AUSTERITY POLICIES

Bad Ideas in Practice

Edited by

Peter Rushton and Catherine Donovan

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Editors

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Contents

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Nicola Roberts is Senior Lecturer in Criminology at the University of Sunderland. Her primary research interests are in gender-based violence, domestic and sexual violence, criminal justice and the rehabilitation of offenders. Her criminological writings have analysed discourses of 'treatment' for convicted domestic violence offenders in the probation service. She is a former probation practitioner and volunteer.

Peter Rushton is Professor of Historical Sociology at the University of Sunderland. His primary research interest is in the social history of law in early modern England and in the British Atlantic, writing on witchcraft, crime and punishment, social welfare, and threats to order such as treason and rebellion. His sociological writings have approached modern problems and events with a view to evaluating the history of the present.

List of Tables

Introduction

Peter Rushton and Catherine Donovan

The reduction of the state since 2010 is not just a financial retrenchment, the product of the collapse of tax revenues after the banking collapse of 2008. It is also a shrinking of the state in terms of both the scope and the level of public support available across many areas of social policy. Austerity is everywhere and nowhere: in those parts of society where the cuts are falling, and living standards static or still declining, there are many problems, both personal and, for those working in public services, professional. Yet the economy is growing, recorded unemployment has fallen, and the service industries, especially online retail outlets, are booming. This is an *austerity boom*, and the contradictions are bewildering. This is not the place to examine the economic arguments for and against the policies of austerity: the aim is to explore the implications for areas of social policy in their implementation. Many

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aspects are changing under this new regime: for one thing, the nature of the organisations delivering many services, and their relationship to the state, have changed. Private contractors have replaced state agencies in many areas of policy. The implications for the staff engaged in these services have involved a reduction in salary levels and in the qualifications required for their posts. Evidence is accumulating of serious social problems: poverty, physical and mental illness, male suicide, homelessness, and the ending of middle-class progress to home ownership, all mark a troubled time This collection of essays explores the ways forces of change, obscured by the blanket name of 'austerity', have affected different services in areas of social policy. We aim to produce a coherent picture of the multiple but related consequences through concentrating our analyses around a number of what we perceive to be the key themes of government, to be explored through explorations of different areas of policy. It is the contention here that these themes or keynotes, while not being a comprehensive survey of all aspects of social policy, are the dominant modes of thinking reflected in government actions.

One consistent feature of government policies, pre-dating austerity, is favouring the private sector and creating new ways of either subcontracting directly to private agencies or opening up opportunities for their participation in public services. The essential belief of government since the 1980s has been that private is best. However, since austerity began with the Comprehensive Spending Review in 2010, *privatisation* has become a process of transfer to, and also inclusion of, private organisations, in state-funded provision, rather than the simple sell-off that occurred with public industries in the 1980s and 1990s. This has been variously described as 'deprivileging the public sector' involving the replacement of hierarchical management with market forces (Bach 2016: 12). Probation, for example, was thrown open to competitive tendering, with many organisations more accustomed to handling 'workfare' and back-to-work programmes, or even catering, winning local contracts (see Roberts' chapter). In the prison service too, just as the trend has been reversed by the federal authorities in the USA, privately-run prisons have become common. In both sectors public organisations were banned from competing for the contracts. One issue with these prisons and their management is accountability.

While both probation and prisons have a chief inspectorate to provide critical annual reports, the day-to-day reporting to central government in the form of the Ministry of Justice frequently remains confidential. Oakwood, a private prison run by G4S, experienced regular disturbances and acts of violence in late 2013 and early 2014 (BBC, 23 January 2014). This prison was supposed to be the 'blueprint for a new generation of big, cheap, jails' (*The Guardian* 2014), with costs up to 50% less than the average. Most of the information about some specific incidents only emerged from recently-released prisoners and prison officers being interviewed anonymously. There were allegations of a 'cover-up' on grounds of commercial interest (Leech 2014). Only because of a BBC investigation did Jerry Petherick, managing director for G4S of their custodial and detention services, appear on BBC radio. However, even here the evidence is mounting as report after report from the Inspectorate of Prisons finds prisons lacking in safety, resources, and qualified staff and the media are beginning to pay attention (e.g. Townsend and Savage 2018). In penal policy, as in many areas of welfare and health provision, there is now a 'mixed market' or 'mixed economy' of private and public institutions. The competitive bidding process for contracts, however, increasingly marginalises or excludes entirely, public organisations (Dominey 2012; Allen 2013). However, more recently, the relentless staff cutting since 2010 has been shown to correlate with increased violence and rioting in prisons and the Justice Secretary has responded with launching a recruitment drive for more prison officers (*The Guardian* 2016). In this book, we look particularly at probation as a key case study of this new process of privatisation (see Roberts' chapter).

The example of probation also illustrates a second general trend in the public services, namely *deprofessionalisation*. One key characteristic of many policies involving the virtual abandonment by the state of direct responsibility for delivering services is the reduced requirement for professionally trained staff. This policy has involved professions being denigrated for their traditionalism as an obstacle to 'reform', or discarded along with their traditional rights of independent judgement (see Malin's chapter). The reduced requirement for skilled and experienced staff, and the de-skilling of those remaining from previous

deliverers, have become core processes in many new institutions and organisations. In the name of 'reform', and against the establishment or 'the blob', for example, Education Minister Michael Gove decreed that the new academies could employ people without teaching qualifications (*The Guardian* 2012). Gove also infamously decried 'experts' during the referendum campaign on the UK's European Union membership, saying that the people had 'had enough of them' (Mance 2016). In other areas such as health, professionalism is being replaced by procedures, followed blindly and recorded for later inspection. Objections to these policies are all too easily dismissed by government as reflecting 'provider interest', the result of the previously protected and privileged status of former state employees. Among academics, there has developed a critical literature on the 'deprofessionalisation thesis' some of it pointing to the ending of the traditional autonomous professional who, at least in the early days of the postwar welfare state, was given the freedom—and the budget—to exercise their professional judgement and discretion. It is certainly difficult for many to defend the 'nostalgic model' of the independent professional (Hafferty and Castellani 2011: 210). This could not last, as value-for-money policies, and increasingly strict forms of accountability in organisations have been imposed in recent years. Another point is that it is often the institutions within which they work rather than the forms of social policy that have developed the new forms of accountability. Moreover, there are some new occupations—perhaps 'professions' in a different mode—developing, particularly in the area of social care. One difficulty is the switch around in thinking since the radical days of the 1970s when the anti-psychiatry and the anti-professionalism critiques of Ivan Illich persuaded many that the client-professionals relationship should be egalitarian, to a recent anxiety that the expert knowledge of the professional, derived from the knowledge acquired over years of training, is being discounted within a context of the new managerialism (Illich 1976; Clark 2005; Duyvendak et al. 2006). To quote Marx, we may have reached the point where the 'bourgeoisie … has converted the physician, the lawyer the priest, the poet, the man of science (sic), into its paid labourers' (Marx, in Marsh 1998: 77).

Within the new patterns of accountability and management, therefore, many professionals have come to feel more like bureaucrats than autonomous actors. Despite policies observing the shibboleth about 'free enterprise', the more that privatisation has progressed, the more that surprisingly fierce levels of external *regulation* have been developed in parallel: this is another key aspect of recent policies analysed in this collection. Regulation occurs at two levels, the institutional and the personal. The most publicly visible have been the national inspectorates of care, health, probation, education and prisons. Some of these are very ancient, going back to the first era of government regulation in the nineteenth century, and mirror the oldest of all, the factory inspectorate. More recent agencies have learnt from the proliferation of national regulators that accompanied the 1980s denationalisation of industry which produced OfWat, Ofcom, and ORR (rail and road). Because there are structures of local monopoly, in health, water or probation, their captive recipients must be reassured of quality by continual reporting and inspection. Targets are set, quality standards are determined, and measurements of effectiveness created. Some of these involve payment by results. Given that organisations—particularly those of private contractors—have to offer value for money, and will have made promises on winning the contract, the delivery of the service will be under continual and detailed scrutiny, not least by bodies such as the National Audit Office as much as by the specialist regulators. Target-setting subsequently pervades the whole organisation as, in a manner reminiscent of traditional *industrial* Taylorian time-and motion studies, each individual employee receives targets they must achieve. Consequently each person has to play their part in achieving the overall fulfillment of the contract. By individualising and personalising the targets, the workforce experiences fragmentation and isolation, their key contact becoming their manager above them. In the light of the known pre-existing stress levels and drop-out rates in many areas of social services such as teaching or child protection, this shift to an imposed individualisation of work bodes ill for those working in the new organisations. 'Fragmentation' of the workforce under new employment conditions has certainly provided for more feelings of isolation and deskilling, even if the rhetoric of the new organisations is all about teamwork and

service to the 'customer' (Bach 2016). A further aspect of this new work relationship also receives emphasis in this collection—the devolution of *risk* to the individual worker, whether working with convicted criminals, victims of domestic violence, or sufferers from ill health. Each type of 'client' presents different problems of risk assessment, but all the practitioners experience the sense of risk-taking and hazardous decision-making under conditions where personal performances are bluntly measured and errors penalised (see the chapters by Malin and Roberts, in this volume).

Another feature that affects both the workforce and their clients, is the *individualisation of responsibility*: if the practitioners have targets to meet, this is no less true of their clients. This is not a new practice. Michel Foucault spoke of the new asylums of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth century, and their 'moral' treatment, as imposing on their patients the 'stifling anguish of responsibility' (Foucault 1965: 247). More recently, criminologists have regarded the discarding of social and economic explanations for crime as a return to classical theories of individual responsibility, and this 'responsibilisation strategy' also pervades discussion of the *victims* of crime too. Potential victims must learn to calculate the risks of their way of life (Foucault 1989: 234; Burke 2005: 286; O'Malley 1992). Service users are therefore exhorted to identify and access the services they require. Doctors explain the options for treatment, but the patients must choose the next stage. Health organisations, prison and probation, educational institutions all offer the setting for individuals to redirect themselves to new lives. Failure to do so is a failure of the self, not the system. There is a forceful element of moral condemnation here, along with criticism of people for their failure to exercise their individual freedom. You are responsible for yourself—and must be made to take that responsibility seriously. Sanctions might be severe, for example denial of medical treatment to those who are tobacco smokers or seriously overweight. In this area, there is a victim-blaming rhetoric that ignores the pressures, particularly on the poor, towards an unhealthy lifestyle. The adoption of bad—unhealthy—behaviour is met with the judgemental reaction that these are lifestyle choices rather than the consequences of social conditions. To put it philosophically, as one health theorist has, the poorer

and more helpless are not yet 'fit' to be held responsible for their own actions, but the widespread economic and social conditions that create this situated helplessness are not given credence in the official rhetoric of responsibility (Brown 2013; following Pettit 2001). Studies of youth justice, similarly, show that, while policies of individualisation endorse the idea of personal responsibility, they have little transformative effect on young people's ability to take control of their lives and 'calculate' a rational way out of the system of deviance (Phoenix and Kelly 2013). As Nikolas Rose commented,

> Those who refuse to become responsible, to govern themselves ethically, have also refused the offer to become members of our moral community. Hence, for them, harsh measures are entirely appropriate. Three strikes and you are out: citizenship becomes conditional upon conduct.

To put it even more bluntly, individuals are forced to be free, as long as they make the right decisions (Rose 2000: 335).

These are not entirely new developments, but they come together in unique ways when enforced by austerity. Collective failures to take responsibility have been detected by government to lurk at the heart of some communities. Families rather than individuals have been identified as failed, morally and practically. This was partly the result of the 2011 riots, though the roots go back to the family policies of previous governments. The 'feral' children of deviant families (see the chapter by Quaid) were proclaimed as responsible for the 2011 disorders—an interesting, almost colonial, image of savages among the civilised (De Benedictis 2012; Allen and Taylor 2012). This sense of the 'others' and of processes of *othering* have been a recurrent feature in the political discussions of those with economic and social problems. As austerity has affected single parents, particularly mothers, through cuts to housing benefit and other changes, the government rhetoric about 'troubled families' was transformed into a high-profile and expensive policy of neoliberal governance of families (see Crossley 2015). Claims were made in justifying the programme that there were 120,000 families which had absorbed a disproportionate amount of time and money from various social services. In a striking fashion the deviant became different, and the difference

was defined as troubles which needed support. The whole language of 'troubles' was open to odd associations (the Irish 'troubles' being one previous euphemism). In this policy, the definition varied from the vague such as families which had caused high costs to the public purse, to the highly specific such as families where children had been excluded from school, or recorded high instances of absence, or were not in school at all. The 'clients' were identified by local authorities who put them forward for funded assistance, thus manufacturing the demand in exchange for money. After five years, the retrospective analysis both by auditing body and one parliamentary committee was that a large amount money and effort had been wasted (Commons Briefing Paper 2016: 6; National Audit Office 2016).

This process of *collective* '*othering*' differs significantly from the individualised blaming of responsibilisation. The individual failure has been redrawn, for certain people and perhaps whole communities, as collective difference. They are seen as a whole, if not exactly as the enemy, but certainly as the deviant, within. As the failed programme aimed at troubled families suggests, part of current thinking is that this deviance can be abolished by close working 'with' such families and individuals. This returns us to the role of the professionals or practitioners. Ideologies of family forms and behaviour have long attributed the prevalence of poor parenting in cases of child abuse to the misconceived tolerance of bad behaviour by such as social work professionals: both the apparently liberal professions and their deviant clients could be indicted together in repeated retrospective condemnation when things went wrong. The child abuse inquiry has been a repeated feature of public attention since the 1970s (Parton 1985, 2014). This form of 'understanding' the deviant is no longer acceptable, and many parallel forms of othering have taken root. The harsh rhetoric against families that have never worked, as against their individual members, reflects a new form of this collective blaming, as these people are contrasted with the virtuous 'hard-working families' of government rhetoric. The social reality is far from this rhetoric, as recent work has demonstrated on some of the poorest areas of the UK (Shildrick et al. 2012; MacDonald 2015). Some of the implications of this myth-making, including exclusion from 'normal' society, are explored in the chapters by Quaid and Gilligan. The key

point is that, through othering, new forms of social exclusion are being created, and new social divisions are being sustained. Quaid, and to a lesser extent Gilligan, also point to the ways in which the processes of othering in relation to families has been gendered in particular ways.

Following the year of the 'Brexit' referendum, in which 52% of the voting public chose to leave the European Union (about 37% of the registered voters), the 'others' among us have become even more generalised in definition and excluded from political and social membership. What has been termed 'xeno-racism', a concept that reflects the development of the politics of anti-immigration aimed at (largely) white European migrants, has provided the backdrop to the debate about the future of the UK (Fakete 2001). There is a broader ideological and emotional crisis of British identity and, perhaps within it, of the identity of the largest group in the population, the English. In many ways, the previous discussion of ideas about freedom, responsibility, autonomy or self-reliance, and the failures of many British people to achieve the necessary levels of these qualities, links with the emerging notion of 'traditional' Britishness. It does not reflect the realities of poverty that led to campaigns for the welfare state created after World War II, as Selina Todd's superb history of working class experience has established. The first 'austerity Britain', the six years after that war, was a long period of hardship rewarded by comprehensive care (Todd 2015). Today, the deviant families are identified as *un*-British in many ways, even if they are ethnically British in legally biological terms, i.e. that fulfil the criteria for UK citizenship. They reflect a failed project of Britishness. By contrast, many migrants are members of completely 'untroubled' families. The irony of designating European migrants—nearly all of them hardworking white Christians—as aliens, cannot be lost on Britain's black and Asian minorities who share so many experiences with them. The impacts of austerity specifically on citizenship and participation in the democratic process are explored in-depth in the chapter by Buchroth and Hetherington. New social divisions are thus being drawn between groups of the inhabitants of the UK as austerity is being pursued during a period of (modest) economic growth and falling unemployment. The purpose of this collection is to explore how the key features highlighted here have been worked out in different areas

of social policy. Not all will be identical in their effects, partly because budgets for health and education have been protected. Yet similar processes of privatisation and regulation, responsibilisation and individual risk management, othering and exclusion, have run through so many areas of both official policy and organisational practice.

The collection is organised into three sections looking firstly at the broader shifts in emerging discourses that are reframing the means available for identifying and understanding current problems. In his chapter, Rushton provides a context for the collection, critically discussing the historical relevance of using 'austerity' as a contextual umbrella term. The historical ways in which 'austerity' has been used and re-worked more recently points to the ability of the Coalition and subsequent Conservative governments to construct a belief that the economic decisions to cut back on public sector spending and introduce profit into the delivery of public sector services are a necessity. As such, Rushton argues, the austerity discourse resonates with prior periods of austerity and there has emerged a consensus that we all need to make painful sacrifices in the short term order for all to gain in the long term.

In the second chapter, Buchroth and Hetherington critically examine the ways in which the meaning of democracy under austerity is being reshaped as a result of political rhetoric and practice which apparently both condone and rationalise a growing belief that not everybody is equal. This is evidenced through a discussion about the ways in which rightwing extremist views are being 'normalised' to some extent and the ways in which those being marginalised are prevented from participation in, and access to, services and other democratic processes. This section ends with a chapter by Quaid whose discussion centres on the way in which austere times have reframed family life as one in which parents, and particularly mothers, are held accountable not only for their children but for broader social problems. Whilst this is not new, Quaid argues that talk of 'feral children' takes this debate to a new place and implicitly and explicitly reflects on the parents of such children and reduces them to being not just marginalised in society but 'a-social' and more 'animalistic'. Quaid argues that such rhetoric facilitates a growing consensus that 'these families/mothers/parents' can be identified

(the troubled families), not for their own sake but to save the hard working tax payers' money.

Underlying these three chapters references are made to neoliberalism as the broader context within which twenty-first century austerity has emerged. Neoliberalism can be understood in many ways but in most there is agreement that this is a collection of beliefs and assumptions about the world that provide drivers for particular economic frameworks for creating wealth, particular relationships between the state and the market, particular relationships between the state and its people, and particular relationships between states; and that these are implemented through local interpretations across most of the world. In what is called 'The West', neoliberalism has fostered a de-regulation of the market (interpreted differently in different countries—the UK has deregulated to a much greater extent than most other European countries); a shrinking role for the state; low tax, small public sector for the people; and a trend to collective negotiation of economic treaties across different geographic areas of the world. However, within these broader trends other discourses have emerged as the truth about what can be said about ways of living and being such as nationhood, the movement of people, citizenship, public service and services, welfare states and freedom. Thus it can be said that within the context of austerity in the UK, particular constructions have arisen about what can/should be expected from individuals that facilitate the broader economic changes being made to the country's public sector. Authors such as Rose (2000) have talked about individalisation, responsibilisation and the construction of the active citizen, for example. Here the 'good citizen' is the one who, simply put, takes care of themselves, presents no 'burden' to the state, is financially autonomous, healthy, hardworking and understands that if things go wrong it is to her/himself that they should look for solutions, blame, responsibility.

In the same way that individual citizens have been and are shaped by the discourses of individualisation, so are those working in the public sector who are seeing their roles being reframed as a result of privatisation and cutbacks in funding. In the second section of the book there is a focus on those delivering services to explore these factors and unpack the implications of them for their working lives, roles and status.

The first chapter by Malin explores the impacts of de-professionalisation across health and social care sectors considering the ways in which austerity and its offspring privatisation, tendering processes, competition, have provided methods to undermine professional or expert roles in favour of, always cheaper, but necessarily less trained, experienced, and autonomous practitioners providing, supposedly the same quality of service.

In the second chapter in this section, Roberts examines the privatisation of the probation service and interrogates the extent to which the subsequent reshaping of rehabilitation will result in losers and winners amongst the offender population. Offenders are to be divided into those posing high and less risk with the former being addressed by offender managers from within a reduced probation service and the latter being worked with by any agency who has won the contract to provide them with services. Roberts considers whether, in theory at least, this approach might benefit those identified for rehabilitation if resources are adequate: however, the implications for the work of the probation service are as yet unknown. Roberts considers the problems attached to risk assessment processes that are available to identify high risk offenders, and the changing nature of the work of offender managers to a supervisory rather than a rehabilitative role. The next chapter in this section, by Gilligan, considers the ways in which the education system is being reconfigured as a result of austerity as an economic and an ideological project. The focus here is on participation and social class and the ways in which children from families living in poverty are excluded in multiple ways both by the withdrawal of funding from educational projects that promote wider participation for school students and the exclusion of students from educational experiences such as cultural trips for lack of money in the family. This is happening, Gilligan argues, at the same time as new parenting discourses produces parents who have active roles in the education of their children and which provides a rationale for funding cuts especially to learning experiences outside the classroom. The cumulative impact of these exclusionary practices in the long-term are also considered.

In the final section the focus is directly on service provision under austerity and the impacts for service users. Dalton's chapter considers

Bourdieu and Wacquant's (1992) notion of 'symbolic violence' as an explanatory tool for the consequences of public sector spending cuts in services for those living with HIV and AIDs. There is acknowledgement that the impacts are not only austerity led but also the result of a biomedicalised presentation of HIV/AIDS which has produced beliefs that this is no longer a problem or not one that is life-threatening. Such beliefs can be conveniently drawn on in rationales for cut backs to provision in this sector. Drawing from a survey of the sector Dalton demonstrates the degree to which services and staff have been cut and the impact of the loss of local specialist knowledge about HIV/AIDS. The effects of symbolic violence are such that those victimised by it might not be aware of it, rather they might accept their experiences as 'to be expected'. For example, cuts to sexual health prevention services can be understood as understandable in light of biomedical advances in the treatment of HIV rather than as a missed opportunity to prevent HIV transmission in a population unaware of the risks of transmission. Thus are service users and potential service users inured to the effects of austerity measures in their own lives which points to the lack of resistance from within this sector to the cuts.

In a similar way, in their chapter Donovan and Durey argue that it is not austerity alone that has resulted in a reduction in the provision of specialist services for those experiencing domestic violence and abuse in the relationships of lesbian, gay, bisexual and/or trans people (LGB and/or T). Rather, they argue that discourses of equalities—which are reinterpreted as 'everybody is the same'—provide a rationale for the financial cuts being made. The right wing acceptance of LGB and/or T people into the neoliberal construct of responsibilised citizenships rewarded with legal equalities such as same sex marriage, has provided a rationale for cutting specialist services. Thus practitioners in their study describe the ways in which mainstream services can refer to discourses of 'sameness' to insist that their services are 'for everybody' and resist arguments that specialist knowledge, experience, and possibly services are required in order to provide an equality of provision to all of those experiencing domestic violence and abuse. These authors also point to the ways in which funding cuts that result, across publicly funded services, in rationing, targeting and prioritising in the delivery of services to current

service users, also acts to constrain the time of practitioners to recognise, identify and argue for the needs of new, potential service user groups.

The consequences of cuts and the failures of provision are explored by Hunter in her chapter which considers the impacts of austerity for children living in the care of the state. Evidence is provided showing the ways in which the position of these children and young people has deteriorated since 2010 so that Hunter argues that it has never been a more dangerous time to be a looked after child. The evidence is stark that children and young people in and leaving care are at a high risk of a range of mental health problems, poor educational outcomes and housing problems. Perennial problems such as unqualified residential home staff have been exacerbated by cuts in children's services that have resulted in different priorities, a recalibration of risk and need and the criteria for intervention and a re-framing of the role and responsibilities of State Parenting. Finally, Cosgrove and Peacock continue the theme of vulnerability with regard to adults in police custody and the volunteer service that supports them. They provide a critique of the ill-defined concept of vulnerability, and explore the experiences of the volunteers in the scheme. They argue that austerity has left the service underfunded, relying on a 'big society' approach that relies on an a misunderstanding that volunteers do not require training and/or supervision (Clayton et al. 2016) and that, moreover, those who need support are left without it in many cases. However, the work of Cosgrove and Peacock suggests that the police are more likely to designate a person as vulnerable and therefore eligible for the scheme than not suggesting possibly a more sympathetic approach to vulnerable adults. Yet, by depending on a voluntary scheme, the authors points to the ways in which the mental health problems created by austerity, that are increasingly being picked up by police services, are losing out on properly funded provision. Those judged vulnerable in custody can be both demonised as a problem category, and at the same time endure an increased dependency on inadequate services.

In all these explorations of current austerity, the problems of the past and the future are examined with a view to establishing the distinctive characteristics of the situation that has developed since 2008. The continuities in ideology and practice are at times striking, as austerity

has enhanced and exaggerated trends already in place. In some areas, though, the austerity imposed since the crisis has introduced new forms of insecurity and denial, exclusion and fragmentation. The sense of a system in crisis is reinforced by the variety of ways in which austerity has worked its way through the different aspects of social policy.

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Part I

Austerity: A Break with the Past?

Austerity—A Critical History of the Present

Peter Rushton

In order to place the problems of social policies in a time of austerity in a wider context, this paper will explore the 'history of the present' in post-2008 austerity Britain. The purpose is not just to list the unique characteristics of the current 'recovery' in terms of inequalities and employment conditions, but to establish their interactions and consequences for UK society and social policy. Above all, the retreat of the state from many forms of direct provision and the introduction of market systems into everything from health to education and refuse recycling, have changed the way that social policies can be implemented. The historically unique features of this recession or, perhaps, their unique combination in the present situation, set the framework for the impact on the areas of social policy in this collection. The comparisons with the experiences and policies of other countries are recognised but not dealt with in any detail (see Farnsworth and Irving 2012). Similarly, the analysis here cannot survey all the recessions of the twentieth

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century (which Christopher Dow has covered superbly) by way of comparison, yet some contrasts with recent experiences of the 1980s and 1990s are made to highlight the distinctive characteristics of the present situation. It is notable that the peculiarities of the twenty-first century's first recession provoked the Bank of England to survey 300 years of economic data to establish its character (Dow 1998; Hills et al. 2010). The aim here is to characterise the present in such a way that the continuities with the recent past are revealed, along with how they are reinforced and reinvigorated through the government responses to the 2008 crisis. In addition, there are new elements introduced through austerity in the context of the unique political and economic circumstances of this recession. The focus here is on changing patterns of inequality and the reinforcement of older trends in new ways since 2008. The scope includes both economic, age and health, as well as a reflection on the underlying economic insecurity and the stress of the new developments in forms of employment, as they affect both private sector and public service workers.

A note is required on the kind of historically-aware social science being adopted here: the sophisticated application of complexity theory to this recent history, most notably by Sylvia Walby (2015), has attractions as both an analysis of the recession's origins and as a formal rethinking of social science. It highlights areas where actions by institutions and governments reinforced each other, or acted in negative ways to reproduce many kinds of inequalities. A critical awareness of opportunities missed, and decisions made, with a critical awareness of the 'road not taken' (Frost 1920: 9), can also highlight where systematic failures were introduced in ways that had irreversible damaging side-effects. These are the feedbacks and loops of Walby's analysis, but they also resonate with conventional historical analysis: some directions taken cannot be reversed, and these actions shape the unique concatenation of events. Like Althusser's famously ill-defined idea of historical contingency, or 'conjunction', this kind of analysis reflects on the unique processes producing historically unusual outcomes even if the recession itself has recognisable origins in the established structures of capitalism (Byrne and Callaghan 2014). Complexity at the level of individuals and groups allows a systematic framework for intersections

and self-reproducing and mutually-reinforcing factors and processes of *inequality*, in a structural way (McCall 2005; Walby 2007). The most important aspect of these approaches is the way it allows analysis to integrate different forms of inequality combining in people's lives, even if it is theoretically difficult to develop a convincing model of how they work together in the social system:

> Social theory faces a challenge in theorizing the intersection of multiple complex inequalities. To do so adequately it must address the ontological depth of systems of social relations of inequality in the institutional domains of economy, polity, violence, and civil society rather than flatten this to a single dimension of culture or economics. (Walby 2007: 466)

In effect, this proposes a system approach without reductionism to a single dimension such as capitalist social relations or the economy, or their dominant actors (the 'ruling class' or the 1%, of Seymour 2014; Dorling 2014), and above all, one which abandons the assumption that the system must enforce all forms of inequality in a uniform way. This is not far from the kinds of historical analysis adopted by politically aware economic historians (Dow 1998) and encourages an attempt to integrate both systems and action, in ways that allow for analysis of the intended and *unintended* consequences of actions by governments and powerful institutions. The approach acknowledges that there may be contradictory tendencies in society, such as the development of insecure forms of employment coinciding with legislative recognition and criminalisation of new forms of exploitation under the heading of 'modern slavery' (Modern Slavery Act, Eliz. II 2015 c.22). The latter is partly directed against exploitation in the overseas supply chains. In other words, it is possible for the economic and the political to work against one another in certain areas, even if the enforcement of the slavery law is uneven and leaves many victims unaided by police intervention (*The Guardian* 2017b; HMICFRS 2017).

Establishing the unique features and consequences of the fourth recession since World War II requires more than a checklist approach, though that is a start. In many ways, the events of 2007–2008 resemble much earlier slumps such as that of 1929, or the classic property-driven

Florida speculation crash of the 1920s, rather than the oil-inflation driven recessions of 1973 or 1981 (Columbo 2012). International dealing in irresponsible bank loans played a far greater part than in any other post-war crisis. Most analysts agree that the Blair government reacted well to the dire situation of 2007–2008, devising policies aimed at recapitalisation of the banks accompanied by partial nationalisation, a speedy change in monetary policy, involving slashing interest rates, and the injection of funds into the system by 'quantitative easing', all contributing to staving off the consequences of the 'credit crunch' which shut off finance to the economy. Under the initial shock of the recession, many governments adopted uncharacteristic policies quite unlike those of the 1930s: as Boyer as noted, they expanded liquidity 'even to speculators', and were willing to cut taxes and increase public spending, as the interest rates fell towards zero. 'Some analysts … even announced the comeback of John Maynard Keynes and, thus, the defeat of new classical macroeconomics' (Boyer 2012: 284). At this point, orthodox economics and neoliberal ideology cut in, as public debts became an obsession: such debt was redefined as a problem of government spending rather than revenue collapse, and cutting the public sector and all welfare spending came to dominate, making 2010 onwards strongly resemble a return to the policies of the early 1930s. This is not the place to engage with critiques of this reversion, as clearly expressed by the likes of Paul Krugman (2008). It is obvious, however, that austerity is a very bad idea (Blyth 2013) and moreover has never been *economically*, let alone morally or politically, justified as a response to our society's problems (Schui 2014). It should be noted that a long term historical perspective on austerity economics is adopted by Blyth (2013) and Schui (2014). In addition, the more polemical literature reinforces this perspective (see Seymour 2014, among many others). With regard to public policy after 2008, the key shift in policy was under the Coalition government from 2010 to 2015 which abandoned the more Keynesian approach of the previous two years, in parallel with the orthodoxy being imposed by Germany inside the Eurozone, and introduced: massive cuts in government infrastructure investment and a public sector wage freeze at a time of 2–3% inflation, a general attack on all areas of public expenditure, and a commitment to a balanced government budget.

These were clearly ideological choices. Austerity was redefined as the solution to the collapse of tax revenues, the growth of a government budget deficit and burgeoning public indebtedness. This was the first post-war recession to be confronted with the fully-developed forms of neoliberal strategies, which redirected the definition of the crisis from problems with the financial system to one of government deficits and debts. The *taxation* crisis was rarely mentioned as a solution to the fiscal crisis of the state, though VAT rates went up, penalising the relatively poor who spent most of their income, while income tax rates on the affluent were reduced.

The focus in what follows is the way that the social consequences after 2008 reinforced trends in social inequality that had been in train for some time, created new forms of marginalisation and exclusion, and at the same time transformed conditions of work both in the economy and in the delivery of public services. Key areas of inequality have been chosen, in what follows, to demonstrate some of the ways that aspects of the recession and the subsequent austerity policies have led to multiple forms of inequity that have reinforced each other in a way that reveals intersectional combinations.

Inequality—Income and Wealth

Bill Clinton's election slogan—'It's the economy, stupid'—is rather an obvious starting point for studying the effects of recession and austerity policies, but it is fundamental to an analysis of British inequality since 2007. Tejvan Pettinger (2016) argues that the recession was one of the deepest, and showed the slowest recovery, even when compared with the 1930s, and that recovery was halted by the deep expenditure cuts after 2010. Geoff Tily, writing for the TUC, went even further back, to the 1840s, and came to the same conclusion (Tily 2015). While there has been growth, it has barely kept pace with the increasing population of the country, so per capita incomes actually fell (IPPR 2017: 14). The consequences of the slow economic recovery since 2008 have been paradoxical for levels of inequality. There has been some equalisation of income distribution, as wages in both the public and private

sectors froze, and those of some of the poorest have been underpinned by state pensions and the minimum wage. This has been accompanied, however, by the increasing values of property and financial assets such as shares, inflated by the Bank of England's policy of pumping money into the financial sector under the heading of 'quantitative easing'. Wealth has therefore continued to remain extremely unequal, following a short-term fall in the crisis, while income has shown some levelling. Thus the richest 1% have continued to do very well, as they had over the previous thirty years. 'While broad measures of inequality were relatively flat in the 1990s and 2000s, inequality between the richest 1% and the rest continued to grow', despite the recession (Corlett and Clarke 2017: 44, their Fig. 30). This has been called a 'regressive recovery' in both economic strategies and austerity measures targetting public financing of welfare and provision, as any benefits have been skewed upwards to a small minority (Green and Lavery 2014). This does not mean that income distribution has not become slightly more equal—the top 10% of income earners, who had pulled away from those below in the 1990s and early 2000s, fell back in relation to the remaining 90%. Yet the top 1% continued their progress away from the rest after 2008. In terms of the ratio of the 90% to the top 10% of income earners, and the proportion of the national income going to the top 1%, it has been calculated that

> In 2014–15, the 90:10 ratio in Great Britain stood at 3.9, down from 4.4 in the early 1990s. By contrast, the top 1% share peaked at 8.7% in 2009–10, 50% higher than the level in 1990, and it stood at 7.9% in 2014–15. (Belfield et al. 2016: 25)

One essential feature of the post-2008 'recovery' has been the prevalence of low rates of pay: 'this low pay trap has worsened since the global recession. Real wages have fallen and the number of workers who are not paid enough to achieve a basic minimum standard of living has increased significantly' (Social Mobility Commission 2017: 71). Falling unemployment since economic growth resumed has been accompanied by a growth in insecure working contracts (see below), yet, despite reported shortages of workers in many sectors as economic

growth has picked up, few have seen this translated into higher wages. 'Average weekly earnings have been decoupled from GDP growth for the first time since comparable data has been available' (from the early 1970s) (IPPR 2017, online, unpaginated). The result is a paradox: 'the economic growth experienced in the UK since 2013 has led to record employment levels. But for low paid workers the low-pay trap has tightened, with young people faring the worst' (Social Mobility Commission 2017: 72). Not surprisingly in this context, inequality has become part of the public discourse of all political parties, and the monitoring of shifting inequalities has become more widespread: not just through the critical approach of academics like Danny Dorling, but embedded in the work of the Resolution Foundation, the Social Mobility Commission, the Office for National Statistics, and Bank of England surveys (Haldane 2016). Sociologists have displayed great scepticism: Danny Dorling (2014) asks 'can we afford the superich?', and Zygmunt Bauman (2013) tries to search for critical answers, while Andrew Sayer (2015) *Why We Can't Afford the Rich* has clearly come to a firm conclusion. This is in contrast with most of the UK press and media commentators who, as Temple et al. (2016) argue, remain firmly within an orthodox neoliberal framework of analysis that endorses the necessity of austerity and of the inequalities in wealth.

Wealth is almost twice as unequal as income, but features far less in today's living standards and inequality debates. The top 1% of adults owns 14% of the country's wealth, and half is owned by the top 10%. In sum, 'Britain's increasingly unevenly shared property wealth is driving up inequality after a decade-long fall' (Resolution Foundation 2017, unpaginated; IPPR 2017). The situation since 2008 has thus reversed the tendency of the previous twenty years. This trend is partly connected to the difficulties in buying property: as home ownership rose from WWII to 2008, inequalities in wealth fell, but since the recession, access to affordable housing has declined, and the proportion of households owning their own houses has fallen. 'This shift in property wealth towards the richest families means that shifts in property ownership are now driving up overall wealth inequality, rather than reducing it' (Resolution Foundation 2017, unpaginated).

Age and Generation

The persistence and growth of economic inequalities has been highlighted in many reports surveying the advanced economies since 2008. Crucial to these inequalities are a number of unusual factors unique to this 'Great Recession' and its aftermath. As in former recessions (1980s and 1990s) the future of the young has been sacrificed: unique, though, has been the experience of older, retired people who have enjoyed index-linked rises in their incomes, the only group to enjoy this outside senior managers in the financial sector. These have been striking features of Britain's recent experience, shared with many European countries. The problems of the young, though, have been reframed in terms of the unfairness of the comparatively comfortable and selfish elderly. Former Conservative politician David Willetts began his careful distraction of attention from the problems of the young by alleging a selfish generation of elderly baby-boomers (born 1945–1955), who were taking a disproportionate share of public resources, ignoring the historically unique circumstances of the final-salary pensions that dominated both private and public sectors up to the 1990s (Willetts 2011). He recognised the consequences of the ending of the post-war consensus, whereby both private and public employers offered decent pensions, without acknowledging his party's responsibility for its abandonment. More realistically, American journalist Don Peck stressed the severity of the recession—'not your father's recession', and characterised it as a crisis for the whole of the self-defined middle class, who in America constitute a majority. Both authors used the image of a future that has been 'pinched' from the young (Willetts 2011; Peck 2011). Willetts also distracted attention from the growing costs of the elderly, both medical and in terms of social care, which the idea of a 'demographic timebomb', common in the 1990s, highlighted. Failure to organise the economic basis for that care has been one of the great weaknesses of twenty-first century politics. Despite the evidence that the older population alone have enjoyed rising living standards since 2008—about 13% in real terms (IPPR 2017: 20), the problem of care highlights the situation in poverty of those aged who had *not* enjoyed the post-war

provision of skilled work and pensions, and who will be overwhelmingly dependent on state provision. Most of these are women (see the evidence by Sara Arber and others, in House of Lords 2013: 168–189).

Willetts and others fail to note the changing structures of work, discussed below, and the additional factors of lower wages and exclusion from the housing market. There is consequently a unique feature of the current situation facing young adults: 'children born in Margaret Thatcher's Britain are the first post-war cohort to start their working lives on lower incomes than their immediate predecessors. Social mobility has stalled for an entire generation' (Sensier and Devine 2017: 3). This has produced what the researchers for the government's Social Mobility Commission call 'a new generational divide' (2017: 5). Regional inequalities in opportunities for the young also remain strong, with one characteristic of the recession being an increase in the number of NEETS ('Not in Employment, Education or Training') in regions such as the West Midlands and the North West, with, by 2010, the highest proportion being found in North East England (ONS 2010: 59). 'Signs of growing precarity and un/deremployment among youth preceded the current crisis, suggesting deeper-rooted global forces unleashed by neoliberal economic policies at work' (Allen undated: 3). The 'lost generation' is an international feature of most advanced economies (European Youth Forum 2013), but this has been accompanied by a pseudo-feminist ideology that individual success is available for young women as never before. Yet there are continuities of class and ethnicity that still shape the limitations experienced by young women—even successful graduates—in the labour market (Allen undated: 19–20). Cuts in public services, where gender equality has made most progress, have a disproportionate effect on women's opportunities (Fawcett Society 2012). With regard to many younger people, there are increasing numbers of children in poverty, reversing the trend established under the Labour governments of 1997–2010: for the first time, the proportion of children is poverty is rising and, strikingly, with majority being in working households (54%; Smith et al. 2017; IPPR 2017, unpaginated). Working poverty, along with almost Victorian levels of insecurity, has become a major feature of our society.

Health Inequalities

The consequences for the general population, and for some particularly vulnerable groups, may be seen in some of the recent health data. Since 2008, there has been much evidence of increasing stress, almost a mental health crisis, among children (Knapp 2012: 54; Department of Health 2016; Frith 2017). This may stem from the belated recognition of a real problem (Matthey 2015; Goldman-Mellor et al. 2016). Yet the provision of children and young people's mental health services is repeatedly reported to be in crisis (see the chapter by Stephanie Hunter in this volume). Another aspect of age is the apparent shift in men's high suicide rates. A particularly affected group is made up of older men whose traditional role in family responsibility, bolstered by skilled industrial work, has been undermined by economic changes (Reeves et al. 2014: 247). It is also worth noting that for these men, this is the second or even third recession of their adult lives, and one characterised by greater economic insecurity (Samaritans 2017: 25–27; Biddle et al. 2008). Yet for young men in higher education the number of suicides also rose by more than a third between 2007 and 2011. 'Health and education are linked in many ways. A combination of rising financial and academic pressures on students coupled with recent cutbacks to university support services might be partly to blame, as well as the rapid dwindling of job prospects' (Dorling 2014; Kindle ed. Loc. 2214–18).

This leads to a broader consideration of the nation's health since 2008, characterised by a rise in death rates which has provoked some public comment as well puzzlement among academic commentators. The trend of continually increasing life expectancies, going back 100 years, has been halted and for some groups reversed. This makes this recession unique. The impact of the Great Recession can be epitomised by the headline in August 2017 concerning the better results at Legal and General where pension payouts had been reduced: 'L&G profits rise as death comes sooner than expected' (*The Guardian* 2017a). Danny Dorling has been tracking the rises in mortality since 2010 in parallel with Professor Sir Michael Marmot (Dorling 2013; Marmot,

as reported by Campbell 2017). Even allowing for occasional influenza epidemics, the trend is worrying:

> People are tending to live longer for a variety of reasons, including improved lifestyles and medical advances in the treatment of many illnesses and diseases. This has resulted in the population increasing in size over time, and the number of deaths generally decreasing. This trend has altered in recent years with deaths increasing between 2011 and 2015.

