

Edited by
**Philomena Essed, Karen Farquharson,
Kathryn Pillay and Elisa Joy White**

RELATING WORLDS OF RACISM

**Dehumanisation, Belonging,
and the Normativity of
European Whiteness**



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Kathryn Pillay • Elisa Joy White
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Editors

Philomena Essed
Antioch University
Yellow Springs, OH, USA

Karen Farquharson
University of Melbourne
Parkville, VIC, Australia

Kathryn Pillay
School of Social Sciences
University of KwaZulu-Natal
Durban, South Africa

Elisa Joy White
Department of African American and
African Studies
University of California at Davis
Davis, CA, USA

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Preface

Populist views that foreground Whiteness as the formative criterion for belonging in contemporary societies significantly underpin current political and social discourse in various regions of the world. Whether cloaked in anti-immigration rhetoric such as Australian approaches to immigration detention, or discourses of security masking anti-Muslim racism as is currently occurring in the United States, the implicit yet often masked engagement with racism represents a legacy of colonial, white supremacist, racial and cultural hierarchies that persist in contemporary times. This centralisation of Whiteness in notions of belonging and the construction of the European as the universal human, marginalises Blackness in particular.

Old and new forms of dehumanisation continue to reinforce European rooted hierarchies of races representing Black lives and ways of being as less human. Whether Blackness is expressed or perceived culturally, socially, or phenotypically, the continued devaluing of individuals and communities perceived or identifying as Black is manifest in a variety of arenas, which include anti-immigration policies, violent policing, profiling of individuals under the guise of national security, aesthetics of culture and physical appearance, and curtailed access to resources. Starting at the end of the 20th century, global proliferations of biotechnological techniques facilitated the return of never-gone ways of racialised thinking about bodies, health, morality and safety. The centuries old stereotype of Blackness which relates to wildness being tamed and subjected to

surveillance lives on. And so do forms of resistance. Patterns of racism influence and reinforce each other across locations and nations. Individuals and institutions can identify in terms of racist ideologies across borders, but also in terms of racism as experience. Antiracism knows no borders either. Critical scholars, activists and forms of resistance influence each other globally. For these and other reasons contributions to this volume were selected in view of enabling readers to find recognition and relate to developments across nations and peoples.

The global reach of 21st century Black liberation movements such as #BlackLivesMatter indicates the prevalence and relatedness of contemporary anti-Black racism across local communities. Despite decades of struggle for social justice and dignity, racism continues to be a pressing social issue and, quite significantly, racism emerges and extends from cultural, social and political systems in which anti-Blackness finds its core. Indeed there has been a backlash against policies to promote equity in many nations. Anti-Black, anti-refugee and anti-Muslim racism in the United States, Europe, Australia, South Africa and other places are all part of ongoing patterns of racism that, while being context-specific, are related and share key features that continue to place targeted groups, in particular African descent and indigenous populations, at the bottom of racialised social hierarchies. While certainly not suggesting a hierarchy of bad and worse racisms, the contemporary obsessive European and US racialisation of religion in the name of anti-terrorism also enables more open forms of anti-Black racism. In this context the term *Afrophobia* has been introduced recently in various European circles of activism and scholarship. While 'race' is a social construction, the material effects of racism have profound and lasting impacts on individual lives. As global movements of people increase, ongoing colonial anti-Black discourses that contribute to the globalisation of racism become reinforced and further entrenched.

The title of this volume is *Relating Worlds of Racism*. We aim to do just that in this volume, showing how racism trajectories and manifestations in different locations relate to and influence each other. In light of this the collection performs two tasks. First, it works to unmask and foreground ways in which notions of European Whiteness have found form in a variety of global contexts that continue to sustain racism as an operational norm resulting in exclusion, violence, humiliations, human rights negations, isolation and limited degrees of citizenship for individuals who are not

racialised as White. The chapters in this book specifically implicate European Whiteness – whether attempting to reflect, negate, or obtain it – in social structures that facilitate and normalise racism. Second, the book interrogates the dehumanisation of Blackness, arguing that dehumanisation enables the continuation of racism in White dominated societies. Our chapters explore instances of dehumanisation across different contexts, highlighting that although the forms of dehumanisation may be locally specific, the outcomes are continually negative for those racialised as Black. Dehumanisation can be absolute, as in the animalisation of Blackness; it can also be relative as in equating being Black with a lesser cultural, social or psychological degree of being human, thereby normalising (imagined) characteristics of Whiteness as the epitome of humanity. The politicisation of individual lives turned into faceless, nameless, feeling-less and human-less refugees on populist governing agenda's across, in particular, the economically rich nations, continues to feed this trend.

Unlike most volumes, which focus on either one context or a comparison of two or three locales, this volume extends the analysis of racism beyond Europe and the United States, and, when considering the west, brings forth fresh perspectival examinations of the extent and manifestation of racism in ways that have not often been explored in related literature. The volume includes contributions from North America, Western and Eastern Europe, Africa, South America and Australia.

Taken together, the chapters argue that while anti-Black racism is enacted in different ways in different contexts, it shares key elements everywhere that maintain and reinforce racist ideologies: beliefs in racial hierarchy, positioning of Black peoples at the bottom of the racial hierarchy, humiliations, and well entrenched structures that reinforce European Whiteness as the desirable norm. Fundamentally, anti-Black racism relies on the implicit dehumanisation of the 'Black other' through hierarchies and practices with far-reaching effects on global communities that are not racialised as White. The two operate in relation to each other, maintaining colonialist racial hierarchies in our post-colonial times. The volume is organised across two related themes. Part one explores 'Racism and the normativity of European Whiteness'; and part two interrogates 'Racism and the dehumanisation of the imagined Black'. Together they provide an innovative and useful lens into both the shared mechanisms of racism across contexts and the specificities of local racisms.

Part I: Racism and the Normativity of European Whiteness

The eight chapters in part one explore how the normativity of European Whiteness contributes to racism in Africa, Mexico, Australia, Eastern and Western Europe and the United States. Each chapter highlights a specific example of Whiteness and its relationship to racism.

In Chap. 1 Moses Ochonu sets the scene of an alternative way of examining the ‘normativity of European Whiteness’ as we see how it persists in a community that is predominantly racialised as Black. Ochonu links postcolonial systems of privilege, identification and social hierarchies that emerge from colonisation with contemporary African social practices. He argues that this historical racist legacy that links Black moral character and conformation to White standards of respectability with civilisation and worth continues to shape contemporary African society, maintaining ideologies of White supremacy in Black societies. This chapter highlights the ways in which colonial legacies continue to maintain the normativity of European Whiteness in the post-colony:

Racial pathologies in Africa often take the form of what Anglophone Africans call colonial mentality, a term which refers to the conscious and subconscious mimicry of behavioural and cultural standards established by European colonisers, European expatriates, and other perceived agents of Euro-American modernity. Anglophone Africans use the rubric of colonial mentality to express or lament many practices, attitudes, and states of mind.

In this way, Whiteness shapes experiences, even when there are few White people present. Danielle Boaz then moves us into a more direct consideration of Whiteness through exploring the conversion by white people to minority religions and the interrogation thereof by the United States legal system. By examining four of the most significant cases related to religious freedom in the United States in the last forty years, Boaz reveals how the court regulates Whiteness in an attempt to rescue “innocent [white] victims” from religious practices often regarded as

uncivilised, and in opposition to religious practices from the West, arguing that decision making by the court in these free exercise cases continue to “hinge on the intersections of race and acceptable spiritual practices”.

Kathryn Pillay moves us out of an exclusive Black/White binary through an examination of the ‘Indian problem’ in South Africa. South Africa provides an interesting case as it remained overtly organised around White supremacist apartheid racial ideologies through most of its post-colonial period. Thus, the norms described by Ochonu as implicitly valorising Whiteness in other African nations were organising principles and policies in South Africa as well. By unpacking the management of ‘Indians’ in the early 20th century, Pillay is able to shed light on the continued contemporary racist othering of South Africans of ‘Indian’ descent. She critiques the persistence of racial classification in post-apartheid South Africa as a way of maintaining White privilege at the expense of other groups.

While Pillay’s engagement with the perceptions of ‘indigeneity’ in the South African context provides an insight into the more invidious impacts of such claims to indigeneity, Sharon Fuller in Chap. 4 highlights empowering claims to indigeneity by a negatively racialised ‘other’ who is not considered ‘of the land’. Reading Pillay and then Fuller provides a fascinating opportunity to consider how circumstances that are prima-facie conditionally similar, can be so dissimilar or offer different power-related outcomes when one interjects the condition of Whiteness as normative. Fuller demonstrates that while western narratives of Blackness locate people of African descent within the “realm of the primitive” the Gulla Geechee in opposition to this, construct themselves as powerful, remaining “steadfast in pursuits of self-determination”. Pillay and Fuller illustrate how racism has similar dynamics across very different contexts.

Ian Law and Nikolay Zakharov then take us out of the positionality ‘of colour’ to consider the function of European Whiteness in navigating racial hierarchies and sometimes marginal spaces of perceived Whiteness. This chapter interrogates how “new nationhood projects” in post-Soviet states, together with significant socio-economic and political processes

contribute to the continuing trajectory of racism in Russia and the deliberate “investment” in Whiteness. It further highlights links between Russian and eastern racism, and western racisms.

Law and Zakharov’s tracking of the development of racial categorisations in Eastern Europe is particularly interesting when juxtaposed with Linnete Manrique’s examination of racial categorisation in the ‘mestizaje’ identity construct or trope persistently manifest in Mexico in Chap. 6. Bringing us into the realm of media studies, Manrique conducts an analysis of *Crónica de castas*, a Mexican television show that chronicles daily experiences of racism and classism. She argues that *Crónica de castas* challenges the official Mexican racial ideology of *mestizaje* (defined as racial and cultural mixture), highlighting how *mestizaje* is underpinned by a desire for Whiteness. Despite the very different postcolonial context of Mexico from those discussed in the previous chapters, and the different mechanisms by which Whiteness is reinforced as the normative category, its dominance nevertheless persists.

In Chap. 7 we move from Mexico to Australia and an exploration of how racism is managed in junior sport. Karen Farquharson, Ramón Spaaij, Ruth Jeanes, Sean Gorman and Dean Lusher examine how diverse junior sports clubs attempt to protect their players from racism through informal means, such as negotiating with other clubs immediately after matches. While less stressful for the children experiencing racism, these informal means are also largely ineffective. The chapter highlights the challenges of enacting antiracist efforts in a context where racism is at times seen as a legitimate sporting tactic.

After considering the purchase of Whiteness through the lens of sport in Australia, we move to Chap. 8, Alina Rzepnikowska’s examination of Polish migrants and the fluidity of social capital corresponding to racialised Polish identities in the UK and Spain. This final chapter of Part One, identifies that Polish migrants’ access to the privilege of Whiteness is contingent upon whether their European status is perceived as marginal or valued as negatively/positively foreign. European identities either afford access to the privilege of Whiteness or become a close cousin to Blackness. This, of course, also moves us to the next section.

Part II: Racism and the Dehumanisation of the Imagined Black

Part two explores racism and dehumanisation in practice. The contributions highlight that the mechanisms of dehumanisation are similar in Northern Europe, Western Europe, South Africa and the United States. In her contribution in Chap. 9, Susann Samples draws on the German 19th century construction of the African colonised native and 20th century visual culture of Black face representations. The period of German colonialism was brief compared to other European countries, but profound in its impact of dehumanising Africans. Samples updates these narratives and objects to address a ‘blackface mentality’ in the context of the history of black face in the US and the continued acceptance of this phenomenon in contemporary EU formations of multiculturalism. The relational configuration of worlds of racism can also be found in the way current global businesses serve racist ideology. German consumers, influenced by US media, select black face attributes that mimic old US African American racial stereotypes, and current rap and urban culture:

Kultfaktor, a subdivision of Amazon.de, sells a large variety of blackface-related articles. For 2.99 Euro, one can purchase a jet-black cream that is for the *Gesicht- und Körperfarbe* (“face and body color,”) and one can emphasize the stereotypically large and wide lips by applying white or red coloring.

Though German science – which included the zoo-like exhibition of African bodies as well as the study of live and dead African bodies to prove White racial superiority – was common throughout Europe, German racial ideologies had a particular impact across its own borders. For instance, Samples quotes Hegel’s denigrating stance that Africa has “no history” and “no movement and development”. While deeply humiliating to Black people in Europe, the dehumanisation of Blackness also holds implicitly the impetus for contemporary Black power affirmations in Germany.

Jeffrey Barnes' Chap. 10 then provides a comparative understanding of formations of Blackness and how they operate in well-known articulations and conditions of racial hierarchy (i.e. Apartheid) as compared to determinations of ethno-religious binaries that are not often examined through the lens of dehumanisation via the proximity to Blackness (and related 'othering') in relation to geographical and spatial rights to belonging (i.e. Israel/Palestine). In his examination of the Israel and Palestine relationship, Barnes presents a salient and provocative epistemological consideration, as he states:

It is worth raising the difficult moral question as to whether or not it is ethical to practice discrimination in the name of security and the legal question as to whether or not security considerations exempt a state from the precepts of the apartheid convention.

Anne de Jong then employs three key snapshots in Chap. 11 – a speech at a Gaza demonstration at the Hague, an open letter regarding Black Pete and Saint Nickolas, and an anti-racist activist's lecture – to “underline the complex ambiguous relation between racism and anti-racism as a contested power-filled and changing process within the same (trans) national space.” Reading de Jong after Barnes and Samples provides a fresh means of reflecting on these intersecting questions of Blackness, skewed representations of Blackness, and Muslim and Arab identities that are at the core of the countering of dehumanisation manifest across current social movements and political advocacy.

Moving from the chapters that include examinations of Blackface also sets up Monique Charles' examination, in Chap. 12, of the Grime music movement in its function as asserting Blackness and political agency in the UK while interrogating the taking on or appropriation of Blackness in popular cultural milieu (of which grime is not immune). It is a test of racism, commodification and the market as Charles sees “industry bear down on an oppressed group to direct its narrative commercially.” Charles also addresses the gendered representations of Blackness as manifest in Grime and broader UK expressions of multiculturalism.

In Chap. 13 we move back to sport. Here, Delia Douglas directly considers the gendered embodiment of Blackness in relation to Serena

Williams and Brittney Griner, two women athletes that challenge alignments with dehumanising understandings of Black femininity and Black masculinity. Considering the seeming perpetual objectification and trolling of female Black bodies in sport, Douglas asserts that the placement of Williams and Griner’s “power and corporeality as outside of the frame of gender normativity must be located in the context of the histories of enslavement and imperialism.”

The previous chapters presume an engagement with racial categorisation but a common thread relating countries throughout Europe is the rejection of the notion of ‘race’ in favour of ethnicity or culture as a group characteristic. Quintessentially European Whiteness is the phenomenon of entertaining an overvalued (nonracist) national self-image, based on the myth of tolerance and the denial of racism. Ideologies of national exceptionalism feed into the belief that racism is a South African or US problem. Invariably, it takes critical scholars and activists – often young people – to challenge, identify and analyse race hierarchies and ideologies hidden behind the discourse of ‘cultural tolerance’. At the same time, as Anna Rastas, Chap. 14, shows in her contribution, ‘The Emergence of Race as a Social Category in Northern Europe,’ academia has been far from innocent. She unpacks historically anchored Nordic collaborations in the making of racist theories. Her contribution relates Nordic countries to the transnational European project where “many Nordic academics and politicians had important and active roles in establishing ideas of race and racial hierarchies in Europe”. She analyses how the exclusion and dehumanisation of Muslims, people of African descent and others categorised as other than White facilitates identification with the nation and with national belonging as indistinguishable from Whiteness. The avoidance of the notion of race does and did not prevent racial dehumanisation but becomes a greater affront rooted in the disregard for, or slow recognition of, Black individuals within spaces of Northern Europe. Rastas’ chapter strongly highlights antiracism, spearheaded by those identifying as Black or as Nonwhite. Interventions, though often based in locally experienced racism, supersede national borders in building relations of resistance, across the Nordic hemisphere and beyond, in particular through social media.

In Chap. 15, Elisa Joy White argues that – in contrast to Scandinavian countries – Ireland and Spain are nations where European Whiteness has not always been an accessible given, historically peripheralised by the UK and North-West Europe respectively. In the interest of attaining or maintaining Whiteness in spite of histories of oppression, the two nations employ policies and legal frameworks of spatial positioning that preclude the inclusion of Black individuals as equally worthy human beings; a poignant case in point are African refugees and immigrants from the African continent. Blackness can only be contained if it is *detained* in these spaces.

The very notion of Blackness is not uncontested as Ethan Johnson argues in Chap. 16. Whereas the US seems to move somewhat away from the binary (one drop rule) system to opening up for those identifying as “mixed race”, the very system of “mixing” represents an elaborate history and vocabulary in Latin America. He examines Black representations in significantly different locales (particularly in their contrasting numbers of Black presence), where both have the reputation of “racial democracy and/or political progressiveness” in each city. The chapter relates two stories of anti-Blackness, at the heart of which are poignant discursive and visual representations of “the intersection of race and sexuality”. We see Blackness through the lens of populations that assert or represent sexualised Blackness via media that are seen as either empowering or problematic.

Taken together, the contributions to this book provide innovative insights into the problematics of racism. The volume as a whole argues that the normativity of Whiteness and the dehumanisation of Blackness work to mutually reinforce racist discourses and practices. Normativity suggests only one category can belong in a society, that which is the norm. In White dominated societies, Whites are the normative group and make decisions about who else can and cannot belong. Groups that are not racialised as White may be dehumanised, making them unable to belong because they are situated as less human. Tackling racism means creating spaces of belonging for all members of society, spaces that dismantle racial hierarchies.

This volume emerged from the ‘Europe and Europe in the World: The politics of belonging and social inclusion’ Mini-Symposium at the

Council for European Studies (CES) 22nd International Conference of Europeanists (SciencesPo, 8–10 July 2015). The Mini-Symposium was organised by Trica Keaton and Karen Farquharson, and Elisa Joy White and Kathryn Pillay were participants. After the conference we were inspired to pull together cutting edge research on racism from across the globe, and so this book was conceived. We are grateful for the support of the CES for the Mini-Symposium, and particularly grateful for Trica Keaton's vision for the session, and her role in getting this volume off the ground, including inviting Philomena Essed to join as an editor. We also thank Palgrave for their support, particularly Sharla Plant, and Viktoria Adler, who compiled the manuscript for us. The volume has truly been a collaborative effort, and a pleasure to bring to fruition.

Philomena Essed
Karen Farquharson
Kathryn Pillay
Elisa Joy White

Contents

Part I Racism and the Normativity of European Whiteness	1
1 Looking for Race: Pigmented Pasts and Colonial Mentality in “Non Racial” Africa	3
<i>Moses E. Ochonu</i>	
2 Practices “Odious Among the Northern and Western Nations of Europe”: Whiteness and Religious Freedom in the United States	39
<i>Danielle N. Boaz</i>	
3 The ‘Indian’ Question: Examining Autochthony, Citizenship, and Belonging in South Africa	63
<i>Kathryn Pillay</i>	
4 Don’t Know Nothin’ ‘bout Subsistence. We Gullah! Construction of Self as Indigenous in the Americas	89
<i>Sharon Y. Fuller</i>	

5	Race and Racism in Eastern Europe: Becoming White, Becoming Western	113
	<i>Ian Law and Nikolay Zakharov</i>	
6	<i>Mestizaje</i>: The All-Inclusive Fiction	141
	<i>Linnete Manrique</i>	
7	Managing Racism on the Field in Australian Junior Sport	165
	<i>Karen Farquharson, Ramón Spaaij, Sean Gorman, Ruth Jeanes, Dean Lusher, and Jonathan Magee</i>	
8	Shifting Racialised Positioning of Polish Migrant Women in Manchester and Barcelona	191
	<i>Alina Rzepnikowska</i>	
Part II	Racism and the Dehumanisation of the Imagined Black	221
9	Black Is <i>Not</i> Beautiful: The German Myth of Race	223
	<i>Susann Therese Samples</i>	
10	A Different Apartheid: Structural, Legal, and Discursive Foundations for Comparing South Africa and Israel	245
	<i>Jeffrey John Barnes</i>	
11	Gaza, Black Face and Islamophobia: Intersectionality of Race and Gender in (Counter-) Discourse in the Netherlands	271
	<i>Anne de Jong</i>	
12	Are You Grime or Part-Time?! Reviewing Race and ‘Realness’ in Britain’s Grime Scene	299
	<i>Monique Charles</i>	

13	Dis'qualified! Serena Williams and Brittney Griner: Black Female Athletes and the Politics of the Im/Possible	329
	<i>Delia D. Douglas</i>	
14	The Emergence of Race as a Social Category in Northern Europe	357
	<i>Anna Rastas</i>	
15	Peripheralised in the Periphery: Migration, Deportation, and Detainment in Ireland and Spain	383
	<i>Elisa Joy White</i>	
16	Blackness and Racial Mixture in Portland, Oregon and Esmeraldas, Ecuador	411
	<i>Ethan Johnson</i>	
	Index	437

Contributors

Jeffrey John Barnes University of Akron, NW Canton, OH, USA

Danielle N. Boaz University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte, NC, USA

Monique Charles University of Warwick, Coventry, UK

Anne de Jong Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

Delia D. Douglas Independent Scholar, Winnipeg, MB, Canada

Philomena Essed Antioch University, Yellow Springs, OH, USA

Karen Farquharson School of Social and Political Sciences, Faculty of Arts, The University of Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia

Sharon Y. Fuller Independent Scholar, Pinole, CA, USA

Sean Gorman Independent Scholar, East Fremantle, WA, Australia

Ruth Jeanes Faculty of Education, Monash University Peninsula Campus, Frankston, VIC, Australia

Ethan Johnson Portland State University, Portland, OR, USA

Ian Law University of Leeds, Leeds, UK

Dean Lusher Social Innovation Research Institute, Swinburne University of Technology, Hawthorn, VIC, Australia

Jonathan Magee Independent Scholar, Crib Point, VIC, Australia

Linnete Manrique Goldsmiths, University of London, London, UK

Moses Ebe Ochonu Department of History, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA

Kathryn Pillay University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa

Anna Rastas University of Tampere, Tampere, Finland

Alina Rzepnikowska School of Social Sciences, The University of Manchester, Manchester, UK

Susann Therese Samples Mount Saint Mary's University, Emmitsburg, MD, USA

Ramón Spaaij College of Sport & Exercise Science, Victoria University, Footscray, VIC, Australia

Elisa Joy White Department of African American and African Studies, University of California at Davis, Davis, CA, USA

Nikolay Zakharov Södertörn University, Huddinge Municipality, Sweden

List of Figures

- Fig. 16.1 Partial view of mural “Libre por Rebelde y por Rebelde Grande” (Free Through Rebellion and Through Rebellion Great), by Artist Alberto Carcelen 421
- Fig. 16.2 Partial view of mural “Libre por Rebelde y por Rebelde Grande” (Free Through Rebellion and Through Rebellion Great), by Artist Alberto Carcelen 423
- Fig. 16.3 Partial view of mural “Libre por Rebelde y por Rebelde Grande” (Free Through Rebellion and Through Rebellion Great), by Artist Alberto Carcelen 424

Part I

Racism and the Normativity of European Whiteness



1

Looking for Race: Pigmented Pasts and Colonial Mentality in “Non Racial” Africa

Moses E. Ochonu

In this essay, I am concerned with two interlinked phenomena. The first is the variegated manifestation of socio-political and economic tropes of privilege, status, and social differentiation in which overt and covert relational codes suffused with racial semiotics and histories are implicated. The second is the connection, causal and cultural, between this racialised discursive and interactional landscape and racial projects and idioms that are either unacknowledged as racial or whose racial properties are assumed to have expired with the oppressive racial practices and encounters of a colonial past.

Mapping Africa’s imbrication in insidious racial aesthetics entails connecting postcolonial systems of identification and social differentiation, which have their ultimate origins in the discursive and social legacies of colonisation, to particular examples of far-reaching colonial racial projects, which foreground current pathologies. Much of the discussion below does this analytical mapping. The analysis is foregrounded by the contemporary ubiquity of structural, historical racism; its persistence in

M. E. Ochonu (✉)

Department of History, Vanderbilt University, Nashville, TN, USA

e-mail: moses.ochonu@vanderbilt.edu

contemporary African political economy and cultural politics; its crude tyranny; its ongoing capacity to structure social relations and allocate privileges and marginality; its tendency to devalue, discriminate, and displace those outside the Euro-American universe of whiteness; and its ability to normalise its tropes. The last section of the essay explores the discursive and textual agency of African actors who have modified, elaborated, expanded, and instrumentalised the languages, idioms, and residual privileges of colonial racialism and white privilege.

On this point about the discursive and gestural complicity of Africans in postcolonial forms of racism, it is important to stress that the argument is not about Africans consciously participating in the perpetuation of racist institutions and idioms that diminish their humanity. Rather, it is about highlighting the racist genealogy and the benign racism of accepting and expressing the idea that the acquisition or embodiment of personal distinction, prestige, and moral virtue by black people qualifies them as civilised and exempts them from racist descriptors, a standard of moral perfection that is elusive and never expected of white people as a condition for recognising their humanity. The notion that, if black people exhibit high moral character and conform to standards of respectability defined by the prevailing white power structure, they would overcome their alleged inferiority and come to be perceived as civilised and worthy of rights, dignity, and recognition, what Ibram Kendi calls uplift suasion,¹ is itself a kind of racism, albeit a benign one. It is prevalent but unacknowledged in Africa.

Africa cannot be essentialised into one category of being, so I preface my arguments here with caution about the limits of generalisation. However, even when we acknowledge Africa's infinite differentiation, its reality as an imaginary of colonial and postcolonial solidarity, and its dizzying ethnic, racial, religious, cultural, linguistic, and socioeconomic diversity, we often do not think of race as being part of a range of practices and semiotic indices implicated in political and social processes on the continent. This is understandable but inaccurate. There is a pervasive discourse of Africa as a non-racial continent, where racial thought, racial discourse, and racial practices are rare, and where the signs and instrumentalities of race are aberrations.² This is of course a problematic assumption

even if you set aside the obvious pitfall of generalising an entire continent into one neat racial taxonomy.

With the exception of South Africa, where citizens of multiple racial heritages interact daily and where an explicitly racial apartheid order elicited an equally avowedly racial response from non-whites, Africa is often understood as a continent of black people, who make sense of differences between themselves largely through other identity markers such as ethnicity, religion, culture, and language. The persistence of racialised slavery and of other manifestations of Arab anti-blackness in Sudan, Mauritania, and in North African countries has not mitigated the monolithic narrative of Africa as an ethnic rather than a racial continent.³ Nor has this tendency to write race out of African identity discourses been tempered by a recent batch of illuminating studies pointing to the colonial and postcolonial aftermaths of African multiracial lives, to forms of racial reckoning, and to persistent racial signs and their intertwinement in histories of enslavement and oppression.⁴

Does this discursive erasure of race in favour of ethnic and cultural identification preclude the presence of racialised idioms and practices in the quotidian and sociological profile of contemporary Africa or does it mask a hidden corpus of racial signs and symbols? The argument of this chapter supports the latter proposition. The dominant Africanist literatures on the processes and imaginaries of solidarity, community, privilege, and self-making tend to deny the presence of discernible racial or neo-racial tropes capable of structuring lived African experiences. To posit the language of race is often to render oneself susceptible to charges of importing Western colonial frames of difference into discussions of postcolonial Africa.

The invocation of racial discursive registers even for purposes of analytical analogies tends to invite claims that such invocations racialise geographies of identification and social relations that are nonracial. Such was the case recently when, writing on the 2015 xenophobic attacks on African “foreigners” in South Africa, Achille Mbembe argued that black South African expressions of xenophobia index a variant of racial pathology derived from a narrative of national chauvinism that is itself located in a notion of exceptional South African blackness.⁵ South African black exceptionalism, Mbembe argued, is derived from, and animated by

the white South African exceptionalism and nationalism that provided ideological sustenance for Apartheid. One commentator who typifies the widespread discomfort of Africans and Africanists with intra-African discourses of race, admonished Mbembe to “stop using the word racism when discussing black on black crime in Africa.”⁶

To advance the social consequences of racialisation—the process by which racial and neo-racial meanings are constructed, appropriated, recalibrated, and given utilitarian social valence—is to risk being accused of misrecognising other social phenomena as racial manifestation. This racial denialism runs deep. Racial conversations about Africa tend to devolve into the past tense, framed by colonial realities pitting undifferentiated European colonisers and similarly undifferentiated African colonial subjects against each other.

When it comes to Africa, race and its discursive offshoots are often understood only in this relational, dramatic, adversarial context of encounters between weak, noble Africans and racist, domineering Europeans. Even in this context of the colonial and early postcolonial relational framing, the denial of race and its resonance is rife, prompting Mahmood Mamdani to isolate and critique two strands of this racial denialism: scholars who ascribe the formation of racial and neo-racial thought and discourse to colonial intellectual and administrative projects, and those who privilege the agency of African elites that purportedly appropriated colonial ethno-racial modes of differentiation.⁷ Another aspect of this scholarly blindness to race in Africa is the tendency to erase the ethno-racial significations of events and phenomena by applying other descriptive registers to them. One example: the bloody 1963 racial coup that overthrew the Omani Arab oligarchy in Zanzibar was rechristened a “social revolution” by some scholars.⁸

The afterlives of past racial regimes in the present are rarely rigorously explored either. Although fairly prevalent across postcolonial Africa, cartographies of white privilege, of vestigial idioms of whiteness, and of racial vocabularies disguised as less-charged lexicons command little recognition as forms of racialism, as manifestations of residual racism. Contemporary Africans, several decades removed from the colonial past, are often credited with little racial awareness or expression. The narrative is simple: postcolonial Africans have no capacity to understand and

express race or to even recognise racism because they come from non-racial societies. It is taken for granted that Africans “discover” race when they migrate to racialised societies such as the United States, where they are racially educated through statutory demographic classification, social interaction, and quotidian experience into a recognition and understanding of race and racism.

The concept of a non-racial postcolonial Africa seems sensible on the surface, for how can race be meaningful in the absence of large-scale, consistent relations between people of difference races? How can race function or make sense in the absence of sustained quotidian race relations—in the absence of statutory racial difference? Although this question is now considered irrelevant and passé in conversations about race and racism in other contexts,⁹ in Africa it is posed in a rhetorical sense, with the answer presumably embedded in the question.

It is true that in racially homogeneous societies, and absent the racial hegemony of colonialism, race becomes a blur, and citizens in such a society can only develop a theoretical understanding of race based on the literatures and visual texts of racial societies, as opposed to an understanding of race founded on lived experience. Africa is however neither racially homogenous nor discursively autonomous of the racial strictures of its colonial experience. It may be true that contemporary Africans, especially those born after political independence, have few personal connections to their countries’ histories of colonial racial oppression. One result of this disconnect is a shabby appreciation for the racist horrors of colonisation on the part of postcolonial Africans. However, experiential race consciousness or its absence says little about the prevalence of stealthy, hidden, and thus unrecognised racial tropes and signs, the focus of this essay.

Moreover, the idea that race, racism, and racialised modes of social relations reside in a colonial past truncated by nationalist triumph is coterminous with the notion that racial and neo-racial forms of understanding the self and the Other were creations of colonialism. Both problematic postulations hold paradigmatic epistemological sway over attempts to understand contemporary Africa, but what if we moved away from the colonial framing of race and from the idea that race can only manifest through dramatic encounters and tensions between different

racess? What if, instead of fixating on race as a relational phenomenon forged only in the crucible of interracial interactions, we see it rather as something subtle, invidious, banal, and disguised—something that is powerful precisely because it is seldom visible, acknowledged, transparent, or self-referential. What kind of racial realities would such an intellectual shift reveal for Africa?

This chapter attempts to unravel this subterranean, quotidian zone of racialised realities in contemporary Africa while foregrounding it in colonial registers of race-informed discourse and in colonial spatial projects that manifested and animated race. First, I survey the current epistemological landscape of race in Africa as a way of establishing a baseline for my exploration of quotidian signs of race, racism, and racialisation in postcolonial Africa. Adapting insights from critical race theory to Africa, I argue that postcolonial Africa is suffused in quotidian racial signs and that, as in Western societies considered racial, race “appears” in Africa as a set of subtle, stealthy, banal, but dominant, idioms and practices.¹⁰ Critical race theory educates us that racialism and racism are powerful precisely because they are normative, institutional, residual, quotidian, and undeclared. The banality of racial tropes is not an exclusive feature of Euro-American society. In Africa, residual and quotidian racial signs are powerful arbiters of practices and discourses that appear race-neutral but that are informed directly or indirectly by the unacknowledged but enduring social valence of whiteness. Second, I analyse various manifestations of this hidden cultural economy of race and racism. I then discuss the normalisation, in the form of seemingly benign quotidian practices, of this racial universe, as well as the role of Africans as agents of this normalisation.

New Epistemologies of Race in Africa

Bucking the scholarly tradition of nonracial analysis, a few Africanist scholars have rejected the notion that race is irrelevant to African social analysis. Historian Jonathon Glassman disavows outright claims that Africans did not formulate strong ethno-racial identities prior to colonial rule,¹¹ and the concurrent contention that racial discourses integral to the

complex process of racialisation in Africa are traceable only to colonial ethno-racial projects.¹² In this argument, Glassman follows Igor Kopytoff's earlier observation that precolonial African neo-racial discourses of civilised insiders and barbaric outsiders, which explicitly invoked the vocabularies of descent and physical appearance, were integral to inter-group political relations across and within Africa's precolonial zones of contact.¹³ Glassman further rejects the rigid distinction between race and ethnicity, a familiar prelude to claims about Africa being a land of ethnic and cultural difference where colonial and Western racial pedagogy purportedly introduced the Othering linguistic techniques of race to devastating consequence.¹⁴ Nationalist projects rooted in ethnic thought and mobilisation were "susceptible to racialization," Glassman insists.¹⁵

Echoing this new epistemological recognition of the workings of race and its entwinements in seemingly nonracial sociopolitical projects, historian Bruce Hall maps the multiple racial discourses and practices that flourished in the West African Sahel prior to, during, and after European colonisation.¹⁶ What emerges is a sophisticated if mutating set of racial scripts that challenges the discourse of nonracial Africa.¹⁷ What these studies show is that vernaculars of racial privilege—claims that privileges and status flow from constructed categories of ethno-racial descent—circulated vigorously and enjoyed social and political currency across the temporal and spatial breadths of Africa. The social currency of whiteness, whatever form whiteness took in different contexts, undergirded the racial imaginaries on display at different times and places in Africa. My reflections and analysis in this chapter sketch the various social arenas in which this unseen hand of whiteness functions.

The most comprehensive corrective to Africanist racial denialism is Jemima Pierre's *The Predicament of Blackness*. Pierre makes a number of bold, striking interventions that will serve to foreground the problematic of this chapter. She begins by delineating the terrain for her contentions: that postcolonial Africa is "structured through and by global white supremacy,"¹⁸ that "race is the modality through which" Africa's familiar menu of identifications—gender, ethnicity, class, nationality, religion, and culture—are structured, understood, and refracted.¹⁹ The process of "European empire-making,"²⁰ Pierre argues, is instrumental to postcolonial African interactions with the powerful structures of global whiteness.

I would add that these racialised hegemonic processes and their postcolonial resonances create hierarchies of power and privilege that are oddly identical to colonial ones. The everydayness of race, Pierre contends, inheres in the fact that racialisation is malleable and can be found in “unusual and unsuspecting places.”²¹

I find Pierre’s notion of the malleability of racialisation useful for the purpose of this chapter, which is to trace various visible and invisible racial manifestations in the practices, interactions, politics, and poetics of the African everyday using the overarching frame of colonial mentality. Following from this logic of malleability, the analysis below extends and instantiates the appearances and resonances of racial idioms in “unusual and unsuspecting” postcolonial African sites of discourse, encounter, and practice, connecting them to racialised colonial pasts that are discernibly unfolding in the present.

Quotidian Racial Signs and Colonial Mentality

Vast ecologies and economies of insidious racial signification and practice permeate postcolonial African elite cultures. Elite aspirations and self-definitions are inflected by the residual privileges of colonial whiteness. These semiotic and cultural universes are routinely reproduced and reenacted across the subaltern spectrums of postcolonial Africa, as non-elite Africans, taking a cue from the paradigmatic discourses and gestures of proximate elite patrons, absorb, normalise, reconfigure, and instrumentalise these tropes, a process of “circular discourse” that lends further banality to these racial signs.²²

These insipient imaginaries calcify and evolve into established, diffused, and commonplace sociological phenomena by which values, ethics, etiquette, and power are recognised, debated, and measured. In this last instance in the dissemination of racialised tropes, the factor of race becomes almost invisible. However, this moment of invisibility and presumed absence gestures, even in its silence, towards the racial registers, past and present, at play.

Often, race is expressed in relations between individuals and groups, and it underpins the tensions, dramas, and conflicts of society. But race

and its language can also manifest as a subconscious psychological hang-over, a pathology that conditions particular behaviours, understandings, and modes of thought. In this frame, racial manifestations do not require the presence of a racially different Other, or, for that matter, the explicit language of race and racialism.

Racial pathologies in Africa often take the form of what Anglophone Africans call colonial mentality, a term which refers to the conscious and subconscious mimicry of behavioural and cultural standards established by European colonisers, European expatriates, and other perceived agents of Euro-American modernity. Anglophone Africans use the rubric of colonial mentality to express or lament many practices, attitudes, and states of mind. The term has a polyvalent semiotic life and functions in multiple contexts. In one context, it can mean buying into powerful ideas about personal worth, dignity, and prestige that have origins in racist perceptions of Africans. In another it can describe a mimetic practice—the process of coveting or reenacting lifestyles, mannerisms, tastes, and fads associated with colonial and postcolonial Euro-American culture and thought. Yet in another, it can denote or connote the conscious and subconscious art of seeking validation from Euro-American or colonial institutions and locales. It can, finally, mean a conscious or subconscious devaluation of African aesthetic or quotidian objects and a preference for their Euro-American analogues.

Mimesis is perhaps too strong a word, too simplistic a concept to describe how the logic of social superiority gets inscribed in the narratives and attitudes of postcolonial Africans without the deployment of an explicitly racial script. Even so, mimesis is a good place to start, for the term accommodates creatively novel adaptations of preexisting hegemonic ideas and practices. Much of this mimetic landscape recalls race only in silent, subconscious reenactments of proactive and reactive responses to the ubiquity of racial signs in our contemporary world. The trope of the African big man, a staple of postcolonial African fiction, conveys the ways in which Africans of varying social stations aspire to standards of value traceable to the hegemonies and paradigms emanating from colonial modernity or from Euro-American standards. The character of Obi Okonkwo in Chinua Achebe's *No Longer at Ease* and Chief Nanga in *A Man of the People* typify this postcolonial self-fashioning.

These fictionalised examples of ostentation and exclusive, conspicuous consumption bespeak the postcolonial caricature produced by the internalisation of tropes of value and self-worth grounded in colonial, neo-colonial, and global infrastructures of whiteness.

These postcolonial aspirations are conditioned by long-established binaries of superior and inferior cultures, mannerisms, and physical appearances. The aspirations are acted out in ways that do not appear on the surface to be racial but that are in fact drenched in unacknowledged racial codes. Furthermore, exhibitions of “white” aspirational standards by Africans are often preceded by equally subconscious appropriations of racial stereotypes about Africans’ supposed cultural and character deficits, Africans’ inferiority. Often it is the acceptance of these stereotypes and the desire to transcend or compensate for them that produce “colonial mentality” and the pathologies associated with it. This is itself a kind of racism, an internalised racism defined by colonial definitions of respectability and civilisation.

Colonial mentality has had a strange, variegated life in postcolonial Africa and can be located in many seemingly unremarkable practices and behaviours. In *The Predicament of Blackness*, Jemima Pierre reveals how bodily practices as seemingly innocuous as skin bleaching and hair straightening reveal the depth and persistence of ideas about the interplay of race, beauty, access, and privilege.²³ The social currency of whiteness as a paradigm of aesthetic value can manifest itself in other seemingly non-racial zones of African life—in quotidian attitudes and behaviours. Many been-tos, Africans who have visited or lived in Europe or North America, return to African homelands with exaggerated exhibitions of “white” mannerisms and speech forms. A significant aspect of this performance is an attitude of affective snobbery towards compatriots, especially compatriots in lower socioeconomic and educational stations of life. This attitude can come across as one based on class, and it is powered by the anxieties of class, to be sure. However, it is also a classic case of racial anxieties manifesting through the idiom of class and status insecurities.

In Africa, race routinely disguises itself as class—or as class consciousness. An unacknowledged racial anxiety often underpins this particular expression of class. This osmotic interplay between race and class is often mistaken for class because, for many Africanists, race is not a useful tool

for explaining social relations in a supposedly non-racial society. It is not only in the United States or other supposedly racial societies that race and class are entwined, however. The two categories similarly overlap in Africa. The difference is that this entwinement is easier to discern in so-called racial societies than in Africa. It is easy to mistake race for class in Africa because class is more visible than race. In Euro-America, statutory racial practices condition citizens and scholars alike to more easily recognise race.

Spatial Racialism

The cultural economy of trans-Atlantic travel and return is guided by an existing perceptual economy in which return from Western metropolis confer the vicarious honorifics of whiteness. It is not just African been-tos who perform colonial mentality, however. Privileged Africans domiciled on the continent are implicated in this racial geography.

After independence from colonial rule, newly empowered African political elites seemed desperate to outdo one another in the quest to reproduce the hierarchies of power, status, and tastes so integral to colonial statecraft. Through a conscious reproduction of colonial cultural and political traditions, African elites became caricatures of the haughty, arrogant, and detached white colonial officialdom. In several cases, this reproduced colonial imaginary defined the political identity of postcolonial political elites.

Colonial mentality has taken new forms in recent years, even if the new forms still betray signs of hidden and unspoken colonial racial legacies. Postcolonial Nigeria is host to some of these subtle manifestations of racial pathologies. In Nigeria, the ultimate status symbol, until the recent emergence of Abuja as the most desirable residential address in Nigeria, was ownership of a home or plot of land in the Ikoyi area of Lagos. Lagos remains the commercial capital of Nigeria but it was the political capital of colonial Nigeria. Established as an exclusive area of European habitation in 1919, Ikoyi would become the neighbourhood in which important colonial officials, including the governor-general, lived, an area considered safe from the miasma of urban Lagos and from the disease

contagion that African modes of living was understood in colonial racist discourse to engender.²⁴

Ikoyi derived its symbolic racial cachet from the European Reservation Ordinance of 1902, which made it legally possible for the British colonial authorities to, as the law stated, “declare that an areas in the Colony or Protectorate....named in such an Order constitute an area reserved for European habitation.”²⁵ The law created a legal framework for establishing a slew of racially segregated European urban spaces across Southern Nigeria, including Ikoyi, and several Government Reservation Areas, or G.R.As as they were and are still called.

In the racial residential segregationist configuration of colonial Lagos, Ikoyi was designated for the habitation of colonial officials and European traders. It was the white, affluent, and luxurious neighbourhood where European men and women of power and privilege lived, interacted, and visually established and replenished the privileges and significations of whiteness that would endure into the postcolonial period. Ikoyi was also the racial space from which white colonial officials imagined and defined the black subaltern Other. Marked by superior urban planning, social amenities, and enforced sanitation, Ikoyi exuded the colonial privileges expressed through the language of racial difference. Racist colonial ideas about blackness and disease and about the nexus of culture and pathology made Ikoyi an intensely racialised space, charged by both the prestige and oppressive power of whiteness.

Outcry against this brazen practice of residential segregation among Lagos’s vocal African intelligentsia and professional class eventually forced colonial authorities to open up the Ikoyi Reservation Area to African residence in 1947, but its lingering exclusivity, marked by a high degree of class privilege, high standards and costs of living, and status baselines kept Africans away until independence in 1960. Moreover, a full realisation of the social prestige of a segregated and racialised colonial space was possible only *after* colonialism, when Africans could access this racialised prestige without the apparent appearance of aping physically proximate colonial officials, which, in colonial times, would have undermined their nationalist bona fides and their anti-colonial critiques. When European colonisers left, newly politically empowered African big men moved into

their segregated abodes in Ikoyi, claiming the aura, status, cachet, and cultural demeanour of whiteness for themselves.²⁶

Prestigious and coveted Ikoyi street names like Osborne and Bourdillon, desirable as lucrative real estate investments and as conferrers of instant postcolonial visibility, have come to symbolise and constitute a link to the prestige and awesome power of the white colonial officials whose name they bear. Residency on one of those streets in postcolonial times suggests that one is the heir to and an inheritor of a colonial valence of whiteness that has managed to endure to the present. When I was growing up in Nigeria, Osborne Road, Ikoyi, in particular symbolised the residential apex of privilege and power, but very few Nigerians knew or were willing to acknowledge that this understanding was framed by the continued cultural sway of the colonial idiom of white superiority.

French Dakar mirrored Ikoyi's inscription of racialised privilege in colonial spaces, but residential racial segregation and its legacies were more profound there than in Ikoyi. Dakar-ville and Dakar's Plateau were designated European quarters, their exclusivity marked by visible signs of privileged spatial interpellation such as sanitation management, enforced building regulations, and fastidious urban planning.²⁷ French colonial authorities went further though, embracing a realm of abstract racial signification and exclusivity signposted by "the requirement for certain social and cultural norms."²⁸ There, a pattern of street naming, which "fashion[ed]... parts of Dakar almost exclusively after the image of the coloniser and for the benefit of the expatriates," formed the bedrock of representations that constituted a "conceptual barrier meaningful in its signification" as the ideational separation between the world of privilege and status and that of squalor and subservience.²⁹ Bigon calls this racialised urban space management a "perceptual barrier," that policed the boundaries of whiteness.³⁰ Once established, perceptions and constructs of "white" spaces ossified, expanded, and continued to define these areas beyond the colonial period.

The late colonial period, the 1950s, was a period of identity flux among Western educated Africans. In a colonial society saturated with the radical rhetoric of anticolonial nationalism and the aspirational discourse of independence, African urban elites oscillated between a rejection of European ways and a subconscious appropriation of European idioms of

self-fashioning, of which residential choices were a critical part. This ambivalence was rooted in the power and normativity of colonial whiteness. Anticolonial nationalism was ironically indexed in part by a desire for the exclusive, racialised privileges of Europeans.

African recruits into the colonial civil service and into colonial conglomerates coveted and were often accorded “comfortable subsidised accommodation in the exclusive Government Reservation Areas... known then as ‘European quarters,’ and once reserved for European staff of the colonial administration came with a full complement of cooks and stewards.”³¹ In his acclaimed memoir, *A Mouth Sweeter than Salt*, Toyin Falola writes about growing up in Ibadan and hearing about and seeing from afar the Government Reservation Area, which the “white colonial officers had created” and buffeted with a forest reserve “so that the natives would not come near.”³² In the mid to late 1950s, however, a radical shift occurred, according to Falola. When he began to visit the G.R.A at that time he “mostly saw black people and just a few whites.” Here is how Falola reports the shift:

The Nigerian elite had been moving to the Government Reservation Area in the decade during which I was born. Elitism was being redefined... Its impact was sudden. The teachers told us that if we were bright we would end up there. If we survived the University of Ibadan, we would pack our luggage from the hostel and move to houses in the Government Reservation Area.³³

The aspirational allure of designated European abodes intersected with the impatient desire of ambitious Western educated Africans to replace Europeans in exclusive residential zones and in other realms of white colonial privilege. The late colonial period of transition to independence witnessed a gradual Africanisation of exclusive European colonial residential spaces, but it was an Africanisation only in demographic terms, as the trappings and symbols of colonial whiteness remained intact in these exclusive zones and in the habits and mannerisms of Africans who now lived in them.

After independence, the new African elite residents of Ikoyi and Dakar began to live like their European predecessors. Residentially segregated

from regular Nigerians like the colonial officials before them, the Nigerian postcolonial political elite proceeded to indulge in tastes suggestive of a desire to be accepted as “civilised” Africans, a desire to distance themselves from the culturally “backward” Africa of racist colonial discourse. This strange colonial obsession cross-fertilised uneasily with a new, seemingly contradictory political epistemology of African nationalism, which was informed by what V.Y. Mudimbe calls Africanism.³⁴ Contradiction or not, the new African lords of Ikoyi not only craved the accoutrements of colonial whiteness; like the European residents of Ikoyi before them, they also looked upon regular Nigerians with a calculated, strategic scorn, understanding them in a colonial racial frame as uncivilised compatriots. It has also become a postcolonial status symbol of immense import to own property on Lagos’s Victoria Island, a swanky island abode named after Queen Victoria of England. It is the height of racial expression in postcolonial Nigeria, but this racial phenomenon is designated by the non-racial name of colonial mentality in popular Anglophone parlance.

The Afterlives of Colonial Urban Racism

Colonial mentality lives on and has mutated into new nomenclatural obsessions. Cities and neighbourhoods with British colonial names carry a certain cultural allure and are magnets for local elites seeking to distinguish and distance themselves from their socioeconomically inferior compatriots. The city of Port Harcourt in Southern Nigeria is named after Lewis Vernon Harcourt, the British Secretary of State for the Colonies at the time of Port Harcourt’s formal colonial beginning in 1913 after the construction of its port. Port Harcourt is the oil industry hub of postcolonial Nigeria, so it attracts a high number of migrants, foreign and local, looking to plug themselves into Nigeria’s lucrative oil industry. There is another unmistakable, if rarely acknowledged, attraction to Port Harcourt: its name is evocative of the symbolic debris of a certain non-“native,” European, white colonial aura.

This image of Port Harcourt as a European urban space permeated by the symbols of “white” modernity was carefully cultivated from the city’s colonial inception at the turn of the twentieth century. European colonial

officials and merchants resident in the city not only monopolised all political resources but, in a rare and radical departure from British colonial indirect rule, administered the colonial township directly and in the process gave it an unmistakably European social imprimatur.³⁵ The vestigial modernity of this symbolic colonial racial investment has stuck to the image of Port Harcourt, repackaged by postcolonial African elites and black and white oil expatriates in the form of the popular image of Port Harcourt as a “garden city.”³⁶ This metaphor of Port Harcourt as a pristine, clean, salubrious garden was only meaningful because of what Port Harcourt purportedly was not: surrounding African villages and towns understood to be miasmatic abodes of dirt, inferior culture, and a threatening, unhealthy backwardness. This ideology of conflated racial, environmental, and cultural semiotics has its origins in racialised colonial residential and urban planning practices designed to give Port Harcourt a European modernist identity, but it is now part of the identity of post-colonial Port Harcourt, proudly embraced by the city’s present Nigerian administrators and residents who routinely posit their city as an exclusive zone of comfort and modernity comparable to Euro-American cities.

In Muslim Kano, Northern Nigeria, the Nasarawa neighbourhood is analogous to Ikoyi in that it too is a spatial repository of the residual prestige of colonial whiteness. The name derives from Nasara, the Hausa name for British colonisers, and, more expansively, European Christians. In this case, then, the name of the neighbourhood is literally inscribed in whiteness. Like Ikoyi, Nasarawa is Kano’s most desirable neighbourhood, its zip code of residual whiteness. Also like Ikoyi, Nasarawa had been the segregated abode of British colonial officials who occupied palatial homes complete with African servants’ quarters, where subaltern subordinates lived in proximity to the colonial officer in order to fulfil their daily obsequious obligations to him.

When the white officials began to vacate the neighbourhood after independence in 1960, Kano’s new African elite moved in and inherited the cultural, honorific, and status constructs associated with Nasarawa. The sights, sounds, smells, and other sensory ingredients of colonial whiteness attracted a new class of indigenous big men who sought to connect with and extend the constellation of racial and class meanings associated with Nasarawa. The new occupants also inherited the racial, cultural,

and segregationist baggage of the departing colonial officials and began, for good measure, to live out the latter's socioeconomic conceit. The segregationist racial logic of colonialism was simply appropriated and refashioned into a class idiom, but the social continuities that Nasarawa came to represent harkened back to British colonial urban investments that made whiteness a paradigmatic social enterprise.

Today, residency in Nasarawa confers an obvious class privilege and status but a measure of the symbolic capital of that class prestige comes from the residual history of Nasarawa's original status as the abode of Turawa (whites). The continuation and expansion of this realm of inherited constructs of white prestige have also depended on the vast, postcolonial culture of expatriation in Kano. In particular, Nasarawa's postcolonial aesthetic biography rests largely on the intersection and symbiotic convergence of two phenomena. The first is the continuous preference for Nasarawa's residential allure by white, Lebanese, Indian, and Asian expatriates. The second is the equally passionate craving for Nasarawa's social prestige by local elites, an economy of valuation that is animated by its established and expanding reputation as the abode of whiteness. Nasarawa, for the postcolonial elite of Kano, represents an aspirational space, but that aspiration derives from an understanding and acceptance of the normativity of whiteness. A contemporary description of Nasarawa encapsulates this conjoined duality:

Nassarawa GRA that forms the wealthy neighborhood in the city [of Kano] remains the most expensive real estate location in the state capital. It has some of the most expensive real estate property in the North outside Abuja... The fact that government house is located there cemented the central position of Nassarawa as the elite location of choice. Foreign expatriates (sic) resident in the city prefer Nassarawa to any other location in the state.³⁷

Because of an escalating culture of expatriation and its enduring connections to the segregationist logics of colonialism and to racialised prestige, Nasarawa continues to enjoy disproportionately high elite and governmental patronage, further rendering it aesthetically and architecturally paradigmatic in the larger social and urban alchemy of Kano. This is an illustration of the ways in which colonial racial norms are reproduced,

replicated, and consolidated by the policies and gestures of postcolonial political entities, ensuring the incremental longevity of normative colonial white privilege.

When I lived and attended university in Kano in the 1990s, I witnessed a residue of the subconscious psychological attachment to symbols connected to or reminiscent of colonial privilege. In the so-called strangers' quarters of Kano, or Sabon Gari, which colonial authorities designated for the habitation of Southern Nigerian and Christian migrants to the city,³⁸ several streets were/are still named after colonial officials who served in the colonial province of Kano. Balat-Hughes and Aitken are two popular streets in Sabon Gari. Those who lived on those streets and those who had business to transact on them took visible delight in enthusiastically announcing, sometimes unprompted, their association with those neighbourhoods. There was still, even in the 1990s, a certain conscious attempt to mine the racial, cultural, and symbolic capital of those white, European, colonial names.

Mimesis and More

The cultural and economic capital of colonial whiteness lives on through seemingly innocuous gestures and quotidian speech acts, which carry significant import in social relations. Local elites and regular folks alike are eager to explore and exploit this social capital of whiteness. The racial imaginaries that certain spaces of past colonial residential and official activity exude become objects of desire and covetousness among Africans seeking power, recognition, or privilege.

Often, it is this new, postcolonial imperative of recognition and social distinction that sustains, expands, and immortalises the ethical, cultural, and sociolinguistic apparatuses associated with these colonial spaces. The transition from colonial racio-spatial segregation to a postcolonial residential spatial segregation ostensibly rooted in class privilege and status anxieties is one that is made possible by the enduring significations that whiteness and its association with prestige continue to exert even though evolving postcolonial African tastes, aspirations, and idiosyncrasies are integral to the continuity of these racial tropes of prestige and value.

Although African postcolonial elites were clearly interpellated into a certain culture of mimesis derived from colonial tropes, the mimetic imagination on display is not merely a desire to assume or mimic the paradigmatic position, privilege, and gaze of the white man, as Frantz Fanon contends in regard to subaltern elites³⁹; nor was it simply a deceptive camouflage as Homi Bhabba argues.⁴⁰ It is also not the confused notion of the self as portrayed by Ralph Singh, the narrator and main character in V.S. Naipaul's *The Mimic Men*. Nor is it what Michael Taussig describes as the gradual silencing of colonial alterity through an equally gradual erasure of difference.⁴¹

The mimesis of postcolonial African elites who moved into the physical and psychic spaces of white privilege was rooted in the anxieties and aspirations of independence—in an ironic desire to attain the seemingly fully realised humanity modelled and promoted by European colonial actors inhabiting reserved residential and political positions. This postcolonial imaginary has been sustained by the vigorous commitment of Nigerian postcolonial governments, at both the national and subnational levels, to preserving and expanding Government Reservation Areas (G.R.As), the surviving avatars and successors of colonial spatial and residential racism. There is currently no state in Nigeria without G.R.As—zones of exclusivity and privilege imagined and birthed on the colonial model. Successive governments have enlarged old G.R.As and developed new ones, effectively guaranteeing the continuity of a colonial racial segregationist ethos that now endures in a purportedly non-racial, class frame.

Race in the African Postcolonial Everyday

Colonial mentality and the suppressed racial anxieties that animate it can manifest themselves through seemingly innocuous aesthetic and political acts. African politicians seeking to be taken seriously at home routinely make political pilgrimages to former imperial capitals such as Paris, London, and Lisbon. No political movement or tendency is considered legitimate unless citizens perceive it to have been validated by global institutions of record, which are in turn driven and validated by white

power formations.⁴² Thus if postcolonial appropriation and performances of residual whiteness are elite undertakings, they are enabled and subsidised by a perceptual economy into which regular Africans have been seduced and in which they actively participate.

Instant political credibility comes from demonstrating that one is connected to or reckoned with in the power circuits of old and new imperial capitals. An adjunct to this enduring cultural power of mythical whiteness in Africa is the fact that many African consumers of news and stories instinctively accord veracity, respectability, and credibility to journalistic and literary productions that either arrive through the informational or publishing loops of the West or have enjoyed prior currency and circulation in “white” circuits.⁴³

Colonial mentality’s most poignant manifestation is in the widespread culture of social deference to expats of various hues of light-skin-ness—Arabs, Indians, Chinese, Levantines, and Europeans. Everywhere in Africa, local interlocutors accord those with lighter skin and straighter hair embarrassingly generous amounts of deference, even veneration, often at the expense of their own or other Africans’ dignity and in disregard for preexisting protocols of hospitality. Across the continent, the lingering social currency of whiteness, nuanced, complex but discernible, seems to govern significant aspects of social and official relations.

In some contexts, this instinctive psychological deference to the tropes of whiteness is hidden behind codes signalling technocratic competence. The idea of recruiting white, Chinese, Indian, or Arab technical partners to shadow projects, initiatives, and contracts proposed and produced by African actors has become an unspoken rule of business and official transactions in many parts of the continent. In some cases, without performing a ritualised homage to white technocratic superiority by invoking white involvement or making an appearance with a “white” business partner, projects can go unapproved, services unrendered. Cameroonian filmmaker Jean-Pierre Bekolo Obama rendered this phenomenon as a poignant but provocative vignette:

It’s not me: it’s Africans in general and Cameroonians more particularly. Give it a try: go into a public administration building with a white man, see how Cameroonians behave when faced with a European, today.

In business, people often seek out a white person to act as a front, just to be taken seriously.⁴⁴

Apocryphal examples of this phenomenon such as the foregoing are fairly common. At a conference in the university of Windsor, a senior Cameroonian-American academic, a professor in an American university, told a group of us the story of his encounter with this continued mental subservience to the signs and sights of whiteness. Leading a group of white American undergraduates from his university on a summer exchange programme to South Africa, the academic was shocked when, upon arrival in South Africa, the black South African immigration officials quickly processed the entry papers of his students only to detain him for rigorous questioning, which lasted for a good deal of time.

His American passport could not rescue him from the ensuing humiliation. He was asked repeatedly what business brought him to South Africa even though it was clear that he was the leader of the student exchange delegation the immigration officers had just let in. He was also questioned repeatedly about Cameroon. His humiliation before his own students complete, the officials finally let him in, whereupon he concluded that racialised self-understanding and its associated pathologies were still prevalent among blacks in post-Apartheid South Africa. The ways in which the privileges of whiteness and the concomitant suspicion of blackness continue to shape bureaucratic logics and the attitudes of postcolonial African state agents substantiate contentions about the banality of unacknowledged racial codes in Africa.

Matthew Hassan Kukah, a Catholic Bishop and a preeminent Nigerian public intellectual, once narrated how, on a road trip from Kenya to Tanzania, the colonial mentality of Tanzanian immigration officials led to his humiliation and a rude awakening on the contemporary work of race in Africa. Here is his recollection of the incident:

The next morning, I arrived at the Park, bought my ticket and boarded a bus. There were about eight of us in the bus and I recall that apart from the driver, I was the only black face. We stopped for refreshments and finally got to the Kenya-Tanzanian border. The bus driver pointed at the border post and told us to go and have our passports stamped. For some strange

reason, I took the lead, feeling that this being African soil; I should be the one to lead the four white men and the three women to the post. I got there first and feeling like a tour guide, I smiled at the officer and then depleted the only Swahili I knew: We are all traveling together, I said. The *mzungus*[whites] handed in their passports and I made sure that mine was the last almost as a courtesy. The officer had no hesitation in stamping the passports of the seven *mzungus*. When he handed them back to us, mine was missing. Hey, I said, where is my passport? He sized me up and said: My friend, you are from Nigeria. You will have to wait a while. What for? I demanded. Because you have a Nigerian passport, he said.⁴⁵

The rest of the story is a stream of increasingly heated exchange with his interlocutors about their inexplicable refusal to honour his valid visa obtained from the Tanzanian embassy in Abuja, Nigeria, while they courteously let his white companions through the border into Tanzania.

In the course of this exchange, which was peppered with jargony repetitions about a fictitious missing item on his valid visa, Kukah casually mentioned in response to a question about his current engagements that he was studying at Harvard University's Kennedy School of Government. The mention of Harvard, perhaps the world's foremost academic brand of Euro-American privilege, prestige, and power, proved to be the seminal moment in the exchange, for it immediately unlocked the intransigence of the immigration officials. This is how Kukah remembers that melodramatic moment in which the power of Harvard as a signifier of race and class privilege rescued him from the tyranny and colonial mentality of his fellow Africans:

As if stung by an insect in his pants, [the immigration official] jumped up. You are from Harvard? A Nigerian, an African at Harvard? My goodness. Let me shake your hand again Father as he surged towards me. I am proud of you as a Catholic and an African. Harvard, he repeated with the reverence of a *babalawo* in a shrine. Sorry about all this Father. Felix, he called out to the officer, stamp Father's passport immediately. Please get him a soft drink.⁴⁶

Kukah is an African intellectual, a Catholic priest with a doctorate degree from Oxford University and a prominent, much sought after African scholar and speaker. Yet his social class meant little in this encounter. His

connection to Africa and the aspects of his biography and engagements derived from and connected to African institutions proved useless in his difficult conversation with Tanzanian immigration officials. Only his connection to an American institution synonymous with white epistemological, economic, and political prestige secured his passage into Tanzania.

Harvard, a precinct of Euro-American educational prestige, in this context functioned as a metaphor, a stand-in, for a prevalent, internalised veneration of a certain racialised ethos of privilege. The immigration officer's highfalutin reaction to Kukah's casual invocation of Harvard attests to a fairly pan-African obsession with the cachet of Euro-American bastions of perceived technological and technocratic superiority—an obsession with institutions and phenomena that for many Africans embody this superiority. The overarching operative code here is that of the perceived socioeconomic superiority of the non-African Other, a chronic incident of xenophilia that derives its meaning from colonial racecraft and its quotidian legacies.

This strain of xenophilia is not ecumenical or race-neutral; otherwise Kukah's Nigerian passport would have made a way for him. Rather, it is a xenophilia grounded in race, and more specifically in the perceived superiority of the lighter complexioned and straighter-haired Other. More precisely, it inheres in an assumption that aptitudes and abilities and the modernities that they construct, are coterminous with expatriate culture. That is the reason that Europeans, Americans, Arabs, Chinese, and Indians enjoy reverence in postcolonial Africa far in excess of familiar norms of traditional African hospitality. It is also the reason that, placed in the same social space as a "white" expat in Africa, the African, regardless of status, can be harassed and treated like an unwelcome stranger in his own country and continent.

Quotidian Racial Lexicons

If the case of white Europeans attracting deference and subservience is within the realm of comprehension, given the recent history of European colonial and neocolonial domination of Africa, the extension of deference to other non-African expats indicates that a deeper racial register is

at work. Like the subtleties of class, the political economy of expatriate privilege conceals the work of race as a conferrer of status and power in postcolonial Africa.

The light skin or the straight hair or a combination of the two can and does supplant class as the supreme signifier of status and respectability in contemporary Africa. In Ghana and Nigeria, the popular appellative words *Oburoni* and *Oyinbo* are descriptive constructs for a range of generic physical whiteness and for people who are deemed to embody a certain understanding of behavioural and cultural whiteness. The people so adjudged may be physiologically distant from whiteness.⁴⁷ *Oburoni*'s racial etymology and provenance are somewhat ambiguous, since the term is also used to denote "stranger" or "foreigner" in a non-racial register.⁴⁸ In its original form, *Oburoni* or *Oburuni* (singular, or plural, *Abrofo*) was a designation for Europeans without regard to nationality and status.⁴⁹ Although this racial etymology included a transition from a mildly negative usage to a positive one of admiration and endearment as Europeans came to symbolise wealth and status rather than the destitution of earlier European missionary visitors,⁵⁰ the racial element remained at its semiotic heart.

Oburoni's usage in seemingly non-racial semiotic contexts, such as in designating a stranger or the subject of affection (such as *me* [my] *Buroni*, or my lady) often includes racial codes, since "foreign" and "stranger" in the Ghanaian context can coincide with a reference to racial Otherness, and since, as Pierre argues, tropes of whiteness continue to define female beauty and desirability in Ghanaian society.⁵¹ *Oburoni* and its Nigerian equivalent, *Oyinbo*, are thus morphological and social referents that often conflate physical attributes such as light skin, straight hair, straight nose with a xenophilic belief that these markers are coextensive with superior ability, intelligence, and socioeconomic capital. This conflation exemplifies colonial mentality, for it is a manifestation of the afterlife of colonial race work. *Oburoni* and *Oyinbo* have origins in a socio-historical ethos in which a binary of white civilisation and black backwardness is a central defining character.

In the Swahili speaking countries of east Africa, *Mzungu* is a term riddled with similarly important sociopolitical semiotics. It refers literally to white people, but it also connotes light-skinned, straight haired racial

morphologies that are believed to correlate to intellectual capacity, prestige, and status. *Mzungu* has spawned a derivative set of lexical referents that retain the racial idioms inherent in the original word, racial codes that are rarely acknowledged as such because they have been rendered banal through everyday conversational usage. Derived from *Mzungu* is the word *Uzunguni*, which refers to the European area of a city or town. In postcolonial quotidian communication and interaction, to claim or be recognised as worthy of *Uzunguni*, a resident of the European[ised] quarter, is to be associated with the prestige and status previously reserved for white colonial officials or settlers. It is a racialised gesture of status in a postcolonial context but its contemporary valence is rooted in colonial race idioms.

Conversely, the word *Uswahilini*, denoting the Swahili (in colonial parlance, “native”) area of a town or city, is reserved, in postcolonial quotidian discourse, for Africans resident in urban and rural spaces perceived to be untouched by European modernist, residential, architectural, and social interventions. To be associated with *Uswahilini*, or the “native” quarter, is to be devalued as uncivilised, rustic, and stuck in the African native world of colonial construct.⁵²

Furthermore, the term *m-Swahili*, which means a Swahili person (plural *wa-Swahili*) is conversationally deployed to refer to a “native” in the sense posited by colonisers’ racial dictionary, that is, connoting untrustworthiness, laziness, and irresponsibility. The term *m-Swahili* is thus one of devaluation even if this devaluation often occurs in a conversational, light-hearted context. This internalised racial devaluation contrasts with and derives its social power from its antipode, the word *Mzungu*, which in East African conversational lexicon stands in for positive traits such as wealth, power, and superior aptitude.⁵³

Like *Oyinbo* and *Oburoni*, *Mzungu* confers actual or honorary whiteness and all that it connotes or references. Once conferred, the conferee becomes an unwitting beneficiary of the subconscious, deeply rooted psychology of race. This is the lot of many Euro-American, Chinese, Arab, and Indian visitors and residents in Africa. Thrust into Africa’s unspoken ethos of racialised hospitality, these individuals are sometimes happy with their sudden elevation to a status with origins in colonial racial classifications and hierarchies. Other times, the unwitting

non-African participant in this postcolonial racial economy merely tolerates the uncomfortable spectacle of his sudden racial ascent in Africa.

Conclusion

Located at once in colonial artifices of oppression and postcolonial social signifiers, manifestations of race in Africa defy constructivist and essentialist grids of analysis—two frames that we deploy to understand how race and its signs work in multiracial societies. Instead, race and its meanings, residues, appropriations, subconscious reproductions, and disguises are diffused in society through subtle and not-so-subtle gestures, attitudes, and informal rules of social relations.

The search for race in Africa is thus one that should begin from a premise of ambivalence: race is simultaneously absent and present in Africa. You cannot find it if you look for it in the arenas and forms in which it manifests in spaces where statutory racial formations persist. In much of Africa, racial idioms are everywhere present in quotidian interactions, in evolving tastes, and in the aesthetics, mannerisms, infrastructures, and luxuries associated with elite culture. We can recover much of this racialised landscape through the analytical lens of what postcolonial Anglophone Africans call colonial mentality.

Racial codes are an unacknowledged but powerful expression of socio-economic aspirations in contemporary Africa, although this reality is concealed beneath layers of appearances that seem to suggest that class and status anxieties alone are at work. I have argued here that the work of transforming Africa's colonial racial landscape into a vast postcolonial arena of multiple racialised interactions and social relations was made possible by inherited colonial racial axioms as well as the active textual and discursive investments of Africans in a new, racialised ethos of prestige. Whether it manifests poignantly in the growing, visible culture of genuflection to light-skinned, straight haired foreigners or in the less suggestive domain of elite residential and social preferences and tastes, racial hangovers remain invisible arbiters of many familiar quotidian postcolonial realities. The continuing work of race manifests in the social cachet that proximity to physical and symbolic whiteness confers.

Tracking the long genealogies and mutating lives of various race-forms in postcolonial Africa calls for a recognition of the ways in which racial and neo-racial constructs are implicated in the encounters and social signatures of high and low cultures on the continent. These race-forms do not often appear as race qua race. Instead they disguise themselves in banal, seemingly ubiquitous phenomena. Racial anxieties and codes hover ubiquitously and ambiguously over many social transactions, structuring behaviours and ways of seeing, being, thinking, and acting, and producing quotidian lexicons and popular social epistemologies. This chapter points to the prevalence of these popular epistemologies of race in postcolonial Africa.

Notes

1. For a full explication of this argument about the complicity of black people in racist enterprises through the acceptance of racist demands for black moral perfection as a condition for the enjoyment of civil rights, for acceptance, and for being spared racist violence, see Ibram X. Kendi, *Stamped from the Beginning: the Definitive History of Racist Ideas in America* (New York: Nation Books, 2016), chapter 10.
2. See for instance, John Hartigan Jr., "Culture Against Race: Reworking the Basis for Racial Analysis," *South Atlantic Quarterly* 104: 3 (2005), 543–560; Vernon J. Williams Jr., *Rethinking Race: Frantz Boaz and His Contemporaries* (Lexington: The University of Kentucky Press, 1996); and Walter Benn Michaels, "Race into Culture: A Critical Genealogy of Cultural Identity," *Critical Inquiry* 18: 4 (1992), 655–685. One could argue that the disavowal of race as a consequential instrument of identification and social relation in Africa began from the inception of African Studies as a professional academic field in the Euro-American academy, for it was one of the pioneers of the field, Melville Herskovits, who inaugurated the argument that explicitly rejected the provenance of race and instead posited the ubiquity of ethnicity and culture as the organising principles of selfhood among Africans, principles that endured into the diaspora. See Herskovits, *The Myth of the Negro Past* (Boston, Massachusetts: Beacon Press 1990 [1941]).
3. For a history of race-based discrimination and slavery underwritten by tropes of Arab racial supremacy, see John Hunwick and Eve Troutt Powell,

- The African Diaspora in the Mediterranean Lands of Islam* (Princeton, NJ: Markus Wiener Publishers, 2002); Chouki el Hamel, *Black Morocco: A History of Slavery, Race and Islam* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2014); Sy Hamdou, "Mauritania: Slavery and State Racism," *Pambazuka News*, August 3, 2011; Afua Hirsch, "Black Mauritians Suffer 'Slavery-like Conditions, Says UN,'" *The Guardian (UK)*, Thursday, September 12, 2013: <http://www.theguardian.com/global-development/2013/sep/12/black-mauritania-slavery-un>. Accessed April 23, 2016.
4. See Carina E. Ray, *Crossing the Color Line: Race, Sex, and Contested Politics in Ghana* (Athens: Ohio University Press, 2015); Christopher J. Lee, *Unreasonable Histories: Nativism, Multiracial Lives, and the Genealogical Imagination in British Africa* (Durham and London: Duke University Press, 2014); Saidiya Hartman, *Lose Your Mother: A Journey Along the Atlantic Slave Route* (New York: Farrar, Straus, and Giroux, 2007).
 5. Achille Mbembe, "Xenophobic South Africa," *Africa is a Country Blog*, April 16, 2015: <http://africasacountry.com/achille-mbembe-writes-about-xenophobic-south-africa/>. Retrieved on April 24, 2015.
 6. "Dr. W. Gabriel Selassie I," comment on Achille Mbembe's essay cited above.
 7. Mahmood Mamdani, *Citizen and Subject: Contemporary Africa and the Legacy of Late Colonialism* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1996), 187–188.
 8. See Lucien Rey, "The Revolution in Zanzibar," in Lionel Cliffe and John Saul, eds., *Socialism in Tanzania* (Dar es Salaam: East African Publishing House, 1972).
 9. Since the publication of Eduardo Bonilla-Silva's *Racism without Racists: Color Blindness and the Persistence of Racial Inequality in America* (Rowman and Littlefield 2009) and the debate that it generated in the United States, the question of how racism and racial marginality show up in seemingly non-racial interactions, institutions, and discourses seems to have been answered definitely in the American context. Philosopher Etienne Balibar's insistence on possibility of "racism without races" is also a reference to this dawn of new kind of racisms in which racial prejudices are embedded in and disguised as institutional practices and as discourses that stress cultural alterity and multicultural divergence. See Balibar, "Is There a 'Neo-Racism?'" in Balibar and Immanuel Wallerstein, *Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities*, Chris Turner, trans. (London: Verso, 1991).

10. For a distillation of the major insights of critical race theory, see Richard Delgado and Jean Stefancic, eds., *Critical Race Theory: An Introduction* (New York: New York University Press, 2012); George Lipsitz, *The Possessive Investment in Whiteness: How White People Profit from Identity Politics* (Philadelphia: Temple University Press, 1998); Cheryl Harris, "Whiteness as Property," *Harvard Law Review* 106: 8, 1707–1791).
11. An example of is the classic work of Alamin Mazrui and Ibrahim Noor Shariff on Swahili identity. See Alamin Mazrui and Ibrahim Noor Shariff, *The Swahili: Idiom and Identity of an African People* (Trenton, New Jersey: Africa World Press, 1994).
12. Jonathon Glassman, "Slower than a Massacre: The Multiple Sources of Racial Thought in Colonial Africa," *American Historical Review* 109: 3 (2004), 720–754, 725.
13. Igor Kopytoff, "The Internal African Frontier: The Making of African Political Culture," in Igor Kopytoff, ed., *The African Frontier* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1987), 50–56.
14. Glassman, "Slower than a Massacre," 727. The most visible face of arguments linking European colonial discourses and praxis to racialisation is Mahmood Mamdani's *When Victims Become Killers*. In chapter 3, he brilliantly explains the process in which ethnic difference was not only created between the Hutu and the Tutsi but was also racialised by Belgian colonial thinking and systems of classification.
15. *Ibid.*, 728.
16. Bruce Hall, *A History of Race in Muslim West Africa 1600–1960* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011).
17. Jonathon Glassman, *War of Words, War of Stones: Racial Thought and Violence in Colonial Zanzibar* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 2011), chapter 2.
18. Jemima Pierre, *The Predicament of Blackness: Postcolonial Ghana and the Politics of Race* (Chicago and London: The University of Chicago Press, 2013), 2.
19. *Ibid.*, 5.
20. *Ibid.*, 3.
21. *Ibid.*, 2.
22. The term "circular discourse" comes from Carlo Ginzburg's seminal quasi-biographical work on cultural reinterpretation by unlettered Italian peasants, *The Cheese and the Worms: The Cosmos of a Sixteenth century Miller* (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press, 1992).

23. Pierre, *The Predicament of Blackness*, chapter 4.
24. Liora Bigon, *A History of Urban Planning in Two West African Colonial Capitals: Residential Segregation in British Lagos and French Dakar, 1850–1930* (Lewiston: Edwin Mellen Press, 2009), 151–153. For a survey of colonial residential segregation in Africa, see Ayodeji Olukoju, “The Segregation of Europeans and Africans in Colonial Africa,” in Laurent Fourchard and Isaac Olawale, eds., *Security, Segregation, and Social Networks in West African Cities in the 19th and 20th Centuries* (Paris: Karthala, 2003), 263–286).
25. “The European Reservation Ordinance, Establishment of Reservations and Boards, 1902,” *Laws of the Colony of Southern Nigeria, Being the Schedule to the Statute Laws Revision Ordinance, 1908, Vol. II* (London: Stevens and Sons Limited, 1908), pp. 1177–78.
26. Bigon, *A History of Urban Planning*, 153.
27. *Ibid.*, 217–263.
28. *Ibid.*, 267.
29. *Ibid.*
30. *Ibid.*, 217.
31. Obi Nwakanma, *Christopher Okigbo, 1930–67: Thirsting for Sunlight* (Suffolk, UK, and Rochester, NY: James Curry and Boydell and Brewer Inc., 2010).
32. Toyin Falola, *A Mouth Sweeter than Salt: An African Memoir* (Ann Arbor: The University of Michigan Press, 2005), 80.
33. *Ibid.*
34. V.Y. Mudimbe, *The Invention of Africa: Gnosis, Philosophy, and the Order of Knowledge* (Bloomington: Indiana University Press, 1988).
35. Howard Wolpe, *Urban Politics in Nigeria: A Study of Port Harcourt* (Berkeley and London: University of California Press, 1974), 62–63.
36. This is the alternative name or nickname for Port Harcourt, a designation that the city’s authorities and residents actively promote as a way of branding the city as a clean, salubrious abode, a branding that derives ultimately from the city’s colonial image.
37. Shafiu Ibrahim Abdullahi, “Reflections on Kano’s Real Estate Potentials,” Blog Post on “Economic Issues”: <http://www.economicissues.blogspot.com/2013/05/reflections-on-kanos-real-estate.html>. Accessed January 9, 2015.
38. See Ahmed Bako, *Sabon Gari Kano: A History of Immigrants and Inter-group Relations in the 20th Century* (Sokoto, Nigeria: Usumanu Dan Fodio University Press, 2006).

39. See Frantz Fanon, *The Wretched of the Earth* (London: Macgibbon and Kee, 1965), chapter 3.
40. See Homi Bhabha, "Of Mimicry and Men: the Ambivalence of Colonial Discourse," *October* 28, Discipleship: A Special Issue on Psychoanalysis (Spring 1984), 125–133.
41. See Michael Taussig, *Mimesis and Alterity: A Particular History of the Senses* (New York: Routledge, 1992).
42. Addresses to prominent Western think tanks are especially coveted venues of credibility. In March 2015, when Nigerian presidential candidate General Muhammadu Buhari was invited to address the prestigious British think tank, Chatham House, many observers in Nigeria interpreted it to be a formal acceptance of the credibility of his candidacy, an embrace of his potential presidency. It marked a turning point for his candidacy, as it signalled Euro-American comfort with the spectre of his political ascendance. Many analysts credit that outing with altering local perceptions of Buhari as sceptical Nigerians citizens cued into the subtle signals of imperial power that emanated from Chatham House.
43. Some literary critics have pointed to the politics of literary valuation which sees African writers and literary producers' creativity being subservient to Western literary palates and to the dictates of powerful Western literary endowments, publishers, and prizes. See for instance Taye Sellassie, "Stop Pigeonholing African Writers," *The Guardian (UK)*, July 4, 2015: <http://www.theguardian.com/books/2015/jul/04/taiye-selasi-stop-pigeonholing-african-writers>. Accessed April 25, 2016; For an even broader critique of Western validation and authentication of African literary production and African writers' surrender to this hegemonic regime, see Helon Habila, "On Dambudzo Marechera: the Life and Time of an African Writer," *VQR: A National Journal of Literature and Discussion*, Winter 2006: <http://www.vqronline.org/essay/dambudzo-marechera-life-and-times-african-writer>. Accessed on April 25, 2016.
44. "Let's Face it: We're in Over Our Heads. We Need White Folks to Come Back," Interview with Jean-Pierre Bekolo Obama. *Chimerengachronic.co.za*, December 17, 2014: <http://chimurengachronic.co.za/in-over-our-heads/>. Accessed on March 10, 2015.
45. Matthew Hassan Kukah, "No Nigerians Welcome,": <http://www.nigeriavillagesquare.com/articles/guest-articles/no-nigerians-welcome.html>. Accessed December 2, 2014.
46. *Ibid.*

47. For a discussion of the etymologies, histories, and contested provenance of Oburoni, a blog post on the influential Africa blog Africa is a Country is a good source. The comments and debates which the post provoked are the richest, most detailed explorations of Oburoni that I have encountered. See Wanlov The Kubolor, "Obroni: A History," [Africasacountry.com](http://africasacountry.com/whitehistorymonth-obroni-a-history/), March 2, 2015: <http://africasacountry.com/whitehistorymonth-obroni-a-history/>. Retrieved March 6, 2015.
48. For an exploration of Obruni's usage to designate strangerhood, see Hartman, *Lose Your Mother*, chapter 1.
49. Professor Edward Kissi. Private communication.
50. Ibid.
51. Pierre, *The Predicament of Blackness*.
52. Professor Joseph Mbele, St. Olaf College. Private communication.
53. I thank Joseph Mbele, a native Swahili speaker and teacher, for his sociolinguistic insights into these terms.

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2

Practices “Odious Among the Northern and Western Nations of Europe”: Whiteness and Religious Freedom in the United States

Danielle N. Boaz

In 1878, the United States Supreme Court heard its first case about the free exercise of religion, *Reynolds v. United States*, which was an appeal of a Mormon man’s criminal conviction for marrying multiple wives. While finding that Reynolds’s religious obligation to practise polygamy did not entitle him to an exemption from laws proscribing it, the Supreme Court rebuked the Mormons for transgressing the boundaries of permissible “whiteness” and opined that in such cases, the government had an obligation to ban offensive practices to “save” the innocent [white] victims who might be impacted or influenced by them. The justices asserted that all “civilized nations” regulated marriage and “polygamy has always been odious among the northern and western nations of Europe, and, until the establishment of the Mormon church, was almost exclusively a feature of life of Asiatic and of African people” (Reynolds 1878: 164, 167–168). They also upheld the validity of the judge’s instructions to the jury that they were to consider the potential damage to “pure-minded women” and “innocent children” should polygamy be allowed to spread.

D. N. Boaz (✉)

University of North Carolina at Charlotte, Charlotte, NC, USA

e-mail: dboaz@uncc.edu

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Although never as explicitly stated as in *Reynolds*, jurisprudence regarding the free exercise of religion in the United States has continued to hinge on the intersections of race and acceptable spiritual practices in two significant ways. First, white practitioners are usually the litigants in the most pivotal cases about the freedom to engage in minority religious practices. Second, appellate courts, for a variety of reasons ranging from the preservation of Western norms to doubts about the sincerity of the practitioner's beliefs, frequently rule against these individuals. Through the brief examination of litigation about religious drug use, animal sacrifice, and Islamic head-coverings, this chapter will explore the relationship between white practitioners and religious freedom in four of the most important free exercise cases in the United States in the last forty years.

Religious Drug Use

One of the most contentious issues regarding religious freedom in the United States is the right of individuals to possess and use illegal drugs as a sacrament in religious services. One of the earliest cases regarding this issue was *People v. Woody*, decided by the Supreme Court of California in 1964. In this case, several Native Americans were arrested for violating a law that prohibited unauthorized possession of peyote after they took part in a Navajo religious ceremony that involved the use of this drug. The defendants appealed their conviction, asserting that it violated their constitutional right to freedom of religion. In a decision determining that the protection of religious beliefs superseded the uniform enforcement of drug laws, the California Supreme Court discussed the history of religious use of peyote dating back at least to 1560. They opined that “[t]he varying currents of the subcultures that flow into the mainstream of our national life give it depth and beauty. We preserve a greater value than an ancient tradition when we protect the rights of the Indians who honestly practiced an old religion in using peyote” (727–728).

The language that the Court used about protecting the “ancient tradition” and “old religion” of Native Americans singled them out as a protected class of minorities who should be granted the right to engage in religious practices that defy the norms of the United States but predate its

existence. Unlike *Reynolds*, where the United States Supreme Court spoke of the government’s obligation to “rescue” innocent [white] victims from the negative effects of practices typically found among Asians and Africans, when the Attorney General of California argued that the use of peyote “could be regarded as a symbol, one that obstructs enlightenment and shackles the Indian to primitive conditions,” the Supreme Court of California was unpersuaded that this justified banning the practice. The Court responded “[w]e know of no doctrine that the state, in its asserted omniscience, should undertake to deny to defendants the observance of their religion in order to free them from the suppositious ‘shackles’ of their ‘unenlightened’ and ‘primitive condition’” (723).

Woody did not represent a simple chronological shift in free exercise jurisprudence from the strong stance the Supreme Court took in *Reynolds* that generally applicable criminal laws trump religious obligations. Fifteen years after *Woody*, state courts would begin to revisit this issue of the religious freedom to use sacramental drugs, when white American converts to minority religions began to fight for similar rights to those granted to Native Americans in California. However, for a variety of reasons, the courts began to deny exemptions from drug laws for sacramental use though dealing with the same or less potent drugs.

In the 1970s and 1980s, white Rastafari adherents asserted their religious rights to use marijuana. Ironically, however, although these cases were some of the earliest litigation about the freedom to practise an African diaspora religion and about the freedom to use marijuana as a sacrament, they were only superficially about religion. These proceedings were part and parcel of a national campaign to dismantle a Church that government officials regarded as a drug cartel.

Rastafari has its roots among persons of African descent in Jamaica, and is renowned for its struggle against black oppression, as well as the sacramental use of marijuana to bring revelations (Campbell 1987: 72–73; Murrell 2010: 310). In the 1970s, however, white Americans founded their own branch of Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church, a splinter sect of this African-centred faith. They purchased millions of dollars’ worth of land and businesses in Jamaica and the United States, but established their primary commune in Star Island, off the coast of Miami, Florida (Campbell 1987: 115–116). The Coptic Church distinguished

themselves amongst Rastafari adherents not only by their skin colour but also with their “international campaign to legalize cannabis,” which led them to be at the centre of several major cases regarding the religious freedom to possess and use marijuana as a sacrament (Savishinsky 1994: 264).

The first litigation began in Star Island, the residential neighbourhood where the Coptic Church held their religious services. After neighbours complained about their large Church gatherings and purportedly incessant use of marijuana, a Miami Dade County court issued an injunction banning the Coptic Church from using the land to hold religious gatherings and prohibiting the use of marijuana on the property. Citing *People v. Woody* as an example, the Coptic Church contended that this injunction violated their religious rights. They appealed this injunction all the way up to the Florida Supreme Court in 1979 in a case called *Town v. State*.

On October 28, 1979, before the Florida Supreme Court published its decision, the renowned TV show *CBS: 60 Minutes* featured an episode on the Coptic Church, entitled “Holy Smoke.” In the introduction, reporter Dan Rather argued that although Star Island had once been home to notorious criminals like Al Capone, none had disturbed their neighbours as much as the Coptic Church. The episode featured continuous video footage of these predominately-white members smoking marijuana, with several cutaways showing children present during this drug use. Rather explained that the Coptics claimed that marijuana was a religious sacrament but they appear to “partake of their sacrament just about all the time.” (“Holy Smoke” 1979) While Rather admitted that even law enforcement would not contest the sincerity of the Coptics’ religious beliefs, they were also the primary importers of the most potent marijuana arriving in the United States. Throughout the episode, Rather emphasized not only the allegedly rampant drug use and trafficking, but also the abundant wealth of the church from their marijuana enterprise.

Not surprisingly, four days after this episode aired, the Florida Supreme Court issued a ruling on the Coptics’ appeal. Upholding the injunctions, the Court expressly distinguished these circumstances from *People v. Woody*, in which “the use of peyote was restricted to adults, and it was used only during a particular ceremony” (*Town v. State* 1979: 651). By contrast, the Court emphasized that evidence showed that “the use of

cannabis by members and non-members of the [Coptic] church continues throughout the day and is wholly unrestricted” and that to grant them a religious exemption from marijuana laws “would, for all practical purposes, legalize the use of cannabis for anyone, member or nonmember of the Ethiopian Zion Coptic Church, who came to petitioner’s residence to use the prohibited drug” (651).¹

A few weeks after Florida Supreme Court’s decision, the Drug Enforcement Administration raided the Star Island compound and arrested nineteen members for violating the Controlled Substances Act, a federal law prohibiting the importation, possession and use of certain drugs (Norgren and Nanda 1996: 162–163). The government claimed that the street value of the marijuana that had been seized from Coptics was \$80–\$100 million. The Coptic Church launched a multifaceted defence, attacking the criminalization of marijuana itself while they continued to contend that their free exercise rights exempted them from prosecution. Ultimately, all but one were found guilty and sentenced to between seven and fifteen years’ imprisonment.

Around the same time, Carl Eric Olsen, a member and priest of the Coptic Church, was convicted of unlawful possession of marijuana with intent to deliver in the State of Iowa after he was discovered with 129 pounds of cannabis and nearly \$11,000 in cash (Iowa v. Olsen 1984). Once again citing *People v. Woody*, Olsen argued that the U.S. Constitution protected his possession and use of marijuana. He appealed his conviction to the Iowa Supreme Court, who determined that the Coptic Church was distinct from Native American peyote users because among the former, the “drug is smoked publicly and continuously and made available to church members regardless of age or occupation” (Iowa v. Olsen 1984).

Through these three cases, these white Rastafarians became the first major advocates of the freedom to use marijuana as a sacrament in the United States. Newspaper and television reports about their legal woes likely shaped the American public’s perceptions of Rastafarians for many years. The Coptic Church’s losses also began an uphill battle for Rastafari religious freedom that continues into the twenty-first century. The only explicit rationales that the courts provided for denying their freedom to use marijuana as a sacrament was that, supposedly unlike Native American peyote users, the Coptic Church engaged in indiscriminate drug use.

However, the unspoken reasoning for these distinctions was that government viewed the Coptics as a criminal organization founded by whites who were profiting substantially off of drug trafficking and, as Rather described in “Holy Smoke,” had gone to Jamaica “looking for marijuana” and found “a religion that extolled the poor, the black man and marijuana all in one tidy package” (“Holy Smoke” 1979).

A few years later, a white man experimenting with peyote and his Native American co-worker would once again take on this issue of the religious freedom to use illegal drugs. In contradiction of decades of precedent protecting peyote use at the state court level, the Supreme Court would deny these litigants unemployment benefits when they were fired for religious drug use. Although nothing was overtly said about race in this opinion, it seems significant that a white convert to the Native American Church was at the centre of this case that unravelled the protections for this “ancient practice” and substantially changed the standards for all free exercise cases in the United States.

