

Heinz Streib · Constantin Klein *Editors*

Xenosophia and Religion. Biographical and Statistical Paths for a Culture of Welcome

With a Foreword by
Andreas Zick

 Springer

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ISBN 978-3-319-74563-3 ISBN 978-3-319-74564-0 (eBook)
<https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-319-74564-0>

Library of Congress Control Number: 2018944134

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Printed on acid-free paper

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The registered company address is: Gewerbestrasse 11, 6330 Cham, Switzerland

Foreword

“... there is something about religion that makes prejudice, and something about it that un-makes prejudice”, assumes Gordon Allport in his well-known paper on the *The Religious Context of Prejudice*, which was published 1966 in *The International Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*. The most important question is not whether religion makes prejudices or not. Wars kill many millions of people in the name of religion, religious sects and terror groups legitimize violence by religion, women are marginalized with reference to religious books and writings, groups have been exploited, tyrannized, and ostracized by religions. On the contrary, religions have rescued lives, supported peace and empathy, and are a cultural memory of human rights. This has been true since religions appeared in the evolution of humankind. Religion will make prejudices and it will unmake prejudices. Religion rests on prejudices, and it liberates from prejudices. Religion is a sphere of conflict and violence. People are interested in conflicts about the questions of whether and which religion is more or less prone to prejudice, racism, and discrimination. Even in recent modern and Western societies, conflicts stem from religion, rise within religions, and are carried about religion. This all is reflected in the current book, but it is not the most challenging scientific question of this book.

The most important word in Allport’s assumption is the little indefinite pronoun *something*. This single word asks for the mechanism and dynamics that transfer religion into hate or love. Why do some religious individuals and groups open their minds, overcome feelings of threat and insecurity, and welcome those who seem to be different, deviant, and strange, whereas other religious persons close their minds, set boundaries between US and THEM, and try to displace, discriminate, or injure others? What is this *something* within religion and within religious individuals and groups?

Heinz Streib and Constantin Klein face this challenge together with their team of young scientists in this outstanding book on *Xenosophia and Religion*. They furnish this brilliant overview with theoretical reflections, empirical qualitative and quantitative research, and political discourses from many years of exploring, developing empirical measures, testing and interviewing, and debating their approach within the scientific community. This book is not an end of an innovative approach on the

“religion-discrimination-link”, but it is an outcome of years of reviewing research and researching in the field of religious studies, prejudice and racism research, and social sciences.

It started years ago when the editors discovered that some relevant phenomena linking religion to prejudices and discrimination are not answered reliably in research. They especially started to flip the focus of traditional research and took the positive side of religion more seriously into account. They focused on xenosophia and asked: Where does xenosophia stem from, what is xenosophia, how can we make it empirically accessible, and which emotions, cognitions, and behaviors can occur when individuals and groups are xenosophic? This surprised us, i.e., the traditional researcher like me, focusing on the black side of religion and developing the concept of group-focused enmity.

The present book, which readers finally hold in their hands, offers many urgent answers to recent scientific questions on the link of xenosophia and xenophobia to human thinking, feeling, and behaving, and it also offers critical questions and ways to run more sophisticated research. It takes us into a scientific journey on the biographical, inter-personal and, collective roots of ingroup love and outgroup love or hate. By a mixed-method approach taking a rich amount of qualitative and quantitative data into account, the authors as a real cohesive team offer insights into the philosophical, psychological, and social roots from faith to social realities. I love this book. It is not easy and fast to read like many faster and easier written essays, which dominate the public and even scientific debate. This book is a voice for comprehensive empirical research on a difficult issue. Only this sophisticated view can offer evidence, which readers might not have expected so far.

This book offers a research compendium of theories on the link between faith and discrimination, measurements of xenosophia, enmity, and biographies. It takes many facets of the phenomena into account so that every reader who is interested in issues of religion and prejudice will find ways into evidence-based discourses. Readers should be open to being surprised. When reading books can make us wise, this is a book on which we should take a chance. We will not be more or less religious, xenosophic, or xenophobic after reading. But we will be cleverer and more prepared for the pitfalls of discourses.

Institute for Interdisciplinary Research
on Conflict and Violence, Director

Andreas Zick

Preface

This book presents the results of the Bielefeld study on xenophobia and religion in Germany. The research has been carried through by a research team at Bielefeld University, Germany, under the leadership of the first editor of this volume, Heinz Streib, and with the second editor, Constantin Klein, as primary researcher. The team has cooperated in designing research, collecting data, evaluating quantitatively and qualitatively, and finally in designing and writing the chapters of this volume. Thus, many people have contributed to successfully complete research and writing, and this book is truly the result of effective teamwork. And here is the chance to mention team members and say thanks.

We thank Anne Swhajor-Biesemann, Uwe Drexelius, and Sven Luhmann for assisting in questionnaire construction in the first phase of the project. Special thanks go to Ramona Bullik, who joined the team in the second phase of the project and has been engaged in interviewee selection and invitation, in interviewing itself, in interview evaluation, and in organizing and administering the qualitative part of project. For interviewing and/or evaluation, we would like to thank Arne Scheunchen, Martin Hornshaw, Tobias Stacke, and Joana Butenaite, who joined our team for a couple of months as an Erasmus intern from Lithuania. Further thanks go to Corinna Beuchel who has transcribed all the interviews.

After the completion of fieldwork, the intense phase of statistical analyses began. Then, Matthias Lühr joined the team as a postgraduate intern, and we thank him for his contributions to our statistical analyses and his authorship of Chap. 7. We also thank Carsten Gennerich, who is a professor of religious education at the University of Applied Sciences in Darmstadt, for contributing his expertise in value research and for authoring Chap. 9.

For the qualitative work such as interview evaluation and case study writing, Ramona Bullik continued in the team; we thank her especially for her contributions to Chaps. 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14. We are grateful also to Barbara Keller, a licensed psychotherapist for psychoanalysis and psychodynamic therapy and the primary researcher in previous and current Bielefeld-based projects, to accept our invitation to join the team, contribute her experience to the qualitative part of the study, and engage as (co-)author in several chapters. Finally, we thank Sakin Özişik and Tobias

Stacke for their contributions to the case studies in Chaps. 13 and 14. For language editing and proofreading, we would like to thank Stephanie Hauser.

We also express our thanks to Springer publishing house to include this volume in their collection of psychological works and especially we thank the senior publishing editor in philosophy and religious studies, Cristina Alves dos Santos, for her kind support.

We are very grateful to the German Research Foundation/Deutsche Forschungsgemeinschaft for funding the research, and thank Bielefeld University for hosting it.

And last, but not least, we want to thank all our research participants who accepted our invitation to take part in the surveys and answer a comprehensive questionnaire. Special thanks go to those participants who have shared their thoughts and reflections about their lives in personal interviews. Without their participation, this study would have never been possible.

Bielefeld, Germany
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Heinz Streib
Constantin Klein

Introduction

Xenosophia is a term that needs explanation, because it is new to empirical research. The Ancient Greek word *xenos* means the *stranger* or *foreigner*—as in today’s meaning of ‘xenophobia;’ and the Ancient Greek word *sophia* means *wisdom*. Thus ‘xenosophia’ means the wisdom that might emerge from the encounter with the strange and the wisdom of adequately responding to the strange. While we are probably the first to introduce this term in empirical research, we are not the first to use the word. We have, as detailed in Chap. 1, been inspired by Waldenfels’ (2011) philosophy of the alien and by Nakamura’s (2000) book with the title *Xenosophie*, in which he presents “building blocks for a theory of alienness.” Inspired by these philosophers, we propose as decisive characteristic of ‘xenosophia’ a specific kind of *responsivity* that resists hastily putting the strange in a box and making it an *other*. In other words: xenosophia is characterized by *hermeneutic humility*. In this understanding, we regard xenosophia being the opposite of xenophobia. Thus we decided to put xenosophia to the fore in this book.

In the following, Chap. 1 explains the theoretical background of a salutogenic perspective and gives details about our understanding of ‘xenosophia’ in relation to ‘tolerance;’ and Chap. 2 relates our study to previous research on prejudice and religion. Then, Chap. 3 presents methodological considerations about our instrument for qualitative analysis, the faith development interview, and Chap. 4 describes our research design, instruments and sample characteristics in detail.

When we were preparing our Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion, we could not foresee that the publication of its results would take place at a time of an epidemic global increase of prejudice and xenophobia, particularly against immigrants and refugees, an epidemic that obviously has infected also political leaders. But in view of these changes, we think, the results of our study may be read as being even more provocative—and hopefully inspire reflection and research on prejudice prevention.

Our research portrays critical times in Germany (see Chap. 5). It documents attitudes in the German population in the time of massive refugee immigration into our country. We were online with a survey in August 2015, when the first large refugee migration wave along the Balkan route arrived in Germany, and we were online

with a questionnaire again in March 2016, when the discussion about the “refugee crisis” dominated the political discourse in Germany and other European countries. Thus, our results address questions like this: does a culture of welcome and dialog have a chance in times of massive refugee migration?

Germany may be regarded by many, not only by the refugees, as being a heaven for the culture of welcome. And surveys, including our own, document indeed that a majority of Germans agree that war refugees should be welcome. But survey results also indicate that Germany is not an isle of the blessed. Data from our research document, for the relatively short time of half a year, a considerable decrease of agreement to the welcoming of war refugees and an increase of xenophobia and other prejudices, especially in East Germany. These are indications of developments in the German population that must evoke the concern of all who support an open society that includes diversity.

In light of these developments, scientific research has the task of not only monitoring prejudice and xenophobia, but also of exploring the factors that support and reinforce prejudice and xenophobia. Moreover, scientific research has the task of investigating the forces at work for prejudice *reduction* and identifying factors that may nurture the culture of welcome and xenophilic attitudes. To take up the metaphor again: we need to know what makes people “diseased” with prejudice and what spreads the xenophobic epidemic. But we also want to know how people regain their “health;” research should aim at identifying the healing powers for the xenophobic epidemic. In other terms: besides a pathogenic perspective, scientific research should also aim at profiling a *salutogenic* perspective (Antonovsky, 1979; 1987; Mittelmark, et al., 2017).

In our research we have thus included a focus on the exploration of potential healing powers and pay special attention to the examination of the psychological and religious constituents that may support positive attitudes such as the culture of welcome or the appreciation of religious diversity. In comparison with extant prejudice research (see Chap. 2, for details), the unique feature of our research is special attention to religion and world view in relation to prejudice. Thereby, our research design includes a differential assessment of religion and thus attends to difference in religious styles and religious schemata (see Chaps. 3 and 6). In agreement with Allport (1954), we believe that religion can “make” and “unmake” prejudice, and that it is a religion “of an ethnocentric order” that makes prejudice, and a religion “of a universalistic order” that unmakes prejudice. The assessment of religious schemata in our study accounts for this double-edged effect of religion.

Our research included the examination of paths to xenosophia—as a step to profile the salutogenic perspective. And the main parts of this book are about these paths. Thereby, ‘path’ is used for both the modelling of quantitative data and the biographical-reconstructive interpretation of interviews. This is supposed to express our expectation that both versions of paths complement each other and that, even in respect to differences between qualitative and quantitative results, their triangulation may yield a more comprehensive picture.

Quantitative analyses are presented in Part II of this book. It begins in Chap. 5 with a comprehensive documentation of xenophobic and xenophilic attitudes in

Germany 2015 and 2016, and thereby, based on analyses of variance, illuminate differences of gender, age groups, Germany East and West, cultural capital, centrality of religiosity, and political party preference.

Statistical path models are presented in Chaps. 6 and 7. The basic structural equation model is developed in Chap. 6; it includes religiosity, *openness to change*, *tolerance of complexity*, and the religious schemata to estimate their effects on target variables such as the welcoming of war refugees, the appreciation of religious diversity, but also on xenophobia in general and on Islamophobia. Chapter 7 expands on this model and includes a broader range of prejudices that are part of the group-focused enmity syndrome (Zick, Wolf, Küpper, Davidov, Schmidt, & Heitmeyer, 2008) and also estimates, together with religiosity, openness and religious schemata, the effects of the norms of masculinity (Enzmann & Wetzels, 2003) on these prejudices. Chapter 8 presents results from three Implicit Association Tests, i.e. an indirect computer-based assessment procedure, to measure the implicit prejudice between the three Abrahamic religions. And finally in Chap. 9, our data are analyzed based on the assessment of values, and plotted in the value space. Thus, the analyses presented in Part II use different quantitative-analytical perspectives to better profile and understand the xenophobic and xenophilic attitudes and their possible development.

Part III includes the results from our qualitative research, based on personal interviews, and details the variety of biographical paths to xenosophia. At the core of this part are four detailed case studies that are supposed to illustrate the four types of our typology, which is presented in Chap. 10. Always with the question in mind, what has contributed to their development of xenophobic attitudes, the interviews of Robert, Nina, Cemal, and Henry¹ were selected and analyzed using structural, narrative, and content analytical procedures; and all case studies include a discussion—a case-specific triangulation—of the scores of the individual case on selected variables of our quantitative data.

Chapter 15 is the concluding discussion, which includes a synoptic review of the four case studies in Chaps. 11, 12, 13, 14, and 15. Statistical paths and biographical paths are discussed separately first to finally consider the triangulation of qualitative and quantitative results.

We hope that the results presented in this book are a contribution to meet the huge challenge for scientific research to not only monitor prejudice and xenophobia, but also explore the factors that support prejudice reduction and the development of xenosophia, which may nurture the culture of welcome, the appreciation of religious diversity and other xenophilic attitudes.

¹Of course, these names are pseudonyms. Also we have removed everything that could be used to re-identify the interviewees in the quotes from the faith development interviews and the interpreting text about these cases.

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Part I
Conceptual and Methodological
Perspectives

Chapter 1

What is Xenosophia? Philosophical Contributions to Prejudice Research



Heinz Streib

This book is about the development and sustainability of a culture of welcome in times of increasing prejudice against immigrants and xenophobia toward refugees. To ground this discussion empirically, the book presents analyses of the qualitative and quantitative data from our Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion in Germany – thereby identifying biographical paths and statistical paths toward xenophobia and xenosophia.

Empirical research, however, needs to explicate the conceptual framework on which it is based. And already the generally synonymous used concepts of prejudice and xenophobia may require some explication. But certainly our key concept, xenosophia, is not taken-for-granted, but new in research on prejudice and in the scientific study of religion, and may be rather unfamiliar to many readers. In this first chapter, therefore, we intend to answer four questions:

- (a) we explain why there is need for complementing the preoccupation for prejudice and xenophobia (the “pathogenic” model) in research and public discussion with a perspective on the positive developments (a “salutogenic” model);
- (b) we explain why we chose the concept of xenosophia to signify the opposite to xenophobia and prejudice, and why we prefer xenosophia;
- (c) we give details about how xenosophia is grounded in philosophical thought; thereby we will present the lines of argumentation in Waldenfels’ and Nakamura’s works about the alien;
- (d) we explain how xenosophia has been operationalized for our empirical research on prejudice.

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Prejudice and Religion

One of the most influential contributions to research on prejudice and on the relation between religion and prejudice is presented in the work of Allport (1954, 1966). And, with Allport, we understand ‘prejudice’ as an “avertive or hostile attitude toward a person who belongs to a group, simply because he belongs to that group” (p. 7) and as “antipathy based upon a faulty and inflexible generalization” (p. 9), which, when acted out, may escalate from “antilocution” to “avoidance” and to “discrimination,” and finally lead to “physical attack” and “extermination” (p. 14–15). When we associate ‘xenophobia’ to ‘prejudice,’ we intend to (a) focus the prejudice on (groups of) strangers such as immigrants and refugees, and (b) to underscore the emotional aspect that Allport’s “antipathy” refers to.

What has prejudice to do with religion? As well-known and frequently cited, Allport claimed that religion can both “make” and “unmake” prejudice. But Allport (1954, p. 456) went further and introduced a differential perspective: he claimed that the promotion of prejudice is connected with the religion “of an ethnocentric order” and the prevention of prejudice is connected with the religion “of a universalistic order.” It is important to take this differential perspective into account, because the “religion of a universalistic order” that may contribute to the “unmaking” of prejudice could be an important contribution to profiling a “salutogenic” model.

The “Pathogenic” Model

Since Allport we have seen an immense body of research on religion and prejudice, which primarily documents that religion tends to be associated with prejudice against people, who are regarded *different*, *other* or *alien* with respect to their ethnic background, color of their skin, their sexual orientation or their religious beliefs and practices (see Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009, for a review). The “pathogenic” effect of religion is well documented (see also Chap. “2” in this book). Thereby, in major lines of research, “ethnocentrism” emerged as a popular construct and was explicitly included in the names of measures (e.g. Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Altemeyer 1996, 2003), while “universalism” is rather absent. Thus we have seen a profiling of the effects of the “ethnocentric” type of religion.

For example, Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992; Hunsberger, Owusu, & Duck, 1999; Altemeyer, 2003; see Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005; for reviews) studied religious fundamentalism and right-wing-authoritarianism and their relation with negative attitudes toward women, blacks, Jews, or homosexuals. Their scales for *religious fundamentalism* (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992, 2004) and *right-wing authoritarianism* (Altemeyer, 1996, 2006) are widely used in research on prejudice. The Right-wing Authoritarianism Scale has three subscales: *submission* (“a high degree of submission to the established, legitimate authorities in their society,” Altemeyer, 2006, p. 9), *aggression* (“high levels of aggression in

the name of their authorities”) and *conventionalism*. For religious fundamentalism and how it is causing prejudices, Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992, 2005) identified at least four mechanisms: first, that religious fundamentalism is characterized by moral dualism, a simplified worldview distinguishing sharply between good and bad; the other three mechanisms are the need for social strength of one’s own ideology and group, the belief that one’s own faith is exclusively true, and a refusal of pluralism.

We can identify in this detailed characterization of the fundamentalist and authoritarian mind set several religious schemata,¹ one of which we have operationalized for empirical research and included in our Religious Schema Scale (RSS, Streib, Hood, & Klein, 2010): the RSS subscale *truth of texts and teachings* (*ttt*). Conceptually, as religious-cognitive schema, the *ttt* schema clearly corresponds to the *conventionalism* of the Right-wing Authoritarianism Scale and to the characteristic of absolute truth of one’s own religion in the Religious Fundamentalism Scale. An empirical confirmation of these correspondences are, as estimated in the data of our Bielefeld-based Cross-cultural Study on Deconversion (Streib, Hood, Keller, Csöff, & Silver, 2009, p. 73), high correlations of the *ttt* subscale with *religious fundamentalism* (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992) of $r_{USA} = .80$ and $r_{BRD} = .81$ and with *right-wing authoritarianism* (Altemeyer, 1996) of $r_{USA} = .68$ and $r_{BRD} = .72$.

In the research on religion and prejudice, we observe a tendency to focus on the negative, pathogenic side, on how the religion “of an ethnocentric order” “makes” prejudice. Taken together, in this research tradition, we have a characterization of religious schemata that may help us explain the development of prejudice and xenophobia. Religious fundamentalism, conventionalism, and authoritarian submission and aggression contribute to the development of a prejudiced mindset. This clearly profiles the ethnocentric habitus, including the “ethnocentric” type of religion—where “ethnocentric” means that one’s own group, tribe, religious group or political establishment is the exclusive center of interpretation authority, moral judgment and legitimization of aggression against out-groups. In the framework of the “pathogenic” model, i.e., under the dominance of fundamentalism and authoritarianism, religion appears to have little chance for “unmaking” prejudice.

¹For the concept of ‘schema’ as applied in the Religious Schema Scale, see Streib, Hood and Klein (2010, p. 153-154). Another schema that can be identified in Altemeyer and Hunsberger’s research is particularly interesting: the schema of exorcism (cf. Schäfer 2015, for the definition and characterization of the exorcism schema for the identity and praxis in the neo-Pentecostal movement of Guatemala), which clearly corresponds to the subscale *aggression* in the Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale.

The “Salutogenic” Perspective

Complementing the “pathogenic” model with a “salutogenic” view is an important contribution to the psychology of religion, because we need to find ways of how people and societies can escape from the vicious circle of prejudice, xenophobia and violence. Thus, the conceptual clarification and operationalization of schemata different from the “pathogenic” schemata is an important task. Research could attend to the other side of religion: the potential of religion for conflict-solving, peace-making and prejudice reduction.

Peace is more than the absence of war. Peace needs to be described positively as the condition for optimal human development, including conditions such as food and shelter, education, and freedom of religion. Likewise, for conceptualizing optimal inter-cultural and inter-religious relations, we need a positive vision, that suggests more than the absence of prejudice, hate and violence. Xenosophia, this our thesis, presents us with the semantic option of a positive antonym for prejudice and xenophobia.

We may indicate the direction in which the vector of the “salutogenic” model is aiming. With reference again to Allport, the “salutogenic” perspective includes the view that the prevention, the “unmaking” of prejudice is connected with the religion “of a universalistic order.” What “universalism” might signify is connected with its polar opposition: “ethnocentrism.” This polarity can be interpreted in a helpful way in the framework of values according to Schwartz (1992, 2003). The polarity between “ethnocentrism” and “universalism” reflects the polarity between *self-enhancement* and *self-transcendence* – the y-axis in the value space (see Chap. 9 for more details). “Self-transcendence,” which is composed in the value space by the values of *benevolence* and *universalism*, means not holding on to one’s own supposedly dominant worldview and value system, but reaching out to, or being concerned with “other” beings and possibly relating to humanity and/or the universe. It is probably not mistaken to draw a line also to the construct of Identification with All Humanity and the IWAH Scale (McFarland, Webb, & Brown, 2012; McFarland, Brown, & Webb, 2013), which attends to the differential extension of in-group identification to a universal perspective – but may also, with a second factor, tap into benevolence and prosocial attitudes (Reysen & Hackett, 2015). And even though McFarland’s IWAH Scale does not assess specifically xenological attitudes, the identification with all of humanity may be an effective predictor for prejudice reduction.

Despite such conceptual and empirical commencements, there is no broad and well-established research tradition about reducing prejudice and moderating xenophobia. Especially when we search for designs including a perspective on religion, we have nothing comparable with the research on social pathologies mentioned above. From their evaluation of almost a thousand reports on prejudice reduction interventions, Paluck and Green (2009, p. 360) conclude that “psychologists are a long way from demonstrating the most effective ways to reduce prejudice,” because

existing studies are lacking “internal and external validity.” As recently reported by Paluck (2016), there are only ca. 11% real-world field studies, while the majority of ca. 60% reports are about nonexperimental intervention, which, despite the abundance of creative ideas, nevertheless provide no reliable answers to the question of what reduces prejudice in real-world settings (Paluck & Green, 2009, p. 360). And, interestingly enough, the huge Princeton *Prejudice and Conflict Reduction Database*, which Paluck and Green used for their review, does not include one study demonstrating the effects of religiosity or spirituality on prejudice reduction. Therefore, it is no surprise that Doehring (2013), in her chapter on how religion and spirituality contribute to or counteract prejudice and discrimination, could not present much evidence about the specific effects of religion or spirituality, but thoughtfully suggests “implementing religious or spiritual values” in extant research-based intervention proposals such as the reduction of automatic activation prejudice, the role of positive guilt feeling about a person’s own prejudices, or intervention with positive role models.

We may conclude that the “salutogenic” model of the reduction of prejudice and the prevention of xenophobia is not yet based on a solid body of empirical evidence. The conceptual perspectives and research instruments are not as well established as in research on prejudice and xenophobia.

Nevertheless, we may begin with looking for the hints and emerging structures that may contribute to the conceptualization and operationalization of developments to “unmake” prejudice. Previous studies on prejudice reduction could make a considerable contribution here. The following selection of recent experimental studies (that all were published after Paluck and Green’s extensive review study) may help us suggest at least a preliminary answer to the question “what works in prejudice reduction,” and thus indicate contours of a “solutogenic” perspective.

- Tadmor and colleagues (2012) tested the reduction of intergroup bias through what they call “epistemic unfreezing.” For multicultural exposure and experimental exposure to multicultural experience, their series of experimental studies demonstrated a reduction of stereotypes, symbolic racism and discrimination, and a reduction of the need for cognitive closure.
- Prejudice reduction can be induced by *counter-stereotypes* and by *creative cognition*, as demonstrated in the study of Gocłowska and Crisp (2013).
- Also, *perspective-taking manipulation*, e.g., by the task of writing a short narrative about an unknown (culturally “other”) target person, has effects on automatic intergroup evaluations, as Todd and Burgmer (2013) have tested in their series of experiments. These studies demonstrate how perspective-taking could have a prejudice reducing effect.
- Er-rafiy and Brauer (2010, 2011, 2012) studied the effects of perceived variability on prejudice reduction. By interventions such as showing a documentary or showing a poster that presents differences among the target group (in this case: Arabs), the experiments demonstrated prejudice reducing effects for the target groups compared to the control groups.

Reading across the research designs of these studies, we may identify patterns of prejudice reduction mechanisms, which can be summarized as follows:

- a. Experiences of multicultural “otherness” such as past real-world multicultural exposure, or the eliciting or recalling of experiences of multicultural “otherness,” for example in an essay writing experiment, leads to reduction of prejudice and to a reduced need for cognitive closure.
- b. The invitation to the cognitive engagement (e.g., in essay writing) with a “strange” person, who is a person from another culture, is an invitation to perspective-taking—and such perspective-taking has prejudice reducing effects.
- c. The encounter with an amazing or perplexing *difference* and *variety* in the “strange,” e.g., in the form of perceived variability in a group of “strangers” who eventually are the object of prejudice and discrimination, reduces prejudice.
- d. The encounter with creative linguistic alienations, such as counter-stereotypes, reduces prejudice.

The common pattern in these four “mechanisms” is the assumption that prejudice reduction – the “unmaking” of prejudice—emerges from the encounter with difference, with otherness, with strangeness. And the studies document that this “works,” thus giving answers to the question “what works in prejudice reduction.” These four purposefully selected pieces of research may help us delineate the contours of the “salutogenic” perspective on the reduction of xenophobia and prejudice. Definitely, this line of research has to eventually go beyond class-room research, include real-world field experiments and a more representative selection of the adult population, as Paluck (2016) rightly and repeatedly suggests.

To be clear, studies such as the ones presented above are a beginning and not much more than that. There should be more coherence to constitute a “salutogenic” line of research. These studies may indicate a promising beginning suggesting that we may wish to include a still other set of predictors than the need for cognitive closure or the need for cognition (that nevertheless reveal as effective predictors, see e.g. Van Hiel, Pandelaere, & Duriez, 2004; Brandt & Reyna, 2010; Dhont, Roets, & Van Hiel, 2013). These experimental interventions operate with experiences of otherness/strangeness, with a difference in perspective and the irritations that come with that. Thus, research on prejudice reduction is well advised to consider constructs such as tolerance of complexity – and eventually xenosophia, since xenosophia operates with a tolerance for the irritation, resistance and, the demand that it is presented by the experience of strangeness, as will be discussed below.

Why ‘Xenosophia’? And why Is it Superior to ‘Tolerance’?

What is the opposite of prejudice and xenophobia? It is illuminating that, for signifying the positive developments, mostly *negations* are used such as “prevention,” “reduction,” “counteracting” or “overcoming.” Obviously there is some uncertainty regarding positive antonyms.

There are, of course, a row of candidates for antonyms to xenophobia and prejudice, for example: ‘tolerance,’ ‘fairness,’ ‘open-mindedness,’ ‘acceptance,’ ‘respect,’ ‘generosity,’ ‘xenophilia,’ ‘identification with all of humanity’ – and, not to forget, Allport’s association to ‘universalism.’ In this context of antonyms, we suggest to also consider ‘xenosophia.’ Each of these potential antonyms indicates a vision for an individual and for a society without prejudice and xenophobia. And these visions differ to some extent, when one or the other antonym is highlighted.

Instead of discussing the antonym candidates one by one, I will start the discussion by focusing on two concepts, namely ‘tolerance’ and ‘xenosophia.’ This selection is, of course, inspired by the structure and profile of the subscales that we have included in the Religious Schema Scale (Streib et al., 2010), which in turn correspond to a selection of religious styles as presented in Fowler’s (1981) model of faith development and in Streib’s (2001) model of religious styles. Thus, the discussion will include a focus on the two schemata: (a) on the schema of *fairness, tolerance and rational choice (ftr)*, which is a characteristic of Style/Stage Four of “individuating-reflective faith” (Fowler) / the “individuating-systemic style” (Streib), and (b) of the schema of *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog (xenos)*, which is a characteristic of Style/Stage Five of “conjunctive faith” (Fowler) / the “dialogic religious style” (Streib).

‘Tolerance’ qualifies for discussion not only because this concept is the basis of the *ftr* subscale, but also because ‘tolerance’ enjoys the most frequent use as an antonym for prejudice in the literature. But words can have a variety of meanings, and ‘tolerance’ is no exception. In the *ftr* subscale name, ‘tolerance’ is embedded between ‘fairness’ and ‘rational choice.’ Such interpretation with the help of explicit associations, I claim, is necessary to state more precisely how to understand the *ftr* schema.

Forst (2013) suggests distinguishing four conceptions of tolerance: (1) the “*permission conception*,” (2) the “*coexistence conception*,” (3) the “*respect conception*” and (4) the “*esteem conception*.” ‘Tolerance’ in the associative context with ‘fairness’ and ‘rationality,’ as in *ftr*, primarily corresponds to the “*respect conception*” (Forst’s third conception), which is grounded in mutual respect despite the recognition of profound ethical and cultural differences. But the meaning of ‘tolerance’ in the *ftr* schema may reflect also features of the “*esteem conception*,” which is the forth and “ethically thickest” (p. 32) in Forst’s typology. Here, ‘tolerance’ means

“not only respecting the members of other cultural or religious communities as legal and political equals but also esteeming their convictions and practices as ethically valuable” (Forst, 2013, p. 31).

In any case, the fair and rational and thus tolerant relation to the “other” in the *ftr* schema is going beyond Forst’s “*permission conception*” (e.g., the toleration of minorities, as long as they are satisfied with the rights granted by the established power) and the “*coexistence conception*” (e.g. the mutual renunciation of violence), which are ethically “thinner,” because they are either based on an asymmetric imbalance of power, or characterized by mutual disinterest. In contrast, the association with respect and esteem and with fairness and rationality qualifies ‘tolerance’ as favorable antonym for prejudice and xenophobia. ‘Tolerance’ in this understanding

transports the vision of communities and societies, in which mutual respect – and eventually positive esteem – for the convictions and practices of the “other” outdoes prejudice and xenophobia. This opens a “salutogenic” view.

We can, however, still imagine a comparative. And this comparative is indicated by the schema of xenosophia. Nevertheless, the “esteem conception” of tolerance foreshadows and prepares for xenosophia. Without fair and rational tolerance, xenosophia cannot develop. There is a gradual transition and overlap between *fr* and *xenos*. To explain the comparative, which is presented by xenosophia, we need to converse with the philosophy of strangeness/alienness. And here Waldenfels’ philosophy of alien is convincing.

As a kind of intermediary step, I first however wish to relate my line of argument to the discussion on tolerance. I briefly discuss and explain, where I see the potentials for the comparative and where I see possible shortcomings of ‘tolerance.’ Thereby I first want to direct attention to the developmental modelling of religion, faith and worldviews. Fowler has seen the need to expand the hierarchical sequence of stages of faith beyond his Stage Four of individuating-reflective faith to Stages Five and Six of “conjunctive faith” and “universalizing faith.” Leaving aside the question of the “logic of development” that is supposed to explain the dynamics that stimulate stage transition, I regard it as an ingenious idea to expand the sequence of stages or styles beyond individuating reflection. Fowler identified as one of the possible shortcomings of Stage Four to be

“an excessive confidence in the conscious mind and in critical thought and a kind of second narcissism in which the now clearly bounded, reflective self overassimilates “reality” and the perspectives of others into its own world view” (Fowler, 1981, p. 182–183).

With reference to the difference between accommodation and assimilation, as assumed in the developmental theory in the tradition of Piaget, Fowler’s critique is directed toward the dominance of one’s own world view and thus the mere assimilation of the “other,” while questions or challenges toward their own system of categories are suppressed. What is missing, is the *inter-action* between the partners in communication and the specification of the eventually *beneficial outcomes for both partners in inter-action*. While the *tolerant* relation may lead to and include respect and eventually esteem for the other’s world view and the other’s cultural and religious practices, it leaves the category system of the observer *unchanged*.

This is different in the concept of xenosophia. Here, the basic assumption is that the “own” inter-acts with the “other” or “strange” to the effect that the “own” is challenged and receives inspiration to creatively change and develop new perspectives. The list of mechanisms that were implemented in the studies on prejudice reduction mentioned above may open a perspective on xenosophia. Despite the difficulties to clearly measure such outcomes, the assumptions are that perspective-change, counter-stereotypes or recognition of differences in the *other* may lead to prejudice reduction – and to the emergence of something new.

Using ‘xenosophia’ in this way and assuming that the individual, from the interaction with the *other/the strange* receives challenges for re-evaluating his or her own world view, which eventually leads to creativity and wisdom, should be based

on convincing argumentation. Therefore, it is suggested that we more deeply enter into philosophical reflection about the relation between *own* and *other*, between the *own* and the *strange/the alien*.

Philosophical Perspectives on the Alien and the Concept of Xenosophia

While we are probably the first to introduce the term ‘xenosophia’ in empirical research and include it in the name of a scale, we are not the first to use the word. We have been inspired by Nakamura’s (2000) book with the title *Xenosophie*, in which he presents philosophical reflections on xenophobia, xenosophia and an outlook on xenology. As in the subtitle, Nakamura’s book presents “building blocks for a theory of alienness.”²

Nakamura develops his perspective on xenosophia in a critical dialog with Husserl’s and Waldenfels’ phenomenological-philosophical thought. Thereby, Nakamura shares basic assumptions especially with Waldenfels. Therefore, we begin with Waldenfels’ philosophy of the alien, proceed with Nakamura’s advancement and precision, and conclude with our own conceptualization of xenosophia.

Waldenfels’ Phenomenology of the Alien

Waldenfels (1990, 1997a, 1997b, 1999, 2007, 2011)³ presents a seminal perspective on the alien, which, this should be stated clearly from the beginning, does not discuss the alien merely in respect to global migration and growing multi-cultural plurality, but as part of a wider philosophical-phenomenological perspective. As Waldenfels explains:

“The alien is more than the mere symptom of a growing multiculturalism on the background of a globalization process. Phenomenologists could argue that the experience of the alien is one of the basic issues of phenomenological thought, and this being the case for a long time...” (Waldenfels, 2003, p. 23).

The perspective on the alien is embedded in a new kind of phenomenology, and Waldenfels identifies himself as phenomenologist, but as a phenomenologist of a

²A note about terminology: Since Waldenfels uses ‘the alien’ and ‘alienness’ in his English publications, I want to be consistent with his terminology. In my own text, I nevertheless prefer to talk about ‘strangeness’ and ‘the Strange,’ in order to avoid or minimize the misunderstanding of ‘the alien’ as person. Instead it should be stated clearly that ‘the alien’ is the translation of ‘*das Fremde*,’ which in the German language is a generalized neuter.

³Almost all of Waldenfels’ texts are in German language and we have only very few translations into English. The texts (Waldenfels, 2003, 2011) from which quotes in this chapter are taken are among the few English publications by Waldenfels.

special kind: The experience of the other “requires a new sort of responsive phenomenology,” which “goes beyond the traditional form of intentional phenomenology just as it leaves behind every sort of hermeneutics” (Waldenfels, 2003, p. 23). Waldenfels explains that “(r)esponding means more than intending or understanding.” Consistent with his propagation of the new kind of responsive phenomenology, Waldenfels intends to develop a

“special logic of response that differs considerably from the logic of intentional acts, from the logic of comprehension or from the logic of communicative action. It leads to a proper form of rationality, namely a rationality which arises from responsiveness itself.” (Waldenfels, 2003, p. 32).

Such response is a *creative* act:

“The response is creative as a response, i.e., as a form of saying and doing which begins elsewhere, yet without being grounded in a given sense of in existing rules. Creative responses are responses which are not pre-given, neither in the realm of things nor in the realm of words. Thus responding runs over a small ridge which separates bondage (*Hörigkeit*) from arbitrariness (*Beliebigkeit*).” (Waldenfels, 2003, p. 35).

Responsive phenomenology leads to a different understanding of the relation between subject and world; it also implies a radical understanding of the alien:

“(T)here is no world in which we will ever be completely at home, and there is no subject which will ever be the master of its own house. This kind of twilight of the idols confronts us with a radical sort of alien that precedes all efforts of appropriation – like the Other’s gaze which meets us before we become aware of it.” (Waldenfels, 2003, p. 24).

This reflects one of the characteristics that Waldenfels notes for the alien: the characteristic of *atopia*. The alien has no place. Waldenfels explains:

“(T)he alien’s place is a peculiar place. It resists any attempt to insert it into a local grid which would be accessible to everyone; it can only be reached crossing a certain threshold. ... (A)bsence, distance or inaccessibility is inherent to the alienness or otherness as such. In this regard the alienness resembles the past which cannot be grasped anywhere else than in its after effects or by memory. The alien does not simply dwell elsewhere, it appears itself as an elsewhere, as a form of *atopia*, just as in the line of Plato who describes Socrates as *atopos*, as somebody strange, as placeless.” (Waldenfels, 2003, p. 26).

What are the effects of the encounter with the alien? Waldenfels (2011, p. 84) claims that the alien “takes us outside ourselves and lets us transcend the boundaries of the specific order.” Concluding his *Phenomenology of the Alien*, Waldenfels says:

“As a phenomenologist, I propagate a specific kind of *epoché* that instigates a suspension of assumptions that are taken for granted, a departure from the familiar, a stepping-back in front of the alien.” (Waldenfels, 2011, p. 84).

The alien, Waldenfels claims, offers a surplus and creates new insights. He says:

“The alien... brings itself to attention as surplus [*Überschuss*] which precedes and exceeds every foreign observation [*Fremdbetrachtung*] and foreign treatment [*Fremdbehandlung*] of the alien. Not only the reduction of the alien to one’s own, but also the attempt of a

synthesis between the two belongs to the violent acts which silence the demand [*Anspruch*] of the alien.” (Waldenfels, 1999, p. 50; transl. H.S.)

To sum up my brief outline of Waldenfels’ phenomenology of the alien, the metaphor of the alien as “sting” [Stachel] is a strong expression of the *demand* of the alien, its challenge coming from outside, its creation of a *pathic* situation (Waldenfels, 2011, p. 21–34). “The sting of the alien not only puts in motion, it penetrates into one’s own flesh like the sting of a gadfly, the symbol of Socratic questioning” (Waldenfels, 1990, p. 8, transl. H.S.).

Nakamura’s Concept of Xenosophia

There are strong parallels in the argumentation of Waldenfels and Nakamura. Nakamura’s building blocks for a theory of the alien clearly rest on the foundation of Waldenfels’ phenomenology of the alien. Nevertheless, Nakamura, who puts the discussion under ‘xenosophia’ as umbrella term, offers valuable contributions to methodological and conceptual precisions. Nakamura is concerned with sharpening the distinction between *other* and *alien*. While Nakamura (2000, p. 115), in his critical reading, concludes that Waldenfels only “takes us to the border of otherness and alienness, but does not cross that border,” Nakamura intends to sharpen this distinction, in order to profile the *alien* and state more precisely that the replacement of alienness with otherness is the problem (for which he uses the term ‘exotism,’ as will be explained shortly). Related to his concern about a clear distinction between *other* and *alien* is Nakamura’s proposal for introducing a clear distinction between inner/vertical alienness and outer/horizontal alienness.

We need to insist on these sharp distinctions and prevent any confusion, this is Nakamura’s thesis, in order to preserve the alienness of the alien. And the alienness of the alien consists of its autonomy, independence, and principal incomprehensibility; the alien comes from the outside and can only be experienced. Thus, the other must not be mistaken for the alien. This implies that we need to be suspicious against any assimilation of the alien, since assimilation implies that the real experience of the alien is substituted by a construction of the alien as other. Nakamura calls the assimilation of the alien “exotism:”

“Exotism ... consists in the application of patterns of interpretation for internal alienness to phenomena of outer alienness, in order to divert or eliminate irritation.” (Nakamura, 2000, p. 49, transl. H.S.)

This is of particular importance for the xenography, the description of types and patterns of how the alien was and is perceived. And exotism has dominated ethnological and inter-cultural perception for centuries – and may indicate the basic mechanism of how prejudice develops. Thus, the perception of the alien, which may allow irritation, is rather the exception. Therefore, we may need to pay attention to the proposal to distinguish *other* and *alien* – to be able to resist the problem that the *alien* is replaced by the *other*.

“In exotism, the alien, which is in experience uncontrollable, is – counter to the resistance of factual autonomy – made-other [verändert], is made into an Other. That, which, on a ‘virtual’ meta-level, is constituted and orchestrated [inszeniert] as supposed alien, suppresses that, which on the horizon level has been experienced as alien. Exotism is thus the replacement of the experienced alien by an orchestrated alien [durch inszeniertes Fremdes], replacement of alienness by otherness.” (Nakamura, 2000, p. 72, transl. H.S.)

Xenosophia, in contrast, is described by Nakamura (2000, p. 238) as a process, which originates at the starting point of the experience of the alien – and this is an experience of crisis in which the usual hermeneutical procedures (of development and correction of pre-understanding) come to a stop. This is an experience of a radical contradiction, an experience of being thrown out of the hermeneutical circle. Nakamura speaks of a “non-hermeneutical reservation.” The crisis is created by the unexpected, challenging and irritating experience that cannot and must not simply be assimilated or integrated.

The non-hermeneutical reservations are necessary, Nakamura (2000, p. 240) says, to prevent potential misperception and misinterpretation of the alien: “The core of the non-hermeneutic is the memento, which keeps alive the moment of irritation against the coming-to-terms with and re-visions of the irritation.” Xenosophia resists the premature abandonment of irritation and perplexity – that is caused by the “sting” of the alien, to recall Waldenfels.

It is adequate and necessary, after the argumentation on a high philosophical-phenomenological level, to descend to the level of a practical xenology. The outlook on a xenology in Nakamura’s book (p. 243–260) thus deals with the ethics that may follow from the consideration of xenosophia. It is unavoidable that we engage in the attempt to understand and interpret the alien, the challenge of the alien calls for a response. Understanding the alien requires a responsive habitus, as Waldenfels maintains, which, however, must never ignore (memento!) the sting of the alien. In this process, we should always conserve an awareness of the difference between alienness and otherness. In other words, understanding the alien needs to at least maintain the reservations of the preliminariness of any understanding. There remains incompleteness, uncertainty, and the potential need for revision. The least that we need to preserve is the awareness that any act of understanding is an annexation, an assimilation of the alien to the categories of one’s own. And this can never be completely adequate. It is, as Nakamura (p. 249) says, like a sentence in an ongoing language game. Beneath the interpretation of the alien in terms of otherness, there needs to be an ongoing awareness of the alienness of the alien. And this constitutes a clear difference to the approach in which the alien is reduced to an “other” without any reservations and memento.

Conceptualizing Xenosophia in Respect to the Hierarchy of Styles of Responding to the Strange – A Conclusion

Our own conceptualization of xenosophia owes much to the phenomenological reflections of Waldenfels and Nakamura. But in the context of our past research and thus of the results presented in this book, the encounter with the strange has a rather specific focus on inter-cultural and inter-religious relations, on prejudices and their potential salutogenic opposite(s). The question therefore is this: How should we draft the differences in the patterns or styles of responding to strangeness in our multi-cultural and multi-religious societies? Can we justify a hierarchy of styles of responding to strangeness? Is there a plausible developmental model of how to understand – and potentially prescribe – statistical and biographical paths to xenophobia? Thus, we draw conclusions about the contribution of the phenomenological reflection on xenosophia and expand on these reflections to answer these questions.

The preeminent and most important characteristics of ‘xenosophia’ as used in our research and thus in the research presented in this book can be summarized in the following theses:

1. Xenosophia begins with experiences of resistance and irritation. Strangers provide each other with experiences of strangeness, for which there is no instant way of understanding and coming to terms with.
2. Nevertheless, irritation and resistance call for a reaction. And here we cannot react otherwise than applying our categories of understanding (in Nakamura’s terms: apply our categories from coming to terms with inner, vertical experiences of alienness to the outer, horizontal experiences of alienness).
3. The decisive question then is this: whether such understanding is regarded definitive and final, closing the door to any irritation, or whether such understanding is regarded as provisional, as a sentence in a language game—with at least the memento to non-hermeneutical reservations. Thus, xenosophia includes the recognition and admission that my own understanding is not the absolute truth; Xenosophia is based on preconditions such as tolerance for complexity and on the virtue of humility, hermeneutical humility, intellectual humility.⁴ Even though tolerance of complexity and intellectual humility are necessary preconditions, we find Waldenfels’ focus on the ‘demand’ or ‘sting’ most precise for the question of how we relate to the alien:
4. The “sting of the alien” must not be abandoned and silenced. In Waldenfels’ terms, the experience of the alien is a demand that calls for a response. And these responses are creative acts exceeding any pre-given ways of responding. Xenosophia, we may conclude, includes inspiration and creativity in responding to the demand of the alien/the strange.

⁴Recently, there is a lively discussion of intellectual humility (see, for example, Davis et al., 2016) and its relation to religious tolerance (Hook et al., 2016). Also scales have been developed for intellectual humility (McElroy et al., 2014; Krumrei-Mancuso & Rouse, 2016). We welcome this discussion and appreciate its contribution to the exploration of preconditions for xenosophia.

5. Xenosophia demands dialog. The experience of strangeness and the irritation that comes with it is mutual. This process of inter-action should be noted also for the xenosophic style. This justifies that, in the conceptualization of the xenosophic schema of the Religious Schema Scale, we have explicitly included “inter-religious dialog,” thus the subscale name reads “xenosophia/inter-religious dialog.” The xenosophic schema presupposes a symmetric inter-action “at the same eye level.”
6. The mutual irritation includes content dimensions regarding worldviews and behavior. The mutual experience of alienness then invites the questioning and potentially revising of one’s own worldview and practice. Dialog, inter-cultural and inter-religious dialog, includes such mutual inter-action of experiences of difference and resistance.
7. Regarding the outcome of the “non-hermeneutical reservation,” the outcome of keeping alive the irritation (or at least the memento for this irritation), we propose: Xenosophia may lead to wisdom. The term ‘xenosophia’ includes ‘sophia,’ ‘wisdom.’ And our conclusion with reference to Waldenfels is this: Wisdom is the “surplus” of the encounter with the strange. Xenosophia is the wisdom that we may expect to emerge from the irritating encounter with the strange. (Unfortunately, this positive outcome is not discussed in Nakamura’s text.)

Now we go one step further and re-consider—in the rearview mirror, as it were—the concepts of xenophobia and tolerance in the light of our definition of xenosophia. Prejudice and xenophobia, we may conclude from the conceptualization of xenosophic habitus, rest on a process by which the strange is assimilated and treated as whatever our more or less prejudiced categories construct as *other*. We may call this, with Nakamura, “exotism”—with all the potential fatal consequences that may follow from this exotism, if otherness is not curbed by ethical prescriptions, but loaded with aversive downgrading because of anxieties or even pure hate. Thus we may understand xenophobia as ethically un-curbed otherness.

Thus, tolerance can also be, and to a large extent is, based on the mechanism by which the strange is constructed and made the other. But in tolerance, otherness is curbed by ethical prescriptions or legal regulations. Of course, the xenosophic habitus also stimulates and promotes tolerant behavior. But the conception(s) of *tolerance* do not necessarily require the non-hermeneutical reservation that is supposed to keep the door open for the irritation and the demand of the strange. Thus, we may conclude that tolerance rests on constructions of the strange as other – constructions, which are not debatable and do not allow irritations, but are taken for granted. This sheds new light on Forst’s (2013) four conceptions of tolerance: The “*permission conception*” grants elementary human rights to the *other*; the “*coexistence conception*” curbs *otherness* by the negative version of the Golden Rule; the “*respect conception*” treats the convictions and practices of *others* as legally and politically equal; and the “*esteem conception*” may express high regard to the *others*’ convictions and practices, but does not necessarily require that one’s own construction of the other is regarded preliminary.

Finally, the above reflections allow placing the styles of responding to the strange into a hierarchical order. From the philosophical argumentation in this chapter, it is clear that xenosophia is more adequate than tolerance and much more adequate than xenophobia. The xenosophic habitus responds in the most appropriate way to the needs and the demands of all participants, including the strangers; thus it contributes best to the common good and minimizes violence, misinterpretation and prejudice.

And also the hierarchy of the developmental sequence of religious styles or faith stages receives support from our reflection on xenosophia. I have argued elsewhere (Streib, 2013) that the hierarchical order of the sequence of faith stages or of religious styles needs philosophical-ethical and/or theological grounding. Now here, in the context of the philosophical-hermeneutical conceptualization of xenosophia, the hierarchy of religious styles can be put on a solid philosophical foundation, especially regarding the difference between individuative-reflective faith (Fowler), individuative-systemic religious style (Streib), and the religious schema of “fairness, tolerance and rational choice,” on the one hand, and the conjunctive faith (Fowler), the dialogical religious style (Streib), and the corresponding religious schema of “xenosophia/inter-religious dialog,” on the other hand.

A more comprehensive picture of xenosophia in the developmental framework including the full range of correspondences between Fowler’s stages of faith, religious styles, the religious schemata and styles of inter-religious negotiation, on the one hand, and the xenological patterns as developed in this chapter, on the other hand, will be presented in Chap. 3 (see Table 3.1).

Including Xenosophia in Empirical Research on Prejudice

In this outlook on the operationalization of xenosophia in empirical research, we focus on our own work and on how xenosophia has been included in the research presented in this book. This outlook is thus a kind of bridge to Chaps. 3 and 4, in which qualitative and quantitative instruments and research designs will be described comprehensively.

We are probably the first to explicitly use ‘xenosophia’ in empirical research. In the Religious Schema Scale (RSS, Streib et al. 2010), which we have developed, validated and included in most of our completed and current research projects, one of three subscales is supposed to assess xenosophia (and dialog): The RSS subscale *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog* (*xenos*). The five items of the subscale read:

“We can learn from each other what ultimate truth each religion contains.”

“We need to look beyond the denominational and religious differences to find the ultimate reality.”

“When I make a decision, I am open to contradicting proposals from diverse sources and philosophical standpoints.”

“Religious stories and representations from any religion unite me with the ultimate universe.”

“The truth I see in other world views leads me to re-examine my current views.”

It is obvious that, in the *xenos* subscale, xenosophia is assessed in the context of religion. And thereby the openness for inter-religious encounter and dialog is emphasized. But the red thread running through all items is the readiness to leave the shell of one’s own religion and world view and the expectation that exposure to the (potentially alien) truth claims and (potentially alien) symbols of other religions and world views may set in motion a dialog – with the expectation that something *ultimate* may emerge. The *xenos* items clearly and explicitly address the challenge of difference and contradiction that may lead to the re-examination of one’s own truths. Thus, the *xenos* subscale reflects the essential features of our concept of xenosophia, as detailed above.

Of the three religious schemata that are measured with the RSS (Streib et al. 2010), we expect especially the schema of *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog* to be clearly opposed to – and potentially a preventive resource against – prejudice and xenophobia. This assumption receives support from previous research with 340 German adolescents (Streib & Klein, 2014), in which we have used stepwise regression to demonstrate the clearly negative effect of *xenos* on anti-Islamic prejudice as the dependent variable. Results from our current study (presented in Chap. 6) not only corroborate these findings with considerably higher statistical power, they demonstrate that a key role is played by the schema *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog*: higher agreement with *xenos* clearly correlates and predicts higher agreement with *Islam as part of the Western world* and the *appreciation of religious diversity*, and higher rejection of *xenophobia* and *Islamophobia*. We can conclude with the claim that we have successfully completed at least first steps for including ‘xenosophia’ in prejudice research.

Besides the operationalization of xenosophia in a quantitative instrument, we attend to xenosophia also in qualitative research using the faith development interview (for details, see Chap. 3). In the framework of faith development theory (Fowler, 1981), xenosophia, as has been mentioned already, corresponds to Fowler’s Stage Five of “conjunctive faith” / to the “dialogical religious style” (Streib, 2001), a style of dealing with religious plurality with the appreciation of dialog and mutual learning, which is characterized by an open attitude towards religious difference. In our basic evaluation procedure indications of dialogical and xenosophic structures are identified in the answers to the 25 questions in the interview. But also through content analysis and narrative analysis, we are attentive to indices of xenosophia and to the narration of events (marked by experiences of strangeness causing reactions such as irritation, perplexity or resistance) that may be interpreted as triggers for biographical developments toward xenosophia. This way, our qualitative approach includes the assessment of biographical paths to xenosophia.

Finally, regarding other constructs and measures for our study (see Chap. 4 for a comprehensive presentation), basic assumptions are supported from the concepts that have been developed in this chapter. In short, xenosophia requires tolerance of complexity and *openness to change*. We have used the following instruments:

Openness to change vs. conservation belongs to the assessment of values according to Schwartz (2007) and is one of the two coordinates in value space. *Tolerance of complexity* has been assessed with the 20-item scale by Radant and Dalbert (2006, 2007). The hypothesis that these constructs are particularly effective in predicting xenosophia is based on the following considerations: Because the xenosophic habitus should be able to stand perplexity and irritation and throughout take a non-hermeneutical stance (at least consider the non-hermeneutical reservations as memento), the individual development of such habitus go hand in hand with high openness to change and with high tolerance of complexity. Thus, we hypothesize that high *openness to change* and high *tolerance of complexity* strongly correlate with and predict xenosophia as measured with the RSS subscale *xenos*.

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Chapter 2

Extant Empirical Research on Religiosity and Prejudice



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“The baiting of Jews, the hunting of Albigenses and Waldenses, the stoning of Quakers and ducking of Methodists, the murdering of Mormons and the massacring of Armenians, express much rather that aboriginal human neophobia, that pugnacity of which we all share the vestiges, and that inborn hatred of the alien and of eccentric and non-conforming men as aliens, than they express the positive piety of the various perpetrators” (James 1902/1982, p. 338).

When explaining the consequences of conversions in his famous Gifford lectures about the varieties of religious experience, William James (1902/1982) mentioned, as the quotation above illustrates, also examples of persecution and violence. However, appreciating the positive effects of religiosity on human life, he appraised such incidents to be rather expressions of fear of the unknown, new, and strange (instead of James’ term “neophobia,” we might alternatively identify this attitude as “xenophobia”) than to be expressions of what he assumed to be “positive piety.” After decades of research on the relation between religiosity and prejudice, we shouldn’t be too sure that devaluation of people perceived as different cannot be an integral part of a religious mindset. In fact, many types of religious orientations, beliefs, and behavior seem to be somehow statistically associated with prejudice against various groups (see Allport, 1954/1979, pp. 444–457; Gorsuch & Aleshire, 1974; Donahue, 1985; Batson, Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993, pp. 293–330; Jacobson, 1998; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009, pp. 411–427; Paloutzian, 2017, pp. 336–348; for reviews of the current states of research). But nevertheless, we might take two important clues from the quotation of James: (1)

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the characterization of targets of prejudice which belong to groups perceived as different and strange, and (2) the hope that there might be ways of being religious which prevent the development of prejudice and instead enable the individual to welcome strangeness (i.e. a “xenophobic” attitude).

In this chapter, we will elaborate on both points: We start with a description of types, emergence, functions, and consequences of prejudice. Then we present an overview about findings on the association between religiosity and various types of prejudice. While higher religiosity is associated with some types of prejudice, this does not apply for other types which appear to be uncorrelated or inversely related to higher religiosity. Hence, it is also plausible to distinguish between distinct types of religiosity as well, and throughout the history of psychological research on religiosity and prejudice, there have been repeated attempts to define and operationalize what James might have had in mind when writing about the “positive piety” free of hostile tendencies to other faiths and denominations. On the other hand, research has also clearly documented that specific types of religiosity, in particular religious fundamentalism, are especially prone to devalue groups perceived as different and strange. We give an overview over the associations of the varying types of religiosity with distinct types of prejudice. Since the differentiation between certain types of religiosity in psychological research on prejudice has almost entirely been a North American enterprise so far, we additionally present a comparative analysis of associations between several measures of religiosity and types of prejudice in the USA, Canada, and six European countries to sketch the context for our own study. We finish our chapter with a discussion of the findings and an outlook on consequences for our Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion.

Prejudice

Definition and Types of Prejudice

In Chap. 1, we have already referred to Allport’s (1954/1979) groundbreaking work on prejudice who defined prejudice as an

aversive or hostile attitude toward a person who belongs to a group, simply because he belongs to that group, and is therefore presumed to have the objectionable qualities ascribed to that group (p. 7).

Hence, prejudice results from an overgeneralization regardless of existing experiences because individuals are categorized as representatives of a certain group which is perceived to be somehow uncomfortably different than oneself (Aronson, Wilson, Akert, & Sommers, 2015; Ashmore, 1970; Banaji & Greenwald, 2013; Dovidio, Hewstone, Glick, & Esses, 2010). Thereby, the differences are merely a result of the perception of the prejudiced person and do by no means need to correspond with real group affiliations or self-chosen identifications. Across cultures, there are a number of real or pretended characteristics to which such differences are attributed, in particular ethnicity, sex, age, nationality, cultural or social background, religion,

sexual orientation, or also disability. According to such differences, people are not only regarded as differing, but also as unequal—due, for example, to perceived biological inferiority (e.g. racism, sexism, or prejudice against the disabled), amorality (e.g. prejudice against the unemployed), uselessness (e.g. prejudice against the homeless), or perverseness (e.g. homophobia). Based on the perceived inequalities, social hierarchies are established and legitimized (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999).

From the beginning of prejudice research (Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswik, Levinson, & Sanford, 1950; Allport, 1954/1979; Hartley, 1946; Henley & Pincus, 1978) on it has repeatedly been noticed that several types of prejudice co-occur—somebody holding xenophobic attitudes is also likely to hold anti-Semitic, racist, sexist, or homophobic attitudes (Groß, Zick, & Krause, 2012; Zick, Wolf, Küpper, Davidov, Schmidt, & Heitmeyer, 2008). This has been described and investigated as “generalized prejudice” by a number of researchers (Asbrock, Sibley, & Duckitt, 2010; Bäckström & Björklund, 2007; Bergh & Akrami, 2016; Bierly, 1985; Duckitt & Sibley, 2007; McFarland, 2010). Ekehammar and Akrami (2003) observed that 50% to 60% of the variance between several types of prejudice can be explained by a generalized prejudice factor. While specific components of a certain type of prejudice seem to depend primarily on situational factors and perceived group memberships of the prejudiced individual (“in-group” vs. “out-group”; see Brewer, 1999), generalized prejudice seems to be more strongly due to personality variables (e. g. low agreeableness and openness; see Bergh, Akrami, & Ekehammar, 2012; Ekehammar & Akrami, 2007; Ekehammar, Akrami, Gylje, & Zakrisson, 2004; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008) and to express a tendency to devalue marginalized groups perceived as lower in status and power (Akrami, Ekehammar, & Bergh, 2011; Bergh & Akrami, 2016; Bergh, Akrami, Sidanius, & Sibley, 2016). Since all various types of prejudice share an ideology of inequality, Heitmeyer (2002; 2007) has proposed to understand distinct types of prejudice to be symptoms of a superordinate syndrome that he calls “group-focused enmity” (GFE). The GFE syndrome includes a variety of seemingly distinct types of prejudice, such as xenophobia (prejudice against migrants), racism (prejudice against other ethnicities), anti-Semitism (prejudice against Jews and Judaism), Islamophobia (prejudice against Muslims and Islam), sexism (prejudice against women), homophobia (prejudice against homosexuals), as well as prejudice against asylum seekers, homeless, unemployed and disabled people (Groß et al., 2012; Küpper & Zick, 2017).¹

¹Of course, there are even many more types of prejudice one can think of. The list doesn’t make any claim to be complete. The naming of the diverse types of prejudice has been and still is subject of intensive discussions, and there are alternative terms for almost each of the types of prejudice mentioned above. For instance, naming some types of prejudice phobias, e.g. *homophobia* or *Islamophobia*, as if prejudice was some kind of mental disease has been discussed controversially (Herek, 2004), and a number of alternative terms have been proposed, e.g. “homonegativity” (Herek & McLemore, 2013; Rye & Meaney, 2010), “anti-Muslim racism” (Shoeman, 2014), or “anti-Muslimism” (Pfahl-Traughber, 2012). However, most of these terms have not become widely agreed-upon definitions yet. Another concern is that many terms do not allow for a clear differentiation between negative attitudes toward a certain cultural phenomenon, e.g. homosexuality or Islam, and toward the groups of people representing the respective phenomenon, e.g. gays and lesbians, or Muslims (Uenal, 2016). The fact that such discussions occur almost always in the literature on a certain type of prejudice can be regarded as indicator that a coherent systematic termi-

Formation of Prejudice

The formation of prejudice can be described as result of three cognitive operations (Zick, Küpper, & Hövermann, 2011): The first operation is *categorization*. For our mind, it is impossible to process the entire variety and complexity of the world (Allport, 1954/1979). For our orientation, we need categories which enable us to reduce and to handle the complexity. These categories do not arise by themselves, but are the result of categorizations, i.e. classifications we make due to perceived characteristics (e.g. identifying humans as categorically distinct from animals due to the perception of their abilities for two-legged walking, cognitive reflexivity, language, complex social networking, production of culture and so forth although, from a biological perspective, homo sapiens is merely one species of mammals among many others). Also, humans are distinguished by categories; probably the most evident example is the classification into men and women. It is obvious that categorization goes always along with simplifications which hardly do justice to existing varieties (e.g. approx. 1% of humans are genetically, hormonally, and/or anatomically not clearly male or female, but exhibit characteristics of both or neither sexes; cf. Blackless et al., 2000).

The second step in the formation of prejudice is *stereotyping*, i.e. the attribution of certain traits and behavioral dispositions to members of an identified category (Aronson et al., 2015). Hence, stereotyping results in the already mentioned over-generalization of characteristics which are attributed to all members of a certain group, regardless of whether an individual shares these characteristics or not (Judd, Ryan, & Park, 1991). While we tend to perceive representatives of our in-groups as relatively heterogeneous, by contrast, we tend to reduce the de facto existing heterogeneity of out-groups and perceive them as relatively homogeneous (“out-group homogeneity effect”)——“they are alike; we are diverse” (Quattrone & Jones, 1980, p. 141).

However, not all forms of stereotyped cognition lead inevitably to prejudice (Devine, 1989). This does not happen until the third step in the process of prejudice formation, the *evaluation* of a category and its representatives, is performed. When evaluated, the stereotypes are provided with positive or negative valences; they are judged to be better or worse——a process usually associated with positive or negative feelings, i.e. the affective component of prejudice (Banaji & Greenwald, 2013). Yet an *evaluation* does not necessarily include a *devaluation*: Beside clearly negatively evaluated stereotypes (e.g. “lazy migrants”), there might be positively (e.g. “punctual Germans”) or ambivalently (e.g. “hot-blooded Latinos”) evaluated stereotypes as well. In the broader sense, both positively and negatively biased perceptions can be considered to be prejudice. However, since negative stereotypes are much more likely to result in negative consequences for the targeted groups, social-

nology for the varieties of prejudice is still widely lacking so far. Because we will discuss a number of distinct types of prejudice in this book, we have decided to orient our terms toward the terminology of Zick and colleagues (Groß et al., 2012; Zick et al., 2008; 2011) who systematically studied up to 12 different types of prejudice as elements of the GFE syndrome.

psychological research has concentrated much more on prejudice in the narrower sense, i.e. negatively stereotyped attitudes toward certain groups (Aronson et al., 2015; Ashmore, 1970; Zick et al., 2011).

Similarities Between the Process of Prejudice Formation and Religious Beliefs

One central reason² for the reported affinity of religiosity toward prejudice is probably that religiosity, as a worldview, underlies similar cognitive mechanisms as prejudice formation (Klein, 2015): The German term “Weltanschauung” (worldview) has been introduced into idealistic and romantic philosophy in order to describe the unifying entirety of an individual’s perceptions, experiences, beliefs, and attitudes (Meier, 1968). In this sense, there could be a variety of worldviews (Dilthey, 1919/1991; Jaspers, 1919/1994; Simmel, 1918), and religious beliefs can then appear to be a legitimate type of worldview among others, too (Schleiermacher, 1799/2006). In fact, religious beliefs are probably among the most comprehensive, unifying types of worldviews, simply because religious traditions have developed comprehensive sets of narratives, dogmatics, and lifestyles which have been shaping (religious) worldviews for centuries (Allport, 1937). Yet, as the history of the term “Weltanschauung” dramatically shows, like the cognitive processes of categorization and stereotyping, each kind of unification necessarily bears the risk not only of simplifications, but of devaluation as well: The Nazis used the term “Weltanschauung” preferably to justify their cruel ideology because it allowed them to argue that their beliefs were the straight consequence of their intuitive, direct perceptions and, hence, unquestionable (Thomé, 2005).

While the term “Weltanschauung” suggests a consistency and stability of ideological beliefs, in fact these beliefs probably underlie many changes and are, when recalled during communication, reflected, newly verbalized, and adapted to new situations. In his theory of social systems, Luhmann (1977; 2000) postulated as core function of religion that religious narratives provide semantic ciphers in order to transfer indeterminable into terms and, hence, to cope with experiences of contingency. In this sense, Luhmann (2000, pp. 147–186) for instance describes the term “God” as a “contingency formula.” According to Luhmann, religious ciphers help to reduce the complexity of our experiences in order to enable communication, which strongly resembles the function of reducing the complexity of our perceptions through the operations of *categorization* and *stereotyping* which we have identified as important steps in the process of prejudice formation. Since religious beliefs and prejudice both serve the purpose of complexity reduction, they are probably likely to intertwine. Taking into account what we have said about the third step of prejudice formation, *evaluation*, we might conclude from this affinity between prejudice

²For descriptions and discussions of further theoretical explanations of the religiosity-prejudice link see Rowatt, Carpenter, and Haggard (2014) or Küpper and Zick (2017).

and religiosity that, as for the emergence of prejudice, it is crucial also for religious beliefs, narratives, and doctrines whether they articulate a devaluation of certain groups or not. If the latter is the case, prejudice is very likely to arise.

Functions and Consequences of Prejudice

Besides the reduction of the complexity of our perceptions, prejudicial attitudes fulfill, as unpleasant as they might be, nevertheless a number of further psychosocial functions for those who hold them. By segregating the in-group from out-groups, prejudice can help to form the individual's identity and a feeling of community among the in-group members (Zick, Küpper, & Heitmeyer, 2010). Among members of religious communities, the feeling of internal cohesion might be further strengthened by describing in-group relationships in terms of family and calling co-affiliates "brother" or "sister" and religious authorities "father" or "mother" which, from an evolutionary perspective, transfers the biological need of conserving one's gene pool to the religious community and might trigger self-preserving, possibly aggressive behavior (Kirkpatrick, 2005).

Feelings of belonging to a certain in-group, e.g. a "chosen people," and identity formation based on group membership further help to establish and to sustain self-esteem (Greenwald et al., 2002; Tajfel & Turner, 1979). Additionally, many types of prejudice offer explanations by ways of popular "myths" (e.g. that women or Blacks are less smart than white men) and provide thereby orientation and guidelines for social interaction (Allport, 1954/1979). Such myths are also used to legitimize existing or desired social hierarchies (Sidanius & Pratto, 1999) and can easily be detected also in the religious realm in the form of mythological narratives explaining and justifying the subordination of a certain group to another. For instance, the tale of Ham compromising the drunken Noah (Gen 9:20-27) has long been used to legitimize the enslavement of Blacks, and the attribution of the responsibility for killing Jesus to Jews is an enduring source of anti-Semitism among Christians (Eisinga, König, & Scheepers, 1995; Glock & Stark, 1966; Pargament, Trevino, Mahoney, & Silberman, 2007). The benefits of prejudice for the in-groups are probably the main reason that prejudicial attitudes are rather stable and are often retained even in spite of contradictory information and experiences.

Prejudice does not necessarily lead to behavior, but provides an ideological basis for its legitimization. Allport (1954/1979) distinguished between certain escalating degrees of manifestation of prejudice in society; starting with "antilocution" of out-groups, continuing with "avoidance," "discrimination," and "physical attack," and ending up with "extermination." The probability that prejudice leads to behavior and even violent acts increases depending on certain catalyzing factors (Fishbein & Ajzen, 1975). First, social norms play an important role: The transfer of prejudice into discriminating behavior is facilitated if the norm of the equality of differing social groups is not put straight, e.g. by laws or constitutions. Second, the perceived attitudes of persons of public life regarded as important by prejudiced people matter.

If someone holding prejudice has the impression that his social environment and public authorities share his attitudes, the motivation to act accordingly increases. Third, opportunities to act discrimination out enable the behavioral manifestation of prejudice. If discrimination or violent acts are not persecuted and penalized, the likelihood of repeated offenses increases. With respect to religiosity, therefore, we can expect that religious stories and teachings as well as given statements of religious institutions or perceived attitudes of religious leaders might affect the occurrence of prejudice both to the better or the worse (Küpper & Zick, 2017).

Associations Between Religiosity and Prejudice

The Paradoxical Relation Between Religiosity and Prejudice

Given how clearly core Christian teachings like “You shall not kill” (Ex 20:13, Dtn 5:17), “You shall love your neighbor as yourself” (Lev 19:18; Mt 22:39; Mk 12:31; Lk 10:27), “Love your enemies” (Mt 5:44; Lk 6:27), and “[God] has made of one blood all nations” (Act 17:26) contradict prejudice, discrimination, and violence (Coward, 1986), one can understand that Allport (1954/1979; Allport & Ross, 1967), when facing contemporary research findings showing positive statistical associations between indicators of religiosity and higher levels of prejudice regarded the relation between religiosity and prejudice to be paradoxical. The observation that religious affiliation, higher levels of self-reported religiosity, and higher rates of church attendance are positively associated with prejudice has first been made systematically in the years after World War II when researchers were trying to understand how anti-Semitic and racist prejudice develop. In their famous study on the authoritarian personality, Adorno et al. (1950) detected that religious participants showed higher rates of anti-Semitism and ethnocentrism than non-religious participants. Allport (Allport & Kramer, 1946) himself noted higher levels of anti-Black racist prejudice among respondents affiliated with a church than among the non-affiliated already some years earlier. While the denomination of respondents was often found to be of less importance (Parry, 1949; Rosenblith, 1949; Spoerl, 1951), being religious or not clearly made a difference.

Since this early phase of research on religiosity and prejudice, the overall positive association between diverse types of prejudice and indicators of general religiosity, in particular religious affiliation, self-rated religiosity, agreement to certain religious beliefs, and church attendance has often been corroborated, at least among predominantly Christian samples. While the first studies have concentrated on associations of religiosity with anti-Semitism, anti-Black racism, and ethnocentrism (see Batson et al., 1993, and Gorsuch & Aleshire, 1974; for overviews), in the meantime associations with other types of prejudice such as sexism (e.g. Burn & Basso, 2005; Glick, Lameiras, & Castro, 2002; Maltby, Hall, Anderson, & Edwards, 2010; Stover & Hope, 1984), homophobia (in particular since the 1980s; e.g. Finlay & Walther, 2003; Fisher, Derison, Polley, Cadman, & Johnston, 1994; Herek, 1987;

Kunkel & Temple, 1992; Larsen, Cate, & Reed, 1983; VanderStoep & Green, 1988) or Islamophobia (in particular since 2001; e.g. Johnson, LaBouff, Rowatt, Patock-Peckham, & Carlisle, 2012a; Kalkan, Layman, & Uslaner, 2009; Panagopoulos, 2006; Rowatt, Franklin, & Cotton, 2005) have been investigated as well (Duckitt, 2010; Hood et al., 2009; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). In recent years, atheists have also been added to the list of potential targets of prejudice (Gervais, 2011; 2013; Swan & Heesacker, 2012). In their detailed review, Batson et al. (1993) found that of 47 older studies wherein associations of general religiosity with anti-Semitic, racist, or ethnocentric prejudice have been studied, only two found negative associations while 37 reported positive associations. More recently, the association between indicators of general religiosity and racism has also been the subject of a meta-analysis over 20 independent samples (Hall, Matz, & Wood, 2010). The authors found a small, but significant mean correlation of $r = .10$ across all studies wherein religiosity has been assessed in terms of self-rated degree of religiosity or ratings of the subjective importance of religion in one's life. However, they noticed that the strength of the association between general religiosity and racism has decreased in recent decades: While the correlation in the 11 studies before 1986 has been $r = .12$, in the 9 studies published since 1986 only a marginal mean correlation of $r = .06$ remained. In another meta-analysis (Whitley, 2009), several indicators of general religiosity were even positively correlated to the appreciation of other ethnic or racial groups while the substantial association between measures of general religiosity and higher levels of homophobic attitudes could clearly be corroborated. Hence, associations between religiosity and prejudice seem to change over time and to differ to some degree depending on the target.

Differences Depending on Distinct Types of Prejudice

In order to understand why religious people display stronger levels of prejudice toward certain groups, in particular gays and lesbians, than toward other racial or ethnic groups, Herek (1987) has suggested to attribute this finding to differences in church teachings. Similarly, Batson and Burris (1994) proposed to distinguish between types of prejudice which are proscribed by many denominations (which can be expected to apply for racist prejudice, at least since the civil rights movement in the 1960s) and such types of prejudice which are non-proscribed or even encouraged by some denominations. In recent years, this taxonomy has been extended and includes the distinction between prejudices toward ethnic or racial, other religious, and moral or fundamental convictional groups (Saroglou, 2016). The latter might in particular apply to homophobic prejudice as many churches still disapprove of homosexuality referring to biblical verses such as Lev 20:13 or Rom 1:26-27, but also to prejudice against atheists as perceived challengers of any religious belief. Also prejudice against feminists (Blogowska & Saroglou, 2011) or single mothers (Jackson & Esses, 1997), hence persons calling traditional gender roles into question, might be assigned to the category of prejudice against morally threatening

groups. Latent sexist attitudes still seem to be prevalent among conservative or fundamentalist Christians, probably because beliefs about gender roles are still shaped by biblical verses like Gen 3:16 or 1. Cor 14:34.

Comparing racist and homophobic prejudice, Duck and Hunsberger (1999) indeed observed that racism was reported to be proscribed by certain religious groups while homophobia was reported to be non-proscribed. Hence, distinguishing between types of prejudice that are more or less in tension with basic religious values helps to explain differing patterns of associations between religiosity and prejudice (Hood et al., 2009; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). Yet caution is still required because religiously proscribed types of prejudice might not be expressed overtly, but subtly and covertly instead (Batson & Stocks, 2005). Additionally, it is necessary to be aware of the specific cultural context, too, since religious cultures might differ in their perceptions of certain types of prejudice. For instance, Lafferty (1990) has argued that in South Africa racism has still been religiously non-proscribed during the politics of Apartheid.

Findings Around the Globe and Across Religious Traditions

In general, cultural context has to be taken into account. For instance, inter-religious prejudice which has repeatedly been reported of Hindus and Muslims in India is stronger among higher religious members of each group (Hasnain & Abidi, 2007; Hewstone, Islam, & Judd, 1993; Tausch, Hewstone, & Roy, 2009), but might, in this specific context, refer rather to a label of general cultural than of religious identity. The link between general religiosity and several types of prejudice has been investigated in several sociological large-scale surveys around the globe. In a study based on the data of the first three waves of the World Values Survey (WVS), including 53 countries and separate samples for Northern Ireland and East Germany and almost 150,000 respondents, Guiso, Sapienza, and Zingales (2003) studied the relationship between religiosity and economic attitudes and included intolerance toward immigrants and toward other races as well as a sexist attitude (“When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.”) in their analyses. They found significant, although very small, positive effects of religiosity as operationalized in terms of religious socialization, religious affiliation, and service attendance on intolerance toward immigrants and other races, but only if the respondents belonged to the dominant religious tradition in a certain country. The association between religiosity and sexism appeared to be stronger, but switched to a negative association if the respondents were members of the dominant religion in their country. Comparing the single indicators of religiosity, Guiso and colleagues noticed that the association between a sexist attitude and service attendance was negative among the members of the dominant religious tradition while the associations between sexism and religious socialization were positive. Hence, regular service attendance might not be a strong indicator of religious commitment when one’s own religion is the dominant one. Comparing the differing religious traditions,

Guiso and colleagues found all religious denominations except Buddhism to be associated with higher levels of intolerance toward immigrants and other races. While Catholics and Protestants did not differ in their levels of intolerance, Muslims and Hindus expressed somewhat higher levels of intolerance whereas Jews exhibited somewhat less intolerance. However, the authors mention that no data from Israel have been included in the analyses so that findings might reflect that all Jews included in the sample belong to minorities in countries dominated by other religious traditions where they might be subject of discrimination. With respect to sexism, adherents of all religious traditions except Jews were found to display some devaluation of women.

Additionally to the findings of Guiso et al. (2003) on associations of religiosity with xenophobic, racist, and sexist attitudes, a number of studies have analyzed the WVS data on the relationship between religiosity and homophobia (Adamczyk, 2017; Adamczyk & Pitt, 2009; Jäckle & Wenzelburger, 2015). Adamczyk and Pitt (2009) used data of the fourth wave of the WVS, including 33 countries and more than 45,000 respondents. Besides other effects on the individual and cultural level, they found a significant effect of the individual importance of religiosity on the disapproval of homosexuality. However, taking general cultural value orientations into account, they observed that personal importance of religiosity has a much greater effect on attitudes about homosexuality in developed countries with a preference for self-expression values such as the USA than in countries like Zimbabwe, which are characterized by an orientation on survival values. Focusing on distinct religious traditions, homophobic tendencies were stronger among Muslims and Protestants than among Jewish, Catholic, Orthodox, Hindu, Buddhist, or not religiously affiliated respondents whereby only few European countries and none with a Protestant majority have been included in the sample so that mainline Protestants might have been underrepresented. Studies from the USA show that Protestants differ strongly in their views on homosexuality. While conservative, evangelical, and charismatic Protestants are very likely to disapprove of homosexuality in general (Finlay & Walther, 2003; Fulton, Gorsuch, & Maynard, 1999; Hill, Moulton, & Burdette, 2004), mainline Protestants on average hold more liberal views (Burdette, Ellison, & Hill, 2005). On the country level, Adamczyk and Pitt (2009) observed that predominantly Buddhist or Hindu countries and, somewhat surprisingly, but maybe due to the selection of national samples, also Catholic countries appeared to be less homophobic as compared to countries with other dominating religious traditions. In a recently published book, Adamczyk (2017) could widely corroborate the findings reported above on an even broader empirical basis using the data of waves 4, 5, and 6 of the WVS, covering 87 countries and more than 200,000 participants. Again, Muslims and Protestants displayed the highest levels of homophobia, followed by Hindus, while not religious and Jewish respondents appeared to be the least prejudiced and Catholics, Orthodox, and Buddhist participants fell in the middle (however, since Israel has not been included in the analysis, it is possible that the result for Jews might have been a bit less liberal if higher numbers of more conservative and orthodox Jewish respondents had been included). But all in all, the differences between the distinct religious denominations, although partly significant,

were rather low (less than one point on a 10-point Likert scale). What Adamczyk (2017) could clearly corroborate in her analysis is the effect of personal salience of religiosity, which had a stronger effect on attitudes toward homosexuals than any other demographic variable included in her analysis. Similar results have also been reported by Jäckle and Wenzelburger (2015) on the basis of the WVS waves 4 and 5. In sum, all around the globe more religious people seem to be more likely to express homophobic attitudes as compared to not religious people.

The Situation in Europe

At the end of this section, we will take a closer look on European countries in order to face the closer cultural context of the Bielefeld Study on Xenophobia and Religion. During the early phases of American research on religiosity and prejudice, there have only been a handful of European studies (e.g. Bagley, 1970; Nias, 1972). However, throughout the last 25 years, the number of studies has increased substantially and allows for an overview over associations between religiosity and various types of prejudice. While some studies about religiosity and ethnocentrism in Belgium and the Netherlands published in the 1990s did not find clear associations of belief in God or church attendance with ethnocentric attitudes (Billiet, 1995; Eisinga, Billiet, & Felling, 1999; Eisinga, Felling, & Peters, 1990), with respect to anti-Semitism, two Dutch studies (Eisinga et al., 1995; König, Eisinga, & Scheepers, 2000) found evidence that secular anti-Semitism was partly motivated by religious anti-Semitism, i.e. the opinion that Jews caused the death of Jesus; an opinion which itself was predicted by agreement to traditional Christian beliefs. In a sociological study using nationally representative samples from 11 European countries and more than 11,000 participants (Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Hello, 2002a), the authors differentiated between several indicators of religiosity and found that religious affiliation and higher rates of church attendance were associated with higher levels of prejudice toward ethnic minorities while belief in God and salience of religiosity were associated with less prejudice. However, in general, effects were rather low. The strongest association with ethnocentric attitudes could be observed for a measure of religious exclusivism claiming that there is only one true religion. Once again, the target of prejudice seems to play an important role: In a survey across 30 European countries (Strabac & Listhaug, 2008), Islamophobic prejudice was not linked to indicators of religious belief and service attendance, but in several recent large-scale surveys importance of religiosity was clearly associated with higher levels of homophobia; and disapproval of homosexuality was found to be stronger in more religious than in more secular countries (Kuyper, Iedema, & Keuzenkamp, 2013; Scheepers, te Grotenhuis, & van der Slik, 2002b; van den Akker, van der Ploeg, & Scheepers, 2013).

In their research on GFE, Küpper and Zick (2010) compared associations between several religious variables and eight types of prejudice across eight European countries (representative national samples, $N = 8,026$) and found religious

affiliation, church attendance, and in particular belief in the superiority of the own religious tradition (“My religion is the only true one.”) to be associated with somewhat higher rates of anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, xenophobic prejudice toward immigrants, racism, and prejudice toward the homeless. While there was no clear pattern for prejudice toward disabled persons, participants scoring higher on the aforementioned measures of religiosity expressed much higher levels of sexist and homophobic prejudice than the non-affiliated or non-attending participants or those without superiority beliefs. Looking at the relationships between prejudice and self-rated religiosity, Küpper and Zick noticed that the rather large group of respondents describing themselves as “quite religious” often displayed higher levels of prejudice than the rather small group of respondents rating themselves as “very religious”—— but only in the more secular countries and with the exception of sexism and homophobia for which the highly religious participants expressed the highest levels of devaluation.

Most recently, in a series of sociological studies Doebler (2014; 2015a, 2015b) used the data of the European Values Study (EVS) to compare the associations of several indicators of religiosity with several types of prejudice across more than 40 European countries: She included a number of single-items assessing distinct aspects of religiosity such as traditional belief in God, an individualized modern belief in some sort of spirit or life force, an exclusivist belief that there is only one true religion, religious affiliation, and service attendance in her analyses, and calculated the associations of these measures of religiosity with anti-Immigrant, Islamophobic, racist, and homophobic prejudice. While the effects of affiliation and attendance appeared to be rather low, Doebler (2014; 2015a) observed that both traditional and individualized beliefs were negatively associated with anti-immigrant xenophobia, Islamophobia, and racism. While belief in a higher spirit or life force was also inversely related to homophobic attitudes, belief in God showed to go along with moral rejection of homosexuality, but not with intolerance toward homosexuals as a group (Doebler, 2015b). As in the studies of Scheepers et al. (2002a) and Küpper and Zick (2010), the exclusivist belief in the superior truth of the own religious tradition was associated with higher levels of prejudice toward all target groups (Doebler, 2014; 2015a, 2015b). And similar to the findings of Küpper and Zick, agreement to prejudice statements in general was higher in more religious than in more secular countries.

Summing up, the European situation can be characterized as follows: While indicators of general religiosity, such as religious self-ratings or church attendance, and religious affiliation seem to be only slightly or not at all related to most types of prejudice, they appear to be associated with stronger prejudice toward sexually marked groups such as women and homosexuals. On the cultural level, prejudice seems to be more likely in more religiously coined contexts. On the individual level, especially the particularistic understanding of one’s religiosity that resembles fundamentalist claims of exclusive truth is prone to prejudiced opinions. Hence, it seems to be crucial to distinguish not only between distinct types of prejudice, but between certain types of religiosity, too.

Distinct Types of Religiosity and Their Associations with Prejudice

In the last paragraph, we have seen that associations between religiosity and prejudice do not only depend on the type of prejudice (e.g. racism or homophobia), but also might differ depending on certain types of religiosity or religious orientations. In recent European studies, primarily the exclusivist opinion that one's own religious tradition is the only true one accounted for the majority of negative associations with prejudice toward other religious and ethnic groups. Such an exclusivist attitude is well-known to be one of the core elements of religious fundamentalism which has been studied extensively throughout the last 25 years, in particular in the USA and Canada (for overviews, see Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005; Hood et al., 2009; Klein, Zwingmann, & Jeserich, 2017c; Rowatt, Shen, LaBouff, & Gonzalez, 2013). According to extant findings, religious fundamentalism is much closer associated with prejudice than any other type of religiosity. Therefore, we will describe concepts of religious fundamentalism and existing findings in more detail in the next paragraphs.

While fundamentalist religiosity generally appears to be strongly prejudiced, since Allport's days, scholars have tried to define, operationalize and empirically corroborate concepts of religious orientations which are uncorrelated or even negatively associated with prejudice (see Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Klein, 2015; 2017, for reviews). So far, we have concentrated primarily on findings based on religious affiliation or on indicators of general religiosity (e.g. service attendance or single-item ratings of individual religiosity or personal importance of religiosity). But grounded in the literature on fundamentalism and opposing religious orientations, it is possible to distinguish between certain types of religiosity that differ in their associations with prejudice. Hence, in the subsequent sections, we will give an overview over the search for unprejudiced religiosity and over the relations between distinct types of prejudice and distinct types of religiosity.

Religious Fundamentalism

In earlier studies, religious fundamentalism has usually been conceptualized as the belief in fundamental contents of sacred writings and their literal truth, and research has concentrated on the Christian tradition (Broen, 1957; Gibson & Francis, 1996; Gorsuch & Smith, 1983; Martin & Westie, 1959; McFarland, 1989). Such an approach has been prominently criticized by Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) because it was not possible to distinguish between the mere agreement to certain beliefs and the way they are mentally represented and acted out. Therefore, they argued to focus stronger on such social-psychological elements of fundamentalist beliefs and proposed to understand religious fundamentalism as

the belief that there is one set of religious teachings that clearly contains the fundamental, basic, intrinsic, essential, inerrant truth about humanity and deity; that this essential truth is fundamentally opposed by forces of evil which must be vigorously fought; that this truth must be followed today according to the fundamental, unchangeable practices of the past; and that those who believe and follow these fundamental teachings have a special relationship with the deity (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992, p. 118).

This definition of religious fundamentalism includes a number of ideological elements which have also been identified to be core characteristics of fundamentalist beliefs in the Fundamentalism Project of the American Academy of Arts and Sciences (Almond, Sivan, & Appleby, 1995); besides the belief in the literal, absolutist, and inerrant truth of a sacred text and corresponding teachings (*literalism*) in particular the simplifying dichotomization between good and evil (*moral dualism*), the orientation toward strict behavioral rules, and the expectation that the true believers belong to the community of the chosen people (*exclusivism*). Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992; 2004; 2005) have operationalized their concept of religious fundamentalism with their Religious Fundamentalism Scale, which is applicable in diverse religious cultures (e.g. Hunsberger, 1996; Hunsberger, Owusu & Duck, 1999) and soon became the most commonly used measure for fundamentalist beliefs. Hence, in recent meta-analyses it was possible to include religious fundamentalism as a certain category (Hall et al., 2010; McCleary, Quillivan, Foster, & Williams, 2011; Saroglou, 2010; Whitley, 2009). According to their results, religious fundamentalism is clearly associated with less openness to experience (Saroglou, 2010) and higher levels of racist (Hall et al., 2010), ethnocentric (McCleary et al., 2011), homophobic (Whitley, 2009), and other prejudice (McCleary et al., 2011). While the mean correlation between religious fundamentalism and racism is rather low with $r = .13$ and has decreased from $r = .28$ across three studies conducted before 1986 to $r = .09$ across 11 studies published since 1986 (Hall et al., 2010), the average correlation between religious fundamentalism and homophobia is visibly stronger: McCleary et al. (2011) report correlations between $r = .28$ and $r = .70$ across 14 samples; the average correlation in the meta-analysis of Whitley (2009) was $r = -.45$ across 17 samples (correlation coefficient with a minus sign because positive attitudes toward homosexuals have been used as dependent variable). Hence, again the type of the target makes a difference.

Analyses wherein effects of religious fundamentalism and other types of religiosity have been studied simultaneously suggest that many effects of religiosity on prejudice can be attributed to fundamentalist tendencies. A number of studies tested whether religious orthodoxy, i.e. conservative beliefs in core religious teachings, does predict prejudice toward other races or homosexuals when religious fundamentalism was included as predictor in the analyses, too (Kirkpatrick, 1993; Kirkpatrick, Hood, & Hartz, 1991; Laythe, Finkel, Bringle, & Kirkpatrick, 2002; Rowatt & Franklin, 2004). While fundamentalism turned out to significantly predict higher levels of prejudice, religious orthodoxy significantly predicted lower rates of racism and had insignificant or even negative effects on homophobia. Since almost all religious traditions postulate some kind of benefit of affiliation to their own

denomination, it seems plausible that they contain some inherent fundamentalist tendencies in terms of a belief in the superiority of their own tradition. Therefore, Klein, Zwingmann, and Jeserich (2017b) analyzed associations between the centrality of religiosity in an individual's personality and four types of prejudice (xenophobia, anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and homophobia) among representative samples from eight countries while partializing out the effects of religious fundamentalism. As result, 22 of the total of 32 correlations between centrality of religiosity and prejudice turned out to be insignificant while only seven of the eight correlations between centrality of religiosity and a homophobic attitude remained significantly positive. Hence, positive effects of general religiosity on ethnically or religiously marked types of prejudice (rather religiously proscribed) might primarily be due to latent fundamentalist tendencies in common religious beliefs (cf. also the reported findings of Doebler, 2014; 2015a; 2015b; Küpper & Zick, 2010; and Scheepers et al., 2002a; on effects of religious exclusivism) whereas religiously non-proscribed prejudice toward homosexuals seems to be affected by "ordinary" religiosity as well.

Interaction and Overlap Between Religious Fundamentalism and Authoritarianism

Many attempts have been made to better understand why fundamentalists tend to be more prejudiced than other religious groups. A number of studies identified certain social-cognitive characteristics among fundamentalists which might support the likelihood to develop devaluating attitudes toward others, for instance social-cognitive inflexibility (Hunsberger, Alisat, Pancer, & Pratt, 1996; Hunsberger, Pratt, & Pancer, 1994; Pancer, Jackson, Hunsberger, Pratt, & Lea, 1995), cognitive rigidity in terms of preference for consistency and low critical thinking (Hill, Cohen, Terrell, & Nagoshi, 2010), closed-mindedness, and preference for order (Brandt & Reyna, 2010). According to Altemeyer and Hunsberger (2005; Altemeyer, 2003), the most important reason for the link between religious fundamentalism and prejudice is a socialization toward authoritarianism among fundamentalist families. Indeed, a strong association between fundamentalism and an authoritarian personality in terms of right-wing authoritarianism (RWA; Altemeyer, 1981; 1988; 1996) is obvious. RWA consists of three components: 1) an orientation toward traditional societal norms (*conventionalism*), 2) the need for strong authorities who guarantee the observance of these norms, combined with the willingness to submissively obey to the authorities (*authoritarian submission*), and 3) the tendency to sharply reject and to fight all opposing opinions and their representatives (*authoritarian aggression*). The three-factorial structure of RWA has been empirically validated in a couple of studies (Duckitt, Bizumic, Krauss, & Heled, 2010; Mavor, Louis, & Sibley, 2010). The RWA construct is called "right-winged" because of the endorsement of conventional norms and authorities (Altemeyer, 1996; 1998). A closer inspection of

the components of RWA soon shows that all three can manifest in a religious way: The orientation toward traditional conventions might include sets of religious teachings and norms. *Authoritarian submission* can include submission under religious institutions and religious leaders, but with respect to a religious frame of reference in particular under the deity and the divine will as fixed in sacred writings. *Authoritarian aggression* can be directed toward immanent and transcendent representatives of evil, e.g. heathens and heretics, or devils and demons. The clear overlap with the characteristics of religious fundamentalism as defined by Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992) is obvious. Hence, it is not surprising that many studies observed high correlations between religious fundamentalism and RWA. In their meta-analysis, Hall et al. (2010) found a mean correlation of $r = .68$ across eight samples while McCleary et al. (2011) report correlations between $r = .47$ and $r = .79$ across 15 samples.