Moreover, 'there was a significant increase between 2014 and 2015 for all persons and both sexes. In the data presented since 1995, this was the first increase in the male rate'. Most of the increase was among people aged 75 or over (ONS 2016a: 3, 4 and 6; 2016b). This is related to declining provision of nursing and social health care (Hiam et al. 2017; Watkins et al. 2017). France and Denmark also showed a rise in deaths in these years, among other countries, where austerity measures had an adverse impact on health (ONS 2016a: 7; Stuckler et al. 2017). It has become something of a cliché that severely unequal societies are more-unhealthy, and this can be made worse by recession. The idea that 'austerity kills' is not new, but has become more plausible in this recession (Stuckler and Basu 2013).

Housing Crisis

Housing is pivotal to a number of related negative effects of austerity, affecting family stability, children's health and education, and the mental state of all members of the household. The situation since 2008 has been unique in the sense that, after an inevitable fall in prices with the credit crunch, housing has increasingly outstripped incomes, particularly in the South and London. With static or falling incomes, entering the housing market has become difficult for many, particularly younger, people. In addition, the rise of a private rented sector on a large scale has not mitigated the situation much, as rents have risen faster than incomes in most cities, especially London. Housing is a classic example of the processes of complexity proposed by Walby and others, in that

a change in one form of provision generates personal and social problems which introduce a self-reinforcing cycle of social exclusion and personal distress (Walby 2007, 2015; also McCall 2005). The government's Housing Benefit cuts—in effect cuts to a benefit which subsidises private landlords by offering them guaranteed income on property—still encourages buy-to-let lending by banks. Without rent controls, and a rising numbers of families seeking private lets, the rented sector has become almost as inaccessible as home-owning. As Dorling comments,

> Private renting is not necessarily good for households with children. Today almost a quarter of all households in England with children live in rented homes […]. It was half that proportion just ten years ago. Only a third of these households have lived in the same home for three years. Children are now far more often moved between schools and friends every year'. (Dorling 2014; Kindle Loc. 1620–22)

In addition, there are rising numbers of families in temporary accommodation. According to the National Audit Office, 'there were 77,240 households in temporary accommodation in England in March 2017, an increase of 60% since March 2011. These households included 120,540 children, an increase of 73% from March 2011'. The costs of temporary accommodation, £845 million, were largely funded by housing benefit. The key cause of this trend, the ending of secure tenancy in private accommodation, has resulted in 105,240 households threatened with homelessness. In addition, the cap on benefits, combined with cuts to housing benefit, are 'expected to lead to a wave of evictions among families who cannot afford to meet the resulting rent shortfall, creating a sharp increase in child poverty and homelessness' (NAO 2017, unpaginated). In addition, mental health is also affected by housing problems, as Dorling has noted, 'as housing becomes harder to secure and hold on to, the number of cases of depression climbs' (Dorling 2014; Kindle Loc. 1670–73).

The cuts and restrictions to housing and disability benefits are part of a much broader programme of government withdrawal of support. The processes are in many ways circular and mutually reinforcing, with

health, housing, educational and economic difficulties creating a vortex of forces leading to potential disaster.

> For people dependent on benefits, balancing the books involves a continual series of fine-tuned micro-budgeting calculations. Any change in one's circumstances (a relationship breakdown, entering or losing work, having one's work hours increased or reduced, changes in family arrangements) can set off a sequence of events that can easily lead to destitution and homelessness. Whenever such a change in circumstances occurs, benefits recipients are expected to notify – separately – each of the offices administering the various funds they receive (the local council for housing benefit, HMRC for tax credits, the Department of Work and Pensions for unemployment and disability benefits). (Forbess and James 2017)

The exit from this cycle is difficult if not impossible.

Work and Insecurity

Another unique feature following the crisis of 2008 has been the astonishingly low unemployment rates: there was no return of the 3m unemployed of Mrs. Thatcher or John Major's recessions. Yet this success is deceptive. The jobs created have been poorly-paid, low skilled, and endured under new conditions of insecurity and instability. Zero-hours contracts, affecting nearly 1m workers today compared with a few thousand fifteen years ago, are one reflection of this growing precariousness. Women make up the majority of workers on these contracts, which in terms of pay offer '50% less than the average worker' (ONS 2017; Cooper and Whyte 2017: 12 and 14). A feature of the jobs market has been this contradiction between employment and the insecurity of many of those who have kept, or found work, since 2008. The 'gig economy' and 'zero-hours contracts', through which employers either define their workers as self-employed to avoid making national insurance payments, or tie their workers to them without any obligation to offer any work, have become familiar through political and media reporting. Guy Standing's book on the 'precariat' (2011) distilled some

of these features into a general thesis about current times, for all social classes. This had been predicted by a concerned Charles Handy in the 1990s, as 'portfolio' work spread though some skilled professions, and noted by some of the few commentators on insecure work at that time (Handy 1994; Vail et al. 1999).The current insecurity needs to be seen in the context of changing forms of control and flexibility of work in general, phenomena that have their origins in the 1980s when employers, mostly foreign car companies, introduced new ways of working. This coincided with the development of devolved, globalised, management of manufacturing and the neoliberal pronouncement of our 'freedom'. Under the mask of 'empowerment' and 'flexibility', workers were subject to more intensive, computer-controlled regimes (Bradley et al. 2000). At the same time, the middle class professionals of the new IT, creative, communication and cultural industries exchanging a fixed contract with a single employer for a 'portfolio' collection of short-term contracts. Far from empowering them, workers suffer increasing stress, the intrusion of work into family and leisure times, and anxiety about future security. Most of the studies have been of relatively educated and skilled workers in new industries, yet, as with the post-2008 situation in general, the stress and mental health effects of this trend are apparent (Thorley and Cook 2017). Studies of fashion, cultural production and some other areas of creative industries noted the gendered bias of much of this precarity (McRobbie 2010; Hesmondhalgh and Baker 2011; Huws 2014). 'There is now considerable evidence that the growth in precarious work, falling wages, cuts to the public sector and greater welfare conditionality have disproportionately affected women, raising concerns that these transformations "spell a tipping point for women's equality"' (Allen undated: 5).

The new ways of working, even with full-time employment by a supportive employer, are different, as home-work segregation has broken down, and personal technologies such as mobile' phones have put people in touch with work at any time of the day or night. This has been termed the 'social factory', whereby work has taken over social and leisure life, and workers are always on call, in touch, and 'at work' (Lazzarato 1996). These factors, of control, computerised surveillance and task-setting, and insecurity, have come together in the management

of every area where zero-hours contracts and 'gig' working have predominated, from warehouses linked to online ordering schedules to taxi-driving and delivery services in large cities. While dominant discourses proclaim that workers enjoy the flexibility and independence of these arrangements, studies indicate great stress and low wages are more commonly experienced (Thorley and Cook 2017). It seems that modern work makes us ill.

The Professionals and the Recession

New ways of working—working 'smarter' rather than harder—have been on offer for some time for the public sector professionals in areas such as education and health. Yet structural changes have made working lives uncertain and unstable in these and other service sectors. The 'postfordist' welfare state was the subject of discussion in the 1990s, as new forms of production and delivery spread from manufacturing to the service sector (Burrows and Loader 1994). The increasing use of agency professionals and private organisations means that 'public service' has become more diffuse and difficult to identify. Are universities, largely funded by fees paid by students from government loans, public institutions? More directly, the private organisations delivering probation services to the less serious offenders, are subject to regulation and inspection, as are the care homes and other private organisations looking after children or adults (see the chapter by Nicola Roberts). Work relations and organisational structures vary across all these organisations, but the auditing of personal performance has become standard, either internally or, with regard to hospitals and individual doctors, externally published. The debate about professionalism and the new marketization of services has varied from the apocalyptic—the 'end of the professions'—to the more critical. Academic discussions have reflected both the pessimistic and the optimistic views of current developments, some arguing that the golden age of autonomous professionals never existed, particularly in areas such as social work (Broadbent et al. 1997; Clark 2005). Others point to new forms of professionalism, 'reprofessionalisation' of some areas of work:

> New concepts and trends have entered the policy arena. Besides contractualisation we now have to add accountability, managerialism, marketisation, privatisation, bureaucratisation, and user-led services. These concepts and trends have affected state policy towards social services, education and health care. Increasingly, welfare states stimulate competition and efficiency in public services via a 'marketisation' that has changed both the process and the culture of social and care services. (Duyvendak et al. 2006: 9–10)

Yet, as Clark points out, 'the question of whether welfare professionals really have less autonomy and discretion than they did, for example, 30 years ago, is an empirical question and we do not have good research to answer it' (Clark 2005, unpaginated). What can be said is that professions are under pressure (see Malin, Chapter 5). 'The norms and routines that have served us well are being cast as outdated practices unsuited to a new era and we are in the course of developing new understandings of what is meant by the term professionalism. But we must be careful not to jump to conclusions' (Broadbent et al. 1997: 1). Accountability and autonomy seem opposed, yet the irony of using independent private organisations to deliver a public service is that there has to be public regulation, auditing and reporting, to ensure standardisation across all regions and organisations (see Roberts, Chapter 6). Thus bureaucracy is piled on bureaucracy in the name of maintaining standards. Weber noticed that 'bureaucracy thus understood, is fully developed … only in the modern state, and, in the private economy, only in the most advanced institutions of capitalism' (Weber 1946: 196).

Conclusion

This chapter has reviewed only some of the key social, economic and health consequences of this peculiar recession and its aftermath, but they are the most crucial aspects that will shape the policies and their impact in the near future. To sum up the features of the present, the engine of economic growth has stalled as we have experienced the slowest growth out of a recession in 100 years: even orthodox economists have difficulty with this. Living standards showed an immediate fall, partly as hours of work fell while people remained 'fully employed',

the government imposed a predictable clampdown on the public sector pay increases, and cuts in welfare concentrated on those dependent on in-work benefits. It took five years for pre-2008 levels of real income to be reached again. Inequalities in wealth showed the quickest recovery, after an immediate fallback in the couple of years after 2008. Changes in working conditions and contracts have institutionalised insecurity and fluctuating pay across many sectors. In this situation, for the first time in 100 years, we have seen falling life expectancies in key groups and regions. The picture given here is of a divided society whose inequalities, and the inevitable social problems that follow from them, have been worsened both by the 2008 crisis and the austerity policies of governments since 2010.

Defining the situation is, though, more difficult than listing the key features. The possible critical views of the present fall into several schools of thought. First, there is the view that nothing has really changed, and *it does not need to*: we have the sixth largest economy in the world, large numbers of fabulously wealthy people to tax, and we can afford continuity with the New Labour project of NHS and other social investments or, the opposite but similar view, if we go on as we have done, the system will deliver the best outcomes a free market can guarantee. Among some economic commentators, there is a slightly more sophisticated argument that capitalism has evolved out of the conditions that produced the 2008 crisis (Kaletsky 2010). Business can remain as normal, if it adapts. This gives hope to both left and right that the economic conditions will support their favoured path. *Apocalypse has been avoided*.

Second is the view that *everything* has changed: after 2008 nothing will be the same again, as British and global capitalism has become unfit for purpose, and lost all social foundations. None of the fundamental problems of slow growth in western economies, and of the imbalanced and vulnerable economy of Britain in particular, have changed, and we remain in continual danger of another slump (Elliott 2017: 22). The benefits of recent growth confirm the social exclusion and marginalisation of millions: recovery has not happened for many people, as Andrew Haldane of the Bank of England has conceded (Haldane 2016). Fundamental problems need radical long-term solutions. This is *Apocalypse Now*.

The third view is that nothing has changed, because this is still the 1980s: the government are Mrs Thatcher's children carrying out the unfulfilled final solutions that Thatcher was unable to implement because of all those wet, pro-European Tory colleagues. This is particularly favoured by those who see austerity as a mask for the final destruction of all systems of welfare—a project 'to permanently dissemble the protection state', Cooper and Whyte say, adding the remark that, 'of course, none of this is new' (Cooper and Whyte 2017: 1 and 17). Ideologically, the 'alchemy of austerity' disguises the reality (Clarke and Newman 2012). Seen conspiratorially, 'austerity is a class project that disproportionately targets and affects working-class households and communities and, in so doing, protects concentrations of elite wealth and power'. Finally, an international ruling class, having created the mess, are able to inflict radical transformations of state and society on the rest of us in order to pay for it (Cooper and Whyte 2017: 11; Seymour 2014). Some observers have described the current situation as the 'end of liberal collectivism', that is, of the consensus and mutual commitment that characterised the post-war welfare state (Grimshaw and Rubery 2012). Others have described this time as the end of the welfare state itself (Mendoza 2015), implementing an inherently *violent* policy, in its destruction of both state provision and the possibilities of a secure life (Cooper and Whyte 2017). The continuities with the ideologies of the 1980s and the 1990s, pursued in a new context of financial collapse and economic crisis, suggest that old clothes have been given a new gloss with extra force. More plausibly, then, this is *Apocalypse, at last*.

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Austerity and the Undermining of Democracy

Ilona Buchroth and Linda Hetherington

Despite the much re-iterated rhetoric of being 'in it together', austerity measures and deepening (in)equality have become inseparably linked. Local Authorities in the most deprived areas of the country, whilst also being more reliant on government grants, for example, have faced a significantly higher per capita reduction in spending than the most affluent ones (Clarke and Cochrane 2013; Joseph Rowntree Foundation 2015). Similarly, different groups in society have been affected by the Comprehensive Spending Review and its after effects in different ways (O'Hara 2012). The independent think-tank, the Women's Budget Group, shows that tax and benefit changes since 2010 will have hit women's incomes twice as hard as men's, and spending cuts have also disproportionately affected more vulnerable groups in society (Donovan et al. 2012; Levitas 2012). A report published by the United Nation's Committee on

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Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (2016) expressed serious concern about the disproportionate, adverse impact that austerity measures are having on disadvantaged and marginalised individuals and groups and has confirmed that the UK government's austerity measures and social security reform are in breach of their obligations to human rights.

In this chapter, further dimensions of the link between austerity and (in)equality will be explored. Against the backdrop of the rising popularity of right-wing views it will be shown how the complementary impact of neoliberalism and austerity forms the basis for legitimising right-wing extremist perspectives and moving these into a more commonly accepted discourse. Moreover, the chapter will focus on how austerity as an ideology complements the hegemony of neoliberalism in creating and legitimising social divisions, leading to wide-spread 'group-focused enmity' (GFE). Underlying GFE appears to be an unquestioned acceptance of unequal rights that challenges fundamental democratic principles.

An additional challenge to democratic principles arises out of the interplay of neoliberalism and austerity as it gives rise to a new form of 'market extremism' that further entrenches social divisions and affects the means and opportunities for those who are thus disenfranchised to effectively mobilise and/or voice a position that deviates from the dominant position. Austerity therefore not only challenges democratic principles it also adversely affects opportunities for active democracy and participation. The final section of the chapter will therefore explore how austerity affects the role of voluntary organisations, their survival within 'the market' and their capacity for developing an independent voice and effective action.[1]

Right-Wing Extremism Is Taking Centre Stage

Several cross-European surveys have indicated a rise in prejudice and discrimination (Zick and Klein 2014; Greven 2016). This trend has been accompanied simultaneously by a rising popularity and electoral success of right-wing/extremist political parties (Chakelian 2017). Over recent years the establishment of the UK Independence Party, the relative initial success of Marine Le Pen in France, Geert Wilders and the

Partij voor de Vrijheid (PVV) in the Netherlands, 'Golden Dawn' in Greece, and the significant number of seats gained by the right-wing, anti-Muslim, anti-immigration, Alternative fuer Deutschland (AfD) in the recent German elections are some of the most prominent examples.

This chapter seeks to explore the conditions under which what previously were considered right-wing extremist views have taken hold as mainstream/centrist and acceptable positions. Furthermore, it will be argued that austerity measures have contributed to and are fuelling these views whilst also adding to their perceived legitimacy.

Group Focused Enmity

One feature of right-wing extremism generally centres on a particular, generally racist rhetoric, expressing an anti-immigration, white supremacist stance. However, several Cross European Studies (Minkenberg 2011; Zick et al. 2011; Klein et al. 2014; Greven 2016) have investigated both the prevalence of right-wing extremist views and also the correlation between these views and attitudes towards wider groups in society. Drawing on data-sets from several longitudinal studies these studies also explore how right-wing extremist views correlate with a range of other social attitudes. One of the clear features emerging is that openly expressed hostility, discriminatory attitudes and behaviours that would have been considered right-wing extremist views have become more acceptable and widespread amongst groups in society that would wish to dissociate themselves from an extremist position. Moreover, hostility appears to be expressed towards a much wider range of groups in society and these sentiments have also become much more widely acceptable within mainstream discourse. Furthermore, the studies show that these attitudes and behaviours are not just rooted in a particular, focused position, such as homophobic attitudes being supported by religious beliefs, but appear as a cluster of discriminatory and hostile attitudes per se. There is a strong correlation, for example, between homophopbia, racism, sexism, xenophobia, islamophobia, hostile attitudes to people in long-term unemployment, benefit recipients, people with disabilities, asylum seekers, alongside beliefs that established

communities (rather than 'newcomers') should be assigned preferential rights and privileges (Zick et al. 2011; Klein et al. 2014).

People expressing hostile attitudes towards one group are therefore also likely to hold similar attitudes towards all other groups that are considered to be weaker or pose a threat to the position and preferential rights of groups considered to be more worthy. This cluster of attitudes is described as a syndrome of a general acceptance of broad based de-valuing of and hostility towards entire groups of people, referred to as 'GFE' (also see Heitmeyer 2001). Important in this context is that GFE and its underlying sentiments no longer appear to be associated with extremist views at the margins of society, but are instead portrayed as a common-sense position. This, in turn, allows right-wing extremism an easy access route into mainstream opinion and to extend its hold through 'the persistent, permanent breach of taboos that makes extreme-right-wing ideology respectable by clothing it in the garb of democratic legitimacy' (Schulz 2011: 30).

This new 'democratic legitimacy' is particularly pronounced in the wish to preserve the perceived rights of established groups and is expressed in sentiments such as 'local homes for local people', 'allowing British businesses to choose to employ British citizens first' (Manifesto UK Independence Party 2015) or more explicitly 'We want our people to come first, before foreigners, asylum seekers or migrants' (*The Sun Newspaper* 2017). As a result of austerity and the reduction of public services these views appear to be becoming more prominent and are voiced in a variety of contexts. This position does not at first glance appear discriminatory, as it does not actively focus on disadvantaging particular groups. However, this widespread and 'common sense' position represents a general acceptance of societal hierarchies, thus perpetrating an 'ideology of inequality' (Zick et al. 2011). This ideology challenges the general principle of equality and universality of rights as two of the fundamental pillars of democracy.

Group focused enmity can also be examined within the wider context of attitudes that can be regarded as anti-democratic or democracy-critical. One of the features of the growing popularity of right-wing/extremist parties can be found in their challenge to parliamentary democracy and democratic institutions. Cultivating an 'us and them' perspective,

therefore, can go both ways—'down' towards marginalised, weaker groups and 'up' towards political elites. Claiming to represent the 'unrepresented' centre, speaking for the 'common person' and their convincing 'common sense' position appear to be the most common methods for right-wing/extremist parties and movements to gain popularity (Greven 2016). Austerity with the accompanying fight for shrinking resources, fuels, strengthens and legitimises this position as GFE also appears to be more prominent amongst people who feel anxious about their economic position (Zick and Klein 2014). This link to underlying anxieties then supports a 'major characteristic of neoliberal democracies … that they function through the generation of consent via fear and anxiety' (Tyler 2013: 8). Moreover, even people who might not hold extremist views themselves appear to be less likely to acknowledge right-wing propaganda as problematic (see Meyer 2014) and thus opportunities for democratic debate and challenge are not utilised.

Although maintaining a critical stance towards democracy can be regarded as a healthy sign of democracy itself, it appears that certain clusters of attitudes can be seen as democracy enhancing, whilst others can be viewed as posing a potential threat to democracy. Zick and Klein (2014) distinguish between a focused questioning of democracy such as investigating undue influences from, for example, economic perspectives and doubts about the functioning of democracy as a workable system. Studies on GFE also suggest that in the bundle of discriminatory attitudes there is also a greater propensity to hold authoritarian views and favour harsh and disciplinarian solutions to perceived problems (Zick and Klein 2014). The latter go hand in hand with a reduced willingness to participate in democratic processes, whilst showing a greater level of acceptance of undemocratic, including violent, means of expressing political views (Minkenberg 2011; Schulz 2011; Zick and Klein 2014). Hostile attitudes therefore are matched with the acceptance of hostile actions. The prevalence of these attitudes is mirrored on a European level where some eurosceptic positions are equally linked to hostile attitudes towards countries within the European Union that are considered to be economically weaker. Zick and Klein (2014) argue that an anti-European position also becomes undemocratic when it is coupled with the anti-humanitarian, misanthropic sentiments that are associated with group focussed enmity.

Austerity and Neoliberalism

Investigating the underlying sentiments expressed in the European studies, above, leads to the need for an exploration of the interplay between neoliberalism and austerity. Farnsworth and Irving (2012) outline how austerity appears to be presented as a general consensus position whilst at the same time portraying the welfare state as a utopian vision and as 'vestiges of a bygone age'. Moreover, Florian Shui (2014) argues that the persuasive power of the austerity argument lies less in an underlying economic rationale, but that it appeals to familiar moral norms of moderation and sacrifice; sentiments that the prime minister Theresa May utilised by replacing references to austerity with 'living within our means' (Merrick 2017). Therefore, although emerging critiques suggest there are aspects of the neoliberal agenda that have not delivered as expected (Ostry et al. 2016), austerity, like its 'sister hegemon' 'neoliberalism' continues to dominate popular discourse and shapes all aspects of social and political life. Neoliberalism frames any discussion from an economic rather than a political or value driven perspective. More specifically, through superimposing the model of the market, neoliberal austerity gives rise to commercialisation of all aspects of public life and personal life, with an economic discourse overriding political or ethical considerations. As a result neoliberal austerity 'configures human beings exhaustively as market actors, always, only and everywhere as "homo oeconomicus [sic]"' (Brown 2015: 31). Austerity needs to be seen in conjunction with neoliberalism as it sharpens the underlying sentiments, trends and tendencies.

Market Extremism

The most dominant and relevant features of 'homo oeconomicus [sic] (Brown 2015: 31)' in this context are firstly an emphasis on personal responsibility and secondly an environment that is permeated by an ideology of competition. Both elements impact particularly on the positioning of groups within society, how they are viewed, valued and, most importantly, how rights are assigned and create what Gross and Hoevermann (2014) describe as a form of 'market extremism'.

Personal responsibility is driven by an expectation of 'entrepreneurial spirit' and self-improvement designed to improve one's market position. The language of neoliberalism has infiltrated all aspects of private relationships, perceptions and motivations. What might have been considered public concerns have become relegated to individuals' inability to acquire the skills or display the requisite attributes to successfully negotiate the challenges of a competitive environment. Moreover, 'the state and the politicians in control want those in the precariat to feel small and inadequate, to blame themselves rather than the structures producing inequality and precariatisation' (Standing 2016: x–xi). As a result those who are indeed successful are likely to regard their own success as a sign of their own achievement and thus deserving of the accompanying privileges (Zick and Klein 2014; McNall 2016). In contrast, those in socially weaker groups can be held personally responsible for their own position. Austerity successfully rides on this wave to allow the state to further dismantle a social contract, shed more of its responsibilities and transfer these to individuals. Thus austerity will also further legitimise the state shedding its responsibility and transferring the cost of self-improvement and self-reliance to the individual, whether this is through education, health or social care.

As Brown (2015) highlights, a feature of neoliberal reasoning is that competition rather than exchange is the root principle of the market. A further feature of 'homo oeconomicus [sic]' is therefore a focus on constant (re)positioning and attempts to improve one's position within the market. Individuals also follow the example of private enterprise, educational and academic institutions, government departments and public bodies in a drive to improve their rating and ranking. In this context value is not just determined in monetary terms, but all spheres of life become 'entrepreneurialised' and overlaid with an imperative to increase the value of human capital. As a result not only public life has become commercialised, but all aspects of private life need to follow the logic of entrepreneurial utilitarianism (Gross and Hoevermann 2014; Brown 2015).

A critical feature of the ubiquitous nature of entrepreneurial thinking and constant focus on the need for self-improvement is the underlying emphasis on competition as a driving force of all human endeavour. Competition by its very nature assumes, even promotes and values,

inequality, and therefore automatically creates winners and losers. The latter by implication is to blame for their fate. Moreover, their failure to successfully secure their position in the market then legitimises their becoming the objects of ridicule and contempt. For example Owen Jones (2011) outlines how working class people have become the butt of jokes and openly expressed ridicule that would be unlikely to be tolerated if directed against other groups. The acceptability of these views permeates all strata of society.

Announcing UK welfare reforms in 2011, David Cameron warned of penalties for recipients of benefits who 'chose' to live off the hard work of others whilst offering support for those who were 'desperate' to work. In a neoliberal society, citizens are expected to find, secure and retain paid employment. Work is presented as the one 'real route' out of poverty. Among priorities to tackle 'long-term structural problems' related to youth unemployment was sustainable economic growth, including 'protecting and extending the flexibilities of the UK labour market' (PM's Office 2011). Neither links between such flexibilities and increased employment insecurity, nor variations in local labour markets, were highlighted.

Meanwhile, political rhetoric used to raise support for welfare reform contributes to public perceptions of unemployment and benefits' recipients. The constituted figure of 'the chav', including 'dole scroungers' and 'teenage pram pushers' (Tyler 2013), has secured a place within the public imagination. Groups of people have become 'national abjects' (ibid.), compounded by political rhetoric used to raise support for welfare reform. In a 2012 speech on the Welfare Reform Bill, David Cameron cited examples such as a working couple taking home £24,000 waiting to start a family compared to an unemployed couple with four children receiving £27,000 in benefits and a family in receipt of £100,000 a year to live in a house unaffordable for many taxpayers who contributed to their benefits. The aim may have been to illustrate the unfairness and inefficiencies of the welfare system inherited by the UK's Coalition government, but it effectively pitted 'irresponsible' behaviours of welfare recipients against responsible, taxpaying citizens—and, Standing (2016) points out, two exceptional cases cited by government are then seen by the public to represent millions.

This changing and sharpening discourse that rebrands welfare recipients as 'scroungers', people with disabilities as 'fakers' and benefit cheats can lead to various 'degrading rituals that … people are forced to undergo in their struggle to survive' (Bond and Hallsworth 2017: 75). Meanwhile, those in genuine need are categorised and condemned alongside a small minority who abuse the welfare system. Groups of citizens therefore become 'revolting subjects', invoking reactions of abhorrence that in turn leads to the formation of a 'disgust consensus' (Tyler 2013: 23). In a similar vein, the rise of popular culture TV programmes focusing on marginalised groups constitute an ideological enterprise to 'reduce their subjects to objects of ridicule and contempt, turning human struggles into a sneering form of entertainment' (Burnett 2017: 217). Denouncing and distancing themselves from these groups allows others to identify themselves not only as 'other than poor' (see Tyler 2013: 167), but also to judge their own lives as 'better', as a board member of a voluntary group in the North-East commented,

> People want to watch programmes about benefits cheats or just people on benefits and people on long-term benefits. …if you don't have someone you consider to be lower than you, you're the lowest…So if people want to …be comfortable with where we are, it's great to see programmes about all these wasters and idle so-and-sos.…so, therefore, aren't I good because I'm better than this?

As a result, as Tyler (2013: 8) argues '[t]hese abject figures are ideological conductors mobilised to do the dirty work of neoliberal governmentality. They are symbolic and material scapegoats, the mediating agencies through which the social decomposition effected by market deregulation and welfare retrenchment are legitimised.' A further aspect of market extremism relates to the value of human beings exclusively being determined by a cost benefit analysis (Gross and Hoevermann 2014). The lack of value assigned, for example, to people out of work or people with disabilities is directly related to their lack of contribution to the economy on the one hand and their perceived 'drain' on the public purse on the other: '…public anxieties and hostilities are channelled towards those

groups within the population, such as the unemployed, welfare recipients and irregular migrants, who are imagined to be a parasitical drain and threat to scarce national resources' (Tyler 2013: 8). Austerity, as it reduces what is available, increases competition and fuels debates about who is considered to be deserving and non-deserving. Austerity shifts responsibility from a shrinking state on to citizens who are seen as architects of their own fates; individual agency is expected to triumph over other, structural, contexts: 'In the pre-globalisation era, unemployment was seen as due to economic and structural factors…Unemployment benefits systems were built on the principle of social insurance…[however] official attitudes to unemployment have radically changed. In the neoliberal framework, unemployment became a matter of individual responsibility, making it almost "voluntary"' (Standing 2016: 53).

Looking down on and devaluing groups on the grounds of their inability to contribute to the public good becomes acceptable as it provides pseudo rational arguments on the grounds of economics and moves what used to be right-wing extremist views into the centre and into an acceptable, common-sense discourse: *The Sun Newspaper* justified its demand to 'draw a line on immigration—or else' with the explanation

> This is not racism. It is a simple question of numbers. Britain has been overwhelmed. Britain has a long tradition of welcoming immigrants of all races. Many have been a huge boon to us — and we should continue to take those who can provably benefit the country. (*The Sun Newspaper* 2013)

The latter part of this statement further highlights the dominant economic framing of discourses that drown out any other perspectives, be they political, rights based, humanitarian or ethical. 'As liberty is relocated from political to economic life, it becomes subject to the inequalities of the latter and is part of what secures that inequality' (Brown 2015: 41). For example, the discussion around the current refugee crisis almost exclusively centres on numbers or what the current infrastructure can 'afford' to carry. Much of the public debate on immigration or the asylum crisis has increasingly focused on categorising people in need in terms of their competencies, skills, ability to assimilate and

their potential value to the economy. This is mirrored in the current debate on the position of EU citizens post Brexit: during Treasury Questions (25 October 2016) the chancellor Phillip Hammond's response to the question of the position of EU citizens in the UK post Brexit was not considered from a rights' perspective, but instead responded to pressure from financial services and businesses that 'we will put their [sic] needs at the heart of our negotiations with the European Union…post Brexit control will not apply to highly skilled / highly paid workers' (Lehmann 2016). Again, refracted through the lens of austerity, the idea of a shrinking public purse that needs to be divided amongst a greater number of (undeserving) claimants appears to be logical and indisputable.

It is interesting to note in this context that the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, offered a counter-position from two perspectives. Firstly she publicly dismissed the claim that the European Union or indeed Germany could not afford to house and support refugees, and secondly stated that if she was put in a position that she had to start apologising for showing a friendly face to people in need, then she could not consider this to be her country (quoted in *Die Welt* 15 September 2015).[2] Not following the economic imperative but foregrounding a different set of concerns appeared to have caused significant political backlash. As Brown points out, in this scenario 'equality ceases to be our presumed natural relation with one another, thus equality ceases to be an a priori or fundament of neoliberalized democracy' (2015: 38). This in turn highlights a further effect of the dominance of a primarily economic discourse. Objectives that might contribute to civilised society, such as investing in education, the pursuit of knowledge, or global concerns such as climate change, protecting the environment etc. appear not to have currency in their own right but need to be linked to quantifiable, economic outputs. The value of university research, for example, is measured in competitive terms and projects aiming to tackle violence against women cannot do so on just the basis of a human rights agenda, but need to justify their funding by demonstrating a potential economic impact, such as how their work could reduce demands on the public purse, such as in housing or health care (see Walby 2004).

Austerity and the Demise of Resistance

As shown above, the combination of neoliberalism and austerity provides an ideological framework that legitimises inequality. However, it also dramatically and fundamentally inhibits dissenting voices from emerging. Rather than regarding austerity measures primarily as a financial exercise, it is worth considering the cumulative effect of cuts to public services in dismantling entire social infrastructures and a dramatic shift in the role of the state (Parker 2015). Across the country hundreds of sports facilities, libraries, parks, museums, swimming pools, leisure centres have been closed, had their services reduced or had to be sold off. The effect of these cuts is not just a reduction in public services, but forms the end of the municipal project: 'parks, museums, libraries, and town halls formed the idea of community as much as the social services it came to provide' (Crewe in Glaister 2016). The lack of public spaces thus also reduces the opportunities for conviviality as a measure and opportunity for social inclusion requiring as they do an active involvement and negotiation of difference (Amin 2006). In this context it is worth noting that hostile attitudes towards people from different cultures and backgrounds are most prominent in more homogeneous areas and that exposure to difference appears to reduce rather than increase discriminatory or racist attitudes (Zick and Klein 2014).

The Role of the Voluntary Sector

Public Sector cuts and the resulting diminishing role of the state is also reflected in the role and the position of the voluntary sector. Under the Coalition's localism agenda third sector organisations were encouraged to take over services previously provided by the state, which also assumed the availability of an army of volunteers willing and able to provide services for, and more cheaply than, the state (see Evans 2011). However, the sector is not consistently represented geographically (Pattie and Johnston 2011). Figures from the Government's Citizenship Survey on Empowered Community (2010) show that the more deprived an area is, the less likely people are to participate in civic

engagement and formal volunteering. Similarly, since local authorities were a major provider of income for third sector organisations (Taylor et al. 2011), and even more so in deprived areas, cuts in public expenditure significantly weakened the sector's ability to respond.

It is interesting to note that, as outlined above, within a neoliberal and austerity rationale, the economic discourse generally replaces and displaces any other, including humanitarian, ethical and moral. However, when promoting government policy, the government is couching financial and economic objectives in the language of morality and mutual obligation. For example the Coalition government used notions of empowerment throughout its localism agenda, which offered opportunities for citizens to take more charge over their lives and communities and to 'champion social action over state control' (Cabinet Office 2010). It equated volunteering and charitable giving to a 'bigger, stronger society' and as something to be 'cherished, celebrated and encouraged' (Cabinet Office and Rob Wilson 2015). However, these aspirations are in sharp contrast to the state delivery model that voluntary organisations are caught within. If organisations need to see themselves as businesses, then the people they work with become customers and clients, rather than active agents with a sustainable commitment to local issues (Buchroth 2010). The resulting democratic deficit arising from a 'top-down' decision-making structure can be seen to be at odds with the 'bottom-up' approach that would characterise both the original nature of the voluntary sector and the social action alluded to above. In a similar vein, harnessing volunteer effort acquires its own neoliberal dimension as it becomes instrumentalised as an investment with particular, pre-determined returns (Lin 2002).

Collective Voice of the Voluntary Sector

A further effect of the voluntary sector's reliance on state funding as part of a contract culture and the resulting delivery of state determined objectives, is its loss of independence and voice. The Baring Foundation (2014, 2015, 2016), analysing the state of the voluntary sector on an annual basis, has consistently drawn attention to and expressed its concern over the increasing threat to the sector's independence: '… [the]

voice of the voluntary sector is vital to a fully functioning democracy … and yet it has been ever more visibly under fire and attack' (2016: 32).

The view that charities are 'becoming too political and too left-wing' has been expressed by a number of Conservative politicians and business leaders have been called upon to 'fight back against charities … who were making arguments against the free market' (Allan and Mason 2014). The growing commercialisation of the voluntary sector makes it difficult to maintain an independence of purpose that distinguishes it from the private or public sector (Civil Exchange 2016). More explicitly, and more directly, new 'gagging clauses' and 'no advocacy' conditions have become part of government grants and contracts, and charities' ability to speak out on issues a year ahead of elections are now governed by the 'Lobbying Act' (Transparency of Lobbying, Non-party Campaigning and Trade Union Administration Act 2014).

These restrictions challenge the very essence of what many charities and voluntary organisations would regard as their primary purpose, i.e., 'pointing to things that are going wrong, identifying new needs, highlighting how services can be improved, pursuing neglected causes, and giving voice to otherwise voiceless people' (Baring Foundation 2014: 16). Instead, the sector is being portrayed as a delivery agent that has inappropriately strayed into political or commercial activity, or both (Civil Exchange 2016).

Competition, as outlined above, is an essential component of the neoliberal context that voluntary organisations need to operate within, and has taken its toll both in terms of the breadth of the sector and the nature of the work organisations can engage in. To reflect the neoliberal discourse where the 'language and realities of the market place … have become the norm' (Tyler 2009: 273) organisations are pitted against each other and placed into competition with other providers. This position has become more explicit in some places, where voluntary organisations entering into tendering processes with local authorities are actively prohibited from discussing the tender formally or informally with other voluntary groups (Benson 2014). As a result many organisations need to negotiate a paradoxical position where they have to demonstrate partnership working whilst also competing directly for the same funding streams.

Thus, the uncertain and precarious position that many organisations find themselves in, leads to further compromising their 'voice' as organisations 'self-censor' for fear of jeopardising their funding sources. Furthermore, in this environment smaller organisations tend to be 'squeezed' out by larger, better resourced, more professionalised organisations that have the infrastructure to deal with the increasingly demanding and sophisticated funding procedures (NCVYS 2008; Clayton et al. 2015). This also confirms concerns raised by Milbourne (2009, 2013) of groups which spent years building community links losing out to new providers with 'smart application skills' but without local knowledge or commitment, leading to diminished provision and anxiety about service continuity. Not only is local expertise at risk, but when the larger organisations' contractual obligations have ended, the community-embedded groups remain. The CEO of one small voluntary organisation in the North-East of England explained,

> We understand this town, we understand its problems, we understand the people who live in it and we understand the people who need to walk through our door – and we have consistently kept that door open and consistently continued to serve people. When they take the shiny money and do some work and then walk away … we are still here picking up the pieces and sorting it out, every time.

This trend is confirmed by a survey of the Third Sector Research Centre that the larger the organisation the more likely it is to attract government funding (Clifford and Backus 2010). Smaller organisations accordingly fare worse, both in terms of income and proportion of cuts. The proportion of the sector's total income that goes to charities with an income of £100,000 or less fell from 5.4% in 2006 to 3.5% in 2013. However, between 2009 and 2012 larger organisations lost 1.6% of their statutory income, compared with small and medium organisations losing between 20 and 25% (Baring Foundation 2016).

In this climate the voice of smaller organisations, often with local knowledge and located within the most disadvantaged neighbourhoods, tends to get lost. A report on third sector independence (Lloyds Bank Foundation 2017), however, stressed the key role of smaller charities in

ensuring their issues were on the agenda and that voices of communities were heard. Moreover, competition mitigates against the voluntary sector uniting to speak with a collective voice, as mistrust and secrecy become the overriding sentiments.

Austerity and Solidarity

Neoliberalism and austerity undermine feelings of solidarity and groups coming together for a common concern (Brown 2015) so that 'the social contract that binds people together for a common purpose is being destroyed and along with it the foundations of democratic society' (McNall 2016: 208). By attributing poverty and its associated problems to individual behaviour, the Coalition Government played down impacts of socio-economic structural factors, including austerity measures (MacLeavy 2011).

Furthermore, the demonization of disadvantaged groups is made easier in times of economic uncertainty as insecurity enables people's fears to be played upon (Standing 2016), which can have negative impacts for the organisations offering them support. As one of the organisations working with homeless people in the North East reflected, it appears to be a lack of comprehension of issues faced by service users that leads some sections of the public to be judgemental, assuming elements of choice and individual blame. Meanwhile, unsympathetic public perceptions of service users of charities providing services related to homelessness and social exclusion—compounded by assumptions about benefits recipients—impact on organisations in terms of attracting volunteers and donations as beneficiaries may be seen by some as undeserving of support. As a result of public attitudes and misconceptions, the pool from which potential volunteers could be recruited is relatively small. Fewer people want to volunteer—with fewer still of the 'right temperament'—to support potentially hard-to-reach groups of people, some of whom have a range of complex needs. Neither might organisations supporting them be seen as appealing causes for public donations. On the contrary, as the CEO of the group referred to above explains,

> We don't do much asking the public for money or anything, we just really, really don't do that because it just opens up a whole sea of abuse usually.

Thus, as neoliberalism shifts attention from structural causes to personal 'failures' and austerity further undermines support mechanisms, not only are some people socially excluded, they are seen as deservedly so by those willing to accept two-dimensional, stereotypical constructions of groups rejected as 'other'.

Conclusion

Austerity, although presented as an unquestionable economic necessity, can be regarded as an ideological project that fundamentally alters the function of the state and relationships between and amongst people. The dual impact of the current hegemonic position of neoliberalism and austerity serves to entrench and legitimise inequalities within society as accepted norms, whilst shifting the responsibility for public and political issues to individuals. Opportunities for these individuals to mobilise and develop a collective voice are simultaneously stifled by the effects of austerity on the voluntary sector. Not only do funding cuts systematically dismantle a viable infrastructure for these organisations, austerity has also fundamentally shifted the sector's prime role from 'critic of the state' to 'agent of the state'.

The democratic deficit arising from the impact of austerity therefore operates on several levels: Culturally it entrenches and legitimises the removal of universal rights and creates hierarchies of entitlement. Structurally, it can move the acceptability of anti-democratic means from the political margins into mainstream discourse and remove the voice of the voluntary sector from the democratic process.

It appears therefore that it is not, how it is often portrayed, external influences that threaten 'our' democratic ways of working, but that the real threat comes from within—i.e., an austerity-fuelled, unquestioned belief in neoliberalism, because it 'transposes the meaning and practice of democratic concerns from a political to an economic register' (Brown 2015: 41).

Notes

1. This part of the chapter will draw on data collected as part of a doctoral study by one of the authors in the North-East England exploring impacts of the rhetoric and policies of austerity during the Coalition Government of 2010–2015, including public spending cuts arising from the 2010 Comprehensive Spending Review (CSR), welfare reform, and the impact of the agendas of localism and Big Society on third sector organisations.
2. Merkel said in the original 'Ich muss ganz ehrlich sagen, wenn wir jetzt anfangen, uns noch entschuldigen zu müssen dafür, dass wir in Notsituationen ein freundliches Gesicht zeigen, dann ist das nicht mein Land.'

