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Paul Smeyers *Editor*

# International Handbook of Philosophy of Education

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Paul Smeyers

Editor

# International Handbook of Philosophy of Education

Volume 1

 Springer



*Editor*  
Paul Smeyers  
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# About the Editors & Contributors

## Editors

**Ann Chinnery** is Associate Professor and Director of Undergraduate Programs in the Faculty of Education at Simon Fraser University, Canada. Her research is located at the intersection of philosophy of education and teacher education, drawing primarily on continental philosophy to address ethical issues in education. Specific areas of interest include the cultivation of moral and social responsibility, educating for critical historical consciousness, and the complexities of classroom dialogue in pluralist societies. Her recent work has appeared in the *Philosophy of Education Society Yearbooks* and journals such as *Educational Theory*, *Teaching and Teacher Education*, *Ethics and Education*, and the *Journal of Educational Controversy*. Her current research focuses on the pedagogical potential of critical historical consciousness as a framework for taking collective responsibility for collective harm regardless of one's individual role in committing the harm. This work includes, but is not limited to, educational initiatives intended to address the Calls to Action of the Truth and Reconciliation Commission of Canada, and preparing K-12 teachers to take up that work in their classroom practice.

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*Leadership in Action* (New York & London: Routledge, 2017); *Education, Assessment and the Desire for Dissonance* (New York & London: Peter Lang, 2017); *Philosophy and Education as Action: Implications for Teacher Education* (Lanham, MD (US): Rowman & Littlefield – Lexington Series, 2017); and *Education and the Polemic of Tolerance: Towards Dissent in Educational Encounters* (New York & London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2017).

**Naomi Hodgson** is Lecturer in Education Studies at Liverpool Hope University, UK, and Visiting Researcher in the Laboratory for Education, Culture, and Society, KU Leuven. Her research, situated in the field of educational philosophy, focuses on the relationship between education, governance, and subjectivity, particularly in relation to the figures of the researcher and the parent. Her current research project, funded by the British Academy/Leverhulme Trust, is entitled ‘The researcher disposition as today’s mode of subjectivation: the case of parenting’, and she is currently completing the manuscript of *Philosophical Presentations of Raising Children – The Grammar of Upbringing*, coauthored with Stefan Ramaekers (KU Leuven), and due to be published in early 2018. She has recently collaborated with Joris Vlieghe (Aberdeen) and Piotr Zamojski (Gdansk) to write a ‘Manifesto for a Post-Critical Pedagogy’ (Punctum, 2017). Naomi is the author of *Philosophy and Theory in Education: Writing in the Margin* (coauthored with Amanda Fulford; Routledge, 2016), *Citizenship for the Learning Society: Europe, Subjectivity, and Educational Research* (Wiley, 2016), and numerous journal articles and book chapters in the field of philosophy of education. She is Managing Editor of the PES Yearbook and Reviews Editor for the *Journal of Philosophy of Education*.

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**Viktor Johansson** gained his Ph.D. in Educational Sciences at Stockholm University in Sweden. He is currently Senior Lecturer at the School of Humanities, Education, and Social Sciences at Örebro University. His expertise and research interests are philosophy of learning, early childhood education, philosophy with children, children’s literature, and philosophy of literature. He is the author of *Dissonant Voices* (2013) and of several articles in the field of philosophy of education, including most recently, ‘Killing the Buddha: Towards a heretical philosophy of learning’ (2017), ‘Unserious but Serious Pilgrimages: What Educational Philosophy can learn about

Fiction and Reality from Children's Artful Play' (2017), and 'Questions from the Rough Ground: Teaching, Autobiography, and the Cosmopolitan "I"' (2015). He is the coeditor of the special issues, 'Perfectionism and Education: Kant and Cavell on Ethics and Aesthetics in Society' (2014) and '*Bildung*, Self-Cultivation, and the Challenge of Democracy: Ralph Waldo Emerson as a Philosopher of Education' (forthcoming in *Educational Philosophy and Theory*). He is currently working on two monographs, one in Swedish on philosophy in early childhood with the working title *Omedelbarhetens pedagogik: Filosofi bortom orden i tidig barndom* (The Pedagogy of Immediacy: Philosophy Beyond Words in Early Childhood) (Gleerups) and another in English called *Literature and Philosophical Play in Early Childhood Education* (Routledge).

**Dirk Willem Postma** studied History and Philosophy of Education at the State University of Groningen in the Netherlands. As a junior researcher at the universities of Leuven, Belgium, and Nijmegen, the Netherlands, he wrote a Ph. D. thesis about the ethical and politico-philosophical dimensions of environmental education: *Why care for Nature? In search of an ethical framework for environmental responsibility and education* (Springer, 2006). Later he conducted applied research and published papers and books in the broader field of citizenship, self-organization, social inequality, and cultural diversity, mainly in Dutch journals for an audience of social work professionals. Since 2016, he leads a research group at the NHL and Stenden Universities of Applied Sciences in Leeuwarden, focusing on participatory action research in the field of community development in deprived neighborhoods. Apart from these academic affiliations, he is actively involved in local communities of citizens, working together with institutions on better living conditions for and with vulnerable groups, in particular with LGBT refugees and citizens suffering from mental health problems.

**Claudia W. Ruitenberg** is Professor in the Department of Educational Studies and Academic Director of Vantage College, both at the University of British Columbia in Vancouver, Canada. She is the author of *Unlocking the World: Education in an Ethic of Hospitality* (Paradigm/Routledge, 2015), coeditor (with D. C. Phillips) of *Education, Culture and Epistemological Diversity: Mapping a Disputed Terrain* (Springer, 2012), and editor of *What Do Philosophers of Education Do? (And How Do They Do It?)* (Wiley Blackwell, 2010), the *Philosophy of Education 2012* yearbook, and *Reconceptualizing Study in Educational Discourse and Practice* (Routledge, 2017). She has taught courses on social and political theory, research design, philosophy of education as educational research, critical thinking, and professional ethics. Her areas of research include political and citizenship education; ethics and education; discourse, performativity, and speech act theory; and art and aesthetic education. She was Scholar in the UBC Centre for Health Education Scholarship 2013–2017, exploring philosophical aspects of medical and other health professions education. She is currently developing further research on the challenges of translation between languages, cultures, and discourses, especially as these affect education in multicultural and multilingual contexts.

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**Christiane Thompson** is Professor of Theory and History of *Bildung* and Education at the Goethe University Frankfurt in Germany. She received her Ph.D. with a work on Theodor Ballauff's theory of education in 2002 (published with Leske & Budrich in 2003). From 2002–2008 she worked on a book examining experience and *Bildung* (published with Schöningh in 2009). From 2009–2010 she was Full Professor of education at the University of Fribourg, Switzerland. From 2010–2014 she was Heisenberg Research Professor for 'Education with a Special Focus on the Theory and Cultural Research of *Bildung*' at the Martin Luther University in Halle-Wittenberg, Germany. Since 2014, she is Professor at the Goethe University Frankfurt. Her main areas of research lie in the philosophy of education. In her research, she relates systematical and historical perspectives in order to provide a well-reflected and critical categorical framework for education and *Bildung*. Furthermore, her work focuses on the power relations and formations within educational processes. Here, the analytical work concentrates on authorization practices and subject formations in educational contexts. Recently, she published: 'Autorisierungen des pädagogischen Selbst', Springer 2017 (book edition together with K. Jergus), and 'Zwischenwelten der Pädagogik', Schöningh 2017 (book edition together with S. Schenk). Currently, she is working on a book edition on Adorno's dictum 'Education after Auschwitz' (together with S. Andresen and D. Nittel) and a book edition on 'Anxiety' (together with A. Schäfer).

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**Michael Bonnett** has held senior teaching and research positions in the UK universities of Cambridge, London, and Bath. Formerly, he was a Visiting Professor at the University of the Aegean. He has published widely in the field of philosophy of education giving particular attention to ideas of learning, thinking, personal authenticity, and the character of the teacher-pupil relationship in education. His book *Children's Thinking: Promoting Understanding in the Primary School* (1994, Cassell) explored the importance of poetic thinking for education. More recently, his focus has been on aspects of sustainability and environmental education, including developing a phenomenology of nature and ways in which human consciousness is inherently environmental. His book *Retrieving Nature: Education for a Post-Humanist Age* was published in 2004 by Blackwell, and his edited collection *Moral Education and Environmental Concern* was published in 2014 by Routledge.

**David Bridges**, BA (Oxon), MA, Ph.D. (London), Hon D Univ (Open University), FAcSS, is Professor Emeritus of the University of East Anglia and Emeritus Fellow of St Edmund's College and Homerton College, Cambridge. He has published extensively in leading journals in philosophy of education and edited works. A substantial collection of his work is gathered in *Philosophy in Educational Research: Epistemology, Ethics, Politics and Quality* (Springer 2017). He is an Honorary Vice President of the Philosophy of Education Society of Great Britain and has served as a council member of both the British and European Educational Research Associations, in both of which he established the philosophy of education networks. Over the last 6 years he has been extensively engaged in the educational, including curriculum, reform movement in Kazakhstan and has previously contributed to curriculum reform in Mongolia, Iran, and Ghana.

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# Philosophy and Education: A Certain Kind of Wisdom



**Paul Smeyers**

This edited collection brings together reflections on the work of well-known authors, various schools of thought, enduring educational debates, and philosophical discussion of new developments within the area of education and child-rearing. It offers a wide variety of possible ways to bring together different philosophical stances and ideas about education and child-rearing; what this field of scholarship has been, what it is now, and how it could or should develop. It is tempting to fall into the trap of legislating what this subdiscipline ought to tackle, yet such attempts sophisticated as they have been, have not proven to be successful in the past.<sup>1</sup> Philosophers have always transgressed the boundaries of their discipline set by their predecessors, and education and child-rearing have developed in unforeseen ways necessitating further work on the meanings of these terms and what is at stake in our

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<sup>1</sup> Starting from seeing education as a field of study that involves a variety of approaches, in the *Blackwell Guide* (Blake, N., Smeyers, P., Smith, R., & Standish, P. (Eds.). (2003). *The Blackwell guide to the philosophy of education*. Oxford) it was for example argued that philosophical analysis may still concern itself with problems rooted in the use of language in educational discourse. Though this task is not anymore that of a conceptual underlaborer, analytic techniques remain useful. Furthermore, philosophy of education should still address the assumptions and values embedded in other disciplinary approaches in the study of education, whether these are explicitly promoted or tacitly assumed in policy and practice. Evidently, this is now a debate between philosophy and other disciplines on equal terms. Finally, it is clear that philosophy of education has to explore what education might be or might become. It can revisit but also problematize its canonical questions about such matters as the aims of education, the nature of knowledge and the point of particular curriculum subjects, about human nature and human practices. Thus, it might analyze for instance what exactly is understood by quality (and its indicators) and what the hidden normative presuppositions are of the present-day logic of neo-liberalism. Overall, it seems to be accepted that it requires not narrow concentration but a flexible and imaginative drawing from different aspects of the 'parent' discipline in relation to specific but typically highly complex problems of practice.

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understanding of them. Many issues have been discussed: for example, in what sense is philosophy different from literature, and if there is a difference then what is to count as literature? Is education a kind of political action and, if so what is to be understood by 'political'?

## Observations and Reminders

There are good reasons for taking the view that education and child-rearing are practices, and so are their philosophical counterpart. Philosophy seems to supply the central arguments, thus exposing the embeddedness of any one point of view in more far-reaching sets of assumptions. Thus, it can enable us to better understand what might be at stake in any particular viewpoint and to come to a conclusion for which there is discernible, appropriate warrant, albeit one that is always exposed to critique. But the nature and force of such arguments, bear witness themselves of course, to philosophical stances. It goes without saying that in these stances epistemological, anthropological, ethical, metaphysical, religious, and even aesthetical elements are interwoven in various ways, together with societal conditions. Similarly, there is a variety of conceptions of education and child-rearing that inspire practitioners and theoreticians alike. No final word on these can be offered to settle the debate forever, for the simple reason that such practices change, affected for example by different manners of teaching or new types of families such as single parent families, so-called blended families, and gay and lesbian parent families.

These practices and their philosophical implications and underpinnings bring about changes in society at large, as do a huge range of social and material circumstances such as drones (and their delivery of medicine and other goods) and the shopping opportunities offered by the web. Naturally benefits and drawbacks go hand in hand. Smart phones have many blessings, but lead as well in a number of cases to addiction and the need for 'digital detox'. Domotica or varieties of home automation change our domestic lives and burglars adapt the ways they operate accordingly; live images (CCTV from helicopters or people's phones) are now broadcasted to our homes, rendering the future of newspapers redundant; the web has affected the way we satisfy our hunger for news but the overload generated may also correlate with depression, feelings of loneliness, and burn-out. The quick fix does not necessarily make older forms such as newspapers redundant, but has certainly altered our news gathering to a large extent. Similarly, the advent of computers and social media has changed education and child-rearing: for example the use of chalk is for some a practice they vaguely remember while for many others it is more of a museum item and the wide availability of explicit pictures on the web forces parents to rethink their role in talking with their children about sex and relationships. Moreover, things do not only change, they change faster as well this gave rise to the popularity of yoga, to the concept of positive slowness, and of 'slow science'. The influence of all these changes on practices of education and child-rearing can therefore hardly be underestimated. Combined with different conceptions of the



task of philosophy, this has generated a vast array of writing in recent years where varying content is discussed from diverse positions.

Looking for crystalline purity in the analysis of these changes is a sure recipe for disappointment. What we are looking for, some would say, are ‘houses of cards’. To change the metaphor, to try to go beyond the multifariousness of language and meaning leaves us with nothing more than ‘an engine idling’.

We want to establish an order in our knowledge of the use of language; an order with a particular end in view; one out of many possible orders; not *the* order. To this end we shall constantly be giving prominence to distinctions which our ordinary forms of language easily make us overlook.<sup>2</sup>

For Wittgenstein, the work of the philosopher is characterized by “assembling reminders for a particular purpose” (ibid., § 127). Surely, philosophy is about arguments, but what is an argument? It is about meaning, knowledge, values, being human, the good, the beautiful, etc., but none of these can easily be delineated without building on other insights. That is how everything hangs together, has meaning for us: a particular order is made explicit, and though this is for me and for some others the order that appeals most, it should be realized that this is only one out of the many possible orders that can be argued for.<sup>3</sup>

Child-rearing and education too will not fare well with a ‘clear’ – in the sense of ‘crystalline’ – picture. It is often forgotten but true nevertheless, that there are many roads to Rome, and not everyone wants to go to Rome anyway. There may be roads which should be avoided, some may be better, others may pose problems, yet such cases always need to be made with attention to particulars, warranting detailed argumentative content and structure. Educators are pressed to take action to ‘do’ certain things; they want to create certain opportunities; they are often unsure though not only about the ‘how to’; they care deeply for those they are entrusted with and desperately try to avoid mistakes. They too often want to believe that there is only *one* way (or one that is the very best). The emotional disturbance this situation creates and the dilemmas to which one may be exposed make it understandable that the justification they offer for their choices may be worded more strongly than the nature of these matters allows. The illusion of absolute control looms at the horizon, even if one realizes that it is neither possible nor desirable. After all one feels responsible; at the same time, one can neither anticipate all the dangers and risks nor the opportunities involved in leading a human life.

Turning to reflection helps, but it cannot do away with the constraints and tensions in which one finds oneself. Surely, there is joy in bringing things together in making sense of them, but there always remains pain in the realization of what has been left out, and yet still we need to act. This points to the need to be modest about what can be achieved through philosophical reflection, in any particular case, both for the individual person, and also for society at large. Addressing, for example,

<sup>2</sup>Wittgenstein, L. (1953). *Philosophical Investigations/Philosophische Untersuchungen* (G.E.M. Anscombe, Trans.). Oxford: Basil Blackwell, I, §132.

<sup>3</sup>An interpretation surfaces here of the famous dictum that philosophy too is its own time comprehended in thoughts.



the surveillance society and its implications for privacy issues and the well-being of citizens it should be realized that it is one thing to make this explicit, yet another to turn the clock back or to deal with the problem appropriately. This is not to say that there is no place for such a debate, but it is quite another thing to expect from foregrounding what is involved that things will change accordingly and rapidly; however, it goes without saying that such reflection may have the capacity to inspire. In sum, there may not be final answers<sup>4</sup> but there certainly are answers worth looking at, in particular when these offer balanced insights, critically appraised, not overstepping the boundaries of what may be achieved yet not avoiding responsibility for what is argued for, possibly radical yet not one-sided ... aspiring to offer a kind of wisdom.<sup>5</sup>

## Avoiding One-Sidedness

The temptation to (wilfully) neglect the above reminders can easily be observed in work in the area of philosophy and education. It is not impossible but it is demanding, not to overstate one's position. After so much hard work, it is understandable if one has an eye only for what one was impressed by and has focused on, or blows things out of proportion, forgetting the need for balance and thus preaching rather than arguing, and striving to settle things for once and all. Yet the tension between achieving a much-needed sense of order and other possible orders cannot be relinquished without paying a price: either to exclude other valuable viewpoints and/or to stop what is nevertheless in motion. It has not gone unnoticed that certain positions focus almost exclusively on a single dimension, for example, on what to be

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<sup>4</sup>Incidentally, one thing that impressed me when reading and studying thoroughly several times the more than 700,000 words of this collection is the fact that many over-all positions (for example, the Kantian, the Heideggerian) when criticized from a different stance are able to digest (incorporate even refute) such criticism. I mean of course not that all stances come down to the same insights, but that more often than not philosophical stances have aspects criticized for being neglected but which are unpacked when looked at and studied more closely. What then results is a richer, more sophisticated, and nuanced take on reality of that particular stance.

<sup>5</sup>For a more detailed discussion, I would like to refer to my earlier work in many cases coauthored: Smeyers, P. (1998). Assembling reminders for educational research. Wittgenstein on philosophy. *Educational Theory*, 48, 287–308; Blake, N., Smeyers, P., Smith, R., & Standish, P. *Thinking again: Education after postmodernism* (1998, Bergin & Garvey), *Education in an age of nihilism* (2000, Falmer Press), and *The therapy of education* (2007, Palgrave Macmillan); Smeyers, P. (2006). 'What it makes sense to say'. Education, philosophy and Peter Winch on social science. *Journal of Philosophy of Education*, 40, 463–485; Smeyers, P. (2006). What philosophy can and cannot do for education. *Studies in Philosophy and Education*, 25, 1–18; Smeyers, P., & Burbules N., (2006). Education as initiation into practices. *Educational Theory*, 56, 439–449; Peters, M., Burbules, N., & Smeyers, P. (2008). *Showing and doing: Wittgenstein as a pedagogical philosopher* (2008, Paradigm Publishers); Smeyers, P., & Smith, R. *Understanding education and educational research*. (2014, Cambridge University Press); Fendler, L., & Smeyers, P. (2015). Focusing on presentation instead of representation. Perspectives on representational and non-representational language-games for educational history and theory. *Paedagogica Historica*, 51, 691–701.

done, or on the epistemological or the ethical, paying lip-service or not even that to the importance of other dimensions, the aesthetical, the religious, the metaphysical. This can work for the sake of the argument when focusing on a particular problem, but this can never be truthful to the nature of what is involved in something so complex as child-rearing and education. Resulting in dangerous simplification it carries moreover the danger of making philosophical discussions superfluous (or even worse, in German *Spielerei*) a game for insiders familiar with the jargon. This is far away from the serious balanced reflection which exercises a kind of compulsion, which changes the reflective agent, and possibly passes on a kind of practical wisdom. Often of course this involves joining with others in dialogue where positions are critically yet respectfully scrutinized – reminiscent of the famous saying that a philosopher who does not take part in discussions is like a boxer who never goes into the ring. Conferences among other meetings should provide such opportunities, and though there may be debate about the particular ring that should be looked for, here as elsewhere it seems important to avoid one-sidedness.<sup>6</sup>

As society becomes more and more complex, there is hardly a place left for all-encompassing simple solutions. It is dangerous as well to sacrifice, particularly in the area of education, what has been cherished as worthwhile in the past to something that is new or different just for the sake of it. It is neither the case that everything should be left as it was, nor that it should necessarily be changed instead, over and over again one has to engage in a debate that identifies the merits and shortcomings of a curriculum, a pedagogy, a way to raise one's children. Educators often underestimate the importance of their actions and beliefs on the life of their children and how their identity is shaped by them. And theoreticians may be tempted to deceive themselves, bracket what is nevertheless passed on under the veil of one or other concept of empowerment or child-centeredness. What is passed on in content and manner remains in my opinion overwhelming and vast. Being aware of this may help but does not obviate it. Incidentally, theoretical reflection itself is also indebted to what has been argued for by our predecessors; here too the temptation should be resisted to present one's ideas and reflections as new, forgetting to acknowledge, and to pay tribute, to the relevance and insights of the legacy of a particular philosopher or a particular philosophical stance.

Should education be dealt with through the lens of power, should it be about empowering, about equality, or about passing on what is held worthwhile for the next generation, and should the latter always be seen as containing elements of restorative tendencies, as exploitative, or as gentle paternalism? Should we instead look to the arts for inspiration or start from a religious position? I am not sure, I cannot be certain without invoking one or other all-embracing taken-for-granted viewpoint, in danger of leaving out what is also valid, interesting, and necessary to do justice to the many elements at stake. Does this beg the question for the viewpoint

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<sup>6</sup>Conferences are essential not only for those who start their career, to hear from colleagues about the intricacies of the position argued for, raising elements that need to be taken into account or possibly have to be weighed differently. Regrettably, in many cases conferences do not surpass the level of networking or even worse are only seen as opportunities to present one's own paper.

that any practice has a life of its own (or is there too much circularity in this argument?), and further that one can never step into the same river twice, that meaning (and human life) is forever evolving in unforeseen ways and cannot be stopped?<sup>7</sup> Is this, i.e., this starting point, more than a descriptive claim? Surely, once this is seen and interpreted as a direction into on the one hand further complexity beneficial to mankind or on the other as a step on the road to decline, obviously a normative stance is at work. It could be argued (and has been by some) that the latter is unavoidable, yet it remains in my opinion questionable whether this implies that such description is impossible. The medium of philosophy is language, and language is used in manifold ways. Notwithstanding the importance of the context, we inherited this language and thus in this sense words have particular meanings. These have to be taken into account in future usage in order for us to make sense, yet the usage itself cannot be legislated. Is this more than a description, an observation of the shifts of meaning? And is it not the case that carefully looking at what is on offer in the world, surprises us, makes us wonder, as least as much as imaginative creative accounts of novels and other works of art can do? The order one has imposed on ‘the world’ may give way to what one is impressed by, created by others who have ‘found’ meaning, and may inspire us to revise our concepts, justifications, and stances, in other words how we and I deal responsibly with just what we are presented with.

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With the above in mind, the *International Handbook of Philosophy of Education* offers in four sections work of more than 100 hundred authors and coauthors from more than 20 countries. The team of nine contributing editors and I have worked intensely for more than 3 years. After an initial lengthy discussion<sup>8</sup> about the ‘what’ and ‘how’, topics were identified and authors we wanted to invite were listed.<sup>9</sup> Though clearly no project of this kind can pretend to be exhaustive, the present selection aspires nevertheless to have chosen what is relevant and needed for students and scholars in philosophy and education nowadays given the state of art of the field.<sup>10</sup> Authors were first asked to write an abstract which was followed by

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<sup>7</sup>In some sense a Marxist thesis.

<sup>8</sup>All contributing editors were involved in the initial discussions; moreover, input was also received from Doret De Ruyter and Stefan Ramaekers.

<sup>9</sup>The gender and international dimension was explicitly observed in this selection; furthermore, it was felt important that besides well-known scholars able junior researchers would also be included.

<sup>10</sup>One of the constraints was of course the page limit set by the publisher. Although Springer proved to be flexible about this, something around 1200 pages was kept in mind. Through the whole process, from the initial lengthy discussion to the final print, the professionalism of Springer’s staff and in particular of Annemarie Keur was highly appreciated.

comments from the editors; similarly, draft versions<sup>11</sup> were dealt with.<sup>12</sup> The result is four sections each preceded by an introduction identifying the over-all approach. Nuraan Davids took the lead for section one, *Voices from the Present and the Past* (36 chapters); Christiane Thompson and Joris Vlieghe oversaw section two, *Schools of Thought* (14 chapters); Ann Chinnery, Naomi Hodgson, and Viktor Johansson dealt with section 3, *Revisiting Enduring Debates* (25 chapters); Kai Horsthemke, Dirk Willem Postma, and Claudia Ruitenberg handled section 4, *New Areas and Developments* (17 chapters). The sections are followed by two more general contributions, respectively, on philosophy of education and political literacy. The book has 95 chapters in total. Notwithstanding the struggle to survive in many university contexts and research settings, there is as yet no shortage of philosophical reflection in the area of education and child-rearing. Time to count our blessings.

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<sup>11</sup> For each section, a particular maximum number of words was communicated (respectively 5000 for section 1; 9000 for section 2; 7000 for section 3; and 6000 for section 4). The quality of the submitted material was in a number of cases so good that though the limit was exceeded, nevertheless, the decision was made to accept it.

<sup>12</sup> Though authors could to some extent use parts of their previous work, nearly all chapters turned out to be 'new' and 'original'. The serious critical scrutiny of abstracts, draft, and final versions of the submitted material led in a limited number of cases to the difficult decision not to include what was submitted.

**Section I**  
**Voices from the Present and the Past**  
Contributing Editor:  
Nuraan Davids

# Introduction: Section 1 – Voices from the Present and the Past



Nuraan Davids

In our pursuits to find and attach meaning to the world around us, philosophers of education often refer to or build on a particular position of a philosopher or philosopher of education. As such, we recognise that how we understand a particular encounter or concept is always open to another interpretation and another way of constructing meaning. In opening a platform for the building on past voices, and offering new and re-considered voices, this section consists of 36 original chapters in which the author(s) describe the relevance of the position of the philosopher (of education) to current important questions in the theory or practice of education. To this end, each chapter describes (aspects of) the theory of the philosopher or philosopher of education, and relates it to a particular question, problem or theory, so that what is constructed and contributed addresses a particular debate. The vast volume of theorists, theories, dilemmas and controversies addressed in the 36 chapters offers some insight into the scope and potential contribution of philosophy in relation to education, and its highly complex contexts and contestations.

This section recognises the importance of a philosophical lens when analysing not only educational theory, pedagogy and policy, but is equally concerned with particular ways of being, thinking and acting, which either emanates from or gives shapes to particular constructions of philosophy of education. In this regard, the various chapters reflect some of the major philosophies of education – both from the past and the present – with the intention of bringing together a cross section of ideas, debates and renewed considerations. This cross section of ideas is made evident not only in the wide range of philosophers of education, educationists, critical and literary theorists, but also in the wonderfully diverse range of authors, who have

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contributed to this section. Thanks to an extensive and insightful array of chapters, this section reflects a depth of critical engagement with key philosophical and educational contributions in relation to contemporary debates. Subsequently, the aim of this section is not to give an overview of the position of the philosopher (of education), but to embed the position in the educational question(s), problem(s) or issue(s) addressed and to provide arguments (by a critical reflection on the merits of the position) for its value and usefulness in the present debate in philosophy of education and/or current educational questions or issues.

In the early stages of compiling this *Handbook*, two key aspects were taken into consideration. On the one hand, it was determined that the section needed to do justice to seminal philosophers ('voices from the past'), whose work continues to hold sway in increasingly fluid societies, communities and educational spaces. In this regard, the section includes reflections on: why Plato and Aristotle's main distinctions and questions on education – for example, reflections surrounding the relevance of ignorance, the role of negativity within education, or the meaning of learning in knowledge acquisition – remain relevant within the contemporary discourse of educational philosophy. Regarded as one of the most important figures in educational theory, attention is given to Jean-Jacques Rousseau's influence on modern philosophy through exploring his fundamental shift to individual education by discussing the problems of power in educational relationships, paternalism and individualisation. In turn, attention is given to Friedrich Nietzsche's argument that inequalities of talent and achievement may improve the well-being of the highest-achieving and lowest-achieving, and all students in between; why the 'father of existentialism', Søren Kierkegaard's pedagogical principles remain highly relevant to modern pedagogy; as well as Immanuel Kant's conceptions of individuals as efficacious, autonomous and creative beings, and why moral education is an open-ended and never-ending process.

The section contains four chapters that might be classified as being particular to a religious tradition. Of course, there are a number of other chapters that focus on theorists or philosophers, who are associated with specific religious discourses – for example, Emmanuel Levinas and Martin Buber are known for their work in Jewish philosophy – the section, however, also wish to show some cognisance of other influential philosophies of education. In this regard, the chapter on Confucius examines the problem of indoctrination in Confucian education, and why a Confucian conception of reflective learning aims to enhance rather than handicap the learner's capacity to formulate and substantiate one's beliefs, evaluate available options and exercise autonomous agency in life. Of the three chapters which focus on philosophy of Islamic education, two focus on what is commonly referred to as the 'Islamisation of knowledge' project. While one focuses on the contribution of Isma'il Rāji al-Fārūqī's 'Islamisation of knowledge' project in relation to both the Islamic intellectual and social tradition, and plural epistemological demands of the modern world, the other offers a critique of Fazlur Rahman's Islamisation approach, and considers the implications for contemporary debates in philosophy of education. The third chapter explores the philosophical thought of Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd

and its significance for reforming the tasks and processes of learning about Islam, learning from Islam and teaching about Islam, which according to the author, opens the door for respectful inter-religious and inter-denominational learning.

In acknowledging the profound significance of pragmatism on contemporary educational debates, the chapter on John Dewey looks beyond superficially constructed ideas of problem-solving and instrumentality and explores an alternative sense of useful knowledge. R.S. Peters' argument for educational inclusion can be applied in order to develop a more nuanced account of meaningful access for all students. And, while the chapter on Charles Taylor focuses on how he redescribes the making of the epistemic self in view of the interplay of its distancing from the world and its turning inward, and how this leads to the paradox of a scientific view from nowhere and a subjective certainty, the chapter on Emmanuel Levinas shows how his account of heteronomous subjectivity contributes to ongoing debates on autonomy as an educational aim.

In turn, Israel Scheffler's broad conception of education rooted in his wider philosophical framework provides a fruitful conceptual framework for opposing the current neo-liberalist tendency towards reducing the value of education to that of economic discourse. Martha Nussbaum's interpretation of fragility for educational theory offers an argument against the unbridled pursuit of control in education; Judith Butler's conceptions of subject, subjection and subjectivation offer particular perspectives on the meaning of social norms and the dependency of the human subject on others, and hence, pedagogy and the philosophy of education; and Nel Noddings provides a distinctively ethical voice in relation to school practices, which align not only with cultivating the interests and aspirations of individual students but also with the moral and civic purposes of education.

In terms of aesthetic theories of education, Klaus Mollenhauer's voice continues to enrich the debate concerning current educational-philosophical discourse, through questions of aesthetic education, aesthetic experience as a threshold experience, and pedagogy as a cultural science. In turn, Maxine Greene's conception of the social imagination offers a valuable critique of education and schooling in the USA, and provides an antidote to the negative forces of scientism, technicism and instrumental rationality that have dominated educational thought and practice for several decades.

Similarly, the section takes into account issues of language, meaning-making, dialogic education and conversation, as encountered, respectively in Ludwig Wittgenstein's repudiation of the 'picture' of science and his welcoming of a broader conception of knowledge, which remains of great value to educational researchers and social scientists of all kinds; Martin Heidegger, who helps us to see the problems in the basic metaphysical assumptions (consciously or unconsciously) rooted in educational theories and practices; Stanley Cavell, whose concern is not with how we learn to read books, or to speak, but with how our reception of words is ineluctably tied to the political, and to our responsibility for words in a community of speakers; Martin Buber, who does not separate religious from cultural or even aesthetic traditions, and assists educators and students in understanding the



dialogue between traditions in a very interconnected world; and Michael Oakeshott's contention that the benefit of conversation in education relates to the element of intellectual versatility that it both demands and fosters.

In addition to the aforementioned chapters, the section has taken meticulous account of the influence of contemporary political philosophers on educational theory and practice. In this regard, readers are exposed to ideas and debates which include: Hannah Arendt's idea of the school as an 'in-between space', that is, an institution between the private domain of the home and the public domain of the world, in which teachers can introduce children into the world, so that they might acquire experience with the actions by which humans build up their world. Attention is given to the implications of John Rawls' model of a just society on contemporary issues in education policy, such as what justifies the public provision of education, what constitutes a fair distribution of educational opportunity; Jacques Rancière's contention that it is not that the authority of knowledge is given over to students at the expense of the teacher's authority, but rather that both student and master meet in an alternative relation of authority; the potential contribution of Chantal Mouffe's work on the agonistic contestation of any hegemonic order to citizenship, political education and schooling; and an exploration of Giorgio Agamben's three methodological points – suspension, archaeology of the signature, and study – which are important for rethinking educational philosophy.

Interspersed in this section are chapters on key literary and critical theorists, which include: how Jacques Derrida's conception of an 'unconditional university' helps us to understand the importance and necessity of our philosophical and humanities heritage, in order to be aware of, and respond to, the most urgent questions and dilemmas posed by the current socio-political context of education; Paulo Freire's decolonisation project, which is intent on dismantling anti-democratic, anti-dialogic and authoritarian schooling by initiating an entirely new project of liberation education within agricultural campesino communities and beyond; as well as Michel Foucault's philosophy of education, which can be identified by the priority it gives to the concern or curiosity for education, in that it expresses a relation of care and concern, not primarily a relation of knowledge and judgement. Attention is also given to Amy Gutmann's consideration of educational policy issues, as a way to demonstrate how non-repression and non-discrimination can be applied to help communities out of tough educational dilemmas; Gilles Deleuze and Félix Guattari's contention that to learn presumes and means to observe a material, an object or a being in a way as signs spread from the observed – inferring that education is not only learning on a higher stage or learning in a second order, it is at the same time the foundation of all processes of learning; the role, according to Bernard Stiegler, which technologies and digitisation – through processes of education – play in the constitution of subjectivity; and although he does not offer any conclusions, which can easily be inserted into actual topics of philosophy and practice of education, Slavoj Žižek's writings should be interpreted as a provocative 'interruption' in the field of pedagogy and educational philosophy.

As each of the chapters in this section reveals, it is through thinking, reflecting and contesting about educational theories and practices that we will gain clarity about such theories and practices. By bringing together philosophical voices and debates from the past and present, this section demonstrates not only the inter-connectedness between philosophy and education, but the potential of philosophy to influence and shape education and educational practices.

# Nasr Hamid Abu Zayd's Philosophy on Islam and Education



Katharina Völker

## On Abu Zayd

A prolific scholar of Quranic studies, Abu Zayd, who taught in Egypt and the Netherlands, is best known for his project of reforming Islamic thought. Born in British-ruled Egypt in 1943, already in his early childhood, he became a *hafiz*, a carrier of the Quran, by virtue of memorising it. While being passionate about the sound, language and transformative power of Quran recitation (Abu Zayd 1996: 19), he also developed an interest in profane literature. After his training as a technician, he enrolled in literary, rhetoric and Islamic studies at the University of Cairo in 1968. Exposing himself to various socio-intellectual influences, he became member of a “literary society in which Marxists, Muslim Brothers and existentialists were represented” and wrote lyrics and prose (Abu Zayd 2006a, b: 39). In 1977, Abu Zayd earned his Master degree with a work on rationalistic trends in Quran exegesis, as developed by the Mutazila (Medieval school of theology). Ever since, he understood his academic identity primarily as that of a literary researcher treating the Quran as an object of scientific studies. In 1981, Abu Zayd was awarded his doctorate in Arabic and Islamic studies from the Department of Arabic Language and Literature (Cairo University) for a thesis on exegesis of the Quran (*falsafat at-ta'wil*; philosophy of *tawil*) of ‘Ibn cArabī’ (Sufi mystic, d. 1240). After being made associate professor at Cairo University in 1987, he accepted a call to the University of Osaka (Japan) where he taught until 1989. Around that time his research on the Quran was inspired by the Russian semiotician Yuri M. Lotman and the notion of *shifra* or *code* (as modelled by *Shannon-Weaver*) in understanding revelation as a communication process. When he published *The Concept of the Text (mafḥūm an-naṣṣ: Dirāsa fi ‘ulūm al-Qur’ān)* in 1991, Egyptian religious authorities accused

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Zayd of denying the divine origin of the Quran. Shortly later in 1992, Abu Zayd published the book *Politics and Islam. Critique of Religious Discourse (Naqđ al-kitāb ad-dīnī)* which appeared in German in 1996. This first major work translated into a Western language marked the start of disseminating Abu Zayd's thought to a wider audience. In it Abu Zayd criticises the instrumentalisation of religious language, by both leftist and conservative parties, for the sake of justifying their political decisions and powers. Addressing religious authorities, politicians and in particular government intrusion into universities earned him the wrath of powerful people. In consequence his tenured professorship at Cairo University was denied in 1992. In 1993, the Appeals Court of Second Degree declared Abu Zayd an apostate (*kafir*: unbeliever), therefore making him a non-Muslim. In consequence, since non-Muslim men are not permitted to be married to Muslim women, the court ruled the official divorce between Abu Zayd and his wife in 1995. Finally, defamation and death threats forced the couple to emigrate. Until today this case is cited amongst the most prominent ones of blasphemy laws being applied by contemporary governments, in order to quash dissent (Thielmann 2003).

From 2000 to 2001 Abu Zayd held the 'Cleveringa Honorary Chair in Law, Responsibility, Freedom of Religion and Conscience' and was guest professor at the University of Leiden. From 2002 until 2003 he was fellow at the *Wissenschaftskolleg zu Berlin* and subsequently professor at the Utrecht University for Humanistics until late 2008. There he was the holder of the Ibn Rushd (Averroes) Chair and remained professor emeritus until his untimely death in Egypt in 2010.

## Islamic Thought on Reforming Education

Abu Zayd's philosophy has to be comprehended in the context of pursuing projects that aimed at the improvement of the human condition through education. Actively teaching in countries that only recently had become independent from their occupiers, academics witnessed how freedom had neither expanded into fields of education nor into politics or the social system. Established rankings and hierarchies still existed. Intellectuals were commonly aware of social injustices, gender inequality, lack of freedom of speech and teaching, low literacy rates, religious tensions, lacuna of democratic structures and, generally, the shortcomings of state obligations towards the betterment of the human condition. One principle in line of this modern Muslim thought was to not blame religiosity for the imperfect state of human affairs, nor an alleged 'backwardness' of Islam in particular, but instead to unleash Islam's usefulness for the common people (Abu Zayd 2001: 57). Such a rethinking of Islam by taking a fresh look at religious sources can be viewed in relation to the search for national and cultural identities of Arab-linguistic countries following the end of colonisation. Such ventures should not be understood as simply manifesting anti-colonial sentiments, but with respect to their intrinsic, and – in our case – humanistic originality, sought to reinterpret religion and adapt its contents to better meet and respond to transformed circumstances.

One way to learn from the Islamic heritage and to promote a critical conscience for the benefit of contemporary social contexts was by the application of novel forms of

critical Quran research within the disciplines of literary and religious studies. Representatives of this stream of scholarship included Taha Hussein (d. 1973), Amin al-Khuli (d. 1966), Aisha Abd al-Rahman (aka Bint al-Shati, Egypt, d. 1988), Ahmad Khalafallah (d. 1998) and `Abdullah al-`Alayli (d. 1996) (Y. Rahman 2001, 58–75; Hildebrandt 2007: 369–373). Some were explicitly politically active, like Taha Hussein and `Abdullah al-`Alayli, who promoted free schooling for all children and educational reform at Al-Azhar University in Egypt, respectively (Sing 2007). Al-Azhar, in effect an unofficial 'Vatican' of Sunni Islam, had been strongly influenced by medieval learning and remained effectively impervious to modern philosophy, sociology and psychology way into modern times (Rahman 1982: 138). At the forefront of reforming this significant institution stands the figure of Muhammad Abduh (d. 1905), one of the forethinkers of *al-nahda* (Islamic Renaissance) and Grand Mufti of Egypt. Supported by his distinct approach to the Quran, he formed the conviction that learning and education are the prerequisites for social change. For Abduh, religious education had the advantage of inducing moral values, while scientific learning would assist rational thinking that analyses the socio-political setting and fosters modernisation (Shafie 2004). Others, like al-Khuli, his wife al-Rahman and Khalafallah focused on the literary study of the Quran with no less significant aims: re-interpreting the Quran by way of applying modern scientific methods of exegesis and finding new answers to social challenges. They applied historical and linguistic study, tracing the instructive and aesthetic character of Quranic language, its emotional impacts as well as its significance for the emergence of Islamic culture and science (Abu Zayd 2006a: 55).

In this research, the inscrutability or obfuscation of the text's meaning (*istiqlah ma'nā al nass*), often supported by the notion of *i'jaz* (inimitability of the Quran), could be overcome by human rationality (*'aql*), just as *naql* ("imitation, that is, the faithful transmission of a received tradition") and *naqliyy* (imitative sciences) could be overcome by *aqliyy* (rational sciences) (Akthar 2008: 58).

Others, like Fazlur Rahman and Muhammad Arkoun, expanded similar scientific endeavours onto Islamic heritage (*turath*), classical exegesis (*tafsīr*) and jurisprudence (*fiqh*). As education minister of Pakistan in 1947, Rahman tackled education policy in the newly emerging Islamic state. He anticipated that education had to be islamised in the sense that Islamic metaphysics would implement Quranic guidance towards social justice.<sup>1</sup> Holistic education should infuse students with Quranic ethical ideals as well as with knowledge from any valuable non-Islamic sources whose content does not contradict the Quranic spirit (Rahman 1982: 133) Learning ought to widen 'the horizons of one's vision and action'; hence it should bear upon one's agency and bring forth an accountable and reflective civil society. Only through education, based upon an authentic Islamic *Weltanschauung*, can God's message enter body and soul in order to guide people. Education represents both an entry for divine guidance into the pan-Islamic *ummah* and a gateway for Islam to become the fuel that fires the engine of development.

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<sup>1</sup>Rahman was not the only thinker of his time to take on the task of rethinking education inspired by Islamic principles. Ismail al-Faruqi and Seyyed Hossein Nasr are known for 'Islamisation of knowledge' and 'Islamisation of science', respectively. Cf. Völker 2016. Chapter on Rahman's reform: 'Education and Islamic Metaphysics'.

Arkoun attributes a slightly different function to education (Günther 2004: 129; Völker 2016).<sup>2</sup> A contemporary of Abu Zayd, Muhammad Arkoun called for a reform of education modelled on the medieval phenomenon of *adab* as represented by Miskawayh's Islamic humanism (Völker 2016). *Adab* is a holistic approach to education that had the potential to create what Arkoun called a new ethos of tolerance and solidarity amongst cultures (Gabrieli 2009; Arkoun 2009: 148). Aspects of *adab* include openness towards various, also non-Islamic sources of knowledge, the surpassing of religious boundaries and the liberalisation of thinking from doctrines and orthodoxies, which should result in 'renewal and creativity' (Arkoun 1994: 77).<sup>3</sup> Education in this sense creates moral thinking and behaviour and contributes to the "fulfilment as individuals and as a species" and to the seeking of "inner sustenance [...] in the clarity and learning of the mind, the rule of reason, nourished not by the sunna of the Prophet but by *paideia*, the *adab* of humanity" (Goodman 2006: 109). Genuine education (*adab haqiqah/alethine paideia*) is achieved through philosophical thinking, not through religious instructions (Kraemer 1992: 231).<sup>4</sup> In the shared context of the Mediterranean region, Arkoun envisages how true education, from primary to university level, can raise awareness of the common cultural heritage and create a tolerant civil society that acts within the frame of universal values. The prevention of an ideological instrumentalisation of Islam, or of religion in general, and of education for the sake of justifying hegemonies of governmental thinking, social hierarchies and religious orthodoxies necessitates a patient humanistic education (Arkoun 1994:26).

Such ideas on education by Muslim scholars of Islam accept the notion of religion as a transformative social factor; that the existence of God and the divine origin of the Quran does not exclude rational human engagement with religion; that the Quran contains historical, non-eternal aspects and is accessible to individual thought; and they accept the necessity of citizen education, critical pedagogy and self-responsibility. Although distinct from each other, these reform projects are liberating in character and help to develop scientific standards for learning and researching about Islam and the Quran.

## Abu Zayd's Contribution to the Reform Debate

Like his predecessors, Abu Zayd supported the idea that the basis for social improvement is learning and a transformed understanding of religion (Abu Zayd 2001: 97).<sup>5</sup> Abu Zayd saw that Egypt's education and scholarship was too impoverished so as to allow for citizen education (Abu Zayd 2001: 49). Elementary signs of this plight

<sup>2</sup> cf. Völker 2016, chapter on Arkoun's reform: 'Society beyond Education'.

<sup>3</sup> Similar views can be traced from Hegel on 'creating knowledge', to J.P. Sartre, F. Fanon and P. Freire.

<sup>4</sup> Kraemer refers to Miskawayh, *Tahdhīb al-akhlāq*, 49–50.

<sup>5</sup> For discussions between Abu Zayd and his teacher Hassan Hanafi about socialist realism, compare *ibid.*

were, in 1990, the chronic shortage of resources, a teacher-student ratio of 1:62 and a literacy rate of 45% (cf. Amirpur and Ammann 2006: 16). In addition, the education sector was abused as battlefield for political struggles (Abu Zayd 2003). Under extra surveillance of religious authorities, there existed no freedom of research and teaching at universities. This influence was also seen upon the general public, since state media invited clerics from Al-Azhar, broadcasting conservative, state-conforming teachings. The participants in the dissemination of Islamic knowledge caused 'ideological bewilderment', by not adhering to any scientific standards, neglecting human reason and the need for proper education and shutting their eyes to the challenges of reality (Abu Zayd 1996: 46). In contrast, Abu Zayd, similar to Arkoun, calls for a revisiting of the scientific Islamic heritage in matters of religion (e.g. in the fashion of Averroism) and pleaded for the distinction of religion (*din*) from religious knowledge (*ma'rifat-i din*) (Abu Zayd 1996: 29; Safdar 2013: 213).

In contrast to linking educational positions with power and self-enrichment, Abu Zayd referred to himself as a servant to the people, an intellectual who, like a street sweeper, merely adds to the improvement of surrounding circumstances (Abu Zayd 2001: 65). One of his efforts was in respect to critiquing the religio-political discourse wherein he discerned possible roots for the plight of education in Egypt. Since 1972, Saudi Arabia, with its petrodollar power, gradually infiltrated Egypt's educational institutions with Wahabi ideology that, amongst other unfavourable aspects, allowed for low educated men to proclaim themselves as authorities of Islam. Furthermore, while this Islamic stream accepts technological innovation at the same time, it neither permits intellectual progress, nor freedom of religion, nor the emergence of individual autonomy, civil society and universal (non-religious) human rights. Hence, and in order to compensate for the failure of a pan-nationalism, Egypt has since 1974 witnessed the emergence of a backward-oriented version of Islam (Abu Zayd 2001: 163–4). Likewise this radicalisation of Islam contributed to effecting president Sadat's political instrumentalisation of religion, which manifested in 1980 with the declaration of *shari'a* as the 'main source for legislation'. In consequence, education became more prone to making concessions to Islamist ideas. To counteract these tendencies, Abu Zayd (similar to Arkoun) argued for the independence of educational institutions from political and ideological agendas (Abu Zayd 2001: 66). As education is freed from political and religious intrusion, Abu Zayd hoped that also the interpretation of religion and scripture would again flourish within the secular realm. Only by being liberated from oppressive influences can exegesis do justice to the transformative and dynamic character of religion (Abu Zayd 2001: 40).<sup>6</sup>

Abu Zayd likewise proposed an inclusivist *Weltanschauung* that carries implications for inter-religious education. For him, cultures are products of acculturation and historical dynamics, and neither cultural purity nor uniqueness, as such, exists (Abu Zayd 2001: 130; 2006b: 10). Hence, essentialist dichotomies such as European

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<sup>6</sup>Some teachers of Al-Azhar are so closely linked to political power that they instrumentalise Islam in various ways to support political schemes. Despite Al-Azhar's claim on monopoly over the interpretation of Islam, Abu Zayd hopes that secularism will enable a multiplicity of interpretations freed from political influence and mutual backups between political and religious interests.



vs. Islamic culture are rendered impossible. Given that cultures develop dynamically, change constantly, interact with each other and produce philosophies and knowledge cooperatively, Abu Zayd encourages the introduction of philosophy into the curricula on all levels of education,<sup>7</sup> akin to Fazlur Rahman and Muhammad Arkoun. However, furthering philosophical thinking and critical scrutiny does not mean the exclusion of religions as sources of knowledge.

Thought systems that claim to provide knowledge are included in the possibility to entail truth. He draws on Ibn Arabi's philosophy of multiple manifestations of truth, in order to argue for tolerance amongst truth seekers (Abu Zayd 2001: 129). This means the need to point out this possibility to students of different faiths and to yield the necessity of holding absolute truth convictions. In all his work, Abu Zayd is acutely aware of the difference between divine wisdom and human fallibility. One consequence of this awareness is that an inner humility from within other religions can be encountered.

Beyond secularism and religious liberalism, Abu Zayd calls for an all-penetrating humanism, the primacy of human dignity and universal rights. Before we are religious, we are all human. Thus, knowledge derived from religion or some other source for that matter must never violate the primacy of human dignity. For example, the right to physical integrity does not allow for 'amputation of body parts or execution', as some contemporary interpretations of Islam suggest (Abu Zayd 2006a: 95).

## The Nature of the Quran

Abu Zayd believed that social change necessitates theological reformation and that renewal must be achieved through set standards of scientific research. In consequence, his work aims at nothing less than developing a new scholarly theology, which is based on a specific understanding of the nature of the Quran (Hildebrandt 2007: 75). He embarked on developing the following ideas: the difference between eternal and timely aspects of the Quran (Ash'ari), the difference between oral and written Quran, the pre-requisite of rationality for revelation (Abduh), the createdness of the Quran (Mutazila), the distinction between corpus (*jism*) and meaning (*ma'na*) (Khuli). These ideas on the nature of the Quran bear crucial consequences for thinking, learning and teaching about religion.

In order for the Quran to speak to the people, it must be delivered from layers of traditional interpretation, sacralised secondary commentaries and legal opinions that are more likely carriers of political and egocentric interests than entailing the will of God. Abu Zayd's understanding of the nature of the Quran allows for this liberating new approach. The Quran is *dhikr*, a reminder of the covenant between the Divine and humankind, and understands itself as a guide towards salvation and

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<sup>7</sup>Abu Zayd's ideas are informed by the philosophies of Claude Lévi-Strauss, Ferdinand de Saussure, Hans-Georg Gadamer, Friedrich Schleiermacher, Wilhelm Dilthey, Martin Heidegger, Paul Ricœur and Toshihiko Izutsu.



divine justice (the Quranic essence).<sup>8</sup> The Quran is also considered a sign of God and the Word of God. However, Abu Zayd points out that it is only one sign amongst many others, such as nature and the universe – indeed, God's creation as such. In addition, the Quran is not the entire word of God, since according to 18:109, the word of God can never be exhausted: "If the sea were ink for the Words of my Lord, the sea would be spent before the Words of my Lord are spent, though We brought replenishment the like of it" (Arberry 1996; Abu Zayd 2008a: 69).

At the same time Abu Zayd emphasises the human character of the Quran. His most controversial stances are best expressed in his own words: "I'm ready to say, the Quran is the word of God, absolutely divine. And the Quran is the word of man, absolutely human" (Abu Zayd 2006b). One aspect of the human text (*nass insani*) is its historicity (*tārīhiya*), which refers to all processes that effected the formation of the Quran. These include God's speech (*kalām Allāh makhlūq*) and the act of transmission (*tanzīl*) in time and space to the angel Gabriel, the processing of the message via the person Muhammad (inspiration/*waḥy*), the communication between Muhammad and the first audience (incl. Prophetic speech) and finally the collection and editing process of the Quranic text (*mushaf*). The "text changes its character from the first moment of its sending – which means since the Prophet cited it in the moment of revelation. It transformed from a divine text, became a concept and hence a human text" (Abu Zayd 1996: 87; Sukidi 2009: 184).<sup>9</sup> As a human, Muhammad received non-verbal messages in specific circumstances ('occasions of revelation' or *asab an-nuzul*, a well-established principle of traditional exegesis) that provoked revelations.<sup>10</sup> For Abu Zayd, revelation therefore has a historical and human dimension, and this comes basically down to the fact that "where there is no addressee there cannot be a message" (Abu Zayd 2008a: 58–60). In support of the historicity of the Quran, Abu Zayd rejects the metaphysical assumption that the Quran is eternal and preserved on a heavenly tablet. This idea stems from literal readings of two Quranic terms: 'mother of the Book' or *umm al-khitāb* (43:2 + 3) and the preserved tablet or *al-lawḥ al-mahfūz* (*Quran*) (Abu Zayd 2008b: 94; Kermani 1996: 61; Sukidi 2009: 185; Y. Rahman 2001: 129). How can the Quran be eternal and the tablet and at the same time be created? Together with the uncreatedness of the preserved tablet, Abu Zayd also rejects the idea of determinism, that fate is 'written in stone'. In short, the Quran that is available to today's community is created and part of the human sphere and hence accessible by human rationality. Although Abu Zayd links the historicity of the text to human history and human understanding, he clearly declares that "with historicity of the Quran, understood as text, is not meant that the text is human". The source of the text is divine, as is the

<sup>8</sup>After oneness (*tawḥīd*), justice is the second chief principle of God's nature, according to the Mutazila. It is the nature of the Quran as God's words to essentially entail divine justice.

<sup>9</sup>For a comparison of ideas on Muhammad's contribution to the revelation process between F. Rahman and N.H. Abu Zayd, see Völker 2015.

<sup>10</sup>The traditional practice of studying the occasions of revelation and the distinctions made between Meccan and Medinan verses proves how Islamic scholarship recognises this link between the message and history.

message. However, the tools for accessing the Quran are human, as are the meaning productions. The Quran is also understood as *muntag taqāfi* (product of culture) as well as *muntijan li al-thaqāfa* (producer of culture), in the sense that it is a product of culture, conditioned by the cultural life of the Hijaz, emanated in Arabic with specific semiotics (Abu Zayd 2008b: 86–88). Subsequently, the Quran created a ‘new’ culture, distinct from the pre-Islamic Hijazi culture in times of *jāhilyya*, by initiating a vast body of interpretations that gave practical, political and ethical instructions for the fast expanding Muslim civilisation.

Considering the written Quran only as a text means exposing it to renderings as manifold as the diversity of human understandings and wishful projections. However, the Quran is also a cooperation between sender and receiver in that the intention of the sender, entailed in the message (*risāla*), is processed by the receiver and disseminated with and by human language. Thus, Abu Zayd reads the Quran likewise as a discourse. The latter notion does more justice to the Quran’s history of creation. It is a discourse that aspires to proclaim, believe and ‘initiate a specific action’ from the addressee (Abu Zayd 2008a: 58–60). This event is different from the written and fixed *mushaf*. Hence, the ‘re-invoking’ of the Quran’s ‘living status’ becomes superior to the mere emphasis of the historicity in the engagement with the text. Also, the dialectical relationship (*alāqa jadaliyya*) between the divine message and the human understanding of it must be emphasised, as it becomes apparent in various dialogues in the polyphonic Quran (Abu Zayd 2004: 18–21; *ibid.*, 2008a: 69).

Again, at the core of this discernment of the nature of the Quran is the human capacity of rational thought, a pre-requisite for the act of revelation. If Muhammad had not understood the messages, how could he implement the consequence of their meanings in the newly emerging Muslim society? And how can the Quran’s message remain relevant, if humans were not continuing to produce meanings? Humanity, in Abu Zayd’s philosophy, is an active body that by reflection on surrounding conditions can alter reality. Humanity is not a passive receiver of religious or political authority nor a passive sufferer from status quos.

## Implications for Learning and Teaching About Islam

To understand humanity as an autonomous agent necessitates open access to education, the promotion of rational, philosophical and critical thinking and the freedom in creating fresh knowledge through research. All cognitive endeavours are only restricted by the primacy of justice and human rights. Since Abu Zayd identifies the core of the Quran’s message as social justice, also the practice of exegesis must be directed at instigating liberty, justice and human rights. Although Abu Zayd calls for secularism in education and politics, he emphasises the need for appropriating the Quranic message anew, in a continuous process of creation, as it was intended by God (Abu Zayd 1996: 115). His concept of the Quran as a patient guide and his proposed educational hermeneutics allow for a transformative but humble production of meaning. Such does not accommodate notions of absolute truths, resolute categories of allowed and forbidden or orthodox exclusivism. The production of meaning is always a human act:

individual, contingent and fallible (Abu Zayd 2009). This allows for the existence of plural understandings of Islam, of which no single one could ever be implemented via state politics or legal systems (cf. Hill and Hill 2000). On a global level, plurality of opinions combined with freedom of expression is essential for a common civilisation and its 'universal discourse about human rights and democracy' (Abu Zayd 2001: 67).

In the contexts of non-Islamic countries, Abu Zayd's philosophy supports processes of deculturation and religious maturity by shifting attention to a reflective and personal understanding of religiosity away from the naturally perceived sense of belonging to an ethnic group or an Islamic denomination. Here, individuals of Muslim minorities can embark on the quest for understanding Islam in a specific social setting and reality, without having to rely solely on traditional concepts that are inherited by the parent generation. This way the meaning of Islam is kept alive by the younger generation in readiness for the next generation. They are enabled to think for themselves and to exchange sentiments amongst peers, free from religious or state intrusion. In Abu Zayd's understanding, we are first participants in a humanistic society and, secondly, believers in a faith. Simultaneously, all humanity takes part in God's ongoing creation, and Muslims contribute to this permanent creation by living their faith. Abu Zayd's ideas empower people to free themselves from the shackles of determinism, paternalism and blind adherence. Competent and matured via education, rationalism and humanism, they will identify existing demands and meet them constructively, with the help of Islam and for the sake of the wider human good.

For the example of Islamic education at state schools as being presently established in Germany, Abu Zayd's hermeneutics and Islam understanding bear valuable implications for developing an Islamic pedagogy. Since several years Islam is being confessionally taught at selected state schools, and from 2010 onwards its formation as well as the university training of Islam teachers has been systematically and financially advanced by the German state. The new teachers now face the challenge of creating a suitable pedagogy, crafting school books and planning teaching curricula (Völker 2013, 2014). Particularly at this rather early stage of a nascent Islamic school pedagogy, Abu Zayd's concepts render inspiration. Elements of school curricula are defined both by standard criteria for school learning (formulated by the state ministry of education) and the religious content (as formulated by Islamic communities). Methods suitable for teaching religious content as well as the standard learning objectives must merge in these curricula of Islam education. Here, Abu Zayd's thought contributes on both levels: content and method. In matter of content, Abu Zayd's work is part of reform movements within contemporary Islam. Let us look also at methodological contributions. From his overall thought on Islam stem requirements for education such as critical-reflective thinking, training students in problem solving, connecting pre-knowledge with the newly self-acquired knowledge (hermeneutic reflection) and open-discourse exchange of ideas. All intellectual processes aim at the improvement of current states of human affairs (humanistic hermeneutics). A pedagogy infused with these basic concepts requires teachers to inspire students to think for themselves. In such terms, a suitable pedagogy excludes top-down, black pedagogy (poisonous pedagogy), exclusive forbidden-allowed pedagogy (Meijer 2010: 736) and banking pedagogy.

Furthermore, Abu Zayd's religious philosophy caters for hermeneutic instruction (hermeneutischer Religionsunterricht) and student-oriented approaches (applied predominantly in Germany in the 1960s and 1970s). Both methods have been developed throughout the years and still inform the official didactic. The hermeneutic religious instruction is characterised by its ability and pre-requisite for students to reflect on human affairs and socio-political realities. Here unfolds the dynamic of meaning production between an unstable system (human nature) and the lasting medium of Scripture (preserved, manifested). The *hermeneutische Religionspädagogik* (c.f. influence of Hans Stock, Martin Stallmann and Gert Otto, in Lämmermann 1994) provides grounds for what the standard school curriculum demands today from a competence-oriented learning (*Kompetenz-orientiertes Lernen*). An intellectual student of Hans-Georg Gadamer, Abu Zayd's hermeneutic *Weltanschauung* necessarily leads towards competence. His idea of cooperative production of meaning (emerging between text and reader) intends student competency. The latter first of all springs from student thinking, which necessitates the acquisition and application of cognitive faculties in order to solve problems. Abu Zayd only acquits 'thinking' to such cognitive operations that are divergent in character and lead towards new horizons (Völker 2017: 123). Motivation, will and social readiness then enable the students to apply new solutions to changing situations successfully and responsibly (Klieme et al. 2003: 72). It is Abu Zayd's suggestion (informed by Marxism), that through thought transformation, reality can be altered. Abu Zayd aims at a holistic *Bildung* (education in its entirety, cf. Arkoun's *adab* in Völker 2016), including student empowering, autonomy and self-responsibility. His thought hands students the tools for free thinking and the ability for liberation in many facets within the set frame of school education. Last but not least, the image of humanity in Abu Zayd's philosophy caters for a constructive teacher-student relation, plus an openness for inter-denominational as well as inter-religious learning. His rejection of absolute truths and the demand for enduring learning are cornerstones for a classroom pedagogy as currently developed and urgently needed for German state schools. The entire cascade of religious learning (university lecturers, school teachers and pupils) is characterised by a vast plurality of ethnic and Islamic denominational backgrounds. Such richness is naturally reflected in the demographics of Muslims in Germany. The future will show whether a pedagogy that carries elements of Abu Zayd's concepts can successfully deliver a religious education to millions of long-term German Muslims as well as hundreds of thousands of refugee children that will for a considerable time live as diaspora within a non-Muslim majority country. Abu Zayd's overall religio-philosophical work certainly serves as a valuable inspiration.

## Abu Zayd's Contribution to Contemporary Muslim Thought

Abu Zayd represents a class of cross-cultural intellectuals whose philosophies benefit from fruitful encounters with other mentalities and world views. Presently, dialectical religious thought and dialogue-oriented theology, as embodied in Abu

Zayd's work, find positive echo in the establishment of Islamic theology at state universities in Germany. For example, his ideas on the nature of the Quran and the proposed Islamic humanism are picked up by one of the most prolific Muslim scholars on Islam, Mouhanad Khorchide. Such pluralistic openness in combination with historical-critical approaches, applied in the training of future imams and school teachers, is the most progressive Islamic educational project within Europe.

Contemporary Muslim scholars, who teach in the field of religion, such as Abdullah Saeed, Bassam Tibi and Farid Esack refer to Abu Zayd as an important modernist. A significant amount of recent publications on 'liberal', 'modern' and 'progressive' Islam refer to Abu Zayd's work. In addition, numerous research theses have been written on him, demonstrating the relevance of his work. His influence on liberal theology becomes apparent in the works of Navid Kermani, Katajun Amirpur, Hamid Dabashi, Nurcholish Madjid and Ahmad Baso. Furthermore, his hermeneutics of the Quran already bears fruit within feminist Quran interpretations. Ziba Mir-Hosseini calls his method 'ground-breaking' and 'immensely important' for exegesis in respect of justice and equality and refers to Abu Zayd as 'among the most prominent and radical of the new reformist thinkers' (Mir-Hosseini 2015). Furthermore, his approach can be found in the works of Amina Wadud and Asma Barlas, amongst others. We see that despite his untimely death, his inspiration is still manifest in the works of students and intellectual followers worldwide.