This infamous case, *Employment Division v. Smith*, is named for the Native American litigant, Alfred Smith, who grew up in a time period when the United States government intentionally separated indigenous children from their families and stripped them of their cultural heritage. Smith had a turbulent childhood, fraught with homelessness and alcohol abuse. After he finally achieved sobriety, he began working for a rehabilitation and treatment facility, helping others who struggled with drugs and alcohol. He developed culturally competent treatment methods which included participation in indigenous forms of drumming and dance, as well as sweat lodge ceremonies (Long 2010: 109). After hearing from his clients about the Native American Church (“NAC”), “an intertribal Christian faith that uses peyote [a small hallucinogenic cactus] as a sacrament in religious ceremonies,” Smith further ensconced himself in the culture that was denied him as a child (Long 2010: 109).² He began to participate in peyote ceremonies, which he said enriched his spirit because he was embracing the ways of his ancestors (Epps 1998: 963). The NAC had a history of assisting alcoholics and addicts like Smith with overcoming substance abuse.

In 1982, Smith began a new job working as a treatment counsellor for the Alcohol and Drug Abuse Prevention and Treatment (“ADAPT”)

Center in a small town in the State of Oregon. He was hired, in part, because of his expertise in alternative Native American treatment modalities for substance abuse because a significant number of ADAPT’s clients were Native Americans. One of Smith’s co-workers, Galen Black, became interested in the NAC after witnessing Smith’s methods (Epps 1998: 965). After participating in other Native American spiritual practices, on September 10, 1983, Black attended a NAC ceremony during which he ingested peyote.

Black, excited by his experience, reported his peyote use to another counsellor at the ADAPT office (Epps 1998: 981–982). The Executive Director soon learned of Black’s peyote use and regarded this as a relapse into substance abuse and demanded that Black attend treatment. When Black refused, he was fired. This series of events led ADAPT to warn Smith, who had not used peyote since beginning his employment with them, that any future participation in these ceremonies would likewise result in his termination. Approximately six months later, Smith resumed the sacramental use of peyote after receiving an eagle feather in the mail—an incident that he regarded as a divine response to this ultimatum (Epps 1998: 984–985; Long 2010: 111). ADAPT demanded that Smith undergo substance abuse treatment but Smith refused because he believed that ingesting peyote was not a relapse, it was a religious practice. Because of his refusal to participate in treatment, ADAPT fired Smith.

After their termination, both men applied for and were denied unemployment benefits because they were lawfully fired for violating ADAPT’s no-tolerance policy for its substance abuse counsellors. They appealed these determinations through the appropriate administrative channels. When these administrative appeals failed, first Black and then Smith brought the issue before the Court of Appeals for Oregon. Relying on prior cases where the United States Supreme Court had determined that individuals terminated for engaging in religious activities should not be denied unemployment benefits, the Court of Appeals issued separate decisions in favour of Black and Smith. After another appeal to the Oregon Supreme Court, these two cases, which had been litigated independently through the state courts (though judges referenced one case when deciding the other), were officially consolidated upon appeal to the Supreme Court. Although Black and Smith had engaged in nearly

identical legal proceedings culminating in this consolidated case, it is important to emphasize that “the dispute [over Smith’s peyote use] might never have erupted at all had it not been for Galen Black” and Black, a white American, was the one who commenced litigation asserting his religious freedom to use peyote had been unconstitutionally restricted (Epps 1998: 981).

Smith was dissatisfied with the decision to consolidate because, as one scholar explained, he viewed this litigation as “his fight against the insensitivity of white culture. Now, the case had been taken away from him and put together with Black’s. Black was not a Native American, nor did he have a long history of involvement with the Native American Church. Smith perceived the consolidation as something that had been done to him” (Epps 1998: 997–998). The NAC likewise vehemently believed that Black, a white American, should not represent their interests before the Supreme Court. However, they also objected to Smith, a “non-traditional” Native American, as a central litigant in this major battle over one of the NAC’s central religious practices. According to an attorney representing the NAC’s interests in this case, they were “incensed at Al Smith because no one regarded him as a member” (Epps 1998: 1006). The attorney claimed that the core members of the NAC had never heard of Smith, that there was no recognized chapter in Oregon, and that they didn’t know that someone “was running meetings up in Oregon and that he was inviting non-Indians into the meetings and that whole thing. When all of that became known to the leadership of the Church they were absolutely incensed” (Epps 1998: 1006). The NAC tried to pressure both men to settle, with one of the leaders asserting that Al Smith was “just a flake, not a real member,” and was a non-traditional Native American who socialized with white women (Epps 1998: 1008).

If these comments stemmed from fear that Smith and Black would not achieve a favourable verdict regarding religious freedom for peyote users, these concerns were well-founded. Resurrecting *Reynolds*, the Court reversed decades of precedents in the state legal systems that provided Native Americans with special exemptions from drug laws for their sacramental use of peyote. This astonishing decision also attempted to carve out distinctions between significant protections that the Court had upheld for white minority religions, such as the Amish’s exemption from

compulsory education laws and a Sabbatarian’s right to receive unemployment benefits after she was terminated for refusing to work on her Sabbath day. Before *Employment Division* came before the Supreme Court, they had required the government to show a “compelling interest” to enforce generally applicable legislation (laws that do not target a particular religion) in a manner that infringed upon religious freedom. It was very difficult to meet this standard and the Court typically ruled in favour of religious practitioners. In *Smith*, the majority of the Court applied a new standard that the government only needed a “rational basis” to apply such laws in a way that limited religious freedom—a standard that could almost certainly be met in every case.³

The Supreme Court’s decision to develop a new standard to evaluate religious accommodations was striking. One cannot ignore that this major blow to Native American religious freedom, as well as this historic reversal of the Court’s position on the relationship between generally applicable laws and free exercise of religion, centred on a case that began with a white person partaking in indigenous spiritual practices. The aftermath of this ruling, however, may be even more telling about the role that race may have played in these proceedings. In 1993, just three short years after the Supreme Court’s decision in *Employment Division*, federal legislators passed a new statute attempting to resurrect the previous “compelling interest” standards for protecting religious freedom (Religious Freedom Restoration Act 1993). Ultimately, the Supreme Court declared that this law unconstitutionally exceeded the legislative powers granted to Congress (*City of Boerne v. Flores* 1997). However, since 1993, 21 state governments have passed analogous laws that attempted to return the protection of religious freedom to its pre-*Smith* standards (“State Religious Freedom Restoration Acts”).

In addition to this legislative rush to shore up state and federal protections of religious freedom for all citizens, Congress also sought to explicitly protect Native American peyote users. In 1978, Congress had implemented a vague statute entitled the “American Indian Religious Freedom Act,” which declared that the “policy of the United States [is] to protect and preserve for American Indians their inherent right of freedom to believe, express and exercise” their “traditional” religions, including “the freedom to worship through ceremonials and traditional rites”

(American Indian Religious Freedom Act §1). Congress amended this law after *Smith* to indicate specifically that the sacramental use of peyote was among the ceremonies and rites that it protected. This amended law was extremely narrow in its language; two different sections clearly state that no Native American could be penalized for sacramental peyote use, without mention of any converts to indigenous religions (American Indian Religious Freedom Act Amendments of 1994 §3(a)(1) and §3(b)(1)). Therefore, if a subsequent case mirrored the facts of *Employment Division, Al Smith*, as a Native American, would have been protected by the revised version of the American Indian Religious Freedom Act while Galen Black, a white American, presumably could have been denied unemployment benefits or even faced criminal prosecution for his peyote use.

When one examines *Employment Division* and the subsequent responsive legislation in this light, it begins to reflect the concerns the Supreme Court expressed in *Reynolds*, even though neither the Court nor Congress explicitly stated them in the late twentieth century. The *American Indian Religious Freedom Act*, both in its original and amended versions, identifies Native Americans as a particular group whose culture and religion should be protected. Historically, state supreme courts issued similar protections, reflecting upon the lengthy and particular nature of indigenous religious “traditions.” However, when confronted by a white American convert who litigated his right to engage in indigenous practices of sacramental drug use and was later joined by his “non-traditional” Native American colleague, the Supreme Court broke with both the State customs of carving out narrow exemptions for peyote use as well as its own standards requiring “compelling interests” before a generally applicable law can trump religious freedom. Although little is said about Galen Black’s race, state and federal legislatures took steps to return general religious freedom to its previous condition and to specifically protect Native American practitioners in their use of peyote; however, no special protections emerged for men like Black who do not share in the “heritage” or “tradition” that seems to make indigenous persons entitled to unique exemptions. When combined with the government’s targeted assault on the Coptic Church in the 1970s and 1980s, one begins to wonder if the religious right to use drugs or engage in other minority religious practices

is reserved for non-whites who the courts have no obligation to protect from their own “primitive condition.”

Animal Sacrifice

During the same time period that *Employment Division* was making its way through the appellate courts, African diaspora religious practices once again became the subject of controversial litigation in Miami-Dade County, Florida. This case was rooted in the racial tensions among the millions of Cubans who immigrated to Southern Florida between the late 1950s and the 1980s, and the growing practice of the Afro-Cuban faith known as “Lukumí” or “Santería.” Derived from a heterogeneous group of enslaved Yoruba speakers who were transported to Cuba in the Atlantic slave trade, this religion centres on the worship of deities known as *orishas* and includes the controversial practice of animal sacrifice (Brandon 1997: 55–60). When a white Cuban attempted to legitimize the historically hidden practice of this African-derived faith by establishing a formal church and education centre, the Cuban dominated City Council and the appellate courts of Southern Florida supported a ban on animal sacrifice that would effectively prohibit the Church from opening its doors. Although the U.S. Supreme Court ultimately found the City Council’s actions to be unconstitutionally targeting a particular religion, the trajectory of this case reveals the strong link between racial and religious tensions in Florida and the language used by the courts suggests that whites may be permitted to engage in minority religious practices when these spiritual rites are familiar to those in the Western world.

Cuba has a long and complicated history that varies from multi-racial alliances to strict racial segregation, and between the strict repression of African-derived religions and the tacit state support of these faiths. Of particular importance for contextualizing Cuban emigration in the mid-twentieth century, the United States imposed racial segregation during its occupation of the island from 1898 to 1902, and encouraged the continuation of these policies of stratification under post-occupation regimes. In the early twentieth century, to bolster the international reputation of the island by emphasizing the sophistication and strong

leadership of the European-descended inhabitants, the Cuban government waged war against African-derived cultural practices (O'Brien 2004: 13–14).⁴ While Cuban history between the U.S. occupation and the mid-twentieth century was not a steady stream of racial discrimination, Fulgencio Batista, the dictator who assumed power after a military coup in 1952, was a U.S. ally who supported capitalism and racial segregation (O'Brien 2004: 17).⁵ Therefore, when Fidel Castro and Che Guevara overthrew Batista and seized control of the government, the Cubans who fled to the United States in the late 1950s and 1960s were largely wealthy white landowners who were negatively impacted by the regime change (Brandon 1997: 100; O'Brien 2004: 16–17).⁶

After the revolution, Afro-Cuban religions began to receive an unprecedented kind of state support in Cuba. Castro's regime "gave the Afro-Cuban religions public recognition as an element of the national cultural heritage," deploying anthropologists from the National Institute of Ethnology and Folklore to study these faiths and encouraging their performance as a type of public entertainment (Brandon 1997: 101–102).⁷ This shift in the official relationship between Santería/Lukumí and the government in the 1960s may have contributed substantially to tensions between the different waves of Cuban immigrants arriving in the United States in the mid to late twentieth century.

In the first twenty years following the Cuban Revolution in 1959, approximately 430,000 Cuban immigrants arrived in Miami-Dade County, Florida (Brandon 1997: 104). The Cuban immigrant population living in the United States remained predominantly white until 1980, when the Mariel boatlift brought approximately 125,000 Cubans immigrants to the United States, many of whom were of African descent (Brandon 1997: 104; O'Brien 2004: 20).⁸ Criminal activity surged in Miami at this time and many blamed the Mariel immigrants, who were poorer than earlier migrants and were rumoured to have been released from Cuba's prisons and mental institutions (O'Brien 2004: 20).⁹ As Cuban populations in the United States began to racially diversify, older generations sought to distinguish themselves from new non-white arrivals. These racial tensions were the backdrop for the litigation over the practice of the Santería in the city of Hialeah in Miami-Dade County, Florida in the 1980s and 1990s (Palmié 1993: 190; O'Brien 2004: 33).

In 1987, a white Cuban immigrant named Ernesto Pichardo, who self-identifies as descending from Spanish and French ancestry, spearheaded plans to establish an official Santería church, the Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, in the city of Hialeah (Palmié 1993: 190). Already contending with the negative imagery of a crime-ridden Cuban immigrant population, the response to the church’s unprecedented attempt to establish an official place of worship for this typically hidden religion was both swift and strong. Alden S. Tarte, an attorney who represented Hialeah residents who opposed the opening of the Church, said “Santería is not a religion. It is a throwback to the dark ages. It is a cannibalistic, Voodoo-like sect which attracts the worst elements of society” (O’Brien 2004: 35). Eduardo Boza Masvidal of the Roman Catholic Archdiocese of Miami explained that the growth of Santería among Cuban immigrants “deeply concerns those of us who wish to see a truly Christian Cuban people” (O’Brien 2004: 35). At a public meeting held by the Hialeah City Council to address concerns about the opening of the church, opponents hurled racial epithets and decried the “barbarism” and “regression” that the faith represented, asking if such practices had been illegal in pre-revolutionary Cuba, why should they be permitted in the United States? (O’Brien 2004: 42).

The social controversy quickly became a legal one when the Hialeah City Council, predominated composed of persons of Cuban descent, overtly began investigating potential mechanisms to prevent the church from opening in the City. Ultimately, they passed a set of ordinances targeting the religion’s controversial practice of animal sacrifice, labelling the practice of ritual slaughter as cruel, unnecessary, and immoral. The City Council proscribed the slaughter of any animal unless the primary purpose was for consumption as food. The Church responded by filing suit, claiming that the City Council had, among other things, violated their right to freely practise their religion.

In addition to the explicit narratives about race in the public response to the opening of the Church, debates about the “African-ness” or “blackness” of Santería played an essential role in the appeals process. Beginning in 1988, the United States District Court of the Southern Division of Florida issued two decisions in favour of the City of Hialeah, finding that the Church could not sue the mayor and city councilmen as individuals,

and determining that the ordinances were constitutional. In both rulings, the judges described Santería as a purely African religion. In the first case, the District Court asserted that Santería, while technically meaning “way of the Saints” in Spanish, is “the name given to traditional African religions which originated in southwestern Africa, in what is known today as Nigeria” (Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah 1988: 1524). In its next decision, the District Court elaborated further that it understood Santería to be an “ancient religion” originating from West Africa which was brought to Cuba by enslaved Yoruba or “Yoba” persons (Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah 1989: 1469). The District Court depicted Catholicism as a veil that enslaved persons used to mask their beliefs because “the practice of their native religion was forbidden.” (1469). The Court continued “[t]he slaves, to escape the severe penalties and social stigma, began to express the Yoba faith through the use of Catholic saints and symbolism. This syncretism permitted slaves to practice Yoba, or Santería, while *appearing* to practice Catholicism” (1469–1470 emphasis added). Therefore, rather than a fusion of European and West African beliefs, the Court concluded that Santería was a religion “practiced mostly by slaves and the descendants of slaves” that eventually “spilled over from the black population to the white population” (1470).

The United States Supreme Court, on the other hand, determined that the Hialeah City Council had impermissibly discriminated against Santería practitioners and thus had violated their rights to freedom of religion. In its decision, the Supreme Court described Santería not as a purely African religion but instead a faith that was syncretic—blending both African and European beliefs and practices. Rather than hiding their “true” religion behind Roman Catholicism, the Court believed Santería practitioners “express their devotion to spirits, called *orishas*, through the iconography of Catholic saints, Catholic symbols are often present at Santería rites and Santería devotees attend the Catholic sacraments” (Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye v. City of Hialeah 1993: 525). Furthermore, whereas the district court had described animal sacrifice as uniquely barbarous rituals conducted by persons of African descent, the Supreme Court emphasized the long tradition of similar practices in Abrahamic faiths (524–525). Although not explicitly stated,

one must note the contrast to *Reynolds* where the Supreme Court ruled against white Americans who were seeking the right to engage in practices typically banned in the Western world but found in Africa and Asia. In this unique case where a white adherent successfully sought the right to engage in a minority religious practice, it is certainly noteworthy that the Court depicts this religion as deeply connected to Christianity through syncretic blending, and describes the practice of animal sacrifice as common in the religious history of white America.

In addition to the tensions over race that underlay the foundations of this case and seeped through the courts' decisions, this litigation also (like *Smith*) underscores strong disputes about who has the right or authority to defend the legal rights of practitioners of minority religions. Some practitioners have criticized Pichardo and his colleagues for what they perceive as an effort to Westernize the practice of Santería/Lukumi by establishing an official church and formal educational centre for a religion that had historically been practised in private homes (Palmié 1993: 202–203). During this litigation, Pichardo was “widely denounced as a publicity seeker, troublemaker, or pretentious upstart trying to establish himself as bogus pope of Miami” (Palmié 1993: 205). Moreover, his more recent efforts to denounce “dishonest” and “unscrupulous” Santería priests and create a mainstream version of a decentralized belief system has been characterized as a component of a growing shift of marginalizing Afro-Cuban practitioners in favour of more affluent whites (Palmié 1993: 204–205).

Islamic Head-Coverings

On September 11, 2001 (“9/11”), nineteen Islamic extremists hijacked and crashed four airplanes, killing almost three thousand people. Just a few months later, as the United States was still reeling from these attacks, a dispute about the right of a Muslim woman to veil her face began in the State of Florida. This case, which was the first major appellate decision regarding Islamic head-coverings post-9/11, centred on a white American female who had converted to Islam as an adult. Amidst overt narratives about national

security, terrorism, and burdens on religious freedom, this case was replete with subtext about race and religious conversion in the twenty-first century.

Sultaana Freeman, the litigant in this pivotal case, has been described as “an all-American woman” (Yildirim 2010: 297).¹⁰ She was born Sandra Michele Keller in Washington, D.C. in 1967 to Christian parents. When she was young, her family relocated to Illinois, where she lived until she graduated from college in 1989 (*Freeman v. Department of Highway Safety* 2006: 51). In 1997, when she was approximately thirty years old, Keller converted to Islam, changed her name to Sultaana Lakiana Myke and began wearing a *niqab*—a veil which covered her face, leaving only her eyes visible. She obtained an Illinois driver’s licence featuring her new name as well as a photo of her veiled face. Shortly thereafter, she married Abdul Maalik Freeman, an African American Muslim, and moved to Florida.¹¹

A few years later, in February of 2001, Freeman obtained a Florida driver’s licence for which she was again photographed wearing her veil (*Freeman v. Department of Highway Safety* 2006: 51). Approximately three months after 9/11, the Department of Highway Safety and Motor Vehicles (“DMV”) sent Freeman a letter notifying her that she must retake her photo without the veil or they would cancel her licence. Freeman filed suit asserting that the DMV was violating her right to free exercise of religion. Not only did she regard the removal of her veil in these circumstances as a general violation of the tenets of her faith, Freeman also asserted that her religion prohibited photographs of the human face. Although her driver’s licence photo featured a headshot of Freeman, she claimed that wearing her veil in the image allowed her to take the photo without violating her religious beliefs because the veil essentially rendered her “faceless.”

Florida is one of the many states that, after *Employment Division*, passed a law that required the government to show a compelling interest before it places a “substantial burden” on a person’s free exercise rights. Although Florida law tipped the balance between government and religious freedom drastically in favour of the latter, Freeman lost her case on two grounds. First, the courts determined that requiring Freeman to remove her veil for a driver’s licence photo did not “substantially burden”

her religion. Second, the courts opined that Freeman’s objection to photographs of the human face was not sincere and thus not a protected religious belief. The exchanges between Freeman and the judges, as well as the rationale for the courts’ decisions, reveal much about their perceptions of this white American woman who was fighting for her right to wear a veil.

To make their decision regarding whether removing the veil placed a “substantial burden” on Freeman’s religious practice, the courts relied on the state’s expert witness, Dr. Kahaled Abou El Fadl. In some Islamic countries such as Saudi Arabia, Dr. El Fadl explained, a concept known as the “doctrine of necessity,” created a permissible religious exemption for women to unveil themselves for medical treatment or certain photo IDs such as passports (*Freeman v. Department of Highway Safety* 2006: 56–57). Adopting El Fadl’s interpretation, the court determined that Freeman’s “veiling practice is ‘merely inconvenienced’ by the photograph requirement” (*Freeman v. Department of Highway Safety* 2006: 57).

The court’s reliance on Dr. El Fadl’s testimony demonstrates two significant oversights on the part of the court. First, Islamic law is not monolithic and Freeman belongs to a different school of law with distinct perspectives about the doctrine of necessity than those expressed by El Fadl (Yildirim 2010: 299–300). The DMV’s expert relied on principles of Islamic law in Saudi Arabia, a country with a very distinct political and religious climate than that of the United States and a nation to which Freeman had no connection. Second, the court disregarded the testimony of Freeman’s own expert witness, a local Imam and a professor at the University of Central Florida, who argued that, according to the school of Islamic law that Freeman followed, the “doctrine of necessity” did not apply in these circumstances. In relying on the state’s expert over the Freeman’s own statements about her religious beliefs as well as the testimony of her expert, the court “engaged in this constitutionally prohibited inquiry of what a woman who self-identifies as a devout Muslim may or may not do without sinning” (Yildirim 2010: 300).

The court’s reliance on expert witness testimony about whether a Muslim woman may unveil herself for a driver’s licence photograph contains important subtext about their perceptions of Freeman and the role of race in this case. By privileging the testimony of a male professor over

Freeman's expert and her own statements about how she interpreted her faith, the court was essentially instructing Freeman in the proper manner of practising her religion. With a paternalistic tone, the courts appears to say to this "All-American" convert to Islam, "It's okay. Your religion allows you to remove your veil in these circumstances."¹² One must wonder whether the Court would have felt compelled to interpret the requirements of Islamic law for Freeman if she was an immigrant from a predominantly Muslim nation.

The court's ruling about the sincerity of Freeman's religious belief also contains interesting contradictions about what is permissible evidence of sincerity. One must recall that Freeman obtained two driver's licence photos wearing her *niqab*—the first in Illinois in 1997 prior to marrying her husband and the second in Florida in 2001 prior to 9/11. Freeman testified that this was a permissible method of having her photograph taken because she was wearing her veil; otherwise, her faith did not permit such images of the human face. Freeman further claimed that she blackened out all such images in her home to prevent her children from viewing them. The courts, however, seized on two arguments to find that Freeman did not have a sincere religious objection to having her photograph taken. First, the court mentioned that Freeman's husband did not object to having his photo taken for his driver's licence (Yildirim 2010: 298–299). Second, they mentioned that Freeman and her husband did not object to video cameras in the courtroom during trial. Presumably, Freeman wore her *niqab* to court, thus the same principle that protected her during the driver's licence photo would prevent the video cameras from infringing on her faith. One must assume that, once again, the individual who the court saw as behaving inconsistently with Freeman's religious beliefs was her husband and not Freeman herself.

It is troubling that the court appears to have primarily relied on the inconsistencies of Freeman's husband's practices to evaluate Freeman's sincerity of religious belief. However, these proceedings become more disconcerting when one considers that Freeman's husband is an African American male who also converted to Islam as an adult.¹³ In a climate where the U.S. public regards Islam as a religion of black and brown people that oppresses females by forcing them to veil themselves, the court subtly shifts accountability for Freeman's religious beliefs to her

African American husband. Finding that Freeman’s beliefs could not be sincere because her husband acted inconsistently with these principles is another way of saying that it is impossible that Freeman could personally choose to be a more conservative Muslim than her husband and could object to graven images when he did not find them problematic. By transferring the responsibility for determining their communal religious beliefs from Freeman to her husband, despite Freeman’s conversion to Islam prior to her marriage, the court’s decision contains a subtext of saving Freeman from her brown-skinned Muslim husband who must have forced her to wear a veil even though it was not her sincere belief.

In addition to these abnormal (and some have argued unconstitutional) methods of evaluating whether unveiling herself placed as “substantial burden” on Freeman’s “sincere beliefs,” when one examines this case in broader context, it becomes clear that it was not just Freeman’s specific request that was on trial but rather society’s perceptions of what it meant to be a Muslim after 9/11. Sahar Aziz argues that “[t]hose suspicious of Muslims often contribute to a perceived grand civilizational clash between the inherently violent, oppressive, and blood thirsty Islam of the ‘East,’ and the liberal, pluralistic, and free America of the ‘West’” (Aziz 2012: 200). Aziz describes the growing violence against women wearing head-coverings in the United States since 9/11—arguing that they have had their scarves ripped off their heads, have been cursed at and beaten, and, most significantly for this chapter, told to go back to the country they came from (247). As a white woman who was born in the U.S. and raised by Christian parents, but who chose to convert to Islam, Freeman “challenge[d] the image of the Muslim as the immigrant or the foreigner” (Yildirim 2010: 307–308). Seval Yildirim further explains that headscarves and veils are regarded as part and parcel of the “anti-terror” climate of the U.S., who views its wars in the Middle East as efforts to liberate brown women from their religious oppression.¹⁴ As a college-educated white American female who envisioned wearing a veil as a religious right, not a symbol of oppression, and who was fighting for her ability to obtain a driver’s licence, which would have given her more independence from her husband, Freeman challenged both the racial and ethnic identities of Muslim women as well as the notion that they welcomed American intervention (Yildirim 2010: 308). Not surprisingly, as

she was asserting her right to engage in a religious practice that is no longer viewed as “modern” or “civilized” in the West, the courts denied this white convert her free exercise rights.

Conclusion

Although much more subtle than the Supreme Court’s ruling in *Reynolds*, these cases about religious drug use, animal sacrifice, and Islamic veils revive nineteenth century debates about the normative boundaries of European or Western whiteness and the protection of religious freedom. The inordinate number of white Americans at the centre of the most significant cases about minority faiths suggests that race is an unspoken factor in the evaluation of these claims. Sometimes, as in the cases of the Coptic Church and Sultaana Freeman, the conversion of white Americans to these minority religions contradicts public perceptions of these faiths and contributes to the courts’ doubts about the practitioners’ sincerity. In other instances, such as *Employment Division* and the *Church of the Lukumi* as well as *Reynolds* itself, these cases involve disputes about the history of a particular religious practice, its similarity to Western religion, and who has the proper authority to litigate on behalf of practitioners. While none of these post-*Reynolds* cases explicitly rebukes white Americans for transgressing the normative boundaries of whiteness by engaging in non-Western practices, the disproportionate number of decisions restricting freedom of religion suggests that the United States legal system has not ceased interrogating the acceptability of a white person’s conversion to a minority religion. These rulings further suggest that when the practices in question are “odious among the Northern and Western Nations of Europe,” courts remain unlikely to decide in their favour.

Notes

1. Interestingly, however, the California Supreme Court had observed in *People v. Woody* that the Native American Church had no official membership requirements or registers, and that estimates of membership

numbers varied widely. Yet, the Court expressed no qualms about non-members engaging in peyote use. In fact, when this issue of sacramental use of peyote later came before the Supreme Court in 1990, the litigation was brought by a nonmember and an individual whose membership was disputed.

2. Although the Church was not incorporated until the early twentieth century, the use of peyote to produce a particular state of consciousness has been a component of indigenous religious ceremonies for centuries.
3. The Supreme Court developed a bizarre interpretation of previous cases, stating that the compelling interest standard only applied in "hybrid cases"- those where more than one constitutional right was at issue, such as the free speech or free association, alongside religious freedom.
4. Specifically, O'Brien notes that after Cuba became independent, a "new nationalism resulted in a campaign of Europeanization that denigrated the African heritage of the island... The campaign to de-Africanize Cuba led, once again, to the persecution of *santeros*, the confiscation of religious paraphernalia, and the enactment of laws forbidding the use of ritual *bata* drums."
5. Ironically, O'Brien notes that many have argued that Batista was a Santería practitioner.
6. Some Santería practitioners opposed the revolution and left when Castro came to power but the majority of practitioners, particularly those who were poor and black, stayed behind.
7. This is not to suggest that Castro's regime unquestionably embraced Afro-Cuban religions but rather that they were brought into the public sphere in ways they had not been prior to the revolution.
8. Specifically, Brandon notes that in 1970, the last year for which this kind of data is available, 96 percent of Cubans in the United States were white. O'Brien adds that the first wave of Cubans were "predominantly white middle-to upper-class professionals" while those after Mariel were "black Cubans from the lower socioeconomic strata of society."
9. O'Brien notes the socio-economic diversity of the Mariel boatlift Cubans and that "drug dealing and killings skyrocketed by almost 20 percent in Miami-Dade county" after the boatlift.
10. I have been unable to locate any materials indicating the exactly ethnic origins of Freeman. However, police records from prior domestic abuse allegations list Freeman as a white female.

11. None of the court records indicate Mr. Freeman's race nor ethnic origins. However, a man purporting to be Mr. Freeman has established a website at freemancase.com wherein he features photos of himself that clearly show a person of African descent and he claims that he was born in Winter Park, Florida.
12. Aliah Abdo (2008) has pointed out that this is not something that is typically done when dealing with Christian litigants disputing analogous issues (492).
13. This information is based on Malik Freeman's own website describing his background.
14. Yildirim explains that the public was wondering, "When the U.S. military was in Afghanistan liberating Afghani women from their burqas, how could an all-American woman go to such lengths to wear one?" (300).

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3

The 'Indian' Question: Examining Autochthony, Citizenship, and Belonging in South Africa

Kathryn Pillay

Introduction

The othering of South Africans of Indian descent as 'foreigner' and the question of where 'they' belong has been perpetuated in one form or another from the arrival of the very first immigrants as indentured labourers, in the 1860s, and continues 24 years after the democratic elections. This implies that very same process of 'othering', exclusion and racism fabricated under colonialism and apartheid continues within contemporary South African society in various forms including, but not limited to, xenophobia, which can be viewed as being inextricably connected to notions of 'us' and 'them', of inclusivity and exclusivity, entitlement and ineligibility, and of the existence of 'citizens' and 'foreigners/outsideers'. This form of racism in South Africa is widespread and overt, and can be termed 'xeno-racism' as "...it's outward defensive mode of expression disguises a stronger opposition to migrants and the continuation of

K. Pillay (✉)

University of KwaZulu-Natal, Durban, South Africa

e-mail: pillaykat@ukzn.ac.za

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racism in an new guise and widened to exclude different groups of people” (Delanty et al. 2008, 2).

Xenophobic and racist behaviour expressed towards refugees and immigrants from the African continent as well as fellow South African citizens seen as unwelcome ‘foreigners’ provide evidence for a society that is still deeply divided along lines of ‘race’ and ethnicity. This nativist discourse with claims of indigeneity raises questions on who ‘qualifies’ to ‘legitimately’ belong to the social body. I argue in this chapter that this notion of autochthony is not just specific to new immigrants but also to fifth and sixth generation South Africans of Indian descent. ‘Indians’¹ in contemporary South African society, are viewed as ‘belonging’ to another ‘homeland’ and having a national ‘origin’ other than that of South Africa. Claims made in the name of indigeneity, culture, ethnicity or ‘race’, are all claims to maintain difference and exclusivity.

Gilroy (2004, 45) insists that in order to abolish the dichotomous positions of ‘us’ and ‘them’, the way forward would be to reject all forms of harmful, essentialised, fixed othering, arguing,

Repudiation of those dualistic pairings – black/white, settler/native, colonizer/colonized – has become an urgent political and moral task. Like the related work of repairing the damage they have so evidently done, it can be accomplished via a concept of relation. This idea refers historians and critics of racism to the complex, tangled, profane and sometimes inconvenient forms of inter-dependency. It supplies a productive starting point for the work Fanon described as ‘disalienation’, by which he meant the unmasking of racialised bodies and their restoration to properly human modes of being in the world.

This chapter aims, therefore, to explore the historical trajectory of the ‘Indian Question’ in South Africa, focusing specifically on the period from 1910 to 1948, and in so doing examines how notions of citizenship, ethnicity, inclusion and exclusion, in contemporary society, which asserts itself as both democratic and ‘non-racial’, mirrors that of historical discrimination, with its roots in colonialism. The ‘problem’ of ‘Indians’ in the country during the colonial period, and what to do with them, became known as the ‘Indian Question’ and the debate in this regard

revolved around measures that could be taken to curtail their advancement in society, after they had served out their contract of indenture.

This period, under study, is significant as it was in 1910 that the Union of South Africa was created and its government inherited "... the old Indian problem of the colonies and the Boer republics ..." (Ebr.-Vally 2001, 82). According to Peberdy (2009, 44), the restrictive practices, legislations, and the beliefs upon which the colonies in southern Africa were founded, continued without intervention in the government of the Union, and all "... anti-Indian immigration policies of earlier jurisdictions were now transported onto the new national stage." Despite efforts against the oppressive system of government, the National Party (NP) was nevertheless elected into office in 1948. The period under examination in this chapter therefore represent the years leading up to the watershed years of apartheid, the system of government that institutionalised racial discrimination.

Data drawn from existing literature and research, as well as data obtained from the newspapers *The Mercury*,² and *Ilanga*,³ as well as political speeches, government legislation, parliamentary debates, and interviews with South African families of Indian descent, are examined and discussed. In addition, views expressed by 'Indians', gleaned from sources such as correspondence in the media, evidence provided to the various commissions, and petitions against pieces of legislation, have also been analysed, to reveal the continuing uncertainty regarding the status of 'Indians' in South Africa, and how the language of xenophobia, racism, citizenship and belonging were consistently employed in the hegemonic discourse during this time.

Creating a 'Nation'

The whole meaning of the Union of South Africa is this: we are going to create a nation – a nation which will be of a composite character, including Dutch, German, English and Jew, and whatever white nationality seeks refuge in this land – all can combine. All will be welcome. (Jan Smuts cited in Moodie 1975, 75)

In attempting to explain what the Union of South Africa represented, Smuts (a minister in the Union government), in a speech given in 1910, provides a clear picture of how the Union government saw the national identity of the country being formed, as indicated in the quote immediately above. ‘Indians’, ‘coloureds’, and ‘Natives’ were effectively excluded from the discourse of the nation in their attempts to establish South Africa as a ‘white nation’⁴ by explicitly prioritising whiteness through policies and practice, and overtly organising society around the normativity of European Whiteness. This was further emphasised by Louis Botha, the first Prime Minister of the Union, at the Inaugural Congress of the South African Party in 1911, when he stated that their programme was “... to make a great White man’s land of South Africa for ourselves and for generations to come” (cited in Krüger 1960, 51–52). Botha argued for, and underlined the importance of, one ‘white race’, i.e. bringing together both British settlers and their descendants, and Dutch settlers and their descendants. In other words the Union of the Colonies was also a union of English speaking ‘whites’ and Afrikaans speaking ‘whites’. ‘Race’ and racial hierarchy then continued to dominate state discourse and inform legislation in the Union. ‘Indians’ therefore did not feature in the nation building narrative and Smuts confirmed this when he said to Mahatma Gandhi in 1911 “... We Whites are a handful. We do not want Asia to come in” (Bhana 1997, 9).

Indian immigrants in South Africa and their descendants who were born in the country had, for 50 years prior to the formation of the Union, experienced discrimination through legislation which regarded them as foreign elements, ‘aliens’ in the country who did not warrant the same treatment as ‘white’ settlers. The sugar planters required the *labour* of the ‘Indians’ but not ‘Indians’ themselves, as if one could be separated from the other.

Calpin (1941, 177–178) in writing about the perceptions of ‘Indians’ at the time of the formation of the Union, stated:

The Indian who had served and made the sugar industry became a pest, a constant irritant to the European, not only because of his commercial competition but also because, unlike the Natives who are conceded a right to the country, he was an alien, a coloured alien at that. Worse than being an irritant to the flesh, he was an aggravation to the mind. His presence, as the

lowly representation of a civilization more ancient and no whit inferior to western civilization, denied the prerogative of the European – the Divine Right of White Skin – consciously approved by the Dutch, and long since assumed by the British. The Indian was a reminder of a subterfuge that made the White man's supremacy possible, and was fast proving in every sphere he was allowed to enter that he was the White man's equal. His presence disturbed a European complacency that might have continued for decades as far as any Native advance endangered it.

The Union government had little choice when it came to the 'Natives' in the country, whom they often referred to as the 'former owners of the soil' ("Correspondence – The Indian Festival from J.T," *The Mercury*, November 13, 1885), i.e. they could not be sent to another 'home country'. In addition the people that the Union government classified as 'mixed race' posed no threat economically, 'Indians' however threatened the supremacy of 'white' rule and the national identity that the government wanted to forge which included 'whites' as central and African people on the periphery and kept under state control. There was no room therefore for an 'alien', in-between 'race'.

The Exodus of the Hindu

The discourse on the 'exodus' of 'Indians' from South Africa therefore gained momentum after the formation of the Union, and the debates and discussions of government were then centred on methods of facilitating this 'exodus' as it had come to be known in the years prior when the media provided 'warnings' of the coming threat of 'freed' indentured labourers in the workforce (see for example "The Coming Labour Problem," *Ilanga*, November 13, 1885). Out of these discussions, immigration legislation was postulated as a key tool for the purpose of controlling the 'numbers' in Natal and limiting further entry of Indian immigrants to South Africa. This discourse of fear of unbridled numbers of Indian immigrants entering the country was not only reported on but perpetuated by the media. Politicians too manipulated the 'fears of the undesirables' and then used the issue of 'unrestricted Indian immigration' as a platform for electioneering, arguing that a budget should be made available to

encourage “Asiatic emigration” (“White and Coloured – The Asiatic Question. Speech by Mr. Cresswell,” *The Mercury*, September 25, 1913).

In the period between 1910 and 1913 a policy to control immigration was formulated in the Union, and this resulted in the 1913 Immigrants Regulation Act, the purpose of which was to encourage ‘white’ immigration, while particularly restricting immigration from India. By means of controlling Indian immigration from the sub-continent and the policing of not only its internal boundaries but also its international borders, the control of ‘Indians’ residing in South Africa, in terms of where they could travel, settle and trade within the ‘borders’ of the country had now been shifted to an international level.

The chief elements contained within the Immigrants Regulation Act of 1913 included the following (drawn from Klotz (1997, 3–5) and Walker (1963, 656–657)):

- Individuals not literate in a European Language would be prevented from entering the country;
- ‘Undesirables’, i.e. persons deemed undesirable on economic grounds or on account of standards or ‘habits of life’, could be excluded from entering the country;
- The right of a wife to join her husband was denied in instances of polygamous marriages, and persons wanting to gain entry into the country, especially Muslims from India, had to provide proof of a monogamous marriage (even if they were in one);
- Ports of entry for Indian immigrants were limited to prevent illegal entry of Indians into the country such as via Mozambique; and
- All Indians immigrating to the Union would be compelled to sign a document indicating that they would not own land, trade or farm in the Free State (which was already prohibited by law so even if this declaration was not signed, the immigrants would still be unable to do any of the above. Immigration policy therefore did not only restrict movement of people into the country but also between provinces within the Union as well).

Immigration officers at the ports were given the authority to interpret the law as they saw fit, thereby including and excluding people as they

deemed appropriate. Although the ability to read and write in a European language was a requirement for entry, literacy in Yiddish was considered acceptable for entry into the country. Exclusion by 'race' was implicit in the legislation, although not directly worded as such. Evidence for this was provided by Smuts as Minister of the Interior, reflecting on the Immigration Regulation Act in 1919 at the House of Assembly. His argument was summarised in the parliamentary proceedings where he stated,

... they wanted to be masters in their own house, and they wanted to be in a position to say whom they did not want in the country ... they all knew it was the intention of South Africa to exclude Asiatics ... it was a matter of the self-preservation of the white man in South Africa ... Therefore, they would avoid naming any race by name, and excluding them on that account, but they must make it clear that they deemed the European civilisation the desirable one from which to see progress and advancement of the country. (*Hansard* 1913, cols. 2050–2051, 30/04/1913 cited in Peberdy 2009, 31)

The penalty for contravening the Immigrants Regulation Act of 1913 by crossing over into the Transvaal was harsh and resulted in three months' imprisonment, with hard labour, and each "pending removal", which meant that the Immigration Department had the right to deport them at any time during the term of their sentence. The Immigration legislation thus made it possible for the Union government to deport anyone classified as 'Indian' or 'Asiatic' who contravened the Act, whether or not they were born in the country.

In addition to the Immigration Regulation Act, it should be borne in mind that the three pound tax that was in place prior to the formation of the Union, was still being enforced which compelled Indian immigrants that arrived under the indenture scheme to either re-indenture, return to India, or pay the three pound tax which would allow them to remain in the Union. The tax was used as a tool in an attempt to rid the then colony of Natal of Indian immigrants who had been released from their indenture contract. Many who had found the tax a huge burden had been compelled to return to India. As one of the individuals affected by the tax stated in a letter to *The Mercury* in 1913,

I am a £3 poll-tax Indian. There are thousands of us in this Colony. The tax is a hardship on the majority of us; it presses heavily on the man with a family, more than on the strong-built man. (“Correspondence from ERAMASWAMI,” *The Mercury*, October 11, 1913)

In addition, an indentured worker who arrived at the age of 14 in Natal in 1910 stated:

... In 1913 ... I earned ten shillings monthly with three pounds tax to pay. We had to carry passes to visit friends and relatives in other estates. Failure to do so meant imprisonment. (Interview with R. Appal Naidoo in Naidoo 1986, 121b)

Demands for the tax to remain however, were evident by the articles and letters to the editor published in *The Mercury*. The words used in the articles such as ‘undesirable element’, ‘absolutely uncontrolled,’ ‘overrun by Indians’, ‘dirty’, ‘unhealthy’, all used in the description of ‘Indians’ reveal the xenophobic/racist sentiments that were overwhelmingly a part of the discourse on ‘Indians’ in South Africa at that time (see for instance “Correspondence – Indian Immigration from South Africa,” *The Mercury*, September 27, 1913). The following extract published in *The Mercury* in 1913 provides a striking example of the perceptions of ‘Indians’ in the Union:

If by any chance this tax should be repealed, what will be the result? The number of dirty, unhealthy coolie hawkers ... will be increased by hundreds. The number of itinerant coolies ... will be increased by thousands. Who will have to pay for the additional policing that will be necessary to cope with the wastrels thus bred of our own folly? The Europeans, of course. Who will also ultimately suffer for the disease that will be spread and bred, too, by the squalor and irregularity of the lives of such a large number of destitute, uninspected Asiatics? (Correspondence from AGRICOLA, 1913)

Coupled with the Immigration Regulation Act, as well as the three pound tax, was a Supreme Court ruling in 1913 which legalised only Christian marriages. This meant that marriages conducted under either

Hindu or Muslim rites were not recognised by the State. The Natal Division of the Supreme Court, argued that women were to be regarded as a prohibited immigrant if married under "Mohammedan law", even if she was the only wife of an Indian possessing the right of domicile ("The Indian Grievances," *The Mercury*, October 3, 1913).

Despite the many discriminatory measures in place, the Union government began to discover that a single solution to the 'The Indian Question' could not easily be found, and the discourse around the deportation of 'Indians' continued with the report of the Asiatic Inquiry Commission proposing voluntary repatriation and residential segregation of 'Indians' in the Union. In addition the report also recommended the introduction of legislation, similar to that which already existed in the Transvaal, to prevent 'Indians' from purchasing coastal land for farming. 'Witnesses' who provided testimony to the Commission raised various grievances against Asiatic Traders in the Transvaal. Amongst the usual rhetoric of uncleanness, immorality, standards of living, depreciating property etc. two in particular stood out:

(10) Their religion, language, colour, mode of thought, ideals, manners and customs are entirely different to those of Europeans; they cannot be assimilated and their presence is a menace to European supremacy ... (12) They become too familiar with Europeans, especially females, in the conduct of their business, and thus destroy the respect of natives for Europeans. (Union of South Africa 1921, 30)

Even though similar sentiments were expressed during colonialism, what is interesting to note here is that 80 percent of the 'Indians' residing in the Union at that point in time, i.e. in the 1920s, had been born in the Union (Gell 1951, 432). The argument against their ability to 'assimilate' in the country of their birth indeed reflected the crude racist attitudes of the day. The Commission report went on to state,

We were much impressed with the evidence given at Durban on this aspect of the question ... by Mr. Leon Renaud, an advocate of the Supreme Court in Natal, who has been closely associated with the Indian community in that province during the past 35 years. He knows their character and idiosyncrasies, speaks their language, and is well acquainted with their views

and habits. As he puts it, there is no man more easily influenced than the average Indian; if fairly treated he is easily led; but he will submit to anything rather than force; he does not like to be driven, and any sort of compulsion makes him a martyr; he is not very strong physically, but morally he is strong. On the subject of separate residential areas, Mr. Renaud made the following statement:- “ ... An Indian does not like to live in a neighbourhood where he is looked upon as a helot; he prefers to be with his own people, and I think that sentiment will always be so ... I do not think it is desirable that Indians should go into European residential areas, because they are not welcome; and I do not think they like to see Europeans in their neighbourhood either”. (Union of South Africa 1921, 34–35)

The Commission took into account the testimony of someone who they believed, and who purported to be, an ‘authority’ on ‘Indians’, as if they were a different species of being and in turn described them as such, i.e. ‘their habits, character and idiosyncrasies’. By accepting this testimony, the Commission legitimised the stereotypes of ‘Indians’ that had already been created and further perpetuated the notion of difference between ‘Indians’ and those who ‘belonged’ in the Union. Following from this testimony the Commission made the following recommendation, “We are of the opinion that ... Municipalities should be empowered to establish one or more separate residential areas for Asiatics” (Union of South Africa 1921, 35).

The language used in Renaud’s testimony, constructed ‘Indians’ as different and as other. Language, as many social constructionists have pointed out, situates individuals into racial ‘groups’ thereby laying down a foundation for race-based atrocities to occur and stereotypes to be created and perpetuated (Durrheim et al. 2011, 87). As Heath (1981, 101) points out, “Individuals are constituted as subjects through discursive formation”. In addition, the acceptance of the testimony by the Commission provides an example of how power gives some people or groups the ability to attribute a particular identity on others. As Parker (1989, 61) reminds us “What is spoken, and who may speak, are issues of power ... As well as organizing and excluding forms of knowledge, discourse relates and helps organize social relations as power relations. Power is usually thought of as the exercise of the will of one social actor over others”.

What is interesting to note is that even though segregation was recommended, the Commission revealed that it had found no evidence to indicate that 'Indians' posed any economic threat to 'whites' in the Union, stating, "Your commissioners failed to discover evidence proving that white skilled labour has suffered seriously from the competition of Indians" (Union of South Africa 1921, 48). In addition they also dispelled reports of the growing numbers of 'Indians' which threatened to 'swamp' Natal by providing population statistics which revealed that the number of 'Indians' in Natal had increased by only 2 percent in eight years. In providing statistics of the total number of 'Indians' in Natal in 1919, the report indicates that of the 135,515 'Indians', about 20,000 were estimated to be "Mahomedan traders and their families" who had arrived as passengers. In other words, the number of people who belonged to the merchant class (including women and children who were not actual business owners) was less than 14.7 percent of the total 'Indian' population in Natal. This also provided evidence which dispelled the notion amongst both 'white' and African people that the majority of 'Indians' in the country were wealthy merchants. This myth was erroneously perpetuated throughout the years and even into democracy. Soske (2009, 31) states,

The most striking aspect of the stereotypes regarding Indians was their obvious falsity. The vast majority of Durban's Indians were hideously poor, many lived in earthen-floor dwellings built from scraps of corrugated iron and pieces of wood, and only a minority could afford anything beyond subsistence. The single largest occupation group during the 1940s and 50s was semi-skilled and unskilled industrial labor. African and Indian observers from outside of Natal, even in later decades, were frequently struck by the expanse and poverty of the Indian working class.

The Union government however, would not be moved by the pleas for fair and equitable treatment of 'Indians' in South Africa. At the Imperial Conference in London in 1921, the Indian representative, V.S. Srinivasa Sastri argued for full citizenship rights to be granted to 'Indians'. This call however was rejected by Prime Minister Smuts who stated,

The whole basis of our particular system in South Africa rests on inequality ... it is the bedrock of our constitution ... you cannot deal with the Indians

apart from the whole position in South Africa; you cannot give political rights to the Indians which you deny to the rest of the coloured citizens in South Africa. (cited in Joshi 1942, 104)

Efforts then were fast underway to put into effect the recommendations of the commission. The result of this was the Durban Land Alienation Ordinance No. 14/1922. This was the first legislated attempt to create separate residential spaces for 'Indians' in Natal. This Ordinance gave the Town Council the authority to restrict land ownership according to 'race', and in effect the power to decide who could own property, where they could own it and how much they could own. More legislation was later proposed in 1924 to further advance the segregation of 'Indians' with regard to residential and trading areas, and the Class Areas Bill was put forward. In a speech discussing the introduction of the Bill, Minister of the Interior, D.F. Malan stated,

I must say, that the Bill frankly starts from the general supposition that the Indian, as a race in this country, is an alien element in the population, and that no solution of this question will be acceptable to the country unless it results in a very considerable reduction of the Indian population in South Africa ... The method which the Bill will propose will be the application of pressure to supplement the inducement which is held out to Indians to leave the country. (cited in Gell 1951, 431)

This blatantly racist speech followed by the promulgation of the Bill caused much opposition from the Natal Indian Congress (NIC)⁵ and resulted in intervention by Sarojini Naidu, an Indian poetess who became regularly involved in the affairs of 'Indians' in South Africa (Vahed 2012, 319). She called for meetings with Prime Minister Smuts to discuss the ire that the Bill had caused amongst 'Indians'. The years following the proposal of this Bill saw continued intervention by the Indian government in the affairs of 'Indians', with requests for meetings with the Union government which in one instance was denied by the Union on the basis that the Indian government would be intervening in South African matters. In addition the Union was insistent on discussing issues related only to the repatriation of 'Indians' with the Indian government, and in 1925

the Areas Reservation and Immigration and Registration Bill was introduced in parliament with the prime purpose being the repatriation of 'Indians'. This prompted the South African Indian Council (SAIC)⁶ to visit India in an attempt to influence the government to intervene once again. Reluctantly and amidst pressure from Britain as well, the Union government relented to a round table conference in 1926 on the proviso that only repatriation would be discussed. Following a conference between the two governments and the SAIC the Cape Town Agreement between South Africa and India was signed in 1927. This Agreement resulted in two important outcomes, firstly the withdrawal of the Areas Reservation and Immigration and Registration Bill by the Union government and secondly the consent to voluntary repatriation by the Indian government. Ultimately what this meant was that 'Indians' in South Africa would be assisted if they left the country willingly. In addition the Agreement also gave rise to the appointments of Agents of the Government of India in South Africa, to represent India and facilitate the repatriation process.

The Cape Town Agreement, the conference, and the communications between the Union government and the Indian government that preceded it, reveals the extremely interconnected, yet complex, nature of the relationship between the Union government and India, and the ongoing intervention of the latter in 'Indian' affairs in South Africa. It demonstrates how 'Indians' and India were inextricably intertwined politically even though more than half had been born in South Africa. This connection between India and 'Indians' is important as it indicates how and why 'Indians' were still viewed as having a homeland other than that of South Africa. There was thus an acute awareness by other South Africans of the connection between India and the concerns of 'Indians' in South Africa.

As mentioned, one of the chief outcomes of the Cape Town Agreement was the introduction of the Immigration and Indian Relief Bill, the aim of which was to allow for certain concessions regarding the previous legislations that were put in place. In addition, it also launched a system of what it termed 'voluntary repatriation'. 'Indians' who decided to leave South Africa and return or emigrate to India received free passage to India plus twenty pounds per adult and ten pounds per child. As Malan,

Minister of the Interior stated, “The whole object of the agreement is to get as many Indians repatriated as possible” (cited in Gell 1951, 432).

However, as Gell (1951, 432) points out, only 10,738 people left South Africa for India in the five years following the Act (even though the funding that was provided to emigrants doubled in 1931). The repatriation efforts failed mainly, as was acknowledged in 1932 at the second Cape Town conference, because of the fact that at the time of the Scheme 80 percent of ‘Indians’ had been born in the Union (Gell 1951, 432). In addition what the repatriation scheme could not achieve was to convince the merchant class, or the skilled ‘Indians’ to leave South Africa. In 1929 the Minister of the Interior stated, “If this agreement is not going to touch these classes, it is no solution of the Asiatic problem” (cited in Gell 1951, 434).

Voluntary repatriation then was promoted by the State even though the various commissions, by using statistics and other evidence, dispelled notions that ‘Indians’ were ‘penetrating’ every area of employment, commerce, and society in general. It was nevertheless still maintained that ‘Indians’ in Natal were a problem that needed remedial attention. As V.S. Sastri, the first Indian Agent-General in the Union, stated in 1921, “White people in South Africa reject the testimony of facts without hesitation” (cited in Gell 1951, 435). However it was not merely simply a rejection of facts, but also a denial of the deep seated racism towards ‘Indians’ that was apparent during that time.

The proposal of voluntary repatriation was vital to the Union government’s project to rid South Africa of ‘Indians’. In the Union it was not just repatriation (which would mean, returning to a country of origin), but in fact voluntary *expatriation* in terms of the ‘Indians’ who had been born in South Africa, as they would be leaving their native land, their country of origin.

The Doctrine of Assimilability

The subjects of citizenship and nationality then were central to the socio-political debates in the Union. This resulted in the passing of the Nationality and Flag Act of 1927 which refused ‘Indians’ the right to

become citizens of South Africa through naturalisation, followed in 1930 by the Immigration Quota Act which considered immigrants by their homeland rather than by their individual situations. This Act prescribed and placed limits on 'who' and 'how many' could enter South Africa. In discussing the rationale behind the Act, Malan who was the then Minister of the Interior, Education and Public Health in the Union, stated that it was based on,

... The desire of every nation to maintain its basic racial composition ... The doctrine of assimilability; and South Africa's desire to maintain its own 'type' of civilisation ... (cited in Elazar and Medding 1983, 156)

Notions of 'assimilability' and 'civilisation' were once again used as justification to exclude 'others' in the Union government's attempts to create a 'white' national identity. Eugenics and 'race science' and notions of a 'pure race' were increasingly pervading the political sphere across the globe, including South Africa, where so called evidence for a superior 'white' 'race' was being promulgated.

The superiority of the 'white race' in the Union was asserted in every sphere of society including the political, social and economic arenas. When Dr. Goonam, the first 'Indian' female doctor in South Africa, applied for a position at a state hospital in the early 1940s, it was turned down with the following reply "the policy of the country is that non-European doctors could not be admitted to Government hospitals as white nurses would not be prepared to take orders from black doctors" (Goonam 1991, 60).

'Indians' in South Africa then, were already considered of a 'lesser civilisation', 'alien' and 'unassimilable' and legislation such as the Quota Act gave the government authority to prevent or limit further immigration from India, while plans to expatriate, repatriate, or deport the current 'Indian' populace was still being executed. One such plan was the 'Colonisation Scheme' that was born out of the second Round Table Conference, the first being in 1926 as mentioned earlier, in Cape Town in 1932. Voluntary repatriation was regarded as a failure at that point as it had not produced the desired results and a new way forward was required. The Colonisation Scheme entailed *relocating* 'Indians' to other

suitable countries, and an Indian Colonisation Enquiry Committee (also known as the Young Committee) was established to examine potential countries that ‘Indians’ could be relocated to.

The complexity of the lived experiences of those categorised as ‘Indians’ however was a far cry from the homogenous group that could easily be deported or relocated, as suggested by the Union government. For example, born in 1934, Jane, a fourth generation South African of partly Indian descent, interviewed for this study, was the third child and only daughter of Francine Ramsamy and Timothy Lazarus. Timothy’s parents were Indian immigrants but Francine was born to an ‘Indian’ father, Jim Ramsamy, and ‘coloured’ mother, Juliet Fynn, and was registered in the “Register of Births of Indian Immigrants in the Province of Natal” in 1913. The birth certificates, at the time, had a column with the title “Indentured or Free/Ingeboek of vry” (all official documentation in the Union was printed in English and Afrikaans only). Under this column heading her father Jim was categorised as ‘CB’, meaning Colonial Born, and her mother Juliet was classified as ‘coloured’. Although neither Francine nor her father were born in India, they were nevertheless still regarded as ‘immigrants’ in the Union. They were expected to register births, marriages and deaths in the Register for Indian Immigrants. Jane’s birth certificate reveals that her mother Francine was also classified as ‘CB’ as was her father Timothy. For all intents and purposes then, according to the State, Francine was ‘Indian’; according to family testimony, however, Francine “appeared coloured” and identified as such. Francine’s mother Juliet’s parents were both classified as ‘coloured’, and were descended from ‘white’ English immigrants who had had children from Zulu speaking women, whom they did not marry.

The complexity of this heritage and ancestry was difficult to negotiate in South African society for Jane and her siblings, as rights, privileges, resources and access were based on outward appearance. An example of this was related to me by Jane’s brother David in e-mail correspondence [David emigrated to North America in 1967 and has only returned once for a brief visit],

David: Although I and my siblings went to Coloured schools, we had a rough time because the Coloureds regarded us as Indians. The first school

we enrolled in was Clairwood Coloured Primary school. My mother in the late 1930s had taken my eldest brother Mark and her brother's son William, to enroll in primary school. She took William to the Coloured school because he was fair-complexioned and had the features of a "pure coloured". The principal, a Scotsman ... born in Scotland, enrolled William, and then asked my mother if she wanted to enroll Mark as well. My mother was surprised because Mark was dark and appeared Indian. My mother had tried enrolling Mark at the Indian Boys School on Dunn Road but they refused to enroll him because to them my mother appeared to be a South African Coloured. Giving up on enrolling my brother she went to the Coloured Primary School to enroll William. And so all of us went to Coloured schools. The Scottish principal had told my mother that there was no reason at all not to enroll her son at the school.

The complexity of being 'Indian' or 'CB' on paper, having the outward appearance of an 'Indian', going to a 'coloured' school and being identified as 'coloured' by others was difficult terrain for a young Jane to negotiate. Even at 76, her age at the time of the interview, the difficulty of being 'in-between' was apparent. Although all her children, grandchildren and great-grandchildren are classified as 'Indian' in contemporary South African society, and have not experienced similar angst, Jane did not identify as an 'Indian'. Neither though did she identify with or relate to being a 'coloured' person.

Jane's 'colouredness', according to her, lies in her ancestry and her upbringing, being raised by her Catholic, 'coloured-looking' mother who identified herself, according to Jane as 'coloured', and who was her primary care-giver, after her father abandoned the family when she was little, and thereafter being raised by her 'coloured' grandmother. At the age of 20 Jane married an 'Indian' man and subsequently relocated to an area set aside by the government for 'Indians'. Her extended 'coloured' family paid little attention to her as many considered themselves "pure coloureds" and wanted to dissociate themselves from any 'Indian' relatives. According to David, "pure coloureds" were very light skinned and could easily pass for 'white' (in fact many did and reclassified themselves as such).

According to Jane, her 'Indianness' lies not in the fact that her father and grandfather were both South Africans of Indian descent or of any shared heritage with 'Indians', but in the final analysis she attributes it to

marrying an 'Indian' man, living most of her life in an 'Indian' residential area, and appearing 'Indian'. Apart from that, this classification has no meaning for her. As Hall (1996, 14) states,

... individuals as subjects identify (or do not identify) with the 'positions' to which they are summoned; as well as how they fashion, stylize, produce and 'perform' these positions, and why they never do so completely, for once and all time, and some never do, or are in a constant, agonistic process of struggling with, resisting, negotiating and accommodating the normative or regulative rules which they confront and regulate themselves. In short what remains is the requirement to think this relation of subject to discursive formations as an articulation ...

As easy as homogenising this so called 'group' was for the purposes of control through legislation and for the purpose of repatriation, the individuals that made up this 'group' could not neatly fit into the categories prescribed by the State, as evident from Jane's experience.

The Plague from the East

The cries of 'Indians' 'penetrating' the economic and social sectors did not weaken even though further evidence to the contrary was being provided year after year, with statistics indicating that the majority were "poor labourers, smallholders and petty traders" (Gell 1951, 436). This however did not halt the barrage of anti-'Indian' rhetoric expounded in the media and by politicians.

The vexing issue of property ownership by 'Indians' in terms of where they could purchase, trade and reside, was not just incited by 'white' fear but was evident from African residents as well. In addition to this, the common xenophobic oratory of 'they are stealing our jobs' was also apparent from African people during this period.

The continued discourse around all 'Indians' being wealthy was perpetuated in the media despite evidence to the contrary. It was not African agitation though that prompted the slew of anti-'Indian' measures that were to follow but the safe-guarding of 'white' interests. So 'fearful' of the

'Asiatic invasion' was the Union government that another commission was set up in 1940 to inquire into the level of 'Indian' 'penetration' into 'white' areas, in both the spheres of trade and property ownership in Natal and the Transvaal from 1927. The Indian Penetration Commission as it was called provided evidence to show that penetration was not threatening. In addition the allegations that property was devalued when 'Indians' purchased in an area were also found to be without merit as witnesses could not provide evidence to this effect in terms of values in monetary amounts. The Commission further discovered that the decline of specific areas was due to urban development as opposed to 'Indian' occupation and that the movement of 'whites' into the suburbs preceded 'Indians' purchasing in that area. In fact what was discovered was that sales to 'Indians' occurred *because* the area had already degenerated and the purchasers who placed the highest offers were the 'Indian' traders (Broome 1942).

However, in spite of this, one of the recommendations of the Committee was 'voluntary segregation', in other words, areas would be set aside for 'Indians' to purchase for residence and trade. This however did not stop the outcries against 'penetration' and many discriminatory measures, apart from the legislation, were taken to prevent 'Indian' intrusion into 'white' areas. Two of these measures included refusal of home loans to 'Indians' who wished to purchase in 'white' areas, collusion amongst residents in particular areas to not sell to 'Indians', or for residents to purchase surrounding properties to prevent 'Indians' from inhabiting those areas (Maasdorp and Pillay 1977, 88). These unofficial measures were indeed followed by similar laws such as the Pegging Act which legislatively enforced methods such as controlling the sale of property between 'whites' and 'Indians' (Maasdorp and Pillay 1977, 90).

The Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian Representation Act No. 28 that followed later in 1946, imposed even more sanctions and limitations on property purchases, such as acquiring permits to sell to other 'races' and to purchase from other 'races'; land could be leased from 'whites' in non-'Indian' designated areas but only for the purpose of trade. This Act, dubbed the 'Ghetto' Act by the people who fought against its implementation, laid the foundation for the Group Areas Act of 1950 which separated people, on the basis of 'race', i.e. where a person resided or was

allowed to reside was determined by 'race'. The Group Areas Act, created residential, social and economic segregation and left a lasting legacy of socio-economic catastrophe in the country, which is still present in contemporary South African society.

Opposition to the 'Ghetto' Act and pressure for its removal came from the NIC, the Indian government and other heads of state and resistance leaders. After India achieved independence in 1947, the government brought the case of the treatment of South African 'Indians' and the general discriminatory 'race'-based practices of the South African state to the United Nations. A presidential speech given by G.M. Naicker of the NIC, expressed the reasons for the opposition to the 'Ghetto' Act as follows:

... We are not here to make extravagant demands or to seek any privileges that are not our due. We are citizens of this country. We are taxed in the usual way. All we ask is to be given in return those rights which belong to all citizens in a democratic state. We are not foreigners. We are South Africans of Indian descent, in the same way as others are South Africans of English, European or African descent. Nearly all of us were born in this country. Our fathers came here in the 1860s and after at the express desire of the then Government of Natal on the promise of rights 'not a whit inferior' to those of the white man... (cited in Bhana and Pachai 1984, 189–193).

The need to identify as South African citizens was important as the political leaders had to now emphasise that the 'Indians' fight for rights was in the country of their birth. They had originated from a foreign land, much like the rest of 'white' South Africa, but the 'burden' of being foreign and different was placed only on the shoulders of 'Indians'.

Conclusion

The idea that people could be classified hierarchically based on 'race' was seen as scientifically valid during the period under study, and gaining ground in countries across the world, including South Africa. The fact

that 'Indians' were able to compete with 'whites' on an equal footing, weakened this notion of hierarchy and superiority of one 'race' over another. Within the official discourse, they were referred to as 'Indians' and not located as part of the broader African majority. Nor were they aligned with the 'coloured' population. The construction of an 'Indian' identity was based on how they had been 'embedded' both within the colonial and union discourse; within the discourse of the nation; within the discourse of the media; and within political and legislative discourse. This continued well into the political course of apartheid, the system of government that continued, and extensively elaborated on, legislated discrimination and 'difference' based on 'race'.

After the general elections of April 1994, South Africa finally became a democratic society and the new government led by the ANC made a Constitutional commitment to inclusivity and to 'non-racialism'. However, processes of othering similar to that which occurred during colonialism and apartheid persist in public and popular discourse. 'Race', ethnicity and class continue to be the organising principle of the economic, political and social spheres of a democratic South African society. Legislation aimed at redressing past inequalities in the workplace, for instance, are based on apartheid era classifications and, as Alexander (2007, 92) argues, this has severe 'unintended consequences' beyond the workplace by "... wittingly or unwittingly entrenching racial prejudice." In addition, questions around citizenship, nationality and 'who belongs' have been brought to the fore.

The change in political power in South Africa then did not alter the psyche of 'race' thinking that is still profoundly engrafted in South African society, as the racial discourse is also entrenched firmly in legislation. In addition the legacy of the discriminatory legislation is still evident in South African society through racialised spaces, residential areas, educational institutions and the like, and the continuation of anti-'Indian' sentiment throughout the years in a democratic society is revealing and perturbing.

The violent anti-'Indian' sentiment with threats of an 'uprising' against 'Indians', raises issues of the consequences and dangers of fixing identities, and of viewing people as 'other', who are not 'us', who exploit 'us' and drain 'our' resources, and who are not 'indigenous' to the land, but

immigrants (Mfeka 2013). When such outbursts are left unchecked by government then words can easily evolve into an uncontrolled violent outcome, as was the case with the xenophobic violence against foreign African migrants, and South African citizens who ‘appeared’ or were regarded as foreign in 2008, and which are ongoing in South African society.

Racial myths about ‘Indians’ as wealthy merchants, exploitative and oppressive persist, and are further perpetuated in public discourse through the guise of entertainment and information dissemination. The racial category ‘Indian’ in South Africa is more than a racial description but also a language of describing some South African citizens as belonging to another nation. According to Nyamnjoh (2006, 38),

Although xenophobia and its ills seem to infect just about all societies experiencing rapid social change, not every foreigner, outsider or stranger is a target. Instead, nationals, citizens or locals are very careful in choosing who qualifies to be treated as the inferior and undeserving “Other”, and such choices depend on the hierarchies of humanity informed by race, nationality, culture, class and gender.

Despite constant efforts by academics and the like to show that ‘race’ has no basis in biology it seems to have had little or no effect in erasing from the psyche that ‘race’ and characteristics assigned to each ‘race’, and inevitably racial hierarchy, exist. The racial categories unreflectively absorbed by the democratic government create a complete otherness in contrast to self, they exclude rather than include and unrepentantly confer an identity onto individuals. ‘Who’ a person is then, is ultimately defined by the state, although census reports have claimed that “... membership of a population group is now based on self-perception and self-classification, not on a legal definition” (Statistics South Africa 2005, v). However, it is impossible for a South African citizen to classify as something other than one of the four ‘major’ ‘race groups’ in South Africa. Ultimately, classification, as during colonialism and apartheid, is based on physical characteristics. The ultimate danger of classification then is that it becomes the essential characteristic of ‘a people’, which under certain circumstances results in ethnic/racial cleansing catastrophes and violence towards others

who are not 'us' as witnessed at various points in time throughout history and indeed presently. Over 150 years then, after their ancestors arrived in the country, South Africans of Indian descent are still perceived as belonging elsewhere, as step-children of the land and undeserving heirs to its resources.

Notes

1. In this chapter the word 'Indian' in inverted commas includes all immigrants to South Africa from the sub-continent and their descendants residing in South Africa, and is used to distinguish them from Indian nationals from India.
2. The Natal Mercury was founded in 1852 and in 1878 became the first English medium daily newspaper. The name of the newspaper changed post-1994 to The Mercury (and will be referred to as such throughout this chapter).
3. Ilanga Lase Natal was founded in 1903 by Rev. John L Dube and was the first newspaper to contain articles primarily in isiZulu (there were some articles written in English as well). In March 1965 the title of the newspaper was abridged to Ilanga (and will be referred to as such throughout this chapter).
4. According to Christopher (2001, 17) even though racial categories were reduced in complexity and extent at the time of the Union, a racial classification system was nevertheless employed which was based on "physical and social characteristics." The three broad racial groups that were recognised by the Census director in the Union period included 'European or White', 'Native' (later to be termed Bantu, Black or African), and the classification "residual Coloured (including Indians, people of mixed race and the Cape Malays)" in other words all those who could not be neatly slotted into the aforementioned categories (Christopher 2009, 104).
5. The Natal Indian Congress (NIC) was founded by the Indian elites and professionals in Natal in 1894 with the main objectives being to improve the quality of life for 'Indians' in South Africa and to end the system of indenture. It is important to note that the government of the time, grouped everyone who came from the sub-continent, India or elsewhere, as 'Indians' and although there were strong divisions between the merchant class and the indentured labourers and the subsequent working

- class, the heterogeneity among 'Indians' was ignored by the government (Naidoo 1998).
6. The South African Indian Congress was founded in 1924, and while they opposed discrimination against 'Indians', they also formed part of the broader struggle for freedom in South Africa.

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4

Don't Know Nothin' 'bout Subsistence. We Gullah! Construction of Self as Indigenous in the Americas

Sharon Y. Fuller

Introduction

Gullah Geechee are descendants of enslaved West Africans of the Mende people who have articulated cultural traditions of their ancestors with the land- and seascapes of South Carolina's Sea Islands. The ecological similarities of Sierra Leone's coastal region, the Gullah Geechee's ancestral homeland, facilitated the importation of African traditions into what became South Carolina, thus resulting in land-based cultural practices that can be defined in an unexpected way as indigenous (Reardon and TallBear 2012). Because of their strong cultural identity and social sovereignty and given their place of origin, the Gullah Geechee trigger complex questions on what factors constitute indigeneity in the Americas. The intricacy of Gullah Geechee identity and sovereignty is not apparent to most, and it cannot be adequately understood solely within prevailing U.S. analyses of race (Ben-zvi 2007; Reardon and TallBear 2012). To fully grasp the uniqueness of their identity, including their articulation of themselves as "indigenous," it is important to explore beyond the

S. Y. Fuller (✉)

Independent Scholar, Pinole, CA, USA

dominant ideologies on indigenous identity and understand distinctive Gullah Geechee linkages to and practices in a particular place. Gullah Geechee sovereignty is not based on traditional claims through treaties, legal constructs, or biological inheritance as are most indigenous claims; rather it is constituted culturally. By presenting an overview of the prevailing racial ideologies that constitute indigeneity, examining how these dominant narratives on indigeneity that privilege biological ancestry constitute identity, and establishing a counter-narrative of human and non-human kinship ties in relation to place in which a culture-based indigeneity is constituted, this chapter challenges the dominant assumptions of what constitutes indigenous identity (Ng'weno 2007a, b; Sturm 2002; TallBear 2013).

Conventional Ideologies of Indigeneity and Blackness

Conventional ideologies define identity based sovereignty as being constituted through traditional or historical territorial claims based on notions of autochthony or firstness. Emily Yeh (2007) notes land-based autochthonous identity consists of inhabiting an ancestral homeland, possessing a distinctive language and culture, and being colonized by outsiders. Thus, indigenous identity, the basis of sovereignty, is often essentialized through a biological and cultural inheritance binary. As a result, indigeneity in relation to Native Americans often falls within a dichotomous framing of Indian and non-Indian, good Indian and bad Indian, and poor Indian and destitute Indian. The latter binary is due to Indianness, as well as blackness, being defined by scales of poverty or, more precisely, in frameworks privileging economic deprivation (TallBear 2013; Ng'weno 2007a, b). Indians who are not poor are therefore subsumed into the racial category of whiteness because prosperity is an indicator of being civilized and embodying whiteness (Said 1979; Sturm 2002). Western epistemologies of race, culture and nationalism therefore provide the foundation for dominant race ideologies reliant on racial or cultural essentialism (Wade 2013; Ng'weno 2007a, b; Hall 1996a). As a

result, the dominant narrative is also instrumental in constructing an imaginary or consciousness that legitimate particular behaviours and material production in relation to whiteness. Further, blood quantum is used by federal agencies such as the Bureau of Indian Affairs to determine Indian identity in the United States (Sturm 2002). Thus, bloodlines or notions of specific biological admixtures, throughout the centuries, have remained the primary denominator in constituting racial identities and are instrumental in retaining a consciousness of white superiority. For example, Schimmel (1991) argues that “as a result of the implicit or explicit comparison of Indian and white cultures, Indians were commonly judged good or bad” in relation to their perceived degrees of whiteness. White thus represents goodness, wholesomeness, and above all else purity. Therefore, in order to be an “authentic” Indian, an individual must also be the appropriate race (TallBear 2013; Ng’weno 2007a, b).

Pure Indians, in accordance with the dominant racial barometer, exist below the white category and above the black category (Said 1979). Indianness also becomes synonymous with indigenous identity within dominant discourses on race in the United States (Sturm 2002). Defined in this manner, indigenous identity represents a vanishing people who *had* the capacity to save humanity before becoming extinct or finding themselves within the throes of annihilation. For example, as a people ostensibly on the brink of extinction championing the charge to resolve all society’s ecological ills within the trope of warrior, princess, or ecological Indian, the transition from primitive to civilized reifies the dominant worldview of what and who is indigenous in addition to serving as a primary example of the essentializing of Indianness (Schimmel 1991). Further, gross generalizations regarding language, livelihood, class, and consciousness also aid in producing a simple and easily replicated homogeneous indigenous identity. The stoic, spiritual, one-with-nature imaginary of indigenous identity produces a status of sainthood for the Indian symbolizing an inferior race whose demise is perceived as inevitable due to dominant discourse within the context of Darwinian logic of survival of the fittest (Hardin 1968; Said 1979). The uncivilized savage is therefore transformed into a soon to be extinct, ecological saviour who now requires salvaging (TallBear 2014). And how does such preservation occur? Increasingly, salvaging is the product of an interesting phenomenon

of reproduction in which an individual becomes Indian, as noted by Circe Sturm in her book titled *Becoming Indian* (2011). In so doing, Indianness is transformed into a commodity. One of the consequences of commodifying Indianness is a preoccupation with materials such as clothing, hairstyle, and traditional baskets. The consumption of such goods contributes to sustaining an imaginary of an intellectually superior, yet extinct race. As a result, in contrast to colonial representations of Indians as uncivilized savages, contemporary constructions valorize Indians as the *Savoir* of humanity. Becoming Indian, is thus embraced rather than shunned. The 21st century phenomenon results in individuals who previously self-identified as white and visibly met the phenotype criteria for whiteness, now identifying as Indian in order to embrace their suppressed Indianness.

The newfound Indianness is generally evidenced anecdotally through warrior and princess narratives used to legitimate alleged—sometimes actual, although often undemonstrable—Indian ancestry (Sturm 2002). In becoming Indian, Indianness is absorbed into whiteness, however the privileges of whiteness are unaffected in the transformation. Admittedly the phenomenon Circe Sturm notes of erroneous claims of Native American ancestry is not unique to people of European descent. Individuals of African descent also frequently make claims regarding “Cherokee princess” lineage (Gates 2009). Genetic testing and genealogical research by scholars such as Henry Louis Gates (2009) however, prove that in many cases, such claims are also erroneous and admixtures are typically the result of slavery’s atrocities. Granted a revisionist version of America’s painful history is a more palpable story for people, including people of African descent, to pass down through the generations. Yet, such claims are also typically evidenced anecdotally. So why is there more tolerance for individuals of African descent making such claims than for those of European descent? Race, according to dominant race theories in the United States, revolves solely around the black/white binary. Therefore, a person is either identified as white, that is an individual of European descent, or not white. As other-than-white, people of African descent and Native Americans were subjected to the same racial oppression and thus share histories and memories of injustices based on race (Sturm 2002). This reality, in part explains why Native Americans

generally demonstrate a greater tolerance in allowing such assertions to go unchallenged publically.

The United States' dominant analyses on race also hold the racial categories of the black/white binary to be mutually exclusive (Ben-zvi 2007; Gilroy 1993). Thus blackness also exists within a dichotomous framing of black and white, rich and poor, and good and bad. Class, however, rather than being represented as a separate category, is often characterized as a homogenous equivalent to race (Gilroy 1993). In other words, individuals who are racially black are also presumed to be of the same class. Whiteness represents the modern and how others must assimilate in order to become civilized (Glissant 2010; Hall 1996a; Said 1979). Adopting beliefs and practices of the dominant culture through acculturation produces scales of whiteness that are not intended to be equivalent to pure whiteness however. Although only resembling whiteness is the intent, the hegemony uses racial purity as the symbol for being civilized (Fanon 2008; Said 1979). In addition to people being co-constituted through spatial negotiations and interactions, one's identity is also produced through the imaginary in relation to race (Fanon 2008). Thus an individual can be made to conform to racial hierarchies as a result of their consciousness. For example, in *Black Face, White Mask* Fanon's (2008) analysis of hegemonic notions of race, notes the contradictions of who one is and who one thinks she or he may be by illustrating who an individual is *not* in relation to whiteness.

It is important to remember that indigenous equates to Indian within dominant ideologies on race. Indigeneity, thus, symbolizes a distinct racial category. As a result, the racial categories of black or Indian are phenotypically coded, while Indian, defined as indigenous, relies on narratives of who actually belongs. Except for the conflation of Indianness equating to race, dominant theories on indigenous identity are typically grounded in polarizing notions of race and indigeneity. Even the notion of an Indian with both Indian and African ancestry is difficult to comprehend, particularly since the convergence of two racial categories connote degeneracy and illegitimacy due to one of the categories being black (Anderson 1997; Ng'weno 2007a, b; Wade 2013). In other words, black and indigenous is not a viable identity within dominant discourses on race. The black/white binary, as a result, is maintained through biological

determinism whereby blackness can only exist in the primitive, while whiteness represents the modern (Glissant 2010; Said 1979). Blackness, therefore, has the effect of replacing Indianness and whiteness, as the hegemonic civilizing expectation of acculturation is deemed in racist thought to be beyond the capacity of individuals of African ancestry (Wade 2013). As a result, people of African descent become subsumed in the universal ideology of black identity (Gilroy 1993). Thus, individuals known or perceived to have a “drop” of African blood, on the basis of phenotype demarcating gradations of purity, get racialized as simply “Black” or “African American” (Anderson 2009; Sturm 2002; Wade 2013). Ideological assumptions of presumably physically distinctive blackness as well as indigeneity, as a result, become primarily based on racial difference. Except for cultures of poverty, blackness represents peoples devoid of culture, history, and national or historical connections (Ng’weno 2007a, b; Wade 2013). Individuals of African descent with incomes exceeding poverty levels remain an anomaly to blackness, as no alternative identity to blackness exists. Black identity is also represented as people that lack any intellectual contributions to offer to modernity in addition to, or perhaps as a consequence of, being racially inferior and uncivilized (Wade 2013). Hence, blackness in relation to whiteness is emblematic of the uncivilized “other” (Said 1979).

Culture Based Indigeneity

Although indigeneity is generally grounded in traditional or historical land-based claims of origin, the Gullah Geechee disrupt the dichotomy of “having been here forever” or “colonial histories of displacement” indigeneity (Clifford 2001; Yeh 2007). They are simultaneously a diasporic African people who imported indigenous practices and applied them in an intimate material relation to a particular North American place. De jure sovereignty is not the reality, but rather de facto assertions of belonging to the land through routes tied to ancestral roots as Clifford (2001) and Ng’weno (2007a, b) argue. Diasporic populations, defined as the movement of indigenous people from their original homeland, are not typically considered in notions of sovereignty in which rootedness is

fundamental. Rootedness, within this context, connotes a continuous geographical presence whereby local and trans-local realities of migration and displacement are rendered invisible (Glissant 2010). Clifford (2007) on the other hand, illustrates the ways in which “roots and routes” transcend conventional legal framings of territories to include the realities of peoples’ non-coercive movement in and out of space. As a result, roots *extended through* routes, enables the transplanting of traditional practices in a new place that presents an opening for non-autochthonous populations to be taken into account. For example, continued participation in cultural heritage days, pow wow rituals, basket weaving, acorn harvesting and cast net fishing in conjunction with new practices resulting from cash-based economies and new technologies illustrate that “concrete ties to ancestral places have not been severed” (Clifford 2007).

Anderson (2009) also argues that autochthonous populations are people whom are long-standing occupants of a territory and bearers of non-Western languages and cultural traditions. He further notes that autochthonous groups are the “products of the situation of colonial domination, sharing a more or less common socioeconomic situation and possessing very rich cultural structures” with one notable exception: in lieu of *firstness*, Anderson uses *long-standing* to define indigenous people occupying a particular landscape. Indigenous scholars TallBear (2013) and Sturm (2002) continue along these lines of reasoning by debunking the notion of static identities stagnated in colonial ideologies and elect to frame indigeneity contemporarily as an “oppositional, place-based existence along with the consciousness of being in the struggle against the dispossessing and demeaning fact of colonization by foreign peoples.” TallBear further argues that indigenous identity is far more multidimensional than usually represented in regards to ancestry:

‘ancestry’ is not simply genetic ancestry evidenced in ‘populations’ but biological, cultural, and political groupings constituted in dynamic, long-standing relationships with each other and with living landscapes that define their people-specific identities and more broadly their indigeneity.

A shift to identity formation frameworks privileging culture over race has not occurred without criticism. Critics assert that the new analytic

prioritizing culture ignores the resurgence of racism, racial binaries, and racial discrimination (de la Cadena and Starn 2007; Ng'weno 2007a, b). Rather than replacing race, scholars stress the importance of including both culture and race in the new identity analytic (Ng'weno 2007a, b). Although both frameworks challenge the presumption that autochthonous equates to sovereignty, a plethora of interpretations are also created as to who is or is not indigenous. In other words, is indigenous identity in the Americas possible absent historical territorial claims and genetic kinship? If so, a more imposing question within the chaotic milieu is, who decides? I contend that the decision often rests with the community, as I will illustrate below.

The transatlantic slave trade produced a new kinship ontology as a result of severed biological ties (Wood 1974) that extended beyond bloodlines to produce what I call, “mudlines”. Contrary to bloodlines that rely on genetics to determine an individual’s ancestry, mudlines are constituted by community acceptance in relation to four fundamental factors. The creation of a common language, having a longstanding relationship within a particular landscape, sharing the collective memories of similar cultural practices and knowledges that were in turn further cultivated by the work experiences that resulted in distinctive behaviour, and standing in unity in struggles against dispossession (Anderson 2007; Guthrie 1996; TallBear 2013). I thus use mudlines to connote a rupture in the way we think about indigenous identity in which biological heredity is not the determinant. Further, mudlines allow for the essential symbiotic relationship between the secular and spiritual (Gordon 2006).

Within the West African cosmology of the Mende people, the Gullah Geechee’s ancestors, humans and the elements of fire, water, earth, nature, and mineral are merely instruments with the sole purpose of satisfying the wishes of spirits, deities, and ancestors (Alexander 2006; Somé 1999). Spirits inhabiting earth’s soil, for example, are therefore able to gain knowledge from human and nonhuman detritus, most importantly bones, according to African cosmology scholars Jacqui Alexander (2006), Malidoma Somé (1999) and Robert Thompson (1983). Skeletons and exoskeletons, within this context, represent the greatest repository of knowledge. In other words, the soil/mud is a vital element of the living landscape. The Gullah Geechee’s beliefs and practices, as a result, are

guided by the worldview or consciousness of the Mende people and Native Americans encountered in South Carolina in which spirit is essential (Alexander 2006; Gordon 2006). A new indigenous identity is thus constituted through an evolutionary mud dance in which the material and spiritual are entangled and integrated at the same time. Deloria (2001) aptly notes how the two concepts, place and spiritual power, are fundamental to the Indian metaphysics of making sense of the world.

Familiarity with the personality of objects and entities of the natural world enabled Indians to discern immediately where each living being had its proper place ... And knowing place enabled people to relate to the living entities inhabiting it.

Unlike the illusion of a people from a distant past now extinct that frames Native American identity, shades of blackness keep the descendants of enslaved Africans' identity squarely in the present (Anderson 2007; Sturm 2002; TallBear 2013). However, a black racial identity only partially describes the Gullah Geechee, because they also constitute themselves culturally as indigenous. Similar to the beliefs of some members of the Cherokee Nation who challenge the prevailing racial ideologies that ask them to choose one racial or ethnic identity, Gullah Geechee indigenous identity is not based solely on race, but rather on "their shared historical experiences and their political status" (Sturm 2002). As a result, blackness and indigeneity consists of different articulations that are not necessarily mutually exclusive. I use Hall's (1996b) articulation theory to elaborate. Hall describes articulation by using the analogy of a cab and trailer that are not necessarily connected to each other unless warranted in a specific instance. Alignments are "hitched" when needed, but they can also disconnect when a particular alignment is no longer relevant. The Gullah Geechee thus wield their authority in relation to the particular situation. For example, they may align to normative notions of citizenship in order to unify in racialized struggles, such as the Civil Rights Movement led by African Americans as a means of achieving equal opportunity benefits and voting rights. In another instance, they may work to illustrate their profound uniqueness as a people, often employing the trickster¹ to construct a distance between other groups and themselves

in order to invalidate laws and rights that apply to African Americans (Ebron 2002).

The fourteenth amendment, which grants rights to citizenship, serves as a case in point; the Gullah Geechee assert their distinct peoplehood and *de jure* sovereignty regardless of citizenship (Chandler et al. 2008). As indigenous people, the Gullah Geechee possess histories of belonging, resisting, and dispossession. In spite of the significant role colonization played in transforming social relations on St. Helena Island, the Gullah Geechee were still able to retain a level of autonomy (Guthrie 1996; Opala 1987). The remoteness of the island, rather than isolation, spared the Gullah Geechee the shame and humiliation commonly associated with blackness in the Americas (Campbell 2002). Further, scholars Blake and Simmons (2008) argue that the limited access to whites beginning in the antebellum era imbued a sense of superiority rather than inferiority that, in part, explains their tradition of being unapologetically Gullah. Yet due to the racialization of blackness, their indigenous articulation in the Americas continues to confound dominant ideologies of indigeneity. So how are the Gullah Geechee constituted as indigenous? I argue that their indigenous articulation is the result of their distinctive cultural traditions and practices that privilege land, community well-being, and self-governance.

Indigenous Articulation: We Gullah!

Peering over the dock at low tide, I noticed a small but steady disturbance in the water. Something was burrowing into the sand. During the next shoveling I caught a glimpse of what appeared to be a lobster tail. “That couldn’t be,” I uttered to no one in particular. Concentrating more intensely, I confirmed that it was a lobster. Excitedly, I conveyed my sighting to a key informant. “Nobody can ever claim they’re without food here on the island,” she merely responded. Later, I also share my observation with her brother. He, too, was nonplussed. “You can also catch flounder there in the pools at low tide,” he said.

The Gullah Geechee’s indigenous identity is constituted through a cultural tradition of reciprocity within a context of livelihood—sharing

focused on a non-monetary communal system and cooperation in which local and global alliances are essential. Reciprocity begins with their relationship with the land to which they are bound rather than territories (Glissant 2010). The Gullah Geechee have lived on the land for four, five, or six generations, continuing cultural traditions critical to who they are as a people. The tradition of land being passed down through the generations also was instrumental in sparing them the legacy of sharecropping and landlessness (Campbell 2002; Guthrie 1996). Such a legacy of inheriting land explains, in part, why it is not uncommon to see community members cast netting, bogging, hand line dipping, and rod fishing throughout the land- and seascapes of the St. Helena Island in often distinctly gendered space. For instance, women are generally found on shoreline creeks and rivers adjacent to their property, while men tend to harvest seafood from a bateau, a small powerboat, or contract out as labourers on shrimping vessels (Chandler et al. 2008). The abundance that results is subsequently distributed to kinship networks or mudlines that include spirit. Mudlines, to reiterate, represent an individual's long-standing relationship and acceptance within a community irrespective of blood. As part of the Gullah Geechee's customary obligation to kinship networks, catches are first distributed locally to immediate and extended family members. Additional distributions are made to out-of-town kin that, as several Sea Island residents attest, have grown accustomed to the much-anticipated deliveries (Chandler et al. 2008). Spirits also share in the island's bounty. Offerings of plants, water, and stones on gravesites are also familiar sights around the island. Spirits are further accommodated by the placement of metal bedframes in several of the Gullah Geechee's front lawns to provide a safe resting space complete with blue bottle tree sentinels to ward off haunts or undesirable spirits. A fundamental belief of the Gullah Geechee is that in honouring humans and nonhumans, abundances are assured (Gordon 2006).

"We have no concept of homelessness," one St. Helena Island resident stated, "food is everywhere—in the creek, in the marsh, in the sea. I can build something back there in the woods and never be hungry." This resident articulated a reality I frequently witnessed as was also illustrated in my observations at the dock. Community members raking in bushels of blue crabs from saltwater marshlands during low tide and retrieving cast-nets

laden with shrimp, mullet, or anything caught in a quarter-inch mesh net, also referred to as a “po’ man’s” net as it is designed to capture everything within its grasp at shifting and high tides were additional high yield harvesting events I witnessed. The shifting tides thus provide an abundance of fish, shrimp, oyster, clams, and crab that is integral to Gullah Geechee beingness and survival (Blake and Simmons 2008). One oysterman reminisced about childhood days spent “shoveling truckloads of oysters” for delivery to oyster houses in Charleston. It was “the type of truck with a lift,” he stated emphatically to ensure I understood he was referring to a dump truck that generally has a load capacity of 13 or more tons. Another resident reminisced about the times he stayed out at sea for weeks on shrimp boats and went on to describe how such jobs no longer exist due to shrimp imports from Thailand. In fact, the 25–30 shrimp boats that a few decades ago headed out to the sounds and Atlantic daily have now dwindled to just under five boats (Business Roundtable 2007). Interestingly, the St. Helena Island resident also insisted that he no longer shrimped, fished, or crabbed, even though I witnessed him do so every day. The resident only associated commercial fishing with livelihoods, while his daily harvest and distribution to kinship networks was simply a normal cultural practice (Campbell 2002; Chandler et al. 2008). Another community member elaborated on the challenges inherent in a regulatory process ill-equipped to adequately govern vital coastal resources. “They don’t know what’s back here in the creek. I always catch plenty,” a long-term resident stated in response to regulatory shrimping restrictions due to perceived population declines in areas actually thriving with shrimp. Regardless of the expectations of regulatory agencies and shoreline access challenges wrought by tourism, the Gullah Geechee persist in harvesting abundances (Chandler et al. 2008). “Regulation’s not a problem, vacation homes don’t bother me either... just fish anyway,” the long-time resident commented. In fact, he went on to describe the optimum turbidity, substrate, location, and time for securing high yields in the Ashepoo, Combahee, Edisto (ACE) basin.