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Mothering in an Age of Austerity

Sheila Quaid

Introduction

This chapter examines particularities and discursive process of neoliberal ideologies and how polarisations of 'mother' occur in austere times. Rushton in his chapter emphasises the changing nature and patterns of inequality that have emerged as a result of austerity. The cuts have had an overwhelming impact on families and in particular on women alone with children. This has been accompanied by a discursive shift to 'mother blaming' for behaviour of young people, ill mental health of families and poverty of children. The depth of the blame culture directed at 'mothers' is evoked in this recent poem made from newspaper headlines;

> Working mothers link to school failure. Welfare reforms could force stay-at-home mothers to work. Working mothers' children unfit. Working mothers

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> may cause break ups… Working mothers 'less likely to cook healthy family recipes.' Companies 'not planning to hire working mums.' Kids pay when mother's away. Who'd be a working mum in the UK? (Jess-Cook 2017)

By exploring impacts on women and as mothers in this chapter, my aim is to reveal the furthering of gender inequalities as a result of recession and governmental response through tax and spending decisions. Through reviewing the depth of research and commentary on the gendered and unequal impact of austerity, this analysis testifies to particularity of experience for women as mothers. The arguments presented are drawn from journalistic sources, as well as quantitative and qualitative academic research. Research continues at a pace, in social geography, sociology, social policy and economics to consider the case that austerity is a feminist issue. It seems clear that austerity requires a gendered and feminist response.

Impact of the Cuts

Tax and welfare policies across the UK are affecting women and mothers in particular ways. Tracey McVeigh reported that 'economists are calling on the government to produce a Plan F to tackle the disproportionate burden being placed on women' (McVeigh 2013), with single mothers losing most under current policies and welfare regimes (Rabindrakumar 2013). Reports of 'Mums against Austerity' (Foster 2016b) highlight the evidence of cuts to domestic violence projects, and in addition, argue that cuts to the criminal justice system and housing affect mothers and their children in the most punitive manner. During the last 5 years many have sought to evidence the material penalty of the cuts and Stenning (2013) provides evidence of the direct hits on family life. In a north-east study entitled 'Feeling the Squeeze' (2017) she explored structure of feeling and emotionality of Austerity in everyday life. The study reveals impact from:

- the freezing of child benefit rates and 'tapering' of access for higher income households (earning over £50,000) plus reductions in a variety of payments to new parents (such as the Child Trust Fund and the Health in Pregnancy Grant)

- the capping of housing benefits (as part of the overall benefit cap, see below), a reduction in Local Housing Allowance rates (which set the local levels of housing benefit) and benefit reduction for 'under-occupation' (the so-called 'bedroom tax')
- time limiting of employment and support allowance (ESA)—a reduction in both coverage and levels of tax credits (in advance of all tax credits being subsumed with Universal Credit, see below) the replacement of the Disability Living Allowance (DLA) by Personal Independent Payments (PIPs) and a re-assessment of all recipients (expected to result in hundreds of thousands receiving reduced levels of benefit)
- the localisation of council tax benefit (i.e. to cash-strapped local authorities) and a reduction of council tax benefit budgets by 10%
- a benefit cap of £500 per week for a family or £350 per week for a single person
- the abolition of community care grants and crisis loans (with a suggestion but no statutory requirement that they be replaced by local schemes, devised by (cash-strapped) local authorities)
- the introduction of Universal Credit from Oct 2013; this will become the main means-tested social security benefit for people of working age, replacing Housing Benefit, Income Support, Employment and Support Allowance (ESA), Jobseeker's Allowance, Working Tax Credit & Child Tax Credit—an increase in state pension age.

In *Lean Out* (2016a), Dawn Foster suggested that 'in Britain today, women are paying the price for nearly a decade of austerity', and outlined cuts in particular to domestic violence projects and cuts resulting in evictions and deportations of mothers having particular consequences for their children. The Fawcett Society (2012) proved in their research that 85% of all the initial cuts affected women more than men. These include women with disabilities, health issues, mental ill health, black women, working class women and single mothers. The Child Poverty Commission published research which shows the existing and predicted continuing rise in absolute poverty from 2010 to 2020 as a result of the erosion of the welfare state. The political media reports regularly on the spending cuts with many highlighting the disproportional effect on women and burden being placed on mothers in particular

(McVeigh 2013) and the independent body known as the Women's Budget Group (WBG) report the impact of austerity policies on different types of family groups in UK which 'paints an alarming picture for the economic recovery of women in England' (Bennett 2015). Mothers' choices between providing unpaid care for children at home and going into paid work are being severely curtailed as a result of austerity cuts. With current ideologies requiring that women need to be in paid work to relieve the state of their maintenance, the choice to care for children is restricted and, with the ideology of privatisation and care being provided by the market, the only option for most working parents is privatised childcare which is priced at such a high level that income is reduced significantly. The attempts by government to underwrite a minimum level of nursery care have not guaranteed its provision. In addition, the widening of health inequalities, demonstrated by numerous surveys, is described by Bambra and Garthwaite (2015) as a neoliberal epidemic. Murphy (2017) highlights the growing health inequalities in the North East of England and suggests that extensive welfare reforms are producing new level of ill health.

History Repeating Itself

The rolling out of neoliberalism and the introduction of austerity policies have been sustained and justified by a twenty-first century version of the 'deserving v. undeserving poor' ideology. During the nineteenth century, poor and working-class people in the UK were divided on these lines by a punitive Poor Law (1834) which carried its own ideological agenda. Discursive phrases such as 'Heaven helps those who help themselves' linked hard work and the protestant ethic with ideas of God and Godliness. Political individualism was expressed in Victorian suppositions that 'whatever is done for men or a class, to a certain extent takes away the stimulus and necessity of doing for themselves', sentiments that underpin many social policies today (Smiles 1859). Much was said about the 'ignorant working classes' and the blame for conditions was laid firmly at the door of the poor themselves:

> The condition of a class of people whose misery, ignorance, and vice, amidst all the immense wealth and great knowledge of "the first city in the world", is, to say the very least, a national disgrace to us. (Mayhew 1851, unpaginated)

The deserving poor were those who were poor through no fault of their own, either because of illness, accident or age, or because there was no work available for them (perhaps because of a factory closure for example). The undeserving poor were those who were poor because of laziness or personal problems like drunkenness. Victorians were very concerned with how they could help the deserving poor without encouraging laziness in the undeserving poor (Woodhorn Colliery Museum, undated). These ideas are returning in twenty-first century Britain within the new philosophies of neoliberalism's austerity policies. Austerity's impacts are being experienced differently depending on whether employed, unemployed, male, female, and migrant, citizen, parent, non-parent and the focus on women as mothers reveals particularity of positioning of mothers in the midst of this process. During the last decade, enormous ideological change and economic restructuring evoke further considerations of the role and socio-positioning of women, generally and mothers in particular. Evidence suggests that women are taking the brunt of austerity policies and taking an unequal hit for the tax and spending decisions of the government since was decided upon as a political and economic strategy in 2010. Research provides us with sound evidence and insights into the gendered nature of austerity impacts. Most evidence based research on this topic acknowledges the fundamental need to look at gendered life and to do research on poverty and economics through a gendered lens. For example, Bennett and Daly (2014) as part of Joseph Rowntree's Foundation produce evidence based in anti-poverty research to indicate the centrality of gender to their in-depth study:

> At first glance, the links between gender and poverty seem obvious. Women have poorer labour market attachment, tend to head poverty-prone households and have less 'human capital'. But these are characteristics of individual lives, rather than explanations. Underlying them is the

> gendered nature of the processes leading to poverty and potential routes out of it. Poverty viewed through a gendered lens therefore requires an examination of social and economic relations, and institutions. (Bennett and Daly 2014: 6)

This is not to say that men, and in particular working-class men as well as men on middle incomes, have not been affected. Men's lives are being affected in devastating ways by austerity, and much recent work (Crossley 2016a, b; Stenning 2013) testifies to the impact on men (as well as women) as workers, and in particular on older men facing redundancy and poor chances of re-employment. In addition, work carried out by Bennett and Daly (2014) focusses on the impact on people living in poverty, both men and women. The picture of devastation emerges as we consider cuts to housing benefit, universal credit, carer's allowances, bed room allowances, and the increasing gender pay gap. Women's location in the economy and their position as welfare claimants, combine to make them vulnerable in times of deliberate austerity (Rubery and Rafferty 2013).

Many writers have taken to blogging about the gender inequalities developing, for example Ellie Mae MacDonald (2018) identifies three areas where the brunt is harder. These are: changes to universal child allowance; inadequate childcare facilities; and the introduction of universal credit which will increase women's dependence on men. She goes on to suggest:

> The welfare state cuts have unacceptable consequences for women. Women are more dependent than men upon the welfare state; care responsibilities prevent many from entering employment and earning an independent income. Even within employment, women may suffer in-work poverty because they are only able to maintain part-time, low-paid jobs whilst caring for dependants. (http://blogs.lse.ac.uk/politicsandpolicy/gendered-impacts-of-austerity-cuts/)

The already existing socio-economic positioning of women, and in particular women who are mothers, creates a certain vulnerability at times of economic restructuring. We need more than ever to consider these

processes through a gendered lens in order to unravel the gendered economic picture of the UK under austerity. It seems obvious that these cuts hit women harder because women are more likely to use public services, work in public sector and in low-paid peripheral work. In addition, women are more likely to be caring for children or older family members. These policies and the gradual removal of state welfare provision will seriously set back 50 years of moves towards gender equality. Whilst we are seeing the emergence of the precariat (Standing 2011) the vulnerability of mothers within this process requires attention in order to work out what can be done about the particular impacts on lone mothers and on women and mothers as carers. Examining the recent economic data, Diane Perrons has noted that:

> In 2015 the UK gender pay gap was above the EU average with the unadjusted median hourly gender pay gap for all workers being 19.2%. This figure can be disaggregated to provide greater insights into the factors responsible. For those working more than 16 hours a week it falls to 16%, and if mothers are excluded from this group, it falls to 10%. For non-mothers working more than 16 hours per week who are between 22 and 35 years old, it falls further to six per cent. This data suggests that the gender pay gap is closely associated with the gender division of labour with respect to care work, as well as the high costs of care services (for example, childcare costs take 40% of a couple's income in the UK, compared to an OECD average of 17%), all of which discourages women from working unless they are very highly paid. (Perrons 2017: 30)

This focus on women reveals the particularities of individual and collective experiences of new economic pressures, and the way that austerity has represented a serious set-back for many women.

In the ideological conditions of individualism, women are also being judged and placed at the centre of blame for so many social ills during these late modern and austere times. The devastating effects of austerity are hitting Households, and women as mothers occupy particular roles in most households with most responsibilities for primary care of children. In particular, single mothers, women and men in black and minority ethnic groups, migrant mothers, disabled mothers and

mothers of disabled children are bearing the brunt of both material and ideological reformation of society as a result of austerity policies. Stories from personal, the political and the philosophical combine to create a mingled contrasting and yet central tale of precarious times and new lines being drawn around ours and our children's citizenship, identities and futures. Mothers are expected to be resilient, innovative with money, balance unpaid work at home and paid work, to keep families happy and secure during erosion of income and increasing job insecurity. They are held responsible for nurturing, guidance and producing the next generations of self-sufficient and 'responsible' neoliberal citizens. When the pressures increase the role of mother is held up as either saintly or to blame for a range of social problems and she is expected to keep mothering through austerity and precarious times. In addition, questions surrounding possible new cultures of domesticity are considered alongside the impact of cuts on parents and families. Intersections of class, nationality, ethnicity and place are present in this review of mothering under austerity. Ideologies and discourses surrounding parent citizenship are explored and in particular, the implied role of mothers.

Neoliberalism

Neoliberalism is defined primarily as a policy that aims to reduce the role of the state (Calhoun 2002). Yet as a corollary, it promotes ideas of independence and self-sufficiency, on the promise of choice and freedom instead of state direction. In addition, it fosters ambivalence towards, or even a wholesale rejection of, interdependency. Times are changing at a fast pace with neoliberalism and current austerity in directions that were not contemplated in the first wave of New Right policies in the 1980s. Taylor-Gooby (2017) suggests that this will include privatisation beyond anything we have imagined and

> That the class solidarities and cleavages that shaped the development of welfare states are no longer powerful. Tensions surrounding divisions between old and young, women and men, immigrants and denizens, and

> between the winners in a new, more competitive, world and those who feel left behind are becoming steadily more important. European countries have entered a period of political instability and this is reflected in policy directions. Austerity predominates nearly everywhere, but patterns of social investment, protectionism, neo-Keynesian intervention, and fightback vary. (Taylor-Gooby 2017, unpaginated)

For this new world system to take hold it requires fundamental economic restructuring and removal of the welfare model with which we were once culturally and politically comfortable in the UK. Austerity is ostensibly a fiscal policy designed to redress so-called national debt and to reinvigorate the economy and it is also the most punitive, damaging and contemptuous political and ideological process of the twentieth and twenty-first century. It is shrouded with ideologies and beliefs about who is to blame for this crisis. The project requires both a practical reorganisation of the political economy and the discursive, ideological construction of neoliberal citizens and subjects. We are asked to 'tighten our belts' to believe that 'we are all in this together' and that paid work is the solution to poverty. In her book rightly called *Austerity Bites*, O'Hara (2014) documents the harsh end of these cuts and the phrase 'the big squeeze' is used to describe the erosion of household income, financial insecurity, and income support: even those in middle income occupations are bearing the brunt. Whilst the case is made by O'Hara that disabled people are taking a particular hit, the position of mothers in households has resulted in particular pressures. Also taking a disproportionate 'hit' from these cuts are 'women and children from black and minority ethnic groups' (O'Hara 2014: 4).

Legitimising Austerity

Ideological and discursive campaigns are being conducted as the press has repeated many neoliberal ideas and the media take a fundamental role in presenting the neoliberal project of austerity. Much recent work (Bramall 2013; Anderson 2015; Hall 2017) explores the cultural reproduction of neoliberal ideologies and suggest that austerity is presented

as an impasse. A sense of collective responsibility is achieved by the creation of a mood of crisis and urgency and the idea that this is a perpetual crisis creates collective sense of urgency and ideas of crisis and emergency are becoming 'everyday experiences' (Anderson 2015), and 'we are all in this together' (Bramall 2013) is a typical of phrase that evoke emotionality to create political mood. Despite these attempts to persuade us all that we are in this together and that this is a national and collective difficulty we are facing there is a sense of fear and apprehension as this unfolds. The changes are unsettling us, making us feel uncertain and for many in UK society, decisions have already created a precarious material base which leaves us feeling as if we are teetering on the edge of old certainties and with little knowledge about how to plan for our futures or for the futures of ours and others children (Standing 2011). Neoliberalism produces uncertainty and reformations of class positioning, and Standing (2011) suggests that the precariat is a new class, comprising the growing number of people facing lives of insecurity, doing work without a career, that is, without a past or future. Their lack of belonging and identity means inadequate access to social and economic rights. Standing (2011) poses questions surrounding the growth of this new class and the potential political dangers it may represent. The general themes emerging centre on the shifting ground of our lives and the removal of old certainties and securities.

Ideological Focus on Mothers

Mothering and the perceived failures of mothers are held up in new neoliberal parenting ideology as a source of many ills such as: poverty, low education attainment, criminality, racism, violence and above all, whether the generation of the future will be good or bad neoliberal citizens (Gilles 2005; Jensen and Tyler 2013; Tyler 2010). The emerging field of maternal studies reflects the fact that the status of all women appears to be affected by dominant ideologies surrounding good and bad motherhood. Stories from personal, the political and the philosophical diverge to create a mingled contradictory and yet central tale. The centrality of motherhood in social and cultural reproduction has been a key

focus of policies for many years, and this is why it is subjugated, controlled, regulated and locked in reproductive rules and norms. In addition to the marginalized position of migrant mothers and their children the development of mother/parent blame reared its head in reaction to the riots of 2011. De Benedictis in her analyis of the rhetoric of 'feral' parent and its link to neoliberalism, quotes Prime Minister of the time, David Cameron:

> The question people asked over and over again last week was 'where are the parents? Why aren't they keeping the rioting kids indoors?'… Families matter. I don't doubt that many of the rioters out last week have no father at home. Perhaps they come from one of the neighbourhoods where it's standard for children to have a mum and not a dad… where it's normal for young men to grow up without a role model, looking to the street for their father figures, filled with rage and anger. So if we want to have any hope of mending our broken society, family and parenting is where we've got to start. (De Benedictis 2012, comments made on 15 August 2011)

With this deliberately strongly worded statement, the class and gender positions of single mothers came to the fore in neoliberal thinking. The use of the term 'feral' was poignant in creating an element of disgust and 'othering' of working class single mums. De Benedictis explores the discursive creation of disgust and polarisation of mothers in these 'feral parents' comments: she point to the way that new versions of parent blame emerged under neoliberalism. Within this development it became clear that mothers, and in particular, single mothers, were at the forefront for criticism. Whilst there is a steady shift of responsibilities from the state to individual families, a polarisation of 'mother types' is discursively constructed. Along with the culture of disgust came an ideological polarisation of mother types, as explored in Tyler's analysis, with its striking title: 'Chav Mum, Chav Scum', noting the structure of difference being created between the normal and the deviant mothers (Tyler 2008). Existing gendered practices of parenting placed mothers with increased responsibility for rearing a generation of future neoliberal citizens. During austerity mothers are expected to take responsibility for 'getting by' with thrift and resilience and the qualities needed:

thrift, resilience, ability to toughen up, and take appropriate measures. The concept of 'parental governance' illustrates the way that parenting, and mothering in particular, have become both the perceived cause of, and solution to, an array of social problems. Late modernity sees emergence of parenting as a political and economic category. As in the nineteenth century, parenting emerged as category for intervention with the medical and psyche professionals seeking to rebuild the child-mother relationship through organised early health initiatives to educate 'ignorant women' (Lewis 1993, 1997). This strategy emerged in recent years in parallel with a denial of the psychosocial impacts of poverty, cuts, welfare reforms and the generally diminishing welfare provision for the poorest in society. Particularities of economic impacts on mothers are well researched and the WBG testify to the gendered impacts of the austerity cuts with 'an alarming picture for the economic recovery of women in England' (McVeigh 2013, unpaginated).

The widespread neoliberal impacts created pressures in many countries but interestingly education and parenting seem to move up the political agenda in countries where austerity policies have been quite severe. Academic analyses of austerity fall roughly into two areas with, on the one hand, studies of the political economy and consequences and, on the other, studies dealing with the psycho-social impacts on people of the austerity cuts programme. Austerity and the increased legal endorsements of certain kinds of freedom have coincided: these last two decades have seen changes in terms of identity and legal choices that once seemed impossible during the early days of the new right. Homophobia and dogmatic attitudes to personal identity have been officially rejected, and social relationships have undergone substantial legal liberalisation. For example, same sex marriage, transgender recognition, equalizing of lesbian motherhood to some extent with heterosexual motherhood have all been features of twenty-first century social changes, yet the neoliberal system produces marginality with new and rigorous regulatory powers. The new forms of freedom and personal choice were accompanied by coercive and restrictive policies with regard to the unemployed and those in receipt of state aid. The customary solution to all social problems under neoliberal ideology is to be productive economically and to find work: this is scarcely new,

but has taken paradoxical forms. This solution is denied to many of those refugees seeking residence (see below), and also to those with insecure residential status. Moreover, work is in fact part of the problem, in that most of the poor families with children have at least one adult in paid employment. The pay levels are, however, low, and it is *working poverty* that is the major problem today (Perrons 2017). Nevertheless, emphasis on individual responsibility is dominant in governmental discourse where paid work is the suggested solution to all financial predicaments. This is despite consistent evidence that low paid peripheral work does not lift people out of poverty (Macdonald and Shildrik 2010). Austerity policies, moreover, place responsibility on parents and expect then to demonstrate 'being more aspirational for your children', and being prepared to join in with an ideology of individualist producing of new generation of self-sufficient highly motivated young people. The idea of taking responsibility for your children's aspirations is matched by the pressure to take responsibility for economic hardship and the toll is likely to be felt collectively at a psychological level. The idea of 'taking responsibility for austerity' and 'tightening our belts' became governmental ideological messages. Whilst people are doing this, Stenning (2013) has shown the rise in anxiety, uncertainty, working to reduce expenditure as 'buffers disappear'. This is echoed in work by Clayton, Donovan and Merchant (2015) where they argue that 'austerity localism' and squeezed funding create undermining of trust and empathy between services. In the midst of this the squeeze on parents is well documented (Jensen and Tyler 2013). There are strongly felt uncertainties and collective feelings of going off track from 'normal' life course (Hall 2017). This uncertain and corrosive effect on daily life for many in the UK is illustrated with experiences which include family upbringing with debt, bad health, shaky investment in normative promises (pensions), difficulty with house buying, resulting in adult children living with parents and many more examples of financial squeeze which fundamentally alters the life course. In the midst of these discursive and economic restructurings new concepts of parent citizenship emerged as the role of parenting (for which, mostly read mothering) is to produce good neoliberal citizens. Maternal failure and the discursive shift

to particular types of 'mother blaming' is illustrated in the poem at the start of this chapter which made up from headlines in the print media over the last few years.

Parental Governance

The politicisation of both education and parenting was intended to place blame and responsibility in these two roles for social ills and social problems. The ideological project of locating blame was achieved through discursive processes. In discourses associated with parental governance the maternal figure comes to the fore. In late modernity we see emergence of parenting as a political and economic category. The phrases such as 'parent citizenship', 'every child matters', 'every parent matters' and with the introduction of parenting classes the message that parenting was the both the cause of and the solution to every social problem was becoming very clear. Parenting in these debates, however, is often presented as a context-free unproblematic skill (Holloway and Pimlott-Wilson 2014). Existing gendered practices of parenting place mothers as charged increasingly with responsibility rearing a generation of future neoliberal citizens. Stenning (2013) has drawn attention to the psychic costs of austerity on mothers, while others highlight the economic pressures on mothers in an individualised and increasingly unequal society. The internalisation of all of this psychological brutality exacerbates the already difficult experience of financial and material hardships. Neoliberal ideologies combined with punitive austerity policies affect us in different ways depending on our position in society as women and men, child, migrant, employed or unemployed.

Migrant Mothers

The position of migrant mothers illuminates the new, rigorous regulatory powers under neoliberalism. New lines are drawn around citizenship and the tie between place of birth and nationality is broken in this neoliberal age thus creating children with no citizenship, no belonging and no rights to reside (Tyler 2013). So, whilst we have formal liberalization, in terms of the market, equality of access to services for all those

in need is continually blocked on the grounds of a different framing of rights—that of natives versus outsiders. Many are denied citizenship today, and now in this neoliberal state, refugees are regarded sceptically as 'asylum seekers', with the consequence that they and their children are subject to exclusion from the economy, and even subject to detention. Children born here in the UK are denied citizenship because of their mothers' uncertain status. These are contradictory times in which freedom of movement for some, secure citizens and tourists, is guaranteed, while others are subject to official controls and media-driven resentment. With these developments new lines are drawn around citizenship with severe consequences for migrant women and their children. Migrant mothers are affected in very particular ways both through material precarity and ideological discursive positioning. Thus, the rights are separated from the birth place and the right to citizenship status is curtailed. migrant mothers are seen as marginal, and in several ways, alien, not just as people of foreign origins, but also as bearers of an alien culture. When Cameron suggested that women's lack of English language was partly to blame for radicalisation, the mothers—nearly all Muslim women—were portrayed as a threat not just to social cohesion but even to the security of the nation: in this way, a new sort of othering was formulated. The new discourse of migration controls marginalises and displaces even long-settled migrants, and has had the effect of positioning people in discourse as potential enemies within our national borders. Although much empirical research shows that migrant women's mothering practices actively and sometimes creatively intertwine with, and *change* the transmission of tradition, they are seen as barriers to modernity (Ganga 2007; Erel et al. 2017). Migrant women are expected to prove their ability to belong by conforming to neoliberal ideals of the good citizen, involving especially their ability to contribute through paid work and integrate themselves and their children into 'British values'.

Troubled Families

The 'feral parents' discourse concerns about single mothers, turned into, at least for some, one of the most punitive interventions to be designed by recent government: this was the Troubled Families Programme

(see Malin's chapter). This is held up by many as a key example of the central place the family has in the neoliberal framework of social restructuring. The centrality of family to neoconservatism is both ideological and practical, to be crafted into a state apparatus. As a means of intervention, the focus is on families who are poor and in trouble (or troublesome), and this in turn led to 'mother blaming' with ideas about immorality and the responsibility of women depriving children of a 'normal' upbringing. This was overridden with subtle narratives of failure and shame and levelled against working class mothers. By 2013, Tyler (2013) argued, a consensus had been rebuilt around the underclass thesis (Murray 1990) and Cameron's statement following the 'riots' of 2011 included questions repeated such as 'where are the parents?'. This led to a new construction of the image of the 'troubled family'. The programme has its roots on the 2006 'respect' agenda (Crossley 2016a, b) which sought to get a 'grip' on families living in poverty and with those unable to cope. Families on the margins of society were therefore identified and targetted for reconstruction. In the search for causes of cycles of poverty, Crossley argues, a reconceptualisation of 'the problem family' was required, and was derived from the idea that there is a particular culture and way of living amongst certain groups which perpetuates poverty and deprivation. Crossley (2016a, b) has suggested that this is not upheld by evidence;

> Although unsupported with evidence this ideological stance has taken hold in the last decade… these reconstructions have occurred despite a large volume of social scientific research which has little evidence of a distinct group of poor people with different culture. (Crossley 2016a, b)

The ideological shift of blame for poverty transfers the problem from the state to the family and its transmission of culture, values and aspiration, and responsibility for failure is laid firmly at the door of the parents. Crossley (2016a, b) has highlighted how maternal mental health is emphasised in these procedures and this suggests that maternal failures come to the fore very easily in this process. The intensification of parent blame under neoliberalism sees maternal factors foregrounded, despite the concentration on the apparently neutral problems of 'parenting'

(De Benedictis 2012). During austerity policies in the UK critical theorists commented on the 'squeeze on parents' (Jensen and Tyler 2013), and the construction of new marginalities, new 'mother types' (Tyler 2013) and new ideological forms of respectable mothers and their opposites (Evans 2016). Ideological lines are drawn in new and unprecedented ways. Neoliberal parenting is being defined and, whilst government discourse appears to conflate mothering and fathering as 'parenting', much current analysis suggests that, for women, motherhood, particularly, is being reconfigured. New discourses surrounding parental governance and parent citizenship not only affect women generally but create polarising debates surrounding women as recipients of charity or welfare benefits. The debates are highly moralised and new divisions between the deserving and undeserving mother proliferate. As noted above, the discursive constructions of the 'chav mum' came to the forefront with the 2011 riots. The event of that summer evoked phrases such as; 'feral children and feral parents' (De Benedictis 2012). New discourses of parent blame are thereby created, desite the evidence of the psycho-social impacts of austerity policies (Stenning 2013). Motherhood as an identity is in reality highly complex, and is integrally linked to female identity and the position of women in society. Yet the ideological imposition of responsibility for social ills has reshaped it into an oversimplified, clichéd social duty, while at the same time fundamental changes in policy directions and in the state framework of support produce new and contested mother identities.

Concluding Thoughts

In the predominant ideology of our time, neoliberal subjects should be self-contained, relying only on themselves to achieve success. Of course, this means, following Valerie Walkerdine, that any failure (as much as any success) is also 'achieved' individually (Stenning 2013). Neo-liberal economic restructuring began in the 1970s where Britain and USA saw a gradual rolling back of the welfare state (Holloway and Pimlott Wilson 2014), and whilst the roll out of neoliberalism has been an international process, various countries have responded in their own

particular ways. The UK introduced austerity policies in 2010 under a New Labour government and so began a programme of cuts to welfare budgets and education budgets. The precarious nature of life under neoliberalism is evident in much academic work detailing the impact of the cuts. Such precarious lives are theorized in recent work where many working people can justifiably be referred to as the precariat (Standing 2011). The legitimacy of austerity is being constructed through discursive shifts around our thinking about personal problems which are refused the status of *structural* features of our society, and instead are portrayed as purely an individual failure. Experiences of crisis and emergency are becoming 'everyday experiences', and yet the sense of emotionality of the situation is employed in order to create political moods of resignation in the face of the inevitable economic reality that demands austerity. Despite the widespread feeling of disruption, the dissatisfaction is displaced onto mythical problems of culture and difference, forms of resentment and xenophobia, and little credence is given to the collective experiences of crisis and emergency which in reality has disrupted an idea of a positive future. Our collective need for austerity has endorsement from orthodox economics, and only the irrational—or the dangerously radical and unrealistic—will challenge it (Anderson 2015; Stenning 2013).

Within this situation, the role of women has both practically and ideologically a pivotal role. The primacy of motherhood in feminist theory is understood as a necessity for understanding cultural, political, social and economic positions of women. The focus on mothers in this chapter tells one story of particularity, and others have testified to the increased particular pressures on women, men, children. Yet the position of women as mothers is at the centre of so many social relationships that the mother role is worthy of attention at this time of reshaping and reforming of economic and personal family lives. Research reveals how mothers are held responsible not just for managing their children without getting overwhelmed but for putting right many of our social problems. The political technique being used to achieve the pushing back of welfare framework and model is a programme of austerity: yet austerity is a political choice designed to achieve particular political goals and aims of neoliberal ideologies.

This is the process surrounding, shaping and in some cases decimating the lives of ordinary people in the current era. It is created with existing patterns of gendered and racial hierarchies of power and the effects of decisions are impacting on people in gendered and racialized ways. Many decisions are being made by middle class white privileged men that have direct and devastating consequences on the lives of the poorest in our society. This is a gendered process with the impacts on women having particularity. Women are bearing the brunt of many austerity decisions and the lives of their children are subsequently affected. Women in the role of mothers are experiencing previously unknown pressures on themselves and their children. For example, since 2010 the rise in deportations and long convoluted decision making about asylum status is affecting migrant women. The rise in evictions of poor working class single mothers living on income support is often followed by displacement as they are relocated away from communities of support. The material life of particularly single mothers and migrant mothers is harsh as a result of policy decisions associated with austerity. The analyses of ideological processes and policy directions reveals the particular pressures, both material and ideological, on mothers in the situation since 2008. Old ideologies and prejudices have been re-institutionalised and given new impetus as a result of the crisis.

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Part II

Undermining Professionals

Austerity and De-professionalisation

Nigel Malin

Introduction

Through austerity appears to be failing as an economic idea, the cuts in public funding reduction continue. The banking crisis of 2008 led to a public rescue of private banks, and subsequent austerity measures have been presented as a necessary response to the state of the public finances in a time of national emergency. The aim is to shrink the state and reduce social welfare provision, not just in response to the current crisis, but permanently. The Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS 2012) calculated that there would be over 900,000 public sector jobs lost in the period 2011–2018. Austerity appears not to be a technocratic exercise in economic management but instead an ideological attack on the foundations of the social contract that formed the basis of the post-war society (Blyth 2013).

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A central concern of this chapter is to consider some of the evidence for an evolving process of *de-professionalisation*, and to pose the question as to whether the direction and substantive nature of this process may have been altered by austerity. It goes without saying that there is a need to ensure that individuals are properly trained and able to undertake particular tasks to work in the public sector and that any differences in rewards are both fair and proportionate. Previous 'reforms' to public services have entailed outsourcing coupled with a dogmatic adherence of the public sector to the purchaser/provider split. This has meant that Local Authorities, the NHS and others no longer directly provide in-house services, but commission them from external private sector providers through forced competition, where costs are minimised to win a contract. If all austerity has done is to reinforce a trend going back to the New Right of the 1980s, encouraged by New Labour in their turn (with their academies, Private Finance Initiative (PFI) supported schemes, extended partnerships and so on), then this in effect should be regarded as continuity rather than radical change.

Ideological Roots of the Concept of De-professionalisation

An aim is to develop an analytic framework for understanding the context in which a process of *de-professionalisation* exists within an employment culture dominated by capitalism, globalisation and inequality. The argument is that this is a feature of a deepened marketisation of public welfare systems, extending the logic of competition in everyday life, where the notion of meritocracy appears to contradict the principle of equality. Over the past few decades, neo-liberal meritocracy has been characterised by the sheer scale of its attempt to extend entrepreneurial competition into all aspects of everyday life and by the power it has gathered by drawing from twentieth century movements for equality. Meritocracy, rather like social mobility, has been presented as a means of breaking down established hierarchies of privilege.

A starting point is to highlight the social and political roots of *de-professionalisation* which seem to reject a 'socially cohesive role' characteristic of a neo- Durkheimian perspective on professions, along with the value of specialist knowledge, skills and acquired status offered by a neo-Weberian perspective. Drawing on an alternative neo-Marxist framework which emphasises power relations the origins of *de-professionalisation* are seen as based on ideas taken from Taylorism (or scientific management) which came to dominate managerial ideas about how best to control alienated labour (Edgell 2012: 57–61). Ideological reference points where the notion of *de-professionalisation* takes shape include therefore:

- *Neo-liberalism* as a blend of *market individualism* and social or state authoritarianism is an ideology where its central pillars are the market and the individual. The principal neo-liberal goal is to 'roll back the frontiers of the state', in the belief that unregulated market capitalism will deliver efficiency, growth and widespread prosperity. This is reflected in a preference for privatisation, economic deregulation, low taxes and anti-welfarism. *Individualism* as a normative concept, in the form of ethical individualism, argues for the right to make choices rather than being forced to accept what is available.
- *Taylorism–Post Fordism* ideas emerged from within an industrial and manufacturing production context which notably endorses the transfer of all discretion from workers to management. Unlike traditional Fordist production, Postfordism has proclaimed the *empowerment* of workers while demanding flexible application of many skills to different tasks, under conditions of computerised surveillance and control (Loader and Burrows 1994).
- *Lifelong–Learning* has become an ideology focussing on the economic imperatives of developing a more productive and efficient workforce: it makes the flexible reskilling of individuals a compulsory life project, rather than offering the time-limited period of traditional study to acquire fixed qualifications. Since 2010 governments have planned to increase the demand for skilled workers by focusing on skills rather than qualifications. The connection with *de-professionalisation* is the way that more of the cost has been shifted onto learners and employers (Callender 2012).

- *Equality* as a formal rule may be described as unjust where it treats unequals equally and therefore fails to reward people in line with their talents and capacities. *De-professionalisation* in the workplace fails to acknowledge any difference between those possessing and those not possessing relevant qualifications and acquired skills.

Theoretical Definitions of De-professionalisation

De-professionalisation might be described the anti-thesis of professionalisation, which is an attempt to translate one order of scarce resources—special knowledge and skills—into another—social and economic rewards (Larson 1977: xvii). This definition of professionalisation tends to be the result of the particular emphasis given to different key aspects of professionalism: status and pay, expertise and standards, values and ethics (Edmond and Price 2012: 30). A more nuanced way of examining the concept of professionalisation—and implicitly that of *de-professionalisation*—is through the lens of 'street-level bureaucracy', an expression coined by Michael Lipsky in an article developed since the 1970s (Lipsky 2010; Hupe and Hill 2016). Lipsky equates the term 'street-level bureaucrat' with 'the public services with which citizens typically interact. In this sense, all teachers, police officers and social workers in public agencies are street-level bureaucrats without further qualification'. He adds that street-level bureaucracy stands for 'public service employment of a certain sort, performed under certain conditions … Street -level bureaucrats interact with citizens in the course of the job and have discretion in exercising authority' (Lipsky 2010: xvii). The concept embeds both bureaucratic and professional characteristics, and encompasses the development of professional roles in public policy delivery.

Lipsky acknowledges that there may be differences between street-level bureaucrats arising from professional status. He emphasises the common characteristics of street-level bureaucrats despite the diverse nature of the public services workforce to which this term refers—receptionists, benefits clerks, judges, doctors, police officers, social workers, teachers and so on (Lipsky 2010). Tony Evans (2015: 283)

claims that this would perhaps make sense if one were to assume the *de-professionalisation* of staff in street-level bureaucracies. However, while professional workers, across a range of different settings, have seen changes that have constrained their work, they have also seen changes that have increased their power and status. In England, for instance the professional status of social workers has been embedded in law for over a decade (Care Standards Act 2000). Social workers are now registered, and only social workers registered by the professional body can operate as social workers. Furthermore, the number of social workers employed within social services in England has increased by 24% in the decade 2000–2010 though it has fallen severely since (HSCIC 2016). Many street-level bureaucrats, as *organisational* professionals (Evetts 2009), working in public agencies responsible for delivering public policies, have to deal with *standards* for doing their work that originate in various sources: public policy, their organisation and their occupation. Whether the process of professionalisation can be fulfilled is likely to depend on the nature of these standards and the way in which they support or maybe oppose each other (Van der Aa and van Berkel 2015). Many of these standards have been changing profoundly over the last decades in ways that potentially affect the promise of professionalism. Expectations regarding public services have been changing, and new standards are being set by public policies and managers. The role of occupational standards may change in various ways and may be reduced, resulting in *de-professionalisation,* which may thwart the promise of professionalism.

Various authors have produced evidence indicating a growing discrepancy between the self-identity of social workers as critical agents in structural social change and policy development, and the actual role that they have come to play in the 'technical' delivery of neoliberal social policies (see for example Clarke and Newman 1997; Kirkpatrick et al. 2005; Garrett 2009, 2014; Lavalette 2011; Marston and McDonald 2012; Rogowski 2011, 2016). *De-professionalisation* offers an alternative standards narrative, revealed in the processes of performance management in the workplace. On the one hand, output targets, as well as the external definition of these targets by policymakers or managers, may conflict with occupational standards and professional ethics and may be experienced as an attack on professional discretion.

On the other hand, performance management may go hand in hand with deregulation and less bureaucratic control, thus actually increasing room for occupational standards (Hill and Hupe 2014; Kirkpatrick et al. 2005; Newman 2005). Rather than being seen as an attack on 'pure professionalism' (Noordegraaf 2011) at the cost of occupational standards and professional autonomy, the exact impact of these changes needs to be conceptualised, depending on the nature of the changes themselves, as well as on the existing working and occupational contexts in which they are introduced, resulting in many professionals adapting creatively to new expectations.

The emergence of the professions as distinctive occupational groups proclaiming the exclusive competence over a particular field has often been identified as the product of specialisation, the division of labour characteristic of modern forms of production and knowledge (Weber 1987). Thus the emergence of the professions was seen as an integral part of the process of rationalisation: the increasing complexity and extensiveness of knowledge and information led to specialisation and the division of labour. *De-professionalisation* can then be seen as the rejection of the 'labour of division' (Fournier 2000) along with the 'incommensurability' characteristic of Weber's definition of professions. Incommensurability proposes that the social position and status of a profession may be such that it is not able to be judged by the same standard as anything else, or indeed has no common standard of measurement: boundaries are thrown up between the sphere of competence of the professions and other spheres of activity. In terms of the attempt through various 'defensive strategies' to place professional activity apart from, outside of, the sphere of ordinary relationships and activity, and in particular, outside of the market, incommensurability supports the view that professions may thus be better seen in terms of the labour of division than as an outcome of the division of labour. In other words, they are not the technical outcomes of the intellectual division of labour but are constituted and maintained through processes of isolation and boundary construction.

Whereas a professionalisation process of separation and boundary creation continues to consolidate an unravelling, rather less sophisticated *de-professionalisation* narrative moves in an opposing direction. Parents may disapprove of their child's lack of progress in a particular

school or what they may perceive as bullying by a peer group, and hence threaten legal action against the school. Social workers may be criticised following the action of taking a child into care or for failing to obtain a favoured adult placement. Here *de-professionalisation* can be used as a term to represent a process of disaggregation, dismantling or 'chipping away' of an established position of authority, even when such disapproval might apply only within a specific context to any one or group of individuals representing a profession. In summary the concept of *de-professionalisation* can be defined in the following multi-dimensional way as being made up of:

- removal of professional control, influence, manipulation; destabilisation of their mode of professionalisation and of their professional ties (Demailly and De La Broise 2009). In practice unalloyed *de-professionalisation* produces a sharp diminution of autonomy at work and a collective powerlessness to conceive of any positive reconstitution of a lost professionalism (i.e. transfer of power dimension).
- to discredit or deprive of professional status, also privately experienced as a weakening of status, respect or tendency away from a position of strength or equal status. It is associated with measures for lessening the need for specialist knowledge and expertise (Rogers and Pilgrim 2014: 107–111) (status and market strength dimension).
- the obverse of professionalisation, in which it is assumed that there is a plurality of professionalisation processes (Demailly 2003; Kuhlmann and Saks 2008): *de-professionalisation* can be regarded as a function or by-product of a normally hierarchical process where certain jobs become vulnerable, subordinate and professional identity scapegoated, replaced by insecurity and a lack of belonging (transformative-contextual dimension).
- an inversion of a specific mode of professionalisation, producing a loss of autonomy in the practice of a profession and subordination to external supervision (Adcroft and Willis 2006; Frostenson 2015) (managerialism dimension).

Somewhat distinct from the above is a definition of *de-professionalisation* based on the notion of 'de-skilling' (see Braverman 1974; Edgell 2012:

56–73). This focuses on the impacts of breaking down a professional task (or work process) into elements creating a more atomised position in the workplace (Heywood 2000: 133). A recent example of breaking down a work process into a linear narrative-form can be provided through 'partnerships' which have characterised the implementation of some of the UK's policies and professional practices towards disadvantaged children and families e.g. Whole Family Approaches (WFA), Sure Start.