However, caution is requested with respect to the measurement tools involved in many of the aforementioned studies. Many studies have assessed religious fundamentalism with versions of Altemeyer's and Hunsberger's (1992; 2004; 2005) Religious Fundamentalism Scale and RWA with versions of their Right-Wing Authoritarianism Scale (RWAS; Altemeyer, 1996; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005). Since Altemeyer and Hunsberger understand religious fundamentalism as "a religious manifestation of right-wing authoritarianism" (Altemeyer, 1996, 161; Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005, 391), high correlations are very likely due to conceptual overlap. According to an in-depth analysis of Mavor, Laythe, and Louis (2011), the strongest overlap on item level could be observed between fundamentalism and the conventionalism component of RWA because several items operationalizing conventionalism explicitly include statements about (ir)religious teachings, institutions, and groups. As Mavor and colleagues (2011; Mavor, Macleod, Boal, & Louis, 2009) could show, the correlation between religious fundamentalism and RWA decreases from $r = .72$ to $r = .46$ if conventionalism is excluded from the analysis. Hence, the association becomes weaker, but remains substantially. Studies wherein effects of religious fundamentalism and RWA have investigated simultaneously often found clearer effects for RWA while the effects of fundamentalism decreased, disappeared or even turned negative due to the inclusion of RWA (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005; Laythe, Finkel & Kirkpatrick, 2001; Rowatt & Franklin, 2004). In the meta-analysis of Hall et al. (2010), the mean correlation between religious fundamentalism and racism was $r = .20$ while the average correlation between authoritarianism and racism was $r = .41$. After partializing the effects of authoritarianism out, the correlation between fundamentalism and racism became even slightly negative ($r = -.11$). Yet Hall and colleagues did not exclude the conventionalism component from their analysis so that their result might still be somewhat confounded. Mavor et al. (2009) observed that the correlation between fundamentalism and racist prejudice, while controlling for RWA, turned slightly positive again ($r = .15$) after removing the conventionalism items from the RWA measure. Hence, the overall strong associations between religious fundamentalism and prejudice seem to be in particular a consequence of the close association between fundamentalism and authoritarianism. But there seems to be also some affinity of

fundamentalist beliefs toward prejudicial thinking independent of RWA. Additionally, again the target of prejudice makes a difference: In a series of regression analyses, Laythe et al. (2002) found fundamentalism to predict less racist, but still more homophobic prejudice when RWA was included in the calculations. Using structural equation modeling (SEM), Johnson and colleagues noted that *authoritarian aggression* mediated the association between religious fundamentalism and anti-Black and anti-Arab racism (Johnson et al., 2012a) while fundamentalism, besides RWA, turned out to be a direct predictor of homophobia (Johnson et al., 2011).

Intratextual Fundamentalism

So far, research on religious fundamentalism and prejudice has strongly referred to Altemeyer's and Hunsberger's concept of fundamentalism and extensively made use of the corresponding measures. While fundamentalism according to Altemeyer and Hunsberger has, due to its focus on exclusivist and dualistic ways of believing and its obvious conceptual overlap with RWA, a rather hostile moment, Hood, Hill, and Williamson (2005) instead have proposed to regard an "intratextual" approach to sacred writings as a core element of religious fundamentalism. Such an approach is characterized by the importance attributed to a certain corpus of texts as the only accepted source of truth and the way the contents of these texts are interpreted in order to find orientation in one's own life. Compared to the sacred writings, all other sources of information are less trustworthy and relevant for the way the fundamentalist believer tries to lead his life. Intratextuality is similar, but not identical with *literalism* as described earlier in this chapter because intratextuality is not about literally believing certain contents of a sacred text, but describes a hermeneutical principle how to find orientation out of the text. While fundamentalism in terms of an intratextual understanding of sacred writings might go along with more exclusivist, prejudicial tendencies, too, such tendencies are probably less inherent in this conceptualization of religious fundamentalism than in Altemeyer's and Hunsberger's.

Based on the concept of intratextuality, two measures for fundamentalism have been developed in recent years: the Intratextual Fundamentalism Scale (IFS; Williamson, Hood, Ahmad, Sadiq, & Hill, 2010) and the subscale *truth of texts and teachings (ttt)* of the Religious Schema Scale (RSS; Streib, Hood & Klein, 2010). So far, there are only few findings on the relation between religious fundamentalism and prejudice based on these measures which do not allow firm conclusions yet. While Williamson, Bishop, and Hood (2014) found no systematic associations between intratextual fundamentalism and racist prejudice, Streib and Klein (2014) observed a slightly significant correlation between *ttt* and anti-Semitism and a clear correlation between *ttt* and Islamophobia. Further research with a variety of fundamentalism measures will be needed in order to better understand to which degree associations between religious fundamentalism and prejudice are in part a result of the conceptualization and of the measure applied.

The Search for Unprejudiced Religiosity

So far, we have seen that, throughout several decades of research, religious affiliation or indicators of general religiosity tend to be correlated with higher rates of prejudice, in particular toward groups which are perceived to threaten traditional moral values of certain religions such as homosexuals or atheists. Prejudice is even more prevalent among fundamentalists while associations between religious fundamentalism and prejudice are usually stronger if prejudice is directed toward the groups just mentioned. But from the very beginning of research, scholars have struggled with the observed associations between religiosity and prejudice and wondered about the paradoxical relationship given the opposing religious teachings and religiously motivated biographical examples of tolerance, compassion, forgiveness, and reconciliation. As Allport and Ross (1967, p. 433) have put it:

One may not overlook the teachings of equality and brotherhood, of compassion and humanheartedness, that mark all the great world religions. Nor may one overlook the precept and example of great figures whose labors in behalf of tolerance were and are religiously motivated—such as Christ himself, Tertullian, Pope Gelasius I, St. Ambrose, Cardinal Cusa, Sebastian Castellio, Schwenckfeld, Roger Williams, Mahatma Gandhi, Martin Luther King, and many others, including the recently martyred clergy in our own South. These lives, along with the work of many religious bodies, councils, and service organizations would seem to indicate that religion as such *unmakes prejudice*.

Indeed, already in the first studies on religiosity and prejudice wherein religiosity has been assessed in terms of church affiliation and church attendance, people attending services weekly have been found to express lower levels of ethnocentric and anti-Semitic prejudice than people attending less frequently (Allport, 1954/1979; Allport & Kramer, 1946; Frenkel-Brunswik & Sanford, 1948). Hence, there seems to be a different kind of religiosity rather opposing prejudice that “seems to be experienced on a deeper level and infused with the character of ethics and philosophy” (Frenkel-Brunswik & Sanford 1948). Allport who himself was a convinced Christian, preaching once a year in Appleton Chapel in Harvard (Allport, 1978; Vande Kemp, 2000), was among the first scholars who tried to conceptualize and empirically discover such a kind of religiosity, thus stimulating a still ongoing search for types of religiosity free of prejudicial tendencies. In the next sections, we give a brief overview over this search and the attempts which have been made to describe and assess diverse types of unprejudiced religiosity.

Intrinsic Versus Extrinsic Religiosity

Based on his reflections about an ideal of mature religiosity (Allport, 1950), Allport proposed to distinguish between a merely “institutionalized” religiosity which is associated with higher levels of prejudice, and an “interiorized” religiosity independent from prejudicial tendencies (Allport, 1954/1979, p. 453). In his later writings,

he described these two types of religiosity due to their differing underlying motivations as central distinctive criterion as either “extrinsically motivated” or “intrinsically motivated” religious orientations (Allport, 1959; 1966; Allport & Ross, 1967). While extrinsically religious persons are assumed to use their religiosity as means for other psychosocial ends, e.g. security, solace, social integration, or status, intrinsically religious people are characterized to find their master motive in their religiosity which is deeply anchored in their personality and affects all other areas of life. Allport and Ross (1967) operationalized intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation with two subscales in the Religious Orientation Scale (ROS). Indeed, they could show that intrinsically religious people displayed lower levels of racist and anti-Semitic prejudice than extrinsically religious persons. However, although intrinsic and extrinsic religious orientation have originally been conceptualized as two poles of the same dimension, Allport and Ross found the two subscales of the ROS to be moderately positively correlated ($r = .21$). Since many study participants endorsed statements of both subscales, Allport and Ross identified, beside intrinsically and extrinsically religious, also an indiscriminately proreligious type of religious orientation who was found to express even higher levels of prejudice than the extrinsically religious respondents.

Nevertheless, subsequent studies corroborated consistently that intrinsic religiosity was not related or uncorrelated with ethnocentric, racist, or anti-Semitic prejudice while extrinsic religiosity was usually found to be associated with higher levels of prejudice (for overviews, see Batson et al., 1993; Donahue, 1985; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). In their meta-analysis on religiosity and racist attitudes, Hall et al. (2010) found a mean correlation of $r = -.07$ between intrinsic religiosity and racist prejudice across 21 samples and an average correlation of $r = .17$ between extrinsic religiosity and racism across 22 samples wherein the ROS or its derivatives (Batson et al., 1993; Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989) have been applied. However, Hall and colleagues noted also for extrinsic religiosity that the association with racism has decreased throughout the last decades: While the average correlation in studies before 1986 has been $r = .25$, in studies published since 1986 the mean correlation has changed to $r = .11$. Hence, the differential effect between intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity seems to be shrinking.

For diverse reasons, Allport’s distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity has been subject of intensive criticism: On the theoretical level, the motivational explanation of the distinction between both types of religiosity has been criticized since an intrinsic motivation might also form the basis for exclusivist and intolerant fundamentalist beliefs (Batson et al., 1993; Rokeach, 1960). Hence, it is not surprising that intrinsic religiosity has repeatedly been found to be positively associated with measures of religious orthodoxy or religious fundamentalism (Batson et al., 1993; Genia, 1996). Stark and Glock (1968) as well as Dittes (1971) have questioned the empirical usefulness of a concept that is based on the description of an ideal type of religious maturity:

If “by definition only altruistic attitudes can follow from religious beliefs (otherwise the belief is inauthentic, extrinsic religion) then it is not possible to see whether the religious training, beliefs, and activities promoted by religious institutions typically do produce admirable results.” (Stark & Glock, 1968, p. 19).

Further critique concerns the reliability and validity of the ROS (Gorsuch, 1994; Kirkpatrick & Hood, 1990), in particular the extrinsic subscale which was often found to have a low internal consistency and might be better split up into several subscales measuring distinct psychosocial motives related to religiosity (Gorsuch & McPherson, 1989; Kirkpatrick, 1989). Hence, in recent years it has been proposed to use solely the intrinsic subscale as a measure for general religiosity or personal commitment to one’s own religiosity (Williams, 1999). But the intrinsic subscale can also be considered to be confounded with Allport’s personal preference for a certain kind of liberal Protestant theology (Huber, 2003). Finally, research since the late 1970s has shown that intrinsic religiosity is not as unprejudiced as Allport intended it to be: While usually negatively correlated with racist or anti-Semitic prejudice, intrinsic religiosity has consistently been found to be positively related to homophobic prejudice (Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). For instance, the mean correlation between intrinsic religiosity and homophobia was $r = .23$ in Whitley’s (2009) meta-analysis. But doubts have also been cast on the association between intrinsic religiosity and racist attitudes. Batson and colleagues found evidence that intrinsic religiosity, although inversely related to direct self-reports of racist prejudice, appears to be less clearly unprejudiced when racism is assessed indirectly (Batson, Flink, Schoenrade, Fultz, & Pych, 1986; Batson, Naifeh, & Pate, 1978). Intrinsic religiosity is known to be moderately associated to social desirable responding in questionnaires (mean $r = .16$ across 30 studies in a meta-analysis of Sedikides & Gebauer, 2010); hence, intrinsically religious persons might report non-racist attitudes largely because they want to appear tolerant, but they might nevertheless show prejudiced behavior when it is assessed indirectly (Batson & Stocks, 2005). Given all these objections, it is not surprising that other concepts of unprejudiced types of religiosity than intrinsic religiosity have been proposed and investigated.

Religion as Quest

The most prominent example of such an alternative proposal is Batson’s concept of a “religion-as-quest” (Batson, 1976; Batson et al., 1993). Batson shared Allport’s view that studying mature religiosity would be most promising in order to identify a type of religiosity that is free of prejudicial tendencies because mature religiosity would provide

... a clear description of an orientation toward religion that is the product of a highly complex cognitive organization for dealing with existential questions, an organization that has emerged from repeated creative changes in response to existential conflicts (Batson et al., 1993, p. 160).

But while Allport did not present an empirical operationalization of his entire concept of mature religiosity (Allport, 1950), but, in his empirical studies (Allport & Ross, 1967), concentrated only on an intrinsic motivational status of one's personal religious orientation which could also include fundamentalist beliefs, Batson argued that a mature religiosity should better be characterized as an open-ended, life-long search for answers to questions about the meaning of life. Batson and colleagues characterize such a quest religiosity as follows:

An individual who approaches religion in this way recognizes that he or she does not know, and probably will never know, the final truth about such matters. Still, the questions are deemed important and, however tentative and subject to change, answers are sought. There may or may not be a clear belief in a transcendent reality, but there is a transcendent religious aspect to the individual's life (Batson et al., 1993, p. 166).

Based on this concept, Batson and colleagues (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991a; 1991b; Batson & Ventis, 1982) developed a scale to measure quest religiosity, and Batson et al. (1993) could present findings showing that the Quest scale was inversely correlated to prejudice against other ethnic groups, women, homosexuals, and communists. In consequence, the Quest scale became a similar classic in research about religiosity and prejudice as Allport's and Ross' (1967) ROS or Altemeyer's and Hunsberger's (1992) Religious Fundamentalism Scale (Hood et al., 2009; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005). The recent meta-analyses corroborate that quest religiosity tends to be negatively associated with various types of prejudice, including racism (mean correlation: $r = -.07$; Hall et al., 2010), homophobia ($r = -.24$; Whitley, 2009), in addition to further types of prejudice ($r = -.23$; McCleary et al., 2011).

While the correlational findings with the Quest scale appear to be very consistent across three decades of research, doubts concerning the proper conceptualization and operationalization of quest as a type of *religiosity* have been cast already early: For instance, Donahue (1985), Hood and Morris (1985), as well as Kojetin, McIntosh, Bridges, and Spilka (1987) have criticized that the Quest scale could alternatively indicate agnosticism, an anti-orthodox attitude, hypercriticism, or religious conflicts in a transitional period. Indeed, quest religiosity has been observed to be only slightly associated with belief in God (Jackson & Hunsberger, 1999) and negatively correlated with attendance at religious services, private prayers (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992), and other measures of religiosity (Batson et al., 1993). Concluding from these findings that the Quest scale should better be understood as a measure of an agnostic orientation (Donahue, 1985; Hall et al., 2010) might be too extreme; however, the risk that the Quest scale does not necessarily point to an explicit religious orientation should be taken seriously. Compared to validity concerns of the Quest scale, there has been only relatively little discussion about the empirical question whether quest religiosity is generally associated with greater tolerance toward out-groups or whether there might also be associations with less tolerance and rejection of certain target groups (Batson, Eidelman, Higley, & Russell, 2001). Goldfried and Miner (2002) conducted a study wherein they investigated whether people expressing high quest religiosity would be willing to

help either of two fictive peers to win a monetary prize. While the first one was religiously unspecified, the second was described as fundamentalist. The purpose of the prize was also experimentally varied across two conditions; either an activity promoting or not promoting fundamentalist behavior. Goldfried and Miner observed that people high in quest religiosity provided less help to the fundamentalist peer, even if the help did not promote fundamentalist values, and concluded that quest religiosity is not associated with tolerance toward persons perceived to violate the value of religious open-mindedness. However, in a methodologically sounder replication study, Batson, Denton, and Vollmecke (2008) found that persons high in quest religiosity were as likely to support a fundamentalist as a non-fundamentalist as long as the intended activity did not promote fundamentalism. Hence, high Quest scorers seemed to differentiate between person and purpose—while tolerating fundamentalists, they rejected fundamentalism. All in all, quest religiosity seems to be a generally tolerant type of religiosity, whereby a quest orientation might not be limited to religious beliefs.

Recent Developments

Beside intrinsic religiosity and quest religiosity, further attempts have been made to describe and to operationalize types of religiosity which might be independent of or inversely related to prejudice. A number of concepts and measures have been developed in order to define and assess mature religiosity; among others (e.g. Benson, Donahue, & Erickson, 1993; Dudley & Cruise, 1990) the Faith Development Scale (FDS; Harris & Leak, 2013; Leak, 2008; Leak, Loucks, & Bowlin, 1999) which is based on Fowler's (1981) Faith Development Theory (FDT). Extant research indeed shows that religious openness as measured with the FDS is associated with less prejudice against homosexuals and Muslims (James, Griffiths, & Pedersen, 2011; Leak & Finken, 2011).

Another measure which refers to FDT is our own instrument, the Religious Schema Scale (RSS; Streib et al., 2010). The theoretical background of the RSS is Streib's (2001; 2003; 2005; Streib et al., 2010) revision of FDT in a theory of distinct religious styles which might develop to a certain degree across the life span and shape the individual's worldview. Specific cognitive and narrative schemata correspond with these styles and have partly been operationalized in the RSS which includes a subscale for an intratextual, fundamentalist understanding of the texts and teachings of one's own religious tradition (*truth of texts and teachings/ttt*), a preference for a fair, rational discourse (*fairness, tolerance, & rational choice/ptr*) as well as the willingness to get challenged and stimulated by experiences of strangeness and to engage in an open dialogue (*xenosophia & inter-religious dialog/xenos*; see Chap. 1). According to first results, *ttt* is cross-culturally associated with low openness to experience and high RWA in the U.S. and in Germany and was found to go along with more inter-religious prejudice against Jews and Muslims among German adolescents while *ptr* and *xenos* correlate positively with openness

and negatively with authoritarianism and inter-religious prejudice (Streib et al., 2010; Streib & Klein, 2014). Hence, results both with the FDS and the RSS provide further evidence that including a perspective on religious development into research on religiosity and prejudice might be a useful enterprise.

With the German findings with the RSS, we already moved from research on unprejudiced types of religiosity which has primarily been conducted in North America to the more secular context of Europe. Here, a model distinguishing between four types of worldviews according to 1) their inclusion or exclusion of belief in a transcendent reality and 2) their literal or symbolic understanding of religious beliefs has become popular in recent years. This model refers to Wulff's (1997) two-dimensional framework of understanding psychological theories about religion and has been operationalized by Hutsebaut, Duriez, and colleagues (Duriez, Soenens & Hutsebaut, 2005; Duriez, Dezutter, Neyrinck, & Hutsebaut, 2007; Fontaine, Duriez, Luyten, & Hutsebaut, 2003; Hutsebaut, 1996) in the Post-Critical Belief Scale (PCBS). The PCBS includes four subscales assessing beliefs which are assumed to be characteristic for each of the four types of worldview: *orthodoxy* (literal affirmation of religious beliefs), *external critique* (literal disaffirmation), *relativism* (reductive symbolic interpretation in terms of human needs for meaning-making), and *second naïveté* (restorative symbolic interpretation). The name of the fourth subscale, *second naïveté*, refers to the French philosopher Ricoeur (1978) and shall express that a corresponding worldview is aware of the tentativeness of human perceptions of reality which cannot claim absolute truth. This insight can open the view for deeper layers of meaning which might be found in religious texts and teachings and, hence, allows for a post-critical religious belief beyond criticism of religion. Therefore, the term "post-critical belief" has been borrowed to name the entire instrument. The PCBS has been developed and most extensively been used in Belgium (Krysinska et al., 2014), but in the meantime also been validated and applied in other European contexts including Germany (Duriez, Appel & Hutsebaut, 2003) and Spain (Muñoz-García & Saroglou, 2008) and made its way recently also overseas to Australia (Pollefeyt & Bouwens, 2010) and to the USA (Shen, Yelderma, Haggard, & Rowatt, 2013). Research findings with the PCBS illustrate that a symbolic understanding of religion, be it in terms of a secular reduction or in terms of a post-critical belief, is associated with less racist attitudes while literal beliefs or disbeliefs go along with higher levels of racism in Belgium (Duriez, 2004; Duriez & Hutsebaut, 2000). Shen et al. (2013) observed that the PCBS was sensitive for distinct targets of prejudice: While a symbolic interpretation of religion in general was associated with lower levels of prejudice against Blacks, Arabs, homosexuals, and atheists, belief in God (inclusion of transcendence) was associated with higher levels of homophobic and anti-atheist prejudice. The two dimensions of the PCBS were found to fully mediate the relationship between general religiosity and anti-Black, anti-Arab, and homophobic prejudice and to partially mediate the relationship between religiosity and prejudice against atheists.

The PCBS points to the necessity to be aware that there might be several dimensions of religious and non-religious worldviews mattering with respect to prejudicial attitudes. Similarly, Krauss and Hood (2013) have argued that various types of

religious orientation could be assigned to a theoretical circumplex, the Commitment-Reflectivity-Circumplex (CRC), which is structured by two superordinate dimensions: 1) commitment vs. non-commitment (i.e. the degree to which religiosity is central in the individual's life and helps establishing a subjectively satisfying, encouraging relationship with God or to which religiosity is rather characterized as doubtful and motivated by extrinsic social needs), and 2) reflectivity vs. unreflectivity (i.e. the degree to which religiosity is characterized by interest in religious and existential questions and helps to make meaning of important life events or to which religiosity is merely motivated by feelings of societal obligation and fear of divine punishment). It is obvious that the CRC extends the distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity and differentiates between various specific religious orientations. Read through a European lens, however, the CRC still focuses on a more or less presupposed religiosity of a Judeo-Christian shape as doubts and tentativeness are still assumed to occur within a religious set of beliefs. It is probably no coincidence that concepts as the CRC and measures as the ROS have been developed in the overall still quite religious context of the USA where the crucial questions are primarily whether someone is really committed to his religious beliefs and for what reasons while being religious at all or not has only very recently become a question at issue (Hunsberger & Altemeyer, 2006; Streib & Klein, 2013). Likely, it is assumingly no coincidence that a measure like the PCBS, although referring to the theoretical framework of an American author (Wulff), has been developed and first been adopted in a European context where distinguishing between those who hold religious beliefs and those who don't matters far more than the question of an intrinsic or extrinsic motivation underlying the individual's religiosity. Hence, future research will be necessary to investigate which measures will prove to be useful both in religious contexts such as the USA and in secular cultures as in many European countries. The existing findings with already cross-culturally tested tools like the PCBS and the RSS give reason to hope that such measures are possible and will be able to provide comparable results.

The Limited Scope of Extant Research on Distinct Types of Religiosity and Their Associations with Prejudice

Developing and using measures like the PCBS and the RSS which are applicable both in religious and secular contexts is imperative as, besides the reported findings, the vast majority of studies on distinct types of religiosity, be it in terms of religious fundamentalism, be it in terms of intrinsic, extrinsic, or quest religiosity, has been taken place in the USA and, due to the impact of the Canadians Altemeyer and Hunsberger, in Canada. This can be illustrated easily by referring to the reviews and meta-analyses quoted several times throughout the previous paragraphs: In their comprehensive overview on research about religiosity and prejudice, Hunsberger and Jackson (2005) included study results from 16 articles in a table comparing the

correlational patterns of intrinsic, extrinsic, and quest religiosity, and religious fundamentalism with several types of prejudice. Only two out of the studies included have not been conducted in the USA or in Canada. Similarly, in the meta-analysis of McCleary et al. (2011), five out of five studies on religious fundamentalism and ethnocentrism, 13 out of 14 studies on fundamentalism and homophobia, and six out of six studies on quest religiosity and prejudice come from the North American continent. Hall et al. (2010) chose as criterion for the inclusion of a study into their meta-analysis on religiosity and racism that the sample “included primarily or solely U.S. participants” (p. 129).

This selection bias is probably not the result of a neglect of studies which have been conducted elsewhere, but reflects that most of the concepts and measures described in the previous sections have only sparsely been used in other cultural contexts so far. To some degree, the concentration on North America surely mirrors the higher religiosity, in particular of the USA, as compared to European countries. However, comparing the findings on distinct types of religiosity with the results from European and worldwide large-scale surveys reported earlier in this chapter, it is striking that there is a substantial body of sociological research on religiosity and prejudice, but only few research outside of North America taking the psychological distinction between certain types of religiosity into account. Therefore, only little is known about associations between distinct types of religiosity and prejudice in other cultures than Canada or the USA.

A problem of many psychological studies is that most samples are small and often limited to students. For instance, the samples in Hunsberger’s and Jackson’s (2005) overview included 1,532 adults, but 4,329 undergraduate students. Hence, many findings can probably not simply be generalized, and it is difficult to estimate how common or seldom certain types of religiosity such as intrinsic or quest religiosity are in the general population. Maybe the unclear generalizability of findings about distinct types of religiosity is a further reason why concepts and measures have not been used more frequently outside of North America. For instance, Beit-Hallahmi (1985, p. 26) has criticized Allport’s research on intrinsic religiosity arguing that people who are “deeply religious and less prejudiced” are only a “small social minority” and do “not affect the general correlation” between religiosity and prejudice. Psychologists sharing Beit-Hallahmi’s skepticism might hesitate to make use of concepts and instruments if they assume that they do not cover the beliefs of study participants in their cultural context. In our own research on deconversion (Streib, Hood, Keller, Csöff, & Silver, 2009), we observed that even people belonging to conservative or evangelical denominations in Germany had problems to fill out Altemeyer’s and Hunsberger’s (1992; Altemeyer, 1996) Religious Fundamentalism scale and RWAS. This might be due to the lower proportions and visibility of religious (predominantly Christian) fundamentalists in public discourses in European countries who, in consequence, might hold less absolutist views. According to U.S. estimates, between 13 and 30% of the U.S. population can be assumed to hold rather or clearly fundamentalist beliefs (Bader, Froese, Johnson, Mencken & Stark, 2005; Davis & Smith, 2008). Based on representative data, Klein

et al. (2017b) compared proportions of fundamentalist milieus and beliefs across the USA, Canada, and six European countries and identified a fundamentalist core milieu of 11.6% and some agreement to fundamentalist statements among 37.9% of U.S. respondents. In Canada, 6.3% of respondents belonged to the fundamentalist core milieu while 21.2% shared some fundamentalist beliefs. These numbers are obviously higher than the percentages in the European countries where 1.4 to 3.7% of respondents could be assigned to the fundamentalist core milieu and 10.7 to 23.8% of respondents agreed to some fundamentalist statements. Similar comparisons based on representative data would be required in order to estimate whether distinct concepts of religiosity are plausible for understanding the varieties of beliefs in a certain culture or not; yet such datasets are seldom in psychological research.

Sociological analyses are often based on representative large-scale surveys. Hence, generalizability of findings is not a crucial question of many sociological studies on religiosity and prejudice. The core problem of representative large-scale surveys is that they can, alongside many other measures, usually include only few indicators of religiosity as well as of prejudice or intolerance (cf. Froese, Bader, & Smith, 2008; Katnik, 2002; and the studies based on WVS, EVS and other surveys described earlier in this chapter). This makes it difficult to satisfyingly assess comprehensive theoretical constructs like the distinct types of religiosity described above.³ When psychological studies are based on representative surveys, the range of assessed constructs is usually more limited than in smaller studies, too: For instance, Rowatt, LaBouff, Johnson, Froese, and Tsang (2009) investigated the associations of religiosity with racial and homophobic prejudice based on the Baylor Religion Survey, a random national U.S. sample (Bader et al., 2005; Bader, Mencken, & Froese, 2007). They included scales of four items for the assessment of attitudes toward Blacks, Asians, and Hispanic/Latinos and a four-item measure of attitudes toward homosexuals while religiosity was measured only in terms of general religiosity based on four indicators including a religious self-rating and frequency of service attendance, scripture reading, and private practice (prayer or

³The selection of indicators within large-scale surveys is often the pragmatic result of a longer process of compromises within a team of researchers with diverging research interests and goes usually along with the deletion of many proposed indicators. In consequence, large-scale surveys often seem to lack a sound theoretical basis for the selection of indicators for a certain construct. This is sometimes even attested by persons who have been involved in the process of questionnaire development, for instance of the items assessing religiosity in the European Values Study (EVS): “One of the main problems of the EVS is the weak theoretical foundation of its measurements. The selection of the items was not at all guided by any theory in the specific domains in sociology, such as in the sociology of religion. This is surprising since the measurement of religious values is one of the main goals of the research. The reason for this was that the selection of the questions was mainly guided by practical considerations and by very broad and general ideas on modernization and social change. According to Halman, the questions resulted from an archive search at Gallup institutes and not from the result of theoretical reflections. In the latter cross-sections of the EVS, the existing questions on religion were not changes (sic!) because of comparability.” (Billiet, 2001, p. 354).

meditation). Results corroborate that higher general religiosity is significantly associated with stronger disapproval of homosexuals, but not with racist attitudes.

In their study on religiosity and GFE among representative samples from eight European countries, Küpper and Zick (2010) also used four indicators for the assessment of religiosity including religious affiliation, religious self-rating, service attendance, and the belief in the superiority of the own religious tradition. But their focus was primarily on the assessment of eight distinct types of prejudice which all have been measured with short scales. Nevertheless, Küpper and Zick tried to identify distinct types of religiosity based on dichotomizations of their four indicators of religiosity. They portray 12 of the 16 possible types whereby only five of them are really prevalent with proportions clearly bigger than 5%—1) a completely unreligious type (25.9 %), 2) a belonging, but not believing type (affiliated, but not religious, no church attendance, and no superiority belief; 17.5%), 3) an affiliated and religious type without attendance and superiority belief (12.2%), 4) a similar type who is affiliated, religious, and participating in services, but holds no superiority belief (13.6%), and 5) a religious, belonging and participating type *with* superiority belief (16.3%). Hence, these five types account for 85.5% of the participants so that they can be assumed to represent the vast majority of respondents. However, since only the item asking for superiority belief asks for a certain ideological content while the other three variables can be assumed to be indicators of general religiosity, the results can hardly be compared to findings based on ROS, Quest scale, FDS, RSS, or PCBS and strongly resemble findings on associations of general religiosity and fundamentalist or exclusivist beliefs with prejudice: The first, unreligious type expresses the lowest level of prejudice as compared to the next three types while the last, superiority-affirming type displays the highest level of prejudice. While the differences are smaller for inter-religious prejudice, i.e. anti-Semitism and Islamophobia (less than a half point on a 4-point Likert scale), the differences are stronger for prejudice against sexually marked groups, i.e. sexism and homophobia (more than one point on a 4-point Likert scale).

Despite of the described limitations, studies like the ones of Rowatt et al. (2009) and Küpper & Zick (2010) are very valuable as they link the precise psychometric assessment of religiosity and prejudice with the generalizability of sociological large-scale surveys. Given the limited scope of extant research on associations between distinct types of religiosity and prejudice, which is predominantly North American and largely based on student samples, more representative data allowing for cross-cultural comparisons between the USA, Canada, and European countries are highly desirable, in order to understand whether similar associations can also be observed in the European context. Hence, in the following section we aim at such comparisons based on the data of the second wave of the Religion Monitor survey.

Associations Between Religiosity and Prejudice in Europe and North America

Sample

The Religion Monitor is a comprehensive survey on religiosity founded by the Bertelsmann Foundation (2009), including diverse scales and items on religiosity (Huber, 2009) and representative samples of approx. $n = 1,000$ participants from 22 countries in the first wave (Huber & Klein, 2007) and from 13 countries in the second wave (Pickel, 2013). In the second wave, items asking for attitudes toward migrants, Jews, Muslims, and homosexuals have also been included so that analyses on associations between religiosity and devaluating attitudes toward these groups are possible. Among the 13 countries included in the second wave are the USA, Canada, the UK, France, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Germany, Israel, Turkey, India, South Korea, and Brazil. However, the questions about attitudes toward the four target groups have not been asked in the surveys in India and Brazil so that we had to exclude these subsamples from our analyses. Further, we decided to exclude Israel, Turkey, and South Korea from our analyses because these three are the only remaining countries whose religious culture has historically *not* been coined predominantly by the Christian tradition and whose populations are *not* predominantly Christian. Additionally, their cultural history is less influenced by the period of Enlightenment and its impact on current ideological orientations. Hence, they are not as comparable as the remaining North American and European countries. Therefore, we focus on the comparison between North America and Europe and base our analyses on the samples from the USA, Canada (CAN), the UK, France (FRA), Spain (ESP), Sweden (SWE), Switzerland (CH), and Germany (GER).⁴ After data cleaning, the entire sample included $N = 7,372$ participants. The basic demographic characteristics of the entire sample and of the eight national subsamples are reported in Table 2.1.

Measures

The primary reason why we have chosen the Religion Monitor for our cross-cultural comparison of associations between distinct types of religiosity and prejudice is that the measures included are identical or similar to the measures applied in our Bielefeld Study on Xenophobia and Religion. In Table 2.2, we give an overview

⁴Since the Religion Monitor is hosted in Germany, the German subsamples have been twice as big as the subsamples from the other countries. For particular research interests, certain groups have been oversampled, e.g. Muslims in Germany. For better comparability with the other countries, we excluded these specific groups from our analyses and used only the data of the $n = 1,077$ representatively selected German respondents. After data cleaning, the remaining German subsample consisted of $n = 996$.

Table 2.1 Distribution of demographic characteristics in the eight national subsamples and in the entire sample ($N = 7,372$)

	USA	Canada	United Kingdom	France	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	Germany	Total
<i>N</i>	957	936	874	876	925	846	962	996	7,372
<i>Age</i>									
<i>M</i>	56.8	51.2	49.8	46.7	45.5	46.6	48.4	51.0	49.5
<i>SD</i>	16.7	16.4	18.9	18.4	18.0	16.1	19.2	17.4	18.0
<i>Sex (in %)</i>									
Male	42.4	44.2	43.5	49.0	48.1	46.0	48.2	43.6	45.6
Female	57.6	55.8	56.5	51.0	51.9	54.0	51.8	56.4	54.4
<i>Commuted Relationship (in %)</i>									
Relationship	66.5	67.8	57.8	63.6	71.5	80.9	63.0	67.6	67.2
No Relationship	33.5	32.2	42.2	36.4	28.5	19.1	37.0	32.4	32.8
<i>Currently Employed (in %)</i>									
Yes	48.7	61.2	55.0	48.7	41.2	76.7	65.9	58.4	56.7
No ^a	51.3	38.8	45.0	51.3	58.8	23.3	34.1	41.6	43.3
<i>Urbanity (in %)</i>									
Rural area	51.9	51.2	60.2	56.4	51.1	59.7	64.1	62.2	57.1
Catchment Area of City	34.1	24.4	24.3	20.3	22.1	18.4	22.7	16.3	22.9
Big City	14.0	24.4	15.5	23.3	26.8	21.9	13.2	21.5	20.0
<i>Religious Affiliation (in %)</i>									
Christian	75.1	65.3	61.0	55.4	74.1	71.7	80.7	74.1	69.9
Jewish	2.0	0.6	0.5	1.0	0.1	0.2	0.2	0.1	0.6
Muslim	0.2	2.5	3.0	8.3	0.3	1.7	2.9	2.7	2.7
Other	8.4	9.4	7.2	4.9	1.8	1.7	3.4	2.4	4.9
No Affiliation	14.3	22.2	28.3	30.4	23.7	24.7	12.8	20.7	21.9

Note ^aPercentages of unemployed include also pupils, students, housewives/house husbands, and pensioners

over the religious constructs and types of prejudice which have been assessed in our study (first column) and in selected other surveys. With our selection of the investigated types of prejudice, we rely strongly on the works of Zick, Küpper, and colleagues who distinguished up to 12 types of prejudice in their German studies on GFE (Groß et al., 2012; Küpper & Zick, 2017; Zick et al., 2008) which have been conducted between 2002 and 2014 (second column in Table 2.2). In their cross-European study on GFE from 2008 (Küpper & Zick, 2010; Zick et al., 2011), they differentiated between nine types of prejudice (third column in Table 2.2). As their focus was on the diverse elements of the GFE syndrome, religiosity has been assessed only with four indicators. The opposite is true for the Religion Monitor (last column in Table 2.2) which placed emphasis on the assessment of religiosity, but included only the four items assessing prejudicial attitudes mentioned above. In Table 2.2, we listed those measures of religiosity from the Religion Monitor which have either been used directly in the Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion or which assess religious constructs which have also been investigated in our study, but have been measured somewhat differently. For instance, in our study fundamentalist and pluralist religious beliefs have been primarily assessed with the subscales of the RSS while there are distinct instruments for both in the Religion Monitor (however, we additionally used secular versions of the Religion Monitor scales in our study). The remaining columns in Table 2.2 present the selections of comparable measures for religiosity and prejudice which have been applied in other surveys focusing on religiosity in recent years; including the annual German general social survey, ALLBUS (latest focus on religiosity in 2012), the International Social Survey Programme/ISSP (latest focus on religiosity in 2008), and the WVS (6th wave from 2010 till 2014). Additionally, Table 2.2 contains information as to whether the diverse datasets provide opportunities for European or transatlantic cross-cultural comparisons. Obviously, no other international survey allowing for transatlantic comparisons has included as many comprehensive measures of religiosity as the Religion Monitor. With respect to measures of prejudice, the Religion Monitor as well as the other surveys have included only single-items for a limited number of attitudes. But as the leading investigator of the GFE studies, A. Zick, has been involved in the planning of the 2012 wave of the Religion Monitor, the items on prejudicial attitudes included resemble the GFE measures somewhat more strongly than the items of the ISSP or the WVS. Hence, the Religion Monitor provides the best opportunity to compare the results of our own study against the background of representative data from North America and from other European countries.

In the following paragraphs, we now briefly introduce the measures from the Religion Monitor which have been used for our comparative analyses of associations between distinct types of religiosity and prejudice in North America and Europe. As many of these instruments are described psychometrically in detail in Chap. 4 of this volume, here, we focus on how the chosen measures relate to concepts and findings reported in the previous sections of this chapter.

Table 2.2 Measures of religiosity and prejudice in the Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion and in recent German and international surveys

<i>Measured Construct</i>	<i>Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia & Religion</i>	<i>GFE</i>	<i>GFE</i>				<i>Religion Monitor</i>
		<i>Germany</i>	<i>Europe</i>	<i>ALLBUS</i>	<i>ISSP</i>	<i>WVS</i>	
<i>Religiosity</i>		<i>2002–2014</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2012</i>	<i>2008</i>	<i>2010–2014</i>	<i>2012</i>
Religious Affiliation	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Religious Self-rating	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Centrality of Religiosity	X						X
<i>Religious Experience</i>	X			X			X
<i>Religious Interest</i>	X			X			X
<i>Religious Ideology</i>	X			X	X	(C)	X
<i>Private Practice</i>	X			X	X	X	X
<i>Public Practice</i>	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Religious Fundamentalism	X						X
<i>Exchistvlsm</i>	X	X	X	(C)	(C)	X	X
<i>Literalism Intratextual</i>	X				(X)		
Religious Pluralism	X			(C)	X/ (C)	(C)	X
Spiritual Self-rating	X			X	(C)		X
<i>Prejudice</i>							
Anti-Semitism	X	X	X	X	(X)	(C)	X
Anti-Christian Enmity	X				(X)		
Islamophobia	X	X	X	X	(X)	(C)	X
Xenophobia	X	X	X	X		X	X
General Racism	X	X	X				
Anti-Black Racism	X	X	X			(C)	
Homophobia	X	X	X	X	X	X	X
Sexism	X	X	X	X	X	X	
Devaluation of Disabled		X	X				
~ Homeless		X	X				
~ Unemployed		X					
~ Asylum Seekers/ Refugees	X	X		X			
~ Sinti and Roma		X					
<i>Cross-cultural Comparison?</i>							
Europe			X		X	X	X
Transatlantic					X	X	X

Notes An “X” symbolizes that single-item ratings or scales assessing a religious or attitudinal construct are included in a survey. “(X)” symbolizes that there are single-item ratings or scales operationalizing a given construct, but that these items or scales have been optional and have only been used in a minority of countries. “(C)” symbolizes that there are only categorical indicators for a given construct

Religious Self-Rating Among other common items, for instance questions about the participants’ religious affiliation, the Religion Monitor also includes a single-item asking to which degree the respondent considers himself to be religious or not. Since religious self-ratings are among the most commonly used indicators for general religiosity, we included this item in our analyses in order to get results that can be compared with a multitude of other findings. In the Religion Monitor, the religious self-rating can be answered with a 5-point Likert scale. Means and standard deviations of the religious self-rating across all subsamples and in the entire sample are presented in Table 2.3.

Table 2.3 Means, standard deviations, and internal consistencies of the measures in the eight national subsamples and in the entire sample ($N = 7,372$)

Measure	USA	Canada	United Kingdom	France	Spain	Sweden	Switzerland	Germany	Total
<i>Religious Self-Rating</i>									
<i>M</i>	3.30	2.86	2.61	2.71	2.53	2.04	2.75	2.72	2.70
<i>SD</i>	1.27	1.29	1.29	1.43	1.17	1.15	1.16	1.13	1.28
<i>Centrality of Religiosity Scale</i>									
<i>M</i>	20.07	17.13	15.39	13.83	15.67	11.56	15.60	15.11	15.62
<i>SD</i>	4.87	5.42	5.93	5.33	5.66	5.03	4.83	5.16	5.75
α	.85	.85	.88	.84	.87	.86	.83	.85	.88
<i>Scale for Religious Fundamentalism</i>									
<i>M</i>	14.37	12.48	12.23	12.04	12.11	10.20	11.03	11.04	11.95
<i>SD</i>	4.68	4.37	3.90	3.70	4.14	4.00	3.58	3.57	4.18
α	.83	.82	.79	.78	.81	.79	.74	.81	.81
<i>Religious Pluralism</i>									
<i>M</i>	3.09	3.16	3.05	2.92	2.97	2.89	3.02	3.07	3.02
<i>SD</i>	.95	.89	.88	.97	.98	1.16	.90	.85	.95
<i>Spiritual Self-Rating</i>									
<i>M</i>	3.61	3.22	2.76	2.70	2.68	1.98	2.61	2.22	2.73
<i>SD</i>	1.13	1.21	1.33	1.23	1.16	1.07	1.16	1.13	1.27
<i>Attitude toward Jews (Anti-Semitism)</i>									
<i>M</i>	2.02	2.15	2.04	2.28	2.54	1.50	2.33	2.15	2.13
<i>SD</i>	1.18	1.24	1.09	1.23	1.14	.95	1.19	1.15	1.18
<i>Attitude toward Muslims (Islamophobia)</i>									
<i>M</i>	3.37	3.35	3.19	3.42	3.75	3.28	3.47	3.12	3.37
<i>SD</i>	1.29	1.25	1.30	1.35	1.20	1.52	1.27	1.30	1.32
<i>Attitude toward Immigrants (Xenophobia)</i>									
<i>M</i>	2.63	2.38	3.39	2.75	3.34	2.19	3.36	2.87	2.87
<i>SD</i>	1.49	1.43	1.49	1.50	1.47	1.54	1.39	1.41	1.52
<i>Attitude toward Homosexuals (Homophobia)</i>									
<i>M</i>	2.95	2.17	2.48	2.68	2.05	1.55	2.13	1.90	2.24
<i>SD</i>	1.75	1.53	1.56	1.57	1.42	1.26	1.43	1.29	1.54

Centrality of Religiosity Scale The basic instrument in the Religion Monitor for assessing religiosity, however, is the Centrality of Religiosity Scale (“Centrality Scale;” Huber & Huber, 2012). The Centrality Scale has been developed by Huber (2003) as a consequence of his constructive critique of the ROS and its derivatives. In order to overcome the weaknesses of the ROS described above, Huber has proposed to distinguish sharply between the “centrality” of an individual’s religiosity in his personality on the one hand and the “contents” of his or her religious beliefs on the other. According to Huber, measures assessing the aspect of centrality should avoid asking for specific motives or contents of belief, but should instead focus on basic expressions of religiosity. Therefore, the Centrality Scale as used in the Religion Monitor (Huber, 2009; Huber & Huber, 2012) measures the intensity of an individual’s religiosity by assessing the five basic dimensions of religious beliefs and behavior described by Glock (1962; Stark & Glock, 1968), i.e. religious experience, religious interest, religious ideology, and private and public religious practice, with seven items. Hence, the Centrality Scale is more comprehensive than the selections of single-items asking for certain religious beliefs (e.g. in God), private rituals (e.g. prayer), or public practices (e.g. church attendance), which are most commonly used in large-scale surveys (see Table 2.2).

According to Huber (2003), the aspect of centrality corresponds with Allport’s (1950) original intention to understand an individual’s religiosity as “mature,” if it is functionally autonomously motivated and, hence, independent from other interests and motives. A religiosity that is rooted in the center of one’s personality is likely to affect many other areas of the individual’s personality, experiences, and behavior while being widely independent from them. Therefore, the Centrality Scale can be understood as an instrument trying to assess more validly what Allport intended to cover with the intrinsic subscale of the ROS: If the sum score of the Centrality Scale is high, i.e. if the respondent has frequent religious experiences, strong religious interests and beliefs, and performs rituals on a regular basis, the individual’s religiosity can be expected to be an essential part of his personality and accordingly “central” to him. At the same time, however, the Centrality Scale can also be understood as a measure for extrinsic religiosity: If religiosity does not lie in the center of an individual’s personality, but is of subordinated importance (i.e. when the score of the Centrality Scale is on a medium level), such a religiosity is likely to be much more strongly affected by other parts of the individual’s personality. Of course, the sum score of the Centrality Scale can also be very low, which indicates that the respondent is not religious at all. Hence, the Centrality Scale is also sensitive for non-religiosity, which is particularly important in a European context. However, since we focus on correlations based on the sum score of the Centrality Scale in our analyses, our findings should probably best be compared with findings on intrinsic religiosity as higher rates of centrality point to a more central religiosity in the respondent’s personality. For information about the psychometric properties of the Centrality Scale in our analyses, see Table 2.3.

Scale for Religious Fundamentalism The Religion Monitor includes also a scale assessing fundamentalist beliefs and attitudes, which is a short version of Huber's (2008) Scale for Religious Fundamentalism. The original scale consists of three subscales with three items. The three subscales assess similar facets of religious fundamentalism as Altemeyer's and Hunsberger's (1992; 2004; 2005) Religious Fundamentalism Scale: (1) an exclusivist belief in the superior truth of one's own religious tradition and in the salvation of its followers (*exclusivism*); (2) a strict distinction between good and evil whereby the latter has to be vigorously fought on behalf of one's own religion (*moral dualism*); and 3) the need for social cohesion among the members of the own tradition and the wish for influence of its representatives in society (*social cohesion*). Thereby, the phrasings of the items appear to be somewhat less extreme than those of Altemeyer's and Hunsberger's instrument.⁵ Hence, the Scale for Religious Fundamentalism might also be applicable in cultures with few fundamentalist tendencies. However, due to its focus on rather sociological aspects of religious fundamentalism, the scale does not include literalist beliefs or an intratextual approach in search for meaning as assessed with the IFS or the subscale *ttt* of the RSS (see Table 2.2). But our results can probably well be compared with findings based on versions of Altemeyer's and Hunsberger's Religious Fundamentalism Scale.

In the Religion Monitor, two of the three items of each subscale of the Scale for Religious Fundamentalism are included so that the applied brief version of the scale consists of six items (Huber, 2009). Unfortunately, in the 2012 wave, participants without religious affiliation have not been surveyed with the first of these items, but instead responded to three items expressing a fundamentalist secular ideology. Since we are interested in a sum score of *religious* fundamentalism for our analyses, we estimated the sum scores on the basis of the existing responses for all participants who answered to all remaining items of the Scale of Religious Fundamentalism.⁶ Although sum scores for such respondents are not as valid as for those who answered all items of the scale, we consider them to be a more valid estimate of fundamentalist religious beliefs as could be provided by the single-items assessing exclusivist or superiority beliefs which are most commonly used in other large-scale surveys (see Table 2.2).⁷ However, participants who did not

⁵Cf., for instance, the following phrasings: "I am convinced that in questions of religion, my own religion is right while other religions tend to be wrong" (Huber, 2009, p. 28) versus "God has given humanity a complete, unflinching guide to happiness and salvation which must be totally followed" (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005, p. 380) or "I am convinced that primarily members of my religion will be saved" (Huber, 2009, p. 28) versus "To lead the best, most meaningful life, one must belong to the one, fundamentally true religion" (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 2005, p. 380).

⁶The entire process of data cleaning is discussed in detail elsewhere (Klein et al., 2017b).

⁷This applies in particular to the items used in the ALLBUS and ISSP surveys which allow only for a threefold categorical distinction between respondents who endorse either an exclusivist opinion ("There is truth only in one religion"), a pluralist opinion ("There are basic truths in many

respond to all remaining items of the scale had to be excluded from the analyses. As result, religiously affiliated participants are slightly overrepresented in our sample. Hence, as a closer inspection of Table 2.1 illustrates, subsamples from countries with a higher degree of secularization (Sweden, France, UK) are somewhat smaller. Also, the proportions of sexes show that women are overrepresented in all subsamples. This is probably due to the fact that, at least in Christian cultures in the western world, women tend to express higher religiosity and are more likely to be religiously affiliated (Francis & Penny, 2014; Klein, Keller, & Traunmüller, 2017a; Trzebiatowska & Bruce, 2012). Although the subsamples from the eight countries are not entirely representative anymore as a consequence of data cleaning (and of unfortunate assessment), they are for sure more representative than the majority of student samples forming the basis of recent reviews and meta-analyses on religiosity and prejudice. Nevertheless, in our interpretation of findings we must be aware of the somewhat limited generalizability of our results. Means, standard deviations, and internal consistencies of the Scale for Religious Fundamentalism are reported in Table 2.3.

Religious Pluralism In the Religion Monitor, also two items of a short scale assessing pluralist religious beliefs (Huber, 2008) are included. As they do not allow for a proper scaling, we analyzed the correlations of both items with prejudice separately and present the findings for the one item that is most consistent and most striking. The phrasing of this item is: “For me every religion has a core of truth” (Huber, 2009, p. 28). Although a single-item cannot indicate a certain construct as an entire scale would be able to do, we consider such an item to be a better measure than the forced-choice categorical items on religious pluralism and exclusivism which have typically been used in other large-scale surveys (see Table 2.2). In the Religion Monitor, the item on religious pluralism can be answered with a 5-point Likert scale. For means and standard deviations, see Table 2.3.

Spiritual Self-Rating Including spiritual self-ratings in surveys on religiosity is a very recent development in research (Streib, Klein, & Hood, 2016a). So far, measures of spirituality have only scarcely been used in research on prejudice. But since measures of spirituality are known to be positively correlated with the personality dimension openness to experience (Saroglou, 2010; Streib, Klein, & Hood, 2016b) which is usually negatively associated with prejudice (Ekehammar, Akrami, Gylje, & Zakrisson, 2004; Sibley & Duckitt, 2008), we find it interesting to calculate the correlations between self-rated spirituality and prejudice in addition to our other analyses. The phrasing of the spiritual self-rating is: “Putting aside whether or not you would describe yourself as a religious person, how spiritual would you say you

religions”), or who doubt any kind of religious truth (“There is very little truth in any religion”). In many European countries, less than 10% of the participants opt for the exclusivist position. Hence, due to the forced-choice format of the items, analyses on fundamentalist beliefs are only possible for small proportions of the samples.

are?" (Huber, 2009, p. 38). Respondents can chose between five rating stages ranging from "not at all spiritual" to "very spiritual." Means and standard deviations are presented in Table 2.3.

Attitudes Toward Jews, Muslims, Migrants, and Homosexuals The items asking for attitudes toward Jews ("The Jews have too much influence in *respective country*."), and migrants ("There are too many immigrants in *respective country*."), have been taken directly from the cross-European study on GFE (Küpper & Zick, 2010; Zick et al., 2011). The items operationalizing attitudes toward Muslims ("Islam fits well in the western world.") and homosexuals ("A homosexual couple should be allowed to marry.") are paraphrasing similar items from the same study. As all four attitudes are measured with single-items, these items can only be used as proxies for the broader constructs of anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, xenophobia, and homophobia, but do not allow for any differentiation between the attitudes toward the phenomenon (e.g. Islam or homosexuality) and toward its representatives (e.g. Muslims or gays and lesbians). Nevertheless, they provide an opportunity to compare how distinct types of prejudicial attitudes vary in their associations with distinct types of religiosity across the included North American and European samples. All four items on attitudes can be answered with 4-point Likert scales. The items on attitudes toward Muslims and homosexuals have been reverse-scored so that higher values of all four items indicate higher levels of rejection of or prejudice against the respective group. The means and standard deviations of the four items are reported in Table 2.3.

Statistics

As results, we report the bivariate correlations of the distinct religiosity measures with the four attitudes. Effects of age, sex, relationship, education (not reported in Table 2.1 because assessment differed across countries and controls should be most suitable for each subsample), employment, and urbanity have been partialized out. Due to sample size, already correlations of $r = .09$ reach the level of $p \leq .001$ among the eight subsamples. Hence, it is important to be aware that correlations of $.10 \geq r \leq .30$ are still small effects while correlations of $.30 \geq r \leq .50$ represent medium effects, and only correlations of $r \geq .50$ can be considered to be strong effects (Cohen, 1988). However, as our main interest is the comparison of patterns across types of religiosity, types of prejudice, and cultures, more important than the size or significance of single correlations are the emerging patterns of associations. Therefore, we present our results in form of bar charts since figures are often superior to tables when general patterns shall be demonstrated (Cleveland, 1994; Gelman, Pasarica, & Dohia, 2002; Kastlelec & Leoni, 2007).

Results

Figure 2.1 shows the correlations between the religious self-rating and the four types of prejudice across the eight countries. The majority of correlations are low, i.e. $-.10 \geq r \leq .10$, with the clear exception of the correlations between self-rated religiosity and the item assessing a homophobic attitude in terms of rejection of same-sex marriages. The correlations between self-rated religiosity and homophobia are much higher than all other associations in all eight countries. In four countries including both North American subsamples, the effects are of medium size ($r \geq .35$); in the other four countries the effects remain of small size ($.14 \geq r \leq .30$), but are still consistently stronger than all correlations with other types of prejudice. The only other associations that reach a similar level are the two correlations between religious self-rating and anti-Semitism in Canada ($r = .13$) and in France ($r = .17$). While the associations with anti-Semitism in general tend to be slightly positive with the exception of the U.S. subsample, correlations with Islamophobia and Xenophobia are partly negative, but remain on a very low level, too. All in all, self-rated religiosity appears to be widely uncorrelated with prejudicial attitudes toward Jews (except in Canada and France), Muslims, and migrants, but substantially related to the disapproval of homosexuality.

As Fig. 2.2 illustrates, the patterns for centrality of religiosity are very similar, but appear to be a bit more pronounced: On the one hand, some inverse correlations of the centrality of religiosity with Islamophobia and xenophobia are slightly more negative and reach the level of small effects in two cases (correlations with xenophobia in the UK and in Germany: $r = -.13$ in both subsamples). Additionally, small




Fig. 2.1 Bivariate correlations between religious self-rating and four types of prejudice in eight countries




Fig. 2.2 Bivariate correlations between centrality of religiosity and four types of prejudice in eight countries

positive associations of centrality of religiosity with anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia are on average slightly lower than the correlations of these types of prejudice with the religious self-rating reported in the previous paragraph. On the other hand, the positive associations between centrality of religiosity and a homophobic attitude become even clearer across all subsamples with coefficients ranging from $r = .23$ (Germany) to $r = .45$ (USA). Thus, the associations between centrality of religiosity and prejudice support the impression that religiosity in general is rather uncorrelated with inter-religious or xenophobic prejudice, but clearly associated with homophobic attitudes.

In contrast to the already reported results, the pattern of associations between the Scale for Religious Fundamentalism and the four types of prejudice (see Fig. 2.3) shows that invariably *all* correlations turn out to be positive. Although some correlations in some countries are on a very low level, on average religious fundamentalism appears to be slightly positively associated with anti-Semitism ($r \geq .10$ in Canada, the UK, France, and Germany), Islamophobia ($r \geq .10$ in the USA, Canada, Switzerland, and Germany), and xenophobia ($r \geq .10$ in Canada, Sweden, Spain, and France). The correlations of religious fundamentalism with a homophobic attitude are obviously higher in all subsamples and visibly higher than the correlations with homophobic prejudice that we have seen so far. With the exception of France ($r = .26$), all coefficients are at least of medium size (remaining European countries: $.30 \geq r \leq .39$) or even stronger (USA and Canada: $.53 \geq r \leq .57$). Hence, religious fundamentalism tends to be positively associated with prejudice in general and is clearly related to homophobic attitudes whereby the latter association appears to be even stronger in North America than in Europe.




Fig. 2.3 Bivariate correlations between religious fundamentalism and four types of prejudice in eight countries

Quite the opposite seems to apply for religious pluralism (see Fig. 2.4): The item assessing a religiously pluralist belief is inversely related to the vast majority of attitudes across all eight samples. The few exceptions, e.g. the correlation between religious pluralism and homophobia in the French subsample ($r = .09$), remain on a very low level. However, the correlations of religious pluralism are obviously smaller than those observed for religious fundamentalism. Many correlations are weaker than $r = -.10$; and there are only two correlations stronger than $r = -.20$. Interestingly, both occur among the U.S. participants: The association of religious pluralism with Islamophobia is $r = -.26$, and the association with a homophobic attitude is $r = -.32$ in the U.S. subsample. Across all eight subsamples, the type of prejudice seems to matter with respect to size and consistency of associations: On average, the strongest effects can be noted for the relation between a pluralist view and Islamophobia ($r \leq -.10$ in the USA, Canada, the UK, France, Switzerland, and Germany). The associations between religious pluralism and a xenophobic attitude toward migrants are also very consistently negative, but on a visibly lower level. Somewhat surprisingly, religious pluralism seems to be almost completely uncorrelated to attitudes toward Jews.

Finally, Fig. 2.5 presents the correlations between spiritual self-rating and prejudice. Here again, we find a differential pattern: While associations of self-rated spirituality with anti-Semitic and Islamophobic attitudes are mostly neutral, correlations with xenophobia are low ($r \geq -.10$ in all subsamples but the UK: $r = -.13$), but widely consistently negative whereas correlations with homophobia turn out to be consistently positive and stronger. They range from $r = .07$ in Germany to $r = .28$ in the USA. All in all, the pattern of associations of spiritual self-rating resembles




Fig. 2.4 Bivariate correlations between religious pluralism and four types of prejudice in eight countries




Fig. 2.5 Bivariate correlations between spiritual self-rating and four types of prejudice in eight countries

those of religious self-rating and centrality of religiosity, but appears to be shifted somewhat more in direction of less positive and more negative correlations.

Discussion

With respect to distinct types of religiosity, we find differential patterns for all types assessed whereby religious self-rating and the Centrality Scale display the most similar results. While religious fundamentalism is positively associated with all types of prejudice, religious pluralism is almost equally consistently inversely related to prejudice, although correlations are obviously weaker as observed for fundamentalism. While religious pluralism across cultures shows the clearest associations with less Islamophobia, which mostly reach the size of small effects, religious fundamentalism is particularly strongly associated with a stronger homophobic attitude, and these effects are of medium or even big size. The clear association with homophobia is also present in the correlations with self-rated religiosity and spirituality, and with the centrality of religiosity, whereby the associations with spiritual self-rating are somewhat weaker than with the other two measures. Hence, with respect to types of prejudice, we can state that the rejection of homosexuality was found to be clearly correlated with all types of religiosity except religious pluralism, while the other types of prejudice are by trend rather uncorrelated with religiosity in general (religious and spiritual self-rating, centrality of religiosity). Although the patterns for anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and xenophobia differ also to some degree, e.g. in the correlations with pluralism or spiritual self-rating, in general, their correlations are rather low and their variations seem to depend rather on certain cultural contexts than on the specific type of prejudice. However, it is striking that, with few exceptions, the patterns are very similar across cultures both for types of religiosity as for types of prejudice. The most obvious exceptions of the overall cross-culturally very consistent patterns are the relatively consistent positive associations of religious self-rating, centrality of religiosity, and, by trend, also spiritual self-rating with an anti-Semitic attitude in France and the surprisingly high inverse relationship between religious pluralism and homophobia in the USA. Nevertheless, all in all the patterns of correlations between religiosity and prejudice appear to be quite similar in North America and in Europe. This is probably the most novel result of our analyses.

Comparing our results with extant research on religiosity and prejudice, we see that they fit quite well with existing findings: The pattern for religious self-rating matches recent findings on similar indicators of general religiosity (Adamczyk, 2017; Doebler, 2014; 2015a; 2015b; Hall et al., 2010, in particular for studies since 1986; Scheepers et al., 2002a; van den Akker et al., 2013, Whitley, 2009). The results with the Centrality Scale resemble the pattern of correlations typical for intrinsic religiosity (Batson et al., 1993; Donahue, 1985; Hall et al., 2010; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Whitley, 2009). It is interesting to compare the results for self-rated religiosity and centrality of religiosity: In general, they look quite similar. Yet it is striking that, in particular in Canada and in the USA, self-rated religiosity is somewhat more clearly associated with other types of prejudice besides homophobia. Self-identifying as religious by religious-self ratings can be regarded

to primarily be an indicator of an individual's religious identity, i.e. the way someone perceives him or herself. In contrast, the Centrality Scale points much stronger to the extent of religious experiences and behavior, i.e. "doing religiosity" in terms of experiences and activities. Since belonging to an in-group, e.g. a certain religious group, is considered to be an integral part of identity and an important source of self-esteem (Greenwald et al., 2002; Tajfel & Turner, 1979), maybe asking for religious self-identification instead of assessing the extent of religious behavior is more likely to result in positive associations with prejudice because the former triggers more defensive evaluations of potential out-groups than the latter?

The results with the Scale for Religious Fundamentalism match findings on religious fundamentalism from North America (Hall et al., 2010; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; McCleary et al., 2011; Whitley, 2009) as well as findings on superiority beliefs from Europe (Doebler, 2014; 2015a; Küpper & Zick, 2010; Scheepers et al., 2002a) showing the general disposition of exclusivist, fundamentalist worldviews toward prejudice. Our findings on religious pluralism appear to be similar to findings on quest religiosity, which is also typically uncorrelated or inversely related to prejudice (Batson et al., 1993; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; McCleary et al., 2011). However, the concepts are by no means identical because the quest construct emphasizes the value of doubts and open questions while religious pluralism is focused on the plurality of divergent religious traditions and truth claims—and has only been measured with a single item in our analyses. Finally, with respect to our analyses on self-rated spirituality, there are only few comparable findings so far. In her studies based on the EVS data, Doebler (2014, 2015a, 2015b) noticed that a belief in some sort of spirit or life force was associated with less xenophobic, racist, Islamophobic, or homophobic attitudes. Similarly, in a study on alternative spirituality in Europe, Siegers (2012) observed that alternatively spiritual persons were in favor of liberal values and attitudes, e.g. homosexuals adopting a child. While we see a trend toward negative correlations between self-rated spirituality and xenophobic attitudes among our respondents, by contrast, we find spiritual self-rating to be positively associated with homophobia. Hence, describing oneself as spiritual is not necessarily related to more liberal attitudes, and the tension between our findings and those of Doebler or Siegers points to the diversity of meanings which are associated with the term "spirituality" (Eisenmann et al., 2016).

Summing up, we consider our findings to fit into the picture that Saroglou (2016) draws of extant research on the relationship between religiosity and prejudice:

These studies show that, partly because of increased social and religious emphasis on the importance of prohibiting racism and xenophobia and promoting tolerance and religious ecumenism (Batson et al., 1993; Hall et al., 2010), religious prejudice against ethnic and several religious outgroups, at least when prejudice is measured through self-reports among ordinary participants, is not prominent today. [...] On the contrary, religiosity, even intrinsic religiosity and not only fundamentalism, typically predicts, beyond some impact of personality dispositions, prejudice and discrimination—even when measured by self-reports—against homosexual persons [...] perceived to threaten basic religious-moral values (Saroglou, 2016, p. 36).

Limitations

Mentioning the limits of self-reports, the quotation above leads to some limitations of our analyses which shall be addressed at the end of this section: There is evidence that associations between religiosity and prejudice which, like in our analyses, have been observed on the basis of self-reports underlie a number of limitations. First, self-report measures always bear the risk that respondents answer items on prejudice in a socially desirable way in order to appear more tolerant, humanitarian, and free of prejudicial tendencies. There have been numerous warnings against the dangers of social desirable responding within prejudice research and repeated discussions about the extent of these dangers (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Taylor, 1961; Whitley & Kite, 2010) and about possible preventive strategies, e.g. use of measures for subtle prejudice or indirect measurement procedures (Fazio & Olson, 2003; Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995). Second, not only self-reports of prejudice, but also self-report assessments of religiosity are known to be correlated with social desirable responding (Gillings & Joseph, 1996; Sedikides & Gebauer, 2010; Trimble, 1997) whereby the associations are weaker for extrinsic (Batson et al., 1978) and quest religiosity (Duck & Hunsberger, 1999), but particularly strong for intrinsic religiosity (Batson et al., 1978; Burris & Navarra, 2002; Leak & Fish, 1989) although this might in part be a result of operationalizing social desirability in terms of pretended obedience to core religious teachings (Watson, Morris, Foster, & Hood, 1986). Third, besides the risk of intentional social desirable responding, self-reports might simply not be capable of detecting associations between religiosity and prejudice on the subconscious, prereflective level of cognition of which respondents are not aware themselves. Indeed, a number of experimental studies recently observed that already subtle religious primes such as certain symbols, words, or buildings increased the likelihood of prejudice and discrimination toward diverse ethnic, religious, or moral out-groups in distinct religious and secular cultures (Johnson, Rowatt, & LaBouff, 2010, 2012b; LaBouff, Rowatt, Johnson, & Finkle, 2012; Ramsay, Pang, Shen, & Rowatt, 2014; Razpurker-Apfeld & Shamo-Nir, 2015). Hence, we have to admit that the scope of our analyses is limited to associations between self-reported types of religiosity and prejudice which might in part be affected by social desirable responding and might overlook associations on the implicit level of cognition.

Another shortcoming of our analyses is the limitation of the number and selection of countries included. As we have seen in previous sections of this chapter, associations between certain indicators of religiosity and less prejudice have only been observed in rather secular European countries (Küpper & Zick, 2010) while certain prejudice rates, in particular of homophobia (Kuyper et al., 2013; Scheepers et al., 2002b; van den Akker et al., 2013), as well as associations between religiosity and prejudice were found to be higher in the more religious European countries (Küpper & Zick, 2010; Doebler, 2014; 2015a; 2015b). We have to admit that, due to our decision to use the Religion Monitor data, only six European countries with a rather high degree of secularization could be included in the analyses. Stronger religious European countries such as Italy, Ireland, Poland, or Malta have

unfortunately not been surveyed. Additionally, the selection of subsamples completely lacks countries with a Christian Orthodox background. Hence, the picture is by no means complete. Additionally, a broader selection of countries would have provided the opportunity to calculate multi-level analyses so that the statistics would have been sounder.

Finally, our results document only the simple cross-sectional correlations between religiosity and prejudice, but do neither include any possible moderating or mediating variables, e.g. personality dimensions like openness to experience or generalized attitudes like RWA, nor do they allow for any longitudinal perspective. Hence, we do not know to which degree the observed correlations might be affected by other variables or might change over time. Nevertheless, we think that our results already give some impression of the overall rather similar patterns of associations between distinct types of religiosity and several types of prejudice across North America and a number of European countries—including Germany and hence, the specific cultural context wherein the Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion has taken place.

Conclusion and Outlook

Which conclusions can be drawn from our review of extant research on religiosity and prejudice and from our own analyses of associations in North America and Europe with respect to our Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion? Probably the most basic insight is that research on religiosity and prejudice should be aware of the complexity of associations and of the differential patterns depending on both types of religiosity and types of prejudice. Hence, future studies as our own are well advised to include a selection of measures of religiosity ranging from conservative or even fundamentalist beliefs to liberal and pluralist religious orientations. Similarly, research should focus on a variety of prejudicial attitudes representing religiously, ethnically, sexually, or morally marked groups. In the Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion, we have responded to this conclusion in several ways: Basically, we include a variety of measures of religiosity and a selection of nine types of prejudice as well as attitudes toward religious pluralism in our study design (see Table 2.2 and Chap. 4 for a detailed description of the study design). For the assessment of prejudice, we use a couple of the same or similar measures as Zick, Küpper and colleagues have used in their research on GFE (Küpper & Zick, 2010; Zick et al., 2008; 2011). With respect to religiosity, we have seen that attempts aiming at distinguishing between certain types of religiosity have tried to identify basic dimensions of religious orientations, e.g. intrinsic vs. extrinsic religiosity (ROS; Allport & Ross, 1967), quest religiosity (Batson & Schoenrade, 1991a; 1991b; Batson et al., 1993) vs. religious fundamentalism (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; 2004; 2005), inclusion vs. exclusion of transcendence and literal vs. symbolic understanding (PCBS; Duriez et al., 2005; 2007; Fontaine et al., 2003; Hutsebaut, 1996), or commitment vs. non-commitment and reflectivity vs. unreflectivity (CRC; Krauss & Hood, 2013). Trying to integrate these approaches, we think that it might

be plausible to distinguish between two general axes of religious (and nonreligious) worldviews: A first dimension reflecting the general degree of interiorization of religious experiences, beliefs, and activities resembling the (rather European) distinction between inclusion or exclusion of transcendence and the (rather American) distinction between intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity or commitment and non-commitment; and a second dimension representing the degree of closed-minded persisting in traditional viewpoints (resembling the literal, unreflective fundamentalist poles) or open-minded, self- and post-critical reasoning about own and alternative beliefs (resembling the symbolic, reflective, and questing poles). In our opinion, the latter dimension is also mirrored in our findings on religious fundamentalism and religious pluralism based on the Religion Monitor data. In our design of the Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion, the first dimension is operationalized with the Centrality Scale (Huber & Huber, 2012). To model the second dimension, we make use of the distinction between *conservation vs. openness to change* as proposed and operationalized in Schwartz' (1992; 2006; 2012) cross-cultural research on universal value orientations, because we assume that this basic distinction is underlying a broad variety of worldviews (Duckitt, 2001). In Chaps. 4, 6, 7, and 8, we use the Centrality Scale and Schwartz' value axis *conservation vs. openness to change* as measures for both dimensions and use them in several analyses as predictors of the diverse types of prejudice. For our selection of interviewees for the qualitative part of our study presented in Chaps. 10, 11, 12, 13, and 14, we use both measures in order to identify possible interviewees (see Chap. 4). Beside the basic operationalization of both dimensions, we refer to Fowler's (1981) and Streib's (2001; 2003; 2005; Streib et al., 2010) theories on religious development in order to identify specific religious schemata which might develop across the life-span and characterize distinct approaches to dealing with alternative religious and ideological standpoints. Hence, we use the RSS (Streib et al., 2010) to distinguish between a fundamentalist (*ttt*), a rational-discursive (*frt*), and a pluralist-dialogical (*xenos*) schema among further measures for ideological fundamentalism and pluralism (Klein, 2010). In our analyses presented in Chaps. 6, 7, and 8, the subscales of the RSS are used as mediators between the basic ideological dimensions and prejudice. In the case studies in Chaps. 11, 12, 13, and 14, they are used to triangulate the interviews with our quantitative data. In sum, we hope that we will be able to draw a detailed picture of differential associations between distinct types of religiosity and prejudice.

A second conclusion that can be drawn from this chapter is that associations between religiosity and prejudice can change over time, probably as a result of attitude change in societies (Hall et al., 2010; Küpper & Zick, 2017; Saroglou, 2016). For instance, we have seen that associations between general religiosity or religious fundamentalism and racism have decreased throughout the last decades (Hall et al., 2010) and "religious prejudice against ethnic and several religious outgroups [...] is not prominent today" (Saroglou, 2016, p. 36). However, it is also possible that new situations perceived as threatening might increase negative stereotypes and devaluating attitudes (Riek, Mania, & Gaertner, 2006; Stephan, Ybarra, & Morrison, 2009) and might also change associations with other constructs. For instance, a societal

challenge such as the migration of huge numbers of refugees might affect attitudes toward refugees and their cultural and religious characteristics to the worse. Therefore, we will present some analyses about attitude change toward refugees, migrants, and Muslims, but also toward other groups, between August 2015, when the first large refugee migration wave on the Balkan route arrived in Germany, and March 2016, before elections in three federal German states, in Chap. 5.

Another insight, in particular from our overview over the conceptual and empirical overlap between religious fundamentalism and authoritarianism, is that there might be influential dispositions moderating or mediating the associations between religiosity and prejudice. Hence, it is important for future studies to take the impact of such mediators into account. For our Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion, in particular two mediators appeared interesting to us in order to better understand which ideological characteristics inhibit or foster a xenophobic attitude: Tolerance of complexity (Radant & Dalbert, 2006) and violence-legitimizing norms of masculinity (Enzmann, Brettfeld, & Wetzels, 2004; Enzmann & Wetzels, 2003). Our review has shown that fundamentalists might be more prone to prejudice because their mindsets are more likely to be characterized by closed-mindedness, inflexibility, and cognitive rigidity (Brandt & Reyna, 2010; Hill et al., 2010; Hunsberger et al., 1994; 1996; Pancer et al., 1995). Hence, we assume that a xenophobic cognitive style and openness to dialog with others might be more likely if people are able to handle and to stand the aporias and ambiguities of the world. This ability is described with the concept of tolerance of complexity, and, hence, we have decided to include the Tolerance of Complexity Scale (Radant & Dalbert, 2006) in our design. Results of our analyses regarding tolerance of complexity are reported in Chap. 6. In our review of fundamentalism and authoritarianism we have seen that in particular the RWA component *authoritarian aggression* is an important mediator between fundamentalist beliefs and prejudice (Johnson et al., 2011; Johnson et al., 2012a). Overt aggression is usually more frequently reported by men (Archer, 2004; Feingold, 1994; Hyde, 1984). In contrast, women are known to express higher levels of religious beliefs, experiences, and practices (Francis & Penny, 2014; Trzebiatowska & Bruce, 2012), at least in predominantly Christian countries in the western world (Klein et al., 2017a). Because the associations of RWA and religious fundamentalism with homophobic prejudice seem to be somewhat stronger among men than among women (Stefurak, Taylor, & Mehta, 2010; Whitley, 2009), Johnson et al. (2012a) have proposed to investigate effects of religiosity and authoritarian aggression on prejudice among men and women comparatively. We react to this recommendation by including the violence-legitimizing norms of masculinity, i.e. the belief that men have to establish their honor and that violent acts are legitimate means to keeping it (Enzmann et al., 2004; Enzmann & Wetzels, 2003), in our design. Violence-legitimizing norms of masculinity can be understood as a generalized attitude similar to RWA, in particular *authoritarian aggression*, but with a specific focus on a gender-specific ideology. In Chap. 7, we present the results of our analyses including violence-legitimizing norms of masculinity for our entire sample and separately for men and women.

When discussing the limitations of our findings based on the Religion Monitor data, we admitted that associations between self-reported religiosity and prejudice might be contaminated by effects of social desirability (Gillings and Joseph 1996; Sedikides and Gebauer 2010; Trimble 1997), and we referred to findings showing that there might additionally be associations between religiosity and prejudice on the implicit, prereflective level of cognition (Johnson et al., 2010; 2012b; LaBouff et al., 2012; Ramsay et al., 2014; Razpurker-Apfeld & Shamo-Nir, 2015). A strategy to discover also the implicit parts of an attitude and to avoid the risk of intentional social desirable responding is the use of Implicit Association Tests (IATs), an indirect, computer-based assessment method (Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998). IATs have been successfully used to study inter-religious (Clobert, Saroglou, & Kwang-Kuo, 2015; Clobert, Saroglou, Kwang-Kuo, & Soong, 2014; Henry & Hardin, 2006; Park, Felix, & Lee, 2007; Rowatt, Franklin, & Cotton, 2005; Rudman, Greenwald, Mellott, & Schwartz, 1999), racist (Rowatt & Franklin, 2004), and homophobic prejudice (Rowatt et al., 2006; Tsang & Rowatt, 2007) and their associations with religiosity, and have proven to be unaffected by effects of social desirability (Rowatt & Franklin, 2004; Rowatt et al., 2006; Tsang & Rowatt, 2007). In order to investigate also the implicit parts of our respondents' attitudes in the Bielefeld Study on Xenophobia and Religion, we included three Single-Category IATs (SC-IATs; Karpinski & Steinman, 2006) assessing implicit attitudes toward the three Abrahamic religions Judaism, Christianity, and Islam into our design so that we can compare possible inter-religious prejudice both on the explicit and implicit level. Results are reported in Chap. 8.

In Chaps. 4, 6, 7, and 8, we already refer to Schwartz' (1992; 2006; 2012) theory of basic human values and include the value axis *conservation vs. openness to change* as predictor of prejudice. In Chap. 9, we present a more detailed analysis of the associations of the distinct values described in Schwartz' theory with the various types and facets of religiosity and prejudice assessed in our study. Although it is well-known that both religiosity and prejudice go along with conservative value orientations, so far few attempts have been made to link research on religiosity and prejudice with research on religiosity and values. While liberal value preferences are correlated with more positive attitudes toward diverse out-groups, conservative value preferences such as conformity, tradition, and security are associated both with higher levels of prejudice (Leong, 2008; Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995; Zick et al., 2011) and with indicators of general religiosity (Roccas & Elster, 2014; Roccas & Schwartz, 1997; Saroglou, Delpierre, & Dernelle, 2004). However, only little is known so far about value orientations going along with distinct types of religiosity, including more open-minded types such as a xenophobic religiosity.

As many other reviews on research about religiosity and prejudice (Batson et al., 1993; Jacobson, 1998; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Hood et al., 2009; Paloutzian, 2017; Rowatt et al., 2013; 2014), our overview almost completely focused on quantitative studies because quantitative approaches have been the dominant research strategies. However, the vast majority of these studies is cross-sectional and does not allow for an analysis of biographical experiences which shaped the participants' attitudes. Additionally, quantitative studies are necessarily restricted to a limited

number of measures covering only a selection of relevant constructs. For an in-depth understanding of the conditions and circumstances which coined the development of an individual's worldview, comprehensive biographical information is required which can only be collected based on qualitative approaches. Therefore, our study design includes also comprehensive interviews of selected participants. Since we refer to FDT (Fowler, 1981) and its revision by Streib (2001; 2003; 2005; Streib et al., 2010) with our assessment of distinct types of religiosity with the RSS subscales, the corresponding qualitative tool, the Faith Development Interview (FDI; Fowler, 1981; Fowler, Streib & Keller, 2004; Streib & Keller, 2015), is used for the interrogation of our participants. Case studies based on the FDI are presented in Chaps. 11, 12, 13, and 14; Chap. 10 gives an overview over the typology of orientations arising from the qualitative part of our study. Detailed information about the most recent developments in FDT and improvements of FDI evaluation will be given in the following Chap. 3.

In sum, our study design tries to reflect a number of insights deriving from our overview over extant research on religiosity and prejudice. It is our hope that our efforts will help us to come closer to a better understanding of how the “positive piety” overcoming the “inborn hatred of the alien” James (1902/1982, p. 338) spoke of already 115 years ago might look like today.

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Chapter 3

How Faith Development Interviews Reflect Biographical Paths to Xenosophia: Conceptual and Methodological Considerations



Heinz Streib and Barbara Keller

Conceptual Considerations

Fowler's Model of Faith Development

The notion that religiosity may change over the course of a person's lifetime is not completely new. But an understanding of the changes of religiosity in terms of structural-developmental progress, as it became popular in the 1970s and 1980s, has established a new line of research that accepts inspirations from Piaget, more precisely: from Kohlberg's (1984) interpretation of Piaget's developmental perspective into theory and research on religion. This appreciation of Piagetian structuralism is certainly true for Fowler's (1981) influential model, but Fowler was rooted deeply enough in religious studies and theology to arrive at a rather multi-dimensional construct of religion – or in his terms: of 'faith.'

The decision to use the term 'faith' was greatly inspired by Cantwell Smith (1963, 1979). But Fowler's 'faith' also reflects perspectives of H. R. Niebuhr (1943) and Tillich (1957). Fowler (1981, p. 92) defined 'faith' in the following way:

In the most formal and comprehensive terms I can state it, faith is: People's evolved and evolving ways of experiencing self, others and world (as they construct them) as related to and affected by the ultimate conditions of existence (as they construct them) and shaping their lives' purpose and meanings, trusts and loyalties, in the light of the character of being, value and power determining the ultimate conditions of existence (as grasped in their operative images – conscious and unconscious – of them).

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This definition characterizes faith as meaning-making (as in the subtitle of *Stages of Faith*) and thereby reflects functional and structural perspectives. Furthermore, by the use of “ultimate conditions of existence,” traditional material definitional characteristics of religion are avoided. Instead, the concept of faith, according to Fowler (1996, p. 168–167), “aims to include descriptions of religious faith as well as the less explicit faith orientations of individuals and groups who can be described as secular or eclectic in their belief and values orientations.” We note that ‘faith’ is not confined to vertical transcendence, but meant to include non-theistic and implicit versions of religion (cf. Streib & Hood, 2011, 2016b).


Fowler conceptualized ‘faith’ broadly and has assumed that a variety of structural aspects are characteristic for faith on a certain stage. Thereby, he included not only structural aspects such as *cognitive development* (adopted from Piaget), *perspective-taking* (adopted from Selman) and *moral development* (adopted from Kohlberg), but he has added four more aspects: *bound of social awareness*, *locus of authority*, *form of world coherence*, and *symbolic functioning*. These seven aspects are assumed to form a coherent heptagonal combine. Thus, stages are defined as “structural wholes,” i.e. the same cognitive structures are present across all seven aspects.

The stages of faith are assumed to progress in an invariant, sequential, irreversible, hierarchical and universally valid sequence – largely following Kohlberg’s criteria of “hard” stage development (Kohlberg, Levine, & Hower, 1983). Fowler assumed the faith stages to progress (loosely related to age) in the following sequence: Stage One of *intuitive-projective faith* (<6 years), where the child, dependent on caretakers, has yet to learn to distinguish between himself and objects and fantasy and reality; Stage Two of *mythic-literal faith* (7–12 years) that is oriented to reward and punishment; Stage Three of *synthetic-conventional faith* (adolescence, adulthood) that is oriented to one’s own group and implicit reasoning; Stage Four of *individuating-reflective faith* with explicit systemic reasoning (late adolescence; adulthood); Stage Five of *conjunctive faith* that is characterized by ‘second naïveté’ recognizing the evocative power inherent in symbols, including symbols of other religious traditions (adulthood); and, finally, and rarely identified in empirical reality, Stage Six of *universalizing faith*, described as loyalty to being and purged of egoistic strivings (adulthood and late adulthood). The sequence of faith stages is visualized as a spiral by Fowler (1981, p. 275).

Taking the sequence of faith stages and the seven aspects together, Fowler (1980) imagined ‘faith’ as a heptagon, as visualized in Fig. 3.1.

This heptagon, introduced by Fowler in 1980, can be taken as the most influential visualization of his model because it structured not only theory, but also research in faith development (even though the figure was not included in *Stages of Faith*). The *Manual for Faith Development Research* is structured like a grid of this heptagon. In a nutshell, this heptagon grid is visible in a large table in *Stages of Faith* (Fowler, 1981, p. 244–245). The *Manual* thus presents, for each stage-aspect combination (i.e. each cell in the heptagon grid), coding criteria for rating the selection of FDI

Fig. 3.1 Aspects and stages in faith development (The Heptagon Model, Fowler 1980, p. 32)
 Note **A** = Form of logic;
B = Perspective-taking;
C = Moral judgment;
C = Bound of social awareness; **E** = Locus of authority; **F** = Form of world coherence;
F = Symbolic function;
 numbers 1 to 5 indicate the faith stages



questions that are considered relevant for this cell. Because we regard it as very helpful for evaluation, we have kept this structure also in the 3rd edition of the *Manual* (Fowler, Streib, & Keller, 2004) and further revisions.

The Religious Styles Perspective

The religious styles perspective (Streib, 2001, 2003a, 2003b, 2003c, 2005b, 2013), which has been elaborated as a result of critical-constructive engagement with Fowler’s project (Streib, 1991), has become the conceptual framework on which our research with the FDI in the completed and current projects is based. The religious styles perspective intends to open up attention to the flexibility and permeability of religious development, rather than confining development to the sequential abandonment of stages that are considered structural wholes. The term ‘style’ is used to




Fig. 3.2 The religious styles (Streib, 2001)

avoid prejudice for, and fixation on, a linear, irreversible developmental model and to open the perspective on the multi-directionality and diversity of developmental trajectories of our respondents.¹ While the conceptual discussion is not the focus of this chapter, it is important to refer to the religious styles perspective here, because of its consequences for the evaluation method. And this has been carefully but extensively revised in light of the religious styles perspective, as will be detailed below.

The conceptual base for the revisions can be explained also with reference to Fig. 3.1. Insofar the heptagon depicts a model of faith development, understood as sequential abandonment of absolutely flat planes (structural wholes), this model needs to be rejected with reference to empirical data that evidence differences in stage assignments of one stage or even more than one stage as rule, rather than as exception. Nevertheless, as a heuristic tool for structuring the evaluation of the FDIs and identifying the religious styles, the heptagon grid has proven useful.

For a visualization of the religious styles perspective, we present in Fig. 3.2 the model, which was inspired by Loevinger's (1976) mile stone model and has been included in an earlier version in the 2001 article (Streib, 2001). The figure intends to account for precursors and post-peak sediments. This may help to understand that more than one style is available at one time in a person's life. The sediments also indicate that past styles are available for revivals as, for example, in mid-life fundamentalist conversions (Streib, 2001, 2007).

¹A note on terminology: We use in this chapter and many other chapters of this book not only the term 'style,' but also the term 'stage.' This is consistent with the 3rd edition of the *Manual for Faith Development Research*, which was used for evaluation. But it is important to note that we associate with 'stage' not the entire set of structural-developmental assumptions, but rather understand 'stage' as synonymous with, or interpreted by, 'style.' In the 4th revised revision (Streib & Keller, 2018), we only use 'style' to turn to a consistent terminology.

The names of the religious styles largely correspond to Fowler's description of faith stages. And in the praxis of empirical research, the coding criteria in the *Manual* could be used for identifying the specific style. The slightly different names of religious styles nevertheless intend to put more emphasis on the inter-personal inter-action that make up a religious style. The faith development interview as a key research instrument and its structural evaluation are still considered valid, however, interpreted from a more comprehensive perspective on development. This allows us to account for variance in stage/style assignment, as the simultaneous presence of different styles is the rule rather than the exception.

On the basis of the religious styles model, we have developed the Religious Schema Scale (RSS, Streib, Hood, & Klein, 2010) as a scale to be used in questionnaire research. Schemata thereby are conceptualized as constructs that are applied, like habitus, to interpret and deal with experiences. In respect to the religious styles, religious schemata may be regarded as indicators for a specific style. Thus, the schema *truth of texts and teachings* is considered indicative of the *instrumental or do-ut-des religious style/the mythic-literal faith*; the schema of *fairness, tolerance and rational choice* indicates the *individuating-systemic religious style/the individuating-reflective faith*; and finally the schema of *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog* point toward the *dialogical religious style/the conjunctive faith*. The RSS also has a specific focus on the domain of inter-religious encounter and thus reflects three different ways of dealing with religious diversity. This is of particular interest in the context of the research presented in this book, as will be explained below.

The attentive reader will also discover that Fowler's Stage Six has no equivalent, but the number of religious styles is only five and ends with the *dialogical style*. We argue for this reduction to the elementary not only with reference to the empirical irrelevance of Fowler's Stage Six, but also because of philosophical and theological problems in Fowler's (1981) use of "universalism" in his understanding of *universalizing faith*—which made him slip into a particular theological interpretation (Stage Six as Kingdom of God) that he found very appealing and convincing.

It is exactly our reserve toward the conceptual closure that we see in Fowler's 'universalism,' which caused us to more modestly assume that openly dealing with paradox and the resistance of the alien is the best we can hope for in our fragmented world (see Chap. 1). Thus, and this is our next argumentative step in this chapter, dialog and xenosophia are regarded the top in the hierarchy of religious styles.

Xenosophia—Top of the Developmental Hierarchy

As noted in Chap. 1 already, there are correspondences between xenological patterns such as xenosophia and Fowler's faith stages and Streib's religious styles. These correspondences are all the more convincing when grounded in a philosophical conceptualization of xenosophia. Then, the differences between the religious styles rest on a solid foundation.

Table 3.1 Correspondences of stage, styles, schemata with Xenological patterns

Faith stages (Fowler, 1981)	Religious styles (Streib, 2001)	Religious schemata (Streib et al., 2010)	Inter-religious negotiation (Streib, 2006b)	Xenological patterns (see Chap. 1)
Conjunctive faith	Dialogical	<i>Xenosophia/inter-religious dialog</i>	Dialogical/inter-religious	Xenosophia
Individuative-reflective faith	Individuative-systematic	<i>Fairness, tolerance and rational choice</i>	Explicitly multi-religious	Tolerance respect/esteem conception
Synthetic-conventional faith	Mutual		Implicitly multi-religious	Tolerance/coexistence conception
Mythic-literal faith	Instrumental-reciprocal	<i>Truth of texts and teachings</i>	Imperialistic mono-religious	Prejudice or tolerance/permission conception
Intuitive-projective faith	Subjective		Xenophobic mono-religious	Xenophobia

It was particularly the difference between xenosophia and tolerance that has opened the perspective in our discussion in Chap. 1. The sharper xenosophia came into focus with reference to the line of the philosophical reasoning of Waldenfels (2011) and Nakamura (2000), the sharper xenosophia stood out from ‘tolerance’ in all its conceptions detailed by Forst (2013) and, of course, from prejudice and xenophobia. As distinctive characteristics of xenosophia, we have noted: the *responsive reaction* to the alien, the *non-hermeneutical reservation* in all attempts of understanding the alien, and not shutting the door against the *resistance* and *irritation* of the alien. Specific to xenosophia is also the potential surplus of creativity and wisdom.

From these characteristics of xenosophia, it is obvious that there is a correspondence with Fowler’s Stage Five of conjunctive faith, Streib’s dialogical religious style, and the religious schema of *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog*. And this also suggests a hierarchical difference to Fowler’s Stage Four of individuative-reflective faith and the related religious style and schema.

Now in this chapter, we take perspective from the other side, from the developmental models, and flesh out the consequences of placing xenosophia on the top of the hierarchy. Table 3.1 is an attempt to associate faith stages, religious styles, religious schemata and xenological patterns. Table 3.1 also includes the association with inter-religious negotiation styles, as noted earlier by Streib (2005b, 2006).

It should be noted, however, that the two columns on the right in Table 3.1 present attitudes that apply the styles (two columns on the left) and the schemata (in the middle) to the domain of inter-religious and inter-cultural relations. This is particularly important in the thematic framework of this book. We should keep in mind

however that, as indicated by the variety of Fowler's *aspects*, the faith stages/religious styles cover more ground, i.e. include more domains such as the understanding of texts and symbols, the social horizon for one's identity, or the ways of symbolizing one's experiences of transcendence, to name a few.

But for the context of our discussion in the book, it is important to note that xenosophia is a feature of Stage Five of *conjunctive faith* (Fowler) and the *dialogical religious style* (Streib), and thus stands on the top of the hierarchy of xenological styles. This hierarchy is reflected in developmental trajectories, even if the "logic of development" is open to empirical enquiry.

The Faith Development Interview and its Evaluation

In view of his broad and comprehensive concept of 'faith,' it is completely understandable that Fowler could not imagine a quantitative measure for 'faith' and has opposed any pencil and paper test, but instead from the beginning has opted for an interview approach, as is documented already in the first edition of the *Manual for Faith Development Research* (Moseley, Jarvis, & Fowler, 1986).

The Faith Development Interview

Research in faith development, according to Fowler, is based on a semi-structured interview, the Faith Development Interview (FDI). An interview takes between thirty minutes and two hours. In the FDI, twenty-five questions are asked that are divided in four sections: first, respondents are invited to reflect on their lives (*life tapestry/life review*), then, in a second section, on their *relationships* past and present, in a third section on their *values and commitments*, and only in the last section on *religion and world view*. Interview questions are presented in full length in Table 3.2.² Interviewees respond by presenting, explaining or justifying their opinions. It is however a special characteristic of the FDI that respondents – motivated by the autobiographical questions at the beginning of the interview process – respond by reporting events and by telling stories and autobiographical narratives.

²We present the version of the FDI questions (follow-up questions are in brackets) as used in our current research. In this version, some questions, as they are presented in the *Manual for Faith Development Research* (also in the 3rd edition: Fowler, Streib, & Keller, 2004), have been slightly modified in order to be more inclusive in regard to the variety of religious traditions and world-views; for example, in question 20, the adjectives "spiritual" and "faithful" have been added; or in question 4, "image of God and relation to God" has been exchanged by "world view" in the main question, and the phrase "image of God and the Divine" has been moved to a follow-up question.