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# Giorgio Agamben



Tyson E. Lewis

What could be more obvious than sending your child to school in order for him or her to ‘learn’ about something? We have become so accustomed today to think of education in terms of learning that we do not question the ubiquitous appearance of the language of learning. We see it in the discourses of the new, flexible, information economy wherein workers must become ‘life-long learners.’ We see it written on the sides of children’s toys, which now readily advertise what ‘learning outcomes’ the child will achieve from playing with the product. Indeed, is it not uncommon to replace the very idea of the student with that of the ‘learner’ and schools with that of ‘learning centers.’ In all cases, learning stands for an educational process whereby the learner has an intention and actualizes this intention through specific experiences in order to measure progress toward fulfilling a goal. Learning therefore emphasizes actualizing intentions in order to develop, progress, and succeed at a given task wherein ‘success’ is a measurable outcome. While this might sound like a desirable project, there are many philosophers of education today who at least question its dominance and its pervasiveness, which has an uncanny ability to eclipse alternative—less functionalist and less outcome oriented—educational logics that do not fall within this basic learning pattern (Lewis 2013; Backer and Lewis 2015; Biesta 2006, 2014; Lewis and Friedrich 2015; Vlieghe 2013; D’Hoest 2012; Simons and Masschelein 2008). It is against this backdrop that we can begin to appreciate Italian philosopher Giorgio Agamben’s methodology for intervening in the present landscape of education.

Agamben offers education a wide range of tools and ideas through which contemporary educational practices and theories of learning can be critically analyzed. While broadly influenced by a host of figures better known in educational circles such as Walter Benjamin, Jacques Derrida, and Gilles Deleuze (among others),

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Agamben is a unique philosopher with his own methodological approach to doing philosophy. In particular, I will focus on three methodological gestures that Agamben brings to education which are both critical and emancipatory: suspension/inoperativity, archeology, and study. Through these gestures, we can problematize the taken-for-granted equation of education today with learning processes. In particular, I will argue that learning can be rendered inoperative through an archeology of the discourses and practices of the learning apparatus, in order to create a space and time for study. At stake here is finding an educational language that is not predicated on sacrifice—the sacrifice of the potentiality of the student for the actuality of learning assessment. Agamben thus allows us to name a particular educational logic—study—and in the process think potentiality as such, freed from any subservience it might have to specific forms of actualization dictated by learning.

The chapter is organized into four sections. I will begin with a very brief overview of learning, which will give a sense of how it is defined in educational theory. In this section, I will argue that learning always positions potentiality in relation to some specific, predefined actualization, thus preventing us from ever thinking educational potentiality as such. The second section will introduce readers to Agamben's notion of suspension/inoperativity. I will give various examples from his work and then turn to education in order to show how suspension is not only a critical tool for exposing certain forms of educational sacrifice but also a positive idea that enables us to imagine alternatives. Third, I will turn to Agamben's major methodological innovation: archeology of signatures. What will emerge here is learning itself as a signature that must be deactivated. And finally, I will discuss study as the educational form of life that remains when learning is rendered inoperative. Study is, on my reading, a particular educational practice that enables us to at last experience potentiality on its own terms, liberated from measure. I will conclude by comparing and contrasting studying with learning and review a number of contemporary examples of study found in the educational literature on Agamben.

## Learning

For a rather standard definition of learning, we can turn to Cornel M. Hamm who once wrote, learning is “intentionally coming to know (or believe, or perform, etc.) as a result of experience” (1989, p. 91). He goes on to suggest that there are three necessary and sufficient conditions of learning. First, intentionality means that one acts with “a purpose and intention to come up to a certain standard” (p. 91). The second condition is experience (which I will not discuss further here). Finally there is mastery. Learning, for Hamm, “always has an object (x), mastery of which is essential for learning to occur” (p. 92). Think here of learning to swim. First and foremost, one has an intention to learn the skills and knowledge base necessary to understand and perform the basic gestures of swimming. Second, this intention is realized through a series of experiences that involve training exercises, competitions, and so forth. The intention overcomes/negates a former state of ignorance/



impotence through a series of experiences. Finally, one's efforts are quantified through signs of growing mastery. As one wins tournaments, meets personal goals, and acquires increasingly nuanced appreciation for swimming, one becomes a master (as the preferred outcome). Learning is therefore the actualization of an intention that can be quantified in relation to a goal (expertise as it is defined by a field or activity). Learning is an economy, a management of potentiality in the name of future measure and the promise of improvement. This measure might be in relation to one's skill level, developmental growth, or even personal happiness. It enables a person to become whatever kind of person he or she has the potential to be (and thus to possess this personhood in the form of personal skills, talents, aptitudes, knowledge/expertise, degrees, diplomas, and so forth). Of course, this does not mean that learning follows a clear, linear path. Indeed, learning might be digressive at times. The key point here is that there is, overall, some kind of progression, culmination, or development that can be perceived by the subject or by an external observer which can count as evidence that something has been 'learned.' In this sense, learning fundamentally concerns a translation process whereby a potentiality becomes actualized so as to be assessed (hence the close connection between learning and testing).

Now, there is nothing here that appears on the surface to be problematic. Indeed, any number of progressive, conservative, and even revolutionary forms of education would embrace some version of Hamm's definition as a feature of what it means to be educated. To recap, one's swimming abilities can be measured in terms of speed and precision in order to improve, maximize efficiency, and thus meet one's personal swimming goals. Learning enables us to change our state from one of ignorance (not swimming) to knowledge (swimming). There is a passage from a potentiality (for swimming) to an actuality (swimming as such).

But perhaps something is lost when education becomes reduced to (some form of) learning. When education becomes a teleology that moves from potentiality *to* an actuality, we lose the ability to think potentiality as such, as a pure means rather than as a means to another end. Here educational philosophy falls in line with a major trend in Western philosophy as a whole. As Agamben argues, it is not uncommon in the Western tradition to make potentiality subservient to actuality. In *Metaphysics*, Aristotle argues, "actuality is prior to potentiality" (1984, p. 1657). He then continues to list the various ways in which potentiality is subservient to actuality. Actuality defines the nature of the potentiality in question, it chronologically precedes potentiality in a causal chain, and it is the end for which potentiality exists. It is this last point that is most important for Aristotle. He writes, "...actuality is prior [to potentiality] in a higher sense also; for eternal things are prior in substance to perishable things, and no eternal thing exists potentially" (p. 1659). In this sense actuality is the highest reality over and above potentiality, which is merely a derivative/dependent state. The point here is that we begin with what is actual (a soul, for instance), which determines a set of potentialities for particular kinds of living beings, and we end with what is actualizable (for this is the end or *telos* toward which a particular set of potentialities strive). When a teleological end is not achieved, the resulting life is incomplete and thus remains deficient.

Here we can return to our definition of learning. The learner is one who actualizes a potentiality in a verifiable form. Indeed, the learner fails when such potentiality remains latent rather than manifest in the development of skills, dispositions, or competencies. The worst nightmare of a swimming coach (for instance) would be the star swimmer on the team ‘not living up to his/her potentiality.’

Contra Aristotle, Agamben privileges potentiality over actuality: “that which is not (*ta mē onta*) is stronger than that which is” (2005b, p. 41). A large portion of Agamben’s work attempts to think potentiality as such, freed from its subservient position to actuality. To do so, Agamben returns to Aristotle to read him differently. In particular, he pinpoints two notions of potentiality at work within Aristotle’s physics. The first can be referred to as generic potentiality, which is the potentiality that education as learning concerns itself with. This is the potentiality that a child might have to know something and the potentiality to become something. But there is another sense of potentiality in Aristotle which attracts Agamben’s interest. This is the potentiality that belongs to someone who has an ability or a skill already. The architect, for instance, has the potentiality to build something but might prefer not to actualize this potentiality in the form of a building. Agamben summarizes as follows: “The child, Aristotle says, is potential in the sense that he must suffer an alteration (a becoming other) through learning. Whoever already possesses knowledge, by contract, is not obliged to suffer an alteration; he is instead potential, Aristotle says, thanks to a *hexis*, a ‘having,’ on the basis of which he can also *not* bring his knowledge into actuality (*me energein*) by *not* making a work, for example” (1999, p. 179). Such an architect remains in potentiality. And this state of being enables us to think the existence of potentiality as such.

This poses an interesting question for educators, especially for those who have become so invested in learning that it has become the be-all-end-all defining educational life. The challenge will thus be as follows: Can Agamben’s approach to philosophy, and his interest in potentiality, enable us to think of a radically different educational logic that is not reducible to learning (as defined above)? Can we think of an educational experience that does not sacrifice potentiality but rather enables one to experience it? To answer these questions, I will now present an overview of Agamben’s philosophical methodology.

## Inoperativity

Throughout Agamben’s unique and highly unusual body of work, there is a consistent emphasis on rendering inoperative taken-for-granted dichotomies of thinking in order to expose an underlying potentiality that would otherwise be concealed. Often Agamben refers to this as a change of metaphor from philosophy as dialectical opposition, negation, and sublation to philosophy as a kind of magnetic field wherein two opposite charges meet in an indeterminate middle point that (paradoxically) neither fully includes nor excludes either pair. This zone of indetermination or indifference between oppositions is a state of suspension that is neither positive nor

negative. It is a magnetic zero point. Another way of saying this would be that the point of magnetic indifference is the zone wherein the magnet is potentially both positive and negative without actualizing either. To pinpoint the zone of indistinction is therefore to (a) render inoperative the dichotomy between positive and negative and subsequently (b) to discover a latent potentiality that underlies the dichotomy.

Throughout his work, Agamben finds these points of suspension within a host of discourses and practices. A classic example from Agamben would be his work on the human animal divide. In his book *The Open: Man and Animal* (2002), Agamben's dialectic of the anthropological machine continually constitutes the human as the negation of the animal. The animal is therefore only included into the human as an exclusion. Yet in medieval manuscripts as well as in the work of Walter Benjamin, Agamben finds moments wherein the anthropological machine exhausts itself and is rendered idle. What is left is not a new articulation of the difference between human and animal but rather a zone of indifference or a zone of life as such. The problem is precisely that something must be continually sacrificed in order to maintain the appearance of such division, in this case, for instance, the existence of the feral child who is neither human nor in-human—the feral child is precisely the human *as not* human, thus interrupting the process of the anthropological machine.

In education, similar approaches have been used to analyze the construction and subsequent suspension of binaries between the inclusion and exclusion of students from public schools (Lewis 2006), good and evil/justice and law (Shapiro 2015), and citizens and non-citizens (Zembylas 2010; Waghid 2014). In such cases, an Agambenian approach discovers the paradoxical terrain of those who do not fit and thus are excluded/sacrificed. At stake here would be the thinking of an educational practice which is fundamentally not predicated on a sacrifice.

But it is important to note that there is a further move here that is often missed by those interested in utilizing Agamben's method of analysis. In contemporary society, many of the tensions which we find in classical Western thought are themselves already inoperative (including the human animal distinction). If this is the case, Agamben's method does not simply point toward the present as a 'liberatory' moment in history wherein we have been freed from such tensions. Nor does he want to merely return to a previous state wherein the binaries remain operative (and thus something is sacrificed). We cannot think on any other terrain outside or beyond the present. Thus the current state of inoperativity should be viewed as both a problem to be overcome and as an opportunity to think fundamental ideas of life (including education) differently—to think them in their potentiality for being otherwise than they have been or have become. In this sense, Agamben would call for a further move, one that suspends the suspension or renders inoperative the inoperativity of the present. This would be a form-of-life that is both immanent to the present condition of inoperativity yet dramatically different—a kind of absolute inoperativity (Watkin 2014).

## Archeology of Signatures

For Agamben (2009), one way to render the present inoperative is to perform an archeology of its signatures. Signatures exist below the level of signifier and signified. They precede and enable concepts and discourses to enter into unrelated domains or networks of dispersed correspondences. The signature is, in other words, a kind of guarantor that facilitates the transmission of concepts and discourses across time and space. Signatures are the background that make signs intelligible as signs within a system of other signs. In other words, signs presuppose an efficacious background of signatures that are “inseparable from the sign yet irreducible to it” (Agamben 2009, p. 50). In short, such signatures, for Agamben, “have always already pragmatically decided the destiny and life of signs that neither semiology nor hermeneutics is able to exhaust” (p. 64). The efficacy of the signature makes signs intelligible as the kinds of signs that they are.

To collect signatures means that one studies the efficacy which makes certain concepts and discourses intelligible and thus transmissible. But to do so is also, and this is the most important point, to render the guarantee of the signature inoperative. Collecting suspends the efficacy of signatures in order to study their intelligibility. Such inoperativity means that differences within a distributed network of signs become indifferences, there are no longer any operative coordinates for this or that preference, this or that hierarchical distribution, or this or that set of codified meaning. Without the signatory function, the present is rendered strange and the transmission of this or that ceases to function. In turn, the signature’s efficacy is let loose for potential new uses and destinations that are not prefigured within the status quo. Thus Agamben’s work is a collection of signatures such as ‘bare life.’ This particular signature does not appear in philosophy as such, or rather it only appears obliquely, in the margins, or in certain aporias within a given work. Yet this fragile, almost invisible signature enables signs of politics to circulate and proliferate throughout Western history. By exposing this signature (which gives efficacy to our political lexicon), its function is suspended, and we are able to think it, thus producing the intellectual conditions for new political practices not based on the sacrifice of bare life to emerge.

The work of Marteen Simons and Jan Masschelein (2008) might well be characterized as the collection of the signatures of learning in various discourses in order to understand the signatory structure embodied in various learning apparatuses. Learning is a signature that lends intelligibility to multiple contemporary educational practices and enables the suturing of multiple discourses ranging from psychology to design management to financialization of educational resources. Connections between these disparate fields are made possible by the efficacy of the signature of learning, which facilitates translatability across domains. An archeology of learning means that we collect its dispersed signatures, render them inoperative, and thus free the efficacy of the signature for new uses beyond its present possibilities. In this sense, the archeologist carves out a space and a time within learning, making room for something different to appear on the scene.

## Studying

Once archeology renders inoperative the signatures of learning, a new educational practice can emerge from within the present. One that is not merely the negation or destruction of learning but rather the inoperativity of learning. This would amount to learning *as not* learning, or an education practice that is neither learning nor not learning. Such a practice is studying.

Briefly summarized, studying, for Agamben (1995), is an “interminable” and “rhythmic” activity that not only loses a sense of its own end but, more importantly, “does not even desire one” (p. 64). Unlike learning which employs a host of means in order to obtain measurable ends (in the form of assessments), study withdraws from such ends. In short, the studier would prefer not to measure up, submit him or herself to quantifiable assessment, dwelling indeterminately in a space and time of endless study. This is why Agamben cites *Bartleby the scrivener* as well as the Jacob van Gatten as paradigms of study. In both cases, we are faced with enigmatic figures who refuse to ‘learn’ how to properly behave, work, or contribute to their societies in any identifiable way. Instead of resisting socialization, they merely persist in their form-of-life as a kind of perpetual irritant that interrupts any means-end logic. They are, in educational terminology, studiers who are outside the law of measure.

The effect of study is far from merely a-political introversion or passive acquiescence. The action of the studier deactivates the law, suspending it and thus opening it up to new uses. Here Agamben (2007) cites Benjamin and his reading of Kafka: “It is the sort of use that Benjamin must have had in mind when he wrote of Kafka’s *The New Attorney* that the law that is no longer applied but only studied is the gate to justice” (p. 76). Commenting further on Benjamin’s reflections on Kafka’s short story (where the lawyer, Dr. Bucephalus, studies rather than practices the law), Agamben (2005a) continues,

In the Kafka essay, the enigmatic image of a law that is studied but no longer practiced corresponds, as a sort of remnant, to the unmasking of mythico-juridical violence effected by pure violence. There is, therefore, still a possible figure of law after its nexus with violence and power has been deposed, but it is a law that no longer has force or application, like the one in which the ‘new attorney,’ leafing through ‘our old books,’ buries himself in study, or like the one that Foucault may have had in mind when he spoke of a ‘new law’ that has been freed from all discipline and all relation to sovereignty. (p. 63)

Suspended, the law that is studied is deactivated, no longer in force, and thus open to play. In this sense, it is not play but rather the relation between play and study that is most important. Summarizing, Agamben (2005a) writes, “And this studious play is the passage that allows us to arrive at that justice that one of Benjamin’s posthumous fragments defines as state of the world in which the world appears as a good that absolutely cannot be appropriated or made juridical” (p. 63). *Studious play* is the moment when the studier becomes indifferent to the sacredness of the law (as well as his or her position in relation to the law), thus profaning it. Note that the studier does not destroy or negate anything. Rather he or she plays with the law as if the law were a toy. The provocation here is to think an educational

logic that does not merely (a) result in the socialization of students into the order of things (as in learning) nor does it (b) merely negate the law (as in certain forms of free schooling), but rather suspends the law of learning without abandoning it. In this sense, Agamben meets with Hannah Arendt in that education is fundamentally conservative. The teacher places the world before the student so that it can be studied as a pure means without preconceived notions of how such material is to be learned. Rather than the forward momentum of learning, the result of study is a kind of rhythmic sway between certainty and uncertainty, progress and regress, sadness and inspiration that hits upon the very potentiality for learning in the first place.

Commenting on Agamben, David Kishik (2012) summarizes the unique mood of studious play as a “*euphoric* aporia” (p. 69). Indifferent to the desire of learning to actualize potentiality for a particular task so as to measure progress or regress, study offers a *passion* for potentiality as such, freed from the ends of learning. Such passion is equal parts inspiration (euphoria) and sadness (aporia), hence the strange behavior and demeanor of the studier who is lost in the archives, can’t sleep at night, constantly rubbing the forehead, perpetually scribbling down notes, struck stupid by epiphanies that are quickly forgotten, etc.

But such a description might give the false impression that study is simply about *delaying* the arrival of a conclusion. This is not the case. Indeed, a true example of study finds in the rhythms of study a pure means rather than a means to another end. Here we can turn to an obscure reference that Agamben makes to an ancient Greek philosopher for an example of study: the last diadoch of pagan philosophy, Damascius. In 529 A.D. the emperor Justinian closed down the Athens school of philosophy. After struggling to overturn the decision, Damascius and his remaining students took what was left of their library and sought refuge at the court of the Persian king, Khosru Nushirvan. In a state of intolerable exile, lacking a formal school, Damascius began to study. He turned his attention to the aporias concerning first principles. In other words, he turns to the question of the signatures of all thought that enable thinking to take place. As Agamben recounts, he labored on this work for 300 days, and in his text, we find many statements such as: “‘despite the slowness of our work, I have not, it seems, concluded anything,’ or ‘may God do as he pleases with what I have just written!’, or again, ‘all that can be said in praise of my exposition is this: that it condemns itself through its recognition of its inability to see clearly, and its impotence to look at the light’” (1995, p. 32). As a refugee, as one in exile from his homeland, he is adrift without proper status or location. In such a no-man’s-land he becomes a studier-as-melancholic who has entered into the interminable rhythms of thought as it tacks back and forth between pleasure and pain, undergoing and undertaking, progress and regress. Indeed, Damascius’ manuscript amounted to nothing more than a prolonged hesitation, a kind of ceaseless circling.

After so much writing, Damascius suddenly lifted his head from the manuscript proper and gazed upon the writing tablet itself. He was then seized by an idea: the idea of potentiality as such. Agamben writes, “The uttermost limit thought can reach is not a being, not a place or thing, no matter how free of any quality, but rather, its own absolute potentiality, the pure potentiality of representation itself: the

writing tablet! What he had until then been taking as the One, as the absolutely Other of thought, was instead only the material, only the potentiality of thought. And the entire, lengthy volume the hand of the scribe had crammed with characters was nothing other than the attempt to represent the perfectly bare writing table on which nothing had yet been written. This was why he was unable to carry his work thought to completion: what could not cease from writing itself was the image of what never ceased from not writing itself...now he could break the table, stop writing. Or rather, now he could truly begin” (1995, p. 34). The signatures of thought were suspended, rendered inoperative through study but this did not end with mere nihilism. The studier of foundations concerning first principles turned to the writing table itself as a field of pure potentiality for thought. Melancholy over the suspension of meaning became inspiration (a euphoric aporia) at a new beginning.

## Conclusion

By (a) rendering inoperative dichotomous thinking through (b) the work of archeology of signatures, Agamben is able to (c) open up a space and time for a new form of life. In education, this means that the inoperativity of the discourses and practices of learning make possible alternative educational logics such as studying. Studying is the latent potentiality within education that has thus far been included as the excluded, ‘useless’ and ‘unproductive’ double of learning. While (a) might appear to be a form of deconstruction, (b) and (c) are uniquely Agamben’s and thus offer significant resources for developing new methods of philosophy of education. Instead of rendering something unintelligible (as in deconstruction), (b) makes intelligible the signatures underlying signifiers and signifieds. And instead of deferring presence to a future (*act as if...*), (c) makes present the potentiality of  $x$  without actualizing this potentiality in a form that is predetermined ( $x$  as not  $x$ ). Importantly, these moves do not destroy learning. Rather they offer the slightest of shifts within learning—learning *as not* learning. Indeed, something must have been learned in order for suspension of learning to happen. As such, studying is not simply or easily conceptualized as the opposite of learning (as in a dialectical pairing). Rather it is the slightest of moves within learning that release learning from its own ends, opening up a space and time for studying to happen. Conceptualizing this fragile and almost imperceptible shift calls for a new kind of profane educational philosophy that is studious and playful, but most importantly does not sacrifice the freedom of potentiality to prefer not to continue learning. In this sense, we might say that Agamben opens the way for reconceptualizing educational philosophy as a form of *potentialism*.



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# “This Is Our World.” Hannah Arendt on Education



Wouter Pols and Joop Berding

Hannah Arendt (1906–1975) is a political thinker. However, her work has major educational implications that have been noticed by many modern-day educationalists (cf. Gordon 2001; Lombard 2003). The influence of her work on the educational debate is rising. Arendt studied with Martin Heidegger and Karl Jaspers. When the Nazi party came to power in 1933, she fled the country. In 1941, she arrived in the United States. Ten years later, she became a US citizen. In her new home country, she wrote the books which made her famous: *The Origins of Totalitarianism* (1951), *The Human Condition* (1958), *Eichmann in Jerusalem. A Report of the Banality of Evil* (1963), *On Revolution* (1963) and the posthumously published *The Life of the Mind* (1978). Arendt wrote many articles beside these books, in different magazines and papers.

One finds only two articles on education in her work, including her ‘The crisis in education’. This article was originally written in 1954. In 1961 (and expanded in 1968), it was published in *Between Past and Future*. ‘The crisis’ starts with a diagnosis of American education. According to Arendt, education in American schools emphasizes the life of children, the learning process and the idea that children and young people can only know and understand what they have discovered by themselves. She calls American education ‘worldless’. Not only the ‘what’ but also the ‘what for’ are left in the dark. Understanding education as a learning and developmental process is a misunderstanding. Education is not just a matter of growing up, it is a matter of growing up in the *world*. Therefore teachers and educators should represent the world. Arendt writes:

The teacher’s qualification consists in knowing the world and being able to instruct others about it, but his authority rests on his assumption of responsibility for that world. Vis-à-vis

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the child it is as though he were a representative of all adult inhabitants, pointing out the details and saying to the child: This is our world. (Arendt 2006, p. 186).

This chapter deals with Arendt's ideas on education. According to her, educators should introduce children and young people into the world. This statement indicates the central theme of the chapter. Questions we will answer are: What does Arendt mean by 'introducing into the world'? What is the meaning of 'world' and what is according to her the aim of this 'introducing'? And, last but not least, how can educators and teachers put this into practice, and what are the conditions that need to be met?

## A Layered Anthropology

Anthropology is the study of humans and their societies. In *The human condition*, Arendt develops an anthropology, not as social scientists would do it, but as a political thinker. Humans are thought of as thinking beings in the philosophical tradition. According to this tradition, the essence of humankind is the *vita contemplativa* (Arendt 1998, p. 14). According to Arendt, however, this isn't valid anymore for modern humans. It is the *vita activa* that characterizes the lives of men and women nowadays. The current mode of life is the active life.

Arendt distinguishes three modes of active life: labor, work, and action. She understands labor as a cyclical process of production and consumption. Work is a process of making, of bringing forth, and action a process of taking initiatives in response to the initiatives of others. Action implicates plurality; when people act they always act 'in concert'.

The first mode of life, labor, is fundamental. It is "the activity which corresponds to the biological process of the human body, whose spontaneous growth, metabolism, and eventual decay are bound to the vital necessities produced and fed into the life process of labour" (Arendt 1998, p. 7). It is a process of incorporation and digestion, of effort and relaxation, of rising and decline. It is a cyclical process in which life maintains itself: an ongoing, repetitive process. Arendt situates labor in the *oikos*, the household. Originally, the labor process took place in the private sphere of the household. Nowadays, this process has exceeded the limits of the household and is spread out over the whole of society. The economic process of labor characterizes modern society. It is a process of production and consumption, just like the biological process: ongoing and repetitive. It is a process based on always new, emerging needs that should be satisfied, again and again.

The second mode of active life, work, is not a cyclical one. The structure is not biological, not natural; it is cultural. Humans create things by working, not things to consume (consumer goods), but things to use (use objects). "Work provides an 'artificial' world of things, distinctly different from all natural surroundings" (ibidem). Work implicates "worldliness" (ibidem). Work is a process of making, of bringing forth. The things that humans bring forth make the world stable. Things

give the world stability; they are objects, they have objectivity (ibid., p. 137). This is the reason that, in contrast to the mode of labor, work creates a world that transcends “the ever-changing movement” of the lives of “mortal men” (ibid., 173). Work makes the world a human world. The artificial things that humans make are use objects. A hammer is used to drive a nail in the wood, a chair to sit on, a pen to write. They can be used as instruments, as tools. Humans can make new things with these tools. A tool is used to reach a goal. This goal can be a means to another goal. The world of things, of use objects, is a world of means and ends. The things in the world aren’t in the world for themselves; they are “for the sake of,” “in order to” (ibid., p. 154). So, the world that work creates runs the risk to be “a strictly utilitarian world” (ibidem).

The last mode of life Arendt distinguishes is action. Action isn’t a natural process, neither a process of means and ends. It is an inter-human process. A man or woman alone can’t act. “Action,” writes Arendt, “corresponds to the human condition of plurality, to the fact that men, not Man, live on the earth and inhabit the world” (ibid., p. 7). Humans act in the world they have created with the work they did. In acting, they establish a community and with this a common world which they not only maintain but also renew. In acting, each human can appear from the different positions he takes up, each in his own way. The condition of plurality is exactly this: “humans are all the same, [...] in such a way that nobody is ever the same as anyone else who ever lived, lives, or will live” (ibid., p. 8).

In acting, the human comes into the world. Through an initiative in response to an initiative of another, a man or a woman appears in the presence of other men or women. “With word and deed we insert ourselves into the human world,” writes Arendt (ibid., p. 176). She calls this insertion a second birth. It is the birth of the human in the public world; here, he shares the world with other humans. Humans can appear in this shared world; “they can show who they are, reveal actively their unique personal identities” (ibid., p. 179). A human can only be fully human in this shared, public world. Through initiatives, he shows who he ‘is’, and through initiatives, he can make a new beginning. Arendt calls the possibility of a new beginning “natality” (ibid., p. 247). A new beginning cannot be predicted. The reason why is the “human condition of plurality.” Plurality implicates freedom. In acting, people are free. “Men *are* free [...] as long as they act, neither before nor after; for to *be* and to act are the same” (Arendt 2006, p. 151). Natality, as the possibility to ‘be’ and to make a new beginning, is inherent to human action, inherent to the freedom to act.

Arendt’s anthropology is a layered anthropology. Human life is layered. The active life people live is characterized by the three modes discussed above. Humans couldn’t stay alive without labor, they wouldn’t have a stable world (‘a human world’) without work, and this world wouldn’t be a common world without action: a world in which humans take initiatives in response to those of others. Men and women can only appear as subjects by action: unique actors whose sameness is rooted in the fact that they differ from each other. Humans can only be fully human in the public world. Here, they can make a new beginning. From this perspective, the modes of life of labor and work are conditional to the fully human life of action.

In acting, men and women shape a common world; this shaping is in essence politics. This is why Arendt's anthropology is in fact a political anthropology.

Arendt takes a critical stance towards modern society. Modern life tends to be dominated by labor. This tendency goes hand-in-hand with the blending of the private and public spheres. It seems that in modern society the private and public integrate into one sphere. In this sphere everyone is a consumer. As consumers, people take part in the ongoing process of production and consumption. With their emerging needs, men and women are individuals that seek satisfaction, not acting subjects that appear in the presence of others. So, consumption tends to take the place of politics in modern society. What is, according to Arendt, a multilayered political anthropology seems to transform to a unilayered, one-dimensional labor anthropology. This not only has implications for men and women in the world but also for the world itself. It loses its stability. Arendt writes: "This earthly home becomes a world in the proper sense of the word only when the totality of fabricated things is so organized that it can resist the consuming life process of the people dwelling in it, and thus outlast them" (*ibid.*, p. 206). If this isn't the case anymore, the world as a stable, human world breaks down.

## Introducing into the World

According to Arendt, education is a process of introducing children and young people into the world. Some sense of what Arendt means by 'world' already emerges from the above. We will now elaborate on this a bit further, and ask what according to her is the aim of this 'introducing' and how to put this into practice.

As we saw, the world is a furnished world; it is furnished with the things people have made, not only in the present and recent past but in the distant past as well. These things aren't consumer goods; they are use objects, objects which give the world stability. This stability ensures that the world can be a home for 'mortal man'. Arendt writes:

The world, the man-made home erected on earth and made of the material which earthly nature delivers into human hands, consists not of things that are consumed but of things that are used. If nature and the earth of the world constitute the condition of human *life*, then the world and the things of the world constitute the condition under which this specifically human life can be at home on earth. [...] [W]ithout being at home in the midst of things whose durability makes them fit for use and for erecting a world whose very permanence stands in direct contrast to life, this life would never be human. (Arendt 1998, pp. 134–135).

Now we may be able to understand what 'introducing into the world' means for Arendt. It means introducing into the world of things, the world of use objects. These objects are not only material things (a hammer, a chair, a pen, a pair of scissors, a violin, a notebook), they are mental things as well (a concept, a rule, a strategy, a design). Introducing children and young people into the world means to let them get acquainted with the objects the world is furnished with, in order to learn to

use these objects. To be introduced into the world means to be able to use the objects of the world, or more precise: to use the objects chosen by adults as worthwhile. Through using them the younger generation becomes at home in the world that older generations have built.

Learning to use the objects of the world is an important aim in education. As we said before, these objects aren't only material, they are mental as well. When children progress in education the mental objects increase in importance. By using mental objects, they learn what the material objects are and how to deal with them. The different school subjects consist of a wide range of mental objects: numbers, the basic operations of arithmetic, parts of speech, spelling rules, scientific concepts, different forms of writing, art, play, and sports. Using these objects, in other words: using these as tools is work in the Arendtian sense. Children work when they solve a mathematical problem, write an essay, do research, or make a design. In this work, all sorts of objects, of tools, are involved: material and mental tools. However, the work children and young people do in school isn't fully work yet. In contrast with the work of adults, the products of school work are not treated and used by others. This is why we speak of doing 'free work' in school.

When children and young people are introduced into the world as described above, they experience a mode of life, that of work, at the same time. One could say that introducing children and young people into the world implicates introducing them into work. However, work is only one of the modes of life people live. As we saw, labor has to do with the biological basic of life; this life is only a precondition for human life. Human life starts with work and finds its fulfillment in action. The world of things, of objects, is the human environment in which people act. Introducing into the world means introducing children and young people into the world of objects and with it having the experience of work, but don't they need to have the experience of human action as well?

Arendt is clear about action. On her view, children are not able to act. In this respect, there is a big difference between children and adults. The relation between children and adults is not equal; it is an asymmetrical, hierarchical relationship. What the child and the adult as educator “have in common is the hierarchy itself, whose rightness and legitimacy both recognize and here both have their predetermined stable place” (Arendt 2006, p. 93). The child and the adult are not in the same position. This is the reason why, according to Arendt, action cannot play a role on the side of children. This position is criticized by many educators (Meirieu 1995, 2004, 2007; Biesta 2014; Berding 2016). The French educator Philippe Meirieu writes: “According to her [Arendt], education should prepare the child to become a subject; however, one should not yet deal with him as such” (Meirieu 1995, p. 104). Anyone can see the tension here.

We propose to make a difference between political and educational action. In political action, the relationship between actors is nonhierarchical. This is not the case in educational action. A school can only be an educational institution if there is a hierarchical relation between teachers and pupils. The teacher is responsible for the introduction of his pupils into the world. His responsibility makes the difference. This is the reason that teachers and pupils aren't the same. Pupils are the

same, in spite of the differences between them; they are the same in the way the teacher approaches them. He approaches them as capable to be introduced into the world, or in traditional, educational terms: as open to formation (cf. Herbart's statement that "[t]he plasticity, or educability, of the pupil is the fundamental postulate of pedagogics" (Herbart 1913, p. 2)). This doesn't mean that teachers treat their pupils all in the same way. Pupils are different in backgrounds, abilities, and behavior; a teacher should take those differences into account. However, his approach (not his treatment) is the same: all pupils are open to formation. By doing so, he invites them not only to work with the objects the world consists of but also to take up positions, to take initiatives, and to insert themselves with 'word and deed' into the world. These words and deeds reveal the meaning of the objects they deal with, but in doing so they reveal themselves in the presence of others as well. "What matters most," Gert Biesta writes, "[...] is *that* you say something" (Biesta 2006, p. 62). By saying something, the child or youngster reveals and appears, by saying and doing, he can 'be'.

Through action(s), people build up their world. Arendt writes about a "world-building capacity" (Arendt 1965, p. 175). This capacity has to do with the "human faculty of making and keeping promises" (ibidem). Promises and agreements deal with the future and provide stability. Children and young people can't take yet the responsibility for their future. This is the reason that actions in education takes place under the responsibility of the educator. It means that the world-building capacity in educational action is still in budding. Introducing into the world is a process of work and action, but not fully accomplished. It is a process of beginning: a beginning to work ('free work'), beginning actions.

In *The human condition*, Arendt presents the metaphor of a table: "a table [...] located between those who sit around it; the world like every in-between, relates and separates men at the same time" (Arendt 1998, p. 52). In extension to this metaphor, we could speak of the table of the world that teachers install in the school (cf. Masschelein and Simons 2013). On this table they have put the objects ('human artefacts') they want their pupils to get acquainted with and learn to use. In this sense, the table is a working table. But the table with the objects on it is an intermediary as well. The pupils sit around the table under supervision of their teacher; everyone has a different position. Each speaks and acts from the position he takes up: both, *with* the mental objects and *about* the material and mental objects of the world. In this speaking and acting, the world becomes a common world, and, at the same time, each appears in the presence of the other. Arendt calls this humanization. "We humanize what is going on in the world and in ourselves only by speaking of it, and in the course of speaking of it we learn to be human" (Arendt 1995, p. 25).

What conclusions may be drawn from the above about the aim of education? To educate means to introduce the young generation, or in other words: the newcomers, into the world in order to humanize the world and these newcomers themselves. Introducing into the world means letting children work with the objects of the world, but also: speak and act, both with and about these objects. Education is instruction, a matter of tasks and assignments, but it is also a matter of discussion

and dialog: free work and beginning actions. In this free work and beginning actions, the world-building capacity is going to flourish, step by step.

## Education in ‘the In-between Space’ of the School

Natality is the capacity to interrupt and to begin something new (Arendt 1998, p. 246). It is the basis of action. Arendt calls this capacity a ‘miracle’.

The miracle that saves the world, the realm of human affairs, from its normal, ‘natural’ ruin is ultimately the fact of natality, in which the faculty of action is ontologically rooted. It is, in other words, the birth of new men and the new beginning, the action they are capable of by virtue of being born. Only the full experience of this capacity can bestow upon human affairs faith and hope, those two essential characteristics of human existence [...]. (ibid., p. 247).

With the birth of every new generation, there is a possibility for a new beginning. Arendt poses: it bestows hope. This possibility of a new beginning is not evident. A new beginning isn’t possible without being introduced into the world, which means: the old world. Education can’t be other than conservative. The future is up to the new generation. However, first of all, the newly born should be introduced to and grow up in the old world in order to make a new beginning; they must learn to use the objects of this world and make beginnings with working and action in the old world. “Exactly for the sake of what is new and revolutionary in every child, education must be conservative; it must preserve this newness and introduce it as a new thing into an old world [...]” (Arendt 2006, p. 189).

Therefore, Arendt says, school should be a ‘protected’ area. The school cannot be situated in the private area of the home, the area in which only exclusiveness counts, neither in the public area of the adult world where everyone is equal distinguished. The school should be situated in an ‘in-between space’. Arendt states that school is “the institution that we interpose between the private domain of home and the world in order to make the transmission from the family to the world possible at all” (ibid., p. 185). It is not the family (the private world) that requires school attendance, it is the state, that is: the public, adult world. And with this requirement, the adult world takes the responsibility for it. The ‘in-between space’, where the introduction into the world takes place, should be a protected area. The school should protect the new generation against, what Arendt calls, the “full light of the public world” (ibidem), but also against the world of labor that transforms the objects of the world into consumer goods and makes consumers of humans.

Arendt calls this ‘in-between space’ of the school “prepolitical” (ibid., p. 92). However, the school isn’t an island; it is embedded in the current society. The processes that take place in society affect the school. We already mentioned the labor process of production and consumption. The children who enter the school take with them the social sphere in which they live (Putnam 2016). Equality doesn’t count in this sphere; it is “like attracts like” (Arendt 2003, p. 208). The children who enter the school are embedded, like the school itself. However, the educational



mission of the school is not to approach them as members of the group they belong to; its mission is to approach them as pupils: pupils who are ‘open to formation’. From this angle, all pupils are equal, despite the social, economical, and cultural groups they belong to.

Being a prepolitical institution is not evident. The school should fight for it. It should fight for the educational mission it stands for. It is not a commercial, neither a social or welfare institution. It is a prepolitical, educational institution in which all pupils are equal: equal in their openness to formation. However, the school is an embedded institution. The world in which the school is embedded is, as Arendt writes, a world “that is or is becoming out of joint” (Arendt 2006, p. 189). Commercial (“the mode of life of labor”) and social (“like attracts like”) processes jeopardize the public world. A common world is not evident. It must be established, again and again. Arendt speaks of “setting-right” (ibidem). This ‘setting-right’ is a political mission, but it is an educational mission as well. Because the school is an embedded institution, it should ‘set-right’ the educational process that takes place in the school, again and again.

Arendt states that a public area can only exist if it is enclosed. “The law of the [Greek] city-state [...] was quite literally a wall” (Arendt 1998, pp. 63–64). She speaks about a “wall-like law” (ibidem). The public area can only exist and continue to exist when it is enclosed and regulated by laws. This goes for the school as well. The school exists due to a law which regulates the educational process. This law differentiates: between me and you, mine and yours. It is this law that positions actors in relation to one another: the teacher with regard to his pupils, the pupils with regard to each other. Without this law, there wouldn’t be actions, no taking up of positions, no initiatives in response to the initiatives of others; without this law, there wouldn’t be a working-together either. In this sense, the law is indeed a wall, a wall that distinguishes the one from the other. The prepolitical ‘in-between space’ of the school exists due to this ‘wall-like law’. This law is the educational law par excellence. With the help of this law, the school can ‘set-right’ the educational process that takes place in it.

The school in an ‘in-between space’, the table of the world installed in it, the pupils around this table under supervision of their teacher, beginning to work with the objects of the world, beginning to act surrounded by these objects. This is the school Arendt suggests. In this school the older generation takes the responsibility not for only the younger generation but for the world as well. Arendt writes:

Education is the point at which we decide whether we love the world enough to assume responsibility for it and by the same token save it from that ruin which, except for renewal, except for the coming of the new and young, would be inevitable. And education, too, is where we decide whether we love our children enough not to expel them from our world and leave them to their own devices, nor to strike from their hands their chance of undertaking something new, something unforeseen by us, but to prepare them in advance for the tasks of renewing a common world. (Arendt 2006, p. 193).

The authority of the teacher rests on the fact that he assumes the responsibility for the world. But what happens when the world is jeopardized by the consumer and social processes that take place in it, when it is destabilized by these processes,



when a common world breaks up? With this breaking up the authority of the teacher also breaks up. According to Arendt, the crisis in education is rooted in this breaking up. However, the school cannot exist without authority; it cannot exist without assuming the responsibility for the world. A teacher cannot practice teachership without taking up the responsibility he stands for. He must do it, again and again. The French political philosopher Myriam Revault d’Allonnes calls this “beginning to continue, continuing to begin” (Revault d’Allonnes 2006, p. 264).

Beginning to continue, continuing to begin. Wouldn’t be this the educational principle for the schools in our time? Beginning to continue, continuing to begin in order to give the young generation a chance of ‘undertaking something new, something unforeseen’.

## In Conclusion: Bridging the Gap Between Past and Future

Humans live in an interval between past and future (Arendt 2006, p. 10). In our time, there is a gap between past and future, a gap which isn’t easy to bridge. Arendt quotes the French poet René Char: “Our inheritance was left to us by no testament” (ibid., p. 3). In essence, the crisis in education is a crisis of time. Today, in the interval of time, humans miss navigation marks, points of orientation. The past isn’t a supplier of signposts any more. A “pre-established framework of reference” is missing (ibid., p. 5).

What rests is thinking. “Each new generation, [...] inserted between an infinite past and an infinite future, must discover and ploddingly pave anew the path of thought” (Arendt 1978, p. 210). According to Arendt, children and young people are not yet able to think for themselves. Thinking should be done on one’s own, alone, in solitude. Taken from this perspective, the school isn’t a place for thinking. However, the school provides “thought-objects” (ibid., p. 77), mental objects to think with. Introducing into the world means also introducing into the world of thinking: a beginning to think, as a beginning to work and a beginning to act. These beginnings provide the members of the young generation the tools not only to think on their own but also to work together and to act ‘in concert’. So that one day, the present-day boys and girls can bridge the gap between past and future: by thinking indeed, but also by working and acting.

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# Dialogue: Buber's Philosophy of Education Revisited



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## Introduction

One of Martin Buber's students in Germany and a colleague later on in Palestine-Israel was Ernst (Akiva) Simon. In his article 'Buber as an Educator' (1958) he wrote the following:

The building of living wisdom, erected by Martin Buber in ceaseless work, rests on seven pillars. Their names are Bible (translation and exegesis), Hasidism (free versions, faithful reproductions, and narrative form), Zionist politics (planning and critique), social philosophy, philosophical anthropology, comparative religion and education (theory and practice). (45)

Buber's work might seem quite broad and have different aspects, especially those regarding Jewish Thought and History. Buber was also quite interested in Taoism, Medieval Christian Mysticism, among other traditions. Buber was also quite a convinced Marxist, especially with regard to the idea of Utopia and its bond to Anthropology. As a translator of the Hebrew Bible into German started with his friend Franz Rosenzweig, and as the compiler of the Hasidic tales, Buber became a 'medium' to the 'German ear'. As an educator, he was outstanding, not only as a professor at the University of Frankfurt am Main and at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, but especially as an adult educator at the House of Jewish Learning (better known as the *Lehrhaus*) and in his daily life as an 'informal' educator. In that sense, Ernst Simon says:

There is scarcely a year of Buber's work without its pedagogical appeals and speeches, programmes and institutions, and they are concentrated, in the years of crisis for the world and the Jewish people, with great topicality and density. Nevertheless, it would be wrong to

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conclude from the order chosen here that the educational doctrine stood at the peak of his system of thought. Buber has no system of thought and has never claimed to be a philosopher in this sense. The various spheres of application of his many-layered and profoundly penetrating thought do not 'follow' logically one from another. (45)

If Ernst Simon is right, then, how can Buber's educational thought be explained? How is education understood from his philosophical perspective? Why is then Buber considered a great educator?

In this chapter, I would like to show that all of these elements are connected with one another through the idea of 'dialogic philosophy' or the 'philosophy of dialogue'. Although I agree with Simon that Martin Buber does not try to establish a program based on any 'philosophy of education', I will state throughout this chapter that the whole Buberian philosophy has a direct implication in education, not as a strict proposal but as 'dialogue'. This word could be a good summary of other Buberian phrases: 'Pointing the way' and the 'Prophetic view'. By explaining this philosophical perspective, Buber's proposal can still be of great interest for educators worldwide, as well as philosophers and thinkers of education.

## **Buber's Philosophy of Education: 'Pointing the Way' and 'Prophetic Mission' Towards 'Dialogue'**

In order to explain 'dialogue' as a keyword in the thought of Martin Buber in general and with regard to education, I suggest starting from other ideas in order to finally attain what we have just seen in Ernst Simon's words. Thus, let us start with the first phrase: 'Pointing the Way'.

We only have small fragments of Martin Buber's life intendedly. Experience cannot be put together as a continuum. Maybe the life of each philosopher that tries to be coherent with his own way of thinking is vital to understand the philosopher's own proposal. I think that in Buber's philosophy, this is the case. As Maurice Friedman puts it in the introduction to the book *Meetings*, fragments of Buber's life narrated by the author:

These 'events and meetings' are in the fullest sense of the term 'teachings' and perhaps, in the end, the most real teaching that Martin Buber has left us. "I am no philosopher, prophet, or theologian," Buber said at a celebration of his eightieth birthday, "but a man who has seen something and who goes to a window and points to what he has seen." In the highly significant Foreword to his Hasidic chronicle-novel *For the Sake of Heaven*, Buber wrote: "He who hopes for a teaching from me that is anything other than a pointing of his sort will always be disappointed." (Buber 1973: 4–5)

This fragment of his life, a retrospective at 80 years old, is a good way of explaining the notion of 'Pointing the Way', a Buberian phrase that enables him to explain the experience in his own terms. Imagine someone trying to follow the same path as his master or anyone else, in this sense. That would be impossible. Experience is something unique. Even if we try to emulate or even imitate the same passage of our own lives, even with a little change it would be different. Even more so, when we

think about following others, there might be quite a frustration because one experience will never match any other.

I imagine Buber's metaphor about 'pointing the way' in the sense that an educator would always point at his or her own experience as a reference to others, but never with the intention of having the other following his or her own path. Only a mere pointing would be enough in order to 'guide' someone else into his or her own experience, into his or her own path.

This could be much more easily understood if we get a notion of what Buber understands by 'education'. Actually, Buber invented a word in German for one of his most notable speeches: *Erzieherische*. This has the root of *Erziehung*, one way of saying 'education' in German, but with the *-ische* ending mostly used for adjectives.<sup>1</sup> Martin Buber was invited to give this keynote speech to the Third International Educational Conference at Heidelberg in 1925: *Über das Erzieherische*. The speech that was later on written down as an article has been translated into several languages with very different titles.<sup>2</sup>

As Buber puts it in his speech: "The true elements educate him – the air, the light, the life in a plant and in an animal; and the social circumstances educate as well. The true educator represents one and the other; and in spite of his presence, in front of the child, he has to be as one of the elements" (Buber 1982: 11). One may then say that the educator tries to put all the things around the individual, including him or herself, in order for the experience to take place. The educator is a mediator between the individual and the many elements that may be significant for an experience, even from childhood. The educator has to be very careful not to think of him or herself as the essence of education, not even as the 'controller' of the educational act. Experience cannot be repeated, and nonetheless, the conditions for developing those bonds could be fostered. In this very frail line, the real educator has to work. To educate implies pointing a way and not imposing a path already walked, because of experience, according to Buber, is unrepeatable. "The educational function means, a high Askese without rigor towards the world, because of the existence of the responsibility of the dominion of the life that is rendered upon us and in which we must influence, but that we must not be intrusive, neither by the will of power or erotically" (Buber 1982: 15).

This leads to the second Buberian phrase that will lead us to the Dialogical principle: the 'prophetic mission'. Martin Buber was a profound and dedicated researcher of different World traditions, including Judaism. Many say that the influence of his Grandfather, Solomon Buber, a great Jewish scholar, was of utmost importance. Zwi Werblowsky says: "Perhaps it is doing an injustice both to the

<sup>1</sup>That is why I decided to name my translation 'Sobre lo educativo' (a close translation into English could be 'About the educational') keeping the imprecise ending of the adjective form in German as well as the neutral article *das*, plus the root of 'education'. The contents of the text also go in that sense, from my perspective (Buber 2014: 173–204).

<sup>2</sup>For example, in the Hebrew translation made by Tzvi Voiselevsky (Buber 1959) and authorized by Buber himself back at the Hebrew University of Jerusalem, we find the title 'About the educational fact'. Moacir Gadotti and Mauro Ângelo Lenzi (Buber 1982) prefer to translate it into Portuguese with the title 'About the educational function'.

history of religions and to Buber to treat them in one breath. Buber was no historian of religion, and, in the last resort, did not mean to be one” (2002: 166). He continues saying that there could be a number of stages in Buber’s work that cannot be taken as one and adds:

But the constants are no less significant, and one of them is Buber’s *habitus mentalis* as prophet, apostle, and bearer of a message. The message itself may have changed [...], but the stance of the messenger did not. Nevertheless, as a thinker whose literary output dealt largely with the records and great documents of what we call ‘religions’ or spiritual traditions, Buber cannot help coming under scrutiny of the historian of religion who, among other things, studies the ways in which the history of religions can be used as a vehicle for conveying a religious message. (166)

According to Werblowsky, Buber did not mean to be a historian of religions or spiritual traditions but to study the texts, the way they have been written and the possibilities of those traditions in the every-day life. Martin Buber would start with his own tradition, Judaism in general and Hasidism in particular. In Buber’s own words:

When I began my work on Hasidic literature my concern was with the Teaching and the Way. At the time I thought that contemplating them as permissible, but since then I learned that the Teaching exists in order to be learned and that the Way exists in order to walk therein. (Buber 1924: 10–11 in Werblowsky 2002: 167)

A very important remark in this sense is the idea of religious or cultural tradition. For Buber, each tradition has its own way of understanding its ideas, concepts, and other ways of interpreting the World. All of them are represented by words. One might be tempted to assume that a word or set of words within one tradition might be equivalent to another. This might not be the case. This is the main argument in his book *Two Types of Faith: A Study of the Interpenetration of Judaism and Christianity* (2004).

Furthermore, for Buber’s understanding of a tradition, there is no division between the religious and the ‘profane’ like the Christian Church pretended in its own tradition. For Buber, religious traditions are cultural. In his *Paths in Utopia* (1996) Buber explains why ‘utopia’ is important for the Marxist traditions, in the sense that it is prophetic. The ethical emanates from the religious in true dialogue, and not as an imposition. He would very much agree on being against impositions from the religious realm, but not severing cultural traditions. Atheists must not feel ‘fearful’ of Buber’s approach on religion since each tradition has its ethical standpoints. From them dialogue is possible.

In his life, Buber tried to build dialogical bridges to understand each and every perspective: Hasidism, the Hebrew Bible, and continuing with Taoism, Christian Medieval Mysticism, among other. Despite the differences, the common ground is the possibility to ‘listen’ to one another, to learn those differences, and not to assume or impose words or categories upon other traditions. He was willing to ‘encounter’ the other, being an individual that at the same time implies a whole tradition in its being. In this sense, Buber should start with his own tradition. Talking about Judaism

was a starting point for this clarification of terms, and thus, a way in which Judaism could get into dialogue with other traditions.

Having this in mind, Buber understands that these traditions are not necessarily or uniquely 'thought-systems', but rather 'life-systems'. In Buber's words:

To recognize the nature of what we call a 'great civilization,' we must consider the great historical civilizations not at the time of their full development but at an early stage. We shall see that each of them can be understood only as a life-system. In distinction to a thought-system, which illuminates and elucidates the spheres of being from a central idea, a life-system is the real unit in which again and again the spheres of the existence of a historical group build up around a supreme principle. This principle achieves adequate consciousness and articulateness only in sublime moments of the spirit, but its effect pervades, in manifold ramifications and shapes, and, of course, also in varying degrees of intensity, the entire existence of the group. Its fundamental character is always a religious and normative one: a religious one, because it always implies an attachment of human life to the absolute, an attachment that, though susceptible of intellectual comprehension, is essentially concrete, means concrete things, and points to concrete things; and a normative one, because the principle, though always relating to transcendent Being controlling the universe, proclaims that Being as exemplary for man, as that which alone, if imitated by man in his life-attitude and social structure, brings order and meaning into earthly existence, and on whose realization on earth by man depends, in fact, the survival of man qua man. (1967: 191–2)

In this sense, Buber understands the 'religious'. In the Jewish texts, especially the Hebrew Bible, the prophets have specific characteristics: they are able to listen to the Divine and then talk to the people. The prophets were the leaders of the Israelites, but also a political and moral vehicle. Thus, Samuel was in charge of objurgating Saul (1 Samuel: 13–15), and Isaiah talks about a Messianic age to come (2–4). Ernst Simon deals with 'Prophethood' in education in the following way:

No Jew before Buber saw and represented the prophets' innermost life in such a way.

It is his vocational nature of the prophetic mission which makes its agents unfitted to serve as 'educational ideals'. Buber knows this very well, just as he has always decidedly rejected any tendency of the foolish admirer and malicious critic to assign the 'prophetic label' to him. What the prophet has done for education is something else: he himself cannot be imitated, but he stands on the highest step of the 'imitation of God' which is, in fact, the central category of Buber's educational philosophy. That which is imposed on the prophet by the cruel choice of grace – to fulfil God's command to him and the people as faithfully as possible – must be the goal of us ordinary human beings to translate into our own sphere with the utmost effort of will and in hopelessness, if the figure, perfected by the earthly yardstick, did not stand on the horizon, inimitably pointing the way. (1958: 46)

In Buber's thought, the religious has a connection with this World. That connection is a moral and political demand that can be stated on the individual and in the collective spheres. Actually, in Buber's philosophical anthropology, the individual is not the origin or essence of the political model, but rather the community. In any case, the prophetic mission is an ethical one. Thus, we will now see the Dialogic implications of Buberian education.

## Dialogue as a Fundamental Issue in Education

For Martin Buber, in the perspective of the human being, there are couples of words that enable us to approach the world. It is through words, in this case, through these couples of words that we can approach experience. These couples of words are not something else outside of the experience. They are the experience itself. The first couple of words is 'I – Thou' (*Ich – Du*). The second one is 'I- it' (*Ich-Es*). According to Buber, "If *Thou* is said, the *I* of the combination *I-Thou* is said along. If *It* is said, then the *I* of the combination *I-It* is said along with it. The primary word *I-Thou* can only be spoken with the whole being. The primary word *I-It* can never be spoken with the whole being" (1958: 3).

This way of understanding the World taking language as its basis is characteristic of Buber's way of seeing what happens around us (*Weltanschauung*). When one person is speaking, the existence is made possible since our relations with the World are exposed in them. The 'being' is 'becoming'. Buber cannot accept the duality of the experience by being divided in 'internal' and 'external'. For him, "It is said that man experiences his world. What does that mean? A man travels over the surface of things and experiences them. He extracts knowledge about their constitution from them: he wins an experience from them. He experiences what belongs to the things. But the world is not presented to man by experiences alone. These present him only with a world composed of *It* and *He* and *She* and *It* again" (Buber 1958: 5).

Taking into account this premises, as experience, the World, according to Buber, is part of the basic word 'I-it'. The basic word 'I-Thou' is part of the World of relationship. Our thinker explains that, according to his point of view, there are three levels of relationships. The first relationship is the one that is given with the World where we see the creatures that inhabit it in a pre-Linguistic relationship. In this way, we are unable to relate to these beings. On a second level, there is the relationship between human beings, in which we use language. Due to language one human being "can give the 'you'" to another human being. It is language that enables human beings to connect in a way. The third level of relationship, according to Buber, includes the ones that are not based on the articulate language. There is no linguistic contact. We do not perceive them, and thus "we feel we are addressed and we answer – forming, thinking, acting" (1958: 6).

His dialogic proposal is based on the idea of the encounter with any expression of the world as a totality. To have an encounter means to have a meeting with totality. To be related is to be bound to the other as a holistic possibility of sense in which by saying 'thou/you' we are willing to come in touch with the other, without partialities.

We might understand education if we see in the "development of creative powers" (Buber 2002: 98) within the individual what Buber sees in the child. Children are always willing to develop different activities (1959: 240), and this determination is what enables to give form to matter. This is only possible within a human context, as a fundamental condition for the individual. Buber explains it with the metaphor of a choir (Buber 1959: 241) that I might just as well expand in order to explain in a better way the contents of the conference.



There is no such thing as a song that has been badly put together or a badly organized symphony taking into account the individual voices. But it is very important to point out that harmony is not achieved only by hearing the individual voices. Even in the cases when we get to hear a solo, there is a silence from the rest of the participants of the choir. In order to hear one voice, it is necessary to pay attention to other voices. A silence of the rest of the voices of the choir is necessary in order to hear the individual voice. The instruments have to be silent in order to hear the solo of a specific instrument. Much attention is needed in any case, either to be able to sing a solo or to be quiet and be silent for the time needed.

This ability of human beings to go into a relation and to be aware of the other enables 'choirs' to exist. This is the way to reveal "the true life of the human being" (Buber 1959: 242). From this perspective it might be impossible to think about living without taking into consideration the rest of the voices. In Buber's words, the project of the individual and the project of being aware of the other are different from one another. The individual has to be able to consider him or herself, but only when we understand the collective participation, the utmost importance of the being is revealed. The person exists due to the others in a dialogical perspective.

The importance of the being is not given by the perspective of the self per se, but rather within the relationship of one individual to the other. "Only when someone takes someone else by the hand, then we are not in a relationship of a 'creator', but rather in a relationship of creating from his or her own nature in the world, not aiming the art of crying, but as a friend, lover, knows that in his or her heart there is reciprocity with whom he or she belongs. An educational fact that does not seem to repair the creation of the birth of things, will find in its future the conviction of a new loneliness in thinking" (Buber 1959: 243). Dialogic education in Buber's perspective implies the recognition of the other, the avoidance of his negation. By recognizing that my own existence depends on the recognition of the existence of the other, there might be a sort of dialogue in which the 'self' is unable to find itself in a relationship with the other. Nonetheless, there is a real dialogue in which, like in the chorus, one understands him or herself by the relationship with the other. The voice of the other, as well as his silence, enables my voice to be heard. When I have been able to understand this simple fact, then I am also able to understand that my silence is needed for other voices to be heard. The relationship between my voice and the rest of the voices must come into balance or tension, up to a certain point, in order to attain harmony.

That is the role of the educator, to be the director of the choir or a conductor. But maybe, just as the conductor, the only way to get to be the one in charge of the baton, and of the whole orchestra or choir, one has to understand what implies to play an instrument or even to play several instruments. Maybe one has to be able to learn how to play several instruments and then understanding the responsibility of the union of voices as a totality. From this dialogic perspective, the totality of voices must be given in a full way, to the child and to human beings in general.

## Evaluating Buber's Dialogue in Education Nowadays

Although I agree with Buber's idea that he himself was no prophet, his teaching, though only 'pointing the way', is even more relevant for the twenty-first century. The philosophy of Martin Buber has to be understood as a totality, despite all the variations in his thought throughout the years. Nonetheless, I will try and explain why following the three Buberian phrases: 'Pointing the Way', 'prophetic mission', and the 'Dialogic Philosophy'.

According to Buber, the experience is fundamental in any educational process. The role of the educator changes with this perspective. One is a part of the person's *milieu*, just like the objects, plants, animals, and other human beings. The intentionality of the educator has to be thought as a mere organizer of the elements provided for possible experiences. The educator (teacher, parent, etc.) has to think of making as rich as possible the environment. He or she is not the center of attention, nor the source of the educational process. I think that educators nowadays, even after many years of different ideas centered on the student, still might think of themselves as the source of knowledge, for example. Buber's ideas also enable us to rethink that the person has no essential being. Not even things, animals or plants are essential in themselves, but part of the world for the other beings. Even God, as the absolute Being, is part of that relationship with the others. Buber calls it "the eternal Thou" (1958).

The relationship between two people is the basis for educability (*Erzieherische*). Buber invents the term in German because I think he wants to lessen the essentiality of human beings as individuals. It is in the community and the relations among its members, and among communities, that we are able to educate human beings. As old sages of any culture, our aim must be only to 'point at a way', at a path we have trodden and only this. We must not pretend to let others follow our own steps, but rather that our experience, as a part of our own complete self may help others on their way.

This community, according to Buber has a perspective of the Divine. Within Buber's way of thinking and according to his own tradition, the 'prophetic mission', in the first place, bonds the 'religious' aspects of the tradition it belongs to. It enables, as well, to open up the tradition as a whole to the possibility of studying itself and its cultural, ethical, political, social, etc. components and its development within its own terms and definitions. In this sense, the 'prophetic mission' is a way that is much needed, from my perspective, in the twenty-first century.

In a world that thought that by eliminating religion a true dialogue would take place, Buber's thought tells us that the contrary might be the option. Knowing one's own tradition in depth makes understanding other traditions possible, especially from the issues that are not shared, but being always willing to accept and understand those issues. Phrases like "All Muslims are terrorists," "All Mexicans are rapists," and other ones politicians around the world carelessly pronounce is a sign that specific (large) sectors of world societies are not willing to hear from the others. The prophetic mission is to be able to say 'no' to slogans that win elections, such as: "All

foreigners should leave.” The ethical and political standpoint of the Biblical prophets is a way of understanding Dialogue.

Finally, the Dialogical perspective in Buber is not just a concept, but rather his whole philosophical standpoint. Actually, as I have tried to show previously, the possibility of encounter is what enables the human being to relate, and by doing so, to connect to the world that surrounds him or her. This dialogue does not necessarily is linguistic. And nonetheless, it enables the thing to be possible. I would like to finish with an anecdote told by Zwi Werblowsky about encounter and dialogue that I think is most relevant to our century:

For Buber, if I may say so, the essence was not really essential. Let me conclude, therefore, with a story that brings Zen and Buber together in Jerusalem, and which I heard from one of our generation's great Zen masters. It is the story of a fruitful misunderstanding, and of an encounter in which one participant did all the talking, the second participant did all the listening and the third participant did nothing at all.

The Zen master was invited on a tour around the word by an ardent American admirer. When the two came to Jerusalem they called on Buber. The American talked, Buber listened, and the Zen master sat in silence. With great verve, the American held forth that all religions were basically one, different variations on an identical theme, manifold manifestations of one and the same essence. Buber gave him one of his long, piercing looks, and then shot him the question: “And what *is* the essence?” At this point the Zen master could not contain himself: he jumped from his seat and with both hands shook the hands of Buber. (2002: 172–3)

## Conclusions

The house that used to be Martin Buber's in Germany is now the headquarters of the International Council of Christians and Jews (ICCJ). In that house, but also at Buber's house in Jerusalem, many encounters were possible. In Heppenheim, Rabindranath Tagore and Albert Einstein met. Buber had an interesting correspondence with Mahatma Gandhi and many others. Buber's house was always open to encounter and dialogue. Maybe, through his ideas on education, we could attain real dialogue among human beings and cultures. Even an educator that conceives him/herself as completely ‘secular’ might be willing to admit that dialogue is possible with the tradition(s) that each person pretended to be educated has.