Illustrating a keen astuteness of resource politics, the community member further speculated that the alleged shrimp decline eliciting restrictions was probably nothing more than the result of a few shrimp boat captains with political clout lobbying legislatures for a change in regulations to compensate for insufficient yields. Admittedly, he did

concede a decline in oyster beds as a result of an influx of fresh water in a marine water body. However, the resident quickly noted that even the new regulations fail to address the causality of such climate change stressors. Thus, in spite of regulatory advisories citing scarcity, St. Helena Island residents' indigenous knowledge enable the harvesting, as one community member stated, of "plenty of shrimp, bass, and oysters in this area." Many Gullah Geechee assert that these yields would not be as high without regularly communicating with nonhumans, another common cultural practice (Gordon 2006). For example, community members often mentioned the symbiotic relationship they have with dolphins in which a light tap on their bateau would signal dolphins to herd schools of mullet into their cast nets (Blake and Simmons 2008). The act of reciprocity may not be evident in this case, due to the dolphins not partaking in the bounty; however, within the context of the ecological web, the Gullah Geechee's cultivation of oyster beds, for example, aid in the thriving of oysters whose colonies strengthen and enrich riverbed substrates that sustain food webs essential to humans and nonhumans.

The Gullah Geechee's cultural tradition of sharing, another integral component of their autonomy, is evidenced by intra-Gullah Geechee exchange transactions. The exchange system occurs on multiple levels to complement the cash-based economic system as needed. The value of goods and services of the non-monetary exchange system however, are not reflected in government standard of living assessments (Business Roundtable 2007). Thus, exchanges that occur within the heterogeneous Gullah Geechee population are unrecognizable by most entities outside the community (Griaule 1970). The Gullah Geechee exchange economy consists of an array of value-laden categories. For example, freshly caught shrimp, crab, oyster, or flounder can be exchanged for the services of an accountant, electrician, automobile mechanic, or plumber. It is important to note that the conventional occupations held by the indigenous population are in many cases self-taught or learned within the community and thus lack state certification or licencing. Further, it is not uncommon for one community member to perform multiple highly skilled tasks interchangeably. In other words, one person could conceivably possess the expertise or local knowledge to function as an accountant, mechanic, and plumber. Thus, as Béné et al. (2009) note, a community

member is able to “bank” on projected yields by agreeing to provide a set amount of future harvests in exchange for a conventional service—similar to the Mende people of West Africa. Autonomy derived from a predominantly non-monetary system however, is perceived as poverty within dominant economic discourse. Yet, the Gullah Geechee adamantly reject notions of poverty. “Don’t know nothin’ ‘bout subsistence. We Gullah!” is their mantra. Similar to Zora Neal Hurston’s (2008) findings of black communities in Florida during the 1930s, the Gullah Geechee’s anti-materialist ideology does not allow them to succumb to a culture of poverty. Hurston also argued that silence was one of the most powerful tools used within the communities she investigated. The community member’s silence about the optimum conditions and place necessary to harvest high shrimp yields is a case in point. Selective dissemination of indigenous knowledge by community members aid in ensuring that access to resources vital to the community’s well-being are protected. The Gullah Geechee’s distinctive identity is, in part, a result of their legacy of land ownership, entrepreneurial adeptness, and intimate knowledge of the land- and seascapes. The onslaught of tourism however, presents a bevy of opportunities for the indigenous population to demonstrate, yet again, their resiliency and adaptability while remaining vigilant in preserving a level of autonomy.

Plantation Culture: Imaginaries of Blackness

...used to be a time when we couldn't get off the plantation, now we can't get on

—Emory Campbell, Sea Island Resident

A stone pillar prominently stood at the gateway of the Avenue of Oaks. Formidable moss-covered oaks bordered the sandy, oyster-shelled road. Spacious contemporary homes with immaculate lawns peaked through the Avenue’s aging canopy. Glossy tourist pamphlets and travel guides from the visitor’s center informed of the slave cabins that once stood close behind the towering oaks. I was greeted by an aesthetic of wealth—past and present landscapes of grandeur shielded by oak sentinels along a path toward the original big house of the Coffin Point Plantation.

South Carolina, once a bustling plantation economy, keeps its colonial plantation culture vibrant by a dominant narrative that romanticizes racial hierarchies of the past and legitimates the reproduction of “the plantation” in the present (Chandler et al. 2008; Creel 1988; Guthrie 1996). The Coffin Point Plantation was my introduction to the plantation culture of the American South. Due to the historical charm presented in dominant representations of a genteel and prosperous South, the Sea Islands are an ideal destination for seekers of an exotic getaway—those who want to experience a romanticized colonial past, particularly during military unrest abroad involving the United States (Creel 1988). Thus, the Sea Islands became a haven tucked safely within American borders during world wars and other military conflicts, such as during the aftermath of the September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks (US Travel Association 2012). Slave cabins that once lined sandy, oyster-shelled roads and shorelines are now replaced with spacious single-family residences and immense condominiums to accommodate scores of tourists and recreational homeowners. The “new crop” of development, so called by Sea Island resident Emory Campbell, is rapidly transforming waterfront property and agricultural lands to a place of grandeur—a contemporary Southern plantation setting replete with gated timeshares, golf resorts, and recreational communities. The familiar sights of Gullah Geechee cast-netting at changing tide, crabbing at low tide, and pole fishing during high tide at public boat-landings and parks throughout the island represents the prevailing understanding of indigenous identity (Ng’weno 2007a, b). Within the context of blackness however, the only role of the indigenous population is to satisfy tourist class interests. The Gullah Geechee, who epitomize the southern black aesthetic, are thus cast in the role of exotic native through the resurrection of the planter class and slave within a postcolonial tourist class and servant binary. Due to indigenous identity equating to Indianness, the exotic native is constituted as the noble African savage or as a black person indigenous to Africa in order to concretely situate blackness as foreign, primitive, and poor (Wade 2013).

The Gullah Geechee, in assuming her or his expected role as exotic native, is granted access to land in order to perform as a maid, caddie, cook, or tour guide, for example. The exotic native’s cultural duties are

thus relegated to leisure time, a practice that threatens pursuits of self-determination. For example, the erection of fences by recreational homeowners guided by capitalism's tenets of constant accumulation privatize a space deemed communal by the Gullah Geechee who are long accustomed to shoreline access. To exacerbate matters, the homeowners are primarily concerned about a property's symbolic value. "Oh, I never eat the fish, never crab. I get whatever seafood I need from Maine," one recreational homeowner stated. A perceived class bias is illustrated in the homeowner's response that supports the perception of blackness equating to poverty and more specifically the Gullah Geechee's cultural fishing tradition as subsistence. The ostensibly impoverished indigenous population are thus required to negotiate with recreational homeowners to gain shoreline access as part of an improbable poverty-eradication strategy and to continue cultural practices incomprehensible to outsiders. Ironically, several waterfront communities have residential vacancy rates as high as eighty-two percent (Beaufort County 2012).

Ribot and Peluso (2003) argue that "those who control physical access to resources may influence who get to work in extraction and production." The Gullah Geechee as result invoke the performative or the trickster as mentioned earlier to exert their power in relation to spatial and temporal expectations (Ebron 2002). Thus, the exotic native as the noble African savage represents the "good blacks" as one recreational homeowner said in reference to select community members, generally negotiate to maintain and protect peopleless houses in exchange for shoreline access. In so doing, the exotic native is able to grant access to community members who fail to symbolize hegemonic ideologies of blackness as racially inferior and subservient to whites. For instance, the work schedule of an exotic native in the racially expected occupation of caddy or maid may prohibit him or her from harvesting shrimp during the optimum tides. Community members granted access by the exotic native, however are often able to secure sufficient shrimp yields to share with those who have work schedule conflicts. Distributions of shrimp are thus still available to the exotic native through acts of reciprocity with community members granted shoreline access in order to continue traditional seafood harvesting practices. Cooperation also enables the Gullah Geechee to assert their authority in other spaces where openings occur

that allow for a level of autonomy to be maintained (Creel 1988; Guthrie 1996). The Cultural Protection Overlay (CPO) ordinance and the Gullah Geechee Cultural Heritage Corridor are two examples of such openings.

The Cultural Protection Overlay district was established to substantially restrict development on St. Helena Island and promote the preservation of Gullah Geechee culture (Beaufort County 2012). The annual Gullah Geechee Cultural Heritage Days is one event that continues to thrive, in part, as a result of the local CPO ordinance. Each November, shortly before Thanksgiving, thousands of tourists descend on St. Helena Island to participate in parades and art and food exhibits, in dances, and in a host of other performances portraying Gullah Geechee culture. The annual event also functions as a “reunion,” bringing together Gullah Geechee from all parts of the country to experience once again, if only briefly, a feeling of belonging. As a result, the Gullah Geechee Cultural Heritage Days event is now one of South Carolina’s largest tourist attractions. The event’s bolstering of tourism aids traditional and non-traditional livelihoods, as state agencies benefit from the large influx of additional tourists participating in the indigenous event and the Gullah Geechee benefit from the increased demand for indigenous cultural events (Clifford 2001).

The second accomplishment of note is the establishment of the Gullah Geechee Cultural Heritage Corridor that extends across the four states of North Carolina, South Carolina, Georgia, and Florida. The corridor is managed by the National Park Service and charged with advocating for Gullah Geechee cultural preservation (GGCHC 2012). External alliances are also critical to the Gullah Geechee’s self-determination pursuits. The International Human Rights Association of American Minorities (IHRAAM), for example has consultative status with the United Nations and therefore is authorized to speak at official proceedings (IHRAAM 2015). The Gullah Geechee, on the other hand, possess no such authority. However, an alliance enables the IHRAAM to use the Gullah Geechee’s indigenous identity as an organizing strategy in relation to human rights globally. The Gullah Geechee’s involvement in a global movement in turn enhances their legitimacy and indigenous identity in local and national campaigns (de la Cadena and Starn 2007). The CPO ordinance, the corridor, and the Gullah Geechee’s global presence

also evidence resiliency, adaptability, and their indelible connection to the ancestral knowledges in Africa and the Americas.

Conclusion: Inscripted Landscapes

The comingling of Native Americans, enslaved Africans, and the planter class' beliefs and cultural practices, in addition to relations with nonhumans in St. Helena Island, constituted a *sui generis* manifestation of an emerging people—the Gullah Geechee. The complexity of Gullah Geechee identity cannot be understood solely within the context of biological determinism. The Gullah Geechee's cultural tradition of reciprocity with humans and nonhumans, sharing within the community and cooperating through local and global alliances enable them to achieve a level of autonomy not typically afforded groups without *de jure* sovereignty. Gullah Geechee ties to the land and place are what makes them so culturally distinct. Racially categorized as indigenous or black in dominant discourses on race, the Gullah Geechee continue to reject these dichotomies, opting rather to define themselves as a people who are racially black and culturally indigenous—although not Afro-indigenous, a term which indicates a racial “mixture” of African descendants and Native Americans (Anderson 2009; Sturm 2002; TallBear 2013). In the construction of self as indigenous, the Gullah Geechee's kinship networks based on mudlines take precedence over genetic ancestry. Mudlines connote a rupture in the way we think about indigeneity. Within this paradigm, longstanding relationships with the land, and more importantly, community acceptance and engagement in their particular place of emergence—determine who or who does not belong (TallBear 2013; Wade 2013).

Images of impoverished African children, requiring as little as \$1 a day, permeate the Western consciousness during late night infomercials. Imploring eyes, distended bellies and tattered clothing persist in eliciting the benevolence of privileged consumers. Hegemonic constructs of race concretely situate people of African descent in the realm of primitive along the white/modern and black/primitive racial continuum. Within this context, they are constituted as poor, ignorant and in dire need of

assistance, irrespective of their social, political or economic status. For instance, while on a tour, a visitor asked, "What's the best book on Gullah culture?" "*Gullah Culture Legacies*," the tour guide replied. Only he and I laughed, since apparently we were the only folks that knew he, the Gullah Geechee tour guide, was the author. During the remainder of the tour, I paid close attention to the guide. I noted that he appeared weary and exhausted; his movements were perfunctory and he slowly exhaled each time someone asked him to speak Gullah. The tour narratives supported an imaginary of exoticism and racial hierarchies. Perhaps not intentionally, tourists' questions and requests kept the discussion focused on consumptive Gullah Geechee identity indicators such as speech, dress, voodoo, and living in ecological harmony (Ebron 2002). After the tour, I left gazing at him sitting slumped in the van, appearing tired and dejected, casually chatting with the last stragglers—his final act of the performance.

The tour guide's narrative of autonomy as conveyed in his book but silenced on the tour, failed to meet the expectation of blackness or indigeneity as intellectually deficient and devoid of culture for white tourists longing for an antebellum southern experience in the role of the planter class. Although cognizant of how within the normativity of whiteness, imaginaries of race construct them as the primitive other, their resolve is self-recognition. Zora Neale Hurston's research of communities in the American South revealed "a sense of black people as complete, complex, undiminished human beings". She argues that to "overcome 'em with yeses, undermine 'em with grins, agree 'em to death and destruction, let em swoller you till they vomit or bust wide open" as characters are portrayed in her novels, enables people to be intentionally invisible and silent amidst incessant chatter. Despite the tour guide's perfunctory monologue as part of the hegemony's global racialized construct of blackness of as Fanon argues of who and what he should be, *Gullah Culture Legacies*, serves as testament to the tour guide's construction of self as an intellectual contributor to modernity.

Although being shrouded in an identity of subservience and poverty within dominant ideologies on race is exasperating, the Gullah Geechee remain steadfast in pursuits of self-determination. In so doing, the Gullah Geechee continue to operate from a consciousness of abundance rather

than poverty. The Gullah Geechee in subservient occupations and engaging in subsistence fishing is the narrative that travels, because it legitimizes dominant racial ideologies of blackness' solitary connection to an ostensibly impoverished continent—Africa. On the surface, the land and seascapes appears to reflect temporal and spatial expectations in congruence with dominant racial ideologies. Upon closer investigation however the realities on the ground convey a vastly different narrative. Narratives of abundance, even though primarily disseminated at the local level, effectively imbue a sense of belonging to community members presumed to be steeped in poverty and powerless. Who they are, what they know and how they elect to convey their knowledge, as a result, is not apparent to most people from outside the community. More important however, is that they feel no obligation to convince others of the validity of their construction of self as indigenous. Thus, “We Gullah!” is all that needs to be said.

Notes

1. The trickster is a central figure in most African and Native American myths whose role, as a god, an animal, or a human, is to model behaviour on codes of conduct between humans and nonhumans. West African Mende tribes tell stories of the Eshu, a trickster who serves as the messenger between the physical and spiritual worlds and models behaviour on change and quarrels (Gates 2014).

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5

Race and Racism in Eastern Europe: Becoming White, Becoming Western

Ian Law and Nikolay Zakharov

Introduction

Studying race in Eastern Europe can play an important role in the theoretical advancement of the sociology of race and racism because it opens up the possibility of analysing a number of societies which have been familiar with these concepts and which have explicitly used them for anti-racist propaganda – not in classification practices concerning population censuses. As a result, the experience of state socialism and its legacy in Eastern Europe today provides us with a range of unique material for reconsidering a number of our assumptions concerning trajectories of global race-formation. This chapter builds on the findings of a programme of research on race and racism in Communist and post-Communist contexts (Law 2012), in modern Russia (Zakharov 2015)

I. Law (✉)

University of Leeds, Leeds, UK

e-mail: I.G.Law@leeds.ac.uk

N. Zakharov

Södertörn University, Huddinge Municipality, Sweden

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and in the other former Soviet Union states (Zakharov and Law 2017) and offers an original intervention in the theory of global racism. This chapter employs an interactive/relational methodology (Dikotter 2008; Goldberg 2008) with respect to the analysis of racial states and is concerned to examine the operation of processes of racialisation across varying forms of modernity. The chapter argues that the East European 'search for race' and the striving to 'attain whiteness', can be understood as attempts to rediscover the privileged whiteness that has been partly lost during the socialist past. Insofar as racial classification contributes to the codification of difference, the adoption of theories and practices of race constitutes an attempt on the part of east Europeans to transcend the trap of the east/west dichotomy. By this intellectuals and politicians have sought to elaborate new logics of identification that will facilitate social cohesion under very specific premises that relate to the position of respective countries in the world and to power relations at home. The new identifications being created operate to serve and reflect their place in the new racial global order and ensure the dominance of the majority at home.

European whiteness, as the editors of this volume have argued, is a normative/desirable category against which all others emerge as lacking. European whiteness is also embedded in differing varieties of modernity in this case the communist political project. Investing in 'whiteness' after the Berlin Wall-era has provided a narrative for post-Soviet states to elaborate their own proper place in the dominant discourses of the developed and civilised First World. This set of racial conditions relies on the interactive and relational shaping and reworking of race and racism in Eastern Europe. The fundamental frameworks for explaining global racialisation are also called into question by the arguments presented here. The role played by western modernity has been key, but this has been overstated. We need to acknowledge and recognise both pre-modern and non-western regions and regimes, and specifically the communist political project as playing important roles too. Communist and post-socialist regimes are rooted in 'solid' modernity with grand narratives and a rational belief in progress through highly controlled use of technology, bureaucracy and military power and they too have their racialised hierarchies and racialised internal enemies and targets of hate, and are ordered and

regulated by identifiable racial logics in state governance. The complacency, arrogance and hypocrisy of these regimes declaring themselves immune to racism has for too long been hidden from scrutiny.

This article argues for a less one-sided account of the process of racial Europeanisation than we have at present. In the context of historical debates over the specification and representation of Eastern Europe, Guido Franzinetti (2008) argues for the inextricable character of the interconnections between Eastern Europe and its neighbours. European history is argued to be incomplete and incomprehensible without including Eastern Europe. The division of Europe into east and west only existed during the Cold War (1945–1991), and the end of the Cold War is the cause of the current decline in east European studies. The penetration of racial discourse into European historiography produced an account which portrayed ‘a grim story of racial struggle, a relentless conflict of Teutons and Slavs, or even as an ineluctable clash of civilizations’ between east and west Europe (Barraclough 1970 as quoted in Franzinetti 2008, p. 361). The indirect legacy of this historical discourse is the separation of Eastern Europe from accounts of global racialisation, which privileges western civilisation and its regimes and peoples and excludes eastern European actors from active participation. This we reject and we call for a new reframing of racial Europeanisation which gives due weight to racial conditions and dynamics in eastern European states. In our working definition the region of Eastern Europe is taken to consist of three sub-regions. As Franzinetti (2008) confirms Eastern Europe can be seen as a composite object which can be best viewed through a set of overlapping sub-regions: these would include a Northern European sub-region, an East-Central or Central European sub-region, and a South-East European or Balkan sub-region which historically roughly map on to the four imperial systems existing in the eighteenth century in the region: Russia, Prussia, Austria and Turkey. This chapter firstly considers the formation and legacy of Russian racialisation and anti-Roma racism in a number of states including Hungary, the Czech Republic, Slovakia and Romania. It then examines racialisation in a variety of post-Soviet regimes including the Baltic states, Ukraine, Moldova, Belarus and the Southern Caucasus (Armenia, Georgia and Azerbaijan). Here we can only briefly point to selected aspects of racialisation processes in these

states. Finally, we acknowledge the need to recognise polyracism (Law et al. 2014) which involves tracing the multiple interconnected origins of racism and the differential operation of multiple racialised modernities which facilitates the inclusion of post-communist states, and many others, as active agents within a comprehensive and systematic theory of global racialisation, and here we briefly make the case for this new theory. This need to re-theorise global racialisation is not addressed in detail in this chapter but this underlying critical line of argument informs our understanding and approach to the examination of racism in these regional contexts. Much greater consideration and analytical space needs to be given to the recognition of racism in under-researched national and regional contexts as a basis for building such a new theoretical account.

Legacies of Soviet Modernity in Russian and East European Practices of Race

The mobilisation of racial categories in anthropology, the tradition of Russian eugenics and the domination of primordial approaches to ethnicity in the Russian social science tradition (see a critical account in Shnirelman 2011; Sokolovsky 2001; Tishkov 1997; Weinberg 1974) have combined to provide a theoretical foundation for prevailing knowledge on race and ethnicity in this region. This evidence points to relational continuities in the scientific construction and understanding of racial and ethnic identities between pre- and post- revolutionary Russia. In the 1920s the Bolsheviks relied on former imperial experts, including ethnographers, for information on the peoples of Russia as a basis for developing ‘Soviet colonisation’, a revolutionary nationality policy and the bringing of peoples into the revolutionary process and securing their active involvement and participation, in an interactive way in the great socialist experiment (Hirsch 2005, pp. 6–7). The anti-colonial, anti-imperialist and multiethnic and multinational aspirations and declarations of the emerging Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (USSR) were combined with ‘selective borrowing’ from Western European imperialism. Soviet colonisation was defined as the state directed development of

productive efforts without imperialistic exploitation of 'less developed peoples by more developed peoples'. The immediate and central construction of a hierarchy of nations and peoples within the revolutionary process provided a core mechanism for the reproduction of elements of racial and ethnic hierarchies from both inside imperial Russia and from contemporaneous external colonial and imperial forms of governance, although, officially, backwardness was not due to innate racial or biological characteristics.

The Soviet regime developed an ideology of 'state-sponsored evolutionism' (Hirsch 2005, p. 7) which was a Soviet version of the civilising mission, entwining a Marxist conception of historical development with European anthropological theories about cultural evolution. This was based on the view that there were ancient, historical, primordial ethnic groups which were to be classified, shaped and privileged as the building blocks of nations, with the state constructing modern nationalities as an essential step on the road to socialism with these nations merging with the advent of communism, constructing a new 'ethnicised modernity' (Bonnett 2002).

The Soviet regime's conception of modernity as well as that of western European nations drew on the legacy of the European Enlightenment with its emphasis on the capacity of science and rationality, which combined with faith in unilinear social and economic progress, would lead towards the ideals of civilisation and the emancipation of humanity. The fundamental tensions inherent in these key ideas facilitated both the reproduction and development of racist/antiracist, colonial/anticolonial forms of governance, and the construction/destruction of ethnicities. Science, technology and rational bureaucracy provided the means for both Stalinist ethnic cleansing and the categorising and promotion of ethnic nationalisms. The Stalinist Soviet experiment was a twentieth century state project with an imaginary of rationalising state administrations, committed to their linked but individual projects of control, centralisation and modernisation. Embedded in these projects was a set of early progressive declarations that anti-Semitism, anti-Black racism and associated forms of national chauvinism were to be ended. This anti-colonial, de-racialising impulse hugely contrasted with the segregating racial logics of apartheid South Africa, and the exterminationist logic of

Nazi Germany. New anti-colonial, raceless states were to be built, new identities constructed and new ethnoracial formations established. Racial identities and racism were to somehow dissolve in the fusing of new socialist societies, and barriers and boundaries to be broken down in the rising of new communist regimes.

As Humphreys (2000) observes, racism was understood differently in post-war east and west Europe, on either side of the Iron Curtain. In Central and Eastern Europe the Holocaust was overshadowed by the death and destruction of Stalin's totalitarianism and communist governments emphasised victory over the Nazis, whereas in Western Europe the Holocaust defined modern history. Also 'in many CEE countries official anti-Semitism coincided with the official founding of the state – to deny anti-Semitism is to deny the regime's creation myth' (Humphreys 2000, p. 9). Racism was not seen as encompassing anti-Semitism and with ethnic and racial identities being actively discouraged under communist rule, where there are no races, there can be no racism. Racism was a white/black issue that happened in the USA and South Africa not in CEE socialist countries. The writing out of racism in these contexts was accompanied by one further key moment of erasure; the failure to recognise the Roma Holocaust, termed *Pořajmos* – the devouring (Hancock 2000), and the role played by Hungarian, Slovakian, Czech, Romanian and Croatian and other governments in deportations, concentration camps and genocide. This silence accompanied Stalinist internationalism which saw ethnic identity as 'bourgeois ideology', and hence the Roma would somehow 'disappear in the cauldron of the People's Republic' (Crowe 2007, p. 92) as they moved from exclusion, marginalisation and mass murder in capitalist societies to forced assimilation through a process of racialised proletarianisation in socialist societies.

The occupation of Central and Eastern Europe (CEE) by Soviet troops and the installation of communist regimes, resulting from Stalin's reward for victory, ended the *Pořajmos*, the Roma Holocaust, but how different were the Nazi and Soviet logics of anti-Roma racism? The Nazi racialised view of the Roma, as an Aryan group who had mixed with inferior races and as a result been reduced to extreme poverty and a nomadic lifestyle, and, who were therefore a major threat to the racial purity and dominance of the German nation, was driven by the logic of extermination.

The related but differing Soviet logic of anti-Roma racism was driven by the logic of national domination, subservience to the state, assimilation and the destruction and outlawing of Roma culture and language. For Stalin, the 'Gypsies' were a backward race in need of socialist improvement. In the 1930s in the Soviet Union the Roma, as with many others, had suffered from forced collectivisation, and above all from Stalinist terror, during which there were hundreds of thousands of arbitrary arrests, together with widespread shootings and deportations to Siberia (FIDH 2004). Whereas in Romania, for example, the inter-war years were very different with an 'extraordinary sense of ethnic self-awareness' (Crowe 2007), the formation of Roma associations, a voluntarist move to sedentary lifestyles and, for some, a move into professional and official positions. This was a trend which had been happening in the Soviet Union in the 1920s, but one which had been reversed with the onset of Stalinist terror and the rise of national chauvinism. The new communist regimes in the CEE countries facilitated a move, not from Holocaust to liberation for the Roma but, from the brutal experiences of one racialised regime to domination and suppression in another. Liberation from racialisation was never on the communist agenda, whereas merging specific nationalisms with Stalinist ideologies to make the Roma disappear into the proletariat in the formation of new socialist societies clearly was.

Complex, multi-faceted racial discourse about the Roma constructed key ideological linkages between the central elements; a genetic inferiority, a foreign asocial group in need of nationalising, a pre-modern backward culture in need of Soviet modernisation, a parasitic group that fed on 'real' workers, a population out of control and in need of sterilisation, a criminal group in need of the prison or the labour camp, inveterate drunks who needed sobering up, and overall a 'brown', 'dark' presence that needed managing, regulating and controlling. Racialisation carried through by communist regimes in this region involved a range of strategies. The utilisation of strategies to exclude the Roma from political power and state posts was one of these, operationalised for example in the 'secret anti-nationality system' in Romania, which put majority Romanians in positions of upper and mid-level state power in regions inhabited by national minorities.

A destructionist logic characterised communist racialisation. An anti-minority, anti-ethnic, anti-cultural, anti-linguistic ethos driven by the Soviet state permeated these regimes. This destruction of ethnic, cultural and linguistic ties and social bonds was necessary to bring the new society into being. Suppression of Roma associations, groups and unions, forced evictions, displacement and migrations of Roma communities and the stealing and decimation of Roma land, livelihoods and lifestyles have all been identified in these racial states. None of this was named as racism, as this did not exist in the Soviet Union. The forgetting and denial of the Roma Holocaust was followed by the denial of official anti-Roma racism with a merging of historical and institutional amnesia. The 'Gypsy Issue' was here constructed as a social issue to be solved by socialist means including segregation, destruction, discrimination and disappearance.

Failed, symbolic political rhetoric about equality, minority rights and integration veiled a segregationist logic in these communist regimes, exemplified by schooling, with Roma children sent to special schools for the 'mentally retarded' and then disappearing out of the system at an early age. Racialised institutions and discriminatory practices thereby reproduced and embedded racial inequalities in communist societies, as they did in Western European societies in the post-war period, for example with the making of African Caribbean children as educationally sub-normal in the UK in the 1960s. There are parallels in patterns of racialised governance in both East and West, for example the use of dispersal policies in housing to reduce the threat of cohesive minority communities to majority groups, the failed patterns of policy interventions on structures of racial and ethnic inequality, and most important of all the construction of racism as something that states did not do and were not responsible for. The logics of post-war racial Europeanisation (Goldberg 2008) operated on both sides of the Iron Curtain, yet most accounts do not give adequate space to Eastern European racialisations.

There are strong continuities in the development of racism in Russia, strong interconnections between Russian and eastern racism and western racisms, and powerful internal social, political and economic forces driving contemporary processes of racialisation in the Russian Federation (Zakharov 2015). Anti-racism as a political project is and has been weak and subject to attack with activists being subject to harassment and in

some cases murder. The attempt to break with racism and colonialism in the Soviet Union has been a failure with the proliferation of race-thinking, decades of denial of the mechanisms of internal racialisation and active racialised construction of many groups inside and outside the Soviet Union, although the regime did not let human heredity become a defining feature of political schemes as in Nazi Germany. The potent logics of Soviet racism mark one central phase in the wider historical formation of racial marking, hierarchies, segregation, violence and domination that have been identified in this chapter. The Soviet period marked the switch from religious thinking to scientific race thinking, with Soviet atheism and Soviet school teaching of biology popularising the idea that physical appearance and/or genes matter more than religion, and now 'the darkies' are the focus of hate (Alexandrov and Ivaniushina 2010). Future prospects are grim and the racialised Russian state will continue to strengthen links between racialisation and criminalisation as well as segregation and marginalisation of stigmatised groups like the Roma. Official challenging of the 'racist underground' provides a rhetoric of progressive action which positions the state as without racism, as in the Soviet era, except that racist thugs and gangsters are now recognised inside this region rather than being identified externally in America and the West. The revival of 'old' racism drawing on contemporary constructions of Slavic pre-history, Aryan myths and also neo-paganism are being forged into new representations and discourses of the racial purity of Russia (Laruelle 2008; Shnirelman 2015). This has been facilitated by Soviet discourses and primary education regarding World War Two which have resulted in lack of knowledge of the ideological foundations of the Nazi regime and associated Aryan myths, together with the yearning to rediscover the national past and rehabilitate regional folklore.

The communist project has also had a civilising internationalist mission to aggrandise otherness. This project's aftershocks are still perceptible in post-socialist societies, such as in episodes of nationally specific and sometimes violent engagement with the concept of race and racism. In this regard, 'whiteness' represents a westernising approach aspiring to locate post-Soviet states within the realm of First World discourse. Racial discourses in some of the post-Soviet states are lineage-based and accompanied by nationalist and clan-politics discourses. Otherwise they are

phenotype-focused and supported by popular (mis)conceptions springing from various Soviet and post-Soviet racialisation encounters. The ephemeral racial reality prevents any stable racial arrangements from being established in this region. The racialisation that needs both internal and external “others” is at variance with the region-specific nation-building intellectual programmes, necessarily making allowance for inequality and authoritarian rule. The contradiction of such racialisation is contained in its concurrent functions – facing the traumatic challenges originating both from the global racial order and from Russia, and naturalising the vexing social differentiation at home. Each of these racialisation projects create identifications in such a way as to reflect their country’s supposed new placement among the ‘civilized’ nations and to ensure the in-county dominance of the respective “titular” nation. In their own turn, the “non-titular” minorities to be found in the region also utilise the idea of race in their own search for roots, this way substantiating their right to their settlement areas and the ‘genetic’ character of cultural traditions, ensuring legitimisation of ethnic identity and reproduction of ethnic community.

Race Governance in the Baltic States

Common for the three Baltic states, their specific political projects to preserve their respective national ethno-racial uniqueness are largely informed by the parallel processes of globalisation and europeanisation (Plakans 2011). In this regard, the refugee crisis in Europe brings to the surface the half-forgotten, semi-hidden national exclusivism and racism, and it simultaneously exposes as wrongful the previously dominant political narrative of these countries as being racism-free. Supposedly unable to ‘absorb’ migrants, some of these countries’ political leadership are calling for the closure of Europe. In March 2016, Lithuanian President, Dalia Grybauskaitė, called for the Baltic states to most literally fence themselves in along their borders with Russia and Belarus. In this way the Baltic states hope to halt the much feared unregulated inflow of migrants and thereby shape their internal racisms at an accelerated tempo. Both Russian and European, both politically inspired and specifically media-born, discourses contribute to these processes.

The formation of the Lithuanian, Estonian and Latvian national movements and their respective nation states occurred at high speed and much later than other Eastern European societies in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries (Hroch 1985). In each of these contexts cultural revivalism and agitation was articulated through the patriotic press and this was interlinked with political action led by patriotic urban intelligentsias rooted in their peasant origins. The process of racialisation was central to this process, for example in the case of the narration of the Lithuanian nation where the myth of shared descent was elaborated as a key mechanism tying together this biologically distinct group of people as a patriarchal peasant family (Balkelis 2009). The nation was therefore imagined, re-activated and forged as comprising a genetically separated people enabling lines of inclusion and exclusion to be drawn. Each of the national movements told a different story, but they were similarly engaged in this process of articulating the connections between race and nation. Here creating nations where none had existed required an immense cultural and political project and racial differentiation was one key tool in building the case for independence. As Björn Felder confirms in the case of Estonia, following the 1905 revolts, 'Estonian intellectuals saw race as a new means in their national struggle to symbolize the nation on a new and deeper level' (2013, p. 9). This built on the creation of an Estonian national identity, which was particularly inspired by traditional cultural references drawn from peasant lifestyles and rural landscapes (Mettam and Williams 2001). Latvian and Estonian national 'awakenings' happened in the wider context of the shaping of nations and unification struggles across Europe and specific adaptations of German nationalistic ideas was a core thread. Here, each person had an essential, fundamental national identity and was born into a 'people' (Latv. *tauta*, Est. *rahvas*) (Plakans 2011, p. 215). Hierarchies of 'peoples' were determined by the relative development of culture/nations. So, we have a central linkage between clearly demarcated groups of people and social/cultural hierarchies. This varying and contested discourse of national identity provided fertile soil for the construction of national-biological-racial chains of meaning shaped by prevailing, dominant international expert regimes of truth regarding the central scientific reality of race, racial hierarchies and the racial origin of nations. This process was at the core of the shaping of

Baltic nationalisms, but with specific characteristics and features in each case as these were interactively constructed in the new narratives of national identity and embedded in state and institutional practices, with increasingly explicit linkages between race, eugenics and national discourse (Felder and Weindling 2013).

These Baltic regimes were also operating, institutionalising and implementing eugenicist policies and programmes in the inter-war period with early establishment of expert and professional societies and networks, with Estonia a leader in the field. Eugenic discourse with its use of ideas of racial character, quality of blood, genetic purity, national vitality, feeble-mindedness, inferiority and sterilisation complemented the wider nation-building projects which 'homogenise the nation ethnically, genetically and racially to form a racial state' (Felder 2013, p. 6). This involved defining the state in biological terms through national regeneration and pursuit of a eugenics agenda by bio-medical elites and politicians.

In the slow process whereby these three Baltic states have sought to acknowledge, recognise and memorialise the Holocaust and the Porajmos it has always been contextualised and in some ways overshadowed by the lasting significance of what replaced Nazi occupation; Soviet occupation and its transformation into Soviet colonialism (Annus 2012). This process of political and economic dominance parallels classic Western colonialism with its vision of remaking the worldview of the people under repression. But as Epi Annus (2012) emphasises, in ideological terms Soviet colonialism produced the reverse: a colonialism that actually created an idealised Western imaginary in opposition to the Soviet modernist project. The perception of the Baltic states as more civilised, enlightened and superior contrasted to that of the Soviet metropolis which was positioned as the reverse; uncivilised, barbarian, and 'Oriental'. This implicit racial ordering had three effects. Firstly, the dominance of a discourse of victimhood which can work to silence other claims for recognition of suffering and humanitarian concern. Secondly, the reinforcement of a hierarchical worldview from which the making of reactions and responses to events and peoples both within and without can be made sense of and understood. Third, the further building of Baltic racialisation as a narrative of legitimated exclusion to be carried forward in political projects of attending to the nation. Post-independence the strength of ethnonational

boundaries in the Baltic states was remarkable, bolstered by the political project of securing, protecting and empowering the core nation (Brubaker 2009). The legacy of the formation of ethnoracial, exclusionary nations in the Baltic and the differing, but interconnected histories of these three states, has provided a frame of meaning through which contemporary migrations, events and responses have been shaped as argued below.

These states have sought to present themselves as free of institutional racism, structural racism and state racism with a strong multicultural heritage of openness and cross-cultural respect. Historical and contemporary amnesia with regard to the racialised making of the state and the exclusionary character of national discourse together with a social environment conducive to the development of hostility to the entry of ethnoracially marked migrants were then evident in this approach. This position derives from a particular conception of racism as to do with 'isolated instances' and unconnected individual actions at the margins of Baltic societies. Lacking a history of direct involvement in racialised African and Asian colonisation and being a victim of Soviet colonisation positions these 'core' nations as being outside racial discourse. Local, internal targets of hostility include Russians, Poles, Jews and Roma/Gypsies, and external groups, foreigners particularly non-Westerners, for example Chinese migrants, Africans and Muslims. The new opposition to ethnoracially marked migrants is also bringing new alliances of 'core' peoples and Russian speakers together.

Baltic race governance involves increasing condemnation of sporadic racist violence, denial of any mainstream problems of racism within the state and within broader society, denial of the intrinsic connections between racism and nationalism and, further, complete denial of the significance of European slavery and colonialism and the international circulation of varying racialised discourses, despite their place within the European political project. Racism and racialised governance in these contemporary social formations is stratified by a complex set of embedded, ingrained, dynamic racist discourses and practices with a sharpening of tension and conflict between the opposing social forces of racism, with its internal and external targets of hate, and antiracism, with its narratives of inclusion and multiculturalism.

Race and Racism in Belarus, Ukraine and Moldova

Racism in Ukraine, Belarus and Moldova is non-reducible to the racist discourse and action by racist intellectuals, far-right parties, and representatives of such like subcultures. The concept of race and its associated forms and elaborations intersecting with constructions of ethnicity, gender and culture is not in the margins, it is pervasive throughout the region and at the core of its states. These former Russian Empire territories were within the Pale of Settlement where Jewish populations were allowed to reside. Before the Holocaust this was home to half of the European Jewry. Even after the Holocaust, up to the demise of the Soviet Union, half of Soviet Jews still called it home. However, the number of Jews living in these regions has significantly declined. Parallel to this population shift, racism and even its so ubiquitous manifestation anti-Semitism were also seen as shifting elsewhere. Racisms are now denied, ascribed to neighbouring states and other states elsewhere.

Both in Belarusian official ideology and in their self-representations, Belarusians are tolerant and otherwise “good souls” – peaceful and hospitable, and of course devoid of any hostile racism. But their “tolerance” is more a form of insularity, a form of conservative seclusion and manifestation of pre-modern peasant restraint rather than a conscious support and sympathy for the “other” (Lastouski et al. 2016). Violent racism is somehow conceived as hardly possible in such a case, but there is a widespread hostile attitude to anything which is culturally alien and to the “other” in principle. The Holocaust left Belarus largely without its Jewish population and an increasingly monocultural society. This means that the upcoming upsurge of immigration is going to become a real test as to whether the Belarusians’ “innate tolerance” holds fast. While Belarusian authoritarianism denies racism, the officially imposed tolerance frame fosters social apathy and thus contributes to an underdeveloped civil society, which would otherwise problematise racism.

Our research on racism in the post-Soviet states shows that the newly established (often only outwardly) pro-democratic and pro-market

regimes have not dismissed pre-existing racialisation. In what seems to be normal for these states, enduring authoritarianism and still betraying the traditional, consolidated societies, these countries' leaders consider any impromptu ethnic mobilisation or uncalled-for racist violence as to be challenging their political power. Belarus is exactly this case, where the weak civil society and the matching independent media are less capable of contributing to any transparency of the political process. Populism and a constantly invoked spectre of enemies within and without the country are fraught with xenophobia and racism. Similar to conditions in Russia, public alienation from the decision-making process results in Belarus in the perception of imposed political decisions and economic failures as being due to aliens, outside the state, who are hostile to ordinary people. The Ukrainian case is in many respects similar to the Belarusian one. The quarter-century long democratisation of Ukraine has not resulted in recognition of racism and racial discrimination. When a military conflict started in Ukraine in 2014, it exacerbated not only pre-existing social and political, but also ethnic, conflicts that have unleashed a largely uncurbed process of racialisation.

Another specificity of this regional racism concerns its close relationship with racialisation processes in the former metropolitan countries, Russia, and in the case of Moldova – Romania. It is known and has already been demonstrated, some racist narratives might be imported, while other arguments are either procreated from scratch or remade to suit local conditions. For instance, a “non-Russian” label is applied to visible minorities in Ukraine, suggesting its origin in the common Soviet past, when the “non-Russian” was anyone not matching the Slavic form of normative whiteness (Helbig 2014). The recurrent label also suggests the post-colonial status of Ukraine, still in the grip of Russian-Soviet discourse. In its own turn, the Moldovan case also illustrates the construction of racism at the intersection of historic and cultural legacies, whereby racialisation processes follow the vicissitudes of Moldovan statehood.

As part of fascist Romania and thus also subject to its racist governance until the end of WWII, the Moldovans were considered as one nation with Romanians, and the Roma were officially proclaimed a “plague”,

most literally implying a biohazard to the “patrician” Romanian nation (Turda 2007). The pro-Nazi government under Marshall Antonescu organised the Roma Holocaust, to include on the present-day territory of Moldova (Dumitru 2016). When it was finally freed from the fascist regime, it simultaneously succumbed to annexation by the Soviet Union, now to become the Moldavian Socialist Republic. At this point, the Roma population started to be assimilated by way of sovietisation, in the pursuit of the new man and elimination of national specificities. We have also conceptualised this process as one of racial proletarianisation. This approach and the would-be society of total equality made the very idea of minorities redundant. However, even though the new Soviet person was not seen as Moldavan or Roma, he or she was to become Russian. Thus in practical terms this approach meant the Slavification of the population. Finally, independent, and in unison with adjacent Romania, Moldova has embarked on a very similar project, now regarding the Roma, by creating the so-called “Roma-line”, as if taken from the well-known theory of “color line”, by Du Bois.

The ethno-cultural policy of the three countries is still informed by their Soviet experience. Many language or ethnicity-focused conflicts are inherited from the Soviet past, when much of the current legislation, institutions, social policies, and the autonomous territories have been shaped. The same concerns the linguistic policies, securing the co-existence of the titular language and Russian, and marginalising other languages (Bespamyatnykh et al. 2014). Legislation recognising minority rights is mostly declarative and very weak on implementation mechanisms. The Soviet-style, “passport” ethnicity is partly preserved in all the three countries. Several ethnic-based and language-specific territorial autonomies have been preserved in Moldova. These practices are a legacy of the late-1980s Soviet official approach to the restoration of rights of formerly deported peoples. It also preserves the language policy from that same period whereby “titular” ethnicity is used to determine the official language, Russian is the lingua franca, and minority languages are also allocated this or another role. Minorities’ media mouthpieces are habitually co-opted by the state, and ethnic activism is channelled into the sphere of culture.

Racialised Modernities in the Southern Caucasus

Contemporary formations of race and racism across the Southern Caucasus region are intimately connected with racialised histories, the legacy of Ottoman, Turkish and Soviet political projects and making of three new racial states: Georgia, Armenia and Azerbaijan which came into being in the post-Soviet era. It is in the interface between racial Europeanisation and the resurrection of both Russian racialised modernity and local racial nationalisms, that the specificities of racisms in the Southern Caucasus region can be found here at this spatial intersection between Eastern Europe, Russia and Western Asia. Prior to the nineteenth century there was no such thing as a 'Caucasian' identity. This region encompassed a set of overlapping linguistic, religious, local and ethnic frames of identification (Iskandaryan 2011). It was only following Russian annexation that the region was administratively defined as 'Transcaucasia'. At the same time Western and Russian racial science were manufacturing varying accounts of the Caucasian race and by the twentieth century a common Caucasian identity was emerging across this region as a product of imperial and Soviet racialised governance. Russia embraced European developments in natural and racial science and developed them into its unique mix of ethnic primordialism and physical anthropology (Geddie 1885). This is exemplified in the writings and collections deposited by Russian ethnographers in the Caucasus Department in Tbilisi, which became the Caucasus Museum in 1867, and which included human skulls as well as a wide variety of other artefacts (Law 2012).

Three varieties of racialised modernity coexist in Southern Caucasus. Each of the Caucasian states adopted its dominant form of racialisation in a unique way. Each of them premised on their own initial racial conditions, which have thereupon shaped distinctive processes and dissimilar outcomes. Specifically, the outcomes were shaped by such factors as the persistent domination of the Soviet centre, the varying academic standing of racial science at home, the changing impact of various racial discourses worldwide, and the characteristics of variously configuring ethno-racial divisions and amalgamations.

Armenian racism has been formed in a mono-ethnic social context. This context is anti-cosmopolitan and territorially situated away from major international migration flows, such as a recent upsurge caused by the Syrian war. Armenia has also left behind the forced exodus of its previous Azerbaijani population and the more voluntary leaving of Russians. Today, the historical progression of Armenians as a racially pure ethnos is presented in the Yerevan-based History Museum, in the sheer absence of international tourists mostly attended by groups of schoolchildren. However, this “airbrushed lining” of museum expositions is undergirded by highly contentious nationalist discourse of the ambiguous racial science at the Armenian Academy of Sciences, still using the methods and findings of Soviet physical anthropology and even craniology. The Armenian government directly promotes nationalist values, such as by changing the school curriculum to accommodate the Armenian Church, from teaching history of world religions to the history of Armenian religion. Armenian racial identity is reportedly a mix of European and Asian characteristics, with admixed mountain and valley distinctions. The observable outward otherness of Georgians, Armenians and Azeris is also intrinsically meaningful for the people in the region. However, as it was also confirmed in interviews in 2014, the dominant view of racism in Armenia is that it is either absent or weak and confined to the radical nationalist or nazi margins (Zakharov and Law 2017). This view and largely the race and racism discourse in Armenia is determined by the most dramatic event in the history of this people, the Armenian Genocide that halved the population and that drove the survivors from their primordial homeland. Thus, for many Armenians racism is something outlandish and to be found primarily in the anti-Armenian Turkish and Azeri racialised nationalism.

In turn, Azerbaijani state-promoted racism is not only pronouncedly anti-Armenian but also draws from a pool of anti-Semitic myths, as a result stirring up a great deal of racial hatred in the country. The discursive rendering of the Azerbaijani nation origins is premised on its territorial integrity and thereby serves the framework for the racialised state. That the Azeri anti-Armenian discourse is interconnected with anti-Semitism is due *inter alia* to the fact that both discourses indulge in universal conspiracy theorising, such as with regard the supposedly

better-educated and more prosperous Armenians plotting against the Azerbaijani nation. The origin of this process of shifting racist tropes from Jews to Armenians is traceable to the pre-Soviet period and was also a direct product of key Soviet actors, but it is the post-Soviet, modern Azerbaijani state that has publicly confirmed such vilification and racialisation of Armenian people as justifiable and necessary.

The present-day Georgia is distinctive for its increasingly exclusivist ethno-religious nationalism combining imperial traditions with the revived Orthodox Church. It features a racial discourse that is hostile towards many groups not included in what is considered the core Georgian national identity. Its complex racialised discourse has many targets including the more regionally uncommon groups homogenisingly labelled as “the black” and “the Chinese”, but also includes quite familiar Roma, Azeris, Meskhetian Turks, and other minority groups. As previously noted, racialisation and anti-Muslimism often converge in political fora, media and school textbooks, to form an aggressive context of racist stereotypes and myths. Intensification of racism in post-Soviet Georgia has been driven by the state via its exclusivist Georgian political projects, ever more closely espousing the Georgian Orthodox Church. Over and above the state-induced racism, there are other facilitating factors in the country that involve problematic semi-autonomous paramilitaries, a declining economy, and the issue of European integration vis-a-vis the future unclear status of Abkhazia and Ossetia.

Polyracism

We have as yet a very limited, partial, uneven account of world racisms and there remains much to document, criticise and challenge in building systematic theory, evidence and multiple anti-racist futures. Poly racism as a theoretical project was first published as a core idea in the developing geo-regional account of Communist, post-Communist, Mediterranean and Caribbean racisms emphasising multiple origins and interconnections across multiple modernities set out in a range of inter-linked publishing projects comprising the *Mapping Global Racisms* research programme of which work on Russia and the post-Soviet republics is one key

thread (Law 2012; Zakharov and Law 2017). Why restrict our deconstruction of racial logics to the operation of Western capitalist modernity and liberal democracies? This arbitrary decision has serious consequences in putting many polities and contexts out of critical sight and deeming them as unworthy of interrogation, for example pre-modern and post-colonial regimes in North Africa and many Communist contexts. The recent exposure of brutality, violence and murder driven by the North Korean state's regulation of racial purity in relation to children of mixed North Korean and Chinese heritage where a prison camp mother was ordered to drown her own baby illustrates this problem (Guardian 2014). The exposure of the North Korean regime's claim to be the 'cleanest', 'purest' race, influenced by Japanese fascism, has only recently received scholarly attention (Myers 2011). Inattention to the proliferation of non-Western racial modernities is also evident in the lack of interrogation of the Soviet Union/Russian Federation, post-Soviet republics, for example in Central Asia, and the Chinese People's Republic (Law 2012; Zakharov 2015; Zakharov and Law 2017). The failure to adequately address racialisation of Soviet and post-Soviet contexts, together with other vitally important contexts such as the Ottoman Empire, Turkey and states in the Middle East, is a major gap in our knowledge and understanding of global racialisation. Accounts of global racial rule (Goldberg 2002) and the modern world as a racial system (Winant 2002) seek to make the case for a global mode of analysis but can frequently fail to adequately provide a systematic account of the complexity and variety of racisms together with, at times, an over 'extravagant' emphasis on structural determinations (Carter and Virdee 2008). Giving adequate weight to the full range of empirical, historical and geo-political evidence of racism which comes into focus through the lens of polyracism theory also has, then, crucial consequences for the identification and evaluation of actors and movements key to the construction of projects of deracialisation.

The concept of polyracism is used here in the context of a new theory denoting the historical development of multiple origins of racism in different regions and forms as opposed to the monoracism arguments positing a linear development of Western racisms from the classical world onwards and outwards (Isaac 2004). Dikötter (2011) refers in a related way to the importance of acknowledging the 'polyphony' of racial discourse.

Arguments for discounting and ignoring an analysis of non-Western racisms, because they are seen as of lesser importance or because they have been more weakly elaborated and implemented (Frederickson 2003), are very much open to challenge. Firstly, these arguments do not attempt to claim that a variety of early regional racisms do not exist, so where they have been well demonstrated and documented this starting point is not in contention. Secondly, constructing a hierarchy of 'importance' is highly suspect, trampling over the perceptions and experiences of racialised groups in those contexts and positing their situations as unworthy of critical assessment. Thirdly, the significance of interconnections, interactions and crossings between systems of thought and in the operation of racialised regimes and empires further problematise a refusal to understand the complexity of the process of racialisation across the planet offering to render only an incomplete and incoherent account. David Goldberg's (2009) methodological emphasis on the significance of investigating the interconnections between racism in one place with racisms elsewhere illustrates the value of relational analysis, which opens up new avenues for study which a comparative methodology cannot.

There is a set of fundamental debates about the origins of racism in the world and an emerging literature which is engaging in the basic task of tracing the social and cultural archives of both race-thinking and the associated history of ideas, together with the development of racialised systems, regimes and empires (Bethancourt 2013; Berg and Wendt 2011; Eliav-Feldon et al. 2009). These debates revolve around a set of fundamental questions. Firstly, the nature of pre-modern racisms is in question: did race and racism, again as both discursive constructions and as core logics in the operation of states and regimes exist prior to the development of Western modernity. If so, then what is their significance? Secondly, if we can establish the existence of these pre-modern processes where do we trace them to? Europe, the Greco-Roman world of classical antiquity, North Africa, China, India or elsewhere. Thirdly, how did trans-regional processes of interaction and inter-connection operate across these sites, and what were the relational mechanisms at work here. Great stress has rightly been placed on the significance of Western modernity as the engine of global racialisation and its systems of colonisation, plantation slavery, industrial capitalism and nationalism with all

their dehumanising and civilising logics. But, this story has often been told with the forgetting and exclusion of the role that both multiple pre-modernities and ‘multiple modernities’ (Eisenstadt 2000), better conceptualised as varieties of modernity (Schmidt 2014), have played in this complex interconnected process. The incorporation of these other contexts requires a revised foundational understanding and theoretical framework for understanding and explaining the racialisation of the planet. So, rather than racism being the product solely of Western modernity, polyracism theory argues that it is also pre-modern (proto-racism), non-Western, non-capitalist (Communist) and the product of other varieties of modernity. This is not to argue that racism is always and inevitably everywhere. It is the product of, and operates under specific conditions in specific places, cultures and polities as we have sought to show in this chapter.

Conclusion

Racism is not just a product of Western modernity. The varieties of racial states and their configurations examined in this chapter confirm that communist and post-communist states are active racial agents and need to be included within a comprehensive and systematic theory of global racialisation. Much still needs to be done to map out racial conditions and their historical and contemporary dynamics in the regimes examined here. This is an under-researched region and working through the theoretical implications of where the inclusion of these regimes into a theory of global racialisation takes us is a core theme in our current research agenda. Most importantly, we have established that a less one-sided account of the process of racial Europeanisation is a necessary precondition for the further development of theoretical understanding of global racialisation.

Healing broken national histories, healing the fragmentation of empire, strengthening social solidarities in threatening times, new racial discourses provide both the comforting arms and the strait-jacket for post-Soviet states. Opening new paths to national visions, providing certainty, providing surety, providing a blow-hole for the whale/wail of

national rage and hate, newly forged racisms will define their twenty-first century. New languages of racial ordering and new modes of racialised governmentalities have been identified across these highly varied post-Soviet republics. Hierarchies of state regulation, hierarchies of violence and hierarchies of core preserved, protected majorities and persecuted minorities structure everyday life from Latvia to Azerbaijan.

The logic of racialisation demands both internal and external 'others', which leads to contradictions within the available intellectual programmes of racialisation under the conditions of striving to legitimise inequality. Racisms in contemporary post-Soviet states should be understood as a component of the new nationhood projects – a component that is self-contradictory in its two functions of responding to the traumatic challenges of the former metropolises and of naturalising social differences at home. Post-Soviet societies have not succeeded in overcoming the institutionalised ascription of a variety of social markers, one of which is race. Thus, racialisation in post-Soviet states operates in a peculiar fashion. On the one hand, it serves in moulding the new nations and is the constitutive process of modernity. On the other hand, racialisation processes maintain the idea of exceptionality, that is they became firmly established during many decades of communist power, that the socialist nations are nations created as part of an 'alternative modernity'.

The assertion of racial privilege can nuance the post-colonial gaze insofar as post-socialist elites seek to elaborate an 'authentic' strategy to challenge Russo-Soviet domination and colonialism. This does not constitute simply an inversion of the symbolical instruments of domination. It is instead an attempt to reconstruct their nations as a 'true' civilisational centre. Since the search for an 'authentic voice' within the framework of the dominant discourses is problematic, the language of race may be represented in this context as the language of the nation that will liberate the genuine spirit of the West from the allegedly degenerate state into which it has fallen. The strategies described above aim at the transformation of the western system of knowledge in the post-socialist space, and they imitate, to differing degrees, the master discourses of the 'coloniser'. This nevertheless leads to a creative, interactive processing of the original discourse that activates the strategies of racialisation. In this context self-racialisation, or attaining whiteness, can be understood as an

attempt to rediscover the authenticity that has been lost – or stolen by communists. Insofar as racial classification contributes to the codification of difference, the adoption of western theories and practices of racialisation constitutes an attempt on the part of citizens of these states to transcend the trap of the East/West dichotomy. By inscribing ‘modern’ or ‘civilised’ racialisation into already available discourses of difference that include the idea of race, intellectuals have sought to elaborate new logics of identification that will facilitate social cohesion under very specific premises that relate to the position of respective countries in the world and to power relations at home. The new identifications being created are to serve and reflect their place among the ‘civilised’ nations and ensure the dominance of the “titular” nation at home. “Non-titular” minorities have utilised the idea of race in the search for roots, to justify their right to the area they populate, to emphasise the ‘genetic’ character of cultural traditions, to legitimise their ethnic identity, and to safeguard and reproduce their ethnic community.

The self-contradiction within colonialism – to civilise its others while also securing their otherness – has been transformed within the communist experience into an internal civilising mission intended to secure the privileged otherness on the global stage. The repercussions of this programme continue to provide national specificity to the engagement with the concept of race and racism in post-socialist societies. Investing in ‘whiteness’ after the Berlin Wall-era has represented a western, modernist approach for guaranteeing that post-Soviet states will find their own proper place in the dominant discourses of the developed and civilised First World.

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6

Mestizaje: The All-Inclusive Fiction

Linnete Manrique

In April 2014, the Mexican public network *Canal Once* launched the realist show *Crónica de castas* (Chronicles of Caste), which features a series of characters and their everyday experiences of racism and classism in Mexico City. This chapter examines how the television show challenges the dominant project of *mestizaje* (racial and cultural mixture), which has been imposed as the official national ideology in Mexico since the early twentieth century. This ideology has attempted to manage diversity and to create a sense of homogeneity across the nation where individuals can identify as members of a unified collective, that is, Mexicans. However, *mestizaje* can best be understood as ‘an all-inclusive ideology of exclusion’ (Stutzman 1981) because while it purports that all Mexican citizens are of mixed blood and of equal status, it is shaped by racial hierarchies that privilege whiteness and devalue indigenusness and blackness. Racial and cultural mixing may be deemed desirable in the rhetoric of *mestizaje*, but its product is nonetheless exhorted ‘to mimic or emulate

L. Manrique (✉)

Goldsmiths, University of London, London, UK

e-mail: linnete.manrique@gold.ac.uk

the standards and habits of whiteness' that are perceived to be superior (Goldberg 2009). To be *mestizo* (or mixed) is not so much the end but the means to achieve a whitened ideal.

Mestizaje operates not unlike the current so-called 'colourblind' or 'post-racial' politics that emerged alongside neoliberalism, which seek to minimize and delegitimize the significance of race, difference and racism as organizing principles of society under the guise of celebrating mixing and multiculturalism (Moreno Figueroa and Saldívar 2015). *Mestizaje* similarly works to obfuscate and to reduce structural limitations and inequalities to the level of individual failings. When charges of racism do come up in Mexico, as in the use of blackface on one of *Televisa's* (the main private media conglomerate) morning shows during the coverage of the World Cup held in South Africa in 2010, *mestizaje* is deployed as an explanation to disavow such charges: 'how can we be racist if we are all Mexican and mixed?' The statement that 'we are all mixed' serves to dismiss the claims to racism of those whose 'ancestry does make a visible difference' (Da Costa 2014; Jiménez Román 2007). Mexican racism is nearly absent from public discourse because it is treated as something that has long been resolved through mixing, and as if whatever remains of it were somehow more benign (and thus acceptable) than what occurs in the US (Lomnitz 2005).

In this chapter, I am interested in exploring how *Crónica de castas*, through its storylines, inverted stereotypes, casting choices and setting (in the infamous urban neighbourhood of Tepito) exposes *mestizaje* as a nationalist fiction disconnected from the Mexican reality. In the first section of the chapter, I provide a historical account of the term *castas*. I examine how the *sistema de castas* (caste system) was intimately linked to the regulation of urban spaces and how it materialized in the paintings of the colonial period in order to contextualize the television show and shed light on its representations of contemporary forms of exclusion and discrimination. In the second section, I provide a detailed analysis of three episodes, discussing various issues, such as the conflation of race and culture and the relation of everyday language and power. I conclude with a brief reflection on the significance of this type of television programme that explicitly names racism in a context that otherwise denies it.

Castas in Colonial Mexico

In the sixteenth century, colonial society in Mexico was conceived in terms of division and separation. Mexico was divided into the *república de españoles* (Spanish republic), under the direct control of the Spanish Crown, and the *república de indios* (Indian republic), governed at a distance through the native nobility that retained a degree of local authority (Carrera 2003; Cope 1994). Art historian Magali Carrera (2003) notes that the republics' conceptual and physical separation took shape as the capital city was built. For example, the Spaniards lived in a rectangular area in the city centre called the *traza*, where streets were orderly and municipal services were readily available. Surrounding the *traza* was the indigenous' section of the city, with dilapidated housing and streets, and limited services (34). Such spatial boundaries, however, were undermined by the function and placement of the *Plaza Mayor* near the *traza*, which housed major institutions such as the cathedral, the viceregal palace, the city council and the marketplace (35). The marketplace became the centre of economic activity, where people from the city and its environs came together on a daily basis to buy, sell and exchange goods, making the neat Spanish-Indian division unsustainable. According to Carrera, Bourbon reformers argued that the capital city needed to be further divided into *cuarteles*, or manageable units, with an administrator for each in order to contain and organize the growing population. These administrators had to maintain detailed information on all the units' inhabitants, such as their family name, marriage status and job title (111). In addition to the *cuartel* system, the government issued various decrees in an attempt to discipline the population and their spaces, bodies and activities. For example, the 1776–1778 Pragmatic Sanction on Marriages allowed parents and civil servants to prohibit marriages that were between 'social unequals,' or among lower *castas*, in order to curtail the proliferation of mixed-race peoples (118). Sumptuary laws for their part determined what colonial bodies could and could not wear, prohibiting the use of expensive jewellery and fabrics (119). At the same time, cleanliness, hygiene and nakedness were seen as problems to address among the plebeians. Certain leisure activities like carnivals were also prohibited.

Carrera (2003) observes that the fact that many of these decrees and mandates had to be reiterated points to the failure to fully control colonial bodies.

The *sistema de castas* reached institutional form in the seventeenth century and persisted until the eighteenth century as an attempt of Bourbon authorities to classify, regulate and manage the different and numerous mixed-race peoples that constituted Mexican society. Art historian Ilona Katzew (2004) and other scholars (Buscaglia-Salgado 2003; Carrera 1998, 2003; Cope 1994; Kellogg 2000; Lomnitz-Adler 1992; Schwaller 2011) point out that the *sistema de castas*, which ranked people according to their alleged percentage of Spanish, indigenous or African heritage (or blood), which then determined their rights, obligations and place in society, was invented in order for the elite *criollos* (Spaniards born in the Americas) to avoid being associated with 'tainted' blood¹ and because they needed a mechanism of social control that could secure their positions of power and privilege.

The *sistema de castas* functioned in part through the use of labels that collapsed national character and race into one, such as Spaniard, *mestizo* and mulatto, in order to categorize and rank individuals. The term *mestizo*, for example, was used to describe the offspring of Spaniards and indigenous peoples, while mulatto referred to the mixture of Spaniards and Africans. In regards to mulatto, the Spanish jurist Juan de Solórzano y Pereira argued that this term was appropriate because this racial combination 'was deemed uglier and stranger, and to make the point of comparing it to the nature of the mule' (Katzew 2004, 44). The appellations that emerged at the time to describe the mixture of Africans and indigenous peoples were varied, but were mostly derived from a zoological vocabulary, such as *lobo* (wolf), *coyote*, *zambo* (knee-knocked), *barcino* (an animal with a brown or reddish white coat) and *albarazado* (from the Arabic *al-baras*, or white leprosy, suggesting that mixture that did not involve a Spanish body could result in offspring prone to illness and degeneracy). Historian Douglas Cope (1994) notes that at its most extreme, the *sistema de castas* included more than 40 racial categories, though most of these did not have any practical significance (24). The most recurrent racial terms that appeared in official documents, such as marriage and birth certificates, census records and Inquisition cases, were

limited to Spaniard, *castizo* (the mixture of Spaniards and *mestizos*), *morisco* (the offspring of Spaniards and mulattos – a term derived from the Spanish word for Moors), *mestizo*, mulatto, Indian and black. While in theory, the *sistema de castas* was meant to provide a sense of order to an increasingly complex society, in practice, Katzew (2004) observes, the *sistema* became ‘an entangled naming game in which few terms meant one thing or were applied in any consistent manner’ (44).

The hierarchy of the *sistema de castas* not only relied on somatic traits to determine an individual’s racial identity, but also on the concept of *calidad* (quality, or overall reputation). Carrera (2003) explains that the qualities and attributes seen as inherent to the *castas* were illegitimacy, impure blood, criminality, drunkenness, idleness, poverty, plebeian status and manual labour (37). In contrast, wealth, nobility, landholder status, purity of blood and legitimacy were all associated with being Spanish. The *casta* taxonomy overlapped with other models of classification that further placed an emphasis on cultural and economic divisions: *gente de razón* (people of reason) versus indigenous peoples; *gente decente* (decent people) versus the *plebe* (plebeians), also known as *gente vulgar* and *populachos*, all terms connoting degradation and degeneracy; and tributaries (Indians, Africans and mulattos) versus non-tributaries (Katzew 2004). However, the high rate of intermarriage among the *castas* and their ability to enter previously designated Spanish trades, such as retailing and artisanry, blurred these Spanish-*casta* divisions, causing deep anxiety among the colonial elite. Carrera (2003) notes that the *casta* paintings produced in the late 1750s and 1760s emerged as a form of ‘social engineering that was being carefully put into place by Bourbon reformers as they attempted to construct, control, and maintain colonial bodies and the spaces they occupied’ (43).

Casta paintings recorded the process of *mestizaje* in a progression of images, usually a series of sixteen scenes, depicting a man (of higher status), woman (of lower status) and one or two children, each designated with a racial label. The paintings began with scenes of individuals of a ‘purer’ racial identity and a higher socioeconomic standing, reflected in their light skin colour, opulent clothing and domestic space, and moved on to individuals who were more mixed and were thus depicted as darker, poorer, in tattered clothing and in the space of the kitchen or the market,

often working (selling vegetables, making cigarettes and so on).² Caribbean studies scholar José Buscaglia-Salgado (2003) points out that some of these paintings further identified the *castas* by adding to the images a brief text describing the 'moral' character of the type. The *mestizo*, for example, was said to be 'naturally humble, peaceful and simple' (173). Other types were thought to be prone to gambling and stealing, to being lazy or restless, or to being good and benign, 'according to their relationship to and distance from the European Ideal' (174). In other words, this white European came to represent a model of ideal humanity against which all other *castas* were measured as deviant.³ It was also not uncommon to end these paintings with images of native indigenous peoples, who were considered to have pure blood, unlike the *castas*. These natives were portrayed as semi-naked and in the wilderness so as to reinforce the belief that they were separate from and thus uncontaminated by the urban environment.

Three important themes recurred in the *casta* paintings. First, as historian Susan Kellogg (2000) observes, 'the paintings idealized and domesticated interracial relationships...depicting tranquil scenes of nuclear families' (74). This was an effective method of obscuring the violence, conflicts, inequalities and poverty of everyday life. Second, the images were 'gendered through their forms, poses, clothing, and in the patterns of interethnoracial couplings' (75). In other words, the fact that higher status men were coupled with lower status women served to naturalize both identity categories (race and gender), 'attributing power to men and inferiority to women and reinforcing idealized familial and societal themes' (76). When images of familial discord were indeed represented, these were invariably gendered and racialized. Kellogg points out, for example, how one painting showed a mulatta trying to slap her partner and in another, a black woman attacked her Spanish master with a mallet (76). Native and *mestiza* women, on the other hand, were portrayed as submissive and passive. These paintings relied on racial and gender identities to make the Spanish-*casta* hierarchy seem like a natural aspect of everyday life.

The third and most important theme of these paintings is that the interracial couples depicted always produced a child of a different category than each parent. Katzew (2004) argues that this had a didactic

function as it could teach viewers to follow the 'right' pattern of mixing in order to reach the desired Spanish, or white, status that was perceived to grant access to privilege, power and wealth. For example, the mixture of Spaniard and indigenous bore the 'promise of a return to a pure (that is, Spanish) racial pole' in three generations (202): Spaniard and indigenous produced *mestizo*; Spaniard and *mestizo* produced *castizo*; and Spaniard and *castizo* produced Spaniard. The *casta* paintings thus framed the Spanish category as an aspirational ideal. The legacy of these ideological paintings is evident in the logic of *blanqueamiento* (or whitening) that is rooted in *mestizaje*. This whitening practice posits that racial mixing with white European or Anglo individuals is desirable because it makes populations whiter and erases seemingly inferior indigenous and black racial traits, leading to the 'improvement' of the Mexican race. The prevalence of *blanqueamiento* in contemporary Mexico underscores the fact that mixed-race status is not an end in itself, or a status that generates pride. As social anthropologist Peter Wade observes, '*mestizaje* takes on powerful moral connotations: it is not just neutral mixture but hierarchical movement, and the movement that potentially has greatest value is upward movement – *blanqueamiento* or whitening understood in physical and cultural terms' (quoted in Radcliffe and Westwood 1996, 37). In the name of *mestizaje*, whitening seeks to bleach the national body politic, thereby eliminating blackness and indigeness from the national imaginary. The fact that whiteness today continues to be correlated with wealth, power and privilege makes the struggle to 'improve' the race not all that surprising.

In contrast to the mixture of Spaniard and indigenous, the Spaniard and African combination did not offer the promise of a purified progeny. The *casta* paintings did depict the gradual whitening of the African-Spanish progeny, resulting in the *albino* category (usually epitomized in the figure of a blond and blue-eyed woman) after three generations. However, the fact that the mixture of *albina* and Spaniard produced a darker-hued child labelled *torna atrás* (literally meaning, going backwards) revealed the perceived taint of black blood, which meant that Africans could never be redeemed in the way indigenous peoples could. Moreover, critical race studies scholar David Goldberg (2009) comments that *casta* paintings also exposed the fragility of whiteness. If a slight hint

of blackness is powerful enough to produce an unsalvageable progeny labelled *torna atrás*, then ‘the sense whiteness has of its self-elevation and superiority is fragile indeed’ (209). In other words, whiteness requires a continuous (self-) declaration and promotion of its privilege and superiority in order to sustain itself at the top of an unstable racial pyramid. A final point to make here is that the varied and humorous labels for the progeny of other *casta* combinations, which displayed both the horror and fascination with interracial mixture (*lobo*, *coyote*, *barcino*, *albarazado*, *grifo* [of curly hair], *torna atrás*, *tente en el aire* [suspended on air], *no te entiendo* [I don’t understand you], etc.), could serve as cautionary tales for viewers to avoid mixing patterns that could dilute Spanish blood to the point of no return. These appellations also betrayed the anxiety of the elite over the impossibility of truly knowing and controlling the population.

The production of *casta* paintings ended with the Independence movement of 1810. The use of *casta* designations was banned in legal records in 1822 and in the 1824 national constitution, which declared all citizens equal under the law (Carrera 2003). The notion of republican citizenship made redundant the practice of differentiating people according to type. Moreover, the founding of the Royal Academy of Fine Arts in 1783 in Mexico City brought about changes in taste and style of painting, which also account for the disappearance of the *casta* genre (Katzew 2004). In fact, painting in the nineteenth century began to focus on ideas of nationhood, reconfiguring the indigenous body, and later the *mestizo*, as authentic embodiments of Mexican national identity (Widdifield 1996).

The series *Crónica de castas* plays with some of the *casta* designations and creates its own to underscore existing forms of discrimination in Mexico (the opening credits are designed to look like a *casta* painting, complete with racial labels that identify the titular characters of each episode). The first episode, for example, is entitled *De criolla con mestizo* (inverting the traditional gender pattern of the paintings) and features the brown, moustachioed Raúl (Harold Torres), who as a taxi driver can navigate spatial boundaries with ease, meeting the upper class Lucía (Naian González Norvind). Although Raúl and Lucía are the principal and only recurring characters, their story is not always the central focus of the series, nor is it the focus of my analysis. The remaining eight

episodes all highlight a different character and his/her experiences of racism, classism and violence in Mexico City. To name but a few episodes: the second episode, entitled *De castiza con indio, coyote*, features a working-class, brown teenager who attends private school on a scholarship and is repeatedly taunted by his wealthy, white classmates. The sixth episode, *El zapoteco*, is about an indigenous Zapotec migrant whose imperfect Spanish is a constant object of derision. Episode seven, *El mazahua y los peregrinos*, depicts a brown teenager seeking to reconcile his urban identity, influenced by hip-hop culture, with his indigenous Mazahua roots. And episode eight, *El igualado* (insolent),⁴ chronicles the upward mobility of a merchant from Tepito and the anxiety this causes to his former rich employee. What is striking about the series is that most of the episodes take place in public spaces, such as the streets and markets, where disorder and conflicts abound. The domestic spaces that we do see are the elegant mansion where Lucía resides with her disaffected and uncaring mother, and the stylish, modern house of the Peñafiel family on the *igualado* episode where there is a clear division of labour (the brown maids are expected to remain in the kitchen when not serving the family). The representation of these spaces serves to undermine the notion of order, familial love and harmony that *casta* paintings sought to convey. In the next section, I describe the setting in which *Crónica de castas* takes place and then discuss in detail three episodes, which I find to best encapsulate the essence of the series.

Castas in Contemporary Mexico

Crónica de castas was shot in downtown Mexico City, in the Tepito area, also known as *barrio bravo* (fierce neighbourhood). Tepito is home to the largest and busiest informal market of Mexico – 72 blocks of stalls that sell everything from traditional food to counterfeit designer pursues to pirated music and movies. Tepito is as famous for its open-air market (which dates back to the colonial era), legendary boxers, street dance parties and devotion to *La Santa Muerte* (Holy Death) as it is infamous for drugs, guns and vice. The reputation for being a space of criminality and danger has made the *barrio* the subject of numerous government efforts

to ‘rescue’ it. In 2003, then-New York mayor Rudy Giuliani arrived at Tepito at the invitation of multibillionaire Carlos Slim and then Mexico-City mayor Andrés Manuel López Obrador, with the goal of providing his expertise on urban cleansing and renovation. The Mexican government introduced the *Mi Barrio Tepito* proposal in 2007, which was to displace hundreds of families to make way for private capital, including Slim’s Inbursa Group and Wal-Mart, in order to improve and modernize the city.⁵ This specific investment project was defeated through the resistance and activism of the locals (Knoll 2013).

Alfonso Hernández, Tepito’s renowned historian and founder of the Centre for the Study of Tepito, which runs a public archive, notes with pride that ‘resistance is in Tepito’s DNA’ – a point driven by the graffiti-style murals painted on the streets, one of which reads, *Tepito existe porque resiste* (Tepito exists because it resists) (Becerra 2014). The politics of resistance that characterize the *barrio* are poignantly illustrated throughout *Crónica de castas*, but especially on episode five, in which the character of Pointer (Raúl Briones) explains to an outsider his experience of social exclusion: ‘I defend my right to exist. I was not given anything. Everything was taken from me. This neighbourhood is my country. Those are my dead soldiers’ – he points to the wall that is known as the ‘mural of the absent,’ which features scores of men in dark suits kneeling down as they watch Jesus Christ pass by on a lion-drawn carriage. The mural is meant to memorialize those who have died because of the so-called ‘war on drugs.’ Hernández adds that in a place where few can count on the state for their survival, what keep the *barrio* standing are the people’s ingenuity, hard work and strong social relations (Becerra 2014).

Director Giménez Cacho stated in an interview that one of the objectives of *Crónica de castas* was to depict the day-to-day existence of Tepito – to highlight its diversity, cultural richness and uniqueness, without resorting to the usual clichés seen on television. The point was not to idealize the *barrio* (violence and discrimination are present throughout the series), but to humanize it. In its realist portrayal of Tepito, *Crónica de castas* captures the concept of ‘conviviality,’ which social theorist Paul Gilroy (2004) describes as ‘the processes of cohabitation and interaction that have made multicultural an ordinary feature of urban life in post-colonial cities’ (xi). Gilroy argues that conviviality is useful because it

introduces a measure of distance from the 'closed, fixed, and reified' notions of race and identity, 'and turns attention toward the always-unpredictable mechanisms of identification' (xi). Conviviality does not celebrate the absence of racism, but it recognizes the 'creative, intuitive capacity among ordinary people [to] manage tensions' and to forge connections with one another that can provide a shared sense of belonging (Wise and Velayutham 2014).

Giménez Cacho spent a year in the *barrio* getting to know and gaining the trust of the locals before beginning to film the series. Some of the *barrio*'s residents even make an appearance on the show. The inclusion of brown people in the show is radical in itself considering the prevalence of whiteness on Mexican television, in which white actors are viewed as having universal appeal and thus play the dominant roles, while others are relegated to the status of extras. Film studies scholars Ella Shohat and Robert Stam (1994) remark that we must pay attention to casting because 'as an immediate form of representation, [it] constitutes a kind of delegation of voice with political overtones' (189). *Crónica de castas* features multidimensional and complex characters played by a diverse group of brown and indigenous people, which serve to contest the normativity of whiteness that often reduces non-white characters to caricatures. Tepito's cultural mainstays, such as the bustling market, the mural of the absent, the shrine of the Holy Death and *Las Gardenias* soccer team also make an appearance on the show. The team's players are all trans people who work as cooks and hairdressers in the *barrio*. The annual game the *Gardenias* play in October as part of the religious celebration of Saint Francis of Assisi is documented on the second episode of the series and illustrates the conviviality among the diverse people from the *barrio*, who come together for the love of the game. Moreover, the inclusion of the *Gardenias* and the recurring trans character of Camilo (Mauricio Isaacs) is important because it provides visibility to a range of sexualities that tend to be subordinated to the figure of the virile, family man in mainstream Mexican media.

A final aspect to highlight here is the Holy Death, embodied in a skeletal form and usually dressed in colourful satin robes as a bride, a nun or a queen, which mark her as female saint. The cult of *La Santa Muerte* only became public in 2001, as it is not sanctioned by the Catholic

Church. The fact that some of the Holy Death's most notorious devotees are members of organized crime or are in prison has only made it more difficult for it to be officially recognized. However, religious studies scholar Andrew Chestnut (2012) and other writers (Castellanos 2004; Gil Olmos 2011; Reyes Ruiz 2011) observe that the majority of the devotees are common people of vulnerable backgrounds, such as working-class mothers, teenagers, street vendors, taxi drivers and prostitutes, who ask her for protection, health, luck, money and sometimes miracles. The Holy Death embodies hope and the possibility of living a better life. In a country beset by violence, uncertainty, and economic and security crises, it is no wonder the belief in the Holy Death has rapidly increased to the point of rivalling the popularity of the nation's patroness, the Virgin of Guadalupe (of course, the two are not mutually exclusive; most of the Holy Death's devotees are also strong Catholics). One of the largest shrines, featuring a life-size statue of the *Santa Muerte*, is set in the home of long-time Tepito resident Enriqueta Romero, who is tenderly depicted on the second episode of the series.

De castiza con indio, coyote

The second episode begins on a dusty soccer field in Tepito, where various people (girls in cosplay, heavily tattooed men and street vendors) are engaged in a friendly game. The scene cuts to a different soccer game set in a carefully manicured indoor field, where young men in uniform are competing in a tournament. After the game ends, Bruno (Pedro de Tavira), Manlio (Rodrigo Corea) and the rest of the team head to the showers. In this intimate space, the boys display both their homoerotic desire for one another and their homophobia. They hide the soap from Manlio and begin to taunt him, slapping his bare ass and using homophobic slurs, such as *puto* (fag – a word commonly used in soccer games to insult the opposite team). The camera here lingers on Manlio's brown naked body, pointing to the unequal racialized power relations between him and his white teammates – while Manlio is being looked at, the others are doing the looking. Visibly irritated, Manlio defends his masculinity by resorting to the same homophobic language and using force to

recover his soap. Bruno laughs and says it is only a joke. He then asks: 'are you also going to get angry when we call you *indio*? Dude, you are *prieto* (dark-brown skin)... get over it, man.' An aspect to note here is that these so-called 'only jokes' tend to be perceived as benign and therefore not racist. But in fact, as sociologists Christina Sue and Tanya Golash-Boza (2013) point out, such racially tinted humour is a powerful mechanism for 'reinforcing systems of domination and inequality' (1595). Moreover, there is a cultural expectation that individuals will go along with these jokes, as evinced in the injunction to 'get over it.' If Manlio were to react negatively or be hurt by such taunts, then he would be perceived as the problem that gets in the way of these boys having fun and as disruption to the cherished 'project of maintaining national unity' (Da Costa 2016, 35). Manlio bears the onus of getting over race, ignoring it and erasing it, as though it has never existed and has left no legacy on his body. Manlio thus behaves accordingly – he endures the jokes in silence. According to Sue and Golash-Boza (2013), responses of silence to or engagement with racial jokes 'imply an acceptance of the humour, conveying a message that it is unproblematic, which then legitimizes and encourages the continued use of such humour' (1595). That Bruno repeatedly pokes fun at Manlio's skin colour and no one challenges him underscores his belief that denigrating anyone darker than himself is an acceptable cultural practice.

Bruno's racism is in full display in a later scene, in which the police stop him for speeding in his ostentatious SUV. In an overbearing manner, he shows his licence to the cop, who then recognizes that Bruno is the son of a powerful man and lets him go without a warning, but not before having to bear in silence an array of insults, such as *indio*, *naco* (being uncultured or uncouth),⁶ *asalariado* (literally, having a salary) and *nopal* (prickly pear cactus – a food associated with the indigenous). Note here how quickly race, class and culture become conflated. In the eyes of Bruno, being poor and indigenous are one and the same. The fact that the terms *indio* and *naco* have become common insults, implying someone is slow or stupid, and addressed at any low-class person, especially of dark complexion, points to the deep-seated anti-indigenous prejudice that persists in contemporary Mexico (King 1994; Knight 1990). While the official ideology of *mestizaje* proclaims the worth and even superiority

of indigenous peoples and cultures, everyday circumstances paint a different picture – one in which indigenous identity continues to be defined in terms of ‘negative failings – lack of education, of fluency in Spanish... or other material possessions’ (Knight 1990) – and thus of getting in the way of Mexico’s modernity.

El zapoteco

The sixth episode of the series features a young indigenous teenager, Bonifacio (David Illescas), who migrates from the southern state of Oaxaca to the capital city in search of a better life. Once in Tepito, he begins to work in the market as a *diablero* (meaning, he delivers packages on a dolly from one stall to another), which is the lowest paid job in the *barrio*. At the market, he meets and falls in love with a local resident named Lola (Alondra Hidalgo). Lola’s family, however, rejects Bonifacio because he is indigenous and prohibits her from dating him. *Crónica de castas* makes a point of showing that it is not only arrogant, rich people like Bruno who harbour and reproduce anti-indigenous sentiment, but it is widespread across Mexico’s social strata. Each episode captures the notion of ‘everyday racism.’ Race studies scholar Philomena Essed (1991, 2002) observes that everyday racism connects structural and ‘ideological dimensions of racism with daily attitudes and interprets the reproduction of racism in terms of the experiences of it in everyday life’ (3). A central feature of everyday racism is that it ‘involves racist practices that infiltrate everyday life and become part of what is seen as “normal”’ (288). Everyday racism is ‘heterogeneous in its manifestations but at the same time unified by repetition of similar practices’ (288). Bonifacio’s imperfect Spanish and occupation, for example, are constant objects of ridicule among people in the *barrio*. Bonifacio endures in silence the playful taunts of his friends, ‘of course you’re from Oaxaca, you speak so funny,’ to more overt forms of discrimination, such as when a cop spits at his feet. His recurrent experiences of racism show that ‘everyday racism does not exist as single events but as a complex of cumulative practices’ (288).

In one striking scene, Lola’s grandfather launches into a tirade during dinner about why she should not date Bonifacio: ‘that guy cannot even

speak his dialect...⁷ ‘He speaks two languages,’ Lola corrects him. He continues: ‘you have no business with that *indio* that will never stop being an *indio*. Those people did not evolve.’ Here biology and culture become entangled. From his point of view, Bonifacio is biologically deficient and thus incapable of learning the ways of the *mestizo* world. The mom interjects, chuckling: ‘Lola wants to go back to the countryside,’ reproducing the stereotype that an indigenous person belongs in rural spaces. Lola snaps and screams: ‘Don’t you see the Indian face that you both have?’ Lola’s comment, and the high angle camera that focuses on the pained facial expressions of the two other characters, underscores the instability of identity. In terms of somatic features, there are no visible differences between Bonifacio, Lola and her family. In a separate context, the family could easily slip into being at the receiving end of such racial epithets as *indio*. However, they take on an air of superiority because of their literacy in Spanish and occupation (teachers), which grants them a higher-class status. As King (1994) observes, language and literacy have been crucial themes ‘in the ideological debate over cultural identity’ in Mexico (2). Indigenous movements have fought for bilingual education and for the recognition of their languages ‘as having an equal status with Spanish’ (70). However, indigenous languages continue to be associated with poverty and are thus highly stigmatized. Spanish for its part is perceived as the language of the modern nation that confers social status and prestige to those who possess it. For example, ‘in the context of passing from an Indian to a *mestizo* identity, [literacy in Spanish becomes] a hallmark of one’s degree of “civilization” and an important boundary marker between the “backward” (wild) Indians and the “advanced” (cultured) *mestizos*’ (159). The family in the series repeatedly comments on Bonifacio’s broken Spanish in order to mark themselves as different from Bonifacio – positioned as an Other who does not belong in the urban space of Tepito – and avoid being mistaken for *indios*.

El mazahua y los peregrinos

Episode seven paints a poignant portrait of a young man, Hipólito, and his struggle to reconcile his urban identity, shaped by hip-hop and rap

culture, with his Mazahua origins. We first meet Hipólito at the Tepito market with his mom and friend Nayla, who are both dressed in traditional Mazahua clothing and switch between Spanish and their language with ease. Hipólito for his part refuses to speak anything other than Spanish and complains that he cannot understand ‘that dialect.’ ‘[Mazahua] is a language not a dialect,’ Nayla corrects him. It is clear throughout the episode that Hipólito is conflicted about his identity and has internalized the dominant ideology of *mestizaje* to the point that he views his own indigenous origins as a shameful condition to overcome. In another scene, when a woman at the market asks Hipólito about why he wears the type of clothing that he does (baggy pants, retro basketball jerseys, large chains), he responds: ‘I’m going to a rap concert. I’m not going out dressed like a goddamn *indio*,’ expressing his discomfort of being associated with the indigenous. The woman retorts: ‘Well, it wouldn’t be a bad idea. People would then know that we are everywhere.’

Later in the episode, Hipólito and his girlfriend get in trouble with the cops because the latter was selling drugs outside their school. Nayla and mom go to the police precinct to post bail for both teenagers. The girlfriend comments to Hipólito that she now sees why he had not introduced her to his family: ‘So you’re ashamed because they’re *indias*. I didn’t know you were the son of María.’ ‘Las Marías’ is a pejorative nickname that has been used in Mexico City since the 1960s to describe rural and indigenous migrant women who work as domestics and street vendors (Esquivel et al. 2008; Rowe and Schelling 1991). This epithet is a powerful form of homogenizing indigenous women as a group and denying them their individuality. The Marías have been constructed as outsiders in relation to urban spaces in Mexico, as deviants who engage in an illegal activity (begging) while pretending to be vendors and as a social problem that state authorities must address (Martínez Novo 2006). The police are notorious for harassing and removing these women from the streets, perceived as obstacles in the modernization of the city. Hipólito’s girlfriend reproduces many of these stereotypes. After Hipólito breaks up with her and walks away with Nayla and his mom, the girl stays behind at the precinct yelling a series of epithets: ‘*hijo de Marías limosneras* (son of beggars), *indio*, dirty, you stink...’ While there are no somatic, class or

linguistic differences between this girl and Hipólito's family, she takes on an attitude of superiority and denigrates these women by virtue of them wearing their traditional dress, which works as a 'boundary marker' to separate indigenous peoples from *mestizos* (King 1994, 159). *Crónica de castas*, however, attempts to undermine this rigid boundary by depicting a more complex geographical and social reality – one in which an increasing number of indigenous peoples work, live and feel at home in cities, at the same time that they maintain ties to their rural communities. As the mom admits: 'Well, yes, now all of us Mazahuas are here in the city.' Hipólito adds: 'Mom, you are even more *chilanga* (a sobriquet for all Mexico City residents) than I am.'

After the painful experience of racism outside the police station, Hipólito begins to reflect on his indigenous origins. That night he dreams that a vagrant on the street addresses him in Mazahua. 'How do you know I am Mazahua?' he asks. The man responds: 'You cannot deny who you are. Have you forgotten? Do you wish you could be white?' The next day, as Hipólito is getting ready to perform in an underground rap battle, he changes his name from MC Hipo to 13 *serpientes* (snakes) and dons his version of the *santiaguero* dress (a traditional dance that dates back to the colonial era) on stage. He raps in a mixture of Mazahua and Spanish and reclaims what previously caused him pain, declaring himself an *indio* and the son of María. By reconciling his indigenous roots with urban global culture, Hipólito creates a 'third space of identity' that breaks down the dichotomy between indigenous peoples and *mestizos*, and engenders new meanings, social relations and ways of life in the process (Hale 2006; Sanjinés 2004). According to anthropologist Charles Hale, this creative third space challenges official *mestizaje* as it 'connotes fluidity and openness to a range of possible articulations' (179).

It is also interesting to note the use of hip-hop culture in this episode. As Latin American studies scholar Josep Cru (2015) observes, hip-hop and especially rap have been appropriated and localized by indigenous communities in their efforts to revitalize and de-stigmatize their languages. First, rap as a form has adapted well within the indigenous context that favours orality over literacy (4). Second, because rap as a genre epitomizes 'coolness' and modernity for many young people, it can help dispel the dominant ideology that associates indigenous languages with

tradition, backwardness and a remote (often pre-Hispanic) past, which separates these languages 'from everyday contemporary uses' (4). Bilingual rap in the series is framed as an instrument of pedagogy and resistance that allows Hipólito to express pride in his distinct modern identity, to expose the Mazahua language to a broader audience and to combat linguistic prejudice.

The three episodes discussed here provide a realist representation of how racism, classism and violence are reproduced in everyday social interactions. I focused on language in particular because in its perceived banality, it tends to avoid scrutiny. However, language is a powerful mechanism for reproducing racialized systems of power that can hide beneath the 'it's only a joke' veneer to downplay its impact. Because humour is seen as not carrying racist intent and therefore benign (Sue and Golash-Boza 2013), people can resort to using words like *indio* and *naco* at the same time that they can hold on to the ideology that racism does not exist because 'we are all Mexican and mixed.' What *Crónica de castas* does so well is to highlight what is undramatically explicit in Mexico: how we so often break each other with words.

Conclusion

Crónica de castas stands out as an anomaly in the Mexican televisual landscape as it names and engages with the topic of racism in a context that otherwise denies it. The fact that *Canal Once*, renowned for its educational and cultural programming, picked up the series no doubt provided the production team with the creative freedom necessary to produce this type of content. But even then, the series was cut short from 13 episodes to nine because of limited funding and was not renewed for a second season (Huerta 2013). *NBC Universo* did broadcast *Crónica de castas* a year later in the United States, promoting it with the hyperbolic statement: 'the series that shook Mexico.' It is difficult to gauge the series' impact, but the fact that it was so short-lived points to a lack of interest from both the network and the public. Nonetheless, *Crónica de castas* is commendable for providing visibility to what is excluded from mainstream media. First, its cast features an array of brown and indigenous

faces in titular roles that would otherwise be relegated to the background of the aspirational white world of *telenovelas*. In an interview, actor Harold Torres, who plays the protagonist Raúl, acknowledged that in another time his only opportunity would have been to play the chauffeur. ‘That is something that television has perpetuated, showing a false reality,’ he concluded. In casting actors that do not conform to Anglo-European standards of beauty, *Crónica de castas* seeks to make the normativity of whiteness strange. Second, the series grants status and visibility to indigenous languages that are always subordinated to Spanish. Shohat and Stam point out that as with casting, ‘issues of self-representation arise in relation to language’ (191). Languages as lived are inscribed within hierarchies of power and culture (191). It is interesting to note how *Crónica de castas* features characters that tell their stories in their indigenous languages, as in the Mazahua episode, thereby contesting the dominance of Spanish. Third, its storylines humanize the lives and customs of the many existing Mexicos that are marginalized from society. Fourth, the series disrupts the enduring binary racial formation of indigenous peoples and *mestizos* by showing that identities are not fixed or stable, but are rather experienced in a continuum.

