1988: 76).
5. This Gestalt perspective holds commonalities with pragmatist philosophy and American functionalist psychology. However, the Gestalt vantage point conceptualizes perception and action as being interactively co-constituted, rather than viewing perception as an outgrowth of action as Dewey (e.g., 1916) and others did (cf. Ash 1995: 10).
6. Koffka (1935: 675) cites Sapir’s (1928: 136) work on cross-cultural linguistic variation to illustrate this point, noting, for example, that the unconscious “habits” of one’s native language influence one’s sensibilities about the requisite “configuration of linguistic sounds.”
7. In a similar vein, Gestalt theorist Wolfgang Köhler (1947 [1929]: 346) employed the term “self-processes” to convey his corresponding ideas about the experiential self in dynamic interaction with the environment.
8. Sapir (1934: 412) rendered an early critique of Benedict’s approach; he cautioned that “insoluble difficulties” would ensue from Benedict’s efforts to “connect patterns or parts of patterns with others of an entirely different

- formal aspect.” Boas also criticized Benedict’s ideas, in doubting it would be possible “to give a picture of the culture which is at the same time a picture of a personality” (1938: 681). For trenchant reviews of anthropological critique involving Benedict’s notion of “culture as personality writ large,” see Bock (1999), Chodorow (1999), LeVine (2001, 2007), Shweder (1979a), Spiro (1951), and Spindler (1978), among others.
9. Analysis of the concept of personality as an integrated, coherent, and stable configuration of personal traits and dispositions is beyond the scope of this paper. Readers are referred to Murray and Kluckhohn (1967, particularly pages 31–33), Nicholson (1998), and Shweder (1979a, b) for further consideration of this topic.
 10. Dynamic, open systems are self-regulating and tend towards homeostasis. However, their inherent permeability leads to a continuous interchange with the environment; therefore, unlike closed systems, open systems are subject to transformation, growth, and change.
 11. Mead’s (i.e., 1947, 1954, 1955) subsequent research on cultural change was influenced by Lewin, with whom she collaborated (see Mead 1943). Bateson’s (i.e., 1951a, b, 1972, 1975) long-standing concern with cybernetic processes was likewise inspired by Gestalt-oriented systems thinkers such as Lewin. For example, Gestalt theory informed Bateson’s ideas about communicative and metacommunicative interpretive “frames,” which, in his view, entail a “system of relationships” (1972: 190).
 12. This vantage point foreshadows—and correlates with—Super and Harkness’ (1981, 1986; Harkness and Super 1983) systems-based conception of the “developmental niche,” which construes “the environment as a communicative medium ... in which two systems, the individual and the contextual, interact” (Super and Harkness 1997: 7–8).
 13. See Goodwin (2000, 2013, 2017) for related discussions about “contextual configurations.” In Goodwin’s terms, these comprise locally relevant, multimodal semiotic fields (e.g., embodied displays, vocal prosody, lexical structure) that “participants demonstrably attend to in order to build the action of the moment”—and that are configured and reconfigured, dynamically, as the course of action transpires (2013: 11). “Rather than replacing one perceptual world with an entirely different one,” Goodwin stresses, “there is relevant change in a continuing contextual gestalt as configurations are reconfigured” such that “new semiotic fields can be added, while others are treated as no longer relevant” (2000: 1503, 1490).
 14. It is significant to note that Bateson’s (1955; cf. Ruesch and Bateson 1949) cybernetic conception of “frame” influenced Goffman’s (1974, 1981) subsequent, well-known use of this term.
 15. Sapir’s views in this regard were influenced by his long-standing professional relationship with the interpersonal psychiatrist, Harry Stack

- Sullivan, whose conception of the “interpersonal field” incorporates ideas from Gestalt theory. Sullivan emphasizes that, “the study of interpersonal relations calls for the use of the kind of conceptual framework we now call *field theory*” (1948: 106; italics in original). He posits that the interpersonal field is mediated through emotions (especially powerful emotions such as anger, love, and fear) that cue participants to differentially notice, appreciate, or overlook specific circumstances or events (e.g., Sullivan 1953).
16. In Mauss’s (1935: 88) view, “the notion that going to sleep is something natural is totally inaccurate.”
 17. However, it is important to note Gottlieb’s (2004: 55, 229–230) added observation that Beng parents take deliberate steps to regulate the timing of certain developmental milestones for cultural and spiritual reasons. For example, they actively prevent babies from walking until after they are a year old, believing that negative consequences will ensue if a baby starts walking too early.
 18. I am particularly indebted to the working families who participated in this study for opening their homes and sharing their lives, as well as to members of the interdisciplinary UCLA/CELF research team, directed by Elinor Ochs, and supported by the Alfred P. Sloan Foundation’s Program on Workplace, Workforce, and Working Families, headed by Kathleen Christensen. All research procedures were reviewed and approved by the university’s institutional review board, and written informed consent/assent was obtained from all study participants [UCLA IRB Protocol #G01–06–083–14].
 19. Although, see Harkness et al. (1995) and Wells-Nystrom (2005) for comparative research that documents cross-cultural differences in children’s sleep practices in industrialized Northern European countries such as Holland and Sweden.
 20. The following transcription conventions, adapted from Atkinson and Heritage (1984), are used to demarcate conversational phenomena. A more fully detailed transcription of these conversational data has been completed and is available for added, fine-grained analysis.

word Bold italics indicate emphasis, signaled by changes in pitch and/or amplitude.

WORD Capital letters indicate increased volume.
 21. These architectural features of study participants’ homes serve as markers of families’ status positioning in a particular social, cultural, and political-economic world (cf. Hayden 2002). In Bourdieu’s (1977) terms, they operate as “structuring structures” that shape bodily dispositions

- of *habitus*—and that hold potential to influence cultural sensibilities and tastes.
22. According to Gumperz (1992: 232), contextualization cues “function relationally” in that they “highlight, foreground, or make salient” certain communicative features vis-à-vis other relevant aspects of the communicative milieu, rather than “rest[ing] on any one single cue.”
 23. This accords with what Goodwin and Duranti have described as the context shaping and context renewing features of human interaction, in which “each event shapes a new context for the action that will follow it” (1992: 29).
 24. Beebe and her colleagues, for example, conceptualize “the relational matrix as a system, in which each component affects and is affected by the other. ... Behavior simultaneously unfolds in the individual, while at the same time each individual modifies and is modified by the changing behavior of the partner” (Beebe et al. 2003: 753–755).
 25. My linguistic anthropological training in language socialization undoubtedly provides an invaluable cornerstone that has helped inspire and undergird the perspective that I articulate here.
 26. Köhler, for example, emphasizes that, “when dealing with the relation between any *phenomenal* facts and events in the brain, we always seem to be confronted with a problem of *emergence*” (1940: 21; italics in original).
 27. Quinn (2011) identifies cultural routines and cultural templates as being significant in this regard. According to Quinn, cultural routines “organize recurrent activities in time and space” whereas cultural templates also “rely on causally linked sequences ... that support reason and narrative” (2011: 249).

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Narrative and Healing in Dynamic Psychotherapy: Implications for Culture Theory

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Narrative is a powerful technology whereby human beings build and inhabit cultural environments. One significant use of this technology, in many different societies, is healing. In the present work, I hope to contribute to the discussion of narrative and psychological healing and in doing so take a step or two toward understanding the role of narrative in culture.

Most work on narrative and healing has sought to investigate how narrative may establish a meaning context within which illness is experienced (Mar 2004; Mattingly and Garro 2000; Kleinman 1988). One of the central themes of this work is that narrative can help to make meaningful that which seems meaningless—that which sits outside of, and threatens, conceptions of what is to be expected in the world. The approach I set forward here does not seek to deny, but rather to modify and augment, this point. In particular, I want to show that such a focus on meaning processes may subtly condition and even undermine our understanding

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of the relation between culture and the body by perpetuating mind/body dualism. Here I hope to harness recent work on embodied cognition to at least partially circumvent this problem and argue that narrative—represented here by examples taken from dynamic psychotherapy—may engage the body and the world to a greater degree than is accounted for in most of the literature on this topic. Rather than look to how narrative helps to integrate a symptom into a context of meaning, I will suggest that a narrative may serve as a means to move between two cultural environments, from threatening to familiar territory.

This argument has implications for how we think about the role of narrative in culture more generally. The word culture is generally understood to refer to the shared cognitive resources of a social group, but under that umbrella dwell many different sorts of phenomena, including schemas and cultural models, political and religious beliefs, patterns of movement such as dances and gestures, and on and on. For many purposes it is good to have a generous term that potentially embraces all of human social action; however theoretical development is not one of those purposes. Trying to develop a theory of culture in its capacious sense is a bit like trying to develop a theory of movement or space: It has too many diverse manifestations to admit of a cohesive general explanation. If, however, one focuses on one particular sort of culture such as narrative, the outlook is brighter.

Narrative is ubiquitous and varied, and there can be no definitive statement embracing all that narrative does in human affairs. A few generalizations are possible however. Narrative orients and coordinates persons and communities in the face of the moral and political problems of daily life. Like rituals, narratives help to locate communities and persons within moral and cultural environments. If the central hortatory mechanism of ritual is collective action, that of narrative is coherence. What we experience as, for example, a plot is a means whereby a complex symbolic creation comes to cohere around a central principle or idea. That coherence has a rhetorical power that can be harnessed to reinforce or change the status quo.

The purposes to which narrative is put are as varied as the situations in which humans find themselves and which they create. In the personal narratives that are highlighted here, speakers narrate to explain what they did or what they do, to recruit listeners to a particular vision of reality and of their place in that reality. Such activity can help patients in psychotherapy redefine themselves and their lives in ways that better

harmonize with who they are in their present circumstances. Studying this process can help illuminate the broader ones whereby persons everywhere create, reinforce, and transform their cultures. To formulate my theory-level goal in an ambitious mode: I will offer a suggestion about how persons in one sort of society inhabit narratives they tell about themselves, and in doing so I hope to contribute to an eventual theory of how narrative establishes and anchors people within a symbolic environment.

EMBODIED AND CLASSICAL MODELS OF COGNITION

Why is it preferable to conceptualize the person's relationship to symbolic resources as entailing active engagement with a cultural environment rather than establishing a context of meaning? This idea grows in part out of recent work on embodied cognition.¹

Embodied cognition is often presented in contrast to standard or classical models of thought.² The latter are distinguished above all by the proposition that cognition is fundamentally a matter of information processing: Humans gather information about the world through perception, and cognition entails processing that information by converting it to symbols that can be manipulated according to certain rules. In contrast, those who favor an embodied approach hold that some or all aspects of cognition are fundamentally embodied, that is, linked to biological processes of perception and movement. At the most basic level, the contrast between the two approaches concerns the extent to which sensorimotor processes play a role in cognition. The classical model does not deny that the data of thought are derived from bodily processes of perception and even movement, however it assumes that this information, once so acquired, is transformed through brain processes that constitute cognition. On the other hand, those who argue for embodied cognition assert that perceptual and motor processes extend into other aspects of thinking, such as reasoning and emotion.

How, and how far, do embodied cognition theorists imagine that sensorimotor processes extend into cognition? It depends; there are many different sorts of claims.³ Perhaps the most studied aspect of thought in the embodied cognition paradigm is conceptualization. The research supporting embodied cognition approaches prominently includes many results that seem to show that our concepts are inextricably tied to our perceptual and motor systems. One major area of such work is based

upon brain imaging studies. There are by now many such studies showing activation of the nervous system's sensorimotor systems when people engage in mental tasks that involve these systems (Barsalou 2010). Many recent imaging studies support the conclusion that information about objects, for example, is stored in sensory and motor networks associated with use of those objects (Martin 2007: 25).⁴

Another example of this sort of argument, well-known to many anthropologists, is Lakoff and Johnson's (1980) *Metaphors We Live By*. To summarize very briefly, Lakoff and Johnson analyze a wide range of English metaphors that compare abstract concepts to embodied experiences. The high frequency of these metaphors is said to support the argument that we form concepts based upon physical experience, that we use familiar physical experiences to understand more abstract ideas. And because we do this, physical experience conditions the meaning of those concepts.⁵

Another broad area of research, very relevant to the topics addressed in this chapter, has to do with how humans understand social situations. A number of studies have shown that we simulate such situations in our own motor and affect systems in order to understand them (Barsalou 2010: 718). Jean Decety and Jennifer Stevens (2009: 15) summarize this point as follows: "The fundamental ability of the motor system to resonate when perceiving actions, emotions, and sensation provides the primary means by which we understand others and can therefore be considered as a basic form of intersubjectivity." Below I will develop the idea that these processes are also central to the way we utilize narratives.⁶

Similar claims about engagement of pre-cortical neural systems are also made in the study of emotion. Although there has been an enormous amount of work on emotion in neurosciences and psychology, a somewhat radical explanation of emotion—sometimes called affect theory—has had an outsized influence on recent thinking in the social sciences. According to this approach, affect is a phenomenon that arises in subcortical systems largely independent of any shaping by cognitive processing. Many such approaches build on the work of Silvan Tomkins (2000), who argued for a set of basic emotions whose expression proceeds according to an invariant pattern. There have been efforts from several different directions (see, for example, Ekman et al. 1969; Wierzbicka 1986; Panksepp and Piven 2012) to establish basic and universal human emotions, presumably evolved and shared across different cultures. As Ruth Leys has summarized this position (in preparing to criticize it):

... the affects must be viewed as independent of, and in an important sense prior to, ideology—that is, prior to intentions, meaning, reasons, and beliefs—because they are nonsignifying, autonomic processes that take place below the threshold of conscious awareness and meaning. (Leys 2011: 437)

Another example of the embodied cognition approach is the work of anthropologist Tim Ingold. Ingold (2000: 2ff.) lists as an epiphany his encounter with the work of James Gibson, who is known above all for advancing an “ecological” approach to visual perception. Gibson (1979) emphasizes the active involvement of the organism in visual perception. As his argument is summarized by a commentator, “Visual processes are not exclusively located in the nervous system ... Vision is an extended process, involving bodies, motions, and interactions ...” (Shapiro 2011: 35). Any movement creates light reflection differences in some but not all features of a scene.⁷ We use both the differences and the continuity in visual perception. The significance of this for Gibson is that it obviates the need for assuming that much of the visual image is provided by processing in the brain. Rather, the visual image emerges through the organism’s active engagement with its environment. This is the basic idea upon which Ingold builds: visual perception is not a passive process but an active one in which the organism’s movements and experience in the environment are significantly implicated. Ingold conceptualizes cognition in general on the model of visual perception, as taking place not exclusively in the mind but rather within an ecological system that includes both the organism and its environment. Human beings can think only by manipulating something physical or symbolic, and thus the process never happens within the boundaries of the organism itself.⁸

Even this very short summary of some parts of the field will suggest that while there are some family resemblances among different embodied cognition approaches, there is no fully established set of principles or research (Shapiro 2011). Many different areas of cognition have been shown to have some connection to perceptual and modal systems (that is, systems that are involved directly in perceiving and acting in the world). The question currently confronting the field is “to what extent do these connections suggest that embodied cognition is central to higher thought processes?” As Barsalou articulates the issue:

One possibility is that grounding [i.e., embodied] mechanisms play relatively peripheral, or even epiphenomenal, roles in higher cognition. Perhaps these mechanisms simply accompany the standard symbolic mechanisms in classic architectures, which causally determine processing. Alternatively, grounding mechanisms may play these causal roles themselves. (Barsalou 2010: 719)

I lack the expertise to weigh in on the debate on the character of cognition, and it is not necessary that I do so, for the weaker formulation, that embodied mechanisms are often involved to some extent in other cognitive processes, is sufficient to my purposes here. For this formulation suggests the importance of conceptualizing a user as actively engaging a narrative on both physical and mental levels.

THE COMPLEMENTARY RELATION BETWEEN CLASSICAL AND EMBODIED APPROACHES

In one sense, the embodied and classical approaches complement one another: Each has a significant theoretical weakness and a corresponding strength. To begin, consider the embodied cognition perspective.

To the extent that advocates of embodied cognition make strong claims about the role of sensorimotor processes in all levels of abstract thought, they risk losing sight of the unique capacity of human beings to use culture to create abstractions. Neuroscientist Gregory Hickok provides an example:

The fact that the hand area of motor cortex activates when we think about grasping a cup doesn't mean that the concept of GRASP more broadly is coded in primary motor cortex; all it means is that we can think about (mentally imagine) the details of a particular grasp. The more abstract concept GRASP, which includes lots of motor possibilities, lots of potential graspers, and lots of objects or even ideas is likely coded at a much higher level and in a system that doesn't have to worry about the particulars of controlling a specific instance of grasping. (Hickok 2014: 167–168)

Another example is some of the work on affect referred to earlier. While it is certainly productive to consider the role of ancient and precortical neural networks in the generation of emotions, emotion extends beyond this. As neuroscientist Richard J. Davidson states in a review:

We now understand that emotion is comprised of many different subcomponents and is best understood not as a single monolithic process but rather as a set of differentiated subcomponents that are instantiated in a distributed network of cortical and subcortical circuits. (Davidson 2003: 129)

Generations of anthropological work show that such matters as culture and personal history profoundly shape emotional response. Hence, in both of these examples (concepts and emotions), the implications of findings from embodied cognition should not be extended so far as to discount the role of abstraction and ideas in human thought and action. I will use the term symbol to refer to such abstractions, although as I will now argue, symbols should not be understood as corresponding to aspects of a separately existing world. It is the capacity for abstraction that allows for the ambiguity of symbolic productions such as narrative, an ambiguity that can help a person to change both a situation and herself.

There is also a profound vulnerability in much thinking on classical cognition. The classical view is typically (if not necessarily) associated with a powerful epistemological assumption, namely that perception represents or corresponds to features of the world external to perception. Alan M. Leslie (1987: 414), in a widely cited paper on pretense and theory of mind, clearly expresses this assumption: "The basic evolutionary and ecological point of internal representation must be to represent aspects of the world in an accurate, faithful, and literal way, in so far as this is possible for a given organism." As Varela et al. (1991: xx) summarize this view, "cognition consists of the representation of a world that is independent of our perceptual and cognitive capacities by a cognitive system that exists independent of the world." The claim is not necessarily that we perceive the world "as it actually is," but rather that the perceptual process recovers some sort of direct information about the external world and represents it in the mind.