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## Introduction

One of the tasks in (re-)presenting a philosopher of the present, like Judith Butler, and discussing her relevance for a Philosophy of Education here, is her own thinking being *present*. This means her thoughts and conceptions are not only being currently in a very dynamic and almost overwhelming sense ‘present’, as there is *new reception* of her work constantly *spreading* in the humanities, especially in philosophy, political, and queer theory (see for instance Benhabib 2013; Choi 2013; Chadderton 2013; Ferrarese 2011; Stoerzler 2005; Youdell 2003; Fraser 1997). This also means Butler’s theorization is constantly *in progress*, while she is publishing new books and essays (like lately *Senses of the Subject* and *Notes Towards a Performative Theory of Assembly*, both 2015a, b), producing the difficulty that there is no defined or finished corpus of her work available at the moment, to rely on from a retrospective perspective. And to discuss the work of a ‘present’ philosopher like Judith Butler here means to discuss a work that itself also *consists of responses* to such receptions and critics of her work, inspiring Butler to rethink her own thoughts, to sharpen them, and to shift them in the present and hopefully in the future as well. Accordingly, as we try to highlight some of her inspiring and impressive thoughts here, this contribution is also one serving as another occasion to follow Butler’s thoughts, to further discuss them, and to shift them in the context relevant for a Philosophy of Education, though the idea to catch up with it in such a discussion needs to be suspended.

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## Four Lines of Thought

Without any doubt, Judith Butler is one of the world's most popular and inspiring recent philosophers with a wide spreading reception within academia, especially in the humanities, but outside of academia as well. She is an US-American philosopher dedicated to 'poststructuralism', holding the Maxine Elliot professorship in the Department of Comparative Literature and the Program of Critical Theory at the University of California at Berkeley since 1998. In addition, she holds the Hannah Arendt Chair at the European Graduate School (EGS), Division of Philosophy, Art and Critical Thought in Switzerland, and is often invited as a guest professor at several universities throughout Europe.<sup>1</sup>

Born in Cleveland, Ohio, in 1956, Butler was raised in a Jewish family and from an early age was in contact with and impressed by the teachings of Buber, Hegel, Kant, and Spinoza in synagogue and philosophy classes. She later studied philosophy at Yale University and was awarded a Ph.D. in 1984 for her dissertation *Subjects of Desire: Hegelian Reflections in Twentieth-Century France* (Butler 1987), already revealing her philosophical involvement primarily in German Idealism, Phenomenology, and the work of the Frankfurt School. In 1990, she received wide recognition for her most famous book *Gender Trouble: Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (1990), in which she challenged and enriched Feminist Theory by questioning founding categories such as 'woman', 'sex, and 'gender' or, more generally speaking, 'identity'. Overviews of her work, since it is an always renewing suggestion to rethink central and founding categories of modern philosophy, especially concerning questions of the subject and even more questions of autonomy and heteronomy for subjectivity.

Speaking from our point of view, there are four lines of thought central to her thinking and work that we would like to systematically outline and differentiate in the following (although these lines are obviously founding this work as a whole and intervene each other). We also briefly comment on the four lines afterward in their significance for the debate in pedagogy and especially in the philosophy of education. These lines are: (a) impacts on Gender and Queer Theory; (b) questions of contingency, difference, and performativity; (c) theories on the subject, subjection, and subjectivation; and (d) ethical and political implications.

### *Line One: Impacts on Gender and Queer Theory*

As already mentioned above, Butler was internationally recognized in the 1990s for *Gender Trouble* (1990), provoking a discussion of the fundamental categories of Feminist thought. Since then, Butler's name has been associated with the notion of

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<sup>1</sup>For more biographical details, insight into her academic and nonacademic commitments, the prizes she won and a full bibliography of her work, see her university homepages: [http://complit.berkeley.edu/?page\\_id=168](http://complit.berkeley.edu/?page_id=168), [www.egs.edu/faculty/judith-butler](http://www.egs.edu/faculty/judith-butler), [www.egs.edu/faculty/judith-butler/bibliography/](http://www.egs.edu/faculty/judith-butler/bibliography/)

Gender or Queer Theory; she is already developing in *Gender Trouble* as much as in the following books *Bodies That Matter: On the Discursive Limits of 'Sex'* (1993), *Excitable Speech: A Politics of the Performative* (1997b), *Psychic Life of Power: Theories on Subjection* (1997a), and *Undoing Gender* (2004a): the idea to denaturalize the division as well as the binarity of gender-conceptions and gendered identity and to incite and reveal other ways of *performing* gendered identities, and in doing so subversively questioning culturally dominant ideas of what 'gender' is and means.

From our point of view, Butler outlined two major tasks since *Gender Trouble* to rethink 'gender' in a way that inspired and provoked the foundation of Gender and Queer Theory: firstly, she disturbed feminist thinking in their quite newly division in 'sex' (biological gender appearance) and 'gender' (social gender appearance). While most gender theorists, at the time *Gender Trouble* occurred, were engaged in thinking of 'gender' as a socially constructed one, outlining the ways of 'doing gender' (West and Zimmerman 1987) interactively and practically, they perceived 'sex' as the biological and bodily bound category of gender itself, sometimes perceived as more or less 'natural', or if not, as essential at least for political collaboration and intervention.

Within this discussion, Butler interrupted with the idea that not only are gender-identities socially constructed, but the idea of bodily viewable gender-divisions are likewise social constructions, questioning *who* is speaking or can speak in the name of a 'woman' as well as questioning the category (as political) itself. She therefore states that there is no such thing as a 'natural', 'biological' 'sex', because there is no other way *to read or to live a gendered body as a gendered one*. This means no living or reading of a gendered body is possible without relying on a discourse that already circulates certain norms and regulations of gender-identity and gender-division (for instance into 'men' and 'women'). Or, as Butler herself puts it: "to understand gender as an historical category, however, is to accept that gender, understood as one way of culturally configuring a body, is open to a continual remaking, and that 'anatomy' and 'sex' are not without cultural framing (as the intersex movement has clearly shown)" (Butler 2004a: 9f.).

Secondly, and associated with this first advice, Butler reveals a "heterosexual matrix" (ibid.) underlying such 'natural' gender-divisions (in 'man' and 'woman'), that is directly linked to acceptable and unacceptable relations with desire. Butler criticizes not only the dominant norm of binary gender-division itself, but also the norms of heterosexuality arising with it. Or, to put it differently, she criticizes the way gender-division is tied to a 'natural' orientation of heterosexual desire, suggesting that being a 'woman' and being perceived as a 'woman', for instance, is secured by an adequate performance of gendered identity implying the performance of an appropriate desire for 'man'. In her own words, she reminds us: firstly, "[s]exuality does not follow from gender in the sense that what gender you 'are' determines what way of sexuality you will 'have'" (Butler 2004a: 16); and secondly, "being a certain gender does not imply that one will desire a certain way" (Butler 2004a: 1). What Butler suggests here is to realize the (potential, but socially disadvantaged) contingency in relating 'gender', 'sex', and 'desire' to one another and therefore to

unlock or open up the cultural frames associated with that linkage, stretching the limits of performance and using the options of performativity of speech acts and acts in general.<sup>2</sup>

Even though the arrival of Judith Butler's works certainly marks a break within gender discourse, insofar questions of justice are primarily no longer introduced and discussed as questions of equality, but rather as questions of difference (cf. Benhabib et al. 1995; also Webster 2000), even though and despite this break, Butler's thought is not received by a larger circle of pedagogues until later and is then mainly advanced by a younger generation of thinkers (especially within the German discourse cf. Fritzsche et al. 2001; Hartmann 2002; Plößer 2005, as well as notably Hark 2005). Alongside a greater interest in questions relating to the body and its meaning (e.g., in the context of pedagogical interactions and institutions, cf. Langer 2008), questions related to heteronormativity (cf. Atkinson and DePalma 2009) and the development of the child's sexuality (cf. for example Renold 2005 and Youdell 2005 as well as Renold et al. 2015) gain greater prominence. In doing so, the deconstructive engagement with 'gender' and advocating 'a plurality of lifestyles' (Hartmann) is guiding most debates.

### ***Line Two: Questions of Contingency, Difference, and Performativity***

From the late 1990s on, Butler is also questioning the methodological implications of such an idea of performance and performativity, thoughts that she is already relying upon in her work concerning gendered identities. In her early thinking of *Contingent Foundations* (1992: 3–21) there is an idea of contingency, of opposing universalism, which she is later clarifying and developing further – for instance, in discussion with Ernesto Laclau and Slavoj Žižek (Butler et al. 2000). As a first step, the term 'contingency' outlines the idea that no recent thinking or (political) opinion can be reasoned by or founded in any recent substance or substantial thinking, because there is no safe ground, no a priori, no foundation, unless you rely on the genealogical viewpoint that thinking of 'contingency' means to think of any word and any subject as something, that it is what it is because of a certain historically and culturally formed development of thoughts, also suggesting that it *could* be otherwise as well.

Coming from this insight, as a second step Butler begins "to interrogate what the theoretical move that establishes foundations *authorizes*, and what precisely it excludes or forecloses" (Butler 1992: 7, emphasis in original). She argues that because none of these foundations are 'given' stable and a priori, because they are not transcendent or 'natural', it is essential to reveal a "negativity at the heart of identity" (Butler et al. 2000: 2). This 'negativity at the heart of identity' also implies thinking

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<sup>2</sup>Though not elaborated here, there is a shift in Butler's attention on *bodily performance* in her earlier books to an *speech act theory based understanding of performativity*, relying on Austin as much as on Derrida, especially discussed and developed in *Exitable Speech* (1997b).



of any identity as founded in difference (with others and itself), which reveals her methodological point. Relying on such an unstable idea of identity allows her to point out the way in which hegemony is established by constructing an (obviously particular) universality as a ‘universality’, something out of question and contingency.

This idea of a hegemony established and stabilized by a (non-) universality suggesting itself as the latter offers insight in two central thoughts of Butler’s idea of performativity: first, that any ‘given’ norm, regulation, or hegemony needs to be stabilized or – in Derrida’s words – needs to be (re-)iterated to become and to appear as ‘given’ or ‘natural’; and, second, that there is an historical line of that process that can be reconstructed and that is implicitly actualized, but that can also be questioned by actions revealing the particularity of that ‘universality’. Constructing hegemony or universality is in that sense not an over expanded or ‘wrong’ construction, but a very powerful or inevitable way of privileging an (at least) particular position, rejecting and excluding others or other potential, but also particular positions. Therefore, Butler suggests in her earlier work: “The only democratic society is one which permanently shows the contingency of its own foundations” (Butler et al. 2000: 86), revealing a way of thought being (radically) democratic, where identity is always haunted by difference, where contingency is always present, and where the unstableness of that construction (of democracy) is viewable. This methodological thinking of the difference – obviously Derrida-inspired – seems to be altered and shifted to the relevance of relation(s) and of human beings being in relation to others and the Other in her later political essays, such as *Precarious Life: Powers of Violence and Mourning* (2004b) or *Frames of War: When is Life Grievable?* (2009).

Even though there have been efforts toward a poststructuralist type of pedagogy since the 1990s (especially in Anglo-American discourse, cf. for example Peters 1996), these do not or very little pick up upon Butler’s work (cf. Peters and Burbules 2004 and Smith 2010; differently Fritzsche et al. 2001). Here, too, the debate begins relatively late (cf. Davies 2008; Ricken and Balzer 2012) and is in part mostly focused on questions relating to the sociology of education (cf. Hey 2006; Youdell 2015). But within the philosophy of education, Butler’s work has become increasingly important to postmodern or poststructural thinking with regard to the subject (cf. more detailed next chapter); especially Butler’s critique of common understandings of ‘identity’ and ‘contingency’ has challenged rethinking the discussion of the ‘human being’, especially within the traditional brand of the philosophy of education, and also to become cognizant of the powerful charge and absence of neutrality in these terms.

### ***Line Three: Theories on the Subject, Subjection, and Subjectivation***

Also already implicit in Butler’s early thoughts on Gender Theory was an idea of the constitution of the subject, as deeply relying on the Other, on discourse and its norms; an idea or better a theory of subject formation she has since followed and

extended, underpinning her philosophical essays as much as the political ones. Especially in *Psychic Life of Power* (1997a), she focuses on the question of subject formation and subjection, revealing the ways the subject is *socially* constructed or constituted. Concerning the subject, Butler insists on two fundamental insights: first, subjects are not ‘given’ as subjects (see above), but they *undergo a process of subjection* to appear as such ‘subjects’ in public, suggesting that they *can* only act and speak ‘freely’ *as* subjected ones. And these subjects’ appearance – as she suggested concerning a “woman” (see above) – is a deeply socially restricted one, though it requires the appearance as being ‘free’ individuals. Obviously relying on and following Foucault’s thoughts, she states “that the point of modern politics is no longer to liberate a subject, but rather to interrogate the regulatory mechanism through which ‘subjects’ are produced and maintained” (Butler 1997a: 32). Because the norms that define who is viewable as a ‘subject’ are not made up individually but rather need to be actualized by others to allow a ‘subject’ to emerge, Butler’s subject is an obviously related and dependent one.

And secondly, to think of such a subject constitution as socially framed and in dependence of others, interpolating the subject as such, Butler is also doubling back to Hegel. On the one hand, Hegel offers a conception of the powerful bondage (between lord and bondsman), a conception of “the production of self-enslavement” (Butler 1997a: 34) or the constitution of an “Other”, a body being produced “as an effect of autonomy [...] in such a way that the activity of its production – and its essential relation to the lord – is denied” (Butler 1997a: 35). On the other hand, Butler relies on Hegel to reveal the (desiring) subject’s attachment to the ways one is *recognized* by others, for instance when she argues that “the Hegelian tradition links desire with recognition, claiming that desire is always a desire for recognition and that it is only through the experience of recognition that any of us becomes constituted as socially viable beings. That view has its allure and its truth, but it also misses a couple of important points. The terms by which we are recognized as human are socially articulated and changeable. And sometimes the very terms that offer ‘humanness’ on some individuals are those that deprive certain other individuals of the possibility of achieving that status, producing a differential between the human and the less-than-human” (Butler 2004a: 2). It is not only a certain dependency or vulnerability Butler insists upon, characterizing the fundamental relation to the Other at the heart of subject formation, but again she also points out – leaving Hegel behind – the normative work of differentiations, underpinning the recognizing act itself, marking who is and can be perceived as ‘human’ – and who is not. Butler suggests that as ‘subjects’, we are in a status of “involuntary exposure” (Butler 2015a: 16) in a double sense; that is, to others, in being impressionable to their offers of recognition as much as desiring such offers, as well as in being vulnerable to the very forms of (mis-) recognition they offer. Therefore, subjectivation, as Butler puts it, implies both, on the one hand to be identified (and identifiable) as ‘someone’ (by others) and on the other hand to be constituted within that logic and terms of others, forming a certain, at least ‘dispossessed’ relation to ‘oneself’.

With regard to the debate in the philosophy of education, especially when debating a poststructuralist understanding of the subject, Butler’s thinking has become a

central point of reference, insofar the increasingly widespread use of the concept ‘subjectivation’ is not fathomable without Butler’s interpretations of Foucault and Althusser (cf. Youdell 2006; Saar 2013). Especially in the discourse of the powerful constitution of the self (cf. Rose 1996), her understanding, where she tied agency and heteronomy together in the pedagogical relevant figure of subjectivation, gained great significance – and in doing so however she points out that these two concepts are not only intertwined, but dependent on each other (cf. Davies 2006 and Rasmussen 2006 as well as Rose 2012). At the same time, Butler’s deliberations touching on subjectivation have encouraged reflection on recognition; in terms of the philosophy of education this included working out an understanding of (pedagogical relevant) recognition and to open such an understanding up to empirical research (see Balzer and Ricken 2010; Ricken 2013; Balzer 2014; Rose and Ricken 2018).

### ***Line Four: Ethical and Political Implications***

From this conception of an impressionable and subjected subject (in formation) Butler draws out, especially in her later work like *Precarious Life* (2004b), *Giving an Account to Oneself* (2005), *Frames of War* (2009), and *Notes towards a Performative Theory of Assembly* (2015b), some ethical and political implications of those thoughts. From our point of view, her political and ethical suggestions are derived from two central insights: first, as outlined already in line two, there is strong emphasis by Butler to conceptualize the world as a radically *socially* conducted one, a social world and its language that is always prior to a single subject’s occurrence and build up in a specific historical manner, but nevertheless one that is also in need of subjects who act and keep on acting, in order to stabilize and reiterate the norms constituting this (social) world. Though this seems to be a very deterministic view at first sight, Butler insists clearly on the political implication of performativity in social life, of the *constant need and chance to reiterate the conditions of sociality*. As already stated above in line three, she argues, for instance, that the terms of recognition offered and displayed as much as other terms, helping us to perceive this world and our status in it, “are socially articulated and changeable” (Butler 2004a: 2), and the political promise of performativity in social life is directly related to this, at least historical and therefore changeable, character of the social world itself, where every act or speech act is (potentially) a *re-signifying* one. Or as Butler suggests, a politic of the performative exploits the possibility of “opening up the term [here: ‘human’, NR/NR] to a history not fully constrained by the existing differentials of power” (Butler 2004a: 14). Secondly, there are some even more general ethical thoughts dedicated to the idea of dependent subjects and their conditions of possibility in Butler’s work. Again, she points out on the one hand that there is a radically, but denied and unmourned, at least *involuntary dependency on otherness* structuring any constitution of the subject as ‘individual’. Mainly relying on Levinas, Butler argues, “[w]here the ethical does enter, it seems, is precisely in that encounter that confronts me with a world I never chose, occasioning that affirmation

of involuntary exposure to otherness as the condition of relationality, human and nonhuman” (Butler 2015a: 16). From this exposure, a fear and a responsibility facing the Other emerges, upon which her ethical implications rely. And on the other hand, she also insists on asking, “Am I responsible for all others, or only to some, and on what basis would I draw that line” (Butler 2009: 35), asking again for the differentials defining ‘humanness’ that are viewable through taking account of, for instance, whose lives are worth mourning in times of global ‘war on terror’. Again, she suggests to realize *where* ‘we’ draw that line, questioning the line itself and also provoking questions such as, who belongs to that ‘we’ and why (see also Butler and Spivak 2007). In the end, these ethical implications involve line two again, in remembering every ‘I’, every stakeholder of identity, to the fact that this ‘identity’, like other terms of self-assurance, are always and deeply (dis-)possessed by the Other, founding a dependency any ‘I’ could ever undergo, while structuring its topography of desire: desiring the (recognition of the) Other, desiring the desire of the (recognition of the) Other, and desiring the (recognition of the) Other to be desirable (to third parties).

Especially the political and ethical implications of Butler’s work have let their mark on general pedagogy and the philosophy of education. Namely, in debating questions regarding the reproduction of social inequality within pedagogical institutions, on the one hand, as well as regarding the meaning of (educational) equality, on the other hand (see e.g. Youdell 2009; Chadderton 2013; Kleiner and Rose 2014).

## The Problem of Becoming a Subject: Subjection and Subjectivation

As outlined above, Judith Butler’s work is not only already complex and comprehensive, but also a very stimulating and inspiring source for a philosophy of education.<sup>3</sup> From our point of view, Butler’s central contribution for a discussion within educational sciences and especially in philosophy of education is her theory of the subject and of subjection and subjectivation (line three, above). No matter in which way you think of and design the educational task or relation theoretically, it is more than obvious that there is a concept of the subject previously involved and needed. And – already outlining a central thesis we develop and rely on later in this chapter – Butler’s way of rethinking the category of the subject and revealing the forces and sources of subject formation is challenging the dichotomy of heteronomy and autonomy that have influenced educational thinking since the Enlightenment.

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<sup>3</sup>For instance, relying only on the German context this is suggested lately by the works of Nicole Balzer, Bettina Kleiner, Kerstin Jergus, Hans-Christoph Koller, Norbert Ricken, Nadine Rose, and Christiane Thompson, for an overview see Ricken and Balzer (2012), Kleiner and Rose (2014), and especially Jergus (2012) for Butler’s reception in Germany. For instance, a special issue of the *British Journal of Sociology of Education* (David et al. 2006) is giving an overview on Butler’s reception and her relevance for educational thinking in the UK as well.

What Butler's theorization of subject formation and subjection suggests are two simple but nevertheless very challenging thoughts: firstly, that references cannot be made to a 'subject' until that 'subject' is addressed as a 'subject', revealing that any 'subject' needs to be called into existence by others and is related to a nexus of discourse far larger than the constituted 'subject' itself; and secondly, that there is no neutral 'subject' and no way to emerge as a neutral 'subject' because any emergence of a subject is orchestrated by and relies upon an historically formed matrix of difference(s) or better, differentiation(s), where normative obligations are implied, especially and foremost: becoming a gendered 'person' with an 'appropriate' desire, but also a racialized one, etc.

From this first loose and abridged summary of what Butler's theory of subjection and subjectivation is about, it is already viewable that the question of gender, or the line of queer-feminist thinking, within Butler's philosophical theorizations is crucial, with nothing being completely overcome in her later work, where obviously the connection of ethical and political concerns moves, for instance, to current phenomena, such as 9/11, the Palestine occupation (see *Precarious Life, Frames of War*, and *Giving an Account to Oneself*), or movements against precarity (and capitalism) (see *Notes towards a Performative Theory of Assembly*). In order to reduce complexity without losing the crucial concerns of Butler's thinking, we focus in the following on systematically reconstructing Butler's theory of subject, subjection, and subjectivation because we consider it to be the heart or center of her theory, where all the above mentioned lines of thought intervene. Starting from that theory of the subject in subjection, we would like to show within this chapter how these four lines of thought are interwoven.

### ***Subject Formation as Subjectivation***

Normally, if we think about the status of the subject, we are used to thinking of it as natural and self-evident, revealing that the subject itself is more or less a precondition of thought, usually passing from our view; since Descartes, the assumption 'cogito ergo sum' functions like a crucial starting point of Western philosophy. Exactly, this transcendental understanding of the subject, especially linked to (post-) Enlightenment philosophers, was threatened and questioned, first by Nietzsche and later by Foucault; Butler is following in their skeptical line. Therefore, she is, like Foucault, interested in revealing the *conditions of possibility* for the subject to emerge, more precisely: in asking *how* human beings *are becoming* 'subjects' or "made subjects" (Foucault 1982: 208) at all, and which implicit (self-)limitations and normative implications are obliged to that process of becoming.

The perspective of inquiry associated to Butler's (nonsubstantial) understanding of 'the subject' is obviously a very fundamental one, asking "how each of us becomes thinking and speaking beings" (Butler 2012: 15). And she attempts to shape her theoretical idea of this process of 'becoming a subject' throughout her sophisticated work in order to describe it more and more precisely. Already in

*Gender Trouble*, she articulates a fundamental critique on thinking of identity in substantial terms and questioning the binary conception of sex and gender (and desire). She states, “inasmuch as ‘identity’ is assured through the stabilizing concepts of sex, gender, and sexuality, the very notion of ‘the person’ is called into question by the cultural emergence of those ‘incoherent’ or ‘discontinuous’ gendered beings who appear to be persons but who fail to conform to the gendered norms of cultural intelligibility by which persons are defined” (Butler 1990/2007: 23). She therefore argues that the constitution of gendered identity is a *performative* action, but its central effect is the impression of just expressing the ‘natural’: ‘normal’ sexes and genders are both the product of a normative process of constitution, but appear as ‘given’ and ‘stable’, invisibly producing and restricting the ‘Other’ and the sphere of division itself. In her early works (such as *Gender Trouble* and *Bodies That Matter*), Butler is already arguing, following Foucault, that there is a heterosexual matrix (and an appropriate expectation of cross-gender desire) founding and forming the ‘natural’ bodies and genders of ‘men’ and ‘women’ as such. And this also implies that any subject that wants to be considered ‘normal’ or ‘distinct’ regarding its gender-identity has to subject itself to that matrix and its associated norms, while Butler is asking for possibilities of a “disruption and displacement of heterosexual hegemony” (Butler 1990/2007: 25).

Butler suggests that normative discourses circulate within society and that the categories (e.g., of binary gendered identities) involved in them are the opportunities of the subject to emerge as ‘human’. Or, to put Butler’s thesis differently, to offer and to assign the status of a ‘subject’ is linked and bound to the question of whether one is recognizable as a ‘normal’ or ‘human’ subject, including the impression of its ‘normal’ performance as a (coherent and distinct) gendered person, in public. Accordingly, anybody (or any body) whose body, desire, or gender (performance) is viewed as not serving those expectations of ‘normality’ is defined ‘un-normal’, ‘nonhuman’, or just inadequate and inferior, revealing not only the force of adaption within the discourse (and the heterosexual matrix), but also how differentiations and any establishment of an order is producing its constitutive ‘Other’s’, creating repressed figures of abjection that need to be kept outside. Accordingly, Butler concludes that “gender norms have everything to do with how and in what way we can appear in public space” (Butler 2012: 17).<sup>4</sup>

In the line of Foucauldian thinking, Butler implies that discursive conditions and norms are circulating the frames of – and are therefore framing – intelligible subject constitution. Indeed, in her following work she is longing for a more generalized perspective (not solely concerning gender) on such processes, asking “what are these norms, to which my very being is given over, which have the power to install me or, indeed, to disinstall me as a recognizable subject?” (Butler 2005: 23).

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<sup>4</sup>Already in *Gender Trouble* Butler was – in terms of footnotes – taking other lines of difference (beyond gender) into account, but especially race (and religion) she considers broader in her later works, such as *Exitable Speech* (Butler 1997b), *Precarious Life* (Butler 2004b), *Frames of War* (Butler 2009), or *Who Sings the Nation-State?* (Butler and Spivak 2007).



As Butler – always re-reading Foucault – suggests, the crucial point in thinking of subjectivation is to capture a paradoxical figure (with)in such subject’s formation process: “The term ‘subjectivation’ carries the paradox in itself: *assujettissement* [Foucault’s original French term, NR/NR] denotes both the becoming of the subject and the process of subjection – one inhabits the figure of autonomy only by becoming subjected to a power, a subjection which implies a radical dependency” (Butler 1997a: 83, emphasis in original). The paradox consists of the idea to view the subject, which was within the philosophical tradition the knowing agent of free will and morality, the individual who is responsible for its own action and acting autonomously, as now being subjected to and by prior discursive norms orchestrating its being. But Butler also insists that although there is obviously a strong and prior dependency underlying this subject formation, this does not make agency impossible, but rather changes the idea of agency, itself, too. From Butler’s point of view, agency is not only a way of using the power that prior subjected the subject, but is using it in a way that does not support subjection any further, although there is no opportunity to eliminate that subjection. This is why the subject itself, from Butler’s perspective, *is* a site of power, because to keep the norms in play requires a subject subjected to those norms, confirming and verifying them, but in that requirement lies the open possibility of questioning the norms by subversively undermining their logics as well. In that way, agency is always tied to those norms as much as the norms are tied to the subjects re-iterating them, as Butler indicates, but that does support viewing the subject as neither fully free nor fully determined, but rather conditioned by and related to plays of power that the subject is itself supporting and that are working through their bodies. Therefore, it is crucial to understand that social norms are defining the spectrum of what is thinkable, speakable, and liveable, and as Butler suggests, norms are a “form of social power that produces the intelligible field of subjects, and an apparatus by which the gender binary is instituted” (Butler 2004a: 48).

### *Norms in Play*

Such norms Butler conceives neither as a social rule that needs to be followed, nor as a supra-individual law to which one is subjected, but as an (unachievable) idealization and implicit standard of normalization supplied in social practices, whereby they function ‘naturally’ and mostly self-evident. Therefore, she insists, especially in her newer work, that reducing the impact of norms to a relation of cause and effect is far too simple: “we tend to make a mistake when we imagine a single norm as a kind of ‘cause’ and the ‘subject’ as something either formed or impressed in the wake of, as the effect of, that norm’s action” (Butler 2014: 176).

She is alleging at least three reasons why such a linear and deterministic perspective is inadequate and lacking complexity. Firstly, Butler declares that “norms tend to arrive in clusters, interconnected” (Butler 2015a: 5) and “norms act on us from all sides, that is, in multiple and sometimes contradictory ways” (Butler 2014: 176).

Both arguments score out the idea of coherent and uniform effects of norms on subjects. Secondly, she accents the processual character of subject formation, which is not concluded as long as a human being is alive. Subject formation is an ongoing process because, she suggests, “they [the norms, NR/NR] are not finished with that work once we emerge as thinking and speaking beings” (Butler 2014: 176). In this sense, a lifelong involvement with norms is implied, an involvement that, from Butler’s point of view, will hardly be the same at any time and will also hardly be in absolutely accordance with those ideal(istic) norms as well, especially considering that Butler is perceiving such absolute accordance with any norm as simply impossible, revealing the phantasmal character of the norm itself. And thirdly, she insists that “norms form us but *only because* we are in some proximate and involuntary relation to their impress” (Butler 2014: 176, emphasis’ NR/NR), which is probably the most important point of her thoughts going beyond Foucault. What she states here is the idea of a (psychic) topography within the ‘subject’ already approaching and responding to the norms, although designed by their action, creating their possibility of effecting the subject; an idea she seeks to describe especially in her recent work in terms of “impressionability” and “vulnerability” (ibid.). Already in *Psychic Life of Power*, Butler tries to rethink the idea of a subject that is created by and, in turn, “against itself” (Butler 1997a: 9) and its own desires, already revealing the fundamental dependency of any emerging ‘subject’ on others, driven by desire and refusing desire and fundamental dependency at the same time.<sup>5</sup>

This short recapitulation of some of her arguments already reveals another of Butler’s central insights: our language, our speech, is already *assuming* the ‘subject’ whose occurrence, whose constitution, is effected by norms we are trying to investigate, following Butler. And this fact of already assuming the subject before it emerges within such occasions of address is also problematized by Butler, revealing another (grammatical) paradox in the heart of subject formation, that: “The paradox of subjection implies a paradox of referentiality: namely, that we must refer to what does not yet exist” (Butler 1997a: 4) or, in other words: “To say that I am affected prior to ever becoming an ‘I’ is to deliver the news by using the very pronoun that was not yet put into play” (Butler 2015a: 4).

The central challenge within her conception of subject formation is therefore not only the paradoxical idea of a subject gaining its agency from a subjection to prior power but also accepting their simultaneous occurrence in a scenery of address and dependency – even radicalizing the paradox of this first thought. As one might see, there is a veritable irritation concerning any diametric construction of relation between subjection and agency, of autonomy and heteronomy coming up with that thinking; an irritation of the division in inner-outer-logics, in logics of being acted on and acting, and as Butler puts it: “The task is to think of being acted on and acting as *simultaneous*, and *not only as a sequence*. Perhaps it is a repeated predicament: to be given over to a world in which one *is formed even as one acts* or seeks to bring something new into being. Acting does not liberate any of us from our

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<sup>5</sup>Leading subject constitution into a melancholy (form of) gender as she unfolds there, relying on and shifting central notions of Freud (see Butler 1997a: 132ff.).



formations [...] At the same time, nothing determines me in advance – I am not formed once and definitively, but continuously or repeatedly. I am still being formed as I form myself in the here and now. And my own self-formative activity [...] becomes part of that ongoing formative process. I am never simply formed, nor am I ever fully self-forming” (Butler 2015a: 6, emphasis NR/NR).

### *Interpellation, Recognition, and Dependency*

Just because such incidents of being formed are nothing to be overcome, there is a strong suggestion of a fundamental dependency coming up with it and haunting Butler’s idea of subject formation. This dependency is not just related to depending on a normative discourse and its offers of ‘humanness’, but it is foremost a dependency concerning the central status of the social other within scenes of *interpellation*<sup>6</sup> and address. To answer the (ultimately Foucauldian) question of how “the subject is produced through norms or by discourse” (Butler 2015a: 5), Butler is relying not only on Althusser’s idea of interpellation, but combines it with Austin’s reflections on the performativity of speech acts, to actually produce – to do – what they only talk about (see especially *The Psychic Life of Power*). Without such naming, without any interpellation by social others, or without a scenario of address, Butler argues that no ‘subject’ can become part of the social world that is always prior to its emergence. The ‘subject’ needs to be addressed, interpellated, and named in order to receive a social recognition, to gain the status of being ‘human’, and to emerge as such.

This is why the categories through which recognition is offered and displayed, the categories that interactionally offer the status of the ‘subject’ (e.g., ‘girl’ or ‘Muslim’) to someone, are working productively and powerfully within that relation of ‘I’ and ‘Other’, as Butler reminds us: “But the moment I realize that the terms by which I confer recognition are not mine alone, that I did not single-handedly devise or craft them, I am, as it were, dispossessed by the language that I offer. In a sense, I submit to a norm of recognition when I offer recognition to you [...]. Indeed, it seems that the ‘I’ is subjected to the norms at the moment it makes such an offering, so that the ‘I’ becomes an instrument of that norm’s agency. Thus the ‘I’ seems invariably used by the norm to the degree that the ‘I’ tries to use the norm. Though I thought I was having a relation to ‘you’, I find that I am caught up in a struggle with norms” (Butler 2005: 26). This conception of recognition and recognizability reveals that acts of recognition are, though they are displayed individually (I know who I am in your eyes because you are signaling it to me), not an individual and neither a harmonic or innocent relation. Moreover, not only the one receiving recognition, but also the one giving recognition, is entangled into the play of powers developing the norms of recognizability implicitly involved in such a process, basically functioning limitedly, in the way Butler puts it: the need of/for a

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<sup>6</sup>Original term of Althusser – Butler is relying on Althusser here, as we state a few lines later.

social recognition by other's ties any 'I' to a fundamentally dependent position within the social world, longing to be recognizable in the eyes of the other and longing for recognition – even if this recognition is displayed in terms of misrecognition and insult.<sup>7</sup> And on the other hand, Butler also suggests, relying on Hegel's idea of reciprocity in recognition, that there is also “a desire to offer recognition to you” (ibid.). So this (double) reciprocity or dependency is not just constituted in the moment of address, but is an attending one; as one might imagine in, e.g., refusing the recognition of a ‘girl’ to/for someone, or at least the recognition of an ‘accurate girl’ to/for someone, who will probably suffer afterward to recognize and understand herself as a ‘girl’.

This is why within this circle of recognition, built on reciprocity, both sides are in the end ‘dispossessed and dispossessing’, as Butler points out, because, on the one hand, to long for recognition is obviously exploitable, but, on the other, also giving recognition is revealed as an act of dispossession and potential violence, receiving its power from far beyond that concrete scenery of address, it is actualized in and opening up the possibility that “the *form* in which I offer it [recognition, NR/NR] is *potentially given to me*” (ibid., emphasis NR/NR). So Butler reminds us, especially in *Hate Speech*, that there is a comprehensive history and historicity lying within our term or categories of recognition, one that is always de-authorizing the author of speech but not leaving him or her irresponsible for actualizing such terms.

Indeed, such scenarios of interpellation and forms of address also reveal how and in which way agency is related to accepting such terms of recognition without fully accepting all their implicit –and probably offensive – implications, as Butler states: “So addressing someone as ‘you’ may well solicit a recognition that it is ‘I’ who is meant by that second person, but that ‘I’ may well resist or shift or reject the various semantics that get associated with that ‘you’. [...] I could [even] act as if I am not being addressed, or I can turn around and offer a clarification of the pronoun I prefer, but whatever I do, I understand that that particular misrecognition was intended for me” (Butler 2015a: 12 f.). This not only outlines the difficulty of offering a form of recognition that is perceived as a misrecognition by the addressed person, but also the general difficulty of (somehow) not being impressable for such offers of recognition. This is another reason why Butler conceives agency as a “radically conditioned form of agency” (Butler 1997a: 15). And following that line, agency paradoxically means to deal with and act within the conditions of subject formation offered by others and available in the social world or prior discourse that become actualized within such scenes of address, or as Butler puts it: “My agency does not consist in denying this condition of my constitution. If I have any agency, it is opened up by the fact that I am constituted by a social world I never chose. That my agency is driven by paradox does not mean it is impossible. It means only that paradox is the condition of its possibility” (Butler 2004a: 3).

Summarizing the very thoughts we reconstructed insofar, it is obvious that Butler's conception of the ‘subject’ is in several aspects a *related* one. She reminds

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<sup>7</sup>See especially *Excitable Speech* for a more detailed conception of that argument, also Balzer (2007) on the question of recognition leading into misrecognition.

us that the categories (with)in which one can only appear as a ‘subject’ are circulating within a social world and its discourses far before “it touches upon us” (Butler 2014: 176). This also suggests that there are prior norms of recognizability circulating and limiting our occurrence, as well as the possibility of that occurrence. Also, Butler suggests these possibilities of occurrence are possibilities within language or speech acts, and are also socially offered possibilities, because giving and receiving recognition is more or less displayed in social categories that are linked to ‘humanness’ and therefore grant the status of a ‘subject’, while others (partly) deny such statuses and work as offensive. And lastly, from Butler’s point of view, agency cannot consist in denying these obvious dependencies, constituting the ‘subject’ in subjection to nonindividual norms beyond its control, but in perceiving such norms of recognizability and such categories of subject formation as historically evolved and therefore *contingent* and potentially open to change in the first place. And, secondly, agency is articulated – in a political sense – whenever such norms or normative “frames” or “framings” (see especially *Frames of War*) are questioned, become re-signified or shifted, or perhaps in some ways also exceeded.

### *An Ethical Turn?*

Based on this conception of fundamental dependency on the Other, combined with insight into a certain ‘impressionability’ and ‘vulnerability’ of that subjectivated and subjected, subject’ and its formation processes, Butler is also turning these insights into ethical questions. Especially in her recent work (in *Frames of War*, *Precarious Life*, and *Giving an Account to Oneself*), she focuses on ethical questions that are themselves not new to her work, but are arising with another emphasis, such as: “who are you?” (Butler 2005: 30); “what counts as a liveable life?” (Butler 2004b: XV); and whose lives or who “will be publicly grievable and who will not?” (Butler 2009: 39).

But how can Butler’s ethic be discussed while she is conceiving a ‘post-sovereign’ subject, a subject not even fully transparent within itself and therefore hardly able to be responsible for his or her (not precisely ‘own’) actions? By asking in this way, one can already see that within Butler’s conception of subject formation there has been an ethical dimension implied from the start that has now been turned into a more explicit one. Obviously, as reconstructed above, Butler’s ‘subject’ is a related one, deeply dependent upon the social others, their recognition, and the terms of discourse offering the status of a recognizable ‘human being’. Relying especially upon Levinas, Butler emphasizes the fact of this precarious and existential exposedness, funding the subject in social relation by whom he or she gets dispossessed and also constantly called into a scene of responsibility. From Butler’s point of view, it is the radical dependency within subject formation that designs the ethical task for the subject. Following Levinas, she suggests in *Precarious Life* as much as in *Giving an Account to Oneself* that there is a primary scene, an “initial impingement by the Other” (Butler 2005: 86) invoking a “primary trauma” (ebd.)

that is constituting the ‘I’, which is deeply affected by this “touch” (Butler 2005: 87) – “without consciousness, without cause, and according to no principle” (ibid.). With this idea, the central conception of Levinas’ ‘face’ is concerned and his assumption that it is unconvincing to think of freedom, sovereignty, or free will as an essential condition for responsibility among human beings. Instead, Levinas and with him Butler argue that the fact of “impressionability”, being the effect of a prior “persecution” (Butler 2005: 85) and “accusation” (ibid.) by the Other, is serving as a crucial condition for responsible relations among ‘humans’ because “we must think of a susceptibility to others that is unwilled, unchosen, that is a condition of our responsiveness to others, even a condition of our responsibility *for* them” (Butler 2005: 87 f.). Following Levinas, it is a “persecutory” scene of (passively) being affected by others and threatened by their ‘face’, allowing and conditioning the (acting) subject to emerge, but only as a vulnerable, susceptible, and related one, being herself hopelessly responsible for others. If existence is only conducted by being affected (and addressed, as Butler suggests) by the other, then this existence is within that constitution already a vulnerable and precarious one. But at the same time, the ‘face’ of the other recalls, as Levinas outlines, the divine command not to kill another human being, revealing that the other, who is threatening me and reminding me of my responsibility, is him- or herself related to me, vulnerable and exposed to my ‘face’ – and this threat and vulnerability on both sides of the relationship may ensure that each act in the least violent manner possible to one another.

Butler’s ‘ethic of nonviolence’ – inspired by Adorno and insofar negatively defined – is derived at least from a “war”-relationship (Butler 2004b: 137) or a sort of doubled resistance against fear, resulting from that fundamental vulnerability of human existence. “There is a fear of one’s own survival, and there is an anxiety about hurting the Other [...] a constant tension between the fear of undergoing violence and the fear of inflicting violence” (ibid.), and this tension needs to be balanced. Accenting this tension of fear founded in vulnerability and susceptibility, Butler again points out the potential violating structure of address from which the subject is emerging – a fact she already thematized broadly in *Excitable Speech*. She is emphasizing the ethical task based on the recognition of the Other as a vulnerable human being and granting the Other maximum openness and nonspecification concerning the central question, “*Who are you?*” (Butler 2005: 30). Therefore, the task is to reduce ethical violence within such specifications and differentiations, nailing persons to certain subject or not-fully-subject positions while undoing their historical contingency. An additional task is to initiate a “critical reflection on those exclusionary norms by which fields of recognizability are constituted, fields that are implicitly invoked when, by a cultural reflex, we mourn for some lives but respond with coldness to the loss of others” (Butler 2009: 36), as the ethical questions mentioned above already signaled. In sum, from Butler’s perspective, dependency is nothing to be overcome, but the foundation of that relationship is revealing the ethical task of living together, addressing each other, and giving to and being given recognition from others.

Summing up these lines of thought within Judith Butler’s work, differentiated here, there is a various and politically relevant philosophical discussion of central

categories of modern thought occurring. At its core, it is about overcoming dualistic and oppositional ideas, especially of autonomy and heteronomy, by introducing and promoting differential and relational figures of thought. One of the most impressive aspects of Judith Butler's work is the assumption that such new figures involve radical transformations for concepts of the ethical and political, as shortly outlined above.

## Impacts for a Philosophy of Education

From the viewpoint of educational theory, or more precisely, of a philosophy of education, there is a special challenge outlined in the comprehensive work of Butler. Not only are special themes relevant to education, such as gender, heteronormativity, identity, or recognition, no longer discussable without relying on Butler's thoughts, but moreover, it is her *way of thinking* that seems to be vital for rethinking central problems of educational thought. From our perspective, if educational theory is committing to the challenges deriving from Butler's way of thinking, reformulating, and questioning central categories such as gender, identity, universality, and contingency, the problem of education itself needs to be redefined and readressed (a reformulation that has not yet been done).

To address only some relevant aspects, we outline three perspectives an educational reception of Butler could follow:

- (a) Butler suggests overcoming the established dichotomy of autonomy and heteronomy in modern thinking and this is involving a central and new conception of the task of educating others. Classical-modern thoughts on education are relying on education as an inevitably paradoxical process, where the educand is, on the one hand, heteronomous, *directed to* seek and *develop autonomy* while, on the other hand, such an educational impulse cannot be secured at any time. Therefore, the modern educational thinking tends to build up an inconclusive alternative between directed 'instructions' and a 'laissez-faire' orientation leading to Reform- or Anti-Pedagogics. Butler's thought of heteronomy, as nothing ever being overcome, is offering the much more challenging insight to conceptualize heteronomy beyond something that interferes with and restricts a given 'subject', but as something creating the source and the possibility of being set(tled) into a relation with its one 'self' as much as with others. It is her categorical move to conceptualize the constitution of figures of autonomy *through* heteronomy and subjection, revealing that there is no 'founding' or primal autonomy to which any human can return, other than to enable an idea of agency within dependent conditions. These ideas suggest thinking of education as a process in which 'subjects' *learn who they are* and can become, through others and their recognition, especially in processes of being addressed (see more broadly: Rose and Ricken 2018). From our point of view, suggesting that others are and become constitutive Other's for any 'subject' emerging and any 'I' articulated is essential in revealing and treating the 'pedagogical problem' (Dilthey) adequately and systematically.

- (b) This is why we also suggested Butler's discussion of subjectivation as being central to pedagogical thinking and especially for a philosophy of education. Her basic idea of subjects being 'made' as such does not only imply the (re-)thinking of epigenesis radically as 'dis-possessed' and constituted by the Other, but it also reveals the idea of autonomous 'subjects' as a specific Western or European concept of self-description, as an historically and culturally designed and 'founded' idea, treated as primal or universal. Thus is *Bildung* as the modern inner core of education, with its characteristic ideas of self-reference, autonomy, and self-reliance, contingent and a special educational paradigm (see Masschelein and Ricken 2010). From Butler's point of view, subjectivation is a process involving speech acts, forms of addressing and re-addressing, revealing the 'subject' as a responsive one, being impressionable, vulnerable, and recognizable. This 'impressionability' is shifting pedagogical thoughts to (re-)consider conceptions of formability and individual learning as more socially grounded concepts of (cultural) acquisition or adoption (see Ricken et al. 2017).
- (c) At least these ideas give entry to an – from the start ethically contoured – idea of pedagogical action, not strongly focusing on autonomy of the educand and the normative orientations viewed necessary, but perceiving and designing this action more clearly as a response and responsibility concerning such an impressionable being as the addressee (see Ricken 2015). Such a perspective allows one to not only identify and criticize certain forms of 'pedagogical violence' (see Masschelein 1996), but also question widespread reform-pedagogical thoughts of a 'Pedagogy from the Child', trying to keep the 'authenticity' of the child intact. Such ideological ideas, which obviously try to hide the powerful impacts of educational actions, can be overcome by such an idea of agency or freedom as Butler is offering. The capacity to act (as a 'subject') from Butler's point of view is not dominated by the idea of acting out as far or as long until the freedom of others is threatened, but it is the capacity to relate to, to question, and to re-signify the cultural and social conditions of life itself, while being impressed by them and the others in specific (cf. Butler 2002). Following these thoughts, education can be perceived – analogue to the paradox of subjectivation, tying agency to subjection – as a necessary and paradoxical coincidence of 'in-ducation' ('Einziehung') and 'e-ducation' (in the way Masschelein reconstructs it as a way to lead someone out, 2010).

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Amanda Fulford

## Stanley Cavell

Only rarely can you read a newspaper, browse social media, or in particular, consult the academic journals in the field of education, without happening upon an article concerning the state of language and literacy teaching, learning, and achievement in contemporary education. Often, such accounts paint a rather negative picture of the state of affairs. Reporting tends to headline crises in various sectors, particularly over declining standards in reading levels, writing ability, and basic oral communication skills, particularly in spoken English. This is not simply a failure of the school system, it seems; research points to the increasing number of young children *entering* school with wholly insufficient language skills to enable them to fully benefit from the transition from home to formal education (NLT 2005; Roulstone et al. 2010). But many school-leavers are then reported to lack the requisite language and communication skills for entry to university (Pring et al. 2009), or into employment (DBIS 2016). Added to this is the seeming moral panic in the face of international comparisons, and league table position for language skills. The situation is exacerbated when, for English-speaking countries, the serious decline in the take-up of study in modern foreign languages is considered in relation to the importance of foreign language competence to support a country's need for strong economic growth, development, and international cooperation (Board and Tinsley 2013, 2016).

Philosophers have long given attention to issues of language, particularly the problems of language use, meaning, the relationship between language and thought, and between language and reality. In ancient Greek philosophy, Plato's dialogue, *Gorgias*, discusses the place of rhetoric, with Gorgias himself questioning whether

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it is possible that language can capture thought. More contemporary uses of the term ‘philosophy of language’ tend to refer to work within the field of Anglo-American analytic philosophy from the mid to late nineteenth century. Some of Gottlob Frege’s early work on sense and reference in expressions (1892), and Bertrand Russell’s analysis of the logical role of descriptions (1905) were later taken forward by the Vienna Circle, and the logical positivists, through their idea of the verification theory of meaning. Put simply, this theory claimed that the truth of sentences could be confirmed through logical analysis. Subsequently, some of the central tenets of logical positivism came under criticism from figures such as W.V.O Quine, and particularly from the ideas in the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein, whose *Philosophical Investigations* stated that: ‘the meaning of a word is its use in the language’ (1958, #43). From Wittgenstein’s later work rose an interest in the pragmatic dimensions of language (epitomised by John Austin’s (1962) speech act theory), and in ordinary language philosophy that stressed how language is central both to the method and content of philosophy. So it is against such a background of thinking in philosophy of language that Stanley Cavell comes to write. In his now celebrated work *Must We Mean What We Say?*, Cavell claims ‘That what we ordinarily say and mean may have a direct and deep control over what we can philosophically say and mean is an idea which many philosophers find oppressive’ (1976, p. 1).

Cavell’s concern with language persists throughout his work. He tackles Benson Mates’ criticisms of the ordinary uses of expressions (Cavell 1976), undertakes an analysis of Wittgenstein on criteria (1979), discusses Austin on examples and on performatives in language (1979; 2005), and offers a vision of what is at stake in our relationship to language in his 1981 reading of Henry David Thoreau’s work, *Walden* (1854/1999). Given these introductory remarks about his philosophical interests, it might seem strange to include, in this volume, a contribution pertaining to Cavell. What distinguishes his work is the breadth of his thought in relation to matters such as ordinary language, literary theory, scepticism, psychoanalysis, film, literature, and opera. But he does not write explicitly about *education*. Moreover, his autobiography, published in 2010, contains little more than passing references to his own education. He recalls a teacher telling him that he had no talent for drawing (p. 81); remembers reading *Les Misérables* in the yard during a lunch break, and being late back for a lesson (p. 104); gives an account of his learning that there was a ‘normal’ time in which to complete work in junior highs (and that he did it more quickly – p. 103); and recounts his developing interest in biology from a textbook studied in high school (p. 111). These fleeting accounts of his schooling reflect the description he gives of them as being ‘my coma years’ (p. 154). Though he recalls the profound impression made on him by one teacher’s recognition of his work – what he calls the ‘permanent effects of an act of acknowledgement’ (p. 155) – it is learning out of school<sup>1</sup> that appears to hold the strongest memories for Cavell, especially the pleasure of learning the pawn shop business from his father (p. 119).

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<sup>1</sup>This idea of learning out of school calls to mind the (1984) title of another of Cavell’s works: *Themes out of School: Causes and Effects*, a text dedicated to the memory of his father and mother.

Cavell's work does not directly address education – in terms of schooling – in the way that, for example, John Dewey's does, nor is the intended audience for his discussions of language one specifically comprised of teachers in educational institutions. His body of work is, however, significant for thinking about contemporary educational debates and questions. These debates, though, are not discussed in his work using the kind of language with which we have become familiar, and that is often enshrined within policy documentation, or litters the strategic and corporate paperwork of educational institutions, be they schools or universities. There is no talk in Cavell's writings of curricula, of learning objectives, of skills acquisition, or of progression in learning; nor is he interested in the formal role of the teacher as pedagogue. Rather, his interest lies in the fact that 'we are educations for one another' (Cavell 1990, p. 31). The kind of education in which Cavell is interested is given expression in a number of interconnected ideas that recur throughout his writings. In what follows, the limited space means that it is not possible to give anything amounting even to a partial account of the richness and complexity of the educative force of Cavell's thought. However, a useful place to start is to consider one of his central claims about philosophy, and to use this as a point of departure for examining his particular take on reading, and his understanding of voice, before concluding with a consideration of the value of these understandings to contemporary debates in education.

In his seminal work, *The Claim of Reason* (1979), Cavell identifies philosophy with education, with the education of grownups.<sup>2</sup> These ideas signal not only that education – in terms of teaching and learning – is central to philosophy, but also that our human lives into and through adulthood are concerned with a kind of education that we might think of in terms of transformation. Central to this form of education (as to philosophy) is language. Cavell writes: 'In philosophizing, I have to bring my own language and life into imagination... This seems to me a task that warrants the name of philosophy. It is also the description of something that we might call education... In this light, philosophy becomes the education of grownups' (1979, p. 125).

## Cavell on Reading

For Cavell, it is from our encounters with language through *reading* that the possibilities of transformation and conversion arise. As Saito and Standish (2012) point out, Cavell's philosophy-as-education cannot be separated out from the question of how we should read. Reading – reading *philosophically* – is a mark of our ongoing education as grownups. But this is not an elitist account. Cavell is not advocating the acquisition of sophisticated techniques that are the preserve of a select few. Rather

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<sup>2</sup>See also Hilary Putnam's (2006) chapter: Philosophy as the Education of Grownups: Stanley Cavell and Skepticism (in Crary, A. and Shieh, S. eds., *Reading Cavell*. London: Routledge, pp. 119–130). The idea of philosophy as the education of grownups then became part of the title of Naoko Saito and Paul Standish's (2012) book, *Stanley Cavell and the Education of Grownups*.

he recognises a relationship to the written word in particular that affords the possibilities for the transformation of the self. Cavell sees these possibilities fleshed out in the work of Ralph Waldo Emerson, whom he describes as ‘a major mind, one worth following with that attention necessary to decipher one’s own’ (Cavell 1990, p. 1). Cavell finds, in the reading of Emerson’s prose, a moral outlook that he terms Emersonian moral perfectionism. This idea does not imply final perfectibility. Perfectionism rather implies that each state of the self is complete – what Emerson would term elsewhere a circle,<sup>3</sup> but that the self is always deferred, and always moving to a further next. Cavell writes: ‘I do not see Emerson as saying...that there is one unattained/attainable self we repeatedly never arrive at, but rather that “having” “a” self is a process of moving to and from nexts’ (1990, p. 12). Cavell specifically resists any final definition of perfectionism but suggests that it is ‘something like a dimension or tradition of the moral life...and concerns what used to be called the state of one’s soul, a dimension that places tremendous burdens on personal relationships and on the possibility or necessity of the transforming of oneself and one’s society’ (1990, p. 2). But while Cavell avoids listing a definitive set of features that constitute perfectionism, he claims that its outlook is ‘embodied and developed in a set of texts spanning the range of Western culture’ (ibid, p. 4). This brings us back to the place of language and reading. But the set of texts that Cavell suggests (ibid, p. 5) is neither exhaustive nor conventional, in the sense of a recognised canon of philosophical writings. While it contains some works of philosophy (including selections from Kant, Heidegger, Nietzsche, and Kierkegaard), the list also includes works of literature, drama, poetry, theology, and 1940s Hollywood film.

In outlining how these perfectionist texts afford the possibilities for the kind of transformation of self and society of which he writes, Cavell claims that reading them is a ‘mode of conversation’ between writer and reader (1990, p. 6). The words stand as an invitation to the reader, a gesture to participate, that requires her to ‘determine her own position with respect to what is said’ (ibid, p. 8). It is through this particular mode of reading that Cavell suggests the reader finds herself attracted to the alterity she encounters. The reader then ‘recognizes [her]self as chained, fixated, and...can turn (convert, revolutionize [her]self) and a process of education is undertaken...in which each self is drawn on a journey of ascent to a further state of that self...it is a transformation of the self which finds expression in the imagination of a transformation of society’ (1990, pp. 6–7).

There is a sense in Cavell’s account of reading of a kind of reversal at work; this feature is brought out by Timothy Gould’s characterisation of Cavell’s ‘model of reading’ (1998, pp. 128ff). Gould highlights that the reader is less in possession of a text, but rather becomes possessed *by* it. Encountering language – through the type of reading that Cavell’s work invites – engages the reader in a cooperative encounter which to some extent reflects the therapeutic processes of the psychoanalytic relationship. Stephen Mulhall (1994) also identifies the psychoanalytic practices of reading in Cavell’s work. The practices of psychoanalysis work metaphorically to

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<sup>3</sup> See Emerson’s essay ‘Circles’ in Emerson, R.W. (1944). *The Essays of Ralph Waldo Emerson*. New York: Random House, pp. 175–188.

describe the relationship between a reader and a text: the reader as analysand and the text as analyst. Central to these ideas is the thought that a text possesses us, reads us, and elicits something like confession. This is what human beings are sentenced to if they are awake to the possibilities of language.

One of Cavell's most detailed discussions relates to his reading of a particular text: Henry David Thoreau's book, *Walden* (1854/1999). Cavell's *The Senses of Walden* (1981), written as the Vietnam War was reaching its denouement, is both a reading of Thoreau's text *and* a text about what it is to read. To read well, and to read *Walden* well, requires what Thoreau terms 'reading in a high sense', that 'we have to stand on tip-toe...and devote our most alert and wakeful hours to' (1854/1999, p. 95). Cavell is not reading Thoreau as suggesting that we should prescribe texts that are complex, capable of being read on different levels, or are even obscure. What is at stake here in our reading of any text is rather how we encounter the words within it. It is about recognising the responsibility for the words that address us through the reading of them, and for how we choose to respond. Cavell is here adverting to a relationship with written words (in particular) that is characterised by a sense of strangeness to them. This is not to encounter words through our initiation into the language community and our mother tongue. Rather it is to experience a father tongue relationship to these same words; one where we are discomfited by them, or at a distance from them, a state that requires us to re-encounter them, and take responsibility again for them. The mother tongue is, for Thoreau, 'commonly transitory, a sound, a tongue...and we learn it unconsciously...of our mothers'. The other is 'the maturity and experience of that; if that is our mother tongue, this is our father tongue, a reserved and select expression, too significant to be heard by the ear, which we must be born again in order to speak' (Thoreau 1854/1999, p. 93). It would be wrong to see in these ideas any sense of the hierarchical (the father tongue preferred over the mother), or that one acquires the father tongue only at a certain stage of development. It is rather that these concepts emphasise our human relationship with language, one that is characterised both by nearness (mother) and distance (father); it is marked not only by our initiation into, but also our departure from, the language community.

## Cavell on Voice

For Cavell, the possibility of perfectionism comes not only through the educative possibilities of our encounter with words through reading, but also can be represented as our search for voice. Gould summarises Cavell's ideas when he writes: 'Voice is meant to provoke us to recover possibilities that we had either dismissed outright or kept at a distance' (1998, p. 51). The concept of voice is both significant and prevalent in Cavell's writings. But to think in terms of 'the' concept of voice, as if it were a unitary idea, would be to misunderstand its complexities within Cavell's work. Gould suggests that Cavell understands voice as: 'epitomizing an entire region of questions about the means by which human beings express themselves and the depth of our need for such expression' (Gould 1998, p. xv), and that it serves

as a ‘centripetal undertow’ to his work (p. 51). Voice in Cavell should not be understood as the mere outward expression of opinion (as when we think, for example, of measures to ‘collect’ the student ‘voice’ through questionnaires). Rather, it is a richly nuanced concept that relates to the aspect of our human expression that Cavell sees as having being repressed by the workings of philosophy, especially in some of the kinds of philosophy of language that were outlined in the early part of this chapter. In writing about the ‘arrogation of voice’ (1994, p. 11), Cavell is signalling his desire to ‘talk at once about the tone of philosophy and about my right to take that tone’ (ibid, pp. 3–4). ‘It is’, writes Cavell, ‘a matter of reinserting or replacing the human voice in philosophical thinking, that voice that philosophy finds itself to need to deny, or displace’ (Cavell 1996, p. 63). Here, voice is one way by which we might pursue ordinary language philosophy, but is also the goal of such a philosophical pursuit. Cavell develops this idea of the repression and recovery of voice through his discussions of Hollywood films of the 1930s and 1940s (Cavell 1996). Typically, he finds in a genre of films that he calls the ‘melodramas of the unknown woman’,<sup>4</sup> the recurrent theme of a woman’s demand for an education, a voice, or ‘the right to tell her story’ (1996, p. 3). Just as the woman’s voice is repressed (by the leading man in the films), only later to be recovered, so Cavell writes of finding *his* voice in the field of philosophy – and so makes his claim that philosophy is autobiography (Cavell 1994).

To think of Cavellian voice in terms only of the philosopher’s right to take a particular tone might lead us towards an individualistic understanding of voice. This would be to misunderstand the importance of the political inherent in his concept of voice. It is in its claim to speak for the human, to speak universally, that Cavell sees what he calls the ‘systematic arrogation of voice’ and its ‘arrogant assumption of the right to speak for others’ (Cavell 1994, pp. vii–viii). Cavell is struck by ordinary language philosophers’ use of ‘we’ in phrases such as ‘when we say...we mean...’. In thinking about what we say, it is significant that the phrase is both first person, and it is plural. That is first person indicates that there is consent from the speaker to what is said; she shows her commitment through her assent. Put another way, she “owns” what she voices’ (Saito and Standish 2012, p. 84). That it is plural shows that she speaks on behalf of others, that others have consented with her, and that her community is hers, *and* that she is answerable for it. Such agreement signals community; as Cavell puts it: ‘The philosophical appeal to what we say, and the search for our criteria on the basis of which we say what we say, are claims to community’ (1979, p. 20). To agree in criteria is, for Cavell, to be ‘mutually voiced...mutually attuned top to bottom’ (1979, p. 32). What we consent to is, for Cavell, an indication of our membership in a polis. It is about what *we* say. This does not suggest some kind of generalisation based on a majority view. Nor is it the case that we come together on a particular occasion and arrive at an agreement. It is rather an idea of ‘being in agreement throughout, being in harmony, like pitches or tones’ (Cavell 1979, p. 32).

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<sup>4</sup>Cavell (1996, p. 3) identifies the following films as representative of the genre: *Stella Dallas* (1937), *Now Voyager* (1942), and *Gaslight* (1944).



Just as in Cavell's notion of reading, our responsibility to, and for, language cannot be separated from our responsibility for the community, so also Cavell's treatment of voice is not only about individual expression, but is similarly tied to the society in which our voices find expression. Cavell writes of 'the voice I lend in recognizing a society as mine, as speaking for me' (1990, p. 27). So both the mode of reading that Cavell espouses, and the development and expression of grownups, are therefore inherently political actions; the relationship between reader and writer epitomises the relationship between the self and the other. These are relationships of which Naoko Saito and Paul Standish write; it is as if we are engaged in a 'finding together...an ongoing aspiration toward the common...through which we are confounded'. This they argue is our 'fatedness to language and to the other' (2010, p. 429).

## Cavell and Education

Saito and Standish claim that mainstream philosophy tends to neglect the educational force of Cavell's work and that his work has yet to receive sustained critical attention in the field of education; yet to understand his work as a whole requires an acknowledgement that his concern *is* with a kind of education. They write: 'Cavell is...very far from the writing of anything like "educational theory", yet his concern throughout his work is with a kind of education, and he has been inclined sometimes to name it as such' (2012, p. 2). So, the approach adopted here is not to take Cavell's writings, and then apply them, as something like a panacea, to help solve the very kinds of problems that the introduction to this chapter outlined. Indeed, Cavell's ideas about reading – where texts possess us, and we as readers are 'read' – are unlikely to be taken up easily in contemporary educational contexts. He writes: 'I imagine that reading, so motivated, will not readily lend itself to classroom instruction' (1982, p. 176). He points to what 'normal routines of education' are inclined to 'ignore and suppress' (1984, p. 113) and reflects on what was 'rigorously closed off' by his own education (ibid, p. 201). The title of his 1984 work, *Themes out of School* hints at the idea of philosophy in, and out of, school (as a discipline in itself, *and* through works of literature, drama, and film); perhaps what is also signalled here are the educative possibilities that lie beyond the confines of formal schooling.

So in thinking about Cavell's work in relation to education and language learning, we might conclude that Cavell has nothing of practical use to say in matters of reading, spelling, grammar, acquisition of a foreign language, and the like. It is true that Cavell gives no advice on pedagogy that might inform a primary school classroom. His work does not provide the kind of easy answers to pressing educational concerns relating to the teaching and learning of language; neither should it be used as evidence to inform the educational practices that are privileged in an educational culture dominated by ideas of impact and measurable outcomes. It is rather that his work on language through an engagement with writers as diverse as Thoreau, Wittgenstein, Derrida, and Austin open out onto broader themes of the political, of our relationships with others, of whether we can know other minds, and of how we

might live together in the city of words. This is a perfectionist task; Cavell writes that the city of words is one in which ‘I am – or I am invited to be – already reading, participating in. This implies that I am already participating in that transformation of myself of which the transformed city, the good city, is the expression’ (1990, p. 8).