The argument here is that the importance and outputs of 'work processes' trumps the perceived contribution of individual professionals. An overall effect of reliance on these partnership or multi-disciplinary structures may be to weaken or diminish the role of specific professionals. For instance, in delivering WFA there may be a statutory or policy requirement for partnership in specific areas of practice. The chosen 'model' includes a series of activities collectively defined as 'participation, engagement and a multi-disciplinary focus', which may include: 'to enable a process of engagement with the family'; 'to assess and review'; 'to develop multi-agency involvement as regards decision-making'; and 'to strengthen coordination of services'. Similarly there are audits of 'work processes' introduced to establish and measure impact and outcomes, and these provide an 'evaluation framework' for managers and professionals to reflect on. WFA was framed as a policy response to a numbers of factors—inadequate range and level of service, poor coordination, problems of access for families, and insufficient adaptability. Whereas organisational or legislative change appeared as the preferred solution earlier on, a change in the 'cultural system' (Boyle et al. 2010) setting legitimate goals, and the technology that determines the means available for reaching them, appears more instinctively relevant today. The above approach—of breaking down a work process into elements—contrasts with the more unifying process demonstrated by creating a 'professional project' (see for example, MacDonald 1995: 187–208). At the core of Braverman's 'deskilling' thesis is the unequal relationship between employer and employee, and 'the manner in which the labour force is dominated and shaped by the accumulation of capital' (1974: 53). In the Marxist tradition, Braverman argues that its creative characteristics make human labour exceedingly adaptable, with

unlimited potential for production. From the standpoint of the capitalist, this is good news, but, in the context of the inherently 'antagonistic relations of production', there is 'the problem of realizing the 'full usefulness' of that labour power' (ibid.: 57). It is imperative to exert control over the labour process in order to maximise the productive potential of labour (and therefore profits). This applies equally to professionals as providers of labour where the focus is on making full use of their knowledge and skills—productive potential—by controlling the work process. Capitalists turned therefore to developments in management and machinery, which not only enhanced the control of labour but also progressively *deskilled* the worker. Braverman summed up Taylor's systematic or scientific approach to management with reference to three related principles: 'the first principle is the gathering and development of knowledge of the labour processes', 'the second is the concentration of this knowledge as the exclusive province of management—together with its essential converse, the absence of such knowledge among the workers', and 'the third is the use of this monopoly over knowledge to control each step of the labour process and its mode of execution' (Braverman 1974: 119; Taylor 1947 (1911): 36). Implicit in these principles is the separation of conception from execution, namely the transfer of all mental labour from workers to managers while simultaneously simplifying and standardizing the tools and tasks that the worker is instructed to use in order to undertake a *de-skilled* task within a designated time-frame i.e. 'the manager's brains are under "the workman's cap"' (cited by Montgomery 1987: 45).

Is De-professionalisation Part of the Neoliberal Extension of Marketisation Agenda?

Viewed as socially and politically contentious, 'cuts to services', if interrogated, place the notion of *de-professionalisation* at the heart of assessing the impact of the commercial model within the NHS. How have these cuts helped to downsize professional service-inputs in the form of efficiencies, pay cuts, rationing, reduced training and staff development, all of which potentially affect overall economic productivity? Pointing

to examples of reported incapacity to deliver along with variations in overall standards nationwide has become a media-driven way of highlighting ineffectiveness (Kitzinger 2000; Butler and Drakeford 2005). For example we rely on migrant medical staff in our NHS because we have not trained sufficient numbers of our own young people. Political will is needed to resource the NHS properly, which is constantly described as being 'in crisis': however, it is a political choice that much of this situation results directly from the Private Finance Initiative (PFI). PFI was first initiated by the Conservative Government of the late 1990s and enthusiastically endorsed by New Labour as a means of raising private finance to fund government projects such as hospitals, nursing homes, police stations and prison services. According to Department of Health estimates over 700 contracts had been signed by the end of February 2016. The concept is very much like taking out a fully serviced mortgage, where not only the interest is repaid but also the upkeep and maintenance. The total national cost of the PFI over the next 35 years has been estimated at £300bn, or nearly £4000 per household.

De-professionalisation as Evidenced Throughout Health, Social Care and Education

'Cuts to services' in health, social care and education have embodied *de-professionalisation* in terms of reducing the number, type and range of 'professional' staff employed: for example fewer qualified teachers employed in free schools, more use made of teaching assistants; also more health support workers as opposed to fully-trained nurses employed in both hospital and community settings (Siddique 2015). The impact of service cuts has resulted in reduced professional influence, for example by curtailing LA responsibilities in relation to child protection, children in need, care leavers and disabled children. Professional influence can be removed further following a children's social care policy objective which places greater reliance on the need to strengthen capacity for developing Local Authority adoption

services and which uses new enhanced powers of an Ofsted inspection regime to regulate child and adult care homes. This model of working appears to value disproportionately the idea of having in post an 'effective manager' far more than any results achieved from the one-to-one intervention of single professionals. There is ample evidence that service cuts have been shaped by an ideological adherence to managerialist methods (see for example, Rogowski 2016). *De-professionalisation,* as a consequence of managerialism, has become evident in the process of carrying out legal aid work, an activity protected not only for the 'highest priority cases' and which increasingly uses para-legal staff rather than social welfare lawyers. A priority case is defined as 'where there is a risk of serious physical harm or loss of home, or where children may be removed from a family' (Howard 2016). Within local authority child protection services it is clear that, partly due to the number of Sure Start children's centre closures, there has been a soaring number of children being removed from their families and placed in care (see the chapter by Hunter in this volume).

Because of the dominant market ideology, NHS services and assets, including blood supplies, nurses and other care professionals, scanning and diagnostic services, ambulances, care homes, hospital beds and buildings—which the British public own—are being handed over to UK and foreign private companies. Privatised services cost the NHS and taxpayer far more than a publicly owned and publicly run NHS. That is because public health systems do not need to pay dividends to shareholders, enjoy lower rates of interest compared with private sector loans, and do not have privatisation's heavy and unnecessary marketising costs of contracts, billings and all the extra administration involved (Demello and Furseth 2016; Greer et al. 2016; Klein 2010). One example of the impact of 'cuts'—and its association with a *de-professionalisation*—is that fewer fully qualified professional staff are employed to work outside hospitals. This is reflected in a diminution in the number of district nurses, CPNs, and care workers. In parallel, NHS data show that the number of GPs in England rose only by just 108 in 2015 despite the Conservative Government's high profile pledge to expand the family doctor workforce by 5000 by 2020 (Clay 2016).

Alternative Types of Intervention in Place of Professional Services

The Conservative Government's 'life chances strategy', intended to focus on supporting children during the early years and improving parenting, was expected to be published in 2016, acknowledging that parenting support programmes have become a growing feature of changes to service direction and a substitute for other professional services. It emerged since that, with a change of Prime Minister, the Department for Work and Pensions (DWP) was to drop this important strategy in favour of a wider scheme on social justice to be outlined in a Government Green Paper in early 2017. The outlined intention is to focus not just on the very poor but also on Theresa May's favoured demographic—the 'just about managing' households. A major plank of the strategy will be addressing joblessness in families, as part of how the Government views effective parenting, and which it believes would be the biggest step towards improving social mobility for children (Mason 2016). The philosophical or theoretical underpinnings of parenting support as a policy field serves to reveal its dominant professional orientation, becoming 'either a benign project of support or part of a more controlling educative or retraining exercise' (Daly 2015: 597–608). As a form of intervention, it is throws the net wider than the truly troubled families where professional child protection intervention is needed.

Some countries tend to regard parenting support as the province of 'professionals'. For example in the Netherlands parenting support is delivered by pedagogues and/or people trained in social work or youth work. However the degree of professionalisation of parenting support is less in England, especially because parenting programmes, which can be delivered by people with relatively little training, have been so predominant there (Daly 2015: 602–603). Parenting classes had been advocated by then Prime Minister, David Cameron who suggested that all parents should be offered them as a measure to help alleviate child poverty, often replacing professionals who may currently provide family support. Parenting support is multi-dimensional and has capacity to play host to varying objectives. Daly and Bray (2015: 633–644) argue that it has

become a popular policy solution as it has the advantage of being relatively easily generalisable—especially in the form of programmes, and aligns with current developments of the welfare state, towards activation, provision of support through services and an interest in localism.

To take the case of the Coalition (and Conservative) Government's Troubled Families Programme (TFP), the content and form of parenting support offered varied considerably. Local authorities across England were enlisted to deliver the programme which, although it carried no new legislation or statutory guidance, was expected to be delivered using a 'family intervention' approach. This approach advocates using a single key worker who can 'grip' the family, their problems and the surrounding agencies' (DCLG 2012: 18) to work with them in a 'persistent, assertive and challenging' (DCLG 2012: 23) way which will encourage them to take responsibility for their behaviour and change their ways. These workers are expected to be 'dedicated to the family' and able to 'look at the family from the inside out, to understand its dynamics as a whole; and to offer practical help and support' (DCLG 2012: 4). Where families did not engage with the programme, workers were encouraged by the government to, in some circumstances ask 'other agencies to accelerate threat of a sanction to exert maximum pressure on families to change' (DCLG 2012: 28). The TFP then, was positioned as a central government programme that would not only 'sort out' troublesome families, but would also 'sort out' the public services that were currently working with the families (Crossley and Lambert 2017). Troubled Families were officially defined as those who met three of the four following criteria: (i) are involved in youth crime or anti-social behaviour; (ii) have children who are regularly truanting or not in school; (iii) have an adult on out-of-work benefits; (iv) cause high costs to the taxpayer (DCLG 2012: 9). The Programme represented a deliberate critique by the Conservative Government of social work's professionalism, its values and its status as an organised group of workers advocating on behalf of children and families. The use of 'key workers' remains in keeping with the wide body of literature on the role of street-level bureaucrats (Lipsky 1980). However, it became acknowledged in an unpublished Whitehall report (see Savage and Wright 2016) that the TFP, as an interconnected government-controlled intervention, as part

of an 'underclass' discourse to tackle entrenched social problems, has to date had no discernible effect on unemployment, truancy or criminality. The proven ineffectiveness of this programme appears alongside an oversight of cuts to benefits, soaring levels of food bank use and lower funding for all public services.

The increased use of foster carers has characterised current policy and the *de-professionalisation* question emerges when it becomes legitimate to ask: should foster carers be treated as 'professionals' and receive a fee for their service, given the public demand for a high level of life-experience, knowledge and skill on the part of those fostering children? The term 'foster carer' in the UK has replaced the term 'foster parent', in order to signal that this is a professional role (Ribbens-Mc Carthy and Edwards 2011: 18). Debate continues as to whether foster carers are employed principally as substitute parents or as paid professionals with a legal status. 'Specialist fostering' involving for example groups of older /younger children, own race and transracial placements, and the viewing of foster carers as professionals opened new dimensions to the practice of foster care. There has been a paucity of formal research around this subject, particularly relating to its outcomes. The evolutionary history of adoption and fostering has been one of overlaps, leading sometimes to ambiguities and confusion about purpose, expectations, roles and relationships (see for example Triseliotis 1997: 331–336). The early 1970s witnessed a form of fostering used either to divert children from institutions or to get them out of there and place them with families. The philosophy that informed it was associated with the notions of community care and normalization that were new at the time (see for example, Malin et al. 1999; Wolfensberger 1972, 1998). Besides viewing specialist fostering as being for the most troubled and troublesome children, its other key features were its contractual nature, time-limited with an average of two years, payment of a fee to foster carers, the training and preparation of carers, the preparation of children before placement, and the provision of post-placement support to foster carers and children alike (Triseliotis, ibid.: 332). Over the years there have been unresolved issues about the role fostering should play in spite of signs of a slow drift towards professionalization. It was reported that the number of those fostering in England remained roughly constant for 25

years i.e. around 32,000 (Triseliotis 1995), but recent evidence shows that there has been a marked increase to between 45,000 and 55,000 by 2016 (Bawden 2016).

Re-adjusting the Ratio of Professionals to Non-professionals Delivering Public Services?

Deprofessionalisation is also reflected in the way that health support workers are employed by NHS England in proportion to professionally trained nurses (CQC 2015a, b; Campbell 2015a, b, c). 'Bed-blocking' currently costs between £800 and £900 million annually (RCN 2016; Campbell 2015a, b, c) indicating that many chronically ill patients remain in hospital unnecessarily. The need to employ large numbers of 'temporary' and more expensive agency nurses to care for those who remain in hospital unnecessarily has resulted in ballooning financial deficits in hospital budgets. Employment agencies charge exorbitant fees and official figures show that the £2.72bn spent on agency and contract staff in the financial year 2015–2016 was £1bn more than planned. Most hospitals now have an increased reliance on temporary staff including locums because of personnel shortages: £4bn spent on agency staff (2015) compared to £2.6bn (2013–2014) and £3.4bn (2014) (McVeigh 2016). Private companies appear to be being awarded huge health contracts at an ever-increasing rate.

The decline in professional advocacy on behalf of youth services, including Connexions, and women's refuge services has likely contributed to difficult outcomes they currently face as both have felt the effect of severe cuts (Brignall 2016). A survey by UNISON of 180 local authorities providing youth services in the UK estimates that cuts in youth service spending, including that spent on staff, between April 2010 and May 2016 stand at £387 million, despite huge disparities in youth unemployment across the UK (for example 18.3% in 2015 in the north-east region). Other services now more reliant on volunteers and 'non-professional' staff as a result of unwelcome financial cuts include women's refuges which have been put at risk by benefit changes. For example it has been claimed that 17% have been shut down over the

last five years and two-thirds are facing closure because of a change in the way that housing benefit is paid to supported and sheltered housing (Gayle 2016). There was an intention to cap the amount of rent that housing benefit will cover in the social sector at the same level offered to private landlords in the same area. Nevertheless the DWP has concluded that a deferral of the reforms until 2018 would give women's refuges a period of grace while officials conduct a review into funding for the supported housing sector.

Is De-professionalisation Associated with 'Under-Performing' Services?

The headline 'hospitals under-performing due to a lack of health care professionals' was quoted from evidence following Care Quality Commission (CQC) inspections placing some hospitals in special measures, for example Addenbrookes (Cambridge), where the CQC Report highlighted 'serious concerns' (CQC 2015a; Campbell 2015a, b, c). These included 'a significant shortage of staff in a number of key areas, including critical care; staff having been moved from ward to ward to cover gaps in rotas, even though some lacked the necessary training. . (and) too few midwives, coupled with a high use of agency and bank staff.' This form of what amounted to hospital 'blacklisting' may cause damage by contamination to the reputation of individual professional staff employed there albeit undeserved. The CQC Report suggests the need for an 'improvement director' but in the confusion it is not clear what exactly merits 'inadequate' patient care or indeed 'special measures'.

An earlier scandal in the UK in the mid-2000s in the Stafford hospital run by the mid-Staffordshire NHS Foundation Trust concerned the level of poor quality health care and emphasised the role of staff malpractice in 'under-performing' medical services. Recommendations of the Francis Report (2013) included: to make all those who provide care for patients accountable for what they do; to enhance recruitment, education, training and support of all contributors to the provision of healthcare; and most importantly, to integrate the essential shared values of a common culture that needs to be fostered by

leaders of the organisation. By mid-2016 it was reported that the tough inspection regime for hospitals introduced to prevent a repeat of the Mid-Staffordshire care scandal had been relaxed as the NHS regulator adjusted to budget cuts brought in by the Secretary of State for Health. The CQC now will undertake 'fewer and smaller inspections of hospitals in England and rely more on information provided by patients and NHS trusts under a new five-year strategy' (Campbell and Johnson 2016). This change will likely see a rolling-back of the in-depth approach to assessing the quality and safety of hospital services since the Mid-Staffordshire Report, which required scores of CQC inspectors spending up to a week examining how hospitals operate. As part of the new CQC strategy inspectors will be expected to concentrate on core services, such as A&E and critical care, and no longer examine in detail how a wide range of departments are doing. The CQC admitted it was having to scale back and rethink because it will be receiving 'fewer resources'—£32 million less by 2019 than the £249 million it currently receives from the Department of Health. The likely result is that fewer inspections will be carried out: this is saddening in a situation where CQC rates just 1% of care homes as outstanding and 40% as either requiring improvement or inadequate (Quinn 2016). A process of *de-professionalisation* characterised by a reduction in service standards has become intensified as a result of depleted staff numbers. NHS Providers now say that the policy of giving the NHS only small budget increases, under the implementation of austerity in 2010, is damaging patient care, created serious staffing problems, and led to key targets being routinely missed (Campbell et al. 2018).

The Care Quality Commission NHS England has vowed to transform mental health services with an extra £1bn a year although there have since been some doubts that this sum is being ring-fenced (Quinn and Campbell 2016). The present Conservative Government along with the previous Coalition have presided over the decimation of mental health services—'a car crash' according to Professor Sue Bailey, former president of the Royal College of Psychiatrists (Allan 2017). Department of Health figures indicate that the number of mental health nurses working in the NHS has dropped by almost a sixth since the Conservatives came to power in 2010. While there were 45,384

mental health nurses working in England in 2010, there were just 38,774 in July 2016. The Government's national plan has a number of targets, for example people facing a mental health crisis will be able to get community care such as 'psychological treatments' 24 hours a day. Each area should have a multi-agency suicide prevention plan yet local plans are not specifically required to recruit additional trained professional staff for example, nurses or social workers. Here *de-professionalisation* becomes signified by an ever-increasing workload assigned to community teams along with an inadequate number of skilled, qualified professionals to provide expert assistance.

De-professionalisation, in Education?

De-professionalisation can be see in the 'cuts to services' experienced in many schools across the UK. A greater onus on solving society's ills has become placed on schools while simultaneously granting them institutional autonomy. Labour Party Shadow Education spokesperson Tristram Hunt argued that the Conservative Government had created a 'schools can-fix it narrative' where labour market changes, housing problems and catchment areas appear to have been ignored (Hunt 2016). The Harvard sociologist, Robert Putnam echoes similar sentiments:

> Schools work as part of a much broader social ecology of churches, clubs, sports leagues and work placements. A rich network of civic capital... used to be offered to our kids, trusting interactions with non-parental adults that socialised them and ensured failure did not have to be fatal. (Putnam 2015: 135–190)

Funding for schools education in England has continued to drop in real terms as it fails to match increased need from a fast-growing population of school-age children. In particular, cuts to school support include mental health services and specialist teacher input for children and young people with special needs (Weale 2015). Instead, relentless forced academisation and the burgeoning of free schools, unaccountable

locally and of hugely variable quality, result in some employing no qualified staff (Millar 2016). In a similar way, supply teaching is currently dominated by cost-cutting private supply agencies that pay up to £60 a day less than the national rates, often with zero paid into a teacher's pension scheme. Agencies send in teachers who may lack professional development opportunities, and possess few if any professional rights such as in-house training. 'We need to re-professionalise the teaching profession', asserts Conservative Government Minister, Nick Boles recognising that some aspects of professionalism are no longer valued and recognised (Lightfoot 2016).

De-professionalisation as Critique and Cuts to Staff Training

There has been a noticeable withdrawal of local authority, hospital trust and in-house funding support for higher-level, clinical and specialist training. Yet most professions now recognise that learning and professional development are lifelong, to be acquired with the aid of Continuing Professional Development programmes (CPD). Led by the Royal College of Nursing, the British Medical Association, the Royal College of General Practitioners and the Patients Association, a coalition of more than 20 charities, medical and professional bodies and trade unions released an open letter to the then PM David Cameron in June 2016 saying that moves to drop funding for student nurses and midwives represented an 'untested gamble'. The proposals included stopping bursaries to support nurses during their training and switching them to student loans. Previously, nursing training had been treated differently to other higher and further education courses precisely to help revert the shortages. The organisations highlighted the 'worrying lack of clarity or consultation about the effect that funding changes could have on those who need to train for more advanced or specialist roles, such as health visitors or district nurses' (RCN letter led by professional bodies, 2016). Simultaneously, an RCN survey pointed to a dramatic fall in the number of school nurses, with almost a third working unpaid overtime

every day to keep up with their workload. The research showed the number of school nursing posts had fallen by 10% since 2010, leaving 2700 school nurses now caring for more than nine million pupils, despite a rising incidence in issues, especially in mental health among children (McVeigh 2016).

De-professionalisation as a Market-Led Critique of Social Work Training

De-professionalisation may be demonstrated through the trajectory of a political economy 'model' of delivering public services, where for example education policy has been progressively shaped by the needs or demands of a market economy. It aims to cut employers' costs, and leads to the gradual 'marketisation' of all services. Such a 'model' comes close to the theory of 'elite control', where for instance the NHS can be thought of as the product of conflict and power struggles between a political and a medical elite and arguably will remain so in the light of policy changes brought about by the Health and Social Care Act 2012 (see for example, Greer, Wismar and Figueras 2016: 3–26). The political economy 'model' therefore suggests that most major policy decisions are subject to the backing of 'big business' or capitalist interests. This perspective falls in line with Marxist views of class-structured society in which a ruling class controls policy and makes most of, if not all, the big decisions, particularly where policies affect the quality of the labour force (Blakemore and Warwick-Booth 2013: 165).

As regards the social work profession, Tunstill (2016) asserts that 'there is a new and dangerously comprehensive quality to the current scope of (training) proposals under debate in the UK which makes them almost invulnerable to evidence-based critique, let alone revision' and goes on to describe a political party consensus about new developments, such as the introduction of an elite social work training route, Front Line (largely independent of the UK university sector). In excess of £100 million of extra funding has been given for fast-track training

to expand the successful Frontline and Step Up schemes to help attract top-calibre graduates into social work, so that by 2018 one in four children's social workers will be qualifying in this way. Up to £20 million will be provided for a new What Works Centre to disseminate best practice (Taylor 2016).

The ability of social workers to offer and provide a range of child and family support services has been recently threatened by proposed clauses in the 2017 Children and Social Work Act, which exempts local authorities from meeting key existing statutory duties. Privatisation seems to pass for innovation. Considering the professional credentials of social work, the current Conservative Government is being advised on how to implement a preferred definition of the social work task, through a Knowledge and Skills Statement (KSS). 'Independent reviews' of aspects of professional social work training were set up to explore the form of training 'ideally structured' to serve the profession, namely *Revisioning Social Work Education* (Croisdale-Appleby 2014) and *Making the Education of Social Workers Consistently Effective* (Narey 2014). It is now an almost compulsory requirement of local authorities to buy in franchised packages, like 'Signs of Safety' and 'Attachment Measuring' packages with large sums being spent on this 'effectively privatised knowledge' (Tunstill 2016). Some social workers may come to view this as a threat to the integrity of existing training programmes which have been validated and overseen by the profession's own association and which have shaped their own professional lives.

Here the *de-professionalisation* process threatens professional knowledge per se, in a move to a professional/post-professional environment where organisations privatise knowledge and charge would-be professionals. The introduction of a quasi-professional qualification system, outside of HE—e.g. Frontline, Teach First—symbolises a major change in this direction. This may include a threat to rigorous regulation where a central argument is that the commodification of knowledge by neo-liberal economic strategy becomes identified with the transfer of a publicly funded good i.e. knowledge—with no cost- into the private sector where it is used to generate profit.

Reviewing the Viability and Completeness of Current Training for Health-Care Professionals

The critique of the basic direction of training as a component of *de-professionalisation* operates similarly within health care where we have only to point to the high number of national and local reviews of nurse and paramedical training over the last 40 years since the 'political economy model' of delivering public services has taken hold (see for example DHSS 1972, 1986; DoH 1988; Jay 1979; Nursing and Midwifery Council UK 2010, 2015). This may appear intrusive to professions if this action becomes part of a strategy to remove clinical tasks away from professional control or influence. What about our reliance on overseas nurses and cuts to the number of UK nurses in training? More than 55,000 EU nationals work as doctors and nurses in a health service that would collapse without them, argues journalist Polly Toynbee (2016). The reason we need so many foreign nurses is that after 2010, the number of UK nurse training places was cut, with the gap filled from abroad. The Secretary of State declared that the 10,000 extra nurses employed under the present Conservative Government had been as a result of importing nurses to cover for training cuts. In 2015 Health Education England was training 3100 fewer nurses than a decade ago, a 19% cut. Yet only 60% of the newly-trained enter the NHS, as the long-enforced 1% pay cap means they can earn more in other occupations. Furthermore this Government has removed nursing bursaries with the intention of widening access to nurse training, whilst at the same time blocking visas to non-EU nurses. This means that, like other students, they will have to take out loans and accumulate large debts. The Department of Health claims that this would allow universities to create some 10,000 more training places: currently they are turning away 37,000 applicants, according to available Universities UK figures.

This somewhat nuanced version of *de-professionalisation* has been characterised as witnessing a trend towards tolerance of incomplete or deficient training. For example, it has been reported that there have been deep cuts—up to 45%—in nurses' post-registration specialist training signifying that closure of courses will create acute shortages in

specialisms, such as A&E, intensive care, diabetes and cancer and palliative nursing (Mulholland 2016). There is some evidence that in the NHS trained foreign nurses are prepared to work for less than professional-styled wages, although this is not consistent with occupying a professional role and responsibilities.

Conclusion

This chapter has attempted to scope the beginnings of an analytical framework for understanding the context in which a process of *de-professionalisation* exists, assuming a neo-liberalist ideology characterised by rationalism, capitalism, technology and regulation (Scholte 2005). Davies (2017: 5) has suggested the process represents an attempt to replace political judgements with economic evaluation, including but not exclusively, the evaluations offered by markets. The original question posed was: 'if there is some consensus that a process of *de-professionalisation* has emerged over recent years, then how has an austerity policy context made a difference?' There are several contextual dimensions used to configure a concept of *de-professionalisation*, for instance service cutbacks, scarce resources, depleted training opportunities, as outlined in this chapter. Similarly other dimensions may have relevance. These include: *de-professionalisation* as defined by a lowering of morale, a demoralisation or denigration of the workforce; by low productivity or a de-skilling of labour where a rise in low-skilled jobs becomes blamed for static wages. Similarly there is evidence for a more allegorical version of *de-professionalisation* as 'abuse of power'. During austerity these factors are, in sociological terms, useful towards mapping out a fuller understanding of how *de-professionalisation* as a process may have had an impact.

What seems to be destroying the Conservative Government is not outside forces, but their strategy of austerity. This includes cutting taxes for the wealthy, while cutting public services and social security for the rest; of rewarding the owners of capital, while punishing those who rely on their labour. The financial crisis has caused permanent damage according to the independent Office for Budget Responsibility (OBR),

to which the Treasury has outsourced economic and fiscal forecasting; and as a result will never return to its pre-crash levels of growth. On the day after the November 2017 Budget Britain's leading financial think-tank, the Institute of Fiscal Studies (IFS), asserted that 'the UK faces two decades of no-earnings growth and more austerity.' Most senior economists claim that productivity must rise or quality of life will fall. Unless Government takes urgent action to boost productivity by investing in education, cutting red-tape and incentivising research and development, a pattern of slower growth will make it more difficult to reduce excessive inequality. An industrial strategy which focuses on education and training to deal with skills shortages along with technological development which creates conditions for investment and growth now becomes the key policy driver to raise productivity. Paradoxically, the economic need for a skilled workforce clashes with the realities of many public services where de-professionalisation has reduced the knowledge, resources and scope of action for those services to be successfully delivered.

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Inspecting 'Transforming Rehabilitation': The Pitfalls of an Austerity Managerialist Approach to Offender Supervision

Nicola Roberts

Introduction

This chapter is about the recent partial privatisation of the probation service in England and Wales with an analysis of the government's inspections of the privatisation endeavour so far. First, it is necessary to provide a brief history of both the changing nature of the probation service and the philosophy of rehabilitation to understand the conditions in which the probation service became partially privatised in 2015 (for a much more comprehensive history, see Burke and Collett 2015). The following section tracks the rise and fall of both rehabilitation, as a rationale for addressing offending behaviour, and the probation service, as an organisation that addresses offending behaviour. Since the 1970s, rehabilitation has not been the focus of government ideologies, policies or practices. Instead, a much more punitive (and expensive) stance to tackling crime has been adopted, the latter which has been

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paradoxical with, firstly, Thatcher's and then subsequent governments' quests to reduce public expenditure. It is against this political and socio-economic backdrop that the focus of the chapter provides a critical discourse analysis (CDA) of the government's inspections carried-out so far on the privatised Community Rehabilitation Companies (CRCs) and the state-controlled National Probation Service (NPS). The question asked of the analysis is: how have the organisations performed? The chapter begins with the history of rehabilitation and the probation service, followed by the methodology, an analysis and discussion of the findings, concluding with the implications of the research.

The Politics of the Probation Service and Rehabilitation

In the Beginning—The Needy Offender: 1876–1960s

Raynor and Robinson (2009: 5) state that the history of the probation service begins in 1876 with the Church of England Temperance Society's decision to create a missionary service because 'active and caring human contact was necessary to persuade sinners and unfortunates to reform'. The focus was on individuals' spiritual welfare and saving their souls to produce a respectable and abstinent citizen. Such missionary work was understood as the natural remit of Christians for whom charitable work was important. Governments, on the other hand, focused on securing the conditions for creating wealth through economic development. However, thirty years later, the Probation of Offenders Act 1907, which provided the foundations for the probation service, gave probation officers a statutory role 'to advise, assist and befriend' offenders on probation orders (Whitehead and Statham 2006: 27). By the mid-twentieth century, the early work of the missionaries to redeem offenders by saving their souls (Raynor and Robinson 2009) was supplanted by the need for probation officers to normalise offenders, 'straighten out characters and to reform the personality of their clients in accordance with the requirements of "good citizenship"'

(Garland 1985: 238). During this time, in the mid-twentieth century, governments were increasingly intervening into the social and economic lives of citizens, and 'citizens had learned to work together' for the common good, increasingly expecting governments to develop answers to social problems (Raynor and Robinson 2009: 6).

Thus rehabilitation was viewed as 'state-obligated'—offenders had the right to be offered opportunities for reintegration into society as law-abiding and useful citizens (Rottman 1990 cited in Raynor and Robinson 2009: 12). As such, Burke and Collett (2015) argue that offenders must have access to personal, social and economic resources, offered in a professional relationship where there is a belief and commitment to offender change; and recognition that rehabilitating offenders may be a long process. This is what Deering and Fielzer (2015: 2) defined as the 'probation ideal'—the purpose and values of probation, however they have been characterised as 'moral arguments about what society ought to do', rather than what society can actually achieve (Raynor and Robinson 2009: 5). They are symbolic gestures, of accepting, allowing and re-instating a law-abiding citizen as a member of a community (Robinson and Crow 2009). Contemporarily, in such communitarian justifications, rehabilitation is seen more than 'simply as meeting offenders' needs or correcting their deficits, but as harnessing and developing their strengths and assets' (Raynor and Robinson 2009: 13). This 'strengths-based' approach, found useful to help offenders desist from crime (McNeill et al. 2012), justifies rehabilitation on the basis of the contribution the rehabilitated offender can make to the community (Raynor and Robinson 2009).

However, the post-war building of communities and economic growth did not eradicate crime. Psychological and sociological positivistic theories gained prominence to explain the persistence of crime (Hudson 1987). At a time when the government was nationalising major industries and utilities (Mair and Burke 2012), prisons evolved as sites of treatment and sentences of probation were common. Much value was placed in casework, psychotherapy and counselling (Brody 1976), and a more therapeutic or treatment approach to rehabilitation was adopted, which addressed so called personality deficits, such as poor mental health, substance use, anger and aggression (Brooks

2012). The role of psychology in explaining the causes of crime was overriding (Mair and Burke 2012), and interventions addressed individual pathology as the cause of crime rather than addressing the social causes of crime (Raynor and Robinson 2009).

The 'New Right' and the Rational Offender: 1970–2000

Whilst rehabilitation reached its heyday during the 1960s in England and Wales (Burke 2012), by the mid-1970s, Britain was in economic, social and political turmoil and crime continued to rise (Mair and Burke 2012). Left-wing critics questioned the role of the state to intervene so intrusively into the lives of individuals and right-wing critics argued that rehabilitation was a soft approach to crime and punishment (Burke 2012; Hudson 1987). The emerging political so-called 'new right' wanted to reduce public expenditure. They also 'rediscovered' the rational actor—offenders chose to commit crime out of free will (Burke 2012). This individual focus on the responsibility of the offender for crime is the result of an individualistic culture of blame for one's actions, a neo-liberal economy and withdrawal of state services. For these reasons, neo-liberal states are more punitive, imprisoning higher proportions of their populations to censure them and hold them accountable for their actions, compared to other types of political economies, such as social democratic states (e.g., Cavadino and Dignan 2006). These latter states are more inclusionary providing protection for citizens against a range of misfortunes, stemming from economic, social, and physical factors (ibid., 2006). They also tend to acknowledge the structural causes of crime, for example, Cavadino and Dignan (2006) argue that failure to provide for individuals who are adversely affected by unregulated market economies is likely to result in more crime.

Yet, there were growing concerns over the lack of an evidence-base justifying using rehabilitation to reduce crime (Brody 1976). This lack of an evidence-base, together with left and right-wing arguments about civil liberties and harsher punishments, respectively, and the view that offenders choose to commit crime, led to the demise of rehabilitation

as a form of therapy and treatment to reduce crime (Hudson 1987), and arguably began the demise of the 'probation ideal' (see Deering and Fielzer 2015). During the 1980s, Conservative governments of the 'new right' aimed to shrink the state and public sector. The Financial Management Initiative, began the quest in 1982, to deliver efficient and effective public services at low cost (Fowles 1990; Worrall and Hoy 2005) and the probation service was made to demonstrate its accountability and its cost effectiveness (Burnett and Roberts 2004). The government increased its control over individual probation services by introducing *National Standards* in 1989 and the *Criminal Justice Act 1991* aimed at standardising practice and toughening-up the view of the organisation, respectively (Hedderman and Hough 2004; Worrall and Hoy 2005). Underlying the Act were economic concerns: to reduce spending in prisons (Rex 1998).

During the early 1990s, then, partnership initiatives between the probation service and the voluntary sector aimed at rehabilitating offenders grew to address the growing gaps in probation services (Dominey 2012). Governments promoted the voluntary sector as being able to provide more flexible services 'closer to the needs of local communities' (Burke and Collett 2015: 124). Indeed, the early 1990s, saw a 'renewed commitment to rehabilitative work with offenders' (Burnett and Roberts 2004: 3), driven largely by academics in the field and the probation service being influenced by the publication of research reviews suggesting that interventions with offenders worked to reduce re-offending. This is best exemplified in what has become known as the 'what works' debate. It was implemented in the late 1990s as the effective practice initiative (Robinson 2001), under the then New Labour government (Spencer and Deakin 2004). This initiative set out a number of best practice guidelines in the supervision of offenders, including offender assessment and management, and delivery of programmes (Chapman and Hough 1998). However, Spencer and Deakin (2004) argue that the 'what works' agenda and its related policies and practices also aimed to reduce expenditure on the prison and offender management.

During the early 1990s, also, debates, fuelled in part by the rising prison population, continued about whether crime could be prevented (Worrall and Hoy 2005). Feeley and Simon (2003), writing from

within an American context in the early 1990s, examine the emergence of a 'new penology': a managerial perspective to deal with 'the increased demands for rationality and accountability coming from the courts and the political system' (Jacobs 1977 cited in Feeley and Simon 2003: 435). It was argued that the 'new penology' did not seek to eliminate crime but, through community sentences (which are cheaper, shorter and less intrusive) acting as mechanisms of control, to manage offenders, according to risk profiles. Probation orders thus became part of 'the continuum of control for more efficient risk management' (Feeley and Simon 2003: 439). Prisons, which are more expensive, seek longer-term control to manage high-risk offenders. Central to this discourse, then, is a managerialist approach of allocating scant resources to the most risky offenders (Feeley and Simon 2003). Teague (2016) argues this quest to allocate resources efficiently to save public money, has been justified to change the nature of the probation service in England and Wales. As such, the rhetoric of 'what works' was about a 'new rehabilitation' (Robinson 1999: 430; 2002) where interventions are 'increasingly inscribed in a framework of risk rather than a framework of welfare' of the offender (Garland 2001: 176). Perpetrator programmes are used to 'treat' offenders and are deemed successful in so far as they protect the public, reduce risk, and are more cost-effective than other punishments. Rehabilitation is thus a way to manage risk (Garland 1997, 2001; Robinson 1999) rather than normalise the offender (Feeley and Simon 2003). Additionally, rehabilitation is reconfigured as being socially useful to protect the public (Burke and Collett 2015; Robinson 2008): 'it is future victims who are now 'rescued' by rehabilitative work, rather than the offenders themselves' (Garland 2001: 176). 'Notions of welfare and care' (Robinson 2008: 436) of offenders have disappeared to be replaced with rhetoric about public protection (Worrall and Hoy 2005).

The New Millennium

At the turn of the century, central governmental control increased, as the probation service became a national service badged as a tough law enforcement organisation. In keeping with this image, probation

areas were incentivised to enforce the orders of the court (NPS 2001), largely around offender attendance at probation and behavioural compliance with their court order (Robinson 2014), for example, 40% of their budget is allocated on this premise. Areas that fall short of the minimum *National Standards* risk losing money from their centrally financed budgets (NPS 2001). This public protection rhetoric facilitates a vision of a legitimate criminal justice organisation that is politically and publicly accountable (Robinson and McNeill 2004) yet enforcing orders has unintended consequences (Robinson 2014). Desistance from offending, i.e., offenders 'going straight' (Maruna 1997) and offender compliance are compromised when community punishments are harsh (Burke and Collett 2015). Raynor and Robinson (2009) argue that individuals are more likely to comply with the law if they view the administration and enforcement of it as just, fair, with a respect for rights, and experience a preparedness to be listened to and helped when needed. Similarly, Dominey (2016) found it was the care and interest given by supervisors and other keyworkers which low or medium risk offenders considered the important part of the community sentence. Irwin-Rogers' (2016) ethnographic research of Approved Premises, support these arguments, too. He found that building quality relationships between supervisors and licencees are best achieved when supervisors treat licencees with dignity, listen to them, and provide them with timely and accurate information. These strategies are likely to lead to important outcomes, such as gaining suitable accommodation and improving the licencee's relationships with their friends and family. Building personal relationships with offenders then is fundamental to facilitate a process of personal change (Canton 2012) that includes focusing on key factors that can help offenders desist from offending (see Farrall 2002).

The Privatisation Years: 2013–2017

Since the rise of the 'new right', there has been an increasing political consensus that privatisation and competition are the best ways to increase efficiency (Burke and Collett 2015). In 2013, Nick Clegg's

announcement that 'the coalition government is driving a rehabilitation revolution' in the way offenders are managed illustrates this consensus (Clegg 2013: unpaginated):

> The majority of community-based offender services will be subject to competition. […]. Providers will be commissioned to deliver community orders and licence requirements, and will be incentivised to reduce reoffending. They will be paid by results according to achieving reductions in reconviction rates. […]. (Ministry of Justice 2013: 10–11)

As of 1 February 2015, these new providers are known as CRCs and there are 21 of them in England and Wales owned by eight 'profit-driven organisations' (McDermott 2016: 194). The NPS retains responsibility for supervising high-risk offenders (National Audit Office 2014: 24) (approximately 20% of supervisees in the community), whereas the CRCs supervise the rest (National Audit Office 2016), who are assessed as low and medium risk offenders. The latter are sourced-out to the competitive market of the CRCs and the ensuing 'supply chain' (National Audit Office 2014: 28), for example, CRCs subcontract work to other organisations (Strickland 2016). The CRCs receive funding in two-parts: (i) a fee for some services, such as delivering the sentence of the court—the funds will depend on the number of offenders being supervised on court orders; and (ii) 'payment by results [PbR] for achieving statistically significant reductions in re-offending' (Strickland 2016: 3). The latter has been termed as 'additional income' (HM Inspectorate of Probation 2016a: 12). The first re-offending data was anticipated from October 2017 (Criminal Justice Joint Inspection 2017), but it was not available at the time of writing.

Methodology

Rushton and Donovan (page 5) write in the introduction to this book, 'given that organisations—particularly those of private contractors—have to offer value for money, and will have made promises on winning the contract, the delivery of the service will be under continual and

detailed scrutiny.' Yet the market and applying PbR in criminal justice terms is complex and untested (Burke and Collett 2015). For these reasons, this chapter analyses the government's inspections carried-out so far on the privatisation of the probation service (see HM Inspectorate of Probation, 2016a, 2016b, 2016c, 2016d, 2016e, 2017a, 2017b, 2017c, 2017d, 2017e, 2017f, 2017g).

There are seven NPS divisions: London, Midlands, North East, North West, South East, South West and Central, and Wales; and 21 CRC areas (GOV.UK 2017). HM Inspectorate of Probation is responsible for inspecting both the CRCs and the NPS and the quality of the work they provide. At the time of writing, there have been twelve government inspections of 'probation' work done by the NPS and the CRCs, as this Table 1 shows.

Many of the CRC areas are left uninspected at the time of writing. Most of the divisions of the NPS have been inspected with the exception of the South West.

CDA was the approach used to analyse the inspections. As van Dijk (1995: 18, original emphasis) states 'CDA specifically focuses on the strategies of *manipulation, legitimation*, the *manufacture of consent* and other discursive ways to influence the minds (and indirectly the actions) of people in the interest of the powerful'. CDA thus implies an oppositional and critical stance against '*the powerful and the elites*' (van Dijk 1995: 18, original emphasis). CDA is set against the backdrop of 'theorising about the

Table 1 NPS and CRCs inspected to date

NPS and CRCs	Date published
York and North Yorkshire	August, 2016
Durham	August, 2016
Derbyshire	September, 2016
Kent	October, 2016
North London	December, 2016
Staffordshire and Stoke	January, 2017
Greater Manchester	February, 2017
Northamptonshire	April, 2017
Gwent	April, 2017
Suffolk	June, 2017
South Yorkshire	June, 2017
Gloucestershire	August, 2017

political or social nature of the world in which the utterance [text] refers' (Antaki 2008: 436). Hence, the purpose of the (brief) history of the changing nature of rehabilitation and the probation service at the beginning of this chapter to outline the theoretical and socio-political backdrop in which to situate the analysis of the inspections. It is important to use CDA to analyse the government's probation inspections because dominant social groups may exercise control over such texts, driven by their own interests. This elite control over important and influential institutional and/or public discourses ensures such discourses are sustained and reproduced, thereby upholding the social and institutional power of the elites. This illustration of power and control might be found in the 'setting of the agenda' (van Dijk 1995: 21). For example, the HM Inspectorate of Probation (2016b: 48) aims 'to report on whether reoffending is reduced, the public is protected from harm, individuals abide by the sentence', thus providing three key outcome measures. As such, the agenda seems set for the assessment of:

- enforcement by implementing orders of the court;
- risk assessment/management to protect the public; and
- rehabilitation to reduce re-offending—the less dominant agenda of the government post the 1960s.