This seems like the most obvious form of common sense, but many (including me; Stromberg 1993; Bowlin and Stromberg 1997) would argue that trouble arises when we assume this common sense position can serve as an explanation of language or cognition. While no one would dispute that in fact human beings control symbolic systems that in effect accomplish what we can call representation, this particular account of it reproduces a realist epistemology that has been questioned, in many different cultural traditions, for centuries.⁹ The philosophical arguments

are complex, but in the present context one part of the debate is particularly relevant.¹⁰ Since we always act in perceiving—we move our heads and eyes, touch with our hands, etc.—there is no independent world we are perceiving, rather we are making the world we perceive. Of course, this does not imply that we fabricate that world: In perceiving we continuously run up against reality. However, we necessarily contribute to fashioning how we perceive that reality. Again, Varela et al. express the point clearly:

...the point of departure for the enactive approach is the study of how the perceiver can guide his actions in his local situation. Since these local situations constantly change as a result of the perceiver's activity, the reference point for understanding perception is no longer a pregiven, perceiver-independent world but rather the sensorimotor structure of the perceiver (the way in which the nervous system links sensory and motor surfaces). (Varela et al. 1991: 173)

These authors—among others—have suggested that this interaction with the world proceeds according to the principles of dynamical systems, self-governing systems that monitor both the environment and themselves and make adjustments based upon this. The details of how this works in perception are not relevant to the current discussion. For here the point is simply that we can conceptualize perception in ways that involve interaction with, and adaptation to, an external environment without assuming that such processes involve representations that somehow correspond to features of that environment.

To see the body as deeply implicated in the work of the mind is to undermine the assumptions of both Western common sense and Western science that take it for granted that the mind is fundamentally separated from the body. An approach to narrative that is not dualistic in this sense offers the advantage of not requiring us to construct an explanation of how the mind can influence the body, as in healing. Rather, within such a framework, that division is never installed, and hence does not need to be removed.

In sum, the classical approach offers a profound advantage in cultural analysis, in that it helps us to conceptualize the role of abstraction and symbolization in thought. A century of research in psychological and cultural anthropology has shown that human action is always culturally shaped and can never be reduced entirely to lower level sensorimotor responses to the environment. Of particular importance here is the fact

that as a narrative is formulated—both in words and in physical performance—the symbols of which it is composed take on something of a life of their own. They have their own resonances, ambiguities, and personal meanings. Thus symbolic creations as well take on their own integrity: Having been formulated in one context, they can then feed back into human communities in another.

Yet, granting the role of abstraction in thought does not entail commitment to a realist epistemology in which symbols correspond to aspects of a separately existing world. In this chapter, this comes down to understanding narrative not as a symbolic artifact that represents events or particular meanings, but rather as a symbolic context that can be imaginatively engaged in much the way we might exploit a physical environment. Through such engagement, both a person and a specific context emerge.¹¹ Consider the familiar fact that we are unable to have thoughts at all except by utilizing external objects or symbols. We can only formulate thoughts by means of these external entities, but these entities are not neutral, they come with their own particularities, which necessarily shape any thought they express. Hence our activity within a cultural environment is conditioned by the possibilities and affordances of that environment, while at the same time what we do in it depends on our interests and our ability to exploit these possibilities.

Thus it is possible to develop an approach to narrative that integrates the advances of the embodied cognition movement while retaining the central role of abstract symbolic processes in human thought. To be clear, this is not a lonely heroic quest; rather, I will be following any number of theorists in a number of disciplines who are heading down the same path. There is a long tradition in anthropology emphasizing the perceptual and motor processes through which the body encounters the environment, reflected (in rather different ways) in the work of such authors as Bourdieu (1977), Csordas (1990), and Ingold (2000). Recent research in psychology and cognitive neuroscience has provided new empirical support for embodied approaches, and there are ongoing efforts, across several disciplines, to integrate these findings into established theoretical frameworks. In my approach, attention is drawn to the body and the environment as parts of thought, and hence part of narrative formulations. As in any ecological system, the parts are interdependent; changes in one sub-system entail changes in others. This provides an opportunity to explore narratives not as discrete mental processes potentially interacting with illness, but as elements of an entire system in (or

out of) balance. Variations in the stories one tells about oneself can be considered to constitute variations in the cultural environment in which one finds oneself. Our bodies can respond differently to those different environments, and one effect of such changes can be to move the body in the direction of healing.

A HYBRID APPROACH TO NARRATIVE

A well-established approach to the question of how humans understand narratives suggests that we create mental “situation models” of the state of affairs depicted in the narrative.¹² Recently this approach has often been integrated with simulation theory, which holds that a reader or listener is able to put herself in the position depicted in the narrative and to understand the world from that point of view (Rinck and Bower 1995; Rinck et al. 1996; Coplan 2004).¹³ Typically simulation theories are considered to be a variety of embodied cognition perspective, wherein the mental simulations provoked by narrative are significantly informed by bodily experience and functioning (Fecica and O’Neill 2010). In other words, the situations provoked by narratives are not only imagined but rather embodied, and in this sense we *inhabit* those simulations organically. So, to take a single example, it has been shown (Matlock 2004) that readers process fictive motion sentences such as “The highway runs through the valley” faster after having read a story about fast travel than after having read a story about slow travel. The inference is that readers have understood the narrative by simulating the sort of travel described therein, as evidenced by their harnessing such a simulation to understand a figurative sentence encountered immediately after reading the story.

This approach—a simulation theory that considers the ways in which narrative processing is grounded in our bodies and surroundings—suggests that in some sense we inhabit narratives, that we react to them as we react to physical environments.¹⁴ The approach differs in some important ways from Western common sense and the tradition of narrative studies built on that common sense. The assumptions about representation as recovery that were discussed above in the context of perception manifest themselves on several different realms of thought, one of those being narrative. An example: To quote a recent, and generally thoughtful, collection of narratives by sociolinguists, “People use narratives to recapitulate past experience by matching a verbal sequence of clauses to the sequence of events which actually occurred”

(Stromquist and Verhoeven 2004: 3). This assertion is often traced to the work of William Labov (1972), and is the basis for much of the work undertaken in narrative studies.

My interest here is in the taken-for-granted assumptions that first, there is a sequence of events “which actually occurred,” and second, that narrative recapitulates this sequence. As with the realist view of perception, this realm of neutral reality initially seems to be simple common sense. Yet, as Ingold (2013) points out, it not universally accepted. Such assertions are clearly linked to a world view, which can be loosely identified with modernity in the West, according to which we live in a reality that can be transparently represented in language or other symbolic systems.¹⁵ Before (roughly) the seventeenth century, Western cultures did not take for granted the notion of a level of neutral reality, isolated from human purposes, which can be recorded and mapped through objective inquiry. For example, in a medieval Western world view it might have been expected that certain modes of representation exerted control over the course of events. (An example is the Bible; see Stromberg n.d. and the sources cited there.) In such a world view, events may not be seen as an order of reality separate from their description.

One can question the view of narrative as a mirror of events for the same sorts of reasons that bring down representation more generally as a mirror of reality. And indeed, the view that narratives should not necessarily be seen as representations recovered from events has been expressed by a number of prominent scholars. Richard Baumann (1986), following Roman Jakobsen, urges us to think about the fact that events themselves are necessarily a product of interpretation. Human beings necessarily dwell in worlds they have a hand in making, and narrative is an extension of this condition, not a disembodied reflection upon it.¹⁶ Here, the goal will be to study the mutually constitutive relation between narrative and events.

An example of this point is how a narrative context can shape emotions, which are clearly embodied phenomena. As I noted in the previous section, the now frequently encountered claim that emotion is unmediated by culture or any sort of symbolic process is untenable. Rather, in practice emotions arise directly out of particular historical contexts. In this, emotions can serve as an example of the sort of synthesis of embodied and classical approaches I advocate. Andrew Beatty (2010) has recently argued that our most effective tool for depicting emotion in ethnography is complex narrative. Through the sorts of narratives that

talented ethnographers or novelists produce, it is possible to put a reader in a situation where she will grasp how a character feels. His argument applies not only to ethnographic writing; I would broaden it by observing that humans have been understanding one another's complex emotions for a very long time, long before any ethnographers or novelists took the stage. They were doing so by producing composite utterances that oriented interlocutors to their situations through a range of processes such as gesture, facial expression, lexical meaning, imitation, bodily entrainment, and so on.

As these processes unfold, emotions take shape, emotions that can be understood only in the contexts of their production. While I would not deny that emotion may manifest itself in ways that seem transparent, this is by no means the only possibility. Oftentimes emotion appears in complex social situations informed by relationships, history, temperament, the immediate context, and so on. That is, the mental process of emotion partakes of the world, an ever-changing world, in much the same way that perception does. The point is perhaps even more relevant to emotion, in that the context in which it takes shape is not only the physical world, but also, inevitably, the social one.

This point offers the possibility of greater insight into both narrative and emotion, for it directs attention to the ways in which they may be mutually constituted. More generally, the effect of this understanding of narrative is to tighten our grasp of the relations between it and the world—including both the body and the environment outside of it. Ingold (2013) has suggested the metaphor of narrative as a journey along a path—and indeed in many places a narrative is an account of a journey (Jackson 2002; Rosaldo 1986; cf. Herman 2007: 318). As one travels that path, one encounters a constantly shifting environment, and one must be attentive to one's surroundings. One may find oneself having to make one's way through unfamiliar territory and calling upon one's past experience to orient oneself. Even on a familiar path—as with a familiar story—one's journey will be slightly different each time. One effect of this metaphor is to cast the problem of the meaning of narratives in a different light. Rather than seeing narratives as having certain meanings, we may see them as offering opportunities—affordances, to use an ecological term—for making sense. Tellers and listeners perceive their location and find in it what is most helpful for them in order to make sense of the situation.

In the hermeneutic tradition that is based upon classical understandings of cognition, narrative is seen as comprised of symbols that correspond to fixed meanings and hence must be interpreted, whether by listeners or by anthropologists. “Hermeneutic” is significant, based as it is in the imagery of a god whose special mission it is to convey messages from a transcendent realm. In this version of symbolic interpretation, culture becomes a transcendent level of meaning that constitutes thought (as in Geertz 1973). In the approach I seek to develop here, symbolic processes remain relevant, but elements of the narrative are not construed in the first place as symbols to be interpreted. They are seen rather as components of a context that affords resources for ongoing construction of a world. Simulation theorist Alvin Goldman (2005) has coined the term “extended imitation” to designate the robust cognitive resources that may be brought to bear in pretend play, in which one not only imitates (say) a cowboy but improvises based upon broad knowledge of the cultural image of the cowboy. Likewise, we bring a wide range of knowledge and memories and bodily awareness to bear in stepping into the narrative situation. It is this that allows us to occupy narratives, whether we tell them ourselves or listen to those told by others.

There is an important omission, however, in simulation theories, one that reflects the theoretical weakness I have already mentioned: simulation theorists tend to ignore the importance of the symbolic dimension. Symbols are fuzzy; in addition to their intended referents, they convey other connotations and resonances. The narratives formulated in symbols necessarily take on an essential ambiguity. One implication of this is that a narrative may land one in a place that is at once familiar and mysterious. And hence the process of simulation, of putting oneself into the place created in the narrative, can itself take on the character of a journey into the unknown. This point is of essential import to the study of narrative in psychotherapy, for it is this element of opacity that provides the opportunity to seek, to learn, and perhaps to discover a new world in which one becomes a somewhat different person.

As a new environment is revealed, we adapt to it both mentally and physically. This ecological approach to narrative harmonizes well with a considerable body of work in neuroscience showing that certain sorts of mental events can have a wide variety of physiological effects (Stromberg 2009). Anyone who has ever had an emotional response to a movie or narrative will not find this surprising. However, our everyday familiarity

with these sorts of body-mind connections should not divert attention from their extraordinary theoretical and practical implications. Physical effects of mental phenomena have often been conceived as quasi-magical, outside the realm of scientific inquiry, dismissed in terms such as “psychosomatic” and “placebo” (Seligman n.d.). Evidence is dismissed because it does not fit into long-dominant assumptions about the separation of the mind from the body (a point made by Hacking 2002). However, within the framework developed here, such phenomena become a matter for empirical inquiry rather than issues that must be politely ignored as an embarrassment.

To briefly summarize this section: I have proposed seeing narrative as a cultural component of the person’s environment, and then looking at the interaction of the person and narrative in the way that embodied cognition theorists encourage us to understand thought more generally. This program translates to a number of specific principles: (1) Conceive the processing of narrative as an interaction of an organism with an environment, utilizing the possibilities of that environment, rather than as a mind using language to represent a separately existing reality or idea; (2) for this reason, attend to the mutual construction of world and mind, of event and narrative; (3) rather than looking for a meaning of the narrative, look instead to the multiple resources to be exploited in social situations, and to the way listeners and tellers create—often in interaction—a new situation. Finally, from classical models of cognition (and from classical psychological anthropology) I take the principle that (4) all reflective mental process is informed and shaped by the cultural and personal resources of the participants; cognition is a dialectic between processes at the level of the body and at those at the level of the capacity to abstract and generalize. And the symbols that allow us to do this have their own histories and resonances.

People use narrative, no less than physical processes such as carpentry and gardening and manufacture, to create the worlds they live in. One implication of this is that sometimes people create worlds they no longer wish to live in, and they seek to change things. New narratives are necessary; however, not just any story will do. Rather, the new stories must be true to the person’s experience of the world yet offer new possibilities. In the following, I hope to clarify these points through particular examples.

INTRODUCTION TO THE CASE STUDIES

Shortly after receiving my PhD in the early 1980s, I began a postdoctoral program that entailed training in dynamic psychotherapy. Working at a community mental health center, I saw a small number of clients—either weekly or bi-weekly—for periods ranging from a few months to over a year. My supervision and training were based in the methods and assumptions of a dynamic psychotherapy strongly influenced by psychoanalysis.¹⁷ I took careful notes, and wrote fairly extensive summaries of each therapy session, in most cases immediately after the session was completed. In cases where I was able to come close to writing down actual dialogue, I reproduced this in my summaries. Indented sections in the following are all excerpted directly from these summaries.

But for a short passage in a paper written around that time (Stromberg 1985), I have never published any material on the patients I saw during this period. Enough time has now passed that I am confident that I can discuss these cases—in which identifying details have been disguised—in a way that leaves my clients' privacy and confidentiality completely uncompromised. The two cases I discuss here are in some ways quite similar, in that both of them focus on long-term patterns of commitment and loss. In contrast to what might be expected in clinical literature, my intent in presenting these cases is to illustrate not how they bear upon issues of etiology or treatment, but rather how the approach I have advocated here can shed light upon the narratives related in therapy. I hope to show, in particular, how narratives can change the cultural environment in which a person dwells, a process that might in the long run contribute to healing. In this sense, my focus here is more on the narratives than on the patients.

What I hope to show was—oddly enough—articulated directly by Chuck, one of the clients I describe below. Although his formulation probably attributes too much to the therapist, it is otherwise quite relevant:

It's about 90% me telling these stories and about 10% you, you're like the narrator [in a movie]. I couldn't come in here by myself and put this all together. So I tell you my dreams and my fantasies and stuff and gradually it begins to all fit together into another story.

He is right. The point is indeed to construct a new story. That point has been made any number of times (Schafer 1976; Spence 1984). Here I want to add that this new story is a new environment, with new opportunities and new embodied responses. It is precisely the advantage of the approach I advocate here that affect and other embodied responses are not seen as either “culturally influenced” or physical but rather both. And it is this that allows us to begin understand how a person might be transformed in a therapeutic process.

DARBY’S DREAM

One of my patients was a woman in her mid-twenties whom I will call Darby. She had grown up in a military family and had moved frequently during her childhood. Our time together was focused on what could be characterized as a tug of war in Darby’s life between commitment and independence. This concern arose first, and most prominently, in Darby’s discussion of her current committed relationship with a woman named Elsa. She felt that Elsa’s lifestyle preferences prevented her from pursuing many things that interested her, including possible relationships with men. Yet Darby was also reluctant to let Elsa go. She was haunted by the loss of a number of strong relationships in the recent past, including one with a therapist that she had seen before me. In a number of different contexts, Darby articulated slight variations on a single theme: She found herself chafing against the demands and restrictions entailed by intimacy while at the same time she regretted the loss of relationships that, for one reason or another, had ended prematurely.

The previous therapist—call him Nate—was mentioned in our first session. Darby had begun seeing him six months earlier. Initially worried that he might be a Freudian, she had found him to be “unassuming” and non-judgmental, and quite likable. She was shocked when, after a few months, he told her that they would have to terminate. Further discussion revealed that at first she was hurt by this news, but then began to also feel angry. She admitted that she had had similar worries about seeing me.

As we talked, over the next several weeks, I learned about several significant relationships that Darby had lost. The first of these was her older sister, who went off to school when they were little and subsequently neglected Darby in favor of her own social relationships. Another involved

a brief but intense love affair she had had with a man (Russell) in her late teens. The relationship had gotten underway during a summer when she was a temporary resident on a college campus where Russell attended school. They had met one another's families and had attempted to sustain the relationship after Darby moved back to California. However, when Russell suggested they meet halfway at the Grand Canyon to spend a week together at spring break, Darby decided not to make the trip. She had subsequently lost contact with Russell, and was haunted by her remorse about the loss of the relationship.

Not surprisingly, Darby's push and pull approach to relationships also showed up as a focus on the therapeutic relationship. She veered between attempts to intensify this relationship and moments when she backed away. Were we moving too slowly? It felt like she was simply repeating much of what she had told Nate. She had nothing to talk about, things were going fine in her life. How many patients was I seeing? Why did I take notes while Nate hadn't? Would it be possible for her to see Nate one more time?

After two months, Darby decided that her life had stabilized and she did not need to be in therapy. At our last scheduled session, Darby reported a recent dream. Her brief account of this dream, and her subsequent comments and additions, constitute the narrative I wish to focus on here. I treat it first of all as a narrative, and secondarily as a dream. That is, while certain features of this story mark it as a dream account, I am trying to understand the narrative, not the dream.

Darby was in a city, not clearly identifiable but uncannily like the one in which she and I were currently living. Quoting directly from my notes:

She found out somehow that Russell was here visiting for a week. She somehow got two phone numbers for him from a friend of his that she couldn't identify. She waited a day before getting in touch with him, perhaps because she had things to do, perhaps because she wanted to show that his presence wasn't that important to her. But then she found out he'd gone back to Connecticut, and she was tremendously hurt that he hadn't called her. She woke up and started crying, the dream really disturbed her. She thought of calling Russell's parents to get his number.

As Darby related the dream, she displayed an increasing amount of anxiety, and was crying at the end of her narration.