Table 3.2 The faith development interview questions

LIFE TAPESTRY/LIFE REVIEW
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 1. Reflecting on your life thus far. Identify its major chapters. (If your life were a book, how would you name the different chapters? What marker events stand out as especially important?) 2. Are there past relationships that have been important to your development as a person? 3. Do you recall any changes in relationships that have had a significant impact on your life or your way of thinking about things? 4. How has your world view changed across your life's chapters? (How has this affected your image of God or of the Divine? What does it mean to you now?) 5. Have you ever had moments of intense joy or breakthrough experiences that have affirmed or changed your sense of life's meaning? (What are they? How have these experiences done so?) 6. Have you experienced times of crisis or suffering in your life? (Have you experienced times when you felt profound disillusionment, or that life had no meaning?)
RELATIONSHIPS
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 7. Focusing now on the present, how would you describe your parents and your current relationship to them? (Have there been any changes in your perceptions of your parents over the years? If so, what caused the change?) 8. Are there any other current relationships that are important to you? 9. What groups, institutions, or causes, do you identify with? (Why are they important to you?)
PRESENT VALUES AND COMMITMENTS
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 10. Do you feel that your life has meaning at present? (What makes your life meaningful to you?) 11. If you could change one thing about yourself or your life, what would you most want to change? 12. Are there any beliefs, values, or commitments that seem important to your life right now? 13. When or where do you find yourself most in communion or harmony with the universe? 14. What is your image or model of mature faith, of a mature response to questions of existential meaning? 15. When you have an important decision to make, how do you generally go about making it? (Can you give me an example? If you have a very difficult problem to solve, to whom or what would you look for guidance?) 16. Do you think that actions can be right or wrong? (If so, what makes an action right in your opinion? What makes an action wrong?) 17. Are there certain actions or types of actions that are always right under any circumstances? (Are there certain moral opinions that you think everyone should agree on?)
RELIGION AND WORLD VIEW
<ol style="list-style-type: none"> 18. Do you think that human life has a purpose? (If so, what is it? Is there a plan for our lives, or are we affected by a power or powers beyond our control?) 19. What does death mean to you? (What happens to us when we die?) 20. Do you consider yourself a religious, spiritual or faithful person? 21. Are there any religious, spiritual or other ideas, symbols or rituals that are important to you, or have been important to you? 22. Do you pray, meditate, or perform any other spiritual discipline? 23. What is sin to your understanding? 24. How do you explain the presence of evil in our world? 25. If people disagree about issues of world view or religion, how can such conflicts be resolved?

The very first question in the FDI invites the respondent to engage in this kind of structured autobiographical reconstruction. This reflects Fowler's strong emphasis on autobiographical reconstruction, which should be elicited by the FDI.³

Structural Evaluation of the Faith Development Interview

Consistent with the broad construct of 'faith,' faith development interview evaluation is characterized as a hermeneutical adventure:

Administering and coding the faith development interview is an exercise in hermeneutics. Language, in the form of verbal response to questions, is the observable datum upon which the interviewer/coder bases inferences about the mental and emotional processes of the person being interviewed. In order to do this, the interviewer must interpret these verbal responses and reconstruct them in terms of structural developmental theory. (Moseley et al., 1986, p. 16).

As this quote, which was included already in the first edition of the *Manual for Faith Development Research*, demonstrates, faith development interview evaluation decisively opts for an interpretative openness. But this quote also restricts openness: Immediately it is suggested to focus the interpretative attention to the cognitive-developmental *structures*. An underlying faith structure is considered the central object of evaluation, while thematic contents such as knowledge, assent to a statement of belief, or report of a practice are regarded to be surface phenomena. Thus, this quote demonstrates how the account for hermeneutical diversity is channeled immediately on the "reconstruction in terms of structural developmental theory."

Evaluating a FDI thus implies to discern a supposedly stable pattern of faith, whose development is seen as "change that eventuates in increasingly complex structures" (Moseley et al., 1986, p. 3). Certainly, identifying the structures, which may or may not be conscious to the interviewee, is an *interpretation*. The question however is whether this interpretation fully reflects the *diversity and multidimensionality* of faith.

Anyway, evaluating a FDI for structure proceeds in rating the responses to the 25 FDI questions in the interview transcript by comparing them with descriptions in the respective section in the *Manual*. After eventually comparing the coding criteria of one stage above and/or one stage below, the evaluator decides for a faith stage to be assigned to that specific passage in the interview. The evaluator then notes this stage assignment, together with the position in the transcript and a brief note for justification of the faith stage assignments, in a scoring sheet (see Fowler, Streib, & Keller, 2004, p. 77, for an example).

³Field work with the FDI in 1970s and 1980s even used the so-called "Life Tapestry Exercise" (see Fowler, Streib, & Keller, 2004, p. 69), a paper with several columns (calendar year; age; geographic and socio-economic place, key relationships; uses and directions of self; marker events; events in society; images of God; value centers; authorities). The respondents were asked to fill this out prior to the interview. The interviewee and the interviewer had the "Life tapestry sheet" in front of them in many interviews. And even when we do not use the "Life Tapestry Exercise" anymore, autobiographical reflection and autobiographical narration are triggered in the FDI.

The total FDI score is calculated, according to the *Manual*, using a simple formula: add all faith stage assignment for the single responses and divide them by the frequency of assignments and eventually round the decimals to integral numbers to indicate the faith stage.

Accounting for Variance in Structural Evaluation

Our revisions of research with the faith development interview are based on the experience accumulated in Bielefeld research projects,⁴ in particular in the Study on Deconversion (Streib, Hood, Keller, Csöff, & Silver, 2009), the Study on the semantics and psychology of “Spirituality” (Streib & Hood, 2016a), and the current longitudinal study on religious styles development.⁵ In preparing field work for the Deconversion Study, the 3rd edition of the *Manual for Faith Development Research* (Fowler et al., 2004) has been completed. Advancements in the 3rd edition will be detailed below (see also Keller & Streib, 2013; Keller, Klein, & Streib, 2013; Streib, Wollert, & Keller, 2016; Keller, Coleman, & Silver, 2016).⁶

The “classical” structural evaluation of the FDI has been carefully modified to allow more openness for diversity in stage assignments to the single FDI questions. This also includes attention to the potential differences between the aspects of faith. Taking a simple average of the 25 scores originally was justified with reference to the assumption that stages are structural wholes in which all aspects are indicators with equal weight and develop synchronically—forming one plane horizontal heptagon without any difference in height, to allude to the visualization in Fig. 3.1. But also without this structural-developmental justification, we have used the calculation of a sum score to obtain a general estimate of the style. Ignored by this way of estimating the total FDI score however is the spread of stage assignments, which frequently is larger than one stage and may possibly indicate aspect-specific differences—eventually exceeding their possible interpretation as developmental time lags (*décalage* in the terms of Piagetian research).

It is not a new finding that faith stage assignments to the single FDI questions vary. The *Manual*, from the first edition on, has assumed some variance in stage assignments. But to do nothing else than averaging this variance leads to an implausible reduction of complexity. Since empirical data evidence differences in stage assignments of more than one stage as rule, rather than as exception, it may be wise to keep the door open to an interpretation of this variance. Our suggestion thus is the visualization of the faith stage assignments to the single FDI questions in figures

⁴With more than 900 FDIs, the Bielefeld Research Center for Biographical Studies in Contemporary Religion has the privilege of owning a considerable FDI data base (probably the largest in the world) with considerable cross-cultural and cross-religious diversity.

⁵See our website for this project at <http://www.uni-bielefeld.de/religiousstylesdevelopment/>

⁶In the meantime, we have completed the 4th revision of the *Manual* (Streib & Keller, 2018) and recommend this for future use in research with the FDI.




Fig. 3.3 The stage assignments to the single FDI questions in the interview with Nina

that we call *stage-aspect maps*. The case studies in this book include such a stage-aspect map. Figure 3.3 is an example from the case study in Chap. 12.

This detailed attention to the stage assignments of the single responses to the 25 FDI questions opens the evaluation for important new questions. It enables the account for the aspect-specific stage assignments. The stage-aspect map also allows for an estimation of the FDI total score, based on the majority of assignments of a certain stage. From Fig. 3.3 it is obvious that Nina’s total FDI score has to be estimated Stage Four. But from this general tendency to Stage Four in Nina’s answers, the question arises: What do her Stage Three answers indicate? Furthermore, the stage-aspect map may allow for a new way of analyzing the FDI, when the responses are sorted according to questions for religious or non-religious themes?

Taken together, accounting for more variance of the stage assignments opens the structural evaluation beyond identifying and justifying the final FDI sum score for the interpretation of differences in style preferences that may be aspect-specific or domain-specific.

The Inclusion of Narrative Analysis

Consistent with the recognition of greater complexity and diversity in the religious styles perspective, the FDIs should be evaluated not only in cognitive-structural terms, but in a decisive qualitative approach accounting for narratives and a variety of content dimensions, as suggested by Streib (2005). Thus, special attention is

Table 3.3 Structure of a narrative according to Labov and Waletzky (1967)

Orientation	Provides background such as antecedents, place, time and persons
Complication	Central event that breaks with normality, elicits an emotion, defines a goal
Evaluation/attempts to solve	Assessment of the situation / attempts to return the situation to normal
Resolution	Successful or not successful result of attempts to solve complication / adjust evaluation
Coda	Signals end, leads back to the present

given to the narratives in the FDI, which is manifest in a focus on life review and on especially revealing (“hot”) narrative segments in the FDI.

When people are asked to look back and reflect on their lives, they do several things: They give information, reporting, explaining and accounting for what happened. In each of the sections of the FDI we receive such information, respondents also spontaneously develop thoughts as they talk about their experiences or the philosophies they have been living with and want to share. When people are revealing something important about themselves, they often tell a story – which points to some importance: What makes an experience worth telling? What makes it special? The linguist Labov has collected many narratives and names in his recent book (Labov, 2013, p. 4), “three universal centers of interest: death, sex and moral indignation.”

A variety of narratives are invited by FDI questions which explore, in biographical perspective, life review, relationships, values and commitments, and religion and world view. Throughout the interviews, we look for narratives as defined by Labov and Waletzky (1967), little stories consisting of orientation, complication, evaluation, resolution, and coda. These narratives, stories worth telling, will point to important aspects of religious experience and identity. Table 3.3 illustrates the structure of such a story, according to Labov and Waletzky, modified by Habermas and Berger (2011).

After having identified a narrative and ordered according to this pattern, we add a title telling what it is all about. In some cases narrators announce this themselves, sometimes giving an abstract which informs about the point to be made (cf. Habermas & Berger, 2011). Noting titles of stories across interviews will support the exploration of the FDI as an instrument which elicits narratives (Keller, Coleman, & Silver, 2016).

The Evaluation of Content Dimensions

Evaluation of the FDI may also consider content dimensions that are influential for religious development. How do we evaluate these contents? We summarize statements and contentions and use concepts like attachment, mentalization, moral foundations, and wisdom to structure interview content in the four sections of the FDI. These explore life review, relationships, values and commitments, and religion and worldview (see Table 3.2, for the FDI sections).

The Life Review section, starting with the question of dividing one's life into chapters, invites autobiographical narrative and reflection. Next, Relationships are explored. This section can be evaluated drawing on current concepts like attachment and mentalization which take into consideration how persons reconstruct relationship experiences and their concepts of their own and others' inner lives. The questions in Present Values and Commitments ask for information on social engagement and on central convictions and moral orientation. The fourth section of the FDI covers Religion and Worldview. Here, we explore the "spiritual," religious or worldview-related self-identification respondents give in the context of telling and reflecting on their development as they see it. Also, issues transcending one's personal existence are addressed, as well as religious or ideological conflict. How respondents handle such conflict is explored by drawing on research and concepts from the study of wisdom. Wisdom or rather "wisdom-related knowledge" was introduced into empirical psychology to get access to culturally based aspects of cognitive development across the adult life span (Dittmann-Kohli & Baltes, 1990).

In the next paragraphs, we give a more detailed outline of the four sections of the FDI and the evaluative perspectives we use. We have explored ratings of "proxies" of e.g. mentalization, attachment and wisdom, using scales of their respective dimensions in our new scoring sheet which we use for documenting and processing FDI ratings. These different perspectives will be drawn together for the interpretation of the cases. And we use these four sections also for structuring case studies.

Life Review: Life Chapters and Autobiographical Reasoning

The first section of the FDI focuses on life review, resembling the "life chapter task" of the research programs of McAdams (1990, 1993, McAdams, Josselson, & Lieblich, 2001). Also, comparable to high and low points, as in the format used by McAdams and his team, experiences of crisis and of intense joy are addressed. Worldview and images of the divine are introduced as potentially important areas of development, to be taken up again in further sections of the FDI. The life review section, especially the question probing for one's life's chapters, invites biographical reconstructions. This allows for the construction of indicators of structure and coherence which we have added to the scoring of the aspects of faith.

When working with the FDI as a narrative, we also turn to the specific contents which are offered as answer to the "life chapter question" and use these to reconstruct the individual biographies. The first step consists in the reconstruction of the trajectory presented by the chapters named. Some respondents offer these in a chronological order, using conventional structures and ordered according to cultural concepts of biography (Habermas, 2010). Others prefer a different structure, sometimes based on very specific labels for their lives' chapters. We rearrange the chapters mentioned according to timeline, noting the structuring strategy of the person. Also, we note themes addressed. We will return to this "abstract" when we have worked through the interview to compare it with the trajectory as it unfolded.

Did the respondent cover what was announced? Where there surprising revelations? This supports our understanding of the dynamics of the interview.

We also draw on McAdams' work for the identification of typical narrative patterns (redemption vs. contamination). For exploring links between self and (religious) experience, we build on the methods suggested by McAdams (1993; Pasupathi, Mansor, & Brubaker, 2007), thus identifying "religious identity narratives" (self-defining narratives of religious experience).

Relationships: Probing into Attachment, and Reflective Functioning

The Relationships section of the FDI elicits narratives of personal relationships as currently experienced. With questions for changes in relationships, and inviting reflections on possible causes for changes this section shows affinity to the Adult Attachment Interview (AAI, Main, Hesse, & Kaplan, 2005). We take this as encouraging exploration with AAI-derived concepts and measures such as attachment style and reflective functioning.

Turning to content in the Relationships section, we note: Who is named as important? Do these persons belong to the interviewee's family, are they friends, colleagues, teachers with which the interviewee has or had a personal relationship? Are other persons mentioned, such as public figures of influence? To what life phases do persons mentioned belong? For interpretation, we turn to two concepts anchored in research on attachment to use the dimensional perspectives they offer. Both have been used as gradual measures in our evaluation procedure: attachment (style) and mentalization (mode).

Thus, the FDI, probing into relationships, allows the assessment of a proxy for attachment, and to establish ratings of secure vs. insecure attachment. We have used the taxonomy introduced by Bartholomew and Horowitz (1991) to guide our ratings (and note them in our scoring sheet). Based on combinations of a person's self-image (positive or negative) and image of others (positive or negative), four attachment prototypes are defined: Persons who have a positive image of themselves and others are supposed to have a secure attachment style and to feel comfortable with intimacy and with autonomy. They should be open to discussion of relationship and attachment, displaying a realistic forgiving perspective, and vivid descriptions of relationships. Insecurely attached persons with a negative view of themselves and a positive view of others are supposed to be preoccupied with relationships, and to make great efforts to gain attention and support and to show indications of low self-esteem. The insecurely attached persons with a positive view of themselves and a negative view of others are supposed to be dismissive of intimacy. They are expected to stress independence, emotional distance, and to downplay rejections. The fearful (disorganized) type has a negative view on self and on others and should show negative attitudes and distrust toward self and others.

Mentalization is another concept connected to the study of retrospective accounts of relationship experience and based on the evaluation of the AAI. Mentalization has been defined as “the mental process by which an individual implicitly and explicitly interprets the actions of himself or herself and others as meaningful on the basis of intentional mental states such as personal desires, needs, feelings, beliefs, and reasons” (Bateman & Fonagy, 2004). Mentalization has also been described as “holding mind in mind”, “attending to mental states in self and others”, “understanding misunderstandings”, “seeing yourself from the outside and others from the inside”, and as “giving a mental quality to or cultivating mentally” (Allen, Fonagy, & Bateman, 2008, p. 3). Mentalization refers to a reflective stance which attends to inner states. The measure of mentalization which is used in most studies, the Reflective Functioning Scale, has first been developed as an AAI-subscale (Fonagy, Target, Steele, & Steele, 1998). The operationalization of the proxy we created for our evaluation makes use of these basic criteria of Fonagy et al.’s Manual: Awareness of the nature of mental states; The explicit effort to tease out mental states underlying behavior; Recognizing developmental aspects of mental states; Mental states in relation to the interviewer.

Present Values and Commitments: Moral Reasoning, Moral Foundations?

The third section of the FDI, Values and Commitments, explores the wider social context of groups and of concerns respondents engage with, of values and norms as they perceive and negotiate them. We note content, that is, individual descriptions and examples of the concerns in which they invest themselves, and how they do that. We also note their current values and commitments as stated. We note what gives their lives meaning, and explore domains of counterfactual thinking. We list moral convictions (right vs. wrong), including examples, if these are given.

This section offers much information for the FDI rating of the aspect of moral judgment, which is based on Kohlberg’s conception of moral reasoning. Recent discussion has referred to the development of the “moral personality” versus “moral intuitions” (Haidt & Graham, 2007; Narvaez & Lapsley, 2009). Both approaches explore morality as encompassing more than moral judgment and embedded in more complex contexts. The model put forward by Haidt and Graham offers descriptive categories for their “moral foundations,” which are applicable to the accounts elicited in this section of the FDI: harm/care, fairness/reciprocity, in-group/loyalty, authority/respect, and purity/sanctity. They argue that the “moral domain” charted by research inspired by Kohlberg and Gilligan focused on justice and care, but neglected community-related orientations such as loyalty to one’s own group, respect for authority, and purity and sanctity. The anthropological foundation may be debatable; the categories themselves have been shown to differentiate between liberals, who endorse harm/care and fairness/reciprocity, and conservatives, who

also endorse the additional three. Also, the notion of moral intuition raises interesting questions with respect to moral behavior: Is this guided by deliberate moral reasoning and / or spontaneous intuition? Therefore, for the exploration of a more encompassing concept of morality, we suggest to complement the original approach by drawing on the taxonomy developed by Haidt and Graham. Different moral attitudes may go along with different self-identifications.

World Views and Religion: Transcendence and Wisdom

In this fourth section, respondents explain their religious identity as they understand it in the context of their images of the transcendent. They are invited to describe their religious or spiritual practices, take their stance toward traditional religious concepts, and display their ideas on the boundaries of human existence and understanding – and on what may lie beyond. Also, they are asked how religious conflicts or conflicts due to different world views might be resolved. Evaluating the content of this section, we attend to the self-identification with respect to religion and world view. We document rituals reported. Also, we note ideas of afterlife or the rejection of such ideas. Addressing the conditions and limits of human existence, of one's own existence, stimulates fears as well as wishes and longings. These are sometimes mixed and conflicted—and their sometimes tentative formulations deserve attention and careful interpretation.

The content dimension in this last section of the FDI suggests an interpretation in terms of 'wisdom.' 'Wisdom' can be understood as linking the cognitive component of faith development with a current concept. Wisdom has been suggested as secular successor of religion (Baltes, 2004)—which makes it an interesting candidate in a faith development research context that is based on Fowler's broad concept of faith. Wisdom, or rather wisdom-related knowledge, has been defined as an expert knowledge system "dealing with the fundamental pragmatics of life," and introduced as an option to explore culture-based aspects of cognitive development across the adult life span (Dittmann-Kohli & Baltes, 1990).

The FDI question of how religious or world view conflicts might be resolved may be especially qualified as proxy of "wisdom-related behavior." Here, we can add content to the ratings in our evaluation and describe in what domains of their lives respondents show wisdom-related behavior, drawing on the criteria as suggested by the Berlin paradigm (Staudinger, Smith, & Baltes, 1994):

- (1) rich factual knowledge about the fundamental pragmatics of life (indicated by a wide variety of themes and depth);
- (2) rich procedural knowledge about dealing with the fundamental pragmatics of life (indicated by e.g. the ability to systematize and to analyze past experiences and to apply this knowledge);

- (3) life-span contextualism: understanding of life contexts and their temporal (developmental) relations (indicated by consideration of age-related, cultural and biographical contexts);
- (4) value-relativism: knowledge about the differences in values and life goals (indicated by decentralization, the ability to distance oneself from personal values, and value related relativism while accepting universal values);
- (5) uncertainty: knowledge about the relative uncertainty of life and its management (indicated e.g. by awareness of unexpected individual or social events and developments).

From the discussion about xenosophia, we may regard the identification of wisdom of special interest for our evaluation of the interviews. We need, however, be careful enough as to recognize the differences between the concept of wisdom in 'xenosophia' and wisdom in terms of the Berlin paradigm. Nevertheless, we may suggest that the response to the experiences of the alien, which does not foreclose irritation and resistance, corresponds to some of the positive features identified in above criteria for wisdom-related behavior. This may enrich our interpretation of paths to xenosophia.

Triangulation with Questionnaire Data

The structural, narrative and content analyses open a broader perspective in the interpretation of the FDIs. But there is even more potential in our research design: Since the interviewees have participated in our questionnaire, we have more data from them that may go into the interpretation of the cases. Relating various perspectives of the interview interpretation to these quantitative data is part of the triangulation which our research design includes. For the purpose of a demonstration, we present the table (Table 3.4) comparing the scores of Nina F. on the most important scales in the questionnaire with her quadrant group.

Of course, triangulating in our research consists in data exchange in both directions: from the FDI evaluation into the quantitative data set, and from the quantitative data set to the single case interpretation. The import of FDI results into the quantitative data set has allowed conducting statistical analyses.

The other direction of triangulation can be seen in the case studies of this book. For each case study, we have produced a table such as Table 3.4. On the basis of such comparison, the FDI evaluation is opened up for more comprehensive interpretation and cross-validation. Ultimately, these comparisons feed into the interpretation of the case studies and profile the case in the context of the quantitative results.

Table 3.4 Comparison of Nina F. with respective quadrant group on the most important scales in the questionnaire

	Single case variable values for Nina F.	Values for “open to change & low religious” Quadrant Group	
		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Self-rating as “religious”	1	1.60	0.77
Self-rating as “spiritual” ^a	1	1.99	1.03
Self-rating as “atheist” ^a	5	3.00	1.52
<i>centrality of religiosity</i>	9	9.79	2.66
Religious Schema Scale (RSS)			
<i>truth of texts & teachings</i>	5	9.72	4.05
<i>fairness, tolerance & rational choice</i>	23	19.60	3.82
<i>xenosophia inter-religious dialog</i>	18	15.49	3.66
<i>Ideological fundamentalism</i>	14	21.65	6.83
<i>Ideological pluralism</i>	13	10.50	2.91
Values			
<i>universalism</i>	5	4.15	1.30
<i>benevolence</i>	6	4.60	1.05
<i>tradition</i>	2	3.05	1.47
<i>conformity</i>	4	3.35	1.29
<i>security</i>	2	3.16	1.23
<i>power</i>	1	3.49	1.40
<i>achievement</i>	5	4.08	1.28
<i>hedonism</i>	6	4.71	1.03
<i>stimulation</i>	4	3.83	1.27
<i>self-direction</i>	6	4.77	1.07
<i>self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence^b</i>	1.42	−0.12	1.03
<i>openness to change vs. conservation</i>	−1.85	−0.83	0.68
<i>tolerance of complexity^a</i>	95	83.67	11.28
<i>violence-legitimizing norms of masculinity^a</i>	9	13.66	4.85
Inter-religious enmity			
<i>anti-Semitism</i>	4	6.69	3.00
<i>Islamophobia</i>	4	8.63	3.72
<i>anti-Christian enmity</i>	8	7.84	2.58

Note All comparisons have been calculated with age cohorts, sex, and cultural and economic capital being controlled. Analyses for the Quadrant 1 group are based on $n = 485$ cases

^aAnalysis based on smaller sample size ($n = 466$), because variables have not been included in the pilot study (see Chap. 4)

^bThe factor scores for the two value axes *self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence* and *openness to change vs. conservation* are z-standardized, i.e. their means are adjusted to 0 and their standard deviations are adjusted to 1. The factor score values for the axes are the same as in Fig. 9.7 of Chap. 9 and correspond to the way the value space is usually constructed. This means that negative values express value orientations toward more *self-enhancement* on the first axis or toward more *openness to change* on the second axis, while positive values indicate value orientations toward more *self-transcendence* (first axis) or toward more *conservation* (second axis)

Case Study Reconstruction—Biographical Paths to Xenosophia

The FDI was designed by Fowler and applied, in the early times of faith development research, as a kind of stand-alone measure for the search and presentation of evidence for the new and, for the time, spectacular hypothesis that there *is* development in faith over the adolescent and adult life-span. The 359 FDIs which Fowler and his research teams in Harvard and Atlanta have conducted and evaluated and Fowler (1981) was able to present, were primarily aimed at providing such evidence.

In subsequent research—Fowler’s faith development theory has inspired over 70 research projects, a majority of which were studies using the FDI (see Streib 2003c, for a review)—new aims for the FDI have emerged. Specific groups and specific challenges came into focus, such as, to note a few, development in adolescence, formation and learning in higher education, the status of and potential promotion of faith development in congregations, career satisfaction of clergy, coping with terminal illness such as HIV infection and coping with death.

Some exceptions notwithstanding, the general focus of research with the FDI did only marginally include cross-cultural and cross-religious—not to speak of longitudinal—perspectives. Also marginalized was the assessment of faith development/religious styles in the context of new forms of religious phenomena which have emerged in the religious field and would deserve attention.

In this context of faith development research, we have attempted to cover new ground already in previous research: We have related deconversion to faith development (Streib et al., 2009); we have extended this focus to the new phenomenon in the religious field which is associated with a self-attribution of “spirituality.” In the research presented in this book, we have investigated faith development in relation to xenosophia and xenophobia. The principal aim of including the FDI in research thus is our interest in a “thick description” of biographical, moral and social-contextual embeddedness of xenosophia.

The FDI invites remembering, reasoning and narrating about biography, relationships in past and present, values and commitments, and on religion and world view. Thus the FDI questions guide an interview which invites the interviewee to wander through the variety of essential domains and biographical epochs in his or her life. Taken together, we used the FDI with the aim of generating a wealth of autobiographical narratives and reflections on a broad variety of life themes. The case studies in the case study chapters of this book are the proof that this methodological decision was not mistaken.

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Chapter 4

Design, Methods, and Sample Characteristics of the Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion



Constantin Klein and Heinz Streib

Conceptualizing the Multi-Method Design of the Study

The core interest in the Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion was to better understand the relationship between religiosity and attitudes toward the “strange” (Greek: “xenos”), whereby we understand religiosity as a multifaceted phenomenon and try to reflect attitudes toward the “strange” with respect to various types of “otherness,” be it the other religious tradition, the other ethnicity, the other sex, or sexual orientation. The background of our study is the recent experience and enduring societal challenge of refugees fleeing from war in Syria, Iraq, and Afghanistan, but also for other reasons and from other places in the world, who have arrived in huge numbers in Germany in 2015 and 2016 (“refugee crisis”). How do Germans experience this situation; how do they evaluate that refugees are coming from “other” origins and belong to an “other” religious tradition? The special focus of our research interest includes the role religiosity plays in the shaping of attitudes—to take Allport’s (1954) prominent words: Does religiosity “make” or “unmake” prejudice? Which styles of religious thinking and feeling go along with which set of attitudes—is it possible to identify a xenophobic religious style, which may enable people to encounter the “strange” less preoccupied, with more openness to gain new insights? But also beside religious styles, which other factors such as values or generalized attitudes interact with religiosity and affect current opinions? How are they associated with explicit attitudes expressed in questionnaire statements, and how do they relate to rather impulsive, implicit types of attitudes that may only become visible via indirect measurement procedures? And how are they rooted in one’s biographical experiences?

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Table 4.1 Instruments in the Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion

	<i>Measure (Authors)</i>	<i>Items</i>
1	Demographics including religious affiliation (Streib et al.)	12
2	Centrality of Religiosity Scale (Huber & Huber)	5/7 ^a
3	Religious, spiritual, and atheist self-rating (Religion Monitor)	3
4	Religious Schema Scale (Streib, Hood, & Klein)	15
5	Ideological Fundamentalism (Huber arr. Klein)	9
6	Ideological Pluralism (Huber arr. Klein)	3
7	Portrait Values Questionnaire-10 (Schwartz/WVS)	10
8	Tolerance of Complexity (Radant & Dalbert)	20
9	Violence-legitimizing Norms of Masculinity (Enzmann, Brettfeld, & Wetzels)	8
10	General Political Orientation (Zick et al.) and Party Preference (Public Polls)	1/2 ^b
11	Scale "Anti-Semitism" (Streib & Gennerich)	4
12	Scale "Anti-Christian Enmity" (Streib & Gennerich)	4
13	Scale "Islamophobia" (Streib & Gennerich)	4
14	Items on religious pluralism (Religion Monitor/Streib et al.)	3
15	Items on xenophobia (Zick et al./Streib et al.)	2
16	Items on attitudes toward refugees (Streib et al.)	2
17	Items on general racism (Zick et al.)	3
18	Items on anti-black racism (Zick et al.)	2
19	Items on homophobia (Zick et al.)	2
20	Items on sexism (Zick et al.)	2
	<i>Subsample: Reaction time tasks</i>	<i>Trials</i>
21	SC-IAT on attitudes toward Judaism (Klein et al.)	120
22	SC-IAT on attitudes toward Christianity (Klein et al.)	120
23	SC-IAT on attitudes toward Islam (Klein et al.)	120
	<i>Subsample: Interview</i>	<i>Questions</i>
24	Faith Development Interview (Fowler)	25

Notes ^aThe Centrality of Religiosity Scale consists of seven items, but of the two items asking for *religious experience* (theistic or pantheistic) and of the two items asking for *private practice* (prayer or meditation), only the item with the higher value is included into the sum score. Hence, the sum score is calculated on the basis of five items; ^b Party Preference was only assessed in the second opinion research surveying ($n = 625$) in March 2016

Our study aims at finding empirical answers to the questions raised above. To explore these questions, the project has taken a multi-method approach and has collected quantitative and qualitative data using questionnaires, reaction-time tasks, and semi-structured interviews. Table 4.1 gives an overview of all instruments used in our study. This combination of different methods allows the analysis of an individual's attitudes toward refugees, migration, religious pluralism and members of distinct religious and other social groups at different levels of description: Self-report measures in the questionnaire ask for responses to pre-defined options and the participants decide what best represents their view or corresponds to their opinions. While restricted to the given wordings, responses to questionnaire items allow for comparisons with results of other studies and surveys that have used the same or

similar measures and enable an integration of our own results into the existing findings. Indirect computer-based reaction time measures try to make use of spontaneous, automatized reactions in order to discover attitudes respondents may not be aware of. Hence, they provide an opportunity to compare what people answer in a questionnaire with what might be the implicit, preconscious part of their opinions. The Faith Development Interview (FDI) invites participants to express their reasoning about their experiences with their own words while drawing on their personal history, and aims at a deeper understanding of the biographical contexts of their attitudes and beliefs (see also Chapter 3). At the end of the FDI (see Table 3.2 in Chapter 3), respondents are invited to reflect on their ideas regarding religious conflicts, thus regarding differences of religious groups and traditions.

We decided to use this combination of methods based on our experience from previous projects (Streib & Hood, 2016b; Streib, Hood, Keller, Csóff, & Silver, 2009) that each of these methods has its strengths that contribute to a more comprehensive, thorough and reliable understanding of the phenomena. Quantitative data were obtained with established psychometrical instruments, which have been applied to survey the entire sample ($N = 1,534$) to allow generalizations with respect to sample characteristics. The questionnaire included a number of measures for religiosity, among them a question for religious affiliation, a scale for general religiosity (*centrality of religiosity*), scales for both fundamentalism and pluralism, for distinct religious schemata, and a number of single-items asking for preferred self-descriptions (religious, spiritual, atheist; see Table 4.1). Among them, in particular the assessment of religious schemata deserves interest, because we assume that the style in which religious beliefs, emotions, and experiences are processed is essential for the way in which religiosity affects attitudes either in a direction toward more tolerance, interest, and acceptance toward the “strange,” or in a direction toward more devaluation and prejudice. Further measures have been applied to assess values and generalized attitudes such as tolerance of complexity or violence-legitimizing norms of masculinity. An additional single-item asked for the general political orientation (left-right). The demographic section of the questionnaire included questions about age, sex, origin, residence, and economic and cultural capital. Finally, also explicit attitudes toward certain groups (Jews, Christians, Muslims, immigrants, refugees, blacks, homosexuals, and women) have been measured with a selection of established items in the questionnaire. Further quantitative data involve reaction times measured in a series of three Single-category Implicit Association Tests (SC-IATs) assessing rather impulsive, implicit attitudes toward the three Abrahamic religions Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. The SC-IATs have been performed by a subsample of $n = 272$ persons who have been recruited in and around the city of Bielefeld and at Bielefeld University. The quantitative data have been statistically analyzed in order to identify substantial associations between the diverse concepts and to detect similarities and differences between distinct groups under study. The results of these analyses are primarily presented in Chapters 5 to 10.

For the exploration of individual dynamics, we used the personal interviews of $n = 27$ respondents who have been invited for participation in the interview study

due to their specific profiles of quantitative data. Potential interviewees have been chosen according to their degree of centrality of religiosity, their level of an open value orientation, and several further criteria. The algorithm of interviewee selection will be described in more detail later in this chapter; the sample of interviewees and several case studies will be presented in Chapters 10 through 14.

In Fig. 4.1, we present the entire design of the Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion. Approaches and instruments are assembled and grouped according to their primary intent: On the left, there are certain dispositions which might be potential predictors of attitudes toward “other” groups; among them religious variables such as religious affiliation, centrality of religiosity, fundamentalism and pluralism, and preferred self-descriptions, as well as values and generalized attitudes such as tolerance of complexity, violence-legitimizing norms of masculinity, or general political orientation. Also as potential predictors, demographic characteristics such as age, sex, and economic and cultural capital are placed on the left side.

In the center of Fig. 4.1, three religious schemata, which are measured with the Religious Schema Scale (RSS; Streib, Hood, & Klein, 2010), are included as potential mediators between dispositions and explicit and implicit attitudes toward certain groups as outcomes. Among these outcomes, on the explicit level, there are attitudes toward religious pluralism, Judaism (in terms of prejudice: anti-Semitism), Christianity, Islam (Islamophobia), immigrants (xenophobia), refugees, blacks (racism), homosexuals (homophobia), and women (sexism). On the implicit level, again, attitudes in the religious realm toward the three Abrahamic religions—Judaism, Christianity, and Islam—are assessed.

The evaluation of the FDI is included in our design at the bottom of Fig. 4.1, reaching from the level of dispositions to the level of attitudes, because the FDI provides comprehensive information about the biographical contexts of the mindsets of our interviewees. The FDI includes questions about the interviewees’ biographies, important relationships in their lives, their values and commitments, and their religiosity and worldviews. Hence, the evaluation of the FDI allows for a better understanding of the interviewees’ particular sets of beliefs and will enable us to reconstruct in our case studies how their biographical experiences have shaped their opinions and attitudes.

This design served as theoretical background for the analyses presented in the following chapters. Due to the analytic focus and the methods, chapters differ in the ways they refer to this basic theoretical framework, be it in terms of Structural Equation Models (SEMs) explicitly including a selection of the variables in the modeled structure (e.g., Chapters 6 and 7), be it in terms of correlational analyses or subgroup comparisons (Chap. 5, 8, and 9), or be it in terms of case studies triangulating quantitative and qualitative data (Chapters 11 through 14). We have tried to clarify in each chapter how the presented analyses refer to the basic theoretical framework, and we hope that this will help readers to better understand how the diverse findings relate to each other and how they contribute to a multicolored mosaic illustrating the complex interplay of religiosity, beliefs and values, biographical experiences, and xenophobic or xenosophic attitudes toward the “strange.”




Fig. 4.1 Design of the Bielefeld Study on Xenosopia and Religion

The Questionnaire: Measures for the Entire Sample

In the following section, the standardized scales and items that have been included in the questionnaire will be introduced. We start with measures of dispositions (religiosity, values, generalized attitudes, and demographics); afterwards we present the RSS as the measure that contains the potential mediators, and finally, the items operationalizing explicit attitudes will be presented as outcome measures. For an overview over the psychometric characteristics of the diverse measures, Table 4.2 presents the means, standard deviations, and reliabilities of all instruments used in the large sample. Additionally, Table 4.2 contains the values for four quadrant groups, which have been generated according to their levels of centrality of religiosity and their value preference for openness to change or conservation in order to select participants who could additionally be interviewed with an FDI.

Measures of Religiosity

Centrality of Religiosity Scale As an enterprise in the psychology of religion, the Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion laid particular emphasis on the assessment of diverse facets of religiosity. Besides a single question asking for the participants' religious affiliation, the Centrality of Religiosity Scale ("Centrality Scale;" Huber & Huber, 2012) has been used to assess the general intensity of an individual's religiosity. The Centrality Scale measures the intensity of an individual's religiosity by assessing the five basic dimensions of religious beliefs and behavior described by Glock (1962; Stark & Glock, 1968), i.e., religious experience, religious interest, religious beliefs, and private and public religious practice, with seven items. While the dimensions of interest, belief, and public practice are assessed with a single item each, the experiential dimension and the dimension of private practice are operationalized by two items reflecting either basic theistic semantics of transcendence (experience of "God"; practicing prayer) or basic nontheistic semantics of transcendence (experience of all-connectedness, practicing meditation). To calculate the sum score of the Centrality Scale, only the higher value for religious experience and private practice is counted. All items were answered with five rating stages expressing either the degree of agreement (from 1 = "not at all" to 5 = "very") or the frequency of experiences and activities (from 1 = "never" to 5 = "very often"). As psychometric characteristics, mean, standard deviation, and internal consistency of the Centrality Scale in our sample are presented in Table 4.2.

"Religious," "spiritual," and "atheist" Self-Rating For the assessment of self-identifications of being "religious," "spiritual," or "atheist," we included three self-ratings, which have been used similarly in the Religion Monitor surveys of the Bertelsmann Foundation (2009; Huber & Klein, 2007; Pickel, 2013). The three single-items asked whether people considered themselves to be religious (from

1 = “not religious” to 5 = “religious”) or spiritual (from 1 = “not spiritual” to 5 = “spiritual”), or agreed to describe themselves as atheist (from 1 = “not at all” to 5 = “very”). For means and standard deviations of the three self-ratings, see Table 4.2.

Ideological Fundamentalism and Ideological Pluralism Since fundamentalist beliefs are not necessarily limited to religious traditions, we decided to include a variation of the Scale for Religious Fundamentalism (Gennerich & Huber, 2006; Huber, 2008), which uses phrasings that can be answered both by religious and by nonreligious people (“Ideological Fundamentalism”). This Ideological Fundamentalism scale had already been tested in an earlier study to investigate fundamentalist beliefs of both religious and nonreligious people comparatively (Klein, 2010). The Ideological Fundamentalism scale has three subscales, each consisting of three items. The first subscale is named *exclusivism* and expresses an attitude of superiority of the truth of one’s own ideological beliefs and a sharp distinction between those “righteous” people sharing the same beliefs and those “errant” people who don’t. A sample item is “I am convinced that in ideological questions, my own worldview is right while other ideologies tend to be wrong.” The second subscale, *moral dualism*, deals with a simplified dichotomized worldview of either good or evil with no twilight zone left in between. Hence, from the perspective of someone holding such a dualistic view, it is important to make a clear distinction between good and bad and to withstand the evil. A sample item is “For my worldview it is important to be constantly on guard against evil.” The third subscale, *social cohesion*, expresses the need for societal power of one’s own ideology and the wish for submissive obedience and internal cohesion among its followers. A sample item is “I try to follow any advice that is given by the leading representatives of my worldview.”

As in Huber’s (2008; Gennerich & Huber, 2006) toolkit of religiosity measures, our scale for Ideological Fundamentalism has been complemented by a short scale assessing Ideological Pluralism, i.e., the willingness to integrate ideas and beliefs from diverse religious, political, or philosophical sources into one’s own worldview. The scale for Ideological Pluralism consists of three items; a sample item is “For me every worldview has a core of truth.” The items of both the Ideological Fundamentalism scale and the Ideological Pluralism scale are answered with five rating stages from 1 = “totally disagree” to 5 = “totally agree.” Means, standard deviations, and internal consistencies of the two scales and of the three subscales for Ideological Fundamentalism are presented in Table 4.2.

Measures of Values and Generalized Attitudes

Portrait Values Questionnaire-10 In order to assess basic value orientations, we included the 10-item brief version of the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ-10) which has been developed for the World Values Survey (<http://www.worldvalues-survey.org/wvs.jsp>) on the basis of Schwartz’s (2003; Schwartz et al., 2001) longer

Table 4.2 Means, standard deviations, and internal consistencies of all quantitative measures in the entire sample and in four quadrant groups according to openness to change and centrality of religiosity

Scale/Subscale/Item	Entire Sample (<i>N</i> = 1,534/ <i>n</i> = 1,471 ^a)	
	<i>α</i>	<i>M</i> (<i>SD</i>)
Centrality of Religiosity Scale	.87	12.14 (4.92)
<i>Religious self-rating</i>	--	2.17 (1.17)
<i>Spiritual self-rating</i> ^a	--	2.22 (1.21)
<i>Atheist self-rating</i> ^a	--	2.41 (1.50)
Ideological Fundamentalism	.87	23.44 (7.48)
<i>Exclusivism</i>	.81	7.47 (3.08)
<i>Moral dualism</i>	.80	9.49 (3.10)
<i>Social cohesion</i>	.79	6.47 (2.77)
Ideological Pluralism	.81	10.45 (2.89)
Portrait Values Questionnaire		
<i>Universalism</i>	--	4.30 (1.25)
<i>Benevolence</i>	--	4.59 (1.12)
<i>Tradition</i>	--	3.69 (1.50)
<i>Conformity</i>	--	3.93 (1.32)
<i>Security</i>	--	3.83 (1.37)
<i>Power</i>	--	3.27 (1.42)
<i>Achievement</i>	--	3.91 (1.32)
<i>Hedonism</i>	--	4.36 (1.17)
<i>Stimulation</i>	--	3.11 (1.44)
<i>Self-direction</i>	--	4.30 (1.29)
<i>Value axis openness to change vs. conservation</i> ^b	--	0.00 (1.00)
<i>Value axis self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence</i> ^b	--	0.00 (1.00)
Tolerance of Complexity Scale ^a	.83	80.28 (11.92)
<i>Burden of complexity</i> ^{a, c}	.75	29.50 (6.71)
<i>Challenge of complexity</i> ^a	.75	22.86 (5.01)
<i>Necessity of complexity</i> ^a	.84	23.91 (4.28)
Violence-legitimizing Norms of Masculinity ^a	.88	13.95 (5.04)
<i>Internal violence</i> ^a	.83	4.29 (1.98)
<i>External violence</i> ^a	.81	9.66 (3.44)
General Political Orientation ^a	--	2.80 (0.86)
Religious Schema Scale		
<i>Truth of texts and teachings</i>	.90	12.16 (4.97)
<i>Fairness, tolerance & rational choice</i>	.86	19.48 (3.83)
<i>Xenosophia/inter-religious dialog</i>	.75	15.93 (3.75)

open to change & low religious (<i>n</i> = 484/ <i>n</i> = 465 ^a)	open to change & rather religious (<i>n</i> = 206/ <i>n</i> = 187 ^a)	conservation-oriented & low religious (<i>n</i> = 571/ <i>n</i> = 556 ^a)	conservation-oriented & rather religious (<i>n</i> = 273/ <i>n</i> = 263 ^a)
<i>M</i> (<i>SD</i>)	<i>M</i> (<i>SD</i>)	<i>M</i> (<i>SD</i>)	<i>M</i> (<i>SD</i>)
9.79 (2.66)	18.07 (2.84)	9.15 (2.97)	18.05 (3.00)
1.60 (0.77)	3.28 (1.09)	1.67 (0.79)	3.38 (1.00)
1.99 (1.03)	3.32 (1.28)	1.70 (0.89)	2.93 (1.20)
3.00 (1.52)	1.61 (1.04)	2.62 (1.52)	1.52 (0.95)
21.65 (6.83)	25.39 (7.99)	22.34 (7.22)	27.42 (6.94)
6.93 (2.99)	7.94 (3.20)	7.03 (2.99)	9.00 (2.78)
8.85 (3.08)	9.90 (3.26)	9.41 (3.09)	10.52 (2.68)
5.87 (2.41)	7.56 (2.99)	5.90 (2.59)	7.90 (2.82)
10.50 (2.91)	11.67 (2.68)	9.78 (2.91)	10.87 (2.60)
4.15 (1.30)	4.68 (1.06)	4.16 (1.26)	4.56 (1.16)
4.60 (1.05)	5.14 (0.79)	4.30 (1.22)	4.76 (1.06)
3.05 (1.47)	3.75 (1.47)	3.91 (1.40)	4.34 (1.33)
3.35 (1.29)	3.42 (1.33)	4.34 (1.15)	4.47 (1.14)
3.16 (1.23)	3.10 (1.30)	4.40 (1.21)	4.37 (1.18)
3.49 (1.40)	3.08 (1.47)	3.23 (1.41)	3.08 (1.38)
4.08 (1.28)	4.25 (1.35)	3.70 (1.33)	3.81 (1.26)
4.71 (1.03)	4.52 (1.08)	4.14 (1.24)	4.07 (1.13)
3.83 (1.27)	3.86 (1.22)	2.49 (1.28)	2.54 (1.33)
4.77 (1.07)	5.10 (0.91)	3.73 (1.29)	4.05 (1.27)
-0.83 (0.68)	-0.81 (0.74)	0.68 (0.65)	0.67 (0.61)
-0.12 (1.03)	0.43 (0.93)	-0.16 (0.95)	0.22 (0.96)
83.67 (11.28)	87.56 (11.28)	75.54 (11.43)	79.11 (9.90)
27.94 (6.60)	26.15 (6.98)	31.38 (6.18)	30.68 (6.24)
23.99 (4.58)	25.08 (4.27)	21.28 (4.92)	22.63 (5.33)
24.62 (3.87)	25.63 (3.75)	22.63 (4.66)	24.16 (3.76)
13.66 (4.85)	13.29 (5.06)	14.11 (5.04)	14.57 (5.29)
4.02 (1.79)	4.22 (2.05)	4.35 (1.98)	4.71 (2.20)
9.64 (3.46)	9.08 (3.39)	9.77 (3.42)	9.86 (3.44)
2.78 (0.93)	2.68 (0.85)	2.84 (0.81)	2.81 (0.84)
9.72 (4.05)	14.62 (4.95)	11.40 (4.36)	16.23 (4.33)
19.60 (3.82)	21.23 (2.55)	18.45 (4.13)	20.11 (3.36)
15.49 (3.66)	17.86 (3.21)	15.04 (3.67)	17.11 (3.62)

(continued)

Table 4.2 (continued)

Scale/Subscale/Item	Entire Sample (<i>N</i> = 1,534/ <i>n</i> = 1,471 ^a)	
	<i>α</i>	<i>M</i> (<i>SD</i>)
<i>Anti-Semitism</i>	.86	6.93 (2.98)
<i>Anti-Christian Enmity</i>	.71	7.55 (3.61)
<i>Islamophobia</i>	.86	8.88 (2.54)
<i>Items on religious pluralism</i> ^a		
<i>The increasing diversity of religious groups in our society represents cultural enrichment.</i> ^a	--	2.51 (0.96)
<i>Islam fits well in the western world.</i> ^a	--	2.30 (0.95)
<i>Europe has to be protected against an increasing Islamization.</i> ^a	--	2.69 (1.06)
<i>Items on xenophobia</i> ^a		
<i>There are too many immigrants in Germany.</i> ^a	--	2.73 (1.03)
<i>The government is doing too little against foreign infiltration.</i> ^a	--	2.58 (1.08)
<i>Items on attitudes toward refugees</i> ^a		
<i>Refugees who only come to Germany because of the better living conditions should directly be deported to their home countries.</i> ^a	--	2.83 (1.04)
<i>War refugees should be accepted into Germany.</i> ^a	--	3.28 (0.88)
<i>Items on general racism</i> ^a		
<i>Some cultures are clearly superior to others.</i> ^a	--	2.32 (0.98)
<i>Some races are more gifted than others.</i> ^a	--	2.11 (1.00)
<i>We need to protect our own culture from the influence of other cultures.</i> ^a	--	2.43 (1.01)
<i>Items on anti-black racism</i> ^a		
<i>There is a natural hierarchy between black and white people.</i> ^a	--	1.78 (0.96)
<i>Preferably blacks and whites should not get married.</i> ^a	--	1.45 (0.81)
<i>Items on homophobia</i> ^a		
<i>There is nothing immoral about homosexuality.</i> ^{a,c}	--	3.02 (1.17)
<i>It is a good thing to allow marriages between two men or two women.</i> ^{a,c}	--	3.04 (1.07)
<i>Items on sexism</i> ^a		
<i>Women should take their role as wives and mothers more seriously.</i> ^a	--	2.15 (0.97)
<i>When jobs are scarce, men should have more right to a job than women.</i> ^a	--	1.45 (0.80)
		Bielefeld subsample (<i>n</i> = 272)
<i>SC-IAT Effect for Attitude toward Judaism</i>	.72	-0.01 (0.32)
<i>SC-IAT Effect for Attitude toward Christianity</i>	.82	0.11 (0.42)
<i>SC-IAT Effect for A ttitude toward Islam</i>	.78	0.01 (0.35)

Notes ^aSome measures have not been used in the pilot sample (*n* = 63); hence, the number of participants for these measures is slightly lower both in the entire sample (*n* = 1,471) and in the quadrant groups; ^bthe two value axes are defined by the z-standardized factor scores deriving from a PCA of the ten single values of the PVQ; ^cwhile the subscale *burden of complexity* has not been inverted so that higher values express more burden, for the calculation of the sum score of the Tolerance of Complexity Scale the items of *burden of complexity* have been inverted

open to change & low religious (<i>n</i> = 484/ <i>n</i> = 465 ^a)	open to change & rather religious (<i>n</i> = 206/ <i>n</i> = 187 ^a)	conservation-oriented & low religious (<i>n</i> = 571/ <i>n</i> = 556 ^a)	conservation-oriented & rather religious (<i>n</i> = 273/ <i>n</i> = 263 ^a)
<i>M</i> (<i>SD</i>)	<i>M</i> (<i>SD</i>)	<i>M</i> (<i>SD</i>)	<i>M</i> (<i>SD</i>)
6.69 (3.00)	6.35 (2.94)	7.22 (2.92)	7.18 (2.99)
7.84 (2.58)	6.70 (2.50)	7.90 (2.52)	6.95 (2.36)
8.63 (3.72)	7.65 (3.42)	9.61 (3.50)	8.71 (3.49)
2.47 (0.97)	2.93 (0.93)	2.33 (0.91)	2.66 (0.98)
2.31 (0.98)	2.58 (0.99)	2.17 (0.91)	2.38 (0.95)
2.62 (1.09)	2.37 (1.06)	2.88 (1.02)	2.63 (1.03)
2.70 (1.08)	2.42 (1.05)	2.91 (0.99)	2.62 (0.97)
2.50 (1.13)	2.30 (1.06)	2.76 (1.01)	2.55 (1.07)
2.76 (1.05)	2.60 (1.10)	3.06 (0.96)	2.65 (1.06)
3.32 (0.90)	3.55 (0.78)	3.11 (0.89)	3.34 (0.83)
2.28 (0.98)	2.12 (1.04)	2.39 (0.96)	2.37 (0.96)
2.06 (0.99)	1.93 (1.02)	2.26 (0.99)	2.01 (1.00)
2.31 (1.05)	2.14 (0.97)	2.58 (0.96)	2.52 (1.00)
1.65 (0.92)	1.56 (0.90)	1.91 (0.95)	1.91 (1.03)
1.35 (0.74)	1.40 (0.83)	1.51 (0.84)	1.53 (0.85)
3.19 (1.18)	2.95 (1.17)	3.01 (1.14)	2.79 (1.17)
3.31 (0.97)	2.95 (1.08)	2.99 (1.06)	2.71 (1.12)
1.89 (0.93)	2.22 (1.00)	2.21 (0.94)	2.47 (0.98)
1.31 (0.70)	1.42 (0.84)	1.51 (0.82)	1.60 (0.87)
(<i>n</i> = 85)	(<i>n</i> = 69)	(<i>n</i> = 48)	(<i>n</i> = 70)
-0.02 (0.31)	0.01 (0.35)	-0.03 (0.30)	-0.02 (0.34)
0.00 (0.39)	0.23 (0.40)	0.05 (0.42)	0.15 (0.45)
-0.02 (0.27)	0.00 (0.34)	-0.07 (0.29)	0.10 (0.45)

version of the PVQ. Based on his cross-cultural research, Schwartz (1992; 1994; 2006; 2012; Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987; 1990) has established a theory of universal value orientations claiming that values can be assigned to ten cross-culturally observable types of values: *Universalism*, *benevolence*, *tradition*, *conformity*, *security*, *achievement*, *power*, *hedonism*, *stimulation*, and *self-direction*. According to Schwartz, these values form up to a circular structure depending on their similarities and dissimilarities. Above, the ten values have been named according to this circular formation; with tradition and conformity sharing the same segment of the circle. According to Schwartz's theory, the values next to each other share similar preferences. For example, both *universalism* and *benevolence* share the interest of other people's well-being. They differ in that *benevolence* is focusing on people in the individual's personal surrounding while *universalism* highlights the equality and hence equal rights and equal treatment for all men. There is also some similarity between *universalism* and the wish for freedom (for oneself, but maybe also for everyone) to act self-directed so that *self-direction* is the value that is located next to *universalism* on the other side.

The circle of the ten values is spanned by two higher-order dimensions or "value axes": The first value axis ranges from values representing openness to change such as *self-direction* and *stimulation* on one pole to conservative values such as *tradition*, *conformity*, and *security* on the other pole. This value axis is called *openness to change vs. conservation*. The second axis ranges from self-centered values such as *power* and *achievement* to values expressing interest in others such as *universalism* and *benevolence* and is named *self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence*. The tenth value, *hedonism*, lies in the transition zone between openness-related values and self-enhancement values and combines elements of both.

Answers to the PVQ-10 are ratings on a 6-point Likert scale, how much a person of the same sex who is described as preferring a certain type of value (e.g., "It is important to this person to help the people nearby, to care for their well-being"/*benevolence*) is like the respondent. The ratings range from 1 = "not at all like me" to 6 = "very much like me." While the original long version of the PVQ consists of 40 items so that each value is operationalized by four items, there is only one item for each value in the PVQ-10. Due to the theoretically postulated and, based on multidimensional scaling (MDS) or confirmatory factor analyses (CFA), empirically often corroborated circular structure of the ten values (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003; Bilsky, Janik & Schwartz, 2011; Schwartz & Boehnke, 2004; Schwartz, 2012), it is hardly possible to create reliable scales on the basis of the ten items of the PVQ-10. Instead, it is possible to generate the two-value axes *openness to change vs. conservation* and *self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence* as factors via Principal Component Analyses (PCA) on the basis of the ten items, which are ipsatized to minimize response tendencies (Gennerich, 2010). Then these factor scores can be used for correlation analyses with other measures. All in all, we could replicate the two value axes acceptably in the Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion; most items loaded substantially ($<-.50$ or $>.50$) and theoretically plausible on one of the two factors. The only exceptions are the *hedonism* item (which

corresponds both with openness-related and self-enhancement-related values), the *tradition* item (which is theoretically expected to share the same circle segment with conformity), and, a bit astonishing, the *achievement* item which showed a plausible but not substantial (.37) loading on the *self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence* dimension (see Chapter 9 for a detailed description).

All in all, using the two factor scores deriving from PCA for further analyses appeared to be legitimate. Since the factor scores for the two value axes resulting from PCA are z-standardized, their means are adjusted to 0 and their standard deviations are adjusted to 1. This means that negative values of the first factor score express value orientations toward more *openness to change* and positive value orientations toward more *conservation*. On the second axis, negative values indicate value orientations toward more *self-enhancement* and positive values express value orientations toward more *self-transcendence*. In Table 4.2, psychometric characteristics for the ten single items of the PVQ-10 and for the two factor scores representing the value axes *openness to change vs. conservation* and *self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence* are reported.

Tolerance of Complexity Scale In addition to the assessment of basic value orientations, we have included two measures for generalized attitudes in the Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion, the first one being the Tolerance of Complexity Scale developed by Radant and Dalbert (2006). The concept of tolerance of complexity has been proposed by Radant and Dalbert (2003) in order to react to the diversification of constructs trying to describe how people deal with complexity in various situations; among them intolerance of ambiguity (Budner, 1962; Frenkel-Brunswik, 1949), preference for variety (Wacker & Nohl, 1974), need for cognitive closure (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994), personal need for structure (Neuberg & Newsom, 1993), and tolerance of uncertainty (Dalbert, 1999). Searching empirically for a superordinate concept, Radant and Dalbert (2003, 2006) have selected a pool of 121 items from 17 scales assessing the constructs mentioned above which have been factor-analyzed with a series of PCAs and CFAs. After a stepwise reduction of the number of items based on their findings, they were able to identify three factors as components of the overarching construct tolerance of complexity which they named *burden of complexity* (inversely scored), *challenge of complexity*, and *necessity of complexity*. While *burden of complexity* expresses the burden someone experiences when confronted with complex tasks or situations, the *challenge of complexity* captures the feelings of being stimulated and challenged by complex tasks or situations. The third component, *necessity of complexity*, expresses the acceptance that complexity is an inherent part of human existence. In its final version, the Tolerance of Complexity Scale consists of 20 items (*burden of complexity*: 9 items; *challenge of complexity*: 6 items; *necessity of complexity*: 5 items) which have to be rated on 6-point Likert scales ranging from 1 = “absolutely false” to 6 = “absolutely true.” Means, standard deviations, and internal consistencies of the entire Tolerance of Complexity Scale and of the three subscales are presented in Table 4.2.

Violence-Legitimizing Norms of Masculinity The scale Violence-legitimizing Norms of Masculinity has been developed by Enzmann and Wetzels (2003; Enzmann, Brettfeld, & Wetzels, 2004) on the basis of Nisbett's and Cohen's (1996) conceptualization of a culture of honour. Violence-legitimizing norms of masculinity express the notion that men have to act dominantly to establish their own and their family's honor and that violent acts are legitimate means to keeping it. Targets of such violent acts can be potential external offenders, but also family members who do not behave according to the expectations of the norms of masculinity. Hence, these norms legitimizing male violence share some commonalities with right-wing authoritarianism in that they postulate traditional gender roles, legitimize aggressive behavior and expect submission under the male authority. Thus, as authoritarianism, violence-legitimizing norms of masculinity can be understood as a generalized attitude and are not specific for any ethnic or religious group. According to Enzmann et al. (2004), they are especially likely to occur in contexts of discrimination, separation, and marginalization. Enzmann and colleagues have used the Violence-legitimizing Norms of Masculinity scale for studying delinquent behavior among adolescent migrants in Germany. In the following years, the scale has been applied in further criminological studies among adolescents in Germany (Baier, Pfeiffer, Rabold, Simonson, & Kappes, 2010; Baier, Pfeiffer, Simonson, & Rabold, 2009); here, violence-legitimizing norms of masculinity have been identified as one of four factors promoting delinquency such as battery and robbery. We have used the scale in a previous study on religiosity and conflict behavior of German adolescents (Streib & Klein, 2012) and found violence-legitimizing norms of masculinity to be the most important predictor of aggressive-escalating conflict behavior.

The Violence-legitimizing Norms of Masculinity scale consists of eight items. On the basis of the results of a PCA, these eight items can be assigned to two subscales; the first one, *internal violence*, expressing the opinion that it is legitimate for men to punish their wives or children physically if they have done something damaging the men's honor. This subscale consists of three items; a sample item is "If a woman cheats on her husband, he is allowed to beat her." The second subscale, *external violence*, operationalizes the willingness to act violently against persons outside of the family in order to protect the family and reestablish one's honor. A sample item is: "A man should be ready to defend his wife and children violently." All eight items of the Violence-legitimizing Norms of Masculinity scale are answered with four rating stages reaching from 1 = "disagree completely" to 4 = "agree fully." The psychometric characteristics of the entire scale and the two subscales are presented in Table 4.2.

General Political Orientation and Party Preference In order to shed some light on the political preferences of our respondents, we included in our questionnaire a single-item about their general political orientation from left-wing to right-wing. The phrasing of this item was taken from Zick's, Küpper's and Hövermann's (2011) study on group-focused enmity (GFE; cf. Zick, Küpper, & Heitmeyer, 2010, for this concept) in Europe. The wording is: "If you think of your political orientation: How would you describe yourself?" The participants could choose between five rating

stages: 1 = “left,” 2 = “rather left,” 3 = “exactly in the middle,” 4 = “rather right,” and 5 = “right.” Mean and standard deviation of this single-item can be found in Table 4.2.

Participants who have been surveyed during the second phase of opinion research surveying in spring 2016 (see the description of the sampling procedure below) have additionally been asked for which political party they would vote if there was an election on next Sunday (elections in Germany are held on Sundays). This question (“Sunday question”) is regularly asked in public polls in Germany since 1949 to estimate party preferences in the general population (Groß, 2010). We presented the main political parties in Germany—Christian Democratic Union of Germany/Christian Social Union in Bavaria (CDU/CSU), Social Democratic Party of Germany (SPD), The Left, The Greens, Free Democratic Party (FDP), and the new right-wing populist Alternative for Germany (AfD)—as potential answers. Additionally, the respondents could tick a box “another party” and could insert a free entry. Response rates to this item are presented in Table 4.7.

Measures of Socio-Biographical Dispositions: The Demographics Section of the Questionnaire

In the demographic section of the questionnaire, we asked for sex and age as well as for some regional information such as the federal state of Germany wherein the respondents were living or the size of place of residence. Country of birth was asked to reconstruct possible migration experience. To allow for comparisons between participants who have been socialized in former East or West Germany, we additionally asked whether the participants grew up either in the Western or the Eastern part of the country, or in another country than Germany. In order to construct economic and cultural capital according to the International Standard Classification of Education 1997 (ISCED; UNESCO, 2006) and OECD (2011), we asked for the number of household members with and without income and family income as well as for the highest levels of school education and vocational training.

Measures of Religious Schemata: The Religious Schema Scale and Its Three Subscales

To distinguish between distinct preferred religious styles as mediators between the diverse predictors and the attitudes as outcomes, we included the Religious Schema Scale (Streib, Hood, & Klein, 2010). This scale consists of three subscales measuring differing cognitive schemata: A first schema featuring an authoritative and exclusivist interpretation of the sacred texts of an individual’s own religious tradition has been operationalized in the subscale *truth of texts and teachings (ttt)*. A sample item is “What the texts and stories of my religion tell me is absolutely true

and must not be changed.” A second schema expressing a supposedly “objective” and tolerant perspective in regard to differing worldviews is operationalized in the subscale *fairness, tolerance and rational choice (ftr)*. A sample item is “Regardless of how people appear to each other, we are all human.” The third subscale highlights the appreciation of strangeness and difference as possibility to gain maybe irritating but also fascinating new insights. Hence, this subscale assesses a schema corresponding to what Nakamura (2000) with reference to Waldenfels (1990; 1997; 2007; 2011) has described as “xenosophia” (see Chapter 1) and, therefore, is named after this concept as *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog (xenos)*. A sample item is “We can learn from each other what ultimate truth each religion contains.” Each subscale of the RSS consists of five items. All 15 items have to be rated on 5-point Likert scales ranging from 1 = “strongly disagree” to 5 = “strongly agree.” The psychometric characteristics of the three subscales of the RSS are presented in Table 4.2.

Measures of Explicit Attitudes/Prejudice toward Certain Social Groups

Anti-Semitism, Anti-Christian Enmity, and Islamophobia Negative attitudes toward Abrahamic religions have been assessed with three short scales, which have been developed by Streib and Gennerich (2011 Streib & Klein, 2014), extending items on anti-Semitism and Islamophobia in Heitmeyer’s (2002; 2007) initial studies on GFE. Streib and Gennerich (2011) used four items for each type of prejudice, and added a scale of four items for negative attitudes toward Christians and Christian religion. In order to create parallel scales for all three Abrahamic religions, two out of the four items for each scale use the same wording while only the name of the respective religious tradition is changed, e.g., Judaism/Christianity/Islam “...is a distortion of true religion” or Jewish/Christian/Muslim religion “...is harmful for world peace.” All items of the three scales have to be rated on 4-point Likert scales ranging from 1 = “disagree completely” to 4 = “agree fully.” Means, standard deviations, and internal consistencies of the three scales are presented in Table 4.2.

Items on Xenophobia, Racism, Homophobia, and Sexism In order to study inter-religious prejudice in context, we additionally included a number of items measuring various facets of the GFE syndrome in our questionnaire. These items have been developed in several studies on GFE in Germany (Heitmeyer, 2002; 2007; Zick et al., 2008; Zick, Hövermann, & Krause, 2012 and other European countries (Zick et al., 2011) and express negative attitudes toward certain social groups: Two items on *xenophobia* measure negative attitudes toward immigrants. The wordings of the items are presented in Table 4.2. Three items assess *general racism*, claiming superiority for some peoples as compared to others (see the wordings in Table 4.2). Two items operationalize additionally *anti-black racism* claiming that there is a clear-cut difference between black and white people that should be kept. Further items deal with sexual preferences and gender roles: There are two

reverse-coded items indicating *homophobia* and two items arguing against emancipation of women and for traditional gender roles, i.e., they express an attitude of *sexism*. Again, the wordings of these items can be found in Table 4.2. All items have to be answered with four rating stages from 1 = “disagree completely” to 4 = “agree fully.” Due to the limited number of items for the diverse types of prejudice, internal consistencies only reach a level around Cronbach’s $\alpha \approx .62$. Although these internal consistencies resemble the values reported by Krause and Zick (2014) for several two-item GFE-measures as satisfying in relation to their brevity, we decided to not calculate sum scores for the prejudice measures due to their limited reliabilities. Instead, we treated them as single items, but agreed to use them as indicators of superordinate latent constructs within structural equation models (SEMs) in Chapters 6 and 7 if such a procedure was legitimized by the indices of model fit. In Table 4.2, we present the means and standard deviations of the items for xenophobic, racist, homophobic, and sexist prejudice.

Items on Attitudes Toward Religious Pluralism and Refugees (Welcome Culture) With respect to current public debates in Germany concerning the welcome of refugees, in particular from Muslim countries, we additionally included several items about religious pluralism and a culture of welcoming refugees. Two items expressing positive attitudes toward increasing religious pluralism in the German society (“The increasing diversity of religious groups in our society represents cultural enrichment;” “Islam fits well in the western world”) have been taken from the Religion Monitor survey in 2012 (Pickel, 2013). The third item “Europe has to be protected against an increasing Islamization” has been added in order to reflect the core message of the right-wing anti-Islamic movement PEGIDA (“Patriotic Europeans against the Islamization of the Occident”), which was founded in 2014 in the (East) German city of Dresden. Since then, PEGIDA has been organizing demonstrations in Dresden and other German cities. The weekly demonstrations in Dresden are usually attended by 2,000 to 3,000 demonstrators, but occasionally by up to 20,000 to 25,000 protestors. According to Hafez and Schmidt (2015), there is sympathy for the slogans of PEGIDA in substantial parts of the German population. Hence, we wanted to include an item measuring the level of agreement to PEGIDA’s central claim.

Additionally, we have phrased two items for attitudes toward refugees in order to mirror a popular, yet simplistic distinction between “good” (those fleeing from war) and “bad” refugees (those “only” coming to Germany for economic reasons) in public debates in Germany. The first item, “Refugees who only come to Germany because of the better living conditions should directly be deported to their home countries,” reflects the latter, the second item, “War refugees should be accepted into Germany,” the former group. For all items on attitudes toward religious pluralism and refugees, we used the same 4-point Likert scales ranging from 1 = “disagree completely” to 4 = “agree fully” as for the other attitudinal measures. Means and standard deviations of these items are presented in Table 4.2.

Instruments for Subsamples

Single-Category Implicit Association Tests

In addition to the questionnaire that has been administered to the entire sample, we have used two types of instruments, which have been presented to smaller subsamples in order to investigate their attitudes and their biographical and ideological contexts in more depth. To detect subtle attitudes which might not be discovered in questionnaires, $n = 272$ respondents who have been recruited in and around the city of Bielefeld and at Bielefeld University have been assessed with a series of three SC-IATs (Karpinski & Steinman, 2006). As all types of Implicit Association Tests (IATs), SC-IATs are indirect computer-based reaction time measures aiming at an assessment of rather impulsive and uncontrolled parts of cognition (Schmuckle & Egloff, 2011). The three SC-IATs included in the Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion have been used to measure implicit attitudes towards the three Abrahamic religions Judaism, Christianity, and Islam. They assess the strength of automatic associations between stimuli, which are presented on a computer screen and have to be sorted to superordinated categories which are also presented on the screen by clicking buttons on the keyboard. The assumption is that research participants will react faster in congruent test blocks when subjectively more closely related stimuli (e.g., words indicating the category “Christianity” and the category “positive”) have to be assigned to categories presented on the same side of the screen, whereas they will react more slowly in incongruent test blocks when subjectively less closely related stimuli (e.g., words indicating “Christianity” and “negative”) are presented on the same side of the screen. To quantify the strength of the implicit association, a SC-IAT effect (“D1”) is calculated by subtracting the mean reaction time of congruous test blocks (measured in milliseconds) from the mean reaction time of incongruous test blocks (cf. Greenwald, Nosek & Banaji, 2003, for the algorithm). The score is standardized for each participant by the intra-individual standard deviation of all critical trials. A positive D1 effect indicates a more positive implicit evaluation of a target (in our study, the religious traditions Judaism, Christianity, and Islam) while a negative effect expresses a negative implicit attitude toward the target. A D1 effect of “0” means that there is neither implicit preference nor implicit rejection of the target. Table 4.2 includes, at the bottom, the mean D1 scores of the three SC-IATs as well as their standard deviations and their internal consistencies. Detailed results of the SC-IATs will be described in Chapter 8.

Faith Development Interview

For a deeper understanding of the biographical background of our participants’ values and beliefs, 27 persons out of the large sample have additionally been selected according to their level of centrality of religiosity, their degree of openness to

change, and further characteristics for being interviewed with the Faith Development Interview (FDI; Fowler, 1981; Fowler, Streib & Keller, 2004). The FDI consists of 25 questions asking for the interviewee's life review, important relationships, values and commitments, and religiosity and worldviews, allowing the exploration of attitudes in the context of the narrative reconstructions of the participant's biography. The FDIs have been evaluated making use of the revised faith development rating as described in the *Manual for Faith Development Research* (Streib & Keller, 2015, which is a carefully revised version of the 3rd edition by Fowler, Streib, & Keller, 2004), including the recently proposed analytic strategies introduced in several publications of our team (Keller, Klein, Hood, & Streib, 2013a; Keller, Klein, & Streib, 2013b; Keller & Streib, 2013; Streib, Wollert, & Keller, 2016c; see Chapter 3 for more details).

Sampling and Data Collection

Data collection was carried out in several phases. We started with a small pilot sample of $n = 63$ persons for developing the SC-IATs. Within this sample, a couple of measures which have been used in the following phases of data collection have not been included, e.g., the scales for generalized attitudes (Tolerance of Complexity Scale, Violence-legitimizing Norms of Masculinity scale) or for prejudice against other than religious groups (*xenophobia*, *general* and *anti-black racism*, *homophobia*, *sexism*), but we have decided that this subsample should nevertheless be integrated into the entire sample.

After the pilot phase, we started data collection in the city of Bielefeld using a random sample of 3,000 addresses, which we got from the residents' registration office. We have sent letters to these addresses including a description of the contents and aims of our study and an invitation to participate in an online survey including a questionnaire and an online-presented reaction time task. Unfortunately, only a minority of the contacted persons participated, so we additionally started a parallel sampling among our students at Bielefeld University. All in all, we got 209 completed datasets for the questionnaire and the three SC-IATs from sampling in the city of Bielefeld and at Bielefeld University which we combined with the datasets from our pilot phase to an overall Bielefeld sample of $n = 272$. This sample is the empirical basis for the analysis of the SC-IAT data presented in Chapter 8.¹

In order to increase the size of the sample considerably and to balance effects of self-selection by collecting more representative data, we started a third phase of data collection and hired an opinion research institute to carry out two additional online

¹ Beside the SC-IAT data, this Bielefeld sample also includes data assessed with a brief scale consisting of ten items measuring social desirability (Stocké, 2003; 2004). As SC-IATs try to assess the rather uncontrolled, implicit attitudes toward a target free of social desirable responding, the Social Desirability Scale has been included in order to check for possible effects of social desirable responding. Results of these analyses will likewise be presented in Chapter 8.

surveys with our questionnaire; one in August 2015 ($n = 637$) when the first large refugee migration wave along the Balkan route arrived in Germany, and one in March 2016 ($n = 625$), shortly before elections in three federal German states (Baden-Württemberg, Rheinland-Pfalz und Sachsen-Anhalt), when the discussion about the “refugee crisis” dominated the political discourse in Germany and other European countries. In the second opinion research surveying, we included the question about party preference (“Sunday question”) described above in addition to the already existing items. The persons who have been inquired in both surveys are not identical so that it is not possible to analyze the data in a longitudinal perspective. But since both surveys are widely representative for the German population in terms of distribution of sexes, age cohorts (between 18 and 69 years), school education, and federal states, it is nevertheless possible to estimate the proportions of diverse opinions in the German public on the basis of the two surveys. Hence, we present some comparisons between opinions held in August 2015 and in March 2016 in Chapter 5. However, since the persons in both subsamples are not the same, we have included them altogether with the Bielefeld subsample in our entire sample of $N = 1,534$ persons (or $n = 1,471$ for those measures that have not been used in the pilot sample) for maximizing the statistical power of the quantitative analyses presented in Chapters 5, 6, 7, and 9.

Before we introduce this resulting sample in more detail in the following section, we briefly add some information about the administration of questionnaire and SC-IATs and about data cleaning: During the first two phases of data collection, the questionnaire and SC-IATs have been programmed using the software Inquisit (www.millisecond.com) and have been hosted online on the server of the software provider Millisecond Software, LLC, in Seattle. Currently assessed data have been exported each week to local computers and have been transformed into SPSS data files. During the third phase of sampling, we used the online survey platform Questback/UniPark (www.unipark.de) because it allowed for applying a quota system that the research opinion institute could use to recruit respondents according to the above-mentioned criteria of representativeness. The questionnaire was hosted on the server of UniPark. Data collection took about one week in August 2015 and one week in March 2016; afterwards all datasets have been exported as SPSS files to our local computers. Data collection was closed after the second opinion research surveying in March 2016.

Data cleaning was carried out during the entire process of sampling. During the first two phases of sampling at the university and in the city of Bielefeld, respondents who did not indicate their sex or age have been deleted from the sample. The very few missing data for indicators of economic and cultural capital have been replaced by sample means. During the third phase of sampling, persons who did not respond to the initial questions asking for the quota criteria (sex, age, school education, federal state) and other demographics have already been excluded from further surveying by the online survey system Questback/UniPark. Hence, there haven't been any missing demographic data during the third phase of sampling. Single missing values for items belonging to scales and subscales have been substituted by individual scale means. Persons who did not answer to more than 90% of the items of a certain scale or to entire parts of the questionnaire have been eliminated. While

less than 10% of the cases of the Bielefeld subsample had to be eliminated, approximately 50% of the cases of the two surveys carried out by the opinion research institute had to be eliminated because they did not match the quota criteria because at least one of the quotas has already been completed. For these respondents, Questback/UniPark stopped surveying immediately after the demographic section has been filled in. Approximately 13% of the remaining respondents had to be eliminated due to missing data. With respect to the demographic variables that have been allocated by quota, means or percentages of the eliminated cases did not differ from the cases remaining in the sample.

Description of the Sample

We start the introduction of our sample with a description of the basic demographic characteristics. Since we were able to take care for the representativeness of several of these variables during the third phase of data collection, these demographics are widely representative for the general German population. However, we have to be aware that this does not apply for some other characteristics, e.g., the respondents' religiosity and preference for political parties. Therefore, we will additionally present the distribution of self-rated religiosity and spirituality and of party preference as compared to survey data for the general German population to call readers attention to differences between our sample and the German public.

Basic Demographic Characteristics

After data cleaning, the entire quantitative dataset included $N = 1,534$ respondents. Male-female relation is in accordance with the distribution of sexes in the general German population with 49.5% being male and 50.5% being female (see Table 4.3 for a comparison between sample demographics and distribution of these demographics in the general German population). Mean age is $M = 42.1$ ($SD = 14.3$), ranging from 14 to 78 years. Table 4.3 presents the distribution of age cohorts in the working age (few existing outliers have been adjusted to the next cohort).

With respect to school education, our sample is somewhat higher educated than the German public with 42.1% of our respondents having the German Abitur (upper secondary education 3A according to ISCED standards) as compared to 30.8% in the general population while only 32.8% have lower secondary education 2B as compared to 40.2% in the general population (see Table 4.3 for details). The relatively high education of our participants is also mirrored with respect to their overall cultural capital (school education and vocational training), which we have assessed and recalculated according to ISCED standards to allow for comparisons with current OECD data. With respect to cultural capital, our sample assembles 8.1% participants with lower secondary education, 65.1% with upper secondary education, and 25.1% with post-secondary or tertiary education while 1.7% report that they have neither

Table 4.3 Distribution of demographic characteristics in the entire sample ($N = 1,534$) and in the general German population

Demographics	<i>Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion</i>		<i>General German Population</i>
	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>
<i>Sex</i>			
Male	759	49.5	48.9
Female	775	50.5	51.1
<i>Age Cohort</i>			
18–29	401	26.1	20.8
30–39	279	18.2	17.6
40–49	333	21.7	24.6
50–59	297	19.4	20.9
60–69	224	14.6	16.1
<i>School Education</i>			
Primary education (no formal graduation)	42	2.7	4.2
Lower secondary education 2B (Hauptschulabschluss)	504	32.8	40.2
Lower secondary education 2A (Realschulabschluss)	343	22.4	24.8
Upper secondary education 3A (Abitur/Fachabitur)	645	42.1	30.8
<i>Federal State</i>			
Baden-Württemberg	181	11.8	13.1
Bayern	206	13.4	15.6
Berlin	55	3.6	4.2
Brandenburg	41	2.7	3.0
Bremen	15	1.0	0.8
Hamburg	25	1.6	2.2
Hessen	95	6.2	7.5
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern	27	1.8	2.0
Niedersachsen	125	8.1	9.7
Nordrhein-Westfalen	510	33.2	21.8
Rheinland-Plal/	54	3.5	4.0
Saarland	17	1.1	1.2
Sachsen	67	4.4	5.0
Sachsen-Anhalt	35	2.3	2.8
Schleswig-Holstein	47	3.1	3.5
Thüringen	34	2.2	2.7
<i>Religious Affiliation</i>			
Jewish	6	0.4	0.2
Roman-Catholic	349	22.8	29.5
Mainline Protestant (Ev. Kirche Deutschlands)	456	29.7	27.9
Other Protestant Churches (Freikirchen)	70	4.6	1.1
Other Christian Traditions	25	1.6	1.5
Muslim	52	3.4	4.6
Buddhist	15	1.0	0.3
Other	24	1.5	0.3
None	537	35.0	34.6

school education (except primary education) nor vocational training. This distribution might be a result of both recruiting parts of the sample at a university and of surveying online because online sampling tends to result in slightly higher educated respondents. Mean per-capita income (unweighted mean per-capita income according to Statistisches Bundesamt, 2008) of our sample is $M = €25,016$ ($SD = €19,179$).

In regard to regional representativeness, the distribution of respondents across the 16 federal states of Germany roughly corresponds with the distribution in the general population; with one exception: Since the first two phases of data collection took place in and around the city of Bielefeld and at Bielefeld University, the federal state of Nordrhein-Westfalen, where Bielefeld is located, is clearly overrepresented (33.2% as compared to 21.8% in the general population). However, even without an oversampling of people from Bielefeld, Nordrhein-Westfalen is by far the most populous federal state of Germany (see Table 4.3). 9.3% participants report that they have been born in countries other than Germany, thus have a migration background. However, only a minority of 1.7% state that they have primarily grown up in another country than Germany. Of the participants of German origin, 16.8% grew up in the eastern federal states or in the former GDR.

In terms of religious affiliation, the distribution again roughly corresponds with the distribution in the general German population. While smaller religious communities such as Jews, Buddhists, other religions, and in particular other churches than the Roman Catholic Church are slightly overrepresented in the sample, the Roman Catholic Church is visibly underrepresented (22.8% of the participants as compared to 29.5% in the general population). This might again be a consequence of sampling in and around Bielefeld, which is, for historical reasons, a traditionally Protestant city. Both mainline Protestants (29.7%) as well as “nones” (35.0%) are slightly overrepresented as compared to the general population (27.9% and 34.6%, respectively), but the distribution still resembles the general pattern.

Self-Rated Religiosity and Spirituality

While our sample can be regarded to be sufficiently representative in terms of distribution of sexes, age cohorts in the working age, school education, federal states, and also religious affiliation, there are some other important characteristics wherein our sample clearly differs as compared to the general German population. This does apply in particular to the distribution of self-rated religiosity and spirituality in the entire sample and to the party preferences reported by the respondents who have participated in the second opinion research surveying in March 2016. Here, we first present the distribution of religious and spiritual self-ratings in our sample (Table 4.4) as compared to the results of the latest representative survey, the Allgemeine Bevölkerungsumfrage der Sozialwissenschaften, ALLBUS 2012 (ALLBUS, 2013) (Table 4.5). For better comparability, the 10-point Likert scale used for self-ratings as “religious” and “spiritual” in the ALLBUS 2012 survey has been transformed into a 5-point scale format.

Table 4.4 Self-ratings as “spiritual” and “religious” in the Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion

	not religious	little religious	moderately religious	quite religious	very religious	total
not spiritual	24.4%	7.6%	3.7%	0.5%	0.7%	37.0%
little spiritual	7.2%	10.7%	6.3%	1.8%	0.1%	26.1%
moderately spiritual	4.4%	5.1%	7.8%	3.1%	0.3%	20.8%
quite spiritual	1.6%	2.3%	2.1%	3.7%	0.8%	10.5%
very spiritual	0.8%	0.7%	1.0%	1.0%	2.1%	5.6%
total	38.4%	26.4%	20.9%	10.1%	4.1%	100.0%

Note Cross-tabulation based on $n = 1,471$ respondents (entire sample without pilot study); bivariate correlation between self-rating as “spiritual” and “religious:” $r = .51$ ($p \leq .001$)

Table 4.5 Self-ratings as “spiritual” and “religious” in the general German population (according to the ALLBUS 2012 survey)

	not religious	little religious	moderately religious	quite religious	very religious	total
not spiritual	24.9%	7.2%	10.0%	7.6%	4.8%	54.4%
little spiritual	3.7%	3.5%	2.3%	4.2%	1.3%	14.9%
moderately spiritual	2.2%	1.6%	4.7%	4.3%	2.0%	14.8%
quite spiritual	1.5%	1.0%	1.7%	4.0%	2.3%	10.4%
very spiritual	0.8%	0.2%	0.6%	1.1%	2.8%	5.5%
total	33.1%	13.4%	19.2%	21.2%	13.0%	100.0%

Note Cross-tabulation based on $N = 3,153$ respondents; bivariate correlation between self-rating as “spiritual” and “religious:” $r = .35$ ($p \leq .001$); the 10-point Likert scale for self-ratings as “religious” and “spiritual” in the ALLBUS 2012 survey has been transformed into a 5-point scale format for better comparability with the data of the Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion. Since East Germans are overrepresented in the ALLBUS 2012 sample, percentages have been calculated using the weights for East and West German residence

In both tables, certain cells have been colorized according to the expressed relation between self-rated religiosity and self-rated spirituality. It is known from other studies that many people express their religiosity in continuity with their spirituality (Marler & Hadaway, 2002; Saucier & Skrzypinska, 2006; Streib, Klein, & Hood, 2016a; Zinnbauer et al., 1997). The cells in the diagonals from upper left to lower right (marked green) in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 include all respondents who specified identical levels of self-rated religiosity and self-rated spirituality.

Table 4.6 Summed percentages of diagonal cells for self-ratings as “spiritual” and “religious” in the Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion and in the general German population

	Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion	ALLBUS 2012 Germany
Clearly more religious	7.1%	29.9%
Slightly more religious	17.8%	16.1%
Equal ratings as “religious” and “spiritual”	48.7%	39.9%
Slightly more spiritual	15.4%	8.1%
Clearly more spiritual	10.8%	6.3%

Note For better comparability, the 10-point Likert scale for self-ratings as “religious” and “spiritual” of the ALLBUS 2012 survey has been transformed into a 5-point Likert scale format. Since East Germans are overrepresented in the ALLBUS 2012 sample, percentages have been calculated using the weights for East and West German residence

Respondents rating themselves as more religious than spiritual assemble in the cells in the upper right corner of Tables 4.4 and 4.5 and are marked blue. Thereby, light blue cells include those who stated a slightly higher religiosity (1 scale point higher than spirituality), whereas dark blue cells contain the percentages of those describing themselves as clearly more religious (≥ 2 scale points higher than spirituality). The cells in the lower left corner of Tables 4.4 and 4.5 (marked yellow) include all those participants who rated themselves as more spiritual; either slightly more spiritual (dark yellow cells; 1 scale point higher than religiosity) or clearly more spiritual (light yellow cells; spirituality ≥ 2 points higher than religiosity).

In both samples the group of the equally religious and spiritual (green cells) is the biggest: almost half of our respondents in the Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion (48.7%) and two out of five respondents in the ALLBUS 2012 survey (39.9%) rated their religiosity and their spirituality on the same level. While the differences concerning the green cells are rather low (our sample seems to be somewhat more secular), there are strong differences concerning the blue and the yellow segments of Tables 4.4 and 4.5.

For direct comparability, Table 4.6 presents the summed-up percentages for the diagonal cells (green) and for the cells below (dark and light yellow) and above the diagonal (light and dark blue).

In the Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion, only a minority of 7.1% characterize themselves as clearly more religious than spiritual. This makes only a fourth of the percentage, which can be found in the ALLBUS 2012 survey, where 29.9% of the participants identified as clearly more religious. This big difference is mostly due to the fact that the number of those who rated themselves as quite (10.1% vs. 21.2%) or very religious (4.1% vs. 13.0%) is obviously lower in our study as compared to the ALLBUS 2012 sample. Correspondingly, the number of those who

describe themselves as moderately, little, or not religious is apparently higher in our sample. However, the percentages of participants rating themselves as slightly more religious than spiritual are quite similar (17.8% and 16.1%, respectively; see Table 4.6). Focusing on the rates of slightly or clearly more spiritual than religious respondents, we find an almost reversed pattern: Seeing oneself as spiritual rather than religious appears to be more popular in our sample than among the ALLBUS 2012 participants. This becomes less apparent with respect to the line totals in Tables 4.4 and 4.5 where only the numbers for the moderately spiritual (20.8% vs. 14.8%), but not for the quite (10.5% vs. 10.4%) or very spiritual (5.6% vs. 5.5%) differ from one another. Counting the sums for the darker (15.4% vs. 8.1%) and the lighter yellow cells (10.8% vs. 6.3%), however, we find that the percentages of respondents who prefer spirituality in our sample almost double those reported for the general German population as reported in the ALLBUS 2012 survey (see Table 4.6).

To draw a conclusion from the distribution of self-rated religiosity and spirituality as outlined in the previous paragraphs, we have to state that our sample differs substantially from religiosity and spirituality rates as reported in the latest representative survey. The sample of the Bielefeld Study on Xenophobia and Religion appears to be clearly less religious, somewhat more secular, but also considerably more spiritual (as mirrored in self-ratings) than the general German population. According to extensive analyses on the semantics and on psychological correlates of the self-description as spiritual (Streib & Hood, 2011; 2016b; Streib & Klein, 2016; Utsch & Klein, 2011), from our perspective, spirituality can best be understood as individualized, experience-oriented religiosity, which is associated with a more liberal, open mindset and typically found among higher educated people.

Since our study does not only deal with negative, “pathogenic” ways of encounter with the “strange,” but has particular interest in “salutogenic” pathways toward more tolerant, open, and positive attitudes toward the “strange” (see Chapter 1), and in the role which certain religious orientations might play for such pathways (see Chapter 2), including a substantial number of religiously liberal persons in the sample may not be misleading, but we have to bear in mind the limited representativeness of our sample in terms of religiosity and spirituality when discussing the generalizability of our findings in the following chapters.

Preferences for Political Parties

As already mentioned, the distribution of party preferences which have been assessed during the second opinion research surveying in March 2016 ($n = 625$) differs clearly from the party preferences in the general German population. For comparison, we present the results for the “Sunday question” for March 2016, i.e., at the same time when our second opinion research survey took place, and the most recent results for November 2016 according to the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen (FGW Telefonfeld GmbH 2016a, 2016b), i.e., the research institute for the public polls of the German public-service broadcasting. Table 4.7 gives an overview about

the distributions in our sample and in the general population. Since the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen does not report decimal places, we also report only integer percentages in Table 4.7.

Since the results provided by the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen encompass only the six parties CDU/CSU, SPD, The Greens, The Left, FDP, and AfD as well as preference for “another party” (unspecified) while non-responders and persons stating that they will not vote for any party are not included, we present only the numbers for the aforementioned party preferences, too. In our March 2016 subsample, 23 persons said that they were not going to vote for any party, 8 persons said that they did not know, and 24 persons did not respond at all. Hence, these 55 persons are excluded from the results. In Table 4.7, the percentages for the remaining $n = 570$ persons who specified a party preference are detailed.

As shown in Table 4.7, our March 2016 subsample differs from the general German population in that the traditionally big parties, CDU/CSU and SPD, receive much less support than in the general population (CDU/CSU: 21% as compared to 36% in November 2016; SPD: 17% as compared to 23% in March 2016), whereas the percentages of some of the “smaller” parties are considerably higher. This is true in particular for The Left (15% as compared to 8% in March 2016) and, somewhat scary, for the right-wing AfD (23% as compared to 12% in March 2016), which is the party preference of the biggest group within our March 2016 subsample. The percentages for both The Left and the AfD almost double the size of the percentages in the general population so that there are obvious deviations in our subsample with respect to political preferences as compared to the general German population.

Although we might assume that the party preferences among the respondents of the first opinion research surveying might resemble those of the second while the preferences of the participants recruited in Bielefeld and at Bielefeld University might differ, unfortunately, we do not know this for sure because the item asking for party preferences has only been included in the surveying in March 2016. Hence, we have to admit that, in terms of party preferences, our entire sample is very likely

Table 4.7 Preference for political parties in the Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion ($n = 570$) and in the general German population in March ($N = 1,205$) and October 2016 ($N = 1,258$) according to the Forschungsgruppe Wahlen

Party	<i>Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion</i>		<i>Forschungsgruppe Wahlen March 2016</i>	<i>Forschungsgruppe Wahlen November 2016</i>
	<i>N</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>%</i>
CDU/CSU	121	21	35	36
SPD	98	17	23	21
The Greens (Grüne)	77	14	12	11
The Left (Linke)	88	15	8	10
FDP	31	5	6	5
AfD	132	23	12	13
Another party	23	4	4	4

Note Slight deviations from 100% are due to rounding

not representative of the German public. However, knowing that there is a substantial number of potentially right-wing persons included in the sample is not a completely bad precondition for a study trying to understand motives for positive and negative attitudes towards the “strange.” In Chapter 5, some findings with respect to the reported party preferences will be presented.

Generating Quadrant Groups for Interviewee Selection

To identify potential interviewees for the qualitative part of the Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion, we have used the quantitative data to generate a rough typology of our respondents in the entire sample according to their reported level of centrality of religiosity and their value preference for openness to change or conservation. These two dispositions have been chosen for two reasons: The first one is that in our previous project on semantics and correlates of spirituality (Klein, Silver, Streib, Hood, & Coleman, 2016; Streib, Klein, & Hood, 2016b; Streib & Hood, 2016a), being susceptible to transcendence (as measured with the Mysticism Scale of Hood, 1975) and open-mindedness (as measured with the subscale *openness to experience* of the NEO-FFI of Costa & McCrae, 1985) have turned out to be proper coordinates for mapping distinct versions of spirituality and religiosity. To parallel this design in our current study, we have chosen the Centrality Scale, the basic measure for religiosity in our study, as operationalization of susceptibility to transcendence and the value axis *openness to change vs. conservation* as operationalization of open-mindedness.