These areas should not be seen as mutually exclusive as they often overlap, but the inspections have enabled them as exclusive categories for assessment. The analysis assesses both the NPS and the CRCs along these dimensions, identifying key enablers and barriers in the inspections that have led to the inspectorate's branding of each of the three key outcome measures as good, acceptable, poor, and so on. Unfortunately, the first two inspections on York and North Yorkshire, and on Durham, did not use any quantifiable measure of success when assessing the three outcome measures and are therefore omitted from the analysis. Standard quantifiable measures need to be consistently applied to aid comparisons between areas, organisations, and over time. In analysing barriers to effective 'probation' work with offenders, who and what is being held accountable for these are explicated. For CDA, it is important to examine texts because the less powerful may be restricted in their use of discourse (van Dijk 1995). That said, the inspectors spoke with service

users, partners, key staff and managers to construct their inspection reports (see for example HM Inspectorate of Probation 2016a).

van Dijk (2002 cited in Antaki 2008: 444) writes 'articles should provide a detailed, systematic and theoretically based analysis…it is insufficient to merely quote, summarise or paraphrase such discourse'. As such, all 12 HM Inspectorate of Probation inspections, detailed above, were imported into NVivo, a computer assisted data analysis software, to analyse the data. The basis of Strauss' and Corbin's (1998) progressive coding framework of open, axial and selective coding was borrowed to organise categories. This is so that findings can be backed-up with 'evidence grounded in the words used or warrantably not used' (Antaki 2008: 444). The quotes/case examples presented in the following section are indicative of the general comments found in the inspection reports.

Findings

The Mixed Market Economy: The Winners and Losers

Senior (2016) states that the part-privatisation of the probation service is all about saving money by the marketization of public services, where offenders become commodities: akin to Feeley and Simon's (2003) 'new penology' where scant resources are reserved for the most risky offenders in order to manage risks rather than to alter individual destinies. The analysis carried out on the 10 inspections of the NPS and CRCs lends support to the existence of a managerialist approach. Generally, across all three outcomes measures of public protection, enforcement—i.e., abiding by the sentence—and reduction in re-offending, the CRCs performed poorly compared to the NPS. Where quantifiable outcome measures were stated (in 10 out of 12 inspections), *all* NPS performed to acceptable standards or above, whereas only four CRCs did (see Table 3), for abiding by the sentence. Table 2 shows the performance of the NPS.

Analysis of the inspections suggests that at the heart of whether an organisation performed poor or good on all outcome measures, was whether they had resources. It follows then, that high scores for all NPS for offenders abiding by their sentence are because these organisations are well-resourced. Since 2001, these organisations were badged as law-

Table 2 NPS performance outcomes

NPS	Protecting the public	Reducing re-offending	Abiding by the sentence
Derbyshire	Good	Generally good	Good
Kent	Mixed	Mixed	Acceptable
North London	Mixed	Mixed	Generally good
Staffordshire and Stoke	Acceptable	Generally acceptable	Good
Greater Manchester	Good	Generally acceptable	Good
Northamptonshire	Good	Acceptable	Acceptable
Gwent	Acceptable	Generally acceptable	Good
Suffolk	Not of sufficient quality	Poor	Acceptable
South Yorkshire	Generally good	Good	Good
Gloucestershire	Good	Mixed	Good

Table 3 CRCs performance outcomes

CRC	Protecting the public	Reducing re-offending	Abiding by the sentence
Derbyshire	Poor	Poor	Adequate
Kent	Mixed	Mixed	Mixed
North London	Poor	Poor	Poor
Staffordshire and Stoke	Insufficient	Not sufficiently effective	Good
Greater Manchester	Fell short of expectations	Not sufficiently effective	Good
Northamptonshire	Poor	Poor	Unsatisfactory
Gwent	Not of sufficient quality	Not sufficiently effective	Acceptable
Suffolk	Not sufficient	Insufficient	Poor
South Yorkshire	Generally acceptable	Acceptable	Inconsistent
Gloucestershire	Poor	Poor	Poor

enforcement organisations—the accumulation of a raft of changes in policies and practices during the 1980s and 1990s. Back then, organisations were incentivised to enforce the orders of the court (NPS 2001). This legacy remains. Analysis of the inspections show they have: competent responsible officers (i.e., probation officers/probation service officers) well-trained and experienced in the field of enforcement and engaging offenders with the requirements of the sentence, reviewing cases, and an

infrastructure of partnership and multi-agency working with strong relationships to other organisations, including the courts. For example:

> Responsible officers completed thorough inductions, setting out the expectations of the sentence firmly from the outset and completing pre and post-programme work to motivate and address barriers to engagement. (HM Inspectorate of Probation 2017c: 62)

Table 2 shows that much of the quality of the work produced by the NPS was 'acceptable'. Analysis of the inspectorate's reports shows that the key factors why NPS met acceptable standards in relation to protecting the public and reducing re-offending were largely due to good assessments and good management, for example:

> A focus on quality, with good management oversight and staff support arrangements, underpinned effective practice. (HM Inspectorate of Probation 2016a: 43)

However, across the two outcome measures of protecting the public and reducing re-offending, three NPS did not meet acceptable standards. Generally, barriers to effective work to protect the public were largely due to: poor assessments and review of cases and competency of staff, as the following quote shows:

> Staff were insufficiently alert, or not sufficiently well resourced, to respond to changes in offenders' circumstances. As such, they did not reflect often enough any new or increased risks in assessments, plans and interventions. (HM Inspectorate of Probation 2016d: 27)

Barriers to effective work to reduce re-offending, for the NPS, generally, were also due to poor assessments and review of cases, but most notably availability of interventions, as the following quote shows:

> There was insufficient progress in delivering interventions. (HM Inspectorate of Probation 2017g: 39)

These same reasons, and more, can be found to be barriers to effective work in the CRCs.

The Managerialist Approach: High Demand, Short Supplies

In analysing the CRCs quality and effectiveness of work along the outcome measures of protecting the public and reducing re-offending, only one and the same CRC met acceptable standards for them both. Table 3 illustrates this.

The CRCs caseloads comprise low to medium risk offenders (National Audit Office 2014), yet the effectiveness of such a managerialist approach is in serious doubt here. Analysis of the data suggests that the CRCs are severely under resourced, and it is this that is hampering their effectiveness to protect the public and reduce re-offending. Key factors indicating under resourcing were: high caseloads, competency of staff—linked sometimes to lack of or poor quality training—and management oversight. All these factors are equally problematic for protecting the public, 'with the public exposed unduly to the risk of harm in some cases' (HM Inspectorate of Probation 2016e: 4):

> Eric is […] subject to an […] community order for an offence of possession of an offensive weapon. His previous convictions included battery against his ex-wife. […]. The direction of work was led by Eric and, as such, was not focused appropriately on the management of risk. The responsible officer […] relied too heavily on self-reported information. When Eric developed new relationships on two occasions, this did not prompt risk-focused home visits, as we would have liked to have seen. The responsible officer confirmed that home visits were carried out simply to aid compliance. There were no efforts to explore who Eric was in a relationship with, if there were any children involved, and why the first relationship had ended when a new one was formed. The case had not been flagged as one involving domestic abuse and there were no victim details recorded, despite some information being available […]. Overall, the responsible officer had failed to take the initiative to influence the level of risk Eric posed to others. During the course of supervision, Eric

> was sentenced for a new violent offence against another female, with whom he denied he was in a relationship. (HM Inspectorate of Probation 2017a: 27)

The author's previous research, carried out 15 years ago, illustrated then the problematic nature of probation officers assessing risk of domestic violence offenders, subsequently leaving women at risk of harm (Ballantyne 2013).

Key factors that impeded effectiveness in reducing re-offending were: poor assessments carried out, management oversight, review of cases, and lack of information sharing. Poor quality and lack of available interventions were particularly problematic:

> There were long waiting lists and delays in the start for programmes, with no guarantee that all service users would complete their programme requirement before the end of their sentence. (HM Inspectorate of Probation 2017c: 46)

McNeill (2013) says that 'Transforming Rehabilitation' is premised upon the notion that offenders who present as low risk of harm but who may be at high risk of re-offending, do not need intensive and skilled support: they can be supervised by less qualified and less skilled supervisors. Yet he argues that for persistent offenders to desist from crime the process is uncertain and complex: 'a long and winding road that requires skilled navigation' (2013: 84), and resources, including skilled and trained staff who are appropriately supervised by competent managers. One of the key resources that are in limited supply in the CRCs are people. As evidenced above, desistance (Maruna 1997; McNeill et al. 2012) and rehabilitation are predicated upon the development of relationships between people including listening to offenders (Canton 2012; Dominey 2016; Irwin-Rogers 2016; Raynor and Robinson 2009), which in turn rely on seeing offenders:

> For the one in four people assessed as low risk, however, their supervision while in the community is scaled back to a telephone call every six weeks

> […]. In our view, this means too many people get too little attention. Without meaningful contact, individuals are most unlikely to develop a will to change. […]. (HM Inspectorate of Probation 2017d: 4)

But McNeill (2013) argues it is a skill developing relationships of trust with offenders whose relationships with people, particularly authority figures, have been traumatic and abusive. This skill 'is made easier where legitimacy is conferred or more often earned by demonstrating the sorts of human values so important to probation practice' (McNeill 2013: 84; see also Irwin-Rogers 2016). Thus, if people and a humanist approach (Gosling 2016) are in short supply, then this negatively impacts upon opportunities for building relationships and reducing re-offending. These problems also inadvertently impact upon protecting the public as the above quote illustrates, too, because offender risk cannot be monitored properly. Risk is a fluid and dynamic concept requiring ongoing assessment and management (McNeill 2013).

Reducing Re-offending to Protect the Public: Rehabilitation by Proxy

Rehabilitation, explicitly, was not assessed as an outcome measure of the inspectorate's inspections, despite many of the organisations inspected in the reports being Community *Rehabilitation* Companies, and despite the government's 'Transforming *Rehabilitation*' (my emphases) agenda being the driver to the partial privatisation of the probation service (see Clegg 2013; Ministry of Justice 2013). Rehabilitation work, whatever its social utility (see above) is, in current practice predicated on public protection (Raynor and Robinson 2009).

> Ted had been convicted of drink-driving for a second time. He also had convictions for criminal damage, which may have been related to drunkenness. He was given ten RAR [Rehabilitation Activity Requirement] days and unpaid work. Ted met with his responsible officer on two occasions. These meetings focused on completing his unpaid work, which he did successfully. There was no exploration of the potential problem with

> alcohol that had been identified in his pre-sentence report, and no assessment of how the RAR days could be used. He had two further telephone contacts with the responsible officer, then his case was transferred to the Operational Hub. No further action was taken on the RAR days, which were said to be complete. […]. (HM Inspectorate of Probation 2017g: 33)

This is rehabilitation as managerial (Robinson 2008), where interventions are 'increasingly inscribed in a framework of risk rather than a framework of welfare', and as such, 'rehabilitation is viewed as a means of managing risk' (Garland 2001: 176)—in the case example above—by monitoring the offender in face-to-face meetings and by telephone. In the author's previous research, such points of contact provide a space only to assess offender risk, albeit crudely and in a rudimentary way (see also the above case example about Eric), rather than carry out any fundamental work with offenders to challenge and change offending behaviours (Ballantyne 2004). This supports Feeley and Simon's (2003) arguments that interventions do not seek to normalise or transform the offender, but to seek to control, sort and manage them according to risk profiles. The offender's alcohol problem, which likely underpinned his repetitive offending behaviour, was not addressed through RAR, in the above case example, despite being part of his court order. Generally, there seems little work from the CRCs aimed at tackling the causes of offending, despite the coalition government envisioning them to provide mentors and direct offenders to services for accommodation, addiction, employment and training (Ministry of Justice 2013). The next section explores in more detail the crux of this problem.

The Expensive Business of Offender Supervision

One of the reasons why the CRCs are under-resourced is as noted in the Inspectorate's report:

> In common with other CRCs nationally, the CRC's caseload is lower than anticipated […], which has an impact on weighted annual volume and therefore payments. […]. (HM Inspectorate of Probation 2017g: 12)

Nellis (2016) argues offender numbers were purposefully overestimated in order to attract the business of the CRCs, initially and that they have been 'short-changed' by the government. He argues as the CRCs continue to develop and adjust, priority is given to work that is rewarded immediately. The financial rewards from re-offending rates, for example, are far away and they are not necessarily easily influenced—for the better—by the CRCs, as the arguments of this chapter illustrate. As a result, CRCs 'cannot afford to keep their third-sector partners on board' and some CRCs may even break their contracts (Nellis 2016: unpaginated). Gosling (2016: 519) argues that PbR adds to existing 'pressures and strains at the coal face of service delivery' because it 'punish[es] already stretched services' (2016: 528). As was noted in one HM Inspectorate of Probation (2017d: 12) report, 'payments may be reduced if the CRC fails to meet certain service levels'. Furthermore, the complex infrastructure, which the partial privatisation of the probation service has engendered, may make it difficult to assign responsibility for good results. For PbR to work, Fox and Albertson (2012) argue, the commissioner (i.e., the government) must be confident that the desired outcome was achieved by the actions of the commissioned service provider (i.e., the CRC). One of the problems with PbR is if 'service provision is complex', then rewards are shared across a number of providers (Fox and Albertson 2012: 367), e.g., CRCs and third-sector agencies, who are part of the ensuing 'supply chain' (National Audit Office 2014: 28). Fox and Albertson (2012) also state that another problem, for PbR, is measuring and evidencing 'what works'. Re-offending data was not available at the time of writing. Yet as Burke and Collett (2015) argue, such reconviction data is more a measure of individuals' decision-making about whether to report or prosecute crime, rather than a straightforward measure of offender change. For example, commissioned service providers may be rewarded by virtue of working with offenders who are assessed as being at low-risk of re-offending or 'who process as successes those re-offenders who simply keep their heads down for long enough' (ibid., 2015: 117). Moreover, investors in the private sector expect to produce returns in the short-term, yet there are no quick-fixes, if any, in criminal justice, and returns are likely to be garnered over a long-term (Fox and Albertson 2012). McNeill (2013:

85) argues that when private contractors realise there are no quick-fixes to secure PbR outcome measures, service providers will have to generate their own profits 'by recruiting inexperienced and unskilled staff and by overburdening them so as to drive down costs' (see also Dominey 2012). This is evidenced in the Inspectorate's reports, for example:

> Cases were assigned to responsible officers who did not have the necessary skills to manage them effectively. (HM Inspectorate of Probation 2017c: 32)

So, CRCs will have to wait for additional income from the re-offending rates. Hedderman (2013) similarly argues that the likelihood of PbR leading to reduced re-offending rates is slim. Yet Raynor and Robinson (2009: 5) point out that justifications for rehabilitation should also be based on 'moral arguments about what society ought to do' rather than solely based on arguments about what society can do. McNeill (2013: 85) supports this arguing that rehabilitation risks becoming a 'market good' rather than a 'moral good': 'it is a duty that citizens owe to one another […] rehabilitation is best thought of as being everyone's concern and no-one's business. Transforming Rehabilitation risks turning it into some people's business and no-one's concern'.

Conclusion

The chapter has analysed the government's inspections carried out so far on the CRCs and the NPS, post the partial privatisation of the probation service, against the three outcome measures of protecting the public, reducing re-offending and ensuring offenders abide by their sentence. Generally, it seems that the NPS is performing to acceptable standards, particularly for ensuring offenders abide by their sentence, whereas the CRCs seem to be performing poorly, generally, across all outcome measures. The crux of the problem is that the CRCs are severely under-resourced particularly in relation to appropriately qualified and managed staff which has negative impacts for offender assessment and management, offender rehabilitation in the community, and, ultimately, public protection.

The funding structure of PbR, provides a partial explanation for the staff shortages because monetary rewards are neither immediately forthcoming, nor sufficient. Nellis (2016) may be right to argue that the CRCs have been 'short-changed' by the privatisation strategy. Fundamentally, though, rehabilitation as a strategy to tackle the causes of crime, such as mental health, substance use, unemployment, homelessness, requires substantial resources and access to good quality interventions from a wide-ranging number of organisations in the community. At the moment, this infrastructure of joined-up working by the NPS, CRCs, and third-sector partners, is not supported financially. These organisations, particularly the CRCs and their third-sector partners need an immediate injection of finances to give practitioners the best chances of caring for and helping offenders to change and desist from criminal behaviours. Yet, despite the continued rhetoric of rehabilitation, Teague (2016: 133) argues 'the privatisation of probation is about the deprioritisation of rehabilitation and penal-welfare intervention'. The arguments of this chapter support this claim. If these organisations are to be financially backed by government/s, such government/s must view rehabilitation in practice as a primary strategy to reduce re-offending. Rehabilitation is morally what these organisations ought to do because 'probation services' are symbolic 'of societies that prioritise human and social inclusion' (Raynor and Robinson 2009: 16). This means that markets must be regulated to promote equality for all so that probation services can thrive (ibid., 2009). There is an important role for the state then in the supervision of *all* offenders in the community, rather than the responsibility of this residing in the private sector and with for-profit organisations (Deering and Fielzer 2015; Hall 2015; my emphasis).

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Poverty, Regulation and New Forms of Educational Exclusion

Kim Gilligan

Introduction

This chapter will argue that over recent years, as a cumulative result of neoliberalism and the impact of austerity, individuals including teachers and families are required to be entrepreneurs of the self (Edwards 2002). This has led not only to explicit aspects of poverty and inequality emerging, but hidden forms of lack of fairness within, for example, educational contexts. The chapter will illustrate how neoliberalism and austerity measures are impacting on schools and teachers, learners and their families directly and indirectly, causing them to increasingly suffer economically and personally including preventing some groups of school learners from accessing the cultural and educational experiences expected of them by society more widely (Bourdieu 2004; Giroux 2008).

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The chapter will firstly outline the nature of neoliberalism more generally and illustrate, by drawing on the work of Giroux, how it is made up of three distinct realms. It will then look at neoliberalism in terms of schools and how the three realms of control identified are played out. The chapter will then go on to explore the impact of austerity measures on schools and teachers and the impact on pupils and their families. Later it will explore how a lack of resources and the destructive effects of other political agendas linked to curriculum reform and teachers' roles are having very specific impacts on subjectivities. The chapter will draw on the work of a number of theorists mainly Giroux (2008) and Foucault (2005) as well as utilising Miranda Fricker's (2009) concept of epistemic injustice to look carefully at the pupils who may be casualties of the current particular form of austerity neoliberalism in the United Kingdom (UK).

Neoliberalism and Its Central Tenets

Neoliberalism has a long history and since the 1970s, Giroux (2008) suggests, we are seeing signs of the 'gilded age' of neoliberalism that existed in America in the late nineteenth century. However, he argues, that the contemporary form is a newer and more ruthless form of what he describes as 'market fundamentalism' (Martin 2007; Giroux 2008). Giroux usefully divides the main purposes of neoliberalism into three distinct regulatory forms which are a political rationale, a regulative force and a mode of governmentality all of which are relevant to this chapter and will be addressed in different ways throughout the discussion.

As a political ideology neoliberalism has its roots firmly in ideas about the centrality of the market to societal and individual success and the necessity to free the economy from any kind of centralised control (Clarke 2004). This political, economic and social theory then promotes forms of social organisation where allegedly freedom and choices abound (Friedman 1962) yet the rights of individuals based on freedom and choices are considered on the whole in terms of market participation rather than as forms of civil rights per se. Giroux (2008)

suggests that in its regulatory form neoliberalism organises a range of flows. The flows include those involving people and knowledge, which then transform the relationships between the state and the economy including reiterating a very clear message about the previous failure of 'big government'. The notion of big government represents the allegedly overly involved role of the state before Neoliberalism. Previous ideological positions that placed the state's role as central are seen as a result as needing to be addressed in different and apparently very common sense ways. Neoliberalism acts as a legitimising framework for specific kinds of practices all of which relate in some way to the primacy of market values. Giroux describes neoliberalism as an encompassing form of public pedagogy (Giroux 2008). The state and the public sector, once mainstays of earlier political ideological positions become ghost or zombie like concepts, out of place in the new seemingly progressive doctrines of neoliberalism (Brown 2005).

Part of the function of neoliberalism as a form of governmentality is the ordering and navigating of populations. Michael Foucault's (2008) concept of governmentality and technologies of governance are particularly useful to consider here because it is based on the idea that the market is seen as something that should be at the centre of institutional, legal and social conditions. Edwards (2002) argues that neoliberalist ideology becomes a form of governance, enmeshed in the process of fashioning conduct, conduct based on certain cultural norms and values where individuals are expected to be active subjects in their own self formation. In essence this requires citizens to take responsibility for all aspects of their lives including their education and ongoing development. This frees the state from the responsibility for this and places all of the risks with the individual.

Neoliberal agendas around an individual's freedom to self-govern and self-build neglects to illuminate the inequalities inherent within these expectations. Many individuals lack the economic and cultural resources to be self-entrepreneurs and this instead results in them being constructed in very specific kinds of ways. In the case of children as learner subjects this often includes being demonised as a result of what Thorne (1987) described as the increasing privatisation of childhood. The emergence of issues related to biopower (Foucault 1991) mean that

some individuals cannot conform to the expectations of them in the contemporary world in areas related to self-management (Rasmussen 2011). An important modern social construction of childhood brings with it inherent tensions with the links made between children being 'at risk' but then, at the same time, being expected to behave in very individualised ways including the avoidance of risks to their education to ensure their place as future citizens.

Neoliberalism and Education

According to Levin (1998) neoliberal educational reform is spreading across the globe in what he describes as a policy epidemic. He suggests that the changes brought about by neoliberal reforms have resulted in a total reorientation of education systems albeit it in geographically specific ways. Three decades of educational reforms have been underpinned by neoliberal ideologies pointing to a crisis in education: that standards are falling with cumulative, negative impacts for the UK economy and our ability to compete internationally (Slater 2015). This crisis discourse is 'evidenced' (fuelled) by organisations like the Organisation for Economic Cooperative Development (OECD) and Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) who publish what are effectively international league tables. The constant reference to falling standards by political parties within education and comparisons being made to other countries by organisations like the OECD and PISA reinforce the idea of deficit present in both UK and American (see De Lissovoy 2010) education systems particularly in core curriculum areas like maths, English and science. The constant negative framing of previous approaches to educational provision facilitates a powerful rationale for the complete dismantling of current educational systems and their replacement with a very specific type of approach influenced by the workings of the market and competition. Klein (2007) is emphatic in suggesting that the key advocates of neoliberal approaches merely construct crises from issues that can be manipulated to seem catastrophic. The initial sources of the crises discourses, according to Berliner and Biddle (1995), was the Nation at Risk Report published in 1983

which suggested that in America the mediocrity produced by the then prevailing education system was in danger of dismantling society altogether. This discourse was replicated by Thatcher in England with similar concerns over standards and the inadequacy of education voiced in parliament. From the mid-1980s education was depicted as, at best, ailing and, at worst, near bankrupt and the solutions of introducing performance management and ideas of customer satisfaction were the beginnings of the present day system.

A powerful element of the crisis agenda related to education was presented through the media (Goldstein 2010) and justified austerity fuelled cost-cutting measures. It pointed to education's apparent ineffectiveness despite the considerable financial investment into it (Saltman 2007). The global financial crisis of 2008 brought with it very particular impacts on the funding available to education, and how this was to be distributed. Schools from the mid-2000s, according to Clarke and Newman (2007), suffered from both political and financial restrictions which together had a major impact on them and how they could operate in the future. The neoliberal agenda that emerged from 2008 included a direct focus on austerity measures and the saving of money through restricted funding and this also had a devastating impact on how things were thought of in education including the curriculum and the knowledge required. The neoliberal backdrop to everything within education became all consuming, bringing with it particular kinds of discourses involving cost appraisal and measurement which went on to influence practices and identities. The high cost of the education system as it was and its apparent ineffectiveness became pivotal parts of the rationale for risk management and reformation agendas being introduced and facilitated by austerity measures. In 2010, the main schools grant was effectively frozen (Sibieta 2017). The DFE also had its capital funding budget cut by a third in real terms between 2010 and 2015. From 2015 and as a result of the spending review schools entered a period of funding cuts in terms of cost per pupil. In 2016, the National Audit Office (NAO) required schools to make £3billion savings by 2019.

There are three key elements impacting on schools as a result of the reforms to schools funding noted above, which constitute what Ball (2003) describes as policy technologies. These technologies are

differently emphasised depending on the educational context they are being applied to. They are though: an emphasis on the market, greater levels of managerialism and a focus on performativity. These three areas fit with the framing elements mentioned above by Giroux (2008) and can be illustrated across education systems internationally. Ball (2003) emphasises that the way in which these market led ideological approaches are 'sold' means they appear as a viable and desirable alternative to state control. They are presented positively as part of a closely interrelated and almost seamless system that functions through networks or architectures of power which are supported by carefully monitored procedures including testing in schools and league tables that supposedly measure success. Other aspects of these regulatory functions (Giroux 2008) involve hierarchical systems that instigate forms of reformation and, where necessary, therapy (Ball 2010). Schools are measured against each other in terms of their performance which is subsequently monitored by overarching organisations like Ofsted. When schools are found to have issues as defined by the regulatory bodies, rehabilitation can include the imposition of policies or the redevelopment of staff to ensure conformity to a perceived standard (Hall and McGinity 2015). Interventions might include staff developments involving intensely personal improvements to essentially eradicate former beliefs and values relating to educational approaches (Rizvi and Lingard 2010). The performativity element in particular has a major impact on, not only educational institutions, but the subjectivities working within them namely teachers (Hall and McGinity 2015). Educational professionals are subjected to ongoing judgements involving both rewards and sanctions which serve to reduce everything to notions of measurement leaving teachers reduced to technicians (Hall and McGinity 2015).

Whilst the new system provides for some individual teachers being labelled and rewarded as 'outstanding' all are subjected to constant surveillance and judgements of their performance (Ball 2010). Within schools and colleges management has become technicians of other peoples' behaviour and have the role of enabling passivity within capable subjectivities: they do not challenge the overarching ideology, yet are required to achieve well against set criteria and performance related targets. People's own values and ideas about what constitutes effective

learning are curbed and they become passive recipients of target driven and pedagogical approaches that involve learning that is measurable in very specific ways. One of the features of the current system is that apparent success, for example, a teacher being described in Ofsted terms as 'outstanding' comes at the cost of what is described by Ball (2010) as high levels of existential dread and ontological insecurity. This means that the constant pressure to maintain this kind of standard of practice constantly undermines any feeling of personal or professional stability. Teachers become constantly aware that at any point based on the schools' inspection process they can quickly move from being labelled as outstanding to needing improvement. As a result of these issues, many teachers feel their commitment and professional judgements have been replaced by lack of authenticity and the sacrificing of personal values. Teachers end up in a position according to Ball (2003) and Cooper and Clyde (2014) where their performances are just that, performances that bear little relation to reality in a way described by Butler (1990). Butler (1990) although not specifically referring to teachers describes subjectivities that are a result of surveillance processes like those described by Foucault (2008) as enacted fantasies in which in the case of teachers the frequently applied metrics within the current education systems replace and distort formerly effective and genuine thought out practices.

Another aspect of educational risk management is the reform of the curriculum and what is to be taught that impacts on teachers' choices of content and pedagogies. Changes to the National Curriculum by subsequent governments including New Labour, Coalition and subsequent Conservative Governments have been profound and wide ranging. Teachers are obliged now to follow what amounts to a heavily prescribed guidance document dictating the specific areas to teach, with a strong emphasis on the core subjects of English, Maths and Science. Teachers cease to have genuine agency over what they do and can no longer have, what Alexander (2010) once described as, benign professional freedom. The impact of curriculum reform coupled with sophisticated data tracking systems mean that teachers today are making fewer and fewer agentic decisions over their curriculum coverage leading to their lack of power over the types of knowledge that they can then go

on to engage pupils with. Stevenson (2008) suggests that these measures have led to de-professionalisation of teachers and a lack of autonomy or judgement over any decisions in the teaching and learning process.

Alongside the neoliberal agenda that reshapes education as a business and promotes ideas such as deregulation, competition, choice and privatisation (Basu 2004) there are inherent contradictions. Neoliberal agendas are largely constructed positively with a vehement support for a decentralised school system that will allegedly free up schools and what were traditionally Local Education Authorities to be more responsive to the variety of needs that different groups of pupils and their families present locally (Chubb and Moe 1988). The main tenets of the neoliberal ideology presume that the more competitive the market, the more pressure there will be on schools to raise their academic standards in line with the demands of 'consumers'. In contrast with the past where the education system had gone some way to having a developmental agenda, in recent years new and invasive approaches have emerged which constitute a new form of learner subjectivity. Homo Economicus (Foucault 2008) is the desired aim for education to produce for the contemporary world. This individual is constructed as having agency over their own life chances and development. Any sense of a socially supported development process within schools is diminishing in favour of an emphasis on internalised motivational factors that facilitate the development of human capital. Concepts like resilience are reinforced and become thought of as individualised dispositions. The fields of school and home (Bourdieu 2004) are expected to be mutually supportive enabling high levels of attainment and progress in school. The levels of success expected are particularly important in, but not exclusive to, core curriculum areas where pupils are offered opportunities to accrue educational and cultural capitals (Bourdieu 2004).

Austerity, Learners and Families

The neoliberal vision for families in education, particularly when children are quite small, is to facilitate the experiences that will help build human capital through economic and psychosocial support. The first

five years of a child's life have been fetishized by policymakers as the make or break period for later successes and failure (Jenson 2012) with psychosocial elements being emphasised as particularly important to support the development of self-efficacy and resilience in the effective, economically active, citizen. Families, particularly mothers are now constructed as partners of successful schooling in providing both economic and psychological support (Siraj-Blatchford 2010).

An alternative and historically more dominant approach to children's participation in education and related activities focuses on these as rights within a discourse of entitlement or social justice. The previous New Labour Government had a focus on ending child poverty and the inequalities resulting from that and subsequently schools saw increases in funding enabling them to provide enhanced experiences like trips to art galleries or outdoor settings where children can enjoy a more holistic educational experience. However, under neoliberalism and as a result of austerity measures, social justice arguments relating to education have been significantly eroded and they have been replaced with the need for self-determination agendas which requires adults to recognise and build up their own capabilities and those of their own children and not rely on the state as previously (Sevasti 2015). Yet, despite their rhetoric, under the New Labour Government particular kinds of narratives began to emerge around 'poor parenting' which required punitive policies. Gillies (2005) notes the severe reprisals within the white paper *Respect and Responsibility Taking a Stand against Anti Social Behaviour* (2003) including benefit sanctions for those considered to be errant and not adequately looking for work and being aspirational for their children. Unfortunately, as noted by Macdonald et al. (2010), discourses around 'problem' groups ignore the very real experiences some families have of low pay and/or precarious work (Shildrick and Macdonald 2013).

Jenson (2012; also Tyler 2013) questions the neoliberal construction of parents, particularly mothers, as being too dependent on the state suggesting instead that it is the failings of the state and the impact of globalisation that is responsible for poverty and inequality. This misrecognition of the causes of poverty and inequality is what Fricker (2009) terms hermeneutical injustice: whereby, for example, structural identity prejudice results in working class mothers and their children

in the education system having their experiences and in the case of mothers their contribution to their children's education, poorly understood or ignored. According to Fricker what results from this is a situation where hermeneutical gaps emerge so the proper interpretation of the reasons for injustice do not occur and are allowed to carry on. In this case the mothers become constructed as less and less capable of supporting their children through education.

Martin argues that the combination of austerity neoliberal discourses has resulted in a reshaping of the welfare state tenet that education should be considered an egalitarian right of all children (Martin 2015). In education, a number of key expectations are required of supporting subjects, i.e. families. They need an awareness of the curriculum that their child is studying and the educational and technological capital to support them in those curriculum areas. Families are expected to engage with schools in very direct ways like attending parents evening but also in implicit ways like requiring their children to go to bed at a particular time so they are 'ready' for learning. Ridge (2013) suggests that to disadvantaged children money really matters and with 60% of children living in poverty in the UK in low income working families worry and anxiety about their current and future circumstances might well grow as they get older. Specific welfare changes under austerity, for example the welfare benefit caps and what has become known as 'the bedroom tax' which applies benefit reductions depending on the number of under occupied bedrooms a claimant has, both introduced in 2013 as a result of the Welfare Reform Act (2012), have increased the precariousness of those in most need (Reed 2016).

Maternal input in some areas of a child's life can have significant impact over the long term and is shaped by the mother's education. A mother who supports her children in gaining access to good communication skills for example is ensuring that they will be able to operate later in the wider employment and education spheres. The work of Lareau (2011) highlights the capacity of some, usually white, middle class, parents to indulge in what is described as 'concerted cultivation'. Concerted cultivation is an ongoing focus on children's accumulation of cultural and academic capital as well as specific skills that can be utilised later and exchanged for other privileges or access to high status goods

like a university education. This agentic behaviour contrasts sharply with the role of other parents, like those of the working classes, who see their role as developing their child naturally through a less purposeful set of interventions and focussing on providing for basic areas like food and housing (Jensen and Tyler 2012). Part of concerted cultivation is supplementing one's child's education with outside school activities involving things like music and other arts. The provision of these things requires a level of resources which is out of reach of some families because of the direct and indirect costs of such activities. This again advantages some groups and disadvantages others. In the past it is highly likely that some schools would have ameliorated the differences by in—school provision but austerity measures have had a significant impact on how willing schools are to provide these out of already very tight budgets. Headteachers took to the national press (Adam 2017) to draw attention to the crippling effects of austerity and cuts to school budgets impacting on specific areas of the country. Schools, outside of London and particularly in deprived areas like the North East can no longer afford to provide the equalising effect that they used to in terms of providing wider cultural experiences.

As a result of austerity families may not now have the economic or educational resources to supplement the education offered by schools. In the past the state would have picked up some of the responsibility for supporting children. Unfortunately, this is not now the case as since 2008, and the financial crisis which impacted across the world, many of the funding streams which were supporting learners and schools have been cut or have disappeared altogether (Ridge 2013). Sevasti (2015) notes a general contraction of public services and the pervasiveness of the marketization agenda across many areas including education which have led to significant inequalities emerging. The cuts in services and educational provision have had a very profound and disproportionate impact on some learners in schools and their families with Flynn (2017), for example, noting the issues affecting children with disabilities in particular, suggesting the devastating impact of austerity measures in Ireland and other regions of the world.

Lash and Urry's (1994) analysis of the disparities between the groups that thrive under neoliberalism and the groups that do not, suggest

there are reflexivity winners and losers, with those losing being the subjects who are not able or will not fit the current form of required identity. The Child Poverty Action Group have long protested against inequalities and their impact on children in particular, but since 2008 and austerity measures, they draw attention to the need for increased recognition of the impact of cuts on some parents. A report in 2014 noted the impact on participation of children in creative subjects, outdoor and design education in particular. In the report commissioned by the Child Poverty Action Group 27% of children on free school meals reported that they felt they had limited access to these activities in school due to their cost; and 57% of children on free school meals cite at least one example of where they have been forced to miss a school trip due to a lack of funds being available. In addition, schools, because of budget cuts, cannot afford the supervision required for pupils on school trips and instead schools are increasingly not offering them or only in a more limited way. Watson and Nolan (2011) suggest wider links between austerity measures, child poverty and forms of social exclusion.

Social exclusion is crucial in understanding how and why some children's lives may never be fulfilled within and through education in the ways of other children. In 1988, following the Education Reform Act (HMSO 1988) children would have been expected to study a wide curriculum and receive a comprehensive understanding of the wider world. On the surface the provision of a national curriculum that is considered by some to be wide and balanced, will in theory, provide all children with the opportunities to gain an extensive view of the world. Within this experience of a broad and balanced curriculum they would have had a significant chance of achieving. Unfortunately, the real picture within schools now as a result of cuts is far from this ideal. Apple (2006) has suggested that how different forms of knowledge are constructed in the current system, and ultimately valued in neoliberal education systems across the world is part of a much wider change in structures and technologies of power. These changing and restrictive structures and how these relate to knowledge and the process of knowledge acquisition are important in understanding how austerity impacts on particular groups. Apple (2006) cautions us against any belief that

curriculum knowledge in schools is neutral or balanced and suggests instead that what counts as legitimate knowledge is indeed the result of new complex power relations related to overarching political ideologies.

In contemporary debates about education and spending cuts *The Guardian* in November 2017 (Marsh 2017) published a demand from Headteachers across the country for the Chancellor, Phillip Hammond, to provide more money for schools, claiming that austerity cuts have had unprecedented levels of negative impacts on schools and what they can ultimately offer to pupils. The Headteachers level the deepest criticisms at the National Funding Formulas imposed on schools. They note that as a result of these schools are being put in a position where they have all but stripped their provision to the bare minimum as a result of which children experience a much narrower curriculum which impacts on not just their intellectual but also cultural development. Many educational researchers question the utility of universal experiences for every child because it is clear under the current regime some children do not fit. Here, Bourdieu's (2004) argument is useful, that the accumulation of capitals can be crucial in having a successful experience of schooling. Bourdieu links social class with educational opportunities and in a world where individuals are required to fashion their identities in very specific ways, some individuals fail to accumulate highly valued forms of capital.

One of the main casualties of neoliberal austerity education policy then is the narrowing range of educational experiences that children may get in a particular school which is a real problem. As early as the 1970s, sociologists, for example Bowles and Gintis (1976), were highlighting the disparities in the educational experiences that some children got as a result of their parents' social positioning. As a result of austerity measures and an increased focus on the core curriculum areas there is now an expectation that the wider range of curriculum activities and experiences like music or cultural visits will be provided by the home. Participation in organised social and cultural activities in the light of austerity then becomes the reserve of only some groups. This is problematic as many authors note the value of such experiences. The skills and knowledge gained yield what some authors refer to as educational and occupational pay offs (Covay and Carbonaro 2010; Lareau 2011).

Although it is important that we consider a curriculum free from austerity based restrictions it is equally important to consider the type of education that might be desirable in order to mitigate against neoliberal ideologies pervading everything including how we think about our place in the world. Of particular concern are the loss of aspects of education like place based learning noted by9Popkewitz (1991) who reveals a need for a place based curriculum.

Austerity, Schools and the Value of Wider Educational Provision

One of the wider issues emerging due to curriculum reform and the management of risks particularly financial ones is the increasing and continual loss of access to different forms of learning. These include, for example, experiences taking place outside of classrooms as well as within them. Recent interest in specific educational approaches like those offered by forest schools indicates the importance of different kinds of educational experiences to individuals (Knight 2009). Even the British Government acknowledges the importance of outdoor learning, even if it is largely through the high status subject of science (Stewart and Costley 2013). Waite (2013) perhaps more importantly in terms of this chapter, suggests that it is the wider benefits of such educational and curriculum approaches that we should be concerned with and outlines the important contribution that is made to what she refers to as children's 'cultural density'. Bonnett (2007) suggests that we look to the contribution that outdoor education for example and cultural visits provide in terms of a child's ability to deal with an uncertain future. This is particularly important as the world is in a state of flux (Giddens 1991) both locally and globally. Stevenson (2008) notes the paradox in the call by some authors for a focus on place based learning and an acknowledgement of its benefits, when global processes would suggest that places are increasingly culturally and economically convergent. It is, however, crucially important to the argument presented later that we understand the benefits of place based learning coupled with wider

curriculum experiences to a profound understanding of a balanced subjectivity rather than the one required by neoliberalism. Hargreaves (1994) suggests an ever greater need for learning experiences that cement meanings and affiliations to local identities, ones that facilitate the construction of healthy identities in relation to self and community and not always globalised issues related to the market (Stevenson 2008). Gruenewald (2003) a critical pedagogue extols the virtues of the study of places that help students engage educationally but in addition also may lead to a critical and in depth understanding of the generation that has come before them and their experiences of the world. This approach however would fly in the face of a neoliberal tendency to look forward rather than back. Looking back is considered to get in the way of progress and inhibits the ability to change in the ways needed to be a twenty-first century citizen.

The experiences offered outside of classrooms may be important for other reasons outside of a strictly educational realm. They offer different kinds of experiences than those contained within the sometimes constraining walls of schools and the curriculum constraints currently in place. Lousley (1999) provided a critique of school based learning, questioning its capacity to politicise or to fully inform young people about the world in which they live. He hints at the conservative nature of the teaching that goes on in schools and the close links to performativity agendas. The restricted nature of the approaches in schools and the pervasiveness of the market and standards/performance based agendas (Ball 2013; Reay 2000) discussed earlier in the chapter mean that what little time is left to do other subjects must then be protected. This is another reason why the results of austerity measures that indirectly impact on schools and families by reducing the learning experiences that are possible, need to be mitigated against. The skills and knowledge fostered in out of school learning play an important role in the education of young people and therefore should be available to all not dependent on the individual's capacity to pay for them or their cultural capital to access them. Thomson (2006) argued for the need for teachers to protect opportunities for local place based funds of knowledge because of the contribution they play in not only the current curriculum but the capacity to introduce learners to alternative ideas.

Alternative ideas that serve to challenge apparently common sense neoliberal discourses are crucial and could be embedded in political and ecological literacies that could be taught in schools and would allow questioning of the social world as it is depicted (Stevenson 2008).