As Erving Goffman (1986) pointed out, a narrative is always in some sense a re-living, and as such the narrative of a dream sets up a three-part relation. There is what Darby construes as the past, there is the dream itself, and finally there is the dream narration. In one sense, all are different, in another sense, all are the same. All tell us something about the symbolic environment in which Darby dwells; that environment, for example, is laden with memories of regret and loss. To be explicit about what is perhaps obvious, Darby's strong emotional reactions to the dream and the narrative make it clear that she engages the narrative on both physical and emotional levels.

She began to fill in more details. The first phone number turned out to be an address, one that she visited in the dream with an unidentifiable friend but which didn't seem to be the place named in the address. Notice what is happening here. The narrative is beginning to encompass an indeterminacy, not simply in the form of "the facts here are indeterminate," but rather in the form of "the facts here point in two different directions." Further, in part this indeterminacy concerns the physical location of the speaker. It is safe to say that while we might sometimes have the experience of being confused about where we are, we presumably do not have the experience of being in two places at once. Yet it is precisely that experience that corresponds most closely with what Darby says; the location and the address do not add up. This is not the only indeterminacy here; after all, the address is a phone number of a companion who cannot be identified.

A core principal of the approach to narrative that I am trying to formulate here is that a narrative puts one in an environment, and initially it seems that my exemplary narrative is well-chosen. Yet there are complications, because this place is not only unknown; its characteristics suggest that it is not actually like any environment that a person has experienced. Ochs and Capps (2001: 5) label this indeterminacy "sideshadowing," a narrative technique whereby events are cast not as certainties, but rather the opposite: "ambiguous, conflictual, unstable, subject to constant revision, perhaps even unknowable." Other authors have used the term "subjunctivity" (Bruner 2009). The concept is often brought to bear in discussion of literary stories, but of course the phenomenon occurs in mundane stories as well (or perhaps mundane stories deserve a bit more credit for their artfulness). Why would events be presented in this way? One possibility is that a narrator may want to counter the inherent tendency of narrative—that which presumably plays into its ubiquity—to

render events as coherent, as having some sort of trajectory or point. As Ochs and Capps put it, sideshadowing restores the presentness of events, restores their familiar incoherence. However, it may be more than this. Frank Kermode argues, in his classic work *The Genesis of Secrecy* (1979), that narrative necessarily breeds mystery—hidden truths that may point to an underlying coherence that is invisible on the surface of experience.

In the ecological approach to narrative, this mystery can be formulated rather simply as the question, “Where am I?” The ambiguity of her location disorients Darby, and certainly may be a source of her increasing agitation and anxiety as she speaks. That feeling is conveyed to me, her therapist, through emotional contagion, creating an embodied response in our little community. This fosters the impetus to resolve the indeterminacy: “We need to figure out where we are.” Note here that in this formulation, I have turned away from the assumption that Darby is representing an event (the dream) and towards the situation that is being created as she speaks. This situation then feeds back upon the event and colors Darby’s memory and understanding of it. Thus it is a simplification, potentially not harmless, to assume that we are dealing with an event (dream) and its account. Rather, there is an ongoing mutual constitution whereby the event informs the narrative and the narrative (and the situation it creates) informs the event.

Events are always to some extent symbolically formulated, and formulating events in narrative doubles down on this principle. Through narrative, events are embedded in an environment with particular sorts of characteristics and opportunities. As we discussed the details of the place where Russell was, it turned out to correspond in several ways to the clinic setting in which we were currently sitting, right down to the paintings on the walls. I suggested that perhaps the unidentifiable friend was me, and Darby smiled in an embarrassed way. She said, “But I wouldn’t take you to a place like that.” I asked, “Where would you take me?” and she responded, “Out to lunch.”¹⁸ Note again that alternatives are being formulated in terms of place, of movement. When I pointed out that these feelings and ideas were related to the fact that this was our final session, Darby began to cry again, saying that it was stupid to cry.

Our time being nearly up, I elected (novice therapist that I was) to try and tie things up for Darby in a final interpretation. I stated that it is not stupid to have strong connections to people. Evidently, I asserted, she had at some point decided to deal with the pain of repeated moves (and the losses those moves entailed) by emphasizing the virtues of

disconnection and change. This, I said (not necessarily correctly), was the topic of her dream. Darby responded, “You mean it isn’t Russell I was feeling worried about separating from, but therapy?” I observed that this was a possible interpretation. Quoting again directly from my notes:

I said that I was probably also the unnamed friend that had Russell’s number, and the dream depicted how I and the therapy had given her a chance, for the first time in ten years, to get in touch with Russell and what he represents, which is her emotional ties to people. Darby sat there, literally with her mouth open, and said, “How do you do that?” I told her that the interpretation was essentially hers, which is true, that I had just put it in a different frame.

Why should a decision, ten years earlier, to pass on a chance to see a boyfriend of a few months still have the power to provoke tears and a desperate impulse to try and reverse the course of events? Why should a few sessions in therapy be able to so powerfully reactivate her ambivalence and regret? Why should a relatively abstract formulation about close emotional ties strike Darby, in that moment, as corresponding so exactly to her feelings and her situation? It is clear enough that Darby feels regret, as she narrates her dream, but there is also an almost panicked sense that she may have made irreversible errors that set her life on a wrong track. Dwelling under that is a mystery, a bewilderment about herself and her actions. That bewilderment drives a search for an answer or a resolution of some kind.

Central to the effort of understanding the emotional situation here is an appreciation of the context within which that situation takes shape. In part that situation consists in the various symbolic and physical resources Darby brings to the encounter: dreams, memories, demeanor, emotions, postures, and so on. Another part of the situation is the social relationship being played out with the therapist. It is the juxtaposition of these two levels that bring Darby’s emotions powerfully to the fore. Put it this way: Darby makes sense of her current situation by fashioning a narrative that reflects that situation while at the same time recapitulating a familiar environment from the past. Using formulations, terms, and emotions that she is used to, she constructs a new cultural environment in which to dwell, an environment that is at once foreign and familiar. In doing this, she activates a range of embodied responses—emotions of course, but perhaps also long-forgotten physical responses such as expressions or

ways of holding her body. Her simulation is augmented by my participation in the role of Russell, or more accurately, my role as a member of the class of Darby's intimates who have disappointed her.

In itself, this narrative could hardly be said to offer a resolution. As the therapy draws to a close, Darby is frustrated and bewildered. Why, she seems to ask, do I reject something that is so important to me? It may well be this impasse that results in the overwhelming feelings that bring Darby to tears twice during her final session. When she hears an interpretation that for her accurately names this situation, some sort of relief ensues. The very power of her frustration is harnessed, like a snapping rubber band, to energize a movement in the other direction.¹⁹

That interpretation is an opportunity, an affordance. It is the chance to understand her misery in terms of a new set of ideas, and to some extent to move from an embodied experience to a more abstract account of her situation. A powerful emotional experience is relived in a new context, or rather a context that is both familiar and new. The opportunity is to swing from a different branch and thereby embark upon a different journey.

Yet the contrast between the embodied and the abstract must not be overdrawn. Rather, it should be understood that what I am separating for analytic purposes—the levels of the abstract and the embodied—are not separate on the level of experience. As we travel through life, we more or less continuously effect cognitive transfers between embodied and symbolized understandings, transfers that necessarily occur in both directions. One important outcome of this process is the integration of the person with the community. As the embodied is symbolized, aspects of our experience are harmonized with the cultural resources of our group; they become more easily communicated and less mysterious or threatening. And as the symbolic is embodied, the cultural resources of the group become not just understandable but felt on a deep level.

In suggesting this mechanism of change, I am drawing on an idea that has been so frequently articulated (albeit in language that varies somewhat from author to author) that it could be said to constitute a rare point of consensus among cultural theorists. One of the earliest (if not the earliest) formulations of this theory, and the one that remains most influential, is that of Emile Durkheim in his *Elementary Forms of the Religious Life*. Durkheim argued that in ritual the collective energy that can be generated in face-to-face human groups is transferred and infused into the most important symbols and ideals of those groups. Emotional

weight is thereby imparted to these abstractions, which become not just ideas but deeply felt commitments. Variations of this idea have repeatedly been called upon to explain not only ritual and religion, but broader cultural phenomena such as metaphor (Quinn 1997; Lakoff and Johnson 1980) and everyday interaction (Collins 2004). Here I am offering yet another example of the same idea, that in narrative the embodied and symbolic aspects of human experience reinforce one another, and that reinforcement may be the basis for either stasis or change.

In the end, little if any change occurs in Darby's life; there is no happy ending here. Darby may have an opportunity, but she does nothing different than she has always done, she leaves. At best, she takes a step toward understanding her own behavior, for there is clearly a moment of insight.

Doris Lessing (1962), depicting a fictional character who one presumes is much like herself in this regard, wrote in *The Golden Notebook*:

I came upstairs from the scene between Tommy and Molly and instantly began to turn it into a short story. It struck me that my doing this—turning everything into fiction—must be an evasion. Why not write down, simply, what happened between between Molly and her son today? Why do I never write down, simply, what happens? ... Obviously, my changing everything into fiction is simply a means of concealing something from myself. (Lessing 1962: 232)

Darby is not a novelist, but rather a patient in psychotherapy. However she, like Lessing, recounts events in a way that reveals some things and hides others. One could almost say that she caches potential for change along her narrative path so that, when she is ready to use it, it will be there to find.

CHUCK'S MEMORIES

Chuck is another patient I saw during my training. I have discussed his case briefly in another publication (Stromberg 1985); here I will be able to go into more detail about his therapy, in part because enough time has passed that I can discuss some more sensitive aspects of the situation.²⁰ Chuck, who was in his early thirties, was referred to me from a psychotherapy group in which he had been participating for some time. He wanted to work on what might be called a failure to embrace a full

and independent adulthood. He wanted stability in his life—a career, marriage. Perhaps above all, Chuck wanted to fit in. A sensitive and intelligent man, he was disappointed with his career path as a nurse. He had been raised in a middle class family, and his two siblings had completed advanced degrees and achieved considerable professional success. Chuck, however, is dyslexic and in his early years did poorly in school. He was also considered a troublemaker and in early teens spent nearly two years in what was then called “reform school.”

In addition to his educational frustrations, Chuck had problems with emotional regulation, especially in dealing with those in authority. This manifested itself in a number of ways: an occasional but overwhelming impulse to disrupt groups, a mistrust of any form of authority, and a tendency to express resistance and anger against superiors at work. As a result, he had been dismissed from several jobs, in spite of the fact that he was a dedicated and talented worker. Here is a memory he reported:

Once when he was little there was a kid across the street, twice his age, who really knew how to push his buttons. He got a group of kids calling Chuck a retard, and Chuck just got more and more furious and felt more and more helpless. He couldn't attack the whole group, there was nothing he could do. He mentioned a lot of such situations, where he was ostracized by a group or by his siblings. He still hates people who control groups, he can't trust them for a minute.

Chuck worked hard in therapy, seeing me twice a week for a period of a little over six months. During this time we returned again and again to a particular scenario: In various contexts, as Chuck felt himself fitting into a community or institution, he would struggle with the emergence of strong emotions of anxiety about his vulnerability. He would respond with aggression; early in his life he repeatedly got into fights, and in adulthood he had violent fantasies and was verbally antagonistic. In addition to causing problems at work, this sort of behavior had alienated him from groups of friends and contributed to his general sense that he could not fit in anywhere.

As we worked to understand and—we hoped—to change this pattern, Chuck's strong emotions often saturated our sessions. He presented himself as highly confrontational and aggressive. He told me several times that he regretted missing combat in Vietnam, as his father had seen combat in the World War II. Another recurring theme was Chuck's

construction of his gender. He was deeply committed to an image of manhood that he probably associated with his father: aggressive, competitive, emotionally distant, and staunchly heterosexual. His own strong feelings, especially about the past, threatened these commitments. Feelings of pity, regret, or closeness (especially to males) were likely to trigger belligerence and underlying anxieties about homosexuality. His relationship to me was tinged with an aggressive sexual component. He often reported that silences between us were unbearable, and would comment, for example, if I were sitting “with my legs apart.”

Many of the dreams he reported in therapy featured his beating or killing unidentifiable males or his sexual interaction with beings that were ambiguously male/female. He recognized that at least one of these dreams seemed to imply a wish to assume the role of a woman in a sexual encounter. In sum, Chuck’s conflicts with men who have some sort of authority over him are based not only in fears of rejection but in a visceral fear of being put in a feminine position, perhaps covering a simultaneous wish to be in such a position. In therapy, we talked. Doing so repeatedly produced powerful and disturbing feelings and impulses.

Much of what we discussed in therapy concerned violent dreams, memories, and fantasies. Chuck had a strong sense of honor, he saw himself as defending against injustices visited upon himself and others. He did not see himself as a bully but rather as one who stands up to bullies and other forms of injustice. Probably the central injustice of his life was when—as a consequence of his repeated truancies from school—he was sent to reform school. Rather poignantly, he described his memory of standing in a courtroom in an uncomfortable secondhand suit bought for the occasion, and the judge told him he would be institutionalized for about two years. His father “just sat there looking sort of confused.”

As a child, Chuck both admired and was disappointed in his father. Chuck’s stories about his father illustrate the older man’s old-fashioned feelings about self-reliance and emotional distance, feelings that Chuck recognizes have impaired his life as an adult. Early in our time together, Chuck told me the following stories:

- C: My father had some friends who had a float in a parade and we were down there before it began and they needed somebody to ride in a rocket ship or flying saucer. So my father said I’d be in it; the idea was that I’d wait for him at the end. But I was really little, I didn’t understand, I got off and just wandered around until a policeman found me. He was really nice, he took me to a store and called my father.

- P: How did you feel?
 C: Lost.
 P: You're not mad at your father for that?
 C: It was just his way of teaching me independence. There was another time, when I caught my first nice big fish, a black bass. It never should've happened, but somehow I kept it alive for three or four days in a bucket by the cabin. And then my father told me to clean it. I still remember the way its lips were moving when I cut its head off. I wouldn't eat any fish except tuna after that for years, in fact I've just started eating fish again recently.

Compare these stories to one that he reports in one of our final sessions:

Then he spoke of a really strong memory of the day he left for [the reform school], his mother had a list of how many pairs of underwear he was supposed to take, etc., and she was packing all that, and his father just sat there looking dumb. The thing was he decided he'd just have to take it, he couldn't acknowledge how much he was going to miss them. So he'd just go without looking back. He said that for the first time since that day he'd had similar feelings, about not wanting to come into therapy. He'd even felt sick, like he had a fever. The thing was, he said, if you know it's better to forget it and strike out on your own rather than draw it out.

In all of these stories, Chuck's father is a passive figure who abandons Chuck to a painful fate. The father is detached from any sort of connection, and in the story of the fish he enforces such detachment on Chuck as well. The thing to do in an emotionally difficult situation is bear up, get it over with, disconnect. Emotional engagement is dangerous, it leaves one vulnerable.

The sense of abandonment constitutes one strand of the narrative configuration that underlies Chuck's therapy sessions with me, and seems to come up for Chuck whenever he begins to be integrated into a group. Two prominent examples of this were his work situation and the therapy itself. He was vigilant, ever aware of the possibility that he would make an emotional commitment to these situations, and would subsequently be abandoned. Perhaps he was not wrong. After only a few months in therapy, I told Chuck that I was going to leave to take another position, and thereafter Chuck's feelings about this became a focus of our work. Here is an account of a dream Chuck had about a month before termination, on the night after a therapy session during which he had become angry with me:

... he's back at a house he rented here [i.e., the city where we both live] with the roommate he's mentioned several times, the one he wishes he'd beat up. They get into a fight and Chuck pounds his head against a table edge—a table like the one in my office—until the guy's skull is cracked. Then he looks at him lying on the floor and is sure he's dead, and thinks he's really in trouble now. But then the guy comes back to life, but now he has just one arm (like a guy in a TV show Chuck had just seen) and he has a razor in this hand. Chuck realizes he must grab the arm and he does, but the guy is still able to reach Chuck's wrist with the razor, even though his hands are held. Chuck realizes he can't let go, for if he does, in that instant the guy will be able to cut deep into his wrist and hit an artery. Chuck hopes that his girlfriend will come up with a knife and stab the guy in the back. At this point he wakes up, and his wrist is tingling, it feels like ice.

Once again, here Chuck depicts himself as being in two situations, one real (he dreamt), one a product of his imagination (the dream). That product, in turn, refers to memories of at least two relationships, namely that with his former roommate and that with me. The man in the dream is a transitional figure who helps Chuck to re-conceptualize where he is. He is simultaneously a man Chuck lived with—an intimate whom Chuck came to want to destroy—and me, the therapist. Whatever the dream is, the account of the dream is the creation of a niche in which Chuck can assess how his feelings about the rival overlap with those about the therapist, potentially revising either or both. There is a conflict, and then a violent altercation that Chuck is unable to end—the threat to his existence persists until the end of the dream. Chuck's embodied response to this threat is confirmed by the fact that he awakens with a feeling of nervous excitement in the body part he has been dreaming of.²¹

In the next session we discussed this dream and several others, quite similar in content. The following exchange occurred:

Chuck: When we were talking about that guy in the dream that I shot, I kept getting sadder and sadder. Oh, is that your serious face?

Peter: So you find you keep having feelings in here that are very sad?

Chuck: Look, I've never felt some of these things since I was little. It's exactly like it was then, I can feel my legs shaking and then my knees start to shake (long pause, after which he reports a story of a nearly violent confrontation with some young men at his apartment complex).

There is much to be said here about Chuck's assertion that he is experiencing feelings he has not had since childhood. I have argued that both listeners and speakers understand narratives through simulation, by placing themselves in the position depicted in the words. I have suggested further that being in this situation is processed in part through abstract symbols and in part through the body, with implications for one's physical situation. Finally, I have proposed that narrative is uniquely suited to the specification and experience of emotion. Chuck's words provide some solid evidence for these assertions. The dream narratives, and the discussion thereof, powerfully transport Chuck to a distant time and a re-experiencing of the anger and fear that continue to shape patterns in his adult behavior. Chuck is threatened by a powerful rival, whom he defeats, but who rises again to pose a threat to Chuck's existence and his masculinity. Although the behaviors—and presumably to some extent the feelings—persist in the present, Chuck calls attention to the fact that suddenly the feelings are more similar to his memories of a distant past. That small clue must be carefully attended to, for it reveals something about the therapeutic process. The situation here is a complex mix of narration, memories, and an ongoing situation. Chuck's testimony means: I acknowledge that my situation, in this moment has changed. My experiences in the past are present right now, and by implication in any situation in the present. In the language of meaning this is a revelation, in the language of the ecological approach it is a context in which Chuck has begun to notice some new opportunities. Chuck goes on to talk about the razor:

- P: Why do you think you woke up?
 C: I told you that, my wrist hurt.
 P: But your wrist hurt because of the dream. Maybe you woke up to keep from dreaming anymore, maybe you were getting too close to something you didn't want to see...
 C: Well, what I didn't want [to see?] was probably my wrist, it was one of those old straight razors, really nasty.
 P: Have you ever seen one of those razors?
 C: Yeah, we used to have them around the house.
 P: Your parents' house?
 C: Yeah, my father had got a bunch of them from my great uncle when he died, eventually he got rid of them, gave them away or something. I thought they were really bitching.
 P: You liked them.
 C: No, they scared the shit out of me, those things are a hell of a lot sharper than a knife.