The second reason is that we could empirically observe that, in our sample, the centrality of religiosity turned out to be almost completely uncorrelated to the value axis *openness to change vs. conservation* ($r = .00$; $p = n.s.$) so that both variables could be used as orthogonal coordinates for mapping the basic dimensions of our participants' ideological beliefs. Therefore, we have split our sample at the medians of centrality of religiosity and *openness to change vs. conservation* and assigned the participants to the four resulting quadrant groups. The first one (Quadrant Group 1; $n = 484$) is characterized by a value preference toward more openness to change and rather low levels of religiosity. The second quadrant group (Quadrant Group 2; $n = 206$) features openness to change, too, but additionally shows rather higher levels of religiosity. In contrast, the participants in Quadrant Group 3 ($n = 571$) prefer a rather conservative value orientation and express rather low levels of religiosity. Quadrant Group 4 ($n = 273$) is characterized by a value preference toward more conservation as well as by rather higher levels of religiosity.

As already mentioned above, some measures have not been included in the pilot questionnaire of our study so that $n = 63$ persons are lacking data for these instruments. Hence, for these measures also the numbers of respondents in the four quadrant groups decrease slightly—from $n = 484$ to $n = 465$ in Quadrant Group 1, from $n = 206$ to $n = 187$ in Quadrant Group 2, from $n = 571$ to $n = 556$ in Quadrant Group 3, and from $n = 273$ to $n = 263$ in Quadrant Group 4.

Basic Demographic Differences across the four Quadrant Groups

Table 4.8 presents the basic demographic characteristics of the four quadrant groups. A closer inspection of Table 4.8 quickly shows that there are clear differences between the four groups with respect to all reported demographics which reflect some of their common peculiarities: For instance, in the empirical study of religiosity it is a well-known phenomenon that women tend to express higher levels of religiosity than men (Francis & Penny, 2014; Trzebiatowska & Bruce, 2012); at least in western predominantly Christian countries (Klein, Keller, & Traummüller, 2017). This is to some degree reflected in the distribution of the two sexes across our four quadrant groups in that men are overrepresented in the rather secular Quadrant Group 1 (54.3%) whereas the majority of the other three groups are women, in particular in the most religious Quadrant Group 4 (55.3%). The varying distributions of the sexes across the four groups are partially mirrored by a χ^2 test which is significant by trend ($\chi^2_{(3, 1534)} = 7.56, p = .051$).

Also, age cohorts are distinctly distributed across the four quadrant groups ($\chi^2_{(12, 1534)} = 39.63, p \leq .001$). A univariate ANOVA controlling for effects of sex and cultural and economic capital corroborates age differences also on the basis of means although the overall effect is relatively low ($F_{(3, 1534)} = 9.98, p \leq .001, \text{part. } \eta^2 = .02$). While the rather openness-oriented and rather secular Quadrant Group 1 does not differ significantly from the openness-oriented, but rather religious Quadrant Group 2 (Mean Difference according to post hoc calculated Scheffé's tests = 0.87; *n.s.*), the participants in Quadrant Group 1 are significantly younger than those in the rather conservative Quadrant Groups 3 and 4 (Mean Difference $\geq 3.78; p \leq .001$). Quadrant Group 2 differs only by trend from Quadrant Groups 3 and 4 (Mean Difference $\leq 3.52; p \leq .097$) while Quadrant Groups 3 and 4 do not differ from one another (Mean Difference = 0.61; *n.s.*). This pattern of findings might be interpreted as a reflection that older generations tend to be more religious (Hood, Hill, & Spilka, 2009), but in particular that they are commonly more in favor of conservation values (Gouveia, Vione, Milfont, & Fischer, 2015; Robinson, 2013; Rokeach, 1973; Schwartz, 2006).

Further group differences can be observed for school education, both with respect to distribution ($\chi^2_{(12, 1534)} = 83.24, p \leq .001$) and to mean differences ($F_{(3, 1534)} = 11.18, p \leq .001, \text{part. } \eta^2 = .02$), and for regional background ($\chi^2_{(6, 1534)} = 39.73, p \leq .001$) and religious affiliation ($\chi^2_{(24, 1534)} = 350.03, p \leq .001$) in terms of distribution. The two openness-oriented Quadrant Groups 1 and 2 are significantly higher educated than the two conservation-oriented Quadrant Groups 3 and 4 (Mean Difference $\geq 0.22; p \leq .009$). While Quadrant Groups 3 and 4 do not differ significantly (Mean Difference = 0.13; *n.s.*), the rather religious Quadrant Group 2 is higher educated than the rather secular Quadrant Group 1 by trend (Mean Difference = 0.19; $p = .060$).

Table 4.8 Basic demographic characteristics of the four quadrant groups

Demographics	Quadrant Group 1: open to change & low religious		Quadrant Group 2: open to change & rather religious		Quadrant Group 3: conservation-oriented & low religious		Quadrant Group 4: conservation-oriented & rather religious	
	<i>(n = 484/n = 465^a)</i>		<i>(n = 206/n = 187^a)</i>		<i>(n = 571/n = 556^a)</i>		<i>(n = 273/n = 263^a)</i>	
Sex	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>
Male	263	54.3	97	47.1	277	48.5	122	44.7
Female	221	45.7	109	52.9	294	51.5	151	55.3
Age cohort	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>
18–29	156	32.2	67	32.5	123	21.5	55	20.1
30–39	92	19.0	34	16.5	98	17.2	55	20.1
40–49	104	21.5	38	18.4	136	23.8	55	20.1
50–59	78	16.1	39	18.9	129	22.6	51	18.7
60–69	54	11.2	28	13.6	85	14.9	57	20.9
	<u><i>M</i></u>	<u><i>SD</i></u>	<u><i>M</i></u>	<u><i>SD</i></u>	<u><i>M</i></u>	<u><i>SD</i></u>	<u><i>M</i></u>	<u><i>SD</i></u>
	39.8	13.9	40.7	15.0	43.6	13.8	44.2	14.8
School education	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>
Primary education	12	2.5	2	1.0	19	3.3	9	3.3
Lower secondary education 2B	126	26.0	41	19.9	237	41.5	100	36.6
Lower secondary education 2A	103	21.3	38	18.4	142	24.9	60	22.0
Upper secondary education 3A	243	50.2	125	60.7	173	30.3	104	38.1
	<u><i>M</i></u>	<u><i>SD</i></u>	<u><i>M</i></u>	<u><i>SD</i></u>	<u><i>M</i></u>	<u><i>SD</i></u>	<u><i>M</i></u>	<u><i>SD</i></u>
	2.9	0.9	3.1	0.8	2.6	0.8	2.7	0.9
Regional background	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>
East German	86	17.8	19	9.2	128	22.4	24	8.8
West German	393	81.2	182	88.4	436	76.4	240	87.9
Other background	5	1.0	5	2.4	7	1.2	9	3.3
Religious affiliation	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>	<i>n</i>	<i>%</i>
Jewish	3	0.6	1	0.5	2	0.4	0	0.0
Roman-Catholic	92	19.0	47	22.8	128	22.4	82	30.0
Mainline Protestant	135	27.9	58	28.1	166	29.1	97	35.5
Other Protestant Churches	4	0.8	28	13.6	10	1.8	28	10.2
Other Christian Traditions	2	0.4	9	4.4	3	0.5	11	4.0
Muslim	4	0.8	13	6.3	5	0.9	30	11.1
Buddhist	1	0.2	9	4.4	5	0.9	0	0.0
Other	9	1.9	5	2.4	3	0.5	7	2.6
None	234	48.3	36	17.5	249	43.5	18	6.6

Note ^aSome measures have not been used in the pilot sample ($n = 63$); hence, the number of participants for these measures is slightly lower

It is well known from research on values that education is inversely associated with conservation values, but positively correlated with openness values since “educational experiences presumably promote the intellectual openness, flexibility, and breadth of perspective” (Schwartz, 2006, p. 10).

The diverging distributions of regional background and religious affiliation mirror primarily the differing levels of religiosity across the four groups. The rather religious Quadrant Groups 2 and 4 assemble fewer respondents from the East German federal states, i.e., the former socialist German Democratic Republic where a strictly anti-religious ideology has been taught in school and Christian churches and other religious groups have been exposed to governmental repression. As a consequence, still to this day the eastern states of Germany are among the most a-religious regions all over the world (Froese & Pfaff, 2005; Schmidt & Wohlrab-Sahr, 2003; Streib & Klein, 2013; Streib, Klein, & Hood, 2016a). Hence, it is not very surprising that participants with an East German background are underrepresented in the two more religious quadrant groups. The same is true for the differences in religious affiliation: Anything else than higher rates of religious affiliation within the more religious Quadrant Groups 2 and 4 would have been very astonishing. The differences are most visible with respect to the percentages of the “nones.” While there are more than 40% “nones” in the two rather secular Quadrant Groups 1 and 3, there are only between 17.5% and 6.6% “nones” in the two more religious quadrant groups.

Profiles of Quantitative Measures for the Four Quadrant Groups

Since the four quadrant groups differ not only with respect to centrality of religiosity and value preferences for either openness or conservation, but with respect to basic demographic characteristics, too, it is very likely that they will also differ with respect to many other variables included in the Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion. To get an impression of their particular religious and ideological beliefs, of the values they share, and of their attitudes, we have additionally calculated ANOVAs for all other measures included in our questionnaire comparing the central tendencies of the four groups and the effect sizes of the quadrant group membership across the diverse variables. In fact, there are significant group differences at least by trend for all measures—except for the single-item asking for the general political orientation. Hence, we consider our selection of centrality of religiosity and *openness to change vs. conservation* as coordinates for mapping the mindsets of our respondents to be productive.

To illustrate the general pattern of religiosity, values, and generalized and specific attitudes across the four quadrant groups, here we present a selection of the group differences as evidenced by the ANOVAs in Fig. 4.2 and Table 4.9. This selection includes all measures for religiosity, value axes, and generalized attitudes except for general political orientation because there have been no significant differ-





Fig. 4.2 z-standardized profiles of selected measures for the four quadrant groups



ences for this single-item. The selection further includes the three religious schemata as measured with the RSS, the three scales measuring attitudes toward the Abrahamic religions, and the two items concerning refugees. For each of the remaining attitudes (attitudes toward religious pluralism, *xenophobia*, *general racism*, *anti-black racism*, *homophobia*, and *sexism*), one item has been chosen to illustrate the overall pattern. The patterns for the other items are quite similar.

For visualization of the group differences, Fig. 4.2 shows z-standardized profiles of the selected measures for each quadrant group (the unstandardized values for all measures and each group have already been reported in Table 4.2 above). The profiles for the four quadrant groups in Fig. 4.2 have been arranged according to stronger agreement to the two variables constituting the quadrant groups, centrality of religiosity and *openness to change vs. conservation*² (for easy identification, the bars for these two variables have been colorized in green). Hence, groups which display higher levels of religiosity (Quadrant Groups 2 and 4) are located in the upper half of the figure, and groups which are characterized by a preference for conservation values (Quadrant Groups 3 and 4) are located in the right half.

The four groups bear specific resemblances and dissimilarities to each other. To start with the groups in the upper half of Fig. 4.2, the two rather religious Quadrant Groups 2 and 4 share values above the mean for all measures of religiosity as well as for religious schemata. Groups 2 and 4 differ in that Quadrant Group 2 expresses lower ideological fundamentalism, lower levels of the (likewise fundamentalism-prone) RSS subscale *ttt* ($F_{(3, 1534)} \geq 47.79$; Mean Differences ≤ -0.27 ; $p \leq .025$), and higher levels of self-rated spirituality, ideological pluralism, and of the RSS subscale *ftr* ($F_{(3, 147111534)} \geq 25.52$; Mean Differences ≥ 0.27 ; $p \leq .027$). The two low religious Quadrant Groups 1 and 3 in the lower half of Fig. 4.2 differ with respect to centrality of religiosity, self-rated spirituality, self-rated atheism, ideological pluralism, *ttt*, and *ftr* ($F_{(3, 147111534)} \geq 25.52$; Mean Differences ≥ 0.13 ; $p \leq .005$). Compared to Quadrant Group 3, the respondents in Quadrant Group 1 appear to be somewhat less “areligious” or “aspiritual,” although clearly more in favor of describing themselves as atheists, more pluralistic, less literalistic, and more open for a fair and tolerant discussion of distinct worldviews.

The rather religious Quadrant Groups 2 and 4 differ from the rather secular Groups 1 and 3 in all measures for religiosity and for religious schemata ($F_{(3, 147111534)} \geq 43.54$; Mean Differences ≥ 0.38 ; $p \leq .001$) except ideological pluralism and *ftr* for which Groups 1 and 4 express similar levels of agreement ($F_{(3, 1534)} \leq 32.61$; Mean Differences ≤ 0.13 ; *n.s.*). Hence, all in all, being rather religious or rather not religious makes a greater difference for the patterns of scales and items measuring religiosity or religious styles than being either openness- or conservation-oriented.

While there are stronger differences between the upper and the lower groups in Fig. 4.2 with respect to measures of religiosity or religious styles, concerning values

²In the literature about Schwartz' (1992; 1994; 2003; 2006; 2012) theory of basic values, the value axis *openness to change vs. conservation* is usually pictured with openness as the pole on the left and conservation as the pole on the right. Hence, in our profile charts z-values below “0” indicate preference for *openness to change* while z-values above “0” indicate preference for conservation.

and generalized attitudes, the pattern becomes more diversified: As the value axis *openness to change vs. conservation* has been used as second dimension to generate the quadrant groups, it is obvious that there are clear differences between the two groups in preference for openness values (Quadrant Groups 1 and 2) and the two groups which are in favor of conservation values (Quadrant Groups 3 and 4) ($F_{(3, 1534)} = 644.63$; Mean Differences ≥ 1.48 ; $p \leq .001$). However, neither Quadrant Groups 1 and 2 nor Quadrant Groups 3 and 4 differ from one another (Mean Differences ≤ 0.03 ; *n.s.*). On the second value axis, *self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence*, the differences resemble those which have been observable for the measures of religiosity: While the rather secular Quadrant Groups 1 and 2 show a preference for self-enhancement values, the rather religious Quadrant Groups 3 and 4 prefer self-transcending values ($F_{(3, 1534)} = 25.17$; Mean Differences ≥ 0.34 ; $p \leq .001$). Further group differences concerning the second value axis are not significant (Mean Differences ≤ 0.21 ; *n.s.*). All four quadrant groups differ from one another with respect to tolerance of complexity ($F_{(3, 1471)} = 76.02$; Mean Differences ≥ 0.30 ; $p \leq .001$). Quadrant Group 2 displays the highest levels of tolerance of complexity, followed by Quadrant Group 1. The mean of Quadrant Group 4 is already lower than the overall mean while the mean of Quadrant Group 3 is the lowest. In contrast, there is only one group difference which is significant by trend with respect to violence-legitimizing norms of masculinity, i.e., the difference between Quadrant Groups 2 and 4 ($F_{(3, 1471)} = 3.07$; Mean Difference = 0.25; $p = .072$), while all other groups do not differ from one another (Mean Differences ≤ 0.18 ; *n.s.*). Nevertheless, each of the four groups has a clearly distinctive profile of value preferences and generalized attitudes.

The profiles of the four quadrant groups for their explicit attitudes toward “other” groups which are perceived as somehow “strange” differ characteristically depending on centrality of religiosity and *openness to change vs. conservation*, too. On the one hand, there are some attitudes for which the level of centrality of religiosity seems to make a greater difference. This is true in particular for anti-Christian attitudes which are expectably on a significantly lower level in the more religious Quadrant Groups 2 and 4 as compared to the rather secular Groups 1 and 3 ($F_{(3, 1534)} = 18.81$; Mean Differences ≥ -0.35 ; $p \leq .001$). Groups 2 and 4 as well as Groups 1 and 3 do not differ significantly from one another (Mean Differences ≤ 0.10 ; *n.s.*).

The level of religiosity also plays a role for the pluralist perception that an increasing diversity of religious groups in the German society could represent cultural enrichment. The rather religious and open to change Quadrant Group 2 agrees significantly higher to this item than the other three groups ($F_{(3, 1471)} = 21.86$; Mean Differences ≥ 0.28 ; $p \leq .028$) while the rather religious, but conservative Quadrant Group 4 expresses still higher agreement than the two secular groups (Mean Differences ≥ 0.19 ; $p \leq .093$) who do not differ from one another (Mean Difference = 0.15; *n.s.*).

On the other hand, there are also several attitudes for which the value preference for either openness to change or conservation seems to play the more important role: This applies to anti-Semitic attitudes, which are less common among the openness-oriented Quadrant Groups 1 and 2 as compared to the rather secular, conservation-oriented Quadrant Group 3 ($F_{(3, 1534)} = 6.18$; Mean Differences ≥ 0.18 ;

$p \leq .026$) and, in the case of Quadrant Group 2, also as compared to the rather religious and conservation oriented Quadrant Group 4 (Mean Difference = 0.28; $p = .029$). Even more clearly, the quadrant groups in favor of openness to change (Groups 1 and 2) express significantly lower agreement to the anti-black racist statement that there would be a natural hierarchy between black and white people than the two conservation-preferring Quadrant Groups 3 and 4 ($F_{(3, 1471)} = 11.59$; Mean Differences ≥ 0.27 ; $p \leq .005$) who, as Quadrant Groups 1 and 2, do not differ from one another (Mean Differences ≤ 0.10 ; *n.s.*).

Openness to change seems to be crucial with respect to attitudes concerning sexual orientation and gender roles. Both for the homophobic statement that marriages between two men or two women should be allowed and for the sexist statement that women should take their role as housewives and mothers more seriously, the low religious and openness-oriented Quadrant Group 1 holds the most egalitarian attitudes and differs significantly from the other three groups ($F_{(3, 1471)} \geq 20.13$; Mean Differences ≥ 0.31 ; $p \leq .001$, and ≤ -0.32 ; $p \leq .001$, respectively). With respect to both items, Quadrant Groups 2 and 3 do not differ (Mean Differences = 0.03; *n.s.*, and = 0.01; *n.s.*, respectively), but with respect to sexism, they differ significantly, at least by trend, from the rather religious and conservation-oriented Quadrant Group 4 ($F_{(3, 1471)} = 22.13$; Mean Differences ≤ -0.25 ; $p \leq .060$). Quadrant Group 3 further differs from Quadrant Group 4 with respect to the item on homosexual marriages ($F_{(3, 1471)} = 20.13$; Mean Difference = 0.26; $p \leq .006$) while Quadrant Groups 2 and 4 do not differ (Mean Difference = 0.23; *n.s.*). Hence, the majority of differences which can be detected among the measures for *anti-Semitism*, *anti-black racism*, *homophobia*, and *sexism* seem to be due to differences in the value preference for openness to change or conservation.

Yet the most differences that can be observed for the explicit attitudes presented in Fig. 4.2 can be attributed to the interaction between centrality of religiosity and *openness to change vs. conservation*, which is captured by the quadrant group membership. This is most obvious for attitudes for which the emerging pattern is that the rather religious and openness-preferring Quadrant Group 2 shows the least prejudiced opinions and the low religious and conservative Quadrant Group 3 holds the strongest prejudices, while Groups 1 and 4 score somewhere in between and do not differ from one another. This pattern can be found for *Islamophobia*,³ for the xenophobic item “There are too many immigrants in Germany,” and for the item expressing a positive attitude toward war refugees (“War refugees should be accepted into Germany”). For all these three measures, Quadrant Group 2 differs, at least by trend, significantly from the other three groups ($F_{(3, 1471|1534)} \geq 12.75$; Mean Differences ≤ -0.27 , $p \leq .018$, or ≥ 0.24 ; $p \leq .099$, respectively). Quadrant Groups 1 and 4 do not differ (Mean Difference ≤ 0.08 ; *n.s.*), but appear to be significantly less prejudiced than Quadrant Group 3 (Mean Differences ≤ -0.20 ; $p \leq .013$, or ≥ 0.24 ; $p \leq .006$, respectively).

³The pattern for *Islamophobia* remains still stable if the Muslim respondents are removed from the analysis ($F = 14.24$; $p \leq .001$).

The interplay between centrality of religiosity and *openness to change vs. conservation* is further visible when there are significant differences between the neither religious nor openness-oriented Quadrant Group 3 as compared to the other three groups. This is true for the item expressing a rejection of economic refugees (“Refugees who only come to Germany because of the better living conditions should directly be deported to their home countries.”) as well as for the racist statement that some races were more gifted than others. For these two items, Quadrant Groups 1, 2, and 4 do not differ significantly ($F_{(3, 1471)} \geq 7.62$; Mean Differences ≤ 0.15 ; *n.s.*) while the low religious and conservation-oriented Quadrant Group 3 displays significantly higher rates of agreement (Mean Differences ≥ 0.20 ; $p \leq .016$) and, hence, more prejudice.

Summing up, there are attitudes, in particular a couple of those concerning the religious realm, which differ primarily depending on the respondents’ centrality of religiosity whereas other attitudes, in particular those dealing with (perceived) ethnicity and sexuality, differ rather depending on the preference for either openness-oriented or conservation-oriented values. However, most measures that we have included in our study, among them the items on *xenophobia*, *Islamophobia*, and on attitudes toward refugees, i.e., the measures on attitudes toward the groups that are most clearly associated with the “refugee crisis”, differ depending on the interaction between centrality of religiosity and the value axis *openness to change vs. conservation*. Therefore, it seems to be reasonable to focus on the effects of these predictors, their interplay with potential mediators and their effects on the diverse outcomes in more detail in the analyses in the following chapters.

Relative Effect Size of Quadrant Group Membership

However, before we come to some concluding remarks about the next analytical steps, we will finally estimate the size of the effects of the quadrant group membership for the selected variables as compared to the effect sizes of the basic demographic characteristics. To compare the effect sizes of the quadrant group membership with the effect sizes of sex, age cohort, and cultural and economic capital, Table 4.9 presents the effect sizes (η^2) for quadrant group membership as well as for the aforementioned demographic variables. For better identification, the cells in Table 4.9 with the highest effect(s) for each variable have been colorized in grey so that emerging patterns become apparent.

Inspecting Table 4.9, the following observations can be made: First, it is clear that quadrant group membership has enormous effects ($\eta^2 \geq .54$) on centrality of religiosity and the value axis *openness to change vs. conservation*. Since these two dispositions constitute the quadrant groups, this finding has been expectable and is somewhat tautological.

Second, there are also very clear effects of quadrant group membership on the further religiosity measures, in particular on the self-rating as religious ($\eta^2 = .45$) which strongly corresponds with the centrality of religiosity, but also on the self-

Table 4.9 Effect sizes for quadrant groups and demographic variables (sex, age cohort, cultural and economic capital) in ANOVAs on selected measures

Dependent Variable	η^2					Adj. R^2
	Quadrant Groups	Sex	Age Cohort	Cultural Capital	Economic Capital	
<i>Centrality of Religiosity</i>	.66***	.00	.00	.02***	.00	.67
<i>Religious self-rating</i>	.45***	.00	.00	.00	.00	.45
<i>Spiritual self-rating</i>	.25***	.01**	.01**	.00	.00	.26
<i>Atheist self-rating</i>	.16***	.01**	.00	.01***	.00	.17
<i>Ideological Fundamentalism</i>	.09***	.02***	.01**	.00	.00	.11
<i>Ideological Pluralism</i>	.04***	.01*	.01**	.02***	.00	.08
<i>Value axis openness to change vs. conservation</i>	.54***	.01**	.01*	.00	.01**	.56
<i>Value axis self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence</i>	.04***	.03***	.04***	.01***	.01**	.11
<i>Tolerance of Complexity Scale</i>	.12***	.01**	.01***	.02***	.01**	.18
<i>Violence-legitimizing Norms of Masculinity</i>	.01**	.07***	.01***	.04***	.00	.11
<i>Truth of texts and teachings</i>	.24***	.00	.00	.01**	.00	.24
<i>Fairness, tolerance & rational choice</i>	.05***	.00	.01**	.05***	.00	.11
<i>Xenosophia/inter-religious dialog</i>	.07***	.00	.01**	.01***	.00	.09
<i>Anti-Semitism</i>	.01*	.02***	.01**	.05***	.00	.08
<i>Anti-Christian Enmity</i>	.03***	.01**	.00	.01**	.00	.04
<i>Islamophobia</i>	.02***	.01**	.01***	.06***	.00	.10
<i>The increasing diversity of religious groups in our society represents cultural enrichment</i>	.04***	.00	.00	.03***	.00	.07
<i>There are too many immigrants in Germany.</i>	.02***	.00	.01***	.08***	.00	.11
<i>Refugees who only come to Germany because of the better living conditions should directly be deported to their home countries.</i>	.02***	.00	.04***	.03***	.01**	.10
<i>War refugees should be accepted into Germany.</i>	.02***	.00	.00	.04***	.01*	.06
<i>Some races are more gifted than others.</i>	.01**	.01**	.01**	.03***	.00	.06
<i>There is a natural hierarchy between black and white people.</i>	.01**	.00	.01**	.06***	.00	.09
<i>It is a good thing to allow marriages between two men or two women.</i>	.04***	.02***	.01*	.01**	.00	.06
<i>Women should take their role as wives and mothers more seriously.</i>	.04***	.02***	.00	.03***	.00	.09

Notes *** = significant with $p \leq .001$, ** = significant with $p \leq .050$, * = significant with $p \leq .100$; cells with highest effect for each variable are colored in grey

ratings as spiritual or atheist, and on ideological fundamentalism ($\eta^2 \geq .09$). Additionally, quadrant group membership has substantial effects on tolerance of complexity and on the RSS subscales *ttt* and *xenos* ($\eta^2 \geq .07$). For all these measures, the effects of quadrant group membership obviously top the effects of the demographics, which are sometimes significant, but considerably lower ($\eta^2 \leq .02$) (note the detail that a xenosophic orientation is not entirely, but widely independent from cultural capital as from other demographic variables—hence, xenosophia seems to be primarily a question of an open religious mindset). For almost all remaining dispositions (ideological pluralism, *self-enhancement* vs. *self-transcendence*, and *ptr*), there are effects of similar size of both quadrant group membership and cultural capital. However, these effects are clearly lower (η^2 between .02 and .05) than those that could be observed for the aforementioned religious and ideological variables. Among the religious and ideological variables, only violence-legitimizing norms of masculinity are almost not affected by quadrant group membership, but by sex ($\eta^2 = .07$ —this is the only variable for which the effect of sex is substantial and higher than all other effects) and by cultural capital ($\eta^2 = .04$). Nevertheless, we may generally conclude that quadrant group membership seems to be of particular importance for the religious and ideological profiles of our participants.

Third, on the attitudinal level there are often effects of rather similar size of both quadrant group membership and cultural capital. This applies for the items representing anti-Christian enmity, attitudes toward religious pluralism and toward refugees, *general racism*, *homophobia*, and *sexism* (η^2 between .01 and .04). For the measures assessing other attitudes, i.e., anti-Semitism, Islamophobia, and the items on *xenophobia* and *anti-black racism*, the effects of cultural capital ($\eta^2 \geq .05$) clearly top the effects of quadrant group membership or of the other demographics ($\eta^2 \leq .02$).

Thus, it can be concluded that, beside centrality of religiosity and *openness to change* vs. *conservation*, education is also crucial for the set of attitudes someone holds with respect to “other” or “strange” groups whereas sex, age cohorts, or economic capital with few exceptions seem to play only a minor role. In subsequent analyses, it will be important to be aware of the potential effects of demographics, in particular of cultural capital (but, for instance, also of sex with respect to violence-legitimizing norms of masculinity), and to either control these effects or to explicitly estimate their size.

Selecting Interviewees from the Four Quadrant Groups

Out of the 1,534 participants of the Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion, a subsample of $n = 108$ had agreed to be interviewed and entered an e-mail address or a phone number in the questionnaire to be contacted. Also these group of potential interviewees can be divided according to the quadrant group pattern: $n = 42$ fall into

in Quadrant Group 1, $n = 29$ in Quadrant Group 2, $n = 16$ in Quadrant Group 3, and $n = 21$ in Quadrant Group 4.

For selecting the persons who we actually have contacted and scheduled a faith development interview, we considered not only quadrant group membership, but also their demographic characteristics (sex, age cohorts, religious affiliations) and their profiles on some quantitative measures such as levels of religiosity, spirituality, and atheism, preferences of values and religious schemata. This way, $n = 27$ persons have been invited and interviewed. The interviews either took place at the interviewees' home or in one of our offices at Bielefeld University. All interviews have been digitally audiotaped and professionally transcribed, and rated by colleagues trained in and experienced with faith development rating.

Each case study in Chapters 11 to 14 includes an individual profile of relevant measures for the interpretation of the cases and thus for triangulation of qualitative and quantitative data. In Chapter 10, we will describe the FDI subsample and the typology deriving from the qualitative analyses in more detail. When introducing the FDI subsample in Chapter 10, we will use the centrality of religiosity and the value axis *openness to change vs. conservation* again as coordinates for mapping our interviewees (see Fig. 10.1 in Chapter 10).

Outlook: Next Analytical Steps

In the last part of this chapter, we have already noted that demographic characteristics make some difference for the attitudes toward "otherness." In Chapter 5, we will continue with this kind of analyses with a special focus on current attitudes toward refugees and Muslims. We will explore how attitudes toward both groups have changed between August 2015 and March 2016, and we will discover which demographic variables predispose for welcoming or rejecting refugees and Muslims.

Chapters 6 and 7 will deepen the analyses of the effects of *centrality of religiosity* and of *openness to change*: In these two chapters, we will present structure equation models which include the two variables that have been used to constitute the quadrant groups as predictors of attitudes toward groups representing "otherness." To shed light on the differential effects of the distinct religious schemata and of generalized attitudes such as tolerance of complexity (Chapter 6) or violence-legitimizing norms of masculinity (Chapter 7), these variables are modeled as mediators between predictors and outcomes. Thereby, the theoretical model presented at the beginning of this chapter (Fig. 4.1) can be seen as the blueprint for the structure equation models in Chapters 6 and 7. Regarding outcomes, Chapter 6 has a focus on attitudes toward migrants, refugees, and Muslims, while Chapter 7 broadens the perspective and includes measures for further explicit attitudes, thus opening a wider perspective on understanding prejudice in the context of group-focused enmity.

Chapters 8 and 9 employ further analytic techniques. In Chapter 8, the SC-IAT data of the 272 participants of the Bielefeld subsample will be analyzed, and the implicit attitudes will be compared with the explicit attitudes. In Chapter 9, it will

be demonstrated how all questionnaire measures and subgroups of our sample relate to the value space defined by Schwartz (1992; 1994; 2003; 2006; 2012).

It is our hope that these various attempts to analyze the data that we have collected will help to draw a comprehensive, multifaceted, and sophisticated picture of how various forms of religiosity relate to attitudes toward diverse types of “otherness” in times of societal changes and challenges.

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Part II

Quantitative Results

Chapter 5

Xenophobia and the Culture of Welcome in Times of High Refugee Immigration



Heinz Streib and Constantin Klein

As the subtitle indicates, this book presents analyses about biographical and statistical paths to xenophobia in Germany, based on the assumption that the xenophobic schema relates positively to attitudes such as the welcoming of refugees or the appreciation of other religions, and negatively to prejudice and xenophobia. For profiling the context in which such biographical and statistical paths and developments of attitudes are embedded, we portray the situation in Germany in regard to prejudice and xenophobia, and in regard to the culture of welcome. This context is especially influenced by the arrival of over one million refugees in Germany in the years 2015 and 2016.

In the previous Chap. 4, we have introduced the entire sample of 1,534 participants in our survey and presented the basic statistics of their religious beliefs, values and attitudes. For our portrait in this chapter, we start with using our latest subsample of 625 participants who have been surveyed by an opinion research institute in March 2016 and is largely representative for the German population in regard to gender, age cohorts, cultural capital and federal states distribution.

We then present details about the short-time changes of xenophobia and the culture of welcome in Germany, because the March 2016 subsample is a repetition of the opinion research survey of 637 Germans, whom we have surveyed in August 2015, at the beginning of massive arrivals of refugees in Germany.¹ Comparison between both subsamples allows an estimation of changes within seven months in regard to xenophobia, Islamophobia and other inter-religious prejudice, and also of changes regarding the culture of welcome in the critical

¹No longitudinal estimates are possible, because not the same persons have participated in this both surveys. See Chapter 4 for sampling details.

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times of large refugee migration into Germany. This will be presented in the second part of this chapter.

Xenophobia and the Culture of Welcome in Germany 2016

In the first part of this chapter we present results about xenophobia, Islamophobia and the culture of welcome, based on a subsample of $n = 625^2$ respondents, who have answered our questionnaire in March 2016, shortly before the elections in the German states of Baden-Württemberg, Rheinland-Pfalz and Sachsen-Anhalt. These are our latest data. We need to focus on a selection of the 30 questions for xenophobia and other types of attitudes, and thereby present the most conspicuous results. Thus, we start with a documentation of the frequencies of agreement to attitudes toward refugees, to attitudes toward Muslims and Islam, and to questions for xenophobia.

Attitudes toward Refugees

As presented in Fig. 5.1, the agreement to a culture of welcoming war refugees appears to be surprisingly high in March 2016: Asked for their agreement to the statement “War refugees should be accepted into Germany,” the majority of 78.7% respondents fully agrees or tends to agree.

A direct comparison of attitudes toward war refugees and so-called “economic refugees” emerges from the attention to the second bar in Fig. 5.1, which indicates rather high agreement (73.7%) to the statement that “refugees who only come to Germany because of the better living conditions should directly be deported to their home countries.” This agreement of almost three out of four respondents is only somewhat lower than the agreement to welcoming war refugees. These two variables in our data are so contrary, that we decided to use them in the more differential analyses below in this chapter.

Given such high agreement to both statements, it is less surprising that, as Table 5.1 (cells marked grey) shows, 55.0% of our respondents simultaneously agree to the welcoming of war refugees *and* the deportation of economic refugees.

Taken together, our results document both, the high agreement to welcoming war refugees in Germany, and an alarmingly high xenophobic aversion against (“economic”) refugees. Thereby, the culture of welcome and the negative attitudes toward (“economic”) refugees appear to a lesser degree polarized in two camps in the German population. Paradoxically, both positive and negative attitudes can, in large percentages, be found in one and the same person.

²For analyses of attitudes toward Islam, Muslims have been excluded from the analysis, which therefore is based on $n = 617$ participants.




Fig. 5.1 Agreement to attitudes toward refugees in Germany (March 2016)

Table 5.1 Cross-tabulation of welcoming war refugees and deportation of economic refugees

		War refugees should be accepted into Germany				Total
		completely disagree	tend to disagree	tend to agree	agree fully	
Refugees who only come to Germany because of the better living conditions should directly be deported to their home countries.	completely disagree	0.5%	0.3%	0.8%	6.2%	7.8%
	tend to disagree	0.6%	1.1%	5.4%	11.2%	18.4%
	tend to agree	0.6%	3.2%	14.2%	13.8%	31.8%
	agree fully	5.6%	9.3%	15.2%	11.8%	41.9%
	Total	7.4%	13.9%	35.7%	43.0%	100.0%

This suggests that there is, in large parts of the German population, considerable uncertainty, and eventually an ambiguity, about the refugees – with the tendency of a polarization in “bad” refugees, who come only for economic reasons, and “good” refugees, who flee war and violence and need shelter.

Attitudes toward Muslims

Now we focus on another instance of xenophobia in Germany: Islamophobia. Figure 5.2 presents the most important questions regarding attitudes toward Islam that were included in our questionnaire.

Thereby, the first four questions in the figure are part of our *Islamophobia* scale, which has been developed and successfully used in previous research with adolescents in Germany 2009 (Streib & Gennerich, 2011; Streib & Klein, 2014). The *Islamophobia* scale is described in more detail in Chap. 4. The scale, which has a reliability of $\alpha = .85$ in the March 2016 subsample, will be used later in this chapter (see Figs. 5.16, 5.18, 5.20) and also in structural equation modelling in Chaps. 6 and 7. Nevertheless, we present simple frequencies here, because this visualizes the very high agreement of about 60% respondents, especially to the statement “The many Muslims make me sometimes feel like a stranger in my own country” and “Muslim religion is harmful for world peace.”

The last two bars in Fig. 5.2 reflect even more sharply the Islamo-phobic tendency in the German population in March 2016: only one third of our respondents agree that “Islam fits well into the Western world,” while two out of three respondents believe that “Europe has to be protected against an increasing Islamization.” These items are treated as single variables in later calculations in this chapter. They can be understood as exemplary indicators of attitudes toward Islam, which are often found in the current public discourse (see Chap. 4 for more details).




Fig. 5.2 Agreement to attitudes toward Islam in Germany (March 2016)

Interestingly, these questions have been answered rather inversely: almost 80% agree to one item, while disagreeing to the other. This means that these two items reflect a rather clear split in our sample between those who agree to the populist right-wing rhetoric of “Islamization,” which is perceived as danger for Europe, and those who think that Islam fits into the Western world. Since these two items have elicited a polar pattern of attitudes, we will use them further in this chapter as single-item indicators of attitudes toward Islam.

Xenophobic Attitudes

To measure xenophobic attitudes, we have used two single items: “There are too many immigrants in Germany” – an item that has often been used in previous research – and: “The government is doing too little against foreign infiltration” – an item that reflects the more recent right-wing populist rhetoric. On both items, our data indicate agreement or tentative agreement of two out of three respondents (see Fig. 5.3). These two variables have also been calculated into a scale *xenophobia*, which will be used for presentations in the second part of this chapter. This scale has a reliability of $\alpha = .79$ in the 2016 subsample.




Fig. 5.3 Agreement to Xenophobic attitudes toward immigrants in Germany (March 2016)

Demographic Group Differences Regarding the Culture of Welcome and Islamophobia

From the analyses of differences, we may expect a more detailed insight in the centers of gravity for the culture of welcome and the various prejudices that we have targeted in our survey. For these analyses of differences, we will use the mean values rather than frequencies, assuming that line graphs are easier to read than bar charts. Thus, we will try to identify whether gender, region (East-Germany; West-Germany), age, cultural capital, centrality of religiosity, or party preference make the greatest difference.

Gender Differences

As Fig. 5.4 shows, our data appear to indicate gender differences in regard to the welcoming of war refugees and the prejudice against “economic” refugees. Women appear slightly more open for welcoming war refugees and somewhat less prejudiced against “economic” refugees.

Also in regard to attitudes toward Islam, men and women appear to be different (see Fig. 5.5): Women agree somewhat stronger to the statement that Islam fits into the Western world, and women less strongly support the idea that Europe has to protect itself against Islamization.

This may reflect a somewhat greater presence of prosocial attitudes in women. But generally we need to conclude that these gender differences do not explain much, because, in our effect size analysis according to Cohen (1988), these differences are below the threshold of small effect sizes (Cohen’s $d < 0.2$ for all gender differences in Figs. 5.4 and 5.5). Thus, because gender differences are marginal, the results presented here do not suggest conclusions that prejudice and Islamophobia is predominantly a problem of male respondents, while the culture of welcoming war refugees would be predominantly supported by women.




Fig. 5.4 Gender differences of attitudes toward refugees in Germany (March 2016, mean values)




Fig. 5.5 Gender differences of attitudes toward Islam and immigrants in Germany (March 2016, mean values)




Fig. 5.6 Differences between West-Germany and East-Germany in attitudes toward refugees in Germany (March 2016, mean values)

Differences between Germany East and West

The analysis of differences in attitudes toward refugees between participants in the old German states (West-Germany) compared with participants in the new German states (East-Germany), however, reveals somewhat larger differences, which can be interpreted as small effects. As presented in Fig. 5.6, the agreement to the statement “Refugees who only come to Germany because of the better living conditions should directly be deported to their home countries” is considerably higher ($\Delta M = 0.25$; $d = 0.26$) in the eastern German states. And we find lower agreement to the acceptance of war refugees into Germany in the respondents in East-Germany ($\Delta M = -0.17$; $d = -0.17$).




Fig. 5.7 Differences between West-Germany and East-Germany in attitudes toward Islam (March 2016, mean values)

East-West differences in attitudes toward Islam are smaller, as Fig. 5.7 indicates; the differences here are again below the threshold of small effects. Nevertheless, the anxiety against the “Islamization” appears to be somewhat higher in East-Germany than in West-Germany. But, surprisingly, also the statement that “Islam fits well in the Western world” finds slightly more agreement in East-Germany.

Age Differences

Analysis of variance was used to assess age differences in mean agreement to our selected items regarding refugees, as Fig. 5.8 presents.

From these analyses it is obvious that age does indeed make a difference for the attitudes toward refugees and attitudes toward Islam. These differences are significant, but effect size is rather small for all analyses in Figs. 5.8 and 5.9.³ That difference between age groups in regard to the culture of welcoming war refugees, the hostility against “economic” refugees, and attitudes toward Islam, is very likely due to the enormous contrast between two age groups: the group of adolescents and emerging adults (18–29 years old) and the group of adults between age 30 and 39. While the adolescent/emerging adult group emerges as the highest in agreement to

³analysis of variance reveals that there were significant differences between the age groups in attitudes toward war refugees ($F_{(4, 625)} = 2.19, p = .069, \text{part. } \eta^2 = .01$), attitudes toward “economic” refugees ($F_{(3, 625)} = 5.27, p \leq .001, \text{part. } \eta^2 = .03$), attitudes toward “Islamization” ($F_{(4, 617)} = 4.07, p = .003, \text{part. } \eta^2 = .03$), and “Islam fits in the Western world” ($F_{(4, 617)} = 4.75, p = .028, \text{part. } \eta^2 = .02$).




Fig. 5.8 Age group differences in attitudes toward war refugees (March 2016, mean values)
Note for Figs. 5.8 and 5.9. Results are based on analysis of variance with age cohort as grouping variable, while effects of gender, cultural and economic capital were controlled




Fig. 5.9 Age group differences in attitudes toward Islam (March 2016, mean values)

the culture of welcome (Fig. 5.8) and lowest in enmity against Islam (Fig. 5.9), it is reversed in the group of adults between age 30 and 39.⁴

Taken together, our survey in March 2016 indicates that Germans under the age of 30 are the highest in supporting the culture of welcome and *not* rejecting refu-

⁴Direct comparison of these two age groups (18–29; 30–39) with effect size estimation indicates a small to moderate effect (Cohen’s *d* between 0.34 and 0.49).




Fig. 5.10 Differences in attitudes toward refugees according to cultural capital (March 2016, mean values)

Note for Figs. 5.10 and 5.11. Results are based on analysis of variance with cultural capital groups as grouping variable, while effects of gender, cultural and economic capital were controlled

gees, and they have the least prejudices against Islam. In contrast, the Germans between age 30 and 39 emerge as the age group that is most hostile against refugees and has the most prejudice against Islam.

Differences in Cultural Capital

Now we explore cultural capital and assess the effect on the attitudes toward refugees and the attitudes toward Islam. Figures 5.10 and 5.11 present results.

Differences in education were assessed with reference to the OECD/ISCED standards (Unesco, 2006; OECD, 2011) and we have constructed three education groups for comparison. Analyses of variance reveal that there are significant, although small differences between these groups in regard to attitudes toward refugees and attitudes toward Islam.⁵ It is thus obvious that attitudes toward refugees and attitudes toward Islam are related to education. The higher the education, the more respondents are open for a culture of welcoming war refugees, reject the rhetoric of “Islamization,” and think that Islam fits into the Western world.

⁵According to our analysis of variance, there were significant differences between the education groups in attitudes toward war refugees ($F_{(2, 625)} = 6.05, p = .002, \text{part. } \eta^2 = .02$), attitudes toward “economic” refugees ($F_{(2, 625)} = 3.94, p = .020, \text{part. } \eta^2 = .01$), attitudes toward “Islamization” ($F_{(2, 617)} = 6.33, p = .002, \text{part. } \eta^2 = .02$), and “Islam fits in the Western world” ($F_{(2, 617)} = 3.52, p = .030, \text{part. } \eta^2 = .01$).




Fig. 5.11 Differences in attitudes toward Islam according to cultural capital (March 2016, mean values)

Differences in the Centrality of Religiosity

Because we have implemented a solid set of measures for the assessment of religiosity in our research design, we can estimate the effect of religiosity on the attitudes toward refugees and attitudes toward Islam very well. Here we focus on one of the basic measures in our questionnaire, Huber’s instrument for the assessment of centrality of religiosity (Huber & Huber, 2012). This scale taps into the importance of religious themes, belief in a divine being, religious experiences, and private and public religious praxis. We have constructed three groups according to Huber’s suggestion: not religious, (moderately) religious, and highly religious. Figures 5.12 and 5.13 present results of the analysis of variance to estimate the attitudes toward refugees and attitudes toward Islam for the three groups.

Not all differences for to the *centrality of religiosity* are significant, and they are of rather small effect size.⁶ To focus on the significant differences, it is interesting that the results for the welcoming of war refugees and the results for the attitude that Islam fits well in the Western world are rather different. While the highly religious respondents are the highest in welcoming refugees, they are somewhat lower in

⁶According to our analysis of variance, there were significant differences between the centrality of religiosity groups only in attitudes toward war refugees ($F_{(2, 625)} = 3.77, p = .024, \text{part. } \eta^2 = .01$) and “Islam fits in the Western world” ($F_{(2, 617)} = 3.34, p = .036, \text{part. } \eta^2 = .01$).




Fig. 5.12 Differences in attitudes toward refugees according to *centrality of religiosity* (March 2016, mean values)

Note for Figs. 5.12 and 5.13. Results are based on analysis of variance with the categorized centrality of religiosity as grouping variable, while effects of gender, age groups, cultural and economic capital were controlled




Fig. 5.13 Differences in the attitudes toward Islam according to the *centrality of religiosity* (March 2016, mean values)

welcoming Islam as part of the Western world (however, the lowest level of agreement to a fit of Islam in the Western world can be observed among the not religious respondents).

The skepticism against Islam among the highly religious respondents may be understandable with reference to the fact that the majority in this group self-identify as members of a Christian church. This may indicate that high religiosity goes hand

in hand with hostility against Islam. On the other hand, there is an indication in our results that high religiosity may be related to the appreciation of the culture of welcome.

Differences According to Party Preferences

Because we included in the questionnaire of our second opinion research survey in March 2016 a question for the voting preferences of the respondents (“If there was an election next Sunday, what party would you vote for?”), we are able to present a differential portrait of attitudes toward refugees and attitudes toward Islam according to party preferences. Already the first observation of Figs. 5.14 and 5.15 give a clear impression that there are great differences between the party preference groups. Statistical analyses confirm this impression:⁷ Party preference makes the strongest differences for the attitudes toward refugees and the attitudes toward Islam. Fig. 5.14 presents the means for the attitudes toward refugees according to party preferences.

Also the attitudes toward Islam are very different for the voters of the various parties, as Fig. 5.15 demonstrates:

Our results demonstrate that hostility against refugees and Islamophobia are favored extremely by the potential voters of the new populist right-wing party, Alternative für Deutschland (AfD, “Alternative for Germany”). In all variables in Figs. 5.14 and 5.15, the greatest differences are between voters of the Green Party (“Die Grünen”) and voters of the AfD. Focusing on the differences between Green voters and AfD voters, Cohen’s d calculation reveals large effect sizes (Cohen’s $d > 1.5$, or $d < -1.0$ respectively).

These large contrasts between the party preference groups in regard to their attitudes toward Islam are corroborated, when we use the scale for *Islamophobia*. Thereby we can attend to the prejudices against other religions and include our scales for *anti-Semitism* and for *anti-Christian enmity*.⁸ As Fig. 5.16 shows, the lines for *Islamophobia* and *anti-Semitism* are largely parallel – indicating that both versions of inter-religious prejudice go hand in hand. And AfD voters are clearly highest on both variables.

Taken together, party preference indicates the largest differences in xenophobic attitudes in respect to people of other religions and people who seek refuge and help.

⁷According to our analysis of variance, there were significant differences between the groups of distinct party preferences in attitudes toward war refugees ($F_{(6, 617)} = 17.10, p \leq .001$, part. $\eta^2 = .14$), attitudes toward “economic” refugees ($F_{(6, 617)} = 18.48, p \leq .001$, part. $\eta^2 = .16$), attitudes toward “Islamization” ($F_{(6, 609)} = 20.14, p \leq .001$, part. $\eta^2 = .17$), and “Islam fits in the Western world” ($F_{(6, 609)} = 21.74, p \leq .001$, part. $\eta^2 = .18$).

⁸The scales for *Islamophobia*, *anti-Semitism* and *anti-Christian enmity* were developed and used in previous research (Streib & Gennerich, 2011; Streib & Klein, 2014). See also Chapter 4, for more details.




Fig. 5.14 Attitudes toward refugees according to party preferences (March 2016, mean values)
Note Results are based on ANOVA with party preference as predictor, while variables for gender, age groups, cultural and economic capital were controlled

Changes between August 2015 and March 2016 in the Attitudes toward Refugees

The results presented so far are based on our opinion research survey in March 2016. This sample has been surveyed at least half a year after the first large refugee migration wave on the Balkan route arrived in Germany. Has the culture of welcome and/or Islamophobia increased or decreased in the meantime?

We are in the position to put the results that have been presented so far in this chapter in profile with another opinion research subsample of ($n = 637$) respondents, who were surveyed in August 2015 – on the peak of the large refugee migration into Germany. Thus comparison allows an estimate of changes in the culture of welcome, prejudices and other attitudes in the relatively short time distance of 7 months.




Fig. 5.15 Attitudes toward Islam according to party preferences (March 2016, mean values)
Note Results are based on ANOVA with party preference as grouping variable, while effects of gender, age groups, cultural and economic capital were controlled

General Changes in Attitudes toward Refugees

Already frequencies indicate that German society has become less welcoming and more xenophobic between August 2015 and March 2016, as Fig. 5.17 presents.

The culture of welcome has decreased, while xenophobia and Islamophobia have increased: While in August 2015, 83.4% respondents agreed or tentatively agreed that refugees who flee from war in their home countries should be accepted into Germany, in March 2016 the percentage of respondents agreeing to this question decreased to 78.9%; thus the culture of welcome has decreased by 4.7 percentage points. In contrast, the agreement plus slight agreement for deporting “economic”




Fig. 5.16 Islamophobia, anti-Semitism and anti-Christian enmity according to party preference (March 2016, mean values)

Note Results are based on analysis of variance with $n = 609$ cases and with party preference as grouping variable, while effects of gender, age groups, cultural and economic capital were controlled

refugees directly in their home countries increased from 66.4% in August 2015 to 73.7% in March 2016, which is an increase of 7.3 percentage points. Thus, already from agreement frequencies, we have a documentation of considerable changes in seven months.

Attention to the mean values not only continues our way of presentation of differences above in this chapter, but opens additional and more precise perspectives and allows the continuation of our calculation of effect size estimates. Thus, Fig. 5.18, which generally presents the same message as Fig. 5.17, more clearly visualizes that welcome for war refugees and unwelcome for “economic” refugees tend toward the same level.

Figure 5.18 documents the slight decrease of welcoming war refugees ($\Delta M = 0.13$) and a somewhat larger increase of hostility against “economic” refugees ($\Delta M = 0.19$). Statistically, these differences between August 2015 and March 2016 are small or even marginal.⁹ What qualifies them as substantial changes is the short time distance of seven month. These changes are alarming, when we see in

⁹According to effect size calculation (for the war refugees item: $d = 0.15$; for the “economic” refugees item: $d = 0.19$), these changes are on or slightly below the threshold for small changes.




Fig. 5.17 Differences between August 2015 and March 2016 in welcoming war refugees and attitudes toward “Economic” refugees




Fig. 5.18 Changes in attitudes toward refugees in Germany between August 2015 and March 2016 (mean values)




Fig. 5.19 Divergent developments in attitudes toward refugees in Germany-East and Germany-West between August 2015 and March 2016

these short-time changes the beginning of a change of mood in regard to the culture of welcome in Germany.

What has brought about that change in the culture of welcome? What caused the growth of hostility against “economic” refugees? It may yield some more insight in the dynamics of these changes, when we could identify some centers of gravity. For this purpose, two divergence perspectives have emerged as interesting: the divergent development in East-Germany in comparison with West-Germany and the divergent developments in the various age groups.

The Diverging Split between East-Germany and West-Germany

When we simultaneously take the difference between West-Germany and East-Germany and the difference between the 2015 and the 2016 surveys into account, as was done in the calculation for Fig. 5.19, a surprising dynamic divergence between East-Germany and West-Germany becomes obvious. Figure 5.19 presents the 2015–2016 differences for East-Germans as dotted lines and the differences for West-Germans as solid lines.

It is obvious that the East-German decrease in the culture of welcoming war refugees doubles the decrease in West-Germany. Conversely the hostility against “economic” refugees increased in East-Germany, and this increase is twice as high as the increase in West-Germany. While according to Cohen’s *d* calculation, the changes in the East-German sample are small (for the decrease of welcoming war refugees:




Fig. 5.20 Divergent developments in general and anti-black racism in Germany-East and Germany-West between August 2015 and March 2016

$d = -0.21$; for the increase of aversion against “economic” refugees; $d = 0.40$), we regard these changes as considerable in respect to the short time of seven months.

For the divergent split between East-Germany and West-Germany in the attitudes toward refugees, parallels are indicated in general racism and anti-black racism, as Fig. 5.20 demonstrates using to single items for each construct: “We need to protect our own culture from the influence of other cultures” for general racism, and “There is a natural hierarchy between black and white people” for anti-black racism.

From these clear parallels to racist prejudice, we conclude that the prejudice against refugees may be part of a more comprehensive syndrome, as also suggested in research on group-focused enmity (Zick, Wolf, Küpper, et al., 2008).

Divergent developments become obvious also from the analyses of differences in *xenophobia* in general and the inter-religious prejudices between the Abrahamic religions. Figure 5.21 presents means of the scales for *xenophobia*, *Islamophobia*, *anti-Semitism*, and *anti-Christian enmity*.

With the exception of the *anti-Christian enmity*, we see an increase on all scales between August 2015 and March 2016, but the increase in the respondents from East-Germany is consistently more than double. These results indicate that one form of prejudice does not stand alone, but prejudices against immigrants parallel anti-Islamic prejudices; and here, the East-West divergence is very large.

Also noteworthy is the relationship of the prejudices between the Abrahamic religions among each other. It is interesting that the increase of *Islamophobia* and *anti-Semitism* clearly parallel each other, but only for respondents East-Germany. It appears that, for East-Germans, prejudice against anything “other” has considerably increased between August 2015 and March 2016.




Fig. 5.21 Divergent developments in Germany-East and Germany-West in *Xenophobia*, *Islamophobia*, *anti-Semitism* and *anti-Christian enmity* between August 2015 and March 2016

Age Differences

For the attempt to understand the changes between August 2015 and March 2016 in regard to the attitudes toward refugees, another differential perspective stands out: the divergence between the age groups. Figs. 5.22 and 5.23 present results.

Regarding the culture of welcoming war refugees (Fig. 5.22), only little changes appear to have occurred for age groups between 40 and 59 years, while for respondents under 40 and over 60, results document a decrease of $\Delta M = 0.2$ in welcoming war refugees. Considerably different for the attitude toward “economic” refugees: We see, again, almost no change in the age group of the respondents between age 50 and 59, and also for the respondents over 60 years we see no change. In contrast, the age groups of the younger respondents appear to make the difference. And here the age group of the 30 to 39 years old respondents stands out in the increase of hostility against “economic” refugees.




Fig. 5.22 Age group differences in the changes of welcoming war refugees between August 2015 and March 2016




Fig. 5.23 Age group differences in the changes of hostility against "Economic" refugees between August 2015 and March 2016

Correlates and Potential Predictors for the Culture of Welcome

Finally, we present an exploration of our data for correlates to the culture of welcome and the attitudes of unwelcoming refugees. These correlates may lead to hypothesize potential predictors, but we need to caution against the misinterpretation of these results as an explanation; our research design is cross-sectional, while explanatory models would require longitudinal data.

But it is rather interesting to explore relations between the agreement to welcoming war refugees and unwelcoming “economic” refugees, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a set of scales that are, in their conceptual focus, not primarily related to the attitudes toward refugees. For this set we have selected the scales on *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* (Enzmann & Wetzels, 2003), the scale for *tolerance of complexity* (Radant & Dalbert, 2003, 2006), and two subscales of our Religious Schema Scale (RSS, Streib, Hood, & Klein, 2010), *fairness, tolerance and rational choice (ftr)* and *xenosophia, inter-religious dialog (xenos)*.¹⁰

For these analyses of variance, we have used the combined subsamples from August 2015 and March 2016, since only minor differences were found when using the split sample. We z-standardized scale means for convenient visualization and easier reading.

All scale differences presented in Figs. 5.24 and 5.25 are significant and effect sizes are at least small, some are rather high.¹¹ Thus we could identify one variable, *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity*, that clearly correlates negatively with the culture of welcoming war refugees and positively with the hostility toward “economic” refugees; and we could identify three variables, *tolerance of complexity*, and the two RSS subscales, *fairness, tolerance and rational choice* and *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog*, that correlate positively with the culture of welcoming war refugees and negatively with the unwelcoming “economic” refugees.

All of these correlates have to do, one way or another, with attitudes toward the strange; but none of them deals with people who come to us from foreign countries in search for work, refuge or asylum. Thus, all of these four visualized correlates

¹⁰Results for the RSS subscale *truth of texts and teachings* are not as linearly related to the two items concerning refugees compared to the correlates we have selected in Figs. 5.24 and 5.25.

¹¹According to the analysis of variance for Fig. 5.24, there were significant differences between the agreement stages to the item “War refugees should be accepted into Germany” in *tolerance of complexity* ($F_{(3, 1262)} = 43.43, p \leq .001$, part. $\eta^2 = .09$), *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* ($F_{(3, 1262)} = 43.23, p \leq .001$, part. $\eta^2 = .09$), *fairness, tolerance and rational choice* ($F_{(3, 1262)} = 121.07, p \leq .001$, part. $\eta^2 = .23$), and *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog* ($F_{(3, 1262)} = 58.00, p \leq .001$, part. $\eta^2 = .12$); for Fig. 5.25, there were significant differences between the agreement stages to the item “Refugees who only come to Germany because of the better living conditions should directly be deported to their home countries” in *tolerance of complexity* ($F_{(3, 1262)} = 7.65, p \leq .001$, part. $\eta^2 = .02$), *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* ($F_{(3, 1262)} = 19.43, p \leq .001$, part. $\eta^2 = .04$), *fairness, tolerance and rational choice* ($F_{(3, 1262)} = 17.09, p \leq .001$, part. $\eta^2 = .04$), and *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog* ($F_{(3, 1262)} = 23.32, p \leq .001$, part. $\eta^2 = .05$).




Fig. 5.24 Correlates for welcoming war refugees

Note Results are based on analysis of variance with $n = 1262$ cases and with the item “War refugees should be accepted into Germany” as grouping variable, while effects of gender, age groups, cultural and economic capital were controlled

demonstrate that attitudes toward refugees are part of a wider network of related factors.

That also the *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* is among these factors is rather new, but gaining plausibility in prejudice research from colleague’s (Baier, Pfeiffer, Simonson, & Rabold, 2009; Baier, Pfeiffer, Rabold, Simonson, & Kappes, 2010) and our own (Streib and Klein, 2012) research. We conclude that the norms of masculinity are a very strong correlate and potential predictor of discrimination and violence. And Chap. 7 in this book will add evidence from our current research and will position the *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* into the network of potential predictors of diverse types of prejudice and xenophobia by using structural equation modelling.

Turning to the positive forces in our set of variables, the two RSS subscales *fairness, tolerance and rational choice* and *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog* as well as the *tolerance of complexity* scale clearly and strongly relate positively to the welcoming of war refugees and negatively to unwelcoming “economic” refugees (even if the effects in Fig. 5.25 are somewhat weaker). It appears that these three variables are a major contribution to answer the question “What leads to and supports the culture of welcome.” With the two RSS subscales, religiosity comes into play – but in a specific way: as religious styles. Thus, a religion featuring tolerance or even




Fig. 5.25 Correlates for unwelcoming “Economic” refugees

Note Results are based on analysis of variance with $n = 1262$ cases and with the item “Refugees who only come to Germany because of the better living conditions should directly be deported to their home countries” as grouping variable, while effects of gender, age groups, cultural and economic capital were controlled

dialog and xenophobia (see Chap. 1 for a detailed discussion) comes into view as clear correlate and potential predictor for the culture of welcome. These effects will be analyzed in more detail in Chap. 6, where *ftr* and especially *xenos* will become a pivotal place in structure equation models.

Conclusion

In the context of our book, this chapter had the primary task of presenting a portrait of the German situation in regard to the culture of welcome, of xenophilia, and of prejudice and xenophobia. Thereby, we have, wherever possible, paid attention to differences in our data, in order to identify centers of gravity for the xenological patterns and their possible developments.

Taken together, higher agreement to the culture of welcome appears to be associated with the characteristics of being either under 30 or over 60 years, having received high education, being highly religious, and living in West-Germany. High agreement to the welcoming war refugees also appears to be associated with the

preference for voting for the *The Greens (Die Grünen)* or *The Left (Die Linke)*, if there were elections next Sunday. Conversely, higher agreement to the xenophobic attitudes appears to be associated with the characteristics of being between 30 and 39 years old, having received low education, being moderately or not religious, and living in East-Germany. High agreement to xenophobic attitudes also appears to be associated with the preference for voting AfD.

Of course, we should be reluctant to support *clichés*, and we should emphasize that xenophobic attitudes are found in all age groups, all *centrality of religiosity* groups, and among voters for any party. We have even documented a certain inconsistency or ambivalence between the general attitude of welcoming of refugees and agreement to German politics to have accepted so many refugees – which we interpreted as associated with images of the “good” refugee, who has escaped from war and terror, and the “bad” refugee, who comes for economic reasons only and eventually has a tendency to become delinquent.

Our analyses indicate that the attitudes toward refugees are not an isolated and new domain of prejudice. On the contrary, our results corroborate something like a xenophobic syndrome, which, apparently, fuels also the current attitudes toward refugees, and for which, especially in the East-German states, we have witnessed an acute phase between August 2015 and March 2016. The syndrome reflects the “group-focused enmity” that has been developed and researched extensively at our own university in Bielefeld (Zick, Küpper, & Hövermann, 2011; Heitmeyer, 2011; Zick, Wolf, Küpper, et al., 2008). Support for such syndrome comes from our data in form of indications of parallel developments of attitudes toward refugees, on the one hand, and, on the other hand, a set of attitudes such as general xenophobia toward strangers in our country, inter-religious attitudes among the Abrahamic religions, Islamophobia in particular, general and anti-black racism.

The culture of welcome came under pressure indeed in the seven months that we documented in our data. And it is still an open question where this development will lead. In this situation it is necessary to develop a perspective in support of the culture of welcome. As a first step in this direction, we have presented as the last part in this chapter, the exploration of correlates and potential predictors of a culture of welcome. And thereby we concluded that a religion featuring tolerance or even dialog and xensophia may qualify as a candidate. These effects will be analyzed in more detail in the following Chap. 6.

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Chapter 6

Explaining Xenophobia and Xenophilia: Effects of Religiosity, Openness, Tolerance of Complexity, and Religious Schemata



Heinz Streib and Constantin Klein

What is responsible for the development of prejudice, xenophobia and xenophilia? What are the most relevant factors? In the construction of coordinates for mapping the variety of positive and negative attitudes toward the strange, we have identified two candidates: *centrality of religiosity* (Huber & Huber, 2012) and *openness to change* (Schwartz, 2007). And these were used for mapping our data and interviewees in a two-dimensional space (see Chap. 4. for details).

In this chapter we thus consider *centrality of religiosity* and *openness to change* as potential predictors, and also examine other variables in our data in regard to their effects on attitudes toward the alien. Thereby, we may expect from *openness to change* to be positively related to xenophilia and other positive attitudes. However, the role of religiosity may be expected to display some ambivalence – which can be justified with reference to Allport’s well-known dictum that religion “makes” and “unmakes” prejudice. Thus, there are some assumptions, but also some open questions regarding the potential predictors that we have to sort out, when we approach the project of modelling these relations.

Construction of the Structure Equation Model with the Religious Schemata

We argue in the other chapters of this book and elsewhere that religiosity, rather than being a monolithic construct, must be analyzed differentially. Religion is a question of style (Streib, 2001, 2003). We thus claim that religion should be

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analyzed with attention to a variety of religious styles. In adaptation and careful modification of Fowler's (1981) differential model of faith development, we propose a model of religious styles that may or may not form a sequence, but certainly overlap each other, while a certain religious style may be in the foreground of every day meaning making and action.

To quantitatively assess different religious styles, the Religious Schema Scale (RSS, Streib, Hood, & Klein, 2010) has been developed. It is not a type of faith development scale that aims at assessing Fowler's six stages with a quantitative measure. Rather it is a measure of religious schemata, which are assumed to indicate the religious styles. Thus the RSS includes three 5-item subscales, *truth of texts and teachings (ttt)*, *fairness, tolerance and rational choice (ftr)*, and *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog (xenos)*. It is noteworthy, not least in respect to the theme of this book, that the RSS includes something new, which we inherited from Fowler's faith development model, as stated earlier:

(O)ur model introduces and highlights something new: the dialogical attitude we call *xenosophia*. This appreciation of the wisdom in encounter with the alien of course relates to Fowler's ingenious idea of assuming stages of faith beyond the individuative-reflective style, thus conceptualizing a style that he called "conjunctive faith" and that features the appreciation of the other and other faith traditions. (Streib et al., 2010, p. 155)

With the inclusion of *xenos*, we also take up the thread of Allport's (1954, p. 465) distinction between a religion "of an ethnocentric order" and a religion "of a universalistic order." This has also been stated earlier:

We claim to take up the tradition of Allport's conceptualization and operationalization of religiosity in regard to prejudice but conceptualize and operationalize religiosity in a different way, namely, in terms of religious styles and schemata, which in turn are derived from Fowler's model of faith development. (Streib & Klein, 2014, p. 161).

The assumptions are these: The *ttt* schema relates to the ethnocentric religiosity, which not only is faithfully holding on to one's own religious tradition, but regarding this tradition as absolute and superior. In contrast, *ftr* and especially *xenos* relate to the universalistic style of religiosity featuring tolerant communication (*ftr*) or openness for the encounter with the other religion and true dialog (*xenos*).

What is the relation between the three RSS subscales? As proposed in the key publication of the RSS (Streib et al., 2010), the religious styles and thus the three RSS schemata would be misunderstood, if viewed as linear succession of stages, which involve the abandonment of the previous stage upon proceeding to a higher stage, as Kohlberg and colleagues (1983) wanted to have it. Rather, we have proposed a triangular relation, which may involve (a) an overlap of the three schemata, (b) contributions from each schema to support the other, and (c) potential developmental movements from each schema to the other. This dynamic triangle has been visualized in the 2010 text as presented in Fig. 6.1.¹

There is, of course, a clear and strong negative relation between *ttt* and *xenos*. But the triangular association suggest a more open and flexible relation—which, for

¹ Reprint from Streib, Hood and Klein (2010, p. 155) with permission from Tylor & Francis.




Fig. 6.1 The dynamic model of religious schemata

example, does not exclude that one can hold on to the tenets of one's belief, but does so with an openness to learn from the other, which may even cause greater appreciation for both the faith of the other as well as one's own faith. The triangular modeling of the three schemata allows for the possibility that faithfulness to one's own tradition (*ttt*) can contribute to xenophilia (*xenos*).

The Basic Model

Now, we are able to account for this triangle using the data from our research. Figure 6.2 presents our basic structure equation model with a good fit to the data of $N = 1471$ Germans.²

The right half of Fig. 6.2 presents the triangular relation between the RSS subscales. Thereby, we assume on philosophical-ethical and theological grounds a hierarchy between the three schemata with *xenos* being the most advanced and ethically most appropriate schema. Therefore, we model, in the structural equation, *xenos* as the target variable and account for the contributions of *ttt* and *ftr* to *xenos*. Noteworthy are the effects of *ttt* and *ftr* on *xenos*. Both are positive – with considerable differences however: $\beta = .35$ ($p \leq .001$) for *ttt* and $\beta = .70$ ($p \leq .001$) for *ftr*. This is especially interesting for the effect from *ttt*: Obviously the readiness for inter-religious encounter and dialog is considerably supported for our respondents by a strong belief in, and faithfulness toward, their own religious tradition. Nevertheless the regression weight of $\beta = .70$ ($p \leq .001$) from *ftr* to *xenos* suggests greater commonalities between *ftr* and *xenos*.

²Model fit indices are: $\chi^2 = 342.54$, $df = 55$, $\chi^2/df = 6.23$, CFI = 97, RMSEA = .06 (upper bound = .07, lower bound = .05). AMOS 23 was used, and maximum likelihood estimation was employed to calculate the model. In the structural equation model, circles represent latent variables, while rectangles represent measured variables. Thereby, observed variables (rectangles) and also error terms for all latent variables, have been blinded for more easy reading of the figures. Note: *** = significant with $p \leq .001$, ** = significant with $p \leq .01$.




Fig. 6.2 The basic model estimating the effects of centrality of religiosity and openness to change on the three RSS subscales

Thus our data support the conceptual assumption about a polar difference in our three religious schemata – with *ttt* standing on the one side as schema indicating an ethnocentric and absolutist religiosity, while *ftr* and *xenos* stand on the other side as schemata indicating fairness and dialog thus a universalistic version of religiosity. But also other conceptual assumptions about the triangular dynamic relation of the three RSS schemata are supported such as the rejection of an exclusive monopolistic prevalence of one schema over the others, and the assumption about mutual effects between the three schemata.³

The left half of Fig. 6.2 presents the potential predictor variables for the RSS subscales: *centrality of religiosity* (assessed and calculated according to Huber & Huber, 2012) and *openness to change*, one of the two coordinates in Schwartz's (2007) value space, which we have measured with the 10-item short version of the Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ-10) which has been developed for the World Value Survey (WVS; <http://www.worldvaluessurvey.org/wvs.jsp>). The inclusion of these two key predictors in this equation thus continues the presentation of our data in the coordinates of religiosity and openness in this book (see Chap. 4, for more details). Thereby in our equation, *centrality of religiosity* relates positively to both *ttt* and *ftr*. However, it is obvious here, as in previous models of this kind, that *centrality of religiosity* as such relates more strongly ($\beta = .59, p \leq .001$) to the absolutistic schema (*ttt*) than to the tolerance schema (*ftr*) ($\beta = .45, p \leq .001$), while the direct effect on *xenos* is insignificant in this equation due to the mediation through *ftr* and *ttt*.⁴ Our interpretation of these effects is that *centrality of religiosity* can exhibit considerably different effects, when mediated, as in our case, by two schemata (*ttt* and *ftr*) that account for a polar contrast between ethnocentric-absolutist and universalist-dialogical profiles of religiosity.

This polar contrast between *ttt* and *ftr* is even more effectively accounted for by the second potential predictor variable, *openness to change*. *Openness to change* positively ($\beta = .10, p \leq .001$) relates to *ftr* and negatively ($\beta = -.20, p \leq .001$) to *ttt*. This means that respondents higher on *openness to change* more strongly reject the ethnocentric and absolutist schema *truth of texts and teachings*, while more open

³Modelling the three religious schemata as triangle, as we have done in our equations, may help to solve the problem of contradictory results regarding the correlations between *ttt* and *xenos*. Negative correlations between *ttt* and *xenos* are reported mostly from research in the West and with majority Christian participants (Streib et al., 2010; Streib & Klein, 2014; Watson, Chen, Ghorbani, & Vartanian, 2015; Streib, Klein, & Hood, 2016, for the USA). However, this is different in research with Muslim (Tekke, Watson, Hisham Ismaeli, & Chen, 2015; Ghorbani, Watson, Amirbeigi, & Chen, 2016) and Hindu (Kamble, Watson, Marigoudar, & Chen, 2014) samples, but also in the German participants in our Spirituality Study (Streib et al., 2016) and in the research presented in this book. There can be positive correlations between *ttt* and *xenos* – and perhaps absence of defensiveness in the Hindu sample in India (Kamble et al., 2014, p. 194) and the absence of the “culture war” of fundamentalism against secular rationality (Ghorbani et al., 2016), may account for this – which may support the Ideological Surround Model: “Where secularism is less influential, and aggressive defense less necessary, Truth of Texts and Teachings can predict greater Xenosophia” (Ghorbani et al., 2016).

⁴Standardized indirect effects of *centrality of religion* on *xenos* are estimated with $\beta = .45$.

respondents tend to positively value and support the schema of *fairness, tolerance and rational choice*.

Consolidating the Basic Model by Including Tolerance of Complexity

The basic model in Fig. 6.2 is a perfect start, because it exhibits the capacity to discriminate between *ttt* and *ftr* considerably well. But still *ttt* relates to *ftr* with a regression weight of $\beta = -.18$ ($p \leq .001$) – which means that *openness to change* and *centrality of religiosity* together do not fully account for this difference. The mediating effects are much stronger when we include the variable *tolerance of complexity* as an additional mediator into the equation, as done in Fig. 6.3.

Tolerance of complexity was assessed with the 20-item scale by Radant and Dalbert (2006, 2007). The inclusion of *tolerance of complexity* in our equation is conceptually justified with reference to assumptions in developmental theory that complexity advances as development progresses.⁵ Results⁶ demonstrate that respondents high on *tolerance of complexity* moderately ($\beta = -.17$, $p \leq .001$) reject the absolutistic schema (*ttt*), while they very strongly support the tolerance schema (*ftr*) with a regression weight of $\beta = .72$ ($p \leq .001$); the direct effect of *tolerance of complexity* on *xenos* is again insignificant in this equation due to the mediation through *ftr* and *ttt*.⁷

Now the three variables in the left half of the equation together appear to perfectly account for the difference between *ttt* and *ftr*: They account for this difference to such an extent that allows the regression weight between *ttt* and *ftr* to become marginal and insignificant. With the model in Fig. 6.3, which consolidates and improves the model in Fig. 6.2, we present a suitable way of understanding the religious schemata and their potential predictors in our data and beyond our current analyses.

Now, we are well prepared for moving on and extending this model on the right hand side by including outcome variables into the equation – which allows analyzing the effects of the religious schemata, but also of *religiosity, openness* and

⁵As *tolerance of complexity* is significantly associated with higher levels of education (Spearman's correlation between *tolerance of complexity* and cultural capital $\rho = .22$; $p \leq .001$), it is likely that including *tolerance of complexity* reflects also educational differences between our respondents. Since we have seen in Chap. 4 that there are significant effects of cultural capital, on several of our attitude outcomes, we will control for effects of cultural capital in the following analyses by calculating our SEMs additionally with inclusion of group comparisons for respondents with ($n = 847$) and without ($n = 624$) access to tertiary education.

⁶Again the analysis is based on $N = 1471$ cases, and the model fit indices are: $\chi^2 = 760.84$, $df = 89$, $\chi^2/df = 8.55$, CFI = .95, RMSEA = .07 (upper bound = .08, lower bound = .07); *** = significant with $p \leq .001$, ** = significant with $p \leq .01$, * = significant with $p \leq .10$.

⁷Standardized indirect effects of *tolerance of complexity* on *xenos* are estimated with $\beta = .42$.




Fig. 6.3 Three religious schemata and the effects of centrality of religiosity and openness to change on the RSS subscales mediated by Tolerance of Complexity

tolerance of complexity on attitudes toward the alien. This is presented in the next section of this chapter.

Estimating Outcomes with the Model

Our extended basic model can now be used for estimating outcome variables. We focus here on selected outcomes which can be considered to be most closely related to the arrival of high numbers of refugees from Syria and other predominantly Muslim countries in Germany. Hence, we have chosen *welcome of war refugees* (as measured with the single item “War refugees should be accepted into Germany”), *appreciation of religious diversity* (as measured with the single item “The increasing diversity of religious groups in our society represents cultural enrichment”), and *Islam as fitting well in the Western world* (as measured with the single item “Islam fits well in the western world”) as positive outcomes, and *Islamophobia* (as measured with the Scale of Streib and Gennerich, 2011) and *xenophobia* (as indicated by the two corresponding items; see Chap. 4 for details about all measures) as negative outcomes for demonstrating the effect patterns with this model on the outcomes.

The following presentation of results thus is based on these five models with five different target variables, while the rest of the equation on the left of the targets was left unchanged. And indeed, regression weights and explained variance for predictors and among mediator variables are identical with very minimal changes only, while only the regression weights and values for explained variance for target variables change. For an easier comparison of the effects of the predictor variables in general and for the three religious schemata in particular, the regression weights and the explained variance for all five exemplary models are presented in Table 6.1, together with model fit indices. Nevertheless, for a better visual understanding of the models, we present two out of our five models (with *welcome of war refugees* and *Islamophobia* as targets) as full models in Figs. 6.4 and 6.5; also for these models, the regression weights on the target variables, explained variance and model fit indices are entered in Table 6.1.

For *welcoming war refugees*, to begin with our first model (presented in Fig. 6.4 and in the first column in Table 6.1), the equation explains 30% of the variance. The outcome, *welcoming war refugees*, is predicted clearly and strongly by the RSS subscales *ftr* and *tnt*, while the direct effect of *xenos* is insignificant in this equation.

Thereby, *ftr* has a substantial positive effect ($\beta = .38, p \leq .001$), while *tnt* has a smaller, negative effect ($\beta = -.12, p = .002$) on *welcoming war refugees*. There are small direct contributions from *centrality of religiosity* ($\beta = .09, p = .014$) and from *tolerance of complexity* ($\beta = .12, p = .015$) to positively support the culture of welcoming war refugees – which indicates that these predictor variables are not totally mediated by the RSS schemata. However, taken together, *welcoming war refugees* does appear to be less a question of (absolutist vs. dialogical) religion, but rather in

Table 6.1 Regression weights of predictor variables in the equation for selected outcomes

	Welcome of war refugees	Xenophobia	Islamophobia ^a	"Islam fits well in the Western world" ^a	Appreciation of religious diversity
<i>Truth of texts and teachings</i>	-.12**	.25***	.33***	-.14***	-.11**
<i>Fairness, tolerance & rational choice^b</i>	.38***	-.25***	-.20**	-.05	-.10*
<i>Xenophobia/inter-religious dialog^b</i>	.05	-.18**	-.31***	.41***	.44***
<i>Centrality of religiosity</i>	.09*	-.20***	-.11**	.04	.09*
<i>Openness to change</i>	-.01	-.11***	-.06*	.03	.03
<i>Tolerance of complexity</i>	.12*	.05	-.01	.11*	.19***
<i>R²</i>	.30	.23	.29	.19	.25
<i>χ²</i>	807.53	911.27	1127.54	813.32	808.17
<i>Df</i>	99	114	149	99	99
<i>χ²/df</i>	8.16	7.99	7.57	8.22	8.16
CFI	.95	.94	.94	.95	.95
RMSEA	.07(.07-.07)	.07(.07-.07)	.07(.07-.06)	.08(.08-.07)	.07(.07-.07)

Notes ^aWhile analyses are generally based on sample of $N = 1,471$, the analyses for Islamophobia and "Islam fits in the Western world" are based on a sample of $N = 1,419$. because Muslims were excluded from the analyses

^bNote on the effect of cultural capital: While the effects of the predictors, *centrality of religiosity* and *openness to change*, as well as the effects of *tolerance of complexity* and *ttt* remain relatively stable in the SEMs with group comparison for respondents with and without access to tertiary education, an effect becomes visible with respect to the regression patterns from *ftr* and *xenos*: Effects of *ftr* tend to increase for the group with access to tertiary education while effects of *xenos* decrease and even disappear. This pattern is reverse for the respondents without to tertiary education. Thus, education appears to make a difference in regard to the path leading to xenophobic or xenophobic attitudes

the first place a question of *fairness, tolerance and rational choice*. Of course, also *ftr* is a mediator in our equation that receives some regression weight ($\beta = .16$, $p \leq .001$) from *centrality of religiosity*, but the main resource for the culture of welcome appears to be an ethics of tolerance.

For the next two outcome variables in Table 6.1, *xenophobia* and *Islamophobia* (for *Islamophobia* see also Fig. 6.5), the pattern is different and, in regard to *ttt* and *ftr*, reversed: Both types of prejudice derive strong support from the absolutist and ethnocentric schema *ttt* ($\beta = .25$ for *xenophobia*, $\beta = .33$ for *Islamophobia*, both $p \leq .001$). Also there are clear preventive effects from both *ftr* and *xenos* – with differences however: While for *xenophobia*, the preventive effect of *ftr* is stronger ($\beta = -.25$, $p \leq .001$) and the preventive effect from *xenos* weaker ($\beta = -.18$, $p = .002$), it is reverse for *Islamophobia* ($\beta = -.20$, $p = .004$ from *ftr* and $\beta = -.31$, $p \leq .001$




Fig. 6.4 Attitudes toward war refugees and the effects of religious schemata, centrality of religiosity, tolerance of complexity and openness to change




Fig. 6.5 Prejudice toward Islam and the effects of religious schemata, centrality of religiosity, tolerance of complexity and openness to change

from *xenos*). Nevertheless, the conceptually assumed pattern of the RSS subscales clearly emerges: *ttt* stands on the one side and has strong positive effects on prejudice against immigrants, strangers and Muslims, while both *fir* and *xenos* stand on the other side with clear negative effects on these forms of prejudice.

Thereby, for *xenophobia*, neither *centrality of religiosity*, nor *openness to change* appears to be fully mediated by the RSS subscales. There are direct preventive effects on *xenophobia* from *centrality of religiosity* ($\beta = -.20, p \leq .001$) and from *openness to change* ($\beta = -.11, p \leq .001$). These direct effects that are not mediated by the RSS subscales are particularly strong for *xenophobia* and somewhat weaker for *Islamophobia*, though also significant. That, for the prejudice against Muslims, religiosity and openness have a considerable unique preventive effect beyond the mediation by ethnocentric/absolutist and universalist/dialogical religious schemata is very likely due to the fact that xenophobia is not primarily concerned with religion, but rather with the relation to strangers with less regard to religion.

Finally, for the last two outcomes in Table 6.1, the belief that *Islam fits well in the Western world* and for the *appreciation of religious diversity* as outcomes, the equations clearly demonstrate that *xenososophia/inter-religious dialog (xenos)* is by far the strongest predictor ($\beta = .41, p \leq .001$ for “Islam fits well in the Western world;” $\beta = .44, p \leq .001$ for the *appreciation of religious diversity*). This strong effect of *xenos* is generally plausible conceptually; it should be noted however that *xenos* has a unique effect in empirical assessment: *Xenos* is able to profile and mediate the general religiosity in a way that the effect of *centrality of religiosity* becomes low or insignificant. Also, on both versions of appreciative outcomes, religion that is characterized by the ethnocentric and absolutist schema (*ttt*) has negative effects ($\beta = -.14, p \leq .001$ for “Islam fits well in the Western world;” $\beta = -.11, p = .007$ for the *appreciation of religious diversity*). Finally, while the direct effects of *centrality of religiosity* and *openness to change* are very low or insignificant, there are still some direct effects from *tolerance of complexity* ($\beta = .11, p = .032$ for “Islam fits well in the Western world;” $\beta = .19, p \leq .001$ for the appreciation of religious diversity).

Direct, Indirect and Total Effects for Estimating the Targets

It has become clear in the above description of results that the structural equation models are able to handle a complexity of relations. And the description so far presented the standardized direct effects only – the interpretation of which is the more difficult, the more mediators are at work in the equation. To get a better estimate of the overall effects of predictor variables, it is necessary go in more detail and attend to the direct, indirect and total effects. Tables 6.2 and 6.3 present an overview of the effects on our five exemplary target variables.

For both *centrality of religiosity* and *openness to change*, Table 6.2 shows that there are indirect effects, i.e. effects that are mediated through consecutive latent variables in the model (and are *not* the original contribution of these mediators),

Table 6.2 Direct, indirect and total standardized effects of self-rated *centrality of religiosity*, *openness to change* and *tolerance of complexity* on the five exemplary attitudinal targets

	<i>Centrality of religiosity</i>			<i>Openness to change</i>			<i>Tolerance of complexity</i>		
	Direct	Indirect	Total	Direct	Indirect	Total	Direct	Indirect	Total
Welcome of war refugees	.09	.12	.21	-.01	.13	.12	.12	.33	.44
<i>Xenophobia</i>	-.20	-.01	-.21	-.12	-.09	-.20	.05	-.31	-.26
<i>Islamophobia</i>	-.11	-.02	-.13	-.06	-.13	-.19	-.01	-.36	-.37
“Islam fits well in the western world.”	.04	.11	.15	.03	.09	.13	.11	.18	.30
Appreciation of religious diversity	.10	.14	.24	.03	.11	.14	.19	.16	.34

Table 6.3 Direct, indirect and total standardized effects of the RSS subscales on the five exemplary attitudinal targets

	<i>Truth of texts and teachings</i>			<i>Fairness, tolerance and rational choice</i>			<i>Xenophilia/inter-religious dialog</i>		
	Direct	Indirect	Total	Direct	Indirect	Total	Direct	Indirect	Total
Welcome of war refugees	-.12	.01	-.12	.39	.04	.42	.05	.00	.05
<i>Xenophobia</i>	.25	-.06	.18	-.25	-.12	-.37	-.18	.00	-.18
<i>Islamophobia</i>	.33	-.12	.21	-.20	-.20	-.40	-.31	.00	-.31
“Islam fits well in the western world.”	-.14	.15	.01	-.05	.27	.22	.41	.00	.41
Appreciation of religious diversity	-.11	.16	.05	-.10	.29	.18	.44	.00	.44

which sum up to small or moderate total effects. We may conclude from this that effects of both *centrality of religiosity* and *openness to change* are not so small as indicated by the direct effects alone. It should be kept in mind, however, that this patterns of direct, indirect and total effects are valid only in concert with the variety of other variables that are included in the equations; nevertheless, a more detailed account of these effects should prevent the impression that *centrality of religiosity* or *openness to change* have only very small and insignificant effects because direct effects are low.

The indirect effects are even stronger for *tolerance of complexity*. The contribution of the indirect effects greatly add to the total effects, so that the total effects demonstrate the very strong role that this variable plays in the equations in predicting positive and negative outcomes (mediated, of course, by the RSS subscales).

The documentation of direct, indirect and total effects continues into Table 6.3 for the RSS subscales. Results in Table 6.3 demonstrate that the RSS subscales, especially *ftr* and *xenos*, are most effective predictors for our five targets. For *ttt* it is remarkable that the plus/minus signs of the direct and indirect effects are reversed: when direct

effects are positive, indirect effects are negative, and vice versa. This is different for *ptr*: indirect and direct effects are mostly poled in the same direction. This may allow some new insight in the interplay of the three RSS subscales, especially in the role of *ttt*: The mediation through *ptr* and *xenos* allows *ttt* to work with split effects and thereby indicate an ambivalence: The part of the variance of *ttt*, which is not mediated through *ptr* and *xenos*, i.e. the residual direct effect, is poled in the direction opposite to the indirect effect; and therefore, in the total effects the direct and indirect effects counterbalance each other to tend toward zero in two equations. These results could be interpreted as an reflection of the ambivalence of religion, which is assessed in our model by the *centrality of religiosity* index and is considerably mediated through *ttt*, in regard to the five target variables (and very likely in regard to other targets of prejudice or xenophobic attitudes, as well): part of religion “makes” prejudice and supports negative attitudes toward the strange, while another part of religion “unmakes” prejudice and supports positive attitudes toward the strange. And the religious schema in our equation that presents this ambivalence is *ttt*. The other two RSS subscales, *ptr* and *xenos* stand together on one side: they “unmake” prejudice and support positive attitudes toward the strange (resp. mediate such variance from religiosity and, more directly, from *ttt*).

Taken together, the results presented in Tables 6.2 and 6.3 go more into detail, and thereby they (a) generally corroborate results presented in Table 6.1, but (b) present also something new:

- The RSS subscales, especially *ptr* and *xenos*, appear to be the most effective predictors for our five exemplary targets. And different from the impression that may emerge from the negative direct effects of *ptr* on “Islam fits well in the Western World” and on the *appreciation of religious diversity*, the total effects of *ptr* and *xenos* go into the same direction. *Ptr* and *xenos* positively relate to the positive targets and negatively to the prejudice targets.
- Also noteworthy are the much stronger effects of *tolerance of complexity* when the indirect effects are taken into account as in Table 6.2: *Tolerance of complexity* works side by side with *ptr* and *xenos*; the pattern of total effects is very similar. But *tolerance of complexity* is mediated to a large extent through *ptr* and *xenos* in our structural equation models.

We may conclude from this that the religious schemata measured with the RSS subscales, and here especially *ptr* and *xenos*, are among the most effective predictors (resp. very effective mediators) for outcomes such as xenophobia, Islamophobia, the culture of welcome and the appreciation of Islam and of religious diversity.

Estimating the Effects of “Spiritual” and “Religious” Self-Ratings

A further step in our analyses included the assessment of “spirituality,” more precisely: of the effects of the self-ratings as “spiritual” and “religious” on the target variables of positive and negative attitudes towards the strange. One reason for this is the comparison of the two measures to assess religiosity: the self-rating as being




Fig. 6.6 Estimation of self-rated “religiosity” and “spirituality” from the three RSS subscales
Note The analysis is based on $N = 1,471$ cases, and the model fit indices are: $\chi^2 = 100.85$, $df = 12$, $\chi^2/df = 8.40$, CFI = .99, RMSEA = .07 (upper bound = .08, lower bound = .06); *** = significant with $p \leq .001$, ** = significant with $p \leq .01$, * = significant with $p \leq .10$

“religious,” which is, in extant research on prejudice, a widely used one-item measure, on the one hand, and the *centrality of religiosity* index, which is built on the basis of seven items, on the other hand.

Another reason for including a differential perspective based on “spiritual”/“religious” self-ratings is the continuation of a line of research from our recent study on the semantics and psychology of “spirituality” (Streib & Hood, 2016), in which we, besides other measures, also included the RSS.

Results from structure equation modelling (reported in Streib Klein, & Hood, 2016, p. 214) indicated that, with 50% of the variance explained, the RSS subscale *ttt* has a much stronger positive effect ($\beta = .68$, $p \leq .001$) on the self-rating as “religious” than on the self-rating as “spiritual” ($\beta = .19$, $p \leq .001$), while *xenos* has a much stronger effect ($\beta = .59$, $p \leq .001$) on the self-rating as “spiritual” than on the self-rating as “religious” ($\beta = .06$, $p < .068$). Streib and colleagues (2016) concluded from these results that self-identified “spirituality” has a clear relation with the schema *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog*. Now we take these results further and not only estimate the relation between self-rated “spirituality”/“religiosity” and *xenos* in our new data, but additionally try to estimate the role of self-rated “spirituality” and “religiosity” for the attitudes toward strangers and people from other religions.

The prediction of self-rated “spirituality” and “religiosity” shows a similar pattern as in the Spirituality Project data, as Fig. 6.6 presents. The RSS subscale *ttt* relates with $\beta = .61$ ($p \leq .001$) to self-rated “religiosity,” while with $\beta = -.10$ ($p = .003$) to self-rated “spirituality;” the RSS subscale *xenos* relates with $\beta = .17$ ($p \leq .001$) to self-rated “spirituality, and with $\beta = -.08$ ($p = .099$) to self-rated “religiosity.” This corroborates our finding in the Spirituality Project that *xenos* appears to be associated more clearly with “spirituality” than with “religiosity.”

With this finding about the relation of “spirituality” and xenophobia in mind, we move on and test the effects of self-rated “religiosity” and “spirituality” on our five exemplary targets; this test involved another series of analyses using again structure equation modeling. As example for these effects, we present the full structural equation model with *Islamophobia* in Fig. 6.7 and compile again the final regression weights for five exemplary targets in Table 6.4; and finally we go more into detail by listing the direct, indirect and total effects in Table 6.5.

Readers might wonder at first sight that we have modeled the religious schemata as predictors and self-rated “religiosity” and “spirituality” as outcomes (whereby “religiosity” serves also as mediator) in the SEM presented in Fig. 6.6, while we use self-rated “religiosity” and self-rated “spirituality” as predictors and the three RSS subscales as mediators in the type of SEMs as presented in Fig. 6.7. However, we have to bear in mind that our data are cross-sectional and, hence, that single regressions paths reflect only the association between one variable and another. These associations might be modeled from a first to a second variable as well as vice versa. Yet there have been two reasons for modeling the SEM in Fig. 6.6 the way it is: First, it allows a direct comparison with the identical model which we have tested in our earlier study (Streib et al., 2016).

Second, modeling the three religious schemata as predictors allows taking the covariances between the three RSS subscales into account in order to profile their specific effects on both self-rated “religiosity” and “spirituality” more clearly. In our subsequent SEMs, the positions of self-rated “religiosity” and self-rated “spirituality” are changed in order to parallel the design of our previously reported SEMs (see Figs. 6.4 and 6.5); thus allowing comparisons of the effects of self-rated “religiosity” and “spirituality” with the effects of *centrality of religiosity*.

For a more detailed assessment of the effects of self-rated “religiosity” and self-rated “spirituality” we take additionally a close look at the direct, indirect and total effects on the five targets (Table 6.5).