Cavell’s idea of education, and specifically of what it means to learn a language, is paradoxical. In one sense, it is not overtly practical; yet on the other hand, he uses very practical examples such as a child learning the name of something, a matter given detailed consideration in his ‘Excursus on Wittgenstein’s Vision of Language’ in his seminal work, *The Claim of Reason* (1979). Here, he explores what it means for us all to learn a language and to be initiated into forms of life. In a similar vein, Cavell is interested in what it is to read and write (philosophy). Through his work *The Senses of Walden*, he provides us with a reading of Thoreau’s text, *Walden*, in which he argues that the task of *Walden* is to discover what writing is, and how we might, or should, read. This is not just about how we read books, but also about how our reception of words is ineluctably tied to the political, and to our responsibility for words in a community of speakers. Cavell’s interest is in how ‘reading a book is metonymic of the more pervasive reading of the world that is required of us’, and with how our education is both ‘into adulthood [and] through adulthood. Indeed it represents a crucial aspect of our ongoing acquisition of language, the condition of continual rebirth’ (Standish 2006, pp. 149–150).

Just as in reading ‘in a high sense’ – where the text convicts us, and we are sentenced to the possibilities of language<sup>5</sup> – is central to the idea of education that is woven throughout Cavell’s work, so the idea of the education of grownups is similarly essential to understanding the educative force of his writings. Thoreau states in *Walden* that we have ‘a comparatively decent system of common schools’ (p. 99); but both Thoreau and Cavell are interested in what constitutes our ‘uncommon schooling’, or the education of grownups. For Cavell, as for Thoreau, our uncommon schooling as grownups is through our ongoing relationship to language – our initiation into, and departure from, it. It is uncommon in the sense that it challenges the common (the near, the mother) and is characterised by a father tongue relationship of distance to language in which we realise the educative possibilities of such an encounter with words.

What underlies Cavell’s emphasis on ideas of reading, and uncommon schooling, is an idea of education that requires, and constitutes, continual transformation. He writes: ‘The anxiety is that...I myself require education. And for grownups this is not natural growth, but *change*. Conversion is a turning of our natural reactions; it is symbolized as rebirth’ (1979, p. 125). This does not place Cavell alongside philosophers of education whose writings address the aims of education as they are variously understood; rather, that Cavell’s understanding of education in terms of change, or of transformation, lies beyond schooling. The kinds of transformation

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<sup>5</sup>Thoreau uses the following illustration for this kind of relationship to words: ‘If you stand right fronting and face to face to a fact, you will see the sun glimmer on both its surfaces, as if it were a cimeter, and feel its sweet edge dividing you through the heart and marrow’ (Thoreau 1854/1999, p. 90).

that we perpetually require are ones that are ineluctably related to what it is to be human, and to live together in the world. But the idea of transformation should not be understood as Cavell's espousal of a kind of lifelong learning through our adulthood that is current in contemporary political and educational discourses. Transformation is not the natural result of continued schooling; it does not come about either through attending courses, amassing qualifications, or through progressing onto ever higher levels of formal education. Nor does it imply the kinds of economic transformation, and social mobility, that governments say come from improving one's life chances through continued attendance in education, and the development of competences that meet the so-called skills gap. In this sense, Cavellian transformation is unrelated to being a student within the confines of any educational institution.

In the current culture in many educational contexts, student surveys, student voice, and in particular ensuring student satisfaction, seemingly drive much policy and practice, particularly in higher education. Education must satisfy, but satisfaction here seems to equate with a form of contentment, with the positive and happy feelings that derive from everything being settled.<sup>6</sup> Cavell's attention to transformation – inseparable from the education of grownups – sits uneasily with these developments. Education through transformation is simply not the same as the education that one gains from schooling. To experience the former is to undergo 'conflict, external and internal; [it] is the very process of our education as grownups: we are destabilized and, in the process, convicted by our every word' (Saito and Standish 2012, p. 6). For Cavell, there is something important in Thoreau's claim that 'Our moulting season, like that of the fowls, must be a crisis in our lives' (1854/1999, p. 23). Our transformation is not natural, like that of the fowls that Thoreau observes at Walden Pond, but is necessary (Cavell draws attention to the imperative 'must' here). Thoreau's experiment in living at Walden Pond was *his* moulting season, his crisis. But the point is that we must undergo our *own* transformations (crises, moulting seasons). And this, claims Cavell, 'will make for more crises' (1981, p. 45). This is unsettling, but is part of our perfectionist education, the education of grownups.

So, Cavell must be considered an important figure for this volume. That he can be thought of in terms of relevance to educational thinking is, to a great extent, due to the way that he keeps returning to ideas of teaching and learning. This is not explicitly through notions of schooling, but rather is seen through the kinds of transformation that our ongoing perfectionist education of language demands. It is in this initiation into, and departure from, our words that he finds an aspiration towards our own best selves, and this is then fleshed out more fully in the writings of Ralph Waldo Emerson. But there is also something important at stake in reading Cavell's work. To read Cavell is to engage in the education of grownups; it is *itself* educative: it demands the very kind of reading that is a recurrent theme in his work, and opens the possibilities for the kind of education of grownups that he espouses.

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<sup>6</sup>For further discussion of this issue, see Fulford, A. (2013). Satisfaction, Settlement and Exposition: Conversation and the University Tutorial. *Ethics and Education* 8 (2), 114–122.

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# Confucius



Charlene Tan

## Introduction

‘Confucius’ is a Latinised version of ‘Kong Master’ (*Kong Fuzi*; 孔夫子). The most famous and influential philosopher and teacher from China, Confucius (c. 551–479 BCE) and his teachings have indelibly shaped the political, social and cultural worldviews and developments in China. Given that much has already been written about Confucius, this chapter does not aim to rehearse the details of Confucius’ thought (for an in-depth discussion of Confucius’ educational philosophy, see Tan 2013). Instead, the purpose of this chapter is to relate the key concepts of Confucius to a perennial concern in education: indoctrination. The chapter begins by briefly introducing the concept and problem of indoctrination. This is followed by an exploration of a Confucian response to indoctrination through Confucius’ notion of reflective learning. The last part considers the possibility of indoctrination in Confucian education by discussing two objections to Confucius’ educational approach.

## Indoctrination

Usually viewed derogatorily, ‘indoctrination’ is often contrasted with ‘education’ and other educational ideals such as rational autonomy and critical thinking. The problem of indoctrination is not a new one, originating in the last century over allegations of political brainwashing by the Soviets and Chinese. But the issues and

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concerns surrounding indoctrination remain contemporary, with policymakers, researchers and educators grappling with existing and new challenges. An example is the initiative of some American public schools to teach religious knowledge to students that has triggered controversies over whether such a move is educational or indoctrinative (Wertheimer 2015; Nemzoff 2016). On the global front, we are confronted with news of the indoctrination of suicide bombers and the indoctrination of patriotism through school textbooks (Mackinlay 2002; Shahriar 2017). Against a backdrop of globalisation and modernisation, Jarvis (2007) cautions against the indoctrination of the “ethos of consumer society generated through the media at the behest of advanced capitalism” (p. 31). Identifying ‘cultural indoctrination’ as the basis of nationalism in a digital age, Christiansen and Koeman (2015) critique the effects of culture on cognitive strategies and professional methodologies.

To date, there is still no consensus on the definitions and characteristics of indoctrination (Tan 2008, 2014a). For the purpose of this chapter, it suffices to note that indoctrination occurs when a person’s capacity to rationally justify one’s beliefs, consider alternatives and make autonomous choices in life is paralysed (Tan 2004, 2011). An indoctrinated person is unable to independently inquire into the worthiness of beliefs based on relevant evidence. Indoctrination undermines the conditions for humans to form intentions, evaluate desires, make and implement decisions. It is dehumanising as it diminishes a person’s intellectual and moral horizon to accept only those beliefs and actions imposed by others. An indoctrinatory culture is a closed tradition that prescribes and permits only one monolithic belief system for its members. By insisting on the strict transmission of and adherence to the sanctioned ideology, an indoctrinatory culture censures alternative beliefs, suppresses contrary evidence and ultimately imperils the development of rational autonomy and moral agency in its members.

It should be clarified that the reference to rationality, autonomy, independence and agency in the preceding does not imply that human beings are viewed as disembodied subjects who possess universal and abstract principles of rational justification. On the contrary, this chapter contends that the individual’s wants, desires and choices are naturally embedded within and shaped by communal forces. Rather than pitting reason and freedom against cultures, religions and customs, the cultivation of rational autonomy necessarily presupposes the existence of a tradition that supports and sustains individual growth and well-being (Jonathan 1995; Tan 2014b). But a challenge faced by educators is how to initiate learners into the culture of their community without indoctrinating them. At the outset, it is important to acknowledge a possible objection to the agenda of initiation. Given that the construction of ‘one’s community’ may imply the existence of a singular community, is this statement in itself not an example of doctrinaire thinking? How then is the initiation into the culture of one’s community dissimilar to indoctrination? Put otherwise, how can indoctrination be avoided if learners, even as they are encouraged to learn and reflect, are simultaneously initiated into ‘the culture of one’s community’?

My response to the above objection is this: most people would agree that initiation in the form of enculturation is essential for all human beings. Enculturation provides members of a community especially children with the cultural coherence

to acquire a substantive set of practices, beliefs and values within a stable environment (Ackerman 1980). Underlining the fact that “we are all the creation of our own historical traditions, both in our acceptance and our rejection of them”, Fox (1997) maintains that “without a linguistic and historical ‘fore-structuring,’ creative and critical thought would be an impossibility” (p. 578). Whilst enculturation usually involves receiving the culture of the community that one is born into or chooses to be a member of, the socialising process does not necessarily presuppose the existence of a singular, essentialised and unchanging community. A community is comprised of a plurality of discourses that is (re)constructed over time, involving dynamic meaning making and internal contestations, conflicts and negotiation. As noted by Anderson-Levitt (2012), “Even when they are alone, people doing interpretive work draw on and respond to resources generated by other people, and in doing so they are interacting with other people” (446). The evolving and multi-faceted nature of a community means that enculturation is not tantamount to an imposition of a narrow set of beliefs and practices. Furthermore, it is possible for educators and parents to choose to initiate learners into the culture of communities instead of ‘one’s community’. The ultimate goal of educators and parents who wish to avoid indoctrination is for the young to learn to develop their own views and critique their own tradition at a later stage (Tan 2004). The necessity of an acquisition of a preliminary tradition for learners, especially children who are too young to exercise their rational faculties and appreciate the rational basis for their beliefs, has given rise to the ‘paradox of indoctrination’ (Tan 2008). As articulated by Macmillan (1983):

The problem of indoctrination is this: in a modern democratic society, the desired goal of education is that each student develop a set of beliefs that are rationally grounded and open to change when challenged by better-grounded beliefs. In order to develop such students, however, it would seem that they must acquire a belief in rational methods of knowing which must itself be beyond challenge, i.e., must be held in a manner inconsistent with its own content. Thus, students must be indoctrinated in order not to be indoctrinated: a pedagogical dilemma or paradox (p. 270).

Thiessen (1993) proposes the following approach regarding the initiation of learners into the culture of their community without indoctrinating them:

After the initiation or nurture phase of children’s development, there should be a gradual opening-up phase where they are exposed to other influences, other beliefs, though still from the vantage point of the tradition into which they were first initiated. To fail to encourage this opening-up phase should be labelled indoctrination. Still later, perhaps at adolescence, young people should be encouraged to begin to reflect critically on the traditions into which they were first initiated. Maturing individuals should also be taught to reflect critically on the alternative traditions, past and present (p. 236).

Whilst I agree with the tenor of Thiessen’s argument, I think the phases of initiation and opening-up are not always linear and clear-cut. Rather, the process is likely to be fluid, iterative and cyclical with overlaps and various possible sequences between the initiation and critique phases. After all, any form of learning, to be efficacious, requires *both* understanding and critically reflecting on the knowledge presented. I therefore propose a more interactive and dynamic approach to avoiding



indoctrination whereby the learner's critical faculties and autonomous agency are developed in both the initiation and critique phases. This next section elaborates on this approach by discussing indoctrination in the context of Confucian education.

## Confucius' Educational Approach

Confucius' thought can be gleaned from the *Analects* which is a Confucian classic that compiles Confucius' sayings and actions (all quotations in this chapter are taken from the *Analects* and translated into English by the author; square brackets denote additions made by the author for the purpose of clarity). Confucius places a great importance on initiating the Chinese learners into *wen* (文) or 'culture', as highlighted in this passage:

9.5 子畏於匡,曰:“文王既没,文不在茲乎?天之將喪斯文也,後死者不得與於斯文也;天之未喪斯文也,匡人其如予何?”

When the Master [Confucius] was surrounded in Kuang, he said, “With King Wen long dead, does not our culture (*wen*) reside here in us? If heaven were going to destroy this legacy, we latecomers would not have had access to it. If heaven is not going to destroy this culture (*wen*), what can the people of Kuang do to me?”

King Wen is one of the sage-kings praised by Confucius for his virtuous rule and adherence to the normative tradition in ancient China. Confucius' belief in the preservation of this normative tradition is implied in his remark that the culture of King Wen now resides in his generation. The continuity of culture is reiterated in another verse where Confucius observes, “The way of Kings Wen and Wu has not yet fallen to the ground but lives in the people” (文武之道,未墜於地,在人) (19.22).

That Confucius treasures the culture of King Wen and desires to propagate it suggests that this 'culture' is not any culture but one that embodies the best of Chinese tradition. Confucius singles out the Zhou dynasty as embodying the culture that should be upheld and propagated (3.14). The Zhou culture, comprising the sum of the knowledge base, values, beliefs, presuppositions and practices of the Zhou dynasty, is manifested through various forms such as traditional texts, ceremonies, social institutions and the exemplary conduct of sage-kings. To distinguish the culture (*wen*) championed by Confucius – modelled by sage-kings such as King Wen and found in the Zhou dynasty – from the ordinary meaning of the word 'culture', I shall use 'Zhou culture' to denote the former for the rest of the chapter.

The initiation into Zhou culture involves *xue* (學) which is 'learning'. Confucius exhorts all to “learn (*xue*) as if you cannot catch up and as if you fear losing it” (學如不及,猶恐失之) (8.17). What then does the learning of Zhou culture entail? First, it involves a broad-based curriculum that is encapsulated in 'the arts' (藝 *yi*) (7.6) of the sage-kings. In ancient China, 'the arts' refers to the following six subjects or domains of learning: propriety or normative behaviours (禮 *li*), music (樂 *yue*),

archery (射 *she*), charioteering (御 *yu*), calligraphy or writing (书 *shu*) and mathematics (数 *shu*). Confucius is described as one who is “broad in learning” (博學) (9.2) and “quietly stores up what is learnt” (默而識之) (7.2); a student of Confucius professes that Confucius “broadens me with culture” (博我以文) (9.11). Mastering the arts initiates the learners into Zhou culture so that this knowledge coupled with moral self-cultivation would prepare them to walk in the footsteps of sage-kings such as King Wen.

But the initiation into Zhou culture neither necessitates nor endorses indoctrination. Recall that indoctrination refers to the paralysis of one’s capacity to rationally justify one’s beliefs, consider alternatives and make autonomous choices in life. To see how indoctrination is eschewed and avoided by Confucius, it is helpful to bring in another concept: *si* (思) or reflection. Learning goes hand in hand with reflection, as asserted by Confucius: “Learning (*wen*) without reflection (*si*) leads to bewilderment; reflection (*si*) without learning (*wen*) leads to perilousness.” (學而不思則罔, 思而不學則殆) (2.15). Confucius’ point is that a person who learns without reflection is perplexed as such a person has not fully grasped the significance of what is learnt. Conversely, a person who reflects without learning is on a shaky ground as such a person lacks the necessary foundational knowledge to act confidently. Noting that reflection (*si*) is not abstract reasoning, Hall and Ames (1987) emphasise that reflection for Confucius is “fundamentally performative in that it is an activity whose immediate consequence is the achievement of a practical result” (p. 44). Learning that is accompanied by reflection or what I call *reflective learning* enhances rather than handicaps the learner’s capacity to formulate and substantiate one’s beliefs, evaluate available options, and exercise agency in life. Let me explain each characteristic of reflective learning, starting with *the ability to formulate and substantiate one’s beliefs*. The passage below expresses Confucius’ teaching approach:

7.8 子曰：“不憤不啓，不悱不發。舉一隅不以三隅反，則不復也。”

The Master said, ‘I do not enlighten a person who is not striving [to understand]; I do not provide [the words to a person] who is not already struggling to speak. If I have raised one [corner] and the person does not come back with the other three [corners], I will not [teach that person] again.’

Rather than utilising didactic teaching and passive learning, Confucius encourages his students to actively construct their beliefs (Tan 2015). The engaged learning that takes place involves making connections (‘striving to understand’), articulating one’s views (‘to speak’) and making inferences (‘come back with the other three corners’). Elsewhere, Confucius also teaches, “When the multitude hates a person, you must examine the matter; when the multitude love a person, you must examine the matter.” (衆惡之，必察焉；衆好之，必察焉) (15.28). This means that we should make up our own mind about a person through careful investigation and not simply rely on popular opinion.

The second characteristic of reflective learning is the *evaluation of available options*. Confucius himself demonstrates this quality in the following two examples:

9.3 子曰：“麻冕，禮也；今也純，儉，吾從衆。拜下，禮也；今拜乎上，泰也。雖違衆，吾從下。”

The Master said, “A ceremonial cap of linen is prescribed by ritual propriety. Nowadays, a silk cap is used instead. This is frugal and I follow the majority on this. To prostrate oneself before ascending [the steps to the hall] is prescribed by ritual propriety. Nowadays, one prostrates oneself only after ascending [the hall]; this is arrogant. Although this goes against the majority, I prostrate myself before ascending.”

In the first instance, Confucius approves the masses’ modification of ritual propriety by substituting the material used for the ceremonial cap. However, he opposes the popular practice of prostrating oneself after ascending the hall in the second example by choosing to prostrate before entering the hall. In both cases, Confucius weighs the options and arrives at a decision based on the moral standard modelled by the sage-kings: frugality in the first example and reverence in the second.

Not only does Confucius critique particular beliefs and practices of his time, he also interrogates the culture that he and his peers have been initiated into. During Confucius’ time, the prevailing cultural norms and guiding discourse were predominantly shaped, modelled and perpetuated by the political rulers. Confucius criticises the rulers, specifically the princes of Lu state, in this verse: “As for the *di* sacrifice that follows the opening libation, I do not desire to watch it.” (禘自既灌而往者，吾不欲觀之矣) (3.10). The *di* sacrifice is a special ceremony that should only be performed by the emperor of the Zhou dynasty. By deliberately appropriating the sacrifice, the princes of Lu not only abuse and pervert the Zhou culture, but also propagate a climate of disrespect, arrogance and rule by might rather than by virtue. The *Analects* records other occasions where Confucius castigates the rulers for violating the Zhou culture (for other instances, see for example 3.1, 3.2, 3.26). Confucius also expresses his disappointment with the widely-held view of filial piety:

2.7 子游問孝。

子曰：“今之孝者，是謂能養。至於犬馬，皆能有養；不敬，何以別乎？”

Ziyou asked about filial piety.

The Master replied, “Nowadays a filial person means one who provides for his parents. But even dogs and horses are provided for. If you show no respect [towards your parents], what is the difference?”

By comparing the prevailing culture of his time with the Zhou culture, Confucius concludes that the former is detrimental to social order and harmony, and calls for a restoration of the latter.

The last characteristic of reflective learning is the *exercise of agency in life*. Learning and doing, according to Confucius, are two sides of the same coin. The Zhou culture is manifested through *li* (禮) that traditionally refers to religious rituals but is expanded by Confucius to cover all normative behaviours. As Confucius puts it:

12.1 子曰：“非禮勿視，非禮勿聽，非禮勿言，非禮勿動。”

The Master replied, “Do not look unless it is in accordance with normative behaviours (*li*); do not listen unless it is in accordance with normative behaviours (*li*); do not speak unless it is in accordance with normative behaviours (*li*); do not move unless it is in accordance with normative behaviours (*li*).”

Confucius’ point is that we should always conduct ourselves in alignment with the tradition of the sage-kings. The essence of normative behaviours (*li*) is the supreme virtue of humanity or benevolence (*ren*). As noted by Confucius: “A person who does not have humanity (*ren*); what [has the person got] to do with normative behaviours (*li*)?” (人而不仁，如禮何?) (3.3). This means that all our actions, whether we are conversing (10.2, 10.15), receiving gifts (10.23), sitting (10.12) or eating (10.10), should stem from and reflect our love for fellow human beings. The intrinsic connection between Zhou culture, learning and normative behaviours is made by Confucius in his description of the *junzi* (exemplary or noble person):

6.27 子曰：“君子博學於文，約之以禮，亦可以弗畔矣夫！”

The Master said, “An exemplary person (*junzi*) who learns culture (*wen*) broadly and is restrained by normative behaviours (*li*) can be relied on to not go astray.”

The above verse informs us that the extensive learning of Zhou culture should be applied in everyday life through the restraint or guidance of normative behaviours.

Confucius’ support for human agency is further evident in his exposition of the quality of *yi* (義) that means rightness or appropriateness. Upholding the exemplary person (*junzi*) as a paradigmatic moral agent, Confucius explains that such a person, “in one’s dealings in the world, is not for or against anything, [and instead] goes with what is appropriate (*yi*).” (君子之於天下也，無適也，無莫也，義之與比) (4.10). The trait of appropriateness directs one to arrive at the best possible judgement or decision in a particular situation. The following passage illustrates the premium Confucius places on the quality of appropriateness:

17.23 子路曰：“君子尚勇乎?”

子曰：“君子義以為上，君子有勇而無義為亂，小人有勇而無義為盜。”

Zilu asked, “Does the exemplary person (*junzi*) regard courage as supreme?”

The Master said, “The exemplary person regards appropriateness (*yi*) as above all. An exemplary person who has courage but lacks appropriateness will be disorderly; the immoral person (*xiaoren*) who has courage but lacks appropriateness will be a thief.”

Overall, we see how Confucius’ notion of reflective learning is instrumental in educating the learners without indoctrinating them. A balance is achieved between initiating members into Zhou culture (*wen*) and enhancing their rational autonomy through learning (*xue*) and reflection (*si*). It is evident that both the critical and moral dimensions are integral to reflective learning. Underscoring critical thinking, Confucius expects the learners to engage in inferential thinking (7.8) and form their own judgement (15.28). In addition, they are encouraged to critique the values, beliefs and practices they have been initiated into and taken for granted. Critical thinking is seen in Confucius drawing his students’ attention to the shortcomings of the prevailing culture (3.26, 2.7) and calling upon them to replace it with

Zhou culture. Characterising Confucius' approach as a 'critical appropriation of tradition', Chan (2000) posits that "ethical reflection and self-cultivation would enable the individual to challenge particular claims of tradition" (p. 245). It should be added that the exercise of critical thinking, for Confucius, is underpinned by moral considerations. Repudiating indoctrination, Confucius recommends a life of self-directed normative behaviours (*li*) that is motivated by humanity (*ren*) and satiated by appropriateness (*yi*). Normative behaviours "offer persons the opportunity to contribute novel meaning to the community and thereby to be integrated in a way enriching to the community" (Kim 2004, p. 119). Jones and Culliney (1998) concur that such behaviours contain "the inherent potential for growth or diminution over time" to the effect that the "structure, sustainability, and orderly flow of information within the system could and would change" (p. 399).

## Indoctrination in Confucian Education

Despite an educational project that abhors and prevents indoctrination, Confucius' educational approach is not immune to the threat or possibility of indoctrination. This section considers two objections to Confucius' teachings as an effective antidote to indoctrination.

The first objection concerns Confucius' recommendation of Zhou culture as the normative tradition. A question is whether indoctrination may occur through the unquestioning and wholesale acceptance of Zhou culture. In other words, is it possible for the learner's rational thinking and agency to be undermined by the imposition of a privileged and totalistic ideology in the form of Zhou culture? To be sure, it is plausible to indoctrinate learners to accept Zhou culture (or any other cultural content, for that matter) blindly. But such an outcome is not inevitable and is in fact avoidable when we take cognisance of Confucius' interpretations of tradition and Zhou culture. Rather than seeing tradition as immutable and essentialised, Confucius regards it as evolving and progressive. The *Analects* informs us that Confucius values the Zhou culture not for its own sake but for its success in selecting, synthesising and preserving the best beliefs and practices of earlier dynasties: "The Yin built on the normative behaviours of the Xia, the abolitions and additions can be known; the Zhou built on the normative behaviours of the Yin, the abolitions and additions can be known." (殷因於夏禮，所損益，可知也；周因於殷禮，所損益，可知也) (2.23). It is also noteworthy that Confucius urges human beings to "broaden the way" (弘道) (15.29) and not to simply follow or preserve it. The 'way' is the way of the sages as embodied in the normative tradition of the Zhou dynasty. To broaden the way, it follows, is to actively and creatively appropriate, modify, enrich and propagate the Zhou culture as part of the on-going endeavour to improve and transform one's tradition. The indoctrination of Zhou culture, therefore, contradicts Confucius' desire to empower human beings with "the freedom to evaluate, criticise and seek to reform the practice tradition itself" (Slingerland, 2001, p. 103).

The second objection spotlights on historical instances where Confucian doctrines have been used to justify and perpetuate ideological indoctrination (e.g. Franke 1960; Hansen 2004; Guo 2012; Tan 2016). Foregrounding the phenomenon of unconditional obedience and rote-learning in Confucian societies, Frederickson (2002) avers that “Confucian ideas came to be used to subjugate others, and less-than virtuous bureaucrats were much a part of the decline of government by the scholar-rulers” (p. 624). If Confucius really opposes indoctrination and champions reflective learning, how do we account for cases of Confucian indoctrination in reality? The first point to note about this objection is that the focus is on the practice rather than the philosophy of Confucianism. These instances do not, in themselves, prove that indoctrination as well as the Confucian doctrines used for indoctrination are consistent with the teachings of Confucius. I would argue that Confucian indoctrination is likely to occur when Confucius’ teachings are selectively manipulated by those in authority to further their political and social agendas through indoctrination.

A case in point is the truncation of Confucius’ notion of reflective learning. An incomplete conception of reflective learning may take the form of marginalising or jettisoning the critical and moral dimensions of reflective learning. Stripped of critical thinking, learning is reduced to mere knowledge transmission, rote-learning and regurgitation. The learners will be ill-equipped to freely inquire, justify their beliefs, critique their traditions and make autonomous choices in life. It is instructive that Confucius alerts us to the danger of memorisation without reflection and application:

13.5 子曰：“誦《詩》三百，授之以政，不達；使於四方，不能專對；雖多，亦奚以爲？”

The Master said, “If [a person] can recite three hundred *Songs*, but is unable to perform an entrusted official duty and exercise [one’s] initiative when sent abroad, what good are the many *Songs* [to that person]?”

What is paramount for Confucius is not learning via the regurgitation of the *Songs* which are ancient Chinese poems. Rather, successful learning is demonstrated through a critical awareness of the practical significance of the *Songs*, which can be achieved *only* when learning and reflection go in tandem.

Besides the critical component, the moral dimension of reflective learning is also essential for learners to become moral agents. Learning that is not premised on and motivated by humanity may lead to actions that do not contribute towards the good of human beings. Worse, such form of learning is open to miseducation and indoctrination where moral agency is denied. Confucius chastises the rulers of his time for ignoring the ethical values of tolerance, respect and genuine grief:

3.26 子曰：“居上不寬，爲禮不敬，臨喪不哀，吾何以觀之哉？”

The Master said, “[One who] in occupying high office is not tolerant, [who] in observing propriety is not respectful, [and who] in overseeing the mourning rites does not grieve – how could I bear to look upon [such a person]?”

Without the critical and moral elements of reflective learning, indoctrination may occur as the members' capacity in rational autonomy is paralysed and their intellectual and moral horizon diminished.

## Conclusion

This chapter has argued that indoctrination may be avoided in Confucian education when the initiation into the culture of one's community is accompanied by learning and reflection. Confucius' educational goal is for the Chinese learners to appreciate, critically appropriate and advance their normative tradition based on the Zhou culture. The chapter explained how Confucius' concept of reflective learning aims to enhance rather than handicap the learner's capacity to formulate and substantiate one's beliefs, evaluate available options, and exercise agency in life. Rather than being indoctrinated, a learner is nurtured to become a reflective and autonomous person who internalises and demonstrates the quality of humanity through normative behaviours. Admittedly, Confucius' educational approach does not guarantee that indoctrination will not or is not likely to take place. The chapter also explored the possibility of indoctrination in Confucian education when the moral and critical dimensions of reflective learning are sidelined or discarded. That Confucian doctrines have been used for indoctrination in reality shows that the prevention of indoctrination requires the creation and sustenance of a conducive social, political and pedagogic culture led by policymakers and educators who are themselves exemplary persons (*junzi*). Arguing that a good leader is one who governs through virtue rather than punitive legal measures, Confucius states that such a person "leads [the common people] with virtue and keeps them in line through normative behaviours" (道之以德, 齊之以禮) (2.3). The short supply of such exemplary leaders in history suggests that Confucius may be too sanguine about human nature and the attainment of his educational vision.

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# Deleuze/Guattari



**Olaf Sanders**

A handbook chapter on Deleuze/Guattari has to start with a serious warning. Their philosophy does not work like most other philosophies. Even well-trained scholars cannot extract key concepts or single figures of argumentation without destroying the plane of immanence as the basic layer of their philosophy. Since it is a philosophy of immanence in a very strict manner, you lose everything with the destruction of its plane of consistency. Deleuze and Guattari would vanish instantly. This chapter has to take another way Deleuze himself refers often to Lewis Carroll's *Alice* novels. After passing the rabbit hole everything changes. Learning to deal with this challenge can be described as a process of *Bildung* itself.

## Who Is Who

Gilles Deleuze (1925–1995) was a French philosopher, whereas Félix Guattari (1930–1992) was a French not-philosopher. He was analyzed by Lacan and educated as psychoanalyst; he worked in the anti-psychiatric *Clinique de La Borde*, also as its head for a while. He acted pedagogically, and as a political activist he was deeply involved in the actions against the wars in Algeria and Vietnam. Guattari met Deleuze in the aftermath of May 1968 at the reform University of Vincennes. Deleuze was teaching there as a professor and at this time he had already published some books about Spinoza, Hume, Kant, Nietzsche, and Proust. Up to this point, Deleuze's most important publications were *Différence et répétition* (1968) and *Logique du sens* (1969). In his review of these two books, Michel Foucault (1970)

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speculated about the century becoming Deleuzian one day. Despite Deleuze's increasing popularity worldwide, the twentieth century did not turn into a Deleuzian century, unfortunately from a Deleuzian point of view.

Deleuze wrote some of his most important books together with Guattari. The first and best known book of Deleuze and Guattari is *L'Anti-Œdipe* (1972). Foucault (1977: XIII) characterized this book in his preface to the English edition in reference to François de Sales as "an Introduction to the Non-Fascist Life." The book has to be seen as an ethics, offering itself as an orientation for pedagogy, probably in a sense of Schleiermacher as an ethical bias, and after all the catastrophes in the twentieth century. Guattari's contribution to the joint work is commonly underestimated.

Since the publication of *The Anti-Œdipus Papers* (Guattari 2006), his contribution can be appreciated a bit more. Deleuze states in *Dialogues* (1977: 18) that Guattari had constantly been struggling with a kind of wild rodeo in his head, partly against himself. Gary Genosko (2002) presents an introduction to Guattari's frantic thinking in a very solid manner and—albeit shorter—to Guattari's emancipatory pedagogy as well as to his relationship to pedagogy itself (cf. Genosko 2008). The *intersections* of the lives of Deleuze and Guattari are described by François Dosse (2010) in a double biography. We have to face at least three different authors, Deleuze, Guattari, and Deleuze/Guattari, for Deleuze/Guattari claim in the introduction to *Mille Plateaux* (1980:9) that they have been copying themselves over writing and became a multiplicity. The second volume *Mille Plateaux* closes the *Capitalism and Schizophrenia*-project started with *L'Anti-Œdipe*. Deleuze and Guattari develop psychoanalysis up to schizoanalysis, following the streams of differences through many of their differentiations. Between *L'Anti-Œdipe* and *Mille Plateaux*, their book about *Kafka* (1975) was published. Their last joint and at the same time most pedagogical book bears the title *Qu'est-ce quel la philosophie?* (1992) asked with the wisdom of age.

After the first collaborations with Deleuze, Guattari starts to write own, mainly rather thin but nevertheless profound and ambitious books filled with sustained actuality. The books *Les trois écologies* (1989) and *Chaosmose* (1992) can be seen as the most influential. For both of them, Deleuze and Guattari, it can be stated that the purpose of their writing is to be of use.

## Problems

In the *Abécédaire*, Deleuze suggests under *Q comme Question* to emanate from problems. Questions and problems are bound together. Questions are not only instruments of questioning to prove knowledge or to explain facts. Questions are meant to start thinking or bring thinking into movement. Deleuze pleads for a positive concept of problems. His concept does not devise problems as something to eliminate but as a challenge, which is changing while working on it. For a philosophy of education in general one can take for granted, what can be considered Deleuze's challenge: explicitly *to do* what the great philosophers did instead of just

*repeating* what the great philosophers *wrote* and thereby simply copying or attaching it to the pedagogical field. This is the way to grasp Deleuze's perspective in which the first and most important task for the philosophy of education is to create new pedagogical concepts and to revise established ones. What does learning mean? What does education mean? Why are fear or money no pedagogical basic concepts?

The *Abécédaire* is a movie document and paradoxically a nearly seven and a half hour long interrogation, hold by Clare Parnet, who wrote the book *Dialogues* together with Deleuze. The paradox moment can be seen even in the title of the movie. The German translation for *abécédaire* is 'Fibel', the English one is *spelling book*. The movie title suggests a simplification of the kind Deleuze is rejecting in the *Abécédaire* under *P comme Professeur*. One is not playing a simplified Berg or Beethoven for nonmusicians. So, nobody should simplify Hegel or Deleuze for nonphilosophers. From this point of view, a handbook chapter is in every case completely unDeleuzian. From what kind of problems—except from this completely irresolvable one—one has to emanate without simplifying in an unacceptable way:

- (a) Philosophy of education is deeply Eurocentric for it holds on to the logic of subject/object. Deleuze and Guattari develop figures of a different logic that are, e.g., compatible to the far eastern or indigenous South American way of thinking. As another reason for eurocentrism, it may be acknowledged that the action-theoretical basis of pedagogy, like the events and situation potentials that are more important in the Chinese culture, are systematically underestimated. Finally, the system/method concept contributes to the eurocentrism as well. Rhizome—rhizome is one of the most popular concepts of Deleuze/Guattari and at the same time it is the title of the introduction to *Mille Plateaux* outsourced in advance as book—grow everywhere.
- (b) Philosophy of education largely avoids 'epochal typical key problems' (Klafki 1991) like globalization, Anthropocene, big data or Posthumanism because it lacks appropriate concepts. Quite early Deleuze/Guattari, Deleuze, and Guattari developed intellectual approaches that help to work on the key problems because they put a brighter spotlight on those key problems than the subject-object-logic.
- (c) Concerning the philosophy of *Bildung*, the works of Deleuze/Guattari, claimed and labeled by themselves as pop-philosophy, help to release the concept of *Bildung* from its high culture bonds. Considering Punk as one of the most critical popular genres one can ask: How could such a post-punk-pedagogy be like?
- (d) Although we understand socialization, learning, education, and *Bildung* as processes, we do not have a profound process concept or a process logic that knows other movements and *dancefloor moves* than the Hegelian "dialectical Prozess-Walzer a priori" (Bloch 1971: 131). In this context, cinema proves to be very informative.
- (e) The loss of significance of the critical pedagogy emerging from the marginalization of the Critical Theory can be slowed down if not reversed by developing its fundamentals into schizoanalysis and post-Deleuzian Marxism. In this spirit, Antonio and Michael Hardt wrote the *Empire*-trilogy (Hardt/Negri 2000, 2004

and 2009). Negri was a good friend to Deleuze and even more to Guattari. Hardt is the author of one of first English introductions into the thinking of Deleuze (cf. Hardt 1993).

- (f) And and and ... Deleuze/Guattari are at least exerted to develop a logic of *and and and*

### Three Pedagogies

Deleuze and Deleuze/Guattari create three pedagogies that are structuring their late works since 1975 (cf. Sanders 2018). The names of the three pedagogies are opposite to their order of origin:

- (a) Pedagogy of concept
- (b) Pedagogy of minor science and
- (c) Pedagogy of perception or of the cinema

It is worth to read the later works of Deleuze and Guattari first. The pedagogies of Deleuze and Deleuze/Guattari build a philosophy of *Bildung* in terms of a Hegelian format.

The age need to become pedagogic to work on the named problems and other important ones. Deleuze and Guattari bring philosophy and pedagogy closer to each other in their last joint book *Qu'est-ce que la philosophie?* (1991). They do this by proclaiming a pedagogical era. The reason for this is the fading of the encyclopedical age whereupon Deleuze and Guattari do not refer to the French encyclopedists but to Hegel's encyclopedia, the *Enzyklopädie der philosophischen Wissenschaften* (1830), which demanded to elaborate philosophy on the basis of Kant's critical philosophy and bring it to an end by doing so. Hegel's claim was impudent from the beginning on. So philosophy survived its predicted end like history did. Nevertheless, the closing gesture had a serious side effect. For its encyclopedic claim, philosophy lost the event of thinking and the event to marketing. Deleuze and Guattari name marketing with regard to thinking an impertinent rival. Through marketing, education is limited to the process of gaining marketable competences. This movement needs to be counteracted. Consequently, Deleuze and Guattari formulate as task for the pedagogy of concept to regain the event from marketing. The pedagogy of concept inherits from the encyclopedia, which wanted itself to be understood as the last valid composition of prepared concepts. Opposite to the encyclopedia, concepts remain in the becoming within the pedagogy. The becoming (devenir) had been put aside to *Sein* (being) by Deleuze/Guattari and Guattari even earlier. As well, becoming is a different mode than history. Deleuze/Guattari interpret history as recorded being. Within Deleuze and Guattari, becoming and *Sein* (being) coexist as two strands or lines of a double articulation. Articulation has, like *aufheben* with Hegel, three definitions: structure, connection, and expression. With Hegel, just as in the German everyday language used, *aufheben* means preserve, abrogate, and elevate. Especially, Deleuze is often labeled as 'anti-Hegelian' as did Foucault in

the abovementioned review. But, strictly speaking, Deleuze is not ‘anti-Hegelian’ because he is not taking a position against Hegel but he is widening Hegel’s philosophy: either-and-or. There is not only history but also becoming. Within the becoming concepts become events. With the use of the pedagogy of concepts they shall be enabled to become this again.

Deleuze and Guattari unfold a theory of concept and produce philosophy, science, and art as a plurality of three equal manners of knowledge. Concepts consist of components and they are created or newly cut by conceptual personæ which do not have to be famous or identical to female and male philosophers—they are just their cover or do house them. Some of the well-known conceptual personæ in the history of philosophy are Plato’s Socrates, Kues’ idiot, and Nietzsche’s Zoroaster (Zarathustra). Conceptual personæ even compose concepts from components that mainly have history. But, also new components can be invented. Deleuze and Guattari state composition as an artificial basic engineering. With this determination, philosophy is again becoming a creative discipline. Philosophers can start again to do what great philosophers always did, namely, to philosophize instead of repeating what great philosophers wrote just as the professors of philosophy often do, who still keep an encyclopedic attitude even after the end of the encyclopedic era by interpreting philosophical texts hoping for, at least for the moment, ultimate interpretation. Again, interpretation is not fulfilling, philosophy has to change something and to make a difference. Deleuze and Guattari draw theoretical *lines of flight* in the tradition of Feuerbach.

Deleuze and Guattari distinguish philosophical concepts from scientific notions. Philosophical concepts are self-referential, scientific notions have at least one empirical element that connects them to reality or the world. Science is always made from the current. Philosophy instead develops the virtual, which is not only containing the essence of *Sein* (being) but also the possible and the impossible. In science, partial observers take the role that conceptual personæ do take in philosophy. Artists do creative work. So do philosophers. But, artists do not only create insubstantial concepts but also substantial monuments. By this means they connect the virtual and the current. The two different manners of knowledge develop their own pedagogies.

The phrasing ‘pedagogy of the minor science’ cannot be found in Deleuze and Guattari although they suggest the existence of such a pedagogy at the end of *Qu’est-ce quel la philosophie?* The phrase is my invention: *Mille Plateaux* can be read as a theory of the minor sciences. Deleuze and Guattari oppose minor science to royal science. Parts of the minor science developed into royal science after abandoning its nomadism and integrating into states. The royal science serves the state, whereas the minor science follows the substance like once the metallurgy. After the rise of the royal science, minor science wandered through the peripheries of knowledge and the academic activities where it even now follows the things and the contexts before they get ordered. By doing so it develops innovations which are then collected and absorbed by the royal science. Occasionally royal science tolerates minor science at its peripheries. Psychoanalysis and psychology are a correlated pair of, even today, predominant minor and predominant royal science.

This pair usually has a comparatively strong corpus of methods, which increases its resistance against paradigm jumps. Paradigm jumps are supported by the minor science through micro-shifts. Royal science uses the knowledge of the minor science for innovations. It can be easily seen at the peripheries that permanently something is developing and meanwhile something is vanishing. Also, education and de-education are two lines of a double articulation.

The pedagogy of perception is the eldest of the three pedagogies, and it mainly descends from Deleuze. This specific pedagogy is due to the simple circumstance described by Foucault in the introduction to *Histoire de la sexualité II: L'Usage des plaisirs* (1984), that in some moments is most important for further thinking and further seeing to see differently from the way of seeing so far. Deleuze is also engaged with other arts, so he wrote a book about the painting of Francis Bacon (cf. Deleuze 1984), but to him the 'highest' among the arts is the cinema. He wrote two books about it: *L'Image-mouvement* (1983) and *L'Image-temps* (1985). Both cinema-books are named after the two types of cinematic images Deleuze is distinguishing: the movement-image and the time-image. Basically, every movie image is both movement-image and time-image, because something is always moving on screen—even if it is only minimal—and every scene lasts. For Deleuze, the movie-still is not a cinema image. When he talks of movement-image or time-image he talks about the moving image which is emerging on the screen. Deleuze takes the screen for the brain (cf. Deleuze 2003: 263 ff.). On screen one can furthermore—and therefore the cinema becomes an ontological laboratory—watch the being becoming. Even in the beginning of *L'Anti-Edipe*, Deleuze/Guattari write: Flux' or streams and cuts everywhere, 'toujours des fleux et des coupures'. Movies consist of nothing else but of flux and cuts. Thus, we did film much longer than the cinema does exist. Plato's cave is an example for a very poor and bad early cinema. The caves of Chauvet shown by Werner Herzog in his documentary movie *The Cave of the Forgotten Dreams* (CND a.o. 2010) are a much earlier good cinema (cf. Sanders 2014).

The book *L'Image-mouvement* functions like a short history of cinema, from its beginning in France and the United States through the European between-wars-avant-garde up to Hitchcock who accomplished cinema. In this respect, *Vertigo* (USA 1958) is a paradigmatic as well as encyclopedic movie. Hitchcock develops mental images that force the audience to think ahead. But, his movies stay didactic because they allow only to rethink the already devised just as directed teaching units and Socratic dialogs do. Deleuze distinguishes between more than one type of movement-images, namely, the perception-image, the affection-image, the action-image, and finally the mental image. Concerning the theory of signs by Peirce, Deleuze relates three image signs to each of the movement-images. Out of the last image sign, the genetic sign of the mental image emerges the time-image as a completely new type of image. Subsequently, the book *L'Image-temps* tells the short history of the vanguard postwar cinema. For this cinema, the organic cut is not an option anymore for the sensorimotor tie between image and movement and the whole as unit was destroyed by the catastrophes in the twentieth century, especially the World War II and the Shoah. The cinema allows to still believe in the whole in a



not naïve way and on behalf of this belief it shows, since the Italian neorealism, the broken world and the consistently breaking sense. *Citizen Kane* (USA 1941) by Orson Welles can be seen as the first important time-image-movie. In this movie, layers of past follow each other, so there is not a whole anymore but still sense. In Alain Resnais' *L'Année dernière à Marienbad* (F/I 1961) peaks of present appear instead of layers of past. A third way to make time itself visible is proved by the Japanese director Yasujiro Ozu. He uses scenes in his movies with nearly no movement at all—and if so, the movement is very slow so the Bergsonian *durée* is tangible.

Movement-image and time-image relate to each other like the two sides of a Möbius strip that are one at the same time. Connection and difference enable to learn how to see better or more precisely. This would be preferable for phenomena like learning, education, and school, so they could be seen in a different light as well.

## Learning, Education, and School

Deleuze utters the concept of learning in *Différence et répétition* and earlier in *Proust et les signes* (1964).

In his book about Marcel Proust, Deleuze writes that learning has especially and substantially something to do with signs. With Proust, Deleuze recognizes signs as objects of a temporal lesson which he distinguishes from abstract knowledge. To learn presumes and means to observe a material, an object, or a being in a way as signs spread from the observed. These signs need to be interpreted and decoded. Who learns becomes an “Egyptologist” of a matter or a thing in the Deleuzian perspective. Only this process of education enables to learn. *Bildung* is not only learning on a higher stage or learning in a second order; it is at the same time the foundation of all processes of learning. Deleuze summarizes: Who or what ever teaches something sends out signs. Every act of learning is an interpretation of signs or hieroglyphs. To Deleuze, the work of Proust grounds in a quite structural way in the learning of signs and not in a performance of memory like the memory of cookies—the madeleines—tea, smells, and others. In *Différence et répétition*, Deleuze adds that learning is a subjective act in view of the objectivity of the problem. Learning always happens in the channel through the subliminal and accompanied by affects. Because Deleuze and Guattari think the subliminal collective, every subjective act outstrips the single subject toward culture. As part of the culture, learning becomes an adventure of the involuntary. During “l’aventure de l’involontaire” (Deleuze 1968: 215) something is happening: Because learning reacts to an event and is an event itself, the movement of learning can be recognized as a transformativ process of *Bildung*.

Concerning the concept of education, Deleuze and Guattari follow widely the understandings of Foucault’s theory of power. Deployments of power arrange points of subjectivation and order their transitions. The subject usually regarded as autonomous doubles itself as subordinated during this process of subjectivation. The

subordination shows itself as standardization. Through processes of standardization the always preconditioned ideal is improving.

The various forms of education or 'normalization' imposed on an individual consist in making him or her change points of subjectification, always moving toward higher, nobler one in closer conformity with a supposed ideal. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 129)

With Foucault, hierarchic control and standardized sanctions intensify into examinations that create new knowledge. This knowledge, however, is nothing but a knowledge of Being as created by the royal scientists. Becoming of all kinds eludes from this kind of knowledge. Only minor scientists possess knowledge about the becoming. For since becoming implicates variation, to become, as a norm directs it, has nothing to with becoming. Hence, one cannot becoming-man but only be a man. But, to be a man can certainly contain to become a man. Becoming performs through micro processes, through standardization with the help of segmentary lines that divide classes from each other. In this regard, Deleuze and Guattari write of 'molar' as an antonym to 'minoritary', they summarize and go one step ahead. In doing so, they shift the concept of subject once again:

There is no becoming-man because man is the molar entity par excellence, whereas becomings are molecular. The faciality function showed us the form under which man constitutes the majority, or rather the standard upon the majority is based: white, male, adult, 'rational' etc., in short the average European, subject of the enunciation. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 292)

Instead of intentional center of perception, thinking, and of acting, subject does also mean issue and subordinated. Finally, it functions as a grammatical function, as subject of declaring and statement. With the concept of *visagéité* (faciality), Deleuze and Guattari connect to Deleuze's consideration about learning and to the philosophy of Emmanuel Lévinas. In this philosophy, the face expresses and supports the imperative 'You shall not kill' for it is very vulnerable. On the contrary, for Deleuze and Guattari the face is a disciplinary and disciplinating protosign that still forms the cinema as white screen and black hole. Deleuze and Guattari oppose the norm of the 'white reasonable man' referring to processes of becoming raising in radicalness. The most moderate process they call becoming-woman what does not happen by itself even with women. One has, as the saying goes, to become what one is. It follows becoming-child or becoming-black, depending on molar preferences of reason or whiteness, becoming-animal, becoming-plant, and finally inorganic or becoming-crystal. To slowdown or even hinder such kind of processes of becoming for keeping the molar laws of arborescence in force is the purpose of faciality. The faciality claims for itself a focal position—in the rhizome everything is center:

The central point, or third eye, thus has the property of organizing binary distributions within the dualism machines, and of reproducing itself in the principal term of the opposition; the entire opposition at the same time resonates in the central point. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 292)

To dissolve opposition in organization, this tactic, also common in reforming educational institutions, works by redundancy. The Redundancy creates and supports a majority in an antidemocratic way, since this majority is not the majority of the population:

Man constitutes himself as a gigantic memory, through the position of the central point, its frequency (insofar as it is necessarily reproduced by a dominant point), and it is resonance (insofar all of the points tie in with it). (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 293)

Man seems like the tree trunk or like the face; he centers up and fixes the points only in relation to himself. That shrinks at least the freedom of movement as elementary liberty, and it hurts one of the principles of Deleuze/Guattari, namely, the one that there are no points but only lines for points are moving and moving draws lines.

Partially, Deleuze and Guattari anticipate the notion of Jacques Rancière in *Le maître ignorant* (1987: 29 ff.) that lessons based on explanation are antiemancipatory and so is the use of the so-called Socratic method. Rancière often refers to Deleuze. Explanation and directed teaching conversations seem to me quite ineffective and of low performance. They *bilden* only rarely. As an extreme form of becoming, *Bildung* can be understood as a process of crystallization where structures repeat and yet diversify, as process where something is growing by developing layers that can as well dissolve again. Generally, lessons function in a different way. A teacher, so it says at the beginning of the 4th plateau, does not inform herself when she questions or examines a student as little as she informs when she gives grammar or mathematic lessons. Deleuze and Guattari do not only support Rancière's understanding that explaining lessons operate antiemancipatory but moreover they refer in recourse to the concrete use of language and its power effect:

she (the schoolmistress) informing them (her students), any more than she is informing herself when she questions a student. She does not so much instruct as 'insign', give orders or commands. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 75)

The wordplay of *enseigner* (teach) and *signer* (sign/subscribe) disappears in the American or German translation. Deleuze and Guattari point out that the commands of a teacher or professor are not external or accessory to that what he teaches: regulations are always based on regulations thus they are redundant. "The compulsory education machine (la machine enseignement obligatoire)" (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 75) does not communicate information but imposes semiotic coordinates with all the dual grammar basics as male-female, singular-plural, noun-verb, subject of the statement or stating subject respectively of the predicating on the child, the adolescent, or the student. Orders—the word has two meanings in German and even three in English—base on and change existing regularities that can be read as sediment of regulations:

The elementary unit of language—the statement (énoncé)—is the order-word (le mot d'ordre). (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 76)

This determination opposes another, the one of the tool.  
Deleuze and Guattari write:

Words are not tools, but we give children language, pens, and notebooks as we give workers shovels and pickaxes. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 76)

They describe rules for grammar as markers of power that guarantee the transmission of information. Information itself shields disfigurements and is effective

against the noise. The criticism of Deleuze/Guattari defends life against the torture of instruction and lessons.

Language is not life, it gives life orders. Life does not speak, it listens and waits. (Deleuze and Guattari 1987: 76)

Lacanian Big Others have always already been there and established the law. The language instead needs to be forced to stutter—also with images.

## Review and Discourse

The international—and in the case of Deleuze and Guattari mainly Anglophone—review takes course primarily through a range of journal focuses, anthologies, and books by Inna Semetsky, Diana Masny, and David R. Cole (cf. Semetsky 2004, 2006 and 2008, Masny/Cole 2009 and Semetsky/Masny 2011 and 2013) to which I contributed as well (cf. Sanders 2011). One article about the concept of a school without conditions, inspired by Deleuze, written for the volume *Deleuze and Guattari, Politics and Education* (2014), edited by Matthew Carlin and Jason Wallin, was finally released online in *Other Education* (cf. Sanders 2015). The discourse meanders mainly in the Deleuze community, which is cross-bounded through the Deleuze studies and the corresponding annual conferences. This results in many prominent not-educationists and not-*Bildungs-* and not-education philosophers participating in the discourse in a *bildungs-* and education philosophical way. Most contributions/articles remain conceptual or applied Deleuzism. This discourse includes the danger of school education that Deleuze always wanted to escape. Instead of doing something different than Deleuze did with his concepts, professors tend to do what professors mainly do. The canonization may become aporiatic. Only *Multiple Literacies Theory* by Masny and Cole (2009) dares to get really close to school. Considering this, the theory by Masny and Cole is an exception, but sometimes it appears quite un-Deleuzian for maybe not being experimental enough. Here, the risk threatens to pedagogize Deleuze and Deleuze/Guattari.

Reciprocal Influences of Deleuze studies and the Anglophone Philosophy of Education are rarely known. And there have been hardly any academic papers produced within the German Philosophy of education and Philosophy of *Bildung* concerning Deleuze and Guattari. In this context, the scientific work of Liane Mozère should be considered. Mozère who died in 2013 was working with Guattari and also a member of the Centre d'études, de recherches et de formation institutionnelles founded by Guattari. Mozère published a lot of papers concerning early childhood education long before it came into fashion (cf. f.i. Mozère 2003a, b).

Altogether, the educational philosophical or pedagogical review of the writings of Deleuze and Deleuze/Guattari is complicated in a literal sense as it seems to be difficult to access. They cannot be used as a brick within a building of theories because all the many little shifts that occur while reading their books change everything. Becoming-educationist always means becoming-revolutionary. Precisely that

enables the creation of new concepts, perspectives, and theories that allow us to work on the sketched problems. This is the input given by Deleuze and Guattari: They enable to differ and to wish what needs to be strengthened in these times of hyperstandardization and advanced wish-colonialization—and this without getting caught into the trap of self-reference.

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# Derrida's Archive and Legacy to Education: Between Past and Future



Denise Egéa

*The archive contains ... places or moments where ... an archive*

*Oriented by the past is turned toward the future and what remains to come.* (Naas 2015, p. 126)

*There is legacy only where assignments are multiple and contradictory, secret enough to defy interpretation, to carry the unlimited risk of active interpretation.* (Derrida 2002b, p. 111)

## Introduction

Derrida (1930–2004) has been referred to as “probably the most famous philosopher of our time” and “the first truly global philosopher,” “an enormously prolific writer and lecturer” (Kujundžić 2011, p. 1), “one of the most important philosophers of the twentieth century” (Glorieux and Hašimbegović 2007, p. 1), the “most inventive of a generation of inventive French thinkers” (Hartman, in White 2007, p. 407). He is one of the most productive philosophers, with “a truly remarkable and as yet *barely explored archive*” (added emphasis; Naas 2015, p. 15),<sup>1</sup> and one whose huge corpus has generated an enormous amount of follow-up events and studies: conferences, seminars, books, articles, theses, dissertations, films, art work, and so on. On the other hand, following his death on October 8, 2004, a shocking number of negative public obituaries were published,<sup>2</sup> “tainted by misunderstanding and ill-advised criticism, displaying a malignant wit and vicious satire ... condemning his thought as ‘obscurantism,’ or being ‘murky,’ ‘enigmatic’ or ‘self-contradictory’” (Fagan et al. 2007, p. 1). Since 2004, a large number of publications, conferences,

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<sup>1</sup> More than 70 books published during his life time, four decades of seminars, all carefully written out (in the process of being published), and innumerable articles, chapters, essays, conference papers, etc., too numerous to count, and not all accounted for.

<sup>2</sup> For example, *The New York Times* (2004, October 10) and *The Economist* (Guerrero Mendez 2004, October 21) denigrated his work, declaring that “[h]e was a sincere and learned man, if a confused one” who “vehemently resisted any attempt to clarify his ideas” (para. 3 and 6).

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forums, and symposia<sup>3</sup> have addressed and explored the meaning of Derrida's legacy in a variety of disciplinary fields; however, none in the context of education. Yet the question of education is at the core of Derrida's work, and one can even affirm that, "in the strongest sense, the question of deconstruction *is* the question of education" (Cahen 2011, p. 5).

Among the many areas in which Derrida's archive represents an invaluable legacy, one is paramount, especially in the context of education: his unrelenting defense of philosophy, of access to philosophy, of the right to philosophy, the right to, and the necessity of, teaching philosophy, and, concomitant to that, the crucial role of Humanities departments in the university, especially as we continue to face the most 'dramatic program cuts' (Wilson 2012). It is the object of the second part of this chapter, after I examine Derrida's "constant preoccupation" (Naas 2015, p. 125), that is, his concern with the 'archive,'<sup>4</sup> heritage, and legacy. Then I discuss how reading Derrida helps understand the importance and necessity of our philosophical heritage in order to be aware of, and respond to, the most urgent problems posed by the current educational context under the pressure of the corporate and money market model. In the last section, I focus on two concepts which run through Derrida's thought and corpus, concepts which I find most helpful to identify, think through, and address some of the most critical current challenges in education.

## Learning from the Past with Derrida

### *Archive*

In his last two seminars at the *École des Hautes Études en Sciences Sociales*, Derrida engaged in "a radical rethinking of the trace and the archive" (Naas 2015, p. 12). 'Rethinking' indeed, because his last 2-year seminar, published posthumously in two volumes under the title *The Beast and the Sovereign* (2009, 2010), was not the first time Derrida explored the theme of the archive. Naas sees a 'long itinerary' in Derrida's reflection on the archive, which he points out is "clearly not just one question among others for Derrida ... but in some sense, the central question" (2015, p. 126). He even goes as far as asserting that it is "the central question of philosophy itself" (p. 126). I shall leave this last assessment to stand as is in Naas's words. Suffice it to stress that the theme of archive and of the related notions of heritage and

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<sup>3</sup>A few examples: *Conferences*: "Derrida's legacy," Tulane University, Baton Rouge, US, 2004, November 19; "Derrida: Negotiating the legacy," Gregynog Hall, University of Wales, Aberystwyth, UK, 2005, January 6–13; "Following Derrida: Legacies," University of Manitoba, US, October 2006; "Commemorating Derrida," University of York, UK, 2014, November 12.

*Books*: Cheah, P., & Guerlac, S. (Eds.). (2009); Gaston, S. (2006); Glendinning, S., & Eaglestone, R. (Eds.). (2008); Naas, M. (2008, 2015); Thomas, M. (2006).

*Articles and Chapters*: Apter, E. et al. (Forum with 19 authors) (2005); Gasché, R. (2014); Mosaic (2006, 2007, 2011a, b).

<sup>4</sup>Derrida consistently used the singular form.

legacy, but also of a string of attendant concepts (trace, memory, tradition, inheritance, writing, supplement, spectrality, gift, debt, and so on) can be found in most of Derrida's texts.<sup>5</sup> In *Archive Fever* (1996), he wrote:

I asked myself what is the moment *proper* to the archive, if there is such a thing, the instant of archivization strictly speaking, which is not ... so-called live or spontaneous memory (*mnēmē* or *anamnesis*), but rather a certain hypomnesis and prosthetic experience of the technical substrate. (original emphasis; pp. 25–26)

Naas sees two sources of the archive. One is in the “attempt to protect, save, or indemnify a unique text” (2015, p. 127), which means that it would be impossible to reproduce it, replace it, or reiterate it by any means. His assertion is supported by Derrida's affirmation that “each time in its original uniqueness, an archive ought to be idiomatic, and thus at once offered and unavailable for translation ... and shielded from technical iteration and reproduction” (1996, p. 90). However, as an archive, a text must also, *at the same time*, be reproduceable, made accessible for future readings. This is the second source identified by Naas: “an *affirmative* relation to that past or that text in the form of a promise or performative repetition” in the future (2015, p. 128). And there lies the *inherent paradox of the archive*: its potential to preserve and protect, and its threat to translate and transform, to alter, through iteration.

This is also where the archive finds itself situated *between past and future*: the ‘archiving event,’ archivization preserves a unique past event (of writing, recorded speech, or gesture), the ‘archived event,’ in the hope and with the promise that it will be made available in the future. For Derrida, the archive was always “at once beneficial and monstrous, *both at once* ... a chance and a threat.... To keep, precisely, one destroys, one lets many things be destroyed” (added emphasis; 2013, p. 26). In that sense, the archiving event is always marked with violence since, while it must preserve the ‘archived event,’ it must *at one and the same time* select, censure, erase, which means neglect, reject, discard, destroy, forget all that is not archived. “The archive begins by selection, and this selection is a violence” declared Derrida in a set of remarks made on June 25, 2002, at the *Institut National de l'Audiovisuel* (INA) in Paris,<sup>6</sup> and published in 2013 in a text titled “Trace and Archive.” In those remarks, he made a distinction between the trace and the archive, affirming that “there is no archive without a trace,” but “every trace is not an archive in so far as the archive presupposes ... that the trace be appropriated, controlled, organized” (2013, p. 23). It is this ‘evaluation,’ this selection, which shift the trace to the status

<sup>5</sup>For example, such obvious titles as: *Archive Fever*; *The Secrets of the Archive*; *Copy, Archive, Signature*; *The Next to Last Word: Archives of the Confession in Typewriter Ribbon*. In other works, the word does not appear in the title, but the concept is no less central: *Of Grammatology* (the trace); *Specters of Marx* and *Ulysses Gramophone* (hauntology); *Echographies*; *No Journalists*; *A taste for the Secret*; *Above All*; *No Apocalypse, Not Now*; *Choosing One's Heritage in For What Tomorrow... A Dialogue*; and Derrida's last interview with *Le Monde* (August 19, 2004, 2 months before his death on October 8): *I'm at War with Myself*.

<sup>6</sup>Created in 1975, the INA is a cultural public institution precisely responsible for the preservation and valorization of radio and television archives and for the transmission of our audiovisual heritage, in France and abroad.

of archive. As such, archivization attempts to preserve selected traces which, in that sense, are always finite.

In his 2002 remarks, Derrida made another distinction between the trace and the archive, based on their relation to power. By appropriating, controlling, and organizing traces, naming them, the archive exerts its power over the trace. Derrida insisted that “There are no archives without a power of capitalization or of monopoly ... of a gathering of statutory traces that are recognized as traces. In other words, there are no archives without political power” (2013, p. 23). Who or what authority decides on what will be archived? According to which and whose criteria?

In essence, a trace is erasable, can be lost. If selected to be preserved as an archive, it will be assigned to a support, “whether tablet or papyrus or paper or hard drive or, today, ‘tablet’ again” (Naas 2015, p. 128), all liable to be damaged or lost (a stark reality when in 2005 Katrina hit New Orleans, for example). The astounding advances in technology have greatly diminished those risks, multiplied the possibilities to increase the volume of the archive, and enhanced its secure safekeeping. The concern for ‘finite survival’ is still there though; but because of

the enormous and unprecedented advances ... in the technical possibilities of archivization, it is becoming today harder and harder not to indulge in the dream of an archive that would become so effective, so performative, that it would be more or less total or absolute. (Naas 2015, p. 133)

Not a position Derrida supported in his 2004 last interview (2004 and 2007). He did acknowledge the progress of our techno-cultural potential; however, he did not believe that it could guarantee the survival of the archive. He declared: whereas people from

previous generations ... thought that such and such a work would survive, owing to its qualities, for one, two – or in the case of Plato, 25 – centuries ... today the acceleration of modalities of storage but also the wear and the wearing out change the structure and the temporal parameters of our legacy. As regards thinking especially, the question of survival has become subject to too many unknowns. (2007, p. 9)

Shortly before his death, he confided, not for the first time, how this question of archive, inheritance, and legacy ‘preoccupied’ him, ‘constantly.’ He asked: “Who is going to inherit and how? ... we exert ourselves without knowing whom exactly the thing we leave behind is entrusted to” (2007, p. 9). What will be preserved, left out, what will be archived, by whom, how, and where?