Consider the razor as an affordance in the narrative, an aspect of the physical environment that in the first place suggests particular ways of grasping, of moving the hand and arm. Chuck, who fought often while growing up, has physical and emotional traces associated with such movements. I am confident he never attacked anyone with a razor, but he thought about it, and about how he could respond to such an attack on him. He also remembers the fascination and terror associated with those razors. All of this, and much more I cannot be aware of, plays into a particular embodied response that is muscular, emotional, hormonal, and cognitive. This complex puts Chuck into a situation that has been long-forgotten and allows him to feel as he did back then. The power of this experience is significantly derived from its embodied aspects; however that corporeal state was only accessible through symbolic and social processes involved in dreaming, remembering, conversing, and relating. This is, then, an experience derived both of embodied and symbolic responses.

Also playing into the situation are memories and experiences of male rivals (Chuck's father, the hated roommate, myself) and elements of the current situation (the coffee table). The dream and its narration put Chuck in several places at once, as we saw with Darby. An unknown situation (the repeated scenario) is blended into a known one (right now). The ambiguity of the narrative is the fulcrum that provides the leverage for transformation (emotions drive the therapy and narratives drive the emotions). In the following section, I will discuss the general implications of this fact.

HOW DOES PSYCHODYNAMIC NARRATIVE HEAL?

My goal here has been to introduce, in a preliminary way, an ecological approach to narrative and healing. Such an approach takes seriously insights from the embodied cognition movement without abandoning what could be called the central tenet of cultural and psychological anthropology, the extent to which all human experience is shaped by culture. This project involves setting aside a long established theoretical language that envisions culture as a system of representational symbols that are interpreted by minds that stand apart from the world. In place of this, I have argued that people inhabit narrative worlds in much the same way that they inhabit environments. In both situations, the organism locates elements of the context which help it to sort out the current

circumstances; which elements of the context are called upon play a role in determining the circumstances. This interrelation implies no separation between a realm of independent events and their representation by means of abstract symbols. Narratives do not represent a level of separate events, rather they are a medium in which persons think, feel, exist.

Simulation theory is helpful for conceptualizing how persons inhabit narratives. Persons imagine themselves in the narrative situation, and as they interact with it, they may sustain previous patterns of action or branch off in new directions. However, the embodied cognition movement has often underestimated—or not considered at all—the role of the mind in abstracting from experience. These abstractions—symbols is still a fine term as long as we do not conceptualize them as representing an independent world by somehow corresponding to features of that world—are the means whereby embodied concepts are translated into communicative forms. Rendering experience in symbolic terms enables, among other things, the imagination and creativity that characterize our species, for doing so introduces ambiguity and abstraction into thought, and with these things come virtually infinite possibilities for constructing new understandings.

My focus here has been on how grounded cognition and abstraction work together in the creation of narratives that in effect place participants in two (or more) contexts simultaneously. It begins in this way: A patient finds herself in a somewhat familiar situation, which she describes to herself in somewhat familiar symbolic terms, and as a result she experiences certain familiar feelings and other embodied responses. Through such a process, the patient may encounter enough consistency in the stories she tells and the embodied responses she experiences that she becomes anchored in patterns of action and feeling she finds aversive. She has created a world in which she does not want to dwell, but feels powerless to change. However, by a process similar to the one whereby this environment was created, another one can be fashioned. This happens by introducing new symbols and finding new opportunities. Eventually these elements give rise to new embodied responses.

This account looks somewhat different from that of standard psychoanalytic metatheory. In particular, the idea of transference is at the heart of Freud's psychoanalytic method and informs all subsequent dynamic psychotherapeutic practices. It is a simple but powerful idea, one with ramifications that extend beyond the therapeutic encounter. Transference, presumably ubiquitous in social relationships, is the

tendency to respond to people who seem familiar by repeating behaviors that one resorted to in earlier encounters with the original person. The patient in psychotherapy is there, at least in part, because of what has proved to be a problematic pattern in his or her social relationships. The therapeutic encounter is itself a social relationship, so it is to be expected that the problematic pattern will begin to occur in the relationship between therapist and patient. This conditions the narratives occurring in the encounter as well as their emotional power, in that the current story may invoke previous feelings. These manifestations become the target of therapeutic effort. In addition to discussing secondhand recountings of events in the patient's life, the therapist makes a special effort to direct attention to patterns in the relationship between herself and the patient; it is through addressing the difficulties of the present relationship that the difficulties of the past can be experienced in a new light. The cases presented here offer a certain amount of empirical justification for these assumptions, for there are obvious parallels between the transference relationship and the extra therapeutic social relationships Darby and Chuck describe. Above all, there is the desire for connection, the inconsistency of this desire, and the sense of loss as they push away the person with whom they seek a relationship.

The conceptualization that I offer here differs from the classic psychoanalytic account primarily in its rhetoric. Rather than focusing on past and current relationships, the approach advocated here focuses upon ambiguous narratives. Darby and Chuck create narratives in which they can comfortably dwell, ones that construe an aspect of the present in ways that provide familiarity and emotional gratification rooted in the past. In my role as therapist, I attempt to help them see aspects of their own activity that have heretofore been cloaked. It is only when the patients recognize what they have been doing that they have the choice of changing it. Specifically, they could occupy this narrative in a new way: They could choose not to walk away from the situations that both frighten and attract them. It is worth emphasizing again that the themes of sexual desire and gender identity that permeate the narratives recorded here are powerful evidence of the physical implications of narrative discourse. Also prominent in these stories are the accompanying physical manifestations. Darby's regret and overwhelming sadness, Chuck's description of the feeling of the clothing associated with leaving for reform school or of feelings of physical illness as he prepares to come to therapy. This is all solid evidence for the contention that Chuck's and

Darby's memories, the interactive problems for which they seek treatment, and their response to therapy are not merely abstract symbolic phenomena. As I have repeatedly noted, these narratives exist in both mind and body. This is one part of the explanation for why Chuck and Darby, like any of us, can recognize the need to be able to change a pattern of behavior, yet be unable to do so. Much of that pattern exists in realms of the person inaccessible to conscious control, and in part it is this that is entailed in labeling a pattern embodied.²²

I have called attention to the fact that the claims I am making about transformation through narrative exemplify a theory that appears in many forms in the social science disciplines. Originally, and most prominently, this took shape as a theory of ritual proposed by Emile Durkheim. Later versions of the same general approach sometimes come closer to emphasizing the mental exchange between the realm of desire and that of the communally formulated (see, for example, Victor Turner's 1967: 54ff. discussion of the exchange between the orectic and the normative poles of the symbol in ritual). My ecological approach to narrative differs from its predecessors in moving away from the assumption that the symbols of the narrative correspond in a more or less one-to-one fashion with realities. Instead, I urge the view that these symbols (as well as the narrative as a whole) constitute an environment that offers resources for thought and feeling. In the approach offered here, the exchange is accomplished through a narrative that is able to simultaneously evoke a realm of desire and one of familiar discourse (the therapy). As these resources are used their resonances provoke their own physical responses. And as this happens, healing can occur.

The advantages of an ecological understanding of narrative are, in the first place, theoretical: From such a perspective, the difficulties of seeing narrative practices as representing a level of phenomenon separate from the body and the world are largely avoided by sidestepping a dualistic conception of representation. This leads to some more practical advantages of this approach. It opens the way to analyzing the ways in which narratives directly condition mental and physical processes, and thereby offers new opportunities for understanding their role in healing.

Narratives may create, maintain, or change a cultural environment. In this chapter, the focus has been on how narrative can help to achieve stasis and transformation in the life of an individual. The point could be expanded to understand the role of narrative in a much broader range of circumstances.

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NOTES

1. The conceptualization of narrative that I advocate here overlaps with pragmatically oriented approaches that have been developed in many different disciplines. See, for example, work on “cognitive narratology” as outlined in Herman (2007). This approach is an extension of a broader program within the discipline of psychology known as “discursive psychology” (see, for example, Edwards and Potter 1992), and many my basic assumptions align closely with this program. In addition, as I note elsewhere, I was also strongly influenced by reading psychoanalyst Roy Schafer (1976) decades ago.
2. My study of embodied cognition approaches has been significantly influenced by the work and writings of Rebecca Seligman; see, for example, Seligman (n.d.).
3. See Gentsch et al. (2016) for a helpful review.
4. There is some controversy about the value of functional magnetic resonance imagery in studying brain function, and as an outsider I am not able to pronounce on the matter one way or the other. Here I am merely reporting that these findings have been used to support premises of embodied cognition.
5. Again, I am citing Lakoff and Johnson's argument for illustrative purposes. See Quinn (1997) for what I find to be a convincing counter to some of their claims.
6. This should not be taken to mean that social situations or narratives are completely handled at the level of motor systems. As Decety and Stevens (2009: 15) go on to note: “Of course, human social cognition cannot be reduced to this primitive, yet essential, level of processing, which constitutes the primary means of self-other connectedness.”
7. Note that, in contrast to the argument I develop in this chapter, Gibson's entire approach remains realist; see Shapiro (2011: 100–101).
8. The proponents of discursive psychology—mentioned above—arrive at a similar conclusion via a different path (one that passes through the country of discourse and conversational analysis). This approach is in turn very similar to the one I developed (Stromberg 1993) travelling through the same territory.

9. Recently representation has become a contentious and troubled concept across a number of disciplines. Please note that in questioning the idea that symbols are fundamentally representational, I do not intend to align with any number of authors who conclude that cultural variation in accounts of representation (or cultural variation in “epistemology,” or “ontology”) entails cultural incommensurability and radical relativism. See Bowlin and Stromberg (1997).
10. Another important problem with seeing mental representations as corresponding to phenomena in a separately existing world is that we are not warranted to make assertions about the world as it exists outside our senses, because we have no access to that world. To say, for example, that in perception our senses recover and represent features of the world as it actually is sounds plausible, but how would we check to see if this is true?

That question seems to point to a very obvious problem with the premise of representation as recovery, but that problem is often overlooked because the point is so counterintuitive (at least to standard Western common sense) and inconvenient. We look around and see things like cows and grass and rhubarb, and we are very confident that should aliens arrive and transport all humans off the planet, the cows and grass and rhubarb would still be here. I referred to this in an earlier publication (Bowlin and Stromberg 1993) as “scientific realism” (the term could have just as well be “common sense realism”). This view works very well for most everyday activities, in fact it works just fine for most science, and I suspect that most Western scientists are common sense realists. They assume that the principles they discover about the world and articulate in scientific generalizations and laws correspond somehow to reality “out there.” Those of us who enjoy the benefits of modern science must acknowledge that this is a very effective working assumption in many scientific contexts.

However, scientific realism is unverifiable, as I have noted. Further, it creates problems that can be significant for some sorts of endeavors. Consider, briefly, a simple concept like motion. (I take this example from Rorty 1979: 266ff.) Aristotle thought about motion in a manner I find difficult to grasp, for implicated in his conception of motion was the assumption that all things contain (entirely separate from the realization of movement) a potential for movement. For that reason, it would be wrong to say that Aristotle saw the same thing when he observed motion as did Newton. Do we then say that Aristotle (and for that matter Newton) were prevented from seeing motion as it actually is by their theories of motion? If so, are we today exempt from this principle? Anthropologists will immediately recognize the unsustainability of asserting that any conception of motion reflects the phenomenon as it really is,

unimpeded by the beliefs that inform the conception. Once one admits this point, the notion that our words pick out objects and processes that exist “out there in the world,” begins to sound like a ritual incantation.

11. In line with the pragmatist assumptions that inform this chapter, I seek to understand social and mental phenomena not as things but rather as processes. This is especially obvious later in this chapter in my renderings of psychoanalytic concepts.
12. For an early statement of this theory, see Johnson-Laird (1983, especially p. 243ff.).
13. Recently simulation theory has often—not always—been presented as compatible with findings on the mirror neuron system. While much of this work is intriguing, the speculated implications of human neuron systems have at times surely been overstated. Until the science of this matter is further sorted out, I prefer to discuss simulation theory and imitation without reference to the possible involvement of the mirror system.
14. I take this assumption in part from work by Tim Ingold (2013).
15. In anthropology, this point is often traced to the work of Michael Silverstein. See, for example, Silverstein (1976).
16. Some readers may interpret this placing of the modern world view in its historical context as an echo of the “post-modernist” epistemological claims that still reign as common sense within much of the discipline of anthropology (recently having graduated from the status of epistemology to that of ontology). On the contrary, I reject epistemological relativism. See Bowlin and Stromberg (1997).
17. Psychoanalytic assumptions are woven into this analysis, often in ways that I have probably not properly acknowledged because they are simply a part of my thinking. As I have noted previously, Schafer (1976, 1992) is an especially important influence here.
18. Allen Johnson (personal communication) points out that here Darby is raising the possibility of an entirely different ecological context for our relationship. This is a good example of how different terms can offer the transition to very different environments.
19. I recorded that movement as an expression of admiration for me. Readers might wonder, as I do, whether my choice about what to include in my notes was at all influenced by a desire to emphasize my own cleverness. Now, decades later, it does not matter much; it is fair to say that Darby experienced the moment as a powerful emotional reversal, an insight into her own enigmatic identity.
20. At the same time, I must emphasize that I have changed particulars to ensure Chuck’s anonymity and that there are some details that I have intentionally left out of my account.

21. Of course, some might suggest that the one armed man and the threat to Chuck's arm express sexual threats via phallic imagery. This may be correct; however in the present analysis, I am trying to stay close to what is directly articulated. Certainly, attention to the sexual aspects of narrative would fit into the general theoretical account I am developing here.
22. Freud, of course, referred to this realm beyond consciousness as the unconscious. I do not use this term because the evidence I have (here and elsewhere) deals with that which is not articulated in discourse. While it sounds paradoxical—people say what they cannot say—where else is the evidence of what cannot be said? The unconscious is those parts of discourse that are initially hidden. See Stromberg (1993, especially p. 128ff.).

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Conclusion: Some Advances in Culture Theory

Naomi Quinn, Karen Gainer Sirota and Peter G. Stromberg

Here in this Conclusion we synthesize the foregoing chapters in a way that reveals the advances they make. We start with the contribution of Roy D'Andrade's idea of *lifeworlds* to our larger project. We then consider at some length our current thinking about the previously under-analyzed concept of *internalization*. It is worth noting that both these offerings, D'Andrade's idea of lifeworlds and our take on internalization, while they may build on previous concepts, as any theoretical move inevitably does, are themselves new, in the sense that they significantly expand upon these earlier forays. Although D'Andrade, the most senior of us, had a long and productive career, this proviso is no less true

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of his fresh thoughts about lifeworlds, and our proposed applications of this concept; his previous work may have presaged this line of thought, but did not make such a singular contribution as does his chapter in this volume.

We continue with some remarks about the uses to which psychological anthropologists like ourselves have put psychodynamic constructs, our thinking about what is innate in humans and how to factor this into our theorizing, and the methods we have found suitable to this effort. Finally, in summary, we ask whether and to what degree we have succeeded in reframing our enterprise—or, in the terms of the metaphor with which we began in our Introduction, about our identification of any of the straight-edge pieces of our puzzle.

LIFEWORLDS AND INTRA-CULTURAL VARIATION

In this section we consider the implications of D'Andrade's notion, mentioned in the Introduction, that culture is organized by *lifeworlds*. This is a term he adapts from Alfred Schütz and Jürgen Habermas. D'Andrade uses the term somewhat differently than do these phenomenologists, however. His lifeworlds consist, not in "the total background ... necessary for human communication" (D'Andrade, this volume), as they would have it, but just in the cultural part of that: "*an interconnected functioning complex of values, practices, norms, sanctions, institutions, and representations intersubjectively shared by a recognized collectivity*" (D'Andrade, this volume; italics in original). This conceptualization of lifeworlds offers a solution to a persistent problem faced by culture theorists regarding how culture is distributed. Before this D'Andrade (1995: 250) himself had cautioned that we must no longer think of culture as "a thing." His ideas about lifeworlds can take us further than this. As D'Andrade conceives them, lifeworlds offer a promising way of mapping the readily observable non-homogeneity of culture, especially evident in more complex societies, to render sensible much intra-societal cultural variation. That is to say, a great deal (though certainly not all) of this cultural diversity, both across and within individuals, can be traced to the various lifeworlds in which people participate and to which they have come to feel that they belong. Importantly, each person typically occupies not one or two but multiple, and in complex societies a multitude of, lifeworlds.

Here is a first place where pieces snap together. D'Andrade's conception of lifeworlds gives us, more than just a common terminology, a way to think about the cultural specificity and intra-cultural variation of knowledge, including that which ultimately gets internalized. Thus, for example, this newly refurbished concept could explain Claudia Strauss's observation, discussed in her chapter, about the different "contexts" from which various opinions are drawn. By this reading, major sources of the contradictory opinions that Strauss's interviewees report holding simultaneously are the multiple lifeworlds to which each belongs. Indeed, Strauss (2012) elsewhere proposes a construct, that of *opinion communities*, having much in common with D'Andrade's lifeworlds.

Those who belong to such communities, Strauss observes, are familiar with the ongoing debates that distinguish that group. Members of tight opinion communities, she outlines, "mostly use the same conventional discourse," as well as sharing a common rhetorical style—both of which affirm a sense of common identity (Strauss 2012: 16). These co-members are also likely to share general schemas, though individuals may differ as to the specifics with which they endow these schemas. Members of looser opinion communities such as employees in a workplace or citizens of a nation state, while they may be familiar with others' views or at least recognize their rhetoric and ideas, can and do disagree with them.¹ Another point that Strauss makes, a significant parallel with D'Andrade's notion of lifeworlds, is that "everyone belongs to multiple opinion communities," naming a long list of examples that would also work as illustrations of different lifeworlds (Strauss 2012). Where Strauss's opinion communities differ from lifeworlds is with respect to their focus on discourse and the way it plays out in such groups. Lifeworlds, arguably, contain a wider range of practices than just discourse. Nonetheless, Strauss's delineation of opinion communities is most helpful in filling in, and persuasively illustrating, some aspects of lifeworlds that remain under-specified by D'Andrade.