Results indicate that direct effects of self-rated “spirituality” on the targets are very small as can be read from Fig. 6.7 for *Islamophobia* and for all five exemplary targets from Table 6.4. Only the estimation of indirect effects (included in brackets in Fig. 6.6 for *Islamophobia*; and for all five targets listed in Table 6.5) reveals that self-rated “spirituality” has somewhat higher total effects on the targets than the direct effects suggest. Thereby a characteristic pattern emerges: Self-rated “spirituality” has positive effects on welcoming war refugees, Islam as part of the Western world, and on the appreciation of religious diversity; self-rated “spirituality” has negative effects on *xenophobia* and *Islamophobia*. Nevertheless, the total effect of self-rated “spirituality” on the targets is with $\beta < .15$ still rather small. We conclude from this that, in comparison with *openness for change* or *tolerance of complexity* in previous models (Table 6.1), self-rated “spirituality” contributes at most moderate effects on our targets.

This is not very different for self-rated “religiosity.” The effects of “religiosity” are ambivalent however, as the plus/minus signs indicate; thus, direct and indirect effects often counterbalance each other, with the result that total effects are only small. This pattern we have seen in the previous models for *ttt* (see Table 6.3). Only




Fig. 6.7 Effects from self-ratings as “spiritual” and as “religious” on Islamophobia mediated by the three RSS subscales

Table 6.4 Standardized direct effects of self-rated “Religiosity” and “Spirituality” and the RSS subscales on five exemplary attitudinal targets

	Welcome of war refugees	Xenophobia	Islamophobia	Islam fits in the western world	Appreciation of religious diversity
<i>Truth of texts and teachings</i>	-.13***	.27***	.38***	- .21***	-.16***
<i>Fairness, tolerance & rational choice</i>	.47***	-.24***	-.20***	-.01	.03
<i>Xenophobia/ inter-religious dialog</i>	.06	-.20***	-.35***	.50***	.46***
Self-rated “religiosity”	.08*	-.17***	-.16***	.03	.10**
Self-rated “spirituality”	.01	-.04	.04	-.03	.02
<i>R²</i>	.29	.21	.29	.20	.23
<i>χ²</i>	122.90	136.04	305.55	115.22	121.60
<i>Df</i>	15	21	41	15	15
<i>χ²/df</i>	8.19	6.18	7.40	7.68	8.10
CFI	.98	.99	.97	.98	.98
RMSEA	.07 (.08-.06)	.06 (.07-.05)	.07 (.07-.06)	.07 (.08-.06)	.07 (.08-.06)

Table 6.5 Direct, indirect and total standardized effects of self-rated “Religiosity” and “Spirituality” on the five exemplary attitudinal targets

	Self-rated “Religiosity”			Self-rated “Spirituality”		
	Direct	Indirect	Total	Direct	Indirect	Total
Welcome of war refugees	.08	-.02	.07	.01	.11	.12
<i>Xenophobia</i>	-.17	.10	-.07	-.04	-.10	-.14
<i>Islamophobia</i>	-.16	.13	-.03	.04	-.14	-.10
“Islam fits well in the western world.”	.03	-.02	.01	-.03	.12	.09
Appreciation of religious diversity	.10	.01	.11	.02	.11	.13

the mediation of the RSS subscales yield slightly stronger direct effects, such as the negative effects for *xenophobia* ($\beta = -.17, p \leq .001$) and *Islamophobia* ($\beta = -.16, p \leq .001$). But, in comparison with the *centrality of religiosity* index, the effects of the self-rating as “religious” are weaker.

Taken together, self-rated “religiosity” and self-rated “spirituality” have rather small effects on the targets. Only through the interplay with the RSS subscales, religion as measured in terms of self-rated “religiosity” can bring into play its ambivalent function to “make” and “unmake” prejudice. The same applies to self-rated “spirituality,” the effects of which on the targets are mostly indirect, thus mediated by the RSS subscales, as can be seen in Table 6.5.

Discussion and Conclusion

The results from our structural equation models indicate that effects of religion per se, whether entered in the equations as *centrality of religiosity* index or as observed variables for self-rated “spirituality” or self-rated “religiosity,” are often moderate and not always easy to interpret. This is most obvious for self-rated “religiosity” (which resembles the types of measures most often used in sociological and social-psychological research on prejudice): we have seen that potential positive direct and negative indirect effects tend to result in low total effects on *xenophobia*, *Islamophobia*, the *culture of welcome*, *Islam as part of the Western world*, or the *appreciation of religious diversity*. While the effects of self-rated “spirituality” show consistently positive attitudes toward the strange, they still remain on a rather low level. Using a comprehensive measure for general religiosity such as the *centrality of religiosity* scale leads to visibly higher total effects. Yet the comparison of direct and indirect effects of all these measures shows the strong mediating role of the three RSS subscales. In addition with their own explanatory power, it is apparent that profiling the differential effects of religion is possible only if distinct styles of how people can be religious are included in the design. With explained variance between $R^2 = .19$ and $R^2 = .30$, the five exemplary structure equation models (Tables 6.1, 6.2 and 6.3; Figs. 6.4 and 6.5) demonstrate acceptable to good explanatory power. The models demonstrate that religion does indeed have great effects on prejudice and the attitudes of welcoming refugees, Muslims and people of other faiths – but much more so if religion is mediated by religious schemata. But also *openness to change* as second predictor variable and *tolerance of complexity* as first-level mediator in the equation make strong contributions, because they supplement the (rather formal) *centrality* of religiosity with value preferences and generalized attitudes which also contribute to the profiling of the specific *contents* (to use the terms of Huber, 2003a, 2003b) of the religious schemata assessed with the RSS. With the three religious schemata included in the equation, the models have proven solid and effective in assessing the effects for targets that concern the attitudes toward refugees, strangers, and people from other religions. Thereby, a key role is played by the schema *xenosphia/inter-religious dialog*.

Generally, a consistent pattern of effects has emerged in these structure equation models: Strong agreement with the absolutistic, ethnocentric schema *ttt* goes hand in hand with higher prejudice against strangers, and Muslims in particular, and with lower welcoming attitude towards refugees. Stronger agreement with *ftt* and/or with *xenos* indicates the opposite, namely higher agreement with *Islam as part of the Western world* and the *appreciation of religious diversity*, while rejecting *xenophobia* and *Islamophobia*.

The polar relationship between the three subscales of the Religious Schema Scale with *ttt* on the one side strongly supporting anti-Islamic prejudice, and *ftt* and *xenos* on the other side strongly rejecting such prejudice, has been demonstrated also in previous research with 340 German adolescents (Streib & Klein, 2014). In this study we have used stepwise regression analysis to not only demonstrate the

superior explanatory power of the RSS over other measures of religiosity, but also the predictive pattern with *ttt* ($\beta = .26, p = .003$) exhibiting a positive, and *ftt* ($\beta = -.29, p \leq .001$) and *xenos* ($\beta = -.18, p = .001$) negative effect on anti-Islamic prejudice as dependent variable. Our conclusion from our study with adolescents applies also to our result of our current research – now with considerably higher statistical power:

With the assessment of religiosity using the Religious Schema Scale, our research reveals an association of certain schemata of religion (subscale *ttt*) with higher prejudice, and of other religious schemata (subscales *ftt* and *xenos*) with lower prejudice. We regard this as a step forward, because a model of religious styles and schemata—with a perspective on religious development—may advance and deepen the psychological understanding of the relation of religion and prejudice. (Streib & Klein, 2014, p. 161).

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Chapter 7

Inter-Religious Prejudice in Context: Prejudice against Black Persons, Homosexuals and Women, and the Role of the Violence Legitimizing Norms of Masculinity



Matthias Lühr, Heinz Streib, and Constantin Klein

Developing a Framework for the Comparative Analysis of Distinct Types of Prejudice: Stepwise Construction of a Hypothetical Model

How is prejudice against religious groups, such as prejudice against Muslims and against Jews, related to other types of prejudice such as racism, sexism, and homophobia? As we know from recent research on prejudice (Zick, Küpper, & Hövermann, 2011), different types of prejudice are strongly correlated. For example, the stronger the prejudice against Muslims, the stronger the prejudice against homosexuals and so on. But to find out what different types of prejudice do or do not have in common, a more detailed look at the respective predictors for different types of prejudice can be a step forward. How does religiosity relate to different types of prejudice? Which elements of religiosity are involved? And which value preferences and generalized attitudes contribute to the explanation of prejudice and interact with general religiosity and with distinct religious schemata?

In order to provide answers to these questions, we will construct a hypothetical model for a comparative analysis of the explanation of six types of prejudice: preju-

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dice against Muslims (*Islamophobia*), against Jews (*anti-Semitism*), against other cultures (*general racism*), against black persons (*anti-black racism*), against women (*sexism*), and against homosexuals (*homophobia*) (for a detailed description of all involved constructs and their operationalizations, see Chap. 4). To get the construction of our hypothetical model across, we will stepwise introduce the distinct variables included in the model, starting with the outcomes, continuing with mediators, and ending up with the predictors. The six types of prejudice mentioned above will be modeled as outcomes. To get a first impression of which types of prejudice show the most similarities, we begin our construction of the hypothetical model with a presentation of the correlations between the six types of prejudice. In the next step, we reflect on the results of research on different types and measures of religiosity and their relation to prejudice. Here, we introduce the three religious schemata measured with the Religious Schema Scale (Streib, Hood, & Klein, 2010): (1) *truth of text and teachings (ttt)*, (2) *fairness, tolerance and rational choice (ftr)*, and (3) *xenosphia/inter-religious dialog (xenos)*. They represent a fundamentalist (*ttt*), a tolerant (*ftr*) and an open (*xenos*) way of understanding religiosity and will be included as mediators in our hypothetical model. In a third step, we introduce the constructs which will be modeled as predictors in our model. Similar to the hypothetical model presented in Chap. 6 and empirically legitimized by the basic analyses presented in Chap. 4, we assume that *centrality of religiosity* (Huber & Huber, 2012), the importance of religiosity in an individual's life, and *openness to change*, a basic human value orientation according to Schwartz (2007), can be understood as basic predictors for negative attitudes toward the strange. As a third predictor for our model, we additionally introduce the *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* (Enzmann, Brettfeld, & Wetzels, 2004) in this chapter. The *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity*, seldom used in research on prejudice, can be regarded as a generalized attitude that legitimizes violent behavior of men. Because of their relation to violence, we expect *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* to have a promoting effect on prejudice.

For proper empirical testing of our entire hypothetical model, we use structural equation modeling (SEM) in order to identify the most relevant predictors and mediators for the six types of prejudice and to analyze their associations with other predictors and mediators. Because SEMs include a complexity of associations, we report direct, indirect and total effects of predictors and mediators on the different types of prejudice to get a more thorough understanding of the results. Especially the inclusion of the *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* additionally suggests investigating different patterns for men and women (see Chap. 4). Therefore, the SEMs are calculated for men and women separately. The results are summarized, discussed and put into the context of recent research.

The Outcomes: Different Types of Prejudice and their Correlations

Previous research on prejudice has focused on the investigation of single types of prejudice for a long time. Starting with racial prejudice in the 1920s (Dovidio, Hewstone, Glick, & Esses, 2010), other types of prejudice like Islamophobia and homophobia and their determinants received some attention, as society and science became more and more aware of the discrimination against Muslims as well as gays and lesbians (Duckitt, 2010; see Chap. 2 for an overview). Instead of viewing single types of prejudice separately, Heitmeyer, Zick and colleagues (Groß, Zick, & Krause, 2012; Heitmeyer, 2002; Zick, Wolf, Küpper, Davidov, Schmidt, & Heitmeyer, 2008; Zick, Küpper, & Hövermann, 2011) demonstrate that several types of prejudice form a syndrome of Group-Focused Enmity (GFE) which can be characterized by its ideology of inequality that goes along with the devaluation of out-groups. Therefore, Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, prejudice against immigrants (xenophobia), anti-black racism, sexism, and homophobia share the underlying ideology of inequality and have much in common. People having prejudice against a certain group are likely to devalue other groups as well.

In order to find out which types of prejudice resemble each other in particular, we take a look at the correlations between Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, anti-immigrant attitudes, anti-black racism, sexism, and homophobia in a representative German sample in a recent study on GFE published by Zick et al. (2011, p. 82–83) (see Table 7.1). In Table 7.2, we present the correlations between the same types of prejudice in our Bielefeld Study on Xenophobia and Religion ($N = 1471$). In our study, we used the same measures for *anti-black racism*, *sexism* and *homophobia* and similar measures for *Islamophobia* and *anti-Semitism* (for detailed information on the sample and on all measures included in our analyses, see Chap. 4), so a direct comparison of the correlations is possible. Instead of *anti-immigrant attitudes*, we

Table 7.1 Correlations of islamophobia, anti-semitism, xenophobia, anti-black racism, sexism, and homophobia in Germany (Zick et al., 2011, p. 82–83)

	<i>Islamophobia</i>	<i>Anti-Semitism</i>	<i>Anti-immigrant attitudes</i>	<i>Anti-black Racism</i>	<i>Sexism</i>	<i>Homophobia</i>
<i>Islamophobia</i>	1	.40***	.55***	.33***	.23***	.24***
<i>Anti-Semitism</i>		1	.49***	.30***	.33***	.23***
<i>Anti-immigrant attitudes</i>			1	.41***	.35***	.26***
<i>Anti-black racism</i>				1	.38***	.22***
<i>Sexism</i>					1	.35***
<i>Homophobia</i>						1

Table 7.2 Correlations of islamophobia, anti-semitism, general racism, anti-black racism, sexism and homophobia in the Bielefeld study on xenophobia and religion

	<i>Islamophobia</i>	<i>Anti-Semitism</i>	<i>General Racism</i>	<i>Anti-black Racism</i>	<i>Sexism</i>	<i>Homophobia</i>
<i>Islamophobia</i>	1	.58***	.65***	.56***	.44***	.21***
<i>Anti-Semitism</i>		1	.51***	.62***	.49***	.25***
<i>General racism</i>			1	.55***	.46***	.19***
<i>Anti-black racism</i>				1	.55***	.26***
<i>Sexism</i>					1	.29***
<i>Homophobia</i>						1

included prejudice against other cultures (*general racism*), as proposed by Zick et al. (2011), as a different type of prejudice into our analysis.

As a first finding, we see that in both studies the correlations between all types of prejudice (with the exception of *homophobia*) are really strong, in our study in particular. In the GFE-sample (see Table 7.1), the strongest correlation occurs between *anti-immigrant attitudes* and *Islamophobia* ($r = .55, p \leq .001$); in our sample, *general racism* and *Islamophobia* correlate the strongest ($r = .65, p \leq .001$). Besides these correlations, *anti-immigrant attitudes* and *anti-Semitism* ($r = .49, p \leq .001$), *anti-immigrant attitudes* and *anti-black racism* ($r = .41, p \leq .001$) as well as *anti-Semitism* and *Islamophobia* ($r = .40, p \leq .001$) are strongly related in the GFE study. The correlations between these types of prejudice remain strong in our study, too. Furthermore, in our study, *anti-black racism* correlates the strongest with *anti-Semitism* ($r = .62, p \leq .001$), and *sexism* correlates the strongest with *anti-black racism* ($r = .55, p \leq .001$). In a previous publication, Zick et al. (2008) also noticed a strong association between *anti-black racism* and *sexism*. Though *homophobia* doesn't correlate especially strong with the other five types of prejudice, in both studies, *homophobia* correlates the strongest with *sexism*.

The reasons for some of these correlations appear obvious: *anti-immigrant attitudes* and *Islamophobia* are similar, because people often make no clear distinction between immigrants and Muslims (Zick et al., 2011). The same argument can be made for the correlation between *general racism* and *Islamophobia*, as, in Germany, people from other cultures are often equated with Muslims. *Sexism* and *anti-black racism* are those types of prejudice that are legitimized by arguments that refer to biological or natural differences between groups of people (Zick et al., 2008). As exemplified by Küpper (2010), *Islamophobia* and *anti-Semitism* can be taken together as inter-religious prejudice, *anti-immigrant attitudes*, *general racism*, and *anti-black racism* address prejudice against ethnic-culturally marked groups, and *sexism* and *homophobia* can be identified as prejudice against sexually marked groups. However, going beyond the pure calculation of correlations, it remains an open question how differently or similarly certain predictors relate to different types or groups of prejudice. It is possible that some might have a positive effect on certain types of prejudice while having no or negative effects on other types of prejudice and vice-versa.

The Mediators: Different Types of Religiosity and their Associations with Prejudice

Religiosity is one of those constructs seeming to show different effects depending on the type of prejudice and the way religiosity is measured. Allport's (1954, p. 447) famous remark that religion both "makes" and "unmakes" prejudice points to the need to differentiate between different ways of being religious. On the one hand, Allport (1954) sees a religiosity of an ethnocentric order that promotes prejudice. On the other hand, he assumes that there must be a religiosity of a universalistic order that should prevent prejudice. In the last decades, researchers on religion and prejudice have tried to elaborate the contents and structures that go along with these two types of religiosity (see Chap. 2, for an overview).

Focusing on religiosity of an ethnocentric order, Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992; 2005) identified religious fundamentalism as a type of religiosity that is positively related to a variety of different types of prejudice. According to Altemeyer and Hunsberger (1992), religious fundamentalism can be characterized by the belief in a set of traditional religious teachings and rules that must be obeyed in order to be in a unique relationship with the deity. Religious fundamentalism includes a closed-minded, simplified worldview distinguishing sharply between good and bad, between insiders and outsiders. In sum, religious fundamentalists reject pluralism and are persuaded of the superiority and strength of the own ideology and group (Klein, Zwingmann, & Jeserich, 2017). The willingness to strictly observe established norms and to follow idolized authorities are characteristics that religious fundamentalism shares with right-wing authoritarianism (RWA), one of the main predictors for *anti-Semitism* and other types of prejudice (Klein, Zwingmann, & Jeserich, 2017; see Chap. 2). Therefore, it is no surprise that religious fundamentalism correlates strongly with RWA (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992). And in the review of Hunsberger and Jackson (2005), religious fundamentalism is positively associated with prejudice against racial/ethnic groups, other religious groups as well as with prejudice against women and homosexuals (see Chap. 2), though in some studies, no significant relationship between religious fundamentalism and racial/ethnic prejudice could be found.

Turning toward the other side of religiosity, Allport and Ross (1967) tried to describe a religiosity of a universalistic order with the concept of an intrinsic religious orientation. An intrinsic religious orientation means the internalization of religious beliefs. Deeply held religious convictions are acted out and strongly affect the individual's entire way of life. Assuming that an intrinsic religious orientation appreciates the values of tolerance, respect and altruism that many religions preach, Allport and Ross (1967) identified a negative correlation between intrinsic religious orientation and *anti-Semitism* as well as between intrinsic religious orientation and *anti-black racism*. The review of Hunsberger and Jackson (2005) supports the finding that intrinsic religious orientation is negatively associated with racial/ethnic prejudice, but a positive relation of intrinsic religious orientation with homophobia

becomes obvious (see Chap. 2). Hence, intrinsic religiosity appears to be not an indicator for a general tolerant attitude, because it shows variable effects on different types of prejudice and mixes with a conservative religiosity that relies on teachings of a religion which might foster, rather than prevent, prejudice against certain groups.

Critics of the concept of an intrinsic religiosity adverted to this ambiguity and argued that it is instead a searching and open religious orientation called “quest” that is linked with reduced prejudice (Batson, Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993). The quest orientation includes personal interest in religious questions, but also the hesitation to give definite answer to these questions. This uncertainty and flexibility should lead to openness to new and unknown (religious) ideas and to compassion toward other people. And indeed, according to the review of Hunsberger and Jackson (2005), the quest orientation is negatively related to prejudice against homosexuals, to racial/ethnic prejudice, and to other types of prejudice as well. However, doubts concerning the concept of quest persist because the corresponding scale does include only few clearly religious contents and is often uncorrelated with other measures of religiosity (Hood & Morris, 1985; Kojetin, McIntosh, Bridges, & Spilka, 1987).

In our study, we included none of those measures, but the *Religious Schema Scale* (RSS) developed by Streib, Hood, and Klein (2010). The RSS includes the three subscales *ttt*, *ftr*, and *xenos* and reproduces the distinction between a religiosity of an ethnocentric and a religiosity of a universalistic order in one instrument. The RSS subscale *ttt* represents a fundamentalist and absolutist religiosity, which points to the truth and the superiority of the own religious tradition and teachings. The RSS subscales *ftr* and *xenos* represent a universalistic religiosity, which emphasizes general tolerance and rational decisions (*ftr*) or openness to a dialog with other religions (*xenos*). In line with the assumptions about the different effects of a religiosity of an ethnocentric order and a religiosity of a universalistic order on prejudice, and in line with recent research on the relation between the religious schemata and prejudice (Streib & Klein, 2014), we expect *ttt* to be positively related to the six types of prejudice and *ftr* as well as *xenos* to be negatively related to every type of prejudice. In order to test this hypothesis and to get a basic impression of the associations between the religious schemata and the six types of prejudice before a more complex modeling, we take a look at the correlations between *Islamophobia*, *anti-Semitism*, *general racism*, *anti-black racism*, *sexism*, *homophobia* and the three religious schemata *ttt*, *ftr*, and *xenos* in Table 7.3.

All correlations are significant and go in the expected direction. The RSS subscale *ttt* correlates positively with all types of prejudice, *ftr* and *xenos* are negatively correlated with the six types of prejudice, but the correlation between *sexism* and *xenos* is rather small ($r = -.05, p = .042$). It is noticeable that *ttt* correlates stronger with *anti-black racism* ($r = .25, p \leq .001$), *homophobia* ($r = .27, p \leq .001$) and *sexism* ($r = .37, p \leq .001$) than with the other three types of prejudice. For *ftr*, the correlations with *Islamophobia* ($r = -.41, p \leq .001$) and *anti-Semitism* ($r = -.38, p \leq .001$) as well as with *anti-black racism* ($r = -.42, p \leq .001$) are considerably

Table 7.3 Correlations between islamophobia, anti-semitism, general racism, anti-black racism, sexism, homophobia, and the three religious schemata

	<i>Truth of texts and teachings</i>	<i>Fairness, tolerance and rational choice</i>	<i>Xenosphia/inter-religious dialog</i>
<i>Islamophobia</i>	.14***	-.41***	-.32***
<i>Anti-Semitism</i>	.17***	-.38***	-.20***
<i>General racism</i>	.19***	-.30***	-.17***
<i>Anti-black racism</i>	.25***	-.42***	-.18***
<i>Sexism</i>	.37***	-.26***	-.05*
<i>Homophobia</i>	.27***	-.24***	-.20***

stronger than with the other types of prejudice. *Xenos* clearly correlates the strongest with Islamophobia ($r = -.32, p \leq .001$).

These results can already give some insight into the commonalities of different types of prejudice, but a more detailed investigation is necessary. In our main empirical analysis, we want to find out how the religious schemata interact with possible predictors of prejudice and how the associations between the religious schemata and the six types of prejudice pan out with other variables included in the equation.

The Predictors: Centrality of Religiosity, Openness to Change, and Violence Legitimizing Norms of Masculinity

The constructs we have included as predicting variables in our analysis for explaining the six different types of prejudice are more general ideological characteristics, namely the *centrality of religiosity*, the value axis *openness to change vs. conservatism*, and *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity*. At first, a question that is still frequently asked concerns the relation of religiosity in general with prejudice. Regardless of specific contents of religiosity, can the overall relevance of religiosity in an individual's life already explain the extant of a certain prejudice? Küpper and Zick (2010) have identified a clear positive effect of self-rated religiosity on *sexism* and *homophobia* in Europe while their results on *Islamophobia*, *anti-Semitism*, *anti-immigrant attitudes*, and *anti-black racism* show only small positive associations between self-rated religiosity and these types of prejudice. In their comprehensive meta-analysis on the association between religiosity and racism, Hall, Matz, and Wood (2010) also found a small positive correlation of $r = .10$ between measures of general religiosity and racist prejudice. However, in studies published since 1986, the mean correlation has decreased to $r = .06$. In our own analysis of the Religion Monitor data from 2012, we found mostly marginal and sometimes inverse correlations between *self-rated religiosity* or *centrality of religiosity* and measures of *Islamophobia*, *anti-Semitism*, and *xenophobia* across eight samples while the strong

association between religiosity and *homophobia* could consistently be corroborated (see Chap. 2). In our analysis in this chapter, too, we assess general religiosity in terms of *centrality of religiosity* with the elaborated and sophisticated Centrality of Religiosity Scale (Huber & Huber, 2012) (see Chap. 4).

As second predictor in our analysis, we include *openness to change*, one of two coordinates of Schwartz's (2007) value space, in our hypothetical model. *Openness to change* as a coordinate of the value space reflects the wish to live an exciting, stimulating life, the approval of creativity, freedom, and self-direction as well as the refusal of conservative values such as security, conformity, and tradition (see Chap. 4). Extant research consistently shows that conservative value orientations are associated with higher rates of prejudice (Leong, 2008; Sagiv & Schwartz, 1995; Zick et al., 2011). If people from other cultures or religions are seen as disturbing conformity and if the confrontation with them is perceived as a threat for the own security and the own tradition, these perceptions are likely to result in negative attitudes toward these groups. Since *openness to change* reflects completely contrary value preferences and the general willingness to deal with something new including other cultures, religions and groups of people, we expect *openness to change* to be negatively associated with prejudice.

Along with the inclusion of *centrality of religiosity* and *openness to change*, we found it reasonable to further add *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* to our research design. The *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* scale is a relatively new measure and not widely used in research on prejudice so far. The reason for that may be that this scale has been developed and is primarily used in criminological research (Baier, Pfeiffer, Rabold, Simonson, & Kappes, 2010; Baier, Pfeiffer, Simonsen, & Rabold, 2009). Based on the concept of a culture of honor by Nisbett and Cohen (1996), Enzmann et al. (2004) developed the scale in order to explain delinquency among juvenile migrants in Germany. Nisbett and Cohen have focused on the culture of honor in the South of the U.S.A.. Enzmann and colleagues transferred this perspective for criminological research in Germany based on the assumption that *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* are not a distinctive ethnical or religious factor, but a generalized attitude arising in the context of marginalization, discrimination, and social exclusion. Similar to Baier and colleagues' (2010, 2009) research, we regard *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* as a generalized attitude that does not exclusively belong to persons with a certain cultural or religious background.

Overall, *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* are characterized by clear-cut gender roles and formulate expectations a "real man" has to fulfill including the use of violence if necessary. The *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* scale can be split into two subscales (see Chap. 4): norms for internal and external violence. The norms for internal violence legitimize men to punishing members of their own family even physically if they have done something appraised as wrong (e.g. "If a woman cheats on her husband, he is allowed to beat her"). The norms for external violence justify male violence against persons outside of the family in

order to protect the family (e.g. “A man should be ready to defend his wife and children violently”).

But why should the approval of *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* be a relevant factor in explaining different types of prejudice? In criminological research (Baier et al., 2009), *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* are one out of four factors promoting propensity for violence among juveniles in Germany. Moreover, in the same study, they have been observed to be a significant predictor for the amount of delinquent acts like battery and robbery. Streib and Klein (2012) have identified *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* as the main predictor for aggressive-escalating conflict behavior among German adolescents. With their relation to violence and their emphasis on the aggressive establishment of traditional roles, the *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* resemble RWA and especially authoritarian aggression. Because RWA is a classical predictor for prejudice (Duckitt & Sibley, 2006; Ekehammar, Akrami, Gylje, & Zakrisson, 2004; Whitley, 1999; Zick et al., 2011), we have good reasons for including the *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* into our analysis.

Calculation of Structure Equation Models

We move on to the empirical analysis of our hypothetical model, which makes use of SEMs. Overall, six parallel SEMs are calculated with *Islamophobia*, *anti-Semitism*, *general racism*, *anti-black racism*, *sexism*, and *homophobia* as six distinct outcome variables. The predictor and mediator variables remain the same throughout all six models. *Centrality of religiosity*, *openness to change* and *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* are modeled as predictors, because they refer to basic ideological characteristics and generalized attitudes. Our mediators consist of the three religious schemata *tnt*, *ftr*, and *xenos* that indicate specific religious styles, i.e. different ways of being religious. The mediator variables are modeled in a triangular fashion, because we assume a hierarchy between the religious schemata with *xenos* being the most advanced and ethically most appropriate schema (see Chaps. 1 and 6).

For a comprehensive visualization of the SEMs, the model with *Islamophobia* as the outcome variable is presented entirely in Fig. 7.1.¹ Here, all paths and regression weights are reported, except the observed variables that are blinded for more easy reading of the figure. Because the covariances between predictors and the regression weights between predictor and mediator variables remain approximately the same

¹Model fit indices are: $\chi^2 = 808.89$, $df = 131$, $\chi^2/df = 6.18$, CFI = .96, RMSEA = .06 (upper bound = .06, lower bound = .06). AMOS 23 was used, and maximum likelihood estimation was employed to calculate the model. In the SEMs, circles represent latent variables, while rectangles represent measured variables. Thereby, observed variables (rectangles) and also error terms for all latent variables have been blinded for more easy reading of the figure. Note: *** = significant with $p \leq .001$, ** = significant with $p \leq .01$, * = significant with $p \leq .05$.




Fig. 7.1 Islamophobia and the Effects of Centrality of Religiosity, Violence Legitimizing Norms of Masculinity, Openness to Change, and the Religious Schemata

Table 7.4 Standardized regression weights of predictor variables for six types of prejudice

	<i>Islamophobia</i>	<i>Anti-Semitism</i>	<i>General racism</i>	<i>Anti-black racism</i>	<i>Sexism</i>	<i>Homophobia</i>
<i>Centrality of religiosity</i>	-.05	-.06	-.17***	-.08	.07	.15***
<i>Violence legitimizing norms of masculinity</i>	.48***	.52***	.53***	.66***	.80***	.21***
<i>Openness to change</i>	-.08***	-.03	-.12***	-.05*	-.12***	-.07**
<i>Truth of texts and teachings</i>	.15***	.10*	.22***	.15***	.15***	.36***
<i>Fairness, tolerance & rational choice</i>	-.02	-.14**	-.01	-.25***	-.03	.10
<i>Xenophobia/ inter-religious dialog</i>	-.35***	-.09	-.16**	.00	-.07	-.54 ***
<i>R²</i>	.46	.42	.48	.72	.82	.35
<i>χ²</i>	808.89	589.88	718.66	523.58	609.34	447.74
<i>Df</i>	131	131	114	98	98	98
<i>χ²/df</i>	6.18	4.50	6.30	5.34	6.22	4.57
<i>CFI</i>	.96	.97	.96	.97	.96	.97
<i>RMSEA</i>	.06	.05	.06	.05	.06	.05
	(.06-.06)	(.05-.05)	(.06-.06)	(.06-.05)	(.06-.06)	(.05-.05)

For *general racism*, *anti-black racism*, *sexism*, and *homophobia*, the analysis is based on $N = 1,471$ cases. The model with *Islamophobia* as target variable is calculated without Muslims ($n = 1,419$). The model with *anti-Semitism* as outcome is calculated without Jews ($n = 1,466$). Note: *** = significant with $p \leq .001$, ** = significant with $p \leq .01$. * = significant with $p \leq .05$

for all six models for the differing target variables, while only the regression weights and the values for the explained variance for outcome variables change, we only present the full model for *Islamophobia* as outcome and report the regression weights of the predictors and mediators on the further outcomes in Table 7.4. This allows a better comparison of the effects of *centrality of religiosity*, *openness to change*, *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* and of the three religious schemata, *tnt*, *ftt*, and *xenos*, on the six different types of prejudice.

Associations between Predictors and Mediators

Before analyzing the effects of the predictor and mediator variables on the different outcomes, we briefly attend to the relations among the predictor and mediator variables in Fig. 7.1. Moving from the left to the right through the model, we focus on the *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* and their covariances with *centrality*

of religiosity and openness to change and also to their regression weights on the RSS subscales *ttt*, *ftt*, and *xenos*.

The violence legitimizing norms of masculinity do not covariate with centrality of religiosity ($r = -.01$, *n.s.*) and show only a very small negative covariance with openness to change ($r = -.08$, $p = .002$). The Violence legitimizing norms of masculinity have a significant direct effect on two of the three RSS subscales. While the effect on *ttt* is positive ($\beta = .30$, $p \leq .001$), the effect on *ftt* is negative, but with a similar effect size ($\beta = -.33$, $p \leq .001$). The direct effect on *xenos* is not significant ($\beta = .04$, *n.s.*)

While the small negative association between violence legitimizing norms of masculinity and openness to change is comprehensible, the associations with the religious measures need some discussion. First, violence legitimizing norms of masculinity do not covariate with centrality of religiosity in our data. This result differs from the results of Baier et al. (2010, p. 112), who report a negative correlation between violence legitimizing norms of masculinity and general religiosity. The apparent discrepancy may disappear, when the RSS subscales, which are included in our equation, are taken into consideration. Agreement to violence legitimizing norms of masculinity might be related to a rather traditional and absolutist type of religiosity, which is represented in our model by *ttt*, but might be negatively related to more liberal and tolerant types of religiosity such as *ftt*. The distinction between an absolutist and a universalistic religious style opens a more thorough understanding of the results. Nevertheless, one surprising finding remains: the lack of any direct effect from violence legitimizing norms of masculinity on *xenos*. Here, we have to take the indirect effects of the violence legitimizing norms of masculinity on *xenos* into account. Violence legitimizing norms of masculinity have a negative indirect effect on *xenos* through *ftt* (standardized indirect effect = $-.24$), but a positive indirect effect on *xenos* through *ttt* (standardized indirect effect = $.11$). This sums up to a negative total effect of violence legitimizing norms of masculinity on *xenos* (standardized total effect = $-.10$). But still, the effect size is considerably smaller compared to the negative direct effect on *ftt* ($\beta = -.33$, $p \leq .001$). This could be a result of the fact that *ftt* is a more general attitude whose concern for an overall freedom and tolerance is in more direct opposition to violence legitimizing norms of masculinity than the specific openness toward other religious teachings and traditions represented by *xenos*.

Estimating Outcomes with the Model

Now, we move further to the right in the model to the effects of the predictor and mediator variables on the six outcomes (presented in Table 7.4). For Islamophobia, violence legitimizing norms of masculinity and the universalist/dialogical religious schema *xenos* stand out as the strongest predictors. While, despite all mediations, the agreement with violence legitimizing norms of masculinity has a considerable

positive direct effect on *Islamophobia* ($\beta = .48, p \leq .001$), *xenos* has a preventive effect ($\beta = -.35, p \leq .001$). Significant, but smaller effects can be observed for the absolutist religious schema *ttt* ($\beta = .15, p \leq .001$) and *openness to change* ($\beta = -.08, p \leq .001$). Like *centrality of religiosity*, the RSS subscale *ftr* has no significant direct effect on *Islamophobia*. Overall, 46% of the variance of *Islamophobia* can be explained with this model.

In Chap. 6, we already introduced a similar SEM with *Islamophobia* as outcome variable, however without the *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* as a predictor, but with *tolerance of complexity* as an additional mediator. In comparison to the model presented in Chap. 6, by including the *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* as a further predictor into the model, the explained variance for *Islamophobia* was increased ($R^2 = .46$ in comparison to $R^2 = .29$) and some patterns among the variables changed compared to the results in Chap. 6. These changes are especially related to the religious schemata. The effect of *ttt* on *Islamophobia* decreased ($\beta = .15$ in comparison to $\beta = .33$), and *ftr* lost its significant predictive power at all ($\beta = -.02$ in comparison to $\beta = -.20$). This is a result of the integration of the *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* which account for a considerable portion of the explained variance and seem to overlap partly with attitudes underlying the religious schemata *ttt* and *ftr*, so the RSS subscales lose some of their explanatory power. In summary, these results indicate that *Islamophobia* is in the first place supported by the agreement to *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity*. Nevertheless, the religious schemata *ttt* and *xenos* still make substantial contributions in predicting *Islamophobia*.

Similarly to *Islamophobia*, *anti-Semitism* is strongly predicted by *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* (see Table 7.4). The regression weight on *anti-Semitism* is even a bit stronger than on *Islamophobia* ($\beta = .52, p \leq .001$). Smaller effects derive from the absolutist religious schema *ttt* ($\beta = .10, p = .018$) and the tolerant religious schema *ftr* ($\beta = -.14, p = .006$). Although *centrality of religiosity*, *openness to change* and *xenos/inter-religious dialog* all have small negative effects on *anti-Semitism*, none of these effects is significant. All in all, in contrast to *Islamophobia*, *anti-Semitism* decreases with agreement to a tolerant and rational attitude, and is not directly related to the general *openness to change* or to the openness for inter-religious dialog.

There are many predictors that have a significant effect on *general racism*, the general prejudice against other cultures. The effect of *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* is on the same level as for *anti-Semitism* ($\beta = .53, p \leq .001$). *Openness to change* ($\beta = -.12, p \leq .001$) and *xenos* ($\beta = -.16, p = .006$) both have a negative effect on *general racism*, while *ttt* promotes *general racism* ($\beta = .22, p \leq .001$). In this pattern, *general racism* is similar to *Islamophobia*. However, for *general racism*, the preventive effect of *xenos* is weaker ($\beta = -.16$ in comparison to $\beta = -.35$ for *Islamophobia*), but *centrality of religiosity* has a significant negative effect on the outcome variable ($\beta = -.17, p \leq .001$).

For *anti-black racism* as outcome, the pattern of the direct effects of the RSS subscales changes again. While the positive effect of *ttt* remains rather constant for all types of prejudice (for *anti-black racism*: $\beta = .22, p \leq .001$), *fr* and *xenos* interchange in their negative effects. Like for *anti-Semitism*, for *anti-black racism*, *fr* emerges as the more decisive negative predictor of the two ($\beta = -.25, p \leq .001$) while there is no negative effect of *xenos*. Contrary to *anti-Semitism*, the negative direct effect of *fr* is a bit stronger ($\beta = -.25$ in comparison to $\beta = -.14$), and the *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* have an even stronger positive effect on *anti-black racism* ($\beta = .66, p \leq .001$). With an explained variance of 72%, *anti-black racism* is well explained by the predictors and mediators included in the equation.

For *sexism*, the explained variance is even higher: 82% of the variance is explained. This is clearly a result of the inclusion of the *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* whose effect on *sexism* is extremely strong ($\beta = .80, p \leq .001$). Besides *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity*, *ttt* ($\beta = .15, p \leq .001$) and *openness to change* ($\beta = -.12, p \leq .001$) have significant effects on *sexism*. But their effect size can't reach that of *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity*. Interestingly, neither *fr* nor *xenos* can significantly reduce *sexism*. Compared with the other five types of prejudice, this is a unique result.

Homophobia stands out in the set of prejudices: *homophobia* is the only type of prejudice on which the effect of *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* is weaker compared to other predicting or mediating variables. While *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* still have a significant effect on *homophobia* ($\beta = .21, p \leq .001$), the predictive power of the RSS subscales *ttt* and *xenos* is visibly stronger. The direct effect of *ttt* is stronger than for other types of prejudice ($\beta = .36, p \leq .001$), and especially *xenos* has an extremely strong negative effect on *homophobia* ($\beta = -.54, p \leq .001$). Furthermore, *openness to change* is a small, but significant predictor ($\beta = -.07, p = .008$) as well as *centrality of religiosity* ($\beta = .15, p \leq .001$). But in contrast to *general racism*, here, *centrality of religiosity* has a positive effect on *homophobia*.

Direct, Indirect and Total Effects

As we have already seen in Chap. 6, the reported direct effects of predictor and mediator variables on the outcomes can differ from the total effects of these variables. SEMs include several indirect paths from the predictors to the outcomes. Because of this complexity, there is some risk to get lost in interpreting effects that change drastically if the total effects are considered. There are two possibilities how total effects can complement the interpretation of direct effects. First, effects increase compared to direct effects if total effects are calculated; hence, total effects help preventing underestimation. Second, effects decrease compared to direct effects if total effects are calculated; then total effects help in preventing overestimation. Additionally, patterns can become visible that could not have been noticed

Table 7.5 Direct, indirect and total standardized effects of centrality of religion, openness to change and violence legitimizing norms of masculinity on the six types of prejudice

	<i>Centrality of religion</i>			<i>Openness to change</i>			<i>Violence legitimizing norms of masculinity</i>		
	Direct	Indirect	Total	Direct	Indirect	Total	Direct	Indirect	Total
<i>Islamophobia</i>	-.05	-.07	-.12	-.08	-.05	-.13	.48	.09	.57
<i>Anti-Semitism</i>	-.06	-.04	-.09	-.03	-.03	-.07	.52	.09	.61
<i>General racism</i>	-.17	.05	-.11	-.12	-.05	-.17	.53	.08	.62
<i>Anti-black racism</i>	-.08	-.01	-.08	-.05	-.06	-.10	.66	.14	.80
<i>Sexism</i>	.07	.05	.11	-.12	-.04	-.16	.80	.06	.86
<i>Homophobia</i>	.15	.01	.16	-.07	-.09	-.16	.21	.11	.33

Table 7.6 Direct, indirect and total standardized effects of the RSS subscales on the six types of prejudice

	<i>Truth of texts and teachings</i>			<i>Fairness, tolerance and rational choice</i>			<i>Xenosphia/inter-religious dialog</i>		
	Direct	Indirect	Total	Direct	Indirect	Total	Direct	Indirect	Total
<i>Islamophobia</i>	.15	-.12	.04	-.02	-.25	-.27	-.35	.00	-.35
<i>Anti-Semitism</i>	.10	-.03	.07	-.14	-.07	-.21	-.09	.00	-.09
<i>General racism</i>	.22	-.05	.17	-.01	-.12	-.13	-.16	.00	-.16
<i>Anti-black racism</i>	.15	.00	.15	-.25	.00	-.26	.00	.00	.00
<i>Sexism</i>	.15	-.02	.13	-.03	-.05	-.08	-.07	.00	-.07
<i>Homophobia</i>	.36	-.17	.19	.10	-.39	-.30	-.54	.00	-.54

by looking at direct effects alone. In order to analyze these possible new patterns, Table 7.5 and Table 7.6 present the direct, indirect and total effects of the predictor and mediator variables on the six different types of prejudice.

For *centrality of religiosity*, the combination of direct and indirect effects seems ambivalent. *Islamophobia*, *anti-Semitism*, and *anti-black racism* combine negative direct and indirect effects that sum up to moderate total negative effects. For *general racism*, *sexism*, and *homophobia*, positive indirect effects become apparent. Thus, the total negative effect of *centrality of religiosity* on *general racism* decreases. This is worth mentioning because *general racism* was the only outcome for which *centrality of religiosity* showed a significant negative direct effect in the respective SEM. When we consider the total effects only, *general racism* (total effect: $-.11$) is on the same level as *Islamophobia* ($-.12$), *anti-Semitism* ($-.09$), and *anti-black racism* ($-.08$). *Sexism* (.11) and *homophobia* (.16) go in the contrary direction. For both outcomes, the total effect of *centrality of religiosity* increases compared to the direct effect. Overall, the total effects support and reinforce the results from the SEMs showing that *centrality of religiosity* has moderate negative effects on *Islamophobia*,

anti-Semitism, *general racism*, and *anti-black racism*, but moderate positive effects on *sexism* and *homophobia*.

Small indirect effects on the target variables exist also for *openness to change* and *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity*. Here, direct and indirect effects are consistently poled in the same direction which results in stronger total effects for both predictors on all six types of prejudice. So, for *openness to change*, the already observed negative effects increase while for *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity*, the positive effects increase. Nevertheless, for *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity*, this is barely noticeable as their direct effects on the six types of prejudice are overwhelming anyway. Regarding the total effects of *openness to change*, there is not much difference between the six types of prejudice. Only the total effect sizes for *anti-Semitism* ($-.07$) and *anti-black racism* ($-.10$) are slightly smaller than for *Islamophobia* ($-.13$), *general racism* ($-.17$), *sexism* ($-.16$), and *homophobia* ($-.16$).

The direct and indirect effects of the RSS subscale *ttt* show the same pattern as we already know from Chap. 6. The RSS subscale *ttt* has positive direct effects on every type of prejudice and negative indirect effects on all but one type of prejudice: There is no indirect effect of *ttt* on *anti-black racism*. Particularly eye-catching is the strong negative indirect effect of *ttt* on *homophobia* ($-.17$), whereas in the previous analysis, we recognized that *ttt* has the strongest positive direct effect on *homophobia*. We can assume that the negative indirect effect is caused by the relation between *ttt* and *xenos* ($\beta = .36, p \leq .001$), as *xenos* has a really strong decreasing effect on *homophobia*. So, if we just look at the total effects, *homophobia* loses its unique feature as the type of prejudice most strongly affected by *ttt*. Instead, *ttt* has similar moderately positive effects on *general racism* (.17), *anti-black racism* (.15), *sexism* (.13) and *homophobia* (.19). On the other hand, the positive total effects of *ttt* on *Islamophobia* (.04) and *anti-Semitism* are pretty small (.07).

For the RSS subscale *ftt*, indirect and direct effects share the minus sign. Compared with the direct effects, the total effects reveal some major changes, particularly for *Islamophobia* and *homophobia*. The RSS subscale *ftt* has only a small negative direct effect on *Islamophobia* and even a positive direct effect on *homophobia*. But for both types of prejudice, strong negative indirect effects were calculated that affect the total effects. So, we have to keep in mind that *Islamophobia* and *homophobia* are not independent of *ftt*, but that the effects of *ftt* on *Islamophobia* and *homophobia* are just mediated by *xenos*. This becomes evident when we compare the total effects of *ftt* on the six types of prejudice. Overall, obvious differences between the different types of prejudice can be identified. The RSS subscale *ftt* clearly has a strong negative total effect on *Islamophobia* ($-.27$), *anti-Semitism* ($-.21$), *anti-black racism* ($-.26$), and *homophobia* ($-.30$), but only a moderate to small negative effect on *general racism* ($-.13$) and *sexism* ($-.08$). As *xenos* is modeled as the last in the row of mediators, no indirect effects occur. In accordance with the direct effects, the total negative effects of *xenos* on *Islamophobia* and *homophobia* are the most striking characteristics.

Estimating the Outcomes for Men and Women Separately

So far, we have taken a detailed perspective on the diverse predictors and mediators supporting or preventing different types of prejudice. Since we have seen in Chap. 4 that the degree of *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* differs strongly depending on the respondents' sex, now we want to additionally calculate SEMs detailing differences between men and women. We build on the models of the previous passages and calculate them including group comparisons for men and women. Thus, predictors, mediators, and target variables remain the same; we just split the dataset into two groups, men ($n = 739$) and women ($n = 732$). For an overview of the structure of the models, Fig. 7.2 presents the full model with *Islamophobia* as outcome.² Covariances and regression weights for men are illustrated in black, covariances and regression weights for women are reported after the slash and in pink color. In Table 7.7, regression weights of the predictor and mediator variables on *Islamophobia*, *anti-Semitism*, and *general racism* are presented for men and women. In Table 7.8, regression weights of the predictors and mediators on *anti-black racism*, *sexism*, and *homophobia* are detailed for men and women.

Covariances between the predictor variables and regression weights of the predictors on the mediators can already give some insight into the different patterns for men and women before taking the outcomes into account. Covariances between the predictor variables show a similar tendency (see Fig. 7.2): For both men and women, *centrality of religiosity* is uncorrelated to the *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* (men: $r = .02$, *n.s.*; women: $r = -.01$, *n.s.*) and to *openness to change* (men: $r = .03$, *n.s.*; women: $r = -.03$, *n.s.*). *Violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* and *openness to change* share a small negative covariance (men: $r = -.09$, $p = .022$; women: $r = -.10$, $p = .01$). Three major differences appear for the regression weights to the RSS subscales. First, for women, the negative effect of *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* on *ptr* is a bit weaker (men: $\beta = -.40$, $p \leq .001$; women: $\beta = -.27$, $p \leq .001$). Second, *openness to change* has a significant positive effect on *xenos* for women ($\beta = .11$, $p \leq .001$), but no effect for men ($\beta = -.01$, *n.s.*). Third, the positive effect of *ttt* on *xenos* is slightly stronger for women than for men (men: $\beta = .31$, $p \leq .001$; women: $\beta = .40$, $p \leq .001$). In conclusion, for women, *xenos* has more in common with *openness to change*, but also with the absolutist religious schema *ttt*, whereas the negative association of *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* and the tolerant religious schema *ptr* extenuates a bit for women.

Now, we attend to the effects of the six predictor/mediator variables on the six different outcomes (see Table 7.7 and Table 7.8). For *Islamophobia*, *ttt* has only a positive and significant effect for women ($\beta = .25$, $p \leq .001$), not for men ($\beta = .04$, *n.s.*). On the other hand, the effect of the *violence legitimizing norms of*

²Model fit indices are: $\chi^2 = 950.84$, $df = 262$, $\chi^2/df = 3.63$, CFI = .94, RMSEA = .04 (upper bound = .05, lower bound = .04). Note: *** = significant with $p \leq .001$, ** = significant with $p \leq .01$, * = significant with $p \leq .05$.




Fig. 7.2 Islamophobia and the effects of religious schemata, centrality of religiosity, violence legitimizing norms of masculinity, and openness to change for men and women

Table 7.7 Standardized direct effects of centrality of religiosity, violence legitimizing norms of masculinity, openness to change, and the RSS subscales on islamophobia, anti-semitism and general racism for men and women

	<i>Islamophobia</i>		<i>Anti-Semitism</i>		<i>General racism</i>	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
<i>Centrality of religiosity</i>	-.03	-.08	-.18**	-.08	.11*	-.17**
<i>Openness to change</i>	-.09**	-.07*	-.10**	-.03	-.12***	-.15***
<i>Violence legitimizing norms of masculinity</i>	.55***	.41***	.65***	.38***	.77***	.39***
<i>Truth of texts and teachings</i>	.04	.25***	.15*	.19**	.13*	.29***
<i>Fairness, tolerance & rational choice</i>	.01	-.02	.05	-.20**	-.09	-.07
<i>Xenophobia inter-religious dialog</i>	-.31***	-.41***	-.14	-.12	-.02	-.18*
<i>R²</i>	.47	.47	.47	.37	.54	.41
<i>χ²</i>	950.84		721.27		846.87	
<i>Df</i>	262		262		228	
<i>χ²/df</i>	3.63		2.75		3.71	
<i>CFI</i>	.95		.97		.96	
<i>RMSEA</i>	.04 (.05-.04)		.04 (.04-.03)		.04 (.05-.04)	

Table 7.8 Standardized direct effects of centrality of religiosity, violence legitimizing norms of masculinity, openness to change, and the RSS subscales on anti-black racism, sexism and homophobia for men and women

	<i>Anti-black racism</i>		<i>Sexism</i>		<i>Homophobia</i>	
	Men	Women	Men	Women	Men	Women
<i>Centrality of religiosity</i>	-.01	-.19**	.11*	.04	.12	.20**
<i>Openness to change</i>	.00	-.10**	.12***	.14***	-.09**	-.06
<i>Violence legitimizing norms of masculinity</i>	.70***	.62***	.77***	.80***	.15**	.21***
<i>Truth of texts and teachings</i>	.09	.22**	.13*	.18**	.42***	.31***
<i>Fairness, tolerance & rational choice</i>	-.24**	-.28**	-.09	.05	.16	.01
<i>Xenophobia inter-religious dialog</i>	.05	-.06	-.02	-.14	-.55***	-.52***
<i>R²</i>	.72	.80	.83	.81	.34	.38
<i>χ²</i>	627.76		720.31		556.57	
<i>Df</i>	196		196		196	
<i>χ²/df</i>	3.20		3.68		2.84	
<i>CFI</i>	.97		.96		.97	
<i>RMSEA</i>	.04 (.04-.04)		.04 (.05-.04)		.04 (.04-.03)	

masculinity is stronger for men ($\beta = .55, p \leq .001$) than for women ($\beta = .41, p \leq .001$). The same pattern occurs for *anti-Semitism*, *general racism*, and *anti-black racism*: For men, *ttt* doesn't have any effects on these types of prejudice, or only a quite small effect (for *general racism*: $\beta = .15, p = .021$). The positive effect of *ttt* on these types of prejudice remains rather constant for women, ranging

between standardized regression coefficients of $\beta = .19$ for *anti-Semitism* and $\beta = .29$ for *general racism*. Consequently, for *anti-Semitism*, *general racism*, and *anti-black racism*, the effect of *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* is stronger for men than for women, although for *anti-black racism*, the difference is rather small (men: $\beta = .70, p \leq .001$; women: $\beta = .62, p \leq .001$). Interestingly, this pattern is not visible for *sexism* and *homophobia*. For *homophobia*, the direct effect of *ttt* is even stronger for men (men: $\beta = .42, p \leq .001$; women: $\beta = .31, p \leq .001$) while the effect of *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* is smaller among men (men: $\beta = .15, p = .004$; women: $\beta = .21, p \leq .001$).

In a more detailed analysis, other differences between men and women are noticeable for certain types of prejudice. Among women, *xenos* has a stronger negative effect on all types of prejudice, besides *homophobia*. Although the effects are not strongly significant, this is especially true for *general racism* (men: $\beta = -.02$ *n.s.*; women: $\beta = -.18, p = .046$). Besides this result, *ftr* has a significant decreasing effect on *anti-Semitism* among women ($\beta = -.20, p = .007$), but not among men ($\beta = -.07, n.s.$). This pattern is only valid for *anti-Semitism*, while for *anti-black racism*, the negative effect of *ftr* is significant for both men and women (men: $\beta = -.24, p = .001$; women: $\beta = -.28, p = .001$). Another difference concerns *anti-black racism*, too. While there are significant negative effects of *centrality of religiosity* ($\beta = -.19, p = .002$) and *openness to change* ($\beta = -.10, p = .003$) among women, these effects are not significant among men.

The results of the different patterns supporting or preventing different types of prejudice among men and women can be summarized as follows: For men, the extent of the different types of prejudice is primarily affected by the agreement to *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity*. This applies to *Islamophobia*, *anti-Semitism*, *general racism*, *anti-black racism*, and *sexism*, but not to *homophobia*. Partly, other variables have small effects on certain types of prejudice, but in general, the direct effect of *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* is overwhelming. While *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* still play an important role among women, too, compared to men, other variables take a more prominent position, especially the RSS subscales. While *ttt* has positive effects on all types of prejudice, *ftr* and *xenos* have slightly stronger negative effects among women than among men.

Summary and Discussion of Results

Predictors and Mediators

For a summary, we begin with the predictor and mediator variables and the different or similar ways they affect the six outcomes. Based on this summary, we discuss the similarities and differences between the diverse types of prejudice. The six predictor/mediator variables and the six outcomes relate to each other in the following ways:

1. *Centrality of religiosity* has significant direct effects on *general racism* and *homophobia*, but with reversed signs. While negatively associated with *general racism*, *centrality of religiosity* is positively associated with *homophobia*. Among women, *centrality of religiosity* additionally has a negative direct effect on *anti-black racism*. The total effects of *centrality of religiosity* show moderate negative effects on *Islamophobia*, *anti-Semitism*, *general racism*, and *anti-black racism*, but moderate positive effects on *sexism* and *homophobia*.
2. *Openness to change* has moderate negative total effects on all types of prejudice, though for *anti-Semitism* and *anti-black racism*, the total effects are a bit weaker. Significant direct effects were discovered for all types of prejudice but *anti-Semitism*.
3. *Violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* turned out to be the strongest predictor for all types of prejudice, for *anti-black racism* and *sexism* in particular. Only on *homophobia*, other variables have stronger effects. In general, *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* have stronger effects on prejudice among men than among women, with the exceptions of *sexism* and *homophobia*.

Including the *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* as a predictor for the diverse types of prejudice is, besides illustrating the differing effects of the three religious schemata *ttt*, *fr*, and *xenos* on prejudice, one central innovation of the analyses presented in this chapter. With the inclusion of the *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity*, the explained variance of the outcomes reaches levels ranging from $R^2 = .35$ for *homophobia* to $R^2 = .82$ for *sexism*. Overall, the *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* are the decisive predictor for the six types of prejudice and for men in particular.

How come *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* are such a strong predictor for various types of prejudice? A strong relation between *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* and *sexism* is plausible. With their notions of what a tough man has to do, *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* share the sexist assumption that men and women differ in their ways of life, their skills, and their emotions, and that there are specific male moral rules men must meet. But why does this generalized attitude have such strong positive effects on other types of prejudice? Besides the mentioned proximity between *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* and authoritarian aggression, it may be the ideology of inequality underlying the diverse types of prejudice (Zick et al., 2008; 2011) that resonates with *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity*. Those who agree that women aren't equal to men, that there is a clear boundary between the in-group of the own family and outsiders, are probably likely to accentuate the ("natural") differences between cultures, ethnicities, religions, and so forth, too.

4. The RSS subscale *ttt* has positive direct effects on all types of prejudice. This applies especially to women; among men, no significant effects of *ttt* on *Islamophobia*, *anti-Semitism*, and *anti-black racism* could be found. For all types of prejudice, *ttt* surprises with negative indirect effects. Hence, in sum, there are moderately positive total effects of *ttt* on *general racism*, *anti-black racism*, *sexism*, and *homophobia*, and only small positive total effects on *Islamophobia* and *anti-Semitism*.

5. The RSS subscale *fr* has significant negative direct effects on *anti-Semitism* (only among women) and especially on *anti-black racism*. As *fr* is strongly related to *xenos*, strong negative total effects are not only visible for *anti-Semitism* and *anti-black racism*, but for *Islamophobia* and *homophobia*, too. However, negative total effects of *fr* on *general racism* are moderate and only small on *sexism*.
6. The RSS subscale *xenos* has negative effects on *Islamophobia*, *general racism*, and *homophobia*, but with differing effect sizes. While the effects on *homophobia* are really strong and still strong for *Islamophobia*, the effects on *general racism* are only moderate. Taken together, *xenos* is the mediator with the most variety in its effects. They range from really strong negative effects on *homophobia* to insignificant effects on *anti-Semitism*, *anti-black racism*, and *sexism*. Taking the significant bivariate correlations between *xenos* and the six types of prejudice reported in Table 7.3 into account, the latter might be a consequence of modeling *xenos* as last in the row of mediators.

Summing up, it appears that all six types of prejudice are somehow affected by religious schemata. While *ttt* shows significant positive effects on all types of prejudice, negative, maybe inhibiting, effects vary across *fr* and *xenos*. Hence, it seems to be a question of the target whether less prejudice is rather a question of rational-based tolerance or of religiously motivated readiness for dialog. Therefore, in the following paragraph we take a closer look on commonalities and differences of the distinct types of prejudice and their associations with predictors and mediators.

Outcomes

To answer the question which types of prejudice distinguish themselves from other types in regard to their respective predictors, we again present a brief summary of the results:

1. For prejudice against religious groups (*Islamophobia*, *anti-Semitism*), the positive total effects of the absolutist religious style *ttt* are slightly reduced as compared to the total effects on prejudice against ethnic-cultural groups (*general racism*, *anti-black racism*) and prejudice against sexually marked groups (*sexism*, *homophobia*).
2. For prejudice against ethnic-culturally marked groups (*general racism*, *anti-black racism*), only one characteristic pattern suggesting similarities between *general racism* and *anti-black racism* could be observed, and it applies to women only: For women, *centrality of religiosity* and *openness to change* have negative direct, not mediated effects on both types of prejudice.
3. For prejudice against sexually marked groups (*sexism*, *homophobia*), it is again *centrality of religiosity* that ties both types of prejudice together. *Sexism* and *homophobia* are the only target variables on which *centrality of religiosity* has positive total effects.

Two of these observations need a more extensive discussion. First, the smaller total effect of the RSS subscale *ttt* on prejudice against religious groups than on prejudice against other groups is quite astonishing. Given the previous findings on religious fundamentalism (Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; 2005; Klein et al., 2017), the conviction of the ultimate truth of one's own religious tradition could be expected to relatively clearly lead to the devaluation of other religions presumably not possessing the right doctrine. Streib and Klein (2014) already discovered a pretty weak positive effect of *ttt* on *anti-Semitism* and assumed that even fundamentalist Christian teachings might value the Jewish origin of Christianity. To extend this thought, it may be possible that those who follow a literal religious interpretation express a prejudice openly if it is tolerated by their religion, but not (or only subtly) if it is proscribed by their religion. As such, homosexuality is rejected by many religious traditions, but tolerance toward other religions might be requested. A similar argument was made by Herek (1987) as well as Batson and Burris (1994) who underline the importance to differentiate between religiously proscribed and religiously encouraged types of prejudice (see Chap. 2). To counter this line of thought, in opposition to devaluating attitudes toward gays and lesbians, Herek (1987) as well as Batson and Burris (1994) considered *anti-black racism* to be a religiously proscribed prejudice. However, in our research, we found similar positive total effects of *ttt* on *anti-black racism* as on *sexism* and *homophobia*. Since Küpper (2010) observed a similar pattern of associations of general religiosity with *anti-black racism*, *sexism*, and *homophobia* in Germany, it might also be possible that our findings reflect a cultural difference between Germany and the U.S. where overcoming *anti-black racism* can be assumed to be more prominent in the public discourses.

Second, the finding of positive total effects of *centrality of religiosity* on sexually marked groups and negative total effects of *centrality of religiosity* on religious and ethnic-culturally marked groups is in line with other research, in particular on effects of intrinsic religiosity (Allport & Ross, 1967; Hall et al., 2010; Hunsberger & Jackson, 2005; Whitley, 2009), although preventive effects of general religiosity on any type of prejudice are not the most prominent result in research on prejudice. Yet, we have to keep in mind that we used the Centrality of Religiosity Scale proposed by Huber and Huber (2012), which can be considered to reflect Allport's and Ross' original conceptualization of intrinsic religiosity while it avoids problems of former operationalizations (see Chap. 2).

Besides the already mentioned similarities between outcome variables, there are other target variables that have something in common.

4. The RSS subscale *xenos* has negative effects on *Islamophobia*, *general racism*, and *homophobia*. For these types of prejudice, the prototypical distinction between a literal and a dialogical religious style is applicable since *ttt* has promoting effects on these types of prejudice. Hence, a dialogical type of religiosity seems to be able to contribute to prejudice reduction in some respects.
5. *Anti-Semitism* and *anti-black racism*, on the contrary, are both affected by the preventive direct effects of *ptr*. Although *ptr* has additionally negative total effects

on *Islamophobia* and *homophobia*, these effects are completely mediated by *xenos*. This is different for *anti-Semitism* and *anti-black racism* because for these kinds of prejudice, only *fr* shows decreasing effects. Additionally, *anti-Semitism* and *anti-black racism* are the two types of prejudice on which *openness to change* has the smallest negative total effects.

6. Sexism stands out in the row of the different types of prejudice as the only one neither affected by significant direct or noticeable indirect effects of *fr* nor *xenos*.

While reporting the correlations between the six types of prejudice at the beginning of the chapter, we already noticed strong correlations between *Islamophobia* and *general racism* and between *anti-Semitism* and *anti-black racism*. Based on the thoughts of Zick et al. (2011), we tried to explain the strong correlation between *Islamophobia* and *general racism* with the assumption that, in Germany, people often don't distinguish between Muslims and people from other cultures. Now, based on our own parallel findings for *Islamophobia* and *general racism*, we find some support for this explanation since we could show that the religious schemata work in the same way for *Islamophobia* and *general racism* with negative direct effects of *xenos*, while for *anti-Semitism* and *anti-black racism*, there are negative direct effects of *fr*. One might reason whether the latter finding as well as the high correlation between *anti-Semitism* and *anti-black racism* noticed at the beginning of this chapter give a hint that Judaism is perceived rather in terms of ethnicity than in terms of religiosity. If this assumption is correct, the high correlation between *anti-Semitism* and *anti-black racism* and their similar correlational patterns might be interpreted as being two associated types of racist prejudice.

Conclusion

Our analyses of predictors and correlates of inter-religious prejudice have shown that inter-religious prejudice can only be understood taking the complex associations of general religiousness (as measured in terms of *centrality of religiosity*) and distinct religious schemata with value orientations and generalized attitudes such as *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* into account and when comparing their effects on inter-religious prejudice with the effects on other types of prejudice. As we have seen, inter-religious prejudice against Jews and Muslims is only part of the symptoms of a broader ideology of inequality as expressed in the concept of GFE (Groß et al., 2012; Heitmeyer, 2002; Zick et al., 2008; 2011). With respect to their associations with the predictors and mediators included in our analyses, in particular with the religious schemata *fr* and *xenos*, *Islamophobia* seems to have even more in common with *general racism* than with anti-Semitism, while anti-Semitism seems to share more similarities with *anti-black racism*. While all of these types of prejudice are positively associated with the fundamentalist religious schema *ttt*, but rather negatively associated with the general *centrality of religiosity*, *centrality of*

religiosity as well as *ttt* appear to be positively associated with *sexism* and *homophobia* (although not as strong as *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity*). While the effects of all religious variables on *sexism* are rather low, there are strong negative effects of *xenos* on *homophobia*. Taking all these complex relationships into account, we might conclude that religion does indeed “make” and “unmake” prejudice (Allport, 1954)—but it is crucial which group of people is the target and even more important how religiosity is understood and practiced. Only a tolerant and xenophobic religiosity might be able to meet the high ethical standards demanded by religious commandments as loving one’s neighbor and even one’s enemy.

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Chapter 8

Implicit and Explicit Attitudes toward Abrahamic Religions. Comparison of Direct and Indirect Assessment



Constantin Klein, Ramona Bullik, and Heinz Streib

Background

The Potential Bias of Self-Report Measures of Religiosity and Prejudice Due to Socially Desirable Responding

In the previous chapters, we have focused on the questionnaire data of our respondents in order to analyze how religiosity, values, and generalized attitudes correspond with several attitudes and prejudice toward groups perceived as different and “strange.” However, it is well-known in socio-scientific research that results based on self-report measures are at risk to be affected by socially desirable responding. This could lead to questionable conclusions. Since most people do not want to appear intolerant, socially desirable responding is in particular prevalent in prejudice research (Dovidio & Gaertner, 1986; Schnell, Hill, & Esser, 1999; Taylor, 1961; Whitley & Kite, 2010). But also self-reports of religiosity are often positively correlated with measures of social desirability (Sedikides & Gebauer, 2010; Trimble, 1997). While socially desirable responding is in particular likely when extreme political or social attitudes are assessed in prejudice research (Schnell et al., 1999), associations of social desirability and religiosity differ depending on the type of religiosity which is investigated.

Global indicators of religiosity such as religious self-ratings, religious affiliation, or frequency of service attendance or prayer are often positively, though in most cases only moderately correlated with measures of social desirability (Robinson, Gibson-Beverly, & Schwartz 2004; Sedikides & Gebauer, 2010; Trimble, 1997)—

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although there are also findings not supporting this trend (Lewis, 1999). If certain components of social desirability are distinguished, in particular *self-deceptive enhancement* (SDE), i.e. the tendency to give honest, but unduly positive self-descriptions, and *impression management* (IM), i.e. the tendency to present oneself in a better light to others (Paulhus, 1984, 2002), global indicators of religiosity turn out to be primarily associated with the IM component (Gillings & Joseph, 1996; Pearson & Francis, 1989; Saroglou & Galand, 2004; Sedikides & Gebauer, 2010).

An intrinsically motivated religiosity (Allport & Ross, 1967; see Chapter 2) is often even stronger correlated with social desirability (e.g. Batson, Naifeh, & Pate, 1978; Burris & Navarra, 2002; Trimble, 1997). Again, primarily the IM component seems to be responsible for the positive associations (Leak & Fish, 1989; Sedikides & Gebauer, 2010). However, also findings on intrinsic religiosity and socially desirable responding are not entirely consistent (Hills, Francis, Argyle, & Jackson, 2004; Hunsberger & Platonow, 1986; Maltby, 1999). Already in 1986, Watson, Morris, Foster, and Hood have argued that significant correlations between intrinsic religiosity and social desirability are in particular likely if the Crowne-Marlowe Social Desirability Scale (Crowne & Marlowe, 1960) is used; i.e. an older measure of social desirability including a number of items overlapping obviously with the behavioral maxims of the Ten Commandments. In consequence, associations between intrinsic religiosity and social desirability might be artificially increased.

In contrast, extrinsic religious orientation (Allport & Ross, 1967; see Chapter 2) is usually not related or even inversely correlated to indicators of social desirability (e.g. Batson et al., 1978; Rowatt & Schmitt, 2003; Trimble, 1997). Again, findings are most consistent for the IM component (Sedikides & Gebauer, 2010). A questing religiosity (Batson, Schoenrade, & Ventis, 1993) seems to be even more clearly negatively associated with socially desirable responding (e.g. Duck & Hunsberger, 1999; Rowatt & Kirkpatrick, 2002; Spilka, Kojetin, & McIntosh, 1985; Watson, Hood, & Morris, 1985) while post-critical belief appears to be uncorrelated to social desirability (Duriez, 2004; for both concepts, see Chapter 2).

According to a meta-analysis of Sedikides and Gebauer (2010), associations between religiosity and social desirability are not only a matter of the type of religiosity, but of cultural context, too: Associations seem to be stronger in the more religious North American context (in Canada and in particular in the USA) while they happen to be weaker in the stronger secularized European context where religiosity itself can be assumed to be less socially desired.

Given the well-known associations between religiosity and prejudice on the one hand (see Chapter 2) and between religiosity and social desirability on the other hand, it is somewhat surprising that only relatively few studies have tried to discover the degree to which the relation between religiosity and prejudice is affected by socially desirable responding. While two studies (Morris, Hood, & Watson, 1989; Duck & Hunsberger, 1999) did not find evidence for a contamination of associations between religiosity and prejudicial attitudes by socially desirable responding, two older studies found behavioral dispositions of intrinsically religious persons to be affected by social desirability (Batson et al., 1978; Batson, Flink, Schoenrade, Fultz, & Pych, 1986). In the latter two studies, overt and subtle prejudice against Blacks has been investigated experimentally. Results showed that the positive

association between intrinsic religiosity and social desirability disappeared in the experimental condition for subtle prejudice and that intrinsically religious participants displayed even higher levels of anti-black prejudice.

Hence, the results of older research are inconsistent. Maybe this is one reason why the complex findings on interrelations between religiosity, prejudice, and social desirability have not systematically been studied further. Only in recent years, new measurement procedures limiting the risk of socially desirable responding like the Implicit Association Test (IAT, Greenwald, McGhee, & Schwartz, 1998) have provided the opportunity to revive this line of research. Before we present results of this research, we briefly introduce the measurement approach of the IAT.

The Implicit Association Test: An Indirect Measure for the Assessment of Attitudes Avoiding Socially Desirable Responding

Within empirical research, diverse strategies have been developed in order to avoid the risk of socially desirable responding; among them the construction of certain scales measuring social desirability as control variable (e.g. Crowne & Marlowe, 1960; Eysenck & Eysenck, 1975; Paulhus, 1998; Reynolds, 1982) or of scales specifically designed to assess subtle prejudice (e.g. Pettigrew & Meertens, 1995), or the use of certain assessment techniques such as the “faking-good instruction” (Viswesvaran, 1999; Wiggins, 1959), the “Bogus pipeline” (Jones & Sigall, 1971; Roese & Jamieson, 1993), or the “randomized response technique” (Himmelfarb & Lickteig, 1982). But during the increasing computerization throughout the last three decades, also new assessment tools in the tradition of the so-called “objective personality tests” (Cattell & Warburton, 1967; Hundleby, Pawlik, & Cattell, 1965) have been developed (Fazio & Olson, 2003). These measurement procedures have the intransparency of their test intention in common (e.g. because reaction times or extreme responding are used as outcome measures). Since the investigated person is not aware of the intention, socially desirable responding can widely be prevented. In particular procedures measuring reaction times are useful to reduce the likelihood of social desirability because intentional socially desirable responding usually requires some reflection which, although short, leads almost necessarily to prolonged response rates (Holtgraves, 2004).

While cognitive processing of information occurs reflectively and controlled on the one hand, it happens impulsively and automatically on the other (Smith & DeCoster, 2000; Strack & Deutsch, 2004). Implicit Association Tests (IATs; Greenwald et al., 1998) are a group of computerized reaction-time based assessment procedures aiming at assessing the rather pre-reflective, implicit parts of an attitude (Gschwendner, Hofmann & Schmitt, 2006). Throughout the last two decades they have proven their applicability; in particular in research on prejudice (Banse, Seise, & Zerbes, 2001; Greenwald, Poehlmann, Uhlmann, & Banaji, 2009). IATs try to assess the strength of automatic mental associations between certain

concepts, typically the targets of attitudes, and their evaluations. The strength of the automatic associations is measured by presenting diverse stimuli (e.g. words or pictures) representing the targets (e.g. “Christianity”, or “Islam”) and the evaluative categories (e. g. “positive” or “negative”) on the computer screen. Participants are requested to assign the stimuli as fast and correct as possible to the target or evaluative categories on one side of the screen by clicking two keys on the keyboard, either with the right hand or with the left. The assumption is that participants will react faster (in milliseconds) in a congruent test condition when more closely related words (e. g. stimuli for “Christianity” + positive words or stimuli for “Islam” + negative words—spoken from a hypothetical Christian’s perspective) have to be sorted by pressing the same key whereas they will react slower in an incongruent test condition when less closely related words (stimuli for “Christianity” + negative words, stimuli for “Islam” + positive words) have to be sorted with the same key. The faster a respondent sorts the stimuli into a combined category (e. g. “Christianity” + positive words), the stronger the automatic association between the target “Christianity” and a positive valence, i.e. the stronger the positive implicit attitude toward “Christianity.”

To quantify the strength of the implicit association, an IAT effect (“ D_1 ”) is calculated by subtracting the mean reaction time of the congruous test blocks (stimuli for “Christianity” + positive words and stimuli for “Islam” + negative words) from the mean reaction time of the incongruous test blocks (stimuli for “Christianity” + negative words and for “Islam” + positive words; see Greenwald, Nosek, & Banaji, 2003, for the algorithm). The score is standardized for each respondent by the intra-individual standard deviations of all critical trials. A D_1 effect > 0 is indicating a positive evaluation of the target located on the “positive” side of the computer screen in the congruent test condition (“Christianity” in our example); a D_1 effect < 0 is signaling a negative evaluation of that target.

Religiosity and Prejudice in the IAT, and the Control of Socially Desirable Responding

The potentials of IATs have soon been recognized within the psychology of religion. Soon after the development of the IAT procedure, Greenwald and his colleagues have presented a first study showing clear implicit preferences of Jewish and Christian participants for their own religious traditions whereby the implicit attitudes were found to differ more strongly than the self-reported explicit sympathy toward both groups (Rudman, Greenwald, Mellott, & Schwartz, 1999). Further IATs in research on religiosity have been developed for the assessment of implicit intrinsic vs. extrinsic religiosity (e.g. Shariff, Cohen, & Norenzayan, 2008; Wenger & Yarbrough, 2005), religiosity vs. spirituality (Bassett et al., 2005), religiosity vs. atheism or secularism (Klein, Hood, Silver, Keller, & Streib, 2016; LaBouff, Rowatt, Johnson, Thedford, & Tsang, 2010; Ventis, Ball, & Viggiano, 2010), or implicit

attitudes toward God vs. toward the devil (Meier, Hauser, Robinson, Friesen, & Schjeldahl, 2007). However, most studies in the psychology of religion making use of the IAT have focused on implicit attitudes and prejudice, e.g. toward other religious traditions (Clobert, Saroglou, & Kwang-Kuo, 2015; Clobert, Saroglou, Kwang-Kuo, & Soong, 2014; Henry & Hardin, 2006; Park, Felix, & Lee, 2007; Rowatt, Franklin, & Cotton, 2005), races (Rowatt & Franklin, 2004), or sexual orientations (Rowatt et al., 2006; Tsang & Rowatt, 2007). The focus on prejudicial attitudes reflects that IATs have shown their greatest diagnostic value in prejudice research wherein they were found to incrementally predict observed behavior as compared to direct measures (Greenwald et al., 2009). In contrast, traditional paper-and-pencil measures showed greater validity in the prediction of personality traits or clinical symptoms as compared to indirect measurement procedures.

For our purpose in the Bielefeld Study on Xenophobia and Religion, studies on implicit attitudes toward the Abrahamic religions Judaism, Christianity, and Islam (Henry & Hardin, 2006; Park et al., 2007; Rowatt et al., 2005; Rudman et al., 1999) are of primary interest. In their study on implicit attitudes toward Jews and Christians, Rudman et al. (1999) used “typical” Jewish and Christian names as stimuli for both target groups (e.g. Birnbaum, Blumenthal, and Cohen for Judaism or Buckley, Higgins, and Tyler for Christianity). Similarly, Park and colleagues (2007) could observe that U.S. college students implicitly evaluated “typical” white or black prenames more positive than Arabic-Muslim sounding prenames like Hassan or Zahir. On the explicit level, the participants displayed no differences in their preference for any of the three groups. However, the implicit effect disappeared when participants read positive information about the enriching effects of Arabs/Muslims on the U.S. culture. In the study of Henry and Hardin (2006), Christian and Muslim students of the American University in Beirut/Lebanon preferred their own religious tradition and showed stronger rejection of the other tradition both on the explicit and implicit level of cognition. On the explicit level, the differences were found to be the lower, the more friends belonging to the other religious tradition the participants had. On the implicit level, this effect could also be observed among the Muslims, but not among the Christians.

While there has been no control of social desirability in the studies described above, Rowatt and colleagues (2005) included the Paulhus Deception Scales (Paulhus, 1998) as direct measure of socially desirable responding into their study design. They detected a clear explicit and slight implicit preference for Christianity or a slight implicit rejection of Islam among their predominantly Christian U.S. students. While the explicit effect was found to be stronger among participants expressing higher levels of religious fundamentalism (as measured with the fundamentalism scale of Altemeyer & Hunsberger, 1992; see Chapter 2), the implicit effect did not differ depending on scores of religious fundamentalism or any other measure of religiosity. This pattern remained stable even after controlling for socially desirable responding. In studies on religiosity and implicit attitudes toward other out-groups (Blacks, homosexuals), Rowatt and colleagues could present parallel patterns of associations (Rowatt & Franklin, 2004; Rowatt et al., 2006, Tsang & Rowatt, 2007). Hence, associations between direct measures of religiosity and

indirect measures of prejudice seemingly do not change after controlling for effects of social desirability. However, all IAT studies of Rowatt and colleagues took place at few U.S. universities so that we do not know for sure whether the observed patterns can be replicated with other samples in other cultural contexts.

Interpreting IAT Effects more Clearly Using Single-Category/Single-Target Implicit Association Tests

Beside the question whether results based on indirect measures such as the IAT are less biased by effects of socially desirable responding or not, another challenge of research with IATs is that classic IAT effects do not provide clear information about the direction of interpretation (Brendl, Markman, & Messner, 2001; De Houwer, 2002). A positive D_1 effect in an IAT measuring implicit attitudes toward Christians as compared to Muslims (e.g. Rowatt et al., 2005) could, on the one hand, signal a preference and higher estimation of Christians (as the own religious in-group)—without any devaluation of Muslims. On the other hand, it is also possible that a positive IAT effect indicates a clear rejection of Muslims (whereby Christians might be evaluated neutrally). A further possibility is that both mechanisms occur simultaneously and contribute together to a clear positive D_1 effect. Since classic IATs express always a relation between two targets, a definite interpretation is hardly possible.

In reaction to this problem Karpinski and Steinman (2006) have developed an alternative variant of the IAT, the Single-Category IAT (SC-IAT). In a SC-IAT, only one target category is presented on the computer screen together with two evaluative categories. While the target is located on the same side as the positive evaluative category in the congruent test condition (e.g. “Christianity” + positive words), it is presented on the same side as the negative evaluative category in the incongruent test condition (“Christianity” + negative words). Since there is only one target category, the D_1 effect resulting from a SC-IAT can clearly be interpreted in terms of either preference *or* rejection of the target.

To our knowledge, SC-IATs have not been used in research on implicit attitudes toward religious groups so far. However, in an unpublished, yet widely cited Dutch study, Wigboldus, Holland, and van Knippenberg (2006) applied, beside a classic IAT, two Single-Target IATs (ST-IATs), i.e. a similar measurement procedure as the SC-IAT, for an investigation of implicit attitudes toward Christianity and Islam, and used the ST-IAT effects for each religious tradition for an interpretation of the classic IAT effect. Hence, they could show that the positive value of the classic IAT effect was likely to be a result of both an implicit preference for the Christian religion and of an implicit rejection of the Muslim religion. However, the correlations between the distinct IAT effects were rather low, but the interpretation could be validated on the basis of stronger associations with the directly assessed explicit attitudes toward both religious traditions.

Unfortunately, Wigboldus and colleagues do only report that they have excluded two Muslim participants from their study, but do not provide any further information about the religious background of their remaining sample. Hence, their study does not allow for any conclusion about associations between the participants' religiosity and their implicit inter-religious attitudes as assessed with the ST-IATs. Future studies investigating implicit attitudes on the basis of ST- or SC-IATs in combination with measures for distinct types of religiosity among samples with certain religious backgrounds are necessary in order to tap the potential of indirect assessment techniques more fully.

Summary

Summing up, we have seen that self-report measures of both religiosity and prejudice are likely to be affected by socially desirable responding. Besides the direct assessment of social desirability, indirect measurement procedures such as the IAT provide an opportunity to minimize the risk of socially desirable responding. They are in particular advantageous for the assessment of attitudes for indirectly measured attitudes have shown to predict behavior beside and above attitudes assessed with paper-and-pencil measures while classic self-reports of personality traits or clinical symptoms are superior to indirect measures of the same characteristics. A challenge of classic IATs is that the resulting D_1 effect is not always easy to interpret because it can indicate preference for one target, rejection of the other target, or both. SC-IATs or ST-IATs provide the opportunity to interpret effects more clearly as they focus on a single target category. However, so far classic IATs have only rarely and SC/ST-IATs, to our knowledge, never been used in combination with direct measures of social desirability and distinct types of religiosity in research on prejudice. Hence, we have included three SC-IATs measuring implicit inter-religious attitudes toward the three Abrahamic religions and a short scale assessing socially desirable responding among the participants of the Bielefeld subsample ($n = 272$; see Chapter 4 for a description of the study subsamples) into the design of our Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion. In the following paragraphs, we will present the methods and results of our analyses of our participants' implicit attitudes toward Judaism, Christianity, and Islam.

Research Questions

With the indirect assessment of positive or negative attitudes toward the three Abrahamic religions among the participants of a subsample of our study, we aim at finding answers to the following research questions:

1. How strong are the positive or negative implicit attitudes toward the Abrahamic religions?
2. How do the implicit attitudes correspond with directly assessed explicit prejudice against the three religious traditions?
3. Do the adherents of distinct religions differ in their implicit attitudes toward their own and other religious traditions?
4. How are the implicit attitudes of our participants associated with their explicit religiosity and their ideological beliefs (centrality of religiosity, openness to change, religious schemata) and with socially desirable responding?

Method

Sample

The SC-IATs and the scale measuring social desirability have been administered additionally to the other instruments described in Chapter 4 to the Bielefeld subsample ($n = 272$) of our entire sample ($N = 1,534$). Hence, the total N of our following analyses is 272. The Bielefeld subsample consists in part of persons living in Bielefeld responding to our postal invitation to participate in our study and in part of students in our courses at Bielefeld University and their peers and relatives. The sampling is reflected in the demographic characteristics of the Bielefeld subsample since the respondents are much younger ($M = 33.9$ years, $SD = 13.1$, Range: 14–78) and better educated (86.0% having upper secondary education 3A or higher) as compared to the entire study population. Not surprisingly, the vast majority is living in the federal state of Nordrhein-Westfalen, in or around Bielefeld (85.3%). Distribution of sexes is almost equal (47.8% female); with respect to mean per-capita income p.a. ($M = €26,457.7$; $SD = €17,293.0$), the Bielefeld subsample does not differ strongly from the rest of the sample. The majority of participants is affiliated to a Protestant church (51.1%). 10.3% are Roman Catholics, 2.6% belong to other Christian churches, one participant is Jewish (0.4%), 13.6% are Muslims, three participants are Buddhists (1.1%), and four belong to other religious traditions (1.5%) while 19.5% are unaffiliated with any religious tradition.

For a comparison of SC-IAT effects, we report results for three groups: Christians ($n = 174$), Muslims ($n = 37$), and Nones ($n = 53$), while we exclude the remaining eight persons from the subgroup comparison. While the group of Muslims is big enough for subgroup comparisons, it is somewhat too small for solid separate analyses of associations. Hence, we present correlations and regression analyses of implicit and explicit attitudes toward Judaism and Islam on the basis of the remaining, predominantly Christian or secular, Bielefeld subsample ($n = 234$), while we excluded the Muslims as well as the single Jewish person from these calculations.

Measures

Direct measures In accordance with our theoretical framework presented in Chapter 4, we use a similar selection of constructs as in the previous Chapters 6 and 7 for our analyses of associations between the SC-IAT effects and direct measures (for a detailed description of the instruments see Chapter 4). In our regressions models, we include the centrality of religiosity (Huber & Huber, 2012) and the value axis *openness to change vs. conservation* (Schwartz, 2006; 2012) in a first step as predictors of implicit attitudes toward Abrahamic religions. Additionally, we include the 10-item German adaptation of Crowne's and Marlowe's (1960) Social Desirability Scale of Stocké (2003; 2004) as predictor in the first regression step. In a second step, the three subscales of the Religious Schema Scale (RSS; Streib, Hood, & Klein, 2010), i.e. *truth of texts and teachings* (tt), *fairness, tolerance and rational choice* (ftr), and *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog* (xenos) are entered into our regression models. For the calculation of bivariate correlations between our SC-IAT effects and the corresponding measures of explicit prejudice against Judaism, Christianity, and Islam, we use the three scales assessing *anti-Semitism*, *anti-Christian enmity*, and *Islamophobia* (Streib & Gennerich, 2011).

Indirect Measures Our three SC-IATs in total consisted of 13 blocks: After a general practice block of 20 trials for all three SC-IATs for learning to sort the stimuli belonging to the evaluative categories (positive and negative words), there have been practice blocks of 20 trials for each condition before the test blocks of 60 trials. Table 8.1 gives an overview over the sequence of all trial blocks. The words which served as stimuli for the positive evaluative category are *good, pleasant, luck, love, healthy, valuable, and joy*; the words for the negative category are *bad, unpleasant, disgust, hate, ill, useless, and poison*. Christianity as target has been indicated by the stimuli *Jesus, Christ, church, Maria, priest, bible, and baptism*; Judaism has been indicated by *synagogue, Moshe, rabbi, shalom, kippa, Zion, and kosher*, and the stimuli for Islam have been *Muslim, Allah, Mohammed, mosque, Mecca, Ramadan, and Qur'an*.¹ The SC-IATs have been administered with the reaction time software Inquisit (www.millisecond.com). The participants were instructed to sort the stimuli which appeared on the screen of their computers as quickly and as correctly as possible by pressing the 'I'-key with the right forefinger and the 'E'-key with the left forefinger. Built-in error penalties have been created because correct responses were required to continue with the next trial.

The sequence of congruous and incongruous blocks within the three SC-IATs has been counterbalanced while the sequence of the three SC-IATs (Christianity-

¹Please note that, from the perspective of religious studies, of course several stimuli could refer to more than one of the three Abrahamic religions: E.g., Moses is a prominent figure not only in the Jewish tradition, but in the other two traditions as well, Jesus is also a recognized prophet in Islam, and, at least in German, the term kosher can also be used to describe the Muslim way of food preparation. But for measures like SC-IATs aiming at assessing impulsive, automatized reactions, it is primarily important to choose stimuli which are spontaneously associated with a certain target. Hence, they should be familiar, rather short, and stereotypical for the respective target.

Table 8.1 Sequence of trial blocks in the SC-IATs on Christianity, Judaism, and Islam

Block	No. of trials	Task function	Items assigned to left-key response	Items assigned to right-key response
<i>SC-IAT Christianity</i>				
1	20	Practice	Positive words	Negative words
2	20	Practice	Positive + Christianity	Negative words
3	60	Test	Positive + Christianity	Negative words
4	20	Practice	Positive words	Negative + Christianity
5	60	Test	Positive words	Negative + Christianity
<i>SC-IAT Judaism</i>				
6	20	Practice	Positive + Judaism	Negative words
7	60	Test	Positive + Judaism	Negative words
8	20	Practice	Positive words	Negative + Judaism
9	60	Test	Positive words	Negative + Judaism
<i>SC-IAT Islam</i>				
10	20	Practice	Positive + Islam	Negative words
11	60	Test	Positive + Islam	Negative words
12	20	Practice	Positive words	Negative + Islam
13	60	Test	Positive words	Negative + Islam

Note Since the stimuli for positive and negative evaluation did not change throughout the SC-IATs, the practice block for positive and negative words has not been repeated in the SC-IATs on Judaism and Islam

Judaism-Islam) has been kept constantly. Since the SC-IATs have been presented between two sequences of our online questionnaire, we wanted to have participants start with the evaluation of the tradition which could be expected to be most familiar to the majority of participants in order to reduce skepticism against the unfamiliar measurement procedure. Before the calculation of the D_1 effects, excessively slow reaction times ($> 3,000$ ms) have been removed to reduce measurement error.

Statistics

SC-IAT effects (D_1) have been calculated using Greenwald et al.'s (2003) improved scoring algorithm. Differences between mean reaction times and between the three D_1 scores are calculated with paired-samples *t*-tests; comparisons of D_1 across distinct groups are calculated with one-way ANOVAs controlling for effects of sex, age cohorts, and cultural and economic capital and with post hoc subgroup comparisons using Scheffé's procedure. For analyses of the strength of associations between the three SC-IAT effects and self-report measures, we report bivariate correlations and linear regression models. In the linear regression models we try to figure out how the distinct direct measures relate to the indirect measures and to check whether certain associations might be affected by socially desirable responding.

Results

Basic SC-IAT Results

We start the report of our results with a brief overview over some quality criteria of our SC-IATs and with the presentation of the basic SC-IAT effects. As presented in Table 8.2, high percentages of correct reactions in all three SC-IATs indicate that our participants understood the instruction correctly and had no major problems to react properly. To check the reliabilities of our SC-IATs, we divided the reaction times of all critical trials in two parts and calculated the internal consistencies between the two. As shown in Table 8.2, the internal consistencies of all SC-IATs are satisfying (Cronbach's $\alpha \geq .72$).

While our participants reacted faster in the congruous condition of the SC-IAT on Christianity, i.e. when the target "Christianity" has been combined with the positive evaluative category ($t = 3.37$; $p = .001$; $d = 0.29$), there are no differences between congruous and incongruous conditions in the SC-IATs on Judaism and Islam ($t \leq 1.06$; $n.s.$; $d \leq 0.09$). In consequence, there is a positive, although weak D_1 effect in the SC-IAT on Christianity while there are D_1 effects around 0 in the SC-IATs on Judaism and Islam. Hence, the effect for Christianity differs significantly from the other two effects ($\Delta D_1 \geq .10$; $t_{271} \geq -3.08$; $p \leq .002$; $d \geq 0.26$) while the effects for Judaism and Islam do not differ ($\Delta D_1 = .02$; $t_{271} = -0.77$; $n.s.$; $d = 0.07$).

Implicit-Explicit Correlations

In Table 8.3, we present the bivariate correlations between the three SC-IAT effects and their explicit counterparts, the directly assessed types of inter-religious prejudice (*anti-Semitism*, *anti-Christian enmity*, and *Islamophobia*). While there is no significant association between implicit and explicit attitude toward Judaism (but also no other significant correlation of either implicit or explicit *anti-Semitism*), the indirect and direct measures for anti-Christian and Islamophobic prejudice are significantly positively correlated with each other ($r = .16$ for both religious traditions, $p \leq .010$). Since there are substantial numbers of Christians and Muslims in our

Table 8.2 Percentage of correct reactions, internal consistencies, mean reaction times, and general SC-IAT effects ($N = 272$)

	<i>SC-IAT Christianity</i>	<i>SC-IAT Judaism</i>	<i>SC-IAT Islam</i>
<i>% correct reactions</i>	96%	96%	95%
<i>Cronbach's α</i>	.82	.72	.78
<i>Mean reaction time (congruous)</i>	832.86 ms	771.01 ms	740.65 ms
<i>Mean reaction time (incongruous)</i>	881.60 ms	769.64 ms	752.10 ms
<i>SC-IAT effect (D_1)</i>	.11	-.01	.01

Table 8.3 Correlations of explicit and implicit attitudes ($N = 272$)

	<i>SC-IAT Judaism (implicit)</i>	<i>SC-IAT Christianity (implicit)</i>	<i>SC-IAT Islam (implicit)</i>
<i>Anti-Semitism (explicit)</i>	-.01	.01	-.08
<i>Anti-Christian enmity (explicit)</i>	.06	.16**	-.11*
<i>Islamophobia (explicit)</i>	.05	-.06	.16**

Notes *** = significant with $p \leq .001$, ** = significant with $p \leq .05$, * = significant with $p \leq .10$. SC-IAT effects have been inverted in order to parallel the polarities of direct and indirect measures. Hence, positive correlations express that higher implicit prejudice goes along with higher explicit prejudice, and lower implicit with lower explicit prejudice

sample while there is only one Jew, maybe both implicit and explicit attitudes toward Judaism have been less salient in our sample. In consequence, both indirect and direct evaluation might be rather indifferently (cf. the D_1 score for Judaism presented above), hence resulting in neutral correlations.