## *Heritage and Legacy*

The archive is what the future will inherit, the legacy of the past to future generations. Derrida has emphasized the importance of our cultural and philosophical heritage and has often stressed the necessity of a ‘philosophical memory.’ He himself has repeatedly paid homage to, and ‘marked the alliance with,’ the philosophers

who preceded him,<sup>7</sup> acknowledging himself as their 'heir,' be it "a question of life or work or thought" (Derrida and Roudinesco 2004, p. 3).

In *The Freedom of Spirit* (1960/1962), using a metaphor of economy, Paul Valéry considered the becomings<sup>8</sup> of culture as an accumulation of capital: "For myself ... they are a kind of capital that grows and ... can be used and accumulated, can increase and diminish like all the imaginable kinds of capital" (Valéry, p. 1089/200).<sup>9</sup> This 'cultural capital' is the archive from the past. And as indicated earlier, this archive, this cultural capital is finite, precarious, fragile, and uncertain. Its survival, its "salvation ... resuscitation or reanimation" (Naas 2015, p. 132) depends on its being "read, interpreted, taught, saved, translated, reprinted, illustrated, filmed, kept alive by millions of inheritors" (Derrida 2010, p. 130). Valéry stressed that artifacts, "*things*, material objects – books, pictures, instruments, etc. – having the probable lifespan, the fragility, and the precariousness of *things*" (original emphasis; p. 1089/200), are not sufficient to ensure a cultural legacy. They require individuals "*who need them and know how to use them*" (original emphasis; Valéry, p. 1089/200). Derrida put it another way, arguing that the archive "resuscitates, each time a breath of living reading, each time a breath of the other or the other breath, each time an intentionality intends it and makes it live again by animating it" (2010, pp. 132–133). Valéry emphasized the need for individuals with "a thirst for knowledge and for the power of inner transformation" (p. 1090/201). The disappearance of those individuals who could keep the memory of a heritage, keep the archive alive, was for Valéry what constitutes the ultimate threat to our cultural heritage.

Commenting on Valéry's text, in *The Other Heading* (1992a), Derrida argued for the necessity of a 'responsible memory,' of both 'repetition and memory,' and of individuals who are capable of assuming the responsibility of this heritage, who are "prepared to respond, to respond *before*, to respond *of*, and to respond *to* what they had heard, seen, read, and known the first time"<sup>10</sup> (original emphasis; p. 70). It is this 'repetition,' this responsibility toward the cultural capital, toward the archive, which guarantee the growth of a 'universal capital.' But for Derrida, the acknowledgment of our heritage is anything but a passive repetition; it entails a willingness to assume this legacy, "as a heritage one calls upon to form new questions or new propositions" (2002a, npn). With a constant reflection fundamental to philosophy, one must put this heritage into question, challenge it, and re-think its assumed certainties. This deconstruction, Derrida understands it as "a tension between memory, fidelity, the preservation of something that has been given to us, and at the same time heterogeneity, something absolutely new" (in Derrida and Caputo 1997, p. 6).

<sup>7</sup>e.g., in no particular order: Plato, Descartes, Kant, Nietzsche, Hegel, Heidegger, Husserl, Rousseau, St. Augustine, Jabès, Ceylan, Levinas, Genet, Lacan, Levi-Strauss, Foucault, Althusser, Deleuze, Lyotard, Artaud, Austin, and others still.

<sup>8</sup>Plural form in Valéry's text.

<sup>9</sup>The first number refers to the French text, the second to the Folliot and Mathews's English translation.

<sup>10</sup>Translation slightly modified. Brault and Nass's original translation: "prepared to respond *to*, to respond *before*, to be responsible *for* and to respond *to*..." – "to respond *for*" means "to be responsible *for*" and respects the parallel structure of the sentence based on "to respond."

A recurring paradox underlies this tension in the necessity to neither accept everything, nor reject anything, to be both faithful and unfaithful to a legacy, that is, not to accept a heritage wholesale ‘passively,’ but to deconstruct it, understand it through its genealogy, its fractures, its gaps, its inconsistencies and contradictions. It is to know it well enough to be able to uncover its sedimentations, layer by layer – not to destroy the preceding systems of thought, but to try to analyze them, uncover their origin, their composition, and assumptions. The choice is then given and received through the experience of this reaffirmation and double injunction, experienced anew in each different context, through new steps of identification, selection, filtering, and interpretation of the archive. In “The Deconstruction of Actuality” (2002c), Derrida explained:

whoever inherits chooses one spirit rather than another. One makes selections, one filters, one sifts through the ghosts or through the injunctions of each spirit. There is legacy only where assignments are multiple and contradictory, secret enough to defy interpretation, to carry the unlimited risk of active interpretation.... A legacy must retain an undecidable reserve. (p. 111)

For example, when Derrida draws on philosophers who preceded him, he “makes [their] works speak from within,” extracting their innermost voices “through their fault lines, their blanks, their margins, their contradictions, but without trying to kill them” (Roudinesco, in Derrida and Roudinesco 2004, p. 2). For Derrida, this recognition carries the necessity of a response to “a sort of double injunction, a contradictory assignment” (in Derrida and Roudinesco 2004, p. 3).

First, we must learn what came ‘before us,’ then we must reaffirm it: “It is necessary first of all to know and to know how to *reaffirm* what comes before us” (in Derrida and Roudinesco 2004, 3). Since our heritage comes before us, it comes to us; it is received by us without our being given a chance to choose it. What is left to us is the power to reaffirm it, yet not without a critical step. The contradiction Derrida perceived is between the passivity of reception and the decision to say “yes”... or “no” (in Derrida and Roudinesco 2004, p. 4). With this decision, this acceptance, comes the necessity to “select, to filter, to interpret, and therefore to transform; to not leave intact, unharmed” (in Derrida and Roudinesco 2004, p. 4).

Secondly, in an approach similar to that required by the act of archivization, while one reaffirms one’s heritage, in order to do so, *at the same time*, one must question it, reinterpret it, critique and displace it. Derrida believed that one must take ‘the unlimited risk of active interpretation,’ one must resist conditioning, escape enlisting, and challenge conformity.

## Thinking Education Through Derrida

### *Reading Derrida*

Through Derrida’s texts, through an attentive and thoughtful reading, we may gain a better understanding of what educational issues we must face. Such reading may also help us articulate more clearly these problems, yet not find solutions which are

a closure, but 'solutions' which we shall see Derrida calls on us to question, relentlessly. Reading Derrida, we do not seek to reduce "the profound arguments which form in his work ... to trivial statements used to talk about implications for schooling" (personal communication, 2000). Indeed, any attempt to summarize complex concepts, to recall them more or less exactly, more or less precisely in order to be able to try and draw some specific 'implications' to be 'applied' to education would not carry much meaning, and would amount to misreading this author. It is not a matter of striving to relate his thoughts to issues of pedagogy or didactics either.

Rather, reading Derrida in the context of education "calls for *an engagement of his form of reasoning and analyzing* with educational issues" (Biesta and Egéa 2011, p.4). Reading Derrida's texts, the way he read other philosophers before him, needs an attentive and respectful reading "through work which actually requires time, discipline, and patience, work that requires several readings, new types of reading, too, in a variety of different fields" (Derrida 1995, p. 401). Furthermore "it is also, and at the least, the taking of a position, in work itself, toward the politico-institutional structures that constitute and regulate our practice, our competences, and our performances" (Derrida 1992b, p. 23).

It is worth noting that, in his own teaching, his own pedagogy, what I would call 'the art of reading' was paramount and constitutes a strong example. Not only were all his seminars prepared and written with great care, "with a very clear pedagogical purpose" Nass reminded us (2015, p. 3), but they were also, like the conferences he delivered, "meant to be understood by those hearing them for the first time" (p. 3). To anyone who ever attended any of Derrida's seminars where he taught his "students how to *read*" (p. 3) works of philosophy or literature, his 'pedagogy' was inspiring. Grounded in reading, he led his students "to read texts closely and patiently, in their letter," and then taught them "how to read them in relation to other texts, themes, and questions from the history of philosophy and literature" (p. 3). Beyond teaching his students about "various philosophical and literary themes, figures and problems," he taught them "how to read, how to question, and, thus, how to teach in turn" (Nass 2015, p. 1). And here, if any, lies a lesson for us, philosophers of education and educators.

In the limits of this chapter and in the context of reading Derrida and focusing on his legacy, as an example, we shall consider two of our most urgent current educational concerns: the closing of philosophy, philosophy of education, and humanities programs at all levels; and the commodification and corporatization of education and the necessity of philosophy education.<sup>11</sup>

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<sup>11</sup>Longer studies on these topics were published earlier, e.g., Egéa-Kuehne (2003, 2012), Egéa (2016a, b)

## *Philosophy and the Mission of the University*

Earlier we saw how Valéry (1960/1962) stressed that, in order for a cultural legacy not only to be sustained but to grow, to flourish, it is essential for individuals to gain knowledge of their heritage, to “know how to acquire [and] exercise the necessary habits, the intellectual discipline, the conventions and methods” indispensable to make a wise use of the archive, of our accumulated capital, “to exploit the arsenal of documents and instruments accumulated over the centuries” (p. 1090/201). This is precisely where philosophy is indispensable. To cultivate the knowledge of one’s heritage, “philosophical teaching must continue to develop, one must continue to read, the relation to tradition must be as cultivated as possible” (Derrida 2002b, p. 15). But at the same time, while being true to the memory of a culture, to what one receives from the past, while continuing to faithfully preserve the archive and pass along a legacy to the future generations, we saw that one must also break from the tradition and strive to inaugurate something new. The pedagogy involved in the teaching of philosophy cannot be one of mere reproduction, which would soon lead to a closing upon itself of the field. It must include *putting into question* past certitudes and assumptions.

Consequently and paradoxically, we must reiterate and stress that one can be faithful to one’s heritage only in as much as one accepts to be unfaithful, to analyze it, to critique it, to interpret it, insistently. Philosophy of education and the teaching of philosophy carry a right, a duty, a responsibility to question philosophy itself and its heritage. Not only must philosophy be taught, it must also be questioned, relentlessly, and philosophy of education must endeavor to do so; it has always been important, and now even more than ever before, to “negotiate a relation ... to philosophy in a philosophical place but also a place where philosophy will be put into question” (Derrida 2002b, p. 18). Questioning was at the root of Derrida’s thought, which was most prominent when he addressed the mission of the university. In his May 2002 interview, he recalled that the concept of the university is

a place of absolute independence in the questioning and in the quest for truth, in the face of any power, political, economic, religious, etc. That is the concept of the university, the principle of the unconditional freedom of the university. (2002a, npn)

and within the university, of philosophy.

In the same interview, Derrida recalled that the founding principle of the university has a history, a heritage of several centuries, and that, if it is to be faithful to its principle, the university must not only allow questioning, even questioning itself, but it must in fact *foster it and nurture it*: “it must not interdict any question, any putting to question, any discourse” within its own borders. The most challenging questions should not be excluded from inside the university, especially not according to “criteria external to the university,” whether these criteria be issued from governmental, techno-scientific, ideological, religious, or economic concerns. Furthermore, within its borders, “the university can discuss, fight against, object,



contest,” these same questions and discourses.<sup>12</sup> Philosophy must question the question itself, its principle, as well as its content. In fact, in his various texts and lectures on the university without condition, Derrida insisted repeatedly that even questioning should not be beyond question, especially within philosophy. He claimed the university as the “ultimate place of critical resistance – and more than critical – to all the powers of dogmatic and unjust appropriation” (Derrida 2002d, p. 204).

This is where the question of the ‘unconditional university’ comes in (university as distinct from other research institutions serving, ‘sponsored by,’ commercial and economic interests), the ‘university without condition,’ where the new Humanities and philosophy should be capable of taking on the task of deconstruction, as a right,

as an unconditional right to ask critical questions ... about the history even of the notion of critique, about the form and the authority of the question, about the interrogative form of thought. For this implies the right to do it *affirmatively and performatively*. (original emphasis; Derrida 2002d, p. 204).

On the next page, Derrida added: “The university should thus also be the place in which *nothing is beyond the question* ... not even the traditional idea of critique, meaning theoretical critique, and not even the authority of the ‘question’ form, of thinking” (emphasis added; p. 205). Not only has the university a “principlial right to say everything,” to question everything, but, at the same time, it should also, again especially through philosophy, “reflect, invent and pose,” profess and teach the “principle of unconditional resistance” as a fundamental right, *questioning even the question* (Derrida 2002d, p. 204–205). And that, questioning, questioning even the question, is one of the most powerful aspects of Derrida’s legacy.

Another most serious current problem in education, intensified by the unprecedented swift development of technology and the money market, is the commodification of education supported by the corporate model. Here, many of Derrida’s texts offer the rationale to argue in favor of the necessity of philosophy education and for the right of access to philosophy programs and the right of teaching philosophy.

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<sup>12</sup>The preceding quotes are from Derrida’s 2002 interview with France 3. However, he has spoken and published numerous times about ‘the university without condition.’ See for example the Stanford lecture written in response to an invitation for the Presidential Lecture Series in the Humanities and Arts hosted by President Gerhard Casper of Stanford University and organized by Hans Ulrich Gumbrecht in 1999. Originally titled “The Future of the Profession; or, The University Without Condition (Thanks to the ‘Humanities,’ What *Could Take Place* Tomorrow),” it was published under the title “The University Without Condition” in *Without Alibi* (2002d). With minor variations, the same lecture was delivered at the University of SUNY Albany on October 11, 1999, under the title “The Future of the Profession or the Unconditional University.” It was hosted by Tom Cohen, and David Wills. It was published in 2001 under the title “The future of the profession or the university without condition (thanks to the ‘Humanities,’ what *could take place* tomorrow)” (2001a).

## *Commodification and Corporatization of Education: The Necessity of Philosophy*

In 2000, Taylor already announced: “Education is the oil of the 21st century.” In the past decades, institutions across North America and Western Europe have had to suffer “dramatic program cuts” (Wilson 2012) or be closed altogether, mostly if not in priority in the humanities departments and philosophy programs. To someone who understands the nature of higher education in the USA, it should come as no surprise that this trend has only grown stronger over the years. Besides the fact that no other country is as well (Web-)connected as the USA, it is also where education has long been said to be ‘a business,’ in which ‘schools market’ and ‘students shop.’ The line between education and training is increasingly blurred, and a utilitarian approach to education more heavily promoted than ever. For example, besides the hegemony of the STEM model, education must comply with ‘school-to-work,’ accountability of teachers and school systems as well as students, mandatory ‘performance assessment,’ with the requirements of standards, outcomes, benchmarks, and so on. Ranking is ubiquitous from schools and school districts to journals (e.g., ‘impact factor’), to international or global ranking of universities. Almost two decades ago, in *Dancing with the Devil* (Katz 1999), James Duderstadt argued that the university was inadequate in its size and practices... even as it is now. He believed that higher education must be ‘scalable,’ which is made possible by Internet, which is perfectly suited to deliver the desired products. He also suggested that soon,

a small number of academic celebrities, a larger number of “content providers,” and a still larger number of “learning facilitators” [would] create “learningware products” and market “courseware” for “an array of for-profit service companies” who in turn [would] sell these products to students.

It is now a reality.<sup>13</sup>

A decade ago, in a December 2008 special issue from UNESCO’s Global Monitoring Report (GMR) Team titled *Education: The other global emergency*, Stéphane Hessel alerted us to what he saw as his greatest concerns. Four years later, in a November 12, 2012, interview, he reiterated his concern and emphasized that “it is through education that current shortcomings can be addressed,” and that

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<sup>13</sup>For example, *Learningware* (<http://www.learningware.in/>) is a leader in developing digital education resources for higher education. They advertise: “Our digital library for engineering education contains 30,000+ learning objects across 56 courses and comes with a powerful set of pedagogic tools including animations, simulations, graphical slides and question banks.... These resources significantly enhance teaching-learning outcomes through structured, engaging and interactive content. Colleges and universities can sign up to access *Learningware* for all their students, teachers and administrators.” They offer: teaching-learning resources, pedagogic tools designed to enhance teaching-learning outcomes, including animations and simulations; access to question banks, large banks of multiple-choice and subjective exam questions across different taxonomy and difficulty levels; custom cloud deployment for college; content mapped to multiple global curricula including USA, India, UK, and many state university standards.

“whatever advancement ... it will be inextricably linked to progress made in the area of education” (p. 4–5). That same month, the 2012 Global Education for All (EFA) meeting was organized by UNESCO and hosted by the government of France in Paris. A Final Statement was issued, “reaffirm[ing] education as a fundamental human right, as enshrined in Article 26 of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and as reflected in the 1990 Jomtien Declaration and the 2000 Dakar Framework for Action” (2012, Item 5, p. 1).

Grounding this reflection in a reading of Derrida, we can see the role philosophers of education can and should play, and their responsibility in the face of the impossible task assigned to education in a time Shakespeare would deem ‘out of joint.’ Indeed, as indicated in his several addresses before UNESCO, Derrida emphasized the crucial importance of philosophy and philosophers. He expressed the same urgency on many other occasions. For example, in his 2002 interview, following up on the deep concern expressed in the media as to the politicians’ ability to analyze and respond to major socio-political developments, Charles Pépin asked Derrida whether “the mighty of this world, heads of states and corporations” should be educated in philosophy. Derrida responded not to entertain too many “illusions as to the organized, institutional, pedagogical form” such a teaching could take. But he recognized that “corporate executives, policy makers, and especially politicians” would benefit from it, in particular since “all the decisions ... so-called ethical, theo-ethical, which must be taken today, questions of sovereignty, questions of international law, have been the objects of philosophical research for a very long time, and in a renewed fashion now” (2002a: npn). In that interview, Derrida insisted that philosophy is more than ever necessary to respond to ‘the most urgent questions’ raised by today’s socio-political issues.

Never as much as today have I thought that philosophy was indispensable to respond to the most urgent questions of society.... Never has philosophy appeared to me as vitally indispensable as *today*. (original emphasis; 2002a, npn)

He underscored that those concerns require a questioning and a reflection guided by the philosophy model, and a sound knowledge of our epistemological heritage is indispensable to inform a responsible response.

Additionally, as seen earlier, not only must philosophy be taught, it must also be questioned, relentlessly, and philosophy of education must endeavor to do so; it has always been important, and now even more than ever before, to “negotiate a relation ... to philosophy in a philosophical place but also a place where philosophy will be put into question” (2002b, p. 18), such as the unconditional university. In the current global, socioeconomic, and educational context, Derrida’s questions, although posed 15 years ago, sound most urgent:

What are the concrete stakes of this situation today? Why must the important questions concerning philosophical teaching and research, why must the imperative of the right to philosophy be deployed in their international dimension today more than ever? Why are the responsibilities which need to be taken no longer, and even less today in the twenty-first century, simply national? What do “national,” “cosmopolitan,” “universal” mean here for, and with regard to, philosophy, philosophical research, philosophical education or training,

or even for a philosophical question or practice that would not be essentially linked to research or education? (2002b, p. 332)

In this context, Derrida had already pointed out, the necessity of philosophy and the teaching of philosophy, as well as the responsibilities at stake, must be considered beyond national borders, on a global and universal level.

Furthermore, I would argue with Derrida that, in the context of globalization, one of the responsibilities of today's philosopher is the necessity to move beyond the worn opposition Eurocentrism vs. anti-Eurocentrism. While upholding the memory of an epistemological heritage essentially Euro-Christian, it is a prime example of the necessity to both recognize its origins and go beyond its limits. It is also essential to be aware that philosophy has been and is being transformed and appropriated by non-European languages and cultures. According to Derrida, this is what a close, 'long and slow' study of its historical roots and development should reveal – a study he did not have time to pursue before 2004.

Following Derrida's thought, letting philosophy, even under the label of cosmopolitanism, be determined by "the old, tiresome, wearing, wearying opposition between Eurocentrism and anti-Eurocentrism" (2002d, p. 336) would be limiting any access to philosophy and to its teaching. In order to follow up and understand 'what is happening and can still happen under the name of philosophy,' I propose to carefully consider the three fields of reflection suggested by Derrida under three 'titles.' According to him, they "could be the concrete conditions for the respect and extension of the right to philosophy" (2002d, p. 337).

1. *First title.* Whoever thinks that the right to philosophy from a cosmopolitan point of view must be respected, granted, extended will have to take into account the competition that exists and has always existed between several models, styles, philosophical traditions.
2. *Second title.* The respect and extension of the right to philosophy to all people also presupposes ... the appropriation but also the overflowing of what are said to be ... the founding or originary languages of philosophy – the Greek, Latin, Germanic or Arabic languages.
3. *Third title.* Although philosophy does not simply amount to its institutional or pedagogical moments, nonetheless the many differences of tradition, style, language, and philosophical nationality are translated or embodied in the institutional or pedagogical models, at times even produced by those structures. (Derrida 2002d, p. 337–340)

The closing of philosophy programs and the commodification and corporatization of education are only two examples where reading Derrida can highlight the importance and the necessity of maintaining, cultivating, and questioning our epistemological heritage. More than ever philosophy and philosophy of education are necessary, for they are indispensable to understand our commitments and responsibilities in the face of those unprecedented challenges and to help us make responsible decisions. This is precisely where reading Derrida can be most powerful.

Two concepts in particular not only help appreciate Derrida's detailed analysis and interpretation of philosophical texts, from Plato to his contemporaries, but they

offer philosophers of education some powerful paradigms to move toward a sounder understanding of the issues at stake in education; for through reading Derrida's texts, we find new ways of thinking and new ways of assuming responsibility.

## Legacy of Two Major Concepts: Aporia, *À-venir*

### *Aporia and Responsibility*

Derrida has extensively analyzed double injunctions, contradictory imperatives, aporias, and ambiguities, and his writings can help us make sense of paradoxical events and situations frequently encountered in education. A most appropriate example here to understand the concept of aporia, essential in education, is precisely the context of heritage and legacy. Above, we discussed how Derrida maintains that “the heir must always respond to a sort of double injunction, a contradictory assignation” (Derrida and Roudinesco 2004, p. 3). Roudinesco understands that for Derrida “the best way to be faithful to a heritage is to be unfaithful” (p. 2), creating a tension between two imperatives. We must know our heritage, but *at the same time*, “this very heritage ... demands reinterpretation, critique, displacement ... a transformation” (original emphasis; pp. 3 and 4). Going one step further, Derrida asserts that it is precisely within our philosophical heritage that we can find the “conceptual tools” which will enable us to challenge the limits of this heritage, as traditionally defined and imposed.

To engage oneself as a philosopher, Derrida believes that one “must do otherwise than merely follow up (*faire du suivisme*) and obey given watchwords or instructions. One must disengage oneself [*se désengager*]” (Derrida 2002a, npn). The paradox and the danger, the dangerous paradox for a philosopher is that he or she must negotiate a balance between engagement and disengagement. Derrida believes that one “can engage politically, *as a philosopher*, only in so far as he or she maintains as much freedom as possible in regards to all that is imposed on him or her as hegemonic discourse, well-received axioms, etc.” (original emphasis; Derrida 2002a, npn). Derrida views his own engagement as concomitant with a necessary autonomy; for him, “[his] political duty as a philosopher” means “being engaged without alienating [his] freedom, [his] right to disengage” (Derrida 2002a, npn). This is closely linked to the aporia of responsible decision. However much Derrida can, and is willing to, account for the heterogeneity and complexity of a situation, ‘when it is necessary,’ he recognizes that there are times ‘when an urgent and binary choice’ is called for in a specific instance; he believes that it is then his “duty to respond in a simple [i.e., straightforward] fashion” (Derrida 2002a, npn), when it is necessary to take a definite stand. Derrida recognizes:

That is not easy. It is even impossible to conceive of a responsibility that consists in being responsible *for* two laws, or that consists in responding *to* two contradictory injunctions. No doubt. But there is no responsibility that is not the experience and experiment of the impossible. (original emphasis; Derrida 1992a, pp. 44–45)

These double injunctions, contradictions, aporias, are, according to Derrida, the very essence of responsibility. He has described and discussed extensively, and in most of his texts, how these dilemmas are inherent in the concept of responsibility, are in fact *the very condition* of its possibility. For “at a certain point, promise and decision, which is to say responsibility, owe their possibility to the ordeal of undecidability which will always remain their condition” (Derrida 1994, p. 75). He stresses repeatedly that, if there is an easy decision to make, and only a set of rules to follow, or a program to implement, there is, in fact, no decision to be made, therefore, no responsibility to be taken.

Our responsibility, as philosophers and as educators, entails being wary of “*both* repetitive memory *and* the completely other, the absolutely new” (original emphasis; Derrida 1992a, p. 19). Which is why we have to be careful, to be ‘vigilant,’ a term often used by Derrida, who prompts us to be wary of “*both* anamnestic capitalization *and* the amnesic exposure to what would no longer be identifiable at all” (original emphasis; p. 19). The difficulty is in assuming a responsibility which is double and contradictory. For while we must preserve and guard an ideal of culture, and an ideal of philosophy, we must also remain aware that a heritage of culture and philosophy (be it of Europe or any other culture) cannot enclose itself within the borders of the university; because the heritage of philosophy “consists precisely in *not* closing itself off in its own identity and in advancing itself in an exemplary way toward what it is not ... indeed ... perhaps something else altogether” (added emphasis; Derrida 1992a, p. 29). Derrida defines “the condition of possibility of this thing called responsibility” as “a certain *experience and experiment of the possibility of the impossible: the testing of the aporia* from which one may invent the only possible invention, the impossible invention” (original emphasis; Derrida 1992a, p. 41). He also shows how closely related aporia, responsibility, and ethics are, declaring: “ethics, politics and responsibility, *if there are any*, will only ever have begun with the experience and the experiment of the aporia” (original emphasis; Derrida 1992a, p. 41). Derrida’s analysis of aporias and antinomies can help us understand not only the complexity of double injunctions facing philosophers of education, but also the necessity to recognize and acknowledge them, and to see the true dilemma *not* as a choice, but as a responsibility to, *both and at the same time*, the multiple imperatives inherent in education and knowledge, and the concomitant issues of ethics and justice.

This touches upon two essential and tightly linked concepts, fundamental in Derrida’s texts and in education: ‘à venir/to come,’ and ‘promise.’

### **À-venir/To Come and Promise**

Derrida links the concept of aporia – this condition of possibility as being dependent on the simultaneous necessity of a condition of impossibility – to the experience of à-venir, to come, to the promise. It is by opening a space for the affirmation of this

promise, of the “messianic and emancipatory promise as promise” (Derrida 1994, p. 75), of the impossible event as a promise, that it will preserve its capital of possibilities, of dynamic ideal in-the-making, *à venir*, to-come. Derrida developed his concept of ‘to-come’ in particular when discussing democracy, then complexified it with the notions of ‘as if’ and ‘perhaps,’ analyzed at length in his various versions on the theme of the unconditional university.<sup>14</sup> This ideal of philosophy and education which would be characteristic of the unconditional, unconditionally free, autonomous university is an idea, an ideal toward which we must strive.

However, when Derrida talks about an ideal of philosophy or of the university *à-venir*, to-come, his reference is not to how we know them now, as determined by their history, their heritage. He makes it clear that the political, philosophical, and economic dimensions of our world have changed, are still changing (increasingly faster), and that philosophers the world over have to re-evaluate, re-think, re-conceptualize the meaning of ‘old’ paradigms and develop new ones. This does not mean, for example, some new brand of philosophy or education which will realize itself only in a future time, nor “a regulating idea, in the Kantian sense, or ... a utopia” (Derrida 1994, p. 65). What Derrida proposes here is some openness to the future and to the other, the different, the new, to renewal which he sees as enlarged and re-elaborated concepts, including but broader than the traditional and humanist project. By the concept of philosophy and education ‘to-come,’ Derrida refers to the very concepts of philosophy and education ‘as the concept of a promise,’ a concept he has further developed in *Specters of Marx* (1994) and his texts on the unconditional university.

The possibility, the eventuality of this promise, is absolutely dependent on preserving within itself a hope, but a hope which can never be expected, anticipated, or identified as such. For the moment it is, it loses its very possibility. Derrida writes: “If one could *count* on what is coming, hope would be but the calculation of a program” (original emphasis; Derrida 1994, p. 169). In fact, it can manifest itself only where there is disruption, where there exists a gap between the present state of philosophy and education, and the idea, the ideal of philosophy and education. It is in this very gap that the future of the profession can be shaped, “between an infinite promise ... and the determined, necessary, but also necessarily inadequate forms of what has to be measured against this promise” (Derrida 1994, p. 65). Derrida’s words about “democracy to-come” can aptly be applied to the promise of philosophy of education, which cannot be a promise unless it “always keeps within ... this absolutely undetermined messianic hope at its heart, this eschatological relation to the to-come of an event *and* of a singularity, of an alterity that cannot be anticipated” (original emphasis; 1994, p. 65), which *must not* be anticipated, lest it would simply not be.

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<sup>14</sup>“What I would like to attempt with you is this apparently impossible thing: to link this ‘as if’ to the thinking of an event that, without necessarily coming about tomorrow, would remain perhaps – and I underscore *perhaps* – to come” (original emphasis; Derrida 2002d, p. 65).



In this gap must be preserved heterogeneity, “as the only chance of an affirmed or rather reaffirmed future” (Derrida 1994, p. 65). Without this gap, without this disruption, philosophy of education may simply believe, in all good conscience, that it has succeeded, and, as a consequence, it may miss its “chance for the future, of the promise or the appeal, or the desire also (that is, its own possibility)” (Derrida 1994, p. 65).

### *Derrida’s Legacy*

“If someone knew nothing about Derrida” (personal communication, 2017) and we could learn only one thing from him, it should be the importance and necessity of our philosophical heritage, and the importance not to simply keep its memory, but to question its teachings. From Derrida, we learn the importance of something found in all his writings: question, question, question again, and question the question. There are no experts. The moment we think we know something, we must look at it again, and question it, not in a nihilistic way, not to demolish it (the most misguided interpretation of deconstruction), but to either recognize its weaknesses, dismiss it (but should we, could we, ever totally dismiss anything we thought we knew?), revise it, shore it, or affirm it, build on it, and then question it again... and again.

The other aspect I find most useful in reading Derrida is his analysis and use of aporia and antinomies. In education, are we not always dealing with contradictory imperatives? For example, one situation of acute educational concern in most developed and developing countries, in particular as a consequence of sharply increased population movements and refugees, is: “How is it possible to reaffirm singularity, minority, specific idioms, natural languages, without giving rise to what we call nationalism in its violent and imperialistic form?” This dilemma, this double injunction, this paradox of universality is a challenge for all philosophers of education, all educators, to develop an ability to mediate differences and boundaries, exclusions and violence, hierarchies and borders, whether they be concerned with languages, rights, or democracy. So how can one respond *both to*, respond *for*, respond *to and for* two imperatives? How can one respond to both the necessity of respecting the voice of the other, the idiom of the other, the heterogeneity which welcomes the other, which is the necessary condition for the very presence of the other, *and at one and the same time*, to the necessity of a universal form of law? How can one satisfy to the conflicting imperatives of “neither monopoly nor dispersion”? How can one choose between two equally imperative injunctions? But again, while traditionally we were asked to make a choice, Derrida calls on us *not* to make a choice, but rather to face our dual responsibilities. As discussed above, that is not easy, but it is the very essence of responsibility.

As philosophers of education in an increasingly diverse and complex world, is it not our responsibility then *not* to simplify or to neutralize complex challenges and aporetic situations? Isn't it *not* to eliminate or exclude complex or controversial issues, but on the contrary, to make sure that they are part and parcel of our philosophy and our education, and that students are given a chance to develop the necessary skills to understand and analyze such problems? Isn't it our responsibility to re-evaluate, re-consider, and re-interpret our position along the continuum of double duties and responsibilities described by Derrida? Isn't it to engage ourselves and our students in a quest for knowledge which should take us all, way beyond the boundaries of our immediate sociocultural context in space and in time? Isn't it our responsibility to have the courage and to encourage our students to take risks, in learning and discovering the other, the unknown, while building up a greater sense of responsibility?

## Conclusion

Derrida's voice is now a 'voice from the past,' which can truly help us face education's most challenging problems. His archive is voluminous and still growing as more texts are made available, being translated, or published for the first time, as is the case of his 40 years-worth of seminars. In his last interview, Derrida declared "one has not yet begun to read me" (2007 p. 33). Indeed, no matter how many times one reads his texts, it is like reading them "for the first time" (Derrida 1992b, p. 70), each time finding more meanings, new layers. However, what this legacy means is definitely not a set of implications, much less rules one could apply to education. Rather, reading Derrida

*calls for an engagement of his forms of reasoning and analyzing with educational issues. It requires attentive and respectful reading "through work which actually requires time, discipline, and patience, work that requires several readings, new types of reading, too, in a variety of different fields" (Derrida 1995, p. 401). (in Biesta and Egéa-Kuehne 2011, p. 4).*

The power of Derrida's legacy for philosophy of education is evident on many levels, but especially in his defense of philosophy and of the 'unconditional university' in the present context of STEM hegemony, and the marketing of knowledge leading to yet more 'dramatic program cuts' (Wilson 2012). A questioning and a reflection guided by the philosophy of education model and a sound knowledge of our epistemological heritage are indispensable to inform a responsible response. There we see how a reading of Derrida helps understand how important and necessary our philosophical and Humanities heritage is, for us to be aware of, and respond to, the most urgent questions and dilemmas posed by the current socio-political context of education. Derrida's archive rich legacy can engage a thoughtful reader in some powerful rethinking of education, "analyzing all the assumptions, the hidden assumptions

which are implied in the philosophical, or the ethical, or the juridical, or the political” issues (Derrida 2011, p. 178). In Derrida’s corpus, we can find some powerful paradigms to develop a greater awareness and better understanding of the most critical educational challenges, their nature and their causes, and to move toward a more responsive and responsible approach to address them.

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# John Dewey and Beautiful Knowledge



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[T]he idea of asking philosophical positions, of attempted answers to the great philosophical questions, what difference they have made and can make in practice, what difference they make to our lives, is a necessary first step towards bringing philosophy back in contact with human concerns, a first step to doing what Dewey asked us to do when he wrote that “Philosophy recovers itself when it ceases to be a device for dealing with the problems of philosophers and becomes a method, cultivated by philosophers, for dealing with the problems of men.” (Putnam 2014)

We have heard of a Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge. It is said that knowledge is power; and the like. Methinks there is equal need of a Society for the Diffusion of Useful Ignorance, what we will call Beautiful Knowledge, a knowledge useful in a higher sense. (Thoreau 1991, p. 112)

## Introduction: What Is Useful Knowledge in the Global Economy?

What is useful knowledge for human beings? What is the task of philosophy in service of life? In times of a global economy, these familiar questions have gained a new resurgence. Problem-solving is taken to be the task of education in the terms of a global economy. The call to bring philosophy back to life and to return knowledge to practical use is emphasized all the more, yet with a distinctive sense. In the so-called knowledge economy, higher education in Europe, Gert Biesta has claimed, is under “an economic spell” (Biesta 2010, p. 45). Current discourse in Japanese educational policy further illustrates this. A recent policy statement from the Council for the Implementation of Education Rebuilding is entitled ‘Education for Realizing the Learning Society, Full Participation and the Revitalization of Local Communities’ (2015). The vision and language of education here is redolent with good intentions for the creation of a society that can respond to the diverse needs of people who want to continue their education. For lifelong learning and citizenship education,

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the significance of the *Shutai-teki* (active and autonomous) power of finding and solving problems is emphasized. Japan is encouraged to be a “country well developed for the solving of problems” (p. 3). But while the language of education is oriented towards practical use and problem-solving, these ideas themselves – *use*, *practicality*, *activity*, and *life* – are subordinated to economic need: so is democracy. What it means to acquire knowledge, what education’s role is in cultivating democratic citizenship, is skewed and narrowed in the discourse of global economy. Though this apparently humane language of education echoes Deweyan ideas of ever-continuing growth and self-realization, what is in fact envisioned is an ideal of the human being in terms of human resources for economic growth.

In the current circulation of the global economy as a part of our daily lives, we cannot ignore the use of knowledge in what we teach and what we learn. Neither simple evasion nor superficial criticism of the global economy will suffice in the face of what constitutes the reality of our lives today: we cannot avoid the currency of the language of the global economy and useful knowledge. A deeper threat lies in the fact that the currency of the language of use, which has come to dictate, so it seems, the terms of any philosophy for life, makes it difficult to think beyond its surface value, as if language itself blocked the liberating power of thought, circumscribing its own possibilities of circulation. For a higher sense of practice, the humanities must work to a different economy: they must question what it means to bring our thinking back to life; they must keep thinking about the meaning of practicality, usefulness, and the point of knowledge and enquiry.

Hence there is a need to present an alternative sense of useful knowledge. What should be resisted is the assimilation of the idea of use into the dominant discourse of profit, efficiency, and transparency. At the same time, the isolation of the humanities, especially philosophy, from the global trend of the economy of thought should also be resisted: a pedantic, abstract, and decontextualized philosophy colludes with the global economy by retaining the dichotomy between the useful and the useless, mind and body, and theory and practice. Now is the time to reconsider an alternative *use* of philosophy and education, to rethink the meaning of thinking in life, and the role of higher education in terms of the humanities, towards education for a higher sense of practice.

In response to this challenge, this chapter explores the contemporary significance of Dewey’s pragmatism – a philosophy in service of practice and action and answering to the problems of common people: it reevaluates the *use* of Dewey’s American philosophy today, especially as lip-service to this is sometimes paid in the rhetoric of this new, alleged practicality. Dewey’s pragmatism can offer us an insight into the current issue – *if*, in the spirit of “reconstruction in philosophy” (1920), it is critically reconstructed such that it is not assimilated simply into ‘pragmatic’ use and hijacked by a superficial idea of problem-solving and instrumentality.

In the following, I shall first introduce some philosophical features of Dewey’s pragmatism as a philosophy for life, showing how they are relevant to the issue of useful knowledge today. Second, for the sake of making Dewey’s pragmatism more thoroughly and robustly resist the tide of global the economy, I shall explore a dimension of *thinking beyond problem-solving*. These matters are pursued in terms



of interrelated notions *the obscure* and *twilight*. Dewey's later writings on aesthetics shed light on an alternative sense of useful knowledge. What Thoreau calls Beautiful Knowledge here helps show that it is a way to make best use of the wisdom of Dewey's pragmatism, and more in general, of American philosophy in resistance to the tide of the global economy.

## The Use of Dewey's Pragmatism Today: Problem-Solving and Criticism

Inheriting Emerson's call for a "philosophy of life" (Emerson 2000, p. 58), Dewey developed the idea of democracy as a personal way of living (creating democracy from within), of philosophy for the common man, and most importantly, of philosophy as education. In particular among classical pragmatists it is Dewey who demonstrates most concretely the contemporary significance of the *praxis* of pragmatism for the reconsideration of useful knowledge and education. Thinking in life as a whole means going beyond the dichotomies of mind and body, means and ends, and fact and value. Dewey's pragmatism is known to be a kind of "instrumentalism" (Bernstein 2014, p. 11): thinking and knowledge are instruments to solve problems in our daily lives. *Praxis* and action are internal to the nature of American philosophy. The idea of useful knowledge is inseparable from this problem-solving as a mode of thinking. Against the opposition of "experience and true knowledge" (Dewey 1980, p. 271), Dewey reclaims "knowledge of *how to do*" (p. 192, my italics). With regard to informational knowledge, he says: "To be informed is to be posted; it is to have at command the subject matter needed for an effective dealing with a problem, and for giving added significance to the search for solution and to the solution itself" (p. 196). Such knowledge is a medium through which mind goes through a "passage from doubt to discovery" (p. 196): it is "experimental" (p. 197). Precisely because it is a philosophy for use, Dewey's pragmatism has the potential to resist dichotomous thinking and its consequent narrowing of the sense of useful knowledge.

Dewey's idea of thinking, however, cannot be simply contained in this stereotypical mode of problem-solving. This is best shown in his recount of critical thinking. Dewey says that a key to creative activity is criticism (Dewey 1984, p. 143). His idea of the "criticism of criticisms" (Dewey 1981, p. 298) is, on Hilary Putnam's account, a matter of "higher-level criticism," involving "'standing back' and criticizing even the ways in which we are accustomed to criticize ideas, the criticism of our ways of criticism" (Putnam 2004, p. 96). Criticism of criticisms is distinguished from analytical thinking for clarity. Rather it involves the robust power of thinking thoroughly in the uncertainty of life. It is also a key to creative democracy (Dewey 1984, p. 143).

Dewey's criticism of criticisms opens a horizon of thinking beyond problem-solving – requiring us to delve more subtly into ordinary life. It offers a key towards a higher sense of practice and useful knowledge. Critical thinking in this sense

involves an awakening to what has not been thought before, an adventure into the unknown by taking a chance. Critical thinking entails, as a precondition of problem-solving, the existential question of how human beings can convert crisis into a chance to be taken, and how we can transform the way we live our lives. It is risk-taking by nature, involving an awakening to what has not been thought before, an adventure into the realm of the unknown. In *Art as Experience* (1934), Dewey calls this comprehensive notion of thinking ‘creative intelligence’ – a kind of thinking that integrates reason with emotion and imagination (Dewey 1987, p. 351).

Furthermore, thinking beyond problem-solving requires a peculiar mode of thinking – thinking in “middle term” (Dewey 1983, p. 96): American philosophy entails the possibility of opening a third way of thinking – a form of antifoundationalism beyond the dichotomy between foundationalism and *anti*-foundationalism. In order to adventure into ‘genuine uncertainty’, Dewey takes *chance* to be the crucial element. Taking a chance, the moment of the leap, is at the heart of his experimentalism and philosophy for action. To think without fixed ground does not mean that anything goes. This is an idea of perfection without final perfectibility, without abrogating the quest for a better life. Thinking on the way, however, *is* difficult. Thinking on tiptoe is a key to sustaining a form of antifoundationalism that neither fully abrogates grounding nor fully relies on secure grounding. As Dewey expresses this poignantly, “Perfection means *perfecting*, fulfillment, fulfilling, and the good is now or never” (Dewey 1983, p. 200, my italics). This is what might be called perfectionist antifoundationalism – a kind of antifoundationalism that does not fall into relativism or anarchy and that retains a quest for a better life. Criteria for the betterment of life are constantly to be revised in an ongoing process of communication.

Still, American philosophy needs to show policy-makers the *merit* of choosing this risk-taking and unstable mode of living. The foundationalist drive is a part of the human condition. It can always lure us to the apparently secure and yet surface value of language in educational policy. This is a state in which each of us stops thinking for ourselves, relying instead on, and being assimilated into, the circulation of the existing economy of exchange. What would be the best possible use of the antifoundationalism of American philosophy for education? How can we shift the mode of our thinking?

## **The Obscure and the Twilight: Thinking Beyond Problem-Solving**

The discourse of problem-solving, however, is on the verge of falling into the hands of the global economy, one that one hundred years ago Dewey would strongly have opposed. Precisely because it is a philosophy that would not *avoid* use, Dewey’s pragmatism must resist being assimilated into this dominant use. His discourse and pragmatism in themselves must be reconstructed, beyond the terms of problem-solving. Dewey acknowledges the limits of scientific intelligence in his reference to

the obscure and the hidden (Dewey 1983, p. 200), the qualitative background of thinking (Dewey 1987, p. 197). These matters are pursued here then in relation to antifoundationalism as realized especially in the idea of betweenness, poignantly captured in notions of the obscure and twilight.

To think in an antifoundationalist way, by standing on tiptoe, one must venture into the precarious borderland between the known and the unknown, on the threshold of “a residuum unknown, unanalyzable” (Emerson 2000, p. 214). It is the notion of *obscurity* that is crucial to the sustaining of a thoroughly antifoundationalist mode of thinking and, hence, to the reconceiving of the idea of useful knowledge.

Behind problem-solving thinking, Dewey equally finds it important to note that for any object of primary experience there are always potentialities that are not explicit; any object that is overt is charged with possible consequences that are hidden (Dewey 1981, pp. 27–28, in Richardson 2014, p. 104). He expresses the sense of the obscure as the background of human intelligence – “the sense of our slight inability even in our best intelligence and efforts” (Dewey 1983, p. 200). In *Art as Experience*, he recognizes the significance of “obscurity” in Shakespeare and Coleridge, and “half-knowledge” in Keats (Dewey 1987, p. 39). The reality of the obscure requires us to exercise, in Keats’ phrase, “Negative Capability” – a kind of poetic insight after reason (*ibid.*). He expresses the sense of “a whole that stretches out indefinitely” as a background of the perception of objects (p. 197). Thinking in the strong present tense (in affirmation) is made possible in the midst of the obscure, the negative. Far from obscurantism, the realism of the obscure is an alternative way to see the reality of the world as always being translated. It expresses a proper respect for the darkness, and hence avoids the violence of language implicit in the clutching and grasping of comprehension. In order to say something, in order to see things, we need the background of the unsayable, the ungraspable. Our perception is fated to be partial. Dewey’s pragmatism as a philosophy for life, thinking beyond dualisms, is preconditioned by this sense of the obscure. To thoroughly resist the tide of a global economy geared towards transparency and accountability, and to live the life of perfectionist antifoundationalism, requires thinking in the obscure and living with what is beyond our grasp.

American philosophy retrieves the idea of light from the dichotomy between the clarity of enlightenment and darkness as a lack of knowledge. It realizes something different both from Plato’s light, which enlightens people in the cave and draws them upwards towards the sun, and from the light of clarity in analytical philosophy. Wittgenstein says, “nothing is hidden” (Wittgenstein 2009, #435). But this does not mean that we can see everything. Rather he indicates that the reality of the world and the truth of the matter cannot be fully elucidated in the light. If obscurity suggests non-presence (at least, what be made simply evident), light is non-mediated directness, casting light on something that is thereby revealed, while something else is thereby hidden. Similarly, to say something involves what is not said, what is hidden. To foreground something suggests another background. This rediscovery of the words is closely related to the idea of *aletheia* – the idea of revealing and of acknowledging the hidden as a background (Standish 2012, pp. 79, 176). The world under the explicit light of problem-solving thought sheds light only on a part of our lives.

When Dewey speaks of the “actual focusing of the world at one point in a focus of immediate shining apparency,” he is hinting at the vague and obscure background that must accompany the explicit (Dewey, *Essay in Experimental Logic*, p. 7). In his recognition of the limits of intelligence, he indicates the nature of partial light:

At most intelligence but throws a spotlight on that little part of the whole which marks out the axis of movement. Even if the light is flickering and the illuminated portion stands forth only dimly from the shadowy background, it suffices if we are shown the way to move. (Dewey 1983, p. 180)

Here he indicates that the revealing of the world is closely related to the gradual finding of the way – being provisional, non-permanent, like the work of the foresters.

The light that is flickering on an obscure border represents the transit from darkness to light, and a movement of evanescence. It is also a mixed state in which light and darkness exist side by side. If we think *clearly* about clarity, we realize that it must involve a proper (or appropriate) distribution of light and shade. We depend upon shade, the dark and *the half-light*. As Dewey says, “At twilight, dusk is a delightful quality of the whole world” (Dewey 1987, p. 198). In English, ‘twilight’ usually connotes the half-light of the evening. Etymologically speaking ‘twi-’ means between. ‘Twi-light’ refers to an indistinct border, between light and dark. It is, in a sense, the state in which light and darkness coexist. The state in which the light permeates the evening darkness evokes ending but is also an expectation of morning, of a new dawn. Twilight as flickering light against the background of darkness symbolizes the partiality of human intelligence.

If the experience of the obscure, standing on tiptoe, is a key to sustaining anti-foundationalism, with the sense of perfecting now or never, what kind of experience of knowing would come to us? What kind of knowledge would we acquire?

## Beautiful Knowledge: The Beautiful as the Functional

For the sake of making the best use of Dewey’s useful knowledge, the positive alternative vision of knowledge that should be presented is to be found in the contemporary wisdom of pragmatism. Its key lies in his aesthetic work. Dewey’s later writings on aesthetics shed light on what can be meant by ‘useful knowledge’: knowledge that cannot be simply assimilated into the practical or reduced to accountable and empirical evidence, and that is inseparable from the beautiful.

Such knowledge communicates illustratively and vividly, albeit in indirect ways, the nature of critical thinking beyond problem-solving. In *Art as Experience* (1934), Dewey presents the idea of art and aesthetic experience as being in continuity with “normal processes of living” (Dewey 1987, p. 16). Aesthetic experience is not a property of professional artists but at the heart of human experience. He also indicates that aesthetic experience has two phases: instrumental and the consummatory.

There are some distinctive characteristics in *Art as Experience* that guide the reader towards an alternative sense of useful knowledge. First, Dewey characterizes aesthetic experience as involving “happiness and delight”, related to a “fulfillment that reaches to the depth of our being” (p. 23) (which is the consummatory phase). Art has to do with the “intensity” and immediacy of the moment, of “what now is” (p. 24), and the experience of “direct seizure” (p. 150). Here Dewey highlights the role of a receptive dimension of experience typified in “esthetic surrender” (pp. 35, 51, 108). We find ourselves by “forgetting ourselves” (P. 110).

Second, we can find in Dewey’s aesthetic theory his idea of growth – growth without fixed ends. Aesthetic experience is “the ever-recurring cycles of growth” (p. 152). Creation without a preset goal does not mean the abrogation of an end: it is a reconfiguration of the idea of an end, as continuously reoriented and revised as we go. This evokes a process of “continuing perfecting” (p. 177). Dewey expresses the sense of being on the “growing edge of things” (p. 149), where the artist is a forerunner who carries forward a new vision. From time to time, Dewey describes the moment of what might be called being on a threshold in the “twilight” (p. 198), where “ordinary boundaries are transformed into invitations to proceed” (p. 213). When an aesthetic experience comes to a closure, this is not its final end but is an “inclusive and fulfilling close,” with the anticipation of a new horizon ahead (p. 62).

Third, in Dewey’s aesthetic theory, although an emphasis is put on “personal perception” (p. 157), aesthetic experience is understood not as limited to the individual experience of the artist but as extending into “a remaking of the experience of the community in the direction of greater order and unity” (p. 87). And again, this is not a closed whole but “an expanded whole” (p. 171). As is typical of pragmatism, Dewey’s whole is a unity with diversity (p. 184). In this whole, the term “egotism” has no place, and we are to be understood as “citizens of this vast world beyond ourselves” (p. 199).

This takes us to the fourth point: aesthetic perception as the precondition of social and cultural criticism. Discussing the significance of criticism from within tradition and convention, Dewey highlights the role of aesthetic judgment as social and cultural criticism. “Better criteria are to be set forth by an improved examination of the nature of works of art in general as a mode of human experience” (p. 313). Unlike his typical emphasis on social and scientific intelligence, Dewey reminds us in aesthetics of the significance of “a bias, a predilection” as the origin of social and cultural criticism, and encourages us not to surrender “the instinctive preference” (p. 327). And then he touches upon the necessity of the cultivation of aesthetic perception as follows:

The function of criticism is the reeducation of perception of works of art; it is an auxiliary in the process, a difficult process, of learning to see and hear. (p. 328)

Through the power of “imaginative projection” and as “the moral prophets of humanity”, poets become “the founders of civil society” (p. 350). The aesthetic is hence inseparable from, and indeed is a precondition to, the political. Dewey’s aesthetic work and other later writings help us see again the dynamism between

tradition and innovation, beyond freedom and control, and they point to the education of aesthetic perception as a key to cultural criticism.

Going beyond the dichotomy of the beautiful and the sublime, and between the aesthetic and the functional (the instrumental), Dewey's pragmatism can turn us towards the experience of transcendence in the ordinary, the moment of rebirth, by finding high intelligence in the low and the common.

Dewey's insight into an alternative sense of useful knowledge – an idea that the beautiful can be useful, the useful is what makes life beautiful – can be further developed in reference to Thoreau's idea of Beautiful Knowledge. Integrating more robustly body, mind and language than Dewey, Thoreau redeems the economy of living in what he calls "higher knowledge" – "the highest that we can attain to is not Knowledge, but Sympathy with Intelligence" (Thoreau 1991, p. 113). "Higher knowledge" is anything but the object of a direct perception under clear sunlight. Without negating the concept of use, knowledge is more than anything *aesthetic*. Thoreau calls this Beautiful Knowledge (p. 112). It is important to attend here to the note of satire evident in the quotation from Thoreau at the start of this chapter. This pokes fun at the pomposity and earnestness of the advocates for the "Society for the Diffusion of Useful Knowledge," the capitalization of which Thoreau ironically appropriates. This helps to show why the point that he is pressing and the phrase that he chooses to adopt do not amount to any simple gesture of romanticism. Knowledge said to be beautiful is tough, robust, and grounded on earth – being surrounded by daily objects, instruments, animals, plants, air, light, sound, etc.

Bob Davis has recently drawn attention to "the legacy of the Transcendentalist writers now so popular in the USA across many areas of philosophical enquiry" (Davis 2015), and in particular he has identified Dewey as an important influence on the idea of outdoor education. In Davis' delineation of outdoor education, Thoreau's *Walking* also can definitely be included as a book that encourages us to go outdoors. There is a danger here, however, of the self's losing itself within a version of the outdoor education caught up in the tide of the global economy. Against such a reading of Dewey and Thoreau, there is much in the account of Beautiful Knowledge that should lead us reconsider the meaning of the outdoors there (by it, through it). Beautiful Knowledge relates to a realm in which the functional and the aesthetic are united. Intellectual work should be integrated with what is commonly thought of as practical (or vocational) education.

Beautiful Knowledge points us neither to experiential education nor to a quasi-mystical realignment with nature – that is, it is not some kind of return to the woods. The beautiful, Thoreau says, is inseparable from the wild – the apparently unbeautiful – as expressed in the metaphor of the "most dismal swamp" in the darkest wood (p. 100). As "wild and dusky knowledge" (p. 112), Beautiful Knowledge can be experienced in the reading of classic texts (pp. 102–103). Beyond the dichotomy of the natural (the wild) and the human (the civilized), and far from anti-intellectualism, Thoreau proposes that we regain the untamed, self-reliant power of thinking and reading as a distinctive capacity of the human.

Associated with ignorance as "negative knowledge" (p. 112), Beautiful Knowledge involves the recognition that "the light which puts out our eyes is

darkness to us,” “a sudden revelation of the insufficiency of all that we called Knowledge before” (p. 113). Such experience of imperfection is a drive towards further perfection in continuing education. Education for Beautiful Knowledge drives teachers and students into the obscure. Knowing is to know what one does not know, and to know how one should know: it never allows us to loosen the power of our thinking.

Beautiful Knowledge is transformational rather than informative. In other words, it is the experience of *knowing*, undergoing the moment of self-transformation. More as a matter of reception rather than acquisition, it involves the experience of human transformation undergoing the phases of crisis. Such experience is consummated in the moment of what Emerson calls the “flying Perfect” (Emerson 2000, p. 252), a symbol of something that can never be fully grasped, never fully elucidated. It is this secular sense of transcendence that is missing from our obsession with useful knowledge today.

In *Art as Experience* Dewey quotes the famous aphorism of John Keats:

Beauty is truth, truth beauty – that is all  
Ye know on earth, and all y need to know.

– Keats quoted by Dewey (1987, p. 40)

The twilight of American philosophy prompts a reconsideration of the meaning of thinking (especially of *critical* thinking), of knowledge, and of the human subject. It reminds us that the language of policy documents (i.e., of self-realization, of diverse needs) cannot help but connote further implications that would touch upon the ungraspable dimension of human transformation. Still we can hear the voices of those whose eyes are only directed to the transparency of the knowledge economy. How can we persuade them of the *use* of “half-knowledge” – knowledge only known in half-light? Wouldn’t the twilight simply be metaphorical, without any substance and impact on educational practice?

## Outward Excursions

In *Democracy and Education* (1916), Dewey proposes the “place of active occupations in education” (Dewey 1980, p. 202). He says that play and active work in the curriculum are “intellectual and social, not matters of temporary expediency and momentary agreeableness” (ibid.). Here “knowledge-getting” is the result of actions and active occupations (p. 203, 207). “Outdoor excursions” are useful as well as social in their aims (p. 204). Dewey illustrates this by using the experiences of gardening, hunting and play (pp. 208, 210, 211). In his strong emphasis on the outside and the active, however, Dewey, on the one hand, leaves room for its being hijacked by the global economy. On the other hand, without fully persevering on the border between the inside and the outside, he lends support to the romantic opponents to the global economy who would seek spiritual salvation by going outdoors, to the woods. Outdoor excursions are not merely active but by nature receptive: they constitute a kind of withdrawal but, through this, a more fully fledged turning outward.



Turning inward into the territory of the vague, the uncertain dimensions of human life, Beautiful Knowledge envisions a more difficult path of education, more fully outward than outdoor education. Such education for Beautiful Knowledge should not be limited to extraordinary experience in the woods. Rather it relates to diverse contexts of intense experience, crossing their borders – ranging from daily occupations outside to the learning of a classic text inside. This is a vision of liberal education in resistance to freedom in the global economy – the kind of education Dewey envisioned in *Democracy and Education* one hundred years ago.

Dewey's emphasis on outdoor education has importance today, but it can also seem somewhat dated. How can it be received in a way appropriate for today – especially against the state of education foregrounded in the introduction of this paper? First and foremost, the insight of Dewey's pragmatism, his "criticism of criticisms," can elucidate the *problems* in what is there in the present curriculum – consider especially assessment and practices of a reductive kind – that eulogizes the significance of immediate experience and yet that in fact blocks what experience can afford us. Second, it reminds teachers, practitioners, and policy makers that the liberal/vocational dichotomization is a distraction and that it is not sound. Following Dewey's insight, vocational education, as might be seen in the experience of civil engineers, can be deeply stimulating and it can help develop the whole person. This is the implications of beautiful knowledge, in the combination of the functional and the aesthetic, knowledge in service to human transformation. Third, in view of Beautiful Knowledge, it is a mistake to be nostalgic about old methods of teaching – learning and teaching in the immediate encounter between teachers and students in a small classroom. New technology and distant learning can also provide occasions for rich learning experience of Beautiful Knowledge. Fourth, if *Democracy and Education* is read along the lines of his later work, *Art as Experience*, it is all the more clear that the cultivation of aesthetic judgment is crucial for the education of democratic citizens. Quoting Shelly, Dewey says that poets are "the founders of civil society" (Dewey 1987, p. 350). This is especially so in the light of the inadequacy of (or misplacement of) critical thinking in education. Dewey would say that aesthetic judgment is the condition of creative democracy, what is at the heart of the criticism of criticisms. For example, the incorporation of film education can be a promising way of cultivating aesthetic judgment and political emotions, and this, in an interdisciplinary way. These implications can constitute an alternative economy of beautiful knowledge today.

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# Critical Reflections on Fārūqī's Islamization of Knowledge



Yasien Mohamed

## Introduction

The scholar Ismā'īl Rājī al-Fārūqī (1921–1986) was deeply troubled by the crisis of knowledge in Islam today. In an attempt to reconcile his faith with the intellectual challenges of the very varied and interconnected world we live in, he developed the concept of the 'Islamization of Knowledge': the synthesis of old and new within an Islamic epistemological framework.

Fārūqī's is not the only Islamic revivalist response to secular modernity. This chapter explores his idea of the Islamization of Knowledge, reviews the modifications and alternatives proposed by other Muslim scholars, and concludes with a new proposal.

## The Biography of Ismā'īl Fārūqī

The Palestinian Fārūqī is noted for his valuable contribution to comparative religion, his critique of Zionism, his theory of Arabism, and his exposition of *tawhīd*. He received his early Islamic education from his father, an Islamic judge, and his early secular and Christian religious education from French Dominicans. At the American University of Beirut, he took a B.A. in Philosophy and English. On his return to Palestine, he was appointed Governor of the Galilee district. With the creation of Israel in 1948, he was deprived of that office and exiled. The Israeli occupation of Palestine had a lasting effect on his thinking, highlighting the vulnerability of Muslims without a vocabulary true to their faith to engage with the modern

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world. His most influential idea, the ‘Islamization of Knowledge’, was born in an attempt to resolve the religious-secular dichotomy of education in the interests of the social transformation of the *ummah* or Islamic nation (Hashim and Rossidy 2006). He promoted it through the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT), which he founded, and the *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*.

After completing a doctorate in Western philosophy, Fārūqī entered the al-Azhar and committed to an intensive programme to gain a deeper appreciation of Islam. In Egypt he was inspired by Muslim reformers such as Muḥammad ‘Abdu. This gave him the impetus to attempt bridging the gap in thought between Islam and the West (Fletcher 2008: 52).

The Islamization of Knowledge was not Fārūqī’s only concern. Imtiyaz Yusuf, one of his former students, argues that it is unfortunate that he has been judged only in relation to this project. Fārūqī’s concerns were broader than Islamization. He was the Muslim trailblazer in the academic study of other faiths: “engaged in Islam’s dialogue with other religions, especially Christianity in the West.... He was not theologically exclusivist, rather a Muslim pluralist scholar of religion. This is evident from Fārūqī’s elaboration of the concept of metareligion as presented in his book, *Christian Ethics*” (Yusuf 2014: 112).

## The Crisis of Muslim Education

In the classical Muslim world, knowledge was integrated. There was no bifurcation of the kind evident today between revealed Islamic knowledge and acquired human knowledge. The two levels of knowledge were complementary, Islamic knowledge providing the general principles and human knowledge the particulars, based on observation and experience. However, in the modern Muslim world, there is a split: the universities are secular and the Islamic seminaries focus on traditional Islamic theology. There is generally no attempt from either side to integrate these two systems of knowledge, partly because the epistemologies that characterize them are in conflict: secularized knowledge relies on empirical observation, but what is referred to as Islamic knowledge is based on both divine revelation and reason. Muslim educationists have realized the need to resolve the contradictions and bring about a synthesis. Several attempts at that synthesis are explored in this chapter.

In *Truth and Method*, Hans Gadamer showed that bias is inevitable in the interpretation of a text. Thus bias is not wrong in itself, but unrecognized it can have negative consequences. Elmessiri’s *Epistemological Bias* provides examples of such consequences in Western social sciences. And, in *Orientalism*, Edward Said demonstrates an insidious European bias in treatment of the East in English literature and in the orientalist’s ‘othering’ of Eastern people as objects of study rather than knowing subjects. Such bias can have far-reaching implications. For example, German philosopher, Emmanuel Kant, gave currency to the notion of Africans as incapable of rationality. That notion was used as a justification for the European colonization of non-European people.

Egypt was the first Arab country to be conquered and colonized by the French. The secular system of school education the colonizers introduced ignored Islam as a factor in Egyptian society, promoted French but neglected Arabic, and taught learners about the greatness of French generals like Napoleon Bonaparte, but not about Arab and Muslim generals like Khālid ibn al-Walīd. Muḥammad 'Abdu, the late nineteenth-century religious scholar and liberal reformer, was critical of this kind of biased French education, which was indifferent to the local cultural heritage of the Egyptian people, cultivating a sense of inferiority in Egyptian children and leaving the main religious tradition of the country completely out of account.