In sum, *Crónica de castas* is an important critique that undermines *mestizaje*’s claim to mixture as a positive aspect of national identity through its representation of racism as an everyday experience for the Mexicans whose ancestry makes a visible difference. In other words, the series demonstrates that ‘race, body, and face’ matter in the lives of Mexicans, for they shape social relations and determine boundaries of inclusion and exclusion (Martínez Andrade 2015, 50). As in the colonial period, somatic and cultural characteristics continue to play a central role in reproducing socioeconomic inequalities in contemporary Mexico.

Notes

1. The hierarchical order in Spain was based on the subordination of state to church and on the ideology of *limpieza de sangre* (purity of blood), which denoted the absence of Jewish or Muslim blood. Anthropologist Claudio Lomnitz-Adler (1992, 264) comments that purity of blood was tied to

- honour in that ‘it reflected the depth of a lineage’s loyalty to Christianity’ and thence, to an individual’s moral attributes such as trustworthiness and decency. In the colonies, the creole elite translated the principle of purity of blood from religious belief to a de facto social stratification based on skin colour, phenotype and class status, which placed creoles at the top of the pyramid and black people at the bottom (Mignolo 2005, 74).
2. Katzew (2004, 204) comments that because ‘somatic subtleties could never be adequately translated in the media of paint...clothing and other accouterments often appear[ed] as ancillary elements needed to reinforce racial and class distinctions’.
 3. Race studies scholar Sara Ahmed (2004) and others (Dyer 1997; Frankenberg 1993; hooks 1990) note that the fact that whiteness remains a taken-for-granted and invisible category allows it to ‘get reproduced as the unmarked mark of the human.’ Whiteness is assumed to represent the universal human condition and as such has the power to define and inhabit the normative.
 4. The phrase *No seas igualado* (Don’t be insolent) works to police boundaries; it is meant to remind people of the place in society where they belong. An *igualado* is thus perceived to be stepping out of these established bounds.
 5. Geography scholar Christien Klaufus (2015, 6) stresses the importance of paying attention to ‘the moral connotations of seemingly neutral policy terms such as “renovation” and “revitalization,” especially in a Latin American context, where the notions of class, race and territory are historically interconnected’. Urban renewal strategies, she continues, ‘often embrace a race- and class-based notion of visual cleanliness, in which street vendors, indigenous people and beggars [are] regarded as “polluters” of the cityscape’ (Klaufus 2015, 6).
 6. Although the meaning of *naco* has changed to the point that it now tends to connote an overall urban kitsch aesthetic, it is also a racialized term (a distortion of the word *Totonaco*) that is used to degrade indigenous peoples, peasants and others perceived to embody ‘the provincial backwardness’ that Mexico has sought to dispel (Lomnitz 1996, 2001). According to cultural critic Carlos Monsiváis (1997, 2010), the epithet of *naco* has become ‘one of the main vehicles through which the cultural contempt for the Indians is articulated’ (Monsiváis 1997, 51). *Naco* is meant to signify people without education or manners, who are insolent, vulgar and graceless (Monsiváis 1997, 53). The *naco* both attracts and repels

because in a country where the majority population is *mestizo* and indigenously, anyone is potentially a *naco*.

7. According to historian Linda King (1994), the tendency to refer to indigenous languages as dialects negates 'their true linguistic nature.' Many Mexican people consider indigenous languages 'inferior forms of expression because they are (incorrectly) thought to lack grammar and an alphabet' (King 1994, 61).

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7

Managing Racism on the Field in Australian Junior Sport

Karen Farquharson, Ramón Spaaij, Sean Gorman,
Ruth Jeanes, Dean Lusher, and Jonathan Magee

K. Farquharson (✉)

School of Social and Political Sciences, Faculty of Arts, The University of
Melbourne, Parkville, VIC, Australia

e-mail: karen.farquharson@unimelb.edu.au

R. Spaaij

Institute for Health and Sport, Victoria University,
Footscray, VIC, Australia

Department of Sociology, University of Amsterdam,
Amsterdam, The Netherlands

e-mail: ramon.spaij@vu.edu.au

S. Gorman

Independent Scholar, East Fremantle, WA, Australia

R. Jeanes

Faculty of Education, Monash University Peninsula Campus,
Frankston, VIC, Australia

e-mail: Ruth.Jeanes@monash.edu

Introduction

Junior sport, sport for children under the age of 18, is enormous in Australia, with 69% of children participating in some sort of organised physical activity outside of school times in 2016 (Australian Sports Commission 2016). Junior sport is considered desirable for children's social development (Eime et al. 2015), and also for identification of future sports talent (Australian Sports Commission 2010). Racism is a global issue in sports (e.g., Associated Press 2008; Azzarito and Harrison 2008; Dubrow and Adams 2012; Gardiner 2003; Long 2000; Massao and Fasting 2010; Hylton 2008b, Spaaij et al. 2015), and while it has been established that participating in junior sport is an important vehicle for the socialisation of children into norms around sexism (Anderson 2013), little has been written about how racism occurs and is managed in junior sport in general, and even less in Australia.

In this chapter we argue that Australian sport is structured around the normativity of Whiteness and the subordination of non-Whites. In particular, Whiteness maintains its normativity and dominance through informal and official ways in which racism is managed. These processes operate in junior sport, where racism is tolerated and even at times condoned as a legitimate sporting tactic. We make this argument through an examination of how junior sports clubs in the state of Victoria manage racial abuse, also called racial vilification, during matches.

Section 18 of *The Racial Discrimination Act 1975* prohibits 'offensive behaviour based on racial hatred', and 18C specifically prohibits words that may offend or humiliate someone based on their race, colour or ethnicity. Nevertheless, racial vilification on sporting fields remains common at all levels of sport. Junior sports clubs are non-government community

D. Lusher

Social Innovation Research Institute, Swinburne University of Technology,
Hawthorn, VIC, Australia
e-mail: dlusher@swin.edu.au

J. Magee

Independent Scholar, Crib Point, VIC, Australia

organisations that field teams for under-18s and are the main way that children are active outside of school (Australian Sports Commission 2016). From an in-depth analysis of qualitative data from nine clubs in Victoria, we find that on-field racism exists and is an important challenge for junior sport clubs with racially diverse players. We find that the official processes are a form of symbolic anti-racism and ineffective in reducing and preventing racial abuse. Thus, clubs resort to informal means of managing racism on the field which they feel have a better chance of being effective.

In the following sections we outline our theoretical approach to understanding racism in Australian sport. We then outline our research methods and report the results of our analysis. We argue that structural and cultural factors result in the maintenance of an on-field sporting culture where racism is essentially tolerated, even when lip service is given to its inappropriateness. Both the official and the informal processes for managing racial abuse reinforce the marginalisation of non-White players while reinforcing the normativity of Whiteness in Australian sport.

Understanding Contemporary Racism in Australia

This chapter draws on a critical race theory approach to understanding racism in the world (Delgado and Stefancic 2017; Burdsey 2012; Hylton 2008a). Although it is widely accepted that 'race' is a social construction, being racialised has substantial material effects, benefitting members of dominant 'races' while disadvantaging members of subordinate groups through racism. Critical race theory problematises the idea that racism is an aberration, arguing instead that racism is part of everyday life that serves to benefit the White elites in White dominated societies. In this approach, the concept of interest convergence is key: Whites will only support initiatives that improve the positions of subordinate groups where they will also benefit (Delgado and Stefancic 2013; Hylton 2008a). Hylton (2010: 345) discusses interest convergence in the context of sport:

Effectively, it is argued that these gains for black and minority ethnic groups would be unlikely to have been acts of altruism, but acts that would

just as much benefit those in power. Anti-racism in sport governing bodies is often a reaction to events that force, for example, football associations to respond not so much because of the hurt to those affected, but because of any combination of the following: (1) their standing in the world will diminish; (2) bids for mega-events may be negatively affected; (3) sponsor perceptions; (4) public sector funds may become more difficult to access; (5) a truly global sport has to be seen to be inclusive.

In these examples, anti-racism initiatives are implemented because they benefit existing sporting powers. These initiatives can have positive outcomes for minority groups once implemented, but they will only be implemented where there is interest convergence. Anti-racist initiatives that emerge as a result of interest convergence can be substantive, but they can also be only symbolic (Hylton 2010; Ahmed 2012). Symbolic acts of anti-racism appear to be enacting genuine change, but have little substance (Hylton 2010; Ahmed 2012).

'Race' is a social construction that emerges differently in different contexts through processes of racial formation and understanding (Omi and Winant 2015). To understand racism in Australia, we need to understand its inception, socially, historically and politically. Australia was founded as a nation in 1901 on an explicit ideology of White supremacy whereby Australia was considered a British outpost from 1788 and the coming of the First Fleet. This ideology had two separate elements: anti-Black racism that managed Indigenous peoples, and anti-immigrant racism that restricted entry to those who were considered to be White. These two types of racism shaped relations between White Australia and, as a consequence, everyone else. Anti-Black racism was entrenched in the Constitution where it continues to enable differential treatment of Indigenous peoples. The new nation of Australia was imagined as a White nation; Indigenous peoples were purposely excluded from the national story and Whiteness was normalised and rendered invisible (Moreton-Robinson 2004).

Anti-migrant racism was institutionalised in the *Immigration Restriction Act 1901*, colloquially known as the White Australia Policy, which prevented non-British migrants from relocating to Australia, supporting the aim of creating and maintaining Australia as a White, British nation (Jones 2003, Teicher et al. 2000). In the post-World War II period Australia somewhat weakened the White Australia Policy by permitting European migrants and post-war refugees entry in a drive to "populate or perish".

Even though these migrants were not considered White, they were considered to be assimilable in that they looked White and their cultures were European (Vasta 2006). Both new migrant communities and Indigenous Australians were expected to assimilate and become White over time (Martin 1978; Vasta 2006; Haebich 1992, 2000, 2008). In reality, this did not happen. Many of these post-war migrants lived in ethnic enclaves and did not integrate into White Australian society (Vasta 2006). They began to put pressure on the Australian government to ease the White Australia Policy. This pressure, combined with external pressures from trading partners such as Japan, led to the dismantling of the White Australia Policy in the 1970s (Markus 2003; London 1970). Since the 1970s, Australia has been formally a multicultural nation in terms of official government policy, and also as a demographic reality (Colic-Peisker and Farquharson 2011). At that time, Australia stopped collecting racial data in the census for all except Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander peoples. However racism, as measured by population surveys of racist attitudes (Dunn and Nelson 2011) and experiences of racial discrimination (Markus 2014), persists and targets both non-White immigrants and Indigenous peoples.

Racism in Sport

Sport is a key site for racism. Racism in sport takes a number of forms from the structural, such as positional segregation where Black athletes are consigned to particular (non-leadership) roles (Loy and Elvogue 1970; Hallinan and Judd 2009); to the material, such as racial abuse on and off the field (Long 2000; Farquharson and Marjoribanks 2006; Gorman et al. 2016b); and the ideological in the form of the myth of natural talent, the myth that Black athletes are better at sport than non-Black athletes (Marjoribanks and Farquharson 2012; Hoberman 1997; Hawkins 2013; Burdsey and Gorman 2015). Racism in Australian sport frequently takes the form of racial abuse (Farquharson and Marjoribanks 2006; Gorman et al. 2016b) as a form of sledging. Sledging is a colloquial term that occurs when a player from one team makes statements to another player on the opposition with the goal of putting that player off their game, thereby gaining some perceived psychological advantage for their team. Historically, sledging has been common in Australian sport, and seen by

many to be a legitimate tactic to gain advantage (Carrington and McDonald 2001; Gardiner 1997; Gorman et al. 2016a; Gorman 2011).

The use of racial abuse as a form of sledging has been the subject of much discussion and research (e.g., Farquharson and Marjoribanks 2006; Long 2000; Gardiner 2003; Carrington and McDonald 2001). 'Racial abuse is of course a form of coercion: it represents, dehumanizes and objectifies its target' (Gardiner 2003: 34). It came to a head in the 1990s in the Australian Football League (AFL) as symbolised by St Kilda player Nicky Winmar lifting his shirt and pointing to his Blackness with pride after having been continuously abused by opposition fans and players throughout the match. Anti-racist stances by Essendon player Michael Long, Winmar and other Aboriginal players eventually lead to the development and implementation of a racial vilification policy in the AFL (Gardiner 1997; Gorman et al. 2016a; Klugman and Osmond 2013).

The AFL racial vilification policy (Australian Football League 2013) was ground breaking at the time. While the strategies may have initially emerged due to interest convergence, the League moved well beyond the symbolic by implementing a range of education programs to change the culture around racial vilification. A large scale research project based on data collected from almost 400 professional players, coaches and clubs officials from across the league found that racial vilification from players during matches was no longer an issue in the sport (Gorman et al. 2016a). The policy and its associated education programmes appear to have thus been proven effective in stamping out on-field racial abuse by players.

The AFL racial vilification policy (Australian Football League 2013) can be viewed as a type of grievance or complaints strategy for managing diversity. Grievance processes are intended to provide means for those who feel discriminated against to have their case heard and to prevent future incidents (Dobbin et al. 2015; Cazaly 2012). In the case of the AFL process, a person who has been racially vilified must either make a complaint or have a complaint made on their behalf. The complaint is then referred to an external complaints officer for resolution (Australian Football League 2013). There are a number of informal steps that can also be undertaken to respond to the complaint, resolving it prior to it being heard at a formal tribunal, but the general approach is one must first complain.

This type of process is mirrored in junior sport. Organisational research suggests that grievance processes in general are ineffective in preventing

discrimination and, further, frequently lead to backlash against the victims (see Dobbin et al. 2015 for a comprehensive overview of the literature on the ineffectiveness of grievance procedures, in particular, in handling civil rights complaints such as racism). While the AFL experience suggests that grievance processes are an important symbolic part of a larger anti-racism strategy, this organisational research would suggest that were the educational programmes not implemented, the policy on its own would likely be ineffective. Based on the research regarding grievance policies, we would expect that victims of racial abuse in junior sport would be unlikely to complain as they would expect to experience negative consequences/backlash for doing so. We would also expect that racial vilification complaints processes on their own would be ineffective in reducing on-field racism in junior sport.

‘[S]port is organized around social, economic, cultural and political structures that historically have privileged, and continue to privilege, dominant groups in society’ (Massao and Fasting 2010: 158–159). In Australian sport, whiteness is the ‘normative’ category, and all the organisational structures serve to maintain White control and dominance. Using critical race theory, we would expect that that any anti-racist initiatives in sport would not disrupt the normativity of whiteness in that context as there is no obvious interest convergence. We would expect, rather, that any approaches to managing racism would do so in such a way as to maintain current White-dominated power structures while also seeming to be anti-racist in intent, in other words, engaging in symbolic acts of anti-racism (Hylton 2008a, 2010).

In this chapter we explore the question: How do junior sports clubs in Australia experience and manage on-field racism? Based on our critical race theory framework, we would expect to find that official anti-racism processes would be symbolic, appearing to act against racism while not effecting substantive change. We would further expect that formal racial vilification processes would be rejected by victims of racial abuse out of fear of backlash through formal sanctions and on-field repercussions in future games. Finally, we would expect that both the official and informal processes for managing racial abuse would further reinforce the marginalised position on non-White groups, and reinforce the normativity of Whiteness in sport. The next section discusses the methods used to empirically test these expectations.

Methods

This chapter draws on data collected as part of a broader project: ‘Participation versus performance: Managing (dis)ability, gender and cultural diversity in junior sport’. This project was funded by the Australian Research Council, VicHealth, the Centre for Multicultural Youth and the Australian Football League (AFL) through Linkage Project Grant (LP130100366). It utilised a mixed methods design, including a large qualitative study (Spaaij et al. 2018). This chapter draws from the qualitative study.

For the qualitative study, nine junior sports clubs were selected through purposive sampling (Waller et al. 2016) so that there were a range of sizes (ranging from 80 to 500 members) and sports (Australian rules football, netball, cricket, basketball and soccer) included. Underlying our sampling approach was the aim of identifying and focusing on researching clubs that were recognised by National and/or State Sporting Organisations as being active in managing diversity, enabling us to potentially identify good practices for this domain. With this in mind, we specifically selected some clubs that were known to value different types of diversity. We also included one rural club and one regional club along with seven metropolitan clubs. Once potential participant clubs were identified, they were invited to participate through a formal invitation letter. Participation was approved by each club’s management committee.

Data was collected between 2014 and 2016. Face-to-face interviews were conducted with at least ten people from each club including club leaders, parents and junior players. One hundred and one people were interviewed across the ten clubs. Approximately 60% of interviewees were men and 40% were women. Approximately 30% were under the age of 20. Although we did not collect racial data, the vast majority of our adult interviewees (club leaders and parents) were White, as were most of the interviewers. In addition to the interviews, participant observations were conducted at two clubs over a sports season. Interviews and observations were focused on understanding what the clubs understood as diversity, whether fostering diversity was a priority, and how different types of diversity were managed day to day.

Interviews were audio recorded, and transcribed. Observation notes were made after each observation. Transcripts and observation notes were entered into NVivo 11 software for thematic analysis. A coding scheme was developed by the research team through a process where all team members coded a proportion of the transcripts through an open coding process (Waller et al. 2016). The emergent codes were compared across the researchers and a final coding scheme was developed and used to code all of the data. This chapter draws from items coded as ‘racism’. The research was approved by the Victoria University Human Research Ethics Committee.

Results

The study included clubs from five sports, and racism was mentioned specifically in all. In the following sections we first discuss the processes for managing on-field racism and their effectiveness, finding that they are examples of symbolic anti-racism and are ineffective in either preventing or responding to racial abuse. We then discuss the repercussions for children of making complaints against racial vilification, finding that there are repercussions for responding to racial abuse, even when reports are not made. We then examine how clubs train children to handle situations where they or their teammates experience racial abuse.

Processes for Managing Racial Abuse

Clubs were asked what happened if a young player was racially vilified during a match. All sports, through their National or State Sporting Association, shared a similar formal vilification process for the official management of racial abuse. This process was similar to the process outlined in the AFL vilification policy (Australian Football League 2013). It involved a complaint, an official report, and either mediation or hearing at a tribunal, with the alleged victim and perpetrator meeting. However, few of the clubs reported actually using this process, mainly because the children who were vilified refused to complain:

They generally they'll write a report and they'll talk to the club, and the club will often deny it, or it just gets dealt with. We've never taken anything to a tribunal. You can. There is a process where you can take it to a tribunal. We've never gone that far, mainly because the kids don't want to do it, you know. But I'm very much wanting to... I write a report each time, so I think they need to know that it's happening. (Basketball club)

Well, the kids don't want to go and sit down with someone that's just called them something over the table. They have to put it in writing and you have to do this and do that and they don't want to do it. And their parents, some of our kids the parents aren't involved so it then requires one of us to take them and they go: 'But then you have to come with us. No, let's just let it go.' They are concerned about repercussions the next time they play them, they'd rather just let it go. (Australian Rules football club)

Clubs preferred not to use official processes because the processes put what was perceived as unfair pressure on the vilified child to prove that they had experienced racism. For example, if an 11-year-old child reported a racist incident, it would trigger a process where the child has to prove the racism whilst the opponent club hires a lawyer to disprove the child's account. This process discourages the use of the formal vilification process for two key reasons. First, the legal cost of this is prohibitive to many clubs who would struggle to pay for their own lawyer; and second, most clubs are unwilling to place an 11-year-old and their family in a situation where there is a lawyer from an opponent club asserting the 11 year old is a liar. Thus, clubs resort to informal means of handling racist incidents. This approach generally is club to club, preferably on the match day, between club managers which may then involve club presidents discussing and sorting it out at both ends. Even though this informal approach was largely acknowledged as being inadequate, clubs felt it had a better chance of being effective than the formal vilification process.

The formal processes were also expected to lead to backlash, and clubs felt they were likely to further traumatise the child who had been vilified. As one club put it:

Look, I think quite openly that it's not being reported, and for me... and that's because of the process and because of the penalty outcome, what you

can expect. So I think that my personal feeling is, without being too rude, is that I think that they're almost null and void. (Australian Rules football club)

The research into professional Australian Rules football suggested that the combination of education programmes and formal vilification policy were successful in stopping racial abuse from players during matches (Gorman et al. 2016a). Educational resources are also available at the junior level. One club reported that they were expected to watch an educational video about vilification:

Respondent: Yeah, we've seen the video on that. We've just done the video on multicultural... cultural diversity and racial vilification. And, yeah, since then we've been vilified twice, so we get it. (Chuckles).

Interviewer: You get it rather than...

Respondent: We get it. The other clubs don't, so yeah.

Interviewer: So you're sort of victims I suppose?

Respondent: Well, yeah, but... yeah, the whole thing's a load of garbage in my opinion. I don't mean that... I mean that... I don't mean that the whole thing's a load of garbage; I mean that you can go out on the footy field and someone can punch you in the head and nothing can be done about it, yet somebody calls you a name, then you have to get dragged aside and deal with it. Now one of my Sudanese boys was racially vilified, and for it to go any further forward we had to go to the league and he had to sit in a room with the kid that did it to him, and he said, 'No thanks. Not interested.' (Australian Rules football)

This quote suggests that there are educational programmes that the clubs have participated in, but that they are not effecting behaviour change during matches. For this club, which has a large number of culturally diverse players, it is important that racial vilification stops. They 'get it'. However, their observation was that other clubs were not changing their behaviour and their players were regularly vilified. So while educational programmes combined with policy are effective at the professional

level (Gorman et al. 2016a), they appear to be less successful at the junior level, at least for this particular club.

The reluctance to pursue official complaints was related to the perceived and experienced likelihood that the complaint would not lead to a satisfactory result and might lead to further abuse. One football club official noted:

What the AFL expect from a kid who has been vilified is really unrealistic. They don't want to sit down in a room facing that person and having a conversation, especially when they're only 11 years of age. Yeah, our Sudanese boys get vilified every second to third week, at least. Sometimes they just fob it off and other times they haven't, it depends on how they react to the situation as to how far we take it. We've had to involve the Match Day Manager, especially on this particular occasion when it was someone from the supporters that had vilified him, we involved the Match Day Manager down at [location] about it and it was sorted out to our satisfaction and things like that but regularly they get vilified. (Australian Rules football club)

This quote highlights that racial abuse is an everyday occurrence, not infrequent, and that there is little clubs feel they can do to prevent it. In this case the club involved a league official, but did not make a formal report; rather they handled the incident informally. There was no expectation that the racism would stop as a result of this.

There was an acknowledgement that the official processes were more symbolic than real. As discussed above, symbolic anti-racist initiatives have the appearance of action, but do not involve substantive change. In this case the racial vilification policies can be seen as symbolic initiatives. For an actual reduction in racial abuse, there needed to be a cultural change as the official process was considered by most to be too traumatic to the vilified players. As another club official pointed out:

Respondent: Some clubs they generally... they pay lip service to it, and I think some clubs in our competition absolutely look to protect themselves before they're looking to protect an opposition player, or speak up and say, "That's wrong." And we do see that.

- Interviewer: OK. And as I said in my question, frustration at that?
- Respondent: Yeah, there's a frustration. Oh, absolutely. Absolutely. So every time we get into these type of situations we're absolutely getting into what the hell, you know. And clubs, their first point is to protect themselves and their players, rather than saying, 'This is not acceptable boys,' going to their boys and really hitting them in the head. (Australian Rules football club)

What is asserted in this quote is that the official processes are not followed, and where they are, they are used to protect and support the perpetrators of the racial abuse, not its victims. It is clear, here, that there is no broad will to prevent this type of racism. The racism itself is common and tolerated, and its perpetrators are protected by their clubs.

Given its frequency, most instances of racial abuse are not actively managed by clubs. Children are expected to ignore all except the most egregious instances. When an incident is actively managed, it is almost always through informal processes. The team leaders do this in a number of ways including dealing directly with the opposing side's leaders or sport officials. For example,

I guess our approach has been to try to deal with it, get the other club to deal with it first because I suppose often it's the kids themselves actually don't really realise what they're doing and some of the time they've got something from their parents and that's not right but I suppose we feel like the first opportunity should be for the club to speak to the kids concerned and explain to the kids why whatever they said was not appropriate, and deal with it that way. (Basketball club)

This quote not only outlines the approach this club takes to managing racial abuse, it also situates the perpetrators of the abuse as innocent of intent. The embedded assumption here is that if you explain why racial abuse is wrong to the perpetrators, they will not do it again, however there was no evidence in our data that is the case.

The following club officials said that they would rather handle an incident by discussing it with the coach or referee rather than having the children act on the field:

If we get a report afterwards, after a game, of an incident that hasn't been dealt with at the time our approach is normally to approach them – usually via the President where our President would approach the President of the other club and talk to that person about the incident that's happened and ask them to talk to the players concerned or the team concerned. Most clubs are really horrified if you say that you think that there's been a racist incident and we've never actually reported an incident, formally reported it. (Basketball club)

This approach was a common informal way of handling an incident. There are two aspects of this approach that are notable. First, children are expected to 'deal with it at the time'. In general this means that they are expected to ignore the incident and get over it quickly. The second is that the club raising the incident with another club expects that the other club, once notified, will respond in some way. However there was no evidence that clubs accused of racism do respond, or if they do, that the response is effective in preventing future incidents.

Embedded here is the expectation that if the racism were to be made public through the enactment of an official racial vilification complaint, the responding club would need to save face by defending their player and denying the racism. If a complaining club wants to make an impact, they would need to do so informally. However this approach does not appear to reduce racism; racial vilification is still very common. So neither the formal nor the informal process is effective, but the informal process has the benefits of being easier to enact, and to make club officials feel that they have taken action to defend their players against racism. Both approaches are symbolic, requiring nothing to change.

Sometimes the children who are not being vilified manage the on-field racial abuse themselves:

So what happened in this other game was actually all our boys circled around our player, and we made it really clear to the opposition that this was unacceptable, and all our players pointed him out, so in the end, after the game, he came over and absolutely apologised. That's about the best you're going to get. (Soccer club)

This type of approach was mentioned several times, in more than one of the sports. It is an example of White players using their Whiteness to

prevent racism against non-White players. It was one of the more effective ways of reducing on-field racism, however it also reinforces Whiteness as normatively the group in control. This is the approach taken by one football club:

There were times where some of our kids were discriminated against, and as a club we made sure that we acted on that straight away. And whether that was internally or with the league, you know that in the first few weeks a lot of our kids were getting sledged. The African kids were getting sledged. So we sent a letter to the President of the league, explaining the situation, and asking them to send our letter to the rest of the competition. And when we went to our games from that point in time, our Manager of the team – of our team – would go and actually speak to the Coach and the Team Manager of the opposition and say we have a lot of African kids in our team, new Australians, we don't want to have any issues in regard to discrimination or racism.

The non-White cannot prevent racism; only the White can do that. So Whites are in charge of both perpetrating and preventing racism. This is not to suggest that non-White players never perpetrate racial abuse. The following quote discusses what is considered vilification and shows the socially constructed nature of Whiteness:

Vilification can be for anything, a kid could be pulled up for calling him fat, it's about how he reacts. If he's upset because he's been called fat then they've just vilified them. It's so politically correct now that you can't say this, you can't say that. Basically we try to say to the boys that they can't say anything, you can't say anything to them and that's it, that's how it is. One of our boys had called one of the kids short and he'd taken offence to being called short. Having said that we still have to keep an eye on – especially in our team, we're Under 13's this year – kids within the team, black kids calling other kids black. One of the boys who has darker skin called the Sudanese black and he's like, well, he didn't even see that he had black skin to be calling someone black. He goes "But I'm white." I'm like "there's no way you're white" but they don't necessarily recognise it so we've had talks about that as well and talks about that across the club as well. It's just really making sure that everyone is tolerant of everybody else. (Australian Rules football club)

Here it appears that perpetrating racial abuse is seen as something that Whites do. In the quote, the young player asserts his Whiteness and his right to call someone else Black. The club official suggests to the player that he is not White, but in any case, no one should be vilified for anything.

Racial Abuse as a Legitimate Tactic

Thus far the analysis indicates that formal and informal processes for managing racial abuse are largely symbolic, but also that the most effective informal process is when the team itself protects its non-White players. Part of the broader context for this tolerance of racism is that racial abuse occurs within a sporting culture where sledging is seen as a legitimate tactic (e.g., Back et al. 2001). In the following quote, the coach uses racial abuse to motivate a non-White player to play better. The vilification is understood to have occurred in order to hinder that player's game, a purposeful act on the part of the perpetrator to improve his team's chances of winning:

We played [against opposition player] and there's a young Lebanese boy, [on our team] and [the opposition player] called him an Arab sheik. *The only reason he called him that is because he was beaten and that was his way of trying to beat him, to get him in his head.* And he did and I pulled him aside there at half time and I said "Look you're going to cop that? You don't have to cop that". Well he came out the second half and he was probably the best player on the ground ... The boy that offended straight up, [our player] ... he just said 'I want to know why you called me that?' And he actually came out and he said '*You were beating me quite easy; I had to do something to try and beat you*'. And I thought 'Well at least he was honest' and he apologised for what he did and they moved on which is exactly what you want to see ... (Australian Rules football club, italics added)

In situating racial abuse as a legitimate tactic, it is explicitly and purposely not being situated as a real problem that should be prevented.

Racist sledging is generally seen as unacceptable, but it is also seen as not really very bad, and that its victims need to be thicker skinned. In the

following quote, the respondent distinguishes between 'Aussies' and Italian migrants, showing that racial abuse is a long-standing cultural practice in Australian sport. As Italians have become increasingly White, the racial abuse has shifted to other non-White groups.

Respondent: You know the Aussies, 'Oh, you bloody wogs [racial epithet].' You know my old man went through it, but now it's virtually run by Italians, so like it's just... it's a natural thing. But there's no racial comments or slurs or any of that happening. Well not in my... I don't see it. I don't see it.

Interviewer 1: Were you ever called a wog playing?

Respondent: Oh mate, plenty of times (laughs), and like water off a duck's back, couldn't care less, you know. So that's why I get a little bit peeved when you have a little bit of a banter out on the footy field and somebody gets carried away with it. I mean that's... I mean I got called it every day for 30 years, mate, it didn't bother me none. (Australian Rules football)

This person successfully survived '30 years' of racial abuse and characterises it as 'a bit of banter', thus minimising it and simultaneously reinforcing it as a legitimate practice.

Backlash, Singling Out and Scapegoating of Victims

It was clear from our analysis that victims of racial vilification both believed they would be and actually were likely to experience backlash if they spoke up or acted in response to the abuse. Repercussions might be that they would make an official complaint and not have it verified and handled fairly, or that they would be singled out in future matches for extra attention and possibly attract further abuse on the field: As one respondent put it: 'They are concerned about repercussions the next time they play them, they'd rather just let it go' (Australian Rules football).

If a non-White child reacted to being racially abused in a match, they were likely to be disciplined for it while the child who had vilified them in the first instance would not have repercussions. Here are two examples:

I know our older boys, some of our Muslim kids are regularly vilified but they've learned to shrug and move on. It happens to them all the time. It's the same kids so they're pretty thick skinned but on a couple of occasions throughout the season it did get to them. ... They're pretty resilient because they're used to it but that doesn't excuse it. Yet we'll find, we had one of our boys called one of the opposition kids a bitch and it went through a vilification process and yes it was serious and all the rest of it, but when it happens to our boys it just seems to get washed under the carpet. But if it's an Anglo family they'll push the point whereas our boys will go 'Just leave it, just leave it, just leave it' *because they know there will be repercussions next time.* (Australian Rules football club, italics added)

We had a case where one of the South Sudanese girls was actually taken to the tribunal for something that she had said because she was really angry about some things [racial abuse] that happened in a game, and she was taken to the tribunal and it was based on something she said which was just a really stupid thing to have said and it should never have got to the tribunal ... (Basketball club)

The first quote highlights the frequency of racial abuse and the costs of reacting. It explicitly shows the difference between the non-White children, who are reluctant to take complaints to the tribunal, and 'Anglo' parents, who are confident that if they go to the tribunal they will get a satisfactory outcome. In both cases the non-White children were taken to the tribunal because they had responded to being racially abused. Neither child received a satisfactory response to their abuse, and both were disciplined for lashing out in response. The children who had provoked the responses were not taken to the tribunal, suggesting that non-White children are strongly disciplined when they respond to abuse, but perpetrators of the original abuse are not.

In some instances, players who were vilified were pulled from the game, essentially punishing them for attracting racial abuse:

- Interviewer: What happens if a kid gets vilified in the game?
- Respondent: Oh, the coaches have, and the managers, team managers and coaches have clear guidelines about what to do, which is to basically withdraw the player from the game until they... if they're upset, and to report the matter both to us and to the Association concerned, but pretty much mostly to us there. But the main aim obviously is to ensure ... the safety of the player concerned. (Basketball club)

The pulling of the player is done for the best of intentions: to protect the player from further abuse. However it also may be experienced as a further negative consequence for being vilified; it is unclear whether the perpetrator of the vilification would have any such negative consequences.

Discussion

From our findings it is clear that on-field vilification is a key manifestation of racism in junior sport. Using a critical race theory approach (Hylton 2010; Delgado and Stefancic 2013), we expected to find that racism was a common everyday occurrence, and that anti-racism measures would be symbolic rather than substantive (Hylton 2010). We further expected to find that processes for managing racial abuse in junior sport would reinforce the normativity of Whiteness across the field. These expectations were borne out by the findings.

Australian sport uses a grievance process to respond to racial abuse, requiring a complaint to be made and responded to through official channels. Grievance processes have been found to be ineffective means for the satisfactory management of discrimination in organisations (Dobbin et al. 2015), although they are a key part of the successful approach taken by the AFL (Gorman et al. 2016a). One of the key issues preventing grievance processes from being effective is backlash against them from White managers (Dobbin et al. 2015). Our findings show that similar backlash happens in junior sport, where children who are

racially vilified are unwilling to participate in grievance processes because they had well-founded fears that grievance procedure outcomes would not be favourable to them. Indeed, any response at all to racial abuse frequently led to negative consequences for the abused and no visible consequences for the abusers. Young people, thus, refused to engage with official processes for managing racism because they and their coaches knew that such complaints would result in the scapegoating of the complainants. In instances of racial vilification the official procedures were rarely implemented, with teams, coaches and management preferring more informal means of managing the racism. The formality of the process itself was a deterrent to its use. The official racial vilification policies and processes, then, can be understood to be types of symbolic anti-racism, where there is the appearance of anti-racist action, but no actual positive anti-racist outcomes (Hylton 2010).

Racial abuse is a form of sledging that, according to Gardiner (2003), dehumanises its victims. However it is something that is seen, even sometimes by its victims, as a legitimate tactic. This makes it very challenging to tackle because it is normalised. As racial abuse targets only non-White players, its prevalence can be viewed as an indication of White dominance, and its tenaciousness as evidence of the normativity of Whiteness and the subordination of non-Whites in sport to Whites.

Given the ineffectiveness of both the official and informal processes for managing racial vilification, why do junior sports rely on them to manage on-field racism? Based on our findings we would argue that vilification management procedures are a form of symbolic anti-racism having the appearance of action while maintaining existing structures and practices that perpetuate racism. The use of the grievance process enables the culturally approved practice of sledging to persist and simultaneously punishes those who would attempt to disrupt it.

The effective management of on-field racism in junior sport is complex. It is embedded in a broader Australian sporting culture where sledging is seen as a legitimate tactic and not really all that bad, even though everyone would agree that racism is bad. Supporting this were two key discourses that emerged repeatedly in the interviews: the denial of racism and the diminishment of racism. The denial of racism discourse asserted that while racism may have been a problem in the past, it no longer was.

The diminishment of racism occurred when racism was acknowledged, but not thought to be a problem. Both discourses support a maintenance of the practice of sledging, through both denying its existence, but more often by situating it as not a real problem and just part of getting ahead in sport. In this view, racist sledging is a legitimate on-field tactic, not something that should be sanctioned.

This ambivalence about tackling racial vilification both leads to and supports ineffective grievance processes, processes that are seen to be responding to racism, while disciplining those who are its victims and in so doing preventing other victims from coming forward. Junior sport can be seen to be acting while subtly maintaining racist power relations.

A key question that emerges from this analysis is how professional (AFL) Australian sport has been able to prevent racial vilification. It may be that the presence of Aboriginal players at all clubs, including some brave and outspoken Aboriginal players beginning with Nicky Winmar and Michael Long in the early and mid-1990s, provided an impetus across the League for sustained action. The AFL in particular is also able to resource processes and support staff to combat vilification. Many junior sports clubs are not culturally diverse and perhaps would not have internal pressure to resist racial vilification. They are also not well-resourced. As our analysis showed, even some non-White players perpetuate racism, suggesting that it is a deeply ingrained practice.

Racial vilification is a common occurrence, aligned with Australia's sporting culture which accepts any means of gaining advantage over the opponent, including sledging (Gardiner 1997). Our analysis has identified structural and cultural factors that result in the maintenance of an on-field sporting culture where racism is essentially tolerated, even when lip service is given to its inappropriateness. The structural factors include the formal and informal processes for handling racial abuse. The cultural factors include the tacit tolerance of racist sledging as a legitimate tactic.

Conclusion

Our analysis has shown that racial abuse in junior sport is supported by structural and cultural factors. Structural factors include the reporting process, which is cumbersome to engage with and frequently results in

scapegoating of the victims. Also included in the structural factors is the normative Whiteness that underpins assumptions about what is racial abuse, and how it should be managed. These structures maintain the status quo where racial abuse is said to be inappropriate, but is tolerated. Related to this, cultural factors also support the continuation of on-field racism. In particular, the culture of sledging, where racial abuse is seen to be an appropriate on-field tactic and where players who complain about it are seen as weak and expected to ‘toughen up’.

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8

Shifting Racialised Positioning of Polish Migrant Women in Manchester and Barcelona

Alina Rzepnikowska

Introduction

The European Union expansion in 2004 resulted in a significant migration from less ethnically diverse Poland to multicultural societies. As a result of this large-scale migration of Polish people to other European countries, many have become conscious of being white as a result of contact with non-whites, and at times, not-quite-white through contact with the white hosts (Lopez Rodriguez 2010; Parutis 2011; van Riemsdijk 2010). Nevertheless, the presumed whiteness has not protected them from racism, violent attacks and discrimination (Fox et al. 2015; Rzepnikowska 2017a), especially in the context of the EU referendum in 2016 and Brexit vote (Virdee and McGeever 2017; Rzepnikowska 2018). In contrast, some literature focusing on Polish migrants in the Spanish context stresses the privileged treatment of Poles due to their whiteness and Europeaness (Nalewajko 2012; Ramírez Goicoechea 2003), although in some media reports they are often placed in the

A. Rzepnikowska (✉)

School of Social Sciences, The University of Manchester, Manchester, UK

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homogenous category of Eastern European Others (Kressova et al. 2011). Hence, these migrants may occupy an ambiguous position in between an assumed higher racial status of white Europeans and Eastern European Other.

The aim of this paper is to explore the shifting racialised positioning of Polish migrant women by drawing on narrative interviews conducted with Polish migrant women living in Manchester and Barcelona about their encounters with the local population in terms of race, ethnicity, religion, class, gender and other categories which often intersect. The fieldwork conducted between June 2012 and March 2013 involved participant observation with the local organisations and groups working with Polish migrants, narrative interviews (20 in Barcelona and 21 in Manchester), as well as one focus group in each city with Polish women. By drawing on literature on whiteness, race, gender and migration this paper explores the shifting racial positions of these women in the context of inter-ethnic encounters with attention to spatio-temporal dynamics, class, gender, racialised discourses and other factors. The empirical examples show how whiteness and Otherness are produced through various encounters. The narratives illustrate how Polish migrant women in some contexts become white and how they benefit from it, even though they can also be subject to racism and xenophobia. The empirical material also shows how some informants perpetuate racism, often to assert their privileged position as white Europeans, even though they might be perceived as Eastern European Others, suggesting hierarchies of whiteness. The central argument in this paper is that racialised positioning of Polish migrant women is unstable and shifting. It is very much interlinked with a particular type of European whiteness that is valued and normative. At the same time, the paper illustrates how whiteness is not just phenotypic but malleable and conditional.

Polish Migration to Britain

There are diverse groups and diasporic identities of Polish migrants in Britain characterised by multiple patterns of mobility as a result of at least three generations of migratory history between Poland and Britain

(Eade et al. 2006). This paper focuses on post-2004 migration. The immediate labour market access of A8 nationals (Accession 8 countries which entered the European Union in May 2004: Lithuania, Latvia, Estonia, Poland, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia and Hungary) into the UK was a result of severe labour market shortages, mainly in low-wage and low-skill occupations in construction, hospitality, transport sectors and public services. Freedom of movement attracted many Poles, especially young people, affected by high rates of unemployment, low wages, and lack of opportunities in Poland (White 2010). These newly arrived migrants constituted the largest group from the A8 countries entering Britain. The Home Office registered the peak of this migration between 2005 and 2007 when Polish migrants constituted 65% of those registered (Home Office 2009). Between 2003 and 2010, the Polish-born population of the UK increased from 75,000 to 532,000 (ONS 2011a). It was estimated that in 2015 the most common non-British nationality was Polish, with 916,000 residents (16.5% of the total non-British national population resident in the UK) (ONS 2015), although this data does not record the length of stay and there is a limited knowledge of how many have left the UK. According to 2011 census data, Polish migrants have the highest birth rate amongst other migrant groups (ONS 2011b) and Polish language has become the most commonly spoken non-native language in England and Wales (ONS 2011c).

The socio-demographic profile of Polish migrants is highly varied. They are mostly young and their qualifications often do not match their employment. Many speak English and have finished secondary school or have obtained a degree, although some researchers highlight that the majority are not university graduates, and many have poor English language skills (White 2011). They work in a variety of sectors including administration; business and management; hospitality and catering; public services; agriculture; manufacturing and food; fish and meat processing; and construction (Drinkwater et al. 2009). In addition, there has been a growing population of university students.

In the post-2004 period, Manchester has witnessed the arrival of Polish migrants, amongst other A8 nationals, who have contributed to a greater

diversity of the city. The official statistics on the numbers and distribution of Polish migrants in Manchester are very limited. According to the Census 2011 data, Central and Eastern European migrants are incorporated in an imprecise category of 'White Other', which also includes other Europeans, Jewish, Irish, Americans and Australians. Polish migrants constituted 1.2 percent of Manchester population which was 503,127 and 0.8 percent of Greater Manchester population (based on self-descriptions) (Manchester City Council 2015, p. 29). Polish is the second most common language (other than English).

Polish Migration to Spain

Spain did not open its labour market to the new accession countries until May 2006. The extent of post-2004 Polish migration to Spain is substantially smaller than in Britain. In December 2014, 90,835 Polish migrants were recorded as living in Spain with a residence permit (Ministerio de Empleo y Seguridad Social 2014). Since the transition period, Polish migration to Spain has been characterised by a new type of Polish migrant: young, educated, highly skilled, coming from bigger cities and entrepreneurial (Nalewajko 2012; Rzepnikowska 2017b). In contrast to the British context, their employment often matched their qualifications or served to improve them. Many came to Spain not only for economic reasons, but also to attend exchange programmes, postgraduate studies, language learning courses or to search for new experiences, discover the culture and seek adventure. Those with higher education and higher skills often arrived in Barcelona (Nalewajko 2012; Rzepnikowska 2017b; Władyka and Morén-Alegret 2013).

In the first decade of the twenty-first century, Barcelona saw an increase of the Polish population as a result of EU expansion. Between 2001 and 2009, the number of Polish migrants increased nearly eightfold (Władyka and Morén-Alegret 2013, p. 147). At the time of my fieldwork in 2012, according to the statistics, the number of registered residents was 2224, increasing to 2453 in January 2015 (Barcelona City Council 2015), although there might be many more.

Race, Racism and Whiteness

As discussed elsewhere (Rzepnikowska 2016a, b), the research material I gathered through my fieldwork shows a constant tension between everyday conviviality and racialised discourses. Amin (2013, p. 4) discusses 'the other face' of the daily encounter with difference as 'phenotypical racism' defined as the precognitive coding of surface bodily differences, for instance skin colour and clothing, as racial markers generating hostility. Racialised discourses construct the visible difference as inferior, dangerous and threatening. Race and racism are deeply rooted in western colonialism and imperialism which coincided with the formulation of scientific ideas about race in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries associated with inherent physical traits, followed by processes of racialisation as a way of categorising different populations ordered hierarchically with whites at the top and blacks at the bottom (Miles 1982; Cashmore 1996). Racialised discourses in the Western world have become increasingly normalised through modernity, although the word blackness acquired its negative meaning through the Medieval Church associating it with darkness, evil and sin, in opposition to whiteness associated with purity and perfection (Yuval-Davis 1997; Cashmore 1996; Rzepnikowska 2016b).

Although claims about the inherent superiority of whites and inferiority of non-whites have been scientifically discredited, in many societies race is still perceived as a fixed objective category (Miles 1982). However, at the heart of the racist discourse is not just physical difference but other variables, including country of origin, religion, nationality and language (Solomos 2003; Yuval-Davis 1997). New racism has been based on 'notion of culture and nation to construct a definition of the British nation that excludes those of different cultural, ethnic or racial background from the national collectivity' (Solomos 2003, p. 33). Racialised discourses also encompass class and gender differences (Bonnett 2000; Byrne 2006).

In the Spanish context, the ideology of race was closely linked with the ideology of purity of blood, referring to pure Christian ancestry, which originated in mid-fifteenth century Spain (Martínez et al. 2012, p. 1). To

overcome its inferiority associated with notions of racial impurity as a result of its connection to “oriental and African elements and the mingling of Christians with Jews and Arabs” (Flesler 2008, p. 20), Spain tried to erase its Moorish past. Since the ‘re-conquest’ of Granada in 1492, inquisitorial religious persecution was implemented through ‘laws of blood purity’ (Dietz 2004, p. 1098), and as a result Jewish and Muslim converts to Christianity (considered as impure) became subject to discriminatory and segregation laws and subsequently expulsion (Martínez et al. 2012). The notions of blood and race became strongly connected in the Spanish context. Furthermore, the role of Spanish conquest of the Americas is also significant in developing the ideas of race and superiority/inferiority, during which the Catholic Church gave validity to the concept that the native inhabitants were sub-humans. Nowadays, Spain is seen as the southern gate to the ‘Fortress Europe’ due to its geographical location. Zapata-Barrero and van Dijk (2007) argue that racism in Spain follows the trend of Europe and they call it the ideology of Iberian and western racial supremacy.

Unlike Spain and Britain, Poland has never had any colonies. Nevertheless, Polish people have been exposed to a very definite construction of blackness influenced by the Western discourses (Rzepnikowska 2016b; Ząbek 2007). The views about non-whites have been influenced by the historical imaginaries and colonial narratives transmitted through the literature and the media (Gawlewicz 2014; Nowicka 2017; Rzepnikowska 2016b). Throughout the years, the images of blacks in Poland have been characterised by ambivalence, including demonisation, sacralisation, and fascination (Ząbek 2007).

The tragic consequences of the Holocaust during World War II, border changes and the communist regime have left Poland as one of the most ethnically, culturally and religiously homogenous countries in the world (Podemski 2012). Contact with non-white people has been rare in many parts of Poland, and nowadays Polish people hardly have a chance to challenge their opinions about black people with reality (Średzinski 2010). The politics of the current conservative government that came to power in 2015 with divisive nationalistic rhetoric fuelling anti-immigrant attitudes and physical attacks on Muslims or ‘foreign-looking’ people, indicate that there might be even less ethnic diversity in the country

(Narkowicz and Pedziwiatr 2017). It could be argued that the socialisation in Poland influenced by Western racialised discourses may provide a context for socio-spatial encounters with difference in multicultural receiving societies.

While Poland adopted racialised discourses from Western Europe (Rzepnikowska 2016b), it was in turn constructed by the West through the use of imperial narrative as the 'Other Europe' perceived as poor, backward and underdeveloped (Imre 2005; Wolff 1994). Owczarzak (2009, p. 4) argues that "Eastern Europe served as the West's intermediary Other, neither fully civilised nor fully savage". Grzymała-Kazłowska (2007) suggests that Polish perceptions about Others have been largely determined by the geo-political and cultural position of Poland between the East and the West. She claims that the opposition of 'us' and 'them' is a result of historical experiences of Polish people and the place of Poland on cultural borderland. One of the most important elements shaping Polish identity and attitudes to Others in Poland is argued to be, on the one hand, a certain inferiority complex towards the Western nations; and on the other, a sense of superiority towards the Eastern nations (ibid). The fall of the Iron Curtain and subsequently the accession of Poland into the EU in 2004 have constituted significant markers of the 'return to Europe' and helped Poland in asserting 'Europeanness' closely linked with whiteness.

While in predominantly white societies blackness is 'hypervisible' (Colbert 2012), whiteness is seen as the norm, as unmarked, mundane and common (Frankenberg 1993). According to black critique, whiteness works as a form of racial privilege which has the effect on the bodies of non-whites. Whiteness is produced by assigning race to others. Therefore, the study of whiteness as a racialised position is to contest its dominance (Ahmed 2004) and its notion as a 'mythical norm' (Lorde 1984, p. 116). Frankenberg (1993, p. 1) stressed the importance to explore "racialness" of white experience.

The debate about construction of whiteness in the context of migration has concentrated on how various European migrants, including Poles, Irish, Italians and Jews, became white in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century in the United States and in Britain. While Irish migrants initially were racialised by being considered as 'not-quite-white'

in the USA and UK in the nineteenth century, they used whiteness against blacks to improve their situation in the labour market (Ignatiev 1995). Nevertheless, they faced high levels of discrimination in Britain until 1970s and 1980s. Ryan's (2007) research about Irish nurses in Britain, who mostly migrated in the 1950s and 1970s, reveals the ambiguous position of these migrants as white and European insiders, but, at the same time, as cultural outsiders. Furthermore, after WWII, displaced persons benefited from immigration policies with racialised preferences for white workers in the UK (Fox 2013; McDowell 2009). Even though whiteness can be defined as a category with shifting borders and internal hierarchies, they can be crossed and climbed by certain groups (Dyer 1997, p. 20).

It is important to highlight gender as an important aspect of the construction of whiteness (Dyer 1997; Frankenberg 1993) with regard to specific functions assigned to women as biological reproducers of the nation (Yuval-Davis 1997). For instance, Latvian migrant women in the post-war period in the UK were seen as more desirable than other migrants, as they were considered as potential wives and mothers of the future generation of Brits (McDowell 2007).

While whiteness has been mostly explored in the West, it has been underexplored in the context of post-socialist societies including Poland. While visual difference has become highly marked in post-communist states, whiteness has remained unnoticed and unacknowledged (Gawlewicz 2014; Imre, 2005; Rzepnikowska 2016b). Since race has been associated with non-whites, Polish people's whiteness has been normalised and invisible. Nevertheless, whiteness is reinscribed when non-whites become visible in Poland and in host countries. Following the EU enlargement in 2004, Polish migrants arriving in the UK initially have become recognised as a 'desirable' migrant group and have been labelled as 'invisible' due to their whiteness. Existing research reveals that Polish migrants arriving in Britain have become aware of their whiteness and they recognised it as an asset according to a belief that white minorities are treated better than non-whites (Eade et al. 2006). Some emphasise their whiteness/Europeanness and distinguish themselves from other migrants and ethnic minorities on the basis of skin colour and place themselves in the category of whiteness to assert their privileged position (Parutis 2011; Lopez Rodriguez 2010). It has been argued that these

migrants, along with other Central and Eastern European arrivals, have been involved in the process of ‘whitewashing’, although whiteness is not explicitly claimed most of the times (Fox 2013; Fox et al. 2015). Some Polish migrants may occupy an ambiguous position in between an assumed higher racial status of white Europeans and a lower social status as a result of low-skilled employment (Fox et al. 2015). Nevertheless, the presumed whiteness of these migrants in the UK has not exempted them from racism, violent attacks and discrimination, partly fuelled by negative discourse in the British media and politics (Fox 2013; Fox et al. 2015). As discussed earlier, racialised discourses are not limited solely to the physical characteristics. The markers of difference with regard to Polish migrants could be the language and the foreign accent or even clothing (Dawney 2008; Nowicka 2012; Rzepnikowska 2018). Nevertheless, as Fox (2013, p. 2) highlights, although “putatively shared whiteness does not guarantee that migrants will not be victims of racism” (see also Miles 1982; Roediger 1994), “whiteness does help secure these migrants a better reception vis-à-vis other ‘less white’ migrants”, and it can be used by them as a tool of racism to establish their own racial superiority. Furthermore, Fox and Mogilnicka (2017) argue that East Europeans acquire racism to situate themselves favourably in Britain’s racialised hierarchies, which is considered as a kind of integration.

In contrast to the British context, the issue of whiteness and Polish migration is relatively under-researched in the Spanish context. Recent literature stresses the invisibility and the privileged treatment of Polish migrants who due to their skin complexion are considered as *nórdicos* from the North, highly respected in Spain (Nalewajko 2012; Ramírez Goicoechea 2003). The ‘invisibility’ of Poles is explained by their physical similarity to Spaniards and Catalans (Władyka and Morén-Alegret 2013). Polish migrants are seen as *próximos* (close) (González Leandri 2003) with regard to alleged cultural, historical, political and religious proximity and there is an absence of the negative rhetoric about Polish migrants, in contrast to the British context. Yet, they can also be seen as different because of associations with communism and Russia and Eastern Europe often perceived as backward.

Exploring whiteness in the context of encounters between Polish migrants and the local population in Manchester and Barcelona might lead to a greater understanding of the shifting positioning of these migrants as privileged white Europeans and racialised Eastern European

Others. The concept of racialised positioning draws on the group position theory advanced by Blumer (1958) and extended by Bobo (1999, 2001). According to Bobo (1999, p. 447), “a central claim of the group position approach ... involves most centrally a commitment to a relative status positioning of groups in a racialised order”. Blumer argued that “racial feelings” depend on “a positional arrangement of racial groups” (Blumer 1958, p. 4). Group position theory focuses on “hierarchical social arrangements, systematic and long-standing advantage and disadvantage, privilege and disprivilege allocated along racial lines” (Bobo 2001, p. 206). The concept of group position identified by Bulmer is usually applied to discuss relations between subordinate and dominant groups, although these ideas may also be applied to relations between minority groups in a multi-ethnic context (Bobo 1999). While the group position theory is very useful to draw on when discussing racialised positioning of migrants, the existing literature often overlooks the possibility of shifting and unstable racialised positioning, especially in the context of migrants coming from predominantly white societies in Central and Eastern Europe to multi-ethnic countries.

The empirical examples will show how whiteness, in-betweenness and Otherness are produced through various encounters of Polish migrant women with white and non-white established population and how their shifting racialised positioning is often influenced by spatio-temporal, gender and class dynamics and racialised discourses.

Empirical Examples in Britain

I’m White Until I Start Speaking

As many other research participants, Lucyna, a 34-year-old part-time PhD student and an office worker, was surprised to encounter super-diversity in Britain:

I remember that when I came to England it was a sort of culture shock for me. As I told you, I didn’t expect that there would be so many different people with different skin colour. I thought that they were all white, posh, English, but this is not the case.

The first time Lucyna referred explicitly to her whiteness was when she talked about an encounter between her and her black work colleague and a group of white British youth at a bus stop:

Once in the beginning when I worked at a nursery, I worked with a colleague who was black and we went together to the bus stop. This example shows how people judge others unfairly ... Only because I was white... there was a group of teenagers and they started using racist language directed at her and they were asking me what I was doing with her ... I thought to myself, how wrongly they judged the situation. She was native English, born and bred in Manchester. They were asking her why she came to this country while I was standing next to her and only because I was white, they thought I was alright.

Following from Byrne (2006), Lucyna became conscious of being white in the presence of racialised others. She understood that her positioning as white in the new multicultural environment is a form of privilege of being unnoticed as the Other. Nevertheless, as she explained in the interview, this white privilege only applies until she starts speaking and her ethnic difference becomes more apparent through her accent, illustrating a shifting racialised positioning. Lucyna told me she felt reluctant to speak Polish and admit that she comes from Poland as a result of widespread negative discourses about Polish migrants in the public, political and media debates in Britain (see also Rzepnikowska [2017a]):

It sounds sad but if you don't speak, then everything is alright, because people are not entirely sure if you are Polish, or maybe English, because I am white. But it is obvious that as soon as I start speaking, you can tell that I have an accent and people straight away know and always ask this question: 'Where are you from?' And it doesn't mean that I am embarrassed of being Polish, but I admit that if I don't have to, I don't start this topic. More importantly, I avoid it, because it always brings bad experiences, almost always.

The Polish migrants' otherness is recognised by foreign accent. Polish names, different letters and pronunciation constitute visible and audible markers of difference (Nowicka 2012). To avoid being perceived as the Other, Lucyna prefers not to speak in public. However, her racialised

positioning as white, allowing a certain level of invisibility, is very unstable, as seen above. Whiteness as a racial identity varies according to social context. When Polish migrants are compared to more visible groups, they are considered 'like us' but once they speak up they might be perceived as 'not quite white' (van Riemsdijk 2010). This confirms Frankenberg's (1993, p. 21) argument that whiteness is always emplaced and temporary. This temporary invisibility due to whiteness was also experienced by Bosnian and other ex-Yugoslav refugees in Australia, as illustrated in Colic-Peisker's (2005) research. However, during the second stage of resettlement, the language barrier and non-English speaking background of these refugees became a basis of difference and exclusion.

While in Lucyna's case the foreign accent is associated with negative experiences, the study of social inclusion of professionally educated and employed non-Anglophone migrants in Australia and the perceptions of foreign accent illustrates that frequent contact between the 'multicultural middle class' and its Anglo-Australian counterparts is likely to be a factor in dissociating foreign accent and negative stereotyping (Colic-Peisker and Hlavac 2014, p. 349). The research results showed that foreign accent was 'unremarkable' at workplace in middle class context and perceived as less of a symbol of otherness in comparison to racial visibility. Nevertheless, other studies indicate that the level of acceptance of foreign accents may be much lower in non-middle class settings and more prejudice is directed towards women (Creese 2010; Harrison 2013). Furthermore, it is important to consider the importance of the migration context and to distinguish between different foreign accents, particularly those more and less desirable. In the British context, due to negative discourses on Polish migration, the foreign accent of Polish migrants becomes an undesirable symbol of Otherness. The white privilege becomes less relevant as these migrants experience racialisation because of audible difference. Finally, it is also important to consider migrants' feeling of 'accent related self-consciousness' due to negative stereotyping (Colic-Peisker and Hlavac 2014), as seen in Lucyna's narrative.

They Don't Know Which Group I Belong to ... I Am In-between

Bogusia is a 37-year-old housekeeper at a hotel in Manchester. Her workplace became the most significant place of interaction with people from various backgrounds (see also Rzepnikowska 2017a). Bogusia stressed that despite working as a housekeeper, she interacted more with the kitchen staff (mostly white British and her Polish husband), because they created a space with a “family-like atmosphere” where she felt accepted. Nevertheless, she told me she felt she was in-between because: “They create a separate group and I am in-between”. She added that other workers “don't know which category to pin me in because I don't stick with Czech girls, but I am not English ... so they don't know which group I belong to and I am in-between, one of a kind”. The position of ‘in-betweenness’ may be arising from the idea of not feeling quite Eastern European but, on the other hand, being perceived as the Other, ‘not-quite-European’ (van Riemsdijk 2010) with a lower status position of a room attendant.

I Am His Slave ...This Time I Am Black and He Is White

In the context of relations with a black male supervisor Bogusia's racialised positioning also illustrates some ambiguity (also discussed in Rzepnikowska 2017a):

There is one *Murzyn* at work ... I work with him and I have a feeling, not as a result of his or my racism, but I am his slave. This time I am black and he is white ... he makes me work hard ... I partly allow him because he is above me. I have no problem with my [white female] boss ... from him I only get orders and this is when my racism comes out ... I have nothing against him but I feel like I am his slave ... That snotty-nosed brat is not going to keep on at me to do my work. He is so lazy.

Bogusia used the ambivalent term *Murzyn* when referring to her black supervisor. This term derived from the same root as the English word ‘Moors’ – *maurus* in Latin, indicates a black person (Ząbek 2007). Its

pejorative connotations are influenced by negative stereotypes and ambivalent translations echoing the context of the slavery and colonialism (see also Gawlewicz 2016; Nowicka 2017; Rzepnikowska 2016b), although Polish people are often unaware of the negative meaning of this term. Bogusia's narrative reflects previous research findings revealing that relations between Central and Eastern European migrants and black supervisors often lead to tensions and demonstrations of power (McDowell et al. 2007; Parutis 2011). This narrative illustrates how uncomfortable Bogusia was about finding herself in a subordinate position to and being given orders by a black supervisor. She considered her lesser position as synonymous with blackness. It is possible that her narrative has been affected by the racialised discourse in Poland. Terms such as *Murzyni Europy* [Negroes of Europe], *biali Murzyni* [white Negroes] and 'European Negroes' have been used in some Polish media, social networks and even in politics with reference to white Poles and Europeans who are underpaid, work long hours in difficult conditions, and/or receive a low wage, often in the context of migration.¹ This racialised discourse makes a direct link between blackness, slave-like conditions and low status. Bogusia struggled to see beyond the slave-master and black-white dichotomies. Despite denying racism at first, Bogusia reinforced preconceived notions of blackness associated with slavery and laziness. By ascribing innate deficiencies to her black supervisor, she discursively constructed him as inferior (Fox 2013). Her subordinate position in relation to her black supervisor clashed with the idea of whiteness associated with a position of dominance and privilege.

Bogusia's example highlights the issue of often ignored racism perpetuated by migrants coming from predominantly white societies. It shows that racism does not only refer to the actions of a dominant majority against minorities, but it can be also used by minorities (Fox 2013; Fox and Mogilnicka 2017). Racialised discourses used in Bogusia's example may have been used to construct her supervisor as inferior in the light of her precarious position at work and possibly to advance white privileged position in the racialised hierarchy in the UK. Fox (2013, p. 4) explains that "it is in part because migrants are victims of racism that they turn to racism themselves in an attempt to establish their own racial superiority".

White Youth Hostility Towards Poles

Paulina is 27 years old, married and has two children. She moved to a shared flat in a high-rise block of flats in Salford with her husband and his friends from Poland. She described her neighbourhood as dangerous and populated mainly by people of South Asian origin and white British people. Paulina and her husband became a target of racist harassment (see also Rzepnikowska 2018):

There were a lot of council flats, high-rise blocks and there were many people hostile towards us, Polish people. When they saw we had a car with Polish registration plates, they started harassing us, kicking the car or breaking the windows. This is how they manifested racism toward us.

In contrast to the previous example, Paulina does not position herself as white in the context of relations with white British people. Her narrative raises the issue of racism and xenophobia based on her nationality/ethnicity. Paulina's car with the Polish registration plates became the symbol of Otherness and, therefore, the target of violence. Nowicka (2012, p. 116) emphasises that Polish migrants "disturb a certain invisibility of white immigrants with the legal equal status of European Union citizens". While previously the conflict and tensions used to affect relations between white British majority and non-white minorities, currently there are new tensions and new forms of racism between newly arrived migrants and the locals. Even though Polish migrants often identify as white, they are racialised and constructed as the unwanted Other. Even if the newcomers are white, they are imagined through the category of race because they are immigrants (Gilroy 2006, p. 56). In the light of socio-economic deprivation of some neighbourhoods, some established residents perceive Polish migrants as a threat and a source of competition for jobs, welfare services and housing.

Paulina's inferior racialised positioning in the context of encounters with British white youth in her neighbourhood changes when she encounters people of South Asian origin. As several other research participants, Paulina positioned herself implicitly as white in the context of contact with men of South-Asian origin (see Rzepnikowska 2016a). Paulina associated these men with kidnappings and rapes of women and with Islam. This echoes stereotypical portrayals of the sexually abusive

Muslim men based on orientalist discourse (Said 1995). In the context of gendered encounter with these men Paulina positioned herself as white by emphasising recognisable ‘Polish appearance’: “My hair colour indicated that I am Polish. Anyway, you can recognise Poles here”.

Several interviewees in Barcelona also expressed their awareness of their foreign appearance when they discussed encounters with non-white men (Rzepnikowska 2017b). Some referred to their blond hair, like Paulina, and blue eyes associated with whiteness. Several said they felt ‘exotic’ due to their foreign look which they thought attracted unwanted attention, particularly from non-white men.

Being with a Black Partner and a Mother of a Mixed-Race Child

The example of another interviewee, 33-year-old Judyta, illustrates how her racial positioning shifts from that of being a mother to a mix-raced child and a partner of a black man, to that of being a privileged white woman and distancing herself from blackness, possibly as a result of pressure from co-ethnics expecting her to fit to a role of the cultural reproducer of the nation (Yuval-Davis 1997); and in other context to that of a migrant woman identifying with black mothers (see also Rzepnikowska 2016a). She felt out-of-place with her black partner and mixed-race child during a Children’s Day event at a Polish club in Manchester attended mostly by white Polish people. Even though mixed-race relationships between Polish migrants and other ethnic minorities are a growing phenomenon, the response of some Poles can be negative (Siarą 2009). Judyta was afraid to take her son to a Polish Saturday school in Manchester or to Poland. She feared he would face racist prejudice. This reminded her about repeated experiences on public transport in Poland when elderly women would make remarks about her son’s skin colour by using the word *Murzynek* strongly disapproved by Judyta. She contested labelling of her child as black by emphasising his bright complexion and by affirming that he is mixed and not “*murzynskie dziecko*” (a black/Negro child) of both black parents. It is possible that this discursive ‘whitening’ is influenced by the deeply rooted and stereotyped images of blackness in

the Polish consciousness and by expectations for women to play a key role in the boundary maintenance and reproduction of their ethnic group (Anthias and Yuval-Davis 1992).

Later in the interview Judyta used a racialising rhetoric when discussing relationships with black men, implicitly positioning herself as a privileged white woman:

I think that black men enter relationships with white women because this offers them a higher prestige. I've had an impression that for them a white woman is something better. Maybe they feel they have a higher status because they are with a white woman and they have mixed children and not black ones (...) because black people are treated as more inferior.

Nevertheless, the racialised discourse was absent in Judyta's narrative about relations with black women with whom she identified because of shared experiences of motherhood and migration (Rzepnikowska 2016a). In her narrative about activities with other mothers, she focused on those commonalities that intercut the dimensions of fixed identity and difference. Despite the initial shock about ethnic diversity in Britain, some Polish migrants establish stronger links with other migrants on the basis of shared experiences (D'Angelo and Ryan 2011). Furthermore, as argued elsewhere (Rzepnikowska 2016a), Judyta and her child's socialisation with a black mother and her children possibly relieved the pressure from other Poles expecting her to fit to a role of the cultural reproducer of the nation (Yuval-Davis 1997) and it offered a sense of security away from racism expressed by other Poles.

Empirical Examples in Spain

If You Are White from Poland ... They [Blacks] Listen to You

Marlena, a 58-year-old cleaner, who had lived for several years in Madrid and then moved to Barcelona, illustrates how she positioned herself as a superior white in relation to South American and black migrants,

although in relations with Catalans she was positioned as an Eastern European Other. Marlena's narrative about relations with her black and South American co-workers at a restaurant illustrates how she positioned herself as white:

I like black people but I don't like South Americans, but not because of skin colour. South Americans are mean, two-faced and they can't work ... I couldn't work with them. Polish women can't work with them because they are thick ... They are good waiters because they understand the language but they are dirty ... If you are in a restaurant you will see how a Pole or a Romanian tidies up and how *sudak* [racial slur] will do it ... I don't like them, I hate them ... They came [swearing] from the bush ... I like blacks because they are smarter and this is the difference. If you work with a person from Africa, I am not talking about the skin colour but about a country, a continent. If you are white from Poland, you are close to Germany, they listen to you and they do what you advised them. They see an authority figure in you and they want to learn.

By stressing her whiteness and the whiteness of the Polish nation and proximity to Germany symbolising the West, Marlena reinforced racialised perceptions and ideas about the Other. She reinforced a highly racist image of 'dirty' and 'lazy' South Americans, with a use of offensive and racialised term *sudak* (originating from the colloquial and derogatory term *sudaca* used in Spain to refer to South Americans, having its origin in deformation of the term *sudamericano* [South American]) in opposition to likable but subordinate blacks. Following from Fox (2013), by ascribing these deficiencies to the former, Marlena discursively constructs them as inferior, contrasting presumably clean, educated and hardworking Polish migrants. As discussed earlier, racism is the ideology that makes use of not only phenotypical and biological but also of cultural difference.

The construction of the latter includes a supposedly positive discourse about black people. However, it is premised on traditional racist ideology and belief of blacks' genetic inferiority contrasting whites' superiority. Furthermore, blacks are described as smart not necessarily in terms of their intelligence but because they are seen as subjugated to authoritative whites. By distinguishing herself from others on the basis on skin colour and positioning herself as white, Marlena placed herself in a position of

power in relation to non-whites (Parutis 2011). She established her own racial superiority towards these groups perceived as racially inferior possibly to maintain and improve labour market position and relieve insecurities and frustrations; and as mentioned in Bogusia's case, to symbolically claim belonging to the dominant majority privileged by whiteness (Fox 2013). It is possible that Marlena needed to assert her whiteness and proximity to Germany to distance herself from non-European and non-white Others and to 'whiten the self' (Fox 2013, p. 11). Furthermore, the constructions of superiority by some Polish migrants over other migrants reflect not only exposure to racialised discourses in Poland but also to public, media and state discourses in Spain involving racialisation of non-European and non-white migrants seen as problematic (Nalewajko 2012). Negative stereotyping of other migrant groups in host society legitimises prejudiced attitudes and facilitates favourable insertion of non-problematic migrants into racialised hierarchies of that society (Fox 2013).

Eastern European Others

While Marlena asserted whiteness in the context of relations with non-white and non-European migrants, she and several other research participants in Barcelona thought that Poland and Polish people were sometimes perceived as stereotypical Eastern European Others by Spaniards and Catalans, often associated with the Soviet bloc, backward East and exoticism, and they felt uncomfortable with this form of othering:

Catalans think that we are good friends with the Russians. They don't know much about us and they associate us with communism after the Second World War. (Marlena)

They think that in Poland polar bears run on the streets. I went to a laser hair removal and the beautician asked me if I had it done before and I said 'yes, in my country'. She asked me 'Where are you from?' and I replied 'From Poland'. She said 'Really? You have laser treatment in Poland? ... They have no idea about our level of life, what sort of people we are. They think we still have communism and you have to explain it all to them. (Dominika)

Nalewajko (2012) points out that it seems that in the Spanish imagination, Poland is seen in homogenous terms as poor Eastern Europe. Similarly, van Riemsdijk (2010) claims that citizens of some European countries imagine Eastern Europe as less developed and ‘not-quite-European’.

Zofia’s narrative also illustrates changing racialised positioning. Initially, in some situations she was treated as the unwanted Eastern European Other:

When I worked in a restaurant ... some clients didn’t want to be served by me, a foreigner. Some didn’t know where Poland is, if we speak Russian, if there is still communism in Poland ... or there were situations when someone would say ‘Didn’t you come to this country to earn money and send it home?’ Or ‘You take advantage of our country for your own benefit and that of your family.’

For some time, this racialisation as Eastern European Other made her feel like a stranger, somewhat inferior. As a result she resisted telling people about her Spanish boyfriend:

I thought that people would think: a girl from the East came to a developed western country, as if I won a lottery, because at the beginning many people thought that. It is surprising how stereotypes can affect self-esteem. I experienced this myself.

You Are Ours

Having gained more work experience, finished her studies and mastered Catalan and Spanish, Zofia distanced herself from the ascribed category of Eastern European Other. The acceptance by her Catalan partner’s family made her feel like a family member (Rzepnikowska 2017b). She also became part of a Catalan association which aims to promote Catalan culture outside of Spain and she developed a strong sense of belonging to this group: “This was an honour for me because I am the only foreigner there ... I also feel like this is my culture, my language and my family”. Being Polish did not exclude her from becoming a part of the group and

her experience illustrates a great example of conviviality beyond ethno-national boundaries (Rzepnikowska 2016b). Nevertheless, it should be noted that her whiteness combined with cultural capital (knowledge of Catalan) gave her advantage of being accepted as a member of a white Catalan group.

Justyna's narrative about her Catalan friends and their attitude to migrants is a good example of how Polish migrants may be seen as 'one of us' by some Catalans in contrast to less desirable non-white, non-European and non-Christian migrants:

Recently I noticed anti-immigrant attitudes among people. They think that Barcelona is more favourable to immigrants, that a native person coming from this city gets lost here. For example, recently I heard this from friends ... but sometimes it makes me feel sad, they don't realise that I sit next to them and I can hear it, and then they say: 'we forget that you are not from here, you are ours'. But obviously they just don't get it, because they talk about immigrants and, hello, I am also [an immigrant], I'm not from here.

Despite being a migrant, the perception of Justyna by her friends as 'one of us' confirms the claims discussed previously about the Spanish imagination of cultural proximity between Polish migrants and the Spaniards. Justyna becomes aware that other less white and non-European migrant groups are stigmatised, while her presence is not perceived as a 'problem'. Nevertheless, her privileged position ascribed to her by her Catalan friends does not stop her from saying 'I am not from here', 'I'm an immigrant too'. The preferential treatment of Justyna, who as a white and European migrant does not constitute 'a problem' is embedded in a wider process of racialisation of non-European and non-white others.

Conclusions

Whereas literature tends to focus on relations between host society and postcolonial/non-European/non-white ethnic minorities, this paper concentrated on encounters between post-2004 Polish migrants with the

native white population and settled ethnic minorities and other migrants. What is particularly interesting about these migrants is their often unstable and shifting racialised positioning.

The empirical examples discussed in this paper showed how whiteness, in-betweenness, Otherness and other types of positioning are produced and reproduced through various encounters with white and non-white population in both Manchester and Barcelona, and how whiteness is not just phenotypic but malleable, conditional and temporary. In some situations, Polish migrants may become victims of racism, xenophobia and stereotyping, while in other contexts, privileged white Europeans, suggesting temporary sameness and partial inclusion in the notion of 'us'. This paper also highlighted the issue of often ignored racism by migrants coming from predominantly white society. It confirmed Fox's (2013) argument that Central and Eastern European migrants are often racialised as different, and at the same time some of them assert whiteness to racialise others and to claim belonging to the dominant majority's privileged category of whiteness. Whiteness is perceived as the norm and mostly asserted or recognised in the context of encounters with non-whites and non-Europeans, particularly in the context of workplace and street encounters.

While some interviewees openly spoke about their whiteness and expressed prejudice, others were less explicit with regards to their racialised positioning as white. It is important to keep in mind that "the absence of racist rhetoric does not imply the absence of racialization or racism" (Leitner 2012, p. 837). Leitner argues that "more educated and well-off whites are better able to control forms of racial signification than are working-class whites for a variety of reasons, including differences in their linguistic repertoire that provide different resources for expressing beliefs" (ibid). Furthermore, even a sincere and well-intended talk about others may conceal racialised power relations.

Several narratives illustrated that even though whiteness does not protect Polish migrants from racism, xenophobia and stereotyping in both cities, in some contexts they seem to be in a better position than more visible non-white minorities. In the context of Brexit, Polish

migrants find themselves in a more precarious situation than Poles in Spain. Their experiences after the EU referendum in 2016 characterised by anti-Polish sentiment (Rzepnikowska 2018) require further exploration. As Erel et al. (2016, p. 1349) argue, the racialisation of European citizens from predominantly white societies ‘create co-citizens as foreigners’ in the context of Brexit. The racist violence followed by the EU referendum in 2016 in the UK clearly shows that the perpetrators ‘made little attempt to distinguish black and brown citizens and white European migrants – in their eyes, they were all outsiders’ (Virdee and McGeever 2017, p. 7).

As seen above, the shifting positioning is influenced by gender, socio-economic status, language, accent, motherhood, spatio-temporal dynamics, as well as racialised discourses in both home and receiving countries. Even though there are some similarities in the positioning of Polish women, there is heterogeneity of experiences, also conditioned by their personal histories, experiences and backgrounds. Their positioning should not always be understood in binary terms but rather as multidimensional.

While this research focused on Polish migrant women, future research should equally explore racial positioning of Polish men. Also, longitudinal research could shed light on how Polish migrants’ positioning may change over a longer period of time.

Notes

1. A populist Polish MEP Janusz Korwin-Mikke, in his speech in the European parliament in 2014 used the term ‘Negroes of Europe’. The article titled “Murzyni Europy” [Negros of Europe] in *Gazeta Finansowa*, August 26, 2016, makes a direct reference to Polish migrants in various European countries, including the UK. See various discussions on a Polish forum website mentioning the term *biali Murzyni* [white Negroes]. “Biali murzyni – najlepsze wpisy,” *Gazeta.pl* Forum, accessed December 13, 2017, <http://dyskusje.gwar.pl/szukaj/forum/biali+murzyni>

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Part II

Racism and the Dehumanisation of the Imagined Black



9

Black Is Not Beautiful: The German Myth of Race

Susann Therese Samples

“Black is beautiful” affirmed and celebrated black pride and self-esteem during the Civil Rights Movement of the 1950s and 1960s in the United States. During this period, African Americans embraced their Blackness and African ancestry. Concurrently, African Americans also began a concerted campaign against the racism of the American visual culture. Racist images of such darky icons as the Mammy, the Coon, the Pickaninny, the Sambo, and the Uncle Tom appeared on a vast array of items, ranging from salt and pepper shakers to the ubiquitous lawn jockey, to board games, food products, advertising, and the media. The frequency and popularity of these negative images of African Americans reinforced the negative attitudes towards Blacks. The gradual disappearance of these racist images and the passage of anti-discriminatory laws began the process of integrating African Americans into American society.¹ In *Black Looks*, however, bell hooks argues that the image of African Americans still

S. T. Samples (✉)

Mount Saint Mary's University, Emmitsburg, MD, USA

e-mail: samples@msmary.edu

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consists of stereotypes: “If we compare the relative progress African Americans have made in education and employment to the struggle to gain control over how we are represented, particularly in the mass media, we see that there had been little change in the area of representation” (hooks 1992). Instead of the degrading darky icons, African Americans are portrayed as stellar athletes, great singers, etc.

In Germany the slogan “Black is beautiful” acquires a more ambivalent interpretation because the German visual culture is characterized by racist images of Blacks and Blackness. For example, the unprecedented size of the post-World War Two generation of Afro-Germans (ca. 6000) prompted a great deal of discussion about their ability to “fit in” German society (Eyferth et al. 1960; Ebeling 1954). However, the growing numbers of African-descended people living in contemporary Germany view “black” traits and black ancestry as increasingly positive and beautiful. The designation “Black” itself, is ambiguous and political since it can designate any darker-skinned individual: “In many European nations, people of color are categorized under the generic label of ‘Blacks’” (Lusane 2002). However, for the purposes of this study, Black will refer specifically to any person(s) of partly African descent. Blacks and Afro-Germans living in present-day Germany experience challenges, developing and maintaining self-esteem and a positive attitude about their African heritage because the visual culture of Germany stigmatizes their skin colour and marks them as Other (hooks 1992; Rutherford 1990; Wright 2004; Hine et al. 2009). For Germans, in general, skin colour is often the determining factor of establishing identity and hierarchy: “Color is not seen as value-free. ‘White,’ the ‘abstraction’ of all colors, is equated with purity (hygienic and moral), with wholeness. ‘Black,’ by contrast, the ‘subtraction’ of all colors, stands for dirt, for evil as such, for menacing nothingness” (Wiedenroth 1992). The presence of racist Black images denies the individuality of the African-descended people and instead reduces them to a series of racist Black stereotypes and caricatures.

The German visual culture is characterized by a “blackface mentality.” By definition, blackface is makeup typically used by a white person (or non-black) to portray a black person.² Like the donning of blackface, the blackface mentality describes the process of the German visual culture’s re-imagining Blacks into its own racist stereotypes. Blackface and another

recurring image, the colonized African native, are products of German imagination, but both affirm and perpetuate the power dynamics of white superiority and black inferiority. The Black Diaspora is an acknowledgement of the shared, common trait of African ancestry, but it also celebrates the diversity of experience which its members have. The blackface mentality of the German visual culture, however, rejects this diversity and instead reduces Blacks to racial stereotypes and caricatures (Segal 1995; Hine and McLeod 1999). The purpose of this essay is to discuss two practices in which Blacks are represented in Germany: the wearing of blackface and the colonized African native.

The blackface mentality is evident in the persistent negative attitudes about and images of Blacks in the German visual culture. People of African descent living in Germany find themselves being defined by these negative racial stereotypes. In her autobiography, *Invisible Woman*, Ika, a post-World War Two biracial German, recounts how her skin colour stigmatized her as Other: “It is universally accepted that it is a terrible thing to be Black and that Blacks are stupid...” (Hügel-Marshall 2008). Further, these Black stereotypes caused her to experience self-hatred: “Blacks are utterly strange to me, and I fear them. I’ve come to hold certain beliefs about them by generalizing from my own case: I am Black and I am ugly, awful to look at with hair so wild no stylist could tame it. I’m a bad seed, wayward, immoral, filthy, and stupid” (Hügel-Marshall 2008).

Blackface can be traced back to the minstrel shows of nineteenth-century America. This employment of blackface and its concomitant, the minstrel show, stressed and made fun of racist Black stereotypes. The white performers exaggerated the physical features of Blacks in a grotesque fashion: the skin colour was coal black with the lips big and wide—painted white or red for emphasis. The clothing, garish, loud, and tasteless, also emphasized difference, i.e. inferiority. Also highly damaging was the deliberate distortion of Black dancing and mannerisms. In American mass media blackface was widely popular: movies, radio, theatre, television, comics, cartoons, etc. Blackface eventually acquired a veracity for the majority white population, however, how they viewed blackness was essentially imaginary, and thus had little or nothing to do with actual black experience. If one sees an image time after time, that

image becomes normal.³ Blackface is a worldwide phenomenon and reflects the various countries' racist cultural traditions. For example, in the Netherlands, a popular figure is *Zwarte Piet* ("Black Pete"), servant of the White Santa Claus who celebrates his birthday in early December, and in Iran Haji Firuz appears in blackface to celebrate *Norooz* (the "Persian New Year"). In 2013 a *Dancing with the Stars* participant darkened her skin to "honor" her favorite actor from *Orange is the New Black*. She was widely criticized for this act (*Dancing with the Stars* 2013).

The image of the colonized African native is a legacy of German colonialism. During the German Colonial Period (1884–1919), theories and ideas such as Social Darwinism and eugenics were highly popular, which further fueled European (German) notions of race and white superiority and domination. Like other colonial powers, Germany saw itself as a "civilizing agent" for the Africans. Hegel also was instrumental in fostering the Germans' negative perception of Blacks, because he argued that Blacks were inferior. In stark contrast to Europe, he pictured Africa as devoid of history. In his *Philosophy of History*, Hegel writes: "At this point we leave Africa, not to mention it again. For it is not a historical part of the World; it has no movement or development to exhibit" (Hegel 1959). Hegel provided a justification for continuing the colonialization.

Africans were brought to Germany as cultural curiosities. *Völkerschauen* ("human exhibits") were popular during this period in the United States as well as Europe. Perhaps the most famous exhibited African was Sara Saartjie Baartman, the so-called "Hottentot Venus." In life Sara Baartman was exhibited naked to women and men. Her dehumanization continued after her death when her vagina, brain, and skeleton were preserved and exhibited in a museum until 1974 (*The Story of Sara Baartman* 2014). Groups of Africans would be on display in their "natural settings," engaged in their everyday activities. At times, these human exhibits stressed the sexual traits of Africans that were considered abnormal compared to white bodies. The actual agenda of these human exhibits was to emphasize cultural differences between Europeans and Africans or, in other words, to demonstrate white superiority and to justify German (European) Colonialization (Dreesbach 2005; van der Heyden 2003). The exhibition of African bodies continued in death; intact bodies, parts of bodies were on display for "scientific study."

In nineteenth-century Germany socio-economic and racial hierarchies were closely related. The colonialization of Africa provided a much needed diversion from the serious domestic issues facing Germany during the Second Reich (1871–1918). Working and living conditions brought about by the Industrial Revolution made Socialism attractive to the working class, but it was an anathema to the conservative ruling classes. The colonizing of Africa facilitated the fostering of a common German consciousness and nationalism. The perception of the African as inferior allowed even the Germans on the lowest socio-economic levels to feel superior. The combination of nationalism and racism helped to unify the Germans (Perraudin and Zimmer 2011), for the Second Reich reflected a forced unification of the predominately Catholic regions with the majority Protestant regions. A mutual distrust existed between these two major religious groups. Further, unions buoyed by the Social Democrats increasingly made more demands on the conservative and autocratic government to improve the working conditions and the quality of life (Raff 1988). The German colonies in Africa consequently functioned as a safety valve for an oppressive and rigid society, providing a means of escape.

German colonialism helped to foster the notion of white supremacy in Germany: “Clichéd ideas and stereotypes in terms of the colonized peoples in no way remained limited to all German publications and colonial trivial literature. Further, large components of the Social Sciences—like ethnology, cultural anthropology, geography and medicine—provided the apparent scientific foundations for the racist ideology of the biological, intellectual and cultural superiority of the white race”—translated from German (Gründler 1999). This racism viewed Blacks as both culturally and genetically inferior. The values of such a hierarchal society and its imperialistic interests devalued Africans. Germany’s colonies in Africa provided the raw resources which further strengthened its Industrial Revolution. It is ironic that this dual exploitation of the colonial subjects and resources not only reinforced German economic superiority and control of Africa, but also created prosperity and hence political stability. This interdependence, however, was conveniently overlooked.

The image of the colonized African native, has remained a component of the German landscape (Hinrichsen 2012; Langbehn 2011). The

actual Colonial Period was brief (1884–1919), but a nostalgia for this ‘glorious’ past persisted until after World War Two. In fact, during these war years, a number of colonial-themed films appeared in Germany, trying to connect the Empire of the past with the National Socialist vision of German Empire at that time. One notable film is *Carl Peters (1941)*, whose depiction of Africans is replete with Black stereotypes. In *Showing Our Colors*, Erika, a biracial German recalled that these productions, lacking enough “Africans,” brought in black POWs:

One time about two hundred to two hundred and fifty Black prisoners of war were brought in because they needed extras for a film. Black POWs from the United States besides. Those poor fellows were glad to be with us, since they got to eat and play football and were treated well. (Reiprich and Ngambi ul Kuo 1992)

In these colonial films, the African native appears as a primitive savage that is slow-witted, scantily dressed, barefoot, etc.

In stark contrast to the United States, blackface is still acceptable in Germany (as well many other countries): all age groups and both genders participate in this activity.⁴ *Kultfaktor*, a subdivision of Amazon.de, sells a large variety of blackface-related articles (Kultfaktor 2017). For 2.99 Euro, one can purchase a jet-black cream that is for the *Gesicht- und Körperfarbe* (“face and body color,”) and one can emphasize the stereotypically large and wide lips by applying white or red colouring. Online there is a huge selection of black-themed wigs, indicating an American influence characterized by racist urban African American stereotypes. Thus, the German consumer can choose a wig for a rapper, Rasta, or pimp, to name a few. The Afro, of course, is the most popular type of Black hair wig, appearing in a variety of sizes and colours. The hair typically is kinky and wild, stressing Otherness. Afro wigs also can be purchased with the accompanying black stereotypical hat/cap gear. These Afro wigs and accessories typically focus on the negative images of urban African Americans. One latex mask of a Black jazz musician is a grotesque grinning caricature: the skin colour is ink black and the face has a big, flat nose and huge lips and teeth. The blackface under discussion also can encompass posturing. Since many of the items are associated with

urban African American stereotypes, adult wearers of this type of blackface sometimes attempt to “walk Black,” which again reduces all African Americans to one distorted caricature. In the United States items such as “bling-bling,” rapper costumes, and black hair wigs are also available on [Amazon.com](https://www.amazon.com), however; the wearing of these items results in harsh criticism and condemnation (Bling Bling Rapper Costume 2016). In general, these items reflect and reinforce racist cultural traditions. The wearing of blackface is, nevertheless, popular throughout the world.

The employment of blackface in Germany falls under two main categories: (1) for good or benevolent causes and (2) for fun and entertainment. Whenever German children appear in blackface, it is often for charitable or religious purposes. For example, German children don blackface as a German Christmas tradition. According to popular legend, one of the three biblical Magi, (the three wise men) Balthasar, was black. Since 1959 German children have been dressing up as the Three Magi for a Catholic Charity fundraiser: they (the *Sternsänger* “star singers”) walk the streets, singing carols and collecting money for various aid projects. It is important that the Balthasar figure is easily identifiable, hence the blackface. Online there are photos of the German chancellor, Angela Merkel, smiling with a child in blackface portraying Balthasar (Angela Merkel with Balthasar 2016). Her presence lends a legitimacy to the practice of blackface.

Four interrelated ads appeared for UNICEF in 2007, with each ad depicting a different German child wearing blackface (Scandalous German UNICEF Advertising Campaign 2007). Here, the purpose of the blackface was for the German children to show solidarity with the African children. However, the employment of blackface stressed the differences which, in turn, kept alive the myth of white superiority. The allocation of space for the German child and the map of Africa is telling: the German children appeared much larger than the image of Africa, suggesting an unequal power dynamic. These ads implied that Africa was overwhelmed by its problems. By stating what Africans lacked, these ads played into the recurring racial image of Africa as one unending crisis and misery. While the objective of this ad campaign was to obtain financial aid for African children, it also reflected the continuing legacy of German colonialism in that it projected a paternalistic attitude towards Africa and Blacks

(Hondius 2014). Faced with loud criticism for the racism of these ads, UNICEF withdrew them.

In the 1952 movie *Toxi*, a reversal of roles occurs in the use of blackface, which had serious implications for that post-World War Two period. Toxi, a young biracial German girl, struggles to find acceptance in West Germany. In one notable scene, Toxi appears in whiteface as one of the two white Magi, while one of the two German sisters appears in blackface as Balthasar. As the darker-skinned child, Toxi would have been the logical choice for Balthasar. Instead, her wearing of whiteface is a device to stress her outsider status in German society. As a biracial German, Toxi cannot be considered “fully” German. Indeed, her African American GI father conveniently arrives to take her away to the United States where she presumably “belongs.” This solution is troubling since it ignores the fact that Toxi is culturally a German and speaks no English. This fiction actually mirrored the reality of that era: many Germans believed that these biracial children should be placed in homes overseas, preferably in the countries of their birth fathers. German intellectuals seriously debated the “adaptability” of these biracial children (Eyferth et al. 1960).

In its campaign against the capitalistic and imperialistic West, i.e. West Germany, East Germany emphasized the Communist ideal of *Völkerfreundschaft* “friendship of the peoples.” The Communist government provided financial and technical aid to developing countries and welcomed guest workers and university students of colour into East Germany. However, a wide gap existed between the state’s attitude and that of the average East German citizen. In general, the East Germans showed an antipathy to these foreigners, especially Africans (Dennis 2011; Schüle 2003).