The D_1 score for Christianity is not correlated with any other directly assessed inter-religious prejudice, but the D_1 score for Islam is significantly inversely related to explicit *anti-Christian enmity*. Given that the majority of our sample is Christian, this finding is probably best interpreted as hint that people rejecting explicit anti-Christian statements are slightly more likely to exhibit implicit Islamophobia. Although the correlations in general are low, this is not untypical for associations between IATs and self-report measures of the same constructs (Greenwald et al., 2009; Hofmann, Gawronski, Gschwendner, Le, & Schmitt, 2005). All in all, the pattern of implicit-explicit correlations can be assumed to be plausible.

Subgroup Comparisons

Comparing the D_1 scores across the three groups of Christians, Muslims, and Nones, although scores differ slightly we find no significant differences with respect to implicit attitudes toward Judaism ($F_{(2, 272)} = 1.80$; Mean Differences $\leq .11$; *n.s.*; part. $\eta^2 = .01$) (see Fig. 8.1). However, in terms of effect size according to Cohen (1988) the difference between Christians and Nones ($d = 0.33$) can be regarded as small, but substantial. Christians display a significantly more positive implicit attitude toward their own religious tradition as compared to Nones ($F_{(2, 272)} = 4.16$; Mean Difference = .18; $p = .019$; part. $\eta^2 = .03$, $d = 0.45$). Neither Christians and Muslims (Mean Difference = .01; *n.s.*; $d = 0.01$) nor Muslims and Nones (Mean Difference = .17; *n.s.*; $d = 0.46$) differ significantly from one another in their implicit evaluation of Christianity; yet the effect sizes differ visibly, and the difference between Muslims and Nones strongly resembles the difference between Christians and Nones. Muslims also evaluate the Islamic tradition implicitly much more positive than Christians or Nones ($F_{(2, 272)} = 8.98$; Mean Difference $\geq .23$; $p \leq .001$; part.




Fig. 8.1 SC-IAT effects across distinct religious and non-religious subgroups

$\eta^2 = .06$, $d \geq 0.63$) while the latter two groups do not differ significantly in their implicit attitude toward Islam (Mean Difference = .03; *n.s.*; $d = 0.09$).

Summing up, the Christian participants seem to hold positive implicit attitudes toward their own religious tradition, while they evaluate the other two traditions rather neutrally or indifferently. Muslims display positive implicit attitudes both toward Islam and Christianity, while their implicit attitude toward Judaism appears to be neutral or indifferent. The D_1 scores for implicit attitudes toward Christianity and Islam of the Nones are also around 0, hence indicating neutral or ambivalent evaluations, while their implicit attitude toward Judaism tends to be negative.

Associations of Implicit and Explicit Inter-Religious Prejudice with Other Constructs Including Social Desirability

As already briefly mentioned above, for the following analyses of associations between the SC-IAT effects and selected directly assessed variables we exclude the Jewish and Muslim participants so that the sample size decreases to $n = 234$. As there are too few Jews and Muslims in our sample to run separate analyses for these religious groups, we do not look further on attitudes toward Christianity as the dominant religious tradition in Germany, but focus on the attitudes of the majority (Christians and Nones who have been socialized in a traditionally Christian culture) toward the religious minorities, i.e. Jews and Muslims, and, hence, exclude the latter from our sample. Table 8.4 presents the bivariate correlations between all measures involved in the following analyses.

While there are many significant correlations between the diverse direct measures (the highest centrality of religiosity and the religious schema *ttt*: $r = .77$, $p \leq .001$), there is only one correlation of the SC-IAT effects with another

Table 8.4 Correlations of measures involved in the following regression models ($n = 234$)

	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10
1. Centrality of religiosity	-.05	.12*	.77***	.20**	.07	-.14**	.04	-.07	-.05
2. Openness to change ^a	1	-.15**	-.18**	.20**	.19**	-.08	-.27***	.01	.06
3. Social desirability		1	.13*	.27***	.08	-.03	-.02	-.01	.07
4. Truth of texts and teachings (ttt)			1	.05	-.11*	.01	.17**	-.10	-.02
5. Fairness, tolerance & rational choice				1	.43***	-.26***	-.26***	.04	-.01
6. Xenophobic/inter-religious dialog					1	-.19**	-.39***	.01	-.13*
7. Anti-Semitism (explicit)						1	.52***	-.01	.00
8. Islamophobia (explicit)							1	.05	.11
9. SC-IAT Judaism (implicit) ^b								1	-.08
10. SC-IAT Islam (implicit) ^b									1

Notes *** = significant with $p \leq .001$, ** = significant with $p \leq .05$, * = significant with $p \leq .10$.^a The score of the value axis *openness to change vs. conservatism* has been inverted in order to parallel the correlations with the regression paths in the SEMs in Chapters 6 and 7. Hence, higher levels express more openness to change; ^b SC-IAT effects have been inverted in order to parallel the polarities of direct and indirect measures. Hence, positive correlations express that a certain variable is associated with higher implicit prejudice, and negative correlations indicate that a certain variable is associated with lower implicit prejudice

Table 8.5 Regression weights of predictor variables in the regression models for explicit and implicit anti-semitic and islamophobic prejudice (*n* = 234)

	<i>Anti-semitism (explicit)</i>	<i>Islamophobia (explicit)</i>	<i>SC-IAT Judaism (implicit)^b</i>	<i>SC-IAT Islam (implicit)^b</i>
<i>Centrality of religiosity</i>	-.26**	-.04	-.01	-.06
<i>Openness to change^a</i>	.00	-.17**	-.02	.10
<i>Social desirability</i>	.03	-.01	-.02	.09
<i>Truth of texts and teachings</i>	.21**	.14	-.10	.02
<i>Fairness, tolerance & rational choice</i>	-.20**	-.09	.06	.02
<i>Xenosphia/inter-religious dialog</i>	-.07	-.30***	-.02	-.15**
<i>R²</i>	.10	.21	.01	.03

Notes *** = significant with $p \leq .001$, ** = significant with $p \leq .05$, * = significant with $p \leq .10$. ^aThe score of the value axis *openness to change vs. conservation* has been inverted in order to parallel the regression weights with those in Chapters 6 and 7. Hence, higher levels express more openness to change; ^b SC-IAT effects have been inverted in order to parallel the polarities of direct and indirect measures. Hence, positive regression weights express that a certain variable predicts higher implicit prejudice, and negative regression weights indicate that a certain variable predicts lower implicit prejudice

variable which is significant by trend: The correlation between the religious schema *xenos* and implicit prejudice against Islam ($r = -.13$; $p = .055$). Since there are no other significant correlations of the SC-IAT effects, they are also unrelated to the Social Desirability Scale. While explicit anti-Semitic and Islamophobic prejudice is not correlated with social desirability, too, centrality of religiosity and *ttt* by trend ($r \geq .12$; $p \leq .071$) and *ftr* ($r = .27$; $p = .001$) are significantly positively associated with socially desirable responding. In other words: *xenos* is the only measure of religiosity in our analysis which is not at risk to be affected by socially desirable responding.

As last finding, we present the results of four parallel linear regressions wherein centrality of religiosity, *openness to change vs. conservation*, and social desirability have been entered in a first step as predictors of explicit and implicit prejudice against Jews and Muslims, and the three religious schemata *ttt*, *ftr*, and *xenos* have been included as further predictors in a second step. Hence, the regression models resemble the structure of the SEMs which we have presented in Chapters 6 and 7, and Table 8.5 comparatively presents the regression coefficients of the distinct predictors on the selected outcomes in the very same way as Tables 6.1 and 6.4 in Chapter 6 and Tables 7.4, 7.7, and 7.8 in Chapter 7.

The first two columns in Table 8.5 widely resemble findings which have also been observed in the previous chapters: While centrality of religiosity ($\beta = -.26$, $p = .012$) and *ftr* ($\beta = -.20$, $p = .008$) predict lower explicit *anti-Semitism*, *ttt* ($\beta = .21$, $p = .048$) goes along with higher levels of *anti-Semitism*. With respect to explicit *Islamophobia*, openness to change ($\beta = -.17$, $p = .007$) and *xenos* ($\beta = -.30$, $p \leq .001$) are the pre-

dictors of lower prejudice. When we turn to the last two columns of Table 8.5 now, we find that there are no significant predictors of an implicit anti-Semitic attitude at all, while implicit Islamophobic prejudice is solely predicted by *xenos* ($\beta = -.15$, $p = .041$). Hence, this is the only effect which can be observed both for the explicit and implicit component of the same type of prejudice. Social desirability does neither predict explicit nor implicit attitudes in our regression models.

Summary and Discussion of Results

We discuss our findings with regard to our four research questions and against the background of the other results of our study which are presented in other chapters of this volume.

1. With respect to the first research question, we can sum up that we found a positive, although still small D_1 score only for Christianity (.11) while the scores for Judaism and Islam did almost not differ from 0, indicating either neutral or indifferent implicit evaluations of the latter two traditions (see Table 8.2). Since all three IATs could be completed without complications and proved to be internally consistent, low scores are rather not due to problems with the procedure or insufficient measurement reliability, but should be interpreted substantially. Since the majority of our participants affiliate with Christianity or are raised in a culture with Christian background, based on the assumption that this majority in our sample immediately and without ambivalence recognize stimuli such as *church*, *Maria*, or *priest* as indicators of “their own” religious tradition a positive D_1 score in the SC-IAT on Christianity could be expected. However, since the score for the subgroup of Christians is only slightly higher ($D_1 = .15$; see Fig. 8.1) than the average score of the entire sample, our Christian participants do not seem to be too excessively or unambiguously dedicated to their own religious tradition. This makes a difference for the Muslim subgroup as Muslims expressed a somewhat higher positive implicit attitude of $D_1 = .23$ to their own tradition. The Christians’ and Nones’ on average rather neutral evaluation of Judaism and Islam may indicate that these two groups appear in general to be less inclined to extreme preferences or rejections of the other two religious traditions. As the subgroup comparison revealed, Muslims clearly showed higher preference for Islam, but also some appreciation of Christianity while they displayed no substantial implicit rejection of Judaism. At first sight, this overall pattern seems to indicate that there is rather low implicit agreement to inter-religious prejudice toward the two minority religions. However, this impression might be considered a bit more carefully when we discuss the findings in comparison to the results on explicit prejudice.
2. Our results show that significant correlations between the SC-IAT effects and the corresponding self-reports of anti-Semitic, anti-Christian, and Islamophobic prejudice could only be observed between the measures for Christianity and

Islam, but not for Judaism (see Table 8.3). That there is no correlation between measures for Judaism may be due to the distribution of adherents of the distinct religious traditions in our sample since there is only one Jewish person while there are substantial groups of Christians and Muslims.² While correlations of $r = .16$ as observed for the explicit-implicit correlations of the measures on attitudes toward Christianity and Islam appear to be rather low, they do not differ substantially from commonly found effect sizes for explicit-implicit correlations: Meta-analytic results from more than 12,000 persons show that the mean correlation between self-report measures and IATs is typically around $r = .20$ (Greenwald et al., 2009; Hofmann et al., 2005). However, beside methodological reasons for the rather low correlations, it is worth comparing the size of the means for our SC-IATs with the means for our explicit measures on inter-religious prejudice: In our Bielefeld sample, the mean values for explicit inter-religious prejudice are on a rather low level and clearly below the neutral means (which is $M = 10.0$ for the inter-religious prejudice variables with a minimum of 4.0 and a maximum of 16.0). The empirical means in our sample are $M = 6.43$ for Islamophobia, $M = 5.76$ for anti-Semitism, and $M = 6.67$ for anti-Christian enmity. Thus, the explicit mean values indicate strong rejection of all three versions of inter-religious prejudice. Therefore, if implicit measures result in rather neutral or only slightly positive attitudes, we may interpret this as hint at somewhat less unprejudiced implicit attitudes in comparison with explicit assessment. Taken together, this would suggest that reflective answering items in the questionnaire results in lower inter-religious prejudice than revealed by the SC-IAT results. This finding supports the importance of critically checking for effects of social desirable responding with regard to self-reported attitudes. We will come back to this issue when we discuss our findings with respect to our fourth research question.

3. The comparison of D_1 scores across religious and non-religious subgroups revealed that Christians showed a clear implicit preference for their own tradition while they evaluated the other two Abrahamic religions rather neutrally (see Fig. 8.1). Muslims did not only prefer Islam, but exhibited also a substantial positive implicit evaluation of Christianity which in terms of effect size differed obviously from that of the Nones. It might be that this finding to some degree reflects an appreciation of the dominant religious tradition as part of the assimilation of Muslims to the German culture. However, we have to be careful not to generalize this interpretation since it is very likely that there is a selection bias with respect to the Muslim subgroup of our participants. Almost all Muslims in

²This is a clear weakness of our study: If we had been able to include a Jewish subgroup in our sample, our analyses would have provided the opportunity to detect group-specific patterns. However, as our review of IAT studies on inter-religious attitudes and prejudice has shown, the focus throughout the last decade has been clearly on the relation between Christians and Muslims (Henry & Hardin, 2006; Park et al., 2007; Rowatt et al., 2005; Wigboldus et al., 2006) while the relation of these two groups to Jews and vice versa has been studied only sparsely (e.g. Rudman et al., 1999). Hence, future studies should lay similar emphasis on implicit attitudes in both directions: attitudes toward Jews and attitudes of Jews toward the other religions.

our study participated in response to the randomly sent invitations to households in the city of Bielefeld. Hence, many of them probably decided to participate due to their interest in a study described to investigate inter-religious attitudes. Maybe such a selection bias resulted in a subgroup of Muslims endorsing religious pluralism and open to inter-religious dialog in our sample. In contrast, Muslims rejecting other religious traditions might have decided to not participate already right after reading our invitation. The subgroup of the Nones showed neither clear positive nor obviously negative implicit attitudes to any of the three targets although their implicit evaluation of Judaism is slightly negative as compared to that of the Christian subgroup. To be fair, we have to admit that the focus of our study is limited to religious traditions while our design did not include attitudes toward secular groups like atheists or agnostics (see Streib & Klein, 2013, for a review of research on atheists, agnostics, and apostates). As our study would have been more comprehensive if a Jewish subgroup could have been recruited, it would have been more balanced if indirect and direct measures of attitudes toward a group of Nones had been included. Maybe we would have found less neutral implicit attitudes of the religious subgroups toward atheists or agnostics than we have found for the Nones toward the religious groups (Shen, et al. 2013).

4. That associations between explicit and implicit measures generally tend to be low (Greenwald et al., 2009; Hofmann et al., 2005) is clearly corroborated by the results of our correlation and regression analyses (see Tables 4 and 5): In both tables, there is only one significant explicit-implicit correlation, i.e. the correlation between the RSS subscale *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog* (*xenos*) and the D_1 score for the SC-IAT on Islam, while there are no significant associations of our implicit measures with centrality of religiosity, *openness to change vs. conservation*, or the other two religious schemata. However, our correlation analyses (see Table 8.4) clearly support the well-known observation that measures of religiosity in general tend to be associated with socially desirable responding (Sedikides & Gebauer, 2010; Trimble, 1997): The centrality of religiosity as well as two of the religious schemata assessed with the RSS (*itt* and *ptr*) showed significant correlations to the Social Desirability Scale, at least by trend. Only the religious schema *xenos* was found to be uncorrelated to socially desirable responding. This finding matches with earlier observations that concepts of open-minded, mature religiosity such as quest religiosity (Duck & Hunsberger, 1999; Rowatt & Kirkpatrick, 2002; Spilka et al., 1985; Watson et al., 1985) or post-critical belief (Duriez, 2004) are not or even inversely related to social desirability. Thus, in light of the correlational patterns presented in Table 4, some predictions in our SEMs presented in Chapters 6 and 7 may require re-interpretation: Especially the religious schema *ptr* which was found to significantly predict lower prejudice toward a number or out-groups in Chapters 6 and 7 appears to be at risk to be biased by socially desirable responding. In contrast, the diminishing effects on prejudice which we could observe for *xenos* seem to be widely independent from this risk. This impression is corroborated in our comparative regression analyses on explicit and implicit anti-Semitic and

Islamophobic prejudice (see Table 8.5): While the significant negative effect of the religious schema *fir* on explicit *anti-Semitism* is not mirrored in the regression model for implicit prejudice against Judaism (nor any other significant predictions), the diminishing effect of *xenos* on *Islamophobia* in the explicit model remains in the model predicting implicit Islamophobic prejudice (although the regression weight is somewhat smaller). As we have seen, *fir* is significantly correlated with social desirability. Since the predictive effect of *fir* on anti-Semitic prejudice is detectable only on the explicit, but not on the implicit level of cognition, self-reported fairness and tolerance concerning Jews and Judaism could be, to some extent, the result of socially desired lip services. Contrarily, a xenophobic attitude unrelated to socially desirable responding, but associated with less Islamophobia both on the explicit and implicit level of cognition is likely to be more of a habit of the xenophobic individual's heart.

Conclusion

Besides the answers we could give to our research questions so far still many questions remain open: Why is *xenos* related to lower explicit and implicit Islamophobia, but not to lower anti-Semitism—a finding which we have also observed on the explicit level on the basis of the entire sample of the Bielefeld Study on Xenophobia and Religion; maybe giving a hint that, among our respondents, Judaism might be interpreted less in terms of religion, but of culture or ethnicity (see Chapter 7)? How would the predictions look like if we would have measured not only inter-religious, but also other types of prejudice both with direct and indirect measures? And how would associations look like in other samples from differing cultural and religious backgrounds? Hence, there is much more to discover in order to disentangle the complex relationships between certain types of religiosity and prejudice, social desirability, and differing assessment procedures. With respect to our current study we might conclude that including indirect measures into research on religiosity and prejudice has, from our point of view, proven to be useful as it has given us the opportunity to triangulate our findings and to reflect the results of our self-report survey in the light of our SC-IAT results.

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Chapter 9

Values and the Value Space as a Coordinate System for Understanding Xenophobia and Inter-Religious Prejudice



Carsten Gennerich

Values can be understood as the core of personal identity (cf. Hitlin, 2003). Therefore, values influence people's attitudes toward foreigners and the inter-religious attitudes which orient relationships to people of other religious traditions. Values determine prejudice, xenophobia and xenophilia. In this chapter, the value concept of Shalom H. Schwartz is used to map the varieties of inter-religious prejudice and xenosophia.

Furthermore, values represent the basic needs of a person in her or his context of life (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003; Kasser, 2002). Additional context variables like cultural capital are also related to the value space. Therefore, the location of inter-religious attitudes in the value space allows inferences about people's processes of meaning-making in their life contexts. This information may help to develop educational programs to support xenophilia.

Theoretical Framework

This chapter is based on the value space as theoretical framework (cf. Gennerich and Ziebertz, 2016 for the following review). Empirically, we will compute and analyze correlations of various attitudes, personal characteristics and group memberships with the two basic dimensions of the value space. The resulting maps could be employed to discuss possible interventions in the fields of education and politics.

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Values and the Value Space

In the social sciences, values refer to the life orientations of individuals and cultures. Kluckhohn (1951, p. 395), for example, defines a value as

“a conception, explicit or implicit, distinctive of an individual or characteristic of a group, of the desirable that influences the selection from available modes, means, and ends of actions.”

In the majority of psychological research, the most prominent conception of values is that of a personality disposition that provides a basis for trans-situational consistency of action (Rohan, 2000). Rokeach (1973) defines values as the primary content of an individual’s identity. According to Rokeach, values function as cognitive standards for personal action. He contends that values are universal, but are differentially esteemed by individuals. Similarly, Schwartz (1994, p. 21) defines values “as trans-situational goals, varying in importance, that serve as guiding principles in the life of a person or other social entity.” Advancing Rokeach’s research, Schwartz and his colleagues address the content structure of values and hypothesize universal conflicts therein (Schwartz & Bilsky, 1987).

Schwartz (1992) documents research results from 20 countries, leading to a bipolar structure of 56 rated values in two orthogonal dimensions of ‘self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement’ and ‘openness to change vs. conservation’. The first dimension represents, with the pole of “self-transcendence,” people’s motivation “to transcend selfish concerns and promote the welfare of others” (p. 44), while, in contrast, the pole of “self-enhancement” represents people’s motivation “to enhance their own personal interest (even at the expense of others)” (p. 43). The second dimension represents, with the pole of “openness to change,” people’s motivation to follow their own interests, while, in contrast, the pole of “conservation” represents the motivation to preserve the status quo in order to maximize certainty (p. 43). Schwartz claims that these two basic dimensions describe the content structure of various types of values, which research has identified so far (see Fig. 9.1):

Benevolence represents pro-social values like concern for the welfare of people with whom one is in frequent personal contact (for example family members). *Tradition* represents values such as the “acceptance of customs and ideas that one’s culture or religion impose” (p. 10) and *conformity* emphasizes “self-restraint in everyday interaction” (p. 9). *Security* values represent collective interests like national security and social order as well as individual interests (e.g., health and a sense of belonging). *Power* represents the goal of attainment of social status and prestige (e.g., wealth, preserving my public image). *Achievement* values “emphasize demonstrating competence in terms of prevailing cultural standards” (p. 8). *Hedonism* is defined by the goal to seek “pleasure and sensuous gratification” (e.g., enjoying life). *Stimulation* represents values like excitement, novelty, and life challenges (p. 8). *Self-direction* is defined by “independent thought and action” (p. 5). *Universalism* is defined by “understanding, appreciation, tolerance, and protection for the welfare of all people and for nature” (p. 12).




Fig. 9.1 The value model of Schwartz (1992)

Figure 9.1 shows the classes of values described by Schwartz in their relation to the two orthogonal dimensions. Moving clockwise, the pole of *self-transcendence* is represented by values of universalism and benevolence. The pole of *conservation* is represented by values of conformity, tradition and security. The pole of *self-enhancement* is represented by values of power and achievement. And the pole of *openness to change* is represented by values of hedonism, stimulation and self-direction. Therefore, similar (classes of) values are located close to one another. For example, both universalism and benevolence are oriented to the welfare of others (self-transcendence). Tradition and security both seek stable life situations. Power and achievement put the emphasis on being socially appreciated, whereas self-direction and stimulation are related to newness and personal mastery. However, the segmentation in the model is a theoretical orientation; empirically the boundaries between the segments are fluent and overlapping. Nevertheless, it is important to note the assumption that all kinds of values can be sufficiently condensed by the two dimensions and that people in all cultures experience value conflicts in a comparable way by the two polarities of *conservation vs. openness to change* and *self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement*.

Empirically, the resulting circle of values represents their relationships: incompatible values are plotted far apart and similar ones are plotted close together (see Fig. 9.2 and figures in Schwartz, 1992). Multidimensional scaling replicates this circular model in terms of clusters of behaviors (Bardi & Schwartz, 2003) and with data from three rounds of the European Social Survey (Bilsky, Janik, & Schwartz, 2011). Meanwhile, Schwartz and colleagues (2012) can base their claim of a universal content structure on 344 samples from 83 countries.

Because the basis dimensions are clearly validated, additional research also provides evidence for the claim that values guide further attitudes and action. For example, they determine consumer behavior (Strack, Gennerich, & Hopf, 2008), ethical reasoning (Strack & Gennerich, 2011) and religious attitudes (Gennerich & Huber, 2006).

To sum up, we can state that values direct perception and action as guiding principles. In addition to this general statement, the theory of Schwartz offers models of how these principles can be understood. The more abstract model focuses on the two axes; the more detailed view makes use of the 10 values. In the following, we will plot the values of the respondents in our Bielefeld Study on Xenosophia and Religion according to the model of Schwartz and visualize respondents' attitudes towards the alien and related attitudes within the same plot. This will show how various attitudes toward the alien are structured in the value space.

An Overview of the Constructs to be Analyzed in the Value Space

We will now give a brief overview of the constructs that we have considered for analysis in the value space.

Tolerance of complexity (ToC) has been assessed using Radant and Dalbert's (2006, 2007) 20-item scale. *Tolerance of complexity* is a construct developed to integrate concepts such as "tolerance for ambiguity" (Frenkel-Brunswick, 1949) or "need for cognitive closure" (Webster & Kruglanski, 1994) under a common roof. Sample items of the ToC scale are "I look at complex problems as a challenge" or "I enjoy dealing with questions that do not necessarily have a definitive answer." Because the encounter with the alien leads to conflicts of belief systems and challenges taken-for-granted assumptions about the world, it can be assumed that xenosophia strongly relates to experiences of complexity. We assume that ToC correlates with universalistic values.

The scale for *Violence Legitimizing Norms of Masculinity* was developed by Enzmann and Wetzels (2003; Enzmann, Brettfeld, & Wetzels, 2004). It measures attitudes of a "culture of honor", which legitimizes violence to maintain personal reputation and honor in cases of threats to property or family and experienced insults (sample item: "A real man is ready to stand up physically to someone talking bad about his family."). In this concept, the male family role is conceptualized in a hierarchical way so that children and females have to be obedient to the father (e.g., "Since he is the father of the family, his wife and children must obey a man."). The focus of these attitudes is definitely not on the needs of other people. The focus is on one's own "honor." Therefore, we expect a clear correlation with values of self-enhancement.

Xenosophia/inter-religious dialog. The Religious Schema Scale (RSS, Streib et al. 2010) consists of three scales that measure religious styles as an advanced

concept of James Fowler’s six stages of faith: (1) *truth of texts and teachings* (ttt), *fairness, tolerance and rational choice* (ftr), and *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog* (xenos). The xenos scale, in particular, is of interest in the context of this chapter because it represents Fowler’s “conjunctive faith”, which appreciates other religious traditions and people of other religions (Streib, Hood, & Klein, 2010, p. 155). It expresses an attitude of universalism and should therefore correlate with the value segment of universalism.

Centrality of religiosity is conceptualized by Huber (2008; Huber & Huber, 2012) as the centrality of the personal religious construct system. The probability of a central position of religiosity is determined by the frequency and intensity of the activation of the personal religious construct system (Huber & Huber, 2012, p. 715). On the content level, the religious construct system is defined by five core dimensions of religiosity: intellect (e.g., degree of thinking about religious issues), ideology (e.g., belief in the existence of God), public practice (e.g., taking part in religious services), private practice (e.g., frequency of personal prayer or meditation) and religious experience (e.g., experience of divine interventions in one’s life or experience of all-connectedness) (p. 717). Because, in the case of private practice and religious experiences, the sum score integrates the higher value of the theistic resp. pantheistic version (cf. Chap. 4 this volume), *centrality of religiosity* should correlate more with values of self-transcendence than with values of conservation.

Spirituality versus religiosity: The semantic of religion is changing in society. Some people prefer the concept of spirituality to describe their religious self-concept (cf. Streib & Hood, 2016). Therefore, we included single item self-rating measures of spirituality and religiosity in our questionnaire. Previous studies indicate that “spirituality” is a more progressive self-concept that correlates with universalistic values. On the other hand, religiosity correlates predominately with values of tradition and benevolence (Streib & Gennerich, 2011, p. 42).

Worldview fundamentalism: The Structure-of-Religiosity-Test distinguishes between three facets of fundamentalism – an ideological component called exclusivism, an ethical component called dualism and a social component called cohesion (Huber, 2008, p. 123). Religious pluralism is conceptualized as an oppositional attitude structure to fundamentalist attitudes (p. 122). In order to substantialize the measure of fundamentalism, the sum score in this chapter integrates exclusivism, dualism, cohesion and the inverted measure of pluralism. Furthermore, the measure broadens Huber’s phrasing from “religious” to “worldview” fundamentalism so that both religious and nonreligious people can answer the questions. Based on previous results (Gennerich & Huber, 2006), we expect fundamentalism to correlate most positively with the pole of conservation.

Prejudice: Feather and McKee (2008, p. 80) state that “the analysis of prejudice as it relates to a person’s specific value priorities” is relatively neglected in the extensive literature on prejudice. However, they found a meaningful correlation pattern (p. 86). Prejudice toward Australian Aborigines correlates positively with values of *power* ($r = .38$) and *security* ($r = .23$) and negatively with *universalism* ($r = -.25$) and *benevolence* ($r = -.37$). Similarly, Gennerich (2010, p. 114–115) shows with two representative samples of German adolescents that various types of

prejudice (e.g., prejudice towards Greeks, Turks, homosexuals, families with a disabled child) correlates positively with the value region of *power* and *security* values and negatively with the region of *universalism*. Therefore, we expect that *anti-Semitism*, *Islamophobia*, *anti-black racism*, *general racism*, *sexism* and *homophobia* will show a correlative pattern resulting in a location in the area bottom right in the value space.

Anti-Christian Enmity: This concept could also be considered to be prejudice. However, our German sample is situated in a predominantly Christian culture. Therefore, an anti-Christian attitude has a different character in comparison to negative attitudes toward minorities. An anti-Christian attitude is directed against tradition and conformity. Prejudice against minorities results from experiences of insecurity about one's own status in society and is closely related to security values as argued above. Based on earlier results, we expect that *anti-Christian enmity* correlates with the pole of self-enhancement and is located more on the left side than prejudice against minorities (Streib & Gennerich, 2011, p. 52).

Political preferences: Huber and Inglehart (1995) show that for most experts the left-right distinction captures the meaning of party differences. However, some explicitly note that "xenophobia" is a crucial category of difference between the parties. Therefore, we address party preferences in our study. There have been dynamic changes in Germany's political landscape. In 2013, a new, probably right-wing party was established: the AfD (Alternative für Deutschland/Alternative for Germany). The party is evidently a populist party. However, it is yet unclear whether the party is positioned at the extreme right or not (Lewandowsky, 2015). Therefore, we try to explore the relationship of party preferences to the value space. Additionally, we will consider the relationship of right-left-orientations to the value dimensions. Conceptually, right-wing ideologies are described by (a) a resistance to change/a preference for traditionalism, (b) acceptance of inequality/hierarchy, (c) cultural and economic conservatism (Thorisdottir, Jost, Liviatan, & Shrout, 2007, p. 177–179). The psychological needs underlying the preference for right-wing orientations are the needs for security and for order and rule-following, whereas people preferring left-wing orientations show openness to experience (Thorisdottir et al., 2007, 180–181). Interestingly, on the empirical level, the need for security is related to right-wing orientation only in Western European countries, whereas the need for security is related to left-wing orientation in Eastern Europe (Thorisdottir et al., 2007, p. 198). In sum, based on this reasoning, the AfD should be located on the right side of the value space.

On the other hand, the Green Party (Grüne) represents universalistic values (cf. Probst, 2013). Therefore, the Green Party will probably represent the left pole of the continuum. Furthermore, the "Left Party" (Die Linke) is associated with the left pole by its name. However, the predecessor to the "Left Party" was the only legal party in the former "German Democratic Republic" (GDR) for which people were forced to vote by the communist regime. Therefore, the "Left Party" does not necessarily represent the left side of the continuum because voting for the "Linke" could be a tradition in the eastern parts of Germany, especially for voters with values of tradition. In conclusion, the Green Party and the AfD should locate on opposing

poles of the left-right continuum. The left pole should be related to values of universalism and the right pole to values of security and power.

However, there is an alternative view of the left-right polarity of the parties. Sidanius (1988) argues that every extreme political position (i.e., independent from left or right) requires a high degree of intellectual sophistication because the positioning in distance from the (conservative) mainstream needs to be elaborated. Additionally, it requires a feeling of security to posit one's beliefs and distance oneself from the mainstream. Because this is true for extreme right and left political opinions, the extreme poles of the left-right polarity may also be related to openness to change. Therefore, it is difficult to formulate a clear expectation. The "right" pole may be located on the conservation side of the value space or on the side of openness to change. The results of our study will have to decide about these possibilities.

Belonging to religious and denominational groups: Members of churches, mosques or other religious organizations form milieus with distinct value patterns. For example, in previous studies, members of Muslim faith groups in Germany have been positioned close to the pole of conservation (Feige & Gennerich, 2008, p. 122; Gennerich, 2010, p. 61), while members of "free churches (Freikirchen)" seem to prefer values of benevolence (Feige & Gennerich, 2008, p. 122; Gennerich, 2010, p. 61). In contrast, religiously unaffiliated young people tend to prefer values of self-determination, stimulation, hedonism and achievement (Gennerich, 2014, p. 239). Catholics and members of the "Evangelical Church in Germany" are less profiled and show no distinct value pattern (cf. Gennerich, 2010, p. 61).

Cultural and economic capital is computed by the international standard devices. Education is measured according to ISCED (1997) and UNESCO (2006). Vocational training is also measured according to ISCED 1997. A combined measure of cultural capital groups was calculated by the OECD Factbook 2010 (OECD, 2011). Economic capital was measured by the average annual per capita income of the family. Therefore, the questionnaire asked for the number of household members with and without income and for the family income in order to calculate the per capita income. The average annual per capita income was calculated by the family income divided by the root of the household size (i.e., unweighted mean per capita income according to the Statistisches Bundesamt, 2008). With reference to previous results, we expect that cultural and economic capital correlates most with values of self-direction and universalism (Gennerich, 2010, p. 55–60).

All in all, there are convincing reasons for relevant correlation of the listed variables with the two value dimensions of the Schwartz value concept. The assumed relationships mainly represent the diagonal axis of values of *universalism* and *self-determination* (upper left) opposing values of *security* and *power* (bottom/right). To check our assumption, we computed the value space as a basis for exploring the assumed relationships. The next section describes the procedures used.

Method

Measures

To measure personal values we used Schwartz' (2003) Portrait Values Questionnaire (PVQ), which was included in a shortened version in the World Value Survey and consists of one item for each value class. This 10-Item PVQ version may not be optimal for a detailed construction of the value space because there is only one item for each segment of the value space (Wetzel, 2010); however, in our study it is sufficient that the poles of the two basic dimensions are measured in a valid way. This is guaranteed by computing the value space in the following steps.

First, the scores on all 10 value variables were ipsatized, i.e., the mean score of all 10 items is computed, and this mean is subtracted from each single item value. Second, the 10 ipsatized value items are factor analyzed. Third, the factor loadings of Table 9.1 are plotted in Fig. 9.2.

Figure 9.2 shows that the pole of *self-transcendence* is represented by *universalism* and *benevolence*. This is consistent with Schwartz' theory. However, *universalism* and *benevolence* are not well differentiated. An exact fit to the theory would require that *benevolence* be located closer to the right side of the value space. The opposite pole of *self-enhancement* is represented by *power*. This is also in line with the theory. However, *achievement* is located rather close to the middle of the value space. In summary, our pattern with slight deviations in the details has to be attributed to the use of the 10-item PVQ version in our questionnaire since, in other samples, a very similar pattern to Wetzel is observed (cf. Wetzel, 2010). Nevertheless, the basic dimension *self-transcendence vs. self-enhancement* is adequately represented by the items.

The second dimension, *openness to change vs. conservation*, is represented very well because *tradition* and *security* represent the pole of *conservation*. Additionally, in line with Schwartz' theory, *security* is located slightly closer to the *self-enhancement* pole, and *tradition* and *conformity* slightly closer to the *self-transcendence* pole. Similarly, the pole *openness to change* is mainly represented by *stimulation* and *self-direction*. The differentiation of both items on the vertical dimension is also in line with Schwartz's theory. All in all, we have a valid measurement of the value space.

Sample

The total sample of German citizens used in our analyses is made up of 1534 respondents. The total sample, however, consists of three subsamples (see Chap. 4 for details): The Bielefeld Sample ($N = 272$), a sample largely representative to the general population from August 2015 ($N = 637$), and a sample largely representative

Table 9.1 Factor loadings of the ipsatized value items on the two factors

Correlation/Factor loadings (ipsatized values)	Self-Transcendence	Conservation
<i>Self-direction</i>	.38	-.56
<i>Power</i>	-.76	-.10
<i>Security</i>	-.10	.68
<i>Hedonism</i>	-.23	-.33
<i>Benevolence</i>	.66	-.09
<i>Achievement</i>	-.37	-.23
<i>Stimulation</i>	-.25	-.68
<i>Conformity</i>	.05	.65
<i>Universalism</i>	.73	.04
<i>Tradition</i>	.08	.45

Note Principal component analysis with varimax rotation based on $N = 1534$ cases




Fig. 9.2 Factor loadings of the 10 ipsatized value items in the two-factor value space

to the general population from March 2016 ($N = 625$). The value space is based on the total sample (cf. Fig. 9.2) as are the correlations plotted in Fig. 9.3. For Fig. 9.4, we also use the factor scores computed for the total sample. However, the party preferences of the respondents in Fig. 9.4 were measured only in March 2016.

Similarly, the comparison of the two general population samples in Fig. 9.5 is based on the factor scores of the total sample; however, only the two groups of interest are plotted with their factor scores.

The sample includes five religious and denominational groups with a substantial number of respondents. 456 respondents are members of the “Protestant Church in Germany (EKD)”, 349 respondents belong to the Catholic Church, 70 respondents are members of a “free church (Freikirche)”, 52 respondents belong to a Muslim tradition, and 537 respondents are without religious affiliation. Figure 9.6 documents the position of these groups in the value circle.

Procedures

To compute the location of various attitudes or individual cases in the value space we employ several steps. First, the factor scores of a factor analysis of the ten value items with two extracted factors are saved as new variables in the dataset. Second, for individuals and certain groups, the factors scores or the mean factor scores can be plotted in the space (cf. Fig. 9.4 and Fig. 9.5). Third, correlations of single items or scales with the two factor-score variables can be computed and plotted (see Fig. 9.3).

Results

Xenosophic and Xenophobic Attitudes in the Value Space: Is There a General Pattern of Xenosophia?

The survey contains a broad range of scales related to xenosophia on the one hand and to xenophobia at the other hand (cf. Chap. 4 this volume). We correlated them all to the two value dimensions of the Schwartz theory. By plotting them in a graph they are located in the value space.

Figure 9.3 shows the correlation of various xenophobic and xenophilic attitudes with the two dimensions of the value space. The *norms of masculinity (VLNM)* locate clearly at the pole of self-enhancement (marked brown in the figure). The other scale with a rather extreme location is *tolerance of complexity* (green) in the upper left quadrant together with the two subscales *necessity of complexity* and *challenge of complexity*, while its opposite pole, *burden of complexity*, is located in the area of security values.

The *worldview fundamentalism* scale and subscales (blue) are positioned on an axis spanned by tolerance of complexity with its anti-pole burden of complexity. However, their position in the middle indicates that they correlate less strongly with the value dimensions. Similarly, the subscales of the Religious Schema Scale (RSS,




Fig. 9.3 Correlation of xenophobic and xenophilic attitudes with the two dimensions of the value space (N = 1534)

marked red) plot on the diagonal axis between *tolerance of complexity* with subscales *necessity* and *challenge* and their opposite subscale *burden of complexity*. This fits the original logic of Fowler’s faith development theory intended to be represented by the measure of schemata in the RSS (cf. Streib et al., 2010) because the developmental goal of the classical theories of religious development is autonomy (Schweitzer, 1999). Autonomy as a value belongs to the class of self-determination values with its opposite value class of security (cf. Fig. 9.1). Thus, the diagonal axis is represented by these measures. In consequence, fundamentalism and prejudice characterize rather simple worldview structures whereas developed structures represent more adequately the complex multifaceted structure of reality. In this line and as a prototypical example of prejudice, *Islamophobia* locates in the area of power values, whereas the items of a welcoming culture locate close to the scale of *worldview pluralism*. The other prejudice scales, *homophobia*, *sexism*, *anti-Semitism*, *general racism* and *anti-black racism* locate between the sum scores of *norms of masculinity* and *worldview fundamentalism*. This indicates the need of people preferring these attitudes to find security and status in a complex and challenging world.

Centrality of religiosity correlates only with *self-transcendence*. This is a result of the prescription to compute this construct. Centrality is computed optionally with

meditation (instead of prayer) and pantheism (instead of theism) if a person prefers these expressions of religiosity. Assuming, in line with former research, that meditation is located on the upper left side and theistic prayer on the upper right side of the value space (Gennerich, 2010, p. 164), the position in the middle of the dimension *openness to change vs. conservation* is the resultant of the two religious options with its different value tendencies. In consequence, religiosity as measured by the *centrality of religiosity* scale is independent from the horizontal dimension of *openness to change versus conservation*.

The single item self-rating measures of *spirituality and religiosity* differentiate again the rather neutral position of *centrality of religiosity* on the dimension of *conservation vs. openness to change*. *Spirituality* is perceived as more open to change, while *religiosity* is perceived as more conservative, which corresponds to the location of *truth of text and teachings* that is also perceived as even more conservative, as is *religious fundamentalism*.

Anti-Christian enmity is clearly an expression of atheistic attitudes; it locates, along with the item "I would call myself an atheist," in the bottom left quadrant in opposition to the item of religiosity.

The resulting positions of the scales in the value space reveal that xenosophia is only partly supported by *tolerance of complexity*. *Tolerance of complexity* locates more toward the pole of *openness to change*, whereas *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog* and xenophilic attitudes are located closer to the pole of *self-transcendence*. Xenosophia appears to be more directly characterized by *centrality of religiosity* and self-transcendent values. But xenosophia appears to be located opposite to the *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity*.

In summary, the results show that xenosophia and xenophobia span a vector space from the upper left area to the bottom right area of the value space. This indicates that the degree of xenosophia is rather independent of the preference for theistic beliefs. We have to call to mind that previous results show positive relationships between religiosity and prejudice (Glick, Lameiras, & Castro, 2002; Hunsberger, 1995; Johnson, Brem, & Alford-Keating, 1997; Konig, Eisinga, & Scheepers, 2000; Scheepers, Gijsberts, & Helo, 2002). These findings may suggest that atheistic attitudes are preferable in order to gain a peaceful society without enmity to out-groups (cf. Dawkins, 2006). However, the value space analysis shows that the positive correlations between religiosity and prejudice can be explained by a common part of variance (i.e., conservation). On the other hand, atheism is not the solution because atheism also shares a common part of variance with prejudice (i.e., self-enhancement). In this line, recent research demonstrates that atheists show patterns of prejudice that are similar to those of religious people (cf. Kossowska, Czernatowicz, & Sekerdej, 2017). The way in which one is religious is especially relevant to prejudice: Duriez (2004) shows that a literal understanding of religious texts (in our case measured with *ttt*) correlates with prejudice but not the inclusion of transcendence in one's belief system (cf. *centrality of religiosity* in Fig. 9.3). In order to foster xenosophia, it is not a question, therefore, of being religious or not. It is important to cultivate a more spiritual worldview based on a plurality of perspectives on questions of truth.

Left-Right-Positioning and the German Political Parties in the Value Space: Was there a Value Shift between 2015 and 2016?

We plotted the right-left orientations based on the rated categories (left, rather left, middle, rather right, right) as well as the party preferences of the respondents in the sample from March 2016 in the value space of Fig. 9.4. The results indicate the meaning of “right” and “left” in the political debate and show the milieus by which the main German political parties may be elected.

Figure 9.4 shows that the polarity of right and left is situated mainly on the vertical dimension of *self-transcendence versus self-enhancement*. The response category “middle” is positioned almost in the middle of the value field. However, according to the theory of Jost, Glaser and Kruglanski (2003), the left-right distinction should correlate with the dimension of *openness to change vs. conservation* because conservatism is theorized as cognition to serve the needs of security in the face of threats. However, other research shows that there is no direct effect




Fig. 9.4 Factor scores of the value dimensions for the groups of party preference at the opinion poll and left-right positioning (five categories) (General Population March 2016, N = 625)

of *openness* on the right-left political orientation (Thorisdottir et al., 2007, p. 198). Thorisdottir and colleagues (p. 199) argue that *openness to change* is associated only with the extreme poles of right and left wing orientation. The association is therefore quadratic. This fits the idea that deviation from the political mainstream requires a high degree of sophistication and creativity independent of the direction (cf. Sidanius, 1988). The results of Piurko, Schwartz and Davido (2011) are similar in some respects but also different. They found that left orientations are positively related to the value of *universalism* and in the same degree to *benevolence*. This matches our results. However, in their study, right orientations are associated with *conformity* and *tradition*. Their measure of right orientations or their sample most likely only captures moderate forms of right (“rather right”).

Therefore, the sympathizers with the new populist and xenophobic party take a rather pronounced position. The AfD is located in the area of achievement values close to the pole of self-enhancement. The closest other party to the AfD is the FDP. Both parties emphasize values of self-enhancement: The FDP emphasizes economic liberalism in combination with hedonistic values (cf. Vorländer, 2013, p. 504), whereas the AfD emphasizes a national-liberal ideology (cf. Berbuir, Lewandowsky, & Siri, 2016, p. 155).

As a populist party, the AfD theoretically includes “a great deal of anti-pluralism” (Berbuir et al., 2016, p. 156). This fits the result that the AfD is located in direct opposition to xenophobic attitudes (cf. Fig. 9.3) and that 68% of AfD sympathizers agree with the statement that “Islam is not compatible with the values of the Federal Republic of Germany” (Berbuir et al., 2016, S. 171). Additionally, “the people” are constructed in opposition to the “elites” and the political establishment (Berbuir et al., 2016, p. 156). This implies that AfD sympathizers understand themselves as individuals with rather low societal status or as being excluded by the political mainstream.

The Green Party (Grüne) has its core competence in the field of environmental protection (Probst, 2013, p. 528). Similar to the majority of its voters, this value is located in the upper left quadrant. The Left Party (Die Linke) also shows a clear value profile. Its voters prefer self-transcendent values. In contrast to research that classifies “Die Linke” as an extremist party, our results show rather moderate attitudes of the voters (cf. Pfahl-Traugher, 2013, p. 552). The party itself is shaped by various influences. It is the party that represents the citizens in the eastern part of Germany (the former GDR) and it is an anti-capitalist party that addresses people disadvantaged by the processes of societal modernization (cf. p. 557).

The SPD is located in the middle of the field. Analyses show that over time the party has developed an openness to all occupational groups, whereas in the 1950s, it was the party of the workers (Spier & von Alemann, 2013, p. 458). The CDU locates itself in the middle-right area of the political system (Zolleis & Schmidt, 2013, p. 415). This fits the political self-understanding of its voters as well.

In summary, the analysis of party preferences shows, similar to the left-right distinction, more variance on the polarity of *self-transcendence* vs. *self-*

Table 9.2 Party preferences in August 2015 and May 2016: Votes in percent “if an election were to take place next Sunday” (Forschungsgruppe Wahlen 2015, 2016)

German Parties	August 2015	May 2016
<i>CDU/CSU</i>	42	35
<i>SPD</i>	26	23
<i>Linke</i>	9	8
<i>Grüne</i>	10	12
<i>FDP</i>	4	6
<i>AfD</i>	3	12

enhancement than on the polarity of *conservation vs. openness to change*. Related to the left-right distinction, the Green Party is most clearly on the left pole. The “Left Party” is slightly less left than the Green Party and is close to the category “rather left”. The SPD is closest to the middle category. The CDU/CSU locates between “rather right” and “middle”. The FDP is closest to the category “rather right”. The AfD is the party closest to the right pole and is located between the categories “right” and “rather right”. This new German party basically represents values of self-enhancement.

These patterns of party preferences are of interest in our context of xenosophia because between August 2015 and May 2016 there was a significant shift in the German political landscape (see Table 9.2): The AfD achieved 12% popularity. This shift is to be attributed to Merkel’s invitation, on April 9, 2015, to Syrian refugees to enter Germany without registering and her further justifications in September 2015 for interpreting formulations in the German asylum law as those of a culture of welcome. In consequence, the number of Syrian refugees grew rapidly, leading to experiences of uncertainty and attitudes of Islamophobia in the population. Is it possible to document this development as a value shift in the two samples of the general population? Figure 9.5 shows the answer to this question.

Figure 9.5 shows that there was a value shift between August 2015 and March 2016 in the general population of Germany. At the same time there was a shift to more *openness to change* and toward *self-enhancement*. This shift contradicts the expectation that experiences of uncertainty and threat motivate more conservative attitudes (Jost, Glaser, Kruglanski, & Sulloway, 2003). We can refine this theoretical expectation. Political conservatism in the sense of the extreme right has a tendency toward supporting *openness to change* because groups with right wing attitudes fight against the political system. Therefore, in Fig. 9.4, the step from “middle” to “rather right” and then to “right” is likely a shift to more *self-enhancement* and *openness to change*. In other words, the value shift from August 2015 to March 2016 can be interpreted as a development from a CDU-position to an AfD-position. It seems that the experiences of threat activate values of self-enhancement and relativize ethical standards of religious traditions (i.e., support of foreigners).




Fig. 9.5 Factor scores of the value dimensions for the two samples of the general population in August 2015 and March 2016

Religious and Denominational Groups in the Value Space

In addition to groups of voters, we are very interested in how the religious and denominational groups scatter in the value circle. The representative sample of the general population provides a solid basis for the analysis of this question. They can be plotted in the value space based on the mean factor scores of the religious groups (see Fig. 9.6).

Figure 9.6 shows the factor scores for the two value dimensions for the five main religious and denominational groups. The “free churches (Freikirchen)” are located close to the pole of *self-transcendence* on the right side. This result reproduces results similar to data from the Shell-Youth study 2002 in Germany (Gennerich, 2010, p. 61). “Free churches” in Germany are characterized by extended forms of mutual social support.

The Muslim groups are the most conservative in our selection. However, in comparison with Catholics, there are only small differences on the dimension *conservation vs. openness to change*. Members of the main Protestant church (“Protestant Church in Germany”, EKD) are located close to the middle of the space with a small tendency in the upper right direction. The group without affiliation locates in the




Fig. 9.6 Factor scores of the value dimensions for the five main religious and denominational groups in the sample ($N = 1534$)

bottom left quadrant. This also matches previous analyses (Gennerich, 2010, p. 61; Gennerich, 2014, p. 238–239).

All in all, the general position of the religious groups in comparison to people without religious affiliation is the upper right quadrant. Relating this result to the value shift documented in Fig. 9.5 and the growth of the AfD, the religious groups are a counterforce against tendencies of extremism in society. Additionally, the religious pluralization of society brought about by the arrival of mainly Muslim Syrian migrants evidently does not foster religious commitments – otherwise the value shift should be in the opposite direction in the upper right. Therefore, religious traditions are not perceived as a resource for solving the refugee crisis. As can be seen, there is also no religious group located in the upper left quadrant. This indicates that a culture of xenosophia is not in the general focus of the religious groups. However, a culture may be developed out of religious traditions because they help to maintain ethical standards which seem to be eroding in context of the perceived crisis with the refugees.

Economic and Cultural Capital in the Value Space

Jost and colleagues (2003) show that prejudice and attitudes like *worldview fundamentalism* correlate with experiences of insecurity and threats. We expect that resources such as economic and cultural capital will buffer experiences of insecurity and threats because education helps people to adapt to new situations more easily based on a flexible and open mind. Additionally, economic resources allow people to change their situation, for example, by moving to a more secure neighborhood. Fig. 9.7 shows the correlation of our measures of capital in the value space.

Figure 9.7 shows that, according to the ISCED 1997, educational level locates in the upper left quadrant. Similarly, the level of vocational training correlates with the upper left quadrant. The combined measure of cultural capital according to the OECD Factbook 2010 shows the same clear location. Furthermore, we measured the average annual per capita income, which correlates mainly with the pole of openness to change and locates in the upper part of the bottom left quadrant. Therefore, the results on cultural capital fit our hypothesis. The average annual per capita income correlates well to our hypothesis with openness to change. However,




Fig. 9.7 Correlation of various measures of economic and cultural capital with the dimensions of the value space ($N = 1534$)

we also expected a correlation with values of self-transcendence, which is not the case in our sample.

On the whole, the results correspond to the theory of Jost and colleagues: Economic and cultural capital mainly correlates with the pole of openness to change. However, education shows a slight correlation with self-transcendence as well. In relation to xenosophia, the average per capita income is located orthogonally and also shows a rather small direct correlation ($r = .06$). However, education is located close to xenosophia and also shows a clear direct correlation ($r = .16$). In sum, education shows up as a relevant factor for achieving an attitude of xenosophia.

Individuals in the Value Space

In the following section of this chapter, we will analyze a selection of participants with whom we conducted personal interviews, with the focus on their xenosophic development. The selected cases in Fig. 9.8 represent all quadrants of the value space. The interviewees analyzed in later chapters of this book (Nina, Henry, Cemal,




Fig. 9.8 Factor scores of both value dimensions for the 27 interviewees

Robert) are highlighted by italics and red color; two additional cases (Annegret, Veronika), which are only briefly introduced in this chapter, are highlighted by green color. Originally, the red cases were selected according to the typology that is explained in Chap. 10. Using the factor scores of both value dimensions each interviewee is positioned in Fig. 9.8 in the value space.

Nina F., a 26-year old student of social sciences with a special focus on social work, clearly locates in the upper left quadrant, which is characterized by values of self-determination and universalism, thus this quadrant is the location for high *tolerance of complexity*, welcome for refugees and preference for the RSS subscales *fairness, tolerance, and rational choice* and *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog*, as Fig. 9.3 demonstrates. The case study about Nina in Chap. 12 substantiates Nina's position in this quadrant of the value space. Nina is an example for the path to xenosophia based on experiences on the interpersonal level: Nina was raised as a child of a bicultural marriage in South America and Germany, she had experiences in two different cultures, but when she moved to Germany as a teenager, she felt being alienated from her peers. Based on and with reference to these experiences, Nina rejects simple-mindedness and stereotypes about outgroups.

The next case, Henry G., locates close to Nina in the upper left quadrant as well. Like Nina, he is an example of a biographical path toward xenosophia, but, as the case study in Chap. 14 demonstrates, Henry's xenosophia emerged from experiences of estrangement and oppression on the institutional level. Born in a country in Southeast Asia with a Buddhist majority culture, he characterizes his socialization as multi-religious. His mother was a Buddhist who converted to Islam and his father was a Muslim. However, he went to a private Catholic school with which his aunt was affiliated. Resembling his multi-religious family situation, Henry mentions that the people in his country of origin "celebrate together, they do everything together" independent of their religious beliefs. After Henry experienced persecution for his political work, he came, after a long odyssey through Southeast Asia, finally to Germany as a refugee. However, he also puts emphasis on a great deal of social support he experienced in this time of threat and struggle. As a consequence of these experiences and in a kind of development of post-traumatic growth, he has developed open-mindedness and altruism.

Robert T. is 50 years old. He studied religious science, completing a master's degree and a Ph.D. He describes himself as a religious person impressed by experiences in nature. In accord with his high scores on *openness to change*, Robert explored Buddhism and other religions already as an adolescent and experienced a breakthrough to his current Buddhist religion or spirituality. He proudly mentions that he is a member of both the Catholic Church and the German Buddhist Union. He is also open-minded about the relationship between the Catholic and Protestant churches. As a Catholic, he sympathizes with the Protestant understanding of the Eucharist and was also willing to become the godfather of a Protestant child. Even more, he is actively involved in an organization of intercultural learning and claims to learn from people of other faiths. All in all, the inter-religious development in his biography is primarily based on the individual level: on his open personality, his intellectual curiosity for strange religions, and his religious and mystical experi-

ences. This generally fits with his location in the value space with high values for *openness to change*.

Cemal K. is a 22-year-old second-generation white collar employee who grew up in a Turkish immigrant family. When Cemal decided to live with his German girlfriend, this provoked a strong conflict with his father, who did not talk to him for 2 years. As detailed in the full case study in Chap. 13, Cemal had to negotiate the conflicting demands of the larger German society and the tradition of his family and the milieu of the Turkish immigrant community. In consequence, he is well aware of the societal pluralism in Germany and reflects on the tensions between his strivings for independence and the expectations of his family and milieu, and appreciates the recent rapprochement with his father. Unlike the majority of other Muslim respondents, who locate in the upper right quadrant of the value space, Cemal appears to prefer values of hedonism and to reject values of tradition. At the same time, he considers achievement and conformity to be important values and shows no appreciation for universalism. The resulting position in the value space is the bottom left quadrant. However, as the case study in Chap. 13 demonstrates, Cemal has developed an attitude of religious tolerance. He claims that every person should decide independently on their own beliefs. He constructs a kind of functional perspective: Allah, God, Buddha or other higher powers are resources to gain energy that is otherwise not accessible. Thus Cemal agrees with an ethical attitude that nobody should harm other people with his or her beliefs. In this respect, he distances himself from his parents, who used references to God to put restrictions on him and to enforce conformity. Cemal's trajectory can be understood as dealing with the challenges of different milieus and the conflicting traditions of these milieus which leads to a relativization of traditional norms (low preference for tradition) and strong plea for tolerance and for support for those who struggle with such tasks. And Cemal develops an ethics of dialog that does not permit over-hasty and downgrading interpretation, but requires an approach of tentativeness and hermeneutical humility. This substantiates Cemal's position in the value space.

Annegret K. belongs to the Protestant Church in Germany. She is married and has two adoptive children, one biological child, and a grandchild. She describes herself as taking good care of her children, her grandchild and also, in the past, of her father-in-law and a neighbor who were in need of care. As the questionnaire results indicate, Annegret's score on the RSS subscale *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog* is 20.0, which is clearly above the average (range from 5 to 25; mean value in the total sample is $M = 15.93$). Correspondingly, Annegret's indices for inter-religious prejudice are rather low: her score on *Anti-semitism* is 4.0 (range: 4 to 16, mean value in the total sample: $M = 6.93$), also her score on *Islamophobia* is low (5.0 in a range of 4 to 16, with a mean value in the total sample of $M = 8.88$), and finally her score on *general racism* is 4.0 (range: 3 to 12, mean value in the total sample: $M = 6.85$). These values are similar to Nina and Henry, which shows that low scores on (inter-religious) prejudice are also possible for a person with rather conservative values. In the case of Annegret, this can be eventually explained by her belief system. In the interview, she relates to ultimate and inclusive concepts like "cosmos," "large community," "humankind," and "universe." These categories,

which she links to the theological concept of creation, are employed as a foundation of a universal principle of humanity and of similarity of all human beings. For example, she argues that “we all... can show negative traits under certain conditions—this is how evil comes into the world.” Evil, therefore, is not attributed to outgroups. She also demonstrates tolerance of complexity when she argues that “life is so complex” that no decision is unambiguous. She mentions that every decision “is accompanied by risks and adverse effects.” Correspondingly, Annegret formulates a pluralistic theological position in relation to Islam and Judaism. She argues that “it is not necessary to decide whether Allah is the better God or our God or the God of Judaism.” From her perspective, it is possible to communicate and cooperate with each other and to say “your opinion is this and I have that opinion, that’s it.” Because there is not one single correct answer, she pleads for a culture of acceptance. In summary, people with low (inter-religious) prejudice are not only to be found in the quadrant of self-direction values and universalism. The quadrant in the upper/right with its values of benevolence and tradition may also be a suitable region for the development of an attitude with low inter-religious prejudice.

Veronika E. is located in the extreme corner of the bottom right quadrant in the area of power values. This value preference she also indicates in the interview where she explains that she has only occasional jobs and emphasizes “I wish to have more money and so on”. With reference to Fig. 9.3 and her value position we have to ask therefore: Is she highly prejudiced against other religions, worldviews and cultures? Her questionnaire results show that this is not the case, except for Islam. Her values are 4.0 on *anti-Semitism*, 6.0 on *anti-Christian enmity*, 2.0 on *anti-black racism*, but 9.0 on *Islamophobia*. Except for *Islamophobia*, these values are below average. In the case of her *Islamophobia*, the value is slightly above average. In the interview she explains her prejudice against Muslims: “I am prejudiced against Muslims and this... is possibly due to the fact that I don’t know any Muslims personally”—which indicates some degree of self-reflection and her ability to analyze her own prejudices. Therefore, her prejudice may be probably open to change. Her extreme position in the value space makes Veronika a puzzling case, because, as Fig. 9.3 shows, the lower right quadrant is the location for all kinds of prejudice. A possible hypothetical explanation may be that she has independent from her preference for materialistic values special resources of self-reflection as an upper secondary level of education (see Fig. 9.7) and psychotherapy. Therefore, struggling for status (e.g. money) not necessarily leads to unchangeable prejudices.

Taken together, the interpretation of these selected cases in the framework of the value space indicates that it may be generally true that people high in *xenosophilia/inter-religious dialog* such as our interviewees Nina, Henry and Robert are located in the upper left quadrant of the value space. But this quadrant may not necessarily be the location for all people with high xenophobic attitude. Cases such as Veronika, who locates in the bottom right, but shows no clear xenophobic attitude, and Annegret, who locates in the upper right and shows xenophobic attitudes (very likely based on her theological reasoning) and Cemal who is located in the quadrant bottom left, may remind us that an interpretation and thus a typology should not be based on a single scale measure and that there may be more variety in the cases

which only can be revealed by in-depth-interpretation and by multi-method triangulation in case study elaboration.

Discussion and Conclusion

The results of our value space analysis (Fig. 9.3) reveal that xenosophia may be part of a larger syndrome of attitudes which express values of universalism. *Xenosophia/inter-religious dialog* locates close to *tolerance of complexity* in the upper left quadrant of the value space. It seems that xenosophia is determined by self-transcendent values like love and the ability to deal with complexity. On the other hand, prejudice is located in the area of values of *power* and *security*. It is closely related to the experience that complexity is a burden and close to the preference for *norms of masculinity*. Furthermore, xenosophia is rather closely related to *centrality of religiosity* and is positioned in opposition to *anti-Christian prejudice*.

Additionally, we located political groups in the value space based on party preferences (Fig. 9.4). Voters for the Green Party and the Left Party express universalistic values and xenophobic attitudes. Voters for the rather conservative parties (CDU/CSU, FDP and AfD) locate closer to the section of the space where prejudice is located. The AfD is located especially close to attitudes of anti-Christian enmity. And indeed their voters show above average *anti-Christian enmity* ($M = 7.92$; $S = 2.55$; range 4–16; mean of the total sample $M = 7.55$). In their case, their highest values on *Islamophobia* ($M = 13.21$; $S = 3.61$; range 4–16; mean of the total sample $M = 8.88$) could be based on a general anti-religious attitude. Of all of the parties, the AfD is indeed the party with the least religious voters (*centrality of religiosity*: $M = 9.86$; $S = 4.92$; range 5–25; mean of the total sample $M = 12.14$). Additionally, the AfD is also the party with the highest *anti-Semitism* among its voters ($M = 9.10$; $S = 2.98$; range 4–16; mean of the total sample $M = 6.93$). However, the voters of the AfD also show the highest values on other prejudices such as *general racism* ($M = 8.86$; $S = 2.32$; range 3–12; mean of the total sample $M = 6.85$) and *anti-black racism* ($M = 4.30$; $S = 1.51$; range 2–8; mean of the total sample $M = 3.23$). Therefore, the effect seems to be based on a more general strategy of constructing one's own status by devaluing outgroups. In sum, the voters of the AfD are the group with the highest values on xenophobic attitudes. This fits to the results of Fig. 9.3, where xenophobic attitudes are located in the area of power values at the pole of self-enhancement, and to Fig. 9.4 in which the AfD is located together with "rather right" and "right" political attitudes at the pole of self-enhancement as well.

Comparing the general population samples from 2015 and 2016 (Fig. 9.5), we were able to document a value shift in the direction of the political right. We decided to take a second sample in 2016, because after over one million refugees came to Germany, the culture of welcome appeared to decline. This was and is a great challenge for the local municipalities and fostered experiences of insecurity in parts of the German population. In consequence, the AfD gained more followers (Table 9.2). Thus, the value shift in 2016 toward the pole of self-enhancement values can be

interpreted as a value shift towards values of the AfD which indeed gained more voters in the German population.

In Fig. 9.6 we also plotted the religious and denominational groups in the value space. The results confirm previous studies: Respondents with no affiliation locate more often in the area at the bottom/left. Members of “free churches (Freikirchen)” locate in the area of *benevolence* at the pole of *self-transcendence*. Muslims locate in the area of tradition close to the pole of *conservation*. Catholics locate slightly in the area bottom/right and members of the “Protestant Church in Germany” close to the middle of the field. In sum, religious affiliation is mainly located in the upper/right area of the value space.

Finally, Fig. 9.7 shows that education and cultural capital correlates with the upper/left area of the values space. This results represent also the direct positive relation of education (according to ISCED 1997) with the scales of *tolerance of complexity* ($r = .23$) and *xenosophia/inter-religious dialogue* ($r = .16$) which located in the same region of the values space.

In sum, xenosophia as an attitude pattern is mainly correlated with values of self-transcendence. Less strongly it is related to the pole of *openness to change*. The total pattern of analyzed correlates in this chapter fits to this position of xenosophia. In the upper left side of the value space xenosophia is based on values of universalism, supported by cultural capital, *tolerance of complexity* and a central position of the religious construct system within the person. In the upper right side of the value space xenosophia is based on values of benevolence and seem to be supported by religious affiliation and the potential of universalistic interpretations of religious categories (see the individual case of Annegret) based on a central position of religiosity in the personal construct system (see the close position of the RSS scale *xenosophia/inter-religious dialogue* and *centrality of religiosity* to one another in the values space). This result is also validated by the results of our interview analysis (see Chap. 15). They show that xenosophia may be supported by secure attachments, which relate to self-transcendence values as well (Mikulincer et al., 2003; Mikulincer & Shaver, 2007).

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Part III
Case Studies

Chapter 10

A Typology of Biographical Trajectories toward Xenosophia



Heinz Streib, Barbara Keller, and Ramona Bullik

One of the big questions for which our research intends to contribute answers regards the paths toward xenosophia and dialog in a world with an epidemic spread of prejudice and xenophobia. The analyses of our data thereby have a twofold focus on both statistical paths and biographical paths. While the previous chapters had a focus on the statistical path models and the multivariate modeling of our quantitative data, the part of our book that starts with this chapter changes perspectives to the qualitative data and to the examination of biographical paths toward xenosophia and dialog. Thus, attention now focuses on the interpretation of the personal interviews with the intent to empirically substantiate a typology of biographical paths toward xenosophia and dialog.

Constructing and substantiating a typology is an open hermeneutical process which oscillates between conceptual assumptions and the unique characteristics of the single cases, thereby identifying family resemblances and contrasts between the cases in the light of specific conceptual assumptions. Thus, when constructing a typology, one of the preparatory tasks is stating the conceptual assumptions explicitly and as precisely as possible.

This chapter therefore starts with a discussion of the typology which we found most convincing in light of our conceptualization of xenosophia and the relation to the strange (see Chap. 1), and then proceeds to a synoptic presentation of the interviews in our sample which we regard the best examples for this typological model.

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Conceptual Assumptions

As mentioned above, conceptual considerations guide the empirical process of how biographical trajectories toward openness to the strange—and potentially toward xenosophia—can be identified in the interviews. The following conceptual assumptions are the basics for our typology construction:

1. For our understanding of basic dynamics of the emergence of xenosophia, we refer, as detailed in the first chapter to Nakamura (2000) and the work of Waldenfels (2011). The encounter with the strange, or, to use Waldenfels' term, the "alien," and the experiences of being regarded an alien and treated as a stranger is a challenge. Waldenfels (1990) speaks of alienness as a "sting." Waldenfels (2011, p. 21–34) also understands the experience of alienness as "pathic," as coming from the outside to the recipient. The experience of alienness thus sets into motion a dynamic of "pathos and response." Therefore, the task for reading the cases is attention to and careful interpretation of such dynamics of "pathic"—and sometimes traumatic—challenges of, and responses to, experiences of strangeness.
2. These challenges and responses, and this is the next conceptual step toward our typology, can be categorized according to the frame of reference or context in which the challenges primarily occur (cf. Streib, 2003), on the individual level (self-self relation), in the context of interpersonal relations (self-other), in the context of the milieu (self-tradition), or in context of institutions such as political or religious organizations (self-world). This differentiation according to the context or the frame of reference can be used for profiling the typological contrasts between the cases.
3. Biographical experiences of strangeness or estrangement/alienation in the past, if they were resolved productively, precipitate, and eventually prepare a person for, the openness to the encounter with strangeness in the present and thus strengthen the capacity of the individual to productively deal with such current experiences. For the identification of biographical paths to xenosophia in the interviews, this means that the (narration of) positive, productive solutions to experiences of strangeness in the past, together with indications of a current xenosophic preference (in the interview and in the questionnaire data), may be taken as indicators of a biographical development toward xenosophia.

Taken together, the challenging experiences of strangeness and responses to these experiences may be different in the four contexts or frames of reference mentioned above. And this allows the conceptualizing of a typology for paths to xenosophia, which we present in Table 10.1.

This typology is so far designed on the basis of conceptual considerations. We now approach the empirical substantiation and thus need to describe what we have in our data.

Table 10.1 Challenges from and responses to experiences of strangeness in four contexts

Frame of reference / Context	Challenge – Experience of alienation from... /Experience of being made an alien by...	Response – Productive solution
Individual	One's own religion or tradition (in which one was raised)	Intellectual curiosity and/or emotional openness for, and practical engagement in, other cultures, religions or worldviews
Interpersonal	One's immediate small life-world such as the peer group	Development of a habitus of tolerance, respect for the other, and tolerance of complexity
Milieu	The majority culture or religion in which one was raised or has immigrated into	Individuation and emancipation, e.g. resolving minority alienation by negotiating conflict between different milieus and value systems in family and tradition
Institutions	Structures in one's society, such as an oppressive regime – with the eventual consequence of forced displacement or seeking refuge abroad	Habitus of non-violence and respect for the other; solidarity and care for fellow-sufferers; a productive solution can be regarded as version of post-traumatic growth

Characteristics of the Interview Sample

In our Bielefeld Project on Xenosophia and Religion with a total of 1,534 participants who answered the questionnaire, we have conducted personal interviews with 27 participants. These interviewees were carefully selected from a subsample of 108 participants who indicated their readiness for an interview. As detailed in Chap. 4, this group of potential interviewees is well distributed in the four quadrants constructed by the coordinates, *centrality of religiosity* and *openness to change*. The participants whom we actually contacted and interviewed were selected considering their quadrant group membership, but also demographic characteristics such as gender, age, religious affiliations, self-ratings of religiosity, spirituality, and atheism, and preferences of values and religious schemata (see Chap. 4).

This way, 27 persons have been invited and interviewed. We have used the faith development interview format as detailed in Chap. 3. The interviews either took place at the interviewees' home or in one of our offices at Bielefeld University. All interviews have been audiotaped, professionally transcribed, and rated by researchers, who are experienced with faith development rating.

The interview sample consists of 17 men and 10 women. Mean age is 35.9 years, spanning from age 21 to 63. With 14 affiliates of Christian churches, 5 Muslims, one Buddhist (who is also a member of Catholic Church), two members of "other" religions, and 5 participants without religious affiliation, distribution of religious affiliation is acceptable; only Muslims are somewhat oversampled. The characteristics are included in Fig. 10.1, where also the specific case values on the *centrality of religiosity* index and the *openness to change* factor can be read.



Fig. 10.1 Interviewees plotted in the space with centrality of religion and openness to change vs. conservation as coordinates

Our data allow for a variety of ways of plotting our sample of interviewees. In principle, any pair of scales in our data could be used as coordinates for plotting the cases. And all of these attempts may be helpful for identifying commonalities and differences between the cases. But all these attempts are preliminary compared to the interview analyses and case study interpretations. In Chap. 9, the Portrait Value Questionnaire (PVQ-10, Schwartz, 2003) has been used, and variables and interviewees could successfully and informatively be plotted in the value space. In respect to the cases, which we have selected as exemplary cases for our typology, Fig. 9.8 in Chap. 9 reveals interesting differences between the four cases, especially on the axis (y) for *self-transcendence* vs. *self-enhancement*. The value preferences of our cases are interesting and will be considered in the interpretation of the cases in the following chapters.

Here in this chapter, we introduce a slightly different coordinate system. This coordinate system has been developed and justified in Chap. 4, where also the four quadrant groups have been detailed. Therefore, we use as y-axis the *centrality of religiosity* scale, while for the x-axis the higher PVQ factor *openness to change vs. conservation* (the x-axis is thus identical with Fig. 9.8 in Chap. 9). As Fig. 10.1 shows, we use the *centrality of religiosity* scale for plotting our cases—which we find indispensable in a study on religion and xenosophia. Moreover, this coordinate system makes our visualization comparable to the mapping of “spirituality” that we used for presenting results of our Bielefeld-based Study on the *Semantics and Psychology of Spirituality* (Streib & Hood, 2016). Figure 10.1 thus presents our 27 interviewees in the coordinate system of *centrality of religion* and *openness to change vs. conservation*.

It is obvious from Fig. 10.1 that our selection for interviewing was not strictly and exclusively structured by the quadrant group membership: while the interview sample is equally divided according to *centrality of religiosity*, the majority of interviewees are considerably higher in *openness to change*.¹

The plotting of our cases in this coordinate system is very informative, and in the case study chapters, the location of the cases in Fig. 10.1 will be discussed. However, this plotting is but one way of visualizing our cases. The selection of cases for potential case study elaboration is primarily based on the criteria that we have described above in the section on Conceptual Assumptions, because we intend to present a portrait of our typology of paths to xenosophia. And nevertheless, not every interview qualifies for case study elaboration; thus, for case study selection, we had to consider further criteria—which are included in the following section.

Selection Criteria for Case Study Interviewees

For our presentation of case studies in the following chapters that will profile our typology, we have selected specific cases from the sample of the 27 persons who were interviewed with the faith development interview. Criteria for this selection were:

1. typicality for one of the four types (individual, interpersonal, milieu-oriented, institutional),
2. high (at least above average) ratings on the RSS subscale *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog*,
3. sufficient narrative text in the interview that allows for the reconstruction of the biography,

¹The factor scores for the value axes *self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence* and *openness to change vs. conservation* are z-standardized, i.e. their means are adjusted to 0 and their standard deviations are adjusted to 1. The factor score values for the axes correspond to the way the value space is usually constructed (see Chap. 9). This means that negative values express value orientations toward more openness to change, while positive values indicate value orientations toward more conservation on the x-axis.

Table 10.2 Demographics and selected scores of case study interviewees

	Gender	Age	Born in...	Religious Affiliation	Religiosity	Spirituality	Atheist	<i>ttt</i>	<i>fr</i>	<i>xenos</i>
Robert T.	M	50	Germany	Buddhism, Catholic Church	5	5	1	14	24	25
Nina F.	F	26	South America (mother: German)	None	1	1	5	5	23	18
Cemal K.	M	22	Turkey	Islam	1	5	1	14	20	16
Henry G.	M	60	Southeast Asia	Islam	2	1	4	11	25	23

4. narration about experiences of strangeness that can be understood as stimulating the development of further openness to the strange and eventually to the development of xenophobic attitudes—and thus correspond to the generally higher ratings on *xenos*.

Finally, we have chosen, according to the established selection criteria, four cases that represent typical developmental trajectories toward xenosophia. Table 10.2 presents some basic quantitative data for these four cases (Robert T., Nina F., Cemal K., and Henry G.).

It is obvious that this selection of cases does not reflect an equal distribution of religious affiliation, since it includes two Muslims and two cases clearly have a migration background. This may be explained by the fact that, for migrants and refugees (and a majority of them are affiliated with Islam), experiences of strangeness are much more likely—and thus are more frequently remembered and narrated in the interviews. It is obvious also that our selection has a clear focus on the cases that have positively resolved their experience of strangeness and thus developed toward xenosophia; but this is due to our selection criteria. Thus our sample of interviewees allowed for an in-depth and differentiated portrait of the four paths to xenosophia.²

In Table 10.3, we present a summary of the typological profile of the four cases. This description reflects the criteria that were established in the first part of this chapter.

While Table 10.3 presents the four cases with brief summaries for easy comparison, we will now describe their profiles in regard to their paths to xenosophia in

²There are in fact interviewees in our sample who display high prejudice and low scores on measures of xenophobic attitudes, and who eventually did not positively resolve previous experiences of strangeness. Unfortunately, our sample of interviewees does not include enough interviews of this sort, which, at the same time, comprehend sufficient narrative text that could have allowed for the reconstruction of their biography and their development of xenophobic attitudes. Thus, regrettably, we are not in the position to “negatively mirror” our typology with elaborate case studies.

Table 10.3 Summary of the cases selected to profile the four types of paths to xenosophia

	Context/ Frame of reference	Challenge (Experience of strangeness)	Response
Robert T.	Individual	Estrangement from the mainstream Roman Catholic tradition in which Robert was raised	Intellectual curiosity and emotional openness toward other religions, especially Buddhism; inter-religious activism
Nina F.	Interpersonal relations	Experience of alienness in peer group communication, when she, as a 13-year-old, moved with her parents to Germany	Development of a habitus of tolerance of complexity and openness for the alien
Cemal K.	Milieus	Experience of alienation and discrimination from the German majority culture as member of Turkish-Islamic minority culture; alienation from family and religious tradition in which Cemal was raised	Resolving minority alienness by negotiating conflict with family and religious tradition; development of strong rejection of any minority discrimination
Henry G.	Institutions	Life-threat by military dictatorship and traumatic experiences as refugee	Altruistic care for fellow-refugees; strong demand of respect for the other and for inter-religious appreciation; very high regard for his own multi-religious socialization

more detail. Thereby, we also attend to the differences between the cases – which will become even more obvious in the full case studies in the single case study chapters.

Different Narratives and Different Paths to Xenosophia

Robert T.

Robert T. was raised in the Catholic tradition, in the mainstream of the dominant culture of his country. However, his family was distant from the church, and Robert, as a teenager, perceived the rules and obligations of the church as rather restrictive. He even considered terminating membership with the Catholic church. However, his father, by defining church traditions as “human work,” allowed an open and potentially critical perspective, which allowed space for the development of individual ideas. Regularly spending the holy week with the Pallotines, participating in their rituals and group activities, provided an experience which Robert appreciated. Literature on diverse Eastern traditions, like the Bhagavad Gita and the Daodejing by Laozi, inspired him to engage with Buddhism and Hinduism.

Robert grew up in a mainstream Catholic as well as liberal environment, where different perspectives on religious matters were encouraged and where his interest in ultimate questions was met by openness toward different answers. He even found literature from “other” (than Catholic Christian) religions and traditions in the family library. This may have provided something like a “culture of welcome” to the adolescent, who was seeking answers to profound questions, and who refers to mentors and teachers when asked to talk about important relationships. Thus, his continuous individual development seems to have been embedded in relationships, or, drawing on a model gaining attention in the psychology of religion, in secure attachments. Interestingly, as an adult, he holds different memberships (Buddhist and Catholic) and is immersed in his own process of continuing integration of different approaches.

Robert is a formidable story-teller. The titles of the narrative segments reported in the case study chapter illustrate his individual trajectory: “Maintaining Christianity as Individualistic Religiosity” reflects his examination of Catholic ways of being religious. “Encounter with Hinduism and Taoism” gives an impression of his way to encounter the alien with interest, with question, and without the intention to make it his own. “Breakthrough to Buddhism” shows him engaged in with an “alien” approach to the ultimate, which he since then keeps in balance with his membership in the Catholic Church.

Robert, who can be described as “accumulative heretic” (Streib, 1999) lives in continuous dialog with different “strange” traditions. This dialogue shapes and enhances his development. Thus we can see a strong emphasis on the individual dimension (Type 1).

Nina F.

Nina F. has more than once encountered experiences of being the alien, when she was living in different countries with her parents. In particular, she felt like “the odd one out,” when she, as a teenager, came back to Germany from South America, where she had been living with her South American father and German mother. When her parents separated, she felt obliged to show more solidarity toward her father. She regarded him as being more in need of support, because he was living now in a strange land.

When growing up, her experiences of the strange seem to have been sheltered—and perhaps framed—by secure attachment to both of her parents. Perhaps she could also observe how her parents encountered experiences of being a stranger, of living in a strange country, of working toward mutual understanding. This may have helped her develop not only a habitus of tolerance of complexity and openness for the strange, but also an appreciation for the promise of new beginnings, and hope for new relationships.

Nina’s challenges seem to focus on interpersonal relations. Her response consists in the development of openness and tolerance toward “strange” others. We can

understand this as an emphasis on the relational-interpersonal dimension. Her narrative “Open for Unplanned Circumstances (and New Relationships)” shows her explorative approach, her ability to see the potential of growth in the encounter with the strange, which for her is the encounter with people who see her as the stranger. The dimension of her encounter with strangeness is the self-other relationship (Streib, 2003); thus Nina is a fine example of Type 2 in our typology.

Cemal K.

Cemal K. is a son of a Turkish immigrant family, whose father had left for Germany when Cemal was 3 years old. Cemal himself came to Germany as a preschool child, learned the language in his kindergarten years and made his way through the German educational system, supported by his father and family who wanted him to be successful in the new country. At the same time, however, it was also expected of him that he be loyal to the family, to the Turkish immigrant milieu and the religious traditions brought from Turkey. He has been confronted with prejudice and is used to be perceived as a suspicious stranger, especially, in his experience, by elderly Germans. His striving toward independence from the Turkish family leads to some estrangement there as well. When he decides to move out of the family home and to live with his German girlfriend, his father stops talking to him, thereby expressing his disapproval of his son’s actions.

Experiences with the strange may oscillate in this family, which came to a foreign country, struggling for success there, while also holding on to their tradition, their religion, and their identity. Cemal seems to be entangled in a paradox: fulfilling his family’s hopes by being successful in Germany implies conflict with the immigrant milieu’s values and alienation from the family and milieu. At the time of the interview, however, there has been a rapprochement between father and son, perhaps pointing to some considerable—if implicit—security of a relationship characterized by separation and reunion.

Cemal, the second generation immigrant from Turkey, is living with the tension of a paradox situation. His successful adaptation to the majority culture of the migration country may alienate him from the minority of the immigrant community. The narrative discussed in Chap. 13, “Missing Grandmother’s Funeral in the Country of Origin,” illustrates the impossibility of being able to be at home in both places. It also resonates to themes like separation and loss, which have been part of Cemal’s migration experience. Cemal reflects on what he has achieved in Germany and what he has inherited from his parents, his larger family, and the Turkish immigrant community in which he grew up. His negotiation of the demands of different milieus may involve development especially with respect to the self-tradition relationship and qualify him as belonging to Type 3 of our typology. With Cemal we meet an emerging adult, who not only rejects the imposition of the family’s or the milieu’s worldview and lifestyle on the offspring, but also has developed an ethics of dialog and encounter with the other that reflects Nakamura’s (2000) practical

xenology (see Chap. 1, for more details): the encounter with the strange should include the proviso of a “non-hermeneutical reservation” that leaves an open space for irritation, perplexity and new insight.

Henry G.

Henry G. was threatened to become a victim of violent political oppression—and had the experience of becoming a suspect and a stranger in his home country. He had to leave his country as a politically active young law student who had protested against the military regime. He then was a stranger in several Asian countries before coming to Europe and, finally, Germany. He has made the farthest journey amongst our interviewees and had to face the additional obstacle that nobody in Germany spoke his mother tongue where he arrived.

Henry had to make a new start. He created a personal life, and he chose a profession far from his original academic aspirations. However, there is continuity in his engagement for others, for the larger community: Henry is busy with voluntary work for refugees and with other social activities. He is proud of having worked his way up in this context and to have spoken at important events and to important people. He is convinced of the importance of these activities.

This becomes evident in his narrative of “Belief in Predestination” which is about the predestination of forced migration, which he discusses with one of the fellow refugees whom he supports. In arguing with an acquaintance, an academic from his home country, who complains, among other things, about loss of status, Henry may be promoting his own solution: take what happened as something that was bound to happen for a purpose. This puts individual fate in a larger context and points to the limitations of individuals’ strategies to change their lives. These limitations may also have a relieving function: it is enough to do as good as one can—there are higher powers which we cannot control. Thus, we may see in this story how Henry constructs his relationship to the larger world, his growth occurs in the developmental dimension of the self-world relationship, and, according to our typology, Henry is an example for Type 4, for which the *institution* is the frame of reference for the challenging experiences of strangeness and alienation. In Henry’s case this frame of reference is the military regime of his home country that forced him to leave everything behind as he was persecuted for his political work. And Henry’s attitude of non-violence and altruism can be understood as outcome of his coping with these experiences. Thus, Henry can serve as an example for a path to xenosophia that is shaped by influences from outside, from the institutions—a path that has been stony and dangerous, but has nevertheless led to a welcoming and appreciating attitude toward other human beings.

Conclusion and Outlook

In this chapter, we have detailed the typology we use of structuring our cases and how we arrived at the four-fold typology. The following chapters will go in more detail and in-depth interpretation of the four exemplary cases, Robert, Nina, Cemal and Henry. Thereby, not only the triangulation with the most informative quantitative measures and the evaluation of the faith development interview according to the classical method, but also narrative analyses will be used to better understand the profiles of these cases.

The four cases allow the inspection of different encounters with the “strange.” We may imagine the different typical constellations on a continuum: Robert found literature on “other” religions in the safe environment of the family library in his home country, Nina travelled between and lived on different continents, however, always in an emotionally secure situation with her bi-national parents. Cemal, second generation immigrant, has experienced separations, first when his father went to Germany, then from the larger family, when he followed him, leaving home country and native language. Henry has left not only a political system that he experienced as oppressive, but also family, friends, culture and language of his native country.

However, not everyone whose family provides literature on “other” religions will develop openness toward those together with a questioning attitude toward his own tradition. Not everybody who has lived with their parents in different parts of the world will respond to being treated as stranger by cultivating a habitus of tolerance of complexity and openness for the alien. Nor will every second generation immigrant transform experiences of discrimination and alienation into efforts at conflict resolution and promoting minority issues. Finally, not every refugee from political oppression works through own experiences of threat and loss in a way which allows him to support others in need.

Obviously, it is not the encounter with something “strange” or “alien” alone which inspires xenosophia. Also, there seem to be resources besides living in a safe country or relying on support of parents or family. Therefore, the case studies which are about to follow seek to explore individual trajectories and to search for conditions which promote xenosophia as response to encounters with the “strange.”

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Chapter 11

“...the follower of a different faith is someone to learn from”—Curiosity and Xenosophia of Robert T.



Heinz Streib and Ramona Bullik

Robert T. is 50 years old at the time of the interview. He has emerged as a perfect candidate for a case study of the type of trajectories toward xenosophia (Type 1 in our typology), for which the frame of reference for the experiences of strangeness is primarily the *individual*, rather than the interpersonal, the milieu or the institutional context, and for which *intellectual* challenges and curiosity in respect to the strange stand in the foreground. This will be demonstrated especially in the reconstruction of Robert’s biographical narration as documented in the faith development interview.

As detailed in Chap. 3, we will approach our reconstruction of Robert’s trajectory by attending to the data we have about Robert. Therefore we begin with attention to his answers in the online questionnaire, then we describe the structural evaluation of the faith development interview, to finally focus on narrative segments.

Robert’s Answers to Selected Questions in the Survey

Table 11.1 presents Robert’s individual scores on selected variables in comparison to the mean values of his quadrant group. As detailed in Chap. 10, the space with four quadrant groups has been constructed with *openness to change* (one factor of the value space as x-axis, assessed with the PVQ-10, Schwartz, 2003; 2012) and *centrality of religiosity* (y-axis) as coordinates. All interviewees of our study were plotted (see Fig. 10.1 in Chap. 10) in the space with *openness to change* and

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Table 11.1 Comparison of Robert's scores on most important variables in the questionnaire with the scores of the "Open to change & rather religious" quadrant group

	Single case variable values for Robert T.	Values for the "open to change & rather religious" quadrant group	
		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Self-rating as "religious"	5	3.28	1.09
Self-rating as "spiritual" ^a	5	3.32	1.28
Self-rating as "atheist" ^a	1	1.61	1.04
<i>centrality of religiosity</i>	24	18.07	2.84
Religious Schema Scale (RSS)			
<i>truth of texts and teachings</i>	14	14.62	4.95
<i>fairness, tolerance & rational choice</i>	24	21.23	2.55
<i>xenosophia/inter-religious dialog</i>	25	17.86	3.21
<i>ideological fundamentalism</i>	29	25.39	7.99
<i>ideological pluralism</i>	12	11.67	2.68
Values			
<i>universalism</i>	6	4.68	1.06
<i>benevolence</i>	5	5.14	0.79
<i>tradition</i>	3	3.75	1.47
<i>conformity</i>	4	3.42	1.33
<i>security</i>	1	3.10	1.30
<i>power</i>	4	3.08	1.47
<i>achievement</i>	6	4.25	1.35
<i>hedonism</i>	6	4.52	1.08
<i>stimulation</i>	4	3.86	1.22
<i>self-direction</i>	6	5.10	0.91
<i>self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence^b</i>	0.04	0.43	0.93
<i>openness to change vs. conservation^b</i>	-1.11	-0.81	0.74
<i>tolerance of complexity^a</i>	91	87.56	11.28
<i>violence-legitimizing norms of masculinity^a</i>	11	13.29	5.06
Inter-religious enmity			
<i>anti-Semitism</i>	4	6.35	2.94
<i>Islamophobia</i>	6	7.65	3.42
<i>anti-Christian enmity</i>	6	6.70	2.50

Note All comparisons have been calculated with age cohorts, sex, and cultural economic capital being controlled. Analyses for the Quadrant 1 group are based on $n = 484$ cases

^aAnalysis based on smaller sample size ($n = 465$), because variables have not been included in the Pilot Study (see Chap. 4)

^bThe factor scores for the two value axes Self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence and Openness to change vs. conservation are z-standardized, i.e. their means are adjusted to 0 and their standard deviations are adjusted to 1. The factor score values for the axes are the same as in Fig. 9.7 in Chap. 9 and correspond to the way the value space is usually constructed. This means that negative values express value orientations toward more self-enhancement on the first axis or toward more openness to change on the second axis while positive values indicate value orientations toward more self-transcendence (first axis) or toward more conservation (second axis)

centrality of religiosity. There, Robert is located in Quadrant 2, the quadrant with high scores for both *openness to change* and *centrality of religiosity*. Robert even reveals as extreme case especially in regard to his high *centrality of religiosity*.

The selection of variables in Table 11.1 includes the majority of measures in our questionnaire that can be regarded as dispositions for xenosophia, respectively as correlates for xenophobia:¹ The set of measures for religiosity and religious styles, values, tolerance of complexity and norms of masculinity, and finally the attitudes toward the Abrahamic religions. Below, we will discuss Robert’s scores in the online questionnaire, note correspondences and possible inconsistencies, in order to quantitatively profile a person who, in our interpretation, has developed a xenosophic attitude.

The self-ratings as “religious,” “spiritual,” and “atheist” together with the results for the *centrality of religiosity* scale (Huber & Huber, 2012) constitute basic information about Robert’s religiosity. It is remarkable that Robert chose the highest possible rating for both “religiosity” and “spirituality,” and thus self-identifies as “very religious” and “very spiritual.” In contrast, Robert rejects most strongly the self-description as “atheist.” Together with a sum score of 24 (25 is highest) on the *centrality of religiosity scale*, Robert presents himself in the questionnaire as a highly religious and spiritual person.

A more differential perspective on Robert’s religiosity is presented in the scores on the subscales of the Religious Schema Scale (RSS, Streib, Hood, & Klein, 2010). With the highest possible score of 25 on the RSS subscale *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog* and only one point lower on the subscale *fairness, tolerance, and rational choice*, Robert appears as a person who is very open to dialog, has a clear xenosophic attitude and thus also highly agrees to fair and tolerant communicative action. Less extreme and more on the level of his quadrant group is Robert’s score on *ideological pluralism*.

With a sum score of 29 (on a scale range between 12 and 56) on the scale for *ideological fundamentalism*, however, Robert scores somewhat higher than his quadrant group ($M = 25.39$). Similarly on the RSS subscale *truth of text and teachings*, Robert scores on the level of his quadrant group. Taken together, this may indicate that, as a highly religious and “spiritual” person, Robert clearly holds on to his religious truths, while being extremely open for a fair encounter and xenosophic dialog with other religions.

Robert’s scores on the scales for inter-religious enmity against the Abrahamic religions also reflect his general inter-religious attitudes: on the subscale *anti-Semitism*, Robert has the lowest score possible, on *Islamophobia*, he also scores considerably lower than his quadrant group; and only for *anti-Christian enmity*, Robert is slightly below his quadrant group. This means that on the quantitative data profile Robert shows very low inter-religious prejudice—which confirms his xenosophic habitus.

¹ See Chap. 4 for a detailed description of the measures in the framework of the research design of the entire study.

In line with that, Robert's results on the scale *tolerance of complexity* (Radant & Dalbert, 2008) are rather high: with a sum score of 91 on a scale range between 31 and 116, Robert's *tolerance of complexity* is rather high, somewhat higher than the means for his quadrant group ($M = 87.56$). And finally, with a sum score of 11 on a scale range between 8 and 32, Robert shows rather low scores for *violence-legitimizing norms of masculinity* (Enzmann & Wetzels, 2003), somewhat lower than the means for his quadrant group ($M = 13.29$).

Taken together, Robert's scores in the quantitative data consistently profile him as a person not only highly religious and spiritual, but at the same time very low on prejudice against other religions, but, on the contrary, very open for dialog and xenophobia.