D'Andrade closes his chapter with a discussion of the innately human dispositions individuals bring with them into the lifeworlds they occupy. The following chapter by Robert Paul expands upon this discussion. Both authors recognize two sets of innate human propensities, an ancestral one shared with other creatures and insuring the reproductive success of individuals and those closest kin with whom they have substantial genetic material in common; and the other, later-emerging, set

(which, D’Andrade notes, Peter Richerson and Robert Boyd designate as “tribal”) dependent upon new human cultural capacities like language, and enabling the larger groups and associations, composed of both kin and non-kin, which humans are unique in fashioning.

Tribal instincts overlay the older ones, but do not eliminate them—setting the stage, these contributors argue, for the inevitable conflicts posed by Richerson and Boyd and acknowledged by anthropologists Paul and D’Andrade in this volume—conflicts between the dynamics of these larger groups and the older more individual or “selfish” instincts. Cultural solutions to these clashes evolve. In the Introduction we mentioned Paul’s account, in his 2015 book, of the way societies have insured a relative degree of peace and cooperation—“social harmony” in his term—by organizing themselves in ways variously designed to control or at least mute the propensity of men, in particular, to engage in violent, socially disruptive competition for mates. In his chapter in this volume Paul makes clear that this male propensity for violence, although it may have had its origins in the competition for mates, is a much more general problem for the all-important maintenance of social harmony in human groups.

Edward Lowe, in his chapter, describes how other conflicts inevitably arise due to allegiance to what, in D’Andrade’s interpretation, might be regarded as the different lifeworlds of the fairly complex society that the Chon Chuuk (people of Chuuk) inhabit. These include: the wider island community of Chuuk, the lineage to which each islander belongs, the extended family of each, the church in which each worships, and so forth. The felt disjuncture Lowe describes adults as experiencing, between their abstract allegiance to the larger collectivity and the more immediate organization of everyday life and its routines, can usefully be reconceptualized as stemming from participation in what are competing lifeworlds. As will be discussed in more detail below, in later life a characteristic conflict often arises, for Chon Chuuk, between one’s loyalty to one’s local kin group and to the competing agenda of the larger, more diffuse community—which may be thought of, in D’Andrade’s rendition of it, as Chuuk civil society—the overall, most encompassing lifeworld to which most people in a given society belong. Funerary rites, we shall see, are designed to alleviate these inner conflicts.

Lowe does the important work of showing how and where an account of internalization might take up where a purely institutional one leaves off—and how each may be enriched by the other. This is the sense in

which, in our Introduction, we hailed Lowe's chapter as bridging inquiries that specify the institutional preconditions for cultural knowledge and those that investigate its psychological meaning for the people living in a given lifeworld. The former is represented in Lowe's formulation by the well-known work of philosopher John Searle (2010); the latter by Spiro's (1987, 1997) conceptualization of internalization. As Lowe (this volume) puts it with regard to the philosopher's theory of status functions, "Searle is describing the processes whereby humans create institutional realities from cultural propositions" and he does so "by imposing 'functions on objects or people where the objects and the people cannot perform the functions solely in virtue of their physical structure' (Searle 2010: 7)." As Lowe later (this volume) elaborates,

... Searle (2010: 57, emphasis in the original) notes that "institutional structures require *collective recognition* by the participants in the institution in order to function, but particular transactions within the institution require *cooperation*" in which the members engage in different tasks in the service of achieving a jointly shared goal. This distinction is important for my argument here because, as Searle goes on to claim, "full blown cooperative collective intentionality...is often necessary for the creation of the institution." In other words, the internalization of a cultural proposition would need to include how it relates to one's sense of self from the standpoint of one's cooperative (or non-cooperative) engagements with other persons, objects, and entities as they are elaborated through a cultural system of status functions and associated deontic powers...

Lowe (this volume) then observes,

Searle does not develop an account of how collective intentionality comes about as a psychological capacity shared among individuals cooperating in the social production of institutional reality. However, Spiro (1987, 1997) has developed just such an account in his theory of cultural reproduction.

Thus the two accounts, one by Searle and the other by Melford Spiro, are complementary in the sense that Spiro recasts Searle's institutional requirements in psychological terms. Firstly, the cultural existence of what Searle terms Status Function Declarations involves, Spiro notes, processes of transmission to novices. Secondly, such propositions must be not only recognized, but also endowed with sufficient conviction and commitment to ensure collaboration in their collective enactment.

In Searle's terms, this is "we' intentionality." In Spiro's more psychological rendition, these propositions have become deeply motivating for individuals in the group—that is, they have been, by Spiro's definition (cited in the Introduction) "internalized." As we have indicated, Lowe's account bridges the two. It is true that Spiro's treatment of internalization does not bring us any closer to an explanation of how it comes about (see the Introduction for this point). Nevertheless, Spiro has made a signal contribution to psychological anthropology by calling attention to internalization and marking it as a necessary component of any theory of culture. This volume's endeavor to explain widely shared internalization is a tribute to his initial parsing of it.

Observations set out by Paul in his chapter can also benefit from reconceptualization in terms of lifeworlds. For example, the physically instantiated "public arena," accessible to all, that is to be found in small societies and isolated communities, may take pride of place among lifeworlds in these groups. Although it is not the only lifeworld to be found in such societies, where such a public arena exists its social significance looms large, as suggested by the litany of social emotions commonly on display there, quoted from Paul's chapter in the Introduction. Equally, the lifeworlds concept also makes sense of the complexity of the "cultural systems" that Paul (this volume) sees as pertaining in contemporary societies, up to "the vast multitude of competing roles composing" these societies. Much if not all of this complexity, including the variety of competing roles in these systems, and the contradictions posed by these many roles, can be understood in terms of the multiplicity of lifeworlds that exist in such societies.

In these complex societies, as noted too in the Introduction, there may be no single physical public arena to which the entire community is privy. Paul suggests, instead, that in such societies what operates as a "public arena" may be virtual or even imaginary—though no less real in people's minds. Different lifeworlds, of course, may feature their own public spaces, and these, like family dinners in the lifeworld of the American household, may carry general sociocultural messages (e.g., in this case as to how recent experiences and current events should be interpreted in terms of broad cultural themes such as success and failure; see Ochs et al. 1992 and Ochs and Taylor 1995, for pertinent examples). However, the entire community may not have access to such places even when they do exist (in the example Paul offers, for instance, women are excluded from Balinese cockfights). Nor do events in all such public spaces always promote general cultural

messages. (One has only to think of commercial establishments like restaurants, in which messages between staff and customers have mostly to do with a fairly narrow and somewhat dated set of restaurant interactions.)

In sum, D'Andrade's proposal recommends itself for capturing, not only the sheer complexity that societies can exhibit, but, too, contradictions inevitably bred by this complexity: the contradictions that arise, as Paul stresses, from the multiple roles that adhere to these many alternative lifeworlds; from the differing beliefs, as reported by Strauss, that may result from membership in different lifeworlds conceived of as opinion communities; and from the inner conflicts, reported by Lowe, that may arise as a result of individuals' competing allegiances to more than one lifeworld. As D'Andrade comments in his volume chapter, "sometimes people experience strong conflict when different values are salient in different lifeworlds." We can extend this observation to conflict, not just between different values, but between, say, the different agendas to which Lowe refers, which may make competing demands on one's participation or resources, such as time or food, for example. The larger point that the authors of this Conclusion want to emphasize is that social practices and more enduring social institutions associated with different lifeworlds have a critical place in a comprehensive culture theory. This interface between institutions and those who participate in them, lifeworlds and the psychology of their individual members—with the diverse roles they play, beliefs they harbor, and allegiances they hold dear—is much in need of future investigation.

The construct of lifeworlds helps to reframe the remainder of this volume's chapters in helpful ways as well. In Karen Sirota's and Bambi Chapin's accounts, mothers and other significant child socializers have a special role to play, mentoring children into their earliest lifeworlds, the households and/or other institutions in which they are growing up. These caregivers develop in children the proper orientations to such lifeworlds and, possibly also, to related other ones that they imagine the children encountering in the future. In Sirota's case, this first lifeworld is that of the middle-class American family; one of the many in which these children growing up in the United States will eventually find themselves enmeshed. Just one other of these other contemporary American lifeworlds is that of the therapy session, a sampling of which Stromberg's chapter is concerned. By comparison with these two cases, the Sri Lankan children of Chapin's ethnography are immersed in the less diverse, more integrated world of their village—perhaps, in D'Andrade's terms,

a community comprising a relatively small number of lifeworlds—possibly even having one primary public arena in common. It is certainly true that other lifeworlds impinge. Indeed, Sri Lankan children watch television and, when they are older, go on Facebook. They get to know a strange anthropologist from elsewhere, and may even grow up to work abroad. Nevertheless, the cultural traditions of their home village—embraced in a smattering of lifeworlds—are paramount in their early lives.

Sirota (this volume) provides a close description of how children's enculturation into the appropriate orientation to a lifeworld might actually occur. As will be discussed in more detail below, this process involves both explicit and implicit priming of children's organization of attention, so that they learn to become "mindful of perceptually and culturally salient aspects of the social, emotional, and material environs." Parent (in this case) and child establish a common frame of reference that shapes participants' *oeuvre* of culturally comprehensible interpretive resources and actions "vis-à-vis the situational field." Here is being suggested a vantage point from which these environs and this situational field can be understood as important components of a lifeworld in which these young children are immersed.

As Naomi Quinn illustrates with the example of American marriage, a lifeworld such as this one has its own dynamic—in her terms, it is motivated by a distinctive overarching cultural schema. At the same time, the schema for such a lifeworld often draws upon larger themes that may also animate other lifeworlds, even the whole of civil society. As D'Andrade (this volume) notes,

Most people seem to move from one lifeworld to another without even noticing. This non-awareness is aided by the fact that some values were important in both lifeworlds. Being responsible and honest, for example, are salient across a wide variety of lifeworlds ...

Thus D'Andrade's rendition of lifeworlds gracefully explains something else, in addition to cultural variation and contradiction, something that Strauss and Quinn (1997) referred to as cultural thematicity. The concept of lifeworlds furthers our appreciation for how such cultural themes are distributed. Again, this observation is not limited to values. For example, Quinn (this volume) identifies a very general American strategy for dealing with difficulties—attempting to overcome them through their own efforts—that her interviewees routinely applied to difficulties that arose in marriages.

Another proviso to D'Andrade's characterization of lifeworlds—a point made by Paul (this volume) with regard to sociocultural systems more generally—is that, while, as Paul asserts, culture cannot be reduced to individuals, neither, he recognizes, can individuals be eliminated from the picture. For individuals are agents unto themselves. As agents, they do not typically drift passively from one lifeworld to another (Holly Mathews, personal communication). Instead, they often selectively apply understandings borne of prior experience that seems to them to resonate with that encountered in the new lifeworld. Thus marital events must be perceived to be difficulties in order for the more general strategy for dealing with difficulties to pertain to the particular lifeworld of marriage. Indeed, such selective interpretation of new situations may be the very instigator of the spread of an understanding from one lifeworld to another.

Lifeworlds may come to share values and other components (such as, we have seen, agendas, strategies, or self-understandings) with other lifeworlds, in at least two other ways. Sometimes, we can imagine, these components have simply been the same from the beginning. (Perhaps the two lifeworlds were once one, and split, or one hived off from the other? It would be hard to reconstruct what had happened.) Another common way lifeworlds come to share components, D'Andrade (this volume) observes, is their spread through colonization—a concept he attributes to Habermas. In this case, components from one lifeworld infiltrate another. D'Andrade notes how upsetting such colonization can be, as it is to faculty when, in the familiar example he offers, their university begins to behave more like a business in search of profit than an institution of higher learning in search of academic excellence. Colonization may thus be the work of one set of people, while others also belonging to the lifeworld being colonized may not favor it, and may even resist it.

However widespread cultural themes may be, neither that idea nor the concept of lifeworlds requires any assumption that a society be cohesive overall. Recognition of this point is all the more important because contemporary theories of culture that emanate from psychological anthropology are often assumed to share with theories associated with some versions of its predecessor, known as personality and culture, a requirement that culture be bounded and homogeneous. However, given the way cultural themes are distributed across lifeworlds, this thematicity may be more or less far-reaching. That is, themes may extend across a few

lifeworlds or many. Equally, themes may be restricted, not just to one given lifeworld, but only to particular subsets of those who inhabit that lifeworld, or to particular aspects of the shared experience of inhabitants. In the limiting case, a theme, and the experience that generated it, may be wholly idiosyncratic to the life of an individual. It is true that particular themes may extend broadly across a civil society, indeed, some are likely to do so. But only some themes will be so extended—giving cultures a patchwork quality rather than a homogeneous look. This is a picture supported by cultural schema theory and the synaptic plasticity that underlies that approach, to be described in the next section.

INTERNALIZATION THROUGH SHARED EXPERIENCE

We turn now to the question of how the understandings that individuals share with others in their lifeworlds get under each of their skins. We remind the reader of the plain definition of internalization that anthropologists and other social scientists commonly use, and that we set out in our Introduction—as that which people take to be true. The simplest way that such internalization becomes shared or collective is directly through the sharing of experience. This understanding of how culture comes to be not just around us but within us is the one that has been relied upon by cultural schema theorists, including volume contributors Strauss and Quinn (1997).

Here we briefly summarize that theory. It derives from an approach positing that the brain does the largest share of its work by means of networks of neural associations first modeled by artificial intelligence researchers and commonly known in that field as “parallel distributed processing” or “connectionism”—the approach readers encountered in the story about the Google initiative told in the Introduction. As this theory goes, neural connections strengthen with activation (or weaken with disuse), a process known as synaptic plasticity, or as (after the first neurobiologist to identify the phenomenon) Hebb’s Law, captured in the old neurobiologists’ saw, “Neurons that fire together wire together.” In this view, experience is represented in the brain as clusters of such neural associations, known as *schemas*. The way neurons fire is such that even when only some of the original stimuli re-occur, the entire assemblage or schema is invoked (see Strauss, this volume).

Strauss and Quinn’s approach to culture piggybacked on this theory, adding the deceptively simple codicil that when two or more people have

the same or similar experiences, they end up with the same or similar representations of it—or what they called cultural schemas. As Westen (2001: 34) has elsewhere put it, in this view “what we mean when we say that cultural beliefs and values are ‘internalized’” is that “they are literally built into associative networks.” As with the schemas held by individuals who do not necessarily share them with anyone else, the durability of cultural schemas depends on strengthening either by frequent repetition or (as outlined in the Introduction) by emotional arousal, and often also on their acquisition during formative periods in a person’s life, when these clusters of associations lay down an initial substratum of cultural knowledge.

One beauty of this approach is that schemas, including cultural schemas, reflect all kinds of co-occurring experience: not just what is happening in the outside world and people’s cognitions about this, but also the emotions they feel and the motivations that arise while they are having this experience. Some contributors, notably Sirota, Stromberg, and Lowe (as already noted, in the Introduction, regarding the latter’s use of the term “embodied habitus”), emphasize the need to expand our understanding of what gets internalized even further beyond thought, emotion, and motivation. What must be included, as well, are other embodied aspects of experience. Theorists advocating these extensions suggest a suite of approaches often captured in terms such as “embodiment,” “enactment” or “extended mind.” Pieces of the culture theory puzzle having to do with these “extended” aspects of experience are currently being filled in by psychological anthropologists who are concerned with them. Such expansions are unproblematic for schema theory; indeed, the theory might have been tailored to it. Schemas, including cultural schemas, are inherently open to every manner of experience; they are, in Sirota’s term, Gestalts. Sirota’s notions about configurational acquisition of culture, we will see, assume that much of this cultural learning occurs implicitly, and her approach to these “Gestalts” shares this orientation with that of those who use the term “embodiment” to describe their focus. More generally, she and they both adopt a broad-based conception of culture that embraces tacit modes of communication and ways of knowing, alongside more explicitly cognized ones.

Suffice it to say here that Strauss and Quinn (1997) never argued or intended that cultural schema theory be limited to what has sometimes been characterized as “cold” cognition. Perhaps because at mid-century a sub-discipline known in its day as “cognitive anthropology” was

influential, and cultural schema theory is associated with that school of thought, subsequent anthropologists have continued to file this theory in the “cognitive” folder.² Perhaps its borrowing from a theory about the brain leaves it vulnerable to this assumption. Or perhaps older theories always find themselves over-simplified in this way. However, cultural schema theory, much to its advantage, is far more open and flexible than the label “cognitive” would imply.

A further advantage of the cultural schema approach is that it deals effortlessly with cultural variation. “Culture,” in this view, is anything but homogeneous. It is only as shared as experience is, and only by those who have shared that experience. As Strauss and Quinn wrote, anticipating D’Andrade’s point about membership in multiple lifeworlds,

an implication of our view is that cultures are not bounded and separable. You share some experiences with people who listen to the same music or watch the same television shows you do, other experiences with people who do the same work you do, and still others with people who have had formal schooling like yours, even if you live on opposite sides of the world. This makes each person a junction point for an infinite number of partially overlapping cultures. (Strauss and Quinn 1997: 7)

(Immediately these authors offer the qualification that, of course, context greatly affects the specific knowledge that people acquire from any such experience.)

In this way of thinking about cultural variation, diverse cultural schemas of the sort to which Strauss and Quinn refer in the quote above may be understood as being associated with different lifeworlds. At its limits, then, a pair of people, such as two siblings, may be said to share a lifeworld unique to themselves; or, at the other end of the continuum, an entire population such as the inhabitants of a nation state may share the same civil society or overarching lifeworld. However, there are limits to such uniqueness and such sharing. Not only, as has already been remarked, are lifeworlds likely to have some values or other components in common with other lifeworlds; it is also the case, as Strauss reminds us in her chapter, that even shared experiences, say, of those who inhabit the same lifeworld, are never completely shared, because different individuals bring different cognitive, emotional, motivational, perceptual, life historical, and other embodied responses to the same external conditions.