Unfortunately, the Muslim world has increasingly adopted the Western system of education and its ideological bias on a binary basis, allowing no conceptual space for valuing the Islamic world's history and its living intellectual and religious tradition. This has had serious consequences. In Saudi Arabia, postgraduate students of Sociology know about Karl Marx, Durkheim, and Adam Smith, but know little, if anything, about Ibn Khāldūn, the fourteenth-century North African pioneer of sociology. Similarly, in the West, many valuable concepts in economics and sociology, such as the division of labour and the labour theory of value, were developed only in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, without any sense that an Islamic scholar had articulated them five centuries earlier.

Recent Muslim social science graduates of American and European universities have tended to adopt Western versions of their own Islamic societies for want of an intellectually compelling alternative. The combination of ignorance of their Islamic intellectual legacy and the bias towards the West at these universities has left them vulnerable. At an academic level, Syed Farid Alatas refers to this phenomenon as *academic dependency*: “a condition in which the knowledge production of certain scholarly communities is conditioned by the development and growth of knowledge of other scholarly communities to which the former are subjected” (Alatas 2010:56).

Perhaps more profoundly, the bias in European and American universities and those which follow their curricula elsewhere is not only towards the West. It is also secular and materialist. This conflicts directly with the Islamic world view, creating an epistemological duality for Muslim students. Western secular knowledge is based on the triumph of the mind in interpreting the observable world and celebrates the human being as a physical and rational animal. From an Islamic point of view, this is not enough. The human intellect alone cannot guide man through life: divine revelation is also needed. Whereas Western secular knowledge sees man as a physical entity determined by the laws of physical nature, for Muslims, the human being is only partly a physical creature, and nature is both physical and spiritual: man is a microcosm of the universe and part of the creation of God. Without acknowledgment of the spiritual dimension of human nature, Western education cannot provide adequate knowledge for a person to know himself and so to know his Lord – the key to his true happiness in this world and the hereafter. For Alatas, this does not mean that secular knowledge from the West should be rejected. The epistemological duality can be overcome by identifying and countering the harmful assumptions which accompany Western secular knowledge before integrating it into the Islamic world view (Alatas 2010, 18–20).

Similarly, Elmessiri argues against blind submission to foreign ideas that are secular and materialistic. Western social scientists are concerned with how material progress can be achieved in society and measure the progress of Muslim societies only on those terms. But Muslims, according to Elmessiri, should measure progress within the framework of their own vision. They should not fear foreign ideas, but should weigh them according their own standards. “What they are really against is having their own concepts weighed for them by scales thrust into their hands by others” (Elmessiri 2006:10).

The twentieth century brought unprecedentedly rapid change, and the Muslim world has not been immune to it. The challenge is to change without losing the fundamentals of faith. Early responses by Muḥammad ‘Abdu in Egypt and Sayyid Aḥmad Khān in India rejected the changing morality of the west, but accepted its science and technology without awareness of the accompanying ideological bias. Ismā’il Fārūqī was critical of their assumption that “the modern subjects are harmless and can only lend strength to the Muslims”. “Little did they realize”, he says, “that the alien humanities, social sciences, and indeed the natural sciences as well, were facets of an integral view of reality, of life and the world, of history, that is equally alien to that of Islam” (Fārūqī 1982: v).

The first thinker to introduce the concept of Islamization was Syed Naquib Alatas (Wan Daud 1991: 35; Mohamed 1993a, b: 12), but it was Fārūqī’s version of the concept that became popular in the Islamic world. In his 1982 book, he proposed the Islamization of Knowledge to overcome the problem of a dichotomous education. In recent years the popularity of the concept has waned, and scholars of the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT) are now talking instead of the integration of knowledge. The rest of this chapter will focus on an exposition of the Islamization of Knowledge, the modifications made to the concept by IIIT scholars, the address to the same problem by two other scholars, and a further possibility.

## **Fārūqī’s Islamization of Knowledge**

As we have seen, modern secular knowledge is not value-free. To bring about the Islamization of Knowledge, the epistemological paradigm of secular modernity, with its conceptions of the self and the world, has to be thoroughly understood. Elmessiri (2006:4) describes a paradigm as a mental abstract picture, which can accept some features of reality and reject others. It is usually hidden because it is taken for granted within a particular discourse. Fārūqī identified the source of the crisis of Muslim society in the paradigm of secular modernity which rejects the reality of faith, leading to the dichotomy of modern secular and Islamic knowledge, each then necessarily with its own system of education. For much of the Islamic world, this dichotomy was reinforced by the colonial experience. The colonizers established Western schools and universities and ignored local cultural and religious values. Islamic education tended to react in unfortunate ways. Increasingly, Western

education came to stand for freedom and enlightenment and Islamic education for control and conformism.

As Professor of Islamic studies at Temple University in Philadelphia, Fārūqī had direct contact with Muslim students and graduates in the social sciences. He noticed that their sentimental attachment to Islam was not enough to engage the philosophical assumptions of modern science. After 4 years, their Islamic consciousness was ravaged, and they felt inferior, with a keen sense of the value of Western knowledge but little idea of the vibrant intellectual heritage of their faith. The crisis they faced was both epistemological and ethical. It was not only about the nature of knowledge but about its informing value system. The secular sciences assume that all knowledge is based on observation, leaving no room for revelation. They also silently embody a value system alien to Islam. Fārūqī sought to resolve this crisis, as representative of the much larger challenge of modernity for Muslims everywhere, through what he called 'the Islamization of Knowledge'. The rejuvenation of the ummah requires that, "the present dualism in Muslim education, its bifurcation into an Islamic and secular system must be removed.... The two systems must be united and integrated" (Fārūqī 1982). This goes beyond a mixing or juxtaposition of Islamic and Western sciences to a total reorientation of knowledge in the light of five universal principles that form the foundation of an Islamic epistemology (Safi 1993:25). These are the unity of God, of creation, of truth, of life, and of humanity.

On the basis of these five principles, Fārūqī introduces a 12-step work plan as a general strategy to realize the Islamization project. The aim is to recast every discipline to be informed with the world view of *tawhīd* (Oneness of God). This orientation must be reflected in the textbooks of each discipline (Fārūqī 1982: 10–11). A creative synthesis is achieved through reinterpreting and adapting the components of secular knowledge in ways consistent with the world view of Islam to produce university textbooks in Islamic sociology, Islamic psychology, and Islamic political sciences. This requires cooperative input from both sides of the divide. The chief responsibility for it lies with modern Muslim scholars, well versed in the disciplines and trained in critical thinking. However, it also demands the input of traditional Islamic scholars with a knowledge of the depth of the Islamic intellectual tradition (Fārūqī 1982: 43).

The first edition of Fārūqī's *The Islamization of Knowledge* was received with great enthusiasm, and its thesis gained wide acceptance. He was concerned with the failure of the traditional Islamic seminaries which were unable to deal with the challenges of secular modernity, so he wanted to ensure that Muslim graduates would have a comprehensive understanding of Islamic culture and civilization while also being strongly grounded in their particular area of modern specialization. To achieve this, he proposed that all students at universities in Islamic countries take an Islamic Civilization course alongside their other subjects over the full undergraduate period (al-Fārūqī 1982).

Since Fārūqī had direct contact with Muslim students and social sciences graduates in America, his Islamization project was initially inspired by them, so he created the IIIT journal as a platform for research and sharing of ideas. Before he died,



Fārūqī founded the International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM), which became the main experimental site for the Islamization of Knowledge. At this university, every student has to do a double major: in Islamic studies and in one of the social sciences. They are also required to master both English and Arabic so that they are qualified to be employed in the civil service, the teaching profession, or private business (AbūSulaymān 2007:13–19).

## Critical Reflections of Scholars Connected to the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT)

A project as wide-ranging as the Islamization of Knowledge requires ongoing monitoring and critique. I shall first discuss the work of two leading scholars inspired by Fārūqī, AbdulHamīd AbūSulaymān and Taha Jabir al-Alwani, both pioneering members of the International Institute of Islamic Thought (IIIT). They have progressively adapted the theory of the Islamization of Knowledge and its work plan. I shall then turn to the work of three other scholars, Elmessiri, Sardar and Henzell-Thomas. Although their views do not necessarily reflect its official position, their books are published by the IIIT, so they point to a general change of direction in critique of the social sciences and a search for a new paradigm.

AbdulHamīd AbūSulaymān, former president of the IIIT, and former Rector of the International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM), agreed with Fārūqī that the first step in Islamization should be mastery of the secular social sciences, but he emphasized that this was a temporary measure. In the classical period, the Muslims were at the forefront of philosophy and science, and the West borrowed from them; but today, it is Western scholars who are pioneering philosophy and science, and Muslims are borrowing from them. He emphasizes that there is no problem in borrowing from the West, provided modern knowledge is integrated with the Islamic intellectual legacy in a creative synthesis. This may restore the confidence of contemporary Muslim scholars. Such a synthesis depends on reformulating modern thought in accordance with the world view of *ṭawḥīd* (Oneness of God). AbūSulaymān notes that the IIIT has cooperated with Muslim elites throughout the world to this end and, through conferences and its *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*, has provided platforms for dialogue and significant scholarly contributions (AbūSulaymān 2007:13–19).

AbūSulaymān sees Islamization as an educational project, involving the integration of disciplines. He speaks of: “a remarkable intellectual integration of knowledge fusing the disciplines of revealed knowledge and those of human and technological sciences” (AbūSulaymān 2007, 13). The question is whether this kind of Islamization can be regarded as genuine intellectual integration or rather as a preliminary attempt at combining the Islamic and Western disciplines. There is nothing wrong with the latter. Students need to be exposed, as a first step, both to the knowledge that emanates from the modern secular university and to that from the Islamic revealed legacy. Such exposure does not produce full intellectual integra-

tion, but is perhaps a starting point towards attaining that goal. At the IIUM the undergraduate must first gain exposure to Islamic and Western disciplines, and only at the postgraduate level can they hope to work systematically on the much longer project of intellectual integration of disciplines. The IIIT has worked towards this goal and cooperated with Muslim academics and intellectuals throughout the world in joint efforts, providing platforms for dialogue and publication of research papers through the *American Journal of Islamic Social Sciences*. This peer-reviewed journal has appeared regularly since its inception and has even published articles critical of the Islamization of Knowledge project or its work plan. Generally, scholars have been in agreement about the crisis of a dichotomous education, but have differed as to how to bring about unification.

Fārūqī proposed the Islamization of Knowledge, to lead ultimately to creative synthesis of knowledge and the publication of textbooks for the Islamic university in Islamic economics, Islamic psychology, and Islamic sociology. This was his first priority at a time when the Muslim world was losing its best minds to the West. Not all the textbooks produced have achieved the envisaged goal of creative synthesis. They have, however, been important in a time when Muslim students in Western-style universities have felt threatened and even overwhelmed by modern higher education and desperately in need of alternative perspectives to enhance their self-worth and build their confidence in their Islamic intellectual heritage.

The second pioneering IIIT academic, Taha Jabir al-Alwani, an eminent Shari'ah scholar and president of IIIT for a decade, differed with AbūSulaymān on the sequence of the Islamization of Knowledge work plan. The first step for him was mastery of the Islamic sciences, as the main task of Islamization and creative synthesis had to come from traditional Islamic scholars (Ragab 2006, 76–77). Alwani appears to have had little faith in the modern educated graduate to bring about genuine Islamization. His scepticism is revealed when he says, "Islamization is not a cosmetic addition of religious terminology and sentiment to studies in the social sciences and humanities or the grafting of relevant Qur'anic verses onto the sciences or disciplines intended for Islamization" (al-Alwani 2005: 29). The first steps should be adopting the Islamic paradigm of knowledge and the Qur'anic methodology (al-Alwani 2005: 35–42). Then the Shari'ah sciences should be reformed, not only in terms of the Islamic epistemology and world view but also through adding some social sciences to the Islamic syllabus (al-Alwani 2005: 57). That would make integration of knowledge possible (al-Alwani 2005: 45).

We now turn to two other approaches within the ambit of the IIIT. Perhaps a good starting point for the synthesis of knowledge is not only a mastery of modern knowledge as Fārūqī suggested but a critique of the secular and Eurocentric bias embedded in it. Abdelwahab Elmessiri, editor of *Epistemological Bias in the Physical and Social Sciences*, focuses on the epistemological bias in Western disciplines. As they stand, he sees these Western disciplines as not always suitable for or applicable to Third World and Muslim countries because of their bias. The book contains concrete examples of this bias in almost all modern disciplines, including Psychology, Anthropology, Political Science, and Sociology. However, the aim is not to replace a Western paradigm with an Islamic one; that would amount to imposing an Islamic

paradigm on the study of Western societies, making the same mistake as “orientalists” did in relation to Islam when they interpreted it in accordance with their Europe-centred bias (Elmessiri 2006: 1–76). Scientific approaches to the study of religion are helpful, particularly in understanding the social dimensions of religion, but in other respects they tend to be reductionistic, giving an unhelpfully limited view of Islam and Muslims. They need to be complemented by Islamic understandings. Put differently, Western scholarship can look at the house of Islam from the outside only, but it is also necessary to look at the house of Islam from the inside. Both approaches are needed to arrive at an in-depth and comprehensive view of Islam. For Elmessiri it is an ongoing concern that Muslim and Arab intellectuals uncritically adopt Western approaches to the study of Islam and Muslim societies, resulting in their self-perception being defined by others, usually in a negative light. Elmessiri sees the primary need as identifying and countering the bias within modern education.

To this end, Elmessiri has edited a volume where the contributors have identified the main biases within their disciplines and pursued the implications. Hussein (2006: 77–104), for example, stresses that Muslim challenges are different from non-Muslim challenges; inevitably Muslim scholars will raise different questions from scholars from the West. From another perspective, Habib (2006, 126–144) sees the values of individualism and self-interest as alien to the collective Muslim psyche, which is more oriented towards altruism and cooperation than to selfishness and competitiveness. He says that Arabs have a collective psyche and do not see themselves in isolation from their tribe or society. But Western-developed sciences expose the Arab to a philosophy of the self-centred individual in competition with other individuals, as in Adam Smith’s *The Wealth of Nations*, where self-interest is the basis for his philosophy of economic development.

Ziauddin Sardar and Jeremy Henzell-Thomas are the authors of an important IIIT book, *Rethinking Reform in Higher Education: From Islamization to Integration of Knowledge*. Still inspired by the first principles from Fārūqī’s work plan for the Islamization of Knowledge, they explore a significant change from the path trodden by Fārūqī, AbūSulaymān, and Alwani. It is a change first signalled by Malkawi (2014), a fellow IIIT author. The new direction focuses on the integration of knowledge so that through a multi-disciplinary approach students are also prepared for the new challenges of technology, pluralism, and ecological sustainability. The IIIT, publishers of the work, make it clear that “the views and opinions expressed in this book are the authors’ and not necessarily those of the publisher”, but it seems that in recent IIIT workshops the focus has been on integration of knowledge rather than Islamization of Knowledge. In the opening chapter, Mapping the Terrain, Sardar (2017: 23) provides a thought-provoking analysis and critique of the modern university: although the world is becoming more complex than ever before, the discipline-specific curriculum only prepares the graduate for the economic market, not to deal with the complexity of the modern world. To counter this, education must be interdisciplinary and knowledge must be integrated, not fragmented. As modern knowledge is embedded within a Western paradigm, embodying a particular epistemology and world view, the university needs to be decolonized. This “does not mean the

exclusion of modern knowledge: the decolonizing process is not an attack on Europe – it is to point out that modern European knowledge is one amongst various forms of knowledge. However, decolonizing does require questioning the Eurocentricism of modern knowledge and its claims to be universal”.

This awareness of the epistemological bias in modern knowledge is relevant for the reform and transformation of universities all over the world. The Islamization project provides useful models for the critique of colonial education, emphasizing that syllabus change needs to be directed by critical thinking, if the epistemological bias in the modern university is to be countered. Sardar's (2017:96) critique of the modern university is important for all students, not only Muslims:

Each academic discipline has emerged within a particular cultural context; and each has its own specific history that defines its contours.... The desire to manage and control the natives Europe conquered gave rise to anthropology. While the function of anthropology was to study the exotic Other, with the aim of proving the inalienable superiority of Europe, the objective of sociology was to inquire into the underclass, the Other within Europe.... Whatever the discipline, the overall narrative was the same: to perpetuate the [dominant] worldview of the West

This awareness of bias in disciplines, however they have developed from their origins, is a first step towards the long and intellectually arduous process of integration of knowledge.

Is the integration of knowledge an alternative to the Islamization of Knowledge? Henzell-Thomas defines the word integration to include not only the integration of knowledge but also the integration of the human personality, where human desire is subservient to reason. This broader and deeper understanding of integration is welcome. However, with respect to knowledge, what integration basically comes down to is synthesis of the old and the new, the Western and the Islamic. This is precisely the goal that Fārūqī laid out for the Islamization of Knowledge. Integration and synthesis are synonyms. So we have to ask, what is really new about the integration of knowledge?

In a draft IIIT document, *Towards an Expanded Glossary of Key Terms: Introduction and Five Model Entries*, Henzell-Thomas refers to the Islamization of Knowledge as “extreme” because it is “setting itself apart from other traditions which it may see as contaminated by secular or other foreign concepts” [Henzell-Thomas, 42]. He concurs with Sardar who sees Islamization of Knowledge as a product of its time and context, but who notes that “it has left an enduring legacy, not least in articulating concerns about the dire state of Muslim thought and education, drawing attention to the Eurocentric nature of social sciences and enunciating the first principles. We move forward with Integration of Knowledge” [Sardar and Henzell-Thomas 2017: 136].

As we approach this new model, we need to examine critically the implications of ‘extreme’ in reference to the Islamization of Knowledge. First, is it Fārūqī's vision that is seen as narrow, or is it the way Islamization of knowledge has been implemented? As mentioned above, Imtiyaz Yusuf pointed out that Fārūqī proposed the Islamization of Knowledge as a man of broad and generous concerns. He did not set himself apart from other traditions, but took part in inter-religious

dialogue. As a Muslim scholar, he was a pioneer in the academic study of religion, and he engaged in Islam's dialogue with other religions in America. Clearly, he was not theologically exclusivist, but a Muslim pluralist scholar of religion. Secondly, dismissing knowledge because it is secular incorrectly reflects Fārūqī's vision. What is the point of Islamization if it does not respond to the problem of secularism embedded in the presuppositions of Western knowledge? Modern knowledge can only be reconciled with the world view of Islam when its inessential secular, anti-religious elements are removed. Once that has happened, knowledge can be enriched with an Islamic dimension. Fārūqī was not opposed to the integration of knowledge; he had a problem with the dichotomy in the educational system and wanted to correct that through Islamization as a means to creative synthesis. How innovative, then, is the new vision and model of Sardar and Henzell-Thomas? In many ways it is very much like Fārūqī's. The way the ideas are implemented is a different matter. There are serious shortcomings at the Islamic universities, where modern and Islamic disciplines have been combined or juxtaposed, but not actually integrated. As Henzell-Thomas points out in his *Glossary of Key Terms*, 'integration' has a primary sense of unification and fusion. This has been attempted under the Islamization of Knowledge project with varying degrees of success in fusing knowledge systems and producing Islamic textbooks. However, Henzell-Thomas distinguishes two other senses of the word 'integration'. Firstly, it can refer to the integrated personality, where wisdom predominates over the lower faculties of the soul. This is an important aspect. Integration starts with the integration of the mind and the human personality. Secondly, integration also means adapting to and co-existing with people of other cultures. This does not mean 'assimilation' where a minority culture is submerged in another culture, resulting in the loss of identity. Muslims should retain their distinct identity and nurture a healthy *asabiyyah* (social solidarity), to use Ibn Khaldun's term. However, this positive sense of community should not lead to an ethnocentric mentality, which looks down on the values of other communities. I shall be taking these two senses of integration further as I pursue my proposal for the integration of knowledge.

## **Critical Reflections of Muslim Scholars Not Connected to the IIIT**

We now turn to the views of two scholars, not associated with the IIIT, who accept Islamization in principle and are open to foreign knowledge and its integration into Islam. They too regard the bifurcation between Western secular knowledge and Islamic knowledge as problematic and propose ways to bridge this gap in responding as Muslims to secular modernity.

The most radical departure from Fārūqī's Islamization has come from Chicago-based Pakistani scholar, Fazlur Rahman. His call is for a critique of the Islamic intellectual legacy in the light of the Qur'an and a corresponding reconstruction of

the Islamic sciences, including law, philosophy, and theology (Mohamed 1993a, b: 31).

Rahman is not opposed to Islamization, but holds that the Islamic intellectual legacy is not absolute and should also be subject to critique. For him, Islamization's attempts to build bridges are problematic, because genuine integration can only take place if the traditional Islamic scholars take the initiative. He states: "It is futile to even raise the question of the Islamization of Knowledge: it is the upholders of Islamic learning, who have to bear the primary responsibility of Islamizing secular knowledge, by their creative intellectual efforts" (Rahman 1982: 134).

For Rahman, the specific rulings in the Qur'an are not objectives in themselves, but are contingent upon definite historical circumstances. They are meant to convey quintessential Islamic moral objectives of justice, mercy, and benevolence. Unlike al-Alwani, who proposes minor reform to Islamic education, Rahman calls for a complete reconstruction of the Islamic sciences, based on the teachings of justice as a predominant theme of the Qur'an, recognizing its affinity to the dominant international culture of human rights.

The other scholar outside the IIIT, who is not only in support of the Islamization of Knowledge but was actually the first to coin the phrase, is the Malaysian scholar Naquib Alatas. His *Preliminary Statement on a General Theory of the Islamization of the Malay-Indonesian Archipelago* was published in 1969 (Wan Daud 1991: 35). In it, he defines Islamization as "The liberation of man first from magical, mythological, animistic, national-cultural traditions opposed to Islam, and then from secular control over his reason and his language... It is also liberation from subservience to his physical demands which inclines towards the secular and injustice to his true self or soul" (Alatas 1985:44). Unlike the IIIT scholars, Alatas, being Sufi-inclined, gives more attention to the liberation of man from his lower self and its desires as part of the process of Islamization. The starting point for him is Islamic metaphysics focused on the reality of God. Knowledge of God goes beyond theory to experience, firmly grounded in revelation. In that context, he deals with the 'de-secularization' of knowledge, exploring it in *Islam and Secularism and the Philosophy of the Future* (Alatas 1985).

Alatas points out that he is not being acknowledged for pioneering the idea of Islamization and that he believes the idea has been wrongly applied at the International Islamic University of Malaysia (personal interview 2004). He founded the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilization (ISTAC) to correct matters. Daud, the deputy director of ISTAC, comments: "Professor Alatas ... has authoritatively defined the meaning of Islamization.... Without proper definitions, Islamization has often been reduced to legalization or to the establishment of some socio-political entities, and knowledge has been wrongly equated with mere facts, skills and technology" (Daud 1991: 36).



## The Integration of Knowledge in Islamic Context: An Alternative Approach

In the light of this valuable debate, I should like to propose a fresh approach with deep historical roots: *the integration of knowledge in Islamic context*. My proposal is partly inspired by the models used by classical Islamic scholars for the integration of knowledge. My article, ‘The Integration of Knowledge in Islamic Context: al-Rāghib al-Iṣfahānī’s Concept of Justice’ (Mohamed 2009), provided for the first time a concrete example of how integration of knowledge took place in the work of al-Iṣfahānī, the eleventh-century philosopher. I showed how al-Iṣfahānī appropriated the Aristotelian categories of justice, integrating them into an Islamic meta-physical framework to develop an authentic Islamic theory of justice, concerned with both individual and social justice as contributing to happiness in this world and in the Hereafter. Al-Iṣfahānī’s approach is what I refer to as the integration of knowledge in Islamic context.

In the classical Islamic period, Muslim scholars critically appropriated Greek ideas. They enthusiastically entertained foreign knowledge and fearlessly integrated what was positive from it into their Islamic world view. They had already established themselves in all branches of knowledge and had a strong Islamic epistemological framework into which foreign knowledge could readily be assimilated. By contrast, Islamization today starts from a position of weakness, because the established bodies of knowledge are Western, and they have no strong Islamic epistemological framework of adequate complexity. Muslim scholars setting out to make meaningful connections with their Islamic intellectual heritage often end up trying to infuse Islamic concepts into a Western knowledge that is not hospitable to them.

Integrating knowledge in an Islamic context must involve the following:

- Identifying certain elements of new knowledge disciplines and integrating them within an Islamic epistemological frame
- Drawing selected methods and techniques with utility and applicability in Islamic societies from new knowledges and integrating them
- Replacing the secular paradigm with an Islamic paradigm elaborated from the Islamic understanding of human nature and creation
- Replacing secular concepts and terms or expanding the vocabulary with faith-based conceptions and terms mediating Islamic values and concerns

Modern social scientific methods may usefully be employed to study Islamic societies, especially the social manifestations of Muslim institutions, governance, economies, and education. However, these methods are not useful in understanding transcendent phenomena (*al-ghayb* – the unseen). Muslim scholars have to be critically receptive to new ideas, methods, and techniques, using what they have to offer without compromising Islamic belief. Why should psychoanalysis as a therapeutic technique not be employed by Muslim psychologists if it proves to be effective? Thus, the Islamic critique of the ideological role of the social sciences need not negate the positive knowledge to be gained from them or from physical sciences and



technology. Once foreign knowledge is integrated into an Islamic context, it becomes naturalized in Islam.

My proposal for the integration of knowledge in Islamic context differs from the current Islamization project. It is more accommodating of epistemological pluralism in a multi-religious society. Islam may share with the other religions the critique of the secular bias within the social sciences, but would integrate the beneficial knowledge into its own social context and world view. Thus, the integration of knowledge in Islamic context is more open to the present global climate of religious pluralism. It is not opposed to the integration of knowledge of other religious contexts, whether they be Confucian, Buddhist, Christian, Hindu, or African.

This is not compromising religion, but allowing scholars from other religious traditions also to integrate knowledge in their own religious context. They should critically assess new knowledge, distinguishing the substantial from the ideologically value-laden, extracting what is beneficial for their needs, and filtering out what is harmful or incongruent. It also implies reforming the Islamic sciences so that they are open to new knowledge, showing their current relevance to the diversity and plurality of our communities, and taking the needs of the environment into consideration.

To sum up: Fārūqī sought a solution to the immediate problem facing Muslim social science students urgently in need of an Islamic perspective on their disciplines if they were not to become alienated from their Islamic identity and intellectual heritage. With this in mind, the notion of the Islamization of Knowledge struck a chord among Muslim academics and was enthusiastically received in Islamic schools in the West and in Islamic universities in the Muslim world. However, Fārūqī's concept of Islamization and its implementation have not gone uncriticized. Many scholars have warned of a cosmetic Islamization and urged that a comprehensive Islamic philosophical framework should be the foundation for any Islamization of the Western sciences. Others have felt that the starting point should be the reform of the Islamic sciences. I have proposed an alternative approach, the integration of knowledge in Islamic context, as a more open-minded response to Western intellectual modernity.

This alternative approach, faithful to the Islamic tradition, is of value in Islamic countries as well as in helping Muslim minorities in the West. It is also realistic about the new world we are living in. In Muslim minority countries where educational institutions are secular in orientation, there may be a functional need for non-Muslims to know more about the religion and intellectual perspectives of their Muslim friends or neighbours. Students may want to choose a module or more in intellectually integrated Islamic studies for their own enrichment or to supplement their areas of specialization. This is possible and manageable. A module on Islamic economics could be very valuable to people working locally or internationally with Islamic banks or with banks offering Islamic finance. A module in Islamic law could serve those well who may have to work with Muslim clients in the areas of marriage, divorce, and inheritance. A module in Islamic pastoral psychology could be helpful to psychotherapists dealing with Muslim clients who suffer from faith-related problems of guilt and depression. Then, as part of a fuller intellectual

history, Ibn Rushd's contribution to philosophy fills in the picture, and the pioneering contribution of the African sociologist, Ibn Khaldun, needs to be recognized in its own right.

In conclusion, while Fārūqī's proposals have valuably asserted the importance of the Islamic intellectual and social tradition, they have also raised a number of issues which have to be confronted in the modern world. Integration of world knowledge in an Islamic context is an immediate challenge. So is the kind of exposure of non-Muslims to various aspects of Islamic knowledge which they need in moving towards meeting the plural epistemological demands of the modern world.

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# Michel Foucault: Educational Philosopher?



Maarten Simons

## Introduction

There are several ways to discuss how the work of Michel Foucault has been used in educational philosophy and theory. The most common way is to retrace references, to recall or reconstruct philosophical debates, and to evaluate his most enduring influence. There is no reason not to take this route and to start with a general overview of how Foucault's work has played, and continues to play a role, in philosophy of education. But there is a good reason to add another layer to such an overview. This additional layer of influence is not about clear-cut references, and is to be located at the level of a philosophical ethos rather than at the level of systems of thought and conceptual apparatuses. This influence is less mediated by debate, argument, and position, than by experience, concern, and style. Adding this layer, arguably, does better justice to how Foucault himself thought about philosophical work. In addition, then, this layer allows us to give Foucault a voice in how to think about philosophy, education, and the relationship between them.

## Foucault's Influence

It is not possible to present a complete overview of all educational research inspired by or based upon Foucault. To have an overall sense of the broad influence of his work, a short overview might suffice (see, for example, Simons and Masschelein 2007). Early on, Foucault's genealogies, and related concepts such as normalization and disciplinary power, played a major role in critical histories of education: the

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history of the modern school and classroom, the normalizing role of the teacher, and the power-effects of the educational sciences (e.g., Pongratz 1989; Ball 1990; Hunter 1994; Popkewitz 1998; Depaeppe 1998). During the 1990s and at the beginning of the twenty-first century, the influence of Foucault can be situated on a continuum between two poles, ranging from theoretical and conceptual research to analytical and empirical studies in education. This overview is limited to the Anglophone context predominantly, and it is important to consider that this influence was partly shaped by the availability of his works in English.

In philosophy of education, the work of Foucault was introduced to question, for instance, the use and underpinnings of key concepts such as autonomy and liberal education (Marshall 1996). More generally, Foucault has been positioned as a key representative of postmodernism and poststructuralism, and his work has played a major role in debates on epistemological and ethical relativism, and in criticisms of the modern conception of the subject underlying educational theory (e.g., Smeyers 1995; Wain 1996; Blake et al. 1998; Biesta 1998). Foucault has also been mobilized in attempts to revitalize the historical materialistic approach in education studies (Olssen 1999), and became a key source of inspiration for the reformulation of the concept of the self (Marshall 2001). But his influence went far beyond that. He also left a clear mark on methodological reflections in educational research, and in sociology of education and educational policy studies in particular (Ball 1994; Popkewitz and Brennan 1997). Finally, Foucault's later work on 'technologies of the self' and 'truth telling' was introduced into the study of ethics in education and in discussions on the role of critique and truth(–telling) in philosophy of education and educational theory (Peters and Besley 2008).

In the study of concrete educational practices, the influence of a Foucauldian approach has been, and remains, very visible. A substantial number of authors make use of his analytical tools (discourse analysis, for instance) or adopt his genealogical analysis in the field of education (to analyze normalizing mechanisms in educational settings, for example). Foucault's lectures on governmentality during his courses at the *Collège de France* in 1977–1978 and 1978–1979 (Foucault 2004a, b; Burchell et al. 1991) have been particularly influential in this regard. One could rightly refer to studies of governmentality as having become a new subdiscipline within the humanities (Dean 1999). The term discipline, however, may not be fully appropriate, as it might mask the huge diversity within these studies, in terms of both research domain and method (Rose 1999). What they have in common, however, is an interest in forms of governmentality, minimally conceived of as the strategies of governing people and governing ourselves. This work on governmentality has also given a new impetus to critical education policy studies while confronting education reforms in the wake of neoliberal and neoconservative policies (see, for example, the edited collection, Peters et al. 2009). The following examples give an idea of the wide range of themes and topics being covered: governmentality, bus-nopower, and liberal education (Marshall 1995); classroom management (Tavares 1996); entrepreneurship and education (Peters 2000); teacher reflection and teacher identity (Fendler 2003; Zembylas 2003); mobilization, flexibility, and lifelong learning (Edwards 2002); neoliberalism, globalization, and democracy (Olssen

et al. 2004); Europeanization and new forms of power (Masschelein and Simons 2002; Hodgson 2016); the care of the self and confession in a knowledge economy (Drummond 2003; Fejes and Nicoll 2015); as well as several edited volumes (e.g., Baker and Heyning 2004; Pongratz et al. 2004; Ricken and Rieger-Ladich 2004).

## Foucault's Concern

Few will doubt that Foucault's influence has been and remains massive. But there are some observations to be made when compiling an overview of the remarkable impact of his work. First, the extent to which Foucault is promoted as a master-thinker in the field of educational research correlates with the 'risk' of creating a growing group of followers, if not a school of Foucault scholars. This risk has, arguably, become a reality, for it is striking to note that many usages of Foucault are, in one way or another, about isolating his method, approach, or conceptual apparatus and applying it to practices in the field of education not previously studied. An example of this is the number of studies that makes use of 'disciplinary power' as an analytical concept to reveal mechanisms of power in the most diverse practices. The widespread use of discourse analysis as a method is another example. The assumption is that Foucault's ideas, approaches, or concepts can be disconnected from the, often very specific, genealogical studies from which they emerged, and that they can be used without considering the research attitude, disposition, or ethos (Karskens 1986). This is not about arguing that many studies are mere copies of the original and that very few take our thinking any further. The relevance of these studies is not in question. There is reason to doubt, however, whether it is at the level of applying conceptual and methodological apparatus and tools that the full relevance of Foucault's work is located.

The second observation to be made is that, although Foucault became a key reference figure, this was not without strong criticism (see, for example, Flynn 1994). Historians (of education) often criticized his work for not being the work of a true historian and, for instance, for making a rather selective use of the archives. Philosophers (of education), for their part, formulated doubts about the relevance of a Foucauldian contribution to theoretical debates about, for instance, the human subject, freedom, and power. His work was considered to be too historical or empirically oriented, and too implicit in its philosophical stance to actually contribute to ongoing philosophical conversations. This kind of criticism was often about the difficulty of giving Foucault and his work a proper place. In one way or another, the work of Foucault provoked strong reactions and did not meet the expectations of the established research disciplines. Despite the temptation to blame the disciplinary gatekeepers for having the wrong expectations, it is perhaps more useful to ask what motivated Foucault's work and made him transgress disciplinary boundaries. This again leads to the question of what Foucault's concern actually was. The third observation here offers the beginning of an answer to this question.

Foucault was one of the protagonists in the modernism-postmodernism debate, as it was staged by Habermas, which also had clear echoes in philosophy of education. In his statements on modernity as being an “unfinished project”, Habermas (1985) strongly opposed Foucault’s ideas about the end of modernism and the death of the subject. He labeled Foucault “crypto-normative” in his ambition to criticize power-knowledge regimes without making explicit the criteria or norms for his critique. For Habermas, such a position not only leads to intellectual relativism but also is politically dangerous. Foucault was categorized as one of the French “young conservatives” who had given up belief in reason and, therefore, the Enlightenment. In his typical style, Foucault questioned this framing of his work in the famous appeal to refuse the “blackmail of the Enlightenment,” that “you either accept the Enlightenment and remain within the tradition of its rationalism [...] or else you criticize the Enlightenment and then try to escape from its principles of rationality” (Foucault 2007: 110). He commented on several occasions on Kant’s essay *What Is Enlightenment?*, not to radically question the project of Enlightenment and modernity, but to distinguish between the critical project to install reason as the supreme court of history on the one hand, and modernity as a concern with one’s present on the other hand:

No philosopher can go without examining his own participation in this *us* precisely it is this *us* which is becoming the object of the philosopher’s own reflection. All this, philosophy as the problematization of an actuality and the philosopher’s questioning of this actuality to which he belongs and in relation to which he has to position himself, may very well characterize philosophy as a discourse of and about modernity. (Foucault 2007: 85)

Foucault’s main philosophical concern was the modern act of questioning one’s actuality, including our actuality that proclaims reason to be the ultimate guide to emancipation and progress. To get a clearer picture of Foucault’s relevance for philosophy of education, it is worth exploring this concern in more detail.<sup>1</sup>

## Foucault’s Truth

Foucault is exceptionally clear about where to situate his own work:

It seems to me that the philosophical choice with which we are confronted at present is this: we can opt for a critical philosophy which will present itself as an analytic philosophy of truth in general, or we can opt for a form of critical thought which will be an ontology of ourselves, an ontology of the actuality. It is this form of philosophy that, from Hegel to the Frankfurt School, through Nietzsche and Max Weber, has founded the form of reflection within which I have attempted to work. (Foucault 2007: 95)

Instead of being engaged in intellectual work that seeks to discover or establish the grounds, rules, or procedures for knowledge and truth, he is concerned with what counts as truth in our actuality to which he himself belongs, and with finding out what made this count as truth. In later studies, which can to a certain extent also be

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<sup>1</sup>The next sections are partly based on: Simons and Masschelein 2014.



read as an ontology of his own work, Foucault traced back this project of a critical philosophy to Greek and Roman antiquity. In the 1981–1982 courses at the *Collège de France*, under the title *The Hermeneutics of the Subject* (Foucault 2001), Foucault studies ancient practices of truth-telling and retraces two traditions in philosophy. The leading questions in this series of courses were: How can people have access to the truth? How can people become truth-tellers? What is the price of having access to the truth? Foucault distinguishes two traditions that each answers this set of questions in its own particular way.

The first tradition, which emerged in Greek antiquity and is dominant today, claims that it is knowledge that offers access to the truth. The point of departure is that in order to have true knowledge, specific (internal and external) conditions related to the act of knowing and the position of the knower have to be taken into account. Aristotle – “the philosopher” – represents for Foucault the incarnation of this tradition (Foucault 2001:18). Probably little clarification is needed to see how this tradition culminated in modern scientific research that relies for the discovery or production of true knowledge on the rigorous use of methods that open up a world of objects to be known and place someone in the position of a disinterested researcher. Philosophical enquiry in this tradition mainly tackles epistemological issues, or aims to answer questions about the foundations or limits of knowledge. Perhaps due to our familiarity with this tradition and its institutionalization in academic and university life, we have lost sight of the fact that it is but one, very particular, way of having access to the truth.

Foucault refers to a less common tradition that claims that access to the truth requires a transformation of the self. This second tradition, which could be called the existential-ethical, spiritual, or ascetic tradition, assumes there is no access to the truth without transforming one’s mode of being. Instead of postulating the subject as an underlying, stable entity that functions as the source or foundation of knowledge, this tradition is oriented toward exercises in thought and experience through which a particular relation of the self to the self, others, and the world – as a specifically shaped form of subjectivity – can be questioned, challenged, and shaped. This is linked to the idea that philosophy is, in the first instance, about a way of living and about the aspiration to live a true life. It is not about developing a system of knowledge or a set of rules that exists externally to the philosopher and can be passed to others. Rather, one becomes a ‘touchstone’ for others in their search for a true life.

In both traditions one has to meet certain conditions and to pay a price for having access to the truth, but the conditions and prices differ: in the first, one must fulfill conditions relating to knowledge; in the second, one undergoes a transformation of the self. On the basis of this distinction, it makes sense, first, to situate Foucault’s own intellectual work within the existential-ethical tradition, and second, to acknowledge that the importance of self-transformation in philosophy allows us to think in a very particular way about philosophy of education: it becomes philosophy as education. Here, a possible influence of Foucault can be seen and might be made possible.

## Foucault's Philosophy

Foucault states that his studies and books work as experiences, and that in his studying and writing he is transforming himself: "What I think is never quite the same [...] for me my books are experiences [...] And experience is something that one comes out of transformed" (Foucault 2000: 239). The term experience is related to practices of putting oneself and one's thinking to the test: "[...] I am an experimenter and not a theorist. I call a theorist someone who constructs a general system, either deductive or analytical, and applies it to different fields in a uniform way. That isn't my case. I'm an experimenter in the sense that I write in order to change myself and in order not to think the same thing as before" (Foucault 2000: 240). While the theorist – a figure clearly associated with the first tradition – puts an outside reality to the test of her theory, thereby immunizing herself, the experimenter always puts her own thinking, and so her very mode of existence, to the test. Notice that experience for Foucault does not refer to what someone has (as in "I have experience of..." or "This experience has enriched me"), but rather to what actually disrupts or destroys the 'I' and 'me': "[...] experience is trying to reach a certain point in life that is as close as possible to the 'unlivable,' to that which can't be lived through. [...] experience has the function of wrenching the subject from itself, of seeing to it that the subject is no longer itself. [...] This is a project of desubjectivation. [...] The idea of a limit-experience that wrenches the subject from itself" (Foucault 2000: 241–242).

Foucault is talking about very specific things; for instance, our common understanding of madness in terms of normality and abnormality, and our tendency to problematize sexuality in moral terms. He does not place himself outside this common understanding and the familiar practices in order to judge those who are part of it. His point of departure is exactly those understandings and practices from which he himself cannot escape, that make his own thinking possible, and that are actually part of his subjectivity. What is at stake is "to construct myself and to invite others to share an experience of what we are, not only our past but also our present, an experience of our modernity in such a way that we might come out of it transformed," and this means, he goes on, "that at the end of the book we would establish new relationships with the subject at issue; the I who wrote the book and those who have read it would have a different relationship with madness, with its contemporary status, and its history in the modern world" (Foucault 2000: 244). Being an experimenter and not a theorist, Foucault regards his books as books of experience and not as truth books or books of demonstration. Truth books aim to pass true knowledge to the readers by way of demonstration. They are focused on argumentation and proof, and they address readers as an audience that has to be convinced. In describing experience books, however, Foucault makes the following remark: "I don't accept the word 'teaching' [...], my books don't exactly have that value [method, demonstration, lessons]. They are more like invitations or public gestures" (Foucault 2000: 245). In view of this invitation and gesture, readers are not put in a position of ignorance, but rather they are invited to 'share' an experience. Foucault

sees his books working at the existential-ethical level, then, and not at the level of knowledge. This short depiction of Foucault's understanding of his own work brings several important aspects to the foreground.

First, what guides Foucault's work is a concern for the present. The aim is not to reveal the truth about what is going on and to demonstrate what is right or wrong, but instead to question the truths we live by and take for granted today. Foucault described this concern for the present as an (historical, critical) "ontology of the present" or an "ontology of ourselves" (Foucault 2007: 95 and 113). This kind of ontology starts from the things that *we* take for granted (or regard today as fundamental or ontological), and asks how *we* came to see these things as fundamental; which *we*, or which subject, came to see these things (e.g., the prison, the hospital, sexuality) as evident or essential. The present, however, is not merely what we see in front of us, nor is it what shows itself when looking through temporal or historical lenses. Rather, Foucault's present presents itself when we are attentive to or "present in the present" (Foucault 2007, p.86). It appears in a kind of "sagittal relationship", and this requires an effort. The present refers to that what is 'actual' or 'actualized' today, to things that matter. The notion of curiosity captures very well this attitude of care toward the present (Rajchman 1991: 141). Curiosity, as Foucault explains, is not to be situated at the level of knowledge and the ongoing assimilation of what we ought to know:

To me it suggests something altogether different: it evokes 'concern'; it evokes the care one takes for what exists and could exist; a readiness to find strange and singular what surrounds us; a certain relentlessness to break up our familiarities and to regard otherwise the same things; a fervor to grasp what is happening and what passes; a casualness in regard to the traditional hierarchies of the important and the essential (Foucault 1997: 325).

The term curiosity, then, relates to care. Care is derived from the Latin word *cura* that provides the root of 'curiosity' and the French *curiosité* (Foucault 1980: 108). An attitude of care encompasses a concentrated, accentuated gaze on what is happening today, what is happening to us in the world, and a willingness to become a stranger in the familiar present; that is, to regard who we are and what we do, and what we regard as our foundations, as no longer self-evident. As such, curiosity combines both distance from and vigilance or attention toward oneself in the present (Gros 2001: 512).

Second, critique for Foucault is first of all an attitude (and even 'akin to virtue'). More specifically, it is a task one takes up (Foucault 2007: 43; Butler 2004; Masschelein 2004). The critical task, according to Foucault, "requires work on our limits, that is, a patient labour giving form to our impatience for liberty" (Foucault 2007: 119). Driven by a curiosity for the present, critical philosophy embodies "an attitude, an ethos, a philosophical life in which the critique of what we are is at one and the same time the historical analysis of the limits that are imposed on us and an experiment with the possibility of going beyond them" (Foucault 2007: 118). Intricately related to the ideas of experience and desubjectivation introduced earlier, the critical attitude at stake combines a limit-attitude and an experimental attitude. These attitudes are different from what motivates a foundational critique that judges

the legitimacy of current practices and understandings based on given principles (limiting attitude) or that unmask particular strategies and tactics by recalling what is given in original experiences (experiential attitude). The limit-attitude is about the act of becoming sensitive to what presents itself as a necessity nowadays in order to explore a possible transgression of its limits. Critical work, then, refers to the work that is done at the limits of ourselves and our present: “[...] It will separate out, from the contingency that has made us what we are, the possibility of no longer being, doing, or thinking what we are, do, or think [...] it is seeking to give new impetus, as far and wide as possible, to the undefined work of freedom” (Foucault 2007: 114). But this limit-attitude should be combined with an experimental attitude, or an attitude that seeks to transform or modify one’s mode of being and how one lives the present. It involves an experimental work of the self on the self, and “this work done at the limits of ourselves must [...] put itself to the test of reality, of contemporary reality, both to grasp the points where change is possible and desirable, and to determine the precise form this change should take” (Foucault 2007: 114). This explains why Foucault refers to the critical ontology of the present as a kind of essay. An essay – as the French word *essayer* or ‘to try’ indicates – is a careful attempt to modify our mode of being in the present. It is a “transforming test of oneself in the play of truth,” or an “*askesis*, an exercise of the self, in thought” (Foucault 1984: 15). For Foucault, what is at stake is the challenge to take care of the self and the world. It is not at all a withdrawal from the world, but rather is an attempt to “live the present otherwise” (Foucault 1979: 790).

## Foucault’s Education

In his later work, Foucault recalls a tradition of philosophy that is primarily concerned with self-transformation, care, and exercise. It is remarkable how he tries to articulate his own philosophical ethos in a similar way. He does not argue that the other tradition – an analytic philosophy of truth – is wrong or mistaken. His concern is not to convince. At most, Foucault argues there is a possible danger in this tradition; it often leads to the installation of tribunals by self-proclaimed judges of truth, progress, reason, etc. who put humanity to the test. Philosophy, for Foucault, starts with the courage of putting oneself to the test, that is, with a deep concern with the present to which one belongs. Herein lies the unique contribution that Foucault makes to philosophy of education, one that is easily overlooked if we remain at the level of concepts, theories, epistemological positions, and methodologies. One could argue that a Foucauldian-inspired philosophy of education can be identified by the priority it gives to the concern or curiosity for education. Education is not approached as a field of application for ideas or concept developed elsewhere; it is not something to pass judgment on. Philosophy of education along Foucauldian lines expresses a relation of care and concern, not primarily a relation of knowledge

and judgment. This concern is not only about unmasking what is self-evident in, or taken as fundamental to, education by others, but also what we in our contemporary reality – to which the philosopher himself belongs – take for granted as the ontological ‘make-up’ of education. But there is more to a Foucauldian-inspired philosophy of education than this.

Foucault frequently writes about processes of self-transformation and (de)subjectivation, but he mainly uses an ethical, and partly political, vocabulary. This is remarkable because, traditionally, these or similar processes are described in educational or pedagogical terms. To the extent that philosophy is an act of self-transformation in thought, one could easily consider this to be an educational process and even argue that philosophy is a particular mode of (self-)education: philosophy as education (Simons and Masschelein 2014). Foucault probably has good reason to draw on ethical and political vocabularies to frame these processes of change. Ethics and politics, in one way or another, approach the issue of change with a particular aim or goal in mind that gives the change processes their orientation and urgency: “you *must* change your life” or “we *have to* change our lives” (see also Sloterdijk 2014). But ethical and political devices such as these assume, and for that reason also forget, that what comes first is the ability to change one’s life: “I *can* change my life.” This assumption is exactly what in (classic) philosophy of education is called the basic assumption or belief of education: human beings can be educated, that is, human beings are born without essence or destiny and thus are able to ‘give shape’ their own essence or destiny (clearly expressed in the German idea of *Bildung*, and perhaps foremost in the term *Bildsamkeit*; Peukert 1992).

Foucault’s studies always seem to circulate around this educational point without really being attentive to it. Or, in other words: while radically questioning essences, Foucault’s critical ontologies of the present seem to bring the reader to the point where it becomes possible to think again about ‘giving shape’ to one’s life. Experience books make it possible to relate in a different way to madness, to sexuality, to punishment, etc., and they create a space where the question about living the present otherwise starts to make sense again (Masschelein and Simons 2013). There is, without doubt, a strong tendency to give an urgency and direction to *how* to live the present otherwise by projecting a compelling ethical or political horizon. But this often seeks to mobilize or even tame education – and its potential for change – in the name of particular ethical or political projects. Instead of looking at education as the carefully designed place and time in which the coming generation can ‘give shape’ to itself, these projects use the transformational force unleashed through education to shape the coming generation into its own image. Foucault himself was, of course, always reluctant to articulate or defend such clear-cut ethical or political projects. And he was criticized for that. His criticism without giving an alternative led Habermas to call him crypto-normative. But what if Foucault’s work were approached as being crypto-educational? It could be an interesting exercise of thought in philosophy of education.

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# Paulo Freire and Liberation Philosophy of Education



Eduardo Duarte

## Introduction: The Revolutionary Struggle

Freire's project of critical literacy, which he initiated in 1946 when he was appointed director of the Department of Education and Culture of the Social Service in the state of Pernambuco, Brazil, was an immediate overturning of the traditional classroom that, along with other vestiges of colonialism, has its roots in European authoritarian pedagogies that accentuate the dichotomy between the expertise of the master (instructor) and the ignorance of the novice (student). "By giving the student formulas to receive and store, we have not offered him the means for authentic thought" (Freire 1973, p. 38). In sum, Freire's is a decolonial project intent on dismantling antidemocratic, anti-dialogic, and authoritarian schooling by initiating an entirely new project of liberation education within agricultural *campesino* communities and beyond.

The critical literacy Freire developed and practiced aspired to be "an education which would lead [people] to take a new stance toward their problems – that of intimacy with those problems, one oriented toward research instead of repeating irrelevant principles. An education of 'I wonder,' instead of merely, 'I do'" (Freire 1973, p. 34). Here an education of wonder must be qualified as an education of wonder at the possibility of social and political transformation: How might the world be otherwise? How might the world be one of justice, peace? How might we build a world by way of egalitarian principles? These questions can only be taken up authentically when they are put to the test and practiced in a classroom where "the teacher has the right but also the duty to challenge the status quo, especially in the questions of domination by sex, race or class" (Freire and Shor 1987, p. 174).

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We must read Freire's work as part of what West calls the critical pragmatic tradition that was initiated by Dewey, i.e., as a philosopher whose work is grounded in the lived realities of teachers and students who struggle daily with the limit situations that curtail their freedom:

First of all, we should be clear that our work, our activities as an educator, will not be enough to change the world. This for me is the first thing, not to idealize the educational task. But, at the same time, it is necessary to recognize that by doing something inside the space of the school we can make some good contributions. We need to have a more or less clear idea of the limits we have as educators. (Freire and Shor 1987, p. 180)

When we read the preceding excerpt, we must recognize the limits Freire is referring to are those very *limit situations* that liberatory education struggles with; limits that are, first and foremost, the hierarchical ordering of traditional schooling. Traditional approaches to teaching and learning, according to Freire, maintain the status quo and reproduce antidemocratic conditions (e.g., racism) insofar as the teaching methods are based upon asymmetrical relationships between teacher and student.

In one of his early and, he would say, formative essays, 'Education as the Practice of Freedom,' Freire articulates his criticism of traditional educational practices by noting the disconnected nature of the curriculum. He writes:

Our traditional curriculum, disconnected from life, centered on words, emptied of the reality they are meant to represent, lacking in concrete activity, could never create critical consciousness. Indeed, its own naïve dependence on high-sounding phrases, reliance on rote, and tendency toward abstractness actually intensifies our naivete. (Freire 1973, p. 37)

The disconnected nature of the curriculum is the tool of oppression that constructs what Freire describes as the "dominating" and "authoritarian" classroom, an environment of schooling that is cultivated by a monological dissemination of knowledge. Within such a setting there is an 'inadequacy of dialogue'. Moreover, the anti-dialogic nature of traditional education is supported by a disciplinary linguistic practice that functions to maintain the students powerless insofar as they do not adopt the language of schooling. Freire identifies this problem of 'classroom discourse' or the problem of 'abstract versus concrete speech' as one of the fundamental limit situations to be taken up by dialogic liberation pedagogy. Freire writes:

I have to think about the language I use and the language the students use when they first come to the university, above all in the students' first year in the university, I have to think again about the dichotomy of reading words and reading the world, between the dance of concepts, a conceptual ballet we learn in the university, and the concrete world that the concepts should be referring to. The distance of the concepts from the concreteness is that problem I come back to when thinking of the question of language in the classroom. The concepts should be associated with a concrete reality but they are not, creating a pedagogical problem. When students come to us in the university, their experience of language is much more the experience of defining the concreteness of their existence, not an experience of dancing with concepts by themselves. (Freire and Shor 1987, pp. 147–148)

Freire's critique of the disciplinary system does not entail the abandonment of theory but the recognition that it must be co-created with students, built with them so that 'little by little' students and teachers together articulate a new critical theory.

Here the point is to move away from the presumption that the teacher alone possesses and is thus alone capable of disseminating theory. Such is the way of monological and anti-dialogical pedagogies, where students are reduced to empty vessels, receptacles; objects to be moved rather than subjects who move. Disrupting this disciplinary system requires a shift toward productive and creative relation to language. Literacy within the Freirean model is emancipatory because it is a tool for the production of a new relation to the world. And this can only happen when the theory that emerges via literacy arises from the world that the students inhabit. Freire writes:

In diminishing the distance between concepts and reality, in starting from the student understanding of their concreteness as they express it, the issue of language is involved with the act of knowing, the act of gradually illuminating the conceptual meaning of experience. We must start from student perception...this means that we start from their language, not from our language. But starting from their levels of knowledge about reality, we try to go with them to more rigorous levels of knowing and expressing reality. (Freire and Shor 1987, p. 150)

## Freire's Philosophical Genealogy

It is safe to say that many who are drawn to critical theory were, like Marx, from a young age moved by their experiences with the stark economic inequalities and social injustices that prevail in the world, and called, vocation like, to expose the repugnant contradiction between the ideals of equality and freedom they had been taught to believe in and the actually existing material conditions they encountered in their everyday life. Critical theory, however, is the calling to expose the contradiction between the principle of equality and reality of inequality, and the authentic response to this calling is *praxis*.

The highly influential critical theory of Paulo Freire exemplifies what Martin Jay refers to when he describes the development of critical theory through dialogue. Freire's application of Marx is articulated in his *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, which is a philosophical account of the grassroots adult literary project he undertook in Brazil that replicated the literacy campaigns of Cuban revolution. Freire identified his project the work of 'the radical, committed to human liberation,' and as such it is an unambiguous testing of Marx's 11th thesis: "the more radical a person is, the more fully he or she enters into reality so that, knowing it better, he or she can better transform it. This individual is not afraid to confront, to listen, to see the world unveiled. This person is not afraid to meet the other people or to enter into dialogue with them...The pedagogy of the oppressed...is a task for radicals...revolutionary cultural action" (PO 21). This is the philosophy of the street that Socrates defined, which happens via dialectics, or what Freire called dialogue, and which makes social transformation via educational *praxis*. With Freire, dialogue is *praxis* because it transforms the world: the speaking of the true word, which is to say *real* word, transforms the world. In other words, this educational *praxis* is a critical philosophical project: it does not simply interpret the world but changes it. All of this is based on

the realization of what Freire calls the ontological vocation of becoming fully human. Dialogue is the response to the call of humanization, the call to *be human*: “to exist, humanly, is to *name* the world, to change it” (69). And where does this call arrive from? Is it from the historical struggle of humankind to realize its ontological vocation, which is to say, from the world? Yes, indeed, especially when we understood ‘the world’ as the work of human hands that at one and the same time brings us together as humanity (a people) and separates us into humans (persons). At one and the same time we encounter the world as the history of humanity and the histories of each and every human person.

Critical consciousness awakens with expression of social discontents “precisely because these discontents are real components of an oppressive situation,” Freire writes in *Education as the Practice of Liberation*. And this awakening arises from the recognition that the oppressive situation is, at the base level, a manifestation of the disrupted harmony between humanity and life on earth. Critical consciousness is thus the form of thinking that not only perceives the ubiquity of gross inequality but at the same time negates the fundamental premise that humans have dominion over life on earth. The source of that claim is found in one of the oldest and lasting narratives of Western civilization, the Old Testament book of *Genesis*. Critical theorists tell this story by relentlessly showing how the exercise of dominion has unfolded as the history of domination and subjection of *all* life on earth: the exploitation and oppression of large segments of the human community by a small number who have placed themselves above the rest.

Theoretically, which is to say, philosophically, Freire’s Marxist critique exposes the colonial logic put to work in schooling. “Manipulation is another dimension of the theory of anti-dialogical action, and...is an instrument of conquest” (Freire 1994, p. 128). In classic Marxist fashion Freire shows how ‘education’ within the neocolonial school is nothing short of socialization into docility, and ‘teaching’ is domination:

Domination is when I say you must believe this because I say it. Manipulation is dominating the students. Manipulating culture makes myths about reality. It denies reality, falsifies reality. Manipulation is when I try to convince you that a table is a chair, when the curriculum makes reality opaque, when school and society present the system of monopoly capitalism as ‘free enterprise.’ In opposition, the liberating classroom illuminates reality. It unveils the *raison d’être* for any object of study. The liberating classroom does not accept the status quo and its myths in society. In that unveiling, we change our understanding of reality, our perception. (Freire and Shor 1987, p. 172)

In response to the foregoing, Ira Shor, one of Freire’s principal collaborators in the USA, explains that this phenomenon of manipulation and domination, notwithstanding the students’ socialization to this form of education, is most often subtle and reinforced by the ideology of the instructor as a ‘neutral’ disseminator and arbiter. A mask of neutrality is donned by the instructor who adopts an apolitical posture, by the teacher who enacts and demonstrates the ‘value’ of disinterested inquiry. Shor unmasks this posture of the teacher who “pretends that reality is not problematic, [and]...thus reduces the students’ own power to perceive and to act on social issues.” Exposed by Freirean critique is the connection between ‘scientific’

disinterested inquiry and domination. “An opaque reality disempowers people, by holding a screen in front of what they need to see to begin transformation. ‘Neutral’ teaching is another name for an opaque curriculum and an opaque curriculum is another name for a domesticating education” (Freire and Shor 1987, p. 174).

From a Habermasian point of view Freire’s conclusion argues that the market logic of a capitalist economic system has effectively colonized the sphere of education. Here then, relying on Habermas categories, we can describe the Freirean project as a struggle to decolonize the market logic from the lifeworld where authentic teaching and learning is rooted. In Habermasian terms the Freirean project is part of the struggle for “radical-democratic change...to erect a democratic dam against the colonizing encroachment of system imperatives on areas of the lifeworld...so that the social-integrative power of solidarity – the communicative force of production – can prevail over the powers of the other two control resources, i.e., money and administrative power, and therewith successfully assert the practically oriented demands of the lifeworld” (Habermas 1992, p. 444). Like Habermas, the Freirean project lays claim to an original or fundamental communicative ontology. The turn to dialogue is thus a return to what always remains prior to the colonizing logic of capitalism. For Freire this amounts to developing a dialogic pedagogy which, while aware of its limits as a lever for social transformation, is nevertheless uncompromising in its commitment to liberation from the ground up. Freire writes:

We must avoid being interpreted as if we were thinking that first, we should educate the people for being free, and after we could transform reality. No. We have to do the two simultaneously, as much as possible. Because of that, we must be engaged in political action against the dehumanizing structures of production. (Freire and Shor 1987, p. 127)

The Freirean liberation pedagogy understands itself to be the practice of politics within the classroom, or a praxis that is aimed at creating a radically democratic education setting, a polyphonic learning environment in which all voices can be heard and can interact with one another. It understands itself to be an avenue for democratization of the school as one sphere of civil society. For Freire, as I will show below, the challenge for educators is to thwart the colonization of the lifeworld by the market logic by making it the very content of learning, i.e., engaging with students in a critical dialogic examination of the dominant ideology and its relationship to education:

That is why...I have insisted with you on a radical pedagogy of asking questions. This pedagogy, experienced in education or in political struggle, is essentially democratic and for that very reason anti-authoritarian.... Its criticism of traditional education is not limited to technical and methodological issues, nor to student-teacher relations, which are important, but extends to criticism of the capitalist system itself. (Freire and Faundez 1989, p. 45)

For Freire the colonization of the educational sphere by the capitalist marketplace logic is exemplified in what he calls the “banking concept of education.” In *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* Freire exposes banking education as an instrument of oppression and articulates his own dialogic praxis as the only means of combatting this authoritarian pedagogy. In turn, it is necessary to understand his critique of banking education before moving forward with an examination of his emancipatory dialogic praxis.

## The Critique of Banking Education

The critique of banking education appears in the second chapter of *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*. “Freire’s analysis of banking education as destructive of human freedom is close to being the classic criticism of all didactic and teacher-centered forms of education” (Elias 1994, p. 114). At the core of banking education is what Freire names the ‘narrative character’ of authoritarian teaching. “This relationship involves a narrating Subject (the teacher) and patient, listening objects (the students)” (Freire 1994, p. 52). In the traditional education setting the relationship between instructor and student is asymmetrical, with the teacher desiring total control over the ‘learning’ process.

The teacher-student relation delineated above is predicated on a curriculum that Freire describes as ‘lifeless and petrified.’ Banking education is thus life-denying, and the banking educator described as a necrophiliac. Banking education “leads students to memorize mechanically the narrated content,” as opposed to creatively and critically posing questions and offering original interpretations. Banking education attempts “to minimize or annual the students’ creative power and to stimulate their credulity” (Freire 1994, p. 54). In banking education there is no recognition of thinking, no collective inquiry because the world is presented as ‘completed.’ Thus the banking educator is teaching at the proverbial ‘end of history,’ an epoch ushered in by the so-called triumph of capitalism. The practice has the goal of reinforcing this ideological claim by ‘teaching’ the students to be passive, and thereby “transforms students into receiving objects. It attempts to control thinking and action, leads women and men to adjust to the world, and inhibits their creative power” (Freire 1994, p. 86). The students in the banking model are reduced to ‘containers’ or ‘receptacles’ to be filled with ‘knowledge,’ the ‘facts’ of the world *as it is*.

Education thus becomes an act of deposition, in which the students are the depositories and the teacher is the depositor. Instead of communicating, the teacher issues communiques and makes deposits which the students patiently receive, memorize, and repeat. This is the ‘banking’ concept of education, in which the scope of action allowed to the students extends only as far as receiving, filing, and storing the deposits...But in the last analysis it is the people themselves who are filed away through the lack of creativity, transformation, and knowledge in this (at best) misguided system. For apart from inquiry, apart from the praxis, individuals cannot be truly human. Knowledge emerges only through invention and re-invention, through the restless, impatient, continuing, hopeful inquiry human beings pursue in the world, with the world, with each other. (Freire 1994, p. 53)

Like Dewey, Freire’s critique of the traditional pedant and authoritarian educator reveals the domesticating outcomes of a ‘teaching’ that is intent on pacifying students. Whereas Dewey and Freire demand a learning environment that allows students to experiment, to create, to invent knowledge, and to inquire through dialogic interaction, the domesticating system of schooling reinforces what Freire calls “the ideology of oppression...Projecting an absolute ignorance onto others,” this ideology “negates education and the process of inquiry” (Freire 1994, p. 53).