Blackface, when worn by adults, can be either political or for entertainment. In March 2016, an amateur German soccer team was the object of a great deal of social media interest because the white members of the team appeared together in a group photo, wearing blackface (German Soccer Team Posts Blackface Photo to Fight Racism 2016). They donned blackface in order to show solidarity with their two Sudanese teammates who had been victims of racism. The players chose a dark brown instead of the normal ink black makeup, but their facial features, nonetheless, appear distorted. Because of its ugly and racist history, blackface should not be employed, however worthy the cause or intention.

Blackface is much in evidence in the popular culture of Germany. For example, the *Karneval* (“Mardi Gras”) season, with its emphasis on masquerades, readily lends itself to the donning of blackface. The tradition of *Karneval* dates back to the 1800s in the western part of Germany. At that time the costumes functioned as a means of mockery. Again, the marketing of blackface-related products is a big business. One popular iconic figure of this celebration and other masquerade events is the *Sarotti-Mohr* (“Sarotti-Moor”). Groups of revellers continue to don blackface to be this famous little black boy icon (van der Heyden 2002). The *Sarotti-Mohr* was created during the Colonial Period and reinforces the image of the colonized African native; he is subordinate and servile. The *Sarotti-Mohr* is a logo for chocolate and the image of this little black boy like the American darky icon, has appeared on items such as porcelain figures, puppets, stuffed toys, etc. It is noteworthy that the *Sarotti-Mohr*, a national icon, has undergone a face lift of sorts: his skin colour is now brown and his features more Middle Eastern (he appears now as an Orientalized Black); however, his subordinate position is unchanged.

In 2013 a popular television show, “*Wetten...Dass?*” (“Wanna Bet That?”) challenged its studio audience to blacken their faces in order to portray a classic figure from a children’s tale, Jim Knopf, the black companion of Lucas the locomotive engine driver. It was a publicity stunt, but many people did indeed don blackface and are shown smiling in one group photo (Stonington 2016). This and the other aforementioned examples of the donning of blackface suggest that for Germans, Blacks can only be depicted with the identifying marker of skin colour. By its very nature, blackface perpetuates the negative images of Blacks.

The question then arises, “Why is blackface so appealing in Germany?” After all, Blacks do not look like this. Blacks are not all coal black and have huge, liver lips, nor do Blacks all have big, bulging eyes and large, pearly teeth. One explanation for the continuing acceptance and popularity of blackface in Germany may be the Germans’ fascination with the exotic (Baum et al. 1992; Wiedenroth 1992), which is based on the myth of race. Exotic is code for non-German, or non-white. Thus, being Black is so alien, so different from Germans’ white privileged experience, that “becoming Black,” that is, wearing blackface, offers a release from the constraints of German disciplined civility and culture. The German adults who employ blackface can perceive themselves as losing their inhi-

bitions by becoming what they perceive to be “Black,” which consists of racist stereotypes.

In the advertising field, the image of the colonized African native, the theme numerous products employed as their logo during the Colonial Period, continues to be popular (Hund et al. 2013; Ciarlo 2011; Huggan 2001; Kellner et al. 1995). The colonized African native represented the fantasies of colonial rule and the perceptions of racial difference. The common characteristics of the colonized African native bear a similarity to the racist African American stereotypes. Africans therefore appear with big, protruding, lips, their complexion is ink black, their hair kinky, and barefoot. The distinguishing “African” traits are little clothing (grass skirts), turbans, and earrings. These colonized African native figures were designed not only to sell a particular product, but also to stress German domination and superiority, or in other words, African subjection and inferiority. They therefore reinforced the roles and identity for the colonizers as well as the colonized. Like blackface, the image of the colonized African native is pure fantasy.

Until recently, a soft ice cream dipped in chocolate was called an *Eis-Neger* (“Negro or ‘N’ ice cream”). *Neger* is controversial since it can have two meanings: either Negro or the “N” word. On 13 May 2013, someone posted: “Lecker Eis-Neger Jumboportion beim Sonntagsausflug in Werder. Hier darf man noch ungestraft einen Neger bestellen.” (Delicious Negro ice cream large scoop during a Sunday excursion in Werder. Here one can still order a Negro without being punished).⁵ The writer’s choice of using the single word *Neger* to refer to the ice cream also is noteworthy, because here the writer blurs the product with the individual. It is bizarre that one can order a Negro (or in buying a slave), but then one would eat the Negro by consuming the ice cream cone. The employment of terms relating to Blacks to describe foods or drinks reflects the legacy of colonialism and white European superiority. The eating or drinking of an ethnic group implies domination on the part of the Europeans, and it presumes a passivity and weakness on the part of the colonized, here the Africans. Furthermore, people of African ancestry are still subjected to having their skin colour described in words normally associated with eating or drinking, for example, *kaffeebraun* “coffee brown.” This tendency also persists in the United States. In a 1995 radio segment about mixed

race Germans, the reporter described the Afro-German man as: “But even his curly hair and café au lait complexion made him stand out” (All Things Considered 1995).

Another example of the colonized African native pertains to Haribo, a German company, which is world famous for its gummy bears. One particular brand is the Skipper Mix, a salty black licorice shaped into ethnic masks or faces to depict the various ports that the “skipper” has visited. The mask depicting an African male is one racist caricature, appearing in profile with big knots representing the kinky hair. The mouth is open and he wears an earring. The facial features are exaggerated to ensure that he is identified as Black. The consuming of this licorice reinforces the unequal power dynamic between the overwhelmingly white consumer and the “licorice” African. In response to a social media campaign, Haribo removed the Skipper Mix from its Danish and Swedish markets (Burrows 2015). It is, nonetheless, troubling that the image of the African remains so racially stereotypical.

Children’s books and songs, often a German child’s first encounter with people of African descent, also reinforce the “blackface mentality” since the legacy of colonialism influences many of these texts, affirming the patriarchal and racial hierarchy in German society. Children’s literature and songs can be an integral component of the socialization process: children learn about their own identity and role in their own society and in the world as well as those of other ethnic groups. Both the book *Der kleine schwarze Sambo* (*Little Black Sambo*) and the song “Zehn Kleine Negerlein” (“Ten Little ‘N’”) introduce their young audiences to different and alien settings and even stranger figures. The selection of black children protagonists is deliberate. Black children, especially boys, are viewed as less dangerous or threatening than adult black males. These black children, like their counterpart, the colonized African native, support the colonial attitude that Blacks were indeed childlike and thus needed to be controlled (by Europeans). A contradiction persisted concerning how Germans viewed Africans: either they were child-like or brutes (Martin 2001).

Der kleine schwarze Sambo was written and illustrated by Helene Bannerman in 1899 at the height of the British Empire. The original setting for the book was India, where tigers are indigenous. The word Sambo

can be traced to both American and British racist cultural traditions. However, the term Sambo and the illustrations accompanying this narrative reflected a more American influence in terms of racist Black images. According to American tradition, Sambo was a docile and content black slave. A comparative study of two editions (1928 and 1984) shows that little has changed in the imaging of Blacks (Bannerman 1928, 1984).

The obvious racism of the 1928 edition mirrors its times. The illustrator, Helmut Skarbina (1888–1945), graphically conveys the message that black is ugly. Further, the 1928 edition's subtitle, *Eine lustige Negergeschichte* (“*A Funny ‘N’ Story*”) effectively sets the tone: children are expected to laugh at the antics of a hapless black boy. The narrative continually pokes fun at Sambo and his parents, who are depicted in this book. The illustrations dramatically distort these black figures; they appear as grotesque caricatures of Blacks. Thus, Sambo is so coal black that only his eyes, nose, and big lips and teeth are discernible in some of the illustrations. Their house is never depicted and the only visible items of furniture are a primitive stove and a simple dining table set. Most disturbing is one illustration that depicts the similarity between Sambo and a monkey: their postures are parallel, their facial features are similar, and both the monkey and Sambo have a similar hair type. The message here is clear: Sambo has much more in common with animals than with humans.

The illustrations of the 1984 edition, a reprint of the original Bannerman narrative, are also racist. In the 1984 edition Sambo's parents are racial caricatures of the American “darky” icons. The mother, Mumbo, wears an outsized bandana and is large, reminiscent of a “Mammy” figure. Mumbo is the complete domestic: she sews her son a new set of clothes, and later she is depicted at a primitive hearth, preparing an absurd amount of pancakes for her family. She is not depicted outside of the family home. The father, Jumbo, wears a wide brimmed hat--the kind associated with the Deep South--and smokes a corn cob pipe. Since the gender roles are traditional, Jumbo, the father, enjoys more freedom: he travels away from home. The 1984 edition depicts Sambo and his parents with big, thick red lips and broad, wide and large noses, and, of course, they are all barefoot in order to show their huge ugly feet. Instead of having kinky hair, Sambo now has curly hair. In one profile of Sambo's mother, she appears almost ape-like--grinning. Their clothing is still rem-

iniscient of minstrel attire: loud, flamboyant, marking them as Other. Germans would never wear such outlandish clothing. Since clothing can be an indication of civilization, the depicted clothing in this book implies a low level of civilization, or in other words, a cultural inferiority. In short, the appearance of Sambo and his parents is offsetting; black is ugly, whereas white is beautiful. In *White*, Richard Dyer comments: “But this then is why it is important to come to see whiteness. For those in power in the West, as long as whiteness is felt to be the human condition, then it alone both defines normality and fully inhabits it” (Dyer 2017).

In addition to “ugly,” the narrative stresses Sambo’s inferiority: he is shown to be rather clueless. Common sense would dictate that after Sambo’s encounter with the first tiger, he would return to the safety of his home. Instead, he plods on, meeting one tiger after the other to the amusement of the reader. This course of action suggests that Sambo, like all Blacks, possesses low intelligence. Another important theme of this story is comic violence. In each encounter the tigers threaten to eat Sambo, and he only escapes his fate by giving each tiger one of his prized possessions. He constantly has near brushes with death, but he is unable to learn from prior experiences. The tigers, too, are victims of their own violence, because they become so furious, they run around behind each other rapidly until they turn into fat.

This book has a “happy ending” of sorts. Sambo gets back his clothing and umbrella, and with the tiger fat, he and his parents can eat pancakes, which is a persistent African American stereotype.⁶ Here again, the narrative is critical of Sambo. By eating 169 pancakes, Sambo is shown to be a glutton, incapable of moderate behaviour, and this lack of control stresses his inferiority. The emphasis on the colour black (the three figures are identified as black Sambo, black Mumbo and black Jumbo) stresses and affirms the hierarchy of skin colour which privileges whiteness. Furthermore, the illustrations accompanying the narrative have a separate story: to show how alien Blacks are. Indeed, they convey the story more powerfully than the written text. The pictures stress the racial differences; the message is that blackness is strange, ugly, and Other. Why would any child wish to identify with Sambo? The objective is to poke fun at these black figures, thereby reinforcing the notion of white superiority. On the inside cover of the 1984 edition, the word *Klassik* (“classic”)

appears. This book distorts the image of Blacks and is replete with racist images that devalue Blacks. It therefore should not be considered a “classic” and should not be accessible to any child.⁷

The children’s song “Zehn Kleine Negerlein” (“Ten Little ‘N’”) originated in the nineteenth century and has many different versions in German.⁸ It is a popular counting song, in which children count down from ten to one, with each number having a corresponding rhyming word that forms a stanza. The word *Negerlein* (“Little ‘N’”) allows the desexing of these black boys, thereby making them non-threatening. The diminutive *lein* in the German language literally neuters a word, further figuratively emasculating these boys. *Lein* also denotes a smallness and *klein* means “little,” too, so their smallness is compounded. The one word *Negerlein* thus figuratively castrates and diminishes the African males in this song.

The “Zehn Kleine Negerlein” under discussion dates back to 1954 and can be found on YouTube (Zehn Kleine Negerlein 1954). It is sung with accompanying illustrations. The casting of these figures as children allows the singer-narrator to display a paternalistic and superior attitude. The song definitely shows that these ten boys need to be controlled. Left to their own devices, they are shown to fail miserably and repeatedly. The setting is probably Africa because of the presence of straw huts at the beginning of the song. These straw huts, of course, emphasize a low level of civilization. The image of the colonized African native is evident in their lack of clothing; they wear grass skirts and are barefoot. In the illustrations, the black boys are stripped of any individuality: they appear the same and are indistinguishable from one another: black tufts of hair, big red lips, big eyes, and amorphous hands and feet. Their dehumanization is complete. Throughout the song, their facial features never change; they are frozen in one dull pose. Without a doubt, the accompanying pictures are more powerful than the lyrics in portraying a warped image of Blacks.

“Zehn Kleine Negerlein’s” objective is to show how hapless and clueless these black boys are. The song recounts how a calamity befalls one boy at the time; it is a celebration of comic violence. Death does occur, but there is no mourning or any reaction on the part of the remaining boys or on the part of the singer-narrator. The song emphasizes the stupidity of these boys, who are placed in situations where they are doomed to fail, and who are shown to be incapable of learning from prior mis-

takes. This particular version ends with the sudden appearance of 10,000 black boys all with the same slow-witted, dull expression on their faces; all indistinguishable from one another. The singer-narrator relates that they are all going to *Negerland* (“N’ land”), which is where they belong. In another version, the lone Negro boy finds a Negro girl and they have children. Both versions stress the never ending saga of these figures. These little black boys repopulate only to be placed again in difficult situations where they are expected to fail. The singer-narrator is detached and smug as he relates their stupidity. The black figures portrayed in *Der kleine schwarze Sambo* and “Zehn Kleine Negerlein” have no redeeming qualities whatsoever. The purpose of both texts is to poke fun at them in order to show German superiority and Black inferiority. They reinforce the image of the colonized African native and its attendant racism.

This objectification of African-descended people is apparent in all the topics under discussion thus far. The persistent racist visual culture in Germany presents a challenge to dark-skinned people in developing pride in their ancestry. Strident nationalism and the scholarly notion of an all-white Europe fueled the nationalistic practices of German historians to ignore or deny the centuries-old black presence in Germany (Europe) and the Black contributions to German (European) history and culture. One striking example is the “re-discovery” and recognition of the eighteenth century philosopher, Anton Wilhelm Amo (ca. 1707–ca. 1756), an African, who successfully defended his dissertation in Latin and taught at the prestigious German universities of Halle and Wittenberg (Heckmann 1991; Klemme and Kuehn 2012). Another example is the coalescing of a black community in Germany that took place in early Twentieth Century, when African colonials attempted to acquire a political voice and care for their fellow diasporic Africans in Germany (Martin 2003).

The last two decades have witnessed the rebirth of community for African-descended people living in Germany, and this, in turn, has led to renewed interest in the presence and history of this group as well as other ethnicities (van der Heyden 2008; El-Tayeb 2001; Oguntoye 1997). One important organization is the Initiative of Black Germans (ISD) whose “purpose is to strengthen the self-esteem of its individual members and to assert the rights of Blacks in German society” (Blackshire-Belay 1996). People of African descent have become more visible and vocal: they have

organized campaigns against racism. They also have established publications such as *Afro Look*, *Bundestreffen*, and *Afrekete* as well as websites to tell their stories (Afro-Tak TV CyberNomads 2017). However, they still represent a small minority within the German population. Actual statistics are difficult to obtain since this group of African-descended people is itself very diverse. This essay has demonstrated that the German visual culture continues to project negative images of Blacks (“blackface mentality”) and this practice is widespread. When Barack Obama won the Democratic nomination for president in 2008, a left-leaning German newspaper (*die Berliner Tageszeitung*) depicted his bid for the White House as *Onkel Baracks Hütte* (“Uncle Barack’s Cabin”) (Onkel Baracks Huette 2008). Though a myth, race still plays an important role in determining worth and power relationships. The darker-skinned the individual, the more Other the individual is considered. Moreover, the two practices of blackface and the colonized African native continue to shape German feelings about race and sublimely appeal to an imagined colonialism.

In 2016 the dramatic increase in the number of darker-skinned immigrants and/or refugees arriving in Germany severely tested Angela Merkel’s idea of *Willkommenskultur* (“welcome culture”). These immigrants are not only from Africa but also from Syria, Afghanistan, etc. Nonetheless, they fall under the “generic” category of “Black.” This growing hostility has been fueled by the media, which at times has described these immigrants as *Schwemme* (“glut”) which dehumanizes them into one shapeless mass. There is a tendency to associate these immigrants with problems and crises, thereby generating a sense of danger or unease for some Germans. The highly publicized string of sexual assaults on German women perpetrated by immigrants at the beginning of 2017 only exacerbated the situation. This rising anti-immigrant sentiment enabled the AfD (Alternative for Germany), a far-right political party, in the recent election (September 2017) to clear the 5 percent threshold necessary to enter the *Bundestag* for the first time (Stanely-Becker 2017). With or without EU input, Germany, like other EU countries has taken a more pro-active role to decrease the number of immigrants entering Germany (Faiola 2017).

The working of images and imaginations of “race” are evident in the many manifestations of racism. The dismantling of racist cultural tradi-

tions can begin by removing racist images of Blacks and other ethnic groups from the German visual culture.⁹ Their absence will promote a healthier, more positive self-image for all people of colour and will help Germans to discard their notion of race which, after all, is a myth, a fiction. German nationality also should undergo a dramatic transformation. Presently, German nationality is racial; to be German is to be white.

In the larger European context, black often is viewed as incompatible with being European. The harmful outcome of this way of thinking is evidenced by the rise of ethno-nationalism in many European countries.¹⁰ The experiences of people of African descent and other ethnicities living in Germany must become a part of German culture and society. Whereas the passage and implementation of anti-discriminatory laws will improve the condition of people of colour residing in Germany, the German people also will have to rethink their attitudes about people of African descent as well as those of other ethnicities. As Dienke Hondius points out in *Blackness in Western Europe*: “In historical studies, European and non-European histories are no longer segregated. Pulling down the convenient but outdated wall between Western and non-Western historiography and exploring the common ground provokes a rethinking of what it means to be European” (Hondius 2014). These aforementioned groups can enrich German culture and society if they are truly welcomed and accepted as equals. Alexander Ngnoubamdjum, a black man living in Hamburg, correctly notes the African-descended people’s continuing role in Germany and in German history: “Die Geschichte bestimmt nicht nur unser tägliches Leben ... wir selbst sind ein Teil einer Geschichte, die erst noch geschrieben werden muss” (“The history not only determines our daily life... We ourselves are a part of a history that still has to be written”) (Ngnoubamdjum 1999).

Notes

1. A few racist images have survived and have undergone a facelift of sorts. The facial features as well as the attire of Aunt Jemima and Uncle Ben are now supposed to be less offensive. However, a black woman smiling, and selling pancakes, and a grinning, older black man, appearing as a waiter, evoke racial stereotypes from the past.

2. Blacks have also worn blackface.
3. There were a number of Americans who saw Obama as president, but they refused to accept the truth of his presidency or even his American heritage (the Birther movement).
4. This phenomenon will be discussed later in this essay.
5. This post has since been taken down, probably for its offensiveness (accessed June 16, 2016).
6. In the United States, the face of Aunt Jemima, is still used to sell pancake mixes and syrup.
7. *Little Black Sambo* is available through Target, but only online for \$13.49, <http://www.target.com> (accessed November 2016).
8. In the United States, a similar counting song exists, “Ten Little Indians,” which counts up from one to ten and then back down again from ten to one. The theme of the song, ten “little Indians” reveals a racist narrative and the comic violence involves the appearing and disappearing of these figures.
9. The United States is undergoing something similar regarding Confederate monuments.
10. For example, In the United States this latent white nationalism acquired a more powerful voice in 2009–2010 with the emergence of the Tea-Party, the “take OUR country back,” and the Birther Movement against President Obama. Trump joined the Birther movement in 2011, and his 2016 presidential campaign was based on white nationalism and white grievance.

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10

A Different Apartheid: Structural, Legal, and Discursive Foundations for Comparing South Africa and Israel

Jeffrey John Barnes

Introduction

There has been a longstanding debate, both in scholarly and activist circles, concerning the applicability of the term “apartheid” to the contemporary state of Israel. Writers have addressed the issue in scholarly works¹ and popular writings.² This has not been without cause; certainly South Africa’s experience with racialised governance invites comparisons with contemporary Israel. While such endeavours have been profitable, increasing our understanding of the Palestine conflict, South African apartheid, and the role of comparative analysis in history, scholars and activists continue to fiercely debate the salience of the apartheid label in the Israeli context.

The present essay attempts to reconcile many of the contradictory conclusions in the literature. It does not represent the incorporation of new research or data, but rather draws from the extant scholarship on

J. J. Barnes (✉)
University of Akron, Akron, OH, USA
e-mail: jbarnes@malone.edu

applying the term apartheid to the Palestine conflict to offer an appraisal of how different actors have approached the debate. I examine six key aspects of the debate, including: (1) definitions of apartheid under international law and how these definitions apply to both South Africa and Israel; (2) the differing notions of what constitutes “race” as a category in both contexts; (3) the role of settler-colonialism both as a historical force and contemporary mythology in both conflicts; (4) the use of spatial segregation by race and ethnicity in South Africa and Israel; (5) the question of the relationship between labour and the national project in both countries; and (6) local responses to racial regimes in South Africa and Israel. I conclude that the apartheid designation is problematic from a scholarly perspective; however, from a legal and, by extension, activist, perspective, the use of the term apartheid is not only appropriate but necessary.

Trying to merge such a diverse range of complicated subjects into the inherently limited space of a single chapter is certainly a daunting task. However, though this essay provides only brief sketches of these six crucial dimensions of the apartheid debate, it is possible to appreciate where both scholarly and activist positions stand at present. Further, nuancing the many facets of the apartheid debate and parsing the difference between scholarly and activist perspectives provides the opportunity to interrogate the epistemological qualities of the apartheid debate, raising the critical question of how and why the academy produces knowledge and how this can relate to and inform activism.

Apartheid Under International Law

To a large degree, legal analyses agree that Israel is guilty of the crime of apartheid. International law and human rights standards are applicable to Israel as a member state of the United Nations and extend to those living in the Occupied Territories (OTs) through the 2012 vote by the United Nations general assembly to extend non-member observer state status to Palestine.³

At the most basic level, Israel has violated the core international standard of human rights in a manner that lays the foundation for the specific

designation of the state's crimes as apartheid. John Dugard, Special Rapporteur on the human rights situation in the Occupied Territories, cogently summarised these general violations in a report, stating that "[t]he international community has identified three regimes as inimical to human rights—colonialism, apartheid and foreign occupation. Israel is clearly in military occupation of the OPT. At the same time, elements of the occupation constitute forms of colonialism and of apartheid, which are contrary to international law."⁴ At the most basic level, then, Dugard argues that the Israeli state is an embodied contradiction of the central tenets of international human rights.

At a deeper level, Israel has violated specific conventions relating to the crime of apartheid. Most notable is the International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid,⁵ of which Israel is not a signatory. Classifying the crime of apartheid as a "crime against humanity," the convention broadly defines apartheid as a range of discriminatory practices "...committed for the purpose of establishing and maintaining domination by one racial group over any other racial group of persons and systematically oppressing them."⁶ Israel violates this treaty through a policy of bantustanisation (segregation in racial enclaves: see below), restriction of movement, arbitrary arrests and unlawful imprisonment on a racial basis, use of a permit regime to restrict mobility, prohibition of mixed marriages, and, most significantly in the case of Palestine, the expropriation of Palestinian land by the Jewish state.⁷

While the legal case for designating Israel as an apartheid state under international law is relatively strong, many object to a direct comparison between South Africa and Palestine based on the framework of the 1973 convention.⁸ The first objection is that Jews and Palestinians, unlike blacks and whites in South Africa, do not constitute racial groups and therefore Israel's discriminatory practices fall outside the umbrella of apartheid. While the concept of race will be discussed in greater detail in the next section, for now it is enough to acknowledge that while the *historical* development of "black" and "white" (and indeed other categories) in South Africa differs markedly from that of "Palestinian/Arab" and "Jew" in Palestine, the essential characteristics of both categorisations fall under the broad definition of what constitutes "race" as a category under international law.⁹ A second objection is that Israel does not distinguish

on racial lines but rather on the grounds of citizenship, extending rights and privileges to its own citizens that it denies to non-citizens, a standard practice for any nation state. This argument could potentially pass muster were it not for a curious distinction in Israeli law between citizenship (*ezrahut*) and nationality (*le'om*), which in most other states in the world are coterminous. There are a number (approximately 20% of Israel's population¹⁰) of Palestinians who hold citizenship in the state of Israel; however, they are barred from attaining Jewish *nationality*. The Israeli state extends preferential treatment to those of its citizens possessing Jewish nationality, demonstrating that its discriminatory practices are centred in the realm of nationality (and, by extension, race), rather than citizenship, and thus constitute an act of apartheid under international law.¹¹ Finally, many of Israel's most passionate apologists claim that the Jewish state's treatment of its Palestinian citizens and Palestinians in the OTs are not, in fact, intended as an act of racial discrimination, and do not belong in the category of apartheid. They argue rather that these acts are necessary security measures and thus legitimate exercises of state power. A cursory examination of the history of the twentieth century demonstrates why such a claim is spurious at best: Adolph Hitler and Saddam Hussein made similar claims about the necessity of racialised policies to state security. Also, it is worth raising the difficult moral question as to whether or not it is ethical to practise discrimination in the name of security and the legal question as to whether or not security considerations exempt a state from the precepts of the apartheid convention.¹²

While the applicability of the 1973 convention to the state of Israel holds up under scrutiny, activists have also advocated charging Israel under several other bodies of international law that relate to the crime of apartheid. The International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination of 1969, to which Israel *is* a signatory, condemns "segregation and apartheid" and includes language that would extend the principle to Israel's policies towards Palestinians living in the OTs.¹³ Article 85 of the 1977 Protocol Additional to the Geneva Convention lists as a "grave breach" of human rights "practices of 'apartheid' and other inhuman and degrading practices involving outrages upon personal dignity, based on racial discrimination,"¹⁴ terms clearly violated by Israel in its legal distinction between Jewish and Arab citizens.

The Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (of which Israel openly boasts about refusing to join) lists apartheid as a crime against humanity.¹⁵ Finally, some have suggested the 1948 Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, to which Israel is a signatory, as applicable to at least the events surrounding the creation of the state of Israel (*al-Nakba*) in 1948.¹⁶ The Convention's condemnation of killing on the basis of "racial or ethnical" categories connects it to the crime of apartheid, itself centred on racial distinctions.

In short, a strong legal case can be raised for designating Israel as an apartheid state, even if the possibility of any actual legal action being taken remains non-existent. By extension, then, it is perfectly reasonable for activists to pursue the categorisation of Israel's crimes as "apartheid." However, debates surrounding apartheid and Palestine also rest on historical and discursive differences between both contexts, and subsequent sections will begin to address these debates while continuing to refer back to legal distinctions.

The Category of "Race" in South Africa and Palestine

Since the legal classification of apartheid rests entirely on crimes based on race, understanding how race functions in South Africa and Israel/Palestine is crucial to understanding the apartheid debate. Additionally, the different construction of race in South Africa and Israel/Palestine is one of the key objections scholars raise when comparing the current situation in Palestine to apartheid in South Africa.

The history of race in South Africa is complex, extending beyond a black-white binary, and is grounded in the country's colonial past (see below). In terms of drawing an analogy between South African apartheid and Israel, however, scholars and activists have focused on the relationship between whites and blacks in South Africa as a point of comparison to Arabs and Jews in Israel. Race relations in South Africa relied heavily on the construction of white superiority and attached an essential, immutable character to whites and blacks based on race. Racial discourse in South Africa was grounded heavily on biological (mis)constructions of race.¹⁷

The concept of race in Israel is more problematic, as the general categories “Jew” and “Arab/Palestinian” are often not thought of as races. Indeed, even within these categories, there are hierarchical divisions related to globally developed concepts of race along a black-white binary.¹⁸ As in the South African case, characteristic traits are mapped onto “Palestinians” and “Jews” as categories; however, standing in stark contrast to South Africa, the categories of “Arab” and “Jew” are not grounded in biological definitions. Palestinian identity is considered hereditary, based on being a descendent of the Arab inhabitants of contemporary Israel and the OTs prior to the establishment of Israel/*al-Nakba* in 1948. The Israeli state has invested heavily in marginalising and depoliticising this identity, categorising its Palestinian citizens as “Arabs” rather than “Palestinian.”¹⁹ While a significant portion of Jewish Israelis identify as atheist (i.e. culturally, but not religiously, Jewish) legal definitions of what constitutes a Jewish person under Israeli law are decided by *halakha* (Jewish religious law), which automatically designates a person to be Jewish if his or her mother is. Israel considers itself to be a “Jewish state” regardless of its Palestinian/Arab population, and legal definitions of who is officially a Jew are important in that the state of Israel offers automatic citizenship to Jewish persons from anywhere in the world. It does not, however, guarantee citizenship to Palestinian exiles from the territory that now constitutes the state of Israel, regardless of how long one’s family resided in the area.

The racialised discourse that privileges Jewish Israeli identity over Palestinian identity manifests itself on a number of fronts. Historically, constructions of Jewish superiority over “primitive” Arabs legitimised the ethnic cleansing of 800,000 Palestinians from the land that now constitutes the state of Israel from 1947 to 1949. The official Israeli narrative surrounding the country’s “War for Independence,” together with the official narrative of other wars fought by Israel require defining the Arab as Other. A host of discriminatory laws, including a permit regime that denies the right of mobility to Palestinians within the OTs and Israel proper, building permit regulations that favour Jewish nationals over Palestinians, and the denial of citizenship and nationality to the inhabitants of the OTs demonstrate the racialised nature of the Israeli legal system. Exclusionary practices, including Israel’s self-designation as a Jewish state (a translucent means of eliding the existence of Israel’s

Palestinian citizens as well as the stateless Palestinians in the OTs), a forced segregation between Palestinians and Israelis enforced by military occupation, and separate roadways and public transportation that provide Jewish Israelis with faster mobility than their Palestinian counterparts evince the privilege exercised by Israeli Jews over Palestinians.

Jewish racial privilege over Palestinians in Israel and the Occupied Territories is maintained through a state-sponsored dehumanisation of Palestinians. In her groundbreaking examination of Israeli textbooks, Nurit Peled-Elhanan finds that children in Israeli schools, which exist primarily to serve the country's Jewish population but also serve some of the Palestinian minority who have Israeli citizenship, are taught a curriculum that actively marginalises Palestinian identity. Israeli textbooks routinely elide the role of Palestinians in the region's history and culture, teaching a Jewish-centred history of the region scrubbed of any Palestinian or Arab contributions. When Palestinians are mentioned, Peled-Elhanan describes that they are orientalised as a type of savage. This combined elision and orientalisation serves to internalise racialised discourse in Israeli students, further highlighting the racialised component of the conflict.²⁰ The sense of "us" verses "them" present in Israeli textbooks is reified through Israel's near-universal draft system, which requires that Jewish nationals complete a two-year period of national service. The ubiquity of the draft within Israeli society creates a shared sense of sacrifice and engenders the cohesion of a racialised identity as Palestinian citizens of Israel are excluded from participation in the armed forces.²¹ Participation in the armed forces is designed to impart the belief that Palestinians are the enemy, that they are less than human, and that the Jewish state and Jewish identity must be protected from this racial threat at all costs. Finally, the intentional targeting of Palestinian civilians by the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) and the frequent demolition of Palestinian homes by the IDF as punishment against Palestinian civilians demonstrates that the Israeli state places little value on the lives of its Palestinian population, including those who have citizenship and those living in the OTs.

In spite of the ways in which the division between Jews and Palestinians functions as a racialised discourse, objections are raised to treating them as such, especially in a comparative context with South Africa. In addition to the differences regarding biological, historical, and religious definitions of race between South Africa and Israel, one of the main

distinctions (though its significance is often overstated) between racial dynamics in South Africa and Israel concerns the demographic ratios between races in both contexts. In South Africa, blacks form an overwhelming majority of the population, a fact that complicated white rule under apartheid. In Palestine, there is a relative balance between Palestinian and Jewish populations if one is to include Palestinians living in the Occupied Territories.²² Some scholars have suggested that the fact that apartheid South Africa was based on minority rule whereas Israel is based on majority rule is one of the reasons the anti-apartheid struggle has been more successful in South Africa than the struggle for Palestinian statehood²³; however, successful movements for minority rights in other contexts argue against this.

Regardless of the different functions and foundational discourses of race in South Africa and Israel/Palestine, in both societies there is a functional category of identity grounded in perceived biological or religious differences to which cultural meaning is attached that serves to establish the power of the dominant group (whites and Jews respectively). Nationalists in apartheid South Africa and Israel shared an ideological affinity in which they envisioned themselves "...as threatened outposts of European civilisation defending their existence against barbarians at the gates."²⁴ Whites and Zionists then actively implemented laws designed to entrench their power against this visceral "threat," laws that promoted exclusion and separateness—i.e., apartheid—demonstrating that while scholars can rightly point to the very different discursive foundations of race in South Africa and Israel, the function of race in both countries as it relates to the apartheid debate is almost identical.

The Role of Settler-Colonialism in the Construction of South African Apartheid and Zionist Rule in Israel

Definitions of race in South Africa and Israel/Palestine are rooted in the historical experiences of colonialism in both contexts. Racialised legal systems emerged in both countries as part of the process of imperialism. Of all the sections in this essay, it is perhaps most difficult to reduce the

history of settler-colonialism in South Africa and Israel to a brief sketch; Dutch and British colonialism in South Africa and British and Zionist colonialism in Palestine emerged as part of a broader, transnational struggle for power and economic control against the backdrop of the emerging twin discourses of race and nationalism and would require many volumes to begin to appreciate. Further, the lingering effects of these colonial endeavours are equally complicated. However, Ronnie Kasrils has noted that “[i]t is Zionist Israel’s racist, colonialist agenda that is the fundamental cause of the conflict, as was the case in the South African example,”²⁵ necessitating that any serious treatment of either conflict, including a discussion of the apartheid question, must address colonialism and its legacies.

European involvement in the area that now constitutes South Africa is a textbook case of settler-colonialism. The Dutch were the first to colonise what was later to become South Africa, beginning the process of dispossessing native populations. Afrikaaner colonial mythology in South Africa “...taught generations of schoolchildren that, when the Dutch colonists arrived on the shores of the Cape in 1652, the ‘Bantu tribes’ in their migration from the north had barely arrived to cross the Limpopo River in what later became South Africa,”²⁶ presenting the territory as empty of persons prior to the arrival of the Dutch. Eventually, the Dutch were joined by the British. British colonialism emphasised the essential nature of colonised persons, believing that while it was possible to bestow the “gift” of British civilisation on black Africans, there was a fundamental inequality between the two races and therefore a need for permanent separateness.

Like South Africa, the creation of the state of Israel is a clear case of settler colonialism²⁷; however, it differs from the South African case in that a non-governmental movement—Zionism—served as the colonial power rather than a sovereign nation.²⁸ Zionists saw in Palestine a chance to create a new reality, and did not seek to conceal the essentially imperial nature of their mission.²⁹ Additionally, while many Zionist leaders mirrored South African nationalist’s claim about the lack of inhabitants prior to colonialism and touted Palestine as a “land without a people for a people without a land,”³⁰ others were more open about the violent relocation of the region’s historic inhabitants that would necessarily accompany

the establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine.³¹ Zionist settlers in Palestine emphasised the use of exclusive Jewish labour, carving out separate enclaves for Jewish life, establishing a precedent of separateness between Arabs and Jews in the territory that was to become Israel. Zionist settler-colonisation of Palestine was accompanied by British colonisation through the establishment of the British Mandate in Palestine. Hedging their bets, the British adopted a divide-rule-policy in Palestine, stoking both Jewish and Arab interests in the region. This, too, contributed to the development of the contemporary conditions that drive the apartheid debate. The withdraw of the British in 1948 and subsequent establishment of the state of Israel (and accompanied dispossession of Palestinians) did not end the process of colonisation in Palestine; rather, following the 1967 Israeli occupation of the Gaza Strip, West Bank, and Golan Heights, colonisation took on a new form via the establishment of exclusively Jewish settlements in Palestinian territories. Thus, while settler-colonialism functioned differently in both South Africa and Israel, a point raised by scholars objecting to the apartheid designation, both effectively disempowered the native populations they sought to displace.

There are further similarities between the functions and foundational myths of settler-colonialism in both societies. First among these is an imagined religio-ethnic mandate that is a central component of both white South African and Israeli nationalist discourse. Both colonial movements relied heavily on projecting themselves back into the role of biblical Israel as it sought to conquer Canaan, anchoring "...their respective settler colonial projects in a fundamentalist interpretation of the Old Testament."³² Jan Smuts, Prime Minister of the Republic of South Africa (1939–1948), openly expressed the racial implications of this shared theo-political vision:

[T]he white people of South Africa, and especially the older Dutch population, has been brought up almost entirely on Jewish tradition. The Old Testament, the most wonderful literature ever thought out by the brain of man, the Old Testament has been the very marrow of Dutch culture here in South Africa...[T]hat is the basis of our white culture, and it is the basis of your Jewish culture; and therefore we are standing together on a common platform, the greatest spiritual platform the world has ever seen.³³

Thus in both cases religion, which oftentimes was confused with and considered coterminous with ethnicity, served to justify colonial endeavours. Further, colonists in both contexts projected their colonialist endeavours as a civilising mission, with whites (especially the British) in South Africa claiming to bring civilisation to black Africans and Zionist settlers in Palestine claiming to “make the desert bloom” by bringing modern agriculture and civilisation to Palestine. Thus while there are a number of differences between the specificities of the colonial endeavour in South Africa, perhaps even enough to prohibit a direct comparison between the two from a scholarly perspective, the discursive and human impact of colonialism in both contexts supports the apartheid designation.

Spatial Separation in South Africa and Israel

The legacy of colonialism in South Africa and Israel/Palestine can be seen in widespread practices of spatial segregation between blacks and whites in apartheid-era South Africa³⁴ and Jews and Arabs in Israel/Palestine. While there are literally thousands of examples of racialised spatial separation in both contexts, two similar practices of segregation dominate the practice of apartheid in South Africa and Israel: (1) a deliberate policy of creating racial enclaves to concentrate blacks in South Africa and Palestinians in Israel (i.e. “bantustanisation”) and (2) the establishment of a “permit regime” to limit mobility of subjugated populations.

The so-called “bantustans” were the hallmark of apartheid in South Africa. South Africa’s apartheid regime sought to categorise and “settle” the country’s black population. Drawing on criteria established by the white government and with no input from blacks themselves, black South Africans were divided into “nations” (e.g. Zulu, Xhosa, Venda, Tswana, Sotho, etc.).³⁵ Each of these “nations” was then assigned a track of land to which it was forcibly settled, effectively creating large reservations for South Africa’s black population. Travel to and from these bantustans was highly regulated. The apartheid government sought international legitimacy for these policies through claiming that they promoted self-governance and autonomy among the country’s black population.³⁶

Israeli policy in the OTs has produced similar racialised enclaves in Palestine. Firstly, and most pressing in humanitarian terms, is the case of the Gaza Strip. The Israeli government rarely grants permission for Gaza's inhabitants to enter Israel proper and maintains a blockade against naval access to the territory. The Israeli government coordinates with the Egyptian government to limit Palestinian mobility between Egypt and Gaza through the Rafah border crossing, effectively sealing off the territory and creating what is in effect the world's largest open-air prison. The shipment of supplies (including crucial construction supplies in the wake of the 2009, 2012, and 2014 Israeli wars against Gaza), is also severely limited. Inhabitants of the West Bank fare little better. The minority of Palestinians that hold Israeli citizenship can travel to and from the West Bank, although they regularly face harassment and detention by Israeli soldiers. For inhabitants of the West Bank without Israeli citizenship, travel to Israel is very difficult, including for work or medical reasons. Similar to the South Africa case, Israel has permitted limited self-government for Palestinians living in the OTs, lending a semblance of credibility to what is clearly a policy of *de facto* and *de jure* segregation. This self-governance, codified in the 1993 Oslo Agreements, exists only in a limited number of disconnected Palestinian enclaves in the West Bank, mirroring the existence of bantustans in South Africa.

The "bantustanisation" of the Palestine conflict can further be seen in Israel's illegal practice of settling its citizens in the occupied West Bank. As of 2012, approximately 123 settlements and 100 "outposts" have been built in the territory, with the total population of Jewish persons in the West Bank (including Occupied East Jerusalem) nearing half a million.³⁷ The settlements are often located around major Palestinian urban centres, effectively cutting them off from the rest of the territory and thus rendering the establishment of a Palestinian state in the OTs untenable. A separate system of highways that are off limits for Palestinian residents of the West Bank link these settlements with Israel, creating a racialised geography that bears a striking resemblance to the South African case.

The ability to travel from and within South Africa's bantustans and areas of Palestinian sovereignty in the OTs required the obtaining of permits, effectively denying freedom of movement for South Africa's blacks under apartheid and Palestinians under Israeli rule. Black labourers

required permits to leave South Africa's bantustans, which most were forced to do for work. Similarly, a permit regime has been established in Palestine, restricting the movement of Palestinians in the OTs, with 101 different permits restricting Palestinian movement as of 2012.³⁸ The granting or withholding of permits, whether for work, medical, or other reasons, has become a system of rewards and punishments for those who are willing or refuse to collaborate with the Israeli regime respectively.

In the case of the racialised segregation of the population, a key element in definitions of apartheid, Israel and South Africa clearly warrant a comparison, and this tends to be one of the few areas in which scholars are open to the apartheid designation for Israel. However, as Leila Farsakh has demonstrated, there is a significant point of divergence between the practice of bantustanisation in both contexts that merits consideration. She states that:

although there are similarities between the Israeli and South African policies of social separation...Israel's primary concern was to achieve maximum supremacy over Palestinian *land* while excluding the population. Apartheid South Africa sought to dominate, rather than negate, the indigenous population as a means to guarantee the settlers' supremacy over the country's economic and political resources.³⁹

Therefore, while the human impact of both apartheid and Zionism allow for an activist and legal comparison between the two, a direct comparison by scholarly standards would ultimately prove unsuccessful in the face of these nuanced differences.

Labour and the Project of Apartheid in South Africa and Zionism in Israel

One of the chief obstacles to formulating a direct comparison between apartheid South Africa and contemporary Israel deals with the question of indigenous labour. Scholars submit that black labour was crucial to the project of apartheid in South Africa whereas Palestinian labour has not only been significantly less important to the Zionist project in Israel, but

also has been actively discouraged. This simplistic assessment merits reconsideration. In addition to the fact that Palestinians have formed a significant component of Israel's labour force, an important correlation between the discursive, rather than practical, role of indigenous labour in both contexts demonstrates that there is in fact a similarity between the two.

Owing to South Africa's demographics, where whites constitute a small minority of the country's population, white rule necessitated mass participation of blacks in the labour force. This did not constitute an ideological problem for the practitioners of apartheid, for as has been previously noted, apartheid in South Africa was primarily focused on white domination of the country's black population. Apartheid ideology allowed for black workers in "servile" jobs, such as domestics in white homes or miners, so long as white supremacy was maintained.

Zionist rule in Israel, however, has been more concerned with maintaining control of territory rather than persons. Furthermore, Israel has claimed itself as an exclusively Jewish state, not a state in which Jewish persons dominate non-Jewish persons in the manner that apartheid claimed white rulership over South Africa's black population. This led Zionist settlers in Palestine and their successor state of Israel to embrace an exclusionary approach to Palestinian labour. For the first half of the twentieth century, during which the initial Zionist colonisation of Palestine began, Jewish intellectuals fostered the image of the "New Jew," a "...bronzed, muscular farmer/soldier...the Zionist alternative to his stooped, intellectual and victimised diaspora predecessor,"⁴⁰ claiming that for the Jewish "nation" to revive itself, an increased focus on participation in manual labour was necessary. Thus the new Jewish communities forming in Palestine during this period embraced a model of exclusive Jewish labour, cutting Palestine's Arab population off from the labour force that would eventually form the backbone of Israel's economy.

The Israeli state continued the policy of emphasising Jewish labour to the exclusion of Palestinians; however, the picture is more complex than many scholars acknowledge. Contrary to the claim made by many scholars that the comparison between South Africa and Israel falls down owing to South Africa's inclusionary labour practices as opposed to Israel's exclusionary policy, Palestinian labourers have served a significant role in

Israel's economy since the founding of the Jewish state in 1948. In the construction and agricultural sectors, Palestinian labourers constituted over a quarter of the workforce in Israel from 1948 to 1967.⁴¹ Following Israel's occupation of the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967, the Israeli government was faced with the dilemma of incorporating Palestine's economy and land without acknowledging its demography. On the one hand, to maintain the occupation and therefore the newly acquired territory, the Israeli government had to ensure that Palestinians had jobs, requiring their participation in the Israeli workforce. On the other hand, Israel did not want to acknowledge the inhabitants of the OTs as citizens. This led to the creation of the permit regime discussed above, whereby Palestinian labourers could temporarily pass into Israel and obtain low wage jobs without becoming Israeli citizens.⁴² Indeed, in the period between 1967 and the signing of the Oslo Accords in 1993, Palestinian participation in the Israeli labour market remained strong,⁴³ especially in the construction sector, where Palestinians constituted over a third of total workers.⁴⁴ The Oslo agreement allowed for limited Palestinian autonomy in the OTs, thereby reducing Israel's obligation to maintain the Palestinian economy as a prerequisite for occupation. Thus, in the years since 1993, it has become increasingly difficult and less common for Palestinian inhabitants of the OTs to work in Israel,⁴⁵ though a number still participate either through managing to get a work permit or, as is more common, working illegally.⁴⁶ Finally, while Palestinian workers are far less likely to be able to work in Israel in the post-Oslo years, the number of Palestinians who obtain permission to work in Israeli settlements in the West Bank has skyrocketed, demonstrating again that Palestinian workers do play a significant role in the Israeli economy.⁴⁷

Thus the picture of Palestinian participation in the Israeli labour market is more complex than simply a policy of intentional Israeli exclusion of Palestinian labourers. At various points, and particularly in certain sectors of the economy, Palestinians have been a crucial part of the Israeli workforce, challenging one of the arguments scholars raise against the apartheid designation. Furthermore, a comparison can be reached in terms of the importance of minority labour, regardless of how it was integrated, to both the South African and Israeli national projects. The control of indigenous labour was, through both practices of inclusion and

exclusion, critical for both South Africa's apartheid government and Israel's government to maintain their respective ethnonationalist regimes.⁴⁸ Indeed, the labour movement in South Africa was one of the main organising impulses of the broader anti-apartheid movement,⁴⁹ and activists working for Palestinian rights in Israel are heavily focused on the question of exclusionary labour policies in Israel, resulting in labour being another point of comparison activists and legal scholars have raised in championing the apartheid designation.

Challenging Apartheid: Local Responses in South Africa and Israel

Most comparative studies of apartheid in South Africa and Zionism in Israel focus on the similarities and differences between the structures of racial separateness in both contexts. However, with the exception of Mona N. Younis' *Liberation and Democratization* and a handful of others,⁵⁰ few have considered the responses of blacks in South Africa and Palestinians in Israel and the OTs to the structures of discrimination particular to both situations. This is problematic, for to understand how scholarly and activist conclusions about the applicability of the apartheid designation in Israel relate demands a thorough knowledge of the challenges that have been levied against both systems in a comparative context. Further, from a historical perspective, the Boycott, Divestment, and Sanctions (BDS) movement—currently one of the largest parochial and international movements against Israeli occupation—was consciously modelled on the resistance of black South Africans.⁵¹

The legal structures of South African apartheid were brought down by a broad grassroots coalition of clergy, union members, students, activists, and others who brought global attention to the problem of apartheid in South Africa by championing a comprehensive international boycott against the apartheid state.⁵² Activists in South Africa framed their struggle as one for equality under the banner of human rights discourse, consciously avoiding presenting themselves in ethno-nationalist terms.⁵³

Palestinian activists have eyed the success of their South African counterparts and have endeavoured to create a similar international movement advocating for the boycott of the Israeli state, a divestment from companies or entities that support the occupation, and international sanctions against Israel to pressure policy change vis-à-vis Palestinians both in the OTs and Israel proper. Omar Barghouti, one of the leading voices advocating for such a boycott, recalls the South African experience with BDS and the importance of listening to indigenous voices in structuring a response to discrimination, stating: "As in the struggle against South African apartheid, genuine solidarity movements are those that recognise and follow the lead of the oppressed, who are in turn not passive objects but active, rational subjects who are asserting their aspirations and rights and their strategy to realise them."⁵⁴ In short, both movements rest on the need for the international community to respond in solidarity to calls for justice from the oppressed and to act in accordance with the wishes and aspirations of those raising such calls.

While the BDS movement in Palestine has gained momentum in the past decade, its chief failure, many argue, lies in the one critical area in which it differed from the South African model of resistance. Whereas activists in South Africa endeavoured to present their cause as a fundamental issue of human rights, Palestinians have articulated their struggle in ethno-nationalist terms, articulating their express goal as the creation of a Palestinian state.⁵⁵ While many, including not only Palestinians but also members of the international community, have argued for the creation of a Palestinian state as a solution to the conflict (a solution that, many would say, is impossible owing to the unique geographic manifestations of separateness in Palestine), the ethnonationalist approach has failed to achieve the same degree of success as the campaign for human rights in South Africa did.

Conclusion

The different dimensions of the apartheid debate examined above demonstrate the difficulties of making a direct comparison between South Africa and Israel from a scholarly perspective. Historical inquiry

privileges the particular, discouraging broad-based comparisons such as that between South Africa and Israel. Perhaps this distinction has contributed to why the academy has been so slow to embrace the BDS movement. However, the comparison is salient from legal and, by extension, activist perspective. It is possible, then, that the academic debate surrounding the apartheid debate misses the point entirely. With its focus on empirical inquiry, academic discussion surrounding the apartheid question in Palestine has focused too much on irrelevant aspects of the Palestinian experience.

But why must knowledge be purely empirical? Does the insistence on rigorous, academic knowledge production privilege the powerful and foster a colonisation of knowledge? Could scholars consider an alternative episteme of experiential knowledge in which the locus of power shifts from the ivory tower to the street, an approach in which Foucault's notion of knowledge-power as a regime of control is radically reimaged, and the lived knowledge of the oppressed becomes a wellspring of power in and of itself? This is what is at stake in shifting the apartheid debate from esoteric roundtables and conferences in universities to the persons whose lives are caught up in these debates.

In the late 1980s, as the Cold War was showing signs of diminishing, it seemed impossible that there was a path forward in South Africa that would allow for complete coexistence between whites and blacks. Several short years later, this pessimism was shattered with the collapse of the legal system of apartheid. While the demise of official apartheid in South Africa failed to solve the plethora of racial issues plaguing the country (indeed, nearly three decades later, the position of poor blacks in South Africa appears to be worsening), apartheid's failure in South Africa and the subsequent creation of a multi-national state from its embers should remain a beacon of hope for those fighting for justice in Palestine. Regimes of separateness last only as long as they are able to successfully project the myth of their own success. A critical understanding of how the Palestinian experience relates to other instances of apartheid provides the foundations for dismembering the current colonial apparatus of Zionism and for imagining a new reality that can take its place.

Notes

1. The works of Uri Davis [*cf. Apartheid Israel: Possibilities for the Struggle Within* (London: Zed Books, 2003); *Israel: An Apartheid State* (London: Zed Books, 1989)] have been very influential in setting the tone for the scholarly debate surrounding the apartheid designation.
2. Former President Jimmy Carter's *Palestine: Peace Not Apartheid* (New York: Simon and Schuster, 2006) is perhaps the most well-known popular use of the apartheid designation; however, Ben White's *Israeli Apartheid: A Beginner's Guide* (London: Pluto Press, 2009) provides a more in-depth approach to bridging the gap between academic discourse and popular perception surrounding the nature of the Zionist project.
3. Edward C. Corrigan, "Israel and Apartheid: A Framework for Legal Analysis," in *Apartheid in Palestine: Hard Laws and Harder Experiences*, ed. Ghada Ageel (Edmonton, AB: University of Alberta Press, 2016), 231.
4. Cited in Shourideh Molavi, *Stateless Citizenship: The Palestinian Arab Citizens of Israel* (Leiden: Brill, 2013), 101.
5. Adopted as UN General Assembly Resolution 2068 on 30 November, 1973.
6. "International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the Crime of Apartheid." <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%201015/volume-1015-I-14861-English.pdf>
7. Virginia Tilley, ed. *Beyond Occupation: Apartheid, Colonialism, and International Law in the Occupied Palestinian Territories* (New York: Pluto Press, 2012), 129–221.
8. Tilley offers a very helpful, in-depth discussion of these objections and their difficulties. See: Tilley, 107–108.
9. *Ibid.*, 108.
10. "65th Independence Day – More than 8 Million Residents in the State of Israel," Press Release, Central Bureau of Statistics, State of Israel, http://www.cbs.gov.il/www/hodaot2013n/11_13_097e.pdf
11. This distinction can be seen further in Israel's self-classification as a "Jewish state".
12. Others have also argued that the convention itself was designed specifically to address South Africa, and thus cannot be applied to Israel. Challenging this, however, is the fact that most international law develops as a result of experience (consider, for example, the development of

- the concept of genocide in response to the Holocaust) and the convention's own claim to have broader applicability.
13. "International Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of Racial Discrimination," <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/CERD.aspx>
 14. "Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions," 8 June, 1977. <https://ihl-databases.icrc.org/applic/ihl/ihl.nsf/Article.xsp?action=openDocument&documentId=73D05A98B6CEB566C12563CD0051E1A0>. Additionally, the Protocol reaffirms Article 49 of the Fourth Geneva Convention, which prevents "...the transfer by the Occupying Power of parts of its own civilian population into the territory it occupies..." Israel's policy of building settlements in the Occupied West Bank is in clear violation of Article 49, and represents a component of the Jewish state's practice of "spatial" apartheid (see below).
 15. The relevant portion of the treaty can be found at <http://www.un.org/law/icc/index.html>
 16. "Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide," 9 December, 1948. <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%2078/volume-78-I-1021-English.pdf>
 17. Williams, Elizabeth M. *The Politics of Race in Britain and South Africa: Black British Solidarity and the anti-Apartheid Struggle* (London, I.B. Tauris, 2015).
 18. This is especially true in the case of Jewish identity in Israel, where *Ashkenazim* (Jews of European origins, generally thought of as more "white") occupy a position of greater privilege in Israeli society than *Sephardim* (Jews of North African or Iberian origin) and especially *Mizrachim* (Jews of Middle Eastern origins, thought to be less "white"). In addition, members of the *Beta Israel* (Ethiopian Jewish) community in Israel occupy a marginalised position in Israeli society based on their African origins. See: Ruth Amir, *Who Is Afraid of Historical Redress? The Israeli Victim-Perpetrator Dichotomy* (Boston: Academic Studies Press, 2012), 127–128, 208–231.
 19. Yitzhak Reiter, *National Minority, Regional Majority: Palestinian Arabs Versus Jews in Israel* (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 2009).
 20. Nurit Peled-Elhanan, *Palestine in Israeli Textbooks: Ideology and Propaganda in Education* (London: I. B. Tauris, 2012).
 21. There are exceptions to this, as described in Rhoda Ann Khanaaneh's *Surrounded: Palestinian Soldiers in the Israeli Military* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2008), however Khanaaneh finds that these exceptions prove the racialised nature of military service in Israel.

22. "65th Independence Day."
23. Mona M. Younis. *Liberation and Democratization: The South African and Palestinian National Movements* (Minneapolis, MN: University of Minnesota Press, 2000).
24. Sasha Polakow-Suransky, *The Unspoken Alliance: Israel's Secret Relationship with Apartheid South Africa* (New York: Pantheon, 2010), 8.
25. Ronnie Kasrils, "Birds of a Feather: Israel and Apartheid South Africa—Colonialism of a Special Type," in *Israel and South Africa: The Many Faces of Apartheid*, ed. Ilan Pappé (London: Zed Books, 2015), 28.
26. Kasrils, 29.
27. For an excellent conceptualisation of the Palestine conflict from a settler-colonial approach, see Lorenzo Veracini, "The Other Shift: Settler Colonialism, Israel, and the Occupation," *Journal of Palestine Studies* 42 (Winter 2013).
28. Younis, 36.
29. Theodore Herzl, founder of the Zionist movement, wrote in his diary that "[w]e shall try to spirit the penniless population away across the border...", describing the need to transfer Palestine's Arab population out of the country to make way for Zionist colonisation as a primary goal of the Zionist movement. Cited in Benny Morris *Righteous Victims: A History of the Zionist Arab Conflict, 1881–2001* (New York: Vintage Books, 2001), 21–22.
30. Chaim Weizmann, director of the World Jewish organisation, proffered that "There is a country which happens to be called Palestine, a country without a people, and, on the other hand, there exists the Jewish people, and it has no country. What else is necessary, then, than to fit the gem into the ring, to unite this people with this country?" Cited in Nur Masalha, *A Land without a People: Israel, Transfer, and the Palestinians: 1949–1996* (London: Faber and Faber Limited, 1997), 61–61.
31. Moshe Dayan, a central figure in the founding of the Jewish state, wrote that the destruction of houses as part of the conflict that led to the creation of Israel was "...not in battle, but as punishment...and in order to chase away the inhabitants..." Cited in Morris, 328.
32. Davis, *Apartheid Israel*, 85.
33. Cited in Davis, *Apartheid Israel*, 86.
34. An important point needs to be raised here. While the formal political arrangement of apartheid ended in South Africa in 1994, the ongoing effects of apartheid and continued racism in South Africa have resulted in continued racial segregation in the country.
35. Tilley, 112.

36. Ibid, 112–113.
37. “Expansion of Settlements and Restriction on Palestinian Construction,” *Journal of Palestine Studies* 41 (Winter 2012): 192.
38. Nadia Abu-Zahra and Adah Kay, *Unfree in Palestine: Registration, Documentation, and Movement Restriction* (London: Pluto Press, 2013), 2.
39. Leila Farsakh, *Palestinian Labour Migration to Israel: Labour, Land, and Occupation* (London: Routledge, 2005), 155.
40. Sheila Hannah Katz, “*Adam and Adama, ‘Ird and Ard*: En-gendering Political Conflict and Identity in Early Jewish and Palestinian Nationalisms,” in *Gendering the Middle East: Emerging Perspectives*, ed. Deniz Kandiyoti (Syracuse, NY: Syracuse University Press, 1996), 87.
41. Farsakh, *Palestinian Labor Migration*, 7.
42. Farsakh, *Palestinian Labor Migration*, 6, 35.
43. Ariella Azoulay and Adi Ophir, *The One-State Condition: Occupation and Democracy in Israel/Palestine* (Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press, 2013); Tilley, 211.
44. Farsakh, *Palestinian Labor Migration*, 117.
45. Azoulay and Ophir, 244–245.
46. Farsakh, *Palestinian Labor Migration*, 120.
47. Farsakh, *Palestinian Labor Migration*, 140.
48. Tilley, 210–211.
49. Younis, 129.
50. Another example is Salim Vally’s essay “Palestinian Solidarity in South Africa and the Academic Boycott of Israel: The Case of the University of Johannesburg and Ben Gurion University,” in *Against Apartheid: The Case for Boycotting Israeli Universities*, eds. Ashley Dawson and Bill V. Mullen (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2015).
51. Ilan Pappé, “The Many Faces of Apartheid,” in *Israel and South Africa: The Many Faces of Apartheid*, ed. Ilan Pappé (London: Zed Books, 2015), 19.
52. The role of formal political movements against apartheid and Israeli occupation, namely the African National Congress (ANC) and Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO) is debatable. Younis provides a helpful discussion of the role played by each organisation in South Africa and Palestine respectively; however, she tends to privilege each group as the sole representative of their constituencies. The movements for BDS in South Africa and Palestine both enjoyed support across a broader swath of society than did their political counterparts, hence the decision to focus on them in this section.

53. Leila Farsakh, "Apartheid, Israel, and Palestinian Statehood," in *Israel and South Africa: The Many Faces of Apartheid*, ed. Ilan Pappé (London: Zed Books, 2015), 169.
54. Omar Barghouti, *BDS: Boycott, Divestment, Sanctions, and the Global Struggle for Palestinian Rights* (Chicago: Haymarket Books, 2011), 227.
55. Farsakh, "Apartheid Israel," 169.

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11

Gaza, Black Face and Islamophobia: Intersectionality of Race and Gender in (Counter-) Discourse in the Netherlands

Anne de Jong

Snapshot 1: Nourdin el Ouali at the Palestine manifestation in Amsterdam on 20-07-2014

Dear Mister President, dear Mark Rutte. You do not know how it feels when a little, vulnerable child calls you daddy. You do not have children so you cannot comprehend that feeling. Daddy, five letters that evoke the strongest feelings of love and responsibility. [Thousands] of Palestinian dads will never again be able to reach out to their children. So many Palestinian children can never call for their daddy ever again.

Mister President, this is not a conflict. It is not even a war. Palestinians do not have an army. This is state terror. This is not about rockets, as you claim, [this] is about stolen land, ethnic cleansing, collective punishment, illegal blockades and settlements. [...] For years we have listened to statements, justifications and lies but mister president, we do not buy it anymore.¹

A. de Jong (✉)

Universiteit van Amsterdam, Amsterdam, The Netherlands

e-mail: a.dejong@uva.nl

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Snapshot 2: Open Letter Regarding Black Pete and Saint Nickolas, 24-11-2014

Dear Prime Minister, Dear Ministers,

We, the undersigned, are writing to express our concern regarding the conduct of Dutch authorities and law enforcement officials on the day of the 'arrival' of Saint Nicholas in Gouda, the Netherlands on 15 November 2014. First hand evidences show clear violations of the freedom of peaceful assembly and reveal patterns of racial discrimination. We urge you to ensure proper independent investigation into the law-enforcement actions, ensure equal treatment of ethnic minorities, and guarantee that future peaceful assemblies will be safeguarded and protected in accordance with international law.

The European Network Against Racism, a network of over 120 NGOs working to counter racism and racial discrimination in the European Union, supports calls to abolish the racist figure of Zwarte Piet. The fully black-faced character is a legacy from The Netherlands' colonial past and contributes to fuelling stereotypes of People of African Descent and Black Europeans. [...] Blackfacing is one of the broader manifestations of Afrophobia that contributes to the dehumanization of Black people and leads to their exclusion.²

Snapshot 3: Jessica de Abreu 'Why We Forget Winnie Mandela' 05-12-2014

When I hear the struggle of Martin Luther King, I also hear the struggle of Coretta Scott King. When I hear Malcom X, I also hear the spirit of his wife Betty X. When I speak about Nelson Mandela, I also speak about Winnie Mandela. Nelson Mandela became a hero but his wife was demonised. To reach gender equality, it is not just important to include women, it is important to tell the right stories about women [...].

Who remembers the role that Winnie played in the struggle against apartheid? She was strong in body and mind. No man, no woman, no policeman or oppressive system could break her. [...] The story of strength should be told here. The woman in Africa has fought.³

This article begins with these snapshots because, at a general level, they illustrate nicely the intersectionality (Crenshaw 1989) and friction

(Tsing 2004; Appadurai 2008) of race and gender within the current setting of increasing Islamophobic racist-nationalist exclusionary discourse and practise in the Netherlands. While each is significant on their own, the relation between and the combination of all three snapshots shed light on and illustrate (1) the ambiguous dialectic relation between, on the one hand, increased Islamophobic and nationalist-exclusionary racism and on the other hand counter-hegemonic anti-colonial and anti-black racist activism; (2) that local place and politics cannot be disconnected from transnational and historical contexts such as slavery and current Israeli settler-colonialism, and (3) that dominant increasingly racialised and gendered Islamophobia discourse and practise not only presents obstacles but also opportunities for intersectional social justice activism.

These snapshots will be placed in their ethnographic contexts consciously prioritising the political discourse (Tilly 1995; McAdam 2002), contentious repertoires (Tarrow 1998), voices and experiences of Palestinian solidarity activists and anti-Black Pete (Zwarte Piet) campaigners in the Netherlands. By prioritising the subaltern experience of current and increasingly interconnected anti-Zionist, anti-Islamophobia and anti-racist activists, I do not aim to downplay or ignore the dominant racist-nationalist exclusionary environment in which they operate nor do I claim to present a complete overview of either current Dutch racism or the anti-racist struggle against it. On the contrary, I first and foremost approach racism as '[...] a process involving the continuous, often unconscious, exercise of power predicated in taking for granted the privileging of whiteness (Frankenberg 1993), the universality of Western criteria for human progress, and the primacy of European (derived) cultures' (Essed 2002b: 204). By presenting the ethnographic description central to this article as snapshots, I thus underline the complex ambiguous relation between racism and anti-racism as a contested power filled and changing process within the same (trans)national space.

Applying a transdisciplinary intersectional approach in both methodology⁴ and analysis (Crenshaw 1989; Lutz et al. 2011) and prioritising the flux relation between hegemonic- and counterhegemonic discourse and practise, this article upholds a twofold theoretical grounding. First, I build on the ground-breaking work on Dutch racism by Philomena Essed

(1991, 2002a, b, 2014), Isabel Hoving (2014) and Gloria Wekker (2012, 2014, 2016). These critical women take the lead in current scholarship that outright rejects the self-proclaimed image of the Netherlands as an inherently open-minded, tolerant and progressive country. Instead, each argues that it is exactly this dominant insistence on a self-image of Dutch innocence which enables and encourages 'entitlement racism'. That is, a racism that is characterised by (1) a 'smug ignorance' about the Dutch colonial past, (2) a Dutch 'self-image that stresses being a tolerant, small and a just ethical nation' which therefore cannot possibly have a racial problem, and (3) a Dutch claim to the right to offend which includes both the 'native demand for gratitude of minorities' and advocating intolerance in name of protecting tolerance (Essed and Hoving 2014: 24, 25).

Second, Ghassan Hage's (2000) overarching conceptualisation of 'White nation fantasy' serves to explore the ways in which Dutch racism is deployed through nationalist-exclusionary discourse and practise. That is, the unquestioned notion of Dutch white people – evil white racists and good white multiculturalists alike- that they are the sole 'managers of national space' with people of colour as mere objects to be tolerated within or excluded from this national space (Hage 2000: 18–20).

Shifting between detailed ethnographic description and broader theoretical analysis, the case studies presented in this chapter will show how Dutch 'smug ignorance' and entitlement racism increasingly exclude anyone who dares to express solidarity with Palestinians, and how anyone that challenges the perspective of 'the Dutch' as anything but open-minded and tolerant is excluded from the imagined Dutch nation or considered not *really* Dutch. This racist-nationalist exclusion, however, not only presents obstacles for Dutch anti-Zionist, Anti-Islamophobia and anti-racist activism but also fosters opportunities. That is, this unequivocal exclusion forged reflection, debates and direct contact between previously separate activist collectives. This newfound cooperation, in turn, transformed the political discourse of Dutch anti-racist activists from a single issue collective to a loose-tight unity that centralises the intersectionality of race, gender, class and nationalism in their struggle against racist-nationalist exclusionary practises and discourse.

Gaza, Islamophobia and Really Dutch

On the 12th of July 2014, the fifth day of Israel's military attack on Gaza and the evening of the first of five large Palestinian Solidarity demonstrations in the Hague, I joined twelve activists who had gathered to evaluate the event and watch the evening news together. While all had been actively involved in organising the protest, the group was split in two with mixed emotions filling the air between them. At one end of the community's hall, the mood was festive with mainly young women laughing, chatting and painting banners for the next demonstration. At the opposite end of the hall, five older men sat quietly around a round table. When I asked them whether they perhaps were not happy about the day's event, it was quiet before a long-term, well-known activist in his sixties explained:

It is not that we are unhappy. Of course we understand their [the younger activists] enthusiasm. They managed to rally a huge crowd with many new people joining us. It is just that... We have been around for a long time and their youthful enthusiasm may backfire. We do not want to see them get disappointed. (Wim 12-07-2014)

When the eight o'clock news started, the room quieted down and the activists gathered around the television. Some cursed underneath their breath when Israel's infamous spokesperson Mark Regev appeared on the screen. After that item, the news showed footage of a demonstration in the Hague. It showed Dutch rapper APPA angrily shouting, 'Allah-u-Akbar' and 'Free Palestine' while switching back and forth between the angry rapper and an apparently equally angry crowd. The voice-over of the news anchor described the atmosphere at the 'Muslim' protest as 'tense and grim' before Esther Voet, the director of the Dutch pro-Israel organisation CIDI⁵ was interviewed:

They carry HAMAS flags. As we all know, Hamas calls for the destruction of Israel, for all Jews to be pushed to the sea. I don't understand how we as a tolerant, democratic society can allow that. As a Jewish minority we feel this is intimidating so in a democratic society we filed a police report. We ask to be protected and feel safe. (Esther Voet, NOS 12-07-2014)

The more senior activists sighed, called out in indignation and looked at the younger activists expecting a similar reaction. The Youth for Palestine activists, however, merely shrugged their shoulders and went back to painting banners. Immediately festive again, they came up with the slogan ‘NOS shame on you, there is blood on your hands too’ [*NOS schande, bloed aan je handen*]. Sultan lingered around the table a bit longer and explained:

How can I be disappointed about the news coverage when they just do what they always do. Come on, they will portray us as Muslims, terrorists, radical or anti-Semites even if we would show up wearing suits and talking all reasonable. We might as well say fuck that. We *are* angry. And we are here to stay. (Sultan 12-07-2014)

Sultan voiced an opinion here that summarises two particular characteristics of the summer of 2014 protests. First, newcomers to the Dutch activism scene such as Youth for Palestine and Back to Palestine⁶ adopted a more confrontational set of actions and jargon that consciously stepped away from the previous moderate approach. Instead they perceived this ‘Dutch way of so called even-handedness’ as a core problem and attacked it accordingly.

Second, they did so as *Dutch* activists, demanding to be heard as *Dutch* citizens rather than as ‘Muslims’ or ‘*allochtonen*’ and therewith directly connected Palestinian solidarity activism with local racist-nationalist exclusionary practises. Or as Rapper APPA loudly declared during the fourth large demonstration of the summer of 2014:

I am a terrorist, extremist, Jihadist and whatever-ist. I am an anti-Semite, a Jew-hater, a wolf in sheep clothes. I am dangerous, a threat, a risk factor. I am, I am, I am... none of those things. I am angry, livid! Am I not allowed to be angry for being labelled all those things simply because of my religion and my ethnic background? Can I not be angry that as a Muslim I cannot speak about the inhumane treatment and ethnic cleansing of Palestinians without being accused of anti-Semitism? Can I not be enraged that I am excluded and demonized by the same politicians that are supposed to represent me?! That my brothers and sisters grow up in a society that deems them second class citizens and guilty by default, no proof needed. [...] Do I have the right to be angry or not?

[...] Open up that fucking door The Hague and listen to your people. We are here. We have always been here. [...] Yes, the Netherlands is losing the battle. But Holland is not losing from the Islam or migrants or from Palestinians or from Black people. The Netherlands lost the battle from itself. I too am Dutch. I too am a cheese head just with an extra Tajine flavour. [...] Zionism kills. Racism is a bitch and Islamophobia is married to her. We are all in it together and we need to stop this together. (APPA, Amsterdam 20-08-2014)

This twofold change in activist political discourse and action- the more confrontational jargon and the emphasis on the connection between Israel's oppression of the Palestinians with Dutch rising Islamophobia- initially caused frictions between various activists along generational and gender lines. Where the older, mostly male activists perceived the new approach – of which APPA became the unofficial spokesperson at that time – as alienating the broader public, the younger mostly female activists saw it as a justified, necessary and effective response to rising Islamophobia and racist-nationalist exclusion in the Netherlands. When an older female activist brought up that APPA's 'strong wording' made her uncomfortable as a feminist, younger female activists nodded but quickly ended the discussion stating that APPA 'does get the point across'.⁸ However, this division near to completely disappeared when, in a matter of weeks, the Gaza protesters were crudely likened with the rise of the Islamic State (Da'esh), all 'Muslim protests' were criminalised,⁹ the flag of HAMAS was forbidden from public display and Prime Minister Rutten excluded the activists from being *truly* Dutch when he appeared at the Catshuis on the 4th of August to meet with representatives of Jewish organisations to discuss this 'worrying development of new Muslim anti-Semitism'. Following this meeting, a joined statement was released in which the prime minister distanced himself and his cabinet from 'those demonstrations'- not differentiating between pro-Islamic State fringe protests and the large scale Gaza demonstrations- and declared that:

Together we are responsible to ensure that conflicts elsewhere in the world do not increase tensions and conflicts between different populations [bevolkingsgroepen] in the Netherlands. We [the Dutch government] will take any measure needed to battle anti-Semitism in order to protect Dutch minorities. (Prime Minister Mark Rutten 04-08-2014¹⁰)

While this statement cannot be fully understood without looking at the normalisation of institutional Islamophobia within (van der Valk 2012; Cherribi 2011) and beyond (Yazdih 2013) the Netherlands, I would like to draw attention to a development it set in motion that certainly was not intended nor foreseen by Prime Minister Rutten himself. That is, among the activists this statement confirmed the notion that the struggle against Zionist dispossession against the Palestinians “there” (Palestine-Israel) was inherently intertwined with the struggle against Islamophobia “here” (the Netherlands-the West). This, in turn, sparked an in-depth and ongoing debate on intersectionality which in the coming year would lead to a newfound cooperation and alliance with another highly contested activist collective in the Netherlands: the anti-Black Face campaign.

Black Face, Denied Racism and National Exclusion

Boom Chicago, a theatre in Amsterdam normally crowded with tourists and locals ready for a laugh from the internationally acclaimed comedy team, today seats around eighty anti-Black Pete activists. It is February 21st 2015, a date significant for two very different but inherently inter-related reasons. This date marks the fiftieth anniversary of the assassination of African American civil rights activist Malcolm X. A video clip about the life and death of this controversial yet admired icon draws to an end when the big screen is filled with a black and white photo of Malcolm X. A squeaky sound bite of one of his many inspirational speeches is played and concludes with his legendary words ‘by all means necessary’. The gathered activists burst out in loud applause, a standing ovation and a spontaneous, continuous chanting of these famous words echoes through the auditorium. ‘By all means necessary, by all means necessary, by all means necessary’. Rinchemar Martina takes to the microphone and repeats these words one last time ‘through all means necessary. Period. And with these words I have the honour to kick off the Kick Out Black Pete campaign 2015!¹¹’.

A middle-aged white woman clutches her bag, looks around nervously, stands up and leaves. With photographs of past demonstrations and rallies rotating on the big screen behind the stage, Rinchemar continues.

It is not a coincidence that we gathered on the anniversary of our black brother Malcolm X. Many have reduced his words, spirit and deeds to mere “willingness to use violence”. We reject this banal interpretation. Violence is not something we can engage with or not. Violence is forced upon us, upon our bodies, every single day. Last December we protested in silence, non-violently but the police attacked us, kettled us and locked us up. The media falsely portrayed us as criminals. This year we kick off the Kick-Out Black Pete campaign on February 21st because we need to prepare. We need to strategize and mobilize. We need our collective strength to once and for all kick out this degrading symbol of slavery, colonialism and white supremacy. (Richemar Martina, Kick-off, Kick Out Black Pete campaign 21-02-2015)

Kick out Black Pete is one of four¹² loosely tied activist collectives that joined forces over the past years to campaign against the Dutch fantasy character and national symbol of Black Pete (*Zwarte Piet*). Black Pete is a central and visible part of the Dutch national holiday celebrations of Saint Nicholas (*Sinterklaas*) which can be broadly compared to Santa Claus. Saint Nicholas, a white old man with a long beard, dressed in extravagant robes and a tabard comes from Spain each year to bring candy and presents to Dutch children on the fifth of December (Hesloot 2005; Smith 2015). Arriving via steamboat Saint Nicholas is surrounded by hundreds of helpers with black painted faces, red lips, big golden earrings and black afro wigs. While this appearance is explained as stemming from the soot of chimneys through which these creatures supposedly deliver the presents, the visible racial caricature can hardly be denied.

This stereotypical image of Black Pete as the jolly, slightly dumb carnivalesque helper of Saint Nicholas has long been controversial. As such, the Dutch version of Sesame Street already featured a black woman in 1987 explaining to Blue Bird how Black Pete made her feel sad every year (Hesloot 2005¹³). It was not until 2011, however, that these grievances reached the mainstream media and ignited a fierce and constant public debate. From this period on, a small but vocal group of activists changed

tactics away from polite dialogue to more confrontational and consciously provocative public actions. One such protest took place during the national arrival of Saint Nicholas (*de intocht*) on the 14th of November 2014 as briefly described in Snapshot 2.

This demonstration had been much anticipated and its preparations and outcome can be argued to closely resemble, or can even be considered a microcosm of, heated opinions and power relations concerning racism in the Netherlands. Until 2011, scarce space had been made to facilitate discussion through, for example, municipality meetings in Amsterdam (RTLnieuws 2014¹⁴). These meetings, however, had been confined to local spaces outside the actual holiday period because, according to the Amsterdam city Mayor, ‘there is a time and place for protests but such actions should not affect the Dutch children for which the holiday is intended (RTLnieuws 2014¹⁵)’. Frustrated by the catch 22 of not receiving broad coverage outside the holiday period but not being allowed to voice discontent within it, and firmly posing the question, ‘For which Dutch children? – For those little black children who get called black Peter by their peers? For those who come home crying and want to ‘scrub off their brownness in the shower?’ black artist Quincy Gario had consciously worn a t-shirt stating ‘Black Pete is racism’ to the 2011 arrival celebrations. Breaking the silent rule of ‘no protests during the actual holiday’, Quincy was beaten and violently tackled to the ground by five police men.¹⁶ The mainstream media coverage and immediate counter-narrative on social media such as Facebook and Twitter created three perceived fixed and mutually exclusive “Black Pete Camps” which can still be observed today.

In one camp were those condemning Quincy Gario’s actions claiming ‘he is a lowlife for disturbing a kids holiday. He and all other thugs should get a job’ (J.Postma 11-11-2011¹⁷). Such responses took on a more rude and often bluntly racist form after Gario appeared on a Dutch talk show a few days later:

This guy should stop whining. During the VOC [colonial] period we knew exactly what to do with such cry-niggers. (Ricoo70 15-11-2011¹⁸)

Our country, our rules. Be grateful that this man hasn't been cast as an illegal alien yet. He should be put in Black Pete's sack and taken away. (kapotte_stofzuiger 15-11-2011¹⁹)

Such racist-nationalist responses grew omnipresent over the following years (Meinema and Wilson 2013; Wouters 2014) and resulted in 'pro-Black Pete' initiatives such as Black Pete needs to stay, Black Pete Fantastic and the Sint & Piet Gilde²⁰ who deny any racial or colonial undertone and instead take it upon themselves to '[...] protect Saint Nicholas AND Black Pete as our cultural heritage²¹'.

On the other end of the spectrum, there were those pointing out Quincy Gario's right to freedom of speech, the excessive police force during his arrest and the stereotypical if not fully racist characteristic of Black Pete. The YouTube video of his arrest rapidly spread on Facebook and was regularly accompanied by discussions on Black Pete as a mere symptom of broader racism in the Netherlands (Balkenhol 2013):

[I am] born and bred in Holland but my brown skin will never allow me to become one of "them". Even if it wasn't intentionally racist before, look at the comments *now* and dare to deny it. You know what, I am black and I am fully Dutch. Fuck those fuckers who celebrate and *still* live in their colonial past. I have news for them. The world has changed and I am not a slave, servant, Black Pete or whatever. BP is racism!. (BB_Brother²² emphasis in original)

Black Pete is obviously a racist phenomenon born from pure racism. Black Pete was invented in a time that dark people were by law inferior to white people. But somehow he conveniently lost his racism along the way?! (Lain Mitchell²³)

While anti-Black Pete comments on social media rarely expressed emotions against all Dutch white people or whites in general (Wouters 2014), they were quickly juxtaposed to the pro-Black Pete camp with each depicted as radical opposite ends of a spectrum of an extremist debate. This created a situation where any, pro- or con, opinion was deemed as radical and where statements such as 'they may have a point but shouldn't have raised this during the holiday' or 'maybe it stems from a darker past

but Black Pete surely isn't connected to racism anymore' were classified not only as reasonable but also as mainstream and representing the Dutch majority (Ibid.). This is most clearly illustrated by Prime Minister Mark Rutten's joking statement, 'Black Pete just happens to be black and there is nothing I can do about that'²⁴.

Resembling the racist-nationalist exclusion of Palestinian solidarity activists, any person who spoke out against Black Pete was thus, perhaps unconsciously but effectively, placed outside of the Dutch imagined national space and classified as not *truly* Dutch. That this also closely follows Ghassan Hage's (2000) conceptualisation of 'evil white nationalists' and 'good multicultural white nationalists' as entitled managers of national space with people of colour as objects to be tolerated or not, can be emblematised by the 2014 Gouda demonstration briefly described in Snapshot 2 and to which Richemar referred during the Kick Out Black Pete event.

Anticipating this well attended yearly nationally broadcasted event, anti-Black Pete activists had requested a permit to demonstrate. The intention was immediately condemned as unethical, radical and even as producing racism because 'Quincy Gario [and others] create a climate in which real racists can come out as defenders of Black Pete. These [real racists] are grateful for the opportunity to enhance their popularity among the moderate Dutch majority' (van der Horst 19-10-2013²⁵). Presented as reasonable and as a generous gesture towards the protesters, Gouda mayor Milo Schoenmaker granted the permission but 'at designated places not near, around or among the Saint Nicholas activities' (RTL nieuws 08-11-2014²⁶). Some ninety activists clearly defied these orders when they stood in silence with t-shirts and banners on the side of the central Gouda square on the day of Saint Nickolas arrival. What followed was a swift police action which surrounded all protesters, but also many black people merely present on the square, arresting them with visible physical violence including beating with clubs and the concurrent arrest in prepared cages at the parking lot of a police station for nine hours (Oudenampsen 2014).

This 'incident' was not broadcasted live but the evening news covered it as 'a disturbance of anti-Black Pete activists and some pro-Pete responses' and the following day's newspaper as 'a riot that was so unreasonable that

reasonable people on either side [pro- or con Black Pete] immediately disassociated themselves' (Ibid.). This perceived 'neutral' reporting not only ignored the silent and nonviolent nature of the protest and the loud, visible and violent police intervention but also repeated the crude categorisation of the protesters as 'unreasonable minority' apart and opposed to the moderate thus 'reasonable majority'. This furthermore anchored an implicit notion of the activists as solely people of colour because 'minority' (*minderheden*) in Dutch is also used to refer to ethnic minorities.

In the following days old and new media alike exploded with pro-, con and so called reasonable columns. The posts and accompanying reactions of three Dutch white female celebrities drew my specific attention because they highlighted the mechanism of racist-nationalist exclusionary practise as well as foregrounded gender and sexist aspects therein. All three women had expressed concern about Black Pete before and pleaded for a Piet make-over that 'would make Saint Nicholas fun for all children'²⁷. All three were met with reactions that excluded them, from the imaginary 'real' Dutch imagined collective through particular racist and sexist slurs such as:

Don't talk about Black Pete. I liked you better when you got finger fucked in your ass in GTST [Dutch daily soup]. (response to actress Tanja Jess, Twitter 12-11-2014 @treoldschool)

Dirty spoiled cancer whore. I hope you drop dead soon and I prefer to do it myself you slut. (response to singer Anouk, Facebook 28-10-2013 Willem Charite)

Go back with them. Take your stretched pussy back and join the banana boat. (response to TV host Sylvana Simons, Twitter 01-12-2014)

During the kick off-Kick out Black Pete meeting in February with which this subheading began, all of the above depicted complexities were elaborately discussed. Alongside activists, the organisers had invited community leaders, black feminists and two female professors who specialised in everyday racism, sexism and women rights. One of the latter, professor Gloria

Wekker, particularly analysed the intersectionality of racism and sexism and emphasised the need for the anti-Black Pete activists to build and foster alliances with other activist initiatives such as feminist collectives and current groups which aim to tackle rising Islamophobia in the Netherlands.

Her speech, which drew on her own experience as a black feminist anti-racist activist academic deeply impressed my master student that had accompanied me to the event. In her thesis on Black Pete activism she later wrote: 'Black and white relations *within* the movement are often taken for granted or treated as a taboo. Gloria Wekker guided an in-depth discussion that neither ignored the potential power of solidarity nor the myriad of power issues that accompany such difference in everyday experiences. This clearly shows the ground-breaking and truly progressive direction of current Black Pete activism.'²⁸

While I do not necessarily contest this enthusiastic conclusion, my attention during Wekker's contribution drew to two particular women in the audience: Ramona Sno and Houda Warsame.

The F-Word, Intersectionality and Uneasy Unity

In the above two ethnographic descriptions of Palestinian solidarity activism and the anti-Black Pete campaign, certain commonalities can be drawn. First, both accounts show how speaking out or protesting, in this case Israel's military attack on Gaza and the colonial appearance of Black Pete, in the current racialised context of the Netherlands leads to ascribed identity-based nationalist exclusion. In other words, questioning dominant discourse and practise concerning these themes, excludes one from the national imaginary space of being *really* Dutch.

Second, this racist-nationalist exclusion materialises in very violent interventions by riot police and the criminalisation of all 'Muslim protests'. Rather than action and reaction, I argue that this should be approached as a dialectic relation between hegemonic- and counterhegemonic discourse and practise. This enables a perception of a continuum of violence (Scheper-Huges and Bourgois 2003) in which police violence is a visible expression of the underlying and constant structural violence

of Islamophobia and everyday- and institutional racism²⁹ (Lentin and Gavan 2011).

Third, the selected ethnographic snapshots illustrate how inner-group analysis of the described direct actions sparked vigorous and ongoing debates about strategy and about the content of shared political discourse(s). Both the Palestinian solidarity activists and anti-Black Pete activists herein increasingly prioritise intersectionality of race, gender, class and the interrelatedness of various activist causes and initiatives. Implicitly present in both cases is a myriad of gender related and gendered relations that the third and final snapshot foregrounds.

After the Kick off-Kick out event, my master student had described the conscious inclusion of black feminist voices and the consistent emphasis on intersectionality as ‘inspiring’ and ‘truly progressive’. While I do not challenge this description, my previous fieldwork among anti-racist activists in the Netherlands sensitised me to the controversies that had led to this conscious focus as well as to the tensions it still caused between various activists.

Earlier that year on the 4th of January 2015, Hodan Warsame and Ramona Sno had uploaded the first of four blog posts that aimed to ‘reflect on the current anti-racism landscape in the Netherlands and highlight aspects that we think deserve further attention’ (Sno and Warsame 2015a). Written in an accessible, firm but foremost informative manner, Sno & Warsame directly addressed Dutch anti-Black Pete organisations and black anti-racism activists who are ‘willing to reflect upon the mechanisms of anti-Black racism and how this relates to other forms of oppression’:

Anti-Black racism movements [provide] spaces in which anti-Black racism is acknowledged and publically discussed which empowers us and enhances our capacity to fight for our freedom and dignity. [One] of the biggest shortcomings of current Black anti-racist organisations in the Netherlands, however, is their inability to define and utilise concepts such as institutional racism, white supremacy and white privilege, for what they were created to do: to provide the conceptual clarity to understand our context, to recognise various oppressions and to effectively strategize against them. (Sno and Warsame 2015a)

Exploring academic and black power literature such as Ture and Hamilton (1992[1967]) and Bell Hooks (1999[1981]), the authors emphasise multiple oppressed identities and the need for intersectionality within current black anti-racism activism. Within hours and completely unforeseen by Sno and Warsame, the comment section of this weblog and Facebook exploded with very strong language accusing the authors of being 'black bitches', 'fat traitors' and 'ignorant sluts' (Sno and Warsame 2015c). Their blogpost had obviously struck a sensitive chord among black anti-racism activists. So much so that the authors decided to postpone part two of the series (Ibid. 2015b) and confront the issue head on during the event 'Who is afraid of the F-word? Feminism and anti-racism, an intergenerational dialogue'.

Consciously presented as an all women panel,³⁰ this evening was set out to reflect upon possible 'insights that the feminist movement can offer the current anti-racism movement in the Netherlands [because] the time is ready. We can observe a second wave of flourishing anti-racist activists who are visible and diverse. Successes have been booked but there are also obstacles and worries [that] should be addressed and openly discussed³¹'.

After an introduction and reflections on the so called first wave of anti-racist activism by renowned scholars Philomena Essed (2002a, b, 2014) and Gloria Wekker (2012, 2014), Ramona Sno was handed the microphone. Visibly emotional with a mixture of anger and sadness yet with linguistic clarity she presented an overview of overly sexist responses they had been confronted with after their now (in)famous blog. Quickly drawing attention away from her personal distress, she pleaded for a more inclusive activist environment in which women's issues are not 'readily dismissed or made to wait till after the revolution' and in which 'one initiative doesn't grow at the expensive of another' (Sno and Warsame 2015b). One example Sno put forward that was discussed among the 140- strong audience, long after the panel was over, concerned the 'We are here!' campaign. Actively involved in both anti-Black Pete activism and this initiative which primarily consists of rejected asylum seekers in the Netherlands who cannot leave but cannot claim any legal or social assistance either,³² Sno explained:

I understand that it is tempting to stress Dutch citizenship in the anti-Black Pete struggle. We were born here too so we should have a say in this.

It is simple, straightforward and probably also effective to a certain extent. But it also excludes possible allies and rejects the rights of other black bodies and their access to justice. We insist to include slavery in our analysis but outright ignore the pleas of *current* victims of modern day slavery and neo-colonialism. (Sno 14-03-2015³³)

The evening continued to discuss successes and challenges, similarities and differences between past and present social justice initiatives ranging from Black feminism to white privilege and from 'We are here!' to specism. With the ultimate and inevitable conclusion that such issues can never be fully explored let alone solved in one single meeting but also stressing 'the uniqueness of the current activist landscape because it does provide space for learning about the complexity of intersectionality', the debate was continued outside the auditorium. Drinks in hand, I found three young pro-Palestine activists that I knew from the Gaza demonstrations of the previous summer, passionately discussing the content of the evening:

My head is spinning because it is exactly all of that. I mean, we discussed the men-women thing remember, but now I think it is also about age, religion and white privilege. Even about class maybe? What do you think, [Hans] kept saying that *he* got his *PhD* on the Israel-Palestine conflict and that did kind of make me reluctant to openly disagree with him. (Nora 04-03-2015)

Yes, for sure. But what impressed me most are the connections. I mean, did anyone invite [the anti-Black Pete activists] or, you know, this crowd, to the prep meetings for the 'Remember Gaza- Gaza one year later' demonstration? (Sultan 04-03-2015)

Words were quickly put to deeds and before the evening ended it was decided that representatives from Kick Out Black Pete would join rapper APPA on the stage on the next Gaza demonstration.³⁴ Perhaps more significant, however, dates were also set for what would later be dubbed 'the activist lectures'. A set of informal closed meetings in which activists from across the broad anti-Zionist, anti-Islamophobia, anti-black-racism landscape would come together to exchange experiences learn about each other's struggles and explore the intersectionality between them.