Strauss's volume chapter and that by Quinn both illustrate as well that the implicit assumptions in discourse can be no less subtle and unconscious than those reflected in more "embodied" modes such as perception and physical movement. Strauss (2005) stresses methods of discourse analysis that highlight subtleties in cultural learning. She deconstructs Bronislaw Malinowski's famous admonition to study "the native's point of view." That point of view, he had said, "is complicated because of the way personal meaning systems are constructed from public culture" (quoted in Strauss, this volume). One of those complications that Strauss (this volume) examines is that "beliefs are internalized in different ways." For one example, she distinguishes two types of covert assumptions. The first consists of tacit presuppositions underlying what is said. These are beliefs that people would assent to, if asked, but that are so taken for granted that they do not normally need saying. The second kind of covert assumption consists of implicit associations that may contradict people's conscious beliefs and explicit statements, as studies of stereotyping have found.

Furthermore, in Strauss's view, which we flagged in the Introduction as being contrary to that of Spiro and D'Andrade, beliefs that one explicitly recognizes but does not hold oneself should be considered to be just as internalized as are those that one does believe. Instead, Spiro's and D'Andrade's definition seems to exclude a mere declarative version of what is "right" and "true"—that which is explicitly considered to be so—in favor of that which motivates a person more or less powerfully. To be sure, D'Andrade's narrower definition does make sense in terms of his conclusion that the "cultural shaping of the emotions gives certain cultural representations emotional *force*, in that individuals experience the truth and rightness of certain ideas as emotions *within* themselves—as something internal to themselves" (D'Andrade 1995: 229; italics in original). So, in this view, only beliefs that have this emotional force for their holder become internalized. Unfortunately, this is a somewhat circular and over-general assertion, pushing the theoretical burden off onto emotion, yet without clearly specifying how emotions themselves get to be "within" individuals.³

These beliefs that one knows others hold but to which one does not oneself subscribe, and that Strauss chooses to regard as also being internalized, may sometimes, she observes, have a "canned" quality when described by interviewees; they may even be explicitly rejected by them. Yet, there is still good reason to acknowledge that those who currently

only know *of* a belief or who just pay lip service to it have, in an important sense, internalized it. For one thing, these kinds of beliefs (or *opinions*, the more encompassing term that Strauss chooses to call them) may still have significance for their holder—perhaps even “negative” significance in the sense that the person regards such a belief or opinion as differentiating him—or herself from others who do not contest it. For another, the “level” at which a given belief is held may change—either over the lifetime of its holder, or under the influence of the context in which that person invokes it. Strauss stresses this point about context in her volume chapter and throughout her work. Moreover, as sociologist Orlando Patterson (2014: 12) points out, the mere espousal of a given value, whether it is truly believed or not by the one who publicizes it, may influence others to believe it. Too, he (Patterson 2014: 16) adds, people may be especially likely to avoid expressing any cynicism they might feel toward a value they espouse, for fear of undermining a project that depends upon the cooperation of others who do adhere to this value.

Strauss (this volume) is emphatic on a related point, too: She cautions against studying *only* people’s implicit understandings to the neglect of their more explicitly held ones. Admittedly, though, as Strauss suggests, in practice psychological anthropologists may have over-stressed the implicit in correcting for the tendency of other social scientists to overlook it. Quinn’s chapter in this volume can be read as an example of this unrelenting focus on the implicit. Her analysis stresses, to the point of perhaps over-relying on, that which is implicitly understood. Quinn compares her analysis of interviews with Americans, on the topic of marriage, to one that sociologist Ann Swidler has applied to similar interviews. She concludes that Swidler misses the larger cultural model underlying this talk about love and marriage because that model is implicit in what her interviewees say, while the sociologist focuses largely on the overt content of their interview discourse, overlooking the covert assumptions that they make. Quinn’s uncovering of this covert meaning depended upon its reconstruction from such linguistic clues as the metaphors speakers pick to reinforce what they intend to convey and the reasoning they do at the speed of speech, as well as the assumptions they make about marital love, equally implicit in this talk (Quinn 2005a). This is not to say that Quinn would advocate ignoring the overt content of discourse that funds Swidler’s analysis; in practice, however, her analysis largely favors the implicit.

It needs to be added, finally, that the cultural schema theory to which Strauss and Quinn subscribe has not, on its own, necessarily improved upon earlier renditions of internalization. It does, to be sure, point in the direction of a key process, synaptic plasticity, that appears to underlie how experiences of all kinds, cognitive, emotional, motivational, and so forth, become related in clusters or schemas—both when such knowledge is individual and when it is shared or cultural. In this sense, such mental schemas may be regarded as being “internalized.” However, schema theorists no less than other theoreticians have all too often used this cover term, “internalization,” as a gloss for something really not well understood—rather than unpacking the process to which it refers in order to explore how it comes about (see Quinn 2011: 249 for this point about the organization of shared schemas more generally)—leaving it pretty much a black box. As will be discussed in the next section, the next chapters in this volume make considerable progress in cracking open the black box to see more of what is inside.

INTERNALIZATION BY CULTURAL TRANSMISSION

If the public arena that Paul describes is one important locale (or set of locales) in which community members are exposed to what is culturally expected of them, another key time and place—and the one where they ordinarily first encounter these cultural expectations—is in their socialization as children. As Paul (this volume) conceptualizes the two, information imparted during a child’s socialization and that which is gleaned from the public arena are two alternative sources of culture. (In making this distinction, Paul comes down squarely on the side of those who would recognize public performances as a separate category of cultural transmission, a position alluded to in the Introduction.) The final process of internalization we will consider, deliberate transmission by socializers, is addressed most fully in the next two chapters, both on child rearing, by Chapin and Sirota. Not only do these two chapters explore this kind of transmission of culture, they also bring home the outsized importance of studying childhood, providing as it does such an unparalleled window into when and how culture is acquired. As Chapin (this volume) puts it, anthropological “research with children has crucial lessons to teach us about how culture works, how individuals take it up and use it, and how it shapes us in culturally patterned ways.” Our predecessors the culture and personality theorists, who shaped our sub-discipline so

profoundly (see LeVine 2010), realized this; contemporary cross-cultural students of childhood know it; but the importance of studying how children are brought up should be more widely recognized, and the research opportunity it provides pursued more widely today. Interestingly, too, the next chapter by Stromberg can equally be said to address transmission, if in a more unusual context and form—that is, the exchange between therapist and patient in a dynamic therapy session. The discussion to follow turns to these three final chapters, to detail the contribution of each and to summarize what, taken together, we think they add up to.

The caution needs to be added that some public activities, such as the custom of family dinners introduced earlier as an example of a public arena in the lifeworld of the American household, may serve simultaneously—as suggested by the examples we gave of testing children at the dinner table on their knowledge and interpretation of events—as important times and places for child socialization. Opportunities for such socialization are often clustered in a lifeworld especially designed for this purpose, but often also, and in some societies more so than others, these occasions spill over into others, perhaps even in other lifeworlds.

As already suggested, the examples of transmission in the ethnographies told in these three final chapters are no less subtle and non-conscious than those from Quinn's and Strauss's analyses of interview discourse. Thus, these anthropologists tell of practices so habitual and so seamlessly integrated into daily life that even their purveyors themselves do not have names for them and do not otherwise explicitly recognize them. These differ from the more explicit disciplinary practices described by Quinn (2005b), that are carried out by design with deliberate intent, such as Chinese "opportunity education" (Fung 1999) or Inuit "causing someone to think" (Briggs 1998), with the goal of making the child into the kind of adult valued in that society. Jean Briggs has termed these latter occasions "dramas," capturing the fact that they are discrete child socialization modules intentionally designed and deliberately enacted for this purpose.⁴

Chapin's (this volume) ethnographic account of Sri Lankan childhood (a fuller version of which appears in her 2014 book) is replete with such small, implicit practices. An exquisite example from her chapter is feeding, which is done the Sri Lankan way, by hand—as Chapin describes it, mothers "rolling little balls of rice and curry together with their finger tips and popping them into the open mouths of their waiting children." This manner of feeding children struck Chapin especially forcefully because she was seeing it in contrast to her middle-class American way of

negotiating with her own young son, who accompanied her in the field, over what he was willing to eat.

The important point we want to make about Chapin's description of Sri Lanka child rearing is this: This way of feeding children, coupled with a similar style of breastfeeding them, toilet-training them, putting them to sleep, and other parallel practices, conveys a larger, if implicit, message to these children, about a distinctively Sri Lankan cultural model of hierarchically ranked relationships. Says Chapin (this volume):

In this cultural model of hierarchy that children in Sri Lanka are deriving, good caregivers know what their children need and what is best for them, and good caregivers provide that. Good children trust their caretakers to know what they need better than they do themselves, and wait for it to be given. In these encounters, it is not only food that is being provided, but nurturance and care, love and safety and approval.

In other words, these children are imbibing, through such small daily practices, a particular nurturing kind of hierarchy. It is a model of nurturant hierarchy that pervades not only Sri Lankan childhood but, thereafter, all of Sri Lankan life. Children first learn it through what Chapin calls "assembly" of caretaking from different domains of experience, disparate except in all carrying the same message that the caretaker knows, and will provide, what is best for them in that moment. It needs to be stressed that these adult caregivers are not, by any means, deliberately teaching this larger model or the value it embodies. As they go about their day, they—like caregivers everywhere—just interact with the children under their care in ways that make sense to them.

In her chapter in this volume, Sirota reports on another emotionally powerful set of child rearing practices: the bedtime routines of middle-class families in Los Angeles. Like Chapin's and other contributors', her analysis depends on largely tacit interactions—in this case all among nuclear family members—that Sirota is able to capture through fine-grained, skilled observation, in this instance from videotape, literally moment-by-moment. She calls these "configurational learning processes" (Sirota, this volume).⁵ As she (this volume) explains, this

learning depends, first, on the cultural shaping of attentional processes, as children are mentored into culturally recognizable ways of perceiving, feeling, and behaving. Concurrently, intersubjective attunement facilitates

configurational learning. Caregiver and child thereby orchestrate a consensually shared frame of reference that sets a feeling tone and moral valence for apperception, understanding, and action.

For example, parents orient children to culturally salient bedtime practices by apprenticing them into relaxed bodily techniques for falling and staying asleep and by pairing these with soothing parent-child activities, such as bedtime stories and quiet talks together, that bridge the energetic pace of daytime and the more sedate rhythms of nighttime. Children experience these regularly co-occurring inputs as a culturally meaningful configuration, or whole, that shapes and affirms a seemingly “natural” albeit culturally constructed constellation of sleep. The experiences described by Sirota form configurations because, occurring as they do all in close temporal succession, they cohere in an all-at-once manner. The experiential components that enter into such configurations become heightened and linked through co-occurring affective qualities, such as inferred intention or feeling tone.

To be clear, the process of learning by configuration that Sirota describes and that of assembly described by Chapin are two sides of the same coin—ultimately, simply a matter of analytic focus. What gets assembled are experiences that occur at different times in different contexts, but that are perceived as being alike in some important respect. Thus, Chapin focuses on a full array of child rearing practices that transpire separately, often in different domains of everyday life—and through which children’s understandings accrue and transform over time. Because these events share some prominent feature—in the Sri Lankan case we are considering, the content and style of the way care of all kinds is administered—they are “assembled” in the mind of the child experiencing them, adding up to a more general lesson—in this case about the ideal nature of hierarchical relationships. Neurally connected in this way, they form a cultural schema. Were Chapin to have recounted additional details about each of these practices—of feeding, toileting, and so forth—she would have likely conveyed the Gestalt-like or configurational nature of the child’s experience of each. Among the components of each of these Sri Lankan child rearing practices that presumably would have been captured in such a whole, would likely have been all the messages, explicit and implicit, including feeling tone and attentional orientation and the like, that are distinctive of this cultural brand of nurturant hierarchy. Sirota’s emphasis is on this Gestalt, a wave of experiences all part of the same event and absorbed by the child as a whole.

Together these experiences too form a schema—presumably also a cultural one, most of these American middle-class children being exposed to similar—in this case, bedtime—experiences. Had Sirota included other parental child rearing practices for comparative analysis, she would likely have observed, and been able to follow out, distinctively American threads common to some or all of them, as did Chapin for the Sri Lankan case.

The hustle and bustle of everyday lived experience may obscure the practical distinction between these two varieties of internalization. Furthermore, these two processes of assembly and configurational learning often transpire together. So it is that, when the child in Sirota's extended example reports to his mother at bedtime that he is not tired, she reminds him of getting into his bath just earlier, when he *was* falling asleep. She says explicitly, "Let me bring you back to that time" (Sirota, this volume). The example from Stromberg's chapter to be considered next provides additional illustrations of the intermingling of these two processes, one based on assembly of the remembered past and present experience, and the other on the Gestalts of those past experiences.

Stromberg's take on narrative draws on two dynamic therapy sessions that he himself conducted and on which he took notes, during his long-ago postdoctoral training. One of these sessions prominently features an extended dream narrative, the other several different narratives of early experiences. As mentioned in the Introduction, in his approach to these narratives Stromberg calls on simulation theory, which suggests "that a reader or listener is able to put herself in the position depicted in the narrative and to understand the world from that point of view" (Stromberg, this volume). Such re-imaginings are not just abstractly remembered; the entire experience of the original event, bodily as well as cognitively or mentally, is re-invoked in this simulation, Stromberg reminds us. Though he identifies his approach with one of "embodiment," Stromberg's effort is to integrate that position with more classical, cognition-based approaches rather than rejecting the latter out of hand as many embodiment theorists are all too inclined to do. To be exact, he (this volume) concludes that "therapeutic efficacy may consist in shifting one's embodied experience of a situation to a more abstract and symbolic understanding."

Each narrative configures into a schema, evoking the richness of all the actual happenings and the feelings and motivations and so forth that come along with the original experience being narrated. Narratives, whatever cultural conventions they incorporate, are inherently configurational in Sirota's term, in that they provide a coherent vehicle for

organizing together disparate aspects of lived experience (see Ricouer 1981 for a compatible view). Equally, they are recollected and revived on the occasion of new events or understandings or memories that share key features with the prior one. In Chapin's term, then, the stories that Stromberg's patients link together, and link to the present, are also assembled across times. Thus the schema that results takes its *configurational* nature from its original source, and its *assembled* nature from the evocation of this earlier event by salient features of new events (or new narratives or memories of the prior events) that make these reminiscent of the original experience being recalled.

The neural explanation that we have provided for these observations of child rearing and therapeutic intervention depends upon the cultural schema theory introduced in the previous section of this Conclusion. We want to stress this point: that the three kinds of internalization we have distinguished here for analytic purposes—that which results from experiences shared by happenstance, and those we have called assembly and configuration, resulting from practices of transmission by child rearers or other agents of socialization and that engineer the patterns of that experience—all arise from the same underlying process of synaptic plasticity.

What justifies a separate section for internalization by transmission is its significance. At this juncture, readers should be reminded of our point about the importance of studying childhood—a maxim that Stromberg's contribution expands to include all such occasions for intentional transmission. These practices of transmission do not just pattern experience, but are engineered to do so in distinctive ways. That is, each invokes, in LeVine and Norman's (2001: 84) felicitous term, a particular "culture's model of virtue," that socializers are transmitting. Therefore these practices shine a light on key cultural values underlying them, values that socializers think important to transmit, and that often amount to enduring, profound cultural themes that characterize given lifeworlds or may be even more widespread. Thus the distinction between internalization by simply having shared the same experience and that by someone's having engineered that experience is a productive one for analytic purposes. It is not always easy to notice, however. Transmitted lessons need not be taught discursively or even explicitly. What we have already noted about the importance of implicit understandings is well-illustrated by these two cases. That is, neither the purveyor of the lesson nor the analyst observer may even be aware of the message being assembled or the configuration being enacted.

PSYCHODYNAMIC PROCESSES

One other explanatory thread in these chapters is the application of theory about psychodynamics. What follows might have been appended instead to the earlier section on “Internalization through Shared Experience.” That is to say, psychodynamic theory deals with a subset of internalized thoughts, emotions, motivations, and embodied experiences—ones that result from certain kinds of conflictual experiences and then find psychic resolution in defenses and other psychodynamic strategies. Indeed, such strategies as cultural defenses (to be discussed shortly at greater length) are good examples of internalization that arises when individuals, usually members of the same group, share the same or similar experiences. In this case, however, the experiences are conflictual ones. Just as other shared experiences become embedded in cultural beliefs and practices, when certain conflictual experiences are shared, and prove irresolvable by any other coping mechanism, they are likely to result in shared (that is, cultural) psychodynamic solutions. Given how central psychodynamic assumptions are to the analyses in some of these chapters, and in psychological anthropology at large today (for a recent summary, see Gammeltoft and Segal 2016), psychodynamics seem deserving of their own section.

However, though some volume contributors explicitly signal the importance of considering psychodynamics (see, especially, Chapin’s, Lowe’s, and Quinn’s chapters), not all uniformly spell out explicitly or develop fully this analytic component of their arguments. Here we will attempt to tease it out even when the author does not mark it. It is also interesting to note that of the volume contributors who rely in their work on psychodynamic insights, Paul, Sirota, and Stromberg come by this interest via psychoanalytic training.⁶ As Stromberg tells it, psychoanalytic assumptions have simply become part of his thinking. Others of us turned to psychodynamic explanations simply because our ethnographic analyses begged for them.⁷

Psychodynamic processes arise out of felt conflict. Psychic conflicts are highly motivating, and thus the situations that evoke psychodynamics are usually of that sort. Finally, these conflicts and the psychodynamic solutions they engender routinely remain hidden or disguised. That is to say, like much of what contributors to this volume describe, they are implicit, and in Freudian terms, unconscious. Possible reasons for the implicit nature of psychodynamic processes will be considered below, in

connection with Stromberg's chapter. All these features of the cases contributors report on—conflict, strong motivation, and implicit assumptions—animate the applications of psychodynamic processes described in these pages.

It is because Stromberg's patients felt conflicted about past relationships that they remembered past events and imported narratives of these into the present situation, their therapy session. A key contribution of his chapter is the re-interpretation of what is happening in transference, an idea at the heart of Freud's clinical method. Freud's assumption was that transference was a tendency to respond to new people one encountered—often including but not limited to one's therapist—in the same ways as one had to earlier ones. Stromberg focuses on the narratives patients tell in the context of this therapeutic relationship. Earlier in this Conclusion we noted Stromberg's argument that, in simulating an earlier event, the therapy patient re-lives the entire experience—and that the therapist's role may be to help the patient understand that experience in a more “symbolic” or cognitive way. He goes on to probe this therapeutic intervention more deeply, suggesting that its underlying meaning is ordinarily concealed from the patient; the help the therapist provides is in aiding the patient's understanding of what it is about. Patients, Stromberg (this volume) says,

create narratives in which they can comfortably dwell, ones that construe an aspect of the present in ways that provide familiarity and emotional gratification rooted in the past. In my role as therapist, I attempt to help them see aspects of their own activity that have heretofore been cloaked. It is only when the patients recognize what they have been doing that they have the choice of changing it. Specifically, they could occupy this narrative in a new way: They could choose not to walk away from the situations that both frighten and attract them.