Freire turns to Hegel for assistance in elaborating his critique of banking education, which is an expression of what Hegel named the master-slave dialectic. Freire

writes that “the students, alienated like the slave in the Hegelian dialectic, accept their ignorance as justifying the teacher’s existence...” (Freire 1994, p. 53). To draw this analogy with sharper lines Freire might have added that insofar as banking education is organized by the master-slave dialectic it permits the teacher to burgle away the students’ capacity for critique and by doing so their faculty for identity formation. Banking education ‘naturalizes’ the authoritarian teacher’s position as ‘master’ and student as ‘slave,’ as object being formed, rather than subject who is forming herself. As Hegel describes it, the dialectic is organized by “a recognition that is one-sided and unequal” (Hegel 1977, p. 114). Hegel writes:

Since to begin with they are unequal and opposed, and their reflection into a unity has not yet been achieved, they exist as two opposed shapes of consciousness; one is the independent consciousness whose essential nature is to be for itself, the other is dependent consciousness whose essential nature is simply to live or to be for another. The former [the teacher] is lord, the other [the student] is slave. (Hegel 1977, p. 115)

For Hegel, self-consciousness – emancipated consciousness – is dependent upon intersubjective, mutual recognition, on symmetric reciprocity: “self-consciousness exists in-and-for-itself when, and by the fact that, it so exists for another; that is, it exists only in being acknowledged” (Hegel 1977, p. 111). Following Hegel, Freire recognized that any project of emancipation via education begins, philosophically, with the premise that self-consciousness (emancipated consciousness) is not an historical inevitability, but must emerge via struggle. For Hegel this struggle was, figuratively, a struggle to the death, the death of the asymmetric relationship, the death of the master-slave dialectic.

The logic of the master-slave dialectic unfolds as a politics of misrecognition. The students’ subjectivity is eclipsed by interpolation of them as receptacles, objects of control as opposed to subjects with freedom. The student is reduced to the status of ‘slave’ and (de)formed into a dependent “and not an independent consciousness...He is therefore, not certain of being-for-self as the truth of himself. On the contrary, his truth is in reality the unessential consciousness and its unessential action” (Hegel 1977, p. 115). In Freire’s terminology the banking educator renders the student dependent, while a dialogic pedagogy undertaken under conditions of mutual recognition emancipates the student’s independent consciousness. Hegel describes the process in this way: “Through this rediscover of himself by himself, the slave realizes that it is precisely in his work wherein he seemed to have only an alienated existence that he acquires a mind of his own” (Hegel 1977, pp. 118–119).

Freire’s liberation project is one of confronting, destructing the contradiction at the heart of the asymmetry and then reconstructing the teacher-student relationship. By reconciling the poles of the contradiction the liberatory educational context produces a democratized classroom where power is circulating dynamically, with no party capable of claiming control over the movement of learning that is propelled by freedom. Students are empowered, and so too the newly liberated teacher who also encounters himself anew. Together they recognize the production of knowledge as a joint effort, a collaborative and collective work. All members of the dialogic learning community “are simultaneously teachers and students” (Freire 1994, p. 56).



Freire warns that the implementation of liberatory pedagogy is one of struggle. This warning, which is often ignored by more liberal and reform minded educators, is captured well by Ivan Illich when he describes Freire's project as a "truly revolutionary pedagogy." In turn, while Hegel's influence is unquestionable, Freire is best understood as a Hegelian-Marxist, or Marxist humanist.

The resolution of the traditional teacher/student contradiction arrives when "the innumerable well intentioned bank-clerk teachers" (Freire 1994, p. 56) abandon the metaphysical view of the self and world as fixed and determined. An education for liberation, on the contrary, is put underway by a process metaphysics that works under the premise that "reality is really a process, undergoing constant transformation." In this case, a process metaphysics deployed within a critical and revolutionary praxis has an existential implication: liberation is the human expression of a primordial dynamic process.

## Freire and the Ontological Vocation to Be Free

The work of the liberation educator is thus first and foremost one of calling the students into what Freire calls their humanization. Teaching is vocational and vocative, a calling of students to their ontological vocation *to be free*:

Concern for humanization leads at once to the recognition of dehumanization, not only as an *ontological possibility*, but as an historical reality. And as an individual perceives the extent of dehumanization he or she may ask if humanization is a viable possibility. Within history, in concrete, objective contexts, both humanization and dehumanization are possibilities for a person as an uncompleted being conscious of their incompleteness.

But while humanization and dehumanization are real alternatives, only the first is the *people's vocation*. This vocation is constantly negated, yet it is affirmed by that very negation. (Freire 1994, p. 25)

When we examine the fragments where Freire rehearses the ontological vocation, we immediately recognize the ontological vocation is the central category for his project, and thus for the philosophy of liberation. Without properly thinking this category we fail, at a philosophical/theoretical level to understand what is happening with the *praxis* that is unfolding with philosophy of education.

Thinking the ontological vocation demands hearing the resonance of ancient words that are conveyed therein – *allí dentro*. Thus, when we take up the work of thinking the ontological vocation, we are compelled to shift into an auditory dimension, to *perceive* via *listening*, because the ontological vocation is an existential *calling*; specifically, a calling that gathers: a congregational gathering, a call to community via communion. This is precisely why the thinking of this category enables us to understand with Freire that the authentic outcome of thinking the ontological vocation is the praxis of dialogue: speaking and hearing the Word, and thereby exercising our primordial right, as Freire puts it.

Thinking the ontological vocation via Freire entails reconciling what appear to be contradictory discourses. For example, Ron Glass criticizes Freire for working

with what Glass calls “conflicting interpretive frameworks...in particular traditions of Marxism, existentialism, and Christianity.” These discursive conflicts produce “certain contradictions...that arise when trying to weave these roots together...” For Glass the major conflict arises with the category: ontological vocation. Glass insists that the discursive conflict “can be seen...in Freire’s conception of humanization as the ontological ‘vocation’ of human beings. The theological notion of vocation undermines the more historicist ontological interpretation required when analyzing oppression (which Freire labels dehumanization) since it is also a way that humans produce the history and culture that they live.”

Glass’ critique raises some important questions: does the “theological notion of vocation” undermine the historicist consciousness that is put to work by the liberation project? Does the ontological call for humanization, for a new humanity, undercut or diminish our capacity to perceive injustice and critique the institutions that produce it? Does the vocational thwart our struggle to mount a praxis and construct alternatives to the status quo?

Clarence Joldersma offers a signpost for a response to Ron Glass when he writes: “Although I do not argue this point, I would think it would be difficult to understand Freire without acknowledging his Christian faith...” Indeed, faith, as I come will back to later, is the dramatic backdrop to Freire’s project, and one that is emphasized by Henry Giroux who, in his introduction to Freire’s *Politics of Education* reminds us that Freire adopted the language of possibility that was worked out by Latin American liberation theologians. Giroux writes the “Language of possibility is rooted in what Freire calls ‘a permanent prophetic vision.’” Giroux continues, “Underlying this prophetic vision is a faith that, as theologian Dorethee Soelle argues in *Choogin Life*, ‘makes life present to us and so makes it possible...it is a great Yes to life...[one that] presupposes our power to struggle.’”

Freire’s thinking arises out of a movement, namely, liberation theology, that, in contrast to what Glass has claimed, presumes a symmetry between the Christian Gospel and critical social theory. As Giroux adds, Freire’s categories of faith and hope are in fact expressions of “his faith and sense of hope in the God of history and in the oppressed, whose teaching [i.e., the pedagogy of the oppressed] make it possible, in Freire’s words, to ‘reconcile Christian love with the exploitation of human beings.’” Reconciliation occurs whenever we perceive in the lived experience of oppression the redemptive passion of Christ’s salvific crucifixion: the liberation of the human spirit in the historical reality of oppression. The perception of this soteriological event in history is a reception of the prophetic call to struggle for justice through an unrelenting faith that is confirmed in the presence of the living Christ in the oppressed.

Thinking, Freire writes, “perceives reality as a process, as transformation” (Freire 1994, 73). This thinking ‘*el pensar verdadero*’ (true/authentic thinking) that is true/authentic because it is appearing through dialogue (the dialectic moving through the human gathering). Dialogue is the only proper response to the ontological vocation because the calling is calling us into the process of becoming. The call says, first and foremost, “All is Becoming.” In turn, dialogue is the only proper response to this call because it alone is capable of placing us (together) in the pro-

cess of becoming. Dialogue in this sense is not mimetic, because we are not imitating the process of becoming. Rather, through dialogue we are gathered *into* Being qua Becoming.

A vocation is a calling, a sonic or auditory disclosure, perceived via listening. The ancient word that we discover when we undertake an archeological exegesis of Freire's 'ontological vocation' is *ekklesia*, which is the word that the Attic Greeks used to designate the process through which individual private citizens were called out of their homes and gathered together into a public place. The Attic *ἐκκλησία* was lifted wholesale into the New Testament Greek and then appeared in Latin virtually unchanged as *ecclesia*, and then later in Spanish became *iglesia*. The original is the compound of *ek* ('out' – as in *exodus*: out on the road, path) and *klē* (to call). Vocation is a calling in the form of an unambiguous saying: an injunction (imperative). The *ἐκκλησία* *calls* out from the private and singular into the public and collective. The necessary presumption here is that there is a sound – traditionally made by a horn ('trumpet') – that is heard *by all in the same way* as an injunction to gather. What's more, it is presumed there is a place where the assembly is meant to gather. The Latins will translate that place as the *res publica*, the shared place.

*κοινός* is the common. *ἐκ κοινού*: of, from the common is what is shared in common – both as the place that is shared and the sharing of a place. Hence *κοινώς* – what is held in common or jointly – should always be joined with *κοινότες* – the act of sharing in common, community. Finally, *κοινός* unfolds as *koinonia* via *κοινῶ* – communicate. All of this can be summarized with the fragment where, in light of the assertions that "the essence of dialogue is the word," and "the true word is praxis," Freire adds, "*Los hombres se liberan en comunión*," which I translate as "the people liberate themselves in *communion*."

Here it is obvious that *reception* qua revelation of the ontological vocation for humanization happens by remaining in the calling in which one is called insofar as one perceives the call to enter into communion with others, i.e., called into the inter-subjective humanization experienced in the *sharing of life*.

The formation of the learning community occurs as an implication of the *conversion* to dialogue, to being-together through the word. And this is precisely how Freire himself puts the matter when he insists that "dialogue...requires an intense *faith* in humankind, *faith* in their power to make and remake, to create and recreate, *faith* in their vocation to be more fully human...[which is] the birthright of all. *Faith* in people is an *a priori* requirement for dialogue; the 'dialogic [person]' believes in others even before [they] meet them face-to-face" (71).

Here is another example of what Glass calls Freire's theological language, but my interest in these concluding remarks is not to revisit *that* critique. The greater challenge appears with showing via an archeological exegesis that Freire's invocation of faith is not a secular humanist euphemism, but, on the contrary, arising out of the discursive field in which liberation theology is rooted, i.e., the efforts in the late 1960s and early 1970s to midwife what Vatican II described as "the birth of a new humanism...defined first of all by [our] responsibility toward [our] brothers and sisters."

What's important here is to recognize that Freire's claim that *faith* in people is an *a priori* for dialogue is an assignment of the faith in the ontological vocation, the vocation to be more fully human, *SER MAS*, which is codified by the primordial to speak the Word.

## Freire's Legacy

Paulo Freire's influence on critical theory and practice in education is unparalleled. His work is read the world over, and has led to creation of institutes in Brazil, the USA, South Africa, Canada, and the UK, which are devoted to the study of his work and to the ongoing engagement with the liberation educational praxis he initiated. Internationally renowned philosopher and theologian Enrique Dussel has identified Freire as a singular figure in the articulation of liberation philosophy. Freire has been credited as the foundational thinker for Augusto Boal's radical theater of the oppressed. Critical educational such as bell hooks, Antonia Darder, Peter McLaren, Donald Macedo, and Henry Giroux are among the most prominent figures who have taken up Freire's work in the USA. In the USA, his work has been read through the lenses of an array of discourses such as neomarxism, postmodernism, feminism, decolonial, and critical race theory. In the two decades since his passing, Freire's legacy has continued to grow with each new generation's response to the vocation to be free and the struggle for human liberation.

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# Maxine Greene's Concept of the Social Imagination



Wendy Kohli

## Introduction

Maxine Greene (1917–2014) was a philosopher of education who grounded her work in existential phenomenology, pragmatism, critical theory, and aesthetics. A prolific writer, public intellectual, and teacher, Greene offers contemporary educators, philosophers, and policy makers a valuable critique of education and schooling. In particular, her concept of the social imagination is a potent antidote to the negative forces of scientism, technicism, and instrumental rationality that have dominated educational thought and practice for several decades. It is also a generative idea that supports the viability of multicultural communities in our schools and in our democratic societies at large. This chapter will address Greene's resistance to the increasing standardization of teaching and learning, the corporatization of schooling, and the shrinking of the public sphere, through a critical understanding of the arts.

Since her earliest writings in the 1970s, Greene has provided a sustained critique of our bureaucratized schooling systems, systems that offer a reduced and packaged concept of education (Greene 1973, 1978). She laments the situation of many teachers and students who often experience a loss of their own subjectivity—their own agency and suggests “that [the teacher] struggle against unthinking submergence... If he wishes to present himself as a person actively engaged in critical thinking and authentic choosing, he cannot accept any ‘ready-made standardized scheme’ at face value” (Greene 1973, p. 269).

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In her later work, Greene makes a compelling case to transform this disempowering situation through critical aesthetic experiences. By invoking the imagination, particularly the *social* imagination, Greene seeks to move us beyond education as “simple transmission” (Greene 1995, p. 3) and also “the hollow formulations, the mystifications so characteristic of our times” (Greene 1988, p. 126). She maintains that “a concern for the critical and the imaginative, for the openings of new ways of ‘looking at things’, is wholly at odds with the technician and behaviorist emphases we still find in American schools” (Greene 1988, p. 126).

It is important to underscore Greene’s insistence on the *social dimensions* of the imagination—imagination that is transformative, that can produce a more humane and just world. Drawing on critical theory, existentialism and the arts to develop her critical concept, Greene deploys it to *provoke*, to provoke us into ‘wide-awakeness.’ As she tells it: “I am interested in trying to awaken educators to a realization that transformations are conceivable, that learning is stimulated by a sense of future possibility and by a sense of what might be” (Greene 1978, pp. 3–4).

This chapter will locate the social imagination in Greene’s existential commitment to provide openings, to create more possibilities, to move us to a more empowered stance in the world. For Greene, as it was for John Dewey, it is through encounters with a range of art forms that we *are* provoked, to “think of things as if they could be otherwise” (Greene 2001, p. 116). And like Dewey, Greene was engaged in applying her theories to real life problems. Through her long teaching and writing career, her 30-year role as Founder and Philosopher in Residence at the Lincoln Center Institute for the Arts in Education,<sup>1</sup> and as co-founder of a small New York City high school focused on the arts and social inquiry,<sup>2</sup> Greene inspired countless generations of teachers, artists, professors, and community activists. Ever the philosopher of education, Greene continually asked us to reflect on the perennial question—to what ends are we preparing the young in our schools? One response from her was to “educate for freedom”<sup>3</sup> through an engagement with the arts (Greene 1988, pp. 117–135). Her concept of the social imagination provides a fuller understanding of Greene’s philosophy of education and its impact on our field.

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<sup>1</sup> The Lincoln Center Institute for the Arts in New York City, now Lincoln Center Education, was founded by Maxine Greene over 30 years ago. <http://www.aboutlincolncenter.org/education-community/lincoln-center-education/lincoln-center-education>

<sup>2</sup> <http://schools.nyc.gov/SchoolPortals/03/M299/default.htm>. From the website of the school: At the High School for Arts, Imagination and Inquiry we work to infuse our interdisciplinary curriculum with experience in, and reflective study of, the arts in accordance with the model created by the Lincoln Center Institute for the Arts in Education. We believe that encounters of this sort release imagination and open unexpected intellectual possibilities that provoke students to reach beyond themselves as they “look at things as if they could be otherwise” and, most significantly, encourage civic dialogue which empowers all of the members of our diverse school community to work towards a more just, humane and vibrant world.

<sup>3</sup> See Greene’s classic text 1988, *The Dialectic of Freedom*, for her historical and philosophical justification of “education for freedom.”

## Situating Greene's Philosophical Stance

Over the course of Greene's lifetime of scholarly work, she maintained that our received framework of critical rationality was not sufficient to understand and educate about the complexity of human experience within diverse societies. For a fuller account of our lived reality, one needed to see from many vantage points and through many disciplinary lenses. She insisted that no one discourse could grasp adequately the complexities and contradictions of human experience in our contemporary multicultural world.

In developing "the capacity to look critically at [the] world" (Greene 1973, p. 167), Greene argued that we must address what she often called "'the sedimentation' of meanings over time," starting from the vantage point of the individual (Greene 1973, p. 165). With her grounding in phenomenology and existentialism, Greene argued for education to start with a strong connection to the subjective experience, the biographical standpoint of the learner, in order to make connections with the subject knowledge at hand. Otherwise, these sedimented layers of meaning can become barriers to educating for democracy, for social justice, and for human liberation if not excavated first from this personal standpoint. She describes this phenomenological process as such:

...the individual is moved to constitute his world as meaningful within the stream of his consciousness...Wanting to *be* someone, he continually moves outward, seeking to transcend, to break through to a new future. He makes this break best of all in the context of his life history, perceiving from his vantage point and *then* from a multiplicity of other vantage points. (Greene 1973, p. 167)

Greene continues by reminding us that "every human being has the capacity to look critically at the world if he is freed to do so through dialogue. Equipped with the necessary skills, he can deal critically with his reality, once he has become conscious of how he perceives it" (Greene 1973, p. 167). Her focus on dialogue, on perception, on situated consciousness resonates with the critical pedagogy of Paulo Freire, another important inspiration for her educational philosophy. She cites his early work, *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, when referring to those "who have to be aroused to a consciousness of how the real is constructed and who have to be challenged to 'name' their lived worlds, and through the naming, to transform those worlds" (Greene 1995, p. 24).

It is clear that Greene offers an expanded notion of critical reflection—one that incorporates not just the rational, but also the emotional, ethical, and aesthetic sensibilities—in order to come to a more complete understanding of reality. Echoing Merleau-Ponty, Greene embraced the "pre-reflective landscape" of each individual's situatedness as the foundation for understanding the world—however partial those perspectives would necessarily be (Greene 1988, p. 21). Similarly, Greene employed Bakhtin's concept of 'heteroglossia,' that is, the recognition of differences within languages and worldviews, to allow for open dialogue and to create spaces "where multiple voices and multiple discourses intersect and interact" (Greene 1988, p. 129).



## Social Imagination and the Transformative Potential of the Arts

Amid this array of perspectives, of multiple voices, Greene, like Dewey, asserted the “potency of the arts” (Greene 2001, pp. 196–197). It is worth quoting Dewey at length here—as Greene often does—to make vivid the influence of his work on her aesthetic-political thinking.

...The function of art has always been to break through the crust of conventionalized and routine consciousness. Common things, a flower, a gleam of moonlight...not things rare and remote, are means with which the deeper levels of life are touched...This process is art...Artists have always been the real purveyors of news, for it is not the outward happening itself which is new, but the kindling by it of emotion, perception, and appreciation.<sup>4</sup> (Dewey, as quoted in Greene 2001, p. 197)

Greene took seriously Dewey’s understanding of the power of art to deepen the lives of people. As evidenced by how she lived her life, she appreciated the aesthetic value of a work of art. However, she also saw that painting, literature, music, drama, dance, photography, and film had the potential for rationalizing the status quo just as much as it could lead to its transformation. Consequently, she resisted sentimentalizing the imagination by reminding us that acts of horror have been committed because someone was able to imagine them and implement them. That is why it was important for Greene to emphasize the development of a critical consciousness of the world through a *critical engagement* with the arts (Greene 2001, p. 197). It is in this extension of Dewey’s aesthetic experience that we see Greene’s political-philosophical roots in existentialism and critical theory/pedagogy.

Greene’s modernist grounding kept her focused on the critical, transformative possibilities of the arts. To support her position, she invoked Jean Paul Sartre who said: “it is on the day that we can conceive of a different state of affairs that a new light falls on our troubles and our suffering and that we *decide* that these are unbearable” (as cited in Greene 1995, p. 5). For Greene, it is our *social* imagination at work when we see as ‘unbearable’ something such as uncaring schools and that we are able to “think of humane and liberating classrooms for every learner” (p. 5). Greene readily admits that to attain this social imagination one must develop “a mode of utopian thinking: thinking that refuses mere compliance, that looks down roads not yet taken to the shapes of a more fulfilling social order, to more vibrant ways of being in the world” (p. 5). No easy task in a world ‘submerged’ in bureaucratic practices; yet she was determined to move us beyond education as “simple transmission” (p. 3).

Greene’s existential commitments forced her to wrestle with the possibilities of hope and despair; yet more often than not, the possibility for deciding, acting, changing, and creating kept the despair at bay. Her concept of the social imagination was intended to provide openings, to create more possibilities, to move us toward a

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<sup>4</sup>This is drawn from Dewey’s *The Public and Its Problems*, Chapter Two “In Search for the Great Community.”

more empowered stance in the world. For Greene, it is through critical encounters with a range of art forms that we are provoked to think and act differently—to become 'wide awake'.

## Consciousness and Wide-Awakeness

In Greene's first major educational philosophy text, *Teacher as Stranger*, she challenges us to rethink our taken-for-granted assumptions through the critical lens of existential phenomenology. Specifically, she asks us "to become highly conscious of the phenomena and events in the world as it presents itself to consciousness" and like Sartre, "to go beyond the situations one confronts and refuse reality as given in the name of a reality to be produced" (Greene 1973, p. 7). As an existential phenomenologist, consciousness plays a central role in how Greene conceptualizes philosophy.

Drawing on Husserl, Greene spoke of the "consciousness of the living being and the life-world constituted by each subjectivity" (1973, p. 35). Applying this concept to her philosophy of education, Greene warns of the "ancient images, abstractions, and slogans [that] too often hang like veils between the teacher and the 'phenomenology of the situation'" (1973, p. 80). Yet, she argues, "if [the teacher] chooses consciousness, if he is alert to the veil, the teacher will realize that to talk about something, to name something is not to guarantee its existence...Existence, empirical reality must be demonstrated" (p. 81). Greene goes on to remind us of how easily it is to accept unquestioningly such commonplace assumptions such as "children are 'learners' when they go to school or that all are provided 'equal opportunity'..." (p. 81). It is here we grasp Greene's critical theory at work, deconstructing the educational slogans that constitute much of our educational landscape. She is nudging us into 'wide-awakeness', into challenging our taken-for-granted views, in order to move beyond such abstractions and slogans.

In her reliance on the phenomenologist's understanding of consciousness, Greene reminds us that it "is in no sense mere innerness or introspection. It thrusts *toward* the world, not away from it...that consciousness is characterized by intentionality: it is always *of* something" (p. 131). Greene implores teachers to be conscious of their lived realities, to examine the specific situations and subjectivities of their students, and to refuse the sedimented meanings they have inherited.

At the same time, Greene is quite aware that most of us, including teachers and students, are "not conscious of [our] standpoint or ... [our] consciousness. [We] live immersed in [our] daily life... tak[ing] for granted the commonsense reality of things" (pp. 131–132.).

This is where the notion of 'wide-awakeness' becomes so crucial to Greene's philosophy. She recounts that when 'wide-awake', our taken-for-grantedness "becomes questionable; there is an interference with the habitual...Ordinary ways of perceiving have to be suspended; questions have to be posed. The individual has

to be jolted into awareness of his own perceptions” (p. 132). ‘Jolted into awareness’: Greene employs Alfred Shutz’s definition of awareness as “a plane of consciousness of highest tension originating in an attitude of full attention to life...” (as quoted in Greene 1978, p. 169).

To arouse this awareness, this ‘full attention’, Greene turns to encounters with the arts, to aesthetic experience. In advocating for the artistic-aesthetic domain, especially in and for schools, Greene makes clear that her commitment to this domain is not simply a love for the arts. Rather, “it derives as well from a sense of the *anaesthetic* character of so many institutions in our culture, including schools” [emphasis added] (Greene 1978, p. 169). Echoing Dewey, Greene argues that this ‘anaesthetic’ character of schools is a product of bureaucratic practices and technicist thinking that contributes to humans becoming “passive gazers, not see-ers; hearers not listeners” (Greene 1978, p. 169). Greene’s life work has been to move us out of our complacency, our passivity, to be more active questioning beings.

Like Dewey and Freire, Greene promotes a philosophy of education built upon problem posing and questioning from an active stance. Citing Dewey, who promoted aesthetic experiences as “a challenge to the systematic thought called philosophy” Greene extends his critique to include “many kinds of linear, positive, thinking” in order to “break... with the mechanical, the sporadic, the routine” (Greene 1978, p. 171).

At the same time, Greene saw the limits of Dewey’s critique and looked to Sartre to bolster her understanding of aesthetic experience—especially his views on “the dangers of fixity” (Greene 1978, p. 172). As an existential phenomenologist, Greene feared the human tendency toward certainty, finishedness, and habituated behavior that was susceptible to reification. Furthermore, she appreciated “Sartre’s stress... on the reconstruction of the present in the light of future possibility...The going beyond...the identifications of lacks in present situations, with the struggle to surpass, with the transformation of the world” (p. 172).

It was Greene’s commitment to ‘going beyond’ that animated her commitment to social justice and educational change. And it was her embrace of the arts that became the vehicle to imagine the possibilities for a different, more humane, and just world.

## Imagining a Transformed World

Greene’s passion for the arts rivaled her commitment to educating for critical consciousness: educating for freedom, for equality, for democracy. Critical aesthetic encounters were for Greene, as indicated earlier, openings for new possibilities, for new visions of the world. They provided a nondogmatic, nondidactic pedagogical approach to educating and empowering young people. And they offered a way to make connections across cultural divides by increasing multicultural understanding and recognizing a multiplicity of voices. Yet Greene was not naïve about the enormity of this endeavor, of the barriers to liberation.

Here she implores us to recognize the task at hand:

Given the dangers of small-mindedness and privatism...I do not think it sufficient to develop even the most variegated, most critical, most imaginative, most 'liberal' approach to the education of the young. If we are seriously interested in educating for freedom...it is...important to find a way of developing a *praxis* of educational consequence that opens the spaces necessary for the remaking of a democratic community. (Greene 1988, p. 126)

Greene is calling for a radical rethinking of education. For her this “would mean fresh and sometimes startling winds blowing through the classrooms of the nation. It would mean the granting of audibility to numerous voices seldom heard before” (Greene 1988, pp. 126–127).

Greene took this passion for rethinking and remaking the world into her lectures at the Lincoln Center Institute for the Arts in Education. In one of her most cited lectures, “Thinking of Things as if They Could be Otherwise,” given in 1997, Greene spoke “about opening spaces in our classrooms, more and more spaces where people can appear as who they are and not *what* they are, spaces for action on the part of all of those involved” (Greene 2001, p. 118). Like Hannah Arendt, Greene insisted that “action, in contrast to behavior, means taking an initiative, embarking on a beginning, setting something in motion” (Greene 2001, p. 119). And she believed to the core of her being that “aesthetic discoveries and experiences...and the effect [they] can have on the spaces we open” encouraged “a sense of agency on the part of teachers and learners both” (p. 119). These aesthetic encounters were also openings to go “beyond the schoolroom space into larger spaces where we look for communities-in-the-making, for...democracy” (p. 119).

Through the Maxine Greene Center for Aesthetic Education and Social Imagination,<sup>5</sup> Greene supported new pockets of innovation, imagination, and transformation through grants to community based youth and arts groups. By making this effort she hoped that microcosms of democracy might flourish and nurture a more enlivened public sphere—especially in a *multicultural* democracy.

## Critical Multicultural Aesthetic Experiences to Enlarge the Public Sphere

Greene's focus on the arts as a powerful source for social transformation had, and continues to have, relevance for educators seeking pedagogies in and for multicultural contexts. Like Dewey, Greene had a dialectical understanding of freedom and democracy, where *individuality* could only be attained through *community*—“in which individuality is constituted by membership, by coming together” (Greene 1995, p. 197). Furthermore, the community she envisioned—these public spaces—are spheres of difference, of multiplicity. For Greene, “the challenge is...to make possible the interplay of multiple voices, of ‘not quite commensurable visions’” (Greene 1995, p. 198).

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<sup>5</sup><https://maxinegreene.org>

Greene makes a compelling case for us critical teacher educators to develop the social imagination in our students when she says: “we who are teachers would have to accommodate ourselves to lives as clerks and functionaries if we did not have in mind a quest for a better state of things for those we teach and for the world we share. *It is simply not enough for us to reproduce the way things are*” (Greene 1995, p. 1) (Italics added). It is Greene’s deep philosophical connection to existentialism, phenomenology, and critical theory—as well as her pragmatic activism—that sustained her hope that people, in community, *can* think differently, *can* change their consciousness, *can* change schools, *can* change history. For Greene, it was an embedded, embodied consciousness that produced this transformative epistemology; this embodied way of knowing the world in which we live.

In *Releasing the Imagination*, Greene speaks of beginnings, and “of how much beginnings have to do with freedom”—freedom to act differently. And this acting differently requires a change of consciousness and an awareness of possibility. She goes on to claim “that if I and other teachers truly want to provoke students to break through the limits of the conventional and the taken for granted, we ourselves have to experience breaks with what has been established in our own lives; we have to keep arousing ourselves and to begin again” (Greene 1995, p. 109).

One significant way Maxine Greene helped teachers ‘begin again’ was through her work as Philosopher in Residence for over 30 years at the Lincoln Center Institute for the Arts in Education (LCI). Working with LCI teaching artists and university teacher education professors, Greene educated hundreds of New York City K-12 teachers about the theory and practice of aesthetic education. She was especially passionate about integrating the arts in ways that represented the diverse cultural experiences of the city’s students. We see again and again in Greene’s Lincoln Center lectures, her commitment to cultural diversity and community. The following passage is worth quoting at length:

Aesthetic encounters with works of art are situated encounters. That means that the perceivers of a given work of art apprehend that work in the light of their backgrounds, biographies and experiences. We have to presume a multiplicity of perspectives, a plurality of interpretations. Clearly, this opens aesthetic educators to the likelihood of more than one interpretation of a poem, a dance, a play, a musical piece. At once, the growing diversity in the New York, and other public, schools continues to remind us that we cannot, in the works of art we explore, confine ourselves to what is called the western “canon.” In consequence, we have tried to vary our offerings to include works from a range of other cultures... Including once unfamiliar musical works and dance performances, for example, we have opened new worlds, new perspectives to ourselves, as well as to the teachers who attend our institute... the community we keep forming by means of our Institute has opened richer and richer dialogues, and our increasingly diverse numbers have found as many notes of connection as they have new possibilities. “Multiculturalism,” therefore, has become more and more multifaceted, more and more open to new interpretations, new ways of viewing works of art, new ways of being in the world. (Greene 2001, p. 175)

One of the teacher educators who participated in Greene’s Lincoln Center Institute created a graduate course called “The Educational Imagination.”<sup>6</sup> The course has

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<sup>6</sup>The instructor was not referring to the classic book by Elliot Eisner, *The Educational Imagination: On the Design and Evaluation of School Programs*, when naming the course.

been taught for a decade and remains a viable component of a Masters of Education program for pre and in-service teachers.

Inspired by Greene to make connections “between the aesthetic, the ethical, the intellectual, the existential, and the political” (Gur-Ze’ev 2005, p. 19), this teacher educator used the ‘potency of the arts’ to move her students to see things in fresh ways, to de-familiarize experience, to become more “wide-awake” (Greene 1973, p. 2). The course employs Greene’s concept of the social imagination to deepen and complicate teachers’ understandings of culture, identity, and curriculum. Through the integration of multicultural aesthetic experiences, and an amalgam of feminist and critical pedagogies, students in the course experience the transformative and transgressive power of the social imagination. Students learn from cultural and social histories of marginalized groups in the USA and around the globe. They encounter contemporary artists who disrupt and challenge taken-for-granted representations, and they see the critical role the arts and artists can play in inciting social and educational change.<sup>7</sup>

By connecting critical educational and cultural theory to their professional/practical and personal experiences, one key aim of the course is to help the students begin to see the world ‘as if it could be otherwise’. The assignments require them to draw on a range of talents and skills and move them increasingly out of their comfort zones—their theoretical, psychological, professional, and aesthetic comfort zones. The course description signals that the teacher’s role is one of empowering students to think critically about their identities, positionalities, and privilege. The course is also intended to do the same for them—as teachers and as citizens in a multicultural democracy.

Each time the course is offered, the instructor is reminded of how important *context* is with regard to the participating graduate students/teachers.<sup>8</sup> This includes taking into account who they are as gendered, classed, raced, beings and, consequently, what/whose cultural knowledge they bring to the class. Unfortunately, many of these graduate students/teachers were found to have relatively ‘thin’ experiences with art, literature, drama, film, and music, especially those from culturally different sources. This poses a pedagogical challenge in terms of how to help them make sense of these unfamiliar artistic works.

Greene offers assistance when she says:

Meaning *happens* in and by means of an encounter with a painting, with a text, with a dance performance. [And yet] the more informed our encounter—by some acquaintance with the medium at hand, some use of critical lenses, and some consciousness of the art world the more we are likely to notice and the more the work is likely to mean. If questions beat inside us about whether or not something is called good art or bad art, what context has to do with an artwork, and what constitutes good reasons, we are likely to perceive even more. (Greene 1995, p. 139)

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<sup>7</sup>Teaching the course for 10 years, the instructor used a range of material. However, the core texts for the course remained stable: Dewey’s *Art as Experience* (1934), Greene’s *Releasing the Imagination* (1995), Greene’s *Variations on a Blue Guitar* (2001), Freire’s *Teachers as Cultural Workers* (1998), Cahan and Kocur’s *Contemporary Art and Multicultural Education* (1996), or Joo and Keehn’s *Rethinking Contemporary Art and Multicultural Education* (2011).

<sup>8</sup>As context, the graduate students getting their Masters degrees in Education are mostly white, female, middle class, suburban teachers.

Grappling with how to facilitate these aesthetic encounters, with this ‘release of the imagination’, keeps the instructor pedagogically engaged. Each year it is a creative, ‘educative experience’—in both planning the curriculum and engaging with the students.

Dewey is helpful here when he reminds us that learning and meaning-making occur when a current experience is connected to a prior one: “Imagination is the only gateway through which these meanings can find their way into a present interaction; or rather...the conscious adjustment of the new and the old *is* imagination” (Dewey 1934, p. 272). At the same time, he cautions us that “there is always a gap between the here and now of direct interaction and the past interactions [and] because of this gap, all conscious perception involves a risk; it is a venture into the unknown...” (Dewey p. 272). So the pedagogical challenge remains one of introducing new, unfamiliar, even transgressive aesthetic experiences to the students in a way they can connect to from their prior knowledge—which *is* a big risk because their prior experience with/knowledge of ‘the arts’ is so varied, and in some cases, so limited. A further issue is to insure that the aesthetic encounter is not, in Dewey’s terms, an “anesthetic,” or numbing experience—one that “prevents them from reaching out, from launching their own inquiries” (Greene 1988, p. 125). This can happen either by offering all-too-familiar works of art from the conventional canon, thereby *shutting off* their curiosity; or stretching them too far beyond with the consequence of *shutting them down* out of fear of looking ignorant or unsophisticated.

Greene’s own words, taken from her 1994 LCI lecture, “...We Have Found the Wonders of Difference...” provide a fitting ending to this piece. They have served to guide many teachers and teacher educators as they created critical aesthetic encounters to foster wide-awakeness across and within diverse communities.

I hope you think about the wonder of multiple perspectives in your own experience. I hope you think about what happens to you...when it becomes possible to abandon one-dimensional viewing, to look from many vantage points and, in doing so, construct meanings scarcely suspected before. (Greene 2001, p. 187)

None of this signifies that you are required to like these works or that you are bound to discover openings within them. I am pointing to, suggesting to you the possibilities opened by imagination—possibilities that something may happen in your experience, that something may open to a new way of seeing or feeling or coping with the world. (Greene 2001, p. 188)

Opening ourselves, putting one-dimensionality aside and shallow conventions, we can nurture a desire for *communitas* by means of art experiences while preserving differences. We need to affirm ourselves and touch our own horizons as we work to fuse with others, as we offer more and more pathways out of the fixed and the ordinary, pathways toward what might be (Greene 2001, p. 190)



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# Amy Gutmann and Liberal, Deliberative Democracy: Implications for Schools



Barbara J. Thayer-Bacon

## Introduction

Amy Gutmann (1949–) is a political philosopher who brings a critical, feminist, and multicultural read to John Dewey’s concept of democratic education. She presents her concept of democracy as *liberal democracy*, focusing on principles of nonrepression and nondiscrimination in *Democratic Education* (1987) and later as *deliberative democracy* in *Democracy and Disagreement* (1996), written with Dennis Thompson. She is a good example of someone working today who is clearly influenced by Dewey’s work and has amended and extended his work to meet what she sees are today’s needs. Gutmann underscores classical liberal assumptions lingering within Dewey’s (1935) *renascent liberal democratic theory*.

Instead of further developing Dewey’s (1916) transactional theory of selves-in-relation-to-others, something that Myles Horton’s (1990) work at Highlander Folk School and my (2008, 2013) work represents, Gutmann emphasizes values such as *freedom* and *choice*, that depend on an assumption of individualism; *deliberation*, that depends on an assumption of rationalism; and *universal rights*, while publicly recognizing particular cultures, which ends up reassuming universality and neutrality. What makes her work critical is her recognition of the need to address material needs in striving for equality. What makes it feminist is her recognition of gender’s influence on inequality, including its influence on material needs in a sexist society such as the USA, where women still do not earn equal pay for their work. What makes her work multicultural is her recognition of the need to develop a concept of democracy that is inclusive of diverse cultural values and needs.

Today key underlying assumptions of liberal democratic theory are questioned and further critiqued. Enlightenment rationalism and the idea of a unitary subject

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are seriously criticized by postmodernists, social feminists, and critical theorists. Rationalism is criticized for focusing on Reason as the ultimate source for finding Truth at the expense of other important tools we use such as emotions, intuition, and imagination (Boler 1999; Greene 1995; Thayer-Bacon 2000). Rationalism is also criticized for its assumption of absolute Truth and lack of attention to power issues (Foucault 1980; Lyotard 1984; Rorty 1979; Thayer-Bacon 2003). Individualism is criticized for its assumption of autonomy, that we develop into selves on our own, naturally (Noddings 1984; Ruddick 1989), and for not addressing the impact of social forces and the context within which we develop (Grimshaw 1986; Smith 1987). Individualism is also criticized for assuming that our selves are unified and whole, rather than multifarious and fractured, certainly not understood by ourselves completely let alone by others different from us (Flax 1990; Irigaray 1974; Levinas 1987).

Gutmann is a good example of a political theorist who presents a current liberal democratic theory and seeks to connect her theory to educational issues, and act upon them. She was a professor at Princeton University (1976–2004) and is now the eighth president of the University of Pennsylvania (Penn), and their first female president (2004–present). She is credited with raising record-breaking levels of funds for Penn’s capital campaigns and using some of these endowments to create more endowed chair positions and attract talented, diverse faculty, as well as admit a strong, diverse student population who receive financial support enabling them to attend. It is vital to the possibilities of democracies that we examine the issue of elite, private schools and good quality, public education paid for by the state and available to all future citizens. This is an issue Gutmann examines as a political theorist and seeks to address directly in her practice as a faculty member and leader of two elite, private universities.

I begin by turning to Gutmann’s (1987) *Democratic Education* to see how she amends and extends Dewey’s concept of democracy in relation to education. I then explore her further development of deliberative democracy as a political theory in *Democracy and Deliberation* (1996). We will learn about her basic principles for democratic education, nonrepression and nondiscrimination, developed in her earlier work and the addition of a third principle, deliberation, in *Democracy and Disagreement*, as she continues to aim to find ways for basic democratic values of liberty, opportunity, and mutual respect to thrive and for acceptable terms for social cooperation to further develop in a world where people disagree in significant ways. We will find that Gutmann relies on a separation between moral ideals and political ideals to maintain the case for the value of deliberative democracy as a political ideal and that there are problems such a separation creates from a transactional perspective of democracy-always-in-the-making. We will consider if Gutmann’s theory will help us improve conditions for democracy someday, or not.

## Amy Gutmann and Deliberative Democracy

Gutmann (1987) centers *Democratic Education* around the question: “Who should share the authority to influence the way democratic citizens are educated?” (p. 3). Her answer is that educational authority in a democracy should be allocated to the state, parents, *and* professional educators (teachers); it should not rest with any one of these alone. It is striking to realize that in 1987 Gutmann was arguing for a democratic society to trust their teachers and treat them as equals, involving them in the development of educational policy and curriculum design. Almost 30 years later teachers are under attack by society at large for not doing their jobs competently and state governors and legislatures are disbanding teacher unions. Things have actually gotten worse for teachers in the USA since 1987. Teachers shoulder the blame for problems in the country’s public school system and have lost ground in terms of having an equally valued and respected voice in school decisions.

Gutmann (1987) wrote during a time in American education when educational policy makers were taking a conservative turn toward worrying about students’ declining achievement test scores, and seeking to go ‘back-to-basics,’ while educational scholars were taking a more liberal turn toward critical pedagogy, focusing on social justice issues. In *Democratic Education*, Gutmann brings out disagreements on issues such as censorship (book banning, teaching creationism, sex education), the need to support teacher unions and teacher professionalization, and the privatization of public schools through voucher plans, in order to show that political controversies are an important source of social progress in a democracy. Gutmann demonstrates that disagreements over educational problems are inevitable, and in a democratic theory of education, a virtue. “The primary aim of a democratic theory of education is not to offer solutions to all the problems plaguing our educational institutions, but to consider ways of resolving those problems that are compatible with a commitment to democratic values” (p. 11). Thus, we find that Gutmann separates moral ideals (the values we embrace that represent the good life) from political ideals so that she can create a space where people can disagree about their views of the good, while agreeing on the value of democracy.

Gutmann (1987) explains that her democratic theory is inspired by Dewey’s, but it diverges in at least one way. “Dewey correctly emphasized the need to enlarge the range of our outlook on education beyond ‘an individualistic standpoint, as something between teacher and pupil, or between teacher and parent.’ But what should that broader, presumptively democratic standpoint be?” (p. 13, inside quote from ‘The School and Society,’ p. 7). For Dewey (1900/1990) the answer to that question is his often quoted guideline: “What the best and wisest parent wants for his own child, that must the community want for all its children” (p. 7).

Gutmann (1987) is troubled by the *must* in Dewey's guideline. She argues that Dewey's *must* contradicts the whole notion of democracy, that enforcing any moral ideal of education without the consent of citizens subverts democracy. Again, Gutmann points to the need to separate conservative and liberal moral ideals of education from the political ideal of democracy. According to Gutmann: "A democratic society must not be constrained to legislate what the wisest parents want for their child, yet it must be constrained *not* to legislate policies that render democracy repressive or discriminatory" (p. 14, her emphasis). While we don't want to dictate people's moral ideals in a democracy, or assume that we all agree what makes a parent wise and good, we do want to do what is needed to assure that we can democratically deliberate on our various views of the good. Citizens and public officials can use the democratic process to destroy democracy, and Gutmann wants to make sure that cannot happen. How does she propose to protect us from destroying democracy while at the same time still allowing us to disagree on what makes a parent 'best and wisest'? By introducing two principles she wants to add to Dewey's basic concept of democracy, the principles of nonrepression and nondiscrimination. Gutmann thinks that these two principles will place limits on parental and state educational authority and cede some educational authority to professional educators. The principle of nonrepression assures "the freedom to deliberate rationally among differing ways of life" (p. 44) and the principle of nondiscrimination assures that "all educable children must be educated" (p. 45). Gutmann claims: "A society that empowers citizens to make educational policy, moderated by these two principled constraints, realizes the democratic ideal of education" (p. 14).

For the remainder of *Democratic Education*, Gutmann (1987) shifts to considering educational policy issues as a way to demonstrate how nonrepression and nondiscrimination can be applied to help us out of tough educational dilemmas. Gutmann's (1987) form of analysis is dialectical in the Aristotelian sense of the term, not as a process that can establish scientific knowledge but as "a process of criticism wherein lies the path to the principles of all inquiries."<sup>1</sup> She begins by evaluating commonly held theories concerning her topic of discussion, in order to develop a better theory that learns from their strengths and avoids their weaknesses. For example, in her chapter "[Introduction: Section 1 – Voices from the Present and the Past](#)" she contrasts Plato's concept of the family state to Locke's theory of the state of families, to Mill's focus on the state of individuals. She shows the strengths and weaknesses of each theory to help her make the case that educational authority must be shared by parents, citizens, and professional educators. Gutmann relies on a strong assumption of rationalism to make her case.

We can see Gutmann's (1987) assumption of rationalism even more clearly when she makes the case that because we allow for competing conceptions of the good life and the good society in a democracy, "a democratic state must aid children in developing the capacity to understand and to evaluate competing conceptions of the

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<sup>1</sup>Gutmann cites in her footnote 7 on p. 21: Aristotle (1928).

good life and the good society” (p. 44). We must teach our children the value of critical deliberation and offer them the opportunity to practice and develop the rational tools they need to help them critically deliberate. This aim leads Gutmann to discuss teacher unions and to make the case for the need to support teacher professionalization (chapter “[Giorgio Agamben](#)”). She recommends that we need to allow teachers to exercise intellectual independence in their classrooms, for if they cannot do this how can they teach their students to be intellectually independent? We, as citizens, can create impartial review boards to address concerns of teachers having too much independence. She points to Dewey as an example of how to treat teachers for in Dewey’s Lab School teachers were treated as partners in school policy; they were treated like colleagues, much like faculty are treated at universities.

In *Democracy and Disagreement*, Gutmann and Thompson (1996) address the subject of moral disagreement and the challenge it presents for democracies by developing a conception of democracy they call deliberative democracy.<sup>2</sup> They argue that scarce resources, limited generosity, incompatible moral values, and incomplete understanding cause moral disagreements. Their central idea in this text is: “When citizens or their representatives disagree morally, they should continue to reason together to reach mutually acceptable decisions” (p. 1). Notice again the very central role reason plays in deliberative democracy. Gutmann and Thompson seek to systematically examine the substance of deliberation through the use of everyday case examples that have occurred such as: moral disagreements about affirmative action, national health care, and a woman’s right to end an unwanted pregnancy to demonstrate how their three theoretical principles of deliberative democracy can be used to help guide moral arguments. These three principles are reciprocity, publicity, and accountability. “Reciprocity asks us to appeal to reasons that are shared or could come to be shared by our fellow citizens” (p. 14). Publicity argues that the reasons citizens and officials give should be public, partly to make sure they are reciprocal, but also to underscore the important value of openness in government. The principle of accountability states: “In a deliberative forum, each is accountable to all” (p. 128). Notice that they repeat the same move Gutmann makes in *Democratic Education* of seeking to separate the political from the moral, and to treat democracy as a universal that is neutral, while partiality rests in the realm of morality.

Let’s move on to consider an important educational issue for democracies someday: whether future citizens should attend the same, quality public schools paid for by the state to assure all students have access to a quality education and are exposed to diverse perspectives, or have a choice of differing high quality private schools that more directly reflect their diverse family and community values and help them develop shared identities with others like them. Maybe we can find an alternative that takes us out of this either/or logic.

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<sup>2</sup>Examples of others who describe their theory as deliberative democracy, influenced by Habermas (1984), include: Benhabib (1996) and Young (2000).

## Educational Implications

In *Democratic Education*, Gutmann (1987) considers the debate between private schools vs. public schools for democratic societies. Is a democratic society dependent on the offering of a state-paid good quality education for all of its future citizens or is it more important to offer its citizens choices in where they send their children to school? Americans, as good representatives of classical liberalist values, consistently opt for what they think offers them the most freedom and choices for their education, so it should come as no surprise that they have historically fought for the option of privately educating or home schooling their children, and only begrudgingly, in the latter half of the 1800s, agreed to the utilitarian argument made by intellectuals such as Horace Mann that it benefits all of us to have our citizens educated and healthy and able to work and contribute to our society (Spring 1993/2011).

The case was made for government sponsored public education for those who could not afford to pay to educate their own children, but in the USA the citizens have never agreed that the government should ensure that all children should receive the same, high quality education (Kozol 1991). Those are values expressed in countries with collective values such as Japan and China (and other countries with more social democratic values such as Norway, Sweden, Finland, Denmark, and Canada), where the vast majority (>97%) of students attend state-run schools and the children are exposed to the same, state-run curriculum (for consistency and quality control, to help ensure equality, cooperation, and a sharing of resources). Americans have only agreed that it is important to ‘minimally educate’ children in the USA, that we have an obligation to supply an ‘adequate education,’ to ensure children are not ‘absolutely deprived.’ The private school business still thrives today in America for those who have the means to pay for their children’s education, as the USA continues to refuse to guarantee its economically poor children anything more than a ‘minimally sufficient education’ (Kozol 1991, 2005).

At the time of Gutmann’s writing, the voucher system was being proposed by conservative politicians such as George W. Bush, then governor of Texas. Voucher proposals return with each presidential election in the USA. The general argument made by advocates is based on classical liberal values, making the case for parents to be able to *choose* what school their child attends, and insisting that the way to solve the inadequacies of a public school system is to make them accountable through a capitalist approach of market *competition*. The general idea is that if public schools have to compete with private schools for student enrollment, they will have to improve the quality of their schools. As public schools are currently designed, the argument goes, there is no market incentive to encourage their improvement. Most seem to agree that the public schools are failing. Critical theorists seek to improve conditions in American public schools and make them more equal, so there is not such a strong class divide between the haves and the have-nots, or racial divide between White students and students of color. Conservative politicians make the case that because our public schools are failing we need to try something else.



Vouchers are a form of credit, that give people a way to take the money they pay through their taxes for public school education, and use it to pay for a private school tuition instead, if that is what they choose to do. It is an idea that threatens to do away with public schooling and privatize all schools. Critical theorists argue that a voucher system does not offer a real choice for lower income families, unless the government supplies people with the means of transportation to get their children to other schools, insists that schools open their doors to all who apply, and the government caps all school tuition rates so that schools cannot raise their tuition rates above what the voucher amount is, for parents who cannot pay more than the value of their vouchers. These safety measures would result in essentially making all schools public. No classical liberal will agree to such terms, as they mean the government becomes significantly involved in the running of schools and removes the incentive the vouchers were meant to create, market competition. However, without making the playing field level, lower income families and parents who have children with special needs, for example, cannot avail themselves of the choices the voucher system supposedly offers.

The general feeling in America today is a loss of faith in our public schools, and a general exodus from public schools for families that can afford to send their children to private schools or home school them. We do not have only lower income children left in the public schools, which was the prediction if a voucher system was adopted in the USA without the caps and protections, but we have close to that in parts of our country. In Kozol's (2005) *The Shame of the Nation*, he describes current conditions in urban school districts across America where the public schools are full of mainly working class children. What we have in the USA is not an education system that can lead to democracies someday; it is a system that continues to lead to greater discrepancies between the haves and the have-nots, who are predominantly people of color in a nation with a long history of racism. The issue of public schools versus private schools through the debate over a voucher system stands today as a vivid example of my (2008) argument that classical liberalism and the assumptions upon which it is based will not, cannot support democratic theory. Classical liberalism undermines the possibilities of a democracy for its logic is based on a view of individual needs in competition with each other, where others are positioned as a hindrance, taking away from and getting in the way of individual needs.

Gutmann (1987) argues in *Democratic Education* in favor of a constrained voucher system for primary education, using her two principles of nonrepression and nondiscrimination to protect parents' options and choices and at the same time address limits on choices due to lack of material resources. Included in her discussion about voucher plans is an argument for the need to redistribute income more equitably so that parents' choices can be real. She argues that the principle of nondiscrimination permits private schools but at the same time she recognizes the need to learn a common set of democratic values including the value of diversity. Her solution is to offer both public and private schools within a well-developed welfare state that federally guarantees students will be able to reach their thresholds, while leaving it up to states and parents to decide how to get students over their thresholds.

Gutmann wants to preserve American's right to choose what type of school they send their children to, and also make it possible for all parents and students to have this choice. I agree with what Gutmann wants to preserve, but since America is not a well-developed welfare state that does what she asks, her solution will not work. However, I must commend her for her extraordinary efforts to expand access for students from low-income, middle-income, and first-generation to college families, to attend the private university of which she is president. To date, she has raised over \$600 million for undergraduate financial aid.

## Evaluation

Gutmann's (1987, 1996) effort to separate moral ideals from political ideals so that people can embrace the universal value of democracy as a political ideal while still disagreeing on what the good life should be is troubling from a pluralistic perspective. Gutmann suggests that democracy is at its best when it protects *both* universal rights *and* it publicly recognizes particular cultures. However, she fails to recognize how the protection of universal rights is based on standards and criteria that are not neutral. Rationality (deliberation) is not politically neutral. It is based on a Euro-western definition of rationality that can be traced back to ancient Greece and values reason over other tools that we use as well to help us make decisions, such as our intuition and emotions (Thayer-Bacon 2000). Gutmann's liberal democracy cannot help but influence judgments made concerning various descriptions of the good life.

From a Native American perspective, for example, the White Man's liberal democratic theory is anything but neutral. It has acted as a poison to Indigenous cultural values and visions of the good life, and sought to destroy their ways of life. There is much evidence to support the claim that pre-contact First Nations such as the Iroquois and the Pueblo Lagunas already had tribal government systems in place that were democratic in structure.<sup>3</sup> Yet, due to Euro-western racist assumptions, many of the explorers and early colonists in America were unable to recognize and appreciate Indigenous highly developed ways of shared governance and instead saw Native Americans as primitive savages. Due to Euro-western sexist beliefs that rejected the idea of women being educated equally to men and able to assume roles of leadership, most of the explorers and early colonists were unable to appreciate the equal roles women shared in Indigenous tribal governance, but instead saw Native American women as 'wild and willful.' The very men who rebelled against tyranny in Europe acted as tyrants against Native Americans and sought to remove them from this 'newly discovered' land. Native Americans have experienced over 500 years of threats of extinction due to political views that Gutmann presents as neutral. They certainly stand as a strong example of the inability to separate political ideals from moral ideals, and as evidence that an assumption of universal rights

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<sup>3</sup> See for example: Allen (1986), Deloria and Lytle (1984), Johansen (1996), Pratt (2002).

does not necessarily allow for the recognition of particular cultural values and ways of life. The personal is political, as feminists teach us, and neutral universal rights are based on hegemonic positions of power, as critical theorists and postmodernists teach us. An historical analysis, like Dewey's, and a material analysis, like Marx's, reveal the power that becomes masked as neutral and natural by the winner while the losers' cultural values become described as uncivilized, threatening, backwards, and part of the past.

While Gutmann (1987, 1996) does underscore the value of diversity and recognizes the challenge of moral disagreements, her split between political ideals and moral ideals and her assumed neutral universal tone in regards to political democracy ends up masking issues of power that are allowed to remain hidden and undisclosed. Her split is what allows her to cling to liberal democratic assumptions of individuality, rationality, and universality, and to argue that the solution to moral disagreements is to teach the values of free and open inquiry, the spirit of democratic citizenship, and individual freedom. Gutmann labels the kind of criticism I am offering as reductive, reducing everything to an exercise of political power. For her, 'the deconstructivist view' that common standards mask the will to power is an argument that is self-undermining, logically and practically. However, in my work I (2008, 2013) present the case that a pluralistic and relational view of democracy-always-in-the-making will help us find our way out of this either/or logic, healing the split between moral and political ideals she proposes, while at the same time keeping front and center issues of power so that they don't remain hidden and go unchallenged.

## Conclusion

I discussed Amy Gutmann's political philosophy of education in this chapter as an example of someone influenced by Dewey's democratic ideas who took those ideas in a liberal democratic direction, which she later described as deliberative democracy. We found that Gutmann's liberal democracy relies on principles of nonrepression, nondiscrimination, and deliberation that depend on classical liberal assumptions of individualism, rationalism, and universalism. Most troubling was the split Gutmann wants to insert between moral ideals and political ideals, so that people can agree on the value of democracy while not having to agree on what the good life should be. I offered Native Americans and the genocide they experienced in 'democratic' America as a vivid example to show what social feminists, pragmatists, and postmodernists have already argued soundly, that political ideals such as *democracy* are anything but neutral, and to treat them as universal and neutral masks the very real power they wield.

Through a closer look at educational policy examples such as the debate between public and private schooling and the proposal to use vouchers to open up more choices for families with limited resources and encourage more competition

between schools, I brought out problems liberal democratic assumptions create. My goal was to show how a transactional view of democracies-always-in-the-making helps us heal the split between moral and political ideals, by relying on a both/and logical approach that never loses sight of power issues that exist within our diverse societies. When we look at our social institutions through a transactional lens we realize how connected and part of one whole our families, churches, economies, governments, and schools are. If we try to address one social institution such as our schools, while ignoring other social institutions such as our economies, or our families, we are doomed to not make effective change. Only through addressing the transactional relationship between them all will we have a chance of addressing problems within particular social institutions effectively. The complexity of the situation cannot lead us to do nothing and give up, we are called to act in the name of social justice, but not recognizing the complexity of the situation will doom us to continual failure. Democracy is a moral *and* political ideal we must continually strive for. The shape of it comes in many forms. It is a beautiful goal of equality worth aiming for, and it can serve as our criteria that give us ways to measure our progress and recognize the work that is yet to be done.

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# Heidegger and the Recovery of Education



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## Introduction

Why Heidegger? Let us begin by asking who Heidegger is. Martin Heidegger (1889–1976), who spent most of his life in his native south-west Germany, was a philosopher whose work is associated especially with phenomenology and existentialism. His philosophy is influenced by Husserl, Dilthey, Kierkegaard, and Nietzsche, and by the German Poet, Hölderlin. In his wrestling with Western metaphysics, he refers extensively to Plato, Parmenides, Heraclitus, Anaximander, and Aristotle. His later work, however, relates also to such Eastern philosophy as the Kyoto school and Taoism (May 1996). He is, without doubt, one of the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century. But what does his work have to do with education?

Heidegger's work bears on education in multiple ways. Even, it might be said, pervasive ways. His project is one that questions the way we live and learn, the way that the world comes to light. Hence, his thinking gives reason to think again about human subjectivity and about the nature of knowledge, matters that have a bearing on the substance of the curriculum itself. It is sometimes said that Heidegger has no ethics. This is true if 'ethics' is understood to involve a systematic approach to an aspect of human lives, with the establishment of principles for action, for example. Yet if one dispenses with these expectations, it can be seen that Heidegger's philosophy is pervaded by questions of value; it is profoundly at odds with the fact/value divide. In this sense, then, the development of our moral lives cannot be understood as separate from the fabric of our experience as a whole and the ways in which we comport ourselves to this. This has a bearing not only on teacher-student relationships –

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perhaps the most obvious way in which a conventional ethics of education might be thought to have purchase – but on the relation to what is studied and, by extension, to the world as a whole. Heidegger's later writings make clear the absolute importance of language in this – to the ways in which the world comes to light and the ways in which students and teachers are engaged with it. In this light learners can come to see themselves as answerable to things, such that things come to be seen in their own right and not just through imposed grids of understanding. Technology is a powerful element in those restrictions of understanding. Heidegger's critique of this, which is by no means a rejection of technology, breaks new ground in revealing the ways in which technology comes to construct us. The implications of this in an age of performativity with its characteristic new technologies should be clear.

In what follows, I propose to draw out these and other implications by selecting three aspects of Heidegger's work, for each of which I shall provide an explanation followed by some remarks about its educational import. I shall consider these aspects under the following headings: *Dasein*, *Being-in-the world*, and *Finitude*. In doing so, I will mainly consider Heidegger's magnum opus *Being and Time* (1927).<sup>1</sup> Upon its publication, this book attained a reputation for its critical and revolutionary approach in philosophy. The questions in *Being and Time* maintain the central theme in the Heidegger's entire work, while his philosophy moved on in his later works.

## Dasein, Being-in-the World, and Finitude

First, Dasein. The word comes from the German verb form *Dasein*. It means 'to be there' or 'to be here'; *Da* (there or here) and *Sein* (being). The term is not a particular invention by Heidegger. In traditional German philosophy, Dasein has been broadly used with regard to the existence of any entity (Inwood 1997, p. 22). In the everyday usage of the term, it refers more narrowly to persons. Heidegger's usage of the term Dasein follows the latter, everyday usage. Further, Heidegger uses the term in order to avoid speaking of the 'human being' or 'man' on the grounds that such terms are burdened with accumulated meanings and associations that he wishes to escape, precisely because these prevent the phenomenology he is elaborating from coming into view.

What matters by choosing the term Dasein rather than human being? By this, Heidegger attempts to show that the way that human has been understood or

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<sup>1</sup> Strictly speaking, *Being and Time* is not the complete book. The book was originally in two parts with three themes each. The first part is the interpretation of *Dasein* (human being) in terms of temporality and the second part is a phenomenological destruction of the history of ontology. *Being and Time* only covers the two themes of the first part. The third theme of the first part is believed to be covered in *Introduction to Metaphysics*. Although Heidegger's thinking moved on from *Being and Time* in his later work, his other work cannot be understood independently from *Being and Time*. Regardless of Heidegger's original intention, this does not change the fact that the book has been so influential in twentieth-century philosophy.



constructed in the modern period as particularly problematic. It is an attempt to disturb thinking by disrupting habitual vocabularies and this is in a way indicative of the book's other lexical innovations. Dasein, according to Heidegger, is the entity "which each of us is himself and which includes inquiring as one of the possibilities of its Being" (Heidegger 1962, p. 27). To put it bluntly, Dasein is a person for whom its being is always in question. In the course of analysis of Dasein, Heidegger attempts to understand the meaning of Being as such.

Likewise, Heidegger's philosophy is fundamentally concerned with the question of being – that is, what is it for something to, say, be red, or be large, or be welcome, but simply *to be*. This is a question which he claims Western thought has lost sight of. Its particular pertinence has to do with the way human life itself is understood. For the human being, the question of what life amounts to, what it is to be, is always there. According to Heidegger, this is the question that has been forgotten since Plato and Aristotle. The question may sound trivial. What it is for something to be is self-evident: it is a universal category that cannot be further defined. For instance, if I see a rose and I say "This is a rose", is it not the case that by being there the rose's being is already evident? What is the whole point of even asking the question whether the rose *is* what it is for the rose *to be*? This is quite different from asking, for example, what colour the rose is. But this is one of the ways in which Heidegger's philosophical project attacks Western metaphysics. In particular, he draws attention to the problems attached to the epistemological categories, to the subject and object division, and to the way we understand ourselves and the world.