Results from the Structural Evaluation of Robert's Faith Development Interview

The Faith Development Interview (FDI) consists of 25 questions covering four sections: (a) life review, (b) relationships, (c) values and commitments, and (d) religion and world view. For the evaluation of the interviews, we used the *Manual for Faith Development Research* (Streib & Keller, 2015, which is a carefully revised and shortened version of the 3rd edition, Fowler, Streib, & Keller, 2004, see also Chap. 3 in this volume). The classical structural analysis proceeds by an interpretation of the interviewee's answers to each of the 25 FDI questions; the mean value of all 25 ratings indicates the interviewee's summary religious styles score. For further, more detailed interpretation, the questions are grouped into aspects that have been identified as "windows" to the person's religious development (Fowler, 1980; 1981): perspective taking, social horizon, morality, locus of authority, form of world coherence, and symbolic function.

Figure 11.1 presents our stage/style assignments for Robert's answers to the 25 questions in the Faith Development Interview.

From Fig. 11.1, it is obvious that Robert's answers to the Faith Development Interview questions are almost equally divided between stages/styles four and five. While Robert uses the individuating-reflective (Fowler, 1981) or individuating-systemic style (Streib, 2001), his answers also clearly reflect the conjunctive (Fowler, 1981) or dialogical style (Streib, 2001). Thus in at least half of his interview answers, Robert argues in a religious style that is characterized by a new appreciation of symbol, including symbols of the other religions, by the readiness for religious dialog and by a xenophobic habitus.

This result from structural FDI evaluation appears to perfectly fit with Robert's scores on the RSS subscales. As Streib et al. (2010) argue, the subscale *xenophobia/inter-religious dialog* may be indicative of the dialogical style of Stage 5 and the subscale *fairness, tolerance and rational choice* points toward Stage/Style 4 of an individuating and reflective style. Then Robert's highest score possible on the subscale *xenophobia/inter-religious dialog* and almost highest scores possible on the




Fig. 11.1 Stage assignments of single answers in Robert's faith development interview

subscale *fairness, tolerance and rational choice* present a person who clearly has moved beyond individuative reflectiveness toward a habitus of dialog and xenosophia.

Robert's Narrations in the Faith Development Interview

Robert's Faith Development Interview is, having lasted 2.5 hours, a very long one, and this interview is a cornucopia of stories. Robert is a great story teller. According to our reading of Robert's interview, the stories about religion are the most dynamic in all sections of the faith development interview (life review, relationships, values and commitments, worldview and religion). Now, we focus on these stories in our attempt to summarize and interpret Robert's trajectory to xenosophia.

Life Chapters

When asked to divide his life in chapters, Robert first considers childhood, youth and adulthood; then he turns primarily to the main phases of education, educational degrees, work life and impressive travels abroad. Robert is a great story teller, adding one story after the other. Thereby, it is interesting that, going into more depth with his life review, Robert puts his intellectual formation and finding his current profession in the foreground. It is noteworthy that Robert mentions a "feeling of

freedom” and “relief that it is over” that arose at the end of high school, military service and his first (uncompleted) university study which was situated in the intermediate field between natural and agricultural sciences; however, Robert notes he did not have these kinds of feelings at the completion of his study of comparative religion. These studies could have continued—and in fact, they did continue. This may indicate that Robert is not dissatisfied with his intellectual development, but feels that he has arrived at the right place; he has found his vocation. The focus of Robert’s professional life review is reflected in his memory of important persons who had an impact on his development: Robert mentions not only parents, older siblings and his wife, but also teachers in school and university, from whom he received deeper insight in the world of religions.

So far, Robert’s life review is not too astonishing and spectacular. This will change suddenly with the question of changes in worldview and the image of God.

Robert’s Narratives about his Religious Development

In the life review section of the faith development questionnaire, the fourth question asks for changes in worldview and image of God. And Robert readily accepts the invitation of this question and responds with rather long and comprehensive narratives. Obviously he feels the need to explain his multiple religious affiliations and his double membership in the Catholic Church and the German Buddhist Union. What could have contributed to the desire to explain his multiple religious affiliations and interests is that our questionnaire allows subjects to mark but one religious affiliation; and there, Robert chose “Buddhist.” Now in the interview, he has enough space for details.

In Robert’s narration about the development of his worldview and his religious affiliations, we have identified mainly three stories, which can be fitted into Labov and Waletzky’s (1967) model of narratives, which distinguishes five steps: (a) orientation, (b) complication, (c) an attempt to solve the complication, (d) a resolution, and (e) a coda. These three stories cover (1) Christianity—or why Robert did not leave the Catholic Church, (2) Hinduism and Daoism as an early encounter with other religions, and (3) Buddhism—which was to become Robert’s main dedication.

The first story (see Table 11.2) details Robert’s experiences with the Christian tradition and justifies why he did not terminate membership, but how Christianity is still of importance in his religious identity:

Robert narrates two occurrences that have, as an adolescent, helped him overcome his estrangement from established Christianity and, as he says, “defiance” toward rituals and morality in the Catholic Church. Robert mentions two “attempts to solve the complication,” that can, following Robert’s narration, be interpreted as contributions to successfully cope with his estrangement from the Catholic Church: one is the example of his father, who himself is described as “very distant from church,” but whose secularizing characterization of the Church as “human work”

Table 11.2 Robert’s narrative segment: “Maintaining Christianity as Individualistic Religiosity”

	English translation	Original German interview text
Orientation	Of course, from childhood I have been socialized Christian, but very, very casually. One could almost say: Distant from church in youth—No, during childhood I was in church quite frequently. There were such compulsory or mandatory events.	Natürlich war ich von klein auf christlich sozialisiert, aber <u>sehr</u> , sehr locker. Man kann fast sagen kirchenfern in der Jugend- (nein), in der Kindheit war ich zwar <u>relativ</u> häufig in der Kirche, Da gab es ja solche Zwangs- oder Pflichtveranstaltungen.
Complication	In confirmation class I was really in a phase of defiance.	In der Firm war ich so richtig in der Trotzphase.
Evaluation/ Attempt to solve I	My father was very, very distant from church. He says: “All is human work,” he says, “and God is nature.” later I learned the word “pantheism,” and I said, “daddy, you are a pantheist.” and this was formative for me, this sentence, which he said frequently so that I, so-to-speak, had more than an only esthetical or scientific interest toward nature.	Mein Vater war <u>sehr, sehr</u> kirchenfern. Er sagt: „Alles das ist Menschenwerk“, sagt er, „und Gott ist die <u>Natur</u> .“ Später habe ich das Wort „Pantheismus“ gelernt und sage: „Papa, du bist Pantheist.“ Das hat mich auch geprägt, dieser <u>Satz</u> , den er relativ <u>häufig</u> gesagt hat[...], dass ich schon... sagen wir mal der Natur gegenüber <u>mehr als nur</u> ästhetisches oder wissenschaftliches Interesse hatte.
Evaluation/ Attempt to solve II	For some years, I regularly attended the Easter week, holy week [retreat of the Pallotines], from Wednesday to Easter Sunday. And I have experienced very intensely this holy week with all the symbols of crucifixion and pain, resurrection. Yes. Liturgically prepared worship services, had discussion group, sung songs, made handicrafts, hiked...	Ich bin einige Jahre lang immer zur Osterwoche, Karwoche [der Pallotiner], von Mittwoch bis Ostersonntag, da hingefahren. [...] Und habe <u>sehr</u> intensiv diese Karwoche erlebt mit dieser ganzen Symbolik von Kreuzigungen und Leiden, Auferstehung. Ja. Liturgisch die Gottesdienste vorbereitet, <u>Gesprächsgruppen</u> gehabt, gesungen, gebastelt, gewandert...
Resolution	Perhaps I would have terminated membership in the church, if I had not had this encounter with the Pallotines, yes.	<u>Vielleicht</u> wäre ich schon längst aus der Kirche ausgetreten, wenn diese Begegnung mit den Pallottinern quasi nicht <u>gewesen</u> wäre, ja.
Coda	I could have left the church because my own religiosity is very individualistic. Well, I could not speak the apostolic creed by heart ... not word by word at least. I would have to interpret many things, in order to agree. Yes. Thus, one could say: “Go, write your own creed!”	Ich hätte austreten <u>können</u> , weil meine eigene Religiosität sehr individualistisch ist. Also ich könnte das ganze apostolische Glaubensbekenntnis... <u>nicht- wortwörtlich</u> zumindest nicht. Ich müsste dann <u>sehr</u> viel interpretieren, um es zu bejahen. Ja. Also da kann man auch sagen, da: „Schreib dir doch ein eigenes!“

and whose understanding of “God as nature” has opened for Robert an interpretation of God that is not confined to the Christian teachings Robert had heard so far. The other solution was on the experiential level: going with the Pallotines through the Holy Week and experiencing the suffering of Christ and celebrating resurrection. Obviously the adolescent Robert with all his hunger for experience could resonate with the Pallotines’ piety and develop a link between his “very individualist religiosity” and Pallotine spiritualité as part of the Catholic tradition.

Interestingly, Robert’s resolution is neither the termination of membership with the Catholic Church, nor new membership in the society of the Pallotines; instead, his solution reflects his “very individualistic religiosity,” which he practices rather *regardless* of his membership in the Catholic Church. Even if Robert wrote his own personal creed, it should be noted nevertheless, this personal creed would very likely be about God—in a very individualistic and unconventional interpretation however. Thus, this narrative finally explains how Robert has “preserved” an image of God—in a very individualistic interpretation—through all the estrangement experiences in his adolescence.

Robert’s development of an inter-religious openness is the theme of the second story (see Table 11.3). With this story, he gives us some details about his early curiosity for other religions.

This narrative segment presents another instance of Robert’s individualist and intellectual approach to the world of religions: his encounter with Hinduism and Daoism. It happened rather by chance, when Robert received some books from the library of his aunt; then Robert began to read—and became fascinated with the Bhagavad Gita and the Dào dé jīng.

This narrative segment can be interpreted in xenological terms: Robert, decades after this event of course, describes this adolescent encounter with Hinduism and Daoism as kind of ambivalent between a fascination with the strange and, from his perspective, with never-heard-of religions, on the one hand, and feelings of estrangement, on the other hand, because these texts contained, for Robert’s liking, too demanding ritual prescriptions (“very ascetic”).

What has opened the door to a resolution, according to Robert’s narration, is his preference for solitude and contemplation—rather than going out and looking for a girlfriend. The outcome of this contemplative encounter is described by Robert as confirmation of his image of God as impersonal, but also as an increasing reverence and awe for the “Creation and what is behind it.” The image of a personal God becomes decisively and explicitly “transpersonal” (even though we may be suspicious whether the term “transpersonal” is a retrospective interpretation). Nevertheless, this is an interesting advancement also in xenological terms: through the encounter with Hinduism and Daoism (or what Robert found in the two texts he had read at this time), God became more of a mystery—and the attribution of “personal” qualities to God is explained as a kind of projection of a “personal” self-understanding of humans on to the Divine. This may reflect the kind of “non-hermeneutical” proviso as it is the claim for xenosophia by Nakamura (2000) with reference to Waldenfels (2011) (see Chap. 1).

Table 11.3 Robert’s narrative segment: “Encounter with Hinduism and Taoism”

	English translation	Original German interview text
Orientation	[from my aunt, I...] received a couple of religious, spiritual books. Among them the Bhagavad Gita. And the Daodejing by Laozi. And I have read these two full of enthusiasm. And all of this, the Christian, and of course the Hebrew Bible, the Hinduist, the Daoist influenced me together, so that, at this time, it was not contradictory in any way.	[Von meiner Tante bekam ich...] so ein paar religiöse, spirituelle Bücher. Unter anderem die Bhagavad Gita dabei. Und-und das Dàodéjīng von Laotse. Und die beiden habe ich mit Innbrunst gelesen. Und das alles hat mich, dieses Christliche, auch natürlich hebräische Bibel, das Hinduistische, das Daoistische <u>so gemeinsam</u> beeinflusst, dass es für mich damals in keiner Weise wirklich einen Widerspruch bildete.
Complication	At the same time, most of these things were very ascetic. I never became an ascetic person. I am rather a hedonist than an ascetic person.	Gleichzeitig waren die meisten dieser Sachen sehr <u>asketisch</u> . Ich wurde nie Asket. Ich bin eher Hedonist als Asket.
Evaluation/ Attempt to solve	But this has certainly contributed, that I, at an age in which others had girlfriends and I certainly would also have liked to have one, I did not have a girlfriend, perhaps I was too much spiritualized. And I loved to be by myself in the woods for hours. Or with a flock of sheep.	Aber hat bestimmt dazu beigetragen, dass ich in einem Alter, wo andere Freundinnen hatten, keine hatte, weil ich dachte - <u>wollte</u> zwar auch eine haben, aber vielleicht war ich zu <u>vergeistigt</u> . Und liebte es, stundenlang alleine im Wald zu sein. Oder bei einer Schafherde.
Resolution	Yes, and the outcome was a great reverence for the creation and what is behind it. This is no personal God – but who can appear personal to humans, because the human being understands him/herself this way.	Ja, und was dabei rauskommt, ist auf jeden fall eine große Ehrfurcht vor der <u>Schöpfung</u> und dem, was dahinter ist. [...] Das ist kein personaler Gott, der den Menschen aber personal <u>erscheinen</u> kann, weil der Mensch sich <u>selber</u> so versteht.
Coda	And nevertheless there is this God or Spirit ...I have then developed the word “trans-personal.”	Und trotzdem ist dieser <u>Gott</u> oder dieser <u>Geist</u> ... Ich habe dann das Wort „transpersonal“ entwickelt.

The third narrative (see Table 11.4) is a key story that explains not only Robert’s growing fascination with Buddhism, which is a strong backbone in his current religious identity and religious practice, but this story also highlights how Robert individually and intellectually has developed his preference for Mahayana Buddhism:

In this third narrative segment, Robert continues his story about his expedition in the world religions; and in this third narrative, we learn about one of Robert’s most important encounters: Buddhism. In fact, besides Christianity, Buddhism is Robert’s main religious preference—which made him choose the Buddhist affiliation, rather than a Christian denomination, in the forced-choice item in the online questionnaire. His explanation here in this narrative segment gives more details: Robert is a member in both the Catholic Church and the German Buddhist Union.

Again, the encounter with Buddhism is not without ambivalence and complication: The Buddhist emphasis on *suffering* appears to be a major problem and obstacle for Robert. And what made Robert’s inclination to Buddhism even more

Table 11.4 Robert's narrative segment: "Break-through to Buddhism"

	English translation	Original German interview text
Orientation	And then, came, what was very important, the encounter with Buddhism.	Und dann kam, was auch ganz wichtig war, die Begegnung mit dem <u>Buddhismus</u>
Complication	In fact, the little I had read did not fascinate me too much, because it appeared too impersonal to me. And it focused too much on suffering, yes. The four Noble truths: "All is suffering" and so forth. (sighing)	Das heißt, das bisschen, <u>was</u> ich davon gelesen hatte, hat mich da nicht so sehr fasziniert, weil mir das zu unpersönlich erschien. Und zu sehr auf das <u>Leiden</u> ausgerichtet, ja. Die vier edlen Wahrheiten: „Alles ist Leiden“ und so weiter. (seufzt)
Evaluation/ Attempt to solve	The break-through to Buddhism, what led me to deal with it more intensely, was in Sri Lanka. [personal encounter with a Buddhist monk and reading his book.] I simultaneously realized that I cannot live without this relationship to god. I could not become a Theravada Buddhist and least a Theravada Buddhist monk. ... there, Mahayana made it a bit easier for me, because it is a bit more positive in regard to transcendence, as Buddha-Spirit that is above everything or in everything.	Der Durchbruch zum <u>Buddhismus</u> , dass der mich <u>intensiver</u> beschäftigte, war eigentlich in Sri Lanka. [Persönliche Begegnung mit einem Buddhistischen Mönch und Lesen seines Buchs.] Habe auch gleichzeitig gemerkt, ich kann ohne diese Gottesbeziehung auch nicht auskommen. Ich könnte kein Theravada-Buddhist und auch schon gar kein theravada-buddhistischer Mönch werden.... Da kam mir dann auch ein bisschen ein Mahayana ein bisschen mehr entgegen, weil der ja ein bisschen positiver in Bezug auf Transzendenz ist als Buddha-Geist, der über allem ist oder <u>in</u> allem ist.
Resolution	And I have encountered other versions of Buddhism. Also Tibetan Buddhist versions. And I have practiced much and since then I have been a member of the Catholic Church and of the German Buddhist union. Thus a double membership, yes. And I should say that these religions, Christianity and Buddhism, are the most important in my life at the moment. But this Hindu, in the first place, Bhagavad Gita and the Daodejing are important in the background. And here and there a few things from other religions.	Und dann habe ich andere buddhistische Richtungen kennengelernt. Auch die tibetisch-buddhistische. Und habe da viel mit praktiziert und seitdem bin ich halt Mitglied der römisch-katholischen Kirche <u>und</u> der Deutschen Buddhistischen union. Also so eine <u>Doppel</u> mitgliedschaft, ja. Und muss sagen, dass diese beiden Religionen, Christentum und Buddhismus, die beiden wichtigsten momentan in meinem Leben sind. Aber dieses Hinduistische, vor allem Bhagavad Gita und das Dào dé jīng sind im Hintergrund aber auch immer noch wichtig dabei. Und hier und da noch ein paar Sachen aus anderen Religionen.
Coda	Thus from this, an individualistic, inter-religious religiosity has developed.	Also das hat so eine individualistische, interreligiöse Religiosität hat sich daraus entwickelt.

ambivalent and difficult, is his reluctance to give up his image of God as someone or something he can relate to.

Here, it was important for Robert to continue reading about the religions he was interested in and to even study comparative religion for his Master’s and Ph.D. In fact, the solution Robert has found for his complications and reservation against Buddhism emerged from further reading and intellectual reflection. His individual intellectual journey has helped Robert to identify the Buddhist subdivision with enough resemblances to the sense of religious identity that he had developed so far.

Despite all memberships and affiliations, it is very important for an understanding of Robert’s religious identity that he always remained faithful to his inner sense of what he explicitly and self-confidently presents as his “individualistic, inter-religious religiosity.”

Experiences of Breakthrough and Crises

Robert responds to the FDI questions dealing with experiences of breakthrough and crises with stories that are connected to his individualistic religiosity. The breakthrough story appears to be of such importance for Robert that he comes back to it repeatedly throughout the interview:

“The penultimate year, I had this experience. I was just reading a book on multiple religious identities. Anyway, on a religiosity that does not express itself directly in concepts and images, but that goes beyond that. Yes. Apophatic, that’s the term! And I was reading that, sitting there and looking out of the train window. When suddenly I saw a group of trees, aspens. And as you know, those leaves move a lot, at the slightest breeze. And I saw these leaves and all at once it was like (snaps fingers) click. And I felt freedom and a connectedness with the whole universe. At this moment. Afterwards I thought: ‘Now, was that an (laughing) experience of enlightenment? Do I have to get that confirmed somewhere?’”²

Reading this story, it is obvious that this was an experience which cannot easily be expressed with words and communicated to others—a unique and powerful experience for Robert. Experiences of connectedness with the universe, as the one told by Robert, are mystical experiences—extrovertive mystical experiences (Stace, 1960; Hood, 2006, 2013). Mystical experiences are often associated with

²“Vorletztes Jahr hatte ich ein Erlebnis. [...] Da hatte ich gerade [...] in einem Buch gelesen über multiple religiöse Identität. [...] Jedenfalls über eine Religiosität, die nicht direkt in Begriffen und in Bildern und so sich ausdrückt, sondern die noch dahinter ist. Ja. Apophatisch, das war der Begriff! [...] Und das habe ich gelesen, saß da so und guckte so aus dem Zug raus. Und da sah ich [...] eine Baumgruppe, das waren Zitterpappeln. Und du weißt ja, die Blätter bewegen sich viel, beim kleinsten Windhauch. Und ich sah diese Blätter und auf einmal machte es so (schnippst) klack. Und ich fühlte eine Freiheit und eine Verbundenheit mit dem ganzen Universum. In dem Augenblick. Dachte hinterher: ‘War das jetzt ein (lachend) Erleuchtungserlebnis? Muss ich mir das selber bestätigen lassen?’”

“spirituality” (for the connection between mystical experiences and “spirituality,” see Streib & Hood, 2016, especially Chaps. 9 and 11).

For experiences of crises, Robert tells more than one story. And these stories again center around Robert as an observer who suddenly has experiences of meaninglessness, as if humans are nothing but “zoological beings” that have developed once by chance and will sometime disappear and be forgotten. These stories are something like the counterpart of the mystical aspen experience: their theme is “lost in the universe,” rather than a feeling of connectedness with the universe. Being worthless and not remembered, but forgotten then becomes a theme that covers long passages in the interview—and suddenly Robert is in the presence and talking about his fear of not being remembered and his desire to arrive at a kind of peace of mind and a way out of the feelings of meaninglessness and transience.

A common structure can be seen in these experiences: they appear suddenly, in the midst of every-day, and they are in the first place experiences of *strangeness*. These kind of experiential stories may be interpreted in terms of the dynamics that Nakamura (2000) describes for the vertical experiences of strangeness: the strange is not coming from outside, but in the self; these experiences come, as it were, from nowhere, they resist at first any understanding and cause perplexity, and, when these experiences are approached in order to be understood, what remains is a kind of proviso that they could also mean something else and could be interpreted differently. In a book on xenosophia, it may be appropriate to draw a line to an interpretation of these stories in terms of xenosophic experience, as detailed by Nakamura (2000), although we should note that these experiences do not *necessarily* belong to this Type 1 of trajectories to xenosophia.

Religious and Inter-Religious Praxis

In regard to his religiosity and his religious praxis, Robert identifies in the Faith Development Interview as “religious,” as “spiritual” and as “faithful;” he does not construct an opposition between these self-descriptions, but rather interprets each of them in his own way:

“Yes, I would call myself that. Even though I don’t live up to the usual image of an active member of a religious community. Not even by praying regularly. I usually pray twice a day. Sometimes sloppily, sometimes more consciously. So, I would call myself that. I know that some people strictly separate these three terms. And I would say it like that: Religious, well, I see, from the word origin, a re-connection to something greater or to a god. Definitely. Spiritual, insofar as I say, ‘Even though material and spirit may not be separable, there is a level or a dimension of existence that lies beyond the physical.’ Definitely. And faithful... well, that means loyalty to what I am convinced of, there are many ways. I don’t necessarily follow a teacher or an actual doctrine, but instead I try to pursue what I estimate as right. And not just live opportunistic and without principles. Yes.”³

³“Ja, also ich bezeichne mich so. Auch wenn ich nicht so in die gängige Vorstellung des aktiven Religionsgemeinschaftsmitglieds [...] gehöre. Noch nicht mal regelmäßig mit dem Beten, ja. Ich

This corresponds to Robert’s answers in the online questionnaire, where he has identified as “very religious” *and* as “very spiritual.” He appears to have created his own individualistic rituals. Thus his individualistic inter-religious attitudes and his networking between various religious traditions find correspondences in this religious-spiritual praxis.

Robert also reports in great detail about his commitment in inter-religious encounter and his activities in groups that work for world peace. World peace, Robert explains,

“starts within the individual. A person who is at peace with him- or herself is the best condition for world peace. Accepting my own inadequacies enables me to better accept other people’s inadequacies or at least tolerate them. Or even respect them. For me, it’s important to not take oneself too seriously, but always in relation to the whole or to others. Overcoming all kinds of claims to absoluteness, whether I am religious or not religious—that’s my main concern.”⁴

Having overcome these claims to absoluteness, we may enter in the process of encountering the other’s religion and meaning construction. Perhaps in this encounter, we find something that may help us identifying and filling the blind spots in our own construction of meaning. The “follower of another faith,” Robert says, “is someone from whom I can learn.” This is Robert’s response to the last faith development interview question about how to deal with religious conflicts. It is noteworthy that with this answer Robert explicitly intends to go beyond the common and often-heard response that people need to talk and communicate; Robert suggests to approach the other who has developed a different religious meaning construction with the openness for a creative—or xenosophic—learning process.

bete immer zweimal am Tag. Manchmal dahingehudelt, und manchmal bewusster. Also ich würde mich schon so empfinden. [...] Ich weiß, dass manche Menschen diese drei Begriffe strikt auseinanderhalten. [...] Und ich würde mal so sagen: Religiös, also ich sehe eine Rück- vom Wort her, eine Rückbindung an ein großes Ganzes oder an Gott. [...] Auf jeden Fall. Spirituell dadurch, dass ich sage: ‚Selbst wenn Materie und Geist nicht trennbar sind [...] Es gibt über das rein Körperliche hinaus eine Ebene oder Dimension des Daseins.‘ Auf jeden Fall. [...] Und gläubig... also das heißt, dem, wovon ich überzeugt bin, ja, Treue, sind vieles. [...] Auch dass ich nicht unbedingt einem Lehrer folge oder einer ganz konkreten Lehre, aber dem, was ich für mich richtig halte, versuche ich auch nachzugehen. Und nicht einfach opportunistisch immer nur ohne Prinzipien zu leben. Ja.”

⁴ “[...] beginnt im einzelnen Menschen. Frieden, den ein Mensch mit sich selber hat, ist die beste Voraussetzung für den Weltfrieden. [...] Wenn ich mich selber annehme mit meinen Unzulänglichkeiten, kann ich auch die Unzulänglichkeiten anderer Menschen besser akzeptieren und zumindest tolerieren. Oder sogar respektieren. Das finde ich immer sehr wichtig, dass man sich nicht sooo extrem für wichtig nimmt, sondern immer in Bezug setzt zum Ganzen oder auch zu anderen. [...] Dass eben diese Absolutheitsansprüche, wenn ich religiös bin, aber auch, wenn ich nicht religiös bin, überwunden werden: Das ist so mein Hauptanliegen.”

Conclusion: Reconstructing Robert's Path to Xenosophia

Taken together, it is obvious that Robert has developed a xenosophic attitude, and we can reconstruct his path to xenosophia, even if not in every detail. But one thing appears to be clear from Robert's biographical narration: Challenges that can be regarded as stimuli for Robert's xenosophic development are *individual* challenges. Robert—and this occurs many times in his stories about his childhood and youth—has many questions about God and the world and an almost never-ending curiosity. Thus he was not satisfied with the answers provided by his family, peers, church or education. But he wanted to read everything himself: not only the Bible, but every other religious text he could find, be it Hindu, Daoist, Buddhist or whatever the religious tradition.

Thereby, Robert appears to always have been skeptical against any definite answer and always searching for something more, something more satisfying. This is mirrored also in his current high scores of *openness to change* and also in his relatively high scores on *tolerance of complexity*. And Robert's way to engage with other religious worldviews was rather identity-oriented and practical: Does this new reading, this new tradition, this new practice respond to my own way of experiencing or practicing religion? Therefore, for Robert, inter-religious encounter leads to inter-religious interaction and inter-religious cooperation.

It appears that, in his religious biography, Robert just picks flowers to integrate in his bouquet. We have, in an earlier study (Streib, 1999), named this kind of religious identity construction "accumulative heresy." The "accumulative heretic" selects—and eventually accumulates—religious traditions, or rather parts of religious traditions, according to an inner sense of what powerfully and effectively responds to the heretic's current need for (religious) experience. The "heretic," it may be important to note with reference to Berger (1979), must not be understood as a person who deviates from the right (Christian) doctrine, but, according to the Greek etymological origin of the word: as a "seeker." It is obvious that Robert's way of dealing with religious traditions clearly illustrates Berger's (1979) heretical imperative. But Robert presents us with a development that is going far beyond the need to take a choice and select a religious tradition (to keep it forever). Instead, Robert's search has not come to an end and is rather ongoing and open-ended. Robert may rather resemble the "pragmatic every-day religious person," who engages in multiple changes and develops a kind of "temporary poly-heresy" (Soeffner, 2013, p. 298). But, in contrast to Soeffner's pragmatic poly-heretic, Robert appears as someone who always preserves his inner sense for his "own" individualistic religiosity—for which two aspects appear most important: an image of God as someone or something he can relate to, and the absence of compulsory rituals such as asceticism. Thus we find it most appropriate to understand Robert as an "accumulative heretic" who is always open for finding another inter-religious flower for his individual bouquet of religious traditions and practices.

Of course, not every type of individualist-intellectual trajectory to xenosophia is a case of an accumulative heretic. To the individualist-intellectual type also belong

mono-religious persons with high regard for and commitment to their own religious tradition, or persons without any religious affiliation and commitment. These other versions of developing individualist-intellectual xenosophia may nevertheless be grounded in high regard for other worldviews and practices—high regard that develops despite any possibility for understanding or considering the strange for an integration into one’s own belief system or practice. Robert’s case, however, highlights an interesting possible individualist and intellectual trajectory toward xenosophia, in which the inter-religious plurality itself is formed into a coherent network of experiences and practices—and from there, the appreciation for the strangeness of the strange religion emerges.

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Chapter 12

“...it’s important ... to open your senses for situations, for people, for circumstances.”—Developing a Habitus of Tolerance of Complexity and Openness for the Alien—Nina F.



Ramona Bullik, Barbara Keller, and Heinz Streib

Nina is a 26-year-old student of social sciences. She is the only child of a bi-cultural marriage, her mother German, her father from South America. Born in her father’s home country in South America, her parents moved to Germany when she was a baby. At the age of seven, the family moved to another South American country where they lived until Nina was 13; then the family moved back to Germany. Referring to the early and disruptive changes of her social environment, Nina states that she has always had a hard time establishing long-term relationships with other people. She sees the reason for this being, on the one hand, that she does not know anybody who has accompanied her since childhood; on the other hand, there are the consequences of having spent her childhood in another country that she experienced when she came back to Germany as an adolescent. Speaking the language but not the code of the peer group was a big challenge in a time when “identity” was the predominant developmental task (see e.g., Erikson, 1950, on psychosocial development). Neither the slang used by the other teenagers nor linguistic styles like irony were familiar to her which made her “the odd one out,” even though she was raised bilingual¹ and has always spoken her mother tongue, German, even when she lived in a Spanish speaking environment. During the interview, she gives vivid descriptions of important relationships and openly discusses them, including difficult situations. She shows a high amount of empathy, especially when talking about her parents, even when discussing conflicts. Therefore, her attachment style can be characterized as “secure” which goes along with both a positive concept of self and others (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991). Nina seems to have established a solid social environment that leaves room for actively shared recreational activities as

¹See also her own reflections on the different ways of how the German and the Spanish language “work for her” in the section “Nina’s Challenge: Interpersonal Relations.”

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well as for social commitment. Taken together, this qualifies Nina as a good example for Type 2 within our typology (see Chap. 10) that deals with the challenges of alienness primarily in the dimension of “interpersonal relations.”

Nina’s Answers to Selected Questions in the Survey

To go into more detail regarding Nina’s profile of attitudes and worldviews and prepare the triangulation of the answers and narratives in her faith development interview (details on the interview are given below) with her responses in the questionnaire, we now present Table 12.1 which contains Nina’s individual scores on selected variables in comparison to the mean values of her quadrant group. For plotting all interviewees of our study in the space with *openness to change* and *centrality of religiosity* as coordinates, see Fig. 10.1 in Chap. 10; there Nina is located in Quadrant 1—the quadrant with high scores for *openness to change* and low scores on *centrality of religiosity*.

The selection of variables in Table 12.1 includes the majority of measures in our questionnaire that can be regarded as dispositions for xenophobia respectively for xenophobia.² Self-ratings as “religious,” “spiritual,” and “atheist” together with the *centrality of religiosity* scale (Huber & Huber, 2012) constitute basic information about Nina’s religiosity. A more differential perspective on Nina’s religiosity is presented in the subscales of the Religious Schema Scale (Streib, Hood, & Klein, 2010) together with the *ideological fundamentalism* scale, which is based on the items from the Religion Monitor. Other, non-religious, dispositions are the values (assessed with the PVQ-10, Schwartz, 2003), the *tolerance of complexity* scale (Radant & Dalbert, 2007), and the *violence-legitimizing norms of masculinity* (Enzmann & Wetzels, 2003). And, finally, Table 12.1 presents Nina’s scores on the inter-religious prejudice scales. Now we go into more detail and discuss Nina’s scores in comparison with her quadrant group.

Nina’s Religiosity and her Attitudes toward Religions

Looking at Nina’s religiosity, it is obvious on first sight that Nina refuses to identify with anything vaguely connected with religion. Her scores for self-rated religiosity and spirituality are the lowest possible, both nearly a standard deviation lower than her quadrant group. On the other hand, she obviously self-identifies strongly as “atheist”; here Nina chose the highest possible rating.

² See Chap. 4 for a detailed description of the measures in the framework of the research design of the entire study.

Table 12.1 Comparison of Nina F. with respect to the "Rather not Religious, Higher Openness" respondents on the most important scales in the questionnaire

	Single case variable values for Nina F.	Values for "open to change & low religious" Quadrant Group	
		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Self-rating as "religious"	1	1.60	0.77
Self-rating as "spiritual" ^a	1	1.99	1.03
Self-rating as "atheist" ^a	5	3.00	1.52
<i>Centrality of religiosity</i>	9	9.79	2.66
Religious schema scale (RSS)			
<i>Truth of texts & teachings</i>	5	9.72	4.05
<i>Fairness, tolerance & rational choice</i>	23	19.60	3.82
<i>Xenosophia/inter-religious dialog</i>	18	15.49	3.66
<i>Ideological fundamentalism</i>	14	21.65	6.83
<i>Ideological pluralism</i>	13	10.50	2.91
Values			
<i>Universalism</i>	5	4.15	1.30
<i>Benevolence</i>	6	4.60	1.05
<i>Tradition</i>	2	3.05	1.47
<i>Conformity</i>	4	3.35	1.29
<i>Security</i>	2	3.16	1.23
<i>Power</i>	1	3.49	1.40
<i>Achievement</i>	5	4.08	1.28
<i>Hedonism</i>	6	4.71	1.03
<i>Stimulation</i>	4	3.83	1.27
<i>Self-direction</i>	6	4.77	1.07
<i>self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence^b</i>	1.42	-0.12	1.03
<i>openness to change vs. conservation^b</i>	-1.85	-0.83	0.68
<i>tolerance of complexity^a</i>	95	83.67	11.28
<i>violence-legitimizing norms of masculinity^a</i>	9	13.66	4.85
Inter-religious enmity			
<i>Anti-Semitism</i>	4	6.69	3.00
<i>Islamophobia</i>	4	8.63	3.72
<i>Anti-Christian enmity</i>	8	7.84	2.58

Note All comparisons have been calculated with age cohorts, sex, and cultural economic capital being controlled. Analyses for the Quadrant I group are based on $n = 485$ cases

^aAnalysis based on smaller sample size ($n = 466$), because variables have not been included in the Pilot Study (see Chap. 4)

^bThe factor scores for the two value axes Self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence and Openness to change vs. conservation are z-standardized, i.e. their means are adjusted to 0 and their standard deviations are adjusted to 1. The factor score values for the axes are the same as in Fig. 9.7 in Chap. 9 and correspond to the way the value space is usually constructed. This means that negative values express value orientations toward more self-enhancement on the first axis or toward more openness to change on the second axis while positive values indicate value orientations toward more self-transcendence (first axis) or toward more conservation (second axis)

Not identifying with any kind of religion corresponds to the result that Nina does not score high on the RSS subscale *truth of texts and teachings* (*ttt*). In fact, she has the lowest rating possible and thereby scores more than one standard deviation lower than her quadrant group which, in itself, already has a very low score on this subscale. This shows, once more, how much Nina rejects anything that has to do with institutionalized religion. And even one step further: Nina strongly rejects *ideological fundamentalism*. Nina scores very low on this scale (with subscales exclusivism and moral dualism) and, again, her score is more than a standard deviation lower than that of her quadrant group. This also corresponds with her scores on *ttt* because this RSS subscale reflects attitudes built upon the belief that the texts of one's own religion present the one and only truth – which may be considered fundamentalist (see Streib, Hood, & Klein, 2010).

On the other hand, Nina's scores for the RSS subscales *fairness, tolerance, and rational choice* (*fr*) and *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog* (*xenos*) are higher than those of her quadrant group (about one standard deviation each). The subscale *fr*, on which Nina scores highest, is related to Stage 4 of individuating-reflective faith in Fowler's (1981) model of faith development. As we will see, this is the stage/the style we can identify in most of Nina's answers in the interview text. Her answer on how religious conflicts can be resolved is a good example for what this subscale stands for, "the concern and vision of a fair coexistence of the religions" (Streib et al., 2010, p. 158).

Also, Nina's high scores on the RSS subscale *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog* correspond with the fact that xenophobic attitudes can be found throughout Nina's interview. Nina seems to be very open to new experience and can appreciate "the alien" which, for her, seems to refer to culture and is certainly not confined to religion. These findings suggest that Nina may be well on her way to the dialogical style (Streib, 2001). Summed up, Nina is a person who is reluctant to identify with any form of organized religion, but who is open-minded and advocates fairness and xenosophia.

Nina's Position in the Value Space

Her position in the coordinate system (Fig. 10.1 in Chap. 10) shows that Nina is a person who is open to change. To measure this, we have used Schwartz' theory and measurement of basic values (Schwartz, 2003, 2012). The dimension *openness to change* is composed by the three variables *self-direction*, *stimulation*, and *hedonism*. Nina scores high on all of these three subscales, with her score for *hedonism* and *self-direction* being one standard deviation higher than the scores of her group; that makes her score on the axis *openness to change vs. conservation* in total -1.85 (the negative value indicating her orientation toward *openness to change* on this bipolar axis, see Fig. 9.7 in Chap. 9 for a visualization), more than one standard deviation lower than her quadrant group. Nina also has high scores on the Values subscales *benevolence* and *universalism* which stand for the enhancement of others and

transcendence of selfish interests (dimension: *self-transcendence*; Schwartz, 2003), on which Nina scores one standard deviation higher than her quadrant group. These quantitative results correspond to Nina's interview where she portrays herself as a very open-minded person who, despite her young age, has accumulated considerable intercultural experience.

In line with this, her results on the scale *tolerance of complexity* are one standard deviation higher than the mean values for the quadrant group. The Tolerance of Complexity Scale consists of the subscales *burden of complexity*, *challenge of complexity*, and *necessity of complexity*, and it is interesting to see that Nina scores high on the *challenge* subscale (about one standard deviation higher than the other Quadrant 1 people). This could mean that she sees the complexity of life as a challenge, but probably, given her answers in the interview, in a positive sense. On the other hand, she seems to feel rather less "burdened" by the complexities she is faced with (on this subscale, her scores are about one standard deviation lower than her quadrant group). This also corresponds with the answers she gives in the interview, which will be discussed in more detail below.

Nina's Attitude toward "Other" Religions

Nina's results for anti-Semitism and Islamophobia are below average: on both scales she shows the scale minimum of 4. This leaves her value for anti-Semitism about one standard deviation lower than the one of her quadrant group in quadrant 1; even more obvious is the deviation concerning Islamophobia. Both results suggest that Nina sees the "other," including "other" religions, as something valuable and something that she encounters without prejudices. Perhaps Judaism and Islam, for her, are not religiously determined in the first place but rather representative of cultures whose differences she experiences not as a threat but as an enrichment for her own life. It is interesting that Christianity is rated significantly more negative than the other two religions. Here, her answers approximately match those of the quadrant group.

What might be the reasons for these findings? The low values for Islamophobia and anti-Semitism may indicate her rather open attitude toward "the unknown." With her history of migration, it is probable for her to show a high amount of openness toward other cultures. Moreover, her high values on the RSS subscale *xenos* point to the assumption that she experiences new encounters as a challenge, rather than as a burden (see her values on the Tolerance of Complexity subscales) and as enhancing her life; the engagement with "the alien" has a positive outcome for her. But why does Nina score comparatively high on *anti-Christian prejudice* then? For one thing, this might be due to the fact that Nina describes herself as not religious, and her rejection may refer to the "Christianity" she came to observe, as she spent most of her childhood in a country in which Catholicism was the state religion into the twenty-first century (it has been turned into a secular state in recent years) and has a population that is more than 90% Christian, with a vast majority of Catholics.

She seems to have adopted some of the critical discourse concerning that country's history, on which she elaborates in her faith development interview (for more details, see below):

"And for some time I have asked myself what would have happened, or what would have happened with Latin America or how Latin America would have developed if this conquest and this proselytization would not have happened. [...] See, they were robbed and during this conquest a genocide took place. And so I find that a bit odd sometimes to donate during Christmas time and to pretend to commit to (smiling) altruism. Yeah, that's why. Thus, I don't like the symbol of the cross somehow because it is a very powerful symbol. [...] and along with this cross you carry around a whole lot of other things and I'm not sure one should want to do that. See? So this symbolizes different things. So... yes of course it can stand for values and charity and whatever, but for me it also stands for... the history of which it comes from. And in what historical circumstances this symbol was carried as well. I would not want to make this my motto and display that openly."³

She describes her skepticism toward the cross when asked to name important religious, spiritual, or other symbols. The cross (and therefore Christianity) is, according to her, negatively connoted as it symbolizes the violent conquest of South America and the atrocities that went along with it. The institutionalized Christianity she explicitly rejects is connected to this specific cultural-historical background with which she may have become familiar when spending part of her childhood in South America.

Nina's Developmental Profile as Seen in the Faith Development Interview

Here we turn to Nina's faith development interview which has already been used to emphasize some findings within the questionnaire results. To understand Nina and her life, her opinions, and her development even better, we now take a closer look at her interview. Our analytic approach starts with a "classic," structural rating of the interview and proceeds by exploring different aspects as they present themselves in the dynamic of the interview. Narrative structures have proved to be an important indicator regarding world view and religion in the study of psycho-social identity

³ „Und ich habe mich eine Zeitlang so ein bisschen gefragt, so was passiert wäre oder was mit Lateinamerika passiert wäre oder wie sich Lateinamerika entwickelt hätte, wenn diese Eroberung nicht statt- und Missionierung nicht stattgefunden hätte. [...] Ne, die wurden geplündert und also so im Zuge der Eroberung wurde ein Genozid an der Bevölkerung verübt. Und dann finde ich das manchmal ein bisschen schräg, dann Weihnachten zu spenden und einen auf (schmunzelnd) Nächstenliebe zu machen. Ja, deshalb. Also das Symbol des Kreuzes mag ich irgendwie nicht, weil das ein sehr mächtiges Symbol ist. [...] Und man trägt mit diesem Symbol auch eine ganze Menge... anderen Kram mit sich rum, von dem ich nicht weiß, ob man das eigentlich immer möchte. Also ja klar kann es auch für Werte und Nächstenliebe und was weiß ich nicht was stehen, aber für mich steht es auch... für die Geschichte, aus der das kommt. Und in welchen geschichtlichen Zusammenhängen dieses Symbol noch getragen wurde. Und das würde ich mir nicht auf meine Fahnen schreiben und damit durch die Stadt ziehen.“

(cf. Keller & Streib, 2013). For identifying a meaningful, representative narrative, we rely on the definition by Labov & Waletzky (1967). These different analytical methods aim at reconstructing the biography of the participants and at identifying the most important traits of their personalities.

Nina’s Faith Development Outline

The Faith Development Interview (FDI) consists of 25 questions covering four sections: (a) life review, (b) relationships, (c) values and commitments, and (d) religion and world view. For the evaluation of the interviews, we use the *Manual for Faith Development Research* (Streib & Keller, 2015, which is a carefully revised version of the 3rd edition by Fowler, Streib, and Keller, 2004). The classical structural analysis proceeds by an interpretation of the interviewee’s answers to each of the 25 FDI questions; the mean value of all 25 ratings indicates the interviewee’s faith stage score. For further, more detailed interpretation, the questions are grouped into aspects that have been identified as “windows” to the person’s faith development⁴: perspective taking, social horizon, morality, locus of authority, form of world coherence, and symbolic function. Figure 12.1 not only presents the scores to the 25 FDI questions in Nina’s FDI, but also shows which questions of the FDI belong to which aspect (for further details concerning the evaluation of the FDI, see Chap. 3 in this volume).

Our presentation of Nina’s religious development thus starts with a summary and overview of her responses to the 25 FDI questions. This is presented in Fig. 12.1 which illustrates that Nina’s answers in the FDI were rated in between synthetic-conventional (stage 3) and individuative-reflective style (stage 4); but the majority of her answers indicate Nina’s preference for the individuative-reflective style. This might be understood with reference to her bilingual upbringing and intercontinental relocations with her parents, who seem to have provided a “secure base,” and, later, her work in the social field, which may have helped her develop, move toward, and consolidate an open and reflective worldview. This can be seen, for example, when looking at her answers to questions that aim to explore the social horizon of the interviewee (*breakthrough, crises, current relationships, groups*)—all these are rated stage/style 4. She appears to be exploring the world from a position of inner security, widening her horizon and including the viewpoint of society and a global perspective—all these are aspects crucial for a social horizon rated stage/style 4. Looking at her answers in the aspect morality, we can see that Nina’s answers are rated between stage/style 3 and 4. Morality questions investigate a person’s understanding of moral issues, how they answer to the question, “What is the nature of the claims that others have on me, and how are these claims to be weighed?” (Streib & Keller, 2015). On the one hand, we can see that Nina is focused on interpersonal

⁴Fowler (1980; 1981) speaks of aspects as “windows” to the person’s faith development; Fowler has originally hypothesized seven aspects.




Fig. 12.1 Stage assignments of single answers in Nina’s FDI

relationships and harmonious relationships (which points to stage/style 3); on the other hand, she describes this personal involvement as important for the maintenance of society, which is considered a stage/style 4 statement. Nina is a young adult currently trying to find her place in life and to substantiate her norms and values. Thus, the transition between styles 3 and 4 is consistent with late adolescence/emerging adulthood according to the assumptions about religious development.

Nina’s Life as Displayed in the Faith Development Interview

Live Review

When asked to name her life chapters, Nina decides to do so in a special way: she names the chapters according to the countries she lived in at the time. Born in a South American country, Nina and her parents moved to Germany when she was a baby. At the age of seven, her family moved back to South America where they lived for seven years. They relocated back to Germany when Nina was 13 and she has lived here ever since.

Nina generally describes her life as being shaped by these movements and changes, the relocation at age 13 having the greatest impact so far. Those experiences of frequent changes in her environment caused Nina to develop a rather spontaneous habit which becomes obvious, for example, when she explains how

she made the decision to work on a social project in South America for some months after she was not accepted for the study program at the university and could not find another job here in Germany. While this might quite easily be offensive to a young, ambitious woman, she did not stand still but spontaneously decided to do something completely different instead which turned out to be another inspiring experience for her. Being in motion instead of standing still is what she names as one of her life mottos:

"Not standing idly in difficult situations, but searching and talking and asking people for their input; just staying in motion—a lot can result from this."⁵

For Nina, this habit of searching and not standing still has proved useful when there was danger of being stuck in difficult situations. About this Nina tells the following story that can be fitted into the classic model of narratives by Labov and Waletzky (1967), which distinguishes five steps: (a) a sort of orientation, (b) complication, (c) an attempt to solve the complication, (d) a resolution, and (e) a coda (Table 12.2).

This narrative is a key story in Nina's identity development because it illustrates her ability to switch languages and environments, to use and productively model her experiences of being alien into openness for new situations, to seize opportunities as they present themselves to her, and not to stick too much to given circumstances. The story she tells might be considered a redemption story, as McAdams, Reynolds, Lewis, Patten, and Bowman (2001) call a story of a "transformation from a bad, affectively negative life scene to a subsequent good, affectively positive life scene" (p. 474). Redemption stories are more likely to occur with a high amount of generativity, the need and the responsibility to guide and to care for the next generation. Nina explicitly addresses this topic when she talks about what she would want to teach her own kids (see citation below). Her life experience has taught her to be open-minded for situations; she finds it "rather dislikable" when people have a rigid set of ideas of how things have to work. And that attitude is something she would like to see transferred to the next generation.

Relationships

The relationship with her parents has a strong impact on her at the time of the interview: Since her parents divorced a couple of years prior, Nina felt forced to re-define her own position toward each of them. And even though she claims that she did not want to be involved in their problems, Nina critically presents to the interviewer her ambivalent involvement with her parents: Nina tells that she had been close to her mother throughout her childhood. But when it came to the divorce, she felt that her father, being in a foreign country without many friends or family, needed

⁵"Wenn man nicht still stehen bleibt, also in so schwierigen Situationen, sondern sucht und redet und die Leute fragt, ob sie eine Idee haben, und einfach in Bewegung bleibt, dann kann sich da heraus ganz viel ergeben."

Table 12.2 Nina's Narrative segment: "Open for Unplanned Circumstances"

	English translation	Original German interview text
Orientation	Two and a half years ago, I had finished my BA and my probation year. And I wanted to start studying at university.	Vor zweieinhalb Jahren hatte ich meinen Bachelor abgeschlossen und mein Berufsanerkennungsjahr abgeschlossen. Und wollte eigentlich anfangen, an der Uni zu studieren.
Complication	I was not accepted, I searched a lot. I could not believe I did not get into university. I was so adamant about that. And I thought: "This just can't be true." I did not have a plan B.	Ich habe keinen Platz bekommen, habe ganz viel gesucht. Ich dachte nicht, dass ich keinen Platz an der Uni bekomme. Ich bin so felsenfest davon ausgegangen, so. Und ich dachte irgendwie: „Das kann überhaupt nicht wahr sein.“ Ich hatte keinen Plan B.
Evaluation/ Attempt to solve	Then I searched to find an alternative, rather desperately. And then there was this possibility to go to [a country in South America], to work there on a project. And within a short time, I packed my things and flew there.	Dann habe ich ein bisschen verzweifelt gesucht, irgendeine alternative zu finden. Und dann hat sich halt über Umwege die Möglichkeit aufgetan, nach [Land in Südamerika] zu gehen, in einem Projekt arbeiten. Und ich habe innerhalb von kürzester Zeit meine Sachen gepackt und bin da hingeflogen.
Resolution	When I was there, I got along really well with all those people and really enjoyed it there.	Also, und dann, als ich da war, habe ich mich mit den Leuten da total gut verstanden und es hat mir super gut gefallen.
Coda	And that was like: "Phew." that encouraged me so much because I was like: "Okay, this evolved out of a situation I had not planned", see? It evolved out of a difficult situation. And then it turned out to be better than I could have maybe planned it. That encouraged me, like: Not standing idly in difficult situations, but searching and talking and asking people for their input; just staying in motion—a lot can result from this.	Und das war so: „Puuh“, das hat mir so total viel irgendwie Mut gegeben, weil ich dachte so: „Okay, das ist aus einer Situation heraus entstanden, die ich so überhaupt nicht geplant hatte“, ne, es ist eigentlich aus einer schwierigen Situation heraus entstanden. Und dann ist es aber schöner geworden, als ich das vielleicht selber hätte planen können. Das hat mir so ein bisschen so Mut gegeben, so in die Richtung: Wenn man nicht still stehen bleibt, also in so schwierigen Situationen, sondern sucht und redet und die Leute fragt, ob sie eine Idee haben, und einfach in Bewegung bleibt, dann kann sich da heraus ganz viel ergeben.

her more now than her mother did, and so she felt obliged to stand by him—which annoyed her mother to some degree. Here, we see an indication that Nina decides to identify with the person who is more in need, or “more alien” in a respective environment.

As for other relations, Nina admits that it is difficult for her to establish long-lasting relationships, because she has grown up with the awareness that people “come and go”; thus Nina has come to the conclusion not to attach herself too strongly to others. Nevertheless, she does have friends and a partner, too, and she is now, for the first time in her life, making the experience of sharing a significant

period of time with the same group of people. She elaborates on that when talking about the girls she knows from her hobby: "...yeah, and that's kind of... funny or rather interesting to see how things change in the course of years or even decades." Nina says that relationships to other people are what give her life meaning, "to know this is what I can be for other people, what role I can play in other people's lives." It is noteworthy nonetheless that there is a strong "I" in a lot of her statements, a striving for independence or, rather, self-dependence and autonomy.

Values and Commitments

In regard to values, Nina shows a fair amount of altruism, which is also expressed in her professional identity: she is studying to become a social worker and is engaged in voluntary work. She spends quite some time in the interview explaining her decision to study social sciences. She had been working with children with disabilities since high school and, when it was time to decide what to do after school, Nina considered the fields that she was best in, which were "languages... and doing something with people." But as languages themselves are but an instrument for her, she soon came to the conclusion:

"Well... okay, but what I have always done... like, always, was work with people and that's what always gave me joy. And then... I figured out... like, it was very obvious for me then: I'm gonna do social work. That's only logical."⁶

While her commitments and interests include aid to developing countries, she is at the same time very critical, pointing out a lot of difficulties and criticizing well-meant attempts to help that are not actually helpful at the end of the day. Interestingly, Nina spontaneously associates an example from politics:

"I care a lot about development aid, but they are endlessly controversial, really. Fair Trade, for example, sounds great, the intention behind it and all, I can totally go with that. But when you... like, dive further into the topic you see that this also generates new dependencies. [...] The more you learn about it, the more difficult it gets. And I have that with a lot of topics. [...] But to find something that does not generate new dependencies and that I can really... support and say 'Yeah, that's a good thing and I will support that', —that's very, very difficult."⁷

⁶"Naja okay, aber das, was ich immer gemacht habe, schon immer, war mit Menschen arbeiten und das hat mir immer viel Spaß gemacht. Und dann... habe ich mir überlegt,... also dann war mir irgendwie total klar so: ‚Ja... Dann mache ich Soziale Arbeit. Das ist eigentlich nur logisch.“

⁷"Mir liegen zum Beispiel so entwicklungspolitische Themen sehr am Herzen, aber ich finde die unendlich kontrovers. Also zum Beispiel Fair Trade könnte man sagen, klingt nach einer super Sache. Oder die Absichten, die dahinter stecken, kann ich total unterschreiben. Aber wenn man dann... wenn man... so da weiter in die Thematik geht, dann sieht man halt, dass das neue Abhängigkeiten schafft. [...] und je mehr man sich damit auseinandersetzt, wird es immer schwieriger. Und so geht mir das in vielen Themenbereichen so. [...] Aber da was zu finden, was nicht neue Abhängigkeiten schafft oder wo ich wirklich... dahinter stehen kann und sagen: ‚Ja, das ist eine gute Sache und dafür werde ich mich einsetzen‘, ist sehr, sehr schwierig."

Her conclusion therefore is: One can only see ahead a limited distance, and people cannot always take into account everything that might possibly happen. The only thing you can do is “to keep your eyes open and decide to the best of your knowledge and conscience and then that’s alright to start with. And you can always correct, adapt, change your actions.” This reflects her openness for change that was also clearly visible throughout the questionnaire. Moreover, this general attitude could be described as awareness for the “relative uncertainty of life and its management” which Staudinger, Baltes, and Smith (1994) identify as one of the criteria of wisdom, describing it as follows:

“Even with incomplete information, this person is willing to trust his/her own judgement, and in case of an unexpected event, to reconsider a decision and to incorporate that event in a constructive manner.” (Staudinger, Baltes, & Smith, 1994, p. 25)

Nina has, at a relatively young age, learned a lot about uncertainties, and she has also learned that she can trust her own judgment, since she has, as she says, “never regretted a decision so far, well, at least not a big decision.” This gives her the readiness to cope with new situations and to even actively seek new, alien situations as she, so far, has always benefitted from them: Nina’s developing xenosophia is based on the positive experiences with the alien, the unknown she has made in her life.

Religion and World View

Nina describes herself in the questionnaire (see Table 12.1) as neither “religious” nor “spiritual”; instead, she chooses the highest rating on the rating scale as “atheist.” In the interview, she tells about her parents’ will to let herself decide whether or not she wanted to be baptized, a decision she never felt the need to make. She does mention a sort of belief in God or “something beyond,” especially when she was younger, mostly in difficult situations. But believing in a good God with all the bad things that happen in the world seems difficult, if not impossible for Nina. She substantiates this attitude with a personal experience accounting of her grandmother’s death when Nina herself was 14 years old, which was characterized by a lot of pain and suffering, leading her to ask:

“Oh, is that necessary? Such a nice old lady, is it really necessary to let her endure so much pain? If there was a God, why could he not just... let her die. Like that. Could that not have been avoided? And that’s when I got really kinda annoyed.”⁸

What we see here is Nina’s critical engagement with theodicy questions and a hypothetical reference to an image of an almighty God. Psychoanalyst Rizzuto sees the development of the God image as related to the identity formation across the life-span. For late adolescence/emerging adulthood, Rizzuto (1979) is aware that this is the time where doubt and critical questions such as theodicy questions arise,

⁸“Oh, muss das sein? Ne, so eine nette Frau: Muss das sein, dass sie so viel leidet zum Ende der Krankheit, so? Wenn es einen Gott gäbe, warum könnte sie nicht einfach... sterben. So. Mh... kann ihr das nicht erspart bleiben? Und da habe ich mich... geärgert quasi.”

and therefore she proposes as helpful God representation for adolescence "a being that can tolerate questioning and doubt while believers face the contradictions of life and the evil in the world" (Rizzuto, 1991, p. 56). For Nina, such a helpful God representation is not available. Her development is rather one that leads to disbelief as she rejects a God allowing needless suffering.

But refusing to describe herself as religious or spiritual does not leave her as a person with a mind for nothing but rationality. When it comes to the question of what happens after death she admits that she sticks to the belief of a paradise-like afterlife. She admits that this idea may be "childish, naïve," but states that she chooses to believe that anyway because the idea of just rotting away in the earth after death is rather depressing for her and the thought of something lying beyond is comforting, "makes it easier [to deal with]." She seems to refer to what Winnicott (1971) has named the intermediate area, an inner space created "between" phantasy and reality. Winnicott saw the intermediate area as offering relief from the ongoing task of reality acceptance and as the origin of arts and religion. Alluding to Winnicott's seminal paper "Playing and reality" (1971), Fonagy and Target have, in a series of papers (e.g., Fonagy & Target, 2007), discussed "mentalization" or "reflective functioning," which develops as the young child, protected by secure attachment, learns to move back and forth between acting "as if," or pretend play, and reality, eventually realizing that there is an inner life and that all experience is mediated by inner processes. Nina acknowledges the tension of her private belief in an afterlife with her rejection of religiosity ("But... yeah, I have asked myself... how that fits together"). She shows advanced reflective functioning when discussing the "as-if" notion of her faith. Her awareness of the comfort created in this intermediate space also feeds into her understanding of "other" or "alien" religious beliefs or world views (see below).

Nina hopes that there is "something good, but that, for me, is definitely not a god in the sense of any religion." The rituals she refers to are rather worldly, and "sin" for her is a traditional and antiquated Christian concept which she rejects. It is therefore rather consistent that, being asked what to do when people disagree on religious questions, Nina says that she does not see any reason for people to fight over that. For her, religious beliefs are there to give comfort and to rely upon in times of need, in existentially threatening situations, something deeply private. Therefore, she sees no reason for anybody to take offense in other people's faith as long as it does not hurt anybody. Conflicts arise when people do not grant each other their beliefs. She ends the interview with a plea for tolerance for different perspectives:

"Both or all [ways of dealing] are not the ultimate truth. But they are just one way of looking for security for oneself. And why the heck should I deny people this? [...] When I only say: 'Yeah, that's just my... my concept of it and that's how I explain things' and when I, at the same time, leave room for other people's explanations, then there would be no reason... for these conflicts."⁹

⁹"Also weil... so die Wahrheit ist das beides- ist das alles eh nicht. Ne, sondern das ist einfach eine Art und Weise, Sicherheit für sich zu suchen. Und warum zum Teufel soll ich die anderen Leuten absprechen wollen? [...] Wenn ich einfach nur sage: 'Ja, das ist halt meine... meine Vorstellung davon und so erkläre ich mir das', und aber auch Platz dafür lasse, dass man sich das auch anders erklären las-se, dann bräuchte es... für mich diese Konflikte nicht zu geben."

Nina takes a more radical position toward Christianity as an organized religion. When asked for her beliefs, values, and commitments, she explicitly rejects the term “belief” as it is for her associated with the church as an institution. As Nina has been working in the social field for a long time, she profoundly criticizes the fact that a lot of social institutions are administrated by the churches. She feels (and actually is) excluded as a potential employee because she is not baptized and church-run institutions demand a formal membership in their churches¹⁰. She states:

“And I personally just cannot accept that. It even annoys me to some degree, I think. Because I mean... Christians have not invented charity (smiles).[...] And I think, of course, if they want to pursue the Christian idea they are free to do so, but I think for myself: Me as a person could do valuable work with the people in these institutions without... [being a Christian on paper].[...] No, I really cannot accept that. It’s the institutions’ own fault then.”¹¹

Nina’s Challenge: Interpersonal Relations

Nina’s interview offers much information concerning her attitudes toward others. It shows how she handles strangeness and how this evolved in the course of her life: Nina had to completely switch her social environment more than once. Her relocation to Germany as a teenager was especially difficult, as she had to figure out first how to belong to a peer group. She describes difficulties based on different cultural backgrounds in a very reflected way:

“Yes, and I felt completely out of place. I did not even understand the German colloquial language. See, I did speak German, as first language, but I did not understand the German youth slang. And I think that was odd for my classmates, thinking: ‘But you are German. You speak German. Why don’t you understand us?’ [...] Spanish as a language works totally different for me. It’s more like paraphrasing, more exaggerating. And German for me is very precise, a bit ironic, a bit cynical. And that’s what I did not understand. [...] And then there were those like girl stories, you know, I tried to attach myself to the girls that I had known before. And then once I walked into a room and overheard them bad-mouthing me. And I was like ‘Phhh.’ I had not anticipated that. I wasn’t used to things like that from

¹⁰In Germany, many hospitals, child care facilities, and other social institutions are administrated by either the Catholic Church or the Protestant Church. These institutions make the membership in their specific Church a mandatory requirement for their employees. Thus people who do not belong to this specific Church will not be employed, and leaving the Church, and even switching denominations, during employment may result in immediate termination of employment.

¹¹“Und das sehe ich persönlich aber überhaupt nicht ein. Also es ärgert mich auch ein bisschen, glaube ich. Also weil... ich weiß nicht, die Christen haben die Nächstenliebe auch nicht erfunden. (schmunzelnd)[...]Und ich glaube- also natürlich, wenn- wenn sie... den christlichen Gedanken weiterführen wollen, dann... können sie das ruhig machen, aber... ich denke mir: Ich als Person könnte für eine Einrichtung auch eine gute Arbeit mit den Menschen machen, ne, ohne [auf dem Papier Christin zu sein]. [...]Nein, das sehe ich aber gezielt nicht ein. Also dann sind die Einrichtungen selber schuld.”

[country in South America], to such bitchiness. [...] But when you get into such an enclosed group of girls – they just don't need you..."¹²

Noteworthy is the combination between cultural factors and the dynamics that are characteristic for the negotiation of social identity in adolescent groups. Taking up the discussion on bilingual language acquisition and psychological development (cf. Amati-Mehler, Argentieri, & Canestieri, 1993), we might ask here if growing up in two continents and languages has ambiguous consequences: On the one hand, Nina has developed a wider "potential space" sensu Winnicott, which supports her openness toward the alien. On the other hand, this leads to her feeling and being perceived as well as treated as "alien" by the German peers when returning as an adolescent.

Therefore, she enjoyed sharing her "alien" experience with a friend who used to live in the same South American country. With her, she could share, recollect and socially validate her own past and the experience of being the person with the "alien" experience:

"And she had been to [country in South America] for one year as well. And for me it was impressive to see that because: I cannot really share these experiences I had in [country in South America] here in Germany. I can tell about them, of course, but I get the feeling for some people it sounds like I was reading from a history book or from a geography book because you can't really imagine that. You know, and because I made such experiences that sound totally strange in a German everyday life. And I have asked myself whether people think I was making these stories up. Hardly anybody that I know has ever been to [country in South America] and so they (smiling) can't really reconstruct whether what I tell is true or whether I am exaggerating in retrospect or whatever. And it was totally different with her. But it's the same for her."¹³

¹²"Ja, ich habe mich völlig unpassend gefühlt. Ich habe auch so deutsche Umgangssprache nicht verstanden. Ne, also ich habe deutsch gesprochen, so als erste Muttersprache, aber so deutsche Jugendsprache habe ich nicht verstanden. Und ich glaube, das war für meine Mitschüler auch seltsam, dass sie denken: „Ja, aber du bist Deutsche. Du sprichst deutsch. Warum... warum verstehst du uns nicht?“ [...] Spanisch funktioniert für mich... also... glaube ich in der Sprache ganz anders. Es ist so mehr umschreibend, mehr übertreibend, mehr... so. Und deutsch ist für mich so sehr... sehr präzise, ein bisschen... ja, ein bisschen ironisch, ein bisschen zynisch. Und das habe ich nicht verstanden. [...] Ja, dann so Mädchengeschichten, ne, dann habe ich mich natürlich an die Mädchen gehalten, die ich von früher noch kannte. Und dann bin ich mal in so einen Raum rein und habe gehört, wie sie so schlecht über mich geredet haben, als ich da rein kam. Und dachte so: „Pf!“ [I: (lacht)] Damit hatte ich nicht gerechnet. Das kannte ich aus... [Land in Südamerika] so auch nicht, so eine Bissigkeit. [...] Aber wenn man so in eine geschlossene Gruppe kommt an Mädchen, die brauchen einen nicht..."

¹³"Und sie war auch für ein Jahr... ja, für ein Jahr oder für anderthalb Jahre insgesamt glaube ich in [Land in Südamerika] auch. Und es war für mich beeindruckend zu sehen, weil: Ich kann diese [Land in Südamerika]-Erfahrungen nicht so gut teilen in Deutschland. Also ich kann davon erzählen, aber ich habe das Gefühl, für manche Leute klingt das so, als würde ich aus einem Geschichtsbuch vorlesen oder aus einem Geographiebuch, weil man sich das nicht so gut vorstellen kann. Ne, und weil ich... so Sachen erlebt habe, die die vielleicht in einem deutschen... Alltag... die hören sich total schräg an. Und ich habe mich auch schon mal gefragt, ob die Leute denken, dass ich ihnen Geschichten erzähle. Weil es kann ja auch... also, es war ja kaum jemand... den ich so kenne, in [Land in Südamerika] und dann (schmunzelnd) können die das natürlich auch nicht nachvollziehen, ob das stimmt oder ob ich im Nachhinein übertreibe oder keine Ahnung. Und bei ihr war das halt nicht so. Aber ihr geht es genauso."

Nina describes here a sensation of alienness that has its origin in the fact that most people in her environment lack the experience that she has had; moreover, she feels that what she has experienced is doubted by others. Plus, she describes a closeness based on the shared background that will make other differences seem small and insignificant. This friendship obviously helps her integrate her life in South America into a shared personal narrative and thus, her identity.

Nina's Response: Openness and Tolerance

For Nina, her own "alienness" seems to be the main incentive for conflicts—and for development. Her conclusion after those experiences is an independence both from circumstances and from people. She can build something new for herself and pays attention to not attach herself too much to other people because her experiences show that people "come and go like one does oneself."

All these experiences, however, result in a great openness toward other people which is explicitly expressed:

"I believe it's important to open your eyes. Or to open your senses for situations, for people, for circumstances. You know, you have ideas in your head too quickly, but instead- it should be about engaging in stuff. And about being willing to understand things. So this is the concept: If I wanted to teach my kids one thing, you know, it would be that. (laughs) Just starting by just looking at things. And not like... I find it rather disliked when people say, like 'Yes, I have a plan how things have to work', you know. I find that rather disliked. Or I'd rather distance myself from an attitude like that."¹⁴

This citation corresponds well with the high value Nina has on the scale for *tolerance of complexity* (see Table 12.1) and it shows that she is not looking for easy solutions; she can handle ambiguities and considers openness for different solutions as enriching for her life.

Conclusion

Taken together, one can conclude that Nina F. in her yet young life has experienced multiple upheavals in the form of migrations. More than once she has been "the alien," and this especially in her adolescent years in which belonging to a peer group

¹⁴"Ich glaube, dass es wichtig ist, so die Augen aufzumachen. Oder die Sinne aufzumachen für Situationen, für Menschen, für Gegebenheiten und nicht... also man hat halt so sehr schnell... Ideen zu irgendetwas im Kopf, sondern- also dass es eher darum geht, sich auf Sachen einzulassen. Und bereit zu sein,... Dinge zu verstehen.... Ja.... Also das ist so die Vorstellung: Wenn ich meinen Kindern irgendetwas beibringen wollte, ne, dann wäre das glaube ich das. (lacht) So erstmal... ja, erstmal einfach auch sich Dinge anzugucken. Unnnd nicht so... ich finde das eher unsympathisch, wenn Leute sagen, so: 'Ja, ich habe den Plan, wie irgendetwas funktionieren muss', ne. Das ist mir eher unsympathisch. Oder da würde ich mich eher von distanzieren wollen."

is particularly important for identity development. These sensations of alienness and otherness, and the rejection going along with that, have had a positive impact on Nina's attitudes: She herself is open toward other "strangers" and can integrate the novelties that come along with those encounters into her life. Her most challenging experiences were those that are located on an interpersonal level and she has learnt to deal with them: Based on a secure attachment style, Nina has been able to find her place, to make friends. Moreover, she is also able to find *new* places, make *new* friends because she has experienced that the "alien" can become an inspiration, if only one is able to be open and willing to broaden one's horizon.

Thereby, it is appealing to Nina to let the alien keep its "sting" (Waldenfels, 1990), to expose herself to new and unknown circumstances, which makes her such a good example for the concept of xenosophia (see Chap. 1 for details). Interestingly, Nina's impromptu speech even resembles Waldenfels' philosophical thoughts on the alien. Her attitude of "just looking at things" instead of trying to comprehend and "integrate" everything reflects a phenomenological approach that appreciates the "surplus of the alien" and resists the "silencing of the demand of the alien" (cf. Waldenfels, 1999, p. 50). It is remarkable that Nina is able to arrive at these conclusions, given her young age.

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Chapter 13

“There are different points of view, German, Turkish, and so on...”—Negotiating World View and Identity in an Immigrant Family— Cemal K.



Barbara Keller, Ramona Bullik, Sakin Özışık, and Tobias Stacke

Cemal, 22 years old at the time of the interview, is a second generation immigrant¹ from Turkey. He came to Germany as a preschool child, and has, in terms of education, professional, and, finally, personal life, made his way in the immigration country. He has been struggling with conflicting demands of the different milieus and traditions of the immigration country and his country of origin. This involves responding to expectations from his parents that he be successful in the immigration country but also stay faithful to the traditions of the country of origin of the family which are valued in the immigrant community, a situation we might call complex. Cemal learned the German language when he entered kindergarten. In adolescence, he found himself confronted with the changes of puberty and the realization that he had developed a worldview different from that of his parents. Akhtar (1999) has conceptualized migration as “third individuation” or as “cultural adolescence,” making use of an analogy of a departure into strange territory which calls for transformation. Different generations within a family may handle that in different ways (cf. Özışık, 2015).

Cemal’s father had left for Germany when Cemal was not yet 3 years old. The family then stayed in Turkey, in the house of Cemal’s grandfather, who served as a father substitute. This grandfather is named among the most important people in Cemal’s life today, together with his German girlfriend. While striving to be successful in the immigrant country, the family kept to their values and traditions, including their religiosity. Cemal’s relationship to his father is characterized by separations, conflict and recent rapprochement. At the time of the interview, Cemal is relieved about a recent tacit reconciliation. His open discussion of the conflict supports the ascription of an attachment style which can be characterized as “secure,” as he shows both a positive concept of himself and others (Bartholomew & Horowitz, 1991).

¹The term generation used here refers to the familial generations.

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He describes his parents, his family in Germany, and the larger family in Turkey as religious, and religion as part of the debates he had with his parents when he started to struggle with the developmental tasks of finding his identity and establishing an intimate relationship, which involved, in his case, choosing to live with a German woman and risking conflict with his family and milieu. In this context he felt that religion was used as an instrument of oppression, as means of binding him to family and a tradition from which he strived to break free. However, he also sees religion as a source of strength and hope. Thus, his trajectory involves the ambiguities he perceives as a second-generation migrant in his family who negotiates the demands of different milieus. Based on these experiences, Cemal argues for tolerance, and discusses support for immigrant youth.

Cemal's Responses to Central Instruments in the Survey

To give more detail on Cemal's attitudes and worldviews and prepare the triangulation with the answers and narratives in his faith development interview (details on the interview are given below), we now present Table 13.1 which contains Cemal's individual scores on selected variables in comparison to the mean values of his quadrant group. For plotting all interviewees of our study in the space with openness to change and centrality of religiosity as coordinates, see Fig. 10.1 of Chap. 10. There, Cemal is located in Quadrant 1—the quadrant with high scores for *openness to change* and low scores on *centrality of religiosity*. Note, however, that we find him close to the center, where the dividing lines cross, which shows that he is not a typical example of "his" quadrant, as his position is close to the neighboring quadrants.

The selection of variables in Table 13.1 includes the majority of measures in our questionnaire that can be regarded as dispositions for xenophobia respectively xenophobia. Self-ratings as "religious," "spiritual," and "atheist" together with the centrality of religiosity scale (Huber & Huber, 2012) constitute basic information about Cemal's religiosity. A more differentiated perspective on Cemal's religiosity is presented in the subscales of the Religious Schema Scale (RSS, Streib, Hood, & Klein, 2010) together with the *ideological fundamentalism* scale, which is based on items from the Religion Monitor. Other, non-religious, dispositions are the values (assessed with the PVQ-10, Schwartz, 2003), the *tolerance of complexity* scale (Radant & Dalbert, 2007), and the *violence-legitimizing norms of masculinity* (Enzmann & Wetzels, 2003). And, finally, Table 13.1 presents Cemal's scores on the inter-religious prejudice scales. Now we turn to Cemal's scores in comparison with his quadrant group.

When we look at Cemal's position in the value space, we find him in the lower left quadrant, defined by *self-enhancement* and *openness to change*. However, we find him rather close to the dividing line regarding *openness* and his position more

Table 13.1 Comparison of Cemal K. with respect to the “Open to change & low religious” quadrant group on the most important scales in the questionnaire

	Single case variable values for Cemal K.	Values for the “open to change & low religious” quadrant group	
		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Self-rating as “religious”	1	1.60	0.77
Self-rating as “spiritual”	5	1.99 ^a	1.03
Self-rating as “atheist”	1	3.00 ^a	1.52
<i>centrality of religiosity</i>	14	9.79	2.66
Religious Schema Scale (RSS)			
<i>truth of texts & teachings</i>	14	9.72	4.05
<i>fairness, tolerance & rational choice</i>	20	19.60	3.82
<i>xenophobia/inter-religious dialog</i>	16	15.49	3.66
<i>ideological fundamentalism</i>	26	21.65	6.83
<i>ideological pluralism</i>	14	10.50	2.91
Values			
<i>universalism</i>	1	4.15	1.30
<i>benevolence</i>	6	4.60	1.05
<i>tradition</i>	1	3.05	1.47
<i>conformity</i>	6	3.35	1.29
<i>security</i>	4	3.16	1.23
<i>power</i>	5	3.49	1.40
<i>achievement</i>	6	4.08	1.28
<i>hedonism</i>	6	4.71	1.03
<i>stimulation</i>	2	3.83	1.27
<i>self-direction</i>	6	4.77	1.07
<i>self-enhancement vs self-transcendence^b</i>	-1.41	-0.12	1.03
<i>openness to change vs. conservation^b</i>	-0.50	-0.83	0.68
<i>tolerance of complexity</i>	74	83.67 ^a	11.28
<i>violence-legitimizing norms of masculinity</i>	14	13.66 ^a	4.85
Inter-religious Enmity			
<i>anti-Semitism</i>	4	6.69	3.00
<i>Islamophobia</i>	6	8.63	3.72
<i>anti-Christian enmity</i>	9	7.84	2.58

Note All comparisons have been calculated with age cohorts, sex, and cultural and economic capital being controlled. Analyses for the Quadrant 1 group are based on $n = 484$ cases. ^aAnalysis based on smaller sample size ($n = 465$), because variables have not been included in the Pilot Study (see Chap. 4)

^bThe factor scores for the two value axes Self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence and Openness to change vs. conservation are z-standardized, i.e. their means are adjusted to 0 and their standard deviations are adjusted to 1. The factor score values for the axes are the same as in Fig. 9.7 of Chap. 9 and correspond to the way the value space is usually constructed. This means that negative values express value orientations toward more self-enhancement on the first axis or toward more openness to change on the second axis while positive values indicate value orientations toward more self-transcendence (first axis) or toward more conservation (second axis)

dominated by *self-enhancement* (see Fig. 9.8 of Chap. 9). Accordingly, we find him, compared to other “rather not religious, but high in openness” participants, a little less inclined toward *openness* than most participants of this quadrant and considerably more directed toward *self-enhancement* (see Table 13.1). A closer look on his values profile shows that Cemal scores high on *benevolence*, *conformity*, *achievement*, *hedonism* and *self-direction*, followed by *power* and *security*, a low score on *stimulation*, and lowest scores on *tradition* and *universalism*.

Cemal’s pronounced high and low individual scores deviate from the more nuanced picture of the average “rather not religious, higher openness” profile. There, the mean score for *tradition* is 3.05 (*SD* 1.47), while Cemal’s score is 1.00, and the mean score for *self-direction* is 4.77 (*SD* 1.07), while Cemal’s score is 6.00.

So far, Cemal’s scores on the scales show someone who looks for success (high *achievement*, *self-direction*, *power*) and pleasure in life (high *hedonism*), who is striving to get along with his environment (high *benevolence*, *conformity*, *security*), and not too involved in doctrine or absolutes (low *tradition* and *universalism*).

Cemal’s *tolerance of complexity* is almost one standard deviation lower than that of his reference group. The subscales show that he sees complexity as necessity and as a challenge. Most striking is that complexity for him is a burden. Here, he scores two standard deviations higher than his quadrant group. It seems that he is aware of the complexities life is presenting him and also ready to cope with complex challenges, but nevertheless he feels burdened and stressed. In search of an explanation for this we might think of Cemal’s potentially ambiguous situation as a son of an immigrant family: it is expected of him that he will be successful in the immigration country, which implies a certain degree of compliance with values and customs in Germany. Also, it is expected that he is loyal to his Turkish family, shares their values, and complies with traditions brought from Turkey, including religious teachings and rituals. These, however, may be seen critically, if not looked down upon, from the mainstream culture of the immigration country. This places Cemal in a paradox situation: to comply with his parents’ aspirations and to be successful in Germany, he has to move away from them and their tradition (cf. King, 2016, p. 989). Might his profile so far be read as suggesting sensitivity toward complex and conflicting demands as well as an inclination to experience those as stressors? And might this reflect his experiences with a complex or paradox constellation which sometimes feels burdensome and which he sometimes would rather not have to deal with? For further insight, we turn to Cemal’s attitudes on religiosity and religions.

Cemal’s Religiosity and Attitudes toward Religions

It is striking that Cemal self-identifies as “spiritual” with the highest rating possible, while decidedly rejecting the labels “religious” and “atheist,” which both receive the lowest possible ratings. Nevertheless, his score on *centrality of religiosity* is more than a standard deviation higher than the average of his quadrant group. This,

again, looks contradictory at first sight: how can “religiosity” be relatively central and rejected at the same time? Then, what exactly might he reject and what might he identify with? His pattern on the RSS shows that, in comparison with other participants in the “open to change & low religious” quadrant, Cemal’s scores on *ttt* are high, while his scores on *fr* and *xenos* are about average. This makes him an interesting example of appreciation of the truth of one’s own tradition and its sacred texts in combination with appreciation of fairness, tolerance, and rational choice and xenophilia. Interestingly, this is mirrored by the combination of relatively high *ideological fundamentalism* and also relatively high *ideological pluralism*. His appreciation for the tradition, as exemplified by his relatively high scores on *ttt*, together with relatively high *centrality of religion*, suggests again a complex, if not contradictory, pattern. Taken together, this supports the impression that Cemal’s profile on the questionnaire reflects the efforts of a second generation immigrant to be successfully integrated in the immigration country and endorsing its liberal and hedonistic values, while keeping the bonds to his family and milieu.

Regarding inter-religious prejudice measures, Cemal shows lower (a little less than one standard deviation) *anti-Semitism*, lower (more than half a standard deviation) *Islamophobia*, and a little higher (less than half a standard deviation) *anti-Christian enmity* than his reference group. This might point to a general tolerance toward “other” religions (lower *anti-Semitism*), identification with his own tradition (lower *Islamophobia*), and a more critical attitude toward the dominant religion of the immigration country.

These findings from the questionnaire are, as mentioned above, complex and sometimes seem contradictory. In order to arrive at a deeper understanding of Cemal’s views and attitudes, we now turn to Cemal’s developmental profile as derived from the Faith Development Interview and his answers there.

Cemal’s Developmental Profile as Seen in the Faith Development Interview

The Faith Development Interview (FDI) consists of 25 questions covering four sections: (a) life review, (b) relationships, (c) values and commitments, and (d) religion and world view. For the evaluation of the interviews, we used the Manual for Faith Development Research (Streib & Keller, 2015, which is a carefully revised and shortened version of the 3rd edition, Fowler, Streib, & Keller, 2004, see also Chap. 3). The classical structural analysis proceeds by an interpretation of the interviewee’s answers to each of the 25 FDI questions; the mean value of all 25 ratings indicates the interviewee’s summary faith stage score. For further, more detailed interpretation, the questions are grouped into aspects that have been identified as “windows” to the person’s faith development (Fowler, 1980, 1981): perspective taking, social horizon, morality, locus of authority, form of world coherence, and symbolic function. Figure 13.1 presents our stage assignments for Cemal’s answers to the 25 questions in the Faith Development Interview.




Fig. 13.1 Stage assignments of single answers in Cemal’s FDI

Cemal’s profile is characterized by mostly stage three ratings, with some stage four ratings in the aspects perspective taking, morality, locus of authority, and symbolic functioning. Social horizon is dominated by stage three which leads us to expect that for Cemal the claims and emotional ties of personal relationships and family are most important.

Also, form of world coherence has been rated stage three, which implies that his cosmology, his idea of what holds the world together, is structured by implicit notions rather than explicit reflection. While in the traditional framework of Fowler’s model Cemal might be seen in a stage three to four transition, which is likely to occur during emerging adulthood, from a religious styles perspective (Streib, 2001), we recognize a combination of styles. Thereby, interestingly, the social horizon and the form of world coherence are characterized clearly by the implicit and external orientation of stage three. In the majority of aspects, however, we see indications for the systemic and reflective approach of stage four. When it comes to perspective taking, Cemal’s review of his life was assigned the reflexivity of stage four:

“So what happened there, so this upheaval that I did no longer want to live the way my parents wanted me to. Like, forbidding many things, not allowing one’s development and yes, because of these restrictions and such: I still notice sometimes, when I act somehow, I act according to what I was taught at that time. And I do not feel so well with that myself. I notice, I still have to work on some of the things that were handed to me. Where I cannot find myself. And that I myself, the way I live, do not fit into my worldview, but since I have these two world views that clashed together, it is enormously difficult for me now sometimes in certain situations to do the right thing or (claps hands). So in itself I would say: I always make, I act in a way that I don’t harm anyone or something like that.

But with regard to other subject matters, because there are different views. German, Turkish, and everything.”²

This passage shows Cemal’s self-reflective awareness of conflicting demands which result in inner conflict, blocking his access to his own intuitions and impulses. It reflects a tension: Cemal feels torn between his wish to unfold and actualize his own self as well as his wish not to do harm to others. Cemal reflects on the expectations, which his family puts on him as the oldest son, and develops a subjective theory on what he may have picked up and internalized. He states that he feels vulnerable toward criticism from his Turkish family, while also being aware of his achievements in Germany. Thus, he gives an impression of the conflicting demands that he negotiates as a second generation member of his immigrant family between the larger society of the immigrant country and the immigrant Turkish community.

In the aspect of morality, it is the detailed answer to what “sin” means to him, which was rated stage four. Cemal’s first response refers to doctrine and tradition: “Sin is just something that people have prescribed that is forbidden.”³ He continues to discuss regulations with respect to rituals of greeting, to clothing, to tobacco, the Islamic prohibitions of alcohol and pork. These he considers to be based on arbitrary authoritarian verdicts. They are respected “because someday someone prescribed it.” While he debates whether such prescriptions should be regarded as “sins,” he concedes that he does not eat pork, because he is not interested, but also because “in the back of his head” he knows that these things are considered a sin. Then, however, he contrasts these prescriptions with what he personally considers a sin. For him, sin means acting destructively in relationships with other human beings, harming others. Conceding that “sin” can be defined in different ways by different people, he argues against using “sin” as an instrument of restriction. He even warns that too much restriction may lead to disastrous consequences when people, after too much constraint, might “just explode.” Therefore, people should be free to live according to their religion, whatever it is, provided it does not injure other people, thus invoking the harm-care dimension of morality according to the model of moral intuitions (Haidt, 2007; Graham & Haidt, 2010).

²“So was da passiert ist, so dieser Umbruch, dass ich nicht mehr so leben wollte wie meine Eltern das wollten. So bezüglich vieles verbieten, nicht so sich selber entfalten und ja, durch die Einschränkungen und so: Ich merke es so noch manchmal so, wenn ich so irgendwie agiere und so, handele ich so, was so mir so damals beigebracht wurde. Und ich fühle mich da nicht so selber wohl. Ich merke so, ich muss noch an einigen Sachen so arbeiten, die mir vermittelt wurden. Wo ich mich selber nicht wiederfinde. Und dass ich- an sich, wie ich lebe, passt das nicht in mein Weltbild, aber da ich ja diese zwei Weltbilder hatte, die so aufeinandergestoßen sind, ist das enorm schwierig für mich jetzt so- manchmal so in bestimmten Situationen so richtig zu handeln oder (klatscht in die Hände). Also an sich würde ich sagen: Ich mache immer- ich handele so, dass ich keinem schade oder so. Aber so bezüglich so anderer Thematik, weil es gibt halt unterschiedliche Ansichten. Deutsch, türkisch, und alles.”

³“Sünde ist ja auch nur etwas, was Leute einem vorgeschrieben haben, was verboten ist.”

The aspect locus of authority is predominantly rated stage four, presenting an individualistic view, exemplified in his idea on what gives his life meaning: “Well, if you can just be the person you want to be, if you also stand for what you are.”⁴

Also predominantly stage four ratings are found for the aspect of symbolic function. Here, Cemal reflects on his way to be religious or spiritual. Although this is not an important question in his life right now, he sees options for a more intensive religious life in the future.

“But I could imagine that some time the time comes when I deal with it more. I could imagine that because... like, if you have some time off, time to yourself, time to contemplate all this and... a higher power and so on. Because in itself a religion is something good. It should be good, these religions were made for, actually, that is how I have perceived it, for people to have a connection. Like a group for example. And if you can identify with a group and gain strength from it—why not?”⁵

Cemal argues against attempts to have something imposed and criticizes unquestioned adherence to rules and tradition. While appreciating the protective function of identification with a group, he requests space for individual development. Thus he engages in working toward an individuating-systemic style of being religious. He sees functional aspects as positive: religion can be a source of strength.

Religious Development

Cemal grew up in a religious family:

“Yeah, I grew up with God, with Allah. You see, my mother prays, my parents are also religious and also my whole family in Turkey. But, you see, it is not as if my parents forced my sisters to wear a headscarf, or something like that, they have always given us freedom concerning Allah and everything.”⁶

Cemal describes that belief in God, Allah, was part of his upbringing, that he perceives his parents and his larger family in Turkey to be religious. He seems to be aware of talking to a non-Muslim interviewer when first introducing the more inclusive “God,” then switching to “Allah.” When he then emphasizes that his parents did not force his sisters to wear a headscarf, he responds to attitudes he is used

⁴“Na, wenn man einfach der sein kann, der man will, wenn man auch dafür steht, was man ist.”

⁵“Aber ich könnte mir das vorstellen, dass irgendwann mal die Zeit kommt, wo ich mich damit mehr befasse. Könnte ich mir vorstellen, weil... so, wenn man irgendwo von irgend allem eine Auszeit hat, dass man sich so selber mit allem beschäftigt und... einer höheren Kraft und so. Weil an sich ist eine Religion was Schönes. Soll auch was Schönes sein, diese Religionen wurden dafür gemacht eigentlich, also das habe ich so wahrgenommen, dass Leute einen Zusammenhang haben. So wie eine Gruppe zum Beispiel. Und, wenn man sich so mit einer Gruppe identifizieren kann und daraus Kraft schöpfen kann – warum nicht?”

⁶“Ja klar, ich bin mit Gott, mit Allah, großgeworden. Also meine Mutter betet, also meine Eltern sind auch religiös und auch meine ganze Familie in der Türkei. Also es ist jetzt aber nicht so, dass meine Eltern unbedingt so meinen Schwestern oder so ein Kopftuch aufzwingen wollten und so – da haben sie uns schon die Freiheit gelassen, so was mit Allah und alles zu tun hat.”

to encountering. He uses this disclaimer to meet preconceptions or prejudices which a non-Muslim interviewer might have. After having implicitly addressed a possible prejudice, he protects his parents from pertaining ascriptions by portraying them as relatively liberal. Then, having stated his family’s position and perhaps also his loyalty, he trusts the interviewer with a critical view. He shares that they used religion in a threatening way and as a means to restrain him. He finds it unfair of his parents to use “God” in arguments with him:

“But (amoyed?) Well, if you learn things like: ‘Do not do that, you will—you go to hell,’ and things like that, if you somehow restrict yourself to accept that you will land there sometime, and that there is a higher power and everything, then this also ruins a lot of things. Also, religion in general can do damage to a lot of things, like, what you see lately, again and again, that if one does not agree with the religion of the other, then it comes to war or something, in the worst case. So I think you should be capable of leaving it to the individual what is right for them.”⁷

Here, Cemal extends his criticism of his parents’ use of religion toward a more general criticism of intolerant ways of being religious, which may, when taken to its extreme, even result in war. He refers to negative consequences of restrictive ways of using religion. Cemal can be critical toward his parents, his religion, and toward God himself:

“Yes, sometimes you really were angry toward (laughing) God. Like, honestly, when you see what happens, like, with my parents, that they hold on to it too much, I was really like, ‘Meh, why have I grown up in this culture and religion, where my parents have such a way of thinking?’”⁸

This may also resonate with Özişik’s observations of conflict between the second and first generation of Turkish immigrant families, which involves a tension between excessive control and lack of guidance felt by the younger, the second generation (Özişik, 2015, p. 419).

At the time of the interview, Cemal does not consider himself very religious when we take into consideration what he has answered in our questionnaire (see above). But, interestingly enough, he mentions some kind of connection toward God that he has been feeling lately:

⁷ “Aber (genervt?) naja, wenn man so mitbekommt so: ‚Mach das nicht, du kommst in die Hölle‘ und so alles, wenn man sich da irgendwie jetzt darauf beschränkt, dass man irgendwann mal da landet, und dass eine höhere Kraft da ist und alles, dann macht das auch vieles kaputt. Auch Religion generell macht auch Vieles kaputt, so, was man jetzt auch in letzter Zeit immer wieder sieht, dass so, wenn einem die Religion des anderen nicht passt, dann gibt es halt im schlimmsten Fall so was wie Krieg oder so. Also finde ich halt sollte man so in der Lage sein, dass man jedem das überlässt, was halt für den selber richtig ist.”

⁸ “Ja, manchmal war man schon sauer auf (lachend) Gott. Also ja ehrlich, so wenn man so sieht, so was passiert und so, so mit meinen Eltern und so, dass die sich zu sehr daran festhalten und so, da war ich wirklich so: ‚Oah, warum bin ich jetzt in dieser Kultur und in dieser Religion aufgewachsen, wo meine Eltern so ein Denken haben?’”

“But otherwise, lately, when I have more time for myself, as I am living alone, I then realize that I nevertheless have hope toward God. Also that I think about Him and so on, that there is something. But I don’t pray myself or something like that.”⁹

It seems like Cemal is on his way to finding his own faith, after a period of time where he felt the need to distance himself from the belief system he grew up in. That he seems to be moving toward his form of privatized and experience based religiosity is supported by the maximum score for his self-assessed spirituality (cf. Streib & Hood, 2011).

Turkish Roots versus German Life

Cemal’s biography is characterized by tensions between his Turkish origin on the one hand and his current life and ambitions in Germany on the other and involves, besides hopes and ambitions, also separations and sadness. Cemal has known crisis and conflict and gives the impression that he has learned to cope with hardship, trusting that a challenging experience like moving out of the family home will make him stronger and that in the end things will get well again, “The sun will shine again some day.”¹⁰

When he discusses experiences of pain, he ponders whether these kinds of experiences are just more likely to stick with one’s memories. He seems to struggle to stay optimistic, while admitting that there are desperate situations in life. Thus, he seems to work toward what McAdams and his team have termed a “redemption narrative,” a narrative where something bad turns out well in the end (McAdams, Reynolds, Lewis, Patten, & Bowman, 2001). The following episode illustrates that such an ending may be difficult to achieve because it is sometimes impossible to fulfill the demands of two worlds. It is also a narrative about where he comes from and where he may one day go.