Austerity Unchecked: The Consequences for Learners and Their Families

Thus far the chapter has argued that austerity measures and a particular emphasis on certain curriculum areas means that some young learners are being denied valuable learning experiences, those offered by out of school based learning. The rest of the chapter will argue the serious consequences of this in respect of the identities being formed both at the present time and in the future. One area of concern is the lack of opportunity for children to become active citizens and, more controversially perhaps, politicised. Much research has been carried out into young people and the benefits of citizenship based education but this is not really explored when we talk about younger children and their capacity for thinking. Hoskins (2012) and Campbell (2008) are concerned at the lack of opportunity for children in schools to be made aware of their place in society or the agency they could access through knowledge of the political system. They suggest a need to tackle inequalities in political socialisation that occur when pupils are denied access to certain kinds of knowledge. The non-compulsory nature of a lot of areas of learning that involve civic engagement, and knowledge of society is problematic in a number of ways. There are considerable claims made about the flexibility of the National Curriculum but this flexibility and freedom is often dependent on many factors like the ethos of the school, the availability of resources or the views of the Headteacher. Due to pressure placed on schools to gain attainment in high status subjects, like maths and English (Burton and May 2015), a broad and balanced, flexible curriculum may only be offered to the more privileged groups who access broader learning opportunities outside of school.

Who gets access to certain resources is often wrapped up with issues of worth and morality which is a very worrying trend within

neoliberal discourses. The government's agenda linked to ending the welfare culture, as mentioned earlier, may cause the demonising of some groups and individuals based on their alleged inability to be active within society. This demonisation (Tyler 2013) extends to children even at a very young age. The tighter conditionality on the allocation of any resources as a result of the Coalition Government's mission to end dependency on the state (Smith 2010) through austerity measures, has resulted in whole groups being constructed in ways that present them as passive and problematic (Tyler 2013). Laclau (2007) suggests that ideological agendas are shaping how we are led to see situations and people.

Conclusions

A number of researchers suggest that neoliberalism and the effects of austerity are causing what is described as the 'biopolitics' of disposability. Bauman (2007) urges attention towards this acute crisis of what is termed human waste. He alleges that current economic systems are causing the complete eradication of any form of nurturing of citizens and care is being replaced by punishment and ever more strict boundaries. These strict boundaries require considerable economic and personal self-management in order to fit in with the requirements. Bauman (2007) suggests that regardless of their circumstances individuals are seen to be responsible for their own fate and are ultimately stripped of what is described as political significance (Ziarek 2008). With austerity these trends are concentrated as they both reflect and construct rationales for funding cuts. Individuals end up suffering from both symbolic and corporeal violence, (see also the chapter by Dalton) and their very presence is seen as undermining society more generally. Foucault (1991) suggests that the processes that ensue from the recognition of these groups involves political technologies being brought to bear which enact the processes involved in the requirement for specific subjectivities: ones who conform. This, according to Lemke (2005) and Butler (2004), results in people being governed in very specific ways which produces and reproduces their subjectivities and practices in terms of

being managed by very specific regimes. Bauman (2004) alerts us to the very real possibility that the groups identified as not fitting with the requirements of society at this time are refused the right to even be imagined and are therefore denied the right to at some points even imagine themselves. This state of not being recognised is similar to the state referred to earlier by Fricker (2009) as hermeneutical injustice. She talks of a situation of 'unknowing' resulting from social conditions that effectively hide the experiences of some individuals from others and sometimes themselves. Fricker states that serious issues ensue when the interests of others particularly hegemonic groups occlude or at least prevent a full understanding of a situation to occur. The relevance of her work to this chapter is how it may be applied to mothers and their children in schools but also to the wider classed group. The presence of hermeneutic injustice, one element of epistemic justice, is obvious in the ways in which some collective or individual experiences are negated or not recognised by schools and wider society. As a result a situation occurs where there emerges social powerlessness and the further marginalisation of the group. In the case of children who cannot participate in activities in schools because of a lack of resources what results is the plight of children and their parents becomes unseen or if seen, is constructed negatively and as being a result of their inability to self-manage. These groups are then seen as individually failing to accumulate the knowledge and skills necessary for self-development.

Failing parents and children are subsequently reframed as morally lacking and having little worth which, in turn, reinforces and, over time, entrenches their disadvantages and their suffering educational injustice or what Pool and Geissler (2005) describe as structural violence. In line with assertions by Martin (2015) it is clear that the differences in access to educational provision will, worryingly, lead to more generalised injustices later around occupation and worth generally. Boff (1989) describes this state as constituting poverty not in monetary terms alone, but by wider mechanisms of impoverishment. The structural violence experienced within the education system by the children and families referred to above is one that eludes full recognition. It is constructed as a result of the complex interconnections of personal biographies and how these are played out in terms of larger matrixes like

culture and the political economy surrounding them. The bodies of the individuals are understood entirely in terms of their lack and failure to acquire and what continues to go unnoticed is the structural inequalities that are really at fault. Austerity neoliberalism then, is a self-fulfilling prophecy: having designated certain groups of parents, families, children as 'undeserving' and in various ways problematic, funding cuts and resulting educational policies reproduce and reinforce the circumstances within which these groups will fulfil their diminished fates with untold consequences for those children as they reach adulthood and society more generally.

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Part III

Some Consequences of Twenty-First Century Austerity

Cutting the Ribbon? Austerity Measures and the Problems Faced by the HIV Third Sector

Drew Dalton

Introduction

Recent figures show that there are over 101,200 people living with HIV in the United Kingdom (UK) and that HIV incidence (the number of new infections) remains high with an average of 6000 people being diagnosed annually (Kirwan et al. 2016; Brown et al. 2017). It has been estimated that UK incidence figures are higher than most countries in Western Europe (Brown et al. 2017). HIV transmission, though declining in some groups, such as MSM (men who have sex with men), is still an issue amongst those presenting with HIV as a late diagnosis and amongst older people aged 50 plus (Brown et al. 2017). Though testing and treatment for HIV is free in the UK, there are still an estimated 13,000 people living with the virus who remain undiagnosed and who are at a higher risk of poorer health outcomes and premature death (Kirwan et al. 2016; Brown et al. 2017). Alongside these high levels of

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HIV incidence, the economic recession of 2008 has led to a series of governmental policy and ideological changes aimed at introducing fiscal austerity. Because of this, the nature of HIV funding has altered significantly over the last decade as the Health and Social Care Act (2012) shifted the responsibility for providing HIV prevention services from NHS Primary Care Services to local authorities. In this chapter there is an exploration of the implications of austerity for the HIV sector, drawing on symbolic violence to explore the impacts for, especially the HIV Third Sector, for both services and prevention.

The research which informs this chapter involved a quantitative survey and qualitative case studies of third sector HIV organisations (Dalton 2016). The results revealed a struggling sector operating a 'survival agenda' (Crowley 2012) wherein support services are being withdrawn, organisations are using their reserves and redundancies are being made, notwithstanding evidence of an increased demand by both new and existing service users. Ironically, given one of the architects of austerity, ex-Prime Minister David Cameron's promotion of decentralisation and the importance of localism, local and often geographically knowledgeable services are closing and under threat of merger with or takeover by 'the big few' nationwide HIV organisations (Dalton 2016). The fragmented nature of HIV funding is visible at local level where local authorities are withdrawing funding or putting services up to tender, which excludes many smaller organisations from applying (Clayton et al. 2015).

What Is Symbolic Violence?

This chapter will offer Bourdieu and Wacquant's (1992) notion of 'symbolic violence' to explore the effects austerity is having on HIV organisations across the UK and how this has become accepted even by those who have become most negatively affected by it: members of the public who may be at risk of HIV transmission. This acceptance has been strengthened further by the dominance of biomedicine convincing the public that HIV and AIDS are no longer 'killer' viruses. Consequently, HIV has 'slipped off the radar' in terms of wider educational efforts and

governmental funding. This chapter makes the case that austerity has led to this symbolic violence because of the denial of adequate funding and resources and the biomedical reconfiguring of HIV as a curable disease (Dalton 2017).

Symbolic violence is not a physical act of violence, but invisible and pervasive forms of violence of the powerful exercised through cognition and misrecognition, often with the unwitting consent or complicity of the dominated. It is embedded within the very structures of power in society and exercised by legitimate organisations, such as government agencies and powerful social actors imposing their own "vision of the social world" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 239). Manifestations of symbolic violence often appear via official offices such as government departments that create a veneer of legitimacy thereby obscuring power relations. In parallel to this, the dominated tend to accept the legitimacy of the office and facilitate the process so symbolic violence, "is exercised upon a social agent with his or her complicity" (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 167) using "taken-for-granted ways of thinking and behaving" (Scott 2012: 16). This becomes as Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) argues:

> …a symbolic act of imposition which has on its side all the strength of the collective, of the consensus, of common sense, because it is performed by a delegated agent of the state, that is, the holder of the monopoly of legitimate symbolic violence. (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992: 239)

These authors work recognises organisations as important sites for the hidden production and reproduction of social inequalities, and so symbolic violence becomes a way through which to understand legitimate domination (Corsun and Costen 2001).

Bourdieu (2001) argued that the most effective domination of people takes place when culture is appropriated and exploited as a strategy by the powerful. Bourdieu (2001) defines this as an act of symbolic violence whereby one's symbolic value, worth, resources and skills are downgraded. The concept of symbolic violence enables us to explain how even the dominated may maintain and reproduce such structures by their actions in the field. It also demonstrates how the dominated act, the way domination affects them and how they comply, continue

or maintain these values intentionally or unintentionally (Yamak et al. 2015). This has been part of the central message of austerity cuts; which places value and importance on volunteering, self-help, less financial state reliance and the scaling back of the state in favour of a third sector with fewer opportunities for central state funding (Clayton et al. 2015).

Bourdieu (1977), with Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) contended that symbolic violence plays an equally important role as physical and material oppression in the formation and reproduction of social hierarchies in contemporary human society. People are subjected to forms of violence through the denial of resources or being treated as inferior which, in turn, limits aspirations and opportunities for social mobility. However, such is the delivery of the policy and rhetoric, people do not view it as violence and instead see it as the 'natural order' of things and become accustomed to it (McKenzie 2015). In the current dominant framework of neo-liberalism, individualism, and self-responsibility, symbolic violence enacts itself within discourses that construct austere fiscal management as inevitable, needed and indeed a 'natural' response to the financial crisis the Coalition government inherited because of the perceived financial mismanagement of the previous New Labour Government. Through political rhetoric, used by the Coalition and subsequent Conservative governments the message of the naturalness of austerity has been reinforced further in the public consciousness. However, for Bourdieu, neo-liberalism is deeply complicit in numerous types of symbolic violence. The ideals of individualisation and self-help serve to hide the role of neo-liberalism in the creation of suffering and as such make "it possible to 'blame the victim' who is entirely responsible for his or her own misfortune" (Bourdieu et al. 2000: 7).

However, symbolic violence as a concept cannot be discussed in a silo and it is important to place it in the context of the other theoretical literature of Bourdieu. Bourdieu and Wacquant (1992) also uses the related notion of the 'habitus' to illustrate how individuals come to internalise these particular ways of seeing the world. The habitus is the set of predispositions that individuals begin to develop in their own ways of thinking about and acting in their own social worlds and which they learn via experiences and because of their socialisation. The more they employ and use these thoughts and actions and find them to 'fit' within their own

social environments, the more they become engrained and become part of habitualised and normalised daily life practices (Connolly and Healy 2004; Scott 2012). However, this habitus is located within a much larger social setting of the 'field' whereby in terms of symbolic violence, individuals are predisposed to misrecognising the structures that manipulate them (Bourdieu and Wacquant 1992). Through internalisation and acceptance of these ideas and structures into their 'mental structures' (habitus), individuals accept them as they unconsciously learn limitations of choice, reproduce subordination and perpetuate inequality, without the need of actual physical force. Therefore, Bourdieu and Wacquant's (1992) theory of symbolic violence becomes a useful tool with which to explore austerity and how it operates as a tool of the dominant over the dominated.

What Is Meant by Austerity and What Has Been Its Impact?

The UK Coalition Government's response to the global financial crisis of 2008 and recession has been fiscal *self-discipline* or 'austerity' after their election in 2010. This austerity was then developed further as a key part of party manifesto by the Conservative Party after the General Election in 2015. Underpinning austerity are four key ideological and policy commitments: firstly, cutting back the role of the state, secondly, promoting local control through localism and thirdly reducing funding to both central and local governments. Reducing the role of the state is a longstanding neoliberal aim in order to promote deregulated market capitalism (Atkinson et al. 2012; Schrecker and Bambra 2015). The final political rhetoric facilitating shrinking the state is the 'Big Society' promoting what some have claimed are simply traditional conservative values of self-help and voluntarism (Donovan et al. 2012; Mendoza 2015).

More recently there have been some measures enacted to protect the most vulnerable to austerity including raising the threshold for income tax (which started in April 2017) and some investment in the building of affordable homes (Mitchell et al. 2013). Nevertheless,

according to the International Monetary Fund, austerity has led to the UK spending the least on public health of the world's major economies, being on par with the USA, a country which has traditionally had a small government (www.poverty.ac.uk, accessed 20/01/18). In addition, the Institute of Fiscal Studies, forecasts that around one million public sector jobs will be lost by 2018 (Crawford et al. 2013) and in terms of public health resources and staffing, planned public health spending is more than 5% less in 2017/2018 than it was in 2013/2014, with forecast cuts in public health funding of at least £600 million by 2020/2021 (Evans 2017). Overall spending on sexual health services has fallen by £64 million (10%), over the past four years from 2013/2014 with a further 5% reduction in sexual health services pending (Evans 2017). Thus, austerity has involved substantial cuts in social protection as a result of welfare reform and reduced local authority budgets (Schrecker and Bambra 2015).

According to the largest ever study of poverty and deprivation in the UK, poverty rates have risen substantially during austerity, with rates at the highest level in 30 years (PSE 2014). Changes planned and enacted from 2015 continue to intensify the losses and following the historical trend austerity will exacerbate health inequalities further, with implications for HIV and AIDS organisations and their service users (Schrecker and Bambra 2015). There has been a widening gulf between the rich and poor within the UK as rising inequality has, on a societal level, been linked to people's levels of unhappiness and mental ill-health. It has been suggested that as economic inequality has increased, so too have anxiety disorders and depression (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010; Dorling 2015; Mendoza 2015). There is also growing evidence of social unrest in opinion polls, such as an Ipsos Mori Poll (Mitchell et al. 2013) whereby 48% of the public agreed with the statement that *budget cuts have gone too far and threaten social unrest.*However, tellingly, 52% of this sample believed that the budget cuts were needed, reflecting the process of symbolic violence, whereby the very people impacted by the cuts, actively support them and normalise the process of austerity (Scott 2012).

In relation to the Third Sector, austerity has had deep impacts and changed the social landscape. The 2010 election pledge by David

Cameron was to create a 'big society': "communities taking more control, of more volunteerism, more charitable giving, of social enterprises taking on a bigger role, of people establishing public services themselves" (www.gov.uk, accessed 20/01/18). However, whether the increase in volunteering (Payne 2017) is due to the big society in action has been questioned. As the state has been reduced and the public sector restructured and sold off to private businesses and organisations (Atkinson et al. 2012), it has been left to the third sector to 'fill the gap' left behind. Volunteering has increased partly out of necessity that illustrates symbolic violence: individuals and communities have unwittingly rallied around the call for volunteers in revitalising their communities by running their own services in place of government financial support. Through internalising these discourses of the dominant even the most intolerable conditions of existence are perceived as acceptable and are increasingly viewed as the natural outcome of things (Bourdieu 2001) as staff from once local authority funded and staffed services are made unemployed and are replaced by volunteers.

While Gross Domestic Product (GDP) fell by 6.3% in 2008/2009, the overall voluntary sector's income fell in the same years by 3.6% in real terms (NCVO 2013). The voluntary sector has been hit significantly by the recession and ongoing austerity and whilst there has been some acclimatising to the economic current conditions (NCVO 2013), this has affected the sector to such an extent that what has been called "the survival agenda" (Crowley 2012: 2) has emerged. This means that many community organisations are faced with the task of financially downsizing, letting staff go and increasing their use of volunteers. At the same time, they are facing increasing demands on their services as poverty levels deepen and public services are diminished. This survival agenda ensures that organisations increasingly plug the gap of local authority provision, live 'hand to mouth' financially and have fewer safety nets in terms of financial assistance due to the withdrawal of the state. This is within a climate whereby competition for charitable funding becomes increasingly narrow and charities are encouraged to become more entrepreneurial and 'business like' in their outputs for funders who themselves face increasing pressures to allocate funding only to those who can 'prove' their need via these business style outcomes. Within austerity

and this uncertainty of survival, community organisations are faced with rationing or reducing much needed services to increasing numbers of people in need and redefining criteria that assess need and priorities (see chapter by Donovan and Durey in this collection for further discussion of prioritisation). Therefore, in an act of irony, community organisations and the staff and volunteers within them, become unwitting transmitters of acts of symbolic violence, such as delivering austerity at local and community level. HIV organisations also face these pressures, but they also face a second barrier, which is a unique cultural and social change as the construction of HIV and AIDS has been reframed as a curable biomedical problem (Dalton 2017). This change has facilitated the austerity cuts to HIV services, which will be discussed below.

Is HIV No Longer a Problem in the UK Anyway? Bio-Medical Shifts and Symbolic Violence

Initially, when HIV and AIDS first appeared in public, there were no biomedical responses to the virus and the third sector led the way emphasising a social model approach based on prevention, community engagement and changing people's attitudes and behaviours (Weeks 2016). However, the arrival and mainstreaming of antiretroviral therapy (ART) from 1996 onwards, increasingly offered to those at risk of HIV has meant that:

> the voices powerfully associated with HIV have largely moved away from the campaign and advocacy groups, having switched to, and accruing dominance from, the biomedical establishment through the medicalisation of HIV. (Dalton 2017: 63)

This has led to a parallel system in which, on the one hand, people today are living longer with HIV treatment and their standards of living are getting better yet, on the other hand, funding for prevention and addressing stigma has reduced. This has had an adverse impact on people's perception of the virus as they no longer worry about (or are aware) of HIV because it is assumed that adequate treatments exist to

address it. What is less known and understood is that, living with HIV is still challenging because HIV/AIDS is still deeply stigmatised. The medicalisation of HIV has contributed to a silencing about HIV within public discourse because of the medical dominance of HIV discussion with treatment offered as prevention. This dominant dialogue ignores the stigma accompanying the virus and favours the medical treatment of it, thereby side-lining prevention and the voices of people living with HIV and their allies and campaigners (Dalton 2017).

The impact of silencing HIV discourses outside of the work of HIV organisations and bio-medical institutions means that it has yet to develop into a 'post-HIV' stage of public understanding, acceptance and education (Dalton 2017). In short, HIV treatment and knowledge has become medicalised and dominated by the medical profession under the guise of the 'just take a pill and you will be okay' narrative (Dalton 2017). The advancements in HIV medication have resulted in the lay public having little to no HIV knowledge and the resistance to the impacts of austerity comes from the HIV community and third sector. With HIV 'falling off the radar' coupled with the scaling back of HIV funding under austerity, this has made for a toxic mix of symbolic violence. This 'containment of information' has led many outside of the realm of HIV activism to have little or no education about HIV itself, in terms of prominence, transmission or prevention (Dalton 2017). What is clear from the evidence is that there is still a manifest need for HIV organisations to exist to tackle the lived reality of living with stigma, to educate the wider public to reduce the engrained stigma around HIV (NAT 2015); and to promote prevention of transmission. The success of the biomedical narrative that the harms of HIV are minimal is an example of symbolic violence because austerity cuts to public health and sexual health campaigns, as well as HIV advocacy and education agencies can be rationalised.

The HIV Third Sector and Austerity

Austerity has led to many restructurings within institutions of the welfare state in order to facilitate cutting budgets. Such restructurings can also constitute symbolic violence. For example, the Health and Social

Care Act (2012) removed Public Health England from the governance of the NHS and made them independent executive agencies. It has been argued that this allowed government funding of public health to be reduced whilst not appearing to reduce NHS funding lest the voting public became aware (Dalton 2017). Proposed cuts from 2015/2016 are in the region of £200 million (NAT 2015). Such tactics of hiding cuts to public health illustrate the ways in which symbolic violence can be enacted as cuts to prevention and other HIV services can be refigured as 'natural' because of the misleading idea, propagated by a biomedical narrative that HIV is no longer a problem. There has been some resistance to these Austerity cuts, led by the National AIDS Trust #StopHIVcuts campaign, and some successes such as their recent successful legal challenge to the NHS to provide PrEP, despite the claims by the NHS that it is too 'expensive' (NAT 2015). However, PrEP is another biomedical medication which further medicalises HIV as this provides a preventative drug to be taken before having sex to lower the risk of HIV transmission. Such successes have not effected positive changes within the Third Sector where Austerity continues unabated.

The nature of HIV funding has altered significantly over the last decade. In another sleight of hand restructure, The Health and Social Care Act (2012) shifted the responsibility for providing HIV prevention services from NHS Primary Care Services to local authorities. This has been accompanied by a dramatic shortfall in the amount of funding evidenced by the fact that in 2001/2002 £55 million was allocated to local authorities for HIV prevention services, yet in 2014 it was just over £10 million. This level of funding is available at a time where there are more people living with HIV in the UK than ever before (Godfrey 2015) suggesting that prevention measures are still needed. Ironically, the cuts in funding come at a time when many organisations have professionalised and are reliant on governmental funding streams as HIV support services have altered. Historically, from the 1980s, third sector organisations grew independently because governmental support was lacking. Whilst the rate of new infections is decreasing (Brown et al. 2017), 'at risk' groups of HIV transmission within the UK are MSM along with women, trans people, young people, older people and Black and Minority Ethnic (BAME) groups (NAT 2015). It has been calculated

that each new HIV diagnosis costs the public purse between £280,000 and £360,000 in lifetime treatment costs. This rises significantly with late diagnosis. Therefore, the move toward cutting sexual health and HIV services is worrying, not only in terms of the personal, social and emotional costs of each individual HIV transmission, but for the future fallout and the impact upon NHS services (NAT 2015).

LGBT (Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender) support services, who often have important links to MSM and who offer HIV testing, have voiced concerns that they must now reduce services and in some cases, remove services such as informal 'drop in' sessions, reduce hours of operation and turn away of clients (Mitchell et al. 2013). This impacts upon their clients at the same time as evidence points toward an increased demand for services around HIV services and sexual health (Mitchell et al. 2013). Further concerns raised are around fewer testing opportunities for HIV and so the longer-term implications are thought by Public Health England (Kirwan et al. 2016) to be an increase in people going undiagnosed and the transmission of HIV to others. Whilst currently standing at one in ten people, the number of people unaware of their own HIV condition could increase further with fewer specialist services, as seen in Greece, where HIV infection has risen by 200% since 2011 as prevention budgets have been cut and intravenous drug use has increased amid a 50% youth unemployment rate (Stuckler and Basu 2013).

The National AIDS Trust (2016) in their research into the importance of HIV support services found that for all service categories, nearly all their service respondents believe that HIV specialist provision is vital due to the nature of specialist knowledge, trust and being part of the 'community.' This is compounded with a general wariness of generic providers of services (see Donovan and Durey's chapter for more discussion of this), whereby perceived HIV-related stigma can be an issue which stops people living with HIV from using these generic services. Furthermore, the report found inconsistencies within funding arrangements, with localised decisions over whether services are funded or not, "which provides the worrying impression of a 'postcode lottery' developing in HIV support services" (NAT 2016: 5). Because of austerity funding cuts many local authorities have removed their HIV provision

completely and specific HIV charities have been forced to close as a result of this (Dalton 2016). As evidence of symbolic violence, very little media outrage presented itself after this. In fact, the councils in these areas often defended their decision to close their HIV provision due to having 'small numbers' of people living with HIV in their constituencies, which works to enforce the naturalness and inevitability of austerity cuts as well as the public perception that HIV is no longer a concern.

The Research Methodology

The aim of the study was to provide a 'snapshot' of the current financial health of HIV/AIDS organisations across the UK. Data was collected via an online survey using 'Survey Monkey' and specific respondents were followed up with further questions via email. Data was collected throughout the time period November to December 2015 for survey responses and third sector case studies were collected in February 2016. Within the survey, respondents were invited to answer a range of questions on their financial and funding position, staffing and volunteers as well as any organisational and sector concerns which they had. There was room to leave comments on the future of their organisation and the HIV Third Sector.

Access to organisations was via email or social media (Twitter and Facebook) as some organisations had a social media presence but not a website or physical address. The sample of different types of organisations, from larger charities to smaller community groups, was intentional through purposeful sampling (Bryman 2012) so that final results would show an overall perspective of the health of HIV Third Sector organisations who work solely, or pre-dominantly, with people living with HIV. In total, twenty-four organisations answered the survey (six did not respond) from those found online and as there is no definitive 'list' of HIV organisations in the UK, it was difficult to find them all. Organisations were approached across the UK and common emerging themes were identified across the sector, despite being in differing locations. Whilst this survey did not claim to be representative of all HIV organisations in the UK, it did attempt to cover different types of

organisations in order to obtain a 'snapshot' of the current financial and physical health of organisations under a changing financial landscape of austerity. For the purposes of this chapter, the 'HIVHIV Third Sector' includes voluntary and community organisations, groups, charities, social enterprises, mutuals and co-operatives.

What Did the Research Reveal?

From the results of the research it is clear that the HIV Third Sector is largely running on a survival agenda (Crowley 2012) which can be evidenced through the following themes: (1) Funding and government-led complacency and (2) Staffing, volunteers and demand. Threaded throughout these seemingly obvious findings under conditions of austerity, lies the power of symbolic violence and the added structural barrier of the medicalisation of HIV.

Funding and Government-Led Complacency

Most organisations surveyed evidenced a survival agenda with 50% of HIV organisations indicating they had to rely on and use their reserves to survive in their previous financial year. When asked how long an organisation could survive on their reserves, if no income or funding materialised, the outlook was bleak, with a total of 31% of the organisations having no reserves at all. Many of these were smaller community groups who might be expected not to have reserves and suggests the 'hand to mouth' nature of their existence. A total of 62.5% organisations either had no reserves or only enough to last between one and three months (of which many of these were the larger organisations). Only 37.5% of organisations had the capacity to survive on their reserves for up to six months and only one organisation answered that they could last 'over a year.' When asked about whether organisations are preparing to use their reserves in the upcoming financial year (2016–2017) the figures were alarming in that a total of 69% organisations answered either 'likely' (19%) or 'yes' (50%) to this question. In terms

of sources of income, HIV organisations rely heavily on public sector and local authority funding, which under current changes to funding, will decrease substantially. Future funding therefore was a key concern amongst respondents, who identified their concerns about austerity reductions on their own organisations, a wider governmental complacency about HIV and the impact that this will have on people living with the virus:

> As local authorities continue to cut back on HIV funding now that it is no longer ring fenced more agencies will close. This will result in an increase in transmissions, a growth in stigma and increased levels of mental health and other issues for those already living with HIV. In essence we are heading in reverse and there seems little anyone is prepared to do about it. (Manager, HIV Organisation 1)

On-going austerity funding cuts will exacerbate future financial difficulties for organisations which are currently struggling in the challenging financial climate and who may currently be using their reserves. This is exacerbated by the finding that almost two fifths (37%) of organisations have suffered a loss in overall income in the previous financial year. As public-sector finance given to HIV organisations has been slowly reduced over the years, it appears that organisations have had to increasingly use their reserves as a 'safety cushion'.

Concerns about complacency from the government and, consequently, wider society reflects respondents' views that there is 'little anybody is prepared to do about it', a common theme throughout the responses. Symbolic violence is illustrated here in the fact, that the dominated no longer question the order of things, even if it causes great risk to themselves. Austerity measures mixed with governmental complacency based on the medicalisation of HIV impacts upon the wider public who accept the both austerity and biomedicalisation rhetorics. This complacency points to the symbolic violence of structural barriers not just to funding but to any consensus that specialist services are necessary. So many respondents argue they just have to "*Keep going in the face of [government] indifference*" (Senior Manager, HIV Organisation 4) and "*inaction from NHS/LA [Local Authority]*" (Senior Manager, HIV

Organisation 2). The symbolic violence experienced by staff and service users, current and potential is summed up:

> Too many lives will be needlessly affected by penny pinching, which is a scandal. We seriously risk losing all the progress made in HIV prevention, and a huge amount of experience, as staff are then lost to other sectors. It is nothing short of a Public Health disaster really, orchestrated by those who know little, and seemingly care even less about those living with HIV or those most at risk. (Senior Manager, HIV Organisation 6)

People do not question their own role in the production and reproduction of domination and subordination (Bourdieu 1977; Bourdieu and Passeron 1977). Symbolic violence and domination becomes exercised over individuals through their everyday social habits. Therefore, symbolic violence can occur through the mundane processes, practices of everyday life and even through inaction and complacency. This was highlighted by respondents as they have tried to fight the cuts and some resistance has mobilised, but this has had varying degrees of success due to what some respondents refer to as the protectionist stance by other HIV organisations in light of Austerity cuts and tendering processes:

> We have received no support from other HIV organisations or charities, in fact quite the reverse. It seems that a fortress mentality exists within the sector and that we are perceived as a threat purely because we have survived and are continuing to provide services. Unfortunately, we do not think many other charities will be able to survive in the way we have and that there will be a great many lost in the next 5 years, possibly sooner. (Manager, HIV Organisation 1)

Even in this excerpt there is evidence of symbolic violence as the fault for protectionism is seen to be in the other HIV organisations rather than seeing the wider context in which the tendering processes for reduced funding sets organisations into competition with each other.

New funding regimes have also made things very difficult for smaller third sector organisations to survive. As Clayton et al. (2015) show, it is larger, national charities and organisations that can afford the time

and have the resources to apply to fundraising and it is they that are most likely to succeed. Similar results were found in this survey with smaller groups indicating their concern about being unable to submit tenders due to their size or resources and reliance of some organisations on staff members who were working unpaid. There was a wider concern that larger HIV organisations would 'swallow up' smaller bespoke groups and be more successful in gaining access to available funding because of having a more professionalised and resourced infrastructure including fundraising departments. This impacts not only on smaller regional HIV organisations, but also on the service users who use them. For example:

> [we have been] decimated. Only the big corporate one will survive. (Senior Manager, HIV Organisation 2)

> Small volunteer run, and user led groups are so vital but are just can't compete with competitive tendering processes. (Senior Manager, HIV Organisation 8)

Several respondents also talked about merging as a way to survive for smaller organisations though some still aired their concerns that if merging was a response to funding problems this might have adverse impacts for service users. For example:

> Only big organisations [will remain] most smaller [organisations] having merged or closed. (Senior Manager, HIV Organisation 13)

> We could merge with other organisations. The concern is that merger is due to cuts and not based on the needs of people with HIV. (Senior Manager, HIV Organisation 2)

Concerns outlined related to a lack of partnership working within the sector, coupled with fears about HIV organisations working in 'silos' to preserve their organisations rather than share resources and skills. Some reported that larger HIV organisations who were not based in their area were not always best placed to offer the support that was needed for service users (for example, they provided online services instead of face

to face groups) and that the closure of smaller organisations would see traditional face to face services decline. Most of the HIV organisations surveyed managed to use their available resources to campaign to stop HIV cuts to services, while simultaneously creating a space for dialogic understandings of their situation. In doing so this has potential to disrupt the habitus which reproduces their domination, however this has yet to result in changes to government funding of HIV support, the removal of tendering processes, or any reduction in the dominance of the medicalisation of HIV. The problem is identified in what one respondent stated:

> [we need to be] [r]eaching audiences beyond HIV communities. (Senior Manager, HIV Organisation 11)

Staffing, Volunteers and Demand

There is evidence of a growing strain on the HIV Third Sector, in that some continued staff cuts are expected (17%) and as a likely effect of this, services will have to be closed (33%) or organisations merged (8%) with the loss of specialist knowledge and experience that this entails. Importantly, during the writing up of this research two HIV organisations closed and five had major funding reductions which led to redundancies of staff. Due to an increase in demand for HIV services and high HIV rates in the UK, a potential issue emerges as 33% organisations expect increases in their numbers/types of service user, and with 25% providing new services and 58% expecting to increase their volunteers, this shows tensions in what can be offered in terms of quality provision. There are some concerns here as paid staffing levels overall are decreasing (17% decreasing versus 8% increasing) and volunteering levels are expected to increase dramatically. HIV organisations reported an increase in volunteer levels (42%) and 58% of all organisations plan to increase their volunteer levels in the coming twelve months. Due to service demand, many volunteers may be expected to run these services, as per the 'Big Society' agenda. However, with fewer paid, specialist staff, questions remain about provision of adequate training and supervision to

offer a quality service. There is no doubt that well-trained, experienced volunteers bring excellent rewards to organisations and add an estimated economic value of £50 billion a year to the economy (Elliot 2014). However, with staff shortages and time-pressures of paid staff, high quality training and supervision of volunteers may not always be feasible which may affect volunteer turnover. Practices that would ordinarily be deemed as problematic or 'violent' such as the removal of services and staffing eventually gain social acceptance through discourses, practices and policies. In the current dominant framework of austerity and neo-liberalism, individualism, and self-responsibility, symbolic violence often leads people to (unjustly) blame themselves for their own suffering whilst the role of society remains hidden (Bourdieu et al. 2000). As an example of this, staffing pressures and financial suffering have forced HIV organisations to increase their volunteering levels to replace staff members, which whilst necessary for services to run, perpetuates the myth that austerity is needed and that volunteers can plug gaps in staffing levels.

Conclusion: Cuts to the HIV Third Sector as an Act of Symbolic Violence

The HIV Third Sector is in crisis and is running on a survival agenda. Government austerity policies and rhetoric can be seen as acts of symbolic violence stripping away access to funds whilst normalising the cuts as natural/needed to address the budget deficit. Normalisation of the cuts is greatly facilitated due to the medicalisation of HIV removing HIV as a problem from the public consciousness. Power operates through misrecognition of the meanings implicit in government action, practice and ritual, and, "any language [the language of the establishment] that can command attention is an 'authorised language'" (Bourdieu 1977: 170) and thus legitimate. Both the language of austerity and the dominance of biomedical understandings of HIV result in a unique experience for HIV organisations under austerity. The uniqueness lies in the biomedical account of HIV rendering discussion of HIV as unnecessary (Dalton 2017) and as the discourse of biomedicine as heroic medicine increases, prevention and education agendas are cut

because people believe that they are no longer needed. The outcomes of this symbolic violence mean that people are becoming infected with HIV needlessly. In addition, effective biomedical treatment has not filtered through to address stigmatisation. The data evidences that this still affects the lives of those living with HIV and therefore, symbolic violence becomes evidenced through cuts to prevention and to specialist HIV Third Sector services which provide the redress and resistance to this stigmatisation.

Symbolic violence is imperceptible, insidious and invisible. This invisibility constitutes an effective tool of silent domination and of silencing the dominated. Dominant discourses often work to silence marginalised voices, in this case the HIV organisations and people living with HIV who often find their voices through the campaigns of these organisations. This silence is not overcome simply by allowing the HIV organisations to speak or for them to voice their concerns because in an era of medicalisation and , such acts seem futile in overcoming the silence. So how might this be contested? Bourdieu (2001) suggests that systemic and structural change needs to take place to ensure that these voices are heard and accorded much more agency. The current UK government's austerity position in terms of HIV needs to change. HIV Third Sector organisations need funding so that they not only continue their work with people living with HIV, but also to educate and promote prevention and develop campaigns to resist the wider stigma process, which continues to grow so long as HIV is seen as only a medical concern.

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"Well That Would Be Nice, but We Can't Do That in the Current Climate": Prioritising Services Under Austerity

Catherine Donovan and Matt Durey

In this chapter, we take a rather different approach to critiquing austerity. Rather than focusing our inquiry solely on the financial consequences of austerity for funding specialist services (in this case, for lesbian, gay, bisexual and/or trans [LGB and/or T[1]] people affected by domestic violence and abuse), here we are also concerned with the neoliberal discourses that have at one and the same time promoted sexual citizenship and provided a rationale for cutting publically funded specialist services for these (and other minoritised) groups. The chapter draws on the qualitative data arising from an evaluation of the North East Domestic Abuse Project (NEDAP), a development project working to raise awareness amongst mainstream statutory and third sector projects about domestic violence and abuse in the relationships of

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LGB and/or T people. Before considering the remit of NEDAP and participants' responses to questions about the impacts of austerity for their organisations' engagement with NEDAP, the chapter sets out some of the broader, contextual factors that shaped the way that NEDAP was unable to secure funding and had to close after three years. In the final year of the project (2014), the Comprehensive Spending Review of the Coalition Government was starting to be felt in the cuts in public sector funding. The evaluation was able to capture not just the impact of NEDAP, but a snapshot of how austerity was starting to be felt in its partner organisations across the North East. Before exploring this in more detail the following sets out the four core contextual factors in which NEDAP worked and folded: neoliberal austerity, the (Big Society), the cuts to the domestic violence and LGB and/or T organisations, and discourses of equality.

Neoliberal Austerity

The language of austerity became ubiquitous within the political and social climate following the financial crisis of 2008 and the subsequent elections of the Coalition and Conservative Governments. Political refrains repeatedly told the country that the economy is 'insecure/uncertain'; that as a country we 'still borrow too much,' and 'don't save enough' (Osborne 2014). In addition, the Chancellor's Budget Statement in March 2014 emphasized the dangers of abandoning austerity and the 'long term economic plan'; the Chancellor asserted that we all must be 'alert to the risks' of abandoning austerity; he spoke of the threats of the Eurozone, and the 'volatility' of emerging markets; and he emphasized the need to 'build our economy's resilience' (Osborne 2014). In addition to the language of austerity, this is the language of risk.

The risk to which George Osborne, along with the entire narrative of austerity, refers, either explicitly or implicitly, is of any challenge to the principles of unfettered neoliberalism. Neoliberalism, according to Clarke (2005: 58):

> does not purport so much to describe the world as it is, but the world as it should be. The point for neoliberalism is not to make a model that is more adequate to the real world, but to make the real world more adequate to its model. This is not merely an intellectual fantasy, it is a very real political project.

Under neoliberalism, all social risks are not only subordinated to economic risks but reconfigured as financial risks themselves—for the tax-paying 'strivers' for example. Indeed, it is through the control of economic risks (or, the consolidation of economic relations) that social problems reframed as economic risks can be managed (or justified) by neoliberal ideology. It is no surprise, therefore, that in addition to reinforcing the notion of economic scarcity, and of economic risk, the language of austerity sees economic growth as the single measure of a society's success. As Clarke (2005: 58) says:

> Neoliberalism has conquered the commanding heights of global intellectual, political and economic power, all of which are mobilised to realise the neoliberal project of subjecting the whole world's population to the judgement and morality of capital.

This is despite the fact that it is consistently shown that it is degrees of social equality and inequality as opposed to economic growth which is a more important indicator of social productivity, health, happiness and stability (Wilkinson and Pickett 2010).

Neoliberal logic is capitalist logic; it is the logic of the free market (Clarke 2005; Harvey 2005). It is not, however, the free market logic of classical liberalism, as Adam Smith would understand the term, where a self-regulating market fuelled by supply and demand operates to produce an optimal balance between what a society needs and what is produced, but a highly moralised, normative understanding of a free market economy as one which protects—at all costs—the right of capital to accumulate (Clarke 2005). Contrary to its classical liberal roots, neoliberalism *encourages* state intervention in the economy in order to further the interests of capitalism (Munck 2005). The response to the

global economic crisis in 2008 is direct evidence of this (see for example, Farnsworth and Irving 2011).

Since the global financial crash, it could be argued that we have entered a new era of neoliberal capitalism in which governments have re-committed to global agreements to keep capital unregulated and find themselves in debt (with high interest rates) to the very financial institutions they took out the debt to rescue (having given it in loans to those institutions with very low interest rates) (Farnsworth and Irving 2011). This has imbued those financial institutions with increasing power over democratically elected governments who are ideologically wed to an increasingly unequal capitalist system in which most of their own populations are becoming poorer and living more precarious lives (Standing 2014). The (re-)commitment to neoliberal capitalism, it has been suggested, has further entrenched what Lilley and Papadopoulos (2014) refer to as biofinancialisation. This process, which they argue has been taking place since the 1980s, promotes the worldview that,

> the worth of almost everything - including the present and future appreciation of assets, goods, services, intangibles, the health and subjective capabilities of individuals, the physical environment, human artefacts, other species, urban space - is in principle transferable to one single logic of financial value that is potentially tradable [sic] in the market. (Lilley and Papadopoulos 2014: 974)

Biofinancialisation introduces 'a *culture of valuation* into everyday life' (Lilley and Papadopoulos 2014: 974, original emphasis) that, along with supporting neoliberal economic and social policies, influences the way in which individuals, groups, and organisations view their own decisions, behaviours, and interactions. Biofinancialisation creates an underlying imperative for individuals to undertake specific, rational calculations with regard to their health, safety, education and so on, which are conceptualised in financial terms. There is a guise of having free choice yet economic self-management is the only choice through which free choice can be exercised. It is in this way that, as David Harvey (2005: 3) suggested:

> Neoliberalism has … become hegemonic as a mode of discourse. It has pervasive effects on ways of thought to the point where it has become incorporated into the common-sense way many of us interpret, live in, and understand the world.

Understood in this way, it is as ideology rather than as political rhetoric that we should read the language of austerity. It is an ideology that extols the virtues of economic liberty, of market individualism, of personal (rather than social) responsibility, and of social inequality. These pillars of neoliberal ideology can be seen expressed in David Cameron's conception of the 'Big Society'.