This interpretation enables Stromberg to explain yet another feature of therapy as well. It is because the way they initially “occupy” these narratives is embodied—and not purely cognitive—that patients may find themselves unable to change a pattern of behavior even after they recognize the need to do so. For the embodied part of that experience is inaccessible to conscious control—and hence, to the deliberate alteration that would require such conscious control. More generally, a promising contribution to psychoanalytic theory is Stromberg's insight that therapeutic

events, such as transference, depend on a basic ability to simulate the world, past and present, in all its embodied fullness. It is Stromberg's grounding in ethnographic description and analysis that enables him to step back from classical psychoanalytic explanations and come up with a more satisfying one of his own.

Does Stromberg's re-interpretation of transference extend beyond the therapy session? There is a hint of such an extension in Sirota's chapter. Says one Los Angeles mother in the body of data she analyzes (Sirota, this volume), about soothing her son to sleep,

"I remember feeling worried as a child. Waking up in the middle of the night and feeling startled" Jeri avers, "and it soothes me, too, every time I put Nolan to sleep." Jeri's affectively charged childhood memories are akin to those expressed by other study participants—and they fuel her resolve to mentor her son's acquisition of self-soothing capacities to aid his sense of comfort at night.

It seems that the "affectively charged childhood memories" of this mother and other adults in the study may work in the same way as the remembered narratives of Stromberg's patients. That is, they are simulations, in all their embodied fullness. Moreover, analyzed in this way, the case of child caregiving suggests a different possibility for healing than that of dynamic therapy. Could it be that bringing up one's own children accomplishes healing of one's own childhood wounds? Just so, this mother, Jeri, in soothing her own son to sleep, feels the soothing that she missed when she, as a child herself, woke up startled and worried in the night. The "treatment" in this case seems to be compensation for needs felt to have been unmet in one's own childhood.⁸ The compensatory experiences associated with child rearing differ from the insights gained through psychotherapy in being as fully embodied as the original childhood experience that is being remembered; thus they may not depend upon being translated into expressly cognitive terms, as is so in therapeutic intervention. Sometimes, however, parents are explicit about bringing up their own children differently than how they were raised. Even further, perhaps bringing up one's own children always involves transference dynamics and healing.

Stromberg's patients wish to change patterns of behavior that they have come to view as dysfunctional; these behaviors signal conflict between the way they are and the way they want to be. Other chapters

deal with conflict within individuals over contradictory external requirements, including cultural dictates, imposed upon them. Such conflicts frequently result in the development of cultural attempts to resolve to them—what Melford Spiro (most fully in his 1965 paper) famously termed “culturally constituted defense mechanisms,” and what more recent writers, like Quinn in this volume, have tended to shorten to “cultural defenses.” Such defenses figure in the analyses offered by both Lowe’s chapter and hers.

A cultural defense that is the focus of Lowe’s analysis is the Chuuk funerary rite, of which he ended up attending so many. As touched on earlier in this Conclusion, in connection with the concept of lifeworlds, Lowe argues that performance of these rites lessens the tension that arises for Chuuk people over their inevitable conflicts between generalized and localized collective interest, or between the urge for “communitas” and the desire to fulfill local everyday needs of a more personal nature. It is of interest that, in bringing this interpretation to Chuuk funerary rites, Lowe is reframing the dialectic Turner poses and with which Lowe himself begins, in a new, more explicitly psychological way—in Spiro’s terms, as a “culturally constituted defense mechanism.”⁹

This analysis of funerals in one society dovetails nicely with another way of thinking, suggested by Paul in his volume chapter, about ritual more generally—as a collective activity that may seem to be performed largely for its own sake, but has a much larger significance. Says Paul (this volume) memorably, a ritual is “the place where the sociality of a sociocultural system recreates itself; rituals are the reproductive organs, so to speak, of human societies” (this last a reference to the parallel genetic reproduction of individuals in Dual Inheritance Theory and like biological approaches). In line with this view of ritual, Lowe describes how one key component of Chuuk funerary rites, breadfruit, symbolically expresses unity through the metaphor of its transformation in preparation—the fusion of fruits harvested from many different tree branches into a single smooth cooked and pounded mash. Another unifying feature of the funerals that Lowe witnessed was the procession of attendees who had come to say farewell, and whose hymn-singing voices, Lowe relates, added “a stoic unity as a counterpoint to the grief-stricken crying and wailing” of immediate relatives. Still another opportunity that funerary rites provide in support of unification comes in the stereotypical speeches that typically end them, given by lineage and other leaders, chiding people for having been separate, unresponsive, and disagreeable in everyday life, and reminding

the assembled of their connectedness “as a single, related people or *chó*” (Lowe, this volume). In the view that Paul brings to them, rituals like these funerals may answer a tension, recurrent across all societies, between allegiance to one’s group and attendance to one’s own personal interests—represented for D’Andrade and Paul by the conflict between the ancient instincts for reproductive success and the later, more social ones. Paul’s reconceptualization thus puts rituals like the funerals Lowe describes in a larger context; they are no longer to be thought of as just a Chuuk problem. To identify such rituals as defenses against such conflict is an alternative, more psychodynamic, way to see them. That latter analysis deepens the account of how this conflict plays out in human societies, but does not contradict speculation as to whence the conflict originates—whether that part of the story be cast in Turner’s terms, as a yearning for *communitas*, or in Paul’s more explicitly biological terms, as a struggle between two sets of equally powerful human instincts.

Another source of anxiety that Chuuk people feel, related to obligations that go beyond sheer self-interest, also comes to the fore during funerals. This other anxiety revolves around the issue of whether they may have neglected their various obligations as kinspeople of the deceased—perhaps they have left a disagreement unresolved, or failed to care for that person well enough during the terminal illness. Such abnegation of duty is the subject of community gossip, which can lead to shame and resentment on the part of the one being gossiped about. (Recall from the Introduction, where we quoted him to this effect, that Paul lists gossip and shame as two of the distinctively human cultural phenomena that get displayed in the public arena.) Lowe (this volume) writes, “during the funeral itself, people aim to engage in actions that would counter, deflect, or displace those threats and avoid the arousal of the associated sentiments.” Thus these rites, in the way they offer this opportunity for redress, appear to have a dual psychodynamic function, defending against both the anxiety felt over conflicting commitments to local interests and those of the larger community, and that over possible non-fulfillment of obligations to particular deceased kin. In Chuuk, funerals endure because the inner conflicts they resolve or at least mitigate are significant and recurrent ones.

Anxieties of the kind Chuuk people feel about lack of unity and common purpose and about unfulfilled duties to kin are emotionally arousing, and thus the impetus to dispel or lessen these by this culturally provided means is highly motivated. The way in which loyalty to the

collective, duties to kin, and other lessons of childhood are learned may be especially motivating and long-lasting. This may be because this early experience is so emotionally arousing, fraught as it always is with danger (Strauss and Quinn 1997: 95); but possibly also it is such a durable and motivating force because of the way it is first learned, through embodied experience, as yet un-verbalized, and relatively unconscious (Lowe, personal communication). In the same way, we saw, Stromberg's patients are said to be unable to change such embodied behaviors even though they want to, and can even verbalize their desire to do so. For the same two reasons, emotional arousal and embodiment, the earliest learned behavior of children such as those studied by Chapin and Sirota is likely to be not just highly motivating but also especially durable, reflected in its resistance to change.

Quinn's chapter, in its critique, alluded to earlier, of sociologist Swidler's rendition of marriage and marital love in terms of tool kit theory, also revolves around a cultural defense. The need for this defense, in Quinn's interpretation of it, everywhere arises out of a conflict—one that follows individuals into adulthood—between feelings of dependency associated with infantile attachment, and the inevitable requirement of eventual autonomy. (Here, then, is posited another universal human conflict, in addition to that posed by Paul and other volume contributors between personal interests and the good of the wider group.) The strictures about emotional arousal and embodied learning discussed just above apply to infantile attachment as well (and probably also to the other side of this conflict, the long effort, which may be especially arousing at times, to gain autonomy). Dependency urges, and the cultural defenses mounted against these, are likely to be both highly motivating and lifelong. As Quinn discusses in her volume chapter, even those other sociologists who have rightly critiqued Swidler for ignoring motivation altogether, themselves fail to consider the kind of motivation that, because it is so utterly compelling and permanent, Quinn labels "deep." Psychoanalytic theory is not fashionable in sociology.

In her chapter in this volume Quinn only touches lightly upon this American cultural defense that she believes to underlie the cultural schema for marriage (but see Strauss and Quinn 1997: 189–209; Quinn 2013: 221–222). It is accomplished through what Chris McCollum (2002: 131) characterizes as being "transformed into an uncompromising assertion of one side of the conflict," recognizable in Americans' fierce self-reliance. This is the defense of reaction formation (sometimes

also called “overcompensation”). Love, in marriage and presumably also in other adult intimate relationships, is an outlet or vent for feelings of dependency that are not fully resolved by the defense of self-reliance. Even so, McCollum argues, Americans must entertain the fiction—another defense—that marriage and other intimate relationships are outcomes, not of dependency needs, but of an external force out of their control. That is, they fall in love. In her 2013 publication, Quinn compares American marital love with *fago*, a key emotion in the lives of inhabitants of the Micronesian island of Ifaluk. She argues that the same universal conflict between dependency and autonomy plays out quite differently for Ifaluk Islanders, resulting in a different defense against it.

Sri Lankan style hierarchy, discussed in a previous section, is not the only lesson being learned by the children Chapin studied; so also is a cultural lesson about desire and its ultimate denial. For Chapin was perplexed by another seeming conundrum about Sri Lankan childhood. Small children who threw tantrums consistently got their way, while, by contrast, older children, at least by ten years, had somehow turned into markedly deferential, self-restrained, and undemanding young people. Again, Chapin was struck by a practice that was radically different than the American child rearing with which she was familiar, and which held that children whose demands were always indulged would be “spoiled.” Plainly incredulous, she (this volume) describes a young girl who got everything that she demanded:

If she wanted to be held, she was held; if she wanted to sit on the table, she sat on the table; if she wanted her older brother’s new game, he was made to give it to her. If she wanted to sit up on the kitchen counter and cut okra with a sharp knife like her mother, then there she was.

Chapin wondered how the seemingly unaccountable, invisible transformation from this behavior to that of older childhood and adulthood takes place. One clue, un-verbalized and indeed nearly imperceptible, came from the unintentional and uncontrollable emotional reactions that mothers and other socialization agents had to these demands. Chapin now noticed these older people wincing, making disgust faces, sulking, and otherwise expressing their disapproval of their children’s (or their younger siblings’) demandingness, even as they gave into it and seemed to accept it. Eventually, Chapin surmises, the unpleasant disapproval children were receiving for being demanding must have trumped the

pleasure of getting what they wanted, and they began to monitor and control their own demanding behavior.

Chapin too may be dealing with a cultural defense, in this case against adults' wishes to realize their own unsatisfied desires. Elsewhere she (Chapin 2010) provides a generous clue to such an interpretation. Just as when the adults in her household gave into the two-year-old there, so did all adults in the village accede to the demands of small children. The clue was their ultimate acceptance of childish tantrums by all the village women, exhaustively surveyed. As everyone told her, no one can tolerate hearing a child cry. "You have to give," said one mother.

Chapin does suggest an underlying psychodynamic process is at work. Mothers and other child caregivers themselves have had to disavow their desires in the course of their own childhoods. These adult desires never find conscious expression, but they do reappear unexpectedly. So, when mothers give into their small children, they may be seen as accomplishing two psychic tasks simultaneously—swiftly appeasing the child and thus stopping his or her demands, and at the same time enjoying a vicarious gratification through the child, with whom their mothers identify, of desires that, because these seem so dangerous, they cannot permit themselves or even acknowledge to themselves.¹⁰ Chapin, content with this psychodynamic rendition of her case, stops short of interpreting caregivers' behavior as a cultural defense. An alternative interpretation might be that it is a defense against the conflict mothers and other adults feel over their own unresolved desires. Having disavowed these desires, they then project them onto the young children in their care. That is, it is not I who have these desires, but the child.

As in the case of so many psychodynamic processes, because they are unconscious and therefore discernable only from the partial clues to be glimpsed from what is visible, the accounts of such cultural defenses must remain speculative. How speculative is reflected in differences of opinion, such as this one about Sri Lankan caregivers' reactions to small children's demandingness, as to whether something is or is not such a defense. One of the outstanding tasks that psychological anthropologists face, then, is to resolve this issue of identifying cultural defenses. Again, Spiro has made the first move by calling attention to such defenses.

One last point: Psychological anthropologists' applications of psychoanalytic theories are not limited to cultural approaches from the vantage point of what is going on inside people. Paul's cross-cultural study of organizational strategies for controlling violent male competitive

impulses offers a beautiful example of how psychodynamics may also inform understanding of the way the external cultural world is shaped by human biology. Moreover, the various cultural evolutionary solutions he describes in his 2015 book employ projection, displacement, and other psychodynamic tactics to deal with potential male aggression (see the 2015 review by Quinn). In line with his long-standing interest in psychoanalytic theory, Paul is planning a sequel that will spell out these psychodynamic implications of his argument in the earlier book.

A NOTE ON PSYCHO-BIOLOGY

The argument Paul makes in his chapter rests on the assumption of an innate human propensity, as we have seen—that of males who compete, violently if necessary, for mates and other resources. However, as should be plain by now, the argument made in every other chapter is deeply implicated in assumptions about human biology as well. In the previous section we briefly considered one example of this—psychodynamic defenses evolved for the resolution of biologically based human conflicts. Because considerations such as those that crop up in this volume about human biology generally concern psychodynamic and other psychological processes, we can use the two terms conjointly, and speak of *psycho-biology*.

Among the psychological anthropologists represented in this volume even D’Andrade, whose chief interest lies in cultural values and their institutionalization, invokes distinctively human psychological capabilities alluded to in the Introduction, such as the evolution of shared intentionality and spoken language (the prime exemplar of a set expanded by Paul to include all symbolic codes), in his explanation for how individual mental states become collective ones. As also noted in the Introduction, suggestions like his and other contributors’ about the possible biological preconditions for culture open up speculation about human evolution. D’Andrade’s notion of the lifeworld also raises questions about what biological resources individuals living in complex societies may bring to necessary negotiations among the multiple lifeworlds to which they belong, with all the contradictory understandings and motivations and psychological strategies that these multiple lifeworld memberships and colonization of one lifeworld by another may pose. An example described in our Introduction would be the work-arounds that Richerson and Boyd (1999) have proposed.

The bare beginnings of a possible neural explanation for one kind of psychodynamic phenomenon we have been considering, defenses, has been offered by two different neurobiologists, Michael Gazzaniga (2011: 97–98) and V. S. Ramachandran (Ramachandran and Blakeslee 1998: 130–136, 152–157). Both locate this process in a left brain capacity that Gazzaniga has called the *Interpreter*. In his thinking, defenses arise because this side of the brain “arrives at the most probable and globally consistent interpretation of evidence derived from multiple sources, and then ignores or suppresses conflicting information.” He and Ramachandran both provide extensive experimental evidence of the Interpreter gone wild due to right brain lesions that compromise the capacity of that side of the brain to do its complementary job of hewing to the known facts, detecting anomalies due to violations of these, and reining in the implausible interpretations that may result.

Another intriguing possibility that may eventually allow us to build a bridge between culture theory and neurobiology is a proposal offered by Joseph LeDoux. He suggests that long-term memory loss “may be due to a stress-induced breakdown in hippocampal memory function” (LeDoux 1996: 240). At the same time, stress does not interfere with the workings of the amygdala, where emotions are stored, so that “it is completely possible that one might have poor conscious memory of a traumatic experience,” the stressor, “but at the same time form very powerful, implicit, unconscious emotional memories through amygdala-mediated fear conditioning” (LeDoux 1996: 245)—emotional memories highly resistant to extinction, thereby becoming lifelong unconscious sources of anxiety. This account of the twin effects of hippocampus and amygdala, LeDoux (1996: 239–246) thought, amounted to an explanation for what Freud called repression. LeDoux regarded it as a possible mechanism underlying repression-based disorders, but one remaining to be proven. Repression was a phenomenon “that we still don’t understand scientifically” (1996: 246), he concluded.

There is in fact an emerging literature on the neural basis of a range of traditional psychoanalytic concepts (see for two short examples Ceylan and Donmez 2011; Berlin and Koch 2009). Advancing understanding of these neural processes will surely both challenge and help our explanations for internalization. Indeed, as the very term implies, internalization and almost anything connected to it—having to do with cognition, emotion, motivation, and embodiment—entail assumptions about human psycho-biology. Contributors who imagine processes of internalization, as we have argued, all necessarily rely, whether explicitly or not, on the

neurobiology of synaptic plasticity. Moreover, our examinations of “personal meaning systems” (Strauss), “assembly” (Chapin), “configurational learning” (Sirota), narrative construction and remembrance (Stromberg), and cultural defense mechanisms (Quinn and Lowe) all call out for more specific explanations of what is going on in the human brain and body, and how these processes, whatever they turn out to be, engage and exploit the external environment. Even if, at present, we do not always have well-developed theories of such mental events and their contexts, and may be forced to gloss over parts of our explanations for the time being, our work points the way. One thing for sure that distinguishes psychological anthropologists such as these volume contributors from their mainstream cultural anthropologist colleagues is our willingness to incorporate innate human proclivities into our explanations. Indeed, a framework for much research in psychological anthropology has been the question of what is universal, and hence potentially traceable to human biology, and what is variable, and hence potentially culturally invented or influenced.

If mainstream cultural anthropologists have been squeamish about any notion of “an internal side to culture”—as the Introduction quoted Strauss (this volume) as observing—this may be because such an admission would open the door to psychological and biological explanation more generally. Instead, as noted in the Introduction, many cultural anthropologists have preferred an unbridled cultural relativism, accompanied by a-theoretic ethnographic description, in favor of reading what psychological anthropologists might have to say on their chosen topic, or rummaging outside their discipline for explanatory leads.¹¹ When inconvenient questions do arise as to the possible psychological basis of some set of beliefs and practices, these frequently remain unexplored and untheorized (see the special issue of the journal *Anthropological Theory* edited by Quinn and Strauss (2006), entitled “The Missing Psychology in Cultural Anthropology’s Key Words,” for some important examples).