The narrative can be fitted into the classic model introduced by Labov and Waletzky (1967) and elaborated by Habermas and Berger (2011), which distinguishes five steps: (a) orientation or abstract, (b) complication, an interruption, something unexpected, (c) a solution or an attempt to solve the complication, (d) a resolution, and (e) a coda, which links what happened in the narrative to the present (Table 13.2).

The complication consists of an illustration of the tension between the demands of his current life in Germany and of his loyalties to his Turkish family: his grandmother in Turkey dies and he cannot attend her funeral because of his obligations here in Germany, an experience he evaluates as sad. The resolution consists of his portraying his late Grandmother as she used to be with the family, as family used to refer to her. Thus, he creates a picture of the grandmother he can remember,

⁹“Aber sonst, so in letzter Zeit, so wenn ich mehr Zeit für mich so habe, so durch das Alleine- wohnen, dass ich dann so merke, dass ich so trotzdem so die Hoffnung zu Gott habe. Auch so daran denke und so, dass es so etwas gibt. Aber jetzt so selber beten oder so tue ich nicht.”

¹⁰“Irgendwann kommt die Sonne wieder.”

Table 13.2 Cemal’s narrative segment: “Missing Grandmother’s Funeral in the country of Origin”

	English translation	Original German interview text
Orientation	Or then, again, what really touched me, was when my grandmother died, about 3 years ago I think. That means, the wife of my grandpa, with whom I have such a close relationship. She was also living there, when we [were] in Turkey.	Oder auch noch mal, also was wirklich mir sehr nahe ging, war, als meine Oma gestorben ist vor drei Jahren ungefähr. Also die Frau von meinem Opa, mit dem ich mich so gut verstehe. Die hat ja auch da gelebt, als wir da in der Türkei [waren].
Complication	No, it was very sad, really, that upset me a lot and what I found worst is that I did not attend her funeral. Because that all took place in Turkey and I had my things here and ...	Nein, das war auch sehr traurig, also hat mich sehr mitgenommen und am schlimmsten fand ich auch, dass ich nicht bei der Beerdigung war. Weil das war in der Türkei alles und ich hatte hier meine Sachen und...
Evaluation/ attempt to solve	yes, that still makes me sad sometimes when I fly to Turkey, to visit the family and you know: “She is not there any more, like that.” That is, that way I have also seen that it is just sad, when someone so close...	ja, das macht mich immer noch manchmal traurig, wenn wir dann zurück in die Türkei fliegen oder so, Familie besuchen und man weiß so: „Die ist gar nicht mehr da und so.“ Das ist schon so, wo ich auch so gesehen habe so, dass es einfach nur traurig ist, wenn jemand so nah...
Resolution	And my granny, she always just sat there. She really only just sat there and only talked to you and sometimes, when you are on the phone, like “Hello, how are you? How is uncle?” and then, you used to ask: “How is granny?”	und meine Oma, die saß da immer nur rum. Die war halt krank. Die saß wirklich nur und hat immer nur mit einem gequatscht und manchmal, wenn man am Telefon ist, noch so: „Hallo, wie geht’s euch? Wie geht’s dem Onkel?“ und dann... hat man immer so [im Kopf]gehört: „Wie geht’s der Oma?“
Coda	And this is just sad. I had not experienced it before, luckily, but at some point it happens, that someone who is important passes away.	Das ist halt immer traurig. Ich hatte es davor nur nicht erlebt zum Glück, aber irgendwann kommt es ja, dass irgendwer mal so, der einem sehr wichtig ist, geht.

including the phone calls, which point to the effort of keeping in touch with the family in Turkey. In the coda then, which ties the experience with the Turkish grandmother to his present life in Germany, he neutralizes the impact of the experience by stating that something like this is bound to happen sooner or later, thus glossing over the tension involved in the migration experience.

Conflicting Milieus and Family Conflict

Cemal is keenly aware of the demands his family has toward him:

“I always had to present myself like the best son possible in front of other relatives, always the model son. I had to be present at all family meetings, things like that. Also, there were very high expectations toward me. What I notice nowadays is that I have high expectations toward myself to make things right, while it is only human to make mistakes.”¹¹

What is most striking in this statement is the discrepancy between his parents’ expectations (that, in the end, have become his own expectations as well) toward him on the one hand and his objective awareness that people have flaws and make mistakes. Having to be the model son seems to have put him under a lot of pressure. His efforts at liberation lead to conflict: when he decided he wanted to move out to live with his German girlfriend, his family, especially his father, did not approve of this decision, and his father showed his disapproval by not talking to his son for two years:

“When I did what I wanted to, (sighing) he did not talk to me for two years, did not like what I was doing. That was just when I did not fit into this world-view anymore because I wanted to do what I wanted to, live alone, decide for myself whom I can, may love. And that was important, it was a decision.”¹²

What Cemal describes sounds like an impasse in the relationship between him and his father that lasted for two years. Cemal’s explanation involves a world view in which he did not fit anymore and, therefore, he had to be cast out. The father refused communication with a son who, from his perspective, had acquired so much of the life style of the immigration country that he had become a stranger. Choosing a local, not a Turkish woman, possibly meant breaking away from the father and his tradition. However, equating the conflict as one between father, who supports tradition, and son, who wants to break free from his parents and their milieu means to discount ambiguities involved in the migration experience of the family, which was initiated by the father. He was the first to come to Germany and wished for his son to be successful in the new country. So the story of the conflict between father and son might also be read as bringing the paradox of the immigration situation to its extreme: the son choosing to live with a German woman might be interpreted as continuation of the father’s striving for a new life in a new country. We may then look for different conflicts challenging the father (or first generation) and the son (second generation) of this immigrant family.

¹¹“Und ich musste natürlich immer da stehen wie der beste Sohn, vor den anderen Verwandten, immer Vorzeigesohn. Immer, wenn irgendeine Familienveranstaltung war, musste ich dabei sein und so. Auch sehr hohe Erwartungen wurden an mich gesetzt. Was ich jetzt heutzutage zum Beispiel merke, dass ich selber einen sehr hohen Anspruch an mich habe und immer so Vieles richtigmachen will, obwohl Fehler machen total menschlich ist.”

¹²“Als ich das gemacht habe, was ich wollte, (seufzend) hat der gut zwei Jahre nicht mehr mit mir gesprochen. Fand das nicht gut, was ich mache. Das war halt also das, wo ich dann nicht mehr in dieses Weltbild gepasst habe, weil ich das machen wollte, was ich wollte. Alleine wohnen, möglichst entscheiden können, wen ich lieben kann, darf. Und das war halt wichtig, das war eine Entscheidung.”

Cemal’s Challenge: Negotiating Different Milieus and Intergenerational Conflict

It seems that for Cemal and his family the challenges of migration are interwoven with the developmental tasks of identity and intimacy for the younger and of generativity for the older generation (Erikson, 1950). King observes: “Migration can frequently be seen as an ‘intergenerational expectation project’ in which the children are expected to furnish ‘proof’ that the effort of migration has been worth all the trouble.” (King, 2016, p. 981, translation BK).

Intergenerational conflict may involve attempts by parents to give guidance and preserve identity, which might well be perceived by the children as restrictive and not helpful in the immigration country (Özışık, 2015). Cemal’s case is exemplary for that dilemma: while his parents do grant him certain liberties, they still want him to stick to a certain degree of tradition which Cemal still finds too constricting. Growing up in different milieus, between expectations of the family in the country of origin, the hopes of the parents, and the demands of the mainstream culture in the immigration country may result in a complex situation: not being able or not wanting to fulfil the parents’ hopes may, at the same time, imply “estrangement” from tradition and home country—unless there is an option for dialog, which can be used as space to share experiences of ambiguity, of loss and separation, of being a stranger in an unknown territory.

Cemal’s Response: Acceptance of the “Strange” as Space for Individual Development

Cemal’s ideal of mature faith stresses space for individuality:

“But I think that there is no perfect definition. Anyone can believe as much or as little in someone as they consider necessary. It is only important that you do not want to impose it on anyone. Like: ‘You have to do that, you have to do that. If you do not do this, if you do not do it—oh, you’re doing this wrong!’ (bewildered) How can you believe in something incorrectly? Ah, that’s totally absurd, because the thoughts and everything, that’s individual. And that happens in your head, and it happens for a reason. And I think everyone should take it that way. Everyone should do what they think is right.”¹³

This statement can be read as plea for tolerance, but also as a plea for space for individual ways of believing and for individual development. Cemal also wishes for

¹³“Aber ich finde, es gibt keine perfekte Definition. Jeder kann ja so sehr an jemanden glauben oder so wenig, wie er das für nötig hält. Nur wichtig ist, dass man das niemandem aufdrängen möchte. So: ‚Du musst das machen, du musst das machen. Wenn du das nicht machst, wenn du das nicht tust- oh, du machst das falsch!‘(fassungslos) Wie kann man denn an etwas falsch glauben?? [...] Ah, das ist total absurd. Weil der Gedanken und alles, das ist individuell. Und das passiert ja in deinem Kopf. Und das hat Gründe, warum es passiert. Und ich finde, das sollte jeder so wahrnehmen. Jeder soll doch das machen, was er (für) richtig hält.”

young immigrants who are confronted with the intertwined tasks of making their way toward adulthood and finding their place in life in the immigration country to receive respect as well as support. Thus he generalizes his plea for space for development.

In his recent rapprochement with his father he demonstrates that he is able to take the other's perspective:

“So my father just came for a visit some day. And we just had a chat. And then this happened more often and then we visited more often, mutual visits and so on. And now we're talking normally, as if nothing ever happened. But anyway: I thought it was a pity. I do not think he'd ever apologize or anything. (Laughs) This he cannot do. And also never admit that he ever made a mistake (grinning) or something. He was also the eldest son in his family and he had to really do a lot and so on. But I think he just does not want to show any weakness before anybody. Yes. That's it.”¹⁴

Thus, he can accept what he perceives as his father's shortcomings and leave him space. He even goes so far to show understanding and find explanations for his father's behavior. He may use the implicit offer to identify with his father's fate. The next step in the development of *xenosophia* might be the development of some dialog between father and son, involving the obligations of first and only sons to their families and milieus of origin and their ambitions and hopes in a new country. Cemal with his rather open attitude and understanding is on a good path here. His roots are in two different worlds; taken together, these are very good prerequisites for developing a *xenosophic* attitude.

This is further demonstrated by Cemal's answer to FDI question 25 about how to solve conflicts that arise from differences in worldview and religious belief. Cemal's response brings a vision of encounter with the strange into play that is based on radical individualism:

“I believe if in fact everyone insists on their opinion, we will not find a solution, because ... I think everybody has an individual worldview and one should never make fun of another's worldview. Because, after all, I do not know why they think like this. Why do they think that way about that topic? Did they relate to [this topic] at some point? Do they have some relative or people or friends who had experience with that? Because I think everyone has their worldview, and this is very individual. Everyone thinks differently about something else. And I think that one should simply have the strength and the peace to let everyone have their opinion.”¹⁵

¹⁴“Also mein Vater hat mich irgendwann mal einfach so besucht, also dann haben wir einfach so gequatscht so auch. Und dann wurde es halt öfter und dann haben wir uns auch oft besucht, so gegenseitig und so. Und jetzt reden wir ganz normal, so als wäre nichts. Aber trotzdem: fand ich schade so. Ich glaube, er würde sich auch niemals entschuldigen oder so. (lacht etwas) Das kann er nicht. Und auch niemals eingestehen, dass je er einen Fehler gemacht hat (grinsend) oder so. Also er war auch der älteste Sohn in seiner Familie und der musste halt auch wirklich vieles machen und so. Aber ich glaube, der will einfach vor keiner Person irgendwie Schwäche zeigen. Ja. Das ist es.”

¹⁵“Ich glaube, wenn jetzt wirklich jeder auf seiner Meinung beharrt, dann findet man auch keine Lösung, weil... ich finde, jeder hat ein eigenes Weltbild und man sollte das Weltbild des anderen nie blöd darstellen. Weil ich weiß doch nicht, warum er so denkt. Warum denkt der jetzt so über diese Thematik? Hat der vielleicht selber mal da einen Bezug gehabt mit? Hat der irgendwie Verwandte oder so Leute, Bekannte, die damit Erfahrungen hatten? Weil ich finde, jeder hat sein Weltbild und das ist so individuell. Jeder denkt anders über etwas anderes. Und ich finde, man sollte einfach die Kraft und die Ruhe haben, jedem seine Meinung zu lassen.”

In this quote, Cemal develops—not in philosophical language, but in impromptu interview speech—a model of inter-religious or inter-worldview dialog. Based on the assumption of individual ownership of one’s opinion, the ethics of dialog does not permit over-hasty and downgrading interpretation, but requires an approach of tentativeness and hermeneutical humility that is open for new insights in potential experiences that may have contributed to the development of the other’s worldview.

Conclusion

Cemal has, as the son and second generation member of an immigrant family, a complex role. While he is, in terms of education and profession, fulfilling his family’s expectations, he lived through conflicts with his family and the surrounding Turkish immigrant milieu. Conflicts started around adolescence and involved his loyalty to values, including religious practices, which are held by his parents, in the surrounding immigrant community, and the larger family in Turkey. The clash of values culminated when Cemal decided to share his life with a German woman. This led to a longer separation from his father who disapproved of his decision.

Cemal responded by staying with his individual plans, moving out and making his own home with his partner. However, when his father came for a visit after 2 years, he could talk to him. That separation and the rapprochement both point to some reliable, if implicit, understanding between father and son.

While Cemal wishes for a more open dialog, he is also able to see his father’s problems. Therefore, he is able not to impose his wishes on him and to accept him as he is. In this implicit way he establishes space for talks between father and son, which may provide space for further development, showing a perhaps implicit version or enactment of xenosophia.

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Chapter 14

“And so I have the chance to help people. And that makes me happy.”—Altruistic Care for Fellow Refugees and Inter-Religious Appreciation—Henry G.



Ramona Bullik and Tobias Stacke

It seems like an impossible task to sum up 60-year-old Henry’s life in just a few sentences: Born in a country in Southeast Asia, he grew up in an environment that he describes as characterized by a multi-religious coexistence, which enriches and shapes his tolerant attitude today. Henry was forced to leave his home and his family at the age of 19 due to political repression and persecution. After an odyssey through other Asian countries which lasted about five years, he finally arrived in Europe. But instead of going to live with his aunt who resided in another European country, he stayed in Germany because he had met a woman and chose to live with her, instead of marrying his cousin for the sake of a residence permit. He has been living in Germany for about 40 years now; he has three kids, two of which are grown-ups already. After having lost his job at a furniture workshop manufacturer, he now spends considerable time with voluntary work as an exile politician fighting for human rights in his home country and as an interpreter for people from his home country who come to Europe as refugees. It is with unconcealed pride that he tells how most of the about 1,000 immigrants from his home country who currently live in Europe have been supported by him.

According to our typology (see Chap. 10), Henry represents the fourth type, whose challenging experiences of strangeness and alienation are located on the dimension of institutions—in Henry’s case the military regime of his home country that forced him to leave everything behind as he was persecuted for his political work. His attitude of non-violence and altruism is an outcome shaped by his coping with these experiences and may well be regarded as a version of post-traumatic growth. Moreover, Henry can serve as an example for a path to xenosopia that is

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shaped by influences from outside; a path that has been stony and dangerous, but has nevertheless led to a welcoming and appreciating attitude toward other human beings.

Henry's Answers to Selected Questions in the Survey

Table 14.1 presents an overview on selected scales and subscales of the questionnaire and Henry's answers in comparison with his respective quadrant group, which is Quadrant 1, that includes people who claim to be rather not religious and rather open to change (for a plotting of all interviewees of our study in the space with *openness to change* and *centrality of religiosity* as coordinates, see Fig. 10.1 of Chap. 10). Henry's results will later in this chapter be triangulated with the answers and narratives in his faith development interview (details see below; for an introduction to research with the faith development interview, see Chap. 3, this volume).

Table 14.1 includes selected measures from our questionnaire that can be regarded as dispositions for xenophobia resp. for xenophobia.¹ The *centrality of religiosity* scale (Huber & Huber, 2012) provides basic information about Henry's religiosity. This is enriched by the scales that ask for self-identification as "religious," "spiritual," and "atheist." These results provide a basis for a more differential perspective on Henry's view on religiosity which is presented in the subscales of the Religious Schema Scale (Streib, Hood, & Klein, 2010) together with the *ideological fundamentalism* scale, which is based on the items from the Religion Monitor. Furthermore, Henry's scores on the Portrait Value Questionnaire (Schwartz, 2003), his scores for *tolerance of complexity* (Radant & Dalbert, 2007) and for *violence-legitimizing norms of masculinity* (Enzmann & Wetzels, 2003) give information on Henry's psychological and attitudinal profile. And, finally, Table 14.1 presents Henry's scores on three inter-religious enmity scales.

Scores Regarding Henry's Religiosity and his Attitudes toward Other Religions

Henry grew up in a multi-religious environment: his mother was a Buddhist before she converted to Islam, his father being a Muslim. Henry himself went to a private Catholic school to which his aunt was affiliated. Nevertheless, today Henry describes himself in the questionnaire as "rather not religious" and "not at all spiritual." The

¹ See Chap. 4 for a detailed description of the measures in the framework of the research design of the entire study.

Table 14.1 Comparison of Henry G. with respect to the “Open to change & low religious” quadrant group on the most important scales in the questionnaire

	Single case variable values for Henry G.	Values for “open to change & low religious” quadrant group	
		<i>M</i>	<i>SD</i>
Self-rating as “religious”	2	1.60	0.77
Self-rating as “spiritual” ^a	1	1.99	1.03
Self-rating as “atheist” ^a	4	3.00	1.52
<i>Centrality of religiosity</i>	10	9.79	2.66
Religious schema scale (RSS)			
<i>Truth of texts & teachings</i>	11	9.72	4.05
<i>Fairness, tolerance & rational choice</i>	25	19.60	3.82
<i>Xenosophia/inter-religions dialog</i>	23	15.49	3.66
<i>Ideological fundamentalism</i>	31	21.65	6.83
<i>Ideological pluralism</i>	15	10.50	2.91
Values			
<i>Universalism</i>	6	4.15	1.30
<i>Benevolence</i>	6	4.60	1.05
<i>Tradition</i>	3	3.05	1.47
<i>Conformity</i>	1	3.35	1.29
<i>Security</i>	4	3.16	1.23
<i>Power</i>	2	3.49	1.40
<i>Achievement</i>	2	4.08	1.28
<i>Hedonism</i>	5	4.71	1.03
<i>Stimulation</i>	2	3.83	1.27
<i>Self-direction</i>	6	4.77	1.07
<i>Self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence</i> ^b	2.21	-0.12	1.03
<i>Openness to change vs. conservation</i> ^b	-1.14	-0.83	0.68
<i>Tolerance of complexity</i> ^a	94	83.67	11.28
<i>Violence-legitimizing norms of masculinity</i> ^a	8	13.66	4.85
Inter-religious enmity			
<i>Anti-Semitism</i>	4	6.69	3.00
<i>Islamophobia</i>	4	8.63	3.72
<i>Anti-Christian enmity</i>	5	7.84	2.58

Note All comparisons have been calculated with age cohorts, sex, and cultural and economic capital being controlled

^aSmaller sample size because variables have not been included in the Pilot Study

^bThe factor scores for the two value axes Self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence and Openness to change vs. conservation are z-standardized, i.e. their means are adjusted to 0 and their standard deviations are adjusted to 1. The factor score values for the axes are the same as in Fig. 9.7 of Chap. 9 and correspond to the way the value space is usually constructed. This means that negative values express value orientations toward more self-enhancement on the first axis or toward more openness to change on the second axis while positive values indicate value orientations toward more self-transcendence (first axis) or toward more conservation (second axis)

description he identifies most with is “atheist” which is rated more than half a standard deviation higher than his quadrant group. In the interview, though, he portrays himself as a person who does have a faith, but a very personal one. And, as we will see later, in the interview, Henry also highly appreciates “spirituality.” This ambiguity cannot easily be explained; our assumption is that it might have to do with a rejection of organized religion which extends to the concept of “spirituality.”

Given his background, it is consistent that we find high scores on the RSS subscale *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog (xenos)* for Henry. Here, he scores two standard deviations higher than his quadrant group. His score on the subscale *fairness, tolerance, and rational choice (ftr)* is the highest possible on this scale and again differs from his quadrant group by one standard deviation. Both of these findings correspond well with the rating of the faith development interview: Henry’s answers were mostly rated between stage 4 and 5—which characterizes him as a person with an individuative-systemic religious style with significant elements of a dialogical style (Streib, 2001). Henry’s FDI ratings correspond to his rating on the RSS: while *ftr* is linked to stage 4 and to the religious style labeled individuative-systemic, high scores on the *xenos* subscale indicate a preference for stage 5 or the dialogical style (Streib et al., 2010). Taken together, Henry’s answers show a person who is not only tolerant, but also open for inter-religious dialog and even seeking the challenge that goes along with the encounter with the “strange.”

Henry’s scores on the scales for inter-religious enmity are expectably low: for *Islamophobia* and *anti-Semitism*, he shows the scale minimum of 4; his value for *anti-Christian enmity* is only slightly higher (and still more than one standard deviation lower than his quadrant group). This may reflect that Henry grew up in a multi-religious environment which for him, in retrospect at least, is of such great importance that it is one of the first things he mentions in his interview:

“I come from a country with lots of different religions and different ethnic groups. The majority of [country in Southeast Asia] is Buddhist, so that’s commonplace. Nevermind if you are a Muslim, Buddhist, Christian, Hindu... and other religions, there is also a smallish Jewish community. They all practice their lives... as Buddhist. And they celebrate together, they do everything together. But in [country in Southeast Asia], religion never was an important thing, so to speak. Everybody was sympathetic toward everybody else. Yes. And that was just normal over there.”²

The strong emphasis he puts on the peaceful coexistence of these different religions is thus consistent with his scores in the survey. He even states that his country was, with regard to religious tolerance, more modern than the Europe of the 70s that he experienced when he arrived here.

²“Ich kam von eine Land,... das viel mmm-... verschiedene Religionen unnd i- verschiedene ethnisch. [...] War der Mehrheit des [Landes in Südost-Asien] ist ein, 65 Prozent, buddhistische Land. Also alltäglich. Egal, ob du Muslime, Budd- Chhristen,... Hindu... und andere Religionen, gibt ja noch bisschen kleinere jüdische Gemeinde, [...]. Die praktizieren ihr Leben... als Buddhist. Und die feiern sie zusammen, sie machen die alle zusammen. Aber in [Land in Südost-Asien] war nie der Religion war... ein wichtiger Punkt, sozusagen. Jeder hatte Verständnis (für die anderen). Ja. Und das war normal so halt da.”

Henry’s Profile in the Value Assessment

Henry is a person who is rather open to change. To measure this, Schwartz’ model of basic values (Schwartz, 2003, 2012) was used (see Chap. 9). Henry’s value on the axis *openness to change vs. conservation* is negative (−1.14) which indicates his high value on the pole of *openness to change* (see note to Table 14.1). This dimension consists of the subscales *hedonism*, *stimulation*, and *self-direction*. And while his values for *self-direction* and *hedonism* are high, higher than his quadrant group even, he scores low on the subscale *stimulation* (more than one standard deviation lower than his quadrant group). These results suggest that Henry is an independent mind striving for autonomy and seeking gratification for himself. But this obviously does not mean that he constantly needs new challenges and stimuli. It is not exaggerated to say that he has had enough challenges in his life and does not need to actively seek them. He receives gratification from his work with other refugees and as an exile politician—and he talks about both of these areas of activity with pride and does not omit the fact that he once even had the chance to meet the Dalai Lama and got to speak in front of the European Parliament. Another important event for him was an Islamic summit that he originally did not attend as a delegate, but only worked at as a waiter. But in the course of the summit, he somehow became an organizer. His conclusion for these experiences reminds of a redemption story, as proposed by McAdams, Reynolds, Lewis, Patten, and Bowman (2001) for that kind of story where a bad situation (or, in Henry’s case, a minor role) turns into something greater:

“I was there as a small hotel catering man. And suddenly... I got to experience [this event] as an organizer. That’s why I always said... I believe in this god, you know? Yes, and that was my breakthrough. A man that small and an event that great.”³

Nevertheless, Henry’s value on the axis *self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence* is considerably positive (compared to his quadrant group, he scores more than two standard deviations higher) which clearly shows his focus on *self-transcendence*, i.e. the concern for others and their well-being. He scores high on the subscales *universalism* and *benevolence* which belong to that dimension, while his scores for *power* and *achievement* are low. Henry does not seem to be very interested in status or privilege; he does what he does because for him it seems the right thing to do. His intentions are rather altruistic and not focused on personal benefits. This, among other things, clearly shows his xenosophic attitude.

³“Ich war da eine kleine Hotel-Catering-Mann. Auf einmal plötzlich... diese Organisator das erlebt. Das habe ich- deswegen habe ich immer wieder gesagt, das- dieser Gott zu glauben, ja? [...] Ja, und das war meine Durchbruch.... Sooo eine kleine Mann sooo... Erlebnis.”

Henry's Developmental Profile in the Faith Development Interview

Now we go into more detail regarding the faith development interview. The design of the study includes a triangulation of the survey results, the interview answers and narratives provided in the interview, so we now focus on the interview and identify story outlines as well as meaningful narratives which proved to be especially indicative concerning world views and psychosocial identity (cf. Keller & Streib, 2013). These narratives are identified and structured with the help of the classic concept provided by Labov and Waletzky (1967). Together with the structural analysis of the answers according to the *Manual for Faith Development Research* (Fowler, Streib, & Keller, 2004; this version has been carefully revised and shortened by Streib & Keller, 2015), this multi-method approach aims at a comprehensive reconstruction of the participant's biography as it unfolds in the progress of the interview.

Henry's Faith Development Scores

We start by looking at the structural analysis of the Faith Development Interview (FDI). The FDI itself consists of 25 questions which are grouped into 4 thematic blocks covering (a) life review, (b) relationships, (c) values and commitments, and (d) religion and world view. This approach, as developed by Fowler (1981, Fowler et al., 2004), proceeds by taking a close look at each of the interviewee's answers and then assigning a stage, thereby referring to certain criteria as described in the *Manual for Faith Development Research*. Figure 14.1 shows the stages to which Henry's answers have been assigned. These aspects are *perspective taking*, *social horizon*, *morality*, *locus of authority*, *form of world coherence*, and *symbolic function* (for a more detailed description, see Chap. 3, this volume).

Henry's answers to the questions that are evaluated in the aspect of *locus of authority*, for example, are rated between stage 4 and 5. *Locus of authority* answers tell us something about where the person sees his or her authority: is authority located internally or externally? To whom do they look for guidance and advice? Stage 4 answers suggest that authority is located internally; decisions are made according to principles that have been thoroughly tested and approved. Authority, if sought externally, is rather located in ideas and/or systems than in individuals. For a statement to be classified as stage 5, it is required that there is a mediated approach to authority, based on multiple perspectives and aspects the individual can take into consideration. This stage even goes beyond the authority of systems and ideas and tends to apply universalizable principles. Generally, stage 5 answers are associated with the xenosophic style that shows engagement with and appreciation for the strange, which might also include contrary opinions and viewpoints.




Fig. 14.1 Stage assignments of single answers in Henry’s FDI

Interestingly enough, Henry’s answers for the aspect of *form of world coherence* are rated about one stage lower. World coherence looks into the way persons construct their world, how the parts of the world make sense. Stage 3 statements in general display a rather stereotypical worldview with a tendency to adopt conventional values and opinions. Interpersonal relationships are important and other views and opinions are rather ignored or excluded. Stage 4 statements, on the other hand, show the person’s ability to deal with such dissonant views. They can be evaluated and integrated—or rejected, for that matter. Henry seems to be at a point in his life where the interpersonal relations (his wife and his yet young child) are taking up considerable space. He had not wanted to let that happen, he wanted to be more independent and free to do what he wanted to. In his world, this would not have meant a hedonistic striving for pleasure, but instead he was (and still is) engaged in a lot of voluntary work and had an active social life. But then his child made him reconsider his priorities:

“And... I was old, I said, now I really want to live, just for me and for... love, ... but (sighs) ... well. ... And then, there is a child again and ... I was very, um, ... confused. I said: ‘I don’t get any time for myself,’ you know? And when this child was born, my life was ... whole again. Because, you know, this kid perhaps thought: ‘This father, he did not want me.’ But from earliest childhood [the kid] has been so much attached to me. And now [the kid] speaks and [it] holds the reins, so to speak. I cannot live without [it]. Yes, and ... and this kid, [it] makes our life more beautiful. And that has been a beautiful turn in my life. And I am grateful, since this kid’s been here, I have got back my courage to face life.”⁴

⁴“Und... ich war alt, habe ich gesagt, jetzt (wollte) ich so richtig schön leben, (schmunzelnd) nur für mich und für... Liebe,... aber (seufzt)... naja.... Und dann ist da wieder ein Kind und... war ich sehr... mhh... durcheinander in mein Leben. Ich habe gesagt: ‚Ich kriege keine Zeit für mich‘, ja?

This special personal situation may be the reason for his focus on interpersonal relations in some respects. On the other hand, the decision to live that life with a small child at his age is a conscientious and conscious one and is thus consistent with the ability to critically reflect one's one world view and to re-think one's own values and priorities which is crucial for stage 4 thinking.

Henry's Life as Displayed in the Faith Development Interview

Live Review

Henry reviews his life in a very comprehensive ad hoc narrative. First, he speaks about his homeland and the special conditions of his upbringing in a country in Southeast Asia. After that, he describes his arrival in Germany and reconstructs his worries and problems, but also the perceived possibilities. After delineating the circumstances of his life, he goes back in his narrative and describes the life path that seems significant to him during his flight through Asia to Europe, which lasted for about five years.

Henry grew up in a small village with his family, his aunt being a substitute mother for some time. His family was wealthy and enjoyed high social recognition. He describes his homeland as a very liberal and cosmopolitan place characterized by religious diversity and care for humanity. However, political persecution forced him to leave the country. At about 18, he broke off his studies and fled through various countries in Southeast Asia. During that time, he was supported by his relatives and his family; nevertheless, Henry temporarily lived a life of extreme poverty. However, he also experienced a great sense of support from the people he met, for which he is very grateful, even today. He sees this as very meaningful for his life. In one of these countries, he completed an apprenticeship as a hotel salesman and engaged in political movements against the regime. After a while, he also had to flee from there. On the way to his aunt, who already lived in a European country, he decided to stay in Germany due to a love affair.

Henry's escape from his home country is composed by different aspects. Based on a recent work by Shakespeare-Finch, Schweitzer, King, and Brough (2014), who researched the posttraumatic growth of refugees from Burma in Australia, the following points can also be found in the description of Henry's flight: (a) distress – fear of violence and death (murder, kidnapping), (b) coping – hope for the future (financial support for family, political activism, education), support (family, community) and (c) posttraumatic growth – appreciation of life (living family, glad to

[...] Und als sie diese Kind geboren hat, mein Leben war wieder... in Ordnung. Na weil, weißt du, dieses Kind hatte vielleicht gedacht: „Dieser Vater, [...] das wollte mich nicht haben. “Aber [das Kind] ist von Kindheit so total an mich... sooo... fixiert. [...] Und jetzt spricht [es] unnd [es] hat mich in der Hand so irgendwie, ne. Soo i-ich kann ohne [das Kind] nicht leben. [...]Ja, und... mmm- und diese Kinnnd, das macht uns richtig schöne Leben. Und das ist eine schöne Schnitt in mein Leben. Und ich bin dankbar,... seitdem diese Kind da ist, habe ich wieder diesen Lebensmut so wieder.”

survive), personal strength (becoming resilient through struggle and growth) (p.318). All these themes can be found in Henry’s life narrative.

Especially at the beginning of his escape, Henry reports negative experiences and difficult situations in Asia. These challenges are common, as Shakespeare-Finch and colleagues (2014, p. 322) note,

“since the legal and institutional features of each country differ, and there are discriminatory attitudes against refugees, not just because they are outsiders, but because of specific attitudes toward their country of origin, their ethnic group, or their religious affiliation.”

During his narrative, Henry describes how he learned a lot about himself during the trip to Europe and also in his time in Germany. He especially ascribes great importance to personal developments during his journey—a trait that can also be found in the study by Shakespeare-Finch and colleagues (2014). The stages of the journey are linked with milestones of personal development and presented as meaningful for their own life. As an example, we present the following quotation from Henry’s interview:

“My life was always like a zigzag. It goes down, up again and down again. And then I came to Europe. And that gave me so much courage, these experiences, these four, five years that I spent in Asia. Since then I’m no longer fearful. I am not a religious man, but I have always believed in God if you want to put it that way. I do not know what this God is, but I’ve always had such experiences.”⁵

This quote portrays an enlightened and mature perspective that points to a strong inner coherence. Henry often finds a meaningful explanation for his life experiences. His faith in God (whatever Henry associates with “God”) is important for him and accompanies his life in many ways. He sees many experiences in his life and the paths on which he walked as opportunities provided by God. A form of spirituality has often been found to be related to higher levels of posttraumatic growth (see, for example, Pargament, Desai, & McConnell, 2006). In retrospect, therefore, much of his life seems to him to be meaningful and good, moments of joy as well as times of crises. This may be a form of coping with the impressions he has accumulated during his time in Asia and Europe. These thoughts are a leading concept for Henry which he likes to share with other people.

In Henry’s numerous parable-like narratives, narrative structures corresponding to the classic model of narratives by Labov and Waletzky (1967) can be found. According to Labov and Waletzky, a narrative can be divided into five steps: (a) orientation, (b) complication, (c) an attempt to solve the complication, (d) a resolution, and (e) a coda. As an example, we present a narrative in which Henry recollects a conversation with a teacher who has fled from Southeast Asia as well. He legitimates his experiences and his way of life in the following quotation (Table 14.2):

⁵“Mein Leben war so immer so wie Zickzack. Da geht unter, wieder hoch, wieder runter. Und dann kam ich nach Europa. Und das macht mir unheimlich viel Mut, diese Erlebnisse, diese vier, fünf Jahre, was ich gemacht habe in Asien. Da... die Ängste habe ich nicht mehr [...] Ich bin kein (religiöser) Mensch, aber ich habe immer an Gott geglaubt, so sagt man. Ich weiß nicht, welche dieser Gott ist,... aber ich habe immer wieder so... Erlebnisse so was gehabt.”

Table 14.2 Henry's narrative segment: "Belief in Predestination"

	English translation	Original German interview text
Orientation	I have already said that all these experiences, this up and down in my life. I left the country where I was born. I have often thought that my life had a pre-planned destiny. I cannot really control or influence this fate. I have often wanted to be able to control it or to influence it somehow. And then you ask other people, "Is this right?", but really you have already made your decision, something like that, and that is predestined, but I have not planned my life like that.	Das habe ich... vorhin... habe ich auch <u>gesagt</u> schon. [...] diese ganze Erlebnisse, hoch, runter, in meine Lebens- das Land verlassen hat, wo ich geboren bin, wo ich <u>heute</u> bin. Und das habe ich immer so gedacht, das ist eine vorgeplante... so Schicksal [...] Ich <u>kann</u> das nicht wirklich <u>steuern</u> . Ich habe mir oft einmal auch so mal <u>gewünscht</u> , so irgendwas zu steuern. [...] aber du fragst jede Menge Leute: „Ist richtig, oder“, aber... du hast <u>schon</u> entschieden irgendwie so, ne? Und das ist also vorgeplant. Aber <u>ich</u> habe nicht geplant. [...]
Complication	I met a family [from my home country] who came here. The father was an academic. He was an English lecturer there at the university. He came to Germany with his child and his wife. He had to leave the country because of the political situation. He lamented an awful lot. His son had some trouble at school, but he later could finally make his high school diploma. And he always complained that his life here is totally bad currently because he could no longer work in the field where he had previously worked. He felt worthless. He said, "I'm 50 years old now and here in Germany. The German language is very difficult for me to learn." Yet he was able to learn it, at least to a sufficient degree. But he was sad and said, "I was beloved and well-known in [home country] because I was an academic lecturer."	Ich habe eine Familie [aus meinem Heimatland], die sie hergekommen, der war... Akademiker. Er war Lehrer, Dozent da in der Uni in (englischer) Sprache. Kam mit eine Kind und Frau nach hier, Deutschland. Und weil er abhauen musste, ne. Wegen der Politik. Aber er hatte unheimlich viel gejammert, sein Sohn war in der Schule, hatte ein bisschen Schwierigkeit gehabt, aber <u>danach</u> ist er jetzt, er machte Abitur. Und <u>er</u> hat immer gejammert, dass hier sein Leben total <u>schlecht</u> ist im Moment. Weil er nicht mehr praktizieren kann, was er ist. Er ist <u>nichts</u> . Sagte er: „Ich bin jetzt 50 und hier... kann ich die deutsche Sprache schwer zu lernen.“ Aber er hatte hingekriegt... Ein bisschen. Aber er war traurig, er sagte: „Ich bin in [Heimatland] eine gemachte Mann. Jeder (grüßt mich) auf die Straße, weil ich Dozent bin.“

(continued)

Table 14.2 (continued)

	English translation	Original German interview text
Evaluation/ Attempt to solve	I said, “I do not know. You are here. That has a purpose. I do not know exactly why.” He had always lamented, so once I was so annoyed and said to him: “If I could push a button that would take you right back to [home country], should I push it for you?” “Yes,” he said, and I said: “With the current situation there?” This year, I remembered it again. He belonged to a Muslim minority. Now there is a conflict between Buddhists and Muslims in [home country]. There have been murders. Many Muslims were killed and thousands of Muslims have fled.	Habe ich gesagt: „Ich <u>weiß</u> nicht. Du bist <u>hier</u> . Das hatte einen <u>Sinn</u> . Ich weiß nicht.“ „Hatte mir immer gejamert, da war ich irgendwann mal so sauer und habe gesagt: „Wenn ich Knopf drücke und wenn du in [Heimatland] bist, würdest du das machen?“– „ja“, sagt er. Habe ich gesagt: „Mit den Situationen auch?“ „Und <u>dann</u> ... dieses Jahr... einmal plötzlich fällt mir ein, [...] der gehörte in muslimische Minderheit. Ne? Jetzt in [Heimatland], buddhistisch-muslimische Auseinandersetzungen. Und das wäre da richtige Mord und Totschlag gegeben. Muslimische wäre... sehr viel umgebracht und <u>Tausende</u> sind verflohen.
Resolution	“So,” I said, “would you like me to send you back to [home country] now?” Then he said, “No, never again.” I replied, “You see, that’s what I meant, it had a purpose, you could do good things in the meantime.	„ja“, habe ich gesagt: „Jetzt... wenn ich dich wieder nach [Heimatland] schicke?“– Sagt er: „(Nein), nie wieder“ und so. Dann habe ich gesagt: „Siehst du?... Und das hatte irgendein... du hast ja gute Dinge gemacht.
Coda	Perhaps God saved you from this crisis and sent you here before. Don’t you think so? I’ve told you again and again, there’s a reason why you’re here. I do not know the reason, but you’ll know it someday.” After that, I asked him, “Do you want to go to [home country] now?” He replied, “No, I cannot do it anymore, it’s so bad.” then I said, “Yeah, it is for a reason that you are here.” So I think that even today, I understood that there were many reasons for my existence in Germany, I want to see it in that way.	Vielleicht der Gott hatte dich vorher schon hierhin geschickt[...] Meinst du nicht, ich habe dir doch immer gesagt, der hatte einen <u>Grund</u> , dass du hier bist. Aber jetzt weiß ich nicht, was das ist. Du wirst irgendwann mal erfahren.“ „Dann habe ich gesagt: „Willst du jetzt nach [Heimatland]?“ „Sagt er: „(Nein), das <u>geht</u> nicht. Das ist <u>so</u> schlimm [...]“ „Habe ich gesagt: „ja. Das hatte einen Grund.“ „Und <u>so</u> denke ich mir auch, dass (für) meine Dasein in Deutschland es so... viele Gründe gegeben so war. Und so will ich es.

It becomes clear that Henry believes in a certain form of predestination, which he values as an opportunity. Henry recollects how much he has learned about himself during his journey to Europe und during his time in Germany. Personal growth and strength seem to be important topics for Henry, and this can be seen as reflecting the theory of posttraumatic growth (Calhoun & Tedeschi, 2006). The stages of his journey are connected to milestones of personal development and are made into a story of meaningfulness.

It is characteristic for Henry's narrative that he puts a strong emphasis on reconstructing his life in his home country. This can be explained, on the one hand, by a phenomenon reported in research on autobiographical memory called 'reminiscence bump' (cf. Conway & Rubin, 1993, for an overview; Conway, Wang, Hanyu, & Haque, 2005, for an intercultural comparison). Most people were found to have the most—and the most vivid—memories of the time between ages 10 and 30. This is supposed to be the time where the most "new" and "first" experiences are made which are therefore remembered more strongly. Conway et al. (2005) found a difference in memory content when comparing individuals from individualistic cultures (i.e. Western societies) with people from rather collectivistic cultures (i.e. Asian societies). People with an interdependent self (as to be expected from Asian citizens) tend to recall memories that are relation-centered, and are focused on social interactions. Henry's memories do not completely fit this description, but especially when talking about his early adolescence, there is a strong focus on interactions with other people and on routine events. On the other hand, his detailed description of a life in Southeast Asia in the 1960s pays tribute to the fact that he does not assume the person sitting in front of him (i.e. the interviewer) to be familiar with these circumstances. The way he addresses different mental states throughout the interview can be interpreted as a high form of reflective functioning as has been described for example by Fonagy and Target (2007).

Summed up, Henry can be described as a person who has, in his early adolescence, grown up in a multi-religious environment. These experiences are memories that he still holds dear and that seem to have shaped his overall open and xenophobic attitude toward new and strange situations. These attitudes will be also found in the next paragraph dealing with relationships.

Relationships

Henry takes much time reminiscing about his childhood and adolescence that he spent in his home country. He describes his father as a person with multiple problems and as a person who did not really take part in the upbringing of his children. The conflict with his father culminates in a political fundamental position when he accused his father of being a capitalist. His mother, on the other hand, is characterized as a very dominant person. To Henry, it seems that she was always scheming among her children, which did not provide a good basis for a healthy relationship among the siblings. This corresponds to his description of the general role of women in his home country. He claims that women had more power in society and therefore the land of origin was called "motherland" instead of "fatherland." His whole family situation was rather open, though. He describes how he grew up with his aunt because she did not have a child of her own and how he took advantage of that situation:

“Well, I more or less grew up at my aunt’s. But I knew this was my mother. ... Yes, but then I was here and when there was an argument here, I would go there and I have two possibilities [to go to] and even more. The whole street was full of relatives.”⁶

On second sight, this unusual family situation could function as a parable for his religious upbringing: While his aunt was affiliated with the Catholic Church and made her nephew go to communion, and his father, as a Muslim, was not happy with that, his mother, who deconverted from Buddhism, took a very pragmatic approach to that, demanding they should just let her do her thing.

At another point of the interview, Henry describes how he and his peers went to events of different religious organizations, depending on the benefits they expected such as receiving a good meal or the opportunity to get in touch with girls:

“My friends, they were all Hindu, Buddhist, and we all went to church, to the temple, the abbey, the mosque... We all went to the mosque together after the month of fasting. And there, all Buddhists became Muslims, they came because there was food at the mosque and they would receive donations. So all my friends came along. The whole mosque was full of children. The same on Christmas, the whole church was packed, because there was good soup and we boys, about 14, 15, we could (grinning) hug the young girls, yes, which otherwise we would not dare to do and now we were hugging them. And kissed them on the cheeks because the last sermon said: ‘And now stand up, embrace... and kiss. Today is reconciliation day.’”⁷

So his memories of his home country are ambivalent: While he fondly remembers the pragmatic multi-religious community, the recollection of his family situation is rather difficult, and unsolved problems with his mother still haunt him, even though (or maybe because) she has been dead for a while. Her dominant stance had a lasting negative affect on the relationship with his siblings, which makes him sad.

In a nutshell, Henry can be described as a rather altruistic person: along with his life as a family father, he reports about voluntary work for refugees and other social activities. There may be a narcissistic element which shows itself when Henry describes the special events he got to attend; but his overall mentality is one of being there for other people and sparing them difficulties that he had to go through himself. This is one of the crucial factors identified as correlates of posttraumatic growth.

⁶“Also ich bin bei meiner Tante mehr oder weniger groß geworden. Aber ich weiß, dass das meine Mutter... ja, aber daaa bin ich... hier und wenn ich hier streite, dann gehe ich da und [...] habe zwei Möglichkeiten und noch mehrere. Die ganze Straße voll waren Verwandte.”

⁷“Meine Freunde, die ja alle so (Hindus), Buddhisten und wir haben immer mit der Kirche, Tempel, Kloster, in Moschee... wir sind immer zusammen gegangen in eine Moschee [...] nach dem Fastenmonat. Und da (werden) die alle Buddhisten Muslim, die kamen, weil da in der Moschee gibt es was zu essen und auch kriegen die Geldgeschenke. Also meine Freunde alle kamen sie mit. [...] Die ganze Moschee war voll mit Kinder. [...] Und genauso in Weihnachten, die ganze Kirche war voll, weil ja alles schön Suppe gibt und [...] wir Jungen, so 14, 15, dann dürfen wir... (schmunzelnd) in Arm nehmen junge Mädchen, ja, und die wir nie trauen und jetzt nehmen wir in Arm. Und dann küssen wir auf die Backen, [...] weil ja der letzte Predigung sagte: „Und dann steh auf, nimm sie in den Arm und,... ja, küssen. Heute ist Versöhnungstag.“”

Values and Commitments

Henry is engaged in political work; for him, that is the only way to achieve his ideological goals. This became clear to him during his political activity in student groups in Asia. His political commitment is accordingly intrinsically based. However, to obtain political influence, Henry sees education as a key condition. He is saddened by the fact that he did not have the chances of a comprehensive education. Nevertheless, he does not give up and tries to achieve his goals through networking which is facilitated by his open attitude. The openness toward people is a characteristic of Henry. Even though, in the course of his life, Henry repeatedly questioned the meaning of his journey and his attitudes, he shows a very open-minded worldview with high acceptance regarding others' individual perspectives and beliefs. In times of disorientation and crises, Henry's basic values were repeatedly reflected and questioned.

In regard to religion, though, Henry arrives at a more critical conclusion. He criticizes that all major religions claim absoluteness. Current global political movements with power interests are seen with skepticism as well. Both examples for him are symptomatic for the state the world is in currently. Having suffered from these circumstances himself, Henry puts strong emphasis on openness and enlightenment. In general, these experiences lead to a pacifist orientation and a deep concern for the welfare of others—which also has been described as one characteristic of posttraumatic growth (Calhoun & Tedeschi, 2006). Furthermore, the pursuit of freedom is central in Henry's life. On the one hand, he was always constrained by political, familial and other interpersonal circumstances. On the other hand, Henry experienced many new perspectives through his unconventional way of life.

Henry's orientation towards enlightenment, mutual acceptance and individual freedom in the way of life are central themes in Henry's narrative. Henry considers it important that people help each other. His strong sense of altruism extends to all people. Therefore, he puts the collective action of people in the focus of his life. Henry is aware that his special way of life would never have been possible without the social support he received. Meanwhile, he sees it as his mission in life to share this experience. In the interview it becomes evident that Henry developed from someone needing (and receiving) help to someone giving help to others. This can be understood as the result of coping with his traumatic experiences. Thus, it seems plausible that he wants to alleviate such traumatic experiences for others. Attending to his scores on the *values* scale (see Table 14.1), we find these values well reflected in the interview. Henry scores high on both *self-transcendence* and *openness to change*. In other words, it can be said that Henry generates his identity in mutual exchange with other people.

Henry appears as a world citizen. For him, openness to and acceptance for the diversity of human beings are basic values. All people should be treated equally. He sees himself as a mediator who has been given the rare opportunity to help people in special living situations. While this all arose from his own biography, Henry lives a xenosophic way of life by getting involved with (and for!) the "stranger" and those who are in need of support.

Religion and World View

As mentioned, Henry experienced a variety of inter-religious encounters during his flight through Asia and Europe. Early familial and social experiences have laid the groundwork for Henry’s considerable openness and readiness for constructive engagement with religious and cultural diversity. He sees human rights and peaceful coexistence as common ground of all world religions. In essence, these are the foundations of all religions, and this is important for Henry. Conversely, the religious institutions that have emerged in the course of the history of religions are seen as the work of humans and not as the core of what religiosity is all about. Thus, Henry perceives many religious practices and rituals as alienated from the true meaning of religion. Talking about the various god representations, Henry comes to the conclusion that nobody has the right to claim exclusive truth:

“When you believe in God, then God is here. And when you believe in God, you don’t have to, five times a day ... like they do in the mosque, bow and get up and do all those rituals. Or like the Buddhists who sit in their monastery and ... no. You have to think about what you did wrong and then make it better. I am sorry, but they are being hypocritical, they pray five times a day and the next moment, they go out and rape somebody. And then they come back and tell their god, I have done wrong ... forgive me. So, you don’t have to go to church to pray ... or to the mosque. God is everywhere. Like, you are in the bathroom and you think of him—then you’re praying. The moment you think of him, you’re praying. That is praying.”⁸

Moreover, he strongly rejects the hypocrisy of the people who hide behind their religion and do not take responsibility for their own actions or, even worse, demand absolution from their God.

In his personal faith, Henry has developed a nonspecific concept of God and higher powers, rather than adopting particular concepts from a specific religious tradition. Henry states that he cannot justify and proof the existence of a God, but nevertheless, the idea of God is important to him, because God is something like a companion. Henry locates God within himself and his imagination. The concept of “chance” is deeply anchored in Henry’s religious and secular perspective. He regards his life as a God-given opportunity and reconstructs the meaning of his life with reference to divine guidance.

Henry’s personal faith and relation to God does not include traditional religious practice. Henry extends his personal view to a more general assumption: every human being can relate to God in his or her own way, while the diversity of religious

⁸“Wenn du Gott glaubst, dann Gott ist hier. Und wenn du dem Gott glaubst, du musst fünfmal nicht... wie die in Moschee gehen und Buckel und Stehauf und... und alle diese Rituale machen. Oder die Buddhisten in die Kloster sitzen und... nein. [...] Du (musst) nachdenken, was du falsch gemacht hast... und wieder gut zu machen. [...] Entschuldigung, wenn die sagen müssen; verarschen, wenn du jeden Tag fünfmal beten... und (im nächsten) Moment vergewaltigst du jemanden und kommst du wieder und sagt der Gott, ich habe falsch gemacht,... verzeiht mir [...] Also... du brauchst nicht in die Kirche gehen (lachend) und beten, in die Moschee. Gott ist überall. Also... du bist... in die Badezimmer, wenn du an ihm denkst, das betest du. In dem Moment, du denkst an ihm, du betest. Das ist beten.”

beliefs and practices should play no role. He therefore separates spirituality from ritualized religious practice:

“Spiritual. Yes. That’s good for the body. But not as a belief. A belief can become extreme or stupid. Spiritual, when you believe this, like I said before, that there is a higher power and you can sit down in your room and look at the sky or you look at the trees and say, ‘Please, help me!’ Because I believe that he is there. But I don’t know it. And that’s for my health and my spirituality was like a nice cream for my skin.”⁹

This specific way of being religious can be linked to his general attitude and to the concept of xenosophia: Henry does not need pre-formed rituals and ideas. He likes to think for himself and form his own paths. On the other hand, he not only tolerates, but respects and appreciates different, alien ways of thinking, worshipping, or acting—as long as they do not claim to hold the ultimate truth.

Henry’s Challenge: Political Institutions and Society

Henry’s biography is shaped by his experiences in his home country and his flight through Asia. When he started his studies in law school, he got engaged in politics opposing the military regime. This regime pretended to be socialist, but soon turned out to be totalitarian and oppressive. Henry recollects the circumstances that led to his flight right at the beginning of the interview:

“Suddenly there was this resistance in [the 60s] and then they crushed the whole university, the military, they wrecked it and... thousands of students were slaughtered in cold blood. And the next day they announced that 100 had been hurt and 10 or 20 were dead. That is not right. From our little provincial town alone, 50 students never came back. And... but I was still so young and when I slowly grew up, [...] I engaged in a political movement. There I had to... this question, that is... back then, it had been ten years ago by then, and we said, ‘Where have all these students gone? From our town alone, 50 are missing, that would mean a whole lot more for the whole country. Everybody has that same question.’ And then they started shooting again, imprisonment, then the whole country is shooting again... I had to flee to [country in Southeast Asia].”¹⁰

⁹“Spirituell. Ja. Das ist gut für die Körper. Aber nicht als Glauben. Als Glauben, wenn sie extrem werden kann oder ganz dumm werden kann. Spirituell, wenn man das glaubt, dass so die... so wie ich so sagte gerade, da gibt es höhere Macht und [...] du kannst dich in diese Zimmer setzen und guckst du Himmel [...] oder guckst dir an die Bäume und sagst, ‚Bitte, (hilf) mir doch!‘ [...] Weil ich glaube, der ist da. Aber ich weiß nicht. Und das ist für meine Gesundheit und meine (Spiritualität)... war- schöne Creme... für meine Haut.”

¹⁰“Auf einmal diese Widerstand in [den 60er Jahren] war... und dann haben sie die ganze Uni plattgemacht, der (Militär), in Asche gelegt und... viele Tausende... Studenten werden kaltblütig... ermordet. Und dann haben sie die nächste Tag... bekannt gegeben und... und das war... ein paar 100 verletzt und zehn oder 20 tot. Das stimmt nicht, bei uns in Stadt schon eigenes kleine Provinzstadt, 50 Studenten sind nie wiedergekommen. Und... und dann war ich aber noch so jung und dann werde ich so langsam erwachsen, [da habe ich] in eine politische Bewegung... mitgemacht. Da musste ich... diese Frage, die ist... damals, da war es so zehn Jahre,... und dann haben wir gesagt: ‚Wo ist diese Studenten geblieben... allein? Ja? Von unserer Stadt... schon 50 verschwindet, dann wäre das ganze Land jede Menge. Da jeder hat das- diese Frage. “Und dann haben die wieder... erschossen, Verhaftung, dann schießt wieder das Land... musste ich fliehen nach [Land in SO-Asien].”

The murder of thousands of students and the way the government concealed these deeds were the main reason for Henry to engage in politics. He felt the need to care for the society in which he grew up, to ask critical questions and to engage in investigation; Henry could not stand idly, while those atrocities happened around him. And this is what finally put his own life in peril and finally made Henry decide to leave his home country and continue his fight in exile.

He experienced what it is like to become a stranger in his own home country and a suspect for the military regime. He became estranged from the political establishment and developed a strong awareness for the injustice that was going on. While his childhood is described as harmonious (at least with regard to his peers), as things changed politically, this had a deep impact on him. The military putsch not only changed the face of his country to the worse, but it also changed Henry and shaped his way of thinking and is responsible for his habitus today.

Henry’s Response: Altruistic Care for Others and Xenosophia

Henry was forced to experience what it is like having to leave his country and start somewhere new. When he came to Europe, there was not much support available, there were no interpreters speaking his language, people did not know his country existed in the first place. He had to go through all these bureaucratic routines by himself since there was no one to help him. And he rejected the little help that was offered: he could have married his relative here in Europe which would have provided him with a permit of residence. But this was not the kind of help he sought. Henry did not want to commit to a relationship for pure pragmatic reasons.

So, after he had finally made a life here, he made it his task to help other people in the same situation he had been in and to spare them the hardships he had to go through. Being able to help people for him is a chance, but also a gift which is not only due to his personal achievements, but also, to a certain degree, a gift of God:

“And so I have the chance to help people. And that makes me happy. When I am alone, there is this song, don’t know who sang it, ‘When you are alone in your bed’, you know, that’s when I think of God. Who helped you do it? Yes? This is not your doing alone. This worked out somehow, but I would not have made it on my own. It is pretty arrogant to say, I have done it all by myself. I believe in god in the sense of: you have done this and you should feel it too, that you did it. And so you develop your... living like that on this planet as long as you live, ... that is your task. That’s why, when I am alone, I feel that God is near me.”¹¹

¹¹“Und so habe ich die Chance so Menschen zu helfen, ja. Und das macht mich glücklich [...] Wenn ich alleine (bin), da gibt es doch auch so ein Lied, weiß nicht, wer hat gesungen: „When you are alone in your bed“, ja, dann denke ich an Gott. [...] Wer hat dir das geholfen? Ja? Das sind nicht alle von mir. Das hat irgendwie geklappt, aber ich hätte alleine nicht geschafft. [...] Das ist ziemlich arrogant zu sagen, ich habe das alles gemacht. [...] Ich glaube an Gott in dem Sinne: Du hast das getan und das müsstest du auch spüren, das hast du gemacht. Und so entwickelst du deine... hier (auf) der Planet das zu leben, solange das du lebst,... das ist deine Aufgabe. [...] Deswegen, das Gott ist mir in dem Moment, wenn ich alleine bin, immer nah.”

This citation illustrates Henry's humbleness and awareness that his own possibilities are limited. Even though Henry claims to be not religious in an organized form, he still can be described as a religious person who does not take for granted what he has achieved.

This kind of faith combined with his own straightforward manner is what enables him to deal with the challenges that life has set him. As a result from his traumatic experiences during his flight to Europe, he feels a strong connection to people who suffer the same fate and in general is open and supportive toward other people—both of which are characteristics that have been described as possible outcomes for posttraumatic growth (e.g. Calhoun & Tedeschi, 2006; Meichenbaum, 2006).

Henry has turned his experiences into a wise worldview. Our analyses depict him as a person who has rich factual as well as procedural knowledge about life. This means, according to Staudinger, Smith, and Baltes (1994), that he has a wide range of general and also specific knowledge, but also knows how to deal with potentially difficult situations because he has figured out strategies of managing problems throughout his life. Moreover, his experiences enable him to appreciate that values may differ interpersonally and may change over time.

Henry's path of life has been a stony one, but the accumulation of the personality traits mentioned above leave him as a person who can appreciate alien and new situations and who is open-minded and always ready to support others regardless of circumstances.

Conclusion

What is our conclusion about Henry's path to xenosophia? He has had multiple experiences of being a stranger himself: he has been estranged from parts of his family of origin; later, the political change in his home country made him feel like a stranger in his own country because he could and would not tolerate the violent regime. Throughout his flight, he was a stranger as well, culminating here in Europe when he could not even find someone who spoke his mother tongue. Nevertheless, and maybe that's due to his childhood experiences of peaceful multi-religious encounters, he has always kept an open mind for others.

Linking Henry's story to our concept of xenosophia, we find that Henry's attitude goes beyond mere tolerance: he not only appreciates the unfamiliar, but embraces it and interacts with it. His approach can well be described with the "salutogenic" perspective (see Chap. 1). Henry is actively seeking to tear down walls, to dissolve prejudices and arrive at a more just and fair world. Taken together, Henry, with his challenge within political systems and intercultural affairs, and his response of an open, tolerant, and welcoming manner, is a good example for the path to xenosophia within the institutional frame of reference.

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Part IV

Conclusion

Chapter 15

Biographical and Statistical Paths toward Xenosophic Religion



Heinz Streib, Constantin Klein, Ramona Bullik, and Barbara Keller

Xenosophia is the term, which—although it is new to prejudice research and to the psychology of religion—we decided to put in the foreground in this book for the following reason: we intend to profile and put up for discussion a salutogenic perspective (as detailed in Chap. 1) that may be useful in holding course and sustain a culture of welcome and dialog in times of epidemic global increase of prejudice and xenophobia, particularly against immigrants and refugees—an epidemic that obviously has infected also some political leaders.

While Germany may be regarded by many, not only by the people seeking refuge in these days, as being a safe place for a culture of welcome, results presented in Chap. 5 demonstrate that Germany is all but an isle of the blessed. Our data show considerable decrease of agreement to the welcoming of war refugees within half a year, from August, 2015 to March, 2016, the rise of xenophobia and other attitudes of group-focused enmity in the same short time, especially in East Germany. These observations are indications of developments in the German population that must evoke the concern of all who support an open society that includes diversity.

In light of these developments and these results, scientific research has—with even increased urgency—the task of exploring the forces at work in prejudice reduction, including the investigation of factors that may promote a culture of welcome and xenosophic and xenophilic attitudes. Thereby, our research has a focus on the exploration and examination of the psychological and religious constituents that may contribute to the advancement of such positive attitudes. Thus, our research includes the examination of paths to xenosophia—as a step to profile a salutogenic perspective.

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Paths Toward Xenosophia

Our research includes attention to the *paths* toward xenosophia. Thereby, “path” is used for both the modelling of quantitative data and the results of the biographical-reconstructive interpretation of interviews. It is our expectation that both versions of paths complement each other and reveal a complex, however more informative picture. This concluding chapter is the place to take the triangulation of qualitative and quantitative results that were presented so far in single chapters in Parts II and III one step further.

For an understanding of the development of xenosophia, we have adopted insights from the philosophy of the alien, as explicated by Waldenfels (2009, 2011) and Nakamura (2000) (see Chap. 1 for details). Their philosophy of the alien invites a processual view, when it suggests a dynamic of experience and response: experiences of the strange/the alien happen to us, and these experiences call for a response. The ideal way of responding to the experience of strangeness/alienness—the xenosophic way of responding, in Nakamura’s terms—is characterized by a unique kind of responsivity, which resists the temptation of immediate hermeneutical appropriation, thus resists the mistake of making the strange into an *other*, but can endure this irritation and develop a creative response.

This processual dynamic of experience and creative responsivity is the decisive characteristic for our modelling of the paths to xenosophia, it therefore calls for operationalization in empirical research. And we claim for the study presented in this book that the research design and evaluation include perspectives on this dynamic—in quantitative and qualitative analyses.

An example of how this dynamic has been operationalized in quantitative analyses is the inclusion of the assessment of *tolerance of complexity* (Radant & Dalbert, 2006, 2007). As will be explained in more detail below, *tolerance of complexity* has emerged as one of the variables with very strong effects on the agreement to the welcoming of war refugees, to the statement that Islam fits in the Western world, and to the appreciation of religious diversity as examples for xenosophic and xenophilic attitudes. However, quantitative analyses focus on relations between variables that have been assessed with psychometrically validated instruments in large samples to construct general paths toward xenosophia. In qualitative work, we base generalizations upon careful comparisons of detailed studies of single cases, focusing on individual biographical reviews and reflections.

In the qualitative work with interviews, the xenosophic dynamic of experience of strangeness and responsivity can be recognized in individual biographical paths. As proposed in Chap. 10, this dynamic can be regarded as the basic structure of the biographical paths toward xenosophia. To illustrate this, we may recall the quote from Nina F.:

“I believe it’s important to open your eyes. Or to open your senses for situations, for people, for circumstances. You know, you have ideas in your head too quickly, but instead- it should be about engaging in stuff. And about being willing to understand things. So this is the

concept: If I wanted to teach my kids one thing, you know, it would be that. (laughs) Just starting by just looking at things.”¹

This is a powerful statement coming from a 26-year-old woman who explicitly concludes the narration about her biographical development—that includes challenging experiences of strangeness—with a statement that reflects the philosophers’ considerations on xenosophia.

These are examples to illustrate our reconstruction of paths to xenosophia. Now, we will summarize results from quantitative analyses and qualitative analyses in order to finally discuss the triangulation of our analyses.

Quantitative Modelling

Assessment of Religiosity in the Path Models toward Xenosophia

It is obvious from our structure equation models in Chaps. 6 and 7 that the special focus of our research is on the investigation of the role of religiosity in relation to xenophobia and xenosophia. Therefore we included in our structural equation models the variable that we regard as optimal for our purpose, namely the Centrality of Religiosity scale (Huber & Huber, 2012), which assesses how central these five dimensions of religiosity are for the respondents: religious experience, religious interest, religious beliefs, and private and public religious practice. And we also included the Religious Schema Scale (RSS, Streib, Hood, & Klein, 2010), which measures three religious schemata, different structural patterns for the interpretation of (inter-)religious experience, in three subscales: *truth of texts and teachings (ttt)*, *fairness, tolerance and rational choice (ftr)*, and *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog (xenos)*.

Especially with the three religious schemata (RSS) included in the equations, the models have proven successful in assessing the effects on targets such as attitudes toward war refugees, immigrants, and people from other religions and of other ethnic background. It is important here to note that the structure equation models work and have acceptable fit indices only when the RSS subscales, our differential assessment of religious schemata, are included (*centrality of religiosity, openness to change and tolerance of complexity* alone are less effective).

For modelling the relation between religion and xenophobic or xenophobic attitudes, we found that the structural equation models presented in Chaps. 6 and 7 fit our data best. And we suggest the inclusion of our measure for religious schemata

¹“Ich glaube, dass es wichtig ist, so die Augen aufzumachen. Oder die Sinne aufzumachen für Situationen, für Menschen, für Gegebenheiten und nicht... also man hat halt so sehr schnell... Ideen zu irgendetwas im Kopf, sondern- also dass es eher darum geht, sich auf Sachen einzulassen. Und bereit zu sein,... Dinge zu verstehen.... Ja.... Also das ist so die Vorstellung: Wenn ich meinen Kindern irgendetwas beibringen wollte, ne, dann wäre das glaube ich das. (lacht) So erstmal... ja, erstmal einfach auch sich Dinge anzugucken.”

that allows for a differential assessment of a xenophobic/ethnocentric religious schema in contrast to xenophobic/universalistic religious schemata in future research about the relation between religion and prejudice.

Two Examples of Path Models toward Xenophobia

The structure equation models in Chap. 6 reflect our way of modelling the paths to xenophobic attitudes. To start with one example, one model estimates the contributions to the appreciation of religious diversity (“The increasing diversity of religious groups in our society represents cultural enrichment”). Effects of *centrality of religiosity* are at a moderate total effect size ($\beta = .24$, see Table 6.2 in Chap. 6); effects of *openness to change* are at lower total effect size ($\beta = .14$), and effects of *tolerance of complexity* are at considerably higher effect size ($\beta = .34$). Considering the contributions of the Religious Schema Scale, the effect of *truth of texts and teachings* is positive on a rather low total effect size level ($\beta = .05$) and the subscale *fairness, tolerance and rational choice* has a somewhat stronger total effect ($\beta = .18$). However, the subscale *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog* has the strongest total effect ($\beta = .44$).

To outline another structural equation model, the model for the welcoming of war refugees (“War refugees should be accepted into Germany”; see also Fig. 6.4 in Chap. 6): This model is not much different from our first example in regard to religiosity, openness and complexity tolerance. But the pattern of effects of the RSS subscales are considerably different: the effect of scores on *truth of texts and teachings* is negative, but still on a rather low total effect size level ($\beta = -.12$) and scores on *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog* have an only marginal total effect ($\beta = .05$), while scores on *fairness, tolerance and rational choice* have strongest total effect size ($\beta = .42$).

Thus, our estimation of path models indicates that, while *centrality of religiosity* and *openness to change* make moderate contributions, and *tolerance of complexity* makes a somewhat higher contribution, it is the religious schemata, the pattern of scores on the RSS, which display the strongest effects. Therefore we conclude: our path models demonstrate that the differential assessment of religious schemata is the key to understanding our participants’ development of xenophobia.

With reference to Allport’s (1954) dictum that religions can “make” and “unmake” prejudice, we conclude: religion can make and unmake xenophobia—with differences, however. The results of our structure equation models clearly demonstrate that *centrality of religiosity* has positive effects (especially indirect and total effects) on the welcoming of war refugees, the appreciation of religious diversity, and on the view that Islam fits in the Western world. But one should not forget that these results emerge in the network of equations that allow for the interplay of the positive with the negative effects (direct effects in particular) of a specific, namely the xenophobic/ethnocentric style of religiosity (as assessed by the RSS subscale *truth of texts and teachings*). Thus, the models show the limitations of

religion (*centrality of religiosity*) to potentially predict xenophobic and xenophobic attitudes, but reveal much stronger positive effects, especially through the religious schemata *fairness, tolerance and rational choice*, and *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog* that assess the xenophobic religion or, in Allport's terms, the religion "of a universalistic order."

Modelling the Paths to Xenophobia and Other Prejudice

In Chap. 6, we have presented models for *xenophobia* and *Islamophobia* as targets. It is no surprise that, in these models, we find that *centrality of religiosity, openness to change* and *tolerance of complexity* have *negative* effects—which indicates that they are opposed to *xenophobia* and *Islamophobia*. Also the pattern of the effects of the RSS subscales are reversed: while *fairness, tolerance and rational choice* and *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog* have high negative effects, thus stand in strong opposition, *truth of texts and teachings* now clearly displays strong positive direct and total effects in support for *xenophobia* and *Islamophobia*. The latter is evidence for the assumption that it is the ethnocentric version of religiosity that is associated with prejudice.

In Chap. 7, we have presented structural equation models that take the models of Chap. 6 one step further and open a new perspective on the modelling of paths toward a wider spectrum of prejudices, which are part of the syndrome of group-focused enmity (Heitmeyer, 2002; Zick et al., 2008): we have, of course inspired by previous research (Baier, Pfeiffer, Simonson, & Rabold, 2009; Baier, Pfeiffer, Rabold, Simonson, & Kappes, 2010; Streib & Klein, 2012), included the Violence Legitimizing Norms of Masculinity Scale (Enzmann & Wetzels, 2003) in the equations that aim at an assessment of the effects on targets such as *Islamophobia, anti-Semitism, general racism, anti-black racism, and sexism*. One outstanding result from Chap. 7 needs to be mentioned in this concluding chapter, because it adds an important aspect to the modelling of the paths to this set of prejudices: the *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* have turned out to have the strongest effect on these targets, exceeding all other predictors in the equation, for men in particular.

Outlook for the Statistical Path Models

The statistical paths toward xenophobia and xenosophia that we have presented are based on samples of $N = 1,471$ participants (resp. $N = 1,419$ non-Muslims for analyses regarding Islam); and the models are satisfactory in fitting the data. Thus, they may offer a solid base on which future research can build and expand. Thereby, two directions of future research stand out: one is expanding the research and investigating other countries and religious landscapes in Europe and beyond, to allow for cross-cultural comparisons. Another desideratum is longitudinal investigation of the

paths to xenophobia; this would allow not only for the monitoring of the relation of religion/world view and xenophobia over time, but also for an estimation of causal relations between the predictors and the targets, thus adding considerable evidence.

But also for the practical work in counselling and in education in our schools and in public education, the path models suggest specific intervention strategies: prejudice reduction work should pay special attention to, aim at calling into question, and reduce the norms of masculinity; it may cultivate tolerance of complexity and hermeneutical humility; it may suggest to reflectively overcome ethnocentric and fundamentalist religious schemata—in order to nurture tolerance and fairness and finally dialog and xenophobic encounter with the other person and the other religion.

Biographical Paths

Statistical path models are based on large samples, but need to focus on selected variables that can be entered into structural equations. The reconstruction of individual biographical paths, and, as a method of aggregating data “bottom up,” that is, taking single cases as points of departure, the construction of a typology of cases, is the valuable contribution of qualitative research. Combining quantitative and qualitative methods gives research results depth of focus (see, for example: Streib, Hood, Keller, Csöff, & Silver, 2009; Streib & Hood, 2016), thus we use triangulation to structure research designs.

In the case study chapters, we have presented comprehensive case studies for each type of our typology. This concluding chapter is the place to draw lines between the four case studies, note differences and common themes that have emerged in the interpretation of the single cases. Thus, we take the triangulation of quantitative and qualitative results beyond the single case, starting with a quantitative comparison of the profiles of central variables of our case study participants, Robert, Nina, Cemal and Henry.

Comparing Individual Profiles of Variables

Table 15.1 presents a synopsis of the tables that are included in the case study chapters—with the difference that now the scores of the four interviewees on selected items and scales in our questionnaire are z-standardized (their means are adjusted to 0, and their standard deviations to 1) and that the scores of the four cases are thus compared with the means in the total sample.

In regard to the attitudinal targets (the last seven lines in Table 15.1), all four cases display great similarities: outstandingly high rejection of *anti-Semitism* and *Islamophobia*, outstandingly high agreement to the culture of welcoming war refugees, outstandingly high rejection of the deportation of economic refugees, and

Table 15.1 Comparison of single case z-standardized values on selected variables

	Robert T.	Nina F.	Cemal K.	Henry G.
Self-rating as “religious”	2.42	−1.00	−1.00	−0.14
Self-rating as “spiritual”	2.31	−1.01	2.31	−1.01
Self-rating as “atheist”	−0.94	1.73	−0.94	1.06
<i>Centrality of religiosity</i>	2.41	−0.64	0.38	−0.43
Religious Schema Scale (RSS)				
<i>truth of texts & teachings</i>	0.37	−1.44	0.37	−0.23
<i>fairness, tolerance & rational choice</i>	1.18	0.92	0.14	1.44
<i>xenosophia inter-religious dialog</i>	2.42	0.55	0.02	1.89
Values				
<i>(self- enhancement vs.) self-transcendence^a</i>	0.04	1.42	−1.41	2.21
<i>(openness to change vs.) conservation^a</i>	−1.11	−1.85	−0.50	−1.14
<i>tolerance of complexity</i>	0.90	1.23	−0.53	1.15
<i>violence-legitimizing norms of masculinity</i>	−0.59	−0.98	0.01	−1.18
Inter-religious enmity				
<i>anti-Semitism</i>	−0.98	−0.98	−0.98	−0.98
<i>Islamophobia</i>	−0.80	−1.35	−0.80	−1.35
<i>anti-Christian enmity</i>	−0.61	0.18	0.57	−1.00
“War refugees should be accepted into Germany.”	0.82	0.82	0.82	0.82
“Economic refugees should be deported.”	−0.80	−1.76	−1.76	−1.76
“There are too many immigrants in Germany.”	−0.71	−1.67	0.26	−1.67
“The increasing diversity of religious groups in our society represents cultural enrichment.”	1.55	1.55	0.51	0.51

Note ^aThe factor scores for the two value axes *self-enhancement vs. self-transcendence* and *openness to change vs. conservation* are z-standardized, i.e. their means are adjusted to 0 and their standard deviations are adjusted to 1. The factor score values for the axes are the same as in Fig. 9.7 of Chap. 9 and correspond to the way the value space is usually constructed. This means that negative values express value orientations toward more self-enhancement on the first axis or toward more openness to change on the second axis while positive values indicate value orientations toward more self-transcendence (first axis) or toward more conservation (second axis)

outstandingly high appreciation of religious diversity. This is no surprise, but confirms expectations for cases that were selected for demonstrating paths to xenophobia and to xenophilic attitudes.

On the non-religious variables, *openness to change*, *tolerance of complexity*, and *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity*, we discern, for Robert, Nina and Henry, a pattern that clearly reflects their paths toward xenosophia: these three cases have highly outstanding scores on *openness to change* and on *tolerance of complexity*, and outstanding negative scores on *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity*. This pattern of scores is different for Cemal: he has moderately higher scores on *openness to change*, his scores on *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity* are just on the level for the total sample, but he has *negative* scores on *tolerance of complexity*.

Attending to religion/world views, the differences between the four cases are even greater. As we see from the first four lines in Table 15.1 in which the scores on

the self-rating as “religious,” “spiritual,” and “atheist” and also the scores on the *centrality of religiosity* scale are presented, the interviewees appear to have developed their paths toward xenosophia from very different positions and different self-identifications regarding religion and world views. It appears to make no big difference whether they currently self-rate as outstandingly religious (Robert) or spiritual (Robert; Cemal), or whether they strongly prefer the self-identification as being atheist (Nina; Henry). Also, their scores on *centrality of religiosity* may be outstanding such as Robert’s that are 2.41 standard deviations higher than that of the total sample—or they may be below the average such as Nina’s and Henry’s scores. Thus, Nina and Henry belong to the group of cases in our data who self-identify as non-religious, non-spiritual and atheists, and who, at the same time, show exceptionally high agreement to xenosophic and xenophilic attitudes. In regard to the theme of our study, xenosophia and religion, we take this as another indication of the ambivalent role of religion: to make and unmake xenosophia.

Slightly different are the scores of our four interviewees on the Religious Schema Scale: their scores on *fairness, tolerance and rational choice* and on *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog* are all above the means in the total sample—with differences however. While Robert and Henry have exceptionally outstanding scores between one and two standard deviations above the total means, and Nina’s scores are moderately outstanding, Cemal’s scores are only slightly above the total means.

Taken together, the four cases reveal clear commonalities in regard to the attitudinal outcome variables such as welcoming war refugees, the appreciation of religious diversity, and outstandingly high rejection of *anti-Semitism* and *Islamophobia*. Robert, Nina, Henry, and, to a slightly lower degree, Cemal, reveal commonalities also in regard to the religious schemata *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog* and on *fairness, tolerance and rational choice*. However, regarding the non-religious correlates, *tolerance of complexity*, and *violence legitimizing norms of masculinity*, Cemal’s scores are considerably distinct from those of Robert, Nina and Henry. And finally, the four cases reveal extreme differences, in regard to religiosity such as the self-identification of being “religious,” “spiritual” or “atheist,” *centrality of religiosity* and the RSS subscale *truth of texts and teachings*. This indicates that, besides commonalities, there are considerable differences between the four cases in regard to their correlational patterns in the quantitative data. And this supports our methodological decision to include a complementary—qualitative—methodological approach to further explore commonalities and differences between the biographical trajectories of the single cases, as we discuss later in this chapter.

Can the four cases so far be regarded as examples for the statistical path models presented in Chaps. 6 and 7? The answer is Yes and No. Triangulation suggests of course that qualitative and quantitative results are compared. But it is important to keep in mind that statistical path models present general statistical trends in large samples—in our case of over 1,400 cases—and thus cannot be read as predicting every individual trajectory. Nevertheless, from a comparison we see that Robert’s and Henry’s, and to some extent Nina’s scores in the quantitative data reflect patterns that we found in the statistical path models. This is considerably different for the case of Cemal, as detailed above. The conclusion here is this: the differences

between different profiles may refer to different biographical trajectories. Individual biographical paths and statistically modelled paths cannot just be harmonized, but need to be held in tension to allow for the discovery of trajectories which deviate from the general trend, for creative insights and new questions.

Faith Development and Xenosophia

The interviews we conducted with our participants are faith development interviews (see Chap. 3). And structural evaluation, according to the *Manual of Faith Development Research*, results in a faith development score; this is presented for our four cases in Table 15.2.

The scores of our four cases on the RSS subscales, especially on *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog* and on *fairness, tolerance and rational choice* (Table 15.1) are reflected in their total faith development scores (Table 15.2). These faith development scores, however, indicate different faith stages/religious styles, thus more pronounced differences, for the four cases: Robert's interview shows a preference for the conjunctive or dialogical style, while Henry and Nina appear to prefer an individuative-reflective style; and in Cemal's interview, we identified stronger presence of a mutual or synthetic-conventional style.

We conclude from this variety of religious styles in the four interviews that there may be unique paths to attitudes such as the welcoming of war refugees, the rejection of xenophobia and the appreciation of religious diversity on all of these faith stages/religious styles—even if the dialogical/conjunctive stage may be regarded as the comprehensive establishment of a dialogical or xenosophic habitus that is based on deep experience and reflection. This conclusion thus calls once more—and even stronger—for decisive idiographic approach to the single cases and their paths to xenosophia.

Four Biographical Trajectories in Synoptic Perspective

Attending to the biographical reconstruction in the interviews and attending to the experiences of strangeness as origin of xenosophic developments, our selected cases seem even more disparate: we have the scientific expert on religion, Robert, who is mostly driven by a questioning attitude regarding the Catholic, the Buddhist and the

Table 15.2 Comparison of faith development scores of case study participants

	Robert T.	Nina F.	Cemal K.	Henry G.	FDI Score Mean for all 27 interviewees
Faith development score	4.7	3.6	3.3	4.2	3.5

“strange” religious traditions; we have Nina, a student with a multiple migration background who has made experiences of alienness when she had to find her place within her peer group as a teenager; Cemal’s family has migrated from Turkey to Germany where he strives to fulfill contradicting expectations—to be successful in the immigration country and loyal to traditions of the country of origin, handling strange aspects of tradition of his native country as well as discrimination in the new country; and Henry is a refugee from Southeast Asia who is already approaching old age and who is engaged in voluntary work helping fellow refugees, but has experienced severe estrangement in his country of origin and on his long way of migration. Yet all these four show traits of a xenophobic or xenophilic attitudes. How did they all arrive at this attitude?

Robert is the only one in our assembly of case studies who does not have any kind of migration background. He has developed an intellectual curiosity and a critical view on at least some facets of his own Christian tradition that was nurtured at first by his family who provided a) literature dealing with religious themes, and b) the environment to discuss those themes as well. It seems that he was allowed to turn to “strange” traditions in an emotionally secure situation. Later on, he started exploring other cultures and religions and has nowadays developed an idiosyncratic style of religiosity, combining elements of mainly Buddhism and Catholicism, but also of Hinduism.

Nina came back to Germany as a teenager after having lived, with her bi-national parents, on another continent for half of her life. She felt very strongly being “the alien” herself—she neither shared a mutual background with her peers nor did she speak the slang the young people used and was therefore immediately marked as an outsider. Her other core experience is the life she had with her parents in South America. There she lived among other, mostly German children, who were there under similar preconditions: their residence there was only temporarily, it was normal to meet new people and necessary not to attach oneself too strongly to anybody as they were bound to leave sooner or later. Moreover, “home” was a temporary concept as well—the time the family would spend there was always limited. These two experiences enabled Nina to develop an open attitude toward strange and new situations. It was vital for her; otherwise she would have been confined to solitude.

Cemal has migrated from Turkey to Germany, his family, and especially his father, are struggling to be successful in the Western society of the immigration country, while protecting the traditional life of the family. Also Cemal, who was a child when he came to Germany, strives to find his way and his identity between two cultures. This involves chances as well as discrimination in the German majority culture, and feeling at home as well as restrictions in the traditions of his family and the community of Turkish immigrants. The path to his personal emancipation is complex: he is, as his family hoped, successful regarding education and profession in the immigration country. However, choosing a German woman to live with is taking things too far in the eyes of his father. For 2 years he does not talk to his son, before he offers reconciliation with his son. Cemal’s conclusion from these experiences is openness for individual ways and the strong demand of mutual respect for

different world views or traditions—without rejecting strong commitment to one’s own tradition, as Cemal’s relatively high scores on the RSS subscale, *truth of texts and teachings* indicate.

Henry also had to make a new home in Germany, after his dramatic flight from Southeast Asia as a young man because his life was threatened by an oppressive regime. Henry describes the environment of his former home country as multi-religious and open toward different traditions in a pragmatic way. On his long journey, he experienced strangeness, also when he finally arrived in Europe and was faced with the situation that nobody knew his mother language even existed. Henry was successful in overcoming this difficult period of his life and transforming these experiences into something valuable: he has developed the desire to help other people in similar situations. This productive solution of traumatizing experiences of strangeness can be understood, perhaps, in terms of post-traumatic growth. And as detailed in the case study chapter, Henry’s productive response to his experiences of strangeness is an example of the development of xenosophia: it leads him to strongly demanding respect for the other and advocating inter-religious appreciation.

So far, we have seen different trajectories, different paths toward xenosophia. What do they have in common? How do they differ? What are possible preconditions for the development of xenosophia? Chapter 10 ended with these questions, and even though it is not possible to find a definite answer, we have carved out different conditions that seem to have opened the door for a development of xenophobic attitudes. For all our case study persons, the encounter with something unfamiliar, something strange, has played a crucial role in their lives. And all of them have responded to this encounter productively. It appears that an open mind, an open attitude is a common theme throughout all of these stories. Moreover, they could always rely on people who were, in one way or the other, helpful, supportive and providing a secure environment: Robert has grown up in a loving family that has provided him with emotional and intellectual support; Nina had her parents and, after a while, also a group of friends she could rely on and that she experienced as stable; Cemal has, in his family, experienced conflict, separation, and rapprochement, and he lives in a stable relationship with his girlfriend. Henry has, throughout his migration journey and in Germany, always met people who helped him. It is evident that the role of the support from other people in the development of a xenophobic/xenophilic attitude needs further attention and we will look into this more deeply in the next paragraph.

Does Secure Attachment Encourage Xenosophia?

We have started to draw on the concept of attachment when interpreting the faith development interview (FDI), making use of some overlap of the FDI questions which explore relationships (with FDI question 7 “... how would you describe your parents and your current relationship with them?” as a start) with questions included in the adult attachment interview (AAI, Ainsworth, 1985; George, Kaplan, & Main,

1985; Main, Hesse, & Kaplan, 2005). We are cautious with respect to interpretations, as our work is, so far, based on proxies; nevertheless, we find this perspective worth pursuing. And interestingly, the answers to the FDI questions on relationship in the interviews of all four of our cases, Robert, Nina, Cemal and Henry, were rated with “secure attachment,” while insecure and fearful attachment were found to be low or absent.

In addition to this observation it may be inspiring, when studying xenosophia, to take a look at the basic research procedure of attachment theory and research. This, interestingly, is based on the “strange situation” (Ainsworth & Bell, 1970), where an encounter with a “stranger” is used as challenge and test. The “strange situation” procedure for the assessment of attachment styles of young children focuses on the child’s behavior during episodes of separation and reunion with the parent. First, child and parent are alone in a room. In the first separation episode, a stranger enters the room; then, the parent leaves and the child is left with the stranger; after a while, the parent comes back and the stranger leaves. In the second separation episode, the parent leaves and the child is left alone in the room. Then, the stranger comes in; after that, the parent comes back and the stranger leaves. Thus, the child is challenged to respond to different facets of encountering a “strange situation.” Observed are the amount of exploration (does the child play with the toys in the room?), reactions to the departure of its parent (does the child show distress?), responses to the stranger (does the child engage with the stranger?), and the reunion behavior with the parent (does the child show relief, keep contact with the parent and continue to explore? Does the child cling to the parent? Ignore the parent?). Perhaps not surprisingly, it is more likely for a securely attached child to use the parent as a safe base to freely explore the room and the toys. Attachment theory thus assumes that secure attachment facilitates increased readiness for facing and exploring new and “strange” situations. Thus, attachment theory may well relate to the dynamic process of experiencing the strange and the individual’s response to it, as described in the philosophy of the alien.

Using the FDI protocols for indications of secure attachment we may detect such security in Robert’s review of his upbringing: he remembers that he could make the acquaintance with “other” religious traditions via their sacred texts, which were provided in a familiar environment—and this encouraged exploration. It seems more complex for Nina, where an element of encounter with the alien is already introduced by the marriage of her parents, who come not only from different countries but different continents. She seems to draw on the secure haven they provided to explore new and “strange” environments. Cemal remembers separation and reunion which he has experienced early in his life, and which, perhaps, have prepared him to risk separation from his family and milieu when he chose to live with a German woman. Perhaps his recent rapprochement with his father points to a, however tacit, quite reliable relationship. Henry has made the farthest journey in terms of leaving family and country. His life review also offers some combination of exploring and security in his memories of his multi-religious family and peer relations. One may ask what has provided stability and support for Henry through his years in exile. If we may plausibly assume that his path toward xenosophia can be attributed to post-

traumatic growth or to high resiliency, this may perhaps have involved inner working models based on earlier experiences with secure attachments.

Thus, the reconstruction of the biographical narratives of our four cases can be read as suggesting that secure attachment may allow the perception and experience of something strange or alien as something to explore freely, promoting high chances of a productive—xenosophic—solution. Some sense of security may have helped Robert to critically question his own faith in his tradition and look at other ways of relating to the transcendent. Such inner sense of security may have supported Nina to cultivate critical individuation (as expressed in her critique of Christianity), but characterized by openness and hermeneutic humility. We may also assume that Cemal relies on such inner sense of security, when he can afford to feel strange toward the family tradition, but also toward the majority culture, without having to take an unambiguous position. And finally, there may be a similar process at work in Henry that helped him, as a young man, to endure political oppression, act on what made him a stranger to the authorities in his country, and finally lead to a life in exile, where he has, again and again, encountered strange situations, languages and people. The paradigmatic “strange situation” already suggests a look at attachment when studying xenosophia. Looking at the participants’ narrative reconstructions of their relationships in the FDI further encourages considering attachment for the exploration of the development of xenosophia, which might be seen as a basic form of prosocial behavior (cf. Shaver, Mikulincer, Gross, Stern, & Cassidy, 2016). To focus on attachment in the development of xenosophia might also give a fresh perspective to the study of the “attachment-religion connection” (cf. Granqvist & Kirkpatrick, 2016).

Conclusion and Outlook

Qualitative analyses allowed the reconstruction of biographical paths toward xenosophia. These paths largely reflect the results based on quantitative analyses, but also include individual trajectories and depth dimensions that are not captured by our quantitative data. This shows how essential it was to include qualitative analyses and explore how persons reconstruct, present and narrate their own development toward xenosophia. Thus, the special focus in our biographical-reconstructive analyses was attention to our participants’ experience of strangeness, and also attention to what might have provided them with the security to perceive something strange, explore new inner territory as well as challenges from the environment, without hastily making them familiar, but tolerating what may remain strange; in other words: productively respond to that “sting of the alien,” to use Waldenfels’ (1990) terms.

What has equipped our participants with the strength and courage that is necessary for a productive response to the encounter with the strange? When we searched for an answer for our four cases, a common theme emerged: attachment. The model of secure attachment, which enables a person to productively deal with strange situ-

ations, has helped us to better understand our cases. Therefore we conclude that attachment and eventually posttraumatic growth and resiliency should be further explored in greater detail, when research wants to shed some light into the biographical processes that may allow a person to develop toward xenophobia.

Besides commonalities, we have attended also to differences between the cases—to explore and finally determine the difference upon which a typology may be grounded. Of course, as detailed above, there are differences between the cases on the basis of the quantitative data such as religiosity, self-identification as atheist or the faith stage score to name a few; but we found these not profound enough for typology construction. Instead, from reading and qualitatively analyzing the cases, the typology was confirmed that attends to the primary frame of reference or context in which experiences of the strange/alien have occurred: in the individual context, the inter-personal context, the milieu context or the institutional context. This typology has been presented and conceptually justified in Chap. 10. Now, after four chapters with detailed case studies, we find this typology even more plausible.

- Type One (see the exemplary case study about Robert in Chap. 11) who experiences strangeness primarily in the individual—intellectual or experiential—realm may, through a productive solution of the strangeness experiences, attain an increased intellectual curiosity and the wisdom that the encounter with strange religions and world views may inspire one’s own creativity.
- For Type Two (see the exemplary case study about Nina in Chap. 12), experiences of strangeness occur primarily in the inter-personal context; and the positive solution of strangeness experience may result in the openness toward new and “strange” people, and in the wisdom to resist putting other people into boxes.
- For Type Three (see the exemplary case study about Cemal in Chap. 13) the context of experiences of strangeness is milieu and tradition. Thus, positive solutions of experiences of strangeness involve the tolerance of being exposed to a complexity of such differences, and may lead to the appreciation of religious and world view diversity and to the rejection of prejudice and discrimination that may be based upon the differences between milieus and traditions.
- Type Four (see the exemplary case study about Henry in Chap. 14) experiences strangeness and alienation primarily in the context of institution such as society and government. Such estrangement can easily turn against the individuals themselves, who then suffer oppression and become the outcasts. The positive solution of such experiences of alienness involves the strength to resist “hardening” and to decisively side with one’s own vision—which, as in Henry’s idealized remembrance, may consist in a dream of multi-cultural and multi-religious diversity.

What holds the four types of this typology together is the dynamic of experience and response to the strange/alien, as detailed in Waldenfels’ and Nakamura’s philosophy of the alien. What characterizes the differences between the four types is the frame of reference or the context in which these experiences of strangeness occur.

Attending to the positive solution should not be read as a try to whitewash the social reality of increasing xenophobia on a global scale; it is not meant to ignore that, unfortunately, a substantial portion of people in our societies develop prejudice and xenophobic reactions from their encounter with the strange/alien. On the contrary, the failed or negative solution of the experiences of the strange may be spelled in all of our four types, and may yield some new insight in the development of xenophobia. Nevertheless: to perceive such negative solutions—and thus the resulting development of prejudice and xenophobia—as *failure* is possible only on the background of a model of how a positive, xenophobic solution may look.

Approaching our quantitative data and the statistical paths from these insights into the biographical paths of encountering the strange/alien, thus engaging again in triangulation of our results, we may, at the closing of this book, with even greater confidence endorse the RSS subscales, *xenosophia/inter-religious dialog* and also *fairness, tolerance and rational choice*, as key instruments to account for the distinction between xenophobic and xenophobic religion. And we may also underscore the great contribution of an assessment of *tolerance of complexity*. The creative and productive way of dealing with and responding to experiences of the strange/alien depends on a habitus of openness for dialog and thus for hermeneutical humility that always keeps in mind the proviso of an “it-could-be-seen-otherwise.” This is no triviality. It is the sharpest contradiction to prejudice and xenophobia.

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