The Big Society

Although the term fell out of favour in both the Coalition and subsequent Conservative governments, the message of the Big Society was integral to the Conservative election campaigns, and remained the message which informed policy (Dowling and Harvie 2014; Williams et al. 2014). The Big Society was described by David Cameron as, 'a huge culture change … where people, in their everyday lives, in their homes, in their neighbourhoods, in their workplace … don't always turn to officials, local authorities or central government for answers to the problems they face … but instead feel both free and powerful enough to help themselves and their own communities' (Cameron 2010).

As Dowling and Harvie (2014) suggest, the ideology of the Big Society is one of community empowerment through the reduction of the state and the devolution and redistribution of state power. At its core, it is about 'communities [becoming] more involved in the organisation and delivery of previously public services' (Dowling and Harvie 2014: 871). It is argued that the specific needs of localities and communities can only be appreciated by those living and working in those areas, and that therefore it is those local stakeholders who should have the power to implement change. However, although proponents of the Big Society have been keen to stress the communitarian aspects of the localism agenda, there is a distinct conflict between redistributing power to local

authorities and communities whilst simultaneously reducing the budgets these authorities have available (Clayton et al. 2015). The result of this inherent conflict is a competitive 'austerity localism' (Featherstone et al. 2012): a 'zero-sum game' 'whereby more "society" involvement equates to less "state" activity' (Lowndes and Pratchett 2012: 32), and local governments and organisations are placed in competition with each other for (reduced) central funding and the means to provide services, undermining concerns for equality and fairness (Newman 2014) and contributing to a 'politics of resentment' (Hoggett et al. 2013).

In furtherance of 'small state' ideals, an important feature of the Big Society is the emphasis on the role of the third sector in replacing state and local authority service provision by taking on more responsibility for services and operating independently of local authority funding and administration. However, as Clayton et al. (2015: 724) have argued, 'there is a discernible gap between the rhetoric and reality of the localism agenda. This is seen in relation to three key areas: funding decisions which are perceived as unfair and unaccountable; a sense of abandonment felt by organisations encouraged to become autonomous under the "Big Society"; and constraints on practices of resourcefulness.' Rather than empowering local communities and organisations:

> Big Society's localism … represents an invidious form of neoliberalism par excellence, fused with a conservative neocommunitarianism that marshals the virtues of volunteerism, entrepreneurialism, and self-reliance to negate the need for collectivism and the public sector. (Williams et al. 2014: 2803)

In addition to the issues of resources and the impact on the practicalities of service provision, the localism agenda is built on the idea that the move from big government to big society increases individual responsibility (Lowndes and Pratchett 2012). This is combined with a particular form of pluralism that suggests that the needs of localities and communities vary; that the communities themselves are inherently different and that therefore there is no need to seek parity of service provision between localities. Moreover, the political rhetoric surrounding austerity localism has not only attacked the cost of various benefits and social

provisions in general, but has also highlighted needs-based benefits and services as a source of unfairness (Hoggett et al. 2013). All of this, combined with the devolution of funding responsibilities, allows localities and local organisations to be held responsible for what are inherently structural failings, as, under the (austerity) localism agenda, and in keeping with neoliberal logic, it falls to individuals and organisations at the local level to make financial valuations about the most appropriate, necessary, and cost-effective services to provide. The localism of the Big Society, therefore, leaves the door open for funding for particular issues, for example, domestic violence, as well as services for minoritised groups such as LGB and/or T people, to fall down the list of priorities in favour of more 'popular' or 'mainstream' needs or social groups. In the following section, we consider the impacts of public sector funding cuts for the domestic violence field and for LGBT organisations.

Austerity, Domestic Violence and Abuse and Specialist Services

Austerity measures and the Big Society rhetoric have had a significant impact on third sector service provision in a multitude of ways (Clayton et al. 2015; Clifford et al. 2013; Egdell and Dutton 2017; Unison 2013; White 2014), effectively recasting the relationship between the state and the third sector (Macmillan 2013). They have also been experienced unevenly across the country, with the most disadvantaged localities suffering the most (Clifford et al. 2013; Jones et al. 2016). Most directly, funding cuts have meant that services are operating under increasingly constrained budgets, often struggling to provide the same range or quality of services as before. Exacerbating this, reductions in welfare support for vulnerable groups such as the unemployed and those on low incomes, disabled people, homeless people, people escaping domestic abuse, the elderly and young people, have resulted in more people needing to access these services (White 2014). There is also evidence that many of the impacts from austerity disproportionately affect women (Fawcett Society 2012; McRobie 2013; NEWN 2013; Unison 2014).

The funding cuts in the public sector have led to significant staff cutbacks in organisations which traditionally employ a high percentage of women (particularly in the North East, where 45% of women in employment were employed by the public sector in 2012) (NEWN 2013). The increasingly prohibitive costs of care for children and older people also fall disproportionately on women performing unpaid carer roles (NEWN 2013). Through myriad ways, austerity works to increase women's financial dependence on being in a relationship (McRobie 2013; NEWN 2013). Such structural inequalities are deeply problematic if domestic violence and abuse is a feature of intimate relationships because leaving and remaining financially autonomous become increasingly difficult.

In the case of domestic abuse services, cuts in funding for frontline services are coupled with the increasing demand brought about by the increase in instances of domestic violence during periods of economic pressure:

> It has long been held that domestic violence tends to increase during difficult periods for societies, in wars and in recessions. What is becoming increasingly evident, as the austerity measures continue to bite, is how the strain of the recession on women – the disproportionate number of public sector job losses being just one example – has combined with both additional strains that are contributing factors to an increase in domestic violence and – simultaneously – a concerning shrinking of the services available to those experiencing domestic violence. (McRobie 2013)

A report by Towers and Walby (2012) found that 31% of funding to the domestic violence and abuse sector was cut by local authorities in 2010/2011–2011/2012; on a typical day 9% of those seeking refuge were turned away by Women's Aid due to lack of space; and of 8 major Independent Domestic Violence Advisor (IDVA) service providers, all faced funding cuts of 25% or more and in about a quarter of these providers, cuts of 100% were expected. In addition, the cuts to funding are unevenly distributed, with higher levels of cuts affecting smaller services, and additional cuts for services specifically dealing with BAME victim/survivors.

There is also evidence that LGBT services are being disproportionately impacted by austerity driven cuts in public sector funding. As Colgan et al. (2014) argue, LGBT organisations rely more on public sector funding than any other specialist provision, and as this has been cut LGBT organisations have been threatened with closure, reductions in staffing and/or service provision, and with having to spend time on diversifying their funding streams (see also Mitchell et al. 2013). In the three years following the closure of NEDAP, a further LGBT organisation represented on the steering group closed, another generic domestic violence organisation that provided a coordinating role for the regional LGBT DVA Forum (which has consequently also stopped meeting) closed, a gay, bisexual men and/or trans men's (GBT) organisation which took on hosting the NEDAP website suffered funding cuts and was unable to maintain the site, and Broken Rainbow—the only national LGBT DVA organisation—also closed (though the national helpline has remained, re-housed with GALOP). Because of the localism agenda, funding for LGBT services is increasingly being provided at a local level, increasing the likelihood of disparity between regions and localities as local authorities work within their own understanding of prioritisation and LGBT issues can be overlooked or subsumed into generic needs ('everybody is the same') (see below). Communities of LGB and/or T people can be especially vulnerable to the localism agenda as they are often more transient, and, as 'communities of interest, not communities of geography,' are more likely to cross local authority borders (Colgan et al. 2014: 46). As we show below, they are also more difficult to evidence as existing, which, in an era where evidenced-based need is paramount, means they can miss out.

In some ways it can be argued that campaigns for equality that draw on discourses of sameness between the everyday concerns of heterosexual and LGB and/or T people—whilst having been successful in achieving legal equalities—can now be utilised in rationales against specialist provision: there is nothing special about being LGB and/or T and therefore mainstream services can respond to their needs rather than specialist organisations or workers. We consider this unintended consequence of adopting neoliberal discourses of equality next.

Neoliberal Discourses of Equality

What has been somewhat surprising during the decades since the 1980s, when neoliberalism has shaped the government policies of all political parties, is the promotion of the equalities agenda, particularly in relation to sexuality and transgender identities. Perhaps less surprising that left of centre parties have championed the rights of these groups, but quite surprising that right of centre parties have. What authors have called homonormativity or the 'sexual politics of neoliberalism' (see, for example, Di Feliciantonio 2015: 1008) has resulted in an assimilation of certain LGB and/or T lives under the protection of heteronormative legislation and citizenship: the civilly partnered, the married, the monogamous, the two-parent families, the ones with resources to flex their pink pound muscle, the white, the middle-class, the educated (Di Feliciantonio 2015; Kandaswamy 2008); as some have characterised them, 'the good gays' (see Richardson 2005). The recent campaigns for same sex marriage found, on the face of it in the UK, an unlikely champion in the Prime Minister, David Cameron (see Donovan and Hester 2014). Yet Cameron's support for same sex marriage—which came at a cost to his popularity within his own party—can also be seen as part of the neoliberal agenda of a responsibilised citizenship (see Rose 2000). Self-help, financial and social autonomy, and striving (as opposed to skiving) are values that can be encouraged and rewarded in all of the population. Additionally, legal measures reinforce regulatory measures for interdependency between individuals rather than dependency on the state. Seen in this way, the assimilation of (particular) LGB and/or T lives is less concerned with social equality across differences than it is with the neoliberal image of equality of access for individuals as consumers to the market of goods and services.

A consequence of such assimilation is that the very diversity that requires liberation is subsumed through a human rights argument into a discourse of sameness: the arguments for same sex marriage adopted this trope of human rights with the mantra that love is a human emotion and that nobody's love should be denied through exclusion from marriage. Whilst a very successful campaigning slogan, the idea that 'we are all the same' can and, does lead to unintended consequences

(see Donovan and Barnes 2017). In this chapter, the unintended consequences are shown to be providing a rationale for cutting specialist LGBT services because mainstream services are seen to provide for everybody.

Before we explore in more detail these impacts of autonomy for work on LGBT DVA in the North East, what follows next is a description of the project and the methodology used to evaluate it.

NEDAP: The Project and the Evaluation

The NEDAP project was set up in 2010 as a development project to increase the capacity and confidence of mainstream services to respond appropriately to the needs of LGB and/or T victim/survivors of domestic violence and abuse (DVA). The project was the result of a regional audit of domestic abuse service provision in the North East (Owen et al. 2007) and collaborative research conducted at the universities of Sunderland and Bristol investigating love and violence within same-sex and heterosexual relationships (Donovan et al. 2006) which highlighted a lack of policy, procedures, training and service provision for addressing DVA in same sex relationships in the UK. NEDAP was created to promote awareness of LGB and/or T victim/survivors of DVA, facilitate inter-agency working, and provide training for people working in LGBT and mainstream services that respond to DVA across the North East. It was the first development project of its kind in the country. The project was hosted by a national charity led by a regional development worker and supported by a steering group comprising professionals from across the region with expertise in a range of related fields including DVA, LGB and/or T community development and casework, research, and equality and human rights. By the time NEDAP closed as a project, it was responsible for several 'legacies': the NEDAP website aimed at practitioners looking for advice and information about LGB and/or T DVA; the Regional LGBT DVA Forum which was meeting three or four times a year; a free training package delivered by four different trainers across the region; and an informal sex and relationships project aimed at young LGB and/or T and/or questioning young people. Our evaluation

was concerned with learning how successful the project had been, and what lessons could be learnt from the way NEDAP had worked that could inform future projects of its kind. The evaluation and the findings that we draw upon in this chapter refer to all of these activities except the informal sex and relationships project as this began too near the end of NEDAP to fall within the evaluation remit (see Formby and Donovan 2016 for an evaluation of this project).

The evaluation was broadly based in critical realist ontology (Bhaskar 2008), which stresses the stratified, complex, and contingent nature of the social world. It also took inspiration from Pawson's work regarding realist evaluations (Pawson 2013; Pawson and Tilley 1997), which provides a framework for engaging with this complexity and understanding how programmes work within a specific context. As our evaluation was concerned with identifying the interconnected factors that generated successes or failures within the design of NEDAP, it was necessary to 'locate the intervention … within the dynamic policy and social systems that surround it and within the dynamic cognitive and behavioural systems that underpin it' (Pawson 2013: 30). Our findings reported here are concerned with what emerged as the most significant aspect of that context: the structural and cultural impacts of austerity.

The evaluation of NEDAP was based on a combination of the secondary analysis of feedback forms from the training events and conferences organised by the project and primary research with project stakeholders and partner agencies. The primary research, which informs the discussion in this chapter, was carried out in two stages: an online survey sent to all contacts on the project mailing list, followed up by a series of semi-structured telephone interviews with 12 key stakeholders recruited from the project steering group, key partner agencies that had worked with NEDAP, and respondents from the online survey. Responses were received from organisations from across the region, and representing a range of different kinds of organisation. The interviews were designed to gain a more in-depth understanding of the impact NEDAP had. They followed a series of standard questions about respondents' experiences of involvement with key aspects of the NEDAP project, but respondents were encouraged to explore

other aspects of their experiences, and how NEDAP related to their work more generally, in order to capture a more accurate picture of the interconnected nature of the context in which the project took place. A full discussion of the findings is found in the evaluation report (Donovan and Durey 2014). In this chapter, we focus on the participants' responses to questions asking about whether or not austerity measures had affected the achievement of NEDAP's aims.

Findings

The interview data and open text data from the survey were thematically analysed specifically looking at where participants made reference to the broader context of austerity and public sector funding cuts and the impacts for their organisations' involvement with NEDAP and/or the issues of DVA in the relationships of LGB and/or T people. Four themes were identified: spaces for development work; prioritisation; protectionism; and rendering invisible LGB and/or T needs.

Spaces for Development Work

Underlying the accounts given about the impacts of austerity on the retention of services promoting LGBT DVA are implicit references to 'what it used to be like'. These are subtle yet revealing in that they speak of previous times when it was possible to undertake development work in response to the identification of new needs; when there were spaces in which reflection and responses (including in developing and/or attending training, building partnership working relationships, undertaking scoping or other needs assessment exercises, forming steering or development groups to secure funding) to new areas of need were possible to be explored. This was the history underlying the origins of NEDAP. As one participant explained:

> For most organisations, domestic abuse is not their core remit, it's something they do in addition to it. (Regional LGBT organisation)

Often those individuals willing to use the spaces they had for development work were aware that they were personal/professional champions of these issues who were supported by their organisations to do that work. Some participants expressed their fears that if their posts were cut the work would be lost or not picked up by their organisation:

> [Y]ou think well I can continue the good work, if you like, but if I go and I'm replaced, then, is that lost? (Local NHS Trust)

One of the key organisations on the steering group of NEDAP had conducted the audit referred to earlier, of services' readiness to respond appropriately to LGBT DVA that helped secure the funding for NEDAP. Other members of the steering group had been able to get involved because they too had spaces in their organisations that allowed them to participate in the development of a new service. It is these spaces that were being lost because of austerity. However, they are not necessarily spoken of explicitly. What is spoken of explicitly is the lack of time practitioners have to attend NEDAP regional forums, the free training or other dissemination events because of having to focus on the provision of their core services and securing the funding to continue with their core services. For example, one participant from a regional sexual violence service explained:

> We've experienced cuts in funding, yes, and it has affected the caseload that we're able to work with and it also has affected the amount of work that we're having to do to enable our organisation to run and to resource our organisation and … so yeah, I would say that it probably has affected how we can engage in NEDAP because it's affected how we can engage in anything that's remotely extra to getting funding for our work and providing services. … I don't want that to come out as that we haven't prioritised ensuring our services are accessible because that's what we have been doing over the last couple of years, but we just haven't engaged in the NEDAP forum type things. (Regional sexual violence service)

Such references to having to focus on the core remit of their organisations were common as well as pressure to do so from funders.

A community development worker from a regional LGBT organisation explained:

> [P]eople will have to reprioritise within their own services because they're also facing budget cuts. So, just like we're having to prioritise, the probation service, the police, … the different domestic abuse agencies, different LGBT agencies, are all getting pulled more and more back into their core remit. (Community development worker, regional LGBT organisation)

Prioritisation

Austerity, both in the form of public sector funding cuts and in the austerity discourse, has created a marketised culture within public services around the need to prioritise. As resources are increasingly limited due to decreased funding, service providers more and more feel the need to 'get the most value for money' out of the services they provide. This frequently takes the form of sacrificing some services in favour of those seen as being more 'central', more 'important', or, remaining focused on the remit for which funding was originally given. This has serious implications for organisations providing (or hoping to provide) services responding to developing needs, because it becomes increasingly difficult to secure funding for anything other than what already receives funding. In a marketised organisational culture, funders increasingly rely on evidence of demand in order to justify and prioritise funding, resulting in the disappearance of spaces for development work—a double-blow, as decreased funding reduces the opportunities for evidence of need to be gathered. For an issue such as DVA in the relationships of LGB and/or T people the consequences of prioritisation are clear because the numbers appearing in mainstream services are very small (Donovan and Hester 2014). This makes it easy for those services to, on the one hand, believe that the need is not sufficient to warrant extra resources, and, on the other, to maintain the narrative that everybody can (and does) use mainstream services. Consequently, from an argument of financial necessity, the specialist needs of LGB and/or T survivors of DVA (and

perpetrators) can then be minimised. One Chief Officer of a regional LGBT organisation felt this was happening:

> [M]ainstream domestic abuse services have been on survival mode and it's … about them keeping their services going. They don't see the LGBT sector as part of their core service. (Chief officer, regional LGBT organisation)

The issue of prioritisation can be seen in numerous areas of public service, for example, homelessness services (Homeless Link 2013) and services for older people (Fitzgerald et al. 2014), and can be seen as characteristic of the neoliberalisation of service provision under austerity. The impacts of such a strategy often fall disproportionately on services directed at smaller populations, the disabled, the homeless, LGB and/or T people—which are often those with multiple, intersecting or more complex disadvantages, and are consequently some of the most marginalised populations in society. A community worker in a GBT sexual health organisation pointed to the ways that the police were an example of mainstream organisations beginning to organise their services to reflect 'the statistics':

> [The police] are not the only culprits by any stretch of the imagination, but the way that they have had to cut their services because of budgets means that everything they now do has to be targeted according to statistics and so LGB and T as a whole is really slipping down the agenda, from my point of view, which means that LGBT domestic abuse situations is also sliding. (community worker in GBT sexual health organisation)

It might be argued that the excerpts pointing to prioritisation are the perceptions of those shaped by the localities in which their organisations are based. However, the representative of the organisation that funded NEDAP had a much wider, national perspective and she too pointed to prioritisation as an issue for services for LGB and/or T people experiencing DVA:

> If you're talking about charitable trusts and foundations, you kind of, the issue, the problem is that this isn't necessarily a priority area for those, so if you look at the trusts and foundations that are engaged in work around domestic abuse, domestic abuse in LGBT communities is not their priority really, or I haven't come across one whose priority it is. (Representative of NEDAP's funder)

Protectionism

Prioritisation can also result in protectionism, another consequence of reduced funding. Thus, whilst for many years successive governments and research recommendations have championed multi-agency, 'joined up', or partnership working between statutory and third sector organisations across the fields of health and social care, crime prevention, welfare and so on, austerity necessarily results in protectionist practices. Where there used to be partnership there is now competition, where there used to be mutual support there is now the commodification of expertise and/or experience (see also Clayton et al. 2015). For example:

> [B]ecause of the funding situation, people just tend to withdraw into their own organisations … and, you know, working in partnership is a really good way to help … especially within the voluntary organisations. But, again, when …when things go out to tender and when PCCs want various bits of work doing people tend to look after their own organisation, rather than want to work in partnership …[to]make sure they survive, really. But that's the sort of environment that we're in, unfortunately. (Senior manager, host organisation of NEDAP)

Rendering Invisible LGBT Needs

Some of the key reasons LGB and/or T people do not use mainstream services or do not identify their sexuality and/or gender identity if they use a mainstream service are fears of hostility or discrimination, homo-bi-transphobia, being outed, and their confidentiality not being respected (Donovan and Hester 2014). Whilst these reasons

for not coming out and/or using mainstream agencies are reasonably well known within those agencies (e.g. see Richardson and Monro 2012) in austerity they can become unknown in rationales for reducing the kind of work that is difficult and/or too time consuming to quantify and show in results for short-term, target-driven agendas. A crude example of this was given by a local sexual health charity:

> And then they go 'oh well, there's no need to fund anymore because,' I mean, I had a conversation with a councillor in [area] who told me there were no gay people who lived in [area]. I said well that was really strange. 'You need to go to [pub] on a Sunday night, it's full of gay people, LGBT people, having fun.' I said 'have you looked on, you know, the number of profiles on Gaydar or pinksofa.com … this is a nonsense.' But if you don't recognise that in your demographic then you don't have to provide services, do you? (Local sexual health charity)

A less crude version of this process of rendering LGB and/or T people as invisible is that of mainstream services seemingly expecting to provide one 'type' of delivery that everybody will have to 'fit' around. In the following excerpt, the community worker at a GBT sexual health organisation explained about the police:

> They keep trying. You know, you have quite dedicated members of staff, individual members of staff, but, really, the overall tone seems to be "oh well, people need to fit in with our services, not our services need to fit around people." And there are lots of different subjects for which that won't work… and it's this, you know, "we make a service and everybody just has to fit into it because that's all we can afford to do right now".

Overall, the impression given from these participants' accounts is that austerity and the funding cuts have made it more difficult to establish and/or retain specialist organisations and/or specialist work to respond to certain minority groups, in this case LGB and/or T people experiencing DVA. Consequently, austerity increases the marginalisation of the needs of these populations. This is perhaps made easier because of the discourses of sameness that have successfully been used to establish

claims to citizenship privileges (e.g. marriage and joint adoption, equality of access to services and equality of treatment in employment, education and purchasing of goods and services) supporting the rationale that there is no longer any need to provide such specialist provision. Instead, mainstream services can claim that their services are for everybody and that nobody is excluded.

Conversely there was also evidence that whilst the needs of minority groups, such as LGB and/or T people experiencing DVA, might be recognised, in times of austerity, they can legitimately be rendered invisible, partly because the evidence base is not there to justify the resource but also because specialist services are seen as 'luxuries' that are not affordable in times of financial crises. The representative from the organisation that funded NEDAP explains:

> It feels, for a lot of providers, it's on the "too hard" list or the kind of, "Well, that would be nice, but we can't do that in the current climate," list. (Regional charitable funder)

Conclusion

Between the surprise re-election of a Conservative Government in June 2015 and the surprise referendum result in favour of Britain leaving the European Union in 2016 there has been fundamental change, both in the leading personnel in the governing Conservative Party as well as in a lessening of the commitment to as harsh an austerity agenda as was once envisaged. Nevertheless even if austerity is slowed down damage has already been done: neoliberal logic has changed the organisational culture of service provision as well as the economic structures within which they operate. Taken together, the analysis suggests both subtle and not so subtle ways in which LGB and/or T people (along with other minority groups) can, as a result of biofinancialisation, be at the same time sidelined and mainstreamed. Losing spaces for development bodes ill for new needs to be identified, evidenced, and promoted through claims for new and/or additional services, workers, specialist knowledge and awareness raising. Championing the needs of LGB and/

or T people often falls to individuals with personal commitment even in times of public sector spending largess. Austerity, however, makes those issues, and potential LGB and/or T service users, even less likely to be recognised as more and more practitioners are made redundant, have their hours cut and/or in other ways have their space for development cut back.

At the organisational level, prioritisation settles in as one of the dominant organising factors. Pulling practitioners and organisations back to their core remit, and concentrating on the groups and issues that can be evidenced as being the most (frequently) in need has the impact of making LGB and/or T people and their particular needs invisible. At the same time however, by drawing on discourses of sameness that are congruous with the market-individualist foundations of neoliberalism, these same organisations can insist that they are still providing services for everybody; and that everybody will get the same service if they come forward. Yet the research suggests that mainstream agencies are not where LGB and/or T people experiencing DVA turn to for help and this is partially because they neither trust those agencies to understand their relationships nor do they trust that they will be treated respectfully (Donovan et al. 2006, 2014). This lack of trust led respondents to express their fears that within the context of austerity it will be difficult to argue that LGB and/or T people require further outreach and development work to increase their confidence to come forward when, on the one hand, many services are coping with reductions in their funding, staffing, and resources, whilst on the other they are trying to cope with increases in the numbers of service users trying to access their services. Under austerity, however, such outreach and/or support for specialist knowledge, workers, or project can be rationalised away with the argument that mainstream agencies provide a service for everybody because everybody's needs are 'the same'. This unintended consequence of campaigns for the equal legal rights for LGB and/or T people with their heterosexual counterparts can be seen to be the rendering invisible the specific needs of LGB and/or T people, not only in terms of their experiences of DVA but in their help-seeking practices (Donovan and Hester 2014), which are difficult to address with a model that is 'one size fits all'.

Note

1. We use the acronym LGB and/or T when we refer to individuals because this recognises that those identifying as 'T' might not be lesbian, gay or bisexual. Elsewhere when we talk about organisations providing services to these groups we use the acronym they use—LGBT.

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Dangerous Times for Looked-After Children: Austerity Cuts Risking the Lives of the Most Vulnerable

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This chapter will critically examine the difficulties faced by looked-after children in the care of local authorities in trying to access children and adolescents' mental health services (CAMHS). It will argue, based on findings which include recent Serious Case Reviews (such as Cumbria, November 2013) and the Scottish review (LACSIG 2013), that there has never been a more dangerous time to be a looked-after child. The Office for National Statistics suggests that 45% of looked-after children have mental health problems compared with 10% of the general population (ONS 2018). They also come from a background of deprivation in terms of work, education, housing, and employment, as well as, in many cases, childhood trauma. These social problems of course reinforce and exacerbate each other (Luke et al. 2014; Gilbert et al. 2009). Despite the evidence, the personal rather than the social dominates many policy responses at different levels. Broadhurst and Mason (2017) argue that working class mothers are expected to 'change' rapidly due to the 'no delay'

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timescale implemented in the 1989 Children Act. In courts, too, there is little consideration by the judiciary of the complex political and structural factors impeding their capacity to parent (Gupta and Lloyd-Jones 2016). Featherstone and Bywaters (2014) found young single birth mothers and 'care experienced' young parents were most likely to be vulnerable to losing their children to a care system, in a situation where they are unable to gain access to psychological therapies to recover from abuse and trauma. Neoliberal ideologies only highlight the personal fault of the parents and do not take account of the collective disadvantages looked-after children and those 'care experienced' have endured. Yet Katz et al. (2007) identified the well-established links between poverty and child protection, and significantly, Hills et al. (2009) found some of the Labour Party's initiatives on child poverty were successful between 1997 and 2005: workless households became fewer and during this time there was a reduction of 5700 children in the care system. Sharon Shoesmith, the Director of Haringey children's services at the time of baby Peter Connolly's death, noted that from 2005 New Labour's policies seemed less effective at tackling poverty and, as the numbers of children in poverty increased, the numbers of children in care grew (Shoesmith 2016). Moreover, professional caution after the serious case review concerning Peter Connolly's death in 2007 probably produced an increase of numbers of children in care, of approximately 10,000 to the current highest level of over 70,000 (Shoesmith 2016). O'Hara (2014) argues that the links to austerity are stark and easily demonstrable by systematic evidence. It is clear that there were many financial issues at the time of Peter Connolly's death: the economic crisis in England had emerged, there was growing unrest in relation to child protection and there was, amongst others, a public enquiry in relation to poor care at Stafford hospital (Shoesmith 2016). Campbell (2016a) states that there has been a £6bn fall in the spending on social care since austerity policies began, producing significant reductions in both safeguarding and care services which enable children to recover from trauma.

Tickle (2017a, b) reports that there are currently 72,670 children in care, and the figure is rising at the fastest rate in five years: this is financially unsustainable. Furthermore, she argues that the human cost has huge implications for future generations of looked-after children and argues kinship care and early intervention with parents needs serious

attention to stop the epidemic of children in care who are more likely to go to prison than university. By contrast, authors like Magin (2016) highlight the convergence of cuts to CAMHS with simultaneous persistent and disabling cuts to other public sector services (accompanied by many tax cuts for corporations). This combination of rising need with falling provision forms the core of the analysis here: it is argued that, with few exceptions, the mental health needs of looked-after children and young people cannot be met under these conditions.

The Local Picture

The North East can serve as an example of the extent of local problems within the overall national picture. There are 152 local authorities in England, of which 127 have recently been inspected by Ofsted with regard to children's services: only 37 were judged to be good or outstanding. Unsurprisingly Tickle (2017a, b) citing Broadhurst and Mason (2017) examined the judgements concerning being taken into care, and found vulnerable children are at a significantly increased likelihood of being taken into care if they are in the North East or North West of England. The judiciary are more likely to grant a care order in these areas—46%, compared to just a quarter of cases in London. Whilst Ofsted do not fully explain this regional variance, the North has increased levels of unemployment, a higher number of families in receipt of free school meals, pupil premium, more parents and children accessing mental health services, and other poverty indicators, including more families using food banks (Trussell Trust 2015). The Office for National Statistics (2018) lists the 28 towns and cities with the most deprived areas many are sited in the North and Midlands. Furthermore Middlesbrough, South Shields, and Gateshead all feature highly in the recorded variables for multi deprivation. Locally, of the twelve North Eastern local authorities Sunderland has very high numbers of children being looked-after. In 2015, it had a rate of 107 per 10,000 population compared to the then national England average of 60 (Gov, UK 2015). The proportion of children entitled to free school meals is 21%, above the national average of 17% in 2015 (Sunderland Ofsted Report 2015).

Ofsted's (2015) findings suggest austerity has impacted on these figures, though the increases may not always reflect safeguarding issues: they may result from over caution after the death of baby Peter Connelly or reflect local cultures of professional practice.

Profile of Vulnerable Children in the UK

At any one time 3% of all children (394,000) are identified as children in need (OFSTED 2017). However as stated earlier, local councils with significant areas of socio-economic deprivation will have more children deemed to be in need of services under section 17 of the 1989 Children Act. The current national figure, referred to earlier is estimated at 56 plans per 10,000 children (Gov, UK). At any one time 50,000 children are judged to be at risk of significant harm and subject to a child protection plan. A child protection plan will be formed during a child protection conference which will follow a section 47 investigation (Children Act 1989). This is enshrined within the 1989 Act to determine if children are deemed to be suffering harm. In Haringey, the rate of child protection plans was 48 per 10,000 at the time of Baby P's death; currently in Haringey it is 74 per 10,000 (Gov, UK). Prior to baby Peter's death the national average was 24 per 10,000. Haringey demonstrated significant deprivation factors including 32% of all children in receipt of free school meals compared to the national average of 15% (Department for Education 2014). Three quarters of the 55,000 children in Haringey are from minority ethnic groups and can speak 160 languages between them. The figures indicate the challenges for services to provide a social work service that meets the needs of their vulnerable and culturally diverse population (Shoesmith 2016).

The Adoption Support Fund

Adoption therapies have received significant funding since 2015, while by contrast, funding for children and mental health (CAMH) has fallen with regard to children in care. With 250,000 children receiving

some form of mental health care in England, there is no doubt about the need for services, but the promised increases in funding have reportedly not reached the areas of need (LACSIG 2013; Campbell 2016b, c, d). It is therefore no surprise that far fewer councils have been judged inadequate for their provision of adoption services, and that 56% have been viewed as outstanding, since the £60m adoption support funding provided since 2015 (and guaranteed until 2020). The link between appropriate funding for services and good outcomes for children and their families is tangible (OFSTED 2017). The author undertook a small scale study in relation to the views of adoptive parents in Sunderland on the impact of the adoption support fund introduced in 2015. The families were all very positive about access to the fund and said it had been life changing indeed the sub heading was, 'when you receive the right help it is like a precious jewel'. Conversely they also identified major issues accessing help from CAMHS and other statutory services. The key issues identified by adopters prior to the fund include long waits for therapeutic appointments and a triage system which they perceived as barriers. They reported assumptions from the professional staff that the process of adoption and the development of mutual acceptance lie behind all problematic behaviours, and consequently there was a lack of recognition of the complexity of the children's needs. One adoptive mother stated the only CAMHS guidance she was given was to read books. For some of these adoptive parents these barriers, some linked to austerity, were demoralising, and they felt contributed to adoption fragility. One parent said, 'we would not have qualified for CAMHS input and everyone knows they are too overstretched anyway'. This may reflect the media awareness of cuts to CAMHS which has been recognised, as when Jeremy Hunt, the Minister for Health, highlighted the need for improvements in relation to CAMHS in 2016 and described it as the weakest link in the NHS in 2016 (Campbell 2016a). Another parent said, 'of course a centralised fund is better than begging for help'. Further to this an adoptive mother emphasised that looked-after and adopted children need specialist mental health provision and said, 'a specialist adoption course arranged by the adoption team has finally all made sense'. All the participants in the study highlighted the complexity of mental health

needs experienced by their adopted children as a consequence of abuse and trauma prior to their children being received into care, prior to the adoption. Parton (2014) has commented in relation to the deconstruction of professionalism in services, which seems to be reflected in the very general advice these adoptive parents received. The risks when services lose their professionalism are high given the complex needs shown by looked-after children.

In the twenty-first century, more children have been adopted from the care system: however, Selwyn et al. (2014) suggests that this push for adoption may have paradoxically led to growing numbers returning to the care system. Older children placed for adoption returned to care at a worrying rate of up to 10%. Often, the children are too traumatized to settle and it is clear that adoption is not always the best solution to the growing number of children in care. The recent murder of Elsie Sculy Hicks in May 2016, by her adoptive gay father, days after the adoption order was made, has put adoption in the media spotlight again for the wrong reasons. Fortunately this has not led to the predicted backlash against adoption or gay adoption, which has only been legal since the implementation of the Children Act 2002. The family court judgement in this case repeatedly absolved the male, gay adopter of any involvement in the murder. Women's rights groups have observed that in other cases, women in care proceedings would be accused of 'failure to protect' (Women's Aid 2017). The need to help adopted children attach to their caregivers cannot be under estimated (Selwyn et al. 2014). If looked-after children cannot return to birth parents, the plan would normally be for permanent care. This could be via adoption or a special guardianship introduced in the 2002 Children Act or long term fostering or residential care (Carr and Brayne 2017). Tickle (2017a, b) argues that the cost associated with fostering fees is a driver for adoption. She also highlights the financial barriers for kinship care, as few suitable carers are offered financial help when it is clearly less costly in human and emotional terms to help a child live with family who love them. Yet clearly many families cannot cope. Burgess et al. (2014) noted the individual shaming and blaming of families lacking capacity to cope.

As noted above, some investments have been made, including the Adoption Support Fund (2015), which is improving the situation for adopted children, but this is only benefiting approximately 5000 children compared to the 73,000 of children in care. Robert Goodwill Minister of state for children and families, wrote to directors of children's services to inform them funding will continue, as the demand has increased by three times with £29m spend this year alone. £60m has been spent on therapy for adopted children since 2015. The minister made a commitment to continue funding until 2020 but emphasised the £5000 funding cap introduced in November, 2015 would stay in place (Adoption UK 2016). Some critics argue this penalises adopted children with enduring and chronic mental health problems which will require long term input. It is of course relevant that the funding provided to date of approximately £60m now exceed the cuts to CAMH. Therefore funding a vulnerable group is valuable but it resembles 'robbing Peter to pay Paul' (Adoption UK 2016) queried the fair access cap and was advised it was a response to the unprecedented demand. The policy, though, reveals that privatised providers, working usually for profit, account for 61% of the professionals as opposed to 2% of adoption support therapies provided by NHS CAMHS (Adoption UK 2016).

Services for Birth Families

In contrast to assistance for adoptive parents and families, services for birth families are under great strain. As noted earlier, Broadhurst and Mason (2017) and Featherstone and Bywaters (2014) found that there are a number of birth mothers, often care leavers themselves, who are repeatedly having their children removed for adoption. They highlight the importance of early help and skilled intervention for these women who are showing a traumatic history of repeated loss and separation from their own children. Services for birth parents who have had their children removed are scarce and nearly non-existent, only Families in Care (FIC) exists in the North East and due to funds can only support two local authority areas (Families in Care 2017).

Tickle (2017b) reported that without the support of advocacy by FIC some women would not have managed to have their children returned to their care. Broadhurst and Mason (2017) undertook a significant mixed methods study with reviews of statistical, quantitative data concerning 65,000 birth mothers and qualitative interviews with 70 birth mothers. Nearly half of the mothers interviewed grew up in care and over a quarter were never provided with the experience of a stable placement, frequently moving between temporary homes. Then, within seven years, a quarter of the women returned to court for care proceedings concerning subsequent children. The acute grief women described after the removal of their children meant day to day functioning was impaired. Of concern, very few women were provided with support to overcome their loss and also recover to enable meaningful contact with their children (Broadhurst and Mason 2017). It is evident that without change the cycle will repeat itself at great financial cost to society as well as the human cost for current and future generations. The author was invited to Malta in 2017 by The Association for Child and Adolescent Mental Health to share the debate in relation to children's mental health and looked-after children. Whilst Malta, as a small island struggles, for complex geographical and religious reasons, to place children for adoption, placing only three children for adoption in 2016, Malta does however have a family support model with a Christian ethos to aid the family staying together, contrasting with the current UK government statistics which indicate the numbers of families being supported, via children in need plans and six weekly reviews is stable. In sharp contrast, the numbers of children on child protection plans, have, as stated earlier, continued on their upward trend (ONS 2018). Locally the national trend has also been mirrored. Some critics say the demarcation between need and risk, developed in the Children Act 1989 is unhelpful as at any one point children in need can elevate to children at risk (Carr and Brayne 2017). Shoesmith has observed that the individualisation of risk is not helpful as social workers are scapegoated as a consequence of child abuse when risk models cannot eradicate abuse (Shoesmith 2016). In spite of efforts at prevention, the high rates of children killed by their parent or carer, between one and two homicides a week, has remained largely unchanged in the last two decades.

Mental Health Services for Looked-After Children

Some aspects of this crisis have been acknowledged by government. The current Conservative Prime Minister, Theresa May, pledged improvements for mental health services and tasked the Care Quality Commission to review this. Thorley and Armiger (2017) argue that Jackson (2009) had already conducted this mapping exercise of the 12 North Eastern local authorities. The duplication nevertheless confirmed the impression of many cuts to services: many organisations highlighted by YoungMinds (2016) and by Jackson (2009) have all lost funding. In particular, services dedicated to looked-after and adopted children, including CLASP (CAMHS looked-after System) have lost financial support. The service, previously set up and managed by the author in Darlington, which was awarded numerous national awards and accolades, was closed when the council was hardest hit by £13m in cuts, and staff had to be redeployed (BBC, 5 February 2016).

Added Vulnerabilities for Those in Residential Children's Homes

The impact of austerity on public services for looked-after children, with reference to mental health services has been significant: indeed even Jeremy Hunt, Conservative Health minister in 2016 admitted there have been 'too many tragedies' (Campbell 2016a). He failed, however, to make links with the approximate £50m cut to CAMHS since 2007. Indeed, Parkinson (2016) found that over a fifth of local authorities have frozen their grants to CAMHS. The tragedies are significant in recent years: three young people killed themselves in north-eastern childrens' homes and were subject to serious case reviews. Whilst some of these children were in contact with CAMHS services, there is little evidence of the intensive work required to support children within residential care. Staff need specialist training to support children with high mental health needs. Study after study has highlighted the significant

vulnerability of children taken into residential care following unstable lives: the impact on children's capacity to form meaningful relationships has been documented by many (Cameron and Magin 2009).

It is a fact that services for care leavers are limited: the Children Leaving Care Act 2000 provides a statutory framework for services. However, many leaving care teams do not employ qualified social workers to undertake the personal advisor role. The serious case review (NSPCC Brighton and Hove 2015 baby Liam) criticised input from this team and their lack of understanding in relation to sharing safeguarding information which they feel contributed to lack of supervision when the care leaver in question seriously harmed his baby. Unusually, the young man agreed to be interviewed for the review from his prison cell as most parents decline. He attributed many of his difficulties to his childhood, which was characterised by abuse then instability in the care system. Yet this is time when the landscape of residential care for looked-after children is changing: OFSTED (2017) calculates, 78% are privatised, provided by charities or private agencies. Ray Jones has stated, 'the care and safety of children and their welfare and safety has become a commodity to be traded between commercial companies' (Jones 2015). The privatisation of public services is part of an agenda to provide limited provision to vulnerable children. The Children and Social Work Bill, which received royal assent in April, 2017, has an increased the privatisation agenda. It was preceded by the Laingbuisson (2016) report which had a firm focus on promoting marketization and proposed commercialisation of statutory children's services. Jones (2016) regards this as a longer term trend which has been reinforced by austerity policies: this journey to privatisation began under New Labour and has continued under the Coalition of 2010–2015, and the Conservative government since 2015. Staggeringly, he identifies a 60% increase in child protection social work at a time of 40% cuts in real funding. A continued 'do more for less agenda' seems pervasive amongst all councils since austerity measures were introduced. This move is concerning as critical interventions by council services, including children's homes, are increasingly privatised. The most recent Ofsted inspection in relation to OFSTED (2015) found their internal residential provision was very good. Indeed four of five were good or outstanding.

By contrast, 28% of privately run children's home are below 'adequate Ofsted standard'. Yet the government's response to councils judged inadequate is to introduce a privatisation model of care. Sunderland is the first council in the Country to see their services delivered as a private company entitled *Together for Children*. Their own service was condemned for delays for services, 'lost' core assessments, and serious case reviews, all the hallmarks of a council in crisis (Sunderland Serious case review, known as baby Penny 2015: see below).