Conclusion

A very visual way in which the above theorised intersectionality comes together is a photograph taken on the 15th of May 2015 during a 'I acknowledge the Nakba' event. During this diverse evening which included musicians, artists, academics and activists from a variety of national, ethnic and religious backgrounds and representing close to the entire scope of Dutch critical activism, rapper APPA and Kno'ledge Cesare, figureheads for respectively the Palestinian solidarity movement and the Kick Out Black Pete campaign, posed together. Hand in hand, the Palestinian Kaffiyah wrapped around their shoulders and with the black power/resist fist up in the air it was later posted at Facebook accompanied with the following status update:

This is what the public prosecution tries to prevent. Standing strong with my brother APPA. Still ready to fight for a future without racism and exclusion. #NAKBA # Solidarity # Strong together. (Facebook page Kno'ledge Cesare 15-05-2015)

The ethnographic description and analysis in this chapter clearly focuses on activism in the Netherlands and cannot be readily exported elsewhere. This photograph of two protagonists central to the ethnographic snapshots presented here, however, reminded me of another Facebook status update that circulated a few weeks before. Alongside a picture of a black man with a Palestinian t-shirt being arrested by the NYC police, the update read:

Last night in jail I (Black) was wearing a #Palestine T-shirt sitting next to a Palestinian wearing a #BlackLivesMatter T-shirt. #NYCRiseup. (Facebook Page Black Intifada 30-04-2015)

From this, it is very tempting to conceptualise the increasing cooperation between various anti-racism activists within the Netherlands as part of a broader transnational development towards a more intersectional social justice activism. As such, it would be fascinating to explore how this new-found cooperation may develop as integrated friendships and allies (Asthan and Moore 2014; Mallory 2012) or continue along the lines of

anti-racism solidarity (Kane 2012; Mullin and Shahshahani 2014). Noticing the current preference for more confrontational jargon and actions, it may also be illuminating to connect these local initiative to the call for Boycott, Divestment and Sanctions (BDS) and see how more recent conceptualisations on anti-Blackness and Black Palestinian Solidarity will be developed within the Netherlands (Ransby 2014; Erakat 2015). Given the centrality of the shared experience of nationalist-exclusion, it would be particularly interesting to deepen analysis along the lines of Ghassan Hage 'white nation fantasy' and, depending on one's research interest, look at how white space is managed and reproduced by 'good white multiculturalist' who with their calls for moderation and 'neutral' approach unconsciously yet effectively silence the voices of those who experience racist-nationalist exclusion on a daily basis. Alternatively, the activists central to this article could also be further explored as a 'multicultural real'³⁵ who by their presence alone prove the 'Dutch white nation' to be a fantasy indeed.

I do certainly not dismiss such possible future endeavours. However, in this essay, I consciously left the analytical paths open for interpretation and presented the ethnographic data as mere snapshots. I do so for three intertwined transdisciplinary reasons.

First, analysis that would focus on either the increasingly racialised nationalist-exclusion in the Netherlands or on the struggle against it, leave the unseen, unheard, yet in many ways central role of the 'imagined silent majority' unexplored. During Israel's attack on Gaza the activists who expressed their dismay were juxtaposed to this silent majority. Where the activists were depicted as emotional and biased, this perceived silent majority was supposedly characterised by neutrality, even-handedness and an overall rational approach. Similarly, the Black Pete discussion is dominated by this imagined silent majority that steers away from any 'radical' stance on Black Pete and therewith effectively marginalise any and all activism. It should be emphasised though that this silent majority by default cannot speak because it constitutes a socially constructed, imaged entity that only exists in the discursive battle of 'the nation' or what it means 'to be Dutch'. Silent, absent, imaginary yet central to the creation and reproduction of racist nationalist-exclusionary practises and discourse and to the everyday experiences of the activists who struggle

against it, analysis should engage with the myriad of power relations behind this invisible racist-nationalism.

Second, if I would present an overarching analytic conclusion about the current Dutch social justice activism landscape, I would inevitably have to draw borders which would not do justice to the complex and changing experiences of contemporary activists. To specify, for example, this newfound cooperation from an overarching anti-racism prism (Bailey 2014; Abukater 2014) or from a solely intersectional lens, would solidify a flux political landscape that is currently foremost characterised by open-ended change, contestations and motion.

Third, a sum up of current affairs would imply an overview of “them”. Of a loose-tight activist collective implicitly conceptualised as apart or separate from the academic writings about them. This would pervert the multiplicity of ways in which individual researchers and the academy as a whole is part and parcel of this changing, power-filled field of increasingly racialised hegemonic- and counter-hegemonic discourse and practise in the Netherlands.

This does not mean that the above snapshots are void of any analytical points nor do I mean to argue against conclusions or stock-taking of changing racisms, Islamophobia and anti-racisms per se. On the contrary, I pose that significant insights lie exactly in movement, change, open-endedness and the particularity of seeming fleeting moments. Just like everyday racism (Essed 2002b) cannot be adequately captured by merely looking at the KKK, so can racist-nationalist exclusionary practise not be fully understood by official policy or registered activist organisations alone. The way the snapshots are presented in this chapter illustrate a fresh way to engage with changing landscapes of racialised othering and with evolving activism which aggregates against such flux processes.

Thick description, and acknowledging the temporality therein, shows how exercising ones democratic right to protest – be it against Israel’s attack on Gaza or against the racist practise of Black Pete – as a Dutch Muslim or as a Dutch person of colour can cast one outside the realm of the imagined white nation. It also draws out how such blunt racist-nationalist exclusionary practices stimulate new activist alliances and cultivates a shared, flux and radical political imagination. Paying attention to obvious and subtle sexism in response to and within the activist scene,

warn us to not romanticise such developments but rather approach them as part of a flux, power filled and changing political landscape. The importance of acknowledging change and temporality is further illustrated by the constant presence of academics and the academy in these snapshots. Whether it is as commentators, lecturers or activist academics it shows that academic knowledge and the people who produce it are an integral part of racist-nationalist exclusion as well as the struggle against it. In this chapter and through these snapshots I thus not only provided fresh insights into current racism and anti-racism protests in the Netherlands, but also shown the potential of transdisciplinary approaches that prioritise change, motion and movement in the everyday experiences of racism.

Notes

1. Parts of the speech that Nourdin el Ouali delivered during the third of five demonstration in the Netherlands in the summer of 2014 against Israel's military attack on Gaza. Excerpts from field notes and translated by the author. The full video recording of the speech can be accessed here: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FnEwLFGDjOo>
2. Open letter as published by the European Network Against Racism (ENAR) and undersigned by 41 affiliated European anti-racist initiatives. For the full letter and accompanying press release see: <http://www.enar-eu.org/Open-letter-on-violations-of-the> & http://www.enar-eu.org/IMG/pdf/2014_november_letter_anti-zwarte_piet_protest_in_gouda.pdf
3. Excerpt of the lecture 'Why we forget Winnie Mandela' by Jessica de Abreu delivered at the 2014 Tribute to Mandela as organised by the New Urban Collective (NUC) in cooperation with Krater Art & Community. 05-12-2014 Tribute to Nelson Mandela: Amandla! Translation by author, full video of lecture can be accessed here: <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=XTNETSVQceY>
4. This article stems from a broader, ongoing comparative research on the symbolic relevance of Palestine within social justice activism in the Netherlands, the United Kingdom and South Africa. This research applies transdisciplinary methods for data collection which rejects distinct separation between researcher and the researched. As such, tradi-

tional anthropological fieldwork methods such as participant observation and in-depth interviews are accompanied by innovative approaches such as reflexive meetings in which the interlocutors are actively involved in the knowledge-making process. For further reading on such methods see De Jong (2011, 2015).

5. CIDI stands for Centre for Information and Documentation on Israel and is a well-known conservative Zionist Israeli lobby organisation in the Netherlands: <http://www.cidi.nl/>
6. Both initiatives we established in direct response to Israel's military operation dubbed 'Operation Protective Edge'. Some of the founding activists had already been involved in previous activism but most were young newcomers who felt that longer existing initiatives such as the Dutch Palestine Committee (NPK) did not offer them enough space for involvement. Where Back to Palestine consisted of Dutch youngsters from Palestinian origin, Youth for Palestine really focused on providing teenagers and people in their early twenties with a platform: <https://www.facebook.com/YFPNL> & <https://www.facebook.com/btpalestine?fref=nf>
7. Allochtonen is a Dutch word that refers to any Dutch person with a non-Dutch national background. Officially this word only captures immigrants and first generation Dutch persons but in general discourse, allochtoon is used for anyone with a non-Dutch background even if this is a second or third generations Dutchman. For background information on this politically loaded term, I suggest van krieken (2008): <http://robertvankrieken.net/?p=22>
8. Any depiction of activists sentiments is necessarily a implication. As such, the broad division saw exceptions to the rule with some older activists immediately welcoming and adapting to the newcomers and with some younger female protesters unhappy with this more provocative turn. It should also be noted that this division, while clearly visible and openly discussed among the activists, does not fit the activists of the International Socialists party. A dozen or so activists from this socialist collective had been long involved with both Palestinian solidarity activism and with broader ant-racism struggles and at times function to mediate between the two groups. See Aouragh (2014).
9. For an ethnographic description of this process of criminalisation see De Jong, 2017 *Zwarte Piet, Palestina en de strijd om het dagelijks leven*. ICA: *Instituut Culturele Antropologie*. Leiden: Universiteit Leiden.

10. <http://www.omroepwest.nl/nieuws/04-08-2014/kabinet-veroordeelt-antisemitisme-bij-haagse-protesten>
11. For public events real names and literal transcriptions are used. When ethnographic notes stem from semi-structured interviews, informal conversations, or so called closed inner-group meeting, all research interlocutors were presented with the option to be quoted by name or stay anonymous. During participant observations of large scale events such as demonstrations or larger discussion meetings, it was not always feasible to present myself as an activist researcher nor to ask permission from all present. Some names have therefore been changed to avoid any inconvenience to my interlocutors.
12. Zwarte Piet Niet: <http://www.zwartepietniet.nl/> Zwarte Piet is Racisme, <https://www.Facebook.com/zwartepietisblackface> Zwarte Piet make-over <https://www.Facebook.com/pages/Pietmakeover/1485255905084399>
13. For the episode of Sesamestreet see: <http://www.marcdehond.nl/sesamstraat-1987-gerda-havertong-en-pino-praten-over-zwarte-piet/>
14. RTL nieuws (22-05-2014) 'Achter de schermen overleg over uiterlijk Zwarte Piet' retrieved on 12-03-2015: <http://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/binnenland/achter-de-schermen-overleg-over-uiterlijk-zwarte-piet>
15. RTL nieuws (08-11-2014) 'Speciale demonstratieplekken tijdens Sinterklaasintocht'. Retrieved on 12-03-2015: <http://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/binnenland/speciale-demonstratieplekken-tijdens-sinterklaasintocht>
16. For the unedited video of this arrest: https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=6ZjU-t0va_w
17. J.Postma placed comment under the article 'Arrestatie naar uiten mening: Zwarte Piet is racisme' on 11-11-2011 on *kontabai.nl*: <http://www.kontabai.nl/2011/11/14/arrestaties-na-uiten-mening-zwarte-piet-is-racisme/> Accessed on 06-03-2017.
18. Ricoo70 placed comment under the article 'Arrestatie was racistisch' on the website *powned.tv* on: <https://www.powned.tv/artikel/arrestatie-was-racistisch> Accessed on 06-03-2017.
19. Kapotte_Stofzuiger placed comment under the article 'Arrestatie was racistisch' on the website *powned.tv* on: <https://www.powned.tv/artikel/arrestatie-was-racistisch> Accessed on 06-03-2017.
20. Black Pete needs to stay: <https://petities.nl/petitie/zwarte-piet-moet-blijven>, Black Pete Fantastic: <https://www.facebook.com/PietenProtest>, and the Sint & Piet Gilde: www.sintenpietengilde.nl
21. www.sintenpietengilde.nl

22. <http://wijblijvenhier.nl/21293/racistische-reacties-anti-zwarte-piet-betoog-quinsy-gario/>
23. <http://nederlandwordtbeter.nl/>
24. '18-10-2013 Rutte: Piet is nou eenmaal zwart' *NOS* <http://nos.nl/artikel/564038-rutte-piet-is-nou-eenmaal-zwart.html>
25. van der Horst, H. (19-10-2013) 'Zwarte Piet voedt juist racisme'. *Joop.nl* http://www.joop.nl/opinies/detail/artikel/23450_zwarte_piet_discussie_voedt_racisme/
26. Milo Schoenmaker, mayor of Gouda in an interview with *RTL nieuws* on 08-11-2014 <https://www.rtlnieuws.nl/nieuws/binnenland/speciale-demonstratieplekken-tijdens-sinterklaasintocht>
27. Several Dutch celebrities placed videos of themselves pleading support to this 'Black Pete make-over' initiatives: <https://www.facebook.com/pages/Pietmakeover/1485255905084399>
28. Master thesis Lisanne Visser 2015. Unpublished, available at: <http://www.scriptsionline.uba.uva.nl/cgi/b/bib/bib-idx?type=simple;lang=en;c=uvascript;sid=03633c9666fda10f0159596c3e00cd61;rgn1=entire%20record;q1=Zwarte%20Piet;Submit.x=0;Submit.y=0;sort=publicationyear;cc=uvascript;view=reslist;fmt=long;page=reslist;start=3;size=1>
29. This point, albeit in a different context and much more elaborate, has been made by several scholars. See for example Goldberg (2006) and Lentin and Gavan (2011).
30. With an obvious wink to the 'Congrats, you have an all male panel' tublr initiative <http://allmalepanels.tumblr.com/>
31. <https://www.facebook.com/events/842006242526238/> 4th of March 2015, Bijlmerpark theatre).
32. Cannot leave either to other EU countries or to their lands of origin. For information on this initiative and for background on the specific situation of rejected asylum seekers in the Netherlands, see: <http://wijzijnhier.org/over-het-asielgat/waarom-vluchtelingen-vaak-onuitzetbaar-zijn/>
33. Ramona Sno during the Who is afraid of the F-word event. Paraphrased from fieldwork notes.
34. Gaza 1 jaar later: Stop de blokkade, stop de bezetting! *Facebook* <https://www.facebook.com/events/1660964567472223/>
35. Ghassan Hage (2000) uses multicultural reality to stipulate that the image of Australia as a white nation is a fantasy. In congruence with Hage's broader framework, I use multicultural *real* rather than multicultural reality because the latter leaves space for conceptualisations of a

Dutch white nation with lots of multicultural Dutch citizens therein. Multicultural real, instead, practically and physically challenges the notion that the Dutch nation has ever been a white united nation and poses that the Dutch as a socially constructed collective has always been multicultural and multi-coloured. Only in the mind of white nationalists, evil racist and good multicultural alike, is it imagined otherwise.

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12

Are You Grime or Part-Time?! Reviewing Race and 'Realness' in Britain's Grime Scene

Monique Charles

Introduction

In this chapter, I principally examine race in the British Grime music scene. Grime music is a Black British musical form with a multicultural scene. I explore issues arising from Grime's transition from a predominantly Black underground scene into an increasingly multicultural commercial genre. In-depth semi structured interviews,¹ observations, documentaries, lyrics etc. will interrogate this transition and be applied to hooks' (1992) concept of *Eating the Other*, Garner's (2007) examination of Whiteness, Allinson's (1994) *It's a Black Thing* and cultural appropriation & what constitutes Grime's authenticity.

To clarify, I will use the term 'Black' or 'Black British' to refer to people of the African diaspora residing in Britain. The term Black includes their working class position; this is implied. It is implied because since the

M. Charles (✉)

University of West London, London, UK

e-mail: monique.charles@uwl.ac.uk

Windrush, African descended colonial peoples (the Caribbean and West Africa) came to Britain after World War II as a reserve workforce. They were invited to rebuild Britain and primarily positioned in low paid jobs to fill labour shortages. They lived in what Hall (1978) identified as *internal colonies* within British society. Contemporarily, many Black Britons still live in the larger cities and inner-city areas (Hesse 2000), where their parents, grandparents and great grandparents lived and worked. I will use the term ‘White or ‘White British’ for people of European descent residing in Britain, referring to their ancestral countries of origin if needed. Where I use the term ‘working class’ explicitly, I refer primarily to the White working classes residing in inner city areas to make a distinction from White middle and upper classes. I use these terms, knowing they are not concrete and sealed categories. This chapter primarily focuses on the Black/White binary, however the diversity of large British inner cities are more complex than this.

When referring to people in the data, I will use the terms panellist, to describe speakers at panel events, and audience members for those attending said events. Lastly those interviewed, for the sake of clarity will be called respondents, or named individually.

What Is Grime?

Grime is a Black British, DIY, male dominated genre of music originating from London’s subaltern inner cities (Campion 2004) at the turn of the twenty-first century. Sonically, it is characterised as typically 4/4 (four crotchet beats to a bar), comprising of repeated 8 or 16 bar cycles. Grime’s sound is dominated by low frequencies— basslines and dub (Henriques 2011; Sullivan 2013; Bradley 2013). The average tempo ranges between 136 and 140 beats per minute (Powell 2012). There can be the sonic effect of vast space in a Grime track (often for a vocal). MCs ‘spit’ in British accents, regional slang and Jamaican infused accents & patois with relentless velocity. The DIY nature of Grime contributes to its lo-fi, gritty, raw, grimy and unrefined sound.

Grime's Rise

Grime's rise – and the string of top ten singles by Black British artists that accompanied it – has made an important contribution to the mainstreaming of Black culture in the UK. Bramwell (2015a, 257)

Grime music consumption expanded rapidly in late noughties (2000s) Britain. Black British youth culture became mainstream youth culture (Lindner 2008), with multi-ethnic youth engaging in and consuming Grime. Those observed attending events, tweeting and respondents interviewed during the data collection period in 2012–2015, were ethnically diverse. Respondents emphasised the multicultural nature of the scene.

...it was quite a mixed scene. Young Black males predominantly... depending on what part of London you are from... there was a lot of integration more so than other parts of the country... White people, Black people... Indian... if you look at those early sets... Dizzee and Crazy Titch, Dirty Goodz, Wiley... Geezus and Slimzee at Rinse [FM]... two White guys and then you had FWD... involved in doing the publishing for lots of different people. Donna, Journalist

In general however, respondents identified Grime music as Black music, partly owing to its sound and visible and substantive Black presence in the scene, it's (a) longstanding diasporic connections to Jamaican sound system & sound clash culture, (b) consumer connection to North American hip hop culture & rap, and (c) regional connections to UK underground musics such as Jungle and UK Garage. Grime's genealogical sonic and sociocultural influences are formed from these pre-existing genres, and social and musical sensibilities (i.e. what makes musical sense to a group – Rose 1994). From the beginning, Black male MCs have been the highly visible face of Grime. Grime is a male dominated scene and intentionally so. Respondents identified the Grime sound and scene as masculine – for 'Da man dem'. Masculinity is aspirational; men vie for alpha position. MCs assert their position in relation to the alpha spot, through braggadocio of their superiority, or ridicule of competitors

for example. It is a space for young men to, demonstrate their agency. Sonically, the songs contain a lot of space and not much melody or harmony, which are associated with a more feminised sound (Machin 2010; Sylvan 2002). Grime is dominant in low frequency bass and dub, considered masculine owing to its penetrative nature (felt vibrating inside the body) (Sullivan 2013). Masculinity is connoted through the use of bass.

Asserting masculinity is an ideological principle in the scene and as a result, there are few femcees (female MCs). Few women have agency to direct the narrative and largely operate in peripheral roles in the scene. To achieve agency as MCs, women masculinise themselves most often through dress and or the incorporation of Jamaican patois and toasting styles which are considered more masculinised.

Significantly, masculinity is racialised in the scene through both race and colourism. Blackness is linked to masculinity. Colourism is linked to skin colour/complexion, desirability and gender, whereby the darker a person's skin, the more masculinised (aggressive) they are perceived to be. The lighter skinned a person is, the more feminised (docile) they are perceived to be. The desirability of these characteristics is linked to the sex of a person and ideas of beauty. For men in Grime, this is connected to masculinity and the possibility of achieving alpha male status.

Binary

Black music listenership in Britain increased with mainstream radio's pursuit to secure a younger audience. The BBC (British Broadcasting Corporation) launched 1Xtra in 2002,² specialising in Black music in response to the falling and ageing listenership on Radio One. They secured DJs from Black pirate radio stations.³ In 2005, Capital Radio bought Black radio station Choice FM,⁴ becoming Capital Xtra. Progressively, Black music and culture mainstreamed and was collectively rebranded '*urban*'. Grime was included in this category. Top ten hits entered the British music charts (i.e. Wretch 32 '*Traktor*' (2011), Tinie Tempah '*Pass Out*' (2010), Tinchy Stryder feat. Dappy's '*Number One*' (2009)). Paradoxically however, those who founded the scene (particularly young Black males), their cultural practices and residential areas remained stigmatised.

British youth is still far away from the dream of a multicultural utopia. Although black youth culture nowadays pervades the realm of mainstream youth in the United Kingdom... it hardly improves the prospects of the status of black youth. (Lindner 2008, 107)

This dichotomy i.e. the love of Black cultural production, but stigmatisation of Black people, is conceptualised in hooks' (1992) eating the other. It elucidates how a group of people can be disregarded and dehumanised, whilst extracting or appropriating their desirable and commodifiable cultural practices. This process – i.e. disinheriting 'Blackened' sound & musical sensibilities (Rose 1994) and reorganising knowledge by the music industry (through the commodification process) (BBM 2015a,⁵ BBM Re:IMI 2015b⁶) – is longstanding in Britain; dating back to when Reggae was first introduced to Britain and the music tweaked to incorporate strings to fulfil a 'rock' sensibility (Jones 1988).

When already living under an oppressive system, the development of a safe space to freely express cultural identity and buffer racism and marginalisation is essential (addressed by Reynolds 2007 later in this chapter). The ability of oppressive forces to intervene at will and binarise people, invade their spaces and dehumanise them in the process, is a racist practice. Racism is systematic and is a process that requires both groups AND power to operate. Garner 2007 refers to low intensity terror which will be addressed later in this chapter.

Knowledge Power Respect

The mainstreaming of commercial Grime and simultaneous non-improvement for Black youth and musicians, sparked a series of roundtable discussions, examining the impact of commodification.⁷ Mainstream developments in Grime moved away and did not reflect the underground scene. BBC 1extra listed Ed Sheeran as the most important person in Black and 'Urban' Music in Britain in 2014.⁸ Sheeran is White British, middle class, and on the surface, is far removed from the origins of Grime (or 'Urban' music). Wiley, a prominent force in the scene since its beginnings, dubbed *The Godfather of Grime* and placed number sixteen on the list of twenty, responded to this list on Twitter:

We influence a man and all of a sudden it turns out he has influenced us. England music industry is backwards. God bless those who try. People think I am mad. I am not mad, I can just see skull duggery from miles away. We have been bumped basically. Not taking anything away from Ed, he is sick. But black artist in England, we are getting bumped. (Twitter, July 12, 2014)

As a Black man publically speaking out, he is aware of his precarious position and vulnerability to attack, despite his authority. The *Godfather of Grime* pre-empts challenges to his experiential knowledge of the underground scene and musical sensibilities by outlining his rationality. He is not mad. He indicates the industry, which is external to the sensibilities of the scene, does not have the authority to shape knowledge about a scene it does/will not understand irrespective of Sheeran's obvious talent. Wiley is correct. To reiterate, BBC 1Xtra was founded in 2002. They developed this list in an authoritative capacity, despite tapping into a pre-existing culture primarily to secure higher listenership; for benefit of self. Wiley's comment highlights that the institutionalisation process disrupts and undermines genealogies of Black practices, sensibilities and culture, effectively divorcing them from its people and *bumping* (discarding) them.

Articles about Ed's listed position and Wiley's response to it; (a) justify Ed's position, (b) remove the element of race from the decision or (c) explain the parameters/criteria this decision was based on. These approaches (a) refuse to examine or (b) are ignorant about cultural appropriation, or eating the other and processes of cultural knowledge theft/rebranding recently identified as 'Columbusing' (Stone 2014). These lines of argument effectively solidify the discarding of people and related knowledges and sensibilities in everyday life and protect extraction and appropriation. Collectively, these industries are an expression of power and low intensity terrorism as outlined by Garner (2007) i.e. structural parameters that bear on an oppressed group that enable the dominant group to emerge as beneficiaries.

Morrison (1987) and bell hooks (2000, 1992) stress the terror and domination of whites as the primary values seen from a black perspective in terms of the power of naming, defining, decision making and the use of symbolic and physical violence. (Garner 2007, 15)

In the specific case of Grime, industry bear down on an oppressed group to direct its narrative commercially; such as naming the genre and receiving the greatest economic reward – even if they know little or nothing about the original sensibilities or cultural production. For example, John Aizlewood, a journalist for the Evening Standard, reported what he perceived to be DJ Maximum's 'technical difficulties' at Skepta's concert in Alexandra Palace in December 2016.⁹ Aizlewood reasoned these difficulties resulted in Maximum 're-starting' 'songs' and negatively affected the concert. In fact, 'Reloads', what DJ Maximum was doing, involves restarting a 'track', and provides an essential participatory element that is a desirable staple in the Grime scene. It has roots in diasporic Black cultural practice and musical sensibilities spanning decades. It can be traced back even further to the Afrodiasporic traditions of 'call and response' (Gilroy 1993) and is an example of a sensibility that feels natural or normative to a group of people. Fortunately the power of social media and technological democratisation (not discussed here) facilitates new methods to redress institutionally constructed narratives.¹⁰

Another example relates to the name 'Grime'. Amongst other names, the underground called it 'Eight bar', 'Sixteen bar' (Akala 2011) or Sublo (Akala 2011, Smith 2003). Wiley calls his music Eski (Smith 2003). Eski is an abbreviated term for Eskimo. It is a racially offensive term; however knowledge of this in Britain is limited. The name Eski does not focus on Inuit peoples, but alludes to the 'coldness' of the sounds in the music he makes. Respondents expressed frustration at the name Grime. They did not know where the term came from to qualify as the official name. They believed the name came from outside the scene and did not like the name or the connotations associated with it:

And at that time on the street, everyone was using the word Grimy anyway. So, it was like they just start calling it Grimy Garage which is just – meant Dark Garage... I saw it went from Grimy Garage, so somebody used the word Grime, and everyone hated it and it was named Grime but the publications used it so it stuck. Sean, Producer

...unfortunately, we never called it Grime... that's what people don't realise. We never called it Grime... I remember one time we sat there and was like where did this title come from? They gave it Grime. They gave it the title. You

know who they is... We don't even know where that came from but it was ours; it was. Roger, Presenter

These respondents had a sense of dispossession, having what was known to them reintroduced in a different way. This was compounded by the officious and authoritative narrative attributed to this reintroduction. This externally defined name is symbolic violence coming from what I term 'The Columbusphere' (Charles 2016b); a place of arrogant false knowledge that has the power to redirect the course of knowledge about an object/subject, its sensibilities and how it is understood. The process of intervention, dehumanisation and directing the narrative of the oppressed group (i.e. Black and working class people) are acts of racial and/or classed based terror. This process is detrimental as it erases the oppressed group, silencing them, undermining their agency and identity, their knowledge and sensibilities.

Institutional processes of commodification may benefit some members of the scene at times (economically, publicity), however overall, it is a form of symbolic violence to the host subculture. One can explore this idea by examining the pre-existing institutional structures in place and how they interact with race and class (Grime has both classed and racial points of consideration to be discussed later in the chapter). Within the scene, core members (artists, producers) were predominantly Black. Social commentators (Journalists, Bloggers and Record Label Owners), and a significant number of cultural distributors/evangelists (DJs) interviewed, observed and referred to were White. Core members are entrepreneurs (problematised by the UK government as NEET – Not in Employment Education or Training (White 2014), or constructed within social exclusion (Shannahan 2009) frameworks), earning a living from their cultural capital, and where mainstream economic advancement may not be a possibility or desired (Gunter 2010; White 2014).

Social commentators inhabit roles where they are permitted to earn a living through an existing capitalistic system that favours and rewards Whiteness (class remains a factor of consideration discussed later). They occupy spaces where one may have a degree of authority to produce knowledge and understanding *over* a 'subject' of investigation (Grime/The other). This is not to suggest social commentators had the power to

create knowledge without institutional resistance (Editors, Music Executives etc. – most often controlled by middle/upper class and White men). However, comparatively, they were able to get closer access to the gatekeepers. The tension of bringing working class ideas to industry still remains irrespective of race. The British music industry is 95.7% white.¹¹ The mainstream press documenting Grime and government implementing policies that problematise Black and working class peoples are predominantly White middle/upper class. Therefore, I am not suggesting that social commentators do not possess genuine passion, interest, understanding or experiential knowledge of Grime subcultural practices. Those interviewed had experiential knowledge, or were in close proximity to the scene. The majority identified as working class (or lower middle class) were raised and/or living in the residential areas that birthed Grime.

Navigation

Black panellists and audience members working in mainstream radio identified that their organisations do not understand Black music sensibilities or the informal DIY nature of the underground. They are principally concerned with making money from it. Black music directly from the underground, was rejected by licensed radio. They declined playing underground music until record companies approved of, or endorsed it, making mainstream radio complicit in institutionalisation and discarding processes. This process creates a powerbase and authority OUTSIDE the subculture. Compounding this, one panellist told audience members that some radio stations in parts of Britain were still less willing to play his industry approved song, or only wanted to play sections where the White artists featured.¹²

The acknowledgment of racism in the music industry, the shifting fan base (becoming increasingly White and middle class¹³) coinciding with commercialisation, cultural appropriation and 'bumping' of Black artists was obvious to most respondents interviewed. Panellists and audience members at different events spoke about the significant and negative impact that the industry can have on Black cultural chance; i.e. blocking artists, changing what they are doing (also outlined by

Riley 2014). At events, those in industry had to navigate corporate sensibilities (solely concerned with extraction) which differed from their own sensibilities and experiential knowledge. Navigation was identified in Riley's (2014) own experiences and some respondents suggested they understood that underground artists had to alter their sensibilities to operate within industry. Like others in industry, Wiley's musical sensibilities were misunderstood and he was not in control of his cultural capital; his lyricism reveals there was an attempt to constrain or block him.

In his track, *It's Wiley (Showa Eski)* (2011b), Wiley gives an autobiographical account of his infamous online release of over 200 tracks via zip files in July 2010. He completely bypassed the industry, giving free music directly to his fans (Hancox 2010). This was allegedly in response to frustrating *creative differences* between him and his then record label. In the first verse, Wiley exudes confidence. He asserts his self-belief in his talent and capabilities. He addresses 'Columbusphere extraction issues' by speaking directly to his fans, thanking them for their patience, trusting they understood his predicament. He reassured his fans that he wants to make music that resonates with him and his true fans; which is different to popular/crossover music the label required. Upon changing labels to create this track and EP, he was able to have more control over his creativity. A few months later, Wiley released his seventh studio album entitled '*100% Publishing*', where he had total creative control over the project (Patrin 2011).

Are You Grime?

Racism and Authenticity

Differing sensibilities and navigation to secure livelihoods bring up questions and issues around authenticity. Respondents did not agree with what was happening to Grime at the height of commercialisation (approx. 2009). Black respondents rationalised why appropriation practices happened:

This is the music industry, this is England, UK. We have a small industry. With Black people we are 3.5% or 4% of the country. 96% are still white. You need to be able to have a universal music. You need to be able to satisfy the masses...
Roger, Presenter

...when I was at my pinnacle, England wasn't ready for that type of music yet... Black people in the whole... England, they don't make no more than 8 percent, in the whole factor... you're trying to promote this music into a population of 8 percent people... England comes from the era of Rock bands, we're talking Oasis, the Beatles, John Lennon, this is English history... They deal with rebellious Rock music. So we're just a small minority of eight percent that's trying to come up with a different thing. Marcus, MC

Roger and Marcus rationalised happenings in terms of being a numerical minority in the English context. Despite living in diverse, inner-city London, there was a vivid sense of being a minority in Britain. They had a resignatory powerlessness and frustrated acceptance of what happens to their cultural capital, knowledge and sensibilities once it enters industry, despite respondents and panellists inadvertently acknowledging that the music was for Black audiences and their working class peers.

Commercial (Sell Out)

An informal discussion with an event organiser & journalist and two White respondents (below) noted this change over time:

...nowadays there are people that you wouldn't expect to be into Grime... people that you would think are more into... indie music...they're Grime fans...
Wayne, Blogger

You notice... the new fan base... seems to be a little bit whiter than it was at the get-go... My personal take on it is that now as England...have Road Rap or... UK Hip-Hop... when [an MC name] and all that was going on... there was another rapper every other day. So it was working great... not everybody... younger ... not White didn't feel that necessary need to do Grime. Because Grime at that point was Tinchy doing 'Number One'... N-Dubz... that

seemed to be where the direction Grime went and Road Rap was going the other one. So if none of that spoke to you or look good to you, you went the other way. Whereas you know with White kids my age, I can't speak for everyone, but I can definitely imagine that no one's going to take you seriously if you're out here trying to emulate kids there with the exception of maybe [An MC name] or something like that. Brad, Fan/Blogger

Wayne notes the shift in fan base. I am unsure whether this is a reference to class, as Indie fans tend to have middle class tastes (McCulloch, Stewart and Lovegreen 2006; Hollingworth and Williams 2009), but it clearly illustrates that it is a different, 'newer', type of fan attracted to Grime; cultural tourists (Lena 2012). Brad is saying the Black fan base largely followed Road Rap trajectories (a newer genre rhizomatically branching from Grime), which still felt more embedded, 'authentic' and underground. White artists followed the more commercial Grime route (unless they were an inner-city MC with experiential knowledge).

Black MCs in industry 'crossed over' to cater to this new tourist audience with 'commercial' Grime. Respondents did not consider commercial Grime the same as the underground Grime music or scene. The industry, adhering to corporate sensibilities, discarded the embeddedness, sensibilities and experiential knowledge integral to the scene, which caused the original fan base to turn away as identified by Brad. 'Commercial' Grime raised issues of race, class, authenticity and credibility. 'Crossover' Grime artists were being challenged about their skills, credibility and authenticity by newer and underground Grime MCs.¹⁴ Compounding this, some successful crossover artists were unhappy in industry.¹⁵ 'Crossover' Grime artists re-sought authenticity and autonomy on their own terms i.e. according to their own, not corporate sensibilities. To regain control over their cultural capital (resisting low intensity terror, Garner 2007), they returned to Black and working class sensibilities, cultural capital and maintain connections with the bodies and residential areas that nurtured the original scene and their creativity. Grime is more than a music or scene, but a culture and way of life:

Grime basically is what man know innit? Marcus, MC

Embeddedness and New Urban Ethnicities

Street/road culture (of which Grime is part) is rooted in the embedded experiential knowledge of the inner-city. It is a Black influenced subculture located within 'mainstream British youth culture' (Gunter and Watt 2009, 520). Grime is very much a 'working class' subcultural form. McCulloch Stewart and Lovegreen highlights that '...young people's membership of subcultural groupings is largely determined by social class.' (2006, 539) and therefore gives further insight into understanding Grime culture and authenticity (and the significance of embeddedness) and a way of life. Class has a significant influence on subcultural practices and identity (McCulloch, Stewart and Lovegreen 2006; Hollingworth and Williams 2009) for young people living in diverse inner-cities.

The only good thing what happened is a bit like what raving did to the Blacks... we started something what everyone accepted to, because Grime no longer just stood for Black road kids anymore, it stood for every road kid, that means if you're Jewish, Turkish, Bognor Regis, East Ham, Peckham, Brixton, Lewisham; If you're from a council estate where it's dead and you wanted to wear nice trainers, you'd be listening to Grime coz that's the people you can relate to, because all the stuff that these MCs are talking about is the stuff you're living as a poor kid in England. Marcus, MC

In British larger inner-city areas, multi-ethnic friendships are commonplace. The recent history of migration to Britain from the colonies to fill working class jobs essential to rebuilding Britain after the WWII (HMS Windrush 1948¹⁶), has lead a consistent presence of diverse groups living together in inner-city and working class areas. Over time, these formed communities that may still have cultural specificities according to ancestry, but adhere to common class and location based sensibilities and identifications – a 'New Urban Ethnicity' (Back 1996).

Identity and Culture

The majority of respondents grew up in or around London's inner cities and experienced the similar class based restrictions. It made Grime inclusive in nature, with genuine relatability, joint experience and cultural

reference points – authentically British. It should be noted that the White working class that live in inner-city areas partaking in Grime and/or street/road culture are vilified (Gunter 2010), othered (e.g. Chav, Jones 2011), demonised and racialised (Nayak 2003) by wider British culture.

A person racialised as white can be ideologically exiled from this privilege, or may pursue values seen as antagonistic, or adhere to a minority religion, or are from a different country... (Garner 2007, 11)

Racialising White people residing in inner cities and/or embedded in Grime, functions as a border control to Whiteness (Nayak 2003). When Black culture, practice and sensibilities are adhered to amongst the White working class, it detracts from Whiteness' 'respectability' status (Nayak 2003; Garner 2007; Lindner 2008).

Young people in inner-city areas such as Gunter's (2010) Manor (East London), Hewitt's (1986) area B (South London) or Gidley's (2007) Deptford (South London), grow up in more multicultural surroundings and develop 'new urban ethnicities' (Back 1996). However, intersectionalities still remain and affect 'subgroups' within the working class collective differently. As such, Reynolds' (2007) study shows that Black British youth often had closest friends of similar ethnic backgrounds *and* socio-economic status. Gunter and Watt 2009; Gunter 2010 inadvertently found same ethnic friendships with white working class 'grafters', 'pups' and other groups in their ethnographic studies. Interracial friendships revolved around and were sustained by a common interest, such as football, more so than similar values, identity and social capital that occurred in same ethnic friendships (Reynolds 2007). Therefore, whilst respondents spoke about having inter-racial friendships, most Black respondents stated that their closest friendships were with other Black people.

Black British (Caribbean) youth identity, leant heavily on the identity and musics from the USA and Caribbean (Gilroy 1993; Reynolds 2006; Beckford 2006) and informed cultural practice and musical and cultural sensibilities. Black same-ethnic friendships buffered the effects of racial discrimination experienced in British life (Reynolds 2007). For respondents, underground Grime provided a way for Black British youth to assert their cultural and musical sensibilities, experiences AND their

Britishness; their unique identity – their *Sonic Footprint Timestamp SFT* (Charles 2016a, b) in both Britain and the diaspora in a way few other scenes or cultural reference points permitted.

Safe Spaces

Nuanced cultural production such as Grime, provide safe spaces for Black youth to express a sense of pride and agency within their cultural practices and sensibilities that are overlooked or have been problematised by the mainstream. White working class youth use these spaces to make sense of their own social dynamics (Bramwell 2015b) and class based identity. In the safe space of an interview, Black respondents express their locational and ancestral identities. In the safe space of a concert, on stage, *shout outs* were made to London regions in particular i.e., W, N, E S, and ancestral countries or regions e.g. Jamaica, Caribbean, Nigeria, Africa. Here, one could cheer and express pride in their residential areas (Howarth 2002), ancestral places, experiential knowledge, culture and sensibilities; all contribute to the formation of identity and self-validation. Performers expressed pride in being British through dress: such as wearing a Union Jack blazer, or announcing to crowds their pride in being a part of British culture and making British music.

Or Part Time...

...back then I would say it was largely a Black music... It was for Black people by Black people... Although you had a couple of White emcees... it had a Black people fan base. Obviously I'm White... a couple of White friends... so it reached us as well... nowadays... there's a lot of White people that are fans of Grime... Wayne, Blogger

Sonic Explorers and Consumption

White people can often move through social space without considering their racialised identity (Garner 2007). In the context of Grime however,

particularly before its commercialisation, White presence was hyper visible. Unlike Black presence in White dominated spaces in Britain, the inverse (i.e. White presence in predominantly Black Grime subculture) was a choice entered into by cultural tourists and some respondents who sought out Grime (especially for international, remote national and/or middle class White respondents/listeners).

Grime operated as a safe space of Black (and working class) expression; for (masculine) self-validation and identity formation. Owing to its significance to identity, culture and way of life, racialised boundaries were policed by scene members who sought to ascertain the intent and/or reasonings behind the presence of unknown White individuals in Grime, particularly with regard to Grime's commercialisation and shifting fan base. White respondents exclusively referred to a network of White middle classed listeners who were active online, in Blogs and Forums, and reading magazines such as *Wire* or *Spin*. It was relayed that these listeners were fans of experimental music.

... White middle class... Musical geeks is the best way of putting it. That's how we would characterise [Magazine name] as an example of that kind of scene.
Sean, Journalist

...it's mostly... White, male... the people in my generation into Grime 8 out of 10 times or at least the ones who I know through the areas of internet I'm on, tend to be White males. Brad, Fan/Blogger

I term these White middle classed listeners 'sonic explorers' who sought out new 'experimental' sonic frontiers. White respondents who lived further away revealed that the Grime scene seemed like an exciting fantasy world. They were drawn to its sonic difference/extremity, larger than life characters, embedded experiences, humour and lifestyles that contrasted with their own. Difference formed part of the attraction:

...not a dream... a distant world away... estates and gang crime and stuff that I was not used to seeing... it appealed to me in that sort of way, the same way that people in the UK... American Hip-Hop appeals to people because it's like glamorous, because they don't see it over here... I had that feeling with Grime

because it wasn't around me, so the only way that I could access it was to listen to it or seeing... Liam, Label Owner

Brad was also drawn to Grime for reasons of difference. For him, Grime contrasted with popular nihilistic American Rap narratives popular at the time. He was particularly drawn to diverse and energetic characters and the especially super geeky narratives of some MCs.

Lindner (2008) finds part of the attraction for White British youth may have more to do with development of identity against parents and teenage rebelliousness. Identification with Grime for self-validation and identity/culture formation, and attraction to Grime to rebel, make oneself distinguishable, to peer into another world or sonic exploration, have two different motivations and highlight the difference of approach and possibly values placed on the importance the music has to one's being. It provides an insight into why policing took place as it entered its commercial stage.

White Visibility, Culture and Lacking

White people *choosing* to participate in Black music scenes and culture are viewed as attempting to obtain Black 'cool' or 'spice' (Riley 2014). In Grime, White middle classed mainstream norms are marginal in an alternative framework of ontology and epistemology. Whiteness is viewed as a neutral and vacant space waiting to be filled; it lacks culture. Blackness from the music and cultural practices 'transfer' onto, and fills the cultural void of the White artist or tourist.

Brad '...people think that I'm trying to behave a certain way and I'm not. The people... who know me... They know who I am. They know how I try to behave... I never do anything that I think is completely over the top... I did try at a certain point to... emulate Grime but, it was already so difficult... trying to be 'the white friend'... "Well, we know you're not actually making fun of us or... slumming it" but at the same time you're still white and therefore I don't know about you guy...'

MC – ‘Okay. Alright, so by this I’m understanding it that it’s a case of people thought that you were... in inverted commas trying to ‘act Black’? Is that what you meant?’

Brad – ‘Yeah... without saying it so explicitly... I definitely noticed it...’
Brad, Fan/Blogger

Brad felt that liking Grime was met with resistance and suspicion because of his distance from the embedded authenticity of the scene locationally and racially. He felt his presence in online spaces was received by others as an attempt to consume and appropriate Grime and its aesthetic, to gain culture and Blackness, to gain Black identity.

A Mixed Race respondent (Black/White) who classified himself as more Black, alluded to this same phenomenon:

Black I’m Mixed Race, but I’m more of the Black side of life. Paris, MC

He then classified his White friend as not completely White:

He’s White, yeah, but he’s mixed with – he’s got a little bit of something from back in the day (laughter)...It’s cultural anyway; he’s got a lot of culture. Paris, MC

To Paris, his White friend liking Grime and having culture made him less White. His friend’s working class also ‘dewhitened’ and cultured him. This, and Paris’ choosing ‘*the Black side of life*’ he was demonstrating that he has culture, uncovering the notion that to be White is to not have culture. He extended this further to imply anyone who partakes in Grime thinks they are Black, simply by engaging in the Grime scene and Black cultural practices:

There’s a lot of White people who think they’re Black, there’s a lot of Chinese people who think they’re Black. It [Grime] was a Black thing, weren’t it? Paris, MC

This theme arose again at an event where a White MC performed. He referred to himself as ‘*this White boy*’ in his lyrics before boasting about having talent and skill. The key word in his lyric ‘*this White boy*’ is the

word *this*, which illustrates that despite his Whiteness, he is a force to be reckoned with and that he is different from other White males.

Blackness is associated with having culture, but also masculinity. His distinction from other white males enables him to be a force to be reckoned with and gives him an opportunity to both possess culture, but also vie for alpha male status. Distinguishing himself from (respectable and middle-class) whiteness increases his masculinity. Ultimately, Blackness is linked with possessing culture, cool and aggressiveness, which is associated with masculinity, his skill set and his cultural capital. The alternative epistemology and ontology, in addition to the hypervisibility of whiteness, may assist fan policing in free spaces of Black (and working class) cultural expression. However, they also subscribe to the same dominant ideologies and stereotypes of the aggressive hyper-masculine Black male and White people (i.e. respectable and middle class) having no culture or ethnicity – simply being the invisible normative receptacle of corruptive or cool Blackness.

Policing the Boundary: Don't Eat Me!

This conflation of Whiteness with lacking culture is policed (at individual levels) by Blacks and working class Whites to resist (a) cultural tourism; being eaten and discarded and (b) low level terror.

Some of the white people at [event] last night looked very confused. I knew some of them just came cos they copped them season tickets. (Twitter, November 15, 2013)

Policing forefronts the lived experience and embeddedness crucial to self-validation, identity and culture formation *alongside* the music to determine who *IS really* Grime.

Sonic exploration and experiencing difference can be personally fulfilling, leading to personal growth. However, the systematic nature of racism becomes problematic at individual levels of consumption and policing. Unknown Whiteness and/or suspected tourism in these spaces comes to represent outsiders seeking to penetrate and centre themselves

in an intra dialogic discussion for those in the inner cities, for whom the music provides self-validation, contributes to identity formation and culture. The complexities of being split (i.e. host culture being consumed and people discarded), and the policing activities related to this may not be understood by sonic explorers. They may consider policing unnecessary, over reactionary or hostile if they are unaware of their role in the process of eating the other and personifying low intensity terror (Garner 2007).

Presenting for purposes of sonic explorative consumption as Allinson (1994) suggests, involves centring oneself to consume what may not fully be understood sonically or contextually. It demonstrates a lack of awareness with regard to the structural representation their presence has. Unlike Allinson's exploration of Hip Hop in the USA however, racial divides in Britain are not as clearly cut owing to differing histories of segregation & integration, and the length of time of significant Black presence in each location and the development of 'new urban ethnicities' (Back 1996). Therefore in the British context, it is unknown and middle classed Whiteness that is policed.

Options

Middle class youth have the option to opt in and out of Black or subaltern subcultures, something the working class cannot (McCulloch, Stewart and Lovegreen 2006; Hollingworth and Williams 2009). The middle classed nature of opting in and out enables cultural tourism (Lena 2012) and eating the other (hooks 1992). This illustrates how in Britain:

- (a) Whiteness is altered in the context of class and proximity to Blackness,
- (b) The institutional and commodifying processes of Whiteness, corporate sensibilities and institutionalisation (i.e. government, industry etc.) are not the same as vilified working class Whiteness,

The White working or middle class who travel/move to embed themselves in the culture and live amongst those in the scene, counter eating the other, even if they are in a position to benefit more so from any institutional opportunities available.

... a lot of them are DJs now... [A DJ name] is a White Liverpoolian lad who moved to London partly because he loved Grime. After like he left school... now DJs at [Venue Name]... fairly successful DJ and he's putting on his own Grime nights... Sean, Journalist

Liam moved from rural England to London, set up a Grime record label and embedded himself in the scene and has achieved great success, respect from his peers and has tracks licenced to a major label.

Conclusion

In this chapter, I examined the British Grime music scene as it expanded from an underground scene into a commercialised genre in the music industry; paying particular attention to race (and class) along this transition. The expansion of the scene and shifting fan base was not without problems.

For those involved in Grime's underground scene, Grime is more than music. It is self-affirming, identity and culture forming. It is loaded with cultural capital, ancestral, class based, locational, musical and cultural sensibilities that are integral to it and make it a way of life. Corporate sensibilities differed from these sensibilities and contributed to exacting low intensity terror (Garner 2007) onto those whose cultural production was being extracted and appropriated. I linked corporate sensibilities with hooks' (1992) conceptual framework before examining the connect-edness of Grime to the cultural identity of scene members. It is a safe space of self-validation, identity formation and relatability to others with similar ethnic background and/or lived experiences.

Corporate sensibilities work parasitically to divorce cultural capital from the embedded lived experience of Black and working class bodies and experiential knowledge; solely to gain for self. This divorce enables the 'creation' of new knowledge. New 'corporate generated' knowledge is deposited into the Columbusphere (Charles 2016b), creates an opening for 'Respectable' Whiteness to intervene institutionally and intercept how things are to be understood. 'Respectable' middle classed White listeners, i.e. cultural tourists, consume through a mediation of the

industry, distributors, lawyers etc. (Allinson 1994) that are already altered to corporate sensibilities and knowledge. Industry destroys cultural chance and musical sensibilities, ultimately dismembering cultural and identity formation. It dislocates and undermines knowledges, genealogies and sensibilities that are integral to self-validation, identity and cultural formations of oppressed people. Grime commercialisation disinherits those from the inner cities, particularly Black people. The systematic nature of the disinheriting process is racist (and classist). Collectively, industries work together, and this results in intervention, appropriation and reconstruction of knowledge, which is low intensity terror for the oppressed group.

I outlined that Black people operate outside of existing capitalistic structures as a means to secure an income from their cultural capital. Those involved in the music industry have to navigate both their own and corporate sensibilities, undermining their experiential knowledge, authority and power. Comparatively, working class White people are more able to fit into existing capitalistic structures to try shaping knowledge. However, I outlined the difficulties White working classes experience when encountering corporate sensibilities in a social commentary capacity.

I highlighted the relationship between individual unknown White presence, and Whiteness as a representation or agent of systematic oppression, centralising and personifying low level terror in Black and working class spaces. I highlighted the ontology and epistemology surrounding middle and upper class White people lacking culture, and the belief Blackness, identity and culture created by the host can be transferred onto the White person or cultural tourist via consumption. Cultural tourism and motivations for sonic exploration included difference, curiosity, distinguishability, etc. It illustrates the difference between consumption for curiosity and consumption for self-validation. This difference brings about random acts of policing the new and demographically different fan-base to resist cultural tourism (Lena 2012) and low intensity terror (Garner 2007). 'Unknown' and middle class Whiteness represents lack, power, tourism and consumption; the threat of penetration into Black and working class safe space that it fails to understand, yet has the potential to change and/or destroy.

Youth subcultural choices were only a real possibility for the middle classes that can opt in and out of subaltern, subcultural practice. 'Respectable' Whiteness (i.e. middle class) is dependent on class and distance from the other, and the ability to CHOOSE whether or not to consume the poor and/or other. However, eating the other practices could be mitigated where newer fans travelled to embed themselves in the culture more fully and engaged with people in the scene to contribute to its growth and development.

'Crossover' artists making music for newer audiences were challenged by their underground peers. Credibility was called into question owing to Grime's links to identity, culture and self-validation – the embedded lived experience that accompanies the music. 'Crossover' artists returned to their own sensibilities and reconnected to the embeddedness of the scene. Grime is more than music for scene members, it's a way of life that is very much embedded in the day to day, providing safe spaces for self-validation, identity and cultural formation in a society that does not hold Black and working class bodies in high regard.

Notes

1. All names have been changed.
2. BBC Press Office (2002).
3. Presenter speaking at Soft launch of the Black Music Research Unit – BMRU (2013).
4. Gboyega (2013).
5. Black British Music.
6. British Black Music: Race Equality: In Music Industry Launch.
7. University of the Arts (2015).
8. Joyce (2014).
9. Aizlewood (2016).
10. Renshaw (2016).
11. The British Blacklist (n.d.).
12. The Ultimate Seminar (2012).
13. Platt (2015).
14. Leeds University Student Union (2016).
15. Adenuga (2016a, b).

16. The British Library (n.d.) The S.S. Windrush was a significant ship involved in post war migration since the Second World War from the Caribbean, docking in Tilbury on Britain's south coast. Whilst there had been a small degree of migration and settlement before S.S Windrush, it marked the beginning specific phase of mass migration in British history (1940s–1970s) from the colonies. Black Britishness is a specific classification and set of lived experiences within the wider Black Atlantic or African Diaspora.

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13

Dis'qualified! Serena Williams and Brittney Griner: Black Female Athletes and the Politics of the Im/ Possible

Delia D. Douglas

Introduction: "How Do 'We' Look"? (Young 2000, 416)

Sport is an area where beliefs about the body, physicality, sex-gender, sexuality and race come together in complex and contradictory ways. Comprised of embodied performances, sport has its own morphology, organized by its own logic of distinction and representation. In North America, organized sport emerged as a racially segregated homo-social cultural arena associated with white heterosexual masculinity and imperial projects (Carrington 2010). As an historically male preserve that sought to institute qualities like aggression, strength, power, and competitiveness as uniquely male traits that reside in the male body, the sexed body binary system was established to portray differences between the sexes as natural (Messner 1988; Willis 1982). Thus, male-dominated sports systems arranged activities available to "men" and "women" according to the classification of some sports as female appropriate, or feminine,

D. D. Douglas (✉)
Independent Scholar, Winnipeg, MB, Canada

such as tennis and golf and others as male, such as football and rugby, to reflect dominant notions of masculinity (Griffin 2012; Cahn 1994). As Birrell and Cole (1990) summarize, “sport works to differentiate winners from losers, the men from the boys, the men from the women. As a significant gendering activity, sport not only reproduces gender and sex differences but it produces a logic of differentiation” (18). The conflation of dominant cultural expectations of gender and sexuality has meant that for female athletes, participation in sport stands in opposition to dominant notions of gender appropriate female behaviour, and thus raises concerns about their heterosexuality (Griffin 2012; Caudwell 2003). For example, the belief that athleticism and power are inherent in the male body means that success in sports for a woman implies that she has metaphorically become a man, as illustrated through the familiar phrase “too good” to be a woman (Brady 2011; Birrell and Cole 1990). However, while organized sport creates a discourse of physicality that identifies sex differences as tangible and important, the focus on differentiating “women” from “men,” obscures how race intersects with sex-gender and sexuality to shape the identities and experiences of black female athletes (Higginbotham 1992; Birrell and Cole 1990).

The physical nature of sport renders it an obviously visual field. The visual includes the outcome of athletic pursuits as well the varied markings of the bodies that compete on the fields of play, making it a meaningful location where the observation, appraisal, and discussion of differences take place (King and Springwood 2001). The certainty in the detectable “facts” of difference is significant as it exemplifies one of the key ideological features of sport, specifically the belief that it is an area where we are dealing with “unmediated ‘reality’” since “running faster, jumping higher, throwing further [is] *seen*—not interpreted” (Willis 1982, 117). Moreover, in North America where black athletic achievement and success are readily visible, the conspicuousness of one or two black athletes in historically all white sports, or the predominance of Blacks in certain sports is often regarded as evidence of racial progress. Thus sport plays an import role in teaching us how to see difference and render it meaningful, offering us a symbolic and material frame of intelligibility about what the body can and cannot do, of the limits and possibilities of human performance/the human. In sum, sport spaces are also

imagined and real sites of spatial differentiation that influence our understanding and expectations of the presence and suitability of an engendered racial sexual body in any given activity.

This chapter explores the perception and treatment of two professional black American female athletes: tennis player Serena Williams and basketball player Brittney Griner. In addition to their colleagues, the public and media have described both of these athletes as possessing an unnatural physicality and embodying masculine traits that give them an “unfair advantage.” Consequently, I consider how the athletic performance/excellence of these two black female athletes interacts with the presumed obviousness of the un/intelligibility of their race-sex-gender-sexual difference to elicit a “high anxiety” that reveals the “ongoing problem of Black exclusion from social, political and cultural belonging; our abjection from the realm of the human” (Sharpe 2016, 14).

I use the term dis'qualified to refer to the ways in which assumptions and claims about their physicality and the exceptional nature of their athletic performance are used as evidence that they should be excluded from competing against *real* women. I invoke the prefix dis' in the vernacular to identify the everyday character of disregard and disparagement directed towards black female athletes; I recognize that what is “at play” is far more insidious, namely, the continued denial of their subjectivity and personhood.

I argue that the identification of Serena Williams' and Brittney Griner's power and corporeality as outside of the frame of gender normativity must be located in the context of the histories of enslavement and imperialism. For instance, the white supremacist and patriarchal discourses of race, sexuality, and sex-gender that were created located black women in particular as not only property, but as physically exceptional; as captive bodies, their whole worth lay in their corporeality (Bakare Yusuf 1999; Spillers 1987). Consequently, I want to link black women's history of captivity, and the denial of a gendered subjectivity and identity to include human geography. I am interested in how the presumed illegibility of the embodiment and performance of these two black female athletes is linked to the racial-sexual, and spatial relations and practices of domination and subordination that govern organized sport (McKittrick 2006). Thus, I consider how the situated specificity of these two black female athletes—

Williams a black heterosexual professional tennis player in a predominantly white sport and Griner—an openly gay professional basketball player in a league consisting largely of black women—shapes how they are perceived and treated. An important cultural site of interracial competition, cooperation and antagonism, sport has played a profound role in civil rights and social justice struggles in North America and across the globe (Carrington 2010; Hartmann 2002). As a site of intimate social interaction, sport is a site where ideas about black female bodies are created, projected, and reconfigured. The intimacies of sport exist between players and coaches, players themselves, and spectators and athletes. I argue that Williams' and Griner's presence and ability in their respective sports exerts pressure on prevailing discursive and "geographic arrangements" (McKittrick 2006, 143), revealing the engendered, racialized and sexual intentions and limits of these socially constructed spaces. In sum, I aim to reveal how tennis and basketball are spaces where the meaning and significance of blackness is communicated, contested, and negotiated spatially, ideologically and materially.

In her important work *The Erotic Life of Racism*, Sharon P. Holland (2012) argues that "[w]e are not done with slavery because we have yet to thoroughly investigate its psychic life" (31). Building on Holland's assertion, sport offers a unique set of analytics to revisit hierarchies of humanness gender non/conformity and contestations of the figure of *woman* (McKittrick 2006; Spillers 1987). Thus, in addition to comments made by their white female colleagues I consider dominant media and social media to draw attention to how contemporary technologies facilitate the dissemination of images, utterances, and narratives of anti-blackness to an ever expanding audience. I maintain that the misrecognition of Serena Williams and Brittney Griner reflects what Christina Sharpe (2009) describes as "monstrous intimacies," that characterize the post-slavery era. As Sharpe (2009) explains, monstrous intimacies refers to "a set of known and unknown performances and inhabited horrors, desires and positions produced, reproduced, circulated, and transmitted, that are breathed in like air and often unacknowledged to be monstrous" (3). I argue that the disparagement and misrecognition of these two black female athletes signals the denial of black female subjectivity, as well as a corporeal harm, an attack on the

“flesh,” denoting a routine violence that is not regarded as such (Spillers 1987, 67). I contend that it is not simply the refusal to “see” and recognize these two athletes as the black women they understand themselves to be, this strategic debasement is a contemporary expression of violence in and through which Whites achieve intelligibility and come to understand and regard themselves as white (Hartman and Wilderson 2003). Thus, through the figures of Serena Williams and Brittney Griner I seek to reveal how sport masks its role in the reproduction of racial-gender-sexual hierarchies as it maintains them. Concurrently a site of subjugation, creativity, and resistance, I aim to demonstrate how sport is an integral site in and through which black women can reimagine, reconfigure and express black female subjectivity and embodied freedom.

Black Women in Their Body ... in Theory

Drawing on enslavement as a foundational moment in the contemporary configuration of anti-blackness in the United States, scholars such as Hortense Spillers, Saidiya Hartman, Tiffany Lethabo King and others, have provided valuable theoretical frameworks and productive language to advance our understanding of the interconnections between subjectivity, the denial of humanness, corporeality, and the un/gendering of black women.

Relevant to this discussion is Angela Y. Davis' (1971) observation that one of the paradoxes of slavery concerns the fact that securing the maximum productivity from black women necessitated that they “be released from the chains of the myth of femininity.... In order to function as slave, the black woman had to be annulled as a woman, that is, as woman in her historical stance of wardship under the entire male hierarchy” (7). Davis' articulation of the multiple uses of black women during enslavement, namely their performance of both reproductive and productive labour, illustrates the tractability of black women and their bodies; discourses of sex-gender intersected with the law to imaginatively, culturally and materially locate them outside of dominant notions of femaleness and femininity.

Hortense Spillers (1987) expands on the sex-gendering of the enslaved in her groundbreaking work “Mama’s Baby, Papa’s Maybe.” Spillers identifies the “theft” of the bodies of African men and women as the moment when all rights to personhood were annihilated (67). She argues that the Middle Passage and enslavement also denied black women the status of mother—in contrast to white women who birthed the offspring of the patriarch, the enslaved birthed property which belonged to the master/enslaver. In this context, the denial of a gendered position and gendered subjectivity rendered enslaved black women objects, or “a territory of cultural and political maneuver, not at all gender related, gender specific” (67).

The multiple uses of black women and their bodies speak to what Saidiya Hartman (1997) identifies as their fungibility. According to Hartman (1997), “the value of blackness resided in its metaphorical aptitude, whether literally understood as the imaginative surface upon which the master and the nation came to understand themselves” (7). As she explains, “the fungibility of the commodity makes the captive body an abstract and empty vessel vulnerable to the projection of others’ feelings, ideas, desires, and values” (21). I refer to Hartman’s idea because it highlights the constructed nature of discourses of difference and their role in ongoing efforts to constrain and regulate black women and their bodies according to the exigencies of white supremacy, patriarchy, and capitalism.

Tiffany Lethabo King (2016) expands on this concept identifying “black fungibility as a form of raw material and an expression of spatial expansion used for hu(M)an ascendancy under conquest” (1026). The connection King makes to the positioning of blackness as “both outside of (ejected from living within) human space but necessary (in its negation) for its production” is helpful to my discussion of the ways in which sport is a key contemporary cultural space of both subjection and resistance for black female athletes. That is, while the patriarchal and heterocentric character of sport structures means that all female athletes continue to navigate the belief that athletic competence masculinizes girls and women, I contend that *the* black female body and black female athletes inherit a legacy of un/gendering that necessitates we rethink notions of gender non/conformity and contestations of the figure of *woman* alongside anti-blackness. In the ensuing discussion I aim to show how the

suspicion and questioning of Serena Williams and Brittney Griner's corporeal integrity illustrates how *the* black female athlete remains a site/sight of ideological contested terrain (Messner 1988).

Captive-ating Bodies: Performance Anxiety and Embodied Resistance

Sport is at once invisible and hypervisible racial terrain. (Hartmann 2002, 406)

Despite decades of participation and progress the sexuality of female athletes who play traditional male activities and team sports is questioned unless they make concerted attempts to assert a heterosexual orientation and embody white male defined standards of attractiveness (Lisee and McDonald 2012; Caudwell 2003). However, while I recognize that female athletes are subject to gender norms and heterosexism, I am suggesting that black women are heirs to a history of un/gendering that annulled black women's status as human and as female. Thus, the focus on sex-gender and corporeality does not account for the ways in which these legacies inform differences in power between white and black female athletes (Cohen 2004). One example of the limitations of the singular focus on sport, gender identity and embodiment can be found in Brenna Munro's (2010) discussion of the controversy surrounding Caster Semenya. According to Munro,

[f]emale athletes inhabit impossible bodies.... The physically exceptional is always in danger of being seen as abnormal, deviant, or monstrous.... All world-class athletes have queerly God-like bodies, strange genetic gifts; but women whose bodies achieve a strength, swiftness, agility, hardness, and bulk that we traditionally associated with the masculine ... are under particular pressure to visually and performatively re-feminize themselves, even as their bodily transformations are required.^{1,2}

While I accept Munro's (2010) observation regarding the distinctiveness of elite female athletes bodies, I maintain that black women's history as property compels us to consider how perceptions of humanness are at

once racialized, engendered, and spatialized (McKittrick 2006; Spillers 1987). For instance, race has long played a role in how we conceive of and experience sex-gender (Higginbotham 1992); given that for women of African descent anatomy did not serve as evidence of femaleness or humanness, demonstrations of athletic excellence present particular challenges and issues that specifically affect black female athletes (Vertinsky and Captain 1998). Consequently, Munro's (2010) reading does not account for the symbolic, psychological, and material role that blackness and sex-gender have played in the construction of "hierarchised registers of embodiment" (Brady 2011, 3).

Judith Butler (1998) takes up a similar position in her discussion "Athletic Genders," arguing that sports have the potential to reconfigure gender ideals as evidenced by those female athletes who were previously deemed "too much, too masculine" have gradually come to be seen as a "new ideal of accomplishment and grace, a standard for women's achievement" (1). Citing the conspicuous example of Martina Navratilova, Butler contends that the emergence of Navratilova's muscularity, aggression, and style of play provoked a "crisis" in the category of woman which ultimately led to a "transformation" of gender ideals. While Navratilova indisputably challenged sex-gender expectations and standards regarding female athleticism and gender expression I would suggest that these shifts, and the attendant public recognition, are inextricably linked to her racialization as a white lesbian in a predominantly white sport. Put another way, that the acceptance of Navratilova signals the diversification of the white culture of tennis, while the sport's racial hierarchies remain intact (Smith 2016). Butler and Munro's conception of "female" athletes reflects a white frame of reference that ignores how sex-gender interacts with other formations, such as race and sexuality to influence how we imagine acceptable gender norms and acceptable gender performance (Cohen 1997; Higginbotham 1992). Consequently, the privileging of analyses of sex-gender and power reinforces hegemonic whiteness and undermines the transformative potential of their analytical frameworks (Cohen 2004).

I regard the assumed un/intelligibility of Serena Williams and Brittney Griner's corporeality and performance as emblematic of slavery's afterlife; the misperception of these two athletes demonstrates how black female bodies do not attain non/normativity principally through the formations

of sex-gender and sexuality (King 2016; Hartman 1997). Therefore, I consider the relationship between blackness, sex-gender, and visibility to enhance our understanding of how the “flesh” categorized as an object, becomes as Spillers (1987) explains, “the captive body reduces to a thing, becoming being for the captor...” (67). That is, if race and sex are understood to be the “truth” of the body, I contend that in sport blackness and the presence and success of black female bodies functions as a language, revealing the racial-sexual-engendered spatial assumptions and investments which both regulate and communicate the meaning of corporeal differences in the service of white self-realization (King 2016; Hall 1996). Drawing from black women’s history as property and their location beyond the rights and limitations of humanist classifications of intelligibility with respect to race, sex-gender, sexuality, and corporeality, in this section I demonstrate how this legacy influences the misrecognition of Serena Williams followed by a discussion of Brittney Griner (King 2015).

Serena Williams: Can You Be a Black *Woman* and Look Like This?

During her 17-year career on the Women’s Tennis Association (WTA) tour neither the public, media, or her competitors nor have been able to take their eyes off of Serena Williams. Williams’ body has been repeatedly regarded as excessive, and unwieldy. For example, on social media Williams is regularly characterized in the following manner:

- “Serena Williams is half man, half gorilla! I’m sure of it.”³
- “She’s built like an NFL linebacker” (Reggid R, July 2015, comment on Elliott 2015).
- “You have to admit, this dude is one heck of a tennis player” (Anonymous, July 2015, comment on Elliott 2015).
- “SIr-ena apparently got the ‘roid cycling down right” (Dolosus, July 2015, comment on Elliott 2015).

Writing for *The Guardian*, Simon Hattenstone (2007) called Williams’ size and shape unbelievable: “Cartoonists would have been hard pressed

to create Serena. First there was the body—all bosom, bottom and muscle” (para. 5). In addition to describing Williams as a “fantasy figure” Hattenstone asserted that Serena “played like no other woman had done, with brute strength” (para. 5).

In October 2014, during an interview on Russian television Shamil Tarpishev, head of the Russian Tennis Federation and a member of the International Olympic Committee, referred to Venus and Serena as the “Williams brothers,” adding “it’s scary when you really look at them” (Shamil 2014, para. 2–3). Tarpishev was subsequently fined \$25, 000 and suspended for 1 year by the WTA. During the 2015 French Open final one of Williams’ hit a serve recorded at 125 mph. Sharapova’s agent, Max Eisenbud, tweeted: 125 mph #isthisnormal? (Newman 2015, para. 5).

Following her victory at the 2015 Wimbledon Championships, after achieving the third leg of the celebrated calendar Grand Slam, Ben Rothenberg (2015) wrote an article for the *New York Times* titled “Balancing body image with ambition.” The article by focusing on Serena Williams’ arms, noting that she covers them when aiming for anonymity. Rothenberg (2015) goes on to describe Williams as having “large biceps and a mold-breaking muscular frame which packs the power and athleticism” that have contributed to her success adding “[h]er rivals could try to emulate her physique, but most of them choose not to” (D1). With the exception of the perspective of fellow American Madison Keys, the article comprises interviews with Williams’ white colleagues about body image and self-confidence as well as their reasons for “choosing” not to imitate the Grand Slam champion (D1).⁴

Rothenberg (2015) later claims that “[d]espite Williams’s success—a victory Saturday would give her 21 Grand Slam singles titles and her fourth in a row—body-image issues among female tennis players persist, compelling many players to avoid bulking up.” The coach of Polish player Agnieszka Radwanska is quoted as saying she is listed at 5 feet 8 inches and 123 pounds emphasizing, “[i]t’s our decision to keep her as the smallest player in the top 10. Because, first of all she’s a woman, and she wants to be a woman” (D1). Radwanska subsequently affirms her coach’s view describing how an increase in muscle would compromise her key attributes of speed and finesse.

Offering a perspective that is at odds with the cynics, Williams says she avoids weights because she would gain unnecessary muscle mass, adding "I'm really happy with my body type, and I'm really proud of it. Obviously it works out for me. I talk about it all the time, how it was uncomfortable for someone like me to be in my body" (D1).

Rothenberg (2015) includes the view of Maria Sharapova, the player most consistently touted as Williams' rival, despite having lost to her in their last 18 matches. Sharapova is described as a "slender, blond Russian" who for nearly a decade had been recognized as one of the highest earning females owing to her extensive endorsements, said she still aspired to be thinner. In her words: "I always want to be skinnier with less cellulite; I think that's every girl's wish" (D1). Rothenberg (2015) ends the article with a comment from Canadian Eugenie Bouchard promoting the benefits of a strong muscular body, stating "[i]f it's what you need to lift trophies, who cares what you look like?" (D1)

The public outcry was swift. Margaret Sullivan, the public editor of the newspaper at the time, wrote a column addressing some of the critical commentary and the perspective of some of the people involved in the project (*New York Times*, 13, July 2015, The Public Editors Journal, n.p.) In the article Rothenberg was quoted stating that he was "disappointed and surprised" (para. 7) by the hostile reaction, acknowledging that he "should have challenged the norms rather than just stat[ing] them as given," adding that the decision to revise the beginning of the article placing Williams at the front regrettably created a "Serena versus everybody else" divide (para. 9).

Rothenberg's (2015) narrative is notable for a number of reasons, a key one being the absence of race in the construction of heterofemininity, embodiment, and gender norms. While the explicit focus on sex-gender and corporeality suggests that the only differences that exist between these athletes involves body size, shape, muscularity, and strength, and the motivation to succeed, the reiteration of Williams' black female body as aberrant sustains the white heteropatriarchal culture of the WTA. I would argue that Rothenberg (2015) reproduces a race and gender hierarchy between Williams and her white colleagues by constructing a narrative that represents the black and white female players on the tour in not simply different, but in "antagonistic, racialized contexts" (Higginbotham 1992, 258).

Thus, Rothenberg's (2015) identification of embodied difference is important precisely because it ignores how constructions of humanness and womanhood have historically positioned black and white women at opposite ends of the spectrum. Moreover, given tennis' legacy of segregation and its historical role in developing a classed and raced figure of *proper* heterofemininity, the prominence of this representation reiterates the notion that physical attractiveness is of greater value than athletic ability.

Returning to the repudiation of Williams self-identification as a black heterosexual woman, what are the criteria used to make this determination? According to Serena's competitors and the bloggers we need simply *look* at them to recognize that *she* is in fact a *he*. The persistent misrecognition of Serena Williams as variously male, manly, inhuman, reveals how despite experiencing some of the privileges associated with heterosexual identity, as a black woman, the disparagement of Williams places her outside the norms of dominant society (Cohen 1997).

The misrecognition of Williams' corporeality and performance illustrates how the spatial organization of the WTA locates Williams' black femaleness and femininity as illegible by some, and impossible, by others. That is, while the positioning of Williams outside of the dominant culture of womanhood is not new, that her adherence to dominant cultural norms of sex-gender and sexuality still renders her illegible, demonstrates how her race and sex-gender constrain the privilege and standing available to her as a black heterosexual woman/athlete (Cohen 1997). The unremitting vilification of Williams confirms the continuing danger that her presence, success, and agency poses to white male domination and capitalism in both tennis and society. I would also suggest that the perception and treatment of Williams is a practice of domination, reflecting a continuing spatial project that seeks to render her a 'captive body' once again. McKittrick (2006) is helpful here, as she observes, "body histories are connected to a long and interhuman geographic story" (146). In this context, Williams journey from Compton, CA to the WTA can be understood as a "geographic story"; the Williams family's decision and ability to leave a space of abjection reflects the conceptual and material practices of containment. That is, the social hierarchies that position Compton as a ghetto are linked to the structures and relations that seek to maintain the racial-patriarchal-economic spatial organization of the WTA. Thus,

efforts to discredit Williams' performance and the continued rejection of her self-identification and racial gender expression can be read as punishment for leaving Compton, a space of black captivity, both conceptually and materially (McKittrick 2006).

Notably, in November 2016 Serena Williams headed back to Compton, with her sisters and mother to open the Yetunde Price Resource Center in honour of their late sister who was the victim of violent crime. Williams' return to Compton produces an alternative geographic knowledge, resisting the racism that renders it a space of black subjugation; rather, Williams' actions recognize and reclaim Compton as a formative place, a place where she (along with her sister Venus) learned to play tennis.

Brittney Griner: Exposed! To Be Young, Black, Gifted, and Gay

Standing at 6 feet 8 inches Brittney Griner is a light-skinned black lesbian who displays a variety of brightly coloured tattoos and dreadlocks. In 2012, Griner won the National Collegiate Athletic Association (NCAA) championship as a member of the Baylor University women's basketball team following an undefeated season and won the Naismith Trophy as the outstanding women's basketball player. That same year Griner was also recognized as Female Athlete of the Year and Female College athlete of the year at the ESPY Awards (excellence in sports performance yearly award). A former NCAA Defensive player of the year and the women's record breaker for slam dunks, Griner was the number one pick in the 2013 Women's National Basketball Association (WNBA) draft. While she did not come out publicly when she was a student at Baylor, a private Baptist university, during the recruitment process Griner told her future coach that she was gay. Initially unaware of Baylor's policy against homosexuality, Griner's sexuality subsequently became "open secret" during her tenure at the university (Fagan 2013b). Throughout her high school and college years Griner endured gendered racist and racialized homophobic violence from spectators and on social media. In 2012 Griner decided to remove herself from consideration for the 2012 Olympic women's basketball team; her withdrawal prompted a barrage of accusa-

tions that she was afraid to take a sex test since it would reveal that she was not in fact who she understands herself to be: female.⁵

On social media Griner is regularly described in the following manner:

- *What are you? #man? #ape?* (Fagan 2013b, para. 8)
- “She talks like a man.”⁶
- “sheeee IS a HEEE” (theTRUman, August 2017, comment on, WNBA Star 2017).
- “The shoulders and facial structure plus the Adam’s apple. Hello sir” (tre page, November 2016, comment on WNBA’s Brittney Griner 2015).

When asked about the “most creative thing she heard on social media” Griner described the claim that she’s tucking, that “[s]he wears long shorts because she can tuck and hide it ... put it somewhere else” (Fagan 2013a).

During the 2012 NCAA finals tournament Baylor coach Kim Mulkey was asked about the mocking, the racist invectives and homophobic slurs Griner receives on social media. Mulkey stated:

This is someone’s child. This is a human being. She didn’t wake up and say make me look like this, make me 6-foot-8 and have the ability to dunk. This child is as precious as they come. (Fagan 2013b, para. 29)

Responding to Mulkey’s statement a year later in a feature article in *ESPN the Magazine*, Griner said that although she understood the intent, she felt that Mulkey was only acknowledging and supporting a part of her: “[i]f you’re up here protecting me, then protect all of me. We can talk about gender, but we can’t talk about the fact that I’m a lesbian?” (Fagan 2013b, para. 29) Griner’s pointed answer is a significant public counter to Mulkey’s erasure and subsequent misrepresentation of her status and identity as a black lesbian; Griner is subject to homophobia that is shaped by anti-black racism, sexism and misogyny. I understand Griner’s reaction as a demand for recognition, an assertion of her subjectivity as well as an acknowledgment of her vulnerability. Insofar as the white imaginary

denies black humanity, black women are seen as invulnerable, insusceptible to pain in any form. Thus, Griner's revelation of the violence of the silencing and invisibilizing of black lesbians offers an important counter to the renunciation of the plurality and complexity of black femaleness and the racist discourses that construct black women as insentient.

In 2010, while she was still in college, culture reporter Guy Trebay wrote an article in the *New York Times* titled, "Brittney Griner, basketball star, helps redefine beauty" (8 April, E8). Noting that Griner stands taller "than 99.35 percent of all Americans," Trebay states that Griner "has the wingspan of an albatross, [and] wears sneakers more than twice as large as the average woman's foot and, more saliently, perhaps, can dunk" (E8). Trebay (2010) later emphasizes her attractiveness although in his words, "the still growing Ms. Griner falls well outside familiar beauty standards" owing to her "attenuated Gumby torso, coltish legs and tomboy features," (E8).

Trebay's (2010) description of Griner invites both wonder and disbelief at the seeming impossibility that her features signal femaleness. Trebay (2010) identifies Griner's distinctiveness, as the source of her beauty; she is at once so strange and (yet) so beautiful. This characterization of Griner as simultaneously inhuman, masculine, and female evokes black women's history of ungendering; his identification of Griner as physically exceptional reinscribes the racial hierarchy by identifying blackness as typically unattractive.

Later in the article Trebay (2010) asserts that

[m]uscular athleticism of a sort that once raised eyebrows is now commonplace. Partly this can be credited to the presence on the sports scene of Amazonian wonders like the Williams sisters, statuesque goddesses like Maria Sharapova, Misty May Treanor and Kerri Walsh, sinewy running machines like Paula Radcliffe or thick-thighed soccer dynamos like Mia Hamm. (E8)

Evoking a colourblind narrative, Trebay (2010) suggests that we now live in an era where the increased visibility of diversely embodied female athletes corresponds to an expansion of ideals of beauty. The construction of a universal aesthetic is confirmed in the observation presented by Dr.

Sweet, director of the Cambridge Center for Gender Relations, who states, “shifts in our relationship to what it means to be aggressive, competitive, muscular and a woman [confirm that] it is not so much a question of gender anymore as what we find sexy and beautiful” (E8). Trebay ends the article with a citation from a model scout who considers representing Griner adding, “I always love one-offs and amazing creatures” (E8).

Trebay’s (2010) account of the celebrated shift in gender norms suppresses the relative differences of power that exist among women, owing to class, sexuality, race, and physical activity. I would argue that despite his claims of the extension of beauty ideals Trebay’s (2010) narrative illustrates the fungibility of the black female body; the symbolic and material exclusion of Griner from the realm of the human demonstrates how black femaleness remains integral to sustaining racial hierarchies (King 2016). Moreover, Trebay’s (2010) celebration of her unparalleled corporeality achieves the domination of Griner through his white gaze; the assessment and interpretation of her body as suitable for the modelling industry signals the contemporary commodification of black female bodies in the service of white exigencies (McKittrick 2006).

Since leaving Baylor Griner has been very vocal about her sexuality, openly claiming her desire for women. The singularity of Griner’s corporeality and performance took on a new significance following her entrance in the WNBA, a league that must navigate the difficult cultural terrain of creating a sustainable professional league in the male dominated terrain of sport (Banet Weiser 1999). In its early years the WNBA sought to construct itself as a “family friendly” form of entertainment. The league promoted itself as a “return to the game,” focusing on motherhood, and dominant femininity as a way of differentiating itself from the NBA, and its cultural standing as a discursively black male space (Banet Weiser 1999). Since its inception the WNBA has struggled with its relationship with its sponsors and the attendant homophobia and misogyny that would reject the league because of their fear that strong, competitive, and muscular female athletes are in fact lesbians (McDonald 2000, 2012).

The WNBA’s adherence to its own version of respectability politics creates a particular problem for black female athletes in that its promotion

of a kinder gentler version of blackness reinforced hierarchies among black women by valuing certain kinds of blackness (related to sexuality, gender identity and expression) over others. That is, the belief in a narrative of redemptive blackness as a way to satisfy sponsors and establish a fan base is intertwined with a community of white intelligibility that demands the surveillance and regulation of the behaviours and identities of black female athletes who stand outside of dominant gender norms (McDonald 2000; Cohen and Jones, 1999). Because the WNBA's corporate sponsorship and media support, are inextricably linked to heterosexism and capitalism, thereby denying the diversity and complexity of black female athletes.

In this context, Brittney Griner's sexuality and athletic performance render her unrecognizable, and ultimately threatening, since she stands in opposition to the league's discourse of respectability. A marquee player for the WNBA, in addition to the persistent questioning of her corporeal integrity Griner is the target of anti-black racist invectives, misogyny, and homophobic slurs. Consequently, Griner's stated same sex desire and her masculine gender expression can be understood as her efforts to reclaim and reconfigure the racial-sexual-sex-gender spatial expectations and boundaries of the WNBA. However, while Griner's openness destabilizes the silence and erasure of black lesbians both in and outside of the WNBA, her visibility and assertion of her desire should not be read as evidence of the absence of anti-black homophobia in any simple sense. As Johnetta Betsch Cole and Beverly Guy-Sheftall (2003) explain, "one of the most pernicious consequences of white supremacist ideology has been the perpetuation of damaging myths about Black sexuality that have portrayed us as lascivious, lewd, hypersexual, degenerate and bestial" (154–155). These ideologies continue to inform and influence black women's expressions and affirmations of desire, agency, and black female subjectivity. Griner is therefore situated within a different geography; as Evelyn Hammonds (1994) argues in her important work, "Black (W)holes and the Geometry of Black Female Sexuality," if we recognize the "politics of silence" as a history shared by black women, then "certain expressions of black female sexuality will be rendered as dangerous, for individuals and for

the collectivity” (137). In this context, black lesbians are read as embodying “a deviant sexuality [that] exists within an already pre-existing deviant sexuality,” and thus deemed a “traitor” to the race by some heterosexual black women (137). I would therefore suggest that the distrust and dismissal of Griner’s self-identification represents both the denial of her (black female) sexual diversity and her personhood.

Living Out Loud

That both Serena Williams and Brittney Griner have been variously perceived as men, masculine, or animals who possess a superhuman strength illustrates the fungibility, or the unyielding “exchangeability of blackness at the site of black femaleness” (King 2015, 65). That is, their athletic performance, embodiment and gender expression challenges the cultural signifiers of race, sex-gender, and sexuality in and outside of sport in ways that remain unrecognizable (Cooper 2010). As a result both athletes are simultaneously hypervisible and invisible—seen not for who they are, but for how they are imagined to be.

Repeatedly told that their athletic performance is beyond the parameters of the possible—too strong, too big, too fast, too good, to be a (black) female, the disbelief and repudiation of Williams’ and Griner’s self-identification represent the “monstrous intimacies” that continues in slavery’s afterlife (Sharpe 2009). For instance, social media accelerates the pace and scope of anti-blackness to an ever-widening audience. The force and breadth of these everyday messages of anti-black racism, misogyny, and homophobia is unprecedented and the harm remains underestimated. Furthermore, their continued misrecognition is aligned with their mistreatment; the claim that they are not real women—truly female—is used as evidence that they should be dis’qualified or excluded from the field of play. Thus, the practice of denigrating these black female athletes is illustrative of how the intelligibility of whiteness is reproduced (Hartman and Wilderson 2003). In sum, the rejection of black female diversity renders them “un geographic” (McKittrick 2006), since locating them outside of the human community makes them captive bodies once again (Brady 2011; Spillers 1987).

Black Female Athletes in Defence of Themselves

It is a peculiar sensation, this double-consciousness, this sense of always looking at one's self through the eyes of others, of measuring one's soul by the tape of a world that looks on in amused contempt and pity. (W. E. B. Du Bois 1903/1982, 45)

In a discussion of the creation of the figure of *the* black athlete as a “political entity” and a “global sporting racial project,” Ben Carrington (2010, 3) rightly states that *the* black athlete has infrequently spoken or been permitted to speak, rather, s/he has routinely been spoken for. This final section briefly considers Du Bois' idea of double consciousness in the context of the presumed implausibility of these black female athletes to consider what it means to be told repeatedly that you inhabit a suspicious body, a problematic body-an impossible body.

Both athletes are keenly aware of how they are seen. In a recent interview Williams was asked how she has dealt with people talking about her body over the course of her career. Williams stated that she intentionally avoided print media about herself since aged 17 when she won her first Grand Slam, the U. S. Open. “People have been talking about my body for a really long time...what matters most is how I feel about me, ... You have to love you, and if you don't love you no one else will” (Bergeron 2016, 22).

Williams' visibility on Instagram and her ease and confidence expressing her desire are reflected in her appearance in a video with Beyoncé for a song from her latest album *Lemonade*. As Williams explains,

Yeah, you know, it was ‘she's too strong,’ and then ‘she's too sexy,’ and then ‘she's too strong’ again. So I'm like, well, can you choose one? But either way, I don't care which one they choose. I'm me and I've never changed who I am. (Bergeron 2016, 22)

Brittney Griner has spoken openly in interviews, on social media and in an autobiography about the myriad challenges she faces navigating ‘the skin she is in,’ as a young black lesbian, and one of the most visible

basketball players in the U. S. (Griner and Hovey 2014). Acknowledging her “big arms, ...bigger hands, ...[and] long legs,” Griner poignantly reveals her vulnerability, stating “[j]ust walking around, it’s kind of like being on display at a museum, like being on display 24/7” (Fagan 2015, para. 7). Finding herself alone and the target of bullies Griner acknowledges that she wondered “what’s the point of even going on anymore...I had a couple of nights where I thought of ending it all and nobody, nobody knew, even to this day people are shocked” (Fagan 2013a). Regarding her style of play Griner said “I was told you don’t play like a girl you don’t play ladylike. What I have to be gentle and not bang and not get mad and show aggression. Why can’t we be fired up?” (Fagan 2013a) Indeed.

That these two black female athletes have been made to see and experience themselves as ‘other’ is significant for it establishes and reaffirms racial boundaries and hierarchies of humanness (McKittrick 2006). Using their bodies against them is one of the ways the white heteropatriarchal gaze dis’qualifies their athletic performance and denies their personhood. Consequently, their responses communicate their interiority and their corporeal independence, revealing how acknowledgement and assertion of black female humanity involves reconciliation between one’s subjectivity and corporeality in a sport system which is simultaneously a space of subjugation and resistance (Hartman, 1997).

Closing Remarks: Black Female Athletes’ Enduring Struggle for Freedom

I am not wrong: Wrong is not my name. My name is my own my own my own. (June Jordan 2005, 309–311)

In this discussion I have explored the perception and treatment of Serena Williams and Brittney Griner to examine how the presumed unintelligibility of their race-sex-gender-sexual difference interacts with their athletic performance to lead many to believe that they should be dis’qualified from the field of play. I have argued that the ongoing suspicion and dehumanization of these two athletes is tied to black women’s history

of ungendering, reflecting a grammar that remains “both haunted *and* developed by old and new hierarchies of humanness” (McKittrick 2006, xvii). The embodied nature of sport performance activates white supremacist patriarchal discourses which annulled black women’s status as human and as female. The identification of Williams’ and Griner’s black female athletic bodies and performance as problematic reveals the fungibility of blackness; the multiple uses, symbolic, psychological, and material, of black femaleness to establish and sustain the boundaries of humanness (King 2015; Hartman 1997). Simply put, the “ontological negation” (Sharpe 2016, 14) of these two athletes demonstrates how the rejection of black female diversity and complexity is spatialized.

Moreover, the continuing expressions of anti-blackness suggests that Williams and Griner are to exist, albeit in a “demoralized form,” (Bakare Yusuf 1999, 318) to ensure the subjectivity and status of those regarded as *real* women/real females. Thus, the relentless criticism that these two black female athletes endure is neither trivial nor simply regrettable; the continued misrecognition of these two black female athletes reflects a contemporary form of violence constituting what Christina Sharpe (2009) describes as the “everyday intimate brutalities of white domestic domination” (9).

As a physical cultural practice sport is a key discursive terrain where racial meanings and inter-group relations are continuously produced and mobilized in ways which emphasize certain differences over others, render them important, magnify them and then use them to support ideologies of racial difference, and sustain racial hierarchies (King and Springwood 2001; Willis 1982). However, while sport is an arena that (re)produces and reinforces public understandings of black female alterity, Serena Williams and Brittney Griner reject dehumanization, proudly and unapologetically announcing their black femaleness, whilst demonstrating their resolve and courage as they negotiate and contest the racial-sexual-gender-spatial hierarchies of their respective sports as sites of belonging and possibility. Boldly claiming and reorienting tennis and basketball beyond white heteropatriarchal regimes of intelligibility, Williams and Griner reveal how the incorporation of both body and mind is integral to their humanness and their enduring struggle to secure corporeal integrity and embodied freedom.

Notes

1. Muffet McGraw cited in Brennan (2012, para. 3). Sharapova cited in Cronin (2013, para. 3–4).
2. Although I do not detail the perception and treatment of black South African Caster Semenya following her stunning victory in the women's 800 metres at the 2009 World Track and Field Championships in Berlin, I would argue that the intrusive and aggressive questioning of the 18-year old runner's identity represents sex-gender specific forms of anti-blackness that confront black women in the public sphere. That is, the *facts* of Semenya's black femaleness were perceived as a threat that warranted the denial of the right and protection of confidentiality. However, while the presumed un/intelligibility of Semenya's performance and embodiment reflects meaningful points of similarity and difference that demonstrate how conceptions of humanness are simultaneously racialized, engendered, and spatialized, a critical interrogation of the suspicion and rejection of Semenya's self-identification and racial gender expression is beyond the existing parameters of this project. Zine Magubane (2014) addresses some of these issues in her article, "Spectacles and Scholarship: Caster Semenya, Intersex Studies, and the Problem of Race in Feminist Theory."
3. In a discussion of the politics of racism and sexism Dr. David Leonard documented tweets posted about Williams following her fifth Wimbledon victory in 2012, observing that she was continually described as a gorilla on social media.
4. Keys' mother is white and her father black; in a recent interview Keys stated that while she is "right in the middle," she does not identify as "African American" or white, saying "I'm just me. I'm Madison." (Toomey 2015, para. 9).
5. Griner's mother was diagnosed with lupus at the start of her college career; she removed herself from consideration for the team in large part to spend time with her mother. She was a member of the U. S. team at the Rio 2016 games.
6. This remark reflects the constant reference to the tone of Griner's voice. Similar examples can be found on YouTube posts and online responses to mass media articles about her. Accessed on November <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=Wij2LVJVQQg>

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14

The Emergence of Race as a Social Category in Northern Europe

Anna Rastas

After scholars all over the world questioned and rejected so-called scientific racism (e.g. UNESCO 1969), the notion of race became taboo in many European countries. Because of the historical burden and negative connotations of the word ‘race’ in Europe not only researchers but also authorities have discussed ‘ethnic groups’ or ‘immigrants’, rather than ‘races’ or ‘racialized minorities’. In many societies, avoiding the word ‘race’, along with normative whiteness and innocent national self-images, has led to denials of racism.