If there is a lesson to be drawn from these tendencies in contemporary cultural anthropology, it might be that any academic field that becomes so insulated in the sense of being unwilling to entertain promising theoretical paradigms from other disciplines is doomed to explanatory failure. Psychological anthropology’s interdisciplinary openness, on which we had occasion to comment in our Introduction—as much as it may offend some more mainstream cultural anthropologists, and as much as it may foster a diversity of approaches and orientations that sometimes seem to border on chaos—is arguably the greatest asset of our subfield.

METHODOLOGICAL APPROACHES

Almost every volume contributor has something important to say about method. There are several methodological themes identifiable in these chapters. A first thread is the necessity of recognizing seemingly inexplicable patterns, even when the surface expressions of these might disguise something deeper. A clear example is Quinn's approach to analyzing interview discourse about marriage, compared to sociologist Swidler's parallel one. Equally stunning—indeed, a *tour de force* of the cross-cultural method—is Paul's discovery, detailed in his book, of the highly variable and complex strategies for containing men's violent competition, underlying diverse social organizations. Deserving the same admiration are his pointed analyses, in his volume chapter, of a smaller number of ethnographic cases. Another, very different, ethnographic example comes from Chapin's inquiries of village mothers and the similar responses they gave, on the order of "We have to give," that turned out to be such a vital clue to these mothers' behavior and motivation.

Often what leads the anthropologist to such realizations is the pure serendipity of ethnographic encounters. Chapin's (this volume) puzzlement about how such utterly demanding children turned into such non-demanding older ones compelled her search for an explanation. However, it was not until her second field trip to Sri Lanka that she even noticed this discrepancy. As she (this volume) tells it, this new realization depended upon a change in residence, and hence in her opportunity to observe:

I had not noticed this kind of demanding toddler behavior and caregiver indulgence during my first stay in Sri Lanka. Then I had lived in my own house in the village with my son and my then-husband. However, once I had noticed this pattern of behavior, I saw it everywhere. I even saw it in my fieldnotes from my earlier stay, although they had not meant much to me then.

Like Chapin, Lowe (this volume) was taken by something he observed in the field, but could not explain: the persistence of funerary rites on the island of Chuuk, in the midst of so much change, due largely to Western influences, in most other traditional practices. Lowe tells how he made this field trip to Chuuk with another, wholly different project in mind, but was confronted during his visit by an unending series of funerals. He was so struck by this chance circumstance and by the historical

durability of this tradition that he changed the focus of his research to study the place of funerary rites in Chuuk life. These—both adaptation to what one happens to encounter when one arrives in the field, and pursuit of the explanation of some inexplicable and haunting practice or pattern of behaviors that one observes there—are utterly commonplace ethnographic experiences, reported over and over again since the beginnings of anthropological fieldwork. Indeed, these can be said to be inherent features of a naturalist's methodology. The great naturalist Darwin, after all, was led to his insight about natural selection by the initially surprising and inexplicable variations across species, like those he noticed in the beaks of the Galapagos finches. This would have been a lucky comparison for Darwin, aided as the evolution of differently sized and shaped beaks had been by the circumstance of these bird populations having been isolated on separate islands and presumably also having undergone extreme alternate periods of drought and monsoon rains.

Another kind of serendipity, also liable to occur during the conduct of ethnography, is the intrusion of other of the analyst's experiences into the analysis. What helped Chapin notice patterns in Sri Lankan child rearing was her awareness of her own very different practices, which she had heretofore taken for granted in raising her young son, who was right there in the field with her. Often too these comparative experiences are far from contemporaneous. As noted in the Introduction, Sirota drew insight from the Gestalt theory that had inspired an earlier generation of psychological anthropologists. Her own acquaintance with that line of theory had been quite incidental to her anthropological research, however. She retrieved her engagement with Gestalt theory from an entirely different context than that of ethnographic analysis, when she had earlier in her career been a child and family therapist in clinical social work. Similarly, Stromberg offers fresh analyses of two dynamic psychotherapy sessions that he took notes on years ago as a therapist-in-training, but that have obviously been lurking in the back of his mind ever since.

Quinn's reconsideration of a sociologist's very different analysis of American marriage than her own began with a chance encounter, again years ago (in the fall of 1986 to be exact), with that other analyst, a sociologist, at a conference, and a nagging but unexplained observation then that the two of them had arrived at opposite conclusions. The sociologist had assumed that Americans' distinctive beliefs about love derive from their understanding of the institution of American marriage; Quinn, conversely, that the early psychodynamics of love gives

rise to a distinctive American cultural model of marriage and that this cultural model had shaped the institution. This realization had dogged her ever since, leading ultimately to her chapter in this volume. Equally, D’Andrade had been led to his theory of lifeworlds by a previously unsolved puzzle that had bedeviled him and his whole generation of anthropologists, and with which he himself had surely had to grapple in his own long-ago graduate career. The point, again, is that we ethnographers find value in these serendipitous possibilities from whatever source and however old, allowing them to influence the direction of our research. We do not rule them out of order because they are not a formal component of the current study or experiment. As all these last examples illustrate, sometimes the departure-point for such new insights can sit shelved in the memory for a very long time.

It should not escape notice that the kind of ethnography we do shares its methodological approach with clinical therapy—one obvious reason for the appeal of psychoanalysis to psychological anthropologists. As Westen (see also Hollan 2016) notes,

Psychoanalytic theory has always rested primarily on the data base of clinical observation, which resembles anthropological fieldwork in many respects: the analyst or analytic therapist steps into the life world of another individual in order to understand the individual’s experience of the self, others, and the world (an “emic” view) and to understand how that person’s experience is itself a product of psychological principles that are not entirely “local” (an “etic” view). (Westen 2001: 33)

In particular, a talent that both anthropological fieldworkers and clinicians rely upon heavily, and that figures large in these chapters, is the readiness to discern patterns and to take them seriously, wherever and whenever they crop up, and whatever personal resources happen to trigger their notice.

A last word about methods. How are we to alert our students to the large dose of serendipity that seems to play such a big part in psychological anthropological research like that reported in this volume? Our methods include the search for pattern, attention to the inexplicable, following up clues, and so forth. Productive clues may be drawn from disciplinary expertise gained long prior to one’s training in anthropology. This tradition of relying on largely unquantifiable methods seems to be an old and widespread one in the parent discipline of anthropology, so

it must be being learned somehow. Perhaps these skills mostly depend on the experience every graduate student has, of being dropped into an unfamiliar society and taxed with figuring out what is going on. Still, it would be good to see these sensibilities spelled out for students before they begin their fieldwork. Perhaps more importantly, the practices and sensibilities they will need in the field run against the “scientific” grain dominating many other social sciences. While ethnography is experiencing somewhat of a vogue outside of anthropology these days, the resistance—often in the forms of outright dismissal of qualitative data and relegation of ethnographic description to the status of anecdote—is still stiff.

SUMMARY: FRAMING, GAPS, AND PROCESS

Have any edge pieces been found and are they beginning to frame the puzzle? Here are some candidates that have emerged: Firstly, lifeworlds, which may help us to map out the distribution of cultural schemas in complex societies, and all manner of similarity, as well as contradiction, competition and conflict, between these. Secondly, internalization, a fertile subject of inquiry in psychological anthropology right now, is one which is beginning to be a little better understood. In this Conclusion, a distinction between two related varieties of internalization has been made: that learned through common experience and that transmitted by socialization (although the two have the same neural basis, and sharing this neurobiology as they do, can and may readily be combined). It has been argued that both can be understood in terms of schema theory—specifically in terms of the synaptic plasticity that underlies that theory, and the enhancement of this plasticity by both recurrence and emotional arousal. It has been suggested, further, that many instances of transmitted internalization, not limited to that reflected in the narratives told in therapy but perhaps also extending to those remembered from childhood, can be better understood in terms of the embodied nature of their learning. Such “transference” may have profound effects on internalization. To wit, this kind of learning through embodiment, rather than merely being transmitted as cognition, may be deeply motivating and extremely durable over the life course.

Just as importantly, plentiful gaps have been identified in psychological anthropologists’ ongoing research and theory having to do with culture. Most generally, more psychological anthropologists need to give

further attention to the design of the outside world. This effort could begin with the identification of the various lifeworlds that exist in complex societies, their composition out of institutions, roles, values, norms, and so forth; the cultural schemas with which given lifeworlds are populated, and the specificity or generality of these schemas. That is, are given cultural schemas unique to a lifeworld or shared across several or many? Are lifeworlds a useful frame for cultural variation, and do they exhaust the explanation of this variation (including, for example, the variation introduced by differing cultural schemas, individual agendas, or ways of bringing up children)?

Relatedly, a pronounced gap is the current lack of thought and research that incorporate knowledge about how human biology, including biological evolution, interacts with culture and cultural evolution, including lifeworlds. Many more of these innate tendencies must be entertained than the instance most prominently featured in this Conclusion—the male proclivity for violent competition among themselves—or the other propensities to which we referred illustratively—such as the human propensity to recreate small, face-to-face, forager-style groups within the many larger and more anonymous organizations that characterize complex societies.

A third glaring gap is in the study of internalization. Internalization is an especially fertile area for research, as reflected in its identification as one of the framing concepts to have come out of this volume. However, it needs also to be acknowledged that efforts in this direction have been heretofore disconnected from one another and are badly in need of further theoretical synthesis. Firstly, the field should settle on a common definition of internalization, e.g., as between D'Andrade's and Spiro's and that of Strauss. Even more importantly, agreement about the conceptual framework needed to theorize about internalization is called for. For example, the suggestions made in this volume, concerning the parts played in internalization of synaptic plasticity, emotional arousal, narrative, embodiment, and so forth, are just that, suggestive. Do emotional arousal and/or embodiment play the key parts contributors have granted them, in the motivation and durability of the cultural knowledge internalized? Are there other such processes with equally key functions? Is this especially true of cultural transmission to young children? The need for further investigation is equally true of psychological anthropologists' forays into psychoanalytic theory in the interests

of further pinning down processes of internalization. Much needed, for starters, is agreement on such matters as when we anthropologists are dealing with transference, when with cultural defenses, when with the unconscious, and when with some other psychodynamic process(es) that may be widely shared in a community.

All these ideas must be explored further and tested on new cases. Moreover, the successful application of schema theory to the understanding of the cultural suggests that psychological anthropologists should be paying close attention to processes discovered by neurobiologists, beyond such processes as synaptic plasticity, emotional arousal, the defenses, and repression, for other hints as to how the internalization of culture might take place and what it might look like. Further, as much as these and other processes of internalization have drawn psychological anthropologists to implicit clues in discourse and other behavior, more explicit shared beliefs and practices are important too and should not be ignored, or treated as irrelevant to exploration of how internalization occurs.

A final gap we have mentioned is the inattention to teaching our students and future fieldworkers the suite of serendipitous and unquantifiable methods they will need in the field. This need is hardly confined to psychological anthropology; indeed, it raises a quandary that the lead co-author's home Department of Cultural Anthropology is currently trying to address, in response to demands from its graduate students for methods courses.

It is worth adding a note about the general emphasis on cultural process that this volume represents. Early on in the turn to cognitive anthropology, D'Andrade (1981) had suggested that the sub-discipline's special role in the cognitive sciences was to investigate "how cultural material was cognitively organized" (D'Andrade 1981: 193). Andrea Bender and her colleagues (Bender et al. 2010: 376) have more recently treated this as a dichotomy between "content" and "process"—the latter having ostensibly been designated the province of cognitive psychologists and other cognitive scientists—speculating that, among other factors, "somehow the content/process division of labor between anthropology and the rest of cognitive science became a barrier that isolated anthropology." While subsequent cognitive scientists like these may have oversimplified this matter, D'Andrade's point was more subtle, and worth quoting at length. As he explained,

In my view, the cognitive part of cognitive anthropology is in its concern with the way in which cultural content “interfaces” with psychological processes. Cognitive anthropology and cognitive psychology are both concerned with the interaction between processing and information, except that the cognitive anthropologist wants to know how cultural information is constrained and shaped by the way the brain processes such information, while the cognitive psychologist wants to know how the machinery of the brain works on all types of information, including cultural information.

An important assumption of cognitive anthropology is that in the process of repeated social transmission, cultural programs come to take forms which have a good fit to the natural capacities and constraints of the human brain. Thus, when similar cultural forms are found in most societies around the world, there is reason to search for psychological factors which could account for these similarities. (D’Andrade 1981: 182)

He then gave extended examples of such cross-cultural similarities from (1) the way humans classify, as reflected in kin terminologies; (2) the way humans learn by guided discovery during socialization; (3) the local content-specificity of human problem solving procedures; and (4) the importance of the affective component of human information processing in lending directive force to cultural schemas.

In point of fact, Bender et al.’s (2010: 378) stance is strikingly similar to that which D’Andrade took toward this “interface” between culture and cognition. In considering this relation, though, they seem to train their sights on how “the social and material world participates in the organization of cognitive processes,” such as how language and speech affect thought, or the cognitive consequences of subscribing to East Asian collectivism versus Western individualism. Perhaps reflecting D’Andrade’s influence, the current volume goes mostly in the opposite direction, asking how the human brain and body constrain the organization of culture. This is decidedly not to be viewed as a criticism of these other theorists’ position, for both are equally worthy of investigation.

From this concluding summary and synthesis it can be deduced that this volume is just a beginning. Hopefully it will not only coax more common conceptualization and common effort out of the psychological anthropology community, but will also push these anthropologists toward fuller appreciation of the theoretical connections and ways forward that may already exist among them and yet go unrecognized in the thinking of any one researcher. A more optimistic possibility still is that the discussion fostered here will extend beyond psychological anthropology.

NOTES

1. Psychologist Drew Westen (2001: 40), in a far-reaching article, anticipates this point about how their memberships in multiple lifeworlds can pose contradictions for individuals when he notes the existence of such memberships. Westen calls these “cross-cutting subgroups.” Strauss and Quinn (1997), in a passage quoted later in this Conclusion as to the non-boundedness of cultures, make a similar claim about each person as “a juncture point for an infinite number of partially overlapping cultures.” The authors suspect that the same observation has been made by others as well. D’Andrade’s concept of lifeworlds develops these suggestions more fully.
2. Indeed, one of us, Quinn, was trained in a graduate program that was a hub of this sub-disciplinary development—a training that consisted largely of the analysis of sets of kin terms, she might add. Quinn, however, has long since ceased to think of herself as a “cognitive anthropologist” narrowly conceived, preferring to call herself by the more expansive term, “psychological anthropologist.”
3. Spiro and D’Andrade are not alone in dispensing with the problem of how cultural knowledge actually becomes internalized, by assigning it to some other equally un-analyzed term. See, e.g., Throop’s (2003) review of several other theorists who, while each has interesting observations to make about internalization, to a person fail to explain how it happens, recasting it instead in terms of some other related construct such as “personal symbols” (Gananath Obesekyere) or transference and counter-transference (Nancy Chodorow). The reader may discover other published examples glossing over internalization in this way.
4. Design and use of such deliberate lessons may be more widely found across societies than might have been suspected, as suggested by the papers in a 2017 session co-organized by Bambi Chapin in memory of Briggs, at the meeting of the American Anthropological Association in November in Washington, D.C.
5. Patterson (2014) is another who writes of cultural configurations, and Sirota’s view is consistent with his. However, whereas Patterson sets out a general portrait of culture as this concept applies to the sociological literature, Sirota’s effort is to detail the cultural acquisition processes that underlie configurational learning.
6. Stromberg has not been trained as a psychoanalyst but was guided during his time working at a community mental health clinic by psychoanalytically oriented supervisors. Prior to becoming an anthropologist, Sirota practiced as a psychodynamically oriented psychotherapist for over twenty years. Paul, as is not unheard of among psychological anthropologists, is also a psychoanalyst with a private clinical practice.

7. Quinn, for example, had had no serious acquaintance with psychoanalytic theory, prior to her integration of it into her analysis of American marriage (see Strauss and Quinn 1997: 201–207), since the time she had briefly encountered it as an undergraduate.
8. Here, then, is ethnographic evidence supporting the insights of psychodynamic and family systems theorists (e.g., Benedek 1959, 1970), who maintain that parents experience intrapsychic growth and maturation by assisting their children in the attainment of developmental goals.
9. Alan Fiske et al. (2017) go one step further in unpacking the psychology of *communitas*, with their analysis of a widespread if not universal emotion they call “*kama muta*” (a Sanskrit term translated into English as “being moved by love”). When this emotion is felt intensely, people are inclined to be “more loving, more closely connected, more willing to make sacrifices for the other, and more devoted to maintaining the relationship,” these authors postulate (Fiske et al. 2017: 90). These are feelings associated with what Fiske has elsewhere labeled “communal sharing,” one of four universal orientations to social relationships. As the authors (Fiske et al.: 90) explain, “We think that the precise function of *kama muta* is to evoke commitment and devotion to communal sharing. Humans are extraordinarily dependent on communal sharing relationships for their fitness (and psychological well-being).” As they (Fiske et al. 2017: 94–95; italics in original) go on to say, “In many cultures there are major rituals that seem to consistently evoke strong *kama muta* or structure its performance according to the situation,” adding that “People evidently frequently tend to *feel* *kama muta* when they participate in or observe rituals that are supposed to evoke it, or when they are expected to perform it.” Among such rituals the authors (Fiske et al. 2017: 95) name funerals like those practiced in Chuuk. Those funerals seem to intensify this emotion in just the way Fiske et al. suggest.
10. This “identification” with one’s child may remind the reader of that felt by the Los Angeles mother with her son, quoted by Sirota, as she soothes him to sleep. Indeed, the two kinds of identification likely originate in the same psychological process. If one agrees with these authors’ interpretation of the Sri Lankan mothers’ behavior as defensive, though, the two experiences may be seen to go in different directions. The American mother is able to find comfort in soothing her son, while the Sri Lankan mother must deal with the severe conflict aroused in her when her daughter becomes demanding, and the way open to do so is by means of a defense. In Chapin’s own view, however, giving into the child in one’s care is simply an opportunity to indulge and satisfy one’s own heretofore unresolved desire, just as in the case of soothing one’s child to sleep.

11. In this respect, modern-day cultural anthropologists are reminiscent of British structuralists. Their colleague Edmund Leach (1961a, b) long ago chided those anthropologists for some quite similar deficiencies. As for one such tendency displayed by both these schools of anthropology, British structuralism and contemporary American cultural anthropology, it may be that in times of theoretical uncertainty our discipline is prone to fall back on the straight ethnographic description that has been its bread and butter.

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