Doward and Menin (2016) criticise the privatisation agenda and highlight the impact of austerity. They argue that councils struggle to recover from poor Ofsted findings as they cannot retain staff, in part because of the fear that they will be personally blamed for the systemic failures (Shoesmith 2016). The need to fund and undertake their own training to remain registered with another new registration body may act as a driver to reduce the cost of agency bills. There are confirmed plans to replace the Health Care and Professionals Council (HCPC) which only replaced the General Social Care Council (GSCC) in 2010. McNicoll and Schraer (2016) criticised the government's failure to deliver their promise of a positive, campaigning College of Social Work, cancelled without warning in 2015. Jones (2015) and other social work academics fear this is another tangible sign of neoliberal attitudes to social work: he estimated that the cost of closing the GSCC was £17m. In less than a decade yet another regulatory body is planned.

Accountability and the Public

Many of the processes of care and decision-making about what is best for children are hidden from view, and obscured by restrictions on court reporting of family legal cases. Occasionally proceedings are reported and councils specified. Some journalists, including Louise Tickle, were successful in requesting that Gloucester council be named in a case debating the suitability of kinship care, and the grandmother of the child was allowed to air her complaint in relation to her treatment by the local authority and name the council (Tickle 2017a, b). The role of the media in creating a sense of panic about social work

in the field of child care and, particularly, child abuse, has long been recognised. Nigel Parton noted long ago how the repeated child abuse inquiries fed into both a critique of social work as a caring profession *and* of the apparently deviant families they had allowed to continue caring for children. In this sense, publicity around childcare fits perfectly with the notion of moral panic as propounded by Stan Cohen (Parton 1985; Cohen 1987). Perhaps because of the awareness of these media effects, Gloucestershire council fought the move to disclosure as they thought it would affect social work recruitment, but the journalists argued the public should know about mistreatment of kinship carers. There are dangers in such openness. In response to emotional newspaper coverage suggesting the moral fabric of society is eroding, a new balanced perspective began to emerge. This is known as the transparency project, based in Bristol, developed by Lucy Reed barrister and Louise Tickle journalist. They have influenced the move for increased information on court judgements to be publicly available. Reed stated, 'investigative journalism is not to be "judge and jury" but to allow the public to see what is being done in their name, both when it goes as it ought and when it goes wrong' (Reed 2017, Transparency disclosure, unpaginated.).

Certain journalists can attend court since 2009. There have been a number of cases including Re X a child (No 3 EWHC 2755) which have influenced the campaign for greater transparency. The President of the Family Court Sir James Munby himself acknowledged the distressing features of this case as parents were acquitted of child cruelty charges but only after final, irreversible, adoption orders were made. It is evident there will be sorrow for this child when they realise they had parents who could have safely cared for them had a miscarriage of justice not taken place. Critics including Boorman (2016) feel the 'no delay' principle in the Childrens' Act, and further performance indicators in relation to Court time within the updated Public Law Outline (2014), mean miscarriages of justice will reoccur with no redress for the child or Family as adoption orders are irreversible, unlike special guardianship orders which can be revoked. In terms of pressure on placements, Fostering Network (2017) report a shortage of 10,000 carers and directors of children services are warning the system cannot cope.

Tickle (2017b) suggests the threshold for significant harm in section 31 of the 1989 Act may be being applied too liberally. Tickle was given consent to cover a care proceedings case in North Tyneside in which the mother's baby had been removed at birth. The judge actually found her to be 'an above average' mother. The mother now provides training to social workers and has a valuable internet resource page entitled 'safeguarding survivor'. Coverage of cases such as these is important. Sir James Munby is currently reviewing cases like these to ensure they cannot reoccur. However, Woman's Aid and other women's rights organisation are concerned that children are being removed under risk of emotional harm, no real assessment or help for the families and children are never returning to birth families (Woman's Aid 2017). As stated earlier we certainly have the highest rates of non-consensual adoption in Europe and many campaigners are addressing this as a form of forced adoption.

Professional Practice and Austerity

The Cumbrian review (2013) examined factors relating to a vulnerable child's suicide and concluded services were optimistically acting as if CAMHS were functioning as an effective service. Broomfield (2017) reported that annual cuts of £538m have hit CAMHS. The picture is confused, with competing figures in relation to the cuts, but there have clearly been cuts that formed the background to some avoidable deaths of children. Broomfield argued that, in spite of Theresa May's recent pledges in 2017 to reduce the associated stigma attached to those who suffer from mental ill health, the concern has not been translated into effective action yet. Delays and shortages pervade the system. The NSPCC surveyed professionals in 2015 discovering that they experienced long waits for therapy, coupled with a 68% increase in crisis mental health presentations at accident and emergency: there were 19,000 hospital admissions for children who have self harmed in 2015/2016. Regional differences associated with poverty and unemployment aggravate an already difficult situation. Certainly mental health rates are highest in the North. The author evaluated a charity providing mental health services in Redcar in 2015 and the increases in referrals after

the steelworks closed was significant. Office for National Statistics data (2018) indicate the North East is a black spot for mental health difficulties with 18.7% of adults reporting depression and anxiety.

The dangers directly attributable to public sector cuts are consequently multifarious and life threatening. They continue to increase as a consequence of austerity which followed the UK Government response to the global financial crisis in 2008. Since then significant public sector cuts have followed even after economic growth. The Joseph Rowntree Foundation (2015) argue that the most vulnerable and disadvantaged children and families in society are suffering the worst cuts and front line social work services are insufficiently funded and thus failing children. Front line services are of course the first point of contact for vulnerable children and the start of the decisions in relation to whether children should be accommodated by the local authority. This is subject to current scrutiny as the local government organisation urged in October 2017 for urgent cash injections to uphold flagging social services which are unable to cope with the demand as a record number of children enter care, over ninety a day. The chair stated, 'children's services face a £2bn funding gap by 2020. If nothing is done to address this funding gap crucial services that many children and families across the country desperately rely upon will be put at risk' (Councillor Watts, LGA Chair, October 2017, unpaginated).

Sunderland was one of the first local authorities to see its childcare services privatised by the government following a damning Ofsted inspection report in July 2015 listing their faults over several previous years. If the failings are scrutinised it is clear that the social work in-take teams were in crisis and mainly staffed by agency workers due to the difficulties in relation to staff retention. One of the serious case reviews refers to health staff naively acting as if the service was functioning when they asserted they should have been contacting children's services to understand why referrals were not acted on (NSPCC, Sunderland Baby Penny serious case review 2015). There were other examples of official criticism: in 2015 the local government ombudsman ruled that a North Eastern council failed to follow due policy and procedure and wrongly placed three children on the child protection register without undertaking a section 47 investigation. The Ombudsman judged

that the family involved were caring for traumatised adoptive children and legally required more robust adoption support as oppose to zealous unwarranted safeguarding interventions. It is unfortunate, given the waiting list for the Ombudsman, that family justice may not happen within the timescale needed (Local Government Ombudsman 2015). In the face of this kind of scrutiny and critical publicity, Hertfordshire Council (2015) has developed an 'escalation' policy in which professionals can anonymously contact senior management, and another worker will scrutinise the case, if the concerns mean child protection work needs 'escalating', that is, taking the child into emergency care. The use of this policy is aimed at saving lives.

These are new ways of professional practice in response to the kinds of scandals, or rather, the scandalous reporting, provoked by failure to care in individual cases. The much publicised anxieties do not stress risks to *already* looked-after children. The risks include sexual exploitation (Rochdale 2013), and serious and enduring mental health difficulties (McCauley and Davis 2009). Of huge concern is increased risk of completed suicide, often following models of imitation. Indeed in 2013, Scotland had to publish guidance specifically on reducing suicide in looked-after children following thirty untimely deaths (LACSIG 2013). It is understood children living in residential care often experience greater risks due to complicated factors including past placement breakdowns and often largely unqualified staff. The staff may not understand the complex needs have looked-after children and how to keep them safe from the significant risks of further abuse (Cameron and Magin 2009). This is in spite of the aspirations of Care Matters (2006) which proposed pedagogic models for children's home staff. This chapter argues that austerity measures have increased the dangers for looked-after children. Abuse and trauma are significant risk factors for mental health problems suffered by at least half of all looked-after children (McCauley and Davis 2009).

Yet the background to this situation lay in positive government initiatives such as the Quality Protects five year programme from 1998, followed by Choice Protects. Many local authorities used this funding to deliver dedicated mental health provision. Despite this, as Jones (2015) has described, neoliberal ideologies of privatization and

the impacts of funding cuts on levels of overall training and salaries, and consequently on the level of professional help offered, have initiated a dangerous decline in the level of service. Parton (2014) refers to the common element of austerity policies as de-professionalization (see Malin's chapter in the volume): for example care leavers are no longer guaranteed a qualified social worker as case manager to assist their settling into independence. Similarly, Selwyn et al. (2014) also highlighted that the current £60m post adoption funds, introduced in 2015, are predominantly funding private therapists as opposed to establishing multi-disciplinary teams who could, ideally, meet the complex needs of these young people. Possibly in response to the inflated charges by private therapist's the Children's Minister Edward Timpson introduced a 'fair access limit' in October 2016 set as a £5000 cap spend per child. If the cap is exceeded local authorities have to match fund therapies which will be a challenge post austerity. The adoption support fund is laudable and local research has been reviewed in relation to the fund. However, it is clear the gap between looked-after children and their counterparts with greater stability is widening. Without funding for looked-after children the risk is the gaps in provision are too great to bridge.

Conclusion

This chapter has asserted that this challenging economic environment has impacted on the most vulnerable in our society, the looked-after children. The £19bn benefit cuts have also caused increasing misery for these young people in conditions of geographic and social marginalisation. The evidence confirms that one of the human cost of these cuts has been the increasing danger for the most vulnerable children in society. It evident that all of the services for looked-after children, CAMHS, fostering and residential care have been negatively affected by cuts. The councils which provide these vital services need significant funding to improve the services provided and decrease the multiple and increasing risks these vulnerable children and young people are exposed to. The danger are clear: risks of suicide, risks of failed safeguarding, risks

of child protection, risks to the futures of care leavers, risks of limited education and training opportunities. If there are not radical changes to the provisions for looked-after children including better access to mental health services and increased support services then these dangerous times for looked-after children and the cycle of devastation will continue and perpetuate for future generations.

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The 'New Normal': Framing Vulnerability, Entitlement and Responsibility in Police Custody in Austere Times

Donna Peacock and Faye Cosgrove

Introduction

The requirement for the attendance of an 'Appropriate Adult' when a 'mentally vulnerable' person is held in police custody is created within the codes of conduct of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act (PACE 1984). Many police force areas do not have an Appropriate Adult Scheme (www.appropriateadult.org.uk), and where established, they are often not available round the clock (HMIC 2015) meaning that 'Vulnerable Adults' frequently do not have access to the support of an Appropriate Adult (HMIC 2015). Provision was historically led by adult social services, with a trend towards the use of volunteers during in the 1990s, and more recently there has been a movement towards the commissioning of services from the private sector

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(http://www.appropriateadult.org.uk/index.php/policy/vulnerable-adults). This has led to an incoherent and inconsistent system of national provision which cannot be relied upon to fully meet the needs of service users.

Drawing upon qualitative research undertaken with custody officers and Appropriate Adult volunteers, this chapter examines the impact of austerity upon the provision of support for 'Vulnerable Adults' within police custody and the challenges experienced by custody officers in ensuring those entering the custody suite receive the necessary protection to safeguard their rights. In framing the discussion contained here it is important to note that the authors reject the concept of 'vulnerability' as representing a deficit approach and where the phrase 'vulnerable' or 'vulnerability' is employed it is reflective of PACE (1984) and not of the standpoint of the authors.

In this chapter, it is argued that austerity measures introduced in England and Wales since the onset of the 2008 recession have greatly increased the demands on available resources. The result is an unsatisfactory picture where 'vulnerable' people cannot be assured of receiving the support that they need and deserve, where evidential requirements are difficult to meet and where neoliberal ideals have replaced welfare concerns as the driving force behind decisions relating to provision of services.

Methodology and Research Site

This study uses a mixed method design, triangulating qualitative data. The use of a mixed methodology allows for the inclusion of data from a range of sources in order to ensure that the findings are comprehensive and are robust (Denzin 1970). It is to be expected that 'due to demands placed on criminal justice organisations and the necessity for secrecy about some operational activities, obtaining data can sometimes prove difficult' (Crowther-Dowey and Fussey 2013: 207) and so data was sought from alternative perspectives in order to ensure that some useful analysis could be conducted, and so that potential bias in the findings could be reduced (Silverman 2004).

This study outlines the policy context of austerity policing, the nature and development of the Appropriate Adult role, and the impact of both austerity measures and narratives of 'vulnerability' for people who are in need of support during their time in custody.

The findings presented here draw upon publicly available reports, policy documents and the findings of previous research, alongside data gathered via a qualitative online survey conducted with ten Appropriate Adult volunteer respondents, interviews with two Appropriate Adult volunteer respondents, a focus group with three Appropriate Adult volunteer respondents, and interviews with eight custody sergeants which have been conducted force-wide across a single police force area and across a range of shifts.

With a population of 1.4 million and 623,061 households, the force area in which the primary research is conducted operates is extensive, spanning over 2000 square miles, and contains six local authority areas, encompassing vast rural areas, two cities and three densely inhabited urban conurbations. The 2011 Census registered over 94% of the population as white, and 5.43% of the population from BAME communities. Thirty-two percent of the population is aged 20–44 and 18% are is 65 and over. There are significant pockets of deprivation across the force area, including one local authority district included within the 10% most deprived in the country (as measured by the 2015 Index of Deprivation) and, at the time of writing, levels of unemployment were significantly higher than the national average.

Despite losing 860 officers and almost 1000 police staff since 2010, the force, as of March 2017, has maintained one of the highest ratios of police officers per 100,000 head of population in England and Wales and close to 3000 officers employed in frontline roles (Allen and Uberoi 2017). With respect to demand on police services, estimates by the force police crime commissioner's office indicate that the force receives over 500,000 calls and over 800 non-emergency calls, and reports almost 1200 incidents with over 250 crimes recorded per day. Non-crime demands involving individuals with mental health issues are also significant with daily estimates at 25 incidents and undertake one place of safety order under s.136 of the Mental Health Act (MHA) (1983).

The force currently has four major custody suites following a recent rationalisation of custody provision, although at the time of writing only three were operational, and benefits from several satellite temporary suites that can be used in exceptional circumstances. A joint inspection by HMIP and HMIC (2014) calculated that 56,840 individuals had been detained in custody suites across the force area between January 2013 and 2014. The report highlighted specific areas requiring attention relevant to the welfare of vulnerable adults, including: inadequacies regarding monitoring and evaluation owing to a combination of paper based and computer based records being used, inconsistent quality assurance processes including handovers and cross referencing of records and CCTV, and a formulaic approach to risk assessment. With respect to the treatment of detainees and conditions within the suites, the inspection (HMIC 2014) commended custody staff for the respect and consideration afforded to vulnerable detainees, when their vulnerability was apparent, but warned that there was a risk that more complex cases of vulnerability could be missed and there was scope for greater sensitivity towards the privacy needs of vulnerable individuals.

Policing in Austerity

Historically, the police organisation has been accustomed to significant and sustained investment from national government, as indicated in the doubling of public spending on policing from £6.45 billion in 1994/1995 to £13.7 billion 2008/2009 (HMIC 2010). This period of investment ended following a Comprehensive Spending Review (HM Treasury 2010) when the police, alongside other public sector agencies, were confronted with a cumulative 20% reduction in central government spending on policing between March 2011 and March 2015, amounting to a £2.42 billion saving in public spending, and continue to be subjected to an expansive programme of budgetary constraints and efficiency savings. In some respects, government directives for efficiency savings and careful fiscal management were not new to the police, since they had already been subject to managerialist policy directives designed to ease the administrative burden and to promote greater

efficiency, effectiveness and value for money (Sheehy Inquiry 1993; Home Office 1995; Cockcroft and Beattie 2009), and widespread adherence to the principles of new public management (Savage 2007; Carlisle and Loveday 2007). However, the scale of reductions in public spending under the current period of austerity was unprecedented and presented a unique set of challenges to the police (HMIC 2012). Part of the solution to achieving savings was to be achieved by 'cutting out time wasting bureaucracy' (HM Treasury 2010: 54), with further savings achieved by removing central targets, supporting professional responsibility and restructuring 'back office' roles (HM Treasury 2010).

Under this altered policing landscape, the police were expected to improve quality of service provision but to deliver more with fewer resources (Millie and Bullock 2012). To counteract criticism, assurances that the frontline would be protected from budget cuts were accompanied by a new discourse of austerity policing (Brogden and Ellison 2013), which presented the period of austerity as an opportunity to review methods of working and to work smarter (Millie and Bullock 2013; HMIC 2014).

There is growing evidence to suggest that police are spending an increasing amount of time dealing with vulnerable people, particularly those with mental health needs, both as victims and as suspects (Cotton and Coleman 2010; Godfredson et al. 2010; Quinn et al. 2016). There is a commitment to improving partnership working and the co-ordination and availability of mental health services (Department of Health 2014). Cuts to other public services mean that the police remit for service is paramount and that the police are often called out to respond to incidents that are more related to safeguarding and unrelated to crime.

As mental health services also adjust to austerity and the provision of protective and treatment based interventions contracts, police are frequently called in the first instance to respond to individuals with mental health issues in distress (Cummins and Jones 2010). Research conducted by McLean and Marshall (2010) with Scottish frontline officers indicates that officers experience high levels of frustration when responding to incidents involving those experiencing mental distress when there is no basis for arrest, when they feel their role has been

misused due to a lack of available support, and when there are no positive outcomes for the individual concerned. For the most part, these officers expressed a preference towards diversion but recognised that 'gaps in services or failures in collaborative working could result in inappropriate detention in police cells' (McLean and Marshall 2010: 68). Police contact, therefore, whether police-initiated or otherwise, all too frequently leads to vulnerable individuals finding themselves caught up within the criminal justice system (Bradley Report 2009).

'Vulnerable Adults': Policy Context

People who are identified as being 'vulnerable' may be more likely than the wider population to be drawn into criminality, may not understand the nature of proceedings against them (Herrington and Roberts 2012) and in interview settings may provide information that is unreliable and inaccurate (Medford et al. 2003) or may provide socially desirable responses rather than the truth (Herrington and Roberts 2012); they are therefore in need of additional protections when coming into contact with the Criminal Justice System.

Recent research further indicates that 'mentally vulnerable' people in custody did not understand what was happening to them or why, said that they felt alone, did not know who to turn to for support and were uncertain about what they should say and do (Hyun et al. 2014). Despite discussions relating to evidential requirements outlined above, the authors here proceed on the basis that *there is* a need for Appropriate Adult services to emotionally support people who have been identified as being 'vulnerable' throughout a difficult and stressful experience.

There are a number of pieces of legislation that outline relevant definitions and rights; the MHA 1983 Section 1(2) states that 'mental disorder means any disorder or disability of the mind'. Sections 6 and 15 of the Equalities Act 2010 define disability as 'a physical or mental impairment which has a substantial and long-term adverse effect on the individual's ability to carry out normal day-to-day activities'. Article 6 of the Human Rights Act 1998 (right to a fair trial) sets out the right for

a suspect to be informed, in a way that the person understands and in detail, the nature of the accusation against them.

The Mental Capacity Act (2005) sets out five principles:

- presumption of capacity;
- the right for individuals to be supported to make their own decisions;
- the right to make 'unwise' decisions;
- best interests; and
- least restrictive intervention.

The Care Act (2014: 192) states that 'everyone is entitled to the protection of the law and access to justice'.

Although there is no single legislative instrument which can be pointed to that covers all of the considerations that must be made in ascertaining need, it is clear that the overall picture, when all are taken together, is that there is an expectation that people who are defined as 'vulnerable' are entitled to some special consideration in order to ensure that they are treated fairly and are able to access justice.

History and Development of the Appropriate Adult Safeguard for Vulnerable Adults

'Mentally vulnerable' people have been found to be at 'increased risk of providing information which is inaccurate, unreliable or misleading' (Gudjonsson 2010). In order to mitigate or reduce this risk the Appropriate Adult is provided as a safeguard. The evidential need for an Appropriate Adult to be present during questioning has been traced back to the so called 'Confait Confessions' procured amid alleged inappropriate questioning and police brutality [*R v Lattimore, Salih and Leighton*, 1975]: the murder convictions which had been secured in the Maxwell Confait murder case were quashed on appeal, as it was decided that there had been a breach of Judges' Rules (Bath et al. 2015) (see also Price and Caplan 1977; Cummins 2011).

The report of the Royal Commission on Criminal Procedure (RCCP 1981) was the forerunner of, and informed the development of PACE

(1984) and the associated codes of practice, it aimed ultimately to achieve 'fairness, openness and workability' (Brown 1997: 1–2). The Appropriate Adult safeguard for 'vulnerable adults' was formally introduced in 1984 under PACE. The requirement for a provision is contained within the codes of practice rather than the Act itself and in particular within code C which sets out the Code of Practice for the detention, treatment and questioning of persons by Police Officers (As amended Feb 2017. See Sections 10(d) and 11(c)).

The PACE (1984) guidance notes outline the nature of 'mental vulnerability:

> 'Mentally vulnerable' applies to any detainee who, because of their mental state or capacity, may not understand the significance of what is said, of questions or of their replies. 'Mental disorder' is defined in the MHA 1983, section 1(2) as 'any disorder or disability of mind'. When the custody officer has any doubt about the mental state or capacity of a detainee, that detainee should be treated as mentally vulnerable and an [Appropriate Adult] called PACE 1984, notes for guidance: 88.

Despite clear guidance within PACE (1984) and elsewhere regarding the nature of 'vulnerability' and the associated entitlement to Appropriate Adult support, there is currently a question over who should be responsible for provision of Appropriate Adult services. There is a statutory obligation for provision for juveniles under the Crime and Disorder Act (1998), which does not extend to adults.

> Section 38 of the Crime and Disorder Act 1998 places a statutory duty on local authorities, via YOTs, to 'ensure the provision of persons to act as appropriate adults to safeguard the interests of children and young persons detained or questioned by police officers'. This is the only definition of the AA role that appears in legislation. There is no equivalent statutory of AAs for vulnerable adult suspects. (Bath et al. 2015: 8)

Early case law following PACE (1984) supported the evidential requirement for an Appropriate Adult to be present when a 'vulnerable' person is in custody, and in particular during questioning (see for example *R v Dutton* [1988]; *Morse and Others* [1990]; Cox [1991]; Kenny [1993]),

however later cases questioned this requirement and asserted the right of the courts to make this decision based upon the nature of the vulnerability and who was present at the time of the interview (see for example cases of *DPP v Cornish* [1997]; R v Law-Thompson [1997]; and R v Gill [2004]).

Adult social services, who historically have provided the majority of Appropriate Adult provision, remain the largest funder of Appropriate Adult services nationally. This provision is currently under severe pressure due to austerity led budget cuts; Appropriate Adult services are not prioritised in budget planning as they are a non-statutory service (appropriateadult.org.uk).

It is recommended that police forces should:

> Ensure that the rights and interests of people with learning disabilities in police custody are safeguarded through the provision of good quality Appropriate Adult schemes that are available both during and outside normal working hours. (HMIP 2014: 48)

As there is a requirement that the Appropriate Adult be independent from the police, it is difficult to see how the police are able to 'provide' a scheme. There is a clear expectation that the police should not proceed with evidence gathering without an Appropriate Adult being present once a person in custody is identified as vulnerable, however, there is less clarity around who should fund and provide the service. Service users can be deemed to be 'vulnerable' for a number of reasons, including learning difficulties or disabilities, or 'mental disorder', which often overlap with other complex needs including drug and alcohol support needs and financial difficulty. It has been suggested that multiple needs are more commonly found than single needs (Finn et al. 2000) and so the role of the Appropriate Adult in supporting a person identified as being vulnerable is characterised by complexity.

The Appropriate Adult Role Under Austerity

The purpose of the Appropriate Adult according to PACE goes beyond merely observing—the role is to advise, to identify whether the

interview is fairly conducted, and to ease and facilitate communication (PACE 1984: 38).

The Home Office (2003) defined the main responsibilities of an Appropriate Adult as being:

- to support, advise and assist the detained person, particularly while they are being questioned;
- to observe whether the police are acting properly, fairly and with respect for the rights of the detained person. And to tell them if you think they are not;
- to assist with communication between the detained person and the police; and
- to ensure that the detained person understands their rights and that you have a role in protecting their rights.

Often the only measure of performance used to evaluate the impact and effectiveness of Appropriate Adult schemes related to time, and there was a lack of focus on the nature of the support that was provided. 'The availability of, and time taken to respond to a police request for an [Appropriate Adult], were of primary importance to [Appropriate Adult] service managers, commissioners and police staff' (Jessiman and Cameron 2017: 248). This is in contradiction to the ways in which service users and Appropriate Adults evaluate the effectiveness of an Appropriate Adult service which highlight the training, professionalism and personal skills and qualities of individual Appropriate Adults.

Service users are unequivocal in their view that Appropriate Adults must be sufficiently trained in order to carry out their role effectively. There is no current requirement that volunteer or professional Appropriate Adults are trained (Bath et al. 2015). National Appropriate Adult Network members are provided with training materials and national standards for minimum levels of training; despite this, Appropriate Adults are often not sufficiently trained (Durcan et al. 2014; HMIC 2014).

Jessiman and Cameron (2017) identify a range of desirable Appropriate Adult attributes from a service user perspective. These include the need to be calm/calming, caring, professional, knowledgeable,

confident, and confidential. The role includes to just 'be there', and to help the service user to avoid feelings of humiliation and mockery.

> Vulnerable adults want help to understand what is happening, communicate effectively and emotional support from a sympathetic and trusted. [Appropriate Adult] (Jessiman and Cameron 2017)

Bartlett and Sandland (2003) identify confusion about the nature of the Appropriate Adult role, with different stakeholders having conflicting perspectives about what the role entails, and what characteristics make for an effective Appropriate Adult. It is argued by White (2002) that extending legal privilege to the Appropriate Adult would help to give some clarity to the nature of the role. Bath et al. (2015) identify a general understanding amongst service users that the role of the Appropriate Adult was to 'help', although the perception was that this was essentially limited to provision of support with communication in interviews. In terms of personal attributes a wider range was identified, but of key importance to service users was level of training, as well as independence, confidentiality and the ability to be non-judgemental. Appropriate Adults in Bath et al. (2015) suggested that in order to carry out their role it was necessary for them to have the appropriate procedural knowledge, an understanding of the nature of the needs of the service users, and the role of others in the police station. Appropriate Adults have also identified their role as being to protect welfare, to provide emotional support, to ensure physical needs are met and to ensure due process (Jessiman and Cameron 2017). They highlight the importance of communication skills, appropriate boundaries and provision of support (Bath et al. 2015).

In practice, operating within the constraints of austerity budgets makes it difficult to ensure that an individual can access an Appropriate Adult at all (it is known that Appropriate Adult services cannot be accessed in all cases, see Bath et al. [2015]; Jessiman and Cameron [2017]): let alone stipulate levels of training or skill, personal attributes, or who the appropriate adult should be. There are existing instructions to police that trained/experienced individuals are likely to be more satisfactory than family members, however it is stated that 'if the detainee

prefers a relative to a better qualified stranger or objects to a particular person their wishes should, if practicable, be respected (Home Office 2003)' (PACE Code C, paragraph 1D).

Primary Research Findings

Perceptions of Responsibility for Provision of an Appropriate Adult Service

The support provided to 'vulnerable' adults in custody needs to be understood against a backdrop of austerity in the police organisation. Custody officers have an acute duty of care to detainees requiring intensive observation, continual risk assessment and considerations of welfare whilst in custody. Nationally, austerity pressures have described as being 'intense' (Stevens Report 2014: 76).

It was clear within custody officer accounts that the occupational pressures within custody suites had amplified under austerity whereby resources are becoming increasingly stretched including human resources:

> I think the problem is at the moment I'm just telling you how it is, erm, we're so…, we're fighting fires…out there there's meant to be four sergeants … well two of our sergeants are in [name of custody suite] tonight so instead of four sergeants being there…we're at fifty percent staffing and we've got four detention officers there and we should have seven. (CO5)

Working with such reduced capacity not only makes operational duties more demanding, but also accentuates the importance of accessing appropriate adults for 'vulnerable' adults under their care. Custody officers operating within such an environment rely on Appropriate Adult services in order that 'detainees' are dealt with as quickly and efficiently as possible, whilst still meeting codes of practice for fair treatment and evidential requirements within their investigations.

Whilst satisfied with the professionalism and support provided by volunteer appropriate adults, custody officers were unanimous that the

service should not be voluntarily provided, but should be placed on a statutory footing in order to minimise distress and to uphold the rights of the individual.

> I think it should be something that is provided and is part of statute… if we bring someone in we need to provide all the services to be able to deal with it. (CO2)

In order to satisfy Articles 6 and 7 of the Human Rights Act, officers must ensure detention lasts for no longer than is necessary. Therefore, uncertainty regarding the provision of Appropriate Adult services undermines the fulfilment of this obligation. Such concerns regarding safeguarding the rights of vulnerable suspects are reflected in the following excerpts;

> If we've got somebody in custody who is innocent for argument's sake… and they are here because somebody has identified them as being responsible for something…they have a right to be dealt with as soon as possible. (CO3)
>
> These people do have human rights and they've got a right to freedom of liberty, and it's been taken away from them, but you know, it's a limited right, it's a qualified right and we've got to make sure that we deal with it as quickly as possible and it's the least intrusive that we can actually do. (CO2)

Therefore, whilst officers agree that the responsibility for locating an Appropriate Adult is with the police organisation to uphold their duty of care, the responsibility for procuring and providing the service rested with social services, feasibly due to their historic responsibility for doing so. Officers therefore perceive the lack of provision as being the responsibility of the local authority: '…them [social services] not turning out…is a failure in their duty of care' (CO3); 'Social services …aren't that helpful… you know so a lot of times you phone people and you get next to no help' (CO4).

Leaving aside financial constraints, placing responsibility on a particular local authority is problematic where a police force area covers several local authorities. This is because of a lack of agreement regarding who is obliged to respond, as indicated in the excerpts below:

> You've got three different authorities and you're thinking who does what, and you lose track on who is supposed to do what and then…. you've got that cross border thing, so they were arrested in [names local authority] but the offence happened in [names local authority] and they'll fight each other about who's gonna come out…there's no uniformity between the authorities at all. (IN1)

The precarious provision and response of appropriate adult services, in this police force area, to requests for service reflects concerns identified by Bath et al. (2015) within 'There to Help'; responses are similarly 'patchy and ad-hoc' (Durcan et al. 2014: 18) and incoherent, and do not sufficiently assure the welfare of the 'vulnerable' adult.

Within this context volunteer schemes offer a 'safety net', providing coverage across the region, meeting service user demand and therefore helping the police to fulfil their duty of care to vulnerable adults. The current reliance upon volunteers was conceived as the 'new normal' (CO4), and a symptom of the 'volunteer society' (CO3). When volunteers attend, they were perceived and experienced as being more motivated and committed to protecting the interests and responding to the needs of the individual than private or local authority providers: however, the insecure status of the local volunteering scheme and the lack of obligation within, provoked concern and anxiety amongst custody officers.

> It's in law that we have to get one, so I think that there should be a statutory provision to provide it. (IN3)

Although the volunteers are clearly very highly valued, it is described as being 'disappointing as a country' (IN2) that the provision of an essential social service is left to volunteers who have no obligation to attend. This insecurity of provision is a concern. When asked to identify who is responsible for providing Appropriate Adult services for 'vulnerable' adults the volunteers identified a range of perceived providers. This included the local police, the local authority, the Police and Crime Commissioner, volunteers, the National Appropriate Adult Network and private providers.

When asked to identify who they thought *should be* responsible for this provision, a similar range was again identified, including the police,

local authority, the PCC, and volunteers, with the significant addition here by most of the volunteers of central government, and also the notable absence here of private providers. One stated that, in her opinion, 'an appropriate adult should be a government requirement that is implemented in every police station' (V1). Volunteers recognise that the police do have responsibilities in this respect, but that the responsibility may not fully lie with the police. One states, 'as soon as someone is arrested, that person is covered by a duty of care by the police, and as such they [the police] should have some part in providing that' (V2).

Vulnerability as a Route to Accessing Resources and Welfare

'Vulnerability' in the Criminal Justice System is constructed on a basis of perceived 'inherent' characteristics, or upon situational conditions (Dunn et al. 2008). As these can be variable over time there is ambiguity regarding identification of 'vulnerability' and the need for an Appropriate Adult (Dehaghani 2016) and therefore the potential for inconsistency in the provision of support. Inherent vulnerability is also useful to the neoliberal agenda as 'presumed inherent vulnerability can function as an excuse for failing to tackle structural vulnerabilities' (Brown 2011: 318–319) or can otherwise deflect attention away from the situational and structural causes of vulnerability.

Identification as being 'vulnerable' can create an entitlement to support, however there is the need to balance this need against the disempowering nature of 'vulnerability' as a label. Volunteers identify a range of areas in which support may be needed. For example 'helping to re-word something or knowing when time out is needed due to emotional stress' (V3). 'Help to understand questions/rights/entitlements… support to ensure they are treated correctly (V4), and 'help with understanding…documents, and the caution, and what the police are asking them. You might need to clarify … giving them a bit of extra time to answer …taking more time out so that they can understand what is being said…helping them to …understand, and that their rights are being upheld, and that they understand what their rights are' (V5).

> If a person suffers from a certain addiction, medication should be given and I think they should be monitored throughout their time in custody. (V1)

De-institutionalisation and Austerity Cuts to Wider Social Provision

De-institutionalisation is perceived by Custody Officers to have had an impact upon the provision of service to people who are identified as being 'vulnerable':

> I think that many of them that would have previously been, I mean, 10, 15 years ago would be in hospitals and wards and supported are being pushed back into mainstream society … they end up here because the support is not there. (IN2)

Cummins suggests that 'one of the effects of de-institutionalisation has been to increase the contact between those with mental health problems and the Police and prison systems', and that 'individuals are physically living in the community but are denied the opportunity to be active citizens' (2010: 19). Cummins's focus is upon neo-liberal policies since the mid-1970s. The effects are keenly felt, and indeed are exaggerated under the current austerity agenda, as there have been swathing cuts to several other areas of provision. One of the volunteers provides an example of this:

> [The police] value our presence, as obviously due to austerity cuts to local government, duty social workers will no longer become involved. (V2)

Under austerity there have been cuts to welfare provision, social provision and health provision, all of which have had a disproportionate impact upon the most vulnerable in our society, and which have created new, and exacerbated existing, mental health conditions (McGrath et al. 2015). Appropriate Adults identify a broad range of issues that service users might experience, identifying social issues as well as 'inherent' characteristics as being courses of and consequences of 'vulnerability', thus demonstrating a much wider perception of 'vulnerability'

than required to meet the implications of PACE (1984) code C. They identified issues including: 'social exclusion, domestic abuse financial problems breakdown of family relations and other social welfare concerns. Suicide is a concern for some' (V6). Appropriate Adults suggest that 'often more help is needed for vulnerable people before and after custody' (V3), and they describe a lack of support in relation to wider services (V6, V1, V2) which can include, in addition to the above, information in relation to 'their mental health or addictions' (V1) 'emergency accommodation' (V2) health and medication (V2) addiction or mental health issues (V1).

Volunteers expressed regret that there are limited services available to service users and claim that they are often requested to help with issues beyond their scope because of gaps in provision, or difficulties with procuring an Appropriate Adult from other sources. This has included support to vulnerable witnesses and victims, juveniles, and in court. Ideally, for one of the volunteers, vulnerable people would be provided with a caseworker that knows them and their specific needs, 'so that the support is consistent' (V2).

Vulnerability as a Mechanism of Control and Exclusion

'Vulnerability' as a concept, and as a label, can also be understood to be problematic. It has been suggested, 'we must recognise the deficit-orientated nature of the term and its link with stigma' (Brown 2011: 319).

Vulnerability discourses are further problematised as deflecting blame from structural inequalities:

> Although they help some individuals to avoid blame for their difficulties, vulnerability discourses emphasise personal reasons for difficulties experienced by individuals, diverting attention from structural issues. Within the context of neoliberal social policy, targeting resources at 'the vulnerable' unintentionally helps to justify overall reductions in entitlements to welfare and is part of the tapestry of increasingly selective welfare systems, which undermine universal citizenship rights. (Brown 2014: 51)

Wishart (2003) and Hollomotz (2009) describe this deflection of attention away from the structural causes of vulnerability as a product of the focus upon the individual, and their individual deficiency, and so the individual is problematised rather than the society. Vulnerability is seen to connote a tragic quality, a deficiency to be pitied (Wishart 2003); it deflects attention away from the underlying generating mechanisms by which social exclusion is produces.

During the current austerity led lack of capacity, it appears that in relation to the provision of scarce resources, there is the perception of a hierarchy of vulnerability. 'Problematised' individual identities are seen as being less deserving of resources than other 'vulnerable' people (see also Green (2007) and Walklate (2011) who discuss hierarchies of vulnerability within victim populations). As one custody officer states:

> You go to the back of the queue, depending on if they are dealing with young children, you know, vulnerability, it has to be that way. (SW1)

It becomes acceptable in austere times to differentiate need based upon identity rather than level of need. In the age of austerity, it could also be the case that those vulnerable people whose behaviours are seen as more problematic might well be those who are less well served as provision is narrowed. In line with the contours of the rest of welfare provision in the UK, even vulnerability seems set to become increasingly conditional (Brown 2014: 52).

Victims who are 'vulnerable' can then be prioritised over offenders or suspected offenders who are 'vulnerable' in times when the allocation of resources are restricted due to scarcity. Drake and Henley (2014) critique the impacts of a dichotomous approach to victims and offenders and identify a clear anti-offender political rhetoric. Austerity cuts can make it acceptable then to prioritise the vulnerable victim of crime, but not the vulnerable offender, who although deserving, is now categorised as *less* deserving of the support of society. We are seeing a return to Victorian notions of the 'deserving' and 'undeserving' poor as were identified by Seebohm Rowntree in 1901.

In addition, according to Brown (2012):

> The increased use of the idea of 'vulnerability' in social policy under New Labour and the Coalition could be seen to be part of the trend towards the characterisation of welfare as a 'gift' rather than a 'right'. (Brown 2012: 48)

Further, the phrase 'Appropriate Adult' and the requirement that one must be provided is loaded with connotations that the vulnerable adults are themselves not deemed 'appropriate' or are somehow not 'adult' enough. This represents a deficiency model and has clear implications for citizenship and rights: 'according to the moral undertones in the 'Big Society', 'the vulnerable' citizen tends not seen as potential or actual contributors to shared public life' (Brown 2012: 48).

'Vulnerable adults' are generally referred to as 'detainees' in conversations with Custody Officers. This may suggest that the main concern of the custody officer is that the person is detained, and not whether they are 'vulnerable' or whether they are 'appropriate' or whether they are an 'adult'. In this way, the custody officers do not contribute to narratives of vulnerability as deficit and cause for control and intervention. They focus upon the processes of detention, and were found to treat each person in detention as an individual with complex and intersectional needs, of which 'vulnerability' is only one aspect.

In the case of vulnerable adults in custody it is notable that no reference is made to any form of offender status such as criminal, offender, perpetrator, suspect or detainee by any of the volunteers—rather the service users are referred to as clients, service users, or just as 'people'. Some talk of 'vulnerable' people, or 'vulnerable' adults. This reflects the NAAN standards that they adhere to, the training that they have received, the language in PACE (1984) and their own desire to support those people that are seen as 'vulnerable.' They are operating within, rather than actively producing the neo-liberal 'vulnerability' discourse.

Conclusion

There are clear tensions between upholding welfare and the procedural demands of policing, the strain between which is enhanced due to increased demands upon Custody suites under austerity. The system

as a whole is 'under extraordinary and unprecedented financial pressure' (Stevens Report 2014: 62). Austerity creates mental health issues, which, coupled with deinstitutionalisation and cuts to wider support networks, have increased the pressure on resources.

The language used within the narratives of support and dependency under austerity mean that 'vulnerability' labels have complex impacts for individuals. '"Vulnerability" seems to be used to indicate risk posed *by* certain individuals as well as *to* them' (Brown 2011: 317). 'Vulnerability' highlights a person as being in need of support, and can therefore be used as a justification for resource. 'Vulnerability', and in particular the need for someone to act as your 'Appropriate Adult' can also be disempowering, and has impacts for citizenship and rights within a neo-liberal discourse which values autonomy, but sees dependency as problematic. There is a need to balance empowerment and support, perhaps by reframing the narrative (Dunn et al. 2008).

There is currently a 'patchwork quilt' of services for adults who have been labelled as vulnerable and who are in custody. The provision nationally is incoherent, insufficient and does not assure the welfare of the 'vulnerable' adult. In many areas there is no provision at all, and where there is provision it is unregulated, funding sources are diverse, and often reliant upon good will rather than statutory obligation for provision.

The neo-liberal agenda since the mid 1970s has meant that dependency is increased, whilst being simultaneously demonised. Despite a lack of statutory provision local authorities, private providers, volunteers, and Police and Crime Commissioners have supported provision of services where possible. Austerity measures mean that their ability to breach this void is compromised. Despite the clear need to provide a coherent, effective and regulated service for 'vulnerable adults', this is unlikely to happen in the near future.

In the area in which this research took place there is a functional and operationally effective scheme, staffed by volunteers, that is highly valued by Police Officers. Despite being very positive about the volunteer Appropriate Adult service, Police Officers recognise the rights of their 'detainees', they reveal anxiety about the voluntary nature of provision, and express concern that the long-term future of the service is

not assured. The provision of a clear and consistent national service is urgently needed. Under austerity the needs of a problematised group have not been prioritised. It is time to rethink the nature of this problematisation, and for us all to recognise that the problem is social, it is structural, and its remedy urgently requires statutory implements and financial commitments to even begin to address the issue.

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Index

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