In the Nordic countries¹ – Denmark, Finland, Iceland, Norway and Sweden – racism as a social fact and the meanings of race for individuals and communities were avoided as topics of discussion for a long time both in the academia and in public. As a result, these countries have also lacked the vocabulary for discussions on racialized identities and racialized social relations. However, things are changing. This chapter explores

A. Rastas (✉)

University of Tampere, Tampere, Finland

e-mail: anna.rastas@uta.fi

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the social and cultural transformations through which ‘race’ has become a social category also in the Nordic societies. Examples from research literature and from my ethnographic studies on racism, anti-racism and African diasporas in Northern Europe show how people, who have moved to Northern Europe from other places, and especially their offspring, have started to question whiteness as a ‘taken for granted’ aspect of Nordic nationalities. They speak about themselves in public as racialized subjects, as non-white Europeans and as citizens who have the right to belong to the countries in which they live. Their agency in the field of anti-racism has started to create new identity politics; new solidarities and spaces and vocabularies for racial identifications.

Nordic Involvements in Race Biology

The politics of race blindness and the discourse of Nordic exceptionalism delimit public discussions on racism in all Nordic countries (e.g. Loftsdóttir and Jensen 2012; McEachrane 2014). By Nordic exceptionalism, I refer to self-ascribed innocence underlying naïve national self-images regarding the colonial complicities of these countries and the denials of the existence of racism. Despite the different colonial ties of these countries and their different immigration histories, in every Nordic country the idea of the Nordic nations comprising especially good people who, unlike other nations, are unable to be racists, can be identified (Browning 2007; Loftsdóttir and Jensen 2012).

Claims concerning the absence of colonial connections, placing racism *elsewhere*, as a property of other people and nations, and other forms of nationalist self-glorification have shaped discussions on racism also in other European countries, including those with strong imperial involvements (e.g., van Dijk 1992, 109; Goldberg 2006; Wekker 2016). Therefore, I am not suggesting that these phenomena should be understood as uniquely Nordic. I have argued elsewhere that exploring commonalities and differences in articulations of history and our colonial complicities in different locations ‘may help us examine when, how and for what purposes particular ideas and discourses – (Finnish or Nordic) exceptionalisms – are employed’ (Rastas 2012, 91). The notion of Nordic

exceptionalism refers here to a discourse, which includes some claims concerning the particularity of the Nordic countries, not to any historical or social facts concerning these countries.

In the Nordic countries, the ‘innocent’ national self-images are partly built on recent history and the branding of these countries as democratic, peaceful societies that have been active, for example, in development cooperation, in peace building projects and in promoting human rights around the world (Browning 2007). When it comes to discussions on racism, this discourse is often defended by claims that the Nordic countries were not involved in colonialism, which is not true. Of what are today understood to be the Nordic countries, only Denmark and Sweden were independent countries during the colonial era.² Denmark was a European colonial power and very much involved in the slave trade. There were slaves also on Saint Barthélemy, an island in the West Indies that Sweden acquired in 1784 (Palmberg 2009, 44–45). Recent literature on the colonial complicities of the Nordic countries also reminds us that the minds of the people living in those countries that were not at the heart of the colonial conquest were nevertheless colonial. This happened through several links that connected people around the world ‘with the kind of knowledge that arouse in the context of, or even in support of, the colonial projects’ (Vuorela 2009, 21. For discussion on colonial discourse and knowledge of ‘the others’ in the Nordic countries, see, for example, Kuortti et al. 2007; Löytty and Rastas 2011 [Finland]; Loftsdóttir 2008 [Iceland]; Eidsvik 2012 [Norway]; Andreassen 2015 [Denmark]).

The discourse of Nordic exceptionalism ignores the fact that many Nordic academics and politicians had important and active roles in establishing ideas of race and racial hierarchies in Europe. According to Mai Palmberg (2009, 45): ‘An often overlooked aspect of Nordic history towards the south is the extraordinary role played by pseudo-scientific racism in the Nordic countries. In fact, in the history of eugenics and pseudo-scientific racism in the first half of the 20th century the Nordic countries, and particularly Sweden, were in the forefront’. Among the Nordic scientists whose studies contributed to the classification of humans into races was, for example, Swedish botanist Carl von Linné (Eze 1997, 10–14). The Swedish Society for Race Hygiene (Svenska

Sällskapet for Rashygien) was founded in 1909 and the National Institute for Race Biology (Statens Institute for Rasbiologi) was established in 1922 in Uppsala (Bashford and Levine 2010; Kjellman 2013). Among the key figures of the International Society for Race Hygiene were Danish and Norwegian researchers (Kühl 2013, 16).

Nordic scholars' work focused especially on the white race. However, as Rikke Andreassen (2015, 33) reminds us, a static perception of race and racial differences never existed; racial categories were the subject of constant negotiation and changed from context to context. The leading figure of Danish physical anthropology, Søren Hansen, positioned the Inuit in Greenland among the lowest races (Andreassen 2015, 41). According to many race scientists, Finns were considered descendants of the Mongols (Halmevirta 1990), rather than belonging to the white race. Claims that Finns were 'less intelligent, more ugly and more primitive than White Swedes, Danes and Norwegians' (Andreassen 2015, 3) led to forceful counter arguments by Finnish scholars in the 19th and 20th centuries. Through projects aimed at proving that Finns, like the other people in the Nordic countries, are Europeans who belong to the white race, the racial order and ideas linking race with nationhood were also established in Finland (Halmevirta 1990).

The histories of racialized minorities in the Nordic countries have yet to be written. Racism was long understood as something that exists outside the Nordic countries, such as in the colonies, in the United States, in South Africa during the apartheid or, if in Europe, in the past during the Nazi regime. In discussions on racism, the old, established national minority communities such as the Roma and the Sami people have been ignored despite the racism that these communities have experienced. The Sami (e.g. Toivanen 2003) and the Roma (e.g. Pulma 2012) have lacked the political power to talk about their situations and their experiences of racism. In research and in political decision-making they have been treated as cultural minorities, not as racialized minorities (e.g. Pentikäinen 2015). In discussions on minority rights, the focus has been on achievements that support positive national self-images, such as how particular minorities' linguistic rights were guaranteed, rather than on problems that remain unsolved (see, e.g., Daher et al. 2016). The Finnish Roma, for example, still face discrimination in the labour market, although their situation cannot be compared with the situation of the Roma in Eastern Europe, where

discrimination against the Roma is common also in education, housing and health care services.³

References to races and accounts based on the old ideas of racial hierarchies were still common, for example, in schoolbooks and in media texts in all Nordic countries in the 1960s – until so-called scientific or biological racism was questioned by scholars and political movements around the world, including in the Nordic countries. Although explicit ideas of racial hierarchies and races as biological facts included in the old race theories have disappeared from scholarly texts, schoolbooks and official discussions, they are still part of the cultural memory of all Nordic countries. There are very few studies about the experiences of those foreigners and other people who in the 19th century were not able to pass as white in Nordic societies. Based on their memoirs and other available documents, experiences of racism were part of their everyday lives (e.g. Rastas 2014; Andreassen 2015).

White immigrant minorities, such as Finns in Sweden and Russians in Finland, have also experienced discrimination and prejudices, and they still have to deal with negative depictions of their communities and their countries of origin. However, their means of combating their experiences of what, I argue, can also be called racism, are different from those of people who cannot pass as white Scandinavians. During the last decades of the 20th century, non-white immigrants and even children who grew up as ‘visibly different’ in these Northern European countries have faced overt racism, including being repeatedly called ‘niggers’ or ‘negros’ (Rastas 2012; Adeniji 2014; Loftsdóttir 2014; Gullestad 2004, 2005; Hübinette and Tigervall 2009). Old ideas of races and a racial order have not disappeared from public discussions either; they are openly promoted and supported by extreme racist groups with whom many populist politicians and their supporters collaborate.

The Increase of Populist Politics and Racist Rhetoric in the 2000s

Because of immigration and its effects on racialized social relations, racism has become a topic of discussion also in Northern Europe over the last decade (e.g. Keskinen and Andreassen 2017). Throughout the 2000s,

everywhere in Europe, including the Nordic countries, increasing numbers of immigrants have been seen as ‘a shared European challenge’, and in public discussions immigrants and their descendants have become ‘intolerable subjects’ (Lentin and Titley 2012). Many people see especially refugees and asylum seekers as abusers of the welfare system and burdens on taxpayers instead of as people who need protection or residents and citizens who (can) contribute to the countries in which they now live. The presence of Muslim communities is increasingly described as a threat not only to local cultures but also to the security of European societies. Anti-immigrant and Islamophobic discussions have been actively promoted by populist politicians and anti-immigrant groups that have taken advantage of the xenophobic discursive climates in local, national and European political fields.

Over the last decade, nationalist–populist parties have gained growing support and political power in Finland, Norway, Sweden and Denmark (e.g. Nikunen 2015, 24–25). Their success in elections has promoted hate speech, especially on the Internet. In political debates on immigration, even openly racist ideas are often articulated in the form of ‘culture speak’ (see Hannerz 1999). Some politicians, celebrities, immigrants’ associations and other NGOs have publically disapproved of racist acts towards immigrants and other minorities, which has increased awareness of racist discourses and encouraged the media and so-called ordinary people to express anti-racist opinions. Nevertheless, among politicians and authorities in general, there is little resistance to xenophobic discourses.

In Sweden established parties have distanced themselves from and refused collaboration with the Sweden Democrats (*Sverigedemokraterna*) (Hellström and Nilsson 2010), a ‘culturally racist party’ (Mulinari and Neergaard 2012, 14) that in 2010 won parliamentary representation in Sweden, but the party has been an active agent in Swedish politics and is openly supported by many Swedes. When Norwegian right-wing extremist Anders Behring Breivik massacred sixty-nine teenage members of the Labour Party at their summer camp in July 2011, Norwegian politicians started to talk about the need to move towards more inclusive ideas of who can be called Norwegian (Osler and Lybaek 2014). Yet, this tragic act of violence did not decrease the widespread xenophobia and anti-

immigrant rhetoric in Norway (Wiggen 2012). According to some scholars, some racist imaginaries were circulated even more after the attack (see Svendsen 2015).

In Finland, members of the openly populist Finns Party (Perussuomalaiset), including some of their MPs and their current leader, have been summoned to court because of their racist and Islamophobic rhetoric. Politicians' racist talks and especially racist violence towards racialized minorities and Finns who have opposed particular racist groups' activities led to large demonstrations in Finland in 2015 and 2016. When a young, white Finnish man, Jimi Karttunen, was killed in September 2016 by a member of the racist Finnish Resistance Movement (Suomen Vastarintaliike)⁴ after he opposed them during a street event in Helsinki, even some government ministers took part in demonstrations against racism organized in the biggest Finnish cities. Although the Finns Party's long-term leader Timo Soini officially announced that the party does not accept racism, during his leadership the party did very little to condemn its members and supporters racist rhetoric (Hatakka 2016). Eventually, his party broke up after an anti-immigration hardliner Jussi Halla-aho was elected as the party's new leader in 2017. Soini and the other Finns Party ministers were allowed to stay in the government only after they and a group of other Finns Party MPs left their party and formed their own new parliamentary group.

Since the beginning of 2000s, denying the existence of racism has become difficult in Nordic countries, but attempts to discuss racism are often still turned into questions of cultural differences or problems related to immigrants' integration. As expressed by Kitimbwa Sabuni, coordinator of the Afro-Swedish National Association (Afrosvenskarna), what is needed is a move forward from what he describes as the immigration paradigm:

Over 60% of our association members are people born in Sweden. The challenges in their everyday life are not about immigration, they are more about racial discrimination. Still these issues don't get recognition. In the public discussion racism is treated as if it was about failing of immigration policy and immigrants' integration, like: if the integration would be better, racism would just hide away. How illogical and paradoxical this kind of

argumentation can be? ... We are trying to bring race into these discussions but opposition is strong. People are shocked about this and start asserting that we are all one race. But I think that bringing the racialization and race to the centre here is vital for the discussions to move on.⁵

Scholars in the Nordic academia have reacted to the above described events and social transformations. Although most studies about migration and immigrant and other minority communities in Northern Europe are still built on an ethnicity paradigm and do not apply race as an analytical category, scholars studying racism have insisted on verbalizing race as a social category (e.g. Sawyer 2002; Rastas 2005; Andreassen 2014; McEachrane 2014; Hübinette and Mählck 2015; Mainsah and Prøitz 2015). Now that the rapidly increasing population of young people who do not identify themselves as white have started to talk about themselves as racialized subjects in public, it has also become easier for researchers to talk about race.

Different Fields of Anti-racism

Nowadays, not only immigration but also the fight against racism, xenophobia and hate speech are considered shared challenges of the European countries, and authorities and politicians must react to claims concerning racism in their countries. In every Nordic country there are official national bodies (ombudsman) to advance equality, and issues related to racism are included in their mandates. In Europe, racism is monitored and anti-racism is advocated by, for example, the European Commission against Racism and Xenophobia (ECRI) of the Council of Europe, as well as some European INGOs such as The European Network against Racism (ENAR). ECRI examines manifestations of racism and intolerance in each Council of Europe member state. Its findings and recommendations are published in country reports that are drawn up after a contact visit to the country in question and a confidential dialogue with its national authorities.⁶ ENAR's Shadow Reports, which are produced to fill gaps in official and academic data, are based on information and data collected by its member organizations. ENAR

also publishes thematic reports and fact sheets.⁷ Publications on racism are also produced by multicultural centres (e.g. Mångkulturellt Centrum 2014), other institutes and NGOs. The European Union has reacted to the rapid increase of hate speech by, for example, adopting acts such as the Framework Decision on Combating Certain Forms and Expressions of Racism and Xenophobia by Means of Criminal Law (European Commission 2008) and by allocating funding for national and international projects aimed at developing tools for authorities and NGOs to fight against racism and xenophobia.⁸

Public discussions, authorities' activities and research on racism have focused on racist attitudes and the agency of particular groups, especially hate speech on the Internet and groups that are considered to be threats to public safety, rather than on the experiences and situations of those whose lives are shadowed by racism (for everyday racism, see Essed 1991). I argue that one explanation for the absence of sociological studies on race relations in these countries is the lack of official data for researchers to rely on in their studies. The Nordic countries do not collect official statistics based on race. Immigrants and those children whose parent(s) have a foreign background but were themselves born in a Nordic country can be found in these countries' official statistics according to their or their parents' countries of origin, but that does not provide enough information about the existence of and increase in racialized minorities in these countries.

Finding words for descriptions of racialized relations in the Nordic countries has been challenging for various reasons. The word 'race' has been avoided in public discussions and consequently in research as an analytical category because of its historical burden and because in Nordic countries discussions on racism and a shared understanding of race as a social construction are a relatively new phenomena. Moreover, sometimes using racial categories has been opposed by immigrant organizations because words referring to race have been considered imports from the United States and Britain and products of those societies' histories and political movements rather than accurate terms for immigrants' racial identifications (Rastas 2013). For example, Somalis make up the largest African diaspora communities (of particular ethnicities or countries of origin) in Denmark, Finland, Norway and Sweden. In all these countries,

a majority of the people of African descent represent the new African diaspora, meaning they are recent migrants from Africa. In the new African diaspora, the processes of identity formation are different from those in the old African/black diaspora communities that have histories connected to the transatlantic slave trade. Moreover, in migrant communities, people do not necessarily embrace political definitions of blackness or Africanness because racialized relations and identities are negotiated not only through local vocabularies and global political movements but also through the ideas and conceptualizations of race relations that people learned in their old home countries.

Although racism has become a common topic of discussion, and even though the Nordic countries are nowadays defined as multiethnic, multicultural societies, in official political and academic discussions race as a social category is still usually ignored or replaced by references to ethnicity (see Andreassen 2014 [Denmark]; Rastas 2013 [Finland]; Adeniji 2014 [Sweden]; Hübinette and Mählck 2015 [Sweden]; Mainsah and Prøitz 2015 [Norway]). We know, however, that although ethnic and racial categorization systems are related, using an ethnicity paradigm to discuss race is problematic (e.g. Bashi 1998) and ignores the experiences of those racialized groups – such as children of mixed parentage or transnational adoptees (e.g. Rastas 2005; Hübinette and Tigervall 2009; Adeniji 2014) – that for whatever reason do not fit into predetermined ethnic categorizations.

So far, few people who identify with racialized minorities in Nordic countries have managed to obtain positions as researchers or as other specialists allowing them to participate in these forums as professionals. Projects and campaigns against racism have often been planned and organized by people who represent white majority perspectives. Representatives from immigrants' and religious minorities' associations are usually invited to participate authorities' and NGO's projects concerning racism as representatives of their ethnic groups or as 'experience experts' representing (all) individuals who face racism in their societies.

However, 'immigrant representatives' in authorities' and some NGO's anti-racism projects often come from associations whose work focuses on diaspora activities emphasizing homeland–hostland relationships, and they have chosen to act as 'promoters of multiculturalism', 'cultural

ambassadors' and experts on particular cultures rather than as representatives of people who are oppressed by racism. This kind of expert role has reproduced their position as representatives of 'other ethnicities' and immigrants instead of as citizens, rather than as people whose expert knowledge of racism, obtained through their positioning in racialized social hierarchies, should be valued. Through their active participation in 'multicultural events' where people have shared their experiences of racism and their other collaborations with local authorities and civil society, immigrants' associations have promoted anti-racism. This collaboration has enabled forums where – in addition to discussions of existing problems and possible solutions that often result in new information campaigns and professional training – people have been able to look for a common language on racialized and ethnicized relations. Nevertheless, although immigrant and diaspora associations have tried to bring problems related to racism into the public discussions, their critical voices have remained rather faint. Furthermore, until recently, non-white people who have grown up in Nordic countries have been absent from most arenas where public discussions on racism have taken place.

Now that many immigrant communities have long histories in Nordic societies and their members – especially their offspring – have become active citizens of these countries, things are changing. As noted by the coordinator of the Afro-Swedish National Association in the quote above, over 60% of the members of this association, which was already founded in the 1990s, are people born in Sweden. Compared with their parents, many of whom have an immigrant background, people who belong to the rapidly growing new generation of non-white people born and/or growing up in the white landscape of the Nordic countries are in a better position to speak about and fight for their rights as racialized subjects – and as citizens of the countries in which they live. They are not comfortable with the roles offered to them by many anti-racist projects led and controlled by white people with a majority background. Despite their (possible) transnational and diasporic identifications, Nordic citizens with transnational roots are tired of being called immigrants or 'multicultural people' or representatives of their parents' ethnicities. To fight against the racism that shadows their everyday lives and well-being, they have started to talk about themselves as racialized subjects by using

racial(ized) terms such as ‘black’, ‘Afro—/African- Swedes/Finns/Danes/Norwegians’, ‘brown girls’, ‘brown people’ or just ‘racialized people’. Furthermore, they have actively started to search for and create forums and communities of people with whom they can negotiate their multiple identifications and share their experiences of racism and of living surrounded by normative whiteness. These groups or communities of mainly young people and young adults have an essential role to play in the emergence of race as a social category in public discussions in Northern Europe.

Online and in the Streets

The word ‘community’ is understood here as a form of social action (e.g. Crooke 2007, 27–40), referring both to products and to social and cultural processes that have transformative power within and beyond them. The new and emerging communities of people who in the Nordic countries identify with racialized minorities are products not only of social and cultural transformations related to demographic changes in these societies but also of the digital connectedness that enables new local, transnational and global forums for identity politics, resistance and social action. Even those communities that are local, in that they have been founded as forums for people within particular nation states, soon become transnational because their founders and many of their participants are diaspora subjects.⁹ They have real ties to people in other countries and real and imaginative ties to various global diasporas that are based not only on race but also, for example, on ethnicity or religion. The emergence of political, collective racialized identities and their articulations have been inspired and empowered by discussions on social media communities, blogs and online journals founded in other countries.¹⁰

Some social media communities have soon turned into quiet communities of passive members. There can be many reasons for that. Some people do not find white people’s presence (if that is allowed) comfortable, sometimes people do not agree with other people’s separatist ideas or other strategies for anti-racism. Some groups have promoted the founder’s own interests rather than becoming communities where people

can discuss and plan the group's objectives and activities. In an interview with the *New York Times*, Paul Gilroy reminds us how 'the routine effects of the online network are often mistaken for the stirrings of an actual movement. The movement from virtual to actual solidarity isn't automatic or even easy' (Yancy and Gilroy 2015).

In the 2010s, dozens of blogs, Facebook groups and other social media forums based on individuals' racial identifications have been founded in Nordic countries by people who identify with blackness or non-whiteness. Compared with the many diaspora and anti-racist associations founded by immigrants and other racialized minorities in Nordic countries in prior decades, these digital forums have attracted many followers within a short period of time, and they have generated plenty of discussion on racism and racialized relations in these countries.

For example, in Finland, a blog entitled *Ruskeat Tytöt (Brown Girls)*, founded by writer and journalist Koko Hubara in 2015, has become a frequently cited publication not only among those who talk about themselves as racialized minorities but also among white people. Hubara's award-winning blog focuses on matters of gender, race, ethnicity and identity in the Finnish context. The AfroFinns Facebook group, which seeks to 'foster a more unified and stronger black community'¹¹ on a national level, got plenty of followers within just a few months in 2015 when it was founded by one person. However, instead of becoming an arena for active discussions, it has become a notice board for ads of particular events and an archive for videos and journal articles. Nevertheless, these groups can be useful forums for spreading information on anti-racist events among black communities and cultures on a national level. Knowledge of black artists' works and what is happening in other countries is also circulated in these groups. White people are welcomed to join some of these groups, but many communities have been founded only for 'people of colour' or 'racialized people'. Such forums are safe spaces that allow people to discuss their experiences and ideas without being forced to 'explain the same things over and over again' to white people (including researchers!) who according to many 'do not understand the reality of non-white people'.¹²

According to Henry Mainsah (2014), who has studied how young African Norwegian women negotiate identity and community through

digital social network communities, these women's ties and ways of belonging are envisioned at both the local and the transnational levels, as well as at the intersection between online and offline spaces. A good example of how global online communities inspire people to go into the streets is the Black Lives Matter movement, which spread to the Nordic countries in 2016 when hundreds of people participated in Black Lives Matter demonstrations in Sweden, Denmark and Norway. In Finland, a demonstration by a small group of people in October 2016 did not receive as much media attention as bigger demonstrations in other countries. Nevertheless, as a public event known to be an initiative of black people, it was a political statement and arena for people, who in other contexts talk about themselves in other terms (e.g. as Muslims, as members of Somali or other ethnic communities or just as Finns), to stand up in public as 'black people' or as allies of black people.¹³ Black Lives Matter demonstrations were not only about bringing questions of race relations into public discussions in the Nordic countries but also about bringing the perspectives and voices of non-white people into local anti-racism activism.

The Internet has made it easier to learn about and join new forms of diaspora and transnational networks that empower people to talk about and contest racism and normative whiteness in existing Nordic anti-racism forums that, as explained above, have been controlled mainly by people who do not self-identify as racialized minorities. For example, in February 2016 the Afro Empowerment Center Denmark organized an event entitled 'Let's Talk about Race'. On Facebook the Center is described as follows:

Afro Empowerment Center Denmark is a proud member organization of the European Network for People of African Descent. This organization is comprised of PAD organizations across Europe working specifically in Human and Civil rights pertaining to PAD. This is a space that inspires and intellectually challenges us. The prior network seminars produced The Demand Catalog for People of African Descent and Black Europeans. www.aec-denmark.dk/Demand-Catalog-PAD-BE_full-length.pdf. ENPAD is a network of black-led anti-racist and Afrikan empowerment organizations from different European countries. In the light of Black Lives

Matter and the grievances/discrimination in Europe regarding People of African Descent it is more than necessary for us to work interdisciplinary, on several levels and united.¹⁴

In *Skandik Afrik – Africans in Scandinavia* online magazine, the event was described as ‘something special’ and ‘first of its kind’ in Denmark (Brown 2016). These local activities and communities, which are inspired by global, European and Nordic organizations and movements, have helped to establish the idea of race as a social category that also has power in Northern Europe. Furthermore, they have raised discussions on the importance of acknowledging situated knowledge in fight against racism. In anti-racist forums, both in online discussions and at events where anti-racism activists with different racial backgrounds collaborate, white Nordic anti-racism activists have found themselves in a new situation. They are asked to reflect on their privileged position and the limits of their knowledge and to learn about and respect ideas of ‘black-led anti-racism’.

White collaborators, or allies, are often invited to events promoting anti-racism that are organized by or together with minoritized people, but there are also forums and events where white people are not welcomed: closed discussion groups on the Internet, thematic events and small gatherings. In Sweden, which has the biggest immigrant communities and largest numbers of non-white citizens, there are more communities and activities for ‘black/racialized people only’ than in other Nordic countries. For example, the African–Swedish organization Black Coffee, which was founded in January 2015, already has local groups in many Swedish cities. According to Araia Ghirmai Sebhatu, co-founder of Black Coffee, it is a separatist antiracist organization, a movement using the Internet as a tool and a platform aimed at connecting all African–Swedish people who accept that ‘the movement generates from a critical foundation’ and that its ideology is black anti-racism and black feminism. ‘Black feminism’ refers here to discussions on intersectionality: ‘how resources, power and privileges are intervened with race, gender and class’. Black coffee activists organize panels, lectures, book clubs and other events, or just drink coffee. According to Araia Ghirmai Sebhatu: ‘[T]here is something deeply radical when Africans in Sweden gather together in public spaces,

even if it's simply for coffee. We choose each other. Black people actively choose to be with only black people. That's how coffee becomes politics'. To him, a separatist movement is an effective strategy against the normative whiteness of his society.¹⁵ In Sweden, there are also other forums and activities from which white people are excluded, such as the workshops 'only for persons who are racialized'¹⁶ that are arranged by activists Wendy Francis and Nora Dome Nelson, who also launched the podcast *Arga Flickor (Angry Girls)*'.

With the examples above, I have tried to show how people who identify with racialized minorities have made race as a powerful social category visible in Nordic countries. They have done this by searching for and joining communities based on racial identifications, by talking about themselves and about others with words referring to race or racialized relations, and through the anti-racism activities they have organized and participated in as racialized subjects. Many people have tried to do these things in Nordic countries (e.g., Kennedy-Macfoy 2014), but until recently individuals' attempts to talk about racism and the many meanings of race have been silenced by denials of racism. The political climate and the increase in open, brutal racism have now made these denials impossible. Moreover, it is more difficult to ignore established communities and the voices of 'our children' – people who were born in and grew up in Nordic countries – than the voices of people whose 'right to belong here' is easier to question. These empirical examples also make visible the necessity of considering not only local but also various transnational and global contexts in research on racialized identities. Now, even in those Northern European locations where there are still few non-white people, individuals are (finally) able to find supportive (digital) communities that allow political collective racialized identities to exist.

Through their agency as racialized subjects, people have raised discussion not only about their own experiences of racism but also about the nature of racialized social relations. As Richard Dyer (1999) has stated, whiteness can be seen where its difference from blackness is inescapable and at issue. When that happens, and when these messages can no longer be silenced, whiteness can no longer just be a 'state of affairs' of the white landscape. Instead, it must be discussed as a position in racialized power relations – not only as a privileged position but also as a standpoint (see

Frankenberg 1993) that can make understanding and knowing about racism difficult for those who are categorized as white. Thus, along with the emergence of 'race' as a social category through discussions on blackness, non-whiteness and whiteness the white majority of the Nordic countries is being put into a new situation: we are asked to question our knowledge of our society and ourselves, our naive national self-image and ideas about ourselves as people 'who cannot be racists'.

Conclusions: The Politics of Naming Racialized Relations

The rapid appearance of race as a social construction in public civil society discussions, in political fields and in media in Northern Europe in the 2000s can be explained by the changing demographics and political climate, as well as by the global circulation of ideas and the virtual communities enabled on the Internet. However, I argue that within the Nordic academia and among authorities there is still a lack of knowledge and understanding of the meaning of race and, consequently, of racism. In these fields, tools for identifying race and its effects in Nordic societies have not yet been founded or even sought. The word 'race' and other words referring to it are still avoided. Yet, as long as some people become racialized and face racism because of their colour, and a line is drawn between those who are categorized as 'white' and those who are not, it has to be verbalized.

We should work harder to find and create tools to enable the meanings of race in our societies to be identified and examined. Academics in the Nordic countries, including myself, have been critical about collecting data and producing population statistics based on individuals' racial and ethnic identifications, but we do not necessarily have to copy the principles and practices used in other countries.¹⁷ I am afraid that as long as there is no available equality data on racial identifications and relations, racism will remain an under-researched topic in these societies, with negative consequences for non-discrimination policies and laws. In many countries, people from minority communities have also opposed or been ambivalent towards equality data collection, but some surveys suggest that we may see changes in that (ENAR 2014, 24).

The politics of naming in the subtitle above refers to the practices and struggles over categorization and questions related to how heterogeneous groups and communities and their shifting identities are conceptualized in everyday encounters and in academic and political forums. It is easy to get lost in translation since most concepts referring to race as a social category are imports from the United States or Britain. Even local meanings of particular concepts are constructed through various crossings of borders of time, geography and linguistics and between academic, political and other discourses.

Relying on racial vocabularies, such as words referring to colour, can be uncomfortable for various reasons. We can never totally escape the risk of essentialism or the racist ideas embedded in them. The meanings of words referring to races need to be negotiated repeatedly because words always carry traces of their earlier meanings and because our societies transform both socially and culturally.

I became aware of the importance of the politics of naming for knowledge production and for the well-being of many people when I studied children's experiences of racism at the beginning of the 2000s. I found out how not having words for their particularity as racialized subjects, and in case of many children the lack of supportive communities, made it very difficult for young people to deal with their experiences and their situations (see Rastas 2005, 2012). Things have changed during the last decade, especially among young people: words such as 'black' don't get stuck in their throats anymore because they can now expect the meanings of these words as social constructions and expressions of political identities to be understood within their own societies. Yet, the popularity of expressions such as 'brown' or 'racialized people' suggests that individuals in Nordic countries are not comfortable with, or do not necessarily want to rely on, words that may be misleading or may hide the complexity of racialized relations and identities. For example, people may reject the prefix 'Afro' or 'African' because, in addition to referring to race/colour, it can also suggest individuals' ties to or knowledge of African cultures, something that many people with parents of African descent do not have. Although the word 'black' has become a collective racial(ized) identity for many young people, it is still avoided as a self-identity among, for example, many North-African and Somali immigrants (Rastas 2013; see also Besteman 1999).

As a researcher, I find the notion of ‘racialized people’ problematic when it is used to refer only to non-white individuals, which is usually the case especially in Sweden and in Finland when activists, artists and students use the term. White(ness) is also a social construction, a product of processes that in research on racism are theorized as racial formation (Omi and Winant 1994) and racialization (e.g. Miles 1989). When people are categorized as ‘white’ they also become racialized, although the consequences are different. The criticism against the normative whiteness expressed by racialized minorities has also raised confusion, mainly because, as explained above, many white people have been put into a new situation that they have found uncomfortable, uneasy and even painful, but also because in anti-racism forums the word ‘white(ness)’ is sometimes used in such a way that its meaning as a social category fades away. In Nordic contexts, I would rather talk about racialized minorities or minoritized communities than racialized people.

Nevertheless, in research on racism we cannot rely only on researchers’ definitions of racial categories. Even when we refuse to use particular words – including individuals’ and communities’ emic categorizations – as research categories in our analyses, we should acknowledge them and trace the shifting meanings of the terms that people use in discussions of their particularity as racialized subjects and their positioning in racialized social relations and hierarchies. That, I argue, can also be a good method for examining the rapid transformations of racialized relations, their local articulations and their transnational and global dimensions.

Notes

1. The notion of ‘Nordic countries’ is used here as a regional and a political concept. The word ‘Scandinavia’ is sometimes used as a synonym for the Nordic countries. Although in some discussion Finland and Iceland are also included among Scandinavian countries, as a regional concept it refers only to Denmark, Norway and Sweden. The now autonomous territories of the Faroe Islands and Greenland are still part of the Kingdom of Denmark.
2. Norway regained its independence in 1905 after 500 years of political union with Sweden and Denmark. Iceland was under the rule of Norway

and then Denmark until it first became an independent state in 1918 under the Danish crown and then in 1944 obtained its full independence as the Republic of Iceland. Finland became an independent country in 1917 after a declaration of independence from the Russian Republic. Most parts of what is now known as Finland were under Swedish rule until 1809 when the Kingdom of Sweden lost Finland in a war with Russia and the new, autonomous Grand Duchy of Finland became part of that country.

3. For the situation of the Roma in Europe see, for example, the latest country monitoring reports of the European Commission against Racism and Intolerance (ECRI), available at <http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/library/publications.asp>
4. This organization is part of the openly racist Nordic Resistance Movement, a national socialist organization that is also active in Sweden and Norway.
5. Interview with Sabuni, by phone on 23 November 2016, was made by Liban Sheikh, who worked as a research assistant on the author's research project on contemporary African diaspora formations.
6. All the Nordic countries are member states of the Council of Europe. ECRI's country reports are available on ECRI's website, see http://www.coe.int/t/dghl/monitoring/ecri/activities/countrybycountry_en.asp
7. For ENAR's publications, see <http://www.enar-eu.org/Publications>
8. Denmark, Finland and Sweden are members of the European Union, whereas Iceland and Norway are not.
9. For example, the founder of *Ms. Afropolitan* blog, Minna Salami, was born in Finland, grew up in Nigeria, studied in Sweden and now lives in London.
10. My ethnographic fieldwork in anti-racist forums and among African diaspora communities in the Nordic countries has included netnography (Kozinets 2010).
11. See <https://www.facebook.com/AfroFinns/>
12. The quotes here are my summaries of what members of these communities have said to me and in public at different anti-racist forums.
13. According to the event's Facebook page, Black Lives Matter Helsinki was organized by the Rasismivapaa Suomi ('Finland Free of Racism' [my translation]) Facebook group, founded in 2013, which is open to anyone. See <https://www.facebook.com/events/1093799630706463/>
14. <https://www.facebook.com/AEC.CPH/posts/963026157139975>

15. Quotes are transcribed from a recording of the panel discussion, 'Anti-Racist Activism and Challenging Normative Whiteness', in which I also participated, during the Anti-racist Forum at Cultural Centre Caisa in Helsinki on 1 October 2016.
16. This is my translation; the original text in Swedish is on their website: 'Workshopen är exklusiv för personer som rasifieras', see <http://www.argafflickor.com/boka-oss>
17. Problems related to ethnic and racial statistics are not only ethical and political, but also relate to the reliability of the research. Within the limits of this article, I am not able to discuss these questions. For discussion in Finnish, see Rastas (2013).

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15

Peripheralised in the Periphery: Migration, Deportation, and Detainment in Ireland and Spain

Elisa Joy White

The geographical locations of Ireland and Spain are undoubtedly distinct, however the nations' historically subaltern positions in the context of Europe underscore their respective tensions within the Eurozone and engagements with migration. Spain – in its southern European position, twentieth century isolation during the oppressive era of autocrat Francisco Franco, and proximity to continental Africa – has experienced an “otherness” in relation to northern European nations. The Republic of Ireland is a nation that has experienced oppression and colonial subjectivity in its relations with Britain (arguably still unresolved outside of the Eurozone and to the North). Throughout the twentieth century both European nations experienced economic distresses to the extreme of high rates of poverty and a resulting substantial out-migration of its populace. Amidst boom and bust times precipitated by European Union membership and global economic conditions, both nations have also been sites of in-

E. J. White (✉)

Department of African American and African Studies, University of California
at Davis, Davis, CA, USA

e-mail: ejowhite@ucdavis.edu

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migration. The nations' mutual circumstances of significant successes in spite of peripheralisation and oppression make Ireland and Spain important sites in which to consider the limits of belonging and inclusion in contemporary Europe.

This chapter – through an examination of detention and the spectre of deportation during the years 2014 and 2015 – particularly considers the persistent and perpetual marginalisation of individuals of African descent migrating to Europe to seek asylum. Immigration policies in Ireland and Spain – and undoubtedly within other European states – perform the contradictory task of simultaneously embracing and violating human rights standards and international law. Ultimately, such policies facilitate the perpetuation of exclusionary renderings of European national identities. The detention of individuals of African descent particularly brings the racialised contours of European identity into sharp relief and structures the way the distinction between belonging to a society and belonging in a *specified* place within a society will continue to underlie the extent of social inclusion across Europe.

The treacherous sea voyages of recent months and years across the Mediterranean and Strait of Gibraltar have heightened the discourse amongst policy makers and various media, as well as focused the global public gaze upon migration to Europe. The discourse on migration – considering a snapshot between 2014 and 2015 – reflects record highs recorded by the UNHCR in the first half of 2015, indicating 103,000 “migrants and refugees” arriving in Europe via the Mediterranean, with “54,000 in Italy, 48,000 in Greece, 91 on Malta and 920 in Spain” (UNHCR 2015). By the end of 2015, Eurostat data indicate that “the number of first time [asylum] applicants more than doubled from 563 thousand in 2014 to almost 1.26 million in 2015” particularly due to “higher numbers of applicants from Syria, Afghanistan and Iraq” (Eurostat 2017). These arrivals are paired with high profile losses of life. In 2014, the UNHCR reported 214,000 arrivals at sea with 3500 deaths (CMSI 2015). The International Organization for Migration (IOM 2015), shortly after the April 2015 deaths of 400 migrants near Italy, reported that “with these latest tragedies, the death toll for 2015 will top 900, compared with 96 during the first four months of last year – roughly a tenfold increase” and that “[t]he majority of incoming migrants appear to be from Sub-Saharan Africa, Eritrea, Somalia and Syria” (IOM 2015).

The tragedy in April 2015 in which 400 people died at sea 120 km from the island of Lampedusa (UNHCR News 2015), echoing the October 2013 tragedy near Lampedusa in which 368 individuals perished when their overcrowded boat sank (Davies 2013), significantly inspired the European Council to engage in policy revisions that address human trafficking and the allocation of resources and responsibility across the 28 EU member states (see European Council 2015a). However, the economic concerns that underlie the human rights discourse at the EU level – perhaps indicative of representative government – were no more progressive than the populist and nativist anti-immigration discourse emerging from political constituencies across Europe (e.g. Front National, UKIP, The True Finns, Danish People’s Party) and, also quite significant, the United States during and after the election of Donald Trump. That is, in contemporary global terms we might consider the fluidity of individuals and possibly more expansive understandings of belonging in Europe. Yet, the cordoning off of individuals – if not completely forestalling their arrival – that persists amidst international laws, EU directives, and human rights initiatives meant to protect rather than harm merely protects narrow constructs of who belongs in and of Europe. The persistent inability of individuals of African descent arriving in Europe to express their global mobility continues to be predicated on the vicissitudes of economic conditions and power through the lens of racialised Whiteness, anti-Blackness, and the specificity of European nationalisms that resist more expansive ethno-cultural expressions of identity. Notably, until relatively recently these very constructs also marginalised Ireland and Spain, and located both nations in more pejorative renderings of European-ness.

Also important for our consideration is the false dichotomy that is perpetuated in the very questioning of why individuals are making their way across land and sea to Europe, as if the relationship between the African continent and European continent were not intertwined. While my intention here is not to review the 1884–85 Berlin Conference or “scramble”/ “carve up” and the resulting partitioning of continental Africa that facilitated the European acquisition of resources, since I am particularly addressing African diaspora communities, it is worth mentioning that it is well documented that the contemporary manifestation of conflict, corruption, and poverty finds implication in earlier moments

of instability on the African continent resulting from European colonisation (for a relatively recent analysis, see Michalopoulos and Papaioannou 2016). This intertwined condition of European advancement in the face of African exploitation is not a new revelation, but the current policy discourse egregiously leaves prior instabilities un-named as if to suggest that conflicts have magically occurred outside of a European context and Europe is merely implicated in the burden of helping out troubled societies. What is significant for our consideration here is that the lack of an articulation of a European legacy of conflict in the homelands of the migrants at sea creates a narrow – if not facile – engagement with contemporary conditions that can only be superficially efficient. This was particularly exemplified in a 2015 European Commission report on migration policy that indicated the key reasons for migration are “[c]ivil war, persecution, poverty, and climate change,” and located Europe as advancing “external policy” to assist “countries of origin” (European Commission 2015: 7). While neglecting to acknowledge the historical context of European engagement in troubled states, the European Commission focused on the policing of people traffickers, criminalisation as a disincentive for migration, and strengthening return policy (European Commission 2015). By eliminating the racialised and colonial contexts as “root causes,” such policies serve to perpetuate the discourse of non-belonging and advance the peripheralisation of “individuals of colour” in the context of Europe.

Underlining the perceived distinction between individuals of Africa and Europe are the policies that either hinder or support mobility in either direction. The early distortion of resources in the spaces of continental Africa has now manifest in a debate about the jurisdictional “carve-up” of *Europe* in determining who will provide resources for human beings in peril. The debates at the beginning of the “migration crisis” in 2015 within the European Council are indicative of the way determinations of who belongs in Europe and can be of Europe are codified. The discourse, even when cloaked by the language of human rights, cannot escape the ultimate effect of defining classes of individuals who – when not monitored, curtailed, and returned at the borders – will represent generations of individuals policed, profiled, and detained, all in the name of human rights and a legacy of racialised and racist migration policies that forestall complete access to rights and citizenship in European nations.

EU states essentially inhibit the inclusion of individuals racialised as other than White through mechanisms that meet at the intersection of migration policies, detention measures, and the looming spectre of deportation via the interpretation of international law and UN policies. Thus, each state becomes complicit in the process of maintaining the exclusion and peripheralisation of communities that would otherwise contribute to new renderings of European societies and cultures. As individuals arriving in European states must, for generations, continue to fight for their right to be in and of Europe on a micro-level, on a macro-level we also see European nations repeatedly re-inscribing their presence, power, and right to be of Europe or the European Union (the UK notwithstanding) by maintaining the persistent boundaries and borders that are racialised, culturally-myopic, and consistently reflective of perceived global differences between north and south communities.

Notably, within the north/south dichotomy, there are micro-conditions of north/south identities that are played out within Europe. This was the case when on the 26th of June 2015 – amidst a heated European Council debate regarding the proposed quota system that would relocate migrants arriving on Mediterranean coasts throughout EU member states – press coverage revealed that “Italian Prime Minister Matteo Renzi, who was reportedly furious at the failure to adopt a mandatory quota system, blasted those leaders, mostly from Eastern European countries, who spoke openly against the system, saying they were ‘not to the level of Europe’” (Gotev 2015). The perception of not fully belonging or not rising to the “level of Europe” may not be of concern to states such as the UK – which during the same meeting announced that by 2017 they would launch a referendum to consider leaving the EU (and did so in 2016 with a resulting Brexit or pro-exit result) – but for states that are financially vulnerable amidst the European Community, the stakes are much higher.

After the EC meetings on the 25th and 26th of June 2015, it was agreed that 40,000 Syrian and Eritrean asylum seekers would be relocated across EU member states on a voluntary basis and 20,000 individuals who have received refugee status would be relocated (ECRE 2015). In the press conference after the meeting, President of the European Council Donald Tusk stated:

[...]Migrants with no legal right to enter the EU must be returned.

The Spanish experience on return was shared by Prime Minister Rajoy. In the past, Spain was faced with a large wave of illegal migrants to the Canary Islands, and yet it managed to prevent this wave. Europe is learning from such experiences.

Today, leaders agreed to accelerate readmission negotiations with the third countries and to fully implement EU rules on returns. We also agreed to use our trade and development agreements on the basis of the ‘more for more’ principle. Finally, Frontex will get more powers to help return illegal migrants. The Commission was tasked to deliver. (European Council 2015b)

The debates among European heads of state highlight the contradictions that result from narrow economic concerns about individuals arriving (i.e. they are “economic” migrants rather than “legal” asylum seekers) and the immediate economic concerns for European nations *because* individuals are arriving (i.e. the cost of maintaining facilities, processing cases, policing migration, and facilitating marginalised “integration” is a burden to states). Hence, problem-solving becomes limited to discourse on criminality in the context of human traffickers which then can be paired with other illegalities on the seas, such as the perceived criminality of migrants accused of illegitimate asylum claims. Yet, legality cannot be effectively determined until asylum seekers are processed. Even as Frontex, the EU Border Control Agency, is given “more powers” to police and return migrants, the agency cannot or should not circumvent international human rights agreements no matter the financial cost to EU states. It only becomes more alarming when we consider that the migration and human rights environment constructed in Spain, to which Tusk refers, is perhaps not the exemplar of what Europe should be “learning.”

Migration, Peripheral “European-ness” and the Human Rights Economy

Ireland and Spain particularly represent the utility of immigration policy in determining the social, economic, and political culture of European belonging and the relationship between ethno-national articulations of

identity and peripheral European-ness. Immigration policy is central to the positioning of Ireland and Spain within Europe and this is significantly manifest in migration-related policies and the experiences of African migrants in the two apparently distinct sites. Also, Ireland and Spain were implicated in the impolite acronym PIIGS, used to refer to the five most economically vulnerable nations in the Eurozone (Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain). The designation as “crisis” nations of the European Union, paired with the nations’ historically racialised positions in the context of European nations, highlight their respective tensions within the Eurozone.

Ireland, the Emerald Isle, is a geographically peripheral nation, with a history of British subjectivity, and related penal policies, feudal exploitation, and famine (see Howe 2000; Lloyd 2011). Further placing the Irish outside of ethno-racial and cultural renderings of European-ness, is the negative racialisation of the Irish, exemplified in the oft quoted “no blacks, no dogs, no Irish” signs in London and Boston as well as proto-anthropologist John Beddoe’s nineteenth century consideration of the “negrescence of the Irish” and their “Africanoid” qualities (Beddoe 1885; also see Ignatiev 2008).

Spain, in its southern European peninsular position, twentieth century isolation amidst the violent and oppressive years of the Franco era from 1936 to 1975, and proximity to continental Africa, has experienced an “otherness” in relation to northern European nations (see Douglass 1999; Marks 1997; Ross et al. 2016). The mere 14 kilometre proximity to continental Africa, the no less than significant 700 year presence of the Moors in Spain, and related interrelationships between northern African and peninsular communities contribute to what scholar Antumi Toasije has described as the “Africanity of Spain” (Toasije 2009). Barbara Fuchs, considering the Alexander Dumas, père, quote, “Africa begins at the Pyrenees,” presented in the introduction of her volume, *Exotic Nation: Maurophilia and the Construction of Early Modern Spain*, explains, “Spain, as a space marked by Moorishness, has long been considered somehow beyond Europe” and argues:

Efforts to render Spain African [...] reinforced and were reinforced by the Black Legend, with profound consequences for the marginalization of

Spain within Europe [...] The early modern construction of Spain in this vein underlies the much later vision of an exotic nation in a high imperialist mode, as a colorful Andalusia of Moors and gypsies synecdochically to represent the nation for Europe. It also ensured the disciplinary marginalization of Spanish, as somehow less European, in historical and literary studies, particularly in the Anglo-American academy. (Fuchs 2011: 4)

Furthermore, in the realm of pejorative and problematic representations of the Spanish amidst economic crises, there is still a desire to dispel myths of Spanish idleness, as described in a 2012 article noting, “The sun, the beach and the noisy fiesta were commodities exploited to attract tourists – in real life, Spaniards work longer hours than most Europeans” (Morán 2012). Yet, a study conducted by Real Insituto Elcano in April 2013 indicated “four out of ten Germans believe Spaniards to be lazy” (Mills 2013) or as *El País* reported (with a picture of Mariano Rajoy and Angela Merkel), “Weak, corrupt, traditional, and a country of lazy people. That’s the image of Spain that a large number of Germans have” (*El País* 2013).

In 1999, Ireland and Spain were among the first group of European Union nations to adopt the Euro. The Republic of Ireland, which joined what is now the European Union in 1973, experienced a historical increase in employment opportunities and economic vitality during the 1990s through approximately 2004. Often described as “the Celtic Tiger,” the economic successes of the Republic of Ireland were particularly fuelled by foreign multinationals lured to the nation as a result of low tax rate incentives and a significant housing boom (see Blue 2000; Coulter and Coleman 2003; Pearlstein 2013). In 2010, two years after the beginning of the current global recession and amidst a mounting economic crisis and a now-burst housing bubble, Ireland arranged a 67-billion euro bailout from the EU with the contingency of implementing an austerity budget (cutting 15 billion euros), which resulted in higher unemployment rates and significant inflation (Broad 2013). Spain, which joined the European Union in 1986, upon taking on the euro experienced a financial boom and an increase in building and related property values. After 2008, the housing bubble was quickly deflated and the newly vibrant Spanish economy was soon in the throes of recession,

accepting a 100-billion euro bank bailout in 2012 and becoming a space of high unemployment, housing evictions, and indebtedness in the Eurozone (see Minder and Kanter 2012; Reuters 2012; Treanor 2012).

The economic crisis in both countries by no means marks the beginning of crises for Black communities in Europe in relation to racism, anti-immigration, cultural biases, and related xenophobia. If anything, there is now a necessity for Black communities in Europe to negotiate a *duo-crisis*. Whether it is the case of a bottle being thrown and ripping through the stomach of a Senegalese man, Moulaye Ndiaye, in Valencia in 2012 (Valero 2012) or the case of objects hurled out of car windows at Africans residing in the Baleskin asylum reception centre in Finglas, County Dublin (Twomey 2013), the economy cannot be solely implicated in acts of racist violence. Nevertheless, the 2014 European Network Against Racism shadow report indicated that “many civil society organizations and other institutions have cited the financial crisis as the primary factor for the rising number of racist crimes...across Europe” (ENAR 2015: 10) Notably, people of African descent and Black Europeans, Muslim women, and Roma experienced the majority of racist crimes across Europe (ENAR 2013) as ethnic minorities and migrants continued to endure the deflection of state problems as a perceived result of their presence (see Lentin 2007). Racism, of course, also predates the description of Ireland and Spain as the economies encompassing the acronym PIIGS but it is the maintenance of borders amidst economic crises that highlights the extent to which both nations deflect becoming the “G” in the acronym – Greece, a nation that has seen the worst of the crisis and a resulting tenuous presence in the EU (see Bandow 2017; Smith 2017).

Ireland, in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, and Spain, particularly during the Franco era through the post-Franco early 1980s, historically experienced more out-migration than in-migration. Both nations are signatories to the UNHCR 1951 Geneva Convention and 1967 Protocol and, as is the case with all EU member states, must fulfil their obligations in relation to various UN human rights treaties and related protections stipulated within and through internal EU human rights protocols. Yet, as we see in the treatment of asylum seekers, the process of adhering to these human rights requirements reflects the desire

to maintain specific ethno-cultural and racialised renderings of both nations by cordoning off, preventing integration, and limiting the possibility for new communities – particularly of African descent – to participate in the larger society. This process, again occurring in the context of international law, is facilitated through detention, limited recognition of asylum seekers, and deportation.

Ireland and Spain have distinctive engagements with their proximity to continental Africa, which involves preventing what might be termed “aero-proximity” for the former and a racialising geographical proximity for the latter. In the case of Ireland, we see the Dublin Regulation I, II and now III, being considered throughout Europe in the context of asylum and refugee quotas and the allocation of jurisdictional responsibility. Dublin III, in force since 2014 – and its earlier formations as Dublin I and II – stipulates that individuals must seek asylum in the first country of arrival. The regulation, as stated in the recast Dublin III, is meant for:

Establishing the criteria and mechanisms for determining the Member State responsible for examining an application for international protection lodged in one of the Member States by a third-country national or a stateless person. (EUR-Lex 2013)

The regulation or Dublin Convention I – brought forth in 1990 – was particularly beneficial to the island nation as there were limited direct flights to Dublin and Shannon airports from countries representing the largest migrant populations in Ireland, particularly Nigeria and the Democratic Republic of the Congo, at the time. In effect, individuals did make the journey to seek asylum in Ireland and returns under the Convention still remain limited but the implication is clear that in theory this would delimit and deter the seeking of asylum in the Republic of Ireland. The Dublin Convention, while initially interpreted by human rights authorities as a positive way of helping states follow through on their obligations under the 1951 Convention and 1967 Protocol, has actually resulted in prolonged detentions, application backlogs while determining jurisdiction, and the limited integration of migrants (see UNHRC 2001; ECRE 2013). Discussions in the Council of the European

Union at the beginning of the “migration crisis” in 2015 were predicated on new interpretations of the Dublin Regulation, thus forestalling the potential for first arrivals to seek asylum in the first state of arrival as well as limiting the obligation (or “burden”) of processing applicants in the Mediterranean states. The other issue – as presented in the context of protecting individuals from human trafficking and criminalising traffickers – involves the intervention of Northern and Central European states in securing that individuals arriving in the Mediterranean do not relocate to other member states.

Ireland, a nation that refers to itself as a place of “*Cead Mille Failte*” (“one hundred thousand welcomes”), does not easily facilitate the welcoming of asylum seekers, many of whom arrived because of positive sentiments resulting from the proximity of Irish missionaries in their homelands (see White 2009). Meanwhile, perpetuating the narrative representation of the humanitarian Irish, the Irish media effectively covered the story of the Irish Navy “pluck[ing] 400 migrants from the Med” (McCormack 2015), quite certainly knowing that – barring a policy shift – the desperate masses would not be seeking asylum anywhere near the Irish Sea.

The geographic location of Spain presents a different context. Just 14 km from the continent of Africa, the access via the Strait of Gibraltar – the expanse of water where the Mediterranean meets the Atlantic – makes Spain a very viable first state of arrival. Yet, as the 2015 migration data indicate, the intention to stay in Spain is less amongst migrants. As one informant, a migrant from Nigeria, told me just one week after 300 individuals arrived on the shores of Tarifa in March 2015, “They won’t stay here. There are no jobs.” The aforementioned 2012/2013 ENAR shadow report noted, “African migrants in Spain are twice as likely to be unemployed as people from the majority population” (ENAR 2013: 14) and this was further confirmed in a 2016 report on Afrophobia across Europe (ENAR 2016). The concern that individuals will make their way to other Schengen states and seek asylum is not unfounded but it also implicates the pressure from other European states to monitor Spain’s maintenance of the borders and to curtail the country’s once relatively progressive immigration policies, which encouraged asylum as a mode of immigra-

tion to Spain – regardless of refugee status – and involved amnesty programmes for undocumented workers (Lopez 2007).

In both nations, economic concerns forestalled the potential for anti-racist and cultural pluralist approaches to new migrant communities, as the goal became less to preserve the humanity of migrants and more-so to remove them and eliminate the perception of being “soft touch” nations in the greater EU context. While the Dublin Regulation merely continued to provide a legal framework that theoretically (though not in actuality) ensured that Ireland was not the first stop for asylum in the EU, the bailout also provoked austere approaches to economic management in the nation and led to greater out-migration amongst Irish nationals – with estimates of 1000 emigrants a week in 2013 (Ó Fátharta 2013) – as well as a disinterest in supporting the rights to resources and equality measures necessitated by the presence of migrants (asylum seeker and other communities) (see *Doras Luimní* 2013). In the case of Spain, the bailout, mass unemployment, and evictions placed an economic focus on assisting Spanish citizens to navigate “*el crisis*” and facilitated a disinterest in supporting programmes that assisted migrants (asylum seekers and others) but also – due to its geographic location – led to contingent pressures to monitor its borders in ways that corresponded with the interests of Central and Northern European nations (see Vitzhum 2005; Arango 2013). In other words, an indebtedness to Europe and the maintenance of status within Europe exacerbated already extant anti-immigration sentiments, cultural biases, racism, and human rights violations.

Peripheralisation Through Detention

The asylum process, particularly in its normalisation of detainment and isolation, is a significant indication of the failure to envision a Europe and – by extension – European identities that are inclusive of individuals of African descent. In Spain, individuals arriving outside of regularised migration contexts are placed in *Centros de Internamiento de Extranjeros* (CIEs) (Centres for the Internment of Foreigners) across Spain and in the Canary Islands, as well as detainment locations on continental African

soil in the Spanish cities of Melilla and Ceuta. The criteria for placement in the CIEs are as follows:

- (1) For purposes of expulsion from the country because of alleged violations[...]including being on Spanish territory without proper authorisation, posing a threat to public order, attempting to exit the national territory at unauthorised crossing points or without the necessary documents, and/or participating in clandestine migration.
- (2) When a judge issues a judicial order for detention in cases where authorities are unable to carry out a deportation order within 72 hours.
- (3) When a non-citizen fails to depart the country within the prescribed time limit after being issued a deportation order.
- (4) To prevent absconding; and
- (5) Pending expulsion of illegally-residing non-citizens convicted of criminal offences in cases where the law provides for expulsion as a substitute for prison sentences not exceeding six years or the payment of a fine. (Ley Orgánica 2010; Global Detention Project 2016)

The centres are located in former prisons and military properties. Notably, their prior uses are echoed in the daily function of the CIEs, spaces that intern individuals in a manner indistinctive from regular prison experiences, even as the individuals have not committed a crime (e.g. 1–4 above can occur in the context of asylum processing, fears of return, and as a result of asylum-related destitution, and #5 can occur in the context of trafficking and extra-legal activities precipitated by and/or emerging in the context of asylum migrations). Opponents of the CIEs, such as the *Comisión Española de Ayuda al Refugiado* (CEAR) and *Campaña por el cierre de los Centros de Internamiento de Extranjeros* (CIEs No), describe the facilities as “*carceles*” (“jails”) (see CIEs No 2015; Ramajo 2014).

During fieldwork in Tarifa in March 2015, I asked the head nurse at *La Cruz Roja* – who regularly treated migrants rescued in the Strait – if she knew where migrants went after receiving care. She responded that “the National Police take them away” and “I do not know where they go afterwards.” I asked if perhaps some were on *La Isla de las Palomas* (a CIE run by the centre in Algeciras), a military compound on a small island connected to Tarifa by a 1 km road and near *La Cruz Roja*. The holding units are located behind the compound walls beyond a formidable

guarded gate. Again, the head nurse explained that she did not know where migrants were placed (“They could be anywhere in the country”). Essentially, migrants become lost within a system that lacks accountability. They are not only criminalised but are cordoned off from the greater society which renders them invisible, less capable of advocacy, and impossibly able to effectively integrate into communities if and when their cases are accepted. Additionally, the Spanish government’s inefficient documentation of those placed in the centres also makes quantitative data difficult to acquire, if not skewed when acquired. As the Global Detention Project notes, “opacity of Spanish immigration detention is evidenced by the absence of public data on detention operations and weak parliamentary oversight” (Global Detention Project Spain 2013–2016). As a snapshot, reports compiled in 2013 indicate that 5000 persons are in the CIEs across Spain (Lucas 2015) and other data note a majority from sub-Saharan Africa in Southern Spain, Ceuta, Melilla, and the Canary Islands (Global Detention Project Spain 2013–2016).

In Ireland, while there are functioning prisons in which asylum seekers are detained, such as Mountjoy and Cloverhill Prison in Dublin, and Cork Prison, as stipulated in Section 9(8) of the Refugee Act 1996 (and as amended through 2004) asylum applicants are only imprisoned as a result of the following circumstances:

- (8) Where an immigration officer or a member of the Garda Síochána, with reasonable cause, suspects that an applicant—
 - (a) poses a threat to national security or public order in the State,
 - (b) has committed a serious non-political crime outside the State,
 - (c) has not made reasonable efforts to establish his or her true identity,
 - (d) intends to avoid removal from the State in the event of his or her application for asylum being transferred to a [Dublin] convention country ...or a safe third country...
 - (e) intends to leave the State and enter another state without lawful authority, or
 - (f) without reasonable cause has destroyed his or her identity or travel documents or is in possession of forged identity documents, he or she may detain the person in a prescribed place (referred to subsequently in this Act as “a place of detention”). (Refugee Act 1996; 2004: Section 9(8))

While stipulations for imprisonment contain subjective determinations (e.g. “*reasonable efforts*” and “*reasonable cause*”) that might be difficult for applicants to display, most individuals who arrive in Ireland to seek asylum – if not immediately turned around – are placed in “reception centres” run by the Reception and Integration Agency (RIA) rather than prisons. The majority of individuals with undecided asylum cases are placed in reception centres dispersed throughout the country and all but two facilities place asylum seekers under the Direct Provision scheme. The scheme, which began in 2000, has been notorious for its human rights violations as individuals and families are placed in limbo for months to years while awaiting an asylum decision.

In my fieldwork during the first wave of significant in-migration to Ireland, I interviewed numerous individuals who experienced Direct Provision. Repeatedly, the issues of the small stipend (initially 15 Irish pounds and 7.50 per child per week and, after joining the Eurozone, 19.10 and 9.60 euros per child per week), the barring of asylum applicants from preparing meals for themselves, the prohibition of employment, the spaces which placed entire families in single rooms (in many cases mothers living with young and teenage female and male children) and, staying in the system for months and years on end as they awaited a decision on their asylum cases, were discussed as major concerns (see [FLAC 2010a](#); [FLAC Report 2010b](#); [White 2012](#)). In spite of continuous criticism of the length of time individuals must endure Direct Provision (critiques even launched in the first year of the programme), January RIA [2015](#) statistics note that over 900 RIA residents have been in the system for over 84 (84+) months ([RIA 2015](#)). By the end of 2016, 510 had remained for more than 84 months ([RIA 2016](#)). Additionally, Direct Provision, described as “toxic” by a Cork clinician, has been detrimental to the mental health of asylum seekers ([O’Shea 2014](#)). During the Universal Children’s Day rally in November 2014, an event particularly focusing on ending Direct Provision in the context of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, reception centre resident Theresa Obi stated:

I used to tell the people in Cork, I think I deserve an award for being in the system for ten years without cracking because the idea of Direct Provision

is to get people to crack up. The idea of isolating people is to make people lose contact with people and before you know it... hope turns to despair. And once it turns to despair, people begin to suffer. A lot of people among the asylum seekers are suffering. A lot of them are dying in pain. We are loads of asylum seekers here but some just don't have the faith to come out again because they feel that they are not achieving anything. But I want to tell you to keep the strength up because someday – just like slavery ended – Direct Provision will be history in Ireland. (Irish Refugee Council 2014a)

It is no small coincidence that Obi compares direct provision to slavery. The persistent lack of freedom continues to be expressed in the outcries of residents and advocates.

During the Children's Day rally, activist Jonathan Muhwezi addresses freedom and then neatly links the way economic concerns trump that of human rights:

Why do we have to fight for our freedom? Why do we have to fight for our children? Why do we have to fight to be treated like human beings?

The success of the country is not based on its economic success. The success of this country is based on the way it treats its citizens. The success of the country is based on the way it treats its children, immigrants, asylum seekers, and refugees! (Irish Refugee Council 2014b)

The issue of freedom is, of course, paired with the fact of a substantial Black presence in the RIA facilities. The January 2015 RIA data indicate that 71.2% of reception centre residents are from the continent of Africa (RIA 2015). This also reflects the reality that whether in "Celtic Tiger" 2000 or in post-bust 2015, the opportunities for migration for individuals of African descent to Ireland have been limited to the realm of asylum, which makes it even more problematic when economic migration arguments are launched in the determination of the veracity of asylum cases (see White 2012). As noted above, in Spain, the available data from the CIEs also indicate a substantial African presence.

Fifteen years after the beginning of Direct Provision, the programme faced a potential revision as a result of a report presented to Minister for Justice Francis Fitzgerald by a working group on June 25, 2015. The 11-member working group was constituted by the Minister for Justice in

October 2014 and comprised of representatives of state offices and NGOs. However, the group was criticised for only including one individual who had experienced the asylum process, Reuben Hamackachere, an asylum and refugee representative with the Irish Refugee Council. By April 2015, Hamackachere, who had spent eight years under Direct Provision with his family, resigned from the committee, as well as Irish Refugee Council CEO, Sue Conlan, because they were both discouraged by the working groups' focus on revising Direct Provision rather than ending it (see MacGuill 2014; Hamackachere and Crowley 2015). It was not until May 2017 that asylum-seekers would receive a "right to work," and in June 2017 that an allowance increase was approved (see NASC 2017a, b). Meanwhile, the June 2017 ascent of Leo Varadkar, Ireland's first Prime Minister with an ethnic minority background (his father is Indian), merely represented a continuation of conservative approaches to immigration and race in line with his centre-right politics (see Van Nguyen 2017).

Similarly, in Spain the fight over the CIEs also contains divergent ideologies, with groups, such as CEAR, advocating for better conditions in the CIEs and others, such as *Brigadas Vecinales de Observación de Derechos Humanos*, *Cerremos los CIEs*, *Ferrocarril Clandestino*, and *Campaña por el Cierre de los CIEs*, demanding the complete closing of the centres. In 2017, the Spanish Interior Minister, Juan Ignacio Zoido, announced the opening of three new CIEs and – falling well short of the desires of those who would like to see all facilities closed – assured that it wasn't "un capricho de gobierno" ("government whim") but a response to the need to "proponer un nuevo diseño con la participación de todos los grupos políticos" ("propose a new design with the participation of all political groups.") (*El País* 2017).

Fast Tracks and Hot Returns

Return rates for Ireland and Spain have varied over the years, reflecting the perception of "soft touch" Irish and Spanish migration policies and the desire to dispel such perceptions for EU related reasons and articulations of national identity. Ireland implemented a fast track measure for

countries deemed “safe countries” in 2002 and included Nigeria on the list, thus facilitating a fast removal of asylum applicants from Nigeria, a nation that has averaged among the top three origins of migrants to Ireland beginning as early as 2000 (White 2012). The fast track was aligned with a repatriation agreement that was never ratified in Nigeria and remains spurious (White 2009). While fast track measures are still in place, as mentioned above, Nigerians and other African nationals represent the highest number of individuals in reception centres, even as across Europe there was an increase in Syrian asylum seekers in 2014 and 2015. Also recall that resisting return to a “safe third country” is grounds for imprisonment (Refugee Act 1996, 2004: Section 9(8)d). These conditions further indicate a significant interned population racialised as Black in Ireland, many born and growing up in Ireland but not citizens because they lack Irish parentage, and living life in one room spaces with parents who have been barred from cooking for themselves and pursuing legal employment.

Notably, the aforementioned working group report, which was released on June 30, 2015 and is the first review of Direct Provision, recommends an increase in fast tracking residency for individuals who have been in the system for over five years, final decisions should be made within 12 months, granting the right to work if a decision has not been made within nine months, larger and private spaces for families, cooking facilities, and an increase in the allowance of €19.10 per adult per week and €9.60 per child per week to €38.74 and €29.80 (RTÉ News 2015). The fast-tracking measures suggest a positive outcome without necessarily noting the manifestly unfounded determination, which is significant in Ireland when considering the nation has had the lowest recognition rate in the EU, coming in at 8.6% in 2013, well under the 26.2% EU average (Reilly 2013) and from 2012–2014 showing 20 times less than Norway, a nation of similar population size (see *The Journal* 2015).

The immediacy of the working group’s recommendations were unclear and, as numerous critics noted, did not necessarily remedy a problematic system that represents itself as benign amidst human right violations. The Department of Justice and Equality announced, “the report will receive serious study and consideration” and that the Minister “reaffirm[ed] that the excessive length of time in the protection system as

the most significant issue facing those in direct provision” (Department of Justice and Equality 2015). While there are 170 recommendations, it is notable that “length of time” is of particular interest to the Minister for Justice because such attention primarily facilitates “fast tracking” and, again, does not guarantee a positive outcome for individuals seeking asylum. As of 2017, Direct Provision persisted and opponents focused on implementing support in areas of housing, education and employment for those who have left the system due to regularisation of their status (see Irish Research Council 2016).

During the period examined, the Spanish government marked CIEs for renovation, yet economic concerns hindered the immediacy of these projects (Global Detention Project 2013). The Algeciras CIE, whose facilities were described by an Andalusia district attorney as “horrepilantes” (horrific), is the one that inspired a closer look at the CIEs (Espinosa 2013). In 2008, shortly after a clandestine video recording of the location was leaked to news reporters, outrage and “*vergüenza*” (“shame”) ensued (Telecinco 2008; Ramajo 2014). Subsequent reports continued to note health violations, the lack of intimacy when visiting with family, poor infrastructure, padlocks and keys prohibiting evacuation, limited protocols for unaccompanied minors, and excessive periods of internment that continue to amount to human rights violations (see *Pueblos Unidos* report 2015). Meanwhile, in Ireland, during a demonstration in County Limerick to close the equally infamous Mount Trenchard facility, Felix, a Hanratty RIA Resident (formerly Hanratty’s Hotel) exclaimed, “We ran away from persecution. We were being persecuted in our countries. We did not come here to be put in prison again. But we are in prison. We always wake up coming out from the prison” (Trade Union TV 2014).

While fast tracking continues in Ireland, in Spain more recently – further shedding earlier, more lenient policies – the process of “*Devoluciones en caliente*” or “hot returns” began. The returns, referred to as “rejections at the border” in the proposed amendment to the Aliens Act, particularly addressed the areas of Ceuta and Melilla and involved the Civil Guard and National Police quickly pushing individuals back into Moroccan waters and out of Spanish jurisdiction before they have the opportunity to declare asylum (Badcock 2015). This was particularly evident in the

2014 deaths of 15 migrants attempting to cross into Ceuta, who drowned after guards fired rubber bullets and released tear gas to prevent them from coming to shore (see Govan 2014). After EU Commissioner for Home Affairs Cecilia Malmström and 13 NGOs implicated “a violation of the Schengen Border Code, the Asylum Procedures Directive, the Returns Directive and the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the EU,” Spain elected to no longer continue the “hot returns” (ECRE News 2014). This does not necessarily mean that such actions do not persist. While interviewing migrants in Tangier, Morocco in March 2015, it was often discussed that the Guardia Civil would “turn you around” and back into Moroccan water space. This is illegal and a flagrant violation of human rights. However, those who experience the harm are not in a position to protest the act. A European Migration Network (EMN) Annual Report on Immigration and Asylum indicates that “[i]n 2015...the highest numbers of refusals at the border were reported by Spain (168,345), some 57% of the EU total.” (EMN 2015: 9). The case against the *Guardia Civil* involved in the murders at Ceuta was suspended in 2015 but calls to reopen the case emerged by early 2017 (see Abad 2015; Peral 2017).

Conclusion: The Price of Whiteness Is the Cost of Blackness

Ireland and Spain – both historically peripheral and negatively racialised spaces of Europe – exemplify how the forestalling of Black inclusion can serve as a currency for the obtaining of European belonging and a perceived Whiteness. Both nations’ efforts to transcend peripheralisation and sustain economic viability are meted out by adhering to the migration objectives of the European Union, which operationally limit the regularisation of individuals of African descent. As argued in this chapter, detention and deportation – in spite of human rights abuses and sometimes under the guise of human rights protocols – effectively serve as pre-emptive measures to prevent Black inclusion in European societies.

Current conditions reflect nearly intractable circumstances – whether in Ireland, Spain or across Europe – in which the humanity of migrants

is overwhelmingly articulated through economic concerns and criminality. This sentiment is neatly expressed in signs held at rallies to close the CIEs:

Cual es el delito? Cual es mi crimen?

Ser mujer? Ser negro? Ser pobre?

Ser inmigrante no es un delito.

[What is the crime? What is my crime?

Being a woman? Being black? Being poor?

Being an immigrant is not a crime.]

Theoretically, being an immigrant should not be a crime. However, human rights notwithstanding, attempting to cross perceived geographical, social, and cultural borders, to traverse and transcend the periphery, to be Black and have the desire to belong within Europe, is not only manifest as a crime; it can be quite deadly.

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16

Blackness and Racial Mixture in Portland, Oregon and Esmeraldas, Ecuador

Ethan Johnson

In this paper my aim is to answer the question, what does Anti-Blackness in two apparently disparate locations, the city and province of Esmeraldas, Ecuador and Portland, Oregon in the United States, have to do with each other? In the Portland Metro Area for example, Black people have never comprised more than 3 percent of the population and the region is often characterized as the Whitest large metro area in America. Whether or not related, there are strong indications a Black identity is less salient in Portland than in other parts of the country. In contrast, the city of Esmeraldas, Ecuador has the largest proportion of Black people compared to any other municipality in the country, approximately 40 percent, and counter to the general trend of eschewing Blackness in Ecuador and Latin America, in the city of Esmeraldas Blackness remains a significantly more salient identity choice for people of African descent than in other parts of the country. Contrary to Portland, the city and province of Esmeraldas in the national imagination are Black places.

E. Johnson (✉)
Portland State University, Portland, OR, USA
e-mail: ejohns@pdx.edu

Recently, much scholarly attention has been focused on the similarities and differences between Anti-Blackness in Latin America and the United States. Specifically, this focus has been on how the two regions appear to be converging in regards to how racial identity is experienced and understood. For example, the United States appears to be moving away from a binary system of racial identity where previously people of African descent that were mixed with other racial groups did not have the option of claiming these other identities, now they can and often do. This is referred to as the Latin Americanization of US race relations (Sexton 2008). In much of Latin America people of African descent have become more critical of the concepts of racial mixture or the tertiary system of racial identity that has historically dominated and are now more often claiming and acknowledging their Blackness. For example, the development of the Organization of Africans in the Americas as a response to the regimen of the Organization of the Americas speaks directly to this shift (Sexton 2008). Through my analysis I will illustrate how a combined discussion of Esmeraldas, Ecuador and Portland, Oregon provides interpretive insights that enrich our understanding of Blackness in general.

This project is based on previous case studies of Portland, Oregon and Esmeraldas, Ecuador. In both research projects ethnographic methods were used. In Esmeraldas the research examined how the first Black self-identifying mayor of the city challenged Anti-Blackness through a set of murals and statues he commissioned upon his election. This research is based largely on data from interviews and observation. I interviewed the mayor, local activists and one of the artists of a mural the mayor commissioned. I also use secondary sources that analyse many of the murals and statues and other artefacts of the cultural topography throughout the city. Regarding Portland, Oregon, I examined how two Black owned newspapers challenged Anti-Blackness in regards to a case of sexual harassment against the then Black chief of police. This research is based largely on analysis of 100's of newspaper articles related to a sexual harassment case of the then second Black chief of police, Derrick Foxworth, and an interview with Foxworth.

I begin my analysis with an examination of the specific socio-historical context of Anti-Blackness of each city and claim that the ways people make sense of racial identity and racism are shaped largely by this context.

I then examine the two efforts by Black people to challenge Anti-Black racism and show the ways their representations of Blackness become complicit in reproducing racial inequality, specifically because they do not challenge the ways sexuality intersects with race. Lastly, I discuss how examination of Black representations of Blackness can provide important insights into the ways dominant notions of race and racism in both regions are challenged and reproduced. While in both cases it is clear the authors of the Black representations of Blackness attempted to challenge the dominant narratives, they also often were silent regarding issues of race, gender or/and sexuality in their characterization of Blackness. I claim that these silences can contribute to the reproduction of racial inequality.

The Social and Historical Specificities of Anti-blackness in Portland and Esmeraldas

Portland, Oregon

In the United States Anti-Blackness has and continues to be structured primarily through the ‘one-drop rule’ or the ‘law of hypo-descent’. This concept, which White elites implemented as slavery ended in order to maintain the exploitation of Black people, states that people or groups with identifiable African ancestry, phenotype and/or complexion are marked as Black people and consequently treated as inferior and/or second-class citizens. Since the end of the Civil Rights Era the ‘one-drop rule’ has lost some of its traction, however the evidence shows that it continues to shape the racial hierarchy in important ways. For example, examination of virtually every socioeconomic indicator reveals that Black people suffer oppression and exploitation more than all other racial groups in education, incarceration, housing, employment and health care (Desmond and Emirbayer 2010). In other words, the initial structures of slavery and Anti-Blackness have not been dismantled. Where the ‘one-drop rule’ shows some waning are in the areas of marriage and claims of multiracial identity. Black and White people marry each other currently at higher rates than any other time in history (Desmond and Emirbayer).

Relatedly, there are more people who claim to be Black/White multiracials than ever before. However, the evidence also demonstrates that among all racial groups, Black and White people transgress the racial romance divide less than all others and Black/White multiracials identify themselves as Black and/or are ascribed Blackness more than all other multiracials, which shows the One-Drop Rule remains in force (Bratter 2010).

The Portland Metro Area is an important place to examine Anti-Blackness and Multiraciality within the United States because it is considered to be the Whitest large city in America. The Portland Metro Area is predominantly White because the overwhelming majority of White people who settled in the Oregon territory in the mid 19th Century hoped and planned to create a White homeland (Johnson 2016). For example, “In November of 1857, Oregon voters approved the proposed constitution, rejected slavery (by a vote of 7727–2645), and excluded free blacks and “mulattoes (by a vote of 8649–1081)” (Brooks 2006: 3). Oregonians rejected slavery not on the principle of exploitation or dehumanization, but because allowing slavery in Oregon would have slave owners bring Black people to Oregon. Indeed, Oregon holds the distinction as being the only state in the Union that had a Black exclusion law in its original constitution. Building upon the efforts to exclude Black people from the state, Oregonians in 1868 voted to rescind their initial ratification of the 14th Amendment in 1866, which extended and guaranteed citizenship to Black Americans in the United States. The exclusion clause in Oregon’s constitution was not removed until 1926 and the re-ratification of the 14th amendment did not occur until 1974. The rescission of the 14th Amendment together with Oregon’s official policy of Black exclusion sent a clear message to Black people that they were not welcome and is evident in the small numbers that migrated to Portland compared to other West Coast cities. Records indicate that Portland’s Black population in 1860 was about 130 and from 1900 to 1920 ranged from 775 to 1556 (Toll 1997).

Prior to 1940, the Black American population in Portland did not exceed 2500 and was the smallest on the West Coast. However, the Black American population grew tenfold, reaching approximately 25,000 in and near the city of Portland in the early 1940s due to employment opportunities associated with the World War 2 ship-building industry.

With the growth of the Black American population racial oppression became more explicit and through legal and extralegal forms of residential segregation realtors, banks and city government collaborated to restrict this population largely to the Albina District in the North-East section of the city. At the end of World War 2 housing and employment discrimination increased and more Black Americans left Portland compared to any other West Coast city and by 1950 fewer than ten thousand remained (Gibson 2004). Not surprisingly, the city of Portland gained a “national reputation among blacks of being the worst city on the West Coast, as bad as any place in the South (Little and Weiss 1978: 47).”

Ironically, Portland, Oregon has developed a reputation as one of the best and politically progressive cities in the country to live in. Aaron Renn in his article the “White City” suggests that it is precisely the homogeneity of Portland that has allowed for the progressive politics to occur (Renn 2009). If Renn and others (Brooks 2006) are correct, Anti-Black racism has facilitated the ability for Portland to model itself as one of the most politically progressive cities in the United States based on the exclusion of Black people and other non-White groups.

The small proportion of Black people and other racialized groups in Portland has meant that the city has not developed a documented legacy of racial strife as compared to other large metropolitan areas. Struggles over public transportation for example have lacked the bitter racial battles that have characterized metropolitan areas with larger populations of Black people, which is related to Portland being recognized nationally as a city with a strong and accessible public transportation system. Similarly, while racial inequality in education is as bad or worse than the rest of the country, because Black people and other racialized groups comprise such a small proportion of the population, conflicts have tended to be over access and not community control and representation (Abbott 2003), which are often more contentious struggles because they enable empowerment through control of the allocation of these resources. Lastly, while White flight occurred in the urban core as Black people moved in, it did not reach the levels of other large metropolitan areas, which kept a strong tax base within the city to maintain mainstream institutions such as schools, libraries and community recreation centres. When White flight occurred in urban areas across the USA in the 1950s and 60s, the White

people fleeing the urban core took their jobs with them as they moved to the segregated suburbs. Black people for the most part were left with no jobs and thus no tax base to support the existing infrastructure of mainstream institutions such as schools, libraries and recreation centres.

Portland's politically progressive reputation is arguably due to its history of racial exclusion. The *de jure* racial exclusion policies of the past while no longer on the books nevertheless continue. For example, a recent study claiming that the Portland Metro Area "has a particularly toxic form of racism and institutionalized racism that renders experiences of communities of color worse than their national comparisons" (Curry-Stevens and Cross-Hammer 2010: 93) sounds very familiar to the claims by Black people that Portland was one of the worst places for Black people to live outside of the South in the mid-20th Century.

Compared to the Southern United States and regions where a documented legacy of Anti-Blackness is more salient, I suggest that the small numbers of Black people coupled with the myth that Portland is a politically progressive city, that is, where little or no racism exists compared to other places in the United States has created more space for the acceptance of interracial relationships and the concept of multiraciality among Black people in the Portland Metro Area. In 2005 for example the Oregon Centre for Health statistics claimed Black men and women in the Portland Metro Area practised exogamy at rates of 65 and 44 percent respectively (Oregon Center for Health Statistics 2005). These proportions far outstrip the national averages that continue to remain at or below 25 and 15 percent for Black men and women respectively. Additionally, the claims of multiracial identity among people of African descent remain much higher than national averages (Urban League of Portland 2015).

If Portland is White culturally and demographically, this means there are few if any Black spaces in the city. In fact, due to gentrification there is no longer a geographical space within the Portland Metro Area that can be described as Black. One might assert that higher rates of interracial marriages and claims of multiracial identity demonstrate that Portland is politically progressive because these data appear to show that race and racism are less important than other regions of the United States. However, viewed within the socio-historical context, higher exogamy

rates and claims of multiraciality do not necessarily reflect a lack of racial strife, but in fact more accurately demonstrate the particular ways Black people have to navigate racism in Portland, Oregon.

Esmeraldas, Ecuador

In Ecuador and elsewhere in Latin America Anti-Black racism has been structured through the dominant discourse of national identity, *mestizaje* or racial and cultural mixture (Anton 2005; de la Torre 2002). The dominant discourse of national identity in Latin America resulted from the efforts of elite groups to develop ideologies in response to the crisis perceived in their mostly non-White European nations. In order to avoid the stigma associated with Black and Indigenous people these elites developed the concept of *Mestizaje*, i.e., racial and cultural mixture. However, these elites also maintained the racial hierarchies of the colonial past as progress was defined as being White and Western (Degler 1971; Rahier 1999). *Mestizaje's* power resides precisely in its ability to simultaneously include all through racial mixture, while excluding those not physically and culturally moving towards Whiteness. As a result, many if not most continue to claim that there is little if any racism in Latin America (Nascimento 1989; Rahier 2003).

Within each nation of Latin America the specific socio-historical conjunctures of colonialism, that is, immigration and settlement patterns, have shaped how elite groups have conceived of the dominant discourse of national identity. In Ecuador, where Indigenous people make-up the largest non-European group, national identity has been defined primarily as Indigenous and European (Rahier 2003). However, the meaning of race is changing in Ecuador and much of Latin America.

In 1998, due largely to the struggles of Indigenous and Afro-Ecuadorian groups and the globalization of multiculturalism, Ecuador for the first time acknowledged itself as a multi-racial and cultural nation through a constitutional referendum. In 2009 through another constitutional referendum, the rights and recognition gained in 1998 were expanded upon and made more specific. Furthermore, since the 1990s a body of literature has developed that examines racial discrimination and inequality in

Ecuador that previously did not exist. However, these changes in the way the nation imagines itself are more rhetorical than substantive. Black and Indigenous people remain at the bottom of the social hierarchy.

While Blackness in Ecuador has been at best ambiguously included in notions of national identity, it was and continues to be a salient part of identity in the city and province of Esmeraldas (Walmsley 2004). In fact, in 2000 the first census to ever provide a place for Afro-Ecuadorians to identify themselves, people of African descent identified as “*negra/o*” as opposed to “*mulato/a*” in the city and province of Esmeraldas more than any other region of the nation (Anton 2004). This is significant considering that the general trend in Latin America and Ecuador is to diminish one’s Blackness through claims of a middle category such as, *mulatalo* (Johnson 2009). The salience of a Black identity within the city and province of Esmeraldas cannot be disconnected from the history of one of the longest-lasting maroon or free slave societies in Latin America and the subsequent development of a majority African-descendant population in the region (Rueda 2001; Tardieu 2006). While Blackness has traditionally been excluded outside of notions of Ecuadorian identity and citizenship, within the city and province of Esmeraldas it is embedded within the colonial and republican history of the region.

Nevertheless, Anti-Black racism is more than evident in the city of Esmeraldas. For example, the city and province of Esmeraldas are conceived as dangerous and underdeveloped places in the national imagination because of the large proportion of Black people that live in the region. Additionally, across the cultural landscape of the city of Esmeraldas Black people continue to be represented in essentialist ways. Examination of how Black and non-Black people make sense of race and racism similarly shows that a racial hierarchy is firmly in place. For example, some Black people try to lighten themselves and/or marry people of lighter complexions in order to improve their and their offspring’s possibilities for social mobility, which is often referred to as “improving the race” (Johnson 2007: 64).

Consideration of other factors besides the large proportion of African-descendant people and the maroon history of the region sheds further light on the ways Afro-Ecuadorians make sense of and negotiate racism and racial identity in the city of Esmeraldas. As the capital of said province, the

city of Esmeraldas is where state institutions, such as social welfare, education, hospitals, and the criminal justice system, are centralized. While the public sector is tenuous throughout Ecuador, it has provided a level of employment and economic stability for Afro-Ecuadorians within the city of Esmeraldas, where they experience the lowest levels of poverty in the nation. In addition, in the latter half of the 20th century the city of Esmeraldas has been on the receiving end of a large migration of non-Black people from other regions of the nation (Preciado 2000). I contend that Afro-Ecuadorians relative socio-economic status and non-Black migration to the region explain with greater nuance the ways race and racism are understood and negotiated within the city of Esmeraldas.

First, with the increase in the *Mestizo/a* and White population, Afro-Ecuadorians must adapt in ways that legitimate the dominant discourse of national identity that they had not had to previously (Johnson 2009). Second, Afro-Ecuadorian gains to mainstream institutions obfuscate racial inequality and discrimination. Where previously, Afro-Ecuadorians were excluded largely outside of mainstream institutions and structures, it becomes more difficult to delineate racial discrimination, as Afro-Ecuadorians often share these spaces with *Mestizo/a* and White people.

Thus, while Portland, Oregon and Esmeraldas, Ecuador may seem like places that have little do with each other, closer examination shows they actually have much in common. In both places Anti-Blackness is deeply embedded at various levels. In addition, powerful discourses of racial democracy and/or of political progressiveness exist in each city. In the next section I reveal through examination of two case studies how Black people resist, make sense of, and negotiate these contexts.

Black Representations of Blackness in Esmeraldas and Portland

Esmeraldas

When Ernesto Estupiñan Quintero was elected as the first Black self-identifying mayor of the city of Esmeraldas in 2000 he very early in his tenure commissioned three works that challenged the dominant

representations of Blackness throughout the city. In 2006, I interviewed the mayor and the artist of the mural the mayor had commissioned about how they each understood was represented in the mural. Previously, every other mural and statue of Black people in the city located Black people peripherally and in essentialist ways. For example, the larger than life statue “Trabajador Bananero” reflects an archetype of Black masculinity in that it celebrates his physical strength while limiting his contribution to society as a manual labourer. Furthermore, the Bananero’s machete, held out at waist height, has long since been broken off, but it no doubt looked particularly phallic in a hypersexualized sort of way when it was still attached. It is quite ironic that the statue stands at the heart of a barrio called Esmeraldas Libre (Free Esmeraldas) when, arguably, Black Esmeraldean banana workers and dock workers worked like slaves.

Through the simultaneous rise of the global multicultural discourse and Afro-Ecuadorian political and economic growth in the city of Esmeraldas, White/Mestiz@ elites have been forced to shift how they represent Blackness. Where previously one could find a Coca Cola ad in the city of Esmeraldas that stated “La Negra que Provoca” (The Black woman that provokes you), today you will find ads encouraging Black people to use a specific cell phone carrier. This shift represents one that depicts Black people as manual labourers and sexual objects to one that now includes them as consumers (Green 2007). As Afro-Ecuadorians have gained some measure of political and economic power within the city, the murals and statues that the mayor commissioned place Black people at the centre of the political and economic development of the province and the nation. However, the importance of race and racism are also diminished in these Black representations of Blackness.

When Ernesto Estupiñan Quintero became mayor of the city of Esmeraldas he commissioned two statues and one mural. One is a larger than life statue of one of the most well-known Black people in Ecuador, Jaime Hurtado. He was the first Black person elected to the national congress in 1978 and he also ran for president in 1984. The other statue is a compilation of three larger than life statues featuring one Black Woman and two Black men playing and dancing to the marimba. It is called the “Marimberos”. The music and dance associated with the Marimba was at

one time illegal in Esmeraldas. The mural, which is titled “Libre por Rebelde y por Rebelde Grande” (Free Through Rebellion and Through Rebellion Great), represents the history of Esmeraldas. Black people feature prominently throughout the mural. While analysis of each of these pieces demonstrates that they simultaneously challenge dominant notions of Blackness while reproducing the racial hierarchy (Johnson 2009), it suffices, here, to use the mural in this section to demonstrate the contradictory ways racism was challenged.

A close reading of this mural is necessary to understand the challenges it represents in relation to the traditional renderings of Blackness found throughout the cultural landscape of the city of Esmeraldas. The mural is read from right to left, beginning with the Indigenous peoples of the region (see Fig. 16.1). In my interview with the mayor, he suggested we go out to the mural so he could better describe its meaning.



Fig. 16.1 Partial view of mural “Libre por Rebelde y por Rebelde Grande” (Free Through Rebellion and Through Rebellion Great), by Artist Alberto Carcelen

He began his interpretation of the mural with the Indigenous images: “In Esmeraldas, Indigenous people were already here, and one of the social organizations of that era that we want to emphasize are the Tolita. The Tolita were agriculturalists, but above all they stand out for their gold and silver work. Esmeraldas is one of the few sites in the world where in that era they were smelting gold. The archeological relics of the Tolita are monumental.”

When I asked the artist of the mural, Alberto Carcelen, about the meaning of the Indigenous illustrations, he explained that the Indigenous section is key to understanding the overall meaning of the mural. He explained that the jaguar figure located in the lower section of this part of the mural is an Indigenous symbol for power. Power, he explained, can be used for both good and bad ends and reflects the general theme of the mural, which depicts the historical struggle of various groups for their freedom against those that attempt to exploit them. From both the perspective of the artist and the mayor it is clear that this is not a story specifically about Black people. This mural is a story about the province of Esmeraldas’ significance within the nation; an attempt to include Indigenous and Black people within the dominant discourse of national identity.

Quintero explained, as did the artist, that the next section of the mural represents the maroon history of the province of Esmeraldas that coincides with the arrival of the Spanish (see Fig. 16.2). The mayor claimed that the origins of the maroon society of Esmeraldas lie in a mutiny, which contrasts with the official story that explains that these maroon groups originated from a shipwreck. He states, “This history of a shipwreck is a lie because it is written by colonizers. They created the story. The slaves aboard the ship escaped seeing what they thought were the shores of Africa. They mutinied.” The figure directly above the lion is meant to be one of the best-known maroon leaders, Alonso de Illescas. Because he lived in Spain prior to being shipped to the Americas he had knowledge of Spanish culture and was able to lead the escaped enslaved people in their future encounters and confrontations with both the Indigenous people living in Esmeraldas, Spanish crown and colonists embarking on military and commercial excursions into the region (Rueda 2001; Tardieu 2006).



Fig. 16.2 Partial view of mural “Libre por Rebelde y por Rebelde Grande” (Free Through Rebellion and Through Rebellion Great), by Artist Alberto Carcelen

While this part of the mural addresses the specificity of the Black experience of slavery and maroon society, the chronology of the mural places this historical moment between the pre-colonial Indigenous era and early liberal-conservative struggles, both of which are inscribed within the “official” story of the nation—once again demonstrating that this mural does not reflect an Afro-Ecuadorian story. Furthermore, this mural treats the Indigenous era of Esmeraldas and the arrival of Black people to the regions as separate. However, these groups both cooperated and struggled with each other in order to gain some measure of freedom within the context of colonialism. Leaving this significant aspect out of the mural diminishes the significance of racial and cultural identity. Additionally, a counter narrative to *Mestizaje* could have been provided here. Racial and culture mixture occurred between Black and Indigenous people in the region for hundreds of years outside of and contrary to the dominant discourse of identity. Indeed, it is through social and cultural adaptations with the Indigenous groups that were there prior to colonization that



Fig. 16.3 Partial view of mural “Libre por Rebelde y por Rebelde Grande” (Free Through Rebellion and Through Rebellion Great), by Artist Alberto Carcelen

Black people eventually became the dominant group in the region (Johnson 2007).

In the next section (see Fig. 16.3), the mural moves historically to the conservative/liberal conflict that dominates the “official” histories of the early republican era of the nation. Moving from right to left are the faces of Luis Vargas Torres and Eloy Alfaro. Vargas Torres, who belonged to one of the elite families of Esmeraldas, aligned himself with Eloy Alfaro and the liberal struggle. Many Afro-Ecuadorian people living in the province of Esmeraldas also participated and gave their lives to the liberal movement because they saw it as a way to escape the sharecropping and debt peonage that structured their lives after the official end of slavery in 1854 (Anton 2005).

The two anonymous figures that follow Eloy Alfaro represent the Afro-Ecuadorians who fought with Vargas Torres in the liberal movement. These two individuals play a critical role in the meaning of the mural. They represent Ecuador’s movement away from a slave-based society, to

one that pitted workers against large landowners. The clothes they wear reflect their position as *campesinos* (peasants), that is, that segment of society dependent upon its labour for survival. In fact, the artist stated that their cloths locate them as *Mestizola* people. This meaning of *Mestizaje* is one that positions all workers within the same ambiguous racial/cultural group. Here, the terms *campesino/a* and *mestizo/a* become interchangeable and serve to erase and obscure the significance of race generally and specifically people of African descent regarding national identity in Ecuador. It is as if at this time in history racism has disappeared, as if the marginalization of the province of Esmeraldas is divorced from race. The intent of the author of the mural is to emphasize social class distinctions over race and ethnicity.

This section of the mural also represents Ecuador's movement from primarily an agricultural society to an industrial one and is represented in the city being chosen as the site of the largest oil refinery in the nation in the 1970s (Preciado 2000). In my interviews with the mayor of the city of Esmeraldas, the artist of the mural, and with the Black political activist and scholar, Pablo Minda, they each explained that this part of the mural represents the province's movement into the modern nation, where class struggles between petroleum workers are linked with the larger national movements for greater access to mainstream institutions, which are simultaneously related to imperial exploitation illustrated in the eagle. This mural represents a political discourse where Black people are included as one of the oppressed classes. Carcelen stated, "It's saying, the classist vision connects to the black ethnic minority: ethnicity and social class, class struggle, is the focus of our image that, as director of artists of the left, popular and freeing, I represent and lead with our art. One does not need to be black in order to be sensitive to the struggles for liberation of the oppressed of our freeing and multicultural Ecuador. I am a painter who in his painting raises the identity of the oppressed in Ecuador." For the artist and the mayor, race is secondary to class as a way of making sense of inequality in Ecuador. This representation does not reveal a struggle based on Blackness, but one in which Afro-Ecuadorians are included as legitimate members of the nation, contesting the traditional representation of Blackness outside of national identity.

Portland, Oregon

On April 6th of 2006, Derrick Foxworth, the second Black person appointed chief of police in the city of Portland, Oregon, was accused by Angela Oswald, a White female civilian Bureau clerk, of sexual harassment. Her claim sparked an investigation of Foxworth for the misuse of city resources; sexual harassment; retaliation against a whistleblower; favouritism; alcohol use on the job; discourteous treatment; disclosing information; and unprofessional conduct. Their relationship took place from April 2000 to September 2001. Foxworth was married at the time to a Black woman.

The mainstream press, in this case the *Oregonian*, which was the paper with the largest circulation in the city and state, printed over a hundred articles about the case. The *Oregonian* characterized Foxworth as a sexual freak in the court of public opinion before the investigation was completed. The paper printed his sexually explicit emails without Oswald's replies; interviewed multiple "experts" of sexual impropriety about the case, none of which had expertise in race or racism; and compared Foxworth's case to much more egregious cases that had been substantiated. The *Oregonian* only acknowledged its possible role in perpetuating racism after Foxworth lost his job, in effect exculpating itself of charges of racism after the damage had been done (Johnson and Hunte 2010).

In the *Portland Observer* and the *Skanner*, two newspapers which were founded and continue to be run by Black people, there were a total of only eighteen articles that focused on the case against Foxworth. In contrast to the *Oregonian*'s daily runs, these papers print weekly, which partially explains their limited coverage of the case. However, other factors may have contributed to this relative small number of articles considering that between the two papers there were approximately sixty issues printed from when the case first broke in April of 2006 until Foxworth announced his intent to sue the city in October of 2006.

In the analysis we found that the Black press on the one hand treated this case almost exclusively through the lens of race by focusing on the significance of Foxworth to the community of Black people in Portland. On the other hand, the *Skanner* and the *Observer* avoided the issue of sexuality almost completely. The papers' limited coverage may also have

been related to the significance sexuality has in the perpetuation of racial inequality. That is, the *Skanner* and *Observer* may have limited the coverage of this case in order to avoid the stigma of deviant sexuality that has been placed on Black people by the larger society. Hence, while the Black press contested how the mainstream press told this story it missed an opportunity to discuss how sexuality was implicated in this case, particularly in relation to Black masculinity and interracial relationships.

In the USA, the myth of Black sexual deviancy is critical to understanding the reproduction of white supremacy (Hill-Collins 2004; hooks 2001). Racial oppression during enslavement and the Jim Crow era vilified Black people as hyper-heterosexual in order to justify and perpetuate their exploitation (Nagel 2003). Black people's understanding of the role of sexuality shaped the Civil Rights movement where lynching as a public spectacle done to Black men became the centrepiece through which racial struggle was framed (Hill-Collins 2004). In this way resistance to the indefensible danger of lynching maintained the masculinity of Black men and challenged the myth of Black sexual deviancy. Within communities of Black people this patriarchal definition of racism has contributed to the neglect of the significance of ideologies of gender and sexuality in reproducing racial inequality and discrimination (Cohen 1999; Crenshaw 1995). Black communities and leadership have carried this understanding of racism into the Post-Civil Rights era and is evident in the ways the Black Press represented the Foxworth case.

When the story first broke on April 6th of 2006, the *Skanner* was the only paper of the two to address the case. Besides the absence of printing excerpts from the racially and sexually explicit emails in the *Skanner's* initial article this piece also countered the mainstream press' version of the story by limiting their coverage to what was known at the time. For example, the *Skanner* article quoted the mayor regarding his decision not to suspend or fire Foxworth: "The city of Portland is investigating all allegations of misconduct made against Portland Police Chief Derrick Foxworth (Staff Reporter 2006a)." The article also states that Foxworth did not deny that he had a relationship with the claimant. This initial article by the Black press stands out as subdued in contrast to the *Oregonian's* sensationalized reporting. It does not consider or suggest anywhere that Foxworth may have committed an act of sexual impropriety.

The next week on April 13th, the Skanner printed another article, which explained that Potter initially stated that he “would wait for the human resources bureau to finish its investigation before making any decisions about the Foxworth case (Staff Reporter 2006b).” The article reveals that Potter had denied requests made by city union officials for Foxworth’s suspension, but due to the high level of interest in the media he relented and felt he had no choice because of the distraction it was causing within the police department. Again, in juxtaposition to the Oregonian’s articles, this piece highlights the Black press’ reluctance to engage in a discussion of sexuality.

The Observer’s article written on April 12th and the Skanner’s written on April 20th, each suggest that race played an important role in this case at two levels. First, the articles claimed racism motivated the charges against Foxworth. Second, these articles focused on the significance Foxworth’s loss will mean to the Black community. That is, Foxworth is characterized as an ‘embraceable asset’ (Page 1997) to the Black community because of his power as chief of police combined with his upstanding moral character. The Skanner article stated, “The hope that surrounded Foxworth’s appointment makes the allegations about his conduct all the more poignant. Whatever other casualties may arise from his case, the whole city feels the loss of another police chief’s promising tenure brought short (Editorial 2006).” In contrast to the Oregonian’s clear representation of Foxworth as a sexual deviant, the Black Press has countered this portrayal with claims of racism and the significant role he played in the Black community and city in general.

Highlighting again the Black Press’ claims of racism and the significance of the loss of Foxworth to the Black community, the Observer article cited above referred to the era of the previous chief of police Mark Kroecker, during which there were two high profile police killings of Black people that paralysed the already tense relations between the Black community and the Portland Police Bureau. The Observer also ran another article written on May 3rd that reveals when the mayor selected Rosie Sizer as the interim chief of police when Foxworth was suspended, she asked Dorothy Elmore to step down from her position as assistant chief of police. The article states, “Foxworth appointed Elmore last October as the first Black American woman assistant chief

(Blount 2006).” Besides Elmore’s appointment, it was common knowledge that Foxworth was actively attempting to increase the racial and cultural diversity of the police department. Clearly these articles challenge the Oregonian’s portrayal of this case through their claims of the significance of race and racism. However, they continued to remain virtually silent on the issue of sexuality. This article was the only one we found by the Black Press to be openly critical of Foxworth’s behaviour. It stated, “The public will likely never know the whole truth of the matter, but it seems clear that at the very least, he exercised poor judgment and acted in a way unbecoming a high-ranking police officer.” Besides this sentence there was no critique or discussion of the how this case is related to sexuality, i.e., sexual impropriety, interracial relationships, and Black masculinity.

The next phase of the story revolves around the findings of the investigation and Foxworth’s demotion to captain by Mayor Potter and promotion to precinct commander by Interim Chief Sizer four days later. In June the investigation cleared Foxworth of all claims except the minor charge of unprofessional conduct. “Charges failed test” (Staff Reporter 2006c) was the title of this most straightforward and succinct piece released by the Observer regarding this phase of the story. It contained only the following paragraph:

City investigators identified and concluded an investigation on eight allegations of misconduct against Chief Derrick Foxworth in connection with a sexual affair he had with a desk clerk six years ago while commander of the Northeast Precinct.

This piece ended in bullet format of each allegation followed by “unsubstantiated”, except for “unprofessional conduct” followed by “substantiated”. Sticking to the known information, this piece attempts to lay the case to rest. As in the previous article, it reports that only one of the charges against Foxworth was substantiated. This article highlights that though Foxworth was cleared of the egregious claims against him, his image remained ‘unembraceable’ within the court of public opinion. Foxworth’s image could not recover from connection to a consensual affair.

Finally, on October 18th both the Skanner and the Observer ran articles speaking to Foxworth's intent to file a discrimination suit against the city of Portland that claims he was demoted because he was a "black man who was involved in a relationship with a white woman" (Associated Press 2006). These pieces each review the history of the case regarding the release of the emails, finding the charges unsubstantiated, and Mayor Potter's claim that the city will "vigorously defend itself against any allegation that he was treated unfairly or inappropriately." In addition, the Observer also asks readers to consider why has "a mayor that has been seen as a civil rights activist when he was police chief in the early 1990s" now stating that Foxworth's suit was unfounded? (McCall 2006). Mayor Potter has suggested on several occasions up to this point that the mainstream media's racialized portrayal of Foxworth contributed to the outcome of the case.

Even though this case is squarely located at the intersection of race and sexuality at multiple levels, the Black Press remained silent on the significance of sexuality. Foxworth's sexual behaviour was rarely questioned or critiqued. This speaks to how Black men are at times beyond critique by their community concerning their sexual behaviour within the Black community and their relationships with White women. Interracial relationships, a site at the intersection of race and sexuality, was also neglected by the Black press considering the tensions and anxieties that exist within the Black community concerning the history of lynching, miscegenation laws and the current 'lack' of available Black men for Black women. Additionally, the particular context of interracial relationships in the Pacific Northwest deserved some discussion. For example, Black exogamy rates in the region are much higher than other parts of the country, which cannot be disconnected from the specific racial history of the Pacific Northwest.

Discussion

The Black Press in Portland focused almost entirely on the significance of race/racism, avoiding the ways racism and sexism are linked. In Esmeraldas, Ecuador, the mayor's representations of Blackness prioritized a class analysis over racism. While sexuality was clearly connected

to non-Black renderings of Blackness seen in the ‘Trabajador Bananero’ and others, the relationship between sexism and racism remained largely unexamined in these Black representations of Blackness.

The Black Press’ silence regarding the role of sexuality in the Foxworth case, perhaps inadvertently, contributes to the reproduction of the racial hierarchy (Nagel 2003; West 1994). Due to the history of murdering Black men for their perceived interest in White women, Black leadership have shied away from openly supporting Black male leaders accused of sexual impropriety, especially with White women, because even when proven innocent they are often judged as sexually deviant. Hence, Black leadership often makes efforts to portray itself as asexual to maintain political legitimacy and status. This strategy of a “politics of respectability” (Cohen 1999; Hill-Collins 2004) does not take into account mass media’s perpetuation of Black masculinity as a dichotomy. That is, Black males can either be the asexual Black male historically represented as ‘uncle Tom’ or the hypersexual black brute figure, which circumscribe the possibilities for Black male sexuality and discussions of healthy sexual behaviour within Black communities.

Furthermore, the Black press was silent concerning the issue of the significance of interracial relationships within communities of Black people (Hill-Collins 2004; Nagel 2003), which has particular relevance in Portland where exogamy rates are much higher than compared to other parts of the nation. Multiraciality (interracial relationships and people who claim to be racially mixed) has deep gendered and racial patterns and cannot be disconnected from the socio-historical context in which it happens. Portland is touted as one of the most politically progressive cities in the nation, which is inextricably connected to its original exclusion of and consequent small population of Black people. Not until 1951 was it legal for Black and White people to marry in Oregon and presently the city of Portland has rates of exogamy for both Black men and women that are close to three times national averages. Arguably, in the case of Portland high exogamy rates and claims of multiraciality are embedded in this politically progressive Anti-Black city. To not address the issue of interracial sexuality leaves the link between political progressive and Anti-Blackness unacknowledged and hidden, diminishing the possibility of Black freedom.

The rise of the global discourse of multiculturalism and the struggles for racial equality that begin to develop in the 1970s in Ecuador and much of Latin America ultimately bring about in the 1990s the first sustained and coherent anti-racist discourse in the region. Nevertheless, the dominant discourse of national identity of *Mestizaje* continues to strongly encourage all to consider that everyone is racially and/or culturally mixed, resulting in the myth of racial democracy and that social class continues to be how many if not most people understand social inequality.

In Esmeraldas, Ecuador, the history of the maroon societies and the resulting high proportion of African descendant people that live in the region help explain why compared to the rest of the nation people of African descent self-identify as Black people more than in any other region of the country. Blackness remains salient in Esmeraldas, Ecuador in a way that no other region of the country experiences. However, as *Mestiz@*/White migration to the region has grown, Black people in Esmeraldas have had to increasingly live and contend with the dominant discourse of national identity that simultaneously includes all through the discourse of *mestizaje*, racial and cultural mixture, and excludes those who are not moving towards whiteness. The contradiction of this discourse in the city of Esmeraldas is particularly stark. On the one hand, many if not most people continue to diminish the significance of racism, while on the other many Black people attempt to 'improve' the race by marrying or having offspring with someone lighter in order to improve their chances for social class mobility. Within this context, it becomes challenging for a powerful anti-racist discourse to emerge.

Ernesto Estipiñan Quintero was the first self-identifying Black person to become mayor of the city of Esmeraldas since 1854. Upon his election he immediately began to commission public works that challenged the ubiquitous negative representation of Blackness found throughout the city. Analysis of these murals and statues reveals that while they challenged traditional renderings of Blackness, they also diminished the significance of racism, in this case the role the dominant discourse of national identity plays in reproducing the racial hierarchy. The artist of the mural explained that *campesin@* and *mestiz@* are interchangeable. *Campesin@s* are a class of people, who become *mestiz@s* through their

clothes just like the other ambiguous racially mixed groups throughout the country, where race is secondary, fighting against their oppressor.

In both cases these Black representations of Blackness, while important in their challenges to the stereotypical ways Black people are represented, are also complicit in the reproduction of the racial hierarchy. In the case of Portland, Oregon leaving absent any analysis of exogamy, that is the relationship between race and sexuality, leaves in place the city's reputation as a politically progressive city. If placed within the socio-historical context, a more critical understanding of multiraciality could be developed. In Esmeraldas, Ecuador where people of African descent comprise the largest segment of the population, prioritizing a social class analysis obfuscates the ways the discourse of racial and cultural mixture maintains the racial hierarchy.

What becomes evident upon relating two apparently very different places in regards to Anti-Blackness is that the intersection of race and sexuality are at its centre. *Mestizaje/Multiraciality* if they are anything are discourses of sexuality, in that they are premised on the deception that as Whites and non-Whites reproduce (disproportionately between White men and non-White women) biologically racial conflict will disappear. However, what the discourse obscures is that it is embedded in the violence and exploitation of Anti-Blackness that supported colonialism.

In conclusion, in the United States, the increase and acceptance of the concept of multiraciality is often put forward as evidence that racism is waning or less important. Analysis of the factors in which multiraciality is happening in Portland, Oregon at the very least casts serious doubt over these claims. Indeed, it points to the importance of maintaining a focus on the original factors structuring colonialism, slavery and Anti-Blackness where exploitation and oppression based on a system of sexualized racism was at its centre.

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Index¹

A

- Ability/abilities, 4, 12, 25, 26, 57,
69, 71–72, 145, 172, 224,
256, 303, 321, 332, 340, 342,
415, 417
- Abnormal, 57, 226, 335
- Abolish, 64, 272
- Aboriginal, 169–170, 185
- Abreu, Jessica de 272, 291n3
- Abuja, 13, 19, 24
- Abuse
domestic, 44–45, 59n10
racial 166–167, 169–171, 173,
175–186
- Academia, 357, 364, 373
- Academic/academics, xiii, 23–24,
29n2, 84, 129, 262, 263n1,
284, 286, 288, 290–291, 359,
364, 366, 373, 374
- Academy, 29n2, 130, 148, 246, 262,
290–291, 390
- Accent/accents, 199, 201–202, 213,
300
- Accept, 240n3, 335, 363, 371
- Acceptance, 12, 19, 29n1, 33n42,
72, 96, 99, 106, 153, 202,
210, 230–231, 309, 336, 433
- Acculturation, 94
- Act
Aliens, 401
American Indian Religious
Freedom, 47–48
Asiatic Land Tenure and Indian
Representation, 81–83
Controlled Substances, 43
Group Areas, 81–82
Immigrants Regulation 68–70, 76
Immigration Quota, 77

¹Note: Page numbers followed by 'n' refer to notes.

- Act (*cont.*)
- Immigration Restriction, 168
 - Nationality and Flag, 76
 - Pegging, 81
 - Racial Discrimination, 166
 - Refugee, 396, 400
 - Religious Freedom Restoration, 47
- Activism, vi, 128, 150, 246, 273–274, 276, 284, 286, 288–291, 370
- Activist, vi, xii, 120, 245–246, 248–249, 257, 260–262, 273–279, 282–291, 371–372, 375, 398, 412, 425, 430
- Afghanistan, 60n14, 238, 384
- Africa, iv, vi–ix, xi, xvii–xviii, xxii, 3–13, 17, 22–23, 25–29, 29n2, 32n24, 34n47, 52–53, 63–77, 82–84, 85n1, 85n5, 102–103, 106, 108, 117–118, 132–133, 142, 208, 226–227, 229, 236, 238, 245–247, 249–258, 260–262, 272, 291n4, 300, 313, 360, 366, 383–386, 389, 392–393, 396, 398, 422
- African/Africans, iv, vi, viii–ix, xi, xiii–xiv, xxii, 4–18, 20–25, 27–28, 29n2, 33n43, 39, 41, 49–52, 54, 56–57, 59n4, 60n11, 63–67, 73, 75, 79, 80, 82–89, 92–94, 96–98, 103–104, 106, 108n1, 125, 144–145, 147, 179, 196, 223–233, 236–239, 253, 255, 260, 264n18, 272, 299–300, 334, 336, 358, 365–366, 368, 370–371, 374, 376n5, 376n10, 383–386, 389, 391–394, 398, 400, 402, 411–413, 416, 418, 425, 433
- African American, 98, 223–224, 228–230, 232, 235, 278, 350n4, 383
- African Caribbean, 120
- Africanisation, 16
- Africanism, 17
- Africanist/Africanists, 5, 6, 8–9, 12
- Africanity, 389
- Africanize, 59n4
- Africanness, 366
- African Norwegian, 369
- Africanoid, 389
- African Spanish, 147
- African Swedish, 371
- Afrikaaner, 253
- Afrikaans, 66, 78
- Afro, 228, 279, 374
- Afro-Cuban, 49–50, 53, 59n7
- Afro-Ecuadorian, 417–420, 423–425
- Afro Empowerment Center
Denmark, 370
- Afro-Finns, 369
- Afro-German, 224, 233
- Afro-Indigenous, 106
- Afrophobia, vi, 272, 393
- Afrosvenskarna*, 363
- Afro-Swedish, 363, 367
- Afro-Tak TV, 238
- Agency
EU Border Control, 388
Reception and Integration, 397
- Agricultural, 103, 259, 425
- Agriculturalists, 422
- Agriculture, 193, 255

- Ahmed, Sara, 160n3, 168, 197
 Aid, 91, 101–102, 229–230
 Aizlewood, John, 305
 Albina, 415
 Alexander, Jacqui, 96–97
 Alexander, Neville, 83
 Algeciras, 395, 401
 Alien, 66–67, 74, 77, 126, 231, 233,
 235, 281, 299, 318, 320, 401
 Allinson, Ewan 299, 318, 320
 America
 Latin, xiv, 411–412, 417–418,
 432
 North, vii, 12, 78, 94, 301,
 329–330, 332
 American, 23, 25, 30n9, 41, 43, 46,
 48, 53–58, 60n14, 103, 223,
 225, 228, 231, 234–235,
 314–315, 331, 338, 414–415,
 428
 African, xi, xxii, 54, 56–57, 94,
 97–98, 223–224, 228–230,
 232, 235, 278, 350n4
 Anglo, 390
 Black, 331, 414–415, 428
 Cameroonian, 23
 Euro, viii, 4, 8, 11, 18, 24–25,
 27, 29n2, 33n42
 Latin, 157, 160n5
 Native, 40–41, 43–48, 90, 92, 97,
 106, 108n1
 South, 207–208
 White, 23, 41, 46, 48, 53, 55,
 57–58
 South, 103, 107
 Ancestors, 44, 85, 89, 96
 Ancestral, 89–90, 94–95, 106, 300,
 313, 319
 Ancestry, 51, 78–79, 90, 92–96,
 106, 142, 159, 195, 223–225,
 232, 237, 311, 413
 Andalusia, 390, 401
 Anderson, Mark, 93–97, 106
 Andreassen, Rikke, 359–361, 364,
 366
 Anglo, 147, 159, 182, 202
 Anglophone, viii, 11, 17, 28, 202
 Anticolonial, 15–16, 117
 Antipode, 27
 Antiracism, vi, xiii, 125
 Antiracist, x, 117, 371
 Anton, Jhon, 417–418, 424
 Apartheid, ix, xii, xviii, 5–6, 23, 63,
 65, 83–84, 117, 245–249,
 251–262, 272, 360
 Arab/Arabs, xii, 5–6, 22, 25, 27,
 29n3, 180, 196, 247–251,
 254–255, 258, 265n29
 Arabic, 144
 Armenia, 115, 129–131
 Aryan, 118, 121
 Asia, 53, 66, 129, 132
 Asian/Asians, 19, 41, 125, 130, 205
 Asiatic/Asiatics, 39, 68–72, 76, 81
 Assimilability, 76–77
 Assimilable, 169
 Assimilate/assimilated/assimilation,
 71, 93, 118–119, 128, 169
 Asylum, 286, 294, 362, 384,
 387–388, 391–402
 Atheism, 121
 Atheist, 250
 Athens, 30n4
 Atlantic, 13, 49, 100, 322, 393
 Australia, iv, vi–viii, x, xxi–xxii,
 165–169, 171, 185, 202, 294

- Australian/Australians, v, xviii,
165–167, 169–177, 179–186,
194, 202
- Australian Football League (AFL),
170–173, 176, 183, 185
- Austria, 115
- Authoritarianism, 126–127
- Autochthony, xvii, 63–65, 67, 69, 71,
73, 75, 77, 79, 81, 83, 90, 95
- Autonomous, 7, 128, 131, 375n1,
376n2
- Autonomy, 98, 101–102, 105–107,
255, 259
- Azerbaijan, 115, 129, 135
- B**
- Baartman, Sara, 226
- Background, 60n13, 152, 159,
202–203, 213, 276, 288,
292n7, 294, 312, 319, 365,
367, 371, 399
- Balkan, 115
- Balthasar, 229–230
- Baltic, 115, 122, 124–125
- Bannerman, Helene, 233–234
- Bantu, 85n4, 253, 255
- Bantustans/bantustanisation, 247,
255–257
- Barcelona, xviii, 191–192, 194, 199,
206–207, 209, 211–212
- Barghouti, Omar, 261, 267n54
- Barrio*, 150
- Baylor University, 341–342, 344
- Belarus, 115, 122, 126–127
- Berliner, 238
- Bilingual/bilingualism, 155, 158
- Bill
- Areas Reservation and
Immigration and Registration,
75
- Class Areas, 74
- Immigration and Indian Relief,
75
- Biracial, 225, 228, 230
- Births, 78
- Black, v–ix, xi–xiv, xviii–xix, 4–6,
14, 16, 18, 23, 26, 29n1, 41,
44–46, 48, 51–52, 56, 59n6,
64, 77, 85n4, 91–94, 97,
102–103, 106–107, 117–118,
131, 141, 145–147, 160n1,
167–169, 179–180, 196–197,
201, 203–204, 206–208, 213,
221–239, 239n1, 240n2, 247,
249–250, 253, 255–258, 260,
271–273, 275, 277–291,
299–322, 329–337, 339–350,
368–374, 376n13, 389, 391,
398, 400, 402–403, 411–433
- Black, Galen, 45–46, 48
- Blacken/blackened, 56, 231, 303
- Blackface, xi–xii, 142, 224–226,
228–233, 238, 240n2
- Blackfacing, 272
- #BlackLivesMatter, vi, 288
- Blackness, v–vii, ix–xii, xiv, xix, 5, 9,
12, 14, 23, 90, 93–94, 97–98,
102–104, 107–108, 147–148,
170, 195–197, 204, 206,
223–225, 235, 239, 289, 302,
315–318, 320, 322, 332–334,
336–337, 343, 345–346, 349,
350n2, 366, 369, 372, 385,
402, 411–421, 423, 425, 427,
429–433

- Blacks, 23, 104, 195–196, 198,
207–208, 223–227, 229,
231–239, 239n1, 240n2, 247,
249, 252, 255–256, 258, 260,
262, 311, 317, 330, 389,
414–415
- Bonifacio, 154–155
- Border/borders, vi, xi, xiii, 23–24, 68,
122, 196, 198, 256, 265n29,
290, 312, 374, 386–388, 391,
393–394, 401–403
- Borderlands, 197
- Bosnian, 202
- Boston, 389
- Boycott/boycotting, 260–261, 289
- Bradley, Lloyd, 300
- Brady, Anita, 330, 336, 346
- Brandon, George, 49–50, 59n8
- Brexit, 191, 212–213, 387
- Britain, xviii, 75, 192–194,
196–201, 207, 299–303, 305,
307, 309, 311, 313–314, 318,
322, 365, 374, 383
- British, 14, 17–19, 33n42, 66–67,
168, 193–195, 199, 201–203,
205, 233–234, 253–255,
299–303, 307, 311–313, 315,
318–319, 389
- Britishness, 313, 322n16
- Brownness, 280
- Brown-skinned, 57
- C**
- Cameroon, 23
- Cameroonian/Cameroonians, 22–23
- Campbell, Emory, 98–100, 102–103
- Canada, xxi, 329
- Canadian, 339
- Cape Town, 75–77
- Capitalism, 50, 104, 133, 334, 340,
345
- Capitalist, 118, 132, 134
- Capitalistic, 230, 306, 320
- Carcelen, Alberto, xxiii, 421–425
- Caribbean, 120, 131, 146, 300,
312–313, 322n16
- Caste, 141–142
- Castiza*, 149, 152
- Castizo*, 145, 147
- Castro, Fidel, 50, 59n6
- Catalan, 199, 208–211
- Catholic/Catholics, 23–24, 51–52,
79, 151, 152, 196, 227, 229
- Catholicism, 52
- Caucasian, 129
- Caucasus, 115, 129
- Celtic Tiger, 390, 398
- Ceuta, 395–396, 401–402
- Chandler, Genevieve, 98–100, 103
- Chauvinism, 5, 117, 119
- Cherokee, 92, 97
- Chinese, 22, 25, 27, 125, 131–132,
316
- Christian/Christians, 18, 20, 44, 51,
54, 57, 60n12, 70, 195, 196,
211
- Christianity, 53, 160n1, 196
- Church
Ethiopian Zion Coptic, 41, 43
Native American, 44, 58n1
- Citizenship, vi, xvii, 63–86, 98, 148,
248, 250–251, 256, 286, 386,
414
- Classism, x, 141, 149, 158
- Classist, 320, 425

- Clifford, James, 94–95, 105
 Cohen, Cathy 335–336, 340, 345,
 427, 431
 Cole, C.L., 330
 Cole, Johnetta Betsch, 345
 Colic-Peisker, Val, 169, 202
 Collectivisation, 119
 Colonial/colonials, xvii, v–ix, 3–34,
 31n14, 32n24, 32n36, 64, 78,
 83, 92, 94–95, 103, 116–118,
 127, 132, 135, 142–143, 145,
 149, 157, 159, 196, 204,
 226–228, 231–233, 237, 249,
 253–255, 265n27, 272–274,
 280–281, 284, 300, 358–359,
 386, 417–418, 423
 Colonialism, xi, 7, 14, 19, 63–64,
 71, 83–84, 121, 124–125,
 135–136, 195, 227, 229,
 233, 238, 246–247,
 252–255, 273, 279, 287,
 359, 417, 423, 433
 Colonialist, vii, 253, 255
 Colonisation/colonised/colonisers,
 viii, xi, 3, 6, 7, 9, 11, 14–15,
 18, 27, 64, 77–78, 90, 95, 98,
 116, 125, 225–227, 231–233,
 236–238, 253–255, 258, 262,
 265n29, 422–423
 Colony, viii, 14, 17, 65–66, 69–70,
 101, 196, 227, 300, 311,
 322n16, 360
 Colourblind, 142, 343
 Coloured, 66, 68, 74, 78–79, 83,
 85n4, 341
 Colouredness, 79
 Colourism, 302
 Columboing, 304
 Columbusphere, 306, 308, 319
 Commercialisation, 307–308, 314,
 320
 Communism, 117, 209–210
 Communist, 113–114, 116,
 118–121, 131–132, 134–136,
 196, 198, 230
 Complexion/complexioned, 25, 79,
 153, 199, 206, 232–233, 302,
 413, 418
 Compton, 340–341
 Condemning, 280
 Confederate, 240n9
 Confirms, 115, 123, 202, 211, 340
 Congo, 392
 Conservative, 57, 126, 196, 227,
 292n5, 399, 423–424
 Constituencies, 266n52, 385
 Coolie, 70
 Cooperation, 99, 104, 274, 278,
 288, 290–291, 332
 Coptic, 41–44, 48, 58
 Corporeal, 332, 337, 345, 348–349
 Corporeality, xiii, 331, 333,
 335–337, 339–340, 344, 348
 Creel, Margaret Washington, 103,
 105
 Crenshaw, Kimberly, 272–273, 427
 Creole, 160n1
 Crime, 6, 51, 152, 246–249,
 267n54, 314, 341, 391,
 395–396
 Croatian, 118
Crónica de castas, x, 141–142,
 148–151, 154, 157–159
 Cuba, 49–52, 59n4
 Cuban/Cubans, 49–51, 53, 59n8
 Curry, James, 32n31
 Curry-Stevens, Anne, 416
 Czech, 115, 118, 193, 203

- D**
- Da Costa, Alexandre, 142, 153
- Dakar, 15–16
- Dance, 44, 97, 149, 157, 420
- Danes, 360, 368
- Danish, 233, 360, 376n2, 385
- Dappy, 302
- Dark/darker, 51, 79, 119, 145, 147, 150, 153, 179, 224, 226, 230, 237, 238, 281, 302, 305
- Darkness, 195
- Darky, 121, 223–224, 231, 234
- Death, 78, 107, 118, 149, 151–152, 226, 235–236, 278, 384
- Dehumanisation, iii, v, vii, xi–xiv, xviii, 221, 226, 236, 251, 272, 306, 348–349
- Delgado, Richard, 31n10, 167, 183
- Democracy, xiv, 73, 132, 419, 432
- Democratic, 63–64, 82–84, 126, 238, 275, 290, 359, 392
- Democratisation, 127, 260, 305
- Democrats, 227, 362
- Deracialisation, 132
- Der kleine schwarze Sambo*, 233, 237
- Dewhitened, 316
- Diaspora, 29n2, 41, 49, 225, 258, 313, 322n16, 358, 365–370, 376n5, 376n10, 385
- Diasporic, 94, 192, 237, 301, 305, 367
- Dikötter, Frank, 114, 132
- Disalienation, 64
- Discrimination, xii, 29n3, 64–66, 86n6, 96, 120, 127, 148, 150, 154, 166, 169, 171, 179, 183, 191, 198–199, 248, 261, 272, 312, 360–361, 363, 371, 373, 415, 417, 419, 427, 430
- Discriminatory, 71, 81–83, 120, 223, 239, 247–248, 250
- Disparagement, 331–332, 340
- Displacement, 94–95, 120
- Dispossessing/dispossession, 95, 96, 98, 253–254, 278, 306
- Dissemination, 10, 84, 102, 332
- Distinguish, 50, 85n1, 198, 213, 247
- Diverse/diversity, x, 4, 59n9, 150, 151, 167, 170, 172, 175, 185, 191–192, 194, 196, 200, 207, 225, 238, 246, 286, 288, 300, 301, 309, 311, 315, 345–346, 349, 429
- Dobbin, Frank, 170–171, 183
- Dominance, x, 114, 122, 124, 159, 166, 171, 197, 204
- Domination, 25, 116, 119, 121, 129, 135, 153, 226, 232, 247, 258, 304, 331, 340, 344, 349
- Dreesbach, Anne, 226
- Drug/drugs, 40–44, 46, 48, 58, 59n9, 149–150, 156
- Durban, iv, xxii, 63, 71, 73–74
- Dutch, 65–67, 253–254, 272–277, 279–286, 288–290, 292n6, 294n7, 295n35
- Dutchman, 292n7
- Dyer, Richard, 160n3, 198, 235, 372
- E**
- Eade, John, 193, 198
- Earth, 96
- Ebron, Paulla, 98, 104, 107
- Ecuador, xix, 411–412, 417–420, 424–425, 430, 432–433
- Ecuadorian, 417–420, 423–424
- Ecuadorians, 418–420, 424–425

- Education, xxi, 47, 49, 77, 121,
154–155, 160n6, 165, 170,
175, 194, 224, 306, 361, 401,
413, 415
- Egypt, 256
- Egyptian, 256
- Eidsvik, Erlend, 359
- El pais*, 390
- Emancipation, 117
- Emigrants, 76, 394
- Emigrate/emigrated/emigration, 49,
68, 75, 78
- Empire, 9, 126, 132, 134, 228, 233
- Employment, 44–45, 47–49, 54, 58,
76, 193–194, 199, 224–225,
229, 232, 306, 390, 400,
413–415, 419
- English, 65–66, 78, 82, 85n2,
193–194, 200–203, 230, 309
- Enlightenment, 41, 117
- Epithet, 51, 155–156, 160n6
- Equal, 67, 83, 97, 141, 148, 155,
205, 272
- Equality, 120, 128, 260, 272, 364,
373, 394, 400–401, 432
- Equitable, 73
- Equity, vi
- Erasure, 5, 21, 118, 342, 345
- Eritrea, 384
- Eritrean, 387
- Eski, 305, 308
- Eskimo, 305
- Esmeraldas, xix, 411–413, 417–425,
430, 432–433
- Esmeraldean, 420
- Española, 395
- Essentialism, 90, 374
- Essentialist, 418, 420
- Estonia, 123–124, 193
- Ethics, 173
- Ethiopian, 41, 43, 264n18
- Ethnic/ethnically/ethnicized, 4–5, 9,
31n14, 57, 59n10, 60n11, 84,
97, 116–120, 122, 124,
127–130, 167, 169, 191, 192,
195–196, 198, 200–201,
205–207, 211–212, 232–233,
239, 250, 254, 271–272, 276,
283, 288, 301, 311–312, 319,
357, 366, 367, 370, 373, 391,
399, 425
- Ethnicity, xiii, 9, 29n2, 64, 83,
116–117, 126, 128, 192, 237,
239, 246, 255, 311–312,
317–318, 364–369, 425
- Ethno, xii, 6, 8–9, 122, 128–129,
131, 211, 239, 260–261, 385,
388–389, 392
- national, 124
- nationalist, 260–261
- race/racial/racially, 118, 125
- Eugenics, 77, 116, 124, 226, 359
- Europe, vi–viii, x–xi, xiii–xiv,
xvii–xix, 12, 39, 58, 113–115,
117–119, 121–123, 125, 127,
129, 131, 133, 135, 196–197,
199–200, 204, 210, 213, 226,
237, 239, 357–365, 367–371,
373, 376n3, 383–394, 400,
402–403
- European/Europeans, iii, v–xi, xiii–
xvii, 1, 6, 9, 11, 13–18, 20–22,
25–27, 31n14, 50, 52, 58,
66–72, 77, 82, 85n4, 92,
114–117, 120, 122–123,
125–126, 129–131, 146–147,
159, 168–169, 191–194,
197–199, 203–205, 208–213,
224, 226, 232–233, 237, 239,
252–253, 264n18, 272–273,

291n2, 300, 357–362,
364–365, 370–372, 376n8,
383–394, 402, 417

Europeanization, 59n4, 115, 120,
122, 129, 134

Europeanness, 197–198

Eurozone, 383, 389, 391, 397

Evangelists, 306

Evolution, 117

Evolutionary, 97

Evolving, 20, 28, 290

Exceptionalism, xiii, 5–6, 358–359

Exclusion, vi, xiii, 63–64, 69, 118,
123–124, 134, 141–142, 150,
159, 202, 252, 258–260, 272,
274, 277–278, 282, 284,
288–289, 291, 306, 331, 344,
387, 414, 416, 431

Exogamy, 416, 430–431

Exoticism, 107

F

Facebook, 280–281, 283, 286, 288,
369–370, 376n13

Fagan, Kate 341–342, 348

Falola, Toyin 16, 32n32

Fanon, Franz 21, 33n39, 64, 93, 107

Farsakh, Leila 257, 266n39, 266n41,
266n42, 266n44, 266n46,
266n47, 267n53

Fascism, 132

Fascist, 127–128

Felder, Björn 123–124

Femininity, xiii, 333, 340, 344

Feminism, 286–287, 371

Feminist/feminists 277, 283–286

Finland, xxii, 357, 359–363,
365–366, 369–370, 375,
375n1, 376n2

Foreigner/foreigners, 5, 26, 28, 57,
63–64, 82, 84, 125, 210, 213,
230, 394

Fox, Jon E., 191, 198–199, 204,
208–209, 212

Foxworth, Derrick, 412, 426–431

Franco, Francisco, 383, 389, 391

Frankenberg, Ruth, 160n3,
197–198, 202, 273, 373

Franzinetti, Guido, 115

Freeman, Abdul Maalik, 54, 60n11,
60n13

Freeman, Sulataana, 54–60

French, 15, 51

French Dakar, 15

French Open, 338

Frontex, 388

G

Gardiner, Greg, 166, 170, 184–185

Gario, Quincy, 280–282, 294

Garner, Steve, 299, 303–304, 310,
312–313, 318–320

Gates, Henry Louis, 92

Gawlewicz, Anna 196, 198, 204

Gaza, xii, xviii, 254, 256, 259, 271,
273, 275, 277, 279, 281,
283–285, 287, 289–291,
294n34

Gell, C.W.M., 71, 74, 76, 80

Gender, xiii, xviii, 9, 84, 146, 148,
172, 192, 195, 198, 200, 213,
228, 234, 271–274, 277, 283,
285, 302, 329–337, 339–342,
344–346, 348–350, 369, 371,
413, 427

Gendered/gendering, xii, 99, 146,
206, 273, 330, 331, 333–335,
341, 431

- Genealogy, 4
 Genetics, 96
 Geneva, 248, 264n14, 391
 Genocide, 118, 130, 249, 264n12
 Georgia, 105, 115, 129, 131
 German/Germans, xi, xviii, 65,
 223–233, 235–239, 390
 Germany, xi, 118, 121, 123,
 208–209, 224–231,
 237–239
 Ghana, 26
 Ghanaian, 26
 Ghetto, 81–82, 340
 Gilroy, Paul, 64, 93–94, 150, 205,
 305, 312, 369
 Glassman, Jonathon, 8–9, 31n12
 Glissant, Édouard, 93–95, 99
 Golash-Boza, Tanya, 153, 158
 Goldberg, David, 114, 120,
 132–133, 142, 147, 294,
 358
 Gordon, David, 96–97, 99, 101
 Gouda, 272, 282, 294
 Granada, 196
 Greece, 384, 389, 391
 Greenland, 360, 375n1
 Grime, xii, xviii, 299–317,
 319–322
 Griner, Brittney, xiii, xix, 329,
 331–333, 335–337, 339,
 341–349
 Guadalupe, 152
 Gullah Geechee, ix, xvii, 89–91,
 93–108
 Gunter, Anthony, 306, 311–312
 Guthrie, Patricia, 96, 98–99, 103,
 105
 Guy-Sheftall, Beverly, 345
 Gypsy, 119–120, 125, 390
- H
 Habitation, 14, 20
 Habits, 16, 68, 72, 142
 Hage, Ghassan, 274, 282, 289, 294
 Hague, xii, 275, 277
 Hair, 12, 22, 25–26, 28, 148, 206,
 209, 225, 228–229, 232–234,
 236
 Hairdressers, 151
 Hairstyle, 92
 Hall, Bruce, 9, 31n16
 Hall, Stuart, 80, 90, 93, 97, 300,
 337
 Hamas, 275, 277
 Hamburg, 239
 Harassment, 120, 205, 256, 412,
 426
 Haribo, 233
 Hartman, Saidiya V., 30n4, 34n48,
 333–334, 337, 346, 348–349
 Hatred, 130, 166, 225
 Hegel, George Wilhelm Friedrich, xi,
 226
 Hegemony/hegemonic, 7, 10, 11,
 33n43, 65, 93–94, 104, 106,
 107, 273, 284, 290, 336
 Helsinki, 363, 376n13, 377n15
 Heterofemininity, 339
 Heteropatriarchal, 339, 348–349
 Heterosexism, 335
 Heterosexual, 329, 332, 335, 340,
 346, 427
 Heterosexuality, 330
 Hialeah, 50–52
 Hierarchies
 racial, vii, ix, xiii–xiv, 27, 66, 84,
 93, 103, 107, 114, 117, 121,
 123, 141, 145–146, 159, 192,
 199, 204, 209, 227, 233, 235,

- 336, 343–345, 349, 359, 361,
413, 417–418, 421, 431–433
social, vi, viii, 123, 340, 367, 375,
418
Higginbotham, Evelyn B., 330, 336,
339
Hill-Collins, Patricia, 427, 431
Hindu, 67, 71
Hine, Darlene Clark, 224–225
Hip-Hop, 309, 314, 318
Hipólito, 155–158
Hispanic, 158
Holland, 277, 281
Holland, Sharon P., 332
Hollingworth, Sumi, 310–311, 318
Holocaust, 118–120, 124, 126, 128,
196, 264n12
Homeland, 12, 64, 75, 77, 89–90,
94, 130, 366, 386, 393, 414
Homelessness, 44, 99
Homogeneity/homogenous, 7, 78,
93, 141, 192, 196, 210
Homophobia, 152, 342, 344–346
Hondius, Dienke, 230, 239
Hostility, 125, 205, 238
Hübinette, Tobias, 361, 364, 366
Hungarian, 118
Hungary, 115, 193
Hurston, Zora Neale, 102, 107
Hylton, Kevin 166–168, 171,
183–184
- I
- Iberian, 196, 264n18
Iceland, 357, 359, 375n1,
375–376n2, 376n8
Identification/identifications, viii,
xiii, 3, 5, 9, 114, 129, 132,
151, 166, 311, 331, 340–341,
343, 346, 349, 350n4, 358,
365, 367–369, 372–373
Identity/identities, x, xii, 5, 8, 13,
15, 18, 31n11, 57, 66–67,
72, 77, 83–84, 89–91,
93–98, 102–103, 105–107,
116, 118, 122–124,
129–131, 145–146,
148–149, 151, 154–159,
192, 197, 202, 207, 224,
232–233, 250–252, 264n18,
284, 286, 303, 306,
312–321, 330, 331, 335,
340, 342, 345, 350n2, 357,
358, 366, 368–369, 372,
374, 384–385, 387, 389,
394, 396, 399, 411–413,
416–419, 422–423, 425, 432
culture formation, 315, 317,
320–321
Identity formation, 95, 314,
318–319, 366
Ideology/ideologies, vi–xi, xiii, 18,
90, 93–95, 98, 102, 104,
107–108, 117–119, 126, 141,
153, 156–159n1, 168,
195–196, 208, 227, 258, 317,
345, 371, 417, 427
Ignatiev, Noel, 198, 389
Ignorance, 274
Igualado, 149, 160n4
Ikoyi, 13–18
Ilanga, 65, 67, 85n3
Immigrant, xiv, 50–51, 56–57,
63–64, 66–69, 71, 77–78, 84,
168–169, 196, 205, 211, 238,
292n7, 357, 361–367, 369,
371, 374, 398

- Immigration, v, 23–25, 65, 67–70, 75, 77, 126, 168, 191–198, 358, 361, 363–364, 384–385, 388–389, 391, 393–394, 396, 399, 402–403, 417
- Imprisonment, 43, 69–70, 397, 400
- Inclusion, xiv, 64, 116, 123, 125, 134, 151, 159, 202, 212, 259, 285, 384, 387, 402
- Inclusive/inclusivity, xviii, 63, 83, 141, 143, 145, 147, 149, 151, 153, 155, 157, 168, 286, 362, 394
- Indenture/indentured, 63, 65, 67, 69, 70, 78, 85n5
- Independence/independent, xxi–xxii, 7, 13–16, 18, 21, 57, 59n4, 82, 89, 123–124, 127–128, 148, 165–166, 250, 263n10, 272, 329, 348, 359, 375–376n2
- India, 68–69, 75–78, 82, 85n1, 133, 233
- Indian/Indians, ix, xvii, 19, 22, 25, 27, 40, 41, 46–48, 63–86, 90–93, 97, 143, 145, 155, 160n6, 301, 399
- Indianness, 79, 90–94, 103
- Indias*, 156
- Indigeneity, ix, 64, 89–90, 93–95, 97–98, 106
- Indigenous/indigenoussness, vi, xvii, 18, 44, 47–48, 59n2, 83, 89–91, 93–98, 101–106, 108, 141, 143–149, 151, 153–159, 160n5, 160n6, 161n6, 161n7, 168–169, 233, 257–259, 261, 417–418, 421–423
- Indio*, 143, 149, 152–153, 155–158
- Inequality/inequalities, 73, 83, 120, 122, 135, 142, 146, 153, 159, 253, 413, 415, 417, 419, 425, 427, 432
- Institutionalisation, 304, 307, 318
- Institutions, vi, 4, 11, 21, 25, 30n9, 50, 83, 120, 128, 143, 391, 415–416, 419, 425
- Intelligibility, 331, 333, 336, 345–346, 349, 350n2
- Interracial, 8, 146, 148, 312, 332, 416, 427, 429–431
- Intersectionality, xviii, 271–275, 277–279, 281, 283–289, 371
- Intersex, 350n2
- Intifada, 288
- Intolerance, 274, 364
- Inuit, 305, 360
- Ireland, xiv, xix, 383–385, 388–394, 396–402
- Irish, 194, 197–198, 389, 393–394, 397–401
- Isaac, Benjamin, 132
- Iskandaryan, Alexander, 129
- Islam, 53–54, 56–57, 205, 277
- Islamic, 40, 53, 55–56, 58, 277
- Islamophobia/Islamophobic, xviii, 271, 273–275, 277–279, 281, 283–285, 287, 289–291, 362–363
- Island/islands
- Canary, 388, 394, 396
 - Faroe, 375n1
 - St. Helena, 98–101, 105–106
 - Sea, 89, 99, 102–103
 - Star, 41–43
 - Victoria, 17
- Islander, 169

Israel, xii, xviii, 245–262, 275,
277–278, 284, 287, 289–290
Israeli, 245, 247–248, 250–251,
254, 256–261, 263, 264n18,
266n52, 273, 292n5
Italian/Italians, 31n22, 181, 197,
387
Italy, 384, 389

J

Jamaica, 41, 44, 313
Jamaican, 300–302
Japan, 169
Japanese, 132
Janes, Ruth, x, xviii, xxi, 165
Jerusalem, 256
Jew, 65, 125–126, 131, 196–197,
247, 249–252, 254–255, 258,
264n18, 275–276
Jewish, 126, 159n1, 194, 196,
247–248, 250–252, 254, 256,
258–259, 264n14, 264n18,
265n30, 265n31, 266n40,
275, 277, 311
Jewry, 126
Jihadist, 276
Jordan, 348
Justice, vi, 261–262, 273, 287–288,
290–291, 332, 398, 400–401,
419

K

Kano, 18–20
Kasrils, Ronnie, 253, 265n25
Katzew, Ilona, 144–146, 148,
160n2
Kellogg, Susan, 144, 146

Kenya, 23
King, Linda, 153, 155, 157, 161n7
King, Tiffany Lethabo, 333–334
Kinship, 90, 96, 99–100, 106
Klaufus, Christien, 160n5
Kopytoff, Igor, 9, 31n13
Korean, 132
Kukah, Matthew Hassan, 23–25,
33n45
Kultfaktor, xi, 228
KwaZulu, iv, xxii, 63

L

Labour, 63, 66, 67, 69, 73, 119,
145, 149, 193–194, 198, 209,
246, 254, 257–260, 300, 333,
360, 362, 425
Lagos, 13–14, 17
Lampedusa, 385
Land, ix, 9, 13, 41–42, 65–66, 68,
71, 74, 76, 81–83, 85, 89–90,
94, 98–99, 102–103, 106,
108, 120, 158, 237, 247, 250,
253, 255, 257, 259, 271, 385
Language, 4–5, 11, 14, 40, 48–49,
65, 68–69, 71–72, 84, 90–91,
95–96, 119, 128, 135, 142,
152, 155–159, 161n7,
193–195, 199, 201–202, 210,
213, 236, 248, 286, 333, 337,
367, 386
Latin, xiv, 157, 160n5, 203, 237,
411–412, 417–418, 432
Latvia, 135, 193
Latvian, 123, 198
Lebanese, 19, 180
Legitimacy, 105, 145, 229, 255, 431
Legitimation, 122

- Lentin, Alana, 285, 294, 362, 391
 Lesbian, 336, 341–347
 Liberal, 57, 132, 423–424
 Liberation, vi, 119, 260, 262, 425
 Libre, xxiii, 420–421, 423–424
 Lindner, Oliver 301, 303, 312, 315
 Lineage, 92, 121, 160n1
 Lisbon, 21
 Lithuania, 193
 Lithuanian, 122–123
 Litigation, 40–42, 46, 49–50, 53
 Little, 233, 236, 415
 Liverpoolian, 319
 Loftsdóttir, Kristin, 358–359, 361
 Lomnitz-Adler, Claudio, 142, 144,
 159–160n1
 London, xxii, 21, 73, 141, 169, 309,
 311–313, 319, 376n9, 389
 Long, Carolyn, 44–45
 Long, Jonathon, 166, 169–170
 Lopez Rodriguez, Magdalena, 191,
 198
 Lovegreen, Nick, 310–311, 318
 Lukumi, 49–53, 58
 Lusher, Dean, x, xviii, xxi, 165–166
 Lynching, 427, 430
- M**
- McCulloch, 310–311, 318
 McDonald, Mary G., 335, 344–345
 McDowell, Linda, 198, 204
 McEachrane, Michael, 358, 364
 McKittrick, Katherine, 331–332,
 336, 340–341, 344, 346,
 348–349
 Magee, Jonathan, xviii, xxii,
 165–166
 Mainsah, Henry, 364, 366, 369
 Malays, 85n4
 Male, 55–56, 203, 233, 236, 277,
 294, 300–302, 314, 317,
 329–330, 333, 335, 340, 344,
 397, 431
 Mamdani, Mahmood, 6, 30n7,
 31n14
 Manchester, xviii, xxii, 191–194,
 199, 201, 203, 206, 212
 Mandela, Nelson, 272, 291n3
 Mandela, Winnie, 272, 291n3
 Marginalisation, 118, 121, 167, 384,
 389, 425
 Marginality, 4, 30n9
 Marijuana, 41–44
 Marjoribanks, Timothy 169–170
 Maroon, 418, 422–423, 432
 Marriage, 39, 57, 68, 70, 78,
 143–144, 247, 413, 416
 Marry, 78, 413, 418, 431
 Masculine, 301–302, 314, 317, 331,
 335–336, 343, 345–346
 Masculinity, xiii, 301–302, 317,
 329–330, 420, 427, 429, 431
 Mauritania, 5
 Maurophilia, 389
 Mayor, 143, 280, 429–430
 Mazahua, 149, 155–159
 Mbembe, Achille, 5–6, 30n5
 Media, x–xi, xiii–xiv, 65, 67, 80, 83,
 122, 127–128, 131, 142, 151,
 158, 160n2, 191, 196, 199,
 201, 204, 209, 223–225, 230,
 233, 238, 279–281, 283, 305,
 331–332, 337, 341–342,
 345–347, 350n3, 361–362,
 368–370, 373, 384, 393, 428,
 430–431
 Mediation, 173, 319

- Medical, 55, 124, 256–257
 Medieval, 195
 Mediterranean, 131, 384, 387, 393
 Melilla, 395–396, 401
 Mende people, 89, 96–97, 102, 108n1
 Mercury, The, 65, 67–71, 85n2
 Merkel, Angela, 229, 238, 240
Mestizaje, xviii, 141–143, 145, 147, 149, 151, 153, 155–157, 159, 417, 423, 425, 432–433
Mestizo, 142, 144–145, 147–148, 155, 159, 161n6, 419, 425
 Metro, 172, 411, 414, 416
 Metropolitan, 127, 415
 Mexican/Mexicans, x, 141–142, 144, 147–148, 150–151, 158, 159, 161n7
 Mexico, viii, x, 141–143, 147–150, 153–159, 160n6
 Miami, 41–42, 49–51, 53, 59n9
 Migrant, x, xviii, 17, 20, 50, 63, 84, 122, 125, 149, 156, 168–169, 181, 191–195, 197–202, 204–209, 211–213, 277, 366, 384, 386–389, 391–396, 400, 402
 Migration, xix, 95, 130, 191–194, 202, 204, 207, 253, 311, 322n16, 383–389, 391, 393–395, 397–399, 401–403, 419, 432
 Miles, Robert, 195, 199, 375
 Military, 50, 103, 114, 127, 247, 251, 275, 284, 291n1, 292n6, 395, 422
 Minority/minorities, viii, 40–41, 46, 48–49, 53, 58, 73, 105, 119, 120, 122, 127–128, 131, 135–136, 167–168, 198, 200, 204–206, 211–212, 238, 251–252, 256, 258–259, 272, 274, 275, 277, 283, 309, 312, 357, 360–366, 368–370, 372, 373, 375, 391, 399, 425
 Minstrel, 225, 235
 Miscegenation, 430
 Misogyny, 342, 344–346
 Misrecognition, 332, 337, 340, 346, 349
 Misrepresentation, 342
 Mixed, 118, 132, 141–145, 147, 158, 172, 206–207, 232, 247, 275, 301, 316, 366, 412, 431–433
 Mixed race, xiv, 67, 85n4, 143–144, 147, 206, 232–233, 316
 Mixing, xiv, 141–142, 147–148
 Mixture, x, xix, 106, 141, 144–145, 147–148, 157, 159, 286, 411–413, 415, 417, 419, 421, 423, 425, 427, 429, 431–433
 Modernisation, 117, 119
 Modernist, 18, 27, 136
 Modernity, viii, 11, 17–18, 94, 107, 114, 116–117, 129, 132–135, 154, 157, 195
 Moldavian, 128
 Moldova, 115, 126–128
 Monoracism, 132
 Moral, viii, xii, 4, 29n1, 64, 146–147, 160n1, 224, 248, 428
 Morality, v
 Mormon, 39
 Moroccan, 401–402
 Morocco, 30, 402

- Mother/mothers/motherhood, 78–79, 132, 149, 152, 198, 206–207, 213, 234, 250, 334, 341, 344, 350n4, 397
- Movement
 Civil Rights, 97, 223
 Ecuador liberal, 424–425, 427
 independence, 148
 South African Labour, 260
- Mozambique, 68
- Mudimbe, V.Y., 17, 32n34
- Mudlines, 96, 99, 106
- Mulata/mulato, 144–146, 414, 418
- Mulkey, Kim 342
- Multiculture/multicultural/
 multiculturalism, xii, 30n9, 125, 142, 150, 169, 172, 175, 191, 197, 201–202, 294n35, 295n35, 301, 303, 312, 365–367, 417, 420, 425, 432
- Multiethnic, 116, 366
- Multinational, 116, 390
- Multiracial/multiracialism/
 multiraciality, 5, 28, 413, 416–417, 431, 433
- Munro, Brenna, 335–336
- Murder/murdering, 118, 121, 132, 402, 431
- Murzyn*, 203
- Murzynek*, 206
- Murzyni*, 204, 213n1
- Music, xii, 149, 299–305, 307–310, 313–315, 317–322, 420
- Muslim/Muslims, v–vi, xii–xiii, 18, 53–57, 68, 71, 125, 159n1, 182, 196, 206, 275–277, 284, 290, 362, 370, 391
- Myth/myths, xiii, xviii, 73, 84, 108n1, 118, 121, 123, 130–131, 169, 223, 225, 227, 229, 231, 233, 235, 237–239, 254, 262, 333, 345, 390, 416, 427, 432
- Mythology, 246, 253
- Mzungu, 26–27
- N**
- Naco*, 153, 158, 160–161n6
- Naidoo, B.R., 70
- Nalewajko, Malgorzata, 191, 194, 199, 209–210
- Naming, 15, 69, 145, 304–305, 373–374
- Narrative/narratives, ix, xi–xii, 5–6, 11, 51, 53, 66, 90–92, 103, 107–108, 114, 122, 124–125, 127, 192, 196–197, 202, 204–205, 207–208, 210–212, 234–235, 240n8, 250, 280, 302, 305–306, 315, 339, 343–344, 393, 413, 423
- Nasarawa, 18–19
- Natal, 67, 69–71, 73–74, 76, 78, 81–82, 85n5
- Nation/nations, vi–vii, ix, xiv, xvii, xiii, 39, 41, 43, 45, 47, 49, 51, 53, 55–56, 65–66, 77, 82–84, 97, 105, 117, 118, 122–125, 127–128, 130–131, 135–136, 141, 144, 148, 152, 155, 168–169, 195, 197, 198, 206–208, 224, 246, 248, 253, 255, 258, 274, 289–290, 294n35, 295n35, 334, 358, 368, 383–394, 400, 402, 417–420, 422–425, 431–432

- National/nationals, v, xii–xiii, 5, 21,
340–41, 50, 53, 64–67, 77,
84–85, 94, 105, 116–117, 119,
121–125, 128, 131, 134–136,
141, 144, 147–148, 153, 159,
168, 172–173, 193, 195, 211,
228, 231, 246, 250–251, 259,
262, 273–274, 278–280, 282,
284, 288, 292n7, 314, 341,
357–360, 362–366, 369, 373,
376n4, 384–385, 388, 392,
394–396, 399–401, 411,
415–420, 422, 425, 431–432
- Nationalism/nationalisms, 6, 15–17,
59n4, 90, 117, 124–125,
129–131, 133, 227, 237, 239,
253, 274, 290, 385
- Nationalist/nationalistic, 7, 9, 14,
121, 123, 130, 142, 196, 237,
253–254, 260–261, 273–274,
276–277, 281–284, 289–291,
358, 362
- Nationality/nationalities, 9, 26, 65,
76, 83–84, 116–117, 119, 193,
195, 205, 239, 248, 250, 358
- Nationhood, ix, 135, 360
- Native/natives, xi, 16, 17, 27, 34n53,
40–41, 43–48, 52, 58, 64,
66–67, 71, 76, 85n4, 90, 92,
97, 103–104, 106, 108n1,
143, 146, 193, 196, 201,
211–212, 225–228, 231–233,
236–238, 253–254, 274, 315
- Nativist, 64, 385
- Nature, iv, 48, 75, 91, 96, 133, 144,
161n7, 179, 231, 250, 253,
263n2, 264n21, 283,
300–302, 307, 311, 317–318,
320, 330–331, 334, 349, 372
- Navajo, 40
- Navratilova, Martina, 336
- Nazi, 118, 121, 124, 128, 130,
360
- Neger*, 232–234, 236–237
- Negra*, 418, 420
- Negrescence, 389
- Negro, 204, 206, 213n1, 232, 237,
361
- Neighbourhood/neighbourhoods,
13–14, 17–20, 42, 72, 142,
149–150, 205
- Nelson, Nora Dome, 372
- Neocolonial, 25
- Neoliberalism, 142
- Netherlands, xviii, xxi, 165, 226,
271–274, 277–278,
280–281, 284–286,
288–291, 294–295
- Netnography, 376n10
- Network/networks, 99–100, 106,
124, 141, 158, 204, 272, 314,
364, 369–370, 391, 402
- Neutrality, 289
- News, 22, 275–276, 281–282, 385,
400–403
- Newspaper, 43, 85n2, 238, 282,
339, 412, 426
- NGOs, 272, 362, 365, 366, 399,
402
- Nigeria, 13–15, 17–18, 21, 24, 26,
33n42, 52, 313, 376n9,
392–393, 400
- Nigerian/Nigerians, 15–18, 20–21,
23–26, 33n42, 400
- Niqab*, 54, 56
- Nobility, 143, 145
- Nonhumans, 96, 99, 101, 106,
108n1

- Norm, vi–vii, ix, xiv, 15, 19, 25, 40, 166, 197, 212, 315, 335–336, 339–340, 344–345
- Normal, 100, 120, 127, 154, 226, 230
- Normalisation, 8, 278, 394
- Normality, 235
- Normative/normativity, vii–viii, ix–x, xiii–xiv, 8, 16, 19, 20, 58, 97, 107, 114, 127, 151, 159, 160n3, 166–167, 171, 183–184, 192, 317, 331, 336, 357, 368, 370, 375
- Norway, 357, 359, 362–363, 365–366, 370, 375n1, 375n2, 376n4, 376n8, 400
- Norwegian/Norwegians, 360, 362, 368–369
- Nowicka, Magdalena 196, 199, 201, 204–205
- O**
- Obama, Barack 22, 238, 240n3, 240n10
- Obi, Theresa, 397–398
- O’Brien, David 50–51, 59n4
- Oburoni/Oburuni/Oyinbo, 26–27, 34n47
- Occupation/occupations, 43, 49–50, 73, 101, 104, 108, 118, 124, 154–155, 193, 247, 251, 254, 259–261, 266n52
- Offspring, 144–145, 334, 358, 367, 418, 432
- Olympic, 338, 341
- Onkel Baracks Hütte*, 238
- Ontology, 96, 315, 317, 320
- Operation/operations, 114, 116, 132–133, 292n6, 359, 396
- Opinion, 44, 72, 175, 196, 276, 280–281, 362, 426, 429
- Opposition, ix, 63, 74, 82, 124–125, 169–170, 176, 178–180, 182, 195, 197, 208, 330, 345, 364
- Oppression, xiv, 5, 7, 28, 41, 57, 277, 285, 383–384, 413, 415, 427, 433
- Oregon, xix, 45–46, 411–417, 419, 421, 423, 425–427, 429, 431, 433
- Oregonian/Oregonians, 414, 426–429
- Orientalised/orientalisation, 231, 251
- Orientalist, 206
- Othering, ix, xii, 9, 63–64, 83, 209, 290
- Otherness, 26, 84, 121, 130, 192, 200–202, 205, 212, 228, 389
- Ottoman, 129, 132
- P**
- Palestine, xii, 245–247, 249, 252–259, 261–262, 271, 275–276, 278, 287–288, 291n4, 292n6
- Palestinian/Palestinians, 247–248, 250–252, 254–262, 271, 273–278, 282, 284–285, 288–289, 292n6
- Paradigm/paradigms, 11, 12, 363–364, 366
- Paradigmatic, 7, 10, 19, 21
- Pejorative, 156, 204, 385, 390

- People v. Woody*, 40–43, 58n1
- Periphery, xix, 67, 383, 385, 387, 389, 391, 393, 395, 397, 399, 401, 403
- Phenotype, 92, 94, 122, 160n1, 413
- Phenotypic/phenotypical/
phenotypically, v, 93, 192, 195, 208, 212
- Pierre, Jemima, 9, 12, 31n18
- Pigmented, xvii, 3, 5, 7, 9, 11, 13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23, 25, 27
- Plantation, 102–103, 133
- Planter/planters, 66, 103, 106–107
- Poland, 191–193, 196–198, 201, 204–210
- Police, 59n10, 153, 156–157, 160n4, 272, 275, 279–284, 288, 388, 395, 401, 412, 426–430
- Polish, x, xviii, 191–213, 338
- Political, vi, ix, xii, xiv, xxi, 3–4, 7, 9, 13, 17–18, 20–22, 25–26, 33n42, 55, 64, 74, 76–77, 82–83, 95, 97, 100, 107, 114, 119–125, 127, 129, 131–132, 151, 165, 171, 197, 199, 224, 227, 230, 237–238, 254, 257, 265n34, 273–274, 277, 285, 290–291, 331, 334, 347, 360–362, 365–366, 368, 370, 372–375, 377n17, 385, 388, 396, 399, 419–420, 425, 431
- Politicians, xiii, 21, 67, 80, 114, 124, 276, 359, 361–364
- Politics, xiv, xix, 4, 10, 33n43, 100, 121, 142, 150, 196, 199, 204, 273, 329, 344–345, 350n3, 358, 361–362, 368, 372–374, 399, 415, 431
- Polyracism, 116, 131–132, 134
- Poor, 44, 59n6, 73, 80, 90, 93, 103, 106, 153, 193, 197, 210, 228, 262, 311, 321, 401, 429
- Popularity, 152, 223, 282, 374
- Populist, v, vii, 213n1, 361–363, 385
- Port Harcourt, 17–18, 32n36
- Postcolonial/postcolonialism, viii, x, 3–15, 17–23, 25–29, 103, 211
- Poverty, 73, 90, 94, 102, 104, 107–108, 118, 145–146, 383, 385–386, 419
- Power, ix, xi–xiii, 4, 10, 13–16, 20, 22, 24, 26–27, 33n42, 50, 59n6, 72, 74, 83, 97, 104, 114, 119, 127, 135–136, 142, 144, 146–147, 152, 156, 158–159, 160n3, 168, 171, 185, 196, 204, 209, 212, 225, 229, 233, 235, 238, 248, 252–253, 262, 273, 280, 284, 286, 288, 290–291, 303–306, 320, 329–331, 335–336, 338, 344, 359–360, 362, 368, 371–372, 385, 387, 417, 420, 422, 428
- Prejudice, 30n9, 83, 153, 158, 202, 206, 212, 361
- Preservation, 40, 69, 91, 105
- Prison, 50, 119, 132, 152, 256, 395–397, 401
- Privilege/privileges/privileged, viii–x, 3–4, 6, 9–10, 12–16, 19–21, 23–26, 78, 82, 90, 92, 98, 106, 114, 115, 117, 135, 141, 144, 147–148, 171, 191, 197–202, 204, 206, 209, 211–212, 231, 235, 248, 250, 251, 262, 264n18, 266n52, 285, 287, 312, 340, 371–372

Privileging, 55, 90, 95, 273, 336
 Progeny, 147–148
 Progress, 69, 114, 117, 224, 273,
 330, 335, 417
 Progressive, 117, 121, 274, 285,
 385, 393, 415–416, 431
 Progressiveness, xiv, 419
 Project, 172, 257, 395–396, 401
 Proletarianisation, 118, 128
 Propaganda, 113
 Property, 17, 19, 42, 71, 74, 80–81,
 99, 103–104, 331, 334–335,
 337, 358, 390
 Prosecution, 43, 48, 288
 Public transportation, 251, 415
 Punishment/punishments, 247, 249,
 251, 257, 265n31, 271
 Purity, 91, 93–94, 118, 121, 124, 132,
 145, 159–160n1, 195–196, 224
 Purposes, 5, 43, 78, 80, 224, 229,
 318, 358, 395
 Pursuit/pursuits, ix, 104–105, 107,
 124, 128, 302, 330

R

Race/races, v, vi, ix, xiii–xiv, xvii–xix,
 4–13, 15, 17, 19, 21, 23–29,
 29n2, 40, 44, 47–48, 51,
 53–55, 58, 60n11, 64, 66–67,
 69, 72, 74, 77, 81–84, 85n4,
 89–93, 95–97, 106–107,
 113–119, 121–127, 129–133,
 135–136, 142–144, 146–147,
 151, 153, 154, 159, 160n3,
 160n5, 166–168, 171, 183,
 192, 195–198, 205–206, 223,
 225–227, 229, 231, 233, 235,
 237–239, 246–253, 271,

273–275, 277, 279, 281, 283,
 285, 287, 289, 291, 301–307,
 309–311, 313, 315–317, 319,
 329–331, 336–337, 339–340,
 344, 346, 348, 357–361,
 363–375, 399, 403, 412–413,
 416–420, 425–426, 428–430,
 432–433

Raceless, 118

Racial, v, vii–viii, ix–xiv, xvii, xix, 3–15,
 17–21, 23, 25–29, 29n3, 30n9,
 49–51, 57, 64–66, 72, 77,
 83–84, 85n4, 90–94, 96–97,
 103, 106–108, 114–125,
 127–132, 134–142, 144–148,
 153, 155, 159, 160n2, 160n6,
 166–173, 175–186, 192,
 195–197, 199–200, 202, 204,
 206, 208–209, 212–213, 225,
 227, 229, 232–235, 239,
 246–249, 251–252, 254–255,
 260, 262, 272, 274, 279, 281,
 306, 312, 318, 330–331, 333,
 335–337, 340–341, 343–345,
 347–349, 357–361, 363,
 365–366, 368–369, 371–375,
 377n17, 389, 412–419, 421,
 423, 425, 427, 429–433

Racial formation, 28, 118, 159, 168,
 375

Racialisation/racialisations, vi, 6,
 8–10, 31n14, 98, 114–116,
 119–124, 127, 129, 131–136,
 202, 209–213, 364, 375, 389

Racialised, v–x, xiv, xviii, 3, 5, 7–8,
 10, 14–16, 18–19, 23, 25,
 27–28, 31n14, 64, 83, 94, 97,
 107, 114, 116, 118–121, 125,
 129–131, 133, 135, 146, 152,

- 158, 160n6, 167, 191–193,
195, 197–201, 203–205,
207–215, 245, 248, 250–252,
255–257, 264n21, 273, 284,
289–290, 302, 312–314, 332,
336, 339, 357–358, 360–361,
363–375, 384–387, 389, 392,
400, 402, 415, 430
- Racialising, 117, 207, 312, 392
- Racialism, 4, 6, 8, 11, 13, 83
- Racism, i–iii, v–xv, xviii, 1–4, 6–8,
12, 17, 21, 30n9, 39, 63–65,
76, 89, 96, 113–123,
125–127, 129–142, 151,
153–154, 157–159, 165–169,
171, 173–181, 183–192,
195–196, 199, 203–205,
207–208, 212, 223, 227, 230,
234, 237–238, 245, 265n34,
271–274, 277–278, 280–291,
303, 307–308, 317, 329, 332,
341–342, 346, 350n3,
357–361, 363–375, 391, 394,
411–413, 415–421, 425–433
- Racisme*, 293n12, 293n17, 294n25
- Racist/racists, vi–ix, xi–xiv, 4, 6–7,
11, 14, 17, 29n1, 64, 70–71,
74, 94, 113, 117, 121,
125–127, 131, 142, 153–154,
158, 168–171, 174, 176, 178,
180, 184–185, 195, 201,
205–206, 208, 212–213,
223–230, 232–234, 236–239,
239n1, 240n8, 253, 272–274,
276–277, 280–286, 289–291,
303, 320, 341–343, 345, 358,
361–363, 365, 367, 369–371,
373–374, 376n4, 386, 391,
394, 432
- Rap, xi, 155–158, 301, 309–310,
315
- Rapper, 228–229, 275–276,
287–288, 309
- Rastafarian/Rasta, xiii, xix, xxii,
41–43, 228, 357–362,
364–366, 368, 370, 372, 374
- Rebellion, xxiii, 421, 423–424
- Recognition, vi, xiii, 4, 7, 9, 20,
29, 50, 107, 116, 124, 155,
237, 336, 342, 363, 392,
400, 417
- Reconcile/reconciling, 149, 155,
157, 245
- Reconciliation, 348
- Refugee, vi–vii, xiv, 64, 122, 168,
202, 238, 362, 384, 387, 392,
394, 396, 398–400
- Reggae, 303
- Religion/religions, vi–viii, 5, 9,
39–41, 44, 46–58, 59n7, 71,
121, 130, 192, 195, 255, 276,
287, 312, 368
- Religious, viii–ix, xii, xvii, 4, 39–49,
53–58, 59n2–4, 121, 129,
131, 151–152, 160n1, 196,
199, 227, 229, 250–252, 288,
366
- Renn, Aaron, 415
- Repatriation, 71, 74–77, 80, 400
- Representation/representations,
xi–xii, xiv, 15, 67, 81, 92, 103,
115, 126, 140, 142, 151,
158–159, 224, 318, 320, 329,
340, 362, 390, 413, 419–420,
425, 430–433
- Reproduction, iv, 13, 28, 92, 103,
117, 122, 154, 207, 289, 333,
413, 427, 431

- Revolution/revolutions/
 revolutionary, 6, 50–51, 59n6,
 116–117, 227, 286
 Reynolds, Tracy, 303, 312
Reynolds v. United States, 39–41, 46,
 48, 53, 58
 Rights, iv, vi, xii, 4, 29n1, 40–43,
 52–54, 58, 73–74, 78, 82,
 97–98, 105, 120, 128, 144,
 171, 223, 237, 246–248, 252,
 260–261, 278, 283, 287, 332,
 334, 337, 359–360, 367, 370,
 384–386, 388, 391–392, 394,
 397–398, 401–403, 413, 417,
 427, 430
 Riley, Mykaell, 308, 315
 Rites, 47–49, 52, 71
 Ritual/rituals, 51–52, 59n4, 95
 Roma, 115, 118–121, 125,
 127–128, 131, 360–361,
 376n3, 391
 Roman, 51–52, 133
 Romania, 115, 119, 127–128
 Romanian/Romanians, 118,
 127–128, 208
 Rome, 249
 Roots, 41, 64, 94–95, 122, 136,
 149, 157, 305, 367
 Rothenberg, Ben, 338–340
 Rural, 27, 123, 155–157, 172,
 319
 Russia, x, 113, 115–117, 120–122,
 127, 129, 131, 199, 376n2
 Russian/Russians, x, 115–116,
 120–122, 125–130, 132,
 209–210, 338–339, 361,
 376n2
 Rutten, Mark, 277–278, 282
 Ryan, Louise, 198, 207
- S**
 Sabon Gari, 20
 Saint/saints, 52, 91, 151
 Saint Barthélemy, 359
 Saint Francis, 151
 Saint Nickolas/Saint Nicholas, xii,
 272, 279–283
 Sambo, 223, 233–235, 237
 Sami, 360
 Santería, 49–53, 59n5
 Sarotti-Mohr, 231
 Saudi Arabia, 55
 Scandinavia, 371, 375n1
 Scandinavian/Scandinavians, xiv,
 361, 375n1
 Segregation, 14–15, 20, 32n24, 49,
 71, 73–74, 81–82, 120–121,
 169, 196, 246–248, 251,
 255–257, 265n34, 318, 340,
 415
 Segregationist, 14, 19, 120
 Semenya, Caster, 335, 350n2
 Settlement/settlements, 122, 126,
 254, 256, 259, 264n14, 271,
 322n16, 417
 Settler/settlers, 27, 64, 66, 246,
 252–255, 257–258, 273
 Sexism, 166, 283–284, 290, 342,
 350n3, 430–431
 Sexist/sexists, 283, 286
 Sexuality, xiv, 329–331, 335–337,
 340–341, 344–346, 413,
 426–431
 Sharapova, Maria, 338–339, 343,
 350n1
 Sharpe, Christina, 331–332, 346,
 349
 Sheeran, Ed, 303–304
 Simmons, Ervin R., 98, 100–101

- Skin, 12, 22, 26, 42, 67, 145, 153,
160n1, 179, 195, 198–200,
206, 208, 224–226, 228,
231–232, 235, 281, 302, 347
- Slave/slaves, 49, 52, 96, 102–103,
203–204, 232, 234, 281, 333,
359, 366, 414, 418, 420, 422,
424
- Slavery, 29–30n3, 92, 125, 133, 204,
273, 279, 287, 332–333, 336,
346, 398, 413–414, 423–424,
433
- Slavic, 121, 127
- Slavicisation, 128
- Slavs, 115
- Slovakia, 115, 193
- Slovakian, 118
- Slovenia, 193
- Slur/slurs, 152, 181, 208, 283, 342,
345
- Smith, Alfred, 44–48, 53
- Smuts, Jan 65–66, 69, 73–74, 254
- Sno, Ramona, 284–286, 294
- Soccer, 151–152, 172, 178, 230, 343
- Social, iv–viii, x, xii–xiv, xix–xxii, 3–9,
11–15, 18–20, 22, 24–29,
51–52, 64, 72, 77, 80, 82–85n4,
89, 98, 107, 114, 116–117, 120,
122–123, 125–128, 130,
133–136, 143–145, 147, 150,
154–159, 160n1, 165–168,
171, 194, 199–200, 202, 204,
226–227, 230, 233, 257, 273,
280–281, 286–288, 290–291,
301, 305–307, 311–313, 320,
329, 331–332, 337, 340–342,
346–347, 350n3, 357–359,
361, 363–375, 384, 388, 413,
418–419, 422–423, 425,
432–433
- Socialism, 113, 117, 227
- Socialist/socialists, 114, 116,
118–121, 128, 135–136, 198,
292n8, 228, 376n4
- Solidarity, 4–5, 229–230, 261,
273–276, 282, 284–285,
288–289, 292n8, 369
- Somali/Somalis, 365, 370, 374
- Somalia, 384
- South Africa/South African, vi–ix,
xi, xiii, 5–6, 23, 63–79,
82–85, 85n1, 85n5, 86n6,
117–118, 142, 245–247,
249–262, 360
- South Asian, 205
- South Carolina, 89, 97, 103, 105
- Southern Caucasus, 115, 129
- Southern Florida, 49, 51
- Southern Nigeria, 14, 17, 20
- South London, 312
- Southwestern Africa, 52
- Sovereignty, 89–90, 94, 96, 98, 256
- Soviet, ix, 114–122, 124–132,
134–136, 209
- Spaaïj, Ramón x, xviii, xxii,
165–166, 172
- Spain, x, xiv, xix, 159n1, 194–196,
199, 207–210, 213, 279,
383–385, 388–394, 396,
398–399, 401–402, 422
- Spaniard/Spaniards, 143–145, 147,
199, 209, 211, 390
- Spanish, 51–52, 143–149, 154–157,
159, 191, 195–196, 199,
210–211, 388, 390, 394–396,
399, 401, 422
- Spillers, Hortense, 331–334,
336–337, 346
- Spiritual, ix, 40, 45, 47, 49, 91,
96–97, 108n1, 254

- Sport/sporting/sports, x, xii–xiii, xviii, xxii, 165–173, 175, 177–181, 183–185, 329–337, 343–344, 346–349
- Stalin, 118–119
- Stalinist Terror, 119
- Stateless, 251
- Status x, 3, 9, 12–15, 17–20, 25–28, 65, 91, 97, 105, 107, 127, 131, 141, 143, 145–147, 151, 155, 159, 160n1, 192, 199–200, 203–205, 207, 213, 230, 246, 288, 302–303, 312, 317, 334–335, 342, 349, 387, 394, 401, 419, 431
- Stereotype/stereotypes/stereotyped/stereotyping, xi, 12, 72–73, 131, 142, 155–156, 202, 204, 206, 209–210, 212, 224–225, 227–229, 232, 235, 239n1, 272, 317
- Stereotypical/stereotypically, xi, 205, 209, 228, 233, 279, 281, 433
- Sterilisation, 119, 124
- Stigma/stigmatised, 52, 121, 155, 157, 211, 224, 302–303, 417, 427
- Sturm, Circe, 90–92, 94–95, 97, 106
- Subaltern, 10, 14, 18, 21, 273, 300, 383
- Subconscious, VIII, 11–12, 15, 20, 27–28
- Subcultural, 307, 311, 321
- Subculture/subcultures, 40, 126, 306–307, 314, 318
- Subjugation, 333, 341, 348
- Subnational, 21
- Subordinate/subordination, 159, 166, 167, 184, 200, 204, 208, 231, 331
- Subservience, 15, 23, 25, 107, 119
- Subsistence, xvii, 73, 89, 91, 93, 95, 97, 99, 101–105, 107–108
- Sudan, 5
- Sudanese, 175–176, 179, 182, 230
- Sue, Christina, 153, 158
- Sullivan, Margaret, 339
- Sultan, 276, 287
- Superior, 12, 14, 26–27, 77, 92, 124, 142, 196, 207, 227, 236
- Superiority, xi, 11, 15, 22, 25, 77, 83, 91, 98, 148, 153, 155, 157, 195, 197, 204, 208–209, 225–227, 229, 232, 237, 249–250, 301
- Supremacist/supremacy, v, viii, ix, 9, 29n3, 67, 71, 168, 196, 227, 257–258, 279, 285, 331, 334, 345, 427
- Swahili, 24, 26–27, 31n11, 34n53
- Sweden, xxii, 113, 357, 359, 361–363, 365–367, 370–372, 375n1, 375–376n2, 376n4, 376n8, 376n9
- Swedes, 360, 362, 368
- Swedish, 233, 359, 362–363, 367, 371, 376n2, 377n16
- Syria, 238, 384
- Syrian, 130, 387, 400
- T
- TallBear, Kim, 89–91, 95–97, 106
- Tanzania, 23–25
- Tanzanian, 23–25
- Tarifa, 393, 395
- Tarpischev, Shamil, 338
- Tbilisi, 129
- Television/TV, 42, 238, 283, 401
- Tepito, 142, 149–152, 154–156

- Territory/territories, 95, 99, 126,
128, 160n5, 246–247,
251–254, 256, 258, 264n14,
275, 414
- Terrorism, vi, 54, 304
- Tinchy Stryder, 302, 309
- Titley, Gavan, 285, 294, 362
- Tolerance, xiii, 45, 92–93, 126, 180,
185, 274
- Torre/Torres, 148, 159, 169, 417, 424
- Tourism/tourist/tourists, 100,
102–103, 105, 107, 130, 278,
310, 314–315, 317–320, 390
- Trade, 49, 68, 80–81, 96, 359, 366,
388, 401
- Traders, 14, 71, 73, 80–81
- Tradition, 8, 40, 48, 52, 98–99, 101,
104, 106, 116, 158, 229, 231,
234, 254, 418
- Traditional, 25, 46–48, 52, 90, 92,
94–95, 104–105, 123, 127,
148–149, 157, 208, 234, 335,
390, 421, 425, 432
- Traditions, 13, 48, 89, 95, 99, 122,
131, 136, 226, 229, 234, 305
- Traffickers/trafficking, 42, 44,
385–386, 388, 393, 395
- Traits, 27, 145, 147, 195, 224, 226,
232, 250, 329, 331
- Transatlantic, 96, 366
- Transcaucasia, 129
- Transdisciplinary, 273, 289, 291
- Transition/transitions, 16, 20, 26,
91, 194, 299
- Translation/translations/translated,
iv, 160n1, 160n2, 204, 227,
374, 376n13, 377n16
- Transnational, xiii, 253, 273, 288,
367–368, 370, 372, 375
- Transvaal, 69, 71, 81
- Treatment, 44–45, 55, 66, 73, 82,
168, 191, 199, 209, 211, 248,
253, 272, 276, 331, 340, 348,
350n2, 391, 426
- Treaty/treaties, 90, 247, 264n15,
391
- Trebay, Guy, 343–344
- Tribes, 108n1, 253
- Tribunal, 170, 173–174, 182
- Tropes, 3–5, 7–8, 10, 12, 20–22, 26,
29n3, 131
- Turkey, 115, 132
- Turkish, 129–130, 311
- Turks, 131
- Twitter, 280, 283, 303–304, 317
- Tyranny, 4, 24
- U**
- Ukraine, 115, 126–127
- Ukrainian, 127
- Uncivilised, ix, 17, 27, 91–92, 94, 124
- Unconstitutionally, 46–47, 49
- Unemployment, 44–45, 193,
390–391, 394
- Unequal/unequals, 143, 152, 229,
233
- UNHCR, 384–385, 391–392
- UNICEF, 229–230
- Union, 65–78, 81, 83, 85n4, 114,
116, 119–121, 126, 128, 132,
191, 193, 205, 227, 260, 272,
313, 365, 375–376n2, 383,
387, 389–390, 393, 401–403,
414, 428
- Urban, xi, 13–15, 17–19, 27, 81,
123, 142, 146, 149–150,
155–157, 160n5, 160n6,
228–229, 256, 302–303,
311–312, 318, 415–416

V

Van der Heyden, Ulrich, 226, 231, 237

Van der Horst, H, 282, 294

Van Dijk, Teun A. 196, 358

Van Riemsdijk, Micheline, 191, 202–203, 210

Victims, viii, 39, 41, 171, 175, 177, 180–181, 184–186, 199, 204, 212, 230, 235, 287

Vilification, 131, 166, 170–171, 173–176, 178–185, 340

Vilified, 170, 173–176, 178–180, 182–184, 312, 318, 427

Violation/violations, 54, 247, 264n14, 272, 394, 397, 400–402

Violence, vi, 29n1, 57, 84, 121, 125, 127, 132, 135, 146, 149–150, 152, 158, 205, 213, 235–236, 240n8, 279, 282, 284, 304, 306, 333, 341, 343, 349, 362–363, 391

Visibility, 15, 151, 158–159, 202, 315, 343, 345, 347

Visible, 8, 10, 13, 15, 20, 28, 31n14, 54, 127, 142, 155, 159, 184, 195, 198, 201–202, 212, 234, 237, 279, 282–284, 286, 292n8, 301, 322, 330, 347, 372

Voice/voices, 135, 151, 237, 240n10, 261, 273, 275, 280, 285, 289, 350n6, 367, 370, 372

Vulnerability, 304, 342, 348

W

Wade, Peter, 90, 93–94, 103, 106, 147

Wales, 193

War/wars, 50, 57, 103, 115, 118–121, 124, 130, 150,

168–169, 196, 209, 224–225, 228, 230, 250, 256, 262, 271, 300, 322n16, 376n2, 386, 414–415

Warsame, Hodan, 284–286

Warwick, xxi

Wealth/wealthy, 19, 26–27, 42, 50, 73, 80, 84, 102, 145, 147, 149

Wekker, Gloria, 274, 284, 286, 358

Welfare, 205, 362, 419

White/whites, vii–ix, xi, xiii–xiv, xviii, 4, 6, 12–27, 39–44, 46–53, 55, 57–58, 59n8, 64–69, 73, 76–83, 85n4, 90–93, 98, 104, 106–107, 113, 118, 146–147, 149, 151–152, 157, 159, 167–169, 171–172, 178–181, 183–184, 191–192, 194–195, 197–208, 211–213, 224–233, 235, 237–239, 240n10, 247, 249, 252, 254–255, 258, 262, 274, 279, 281–285, 287, 289–290, 294–295, 300–301, 303–304, 306–307, 309–310, 312–320, 329–340, 342, 344–345, 348–349, 350n4, 360–361, 363–364, 366–369, 371–373, 387, 413–417, 419–420, 426–427, 430–433

dominance, 184

privilege, ix, 4, 6

supremacy, 9, 279

Whitened, 142

Whiteness, iii, v–x, xiii–xiv, xvii, 1, 4, 6, 8–10, 12–20, 22–23, 26, 28, 39, 58, 66, 90–94, 107, 114, 121, 127, 135–136, 141–142, 147–148, 151, 159,

- 160n3, 166–168, 171,
178–180, 183–184, 186,
191–192, 195, 197–202, 204,
206, 208–209, 211–212, 235,
273, 312, 317–321, 336, 346,
357–358, 368, 370, 372–373,
385, 402, 417, 432
- Whitening, 147, 206
- Whitewashing, 199
- Williams, Serena, xii, xix, 329,
331–333, 335–341, 343,
345–349
- Windrush, 300, 311, 322n16
- Winmar, Nicky, 170, 185
- Work, iv, xiv, 23, 26, 28, 31n11, 47,
64, 96–97, 104, 124, 131,
133, 135, 150–151, 154,
156–157, 193, 201, 203–204,
208, 210, 256–257, 259, 273,
319–320, 332, 334, 345, 360,
366, 371, 373, 390, 399–400,
422
- Worker/workers, 44–45, 70, 119,
198, 200, 203, 230, 258–259,
394, 420, 425
- Workforce, 67, 259, 300
- Workplace, 83, 202, 212
- X
- Xenophobia, 5, 63, 65, 84, 127, 192,
205, 212, 362, 364–365, 391
- Xenophobic, 5, 64, 70, 80, 84, 362
- Y
- Yildirim, Seval, 54–57, 60n14
- Yoruba, 49, 52
- Younis, Mona, 260, 265n23, 265n28
- Youth, 172, 201, 205, 276, 301,
303, 311–313, 315, 318, 321
- Yugoslav, 202
- Yuval-Davies, Nira, 195, 198,
206–207
- Z
- Zanzibar, 6
- Zapotec/*zapoteco*, 149, 154
- “Zehn Kleine Negerlein,” 233,
236–237
- Zionism, 253, 257, 260, 262, 277
- Zionist/Zionists, 252–255, 257–258,
263n2, 265n29, 273–274,
278, 287, 292n5
- Zulu, 78, 255