Consider the following statement: *This is a rose*. How do we know that this entity is a rose? Scientists, or botanists, in this example, would identify it under the genus of the species. Along with the fact that the entity is there, we want to know what this entity is, the substance. For this, philosophers worked on the category and the class of entities. According to Aristotle, the most fundamental part of being is substance (Aristotle 2012b, *Metaphysics* 1028a). Aristotle introduces the Categories in 10 classifications: substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, situation, condition, action, and passion (Aristotle 2012a, *Organon*). Based on the classification we can identify or know what the entity is in such and such way. It seems clear and evident. With a degree of variations, this way of understanding of things has been accepted in Western philosophy.

Heidegger questions this: how can we understand being as a whole, not as the collection of entities, but in terms of the ambiguous term 'being'? For Aristotle, there are different types of being: 'That being', the fact that something is or exists and 'What being', what the thing is. Mathematicians can work for 'that being' in numbers, and scientists can identify the whatness of the thing. Heidegger however is more interested in *how* being exists – so-called, How being, the mode, manner, or type of an entity's being. Dasein understands its being not as 'that being' or 'what being' but 'how being', the mode through which an entity is related to me. In this analysis, Heidegger points out the lack of problematisation of the epistemological category in consequence of which the question of being is naturally neglected.

Consider this: *This is the rose*. In the ordinary English the sentence does not look quite natural on its own. It might need further context, something like, "This is the

rose that I once mentioned to you before.” Such usage naturally presupposes particular contexts. What Heidegger is attempting to emphasise is this: the question of being is not a task of epistemology in terms of categorical definition. Heidegger relates the inquirer’s mode of the thought to the question of being. Let us hear Heidegger directly:

If the question about Being is to be explicitly formulated and carried through in such a manner as to be completely transparent to itself, then any treatment of it in line with the elucidations we have given requires us to explain how being is to be looked at, how its meaning is to be understood and conceptually grasped; it requires us to prepare the way for choosing the right entity for our example, and to work out the genuine way of access to it. Looking at something, understanding and conceiving it, choosing, access to it – all these ways of behaving are constitutive for our inquiry, and therefore are modes of being for those particular entities which we, the inquirers, are ourselves. Thus to work out the question of Being adequately, we must make an entity – the inquirer – transparent in his own Being. The very asking of this question is an entity’s mode of Being; and as such it gets its essential character from what is inquired about – namely, Being. (Heidegger 1962, pp. 26-27)

Heidegger claims that Dasein should be the first entity for our inquiry. We, the inquirer, inquire ourselves. This is not to establish a thorough object knowledge of study questioning on being but to understand the mode of Being in the analysis of human being. “This is the rose” indicates how human being experiences the existence of the rose in a specific place within each particular context. The question of being involves Dasein and its experience of being.

Second, Being-in-the world. The rose is not simply out there waiting for being observed by the subject, the knower. This is linked to the matter of subject and object. The what of being or that of being establishes the division between the knower (as subject) and the entity (as object). Heidegger describes the object understood in this way as ‘present-at-hand’. The entity is simply present in front of the knower. But this is not the only way to understand the entity. Another way to look at the entity is to see its context. The things have relational meaning to Dasein. The famous example that Heidegger provides for this is the hammer in the work shop. For the craftsman, the hammer is not to be examined by weight, colour, or strength. These are the aspects of the present-at-hand. For the craftsman, the hammer is to fix a nail on to the wood in order to craft a table that is made for the dining room in his house. The craftsman does not know the weight of the hammer or its exact colour. But he knows precisely when or how to use it. Dasein’s relation to the entities in the purpose of use is what Heidegger describes as ready-to-hand. The workshop looks messy for strangers but is perfectly well organised for the craftsman who knows where all his tools are. For Dasein, the ready-to-hand does not refer to the value of the thing in terms of utility. By this, Heidegger shows that Dasein and the world are not strictly separated, but related. In fact it may be that the example of the craftsman is slightly misleading insofar as it may be taken to suggest that this relationship is peculiar to the experience of the craftsman. On the contrary: the ready-to-hand is a dimension of existence for Dasein generally. The point is that the thing is encountered in use and without direct contemplation. This is emphasised by Heidegger’s characterisation of Dasein as ‘being-in-the-world’, with hyphens in the expression.

He hereby seeks to reveal the nature of human being as always engaged in activity, as embodied, as involved with others in projects, with a past of activities they have come from, and in anticipation of those goals they are moving towards. This is very different from the picture of the human being put forth by Descartes as a mind separated from a body and abstracted from experience.

This shows how Heidegger applies phenomenology in his inquiries. Phenomenology is defined as the study of structures of experience, or consciousness. This is a study of 'phenomena' of things as they appear in our experience, or the ways in which we experience things (intentions), thus the meanings things have in our experience. Heidegger, influenced by Husserl, approaches the analysis of Dasein by phenomenology, setting aside the epistemological categories, the slogan of phenomenology becomes "To the things themselves". For Husserl, phenomenology is via transcendent ego, abstracting from all significance or the meanings that we experience from things, 'retaining' the aspects of the table that I have seen, and synthesizing them to form a conception of the table as it is. Unlike Husserl, Heidegger takes phenomenology in quite an etymological sense of phenomenon and logos, as he puts it "letting things show themselves." Phenomenology is to make entities apparent, which usually go unnoticed in everyday life. This is not by abstract arguments but by the phenomenological (the way we experience things) descriptions of the everydayness of Dasein. Recall, this is the main question of being in Dasein. Dasein is the being who experiences being from its own existence. Heidegger's analysis of Dasein is therefore built along its ontological structure. By this, he does not use abstract arguments, but interprets Dasein's existence. It is what he calls the existential interpretation of Dasein.

Last, Finitude. For Heidegger, the existence of Dasein is shown in its temporal structure. This is quite a radical shift in the understanding of human being in Western metaphysics. Dasein is not a substance with essence to be discovered, but whose being is always experienced. Such experience is not captured intellectually, but appears to us first through different moods. And Dasein first experiences its modes of being as possibility. He finds that Dasein is not a definite actual being, but a possibility of various ways of being. His approach converts the common understanding of being between the actual and the potential. Aristotle puts actuality prior to potentiality, for the actual entity can be identified as to be the case or to be true. The entities based on the substance can be classified or identified by its genus. In contrast to Aristotle, Heidegger puts possibility prior to its actuality. Since Plato, being has been understood as something unchanging, eternally present, form, or ideas. Being is regarded as atemporal.

In Heidegger's analysis of time, it is always Dasein's time in its temporal structure, timeliness of human being. Heidegger takes issue with the commonly accepted understanding of time. Time is not the series of nows which are divided into past, present, and future. Dasein is only understood in terms of being thrown to the world, being ahead of its own being, and being already where it is. One dimension of this is that Heidegger places much emphasis on the fact of our mortality and on the way that our awareness of it, our 'being-towards-death', affects our lives in a pervasive and a priori way. This is something that is scarcely a focus of concern in schools,

and yet, given that human beings are mortal, it is always present. For Heidegger, Dasein exists as dying: “As soon as man comes to life, he is at once old enough to die” (Heidegger 1962, p. 289). In contrast to the atemporality of being in Western metaphysics, Heidegger describes the way Dasein experiences being through the mode of anxiety: through awareness of the fact of my mortality. This is temporal presence – becoming, arising, fading, dying. A further factor of the temporal structuring as Dasein lies in the fact that Dasein did not choose to be born. By existing, Dasein creates or is created in its own ways to be. Existence is standing forth. The existence of Dasein is nothing but standing forth: as *ex*-istence, Dasein stands outside itself. This questioning of being in the analysis of Dasein brings us to the question not of who I am but of how I become who I am.

Through Heidegger’s work in the tradition of phenomenology and hermeneutics it is possible to see education in a different way. Phenomenology is concerned with the way that the world comes to light *from the point of view of the human being*, as embodied and acting in the world. Hermeneutics concerns the way that the world comes to light in terms of interpretation: things are understood as thematised in some way and as available to new connotation and associations. We always see something *as* something and it is this respect that his phenomenology is hermeneutical. Understanding is fundamentally different from the cognition. Understanding is prior to cognition, presupposes a prior understanding of what we want to know. Meaning of being presupposes a prior understanding of being. Dasein is not constituted in a blank tablet of mind. In its existence, Dasein understands the world. Understanding, constitutes being in the world. Dasein interpret things not as a whole, but in a specific use and context: understanding something *as* something. This is how *Being and Time* is structured. It begins with preliminary analysis (understanding) of Dasein, and then interprets it as temporality and historicity.

## Time of Education in Hermeneutic Phenomenology

We have now tasted a bit of Heidegger in the way he wrestles with the Western metaphysics. But how is this relevant to education? It disrupts or reveals the problems in the basic metaphysical assumptions (consciously or unconsciously) rooted in educational theories and practices. It will help us see a different way to question educational issues. In particular, this chapter draws attention to the way modern discourse refers to time in education.

Time in education, in the neo-liberal framework, has come to be construed as a resource. In the context of a free market, with privatisation and deregulation, time is ‘used’ more or less ‘efficiently’. Indeed, the virtue of education has become efficiency, in an inflated vocabulary of excellence and performativity. Such time, the time of education, is manipulated in instalments, in grids of measurement, calculation, and exchange, and where the saving of time is the measure of success. Educational time has become something countable, plannable, and measurable. A certain number of teaching inputs is equivalent to the outcome of the lesson week

by week syllabi, course descriptions. Lesson plans are the prevailing idea of good teaching these days and have a typical association with the ideas of efficiency, goals, and outcomes. Time has become a criterion of efficiency; we should neatly invest our time and energy in education. Otherwise, time is wasted.

If only the values of education could be restored! If that were the case one might claim instead that ‘true’ education should equip children with autonomy and freedom. In so doing, there are roughly two different thoughts in educational practices: liberal education and progressive education. Liberal education aligns itself with the classic values of education: freedom, tradition, and cultural upbringing. Progressive education however has come to light roughly in the twentieth century, led by educators who questioned the practices and traditional values of liberal education.

In terms of practice, liberal education claims that children should be educated in a fairly disciplined way in order to be equipped with full autonomy at the end of education. Progressive education, however, emphasises the importance of the experience of freedom in childhood. Liberal education and progressive education may differ on what point the education should give what amount of freedom to the children, they both assume a chronological time frame of the educational project. This is the discourse of *not yet*, that something is not yet achieved, one to be achieved at the end of education. This lies on the chronological understanding of time in education.

The implication of such a bright day to come varies from economic success to other ideals of education such as freedom or autonomy. One may read, for example, the biblical promise of God that one who listens to the truth shall be free. Some individuals deliver the stories of how they came to be successful, perhaps they were diligent. Some stories typically rely on educational impact in a particular time frame. There is a before and after of education. It is something of a myth in education: If you do well in education, you will be better off in the future.

In Western metaphysics, time has been understood as “the measure of motion, the number of motion in respect to ‘before’ and ‘after’” (Aristotle 2008, *Physics*, 219b1–2). In the time of ‘before’ and ‘after’ one understands events in a chronological order. Time appears as follows: ideals (economic values or personal or abstract values) are to be achieved or exchanged sometime in the future, at the end of education. Educational practices are understood and valued in the order of chronological measurement of time.

The time has been characterised by datability as *chronos*. Heidegger criticises this common-sense conception of time. While such a concept of time is important to our lives (for example, the deadline of this paper is the 1st June), this relation exists only in relation to our experiencing what we are doing with different degrees of focus and intensity at different times. Today is 30th of May. This statement does not address anything to me – not, that is, until there is a context, as for example where I realise anxiously that the paper is still some distance from being finished. The 30th of May is then not a simple day: it becomes a day when there is something that burdens me, when something is at stake for me, perhaps with the trace of a thought also that some final judgement day is coming. After all I shall never face quite these circumstances again, and today I must act. Time involves the meaning,

the mode of being. In the previous section we briefly discussed being-in-the-world. The basic mode of being-in-the-world is understanding. This is not a cognitive process, but human being in relation to the things in practical situations. To understand the event, we need the chronological description of things, but as Heidegger emphasises, that it is only one mode of understanding. Human understanding is not constrained by the chronological and cuts across its sequential character in seeking to make sense of something. Heidegger emphasises Dasein's understanding in terms of possibility (Yun 2014).

In Western philosophy, possibility has been regarded as something not yet actualised. The possible, is a set that is complementary to the actual. It is also possible that some events that are not yet actualised may be actualised in the future. In a logical sense, the possible is only found in thinking such as “crossing the Rubicon to conquer Rome” or “picking the apple from the tree of paradise” (as Leibniz considers). The actual is here and now thereby can be proven while the possible lies in the future or is non-temporal, where nothing can be proven or guaranteed. For Heidegger, the possible is concerned with an existential possibility, or ability-to-be (Seinkönnen). Possibilities are ways of being as the ability to be. And this is not a dimension of my *existence*. Possibility, for Heidegger, indicates the mode of the world in which I am. The futural here, within the structure of freedom in finitude, is a dimension of the historicity of being-in-the-world.

Only an entity which, in its Being, is essentially futural so that it is free for its death and can let itself be thrown back upon its factual ‘there’ by shattering itself against death – that is to say, only an entity which, as futural, is equiprimordially in the process of having-been, can, by handing down to itself the possibility it has inherited, take over its own thrownness and be in the moment of vision for ‘its time’. Only authentic temporality which is at the same time finite, makes possible something like fate – that is to say, authentic historicity. (Heidegger 1962, p. 437)

The possibility of Dasein includes the possibility of death. Heidegger describes the fact of finite human being as being-towards-death. This does not mean that we are heading to die in the chronological time. Being-towards-death invites us to think about the world differently. This awareness of our mortality always somehow flickers beneath our everyday absorption in things, conditioning those practices, however much this may be concealed. For this Heidegger exploits different modes of temporality as ‘ecstasies’ between the past, the present, and the future. The sense of here and now is not from the series of now but from an ecstatic mode of temporality.

This understanding of time invites doubts about the time of education in the chronological sense of before and after. Education is placed in the linear progressive conception of time. And in this temporality, Heidegger warns us the possible forgetfulness of one's own being. We understand ourselves as possibility by existence. Education here is not devised to be realised at the end of this action. The action affects here and now of the ecstasies of temporality in our existence.

Elsewhere I discussed the time of education as follows: the aim of education cannot be reduced only for an unattainable future (Yun 2014). Educational actions are the secured gesture within which we initiate things without making any claim to, or

any necessary expectation of, becoming this or otherwise that. This possibility of being, this existence of being has been neglected in the neo-liberal take on education. Underneath it, the chronological understanding of time in education buttresses the myth of education for success. This should disturb the way we learn, the substance of the curriculum and the nature of knowledge.

## **New Possibility of Subjectivity in Education**

We have now come to the point that of identifying one of the metaphysical assumptions in educational discourse as a temporal issue. In this discourse, not only economic success but also ideals are expected to be achieved at the end of education in a chronological time set. This kind of belief can disappoint us when it is not actualised for obvious reasons. What is even more problematic is, as discussed earlier, that we fall into this way of thinking and forget the fact that we exist in our existential experience. What does this tell us in education? Is this reading of Heidegger merely negative criticism? What can Heidegger offer as positive or alternative possibilities? I would like to push the argument forward with a new possibility of subjectivity. Let us begin with Heidegger's criticism of modern technology.

Heidegger is typically accused of anti-modernism. He does not claim however that we should abandon modern technology. He warns, however, that there is a way of thinking bolstered into modern technology. The dichotomy in object/subject has been reflected in our understanding of the world. The world has become the resources of present-at-hand for human being. The object is itemised and categorised to be known and be used by the subject. This way of thinking is affected in the modern technology. That the world becomes the resources to be atomised, stored, distributed at human being's will. At the end, the human being has become one of the resources at its use. This is, what Heidegger calls, the destructive or nihilistic nature of modern technology.

According to Heidegger, the essence of technology is Enframing. Heidegger claims that we should have a better relationship with this. For this we need a new way of thinking forward, or to rethink what is commonly accepted in our thinking. This is to rethink thought on technology, not only to critique but to find a better way of living with technology. If one understands the ready-to-hand of things, this can be different. Ready-to-hand does not mean that the things are instrumentally used by human being. It is more to address the relationship with the things. We relate ourselves with the world or the things in a richer relationship. According to Heidegger, the world is not to be possessed by Dasein. We only participate in the events of the world. The relationship between the human being and the world is rather reciprocal because human being is affected by the world and affects the world. Heidegger elaborates further on this:



We let technical devices enter our daily life, and at the same time leave them outside, that is, let them alone, as things which are nothing absolute but remain dependent upon something higher. I would call this comportment toward technology which expresses 'yes' and at the same time 'no,' by an old word, *releasement toward things*...

There is then in all technical processes a meaning, not invented or made by us, which lays claim to what man does and leaves undone. We do not know the significance of the uncanny increasing dominance of atomic technology. *The meaning pervading technology hides itself*. But if we explicitly and continuously heed the fact that such hidden meaning touches us everywhere in the world of technology, we stand at once within the realm of that which hides itself from us, and hides itself just in approaching us. That which shows itself and at the same time withdraws is the essential trait of what we call the mystery. I call the comportment which enables us to keep open to the meaning hidden in technology, *openness to the mystery*. (Heidegger 1966, p. 55)

For Heidegger, the authentic relationship with technology is expressed in a releasement towards things (*Gelassenheit*), towards which we say yes and no. Because it is not entirely human will that occasions this, there is mystery in this releasement; it is not purely or primarily a matter of human mastery. In line with this, Heidegger speaks of a non-willing, beyond the division of subject and object. It is a matter of something "outside any kind of will", of a willingness to renounce willing (Heidegger 1966, pp. 59–60). Lewis points out "beyond the metaphysics of willing to a mode of being that is more willing to be responsive, sensitive, and thankful for what is offered up by the world" (Lewis 2013, p. 29). On Heidegger's account of this, the force of the idea of releasement is such as to enable us to understand freedom in terms of the mystery of letting be.

What *Gelassenheit* might amount to in relation to education can be seen by considering the way that the idea of freedom has figured in defences of different conceptions of education. In the idea of a liberal education freedom is understood as involving the initiation into worthwhile pursuits and into those habits of thought that develop rational autonomy. In child-centred education, it is understood as involving the growth of the child from within, where freedom is from the start a condition for the best growth and development of the child. In contemporary practice education is understood as providing the skills and abilities to enable freedom of choice in free market conditions. All of these, however, presuppose that freedom is something that human beings have, as a property. But, according to Heidegger, this loses sight of a deeper sense in which freedom is the pre-condition not only of human beings but of things as they appear in the world. Children by their existence are free. In poetic thinking, as Michael Bonnet argues, children experience and express their own being. This is beyond the measurement of the values inherent to achievement or possession. Heidegger here claims the opposite in *Gelassenheit*, which can be loosely translated as 'letting-be'. This orientation, which is so strongly present in Heidegger's later writings, can be understood in terms of the contrast between a thinking that is calculative and seeks to control, on the one hand, and one that is meditative and receptive on the other. If there is a new subjectivity to be considered in education, one should start from a different orientation. The subjectivity is not the possessor of freedom. This is the subject that is receptively responsible for their own being in the world.

In this sense, then, the development of morality lies in the fabric of our experience as a whole and the ways in which we comport ourselves to this. Such a sense of morality varies by situations beyond the possible categorisation or a set of values. The value of action requires my spontaneous receptive responsibility to the event. In this regard, the following might be said: it is true that Heidegger has no ‘ethics’ if this is taken to refer to a systematic approach to ethics. Yet in another sense it should be clear that ethics pervades Heidegger’s thought. Education in the Heideggerian sense calls for ever for more importance in the teacher’s judgement in the classroom. The teacher’s attentiveness to the situation and timely and thoughtful judgement affects the possible event of learning at any moment that is beyond our calculable time measurement. This has a bearing on the teacher-student relationship, but also on the relation to what is studied and, by extension, to the world as a whole. Educational events, therefore, should have bearing on the existential events. This is existential insofar as the teacher and learner are understood as the existential being of possibility with authentic relationship to things in the world. Heidegger’s notion of language reminds us of this – the ways in which the world comes to light to us and the ways in which students and teachers are engaged with it. The educational experience must involve to see ourselves as answerable to things, such that things come to be seen in their own right. Education as an existential event emphasises here not the recovery of the educational values but of educational experience of the world, the studies, and the relationship.

## Conclusion

This chapter started by emphasising the broad range of Heidegger’s significance for education. In more detail, it showed the philosopher’s wrestling with Western metaphysics and his attempts to deconstruct it via hermeneutic phenomenology. I attempted to show that the assumptions in educational discourses share the assumptions of traditional Western metaphysics, temporality in particular. This has served the neo-liberal framework as well as a set of classic values in education. The values can serve as the currency of education. In order to achieve autonomy, students must be restrained. The logic here is in the same framework of thinking of temporality. Education is serving for the sake of something. I exchange my time of education with the values like earning higher salary. Such values can easily be translated to the economic value of autonomous choice. As Paul Standish argues:

For all their undoubted importance, however, the ideals of autonomy and authenticity are subject to a degeneration with broad cultural and educational manifestations. Autonomy becomes allied to consumerist conceptions of free choice while authenticity is subject to a sentimentalized idealization of the self and a theatricalization of the real: media images enframe us with hyperbolic images of ‘the real thing.’ The kind of mastery celebrated in autonomy correlates with an expectation of explicitness and transparency (and with self-management and presentation). (Standish 2000, p. 159)

Rather than attempt to rehabilitate such values of education, we should attempt to retrieve education itself. This involves overcoming the metaphysical assumptions embedded in current educational discourse, as were illustrated above in connection with the chronological time and the values it exacts. In response to the question of what it is that constitutes education as such, let me say that educational practice should be able to address possibilities of human being in a richer sense. In this respect, Heidegger's influence in educational thinking lies in various areas of practices and studies. In his hermeneutic phenomenology, we have revisited our understanding of temporality in terms of our own existence. Second, we have revisited the subject-object dichotomy by which the way we understand the world has been deeply rooted. Heidegger has influenced educational thinking in various areas. His work has been taken up in education – to children's thinking, environmental education, and technology. Heidegger's philosophy leads us to see the world not as resources to be achieved or possessed but us to respect and communicate at an existential level. Educational practices in children's thinking are not a technical focus on rational thinking. It respects the poetic aspects of thinking. It also allows us to think of technology more carefully, with the new possibility of subjectivity.

There are some commentators, who have insightfully discussed Heidegger ideas in philosophy of education. In light of the problem of freedom in education, for example, the work of Michael Bonnett (1994, 2004) and Paul Standish (1992, 1997, 2000) attempt to sketch Heideggerian approaches, while later publications by Ilan Gur-Ze'ev (2002), Thomson (2005), Duarte (2012) and Gibbs (2012) extend interesting lines of thought. Gur-Ze'ev, for instance, describes the possibility of a counter education which is in opposition to the nominalising doxa of education, follows the path of Heidegger's philosophy.

Some limitations to his work should also not be neglected. Heidegger's account of Dasein, in particular, and his treatment of human subjectivity as a whole, has little serious consideration of childhood. This is puzzling. For without this notion one still wonders how we come into these practices that constitute Dasein. It is even more problematic especially when Heidegger has to say profound things about teaching and learning. For Heidegger, however, perhaps childhood is naturally included in temporality of Dasein, and not particularly necessary to set a certain period of time as childhood. He does not put any particular concerns in the nature of childhood. Another limitation is with his ontological conception of human relationships. Heidegger has compelling thoughts on being with others. This is something to do with the relationship to others as a being-alongside. But this does not address the deeper sense of alterity, as Immanuel Levinas emphasises, that one is addressed by the other, always already addressed. Being-alongside neglects the very beginning of the subject, the one who is being addressed by the other. For Levinas, Heidegger's concept of being-with (*Mitsein*), a relation of 'marching together', implies a militant imagery in Heidegger's thought.<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>The expression from Levinas reminds the readers of Heidegger's unapologetic misjudgement in 1933. And the fact should never be neglected or excused in reading Heidegger. Although Heidegger has the radical and highly influential nature of his thought in twentieth century, one should never

Bearing this point in mind, this chapter tries to read or write questions attached to the current educational issues in a different way via Heidegger. At a fundamental level, the way of thinking, one may call the metaphysics of education should be carefully deconstructed. Such thinking gives us a positive approach on education with a new subjectivity, *Gelassenheit* of Dasein. Heidegger pushes us to question what we have lost in thinking education and its practice, and what should be pursued as initiatives in thinking. This is not a nostalgia for the past, however. It is an attempt to problematize instrumental ways of thinking in education and to recover it in thinking education within itself. The recovery of education is a gesture to move on to those educational questions that invite us to think beyond.

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neglect the disastrous fact of his political involvements. No matter how long or short, his affiliation with Nazism, as Rector of the University of Freiburg, was an irreversible taint upon his career. It may still be controversial how much his philosophy influenced his political judgement, but there is no doubt about his involvement in Nazism. This is the disruptive historical nature for us to approach Heidegger. Thereby, reading Heidegger always has a double edge. One cannot simply ignore his political misjudgement when reading the philosopher's great thinking. There is a painful reminder one should always bear in mind. Richard Rorty (1998) expresses this point that Heidegger will be read "for centuries to come, but the smell of smoke from the crematories – 'the grave in the air' – will linger on these pages."

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# Unifying Ourselves As Efficacious, Autonomous and Creative Beings – Kant on Moral Education As a Process Without Fixed Ends



Klas Roth

## Introduction

Immanuel Kant was born in 1724 and died in 1804 in Königsberg (now Kaliningrad, Russia; it was earlier a part of East Prussia). He was the fourth of nine children. Kant's parents were followers of Pietism, a branch of the Lutheran Church. A friend of the family – a pastor – made it possible for Kant to enter a Pietist school. Kant later enrolled at the University in Königsberg as a student of theology. He also studied mathematics and physics. However, Kant did not complete his degree at the University partly due to the death of his father. He continued instead as a private tutor in three families for about 6 years before, with the help of a friend, he took his degree and took up a position as a Privatdozent (lecturer) at the University of Königsberg at the age of 31. Kant lectured on topics such as anthropology, geography, mathematics, metaphysics, the natural sciences and pedagogy. It was not until later, at the age of 57, that he published his famous work *Critique of Pure Reason* (1998a), which he rewrote and published in a new version 6 years later. Kant published two more critiques – *Critique of Practical Reason* (1997) and *Critique of the Power of Judgment* (2000). He also published a number of works on other subjects such as religion, history and anthropology. He wrote little, however, on education. He only published the *Essays Concerning the Philanthropinum* and the “Doctrine of the Methods of Ethics” in his *Metaphysics of Morals* (1996a, 6: 477–484). The other published work on education – *Lectures on Pedagogy* (2007) – was put together and edited by his former student Friedrich Theodor Rink.

The philosophy of Immanuel Kant still has enormous influence in philosophy and other fields. Little, however, has been written on his work on education, but this literature is growing. Paul Guyer (2014b), Barbara Herman (2007), James Scott

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Johnston (2013), Robert Louden (2011), Kate A. Moran (2012), G. Felicitas Munzel (2012), Klas Roth and Chris W. Surprenant (2012) and Chris W. Surprenant (2014), amongst others, have published works on Kant on education. These authors have shown in various ways that it is important to consider Kant's philosophy of education in the light of his other work, *inter alia* on practical reason, anthropology and aesthetics, and not merely the published work on education.

This chapter outlines three themes, which Kant develops throughout his work. He argues that as human beings we can be characterised by our capacities to make ourselves efficacious, autonomous and creative, and that these capacities ought to be cultivated in education when we want to moralize ourselves, that is, cultivate our moral dignity in practice. These characteristics do not therefore merely indicate what can be made of us, but what we can make of ourselves in education and elsewhere. The moralization of us is not, however, something that can be pursued by an individual or specific groups of people in isolation, nor is it something that can be pursued only once; it is an open-ended and never-ending process<sup>1</sup> that can be taken up and pursued in the world by the human species.

It seems, however, that recent interpretations and reconstructions of Kant's work do not consider the above-mentioned characteristics together in the process of moralization. It seems instead that they emphasise either his practical philosophy in terms of efficacy and autonomy<sup>2</sup> or his views on creativity, in particular his thoughts on genius<sup>3</sup>. It seems too, that we, according to Kant, wilfully deviate from unifying us in the terms mentioned above due to our innate propensity to evil (see part two). It does not, however, suggest that we should not strive to unify ourselves in the terms suggested. On the contrary, the efforts to cultivate ourselves in the above-mentioned terms should remain. It seems, however, that education in present times does not necessarily make it possible for children and young people to render themselves efficacious, autonomous and creative (see Part 3). Education can, then, be criticised for not making it possible for them to cultivate themselves in the sense mentioned, and for not being an open-ended and never-ending process in moral terms.

## Rendering Ourselves Efficacious, Autonomous and Creative

How, then, can we cultivate our moral dignity in practice? We do this not merely by rendering ourselves efficacious, but in particular autonomous. We render ourselves efficacious by being initiated into already known ways of understanding concerning ourselves, others and the world, and by being trained, that is, disciplined and civilized to behave in the same or similar ways as others do in similar situations; we can

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<sup>1</sup> See Guyer 2014b, for a discussion on this.

<sup>2</sup> See, for example, Korsgaard 2008 and 2009.

<sup>3</sup> See, for example, Allison 2001, Chapter 12, Bruno 2010, Chapter 4, Crowther 2010, pp. 147–152, Guyer 1997, pp. 355–361, and 2014a, Chapter 9, for discussions on Kant's notion of creativity, in particular genius.



also do so by cultivating our capacities so that we are capable of pursuing the ends set.

We render ourselves autonomous by conferring value on our capacity to set and pursue our own freely chosen ends and determining ourselves to be the cause of such ends (see Kant 1998b, 4: 429, and 4: 440). We cannot therefore just use each other as mere means for some further end, nor just understand who we are in relation to narratives, practices and traditions; we can also transform and transcend how we take things as they stand, and think anew. Rendering ourselves autonomous means, then, that we should not merely determine ourselves to be the cause of some particular end, accepted and legitimised within a specific community and/or nation-state; we can and should also determine ourselves to be the cause of morally permissible ends or in Kant's words – the highest good in the world.<sup>4</sup>

When pursuing the highest good in the world, we do not hinder or prevent each other from setting and pursuing particular ends, nor each other's rights to determine ourselves to be the cause of the ends we have chosen. We engage in making it possible for not just a few but in principle all concerned to pursue their own freely chosen ends if, and only if, those ends and the pursuit of them do not violate the capacity of any other persons to set and pursue their own freely chosen ends. If, however, a group of people, within, for example, a nation-state, only have their own specific and subjective ends as the determining grounds, not merely of their own will but also of the will of others, then they do not necessarily make it possible for others to set and pursue their own freely chosen ends and engage in the moral pursuit of finding out which ends are morally permissible.

A human being who forces any other person to submit to his own ends does not respect the dignity either of the other or of himself as a human being endowed with freedom to make his own laws and obey "no law other than that which" (Kant 1998b, 4: 434) he gives himself; such a being does *not* render himself autonomous. On the contrary, he renders himself heteronomous, namely dependent on the will of others or a slave of his passions (or both), and hence does not "allow [someone else] to set [his] own ends ... [or] work toward the systematic satisfaction of the ends that they set, that is, toward the satisfaction of a system of particular ends that is consistent with the free choice of each agent as an end in itself" (Guyer 2014a, p. 409). Thus, a heteronomous being limits his choices to the pursuit of specific external and agreeable ends and renders himself efficacious with regard to such ends. He does not exercise his freedom to transcend and transform his beliefs, or the values or norms he holds, or the ones held by any other. Such a being does not "strive for the attainment of this perfection in himself, and to do what he can to promote it in others as well" (Wood 1970, p. 226); he merely take things as they stand and strives to maintain them as they are.

We as human beings who, on the other hand, want to perfect ourselves morally, that is, cultivate our moral dignity, have to confer value on the rational capacity of ourselves, in particular the moral law, specifically the principle of autonomy, the

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<sup>4</sup>See Kant 1997, in particular Chapters II–IX, and Kant 2000, § 84, 86, 87 and 91 for discussions on the notion of the highest good.

supreme principle of morality, namely “the property of the will by which it is a law to itself” (Kant 1998b, 4: 440) and not merely a particular incentive, that is, a “motivationally loaded representation of an object” (Korsgaard 2004, p. 83); we also have to engage in the free play between imagination and understanding.<sup>5</sup> When we do this, we exercise our freedom to free ourselves from the domination of the other and from being the slave of our passions; we then determine ourselves to be the cause of our own actions and cultivate the power of our judgement continuously, in practice.

By cultivating the power of judgment, we do not merely exercise the determining power of judgment to classify objects, compare and/or evaluate them, or compare and/or evaluate the classifications in agreement with others; nor are we just encouraged to do so; nor do we just think for ourselves, from the standpoint of the other and continuously.<sup>6</sup> We also exercise the reflective power to transcend and transform how things stand and search for new ways of thinking about the other, the world and ourselves. When exercising this power, we do not address or hold on to any particular interest in the object given, maintain a specific use of a particular concept or subsume a particular under an already given concept, even though we may be influenced more or less strongly to do so. We contemplate objects “without regard to any purposes that can be fulfilled or interests that can be served by their existence” (Guyer 2000a, p. xxviii) and seek “to discover a concept for a particular object that is given to it” (Guyer 2014a, p. 356). When exercising the reflective power of judgment, we do not just allow ourselves to be determined by how others use specific concepts or utterances in practice in every single case. We somehow give “the mind room for play in some aspect that goes beyond the mere application of determinate

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<sup>5</sup> See also Guyer, (2006) for a discussion on three different interpretations of the free play between imagination and understanding, namely the precognitive, the multicognitive and the metacognitive approach, which Guyer defends. The precognitive approach suggests that ‘free play’ means playing around with images which would not be constrained by any determinate concepts, and the multicognitive approach suggests that ‘free play’ means playing around with concepts which would not be determined or constrained by any determinate concepts, which Guyer argues are dubious (see 2006, p. 178). He argues instead that “the only way we can understand Kant’s account of the free play of the cognitive powers consistently with our own and his assumptions about the determinacy of the objects of aesthetic judgment, as well as with his assumption about the judgmental and therefore object-referring structure of consciousness itself, is by replacing the precognitive and multicognitive approaches with what I will now call a ‘metacognitive’ approach. [And Guyer continues:] On such an approach, the free and harmonious play of imagination and understanding should be understood as a state of mind in which the manifold of intuition induced by the perception of an object and presented by the imagination to the understanding is recognized to satisfy the rules for the organization of that manifold dictated by the determinate concept or concepts on which our recognition and identification of the object of this experience depends. It is also a state of mind in which it is felt that – or as if – the understanding’s underlying objective or interest in unity is being satisfied in a way that *goes beyond* anything required for or dictated by satisfaction of the determinate concept or concepts on which mere identification of the object depends.” (Guyer 2006, pp. 182–183)

<sup>6</sup> See Kant 2000, 5: 295 and 2006, §43 for discussions on three maxims of human understanding; see also Deligiorgi 2002, Merritt 2009, Roth 2011 and 2015, for discussions on this and similar issues.

concepts to them” (ibid., 2014a, p. 367) and transforms how others or we take things as they stand, which can be hard work.<sup>7</sup>

The reflective power of our judgment is, for Kant, particularly noteworthy in relation to objects we find beautiful, but not only such objects. Paul Guyer says: “the real basis for Kant’s interest in aesthetic phenomena is precisely his view that the freedom of the imagination that we *experience* in our encounter with beautiful objects can give us a feeling of the reality of the freedom of the will that we can only *postulate* within purely moral reasoning, and the natural *existence* of beauty can give us a feeling that nature is hospitable to the achievement of our moral goals as well” (ibid., 2014a, p. 360).

It seems, then, that we can have an experience of the power of “the freedom of the will” not merely when we go against and transform already known ways of understanding objects and events in the world and think anew, but also in aesthetic experience. We can, during such an experience, come to realize that it is not without difficulty to surpass more or less determinate ways of understanding or going about in the world; we can also come to realize that it is detrimental in certain situations to go against what are considered to be accepted and supposedly legitimised ways of thinking and acting by others.

Hence, the freedom of the will and the experience of the power of it require that we exercise our freedom to confer value on ourselves as beings capable of conferring value not merely on particular external ends but also on others and ourselves as beings capable of conferring value on our capacity to set and pursue new ends (see Korsgaard 1996 for a discussion on this). It also requires, as seen, that we engage in a disinterested contemplation of the object, “not by a practical concern for utility or advantage in the possession of the object, but by the free and harmonious play of the cognitive faculties of imagination and understanding” (Guyer 2000a, xvii). Such an exercise reflects, for Kant, the valuable relation between our mental powers, whose union constitutes genius, and is ultimately a sign of our human freedom. Kant says:

The mental powers, then, whose union (in a certain relation) constitutes **genius**, are imagination and understanding. Only in the use of the imagination for cognition, the imagination is under the constraint of the understanding and is subject to the limitation of being adequate to its concept; in an aesthetic respect, however, the imagination is free to provide, beyond that concord with the concept, unsought extensive undeveloped material for the understanding, of which the latter took no regard in its concept, but which it applies, not so much objectively, for cognition, as subjectively, for the animation of the cognitive powers, and thus also indirectly to cognitions; thus genius really consists in the happy relation, which no science can teach and no diligence learn... (Kant 2000, 5: 317)

We see, then, that it is through the free play between our cognitive capacities that we can go beyond more or less specific ways of understanding how things stand and create new ends. Here is where this chapter goes beyond Christine Korsgaard’s interpretation and reconstruction of Kant, in which she focuses on rendering ourselves efficacious *and* autonomous in the world by complying with the principles of

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<sup>7</sup> See also Munzel 1999 for a discussion on the value of cultivating reflective judgment in education and elsewhere.

practical reason.<sup>8</sup> It does so by also emphasising the value and importance of exercising and cultivating the reflective power of our judgment. This is because we should not only cultivate our capacity to set and pursue particular ends or just determine ourselves as the cause of particular ends in the world, nor just confer value on ourselves as value-conferring beings, capable of setting and pursuing morally permissible ends; we should also promote and preserve our freedom to engage the free play between imagination and understanding. We cannot therefore merely act in agreement with and be motivated by the principles of practical reason in order to perfect ourselves as moral beings. We also have to cultivate the full power of our judgment in practice, in communication with others. This is not, however, something that happens just once; it has to be cultivated continuously when we want to perfect ourselves morally and pursue the highest good in the world.

We see, then, that we express our unique moral dignity, according to Kant (1998b, 4: 437), when we determine our ends through reason, namely when we render ourselves efficacious, autonomous and creative, but not when we submit to the ends set by someone else or become the slaves of our passions.<sup>9</sup> We render ourselves efficacious by exercising our freedom to cultivate the rational capacity to set and pursue ends with the means available. We render ourselves autonomous by being the cause of our own ends and by pursuing morally permissible ones.<sup>10</sup> And we cultivate our creative capacity by exercising the free play between our imagination and understanding. Such an engagement can give us an experience of “the reality of the freedom of the will” and is a symbol of a morally good soul.<sup>11</sup> We cannot, however, experience just “the reality of the freedom of the will” but also its power when we exercise our freedom “to play with features beyond what are necessary just for the object to satisfy its concept” (Guyer 2014a, p. 367). Hence, we value our moral dignity in education and elsewhere, the extent to which we render ourselves in the above-mentioned terms. There is, nonetheless, no guarantee that we perfect ourselves in terms of efficacy, autonomy and creativity, or that we make it possible for us to do so; we wilfully deviate from doing the above, from time to time.

## **Wilful Deviations from the Duty to Cultivate Ourselves As Efficacious, Autonomous and Creative Beings**

We see that we have good reasons, according to Kant, to unify ourselves as efficacious, autonomous and creative beings, and that we should make it possible for us to do so. We could not, however, be sure that each and every one strives to do so in

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<sup>8</sup> See Korsgaard 2008, 2009, where she develops a view of agency in terms of efficacy and autonomy, but not creativity, with regard to Kant’s principles of practical reason, namely the hypothetical and categorical imperative; see Kant 1998b, in particular Section II for a discussion on these principles.

<sup>9</sup> See also Roth 2014 for a discussion on this and similar issues.

<sup>10</sup> See Guyer 2000b for a discussion on morally permissible ends.

<sup>11</sup> See Kant 2000, §42, §59; see also Baxley 2005 and Guyer 2005 for discussions on this.

every single case even when they are enabled to do so; some will wilfully turn away from doing so from time to time due to their desire to do what is unlawful. He says:

... in him [the human being] there is a tendency actively to desire what is unlawful, even though he knows that it is unlawful; that is, a tendency to *evil*, which stirs as inevitably and as soon as he begins to make use of his freedom, and which can therefore be considered innate (Kant 2006, p. 229)

Kant argues that we as human beings are capable of making a choice between acting lawfully or not. He also argues that the desire to do what is unlawful is “not to be sought in the natural inclinations, which merely lack discipline and openly display themselves unconcealed to everyone’s consciousness, but is rather as it were an invisible enemy, one who hides behind reason and hence all the more dangerous” (Kant 1998b, 6: 58); namely our free will, in particular our tendency to reverse the order of the moral law and the principle of self-love as an incentive for our will so that we make the latter the condition for the former rather than the other way round. Our free will is therefore a “condition for the possibility of being good or evil” (Wood 1970, p. 212), and we corrupt the human heart when we reverse “the ethical order as regards the incentives of a *free* power of choice” (Kant 1998c, 6: 30); that is, when we make the principle of self-love the condition for the moral law. Allen W. Wood says:

The good man makes it a rule to do his duty, and to pursue the satisfaction of inclination only when this is compatible with the performance of duty [to wilfully act upon the moral law]. The evil man, on the contrary, seeks first his own happiness [or the personal ends of a few]. ... But the good man does not cease to have natural needs and inclinations, nor does the evil man cease to understand his moral obligation and to recognize it as an incentive for action. (Wood 1970, p. 213)

We cannot, then, understand ourselves without viewing ourselves as rational beings endowed or condemned with free choice and action. Hence, the cause of whether we render ourselves – in particular our character – good or evil is to be found in whether we choose to have the moral law or the principle of self-love as the incentive of our action.

Kant says that this propensity to evil “must reside in the subjective ground of the possibility of the deviation of the maxims from the moral law ... [and that it] can only attach to the moral faculty of choice” (Kant 1998c, 6: 29 and 6: 31). He argues that there cannot “be any further cognition of the subjective ground or the cause of this adoption (although we cannot avoid asking about it) [and he continues:] [W]e are just as incapable of assigning a further cause for why evil has corrupted the very highest maxim in us, though this is our own deed....” (ibid., 1998c, 6: 25 and 6: 32). There is, therefore, no further cause of evil or goodness other than our free choice.

This choice, whether to let either one of the above-mentioned principles determine one’s will, is not just innate and radical;<sup>12</sup> it also seems to be influenced by the antagonism in society. It is something we need to be on our guard against and we do

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<sup>12</sup> See Kant 1998c, 6: 21, 38, 43, and Kant 2006, p. 229 for discussions on evil being innate.

this when we “[h]ave courage to make use of [our] own understanding” (Kant 1996b, 8: 35), that is, think for ourselves, etc. Kant continues:

Here I understand by ‘antagonism’ the *unsociable sociability* of human beings, i.e. their propensity to enter into society, which, however, is combined with a thoroughgoing resistance that constantly threatens to break up this society. ... [Kant, continues:] Now it is this resistance that awakens all the powers of the human being, brings him to overcome his propensity to indolence, and, driven by ambition, tyranny and greed, to obtain for himself a rank among his fellows, whom he cannot *stand*, but also cannot *leave alone*. (Kant 2009, p. 13)

We see, then, that one of the reasons why human beings are inclined to act upon the principle of self-love rather than the moral law is that they have a tendency [Hang] to evil, that is, is a “tendency to prefer the incentives of inclination to those of moral reason” (Wood 1970, p. 219), and this tendency “can be brought under the general title of a self-love which is physical and yet *involves comparison* (for which reason is required); that is, only in comparison with others does one judge oneself happy or unhappy. [And Kant continues:] Out of this self-love originates the inclination *to gain worth in the opinion of others*, originally, of course, merely *equal worth*: not allowing anyone superiority over oneself, bound up with the constant anxiety that others might be striving for ascendancy; but from this arises gradually an unjust desire to acquire superiority for oneself over others” (Kant 1998c, 6: 27). It is our craving to obtain “a rank among” our fellows which seems to be reinforced in education (see Part 3), and perhaps in society at large, that makes us override the moral law and become the victims of vices of different kinds, namely envy, ingratitude, arrogance on the one hand, and defaming others and rejoicing in their misfortune on the other. It can even be the case that we do not just fail to do what is right; we act straightforwardly on an inclination and use the other as a mere means for the fulfilment of our own ends, or the ends set within a specific society. It may even suggest that we do away with the other if for some reason we find the other as a treat for us in the pursuit of our own ends. It is here that the evil character shows itself most clearly for Kant (see Kant 1998c, 6: 30).

The evil character shows itself less clearly, for him, at the first and second level of evil; the first level is the frailty of our nature or weakness of will – here we still want to do what is right, but we “succumb to temptation” (Wood 1970, p. 218), and the second is “the propensity to adulterate moral incentives with immoral ones” (Kant 1998c, 6: 30), namely when we pretend that we comply with the moral law, when in fact we are motivated by the principle of self-love and just want to use the other as a mere means to some further end. Hence, it is when “we come to value ourselves in the wrong way, preferring the worth of our condition – which can be compared favorably to that of others – over the worth of our person” (Wood 2010, p. 167), in particular the worth of ourselves as value-conferring beings, that we corrupt ourselves, our hearts. It is then we are influenced and perhaps even reinforced to become evil, instead of taking our responsibility to engage in “a kind of rebirth, as it were a new creation” (Kant 1998c, 6: 47) and perfect ourselves as moral beings, in education and elsewhere.

It is, however, not enough that we realize that we cannot avoid making a choice; we need to make the right one, namely to comply with the moral law. As moral persons, we can go against the inclination to override the moral law, and this we do when we render ourselves as a whole, and not merely efficacious with regard to specific desired ends. If instead we subordinate the moral law to the mere satisfaction of an inclination or to making ourselves efficacious with regard to specific desired ends, then we reduce ourselves to beings who are more or less identified with our inclinations or functions used for some specific purpose(s) within specific communities and/or nation-states, which suggests that we submit to the will of someone else or become the slave of our passions, or both, and this we cannot do if we want to become moral persons.

Thus in order to decide which persons we want to be or become, we have to decide which principle we want to act in agreement with and be motivated by, namely whether we want to act upon and be motivated by the principle of self-love or the moral law, and be enabled to do so. If we comply with the principle of self-love, we first seek our own happiness. If we instead comply with the moral law, we cultivate our character as moral beings, that is, we make it your duty to perfect ourselves morally and seek “*the happiness of others*” (see Kant 1996a, 6: 386). If we refuse our moral restrictions, we reduce ourselves as human beings and identify ourselves either with a specific function or with our sensuous inclinations (or both), which we cannot do if we want to raise ourselves up from our crude state of nature (see below). Henry Allison, for example, says that we “cannot conceive of [ourselves] as such [agents, that is, as moral persons] without assuming that [we] have a certain control over [our] inclinations, that [we are] capable of deciding which of them are to be acted upon (and how)”, and which to resist (Allison 1995, p. 41),<sup>13</sup> and we do this when we make the moral law the condition of the principle of self-love rather than the other way around. Kant says:

The human being must make or have made *himself* into whatever he is or should become in a moral sense, good or evil. These two [characters] must be an effect of his free power of choice, for otherwise they could not be imputed to him and, consequently, he could be neither *morally* good nor evil. If it is said, The human being is created good, this can only mean nothing more than: He has been created for the *good* and the original *predisposition* in him is good; the human being is not thereby good as such, but he brings it about that he becomes either good or evil, according as he either incorporates or does not incorporate into his maxims the incentives contained in that predisposition (and this must be left entirely to his free choice). (Kant 1998c, 6: 44)

Kant continues:

Hence the difference, whether the human being is good or evil, must not lie in the difference between the incentives that he incorporates into his maxim (not in the material of the maxim) but in their *subordination* (in the form of the maxim): *which of the two he makes the condition of the other*. It follows that the human being (even the best) is evil only because he reverses the moral order of his incentives in incorporating them into his maxims. He indeed incorporates the moral law into those maxims, together with the law of self-love; since, however, he realizes that the two cannot stand on an equal footing, but one

<sup>13</sup> See also Korsgaard 2009, in particular Chapter 4.4, for a similar argument.



must be subordinated to the other as its supreme condition, he makes the incentives of self-love and their inclinations the condition of compliance with the moral law – whereas it is this latter that, as *the supreme condition* of the satisfaction of the former, should have been incorporated into the universal maxim of the power of choice as the sole incentive. (Kant 1998c, 6: 36)

The good person therefore wilfully acts upon the moral law, and the evil one “reverses the moral order of his incentives”, making the principle of self-love the condition for the moral law; the latter does not treat humanity “*whether in your own person or in the person of any other, always at the same time as an end, never merely as a means*” (Kant 1998b, 4: 429); neither does he let the other or himself cultivate the capacity to freely set and pursue morally permissible ends but just the required ends in a specific community and/or nation-state; nor does he let himself or the other be the cause of his or her actions, nor engage in the free play between the imagination and understanding, and think anew. Such a person treats humanity “*in [his] own person or in the person of any other*” merely as a means for some further end; he therefore wants to affect the beliefs, values and norms of action of the other so that they are formed and in agreement with the accepted ones.

Kant says, however, that you can “indeed be constrained by others to perform actions that are directed as means to an end, but [you] can never be constrained by others to have an end”, and Kant continues: “only [you yourself] can make something [your] end” (Kant 1996a, 6: 381). That is, even though you are constrained by others or believe yourself to be so in ways mentioned above and that, as an effect of this, you are or think you are prevented from cultivating the predisposition to personality, namely your “awareness of [your] obligations and [your] accountability before the moral law” (Wood 1970, p. 210), you are not necessarily constrained or prevented from doing so; it is not possible in principle, according to Kant, to prevent yourself from exercising your freedom to comply with the moral law. He says:

[S]ince the human being is still a *free* (moral) being, when the concept of duty concerns the internal determination of his will (the incentive) the constraint that the concept of duty contains can be only self-constraint (through the representation of the law alone); for only so can that *necessitation* (even if it is external) be united with the freedom of his choice. (Kant 1996a, 6: 380)

This suggests that it is always possible in principle to make the moral law the condition for the principle of self-love and have it determine our will. It is, however, hard work to cultivate the humanity in our own person and that of any other, as well as the predisposition to personality, that is, “the susceptibility to respect for the moral law *as of itself a sufficient incentive to the power of choice*” (Kant 1998c, 6: 28) so that we take the responsibility to strive to render ourselves efficacious, autonomous and creative, instead of corrupting our mind’s attitude “at its root (so far as the moral disposition is concerned)” (*ibid.*, 1998c, 6: 30), in education and elsewhere in society. It seems, however, that we do not live in an age when children and young people are rendered efficacious, autonomous and creative, which when realized in practice is an open-ended and never-ending process; it seems rather that they are enabled and influenced to render themselves efficacious with regard to desired ends, and at best autonomous, but not necessarily creative.

## Education: Perfecting Moral Beings, in an Open-Ended Process with No Fixed Ends?

Kant says, in *Lectures on pedagogy*, that education should not only make children and young people “fit in with the present world” (Kant 2007, 9: 448), it ought also “to educate them better, so that a future, better condition may thereby be brought forth” (ibid., 9: 448). He continues: “The final destiny of the human race is moral perfection ... How, then, are we to seek this perfection, and from whence is it to be hoped for? From nowhere else but education.” (Collins 1997, 27: 470–471) In this chapter, it is argued, as seen, that Kant emphasises the value of making us efficacious, autonomous and creative, which suggests that those who are enabled and do render themselves in the above-mentioned way exercise their freedom to set and pursue morally permissible ends, be the cause of their own ends, engage in a continuous transformation of their own beliefs, values and norms of action and think anew; they also engage in responding to anything that prevents them from perfecting themselves morally.<sup>14</sup>

It seems, however, that children and young people as well as teachers are cultivated and civilized but are not necessarily moralized in education and elsewhere,<sup>15</sup> that is, rendered efficacious with regard to specific desired ends and affected to become loyal and morally committed to the values of the nation-state, but not necessarily autonomous and creative “so that a future, better condition may thereby be brought forth”. First, children and young people as well as teachers are nowadays expected, at the policy level, to be cultivated in education in order to become employable, competitive, movable and flexible on the market, that is, rendered efficacious with regard to specific desired end(s),<sup>16</sup> or to put it in the words of Kant: they are influenced in education to cultivate their capacities in order “to perform actions that are directed as means to an end” (Kant 1996a, 6: 381). Moreover, it has also become more common to evaluate the outcomes of education to generate knowledge with regard to the extent to which the desired ends have been achieved and use this knowledge to make it more possible to achieve the desired ends.<sup>17</sup> This too may lead teachers and students to confer value on the desired ends and not on themselves as value-conferring beings.

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<sup>14</sup> See Dewey’s *German Philosophy and Politics*, 1915/1979 in which he strangely argues that Kant defends the idea that those who do their duty submit themselves to the will of others and follow their orders. It seems that Dewey mistakenly associated duty with heteronomy instead of autonomy, and that he therefore thinks that Kant defends the absurd idea that doing one’s duty consists in following orders, and hence not thinking for oneself, from the standpoint of the other, and consistently; see also Campbell 2004 and Johnston 2006 for critical discussions on Dewey’s reception of German philosophy in general and Kant’s in particular in his *German Philosophy and Politics*.

<sup>15</sup> See Kant 2006, 324 and 2007, 9: 450 for the value of cultivating, civilizing, and moralizing ourselves in education and elsewhere.

<sup>16</sup> See Rönström 2012, 2015 and Wahlström 2015 for discussions on this and similar issues.

<sup>17</sup> See, for example, Biesta 2010; Lingard, Martino and Rezai-Rashti (Eds.) (2015) and Smith (Ed.) (2016) for critical discussions on this and similar issues.

Second, there is also an emphasis on influencing children and young people through education in nation-states to become civilized by shaping their loyalty and moral commitment to the nation-state and its members; “This shift was accomplished in many ways: through language policies, through the development of standard curriculums, through the construction of a national history and symbols and through the development of a common identity, often identified with the majority-culture within the nation” (Roth and Selander 2008, p. 207). This civilizing of them in the above-mentioned sense does not, however, necessarily enable children and young people or teachers to think for themselves or enlarge their thinking outside the interest of the nation-state and maintain their freedom to do so.<sup>18</sup>

The above suggests that children and young people (and others) are led to learn to confer value on particular desired ends, specific methods and means available for achieving them and to render themselves efficacious with regard to certain desired ends and expected outcomes; it does not necessarily mean that they are enabled to confer value on themselves as value-conferring beings, nor that they take their responsibility to confer value on themselves as such beings so that they are capable of pursuing the highest good in the world, and not just particular valued ends in specific societies and/or nation-states, which today is or seems to be the case.<sup>19</sup> Moreover, even though we would want to make it our own end to perfect children and young people morally, that is, to render them autonomous, or by influencing them to become morally committed and loyal to the nation-state and its members, it is not possible to do so; it is a contradiction in terms. That is, “it is self-contradictory to require that I do (make it my duty to do) something that only the other himself can do” (Kant 1996a, 6: 386),<sup>20</sup> namely that he distances himself from particular ends, ways in which he thinks about them or themselves, others and the world, reflects upon and possibly also challenges and changes them when needed; we can, however, enable them to do so even though we cannot make it our duty to do “something that only the other can do”. However, even though children and young people are enabled to render themselves efficacious, autonomous and creative, they still have to take their responsibility to do so, that is, to struggle against their inclination to submit to the principle of self-love and override the moral law. They then also have to struggle against the frailty or weakness of their will and their propensity to perform actions which seem to conform to duty but which are “not done purely from duty” (Kant 1998c, 6: 30) but motivated by the principle of self-love. Moreover, they would also have to go against their propensity to corrupt their hearts by its roots, by directly reversing “the ethical order as regards the incentives of a *free* power of choice” (ibid., 1998c, 6: 30) and designate themselves as evil. By taking their responsibility, however, to do their duty, they can become aware of and acknowledge their free choice with regard to the above, which is hard work – it is even harder if they are prevented from doing so.

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<sup>18</sup> See Roth 2012b and 2015 for discussion on this and similar issues.

<sup>19</sup> See Roth 2012a, 2014 and 2015 for discussions on this.

<sup>20</sup> See also Surprenant 2014 for a discussion on the value of cultivating virtue in education and elsewhere in Kantian terms.

Third, it is not uncommon to argue that critical thinking is or ought to be an overall aim of education, particularly in liberal-democratic societies. Harvey Siegel, for example, argues that critical thinking ought to be *the* educational aim of education (see Siegel 1988), so that children and young people come to cultivate a ‘critical spirit’ and can think critically about knowledge, norms and values whenever needed. It can be disputed, however, that critical thinking and not moral perfection ought to be the ultimate end of education; it can be argued that the latter and not the former ought to be its ultimate end. One reason is that critical thinking concerns what is known, while moral perfection also focuses on the value of engaging in the free play between imagination and understanding. Thus it seems that we, as rational beings endowed with freedom, should not merely cultivate and civilize but also moralize ourselves. The process of moral education is therefore not merely challenging, open-ended and never-ending, but hard work as well. Kant says:

A human being has a duty to raise himself from the crude state of his nature, from his animality (*quoad actum*), more and more toward humanity, by which he alone is capable of setting himself ends; he has a duty to diminish his ignorance by instruction and to correct his errors. And it is not merely that technically practical reason *counsels* him to do this as a means to his further purposes (or art); morally practical reason *commands* it absolutely and makes this end his duty, so that he may be worthy of the humanity that dwells within him. A human being has a duty to carry the cultivation of his *will* up to the purest virtuous disposition, in which the [moral] *law* becomes also the incentive to his actions that conform with duty and he obeys the law from duty. This disposition is inner morally practical perfection. (Kant 1996a, 6: 387)

Thus we should operate as a whole and determine ourselves as rational beings that do not just set and pursue particular ends but aim to pursue the highest good in the world. We cannot, then, just place a higher value on particular desired ends in a specific society and/or nation-state, or in the satisfaction of particular enjoyments for which we ourselves have aroused a particular inclination; this applies also when the satisfaction of particular enjoyments or the pursuit of specific desired ends goes against or just happens to be in line with the pursuit of the highest good as an object of morality. We should instead, according to Kant, place a higher value on making the moral law the supreme condition of the satisfaction of particular enjoyments and specific desired ends rather than the opposite.

When we render ourselves efficacious, autonomous and creative, that is, when we operate as a whole and are enabled to do so, we confer value on ourselves as rational, value-conferring beings, namely as beings capable of setting ends and making ourselves the cause of our own ends, in particular morally permissible, including the free play between the imagination and understanding. Thus, we do not just submit to the ends of others and render ourselves efficacious with regard to them; we do not make the satisfaction of our own end(s) the only reasonable and legitimate aims for ourselves; and as an effect thereof, we do not place a value on each other as value-conferring beings, nor do we prevent each other from having particular ends as objects for reflection, nor challenge and change them when needed, and – once again – hinder each other from thinking anew.

It seems, however, from what has been said above, that education influences children and young people to confer value on specific desired ends, but not necessarily on themselves as value-conferring beings, nor as beings who can exercise their freedom to engage in the free play between imagination and understanding. Hence, it seems that they are expected to cultivate themselves and their capacities in order to become efficacious on the market, but not necessarily autonomous or creative, which in turn suggests that the moral dignity of children and young people is not valued in education, nor the moral dignity of those who educate them. This suggests that children and young people are led to submit to the principle of self-love and override the moral law and that they are not being respecting for their “duty to carry the cultivation of [their] *will* up to the purest virtuous disposition”, that is, exercise their freedom to take their responsibility to unify themselves as efficacious, autonomous and creative beings.

However, even though we should take our responsibility to unify ourselves as a whole, and make it possible for us to do so, there is no guarantee that we will strive to unify ourselves in terms of efficacy, autonomy and creativity, nor make it possible for each other to engage in such a pursuit. On the contrary, those concerned may choose to comply with the principle of self-love, and as an effect thereof override the moral law. They may then submit to the ends of someone else or others in order to “*gain worth in the opinion of*” them. They may also prevent each other from setting and pursuing their own ends, in particular morally permissible, and as an effect of this, not allow each other to exercise their freedom to reflect upon and critically assess the ends set, to engage in a continuous transformation of them and to think anew. Hence, they may be used, or use each other as a means for some further end, more or less aggressively and violently.

In order to go against our innate propensity to evil and perfect ourselves morally, we have to actively cultivate our moral character, and this we do when we comply with the moral law and pursue the highest good in the world, and make it possible for us to do so continuously, in education, and elsewhere; education is therefore an open-ended and never-ending process, in moral terms.

## Summary

It is argued with Kant that we have a duty to moralize ourselves, and that we should not merely render ourselves efficacious in education with regard to specific desired ends within a specific society and/or nation-state, or that we just should accept things as they stand. It is also argued that we should unify ourselves, that is, render ourselves efficacious, autonomous and creative, and this we do when, *inter alia*, we exercise our freedom to transcend and transform the ways things stand and create new ends. Moreover, it is argued that we are influenced to deviate from doing so and that we even wilfully deviate from doing so from time to time due to our imperfect rational nature. We can, however, choose to sustain our unique moral dignity by promoting morally permissible ends and make it possible for us to do so. We can

also experience this through the power of the freedom of our will when we comply with the moral law and engage our mental powers, even though there is no guarantee that this will occur.

Hence, we are consequently confronted with a continuous challenge to moralize ourselves and to combat our propensity to evil, that is, our tendency to act upon and be motivated by the principle of self-love, and the fact that we are influenced, *inter alia*, to merely render ourselves efficacious with regard to desired ends in education and society at large, or so it seems. We struggle, therefore, with others and ourselves when deciding whether we should let our will be determined by the moral law or by the principle of self-love. The unification of us in the above-mentioned terms in education and elsewhere is therefore hard work and a process without fixed ends.

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# Invisible Teaching: Søren Kierkegaard



Herner Saeverot

This contribution analyses Søren Kierkegaard's pedagogical principles within the framework of four significant questions that are part of modern pedagogical thinking. First, it analyses the 'why' of education. In addition to legitimating the pedagogical praxis, this question gets to the purpose of education. Any pedagogy must have a justification and a purpose; if it does not, it will lack direction and arbitrariness will ensue. Secondly, it analyses the 'who' of education. Who is the student who is to be the subject of the pedagogical praxis? Thirdly, it analyses the 'how' of education. How is the pedagogy to be carried out in practice? Fourthly, it analyses the 'what' of education. What should be the content of pedagogy?

How does Kierkegaard, through his pedagogical perspectives, answer these questions convincingly? We know that he was not first and foremost a pedagogue. Therefore, he never presented any systematic pedagogical ideas. However, by looking at his works more closely, we can nevertheless see that he regularly tried to solve complicated pedagogical issues, including the four questions this contribution analyses. Kierkegaard provides an original contribution to pedagogy, in part because he relies on ideas about irony and deception, and this contribution argues that his pedagogy can be highly relevant to modern pedagogy, at least in some areas.

Before elaborating on the 'why', 'who', 'how' and 'what' of education, I wish to offer some insight into key aspects of Kierkegaard or his theory of indirect communication and how this theory might be referred to or used nowadays.

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## Visible Learning and Direct Instruction Versus Indirect Communication

Although modern education is extensive and consists of many different perspectives, there are certain trends. One such trend is the so-called visible-learning paradigm (Nielsen & Klitmøller, 2017, p. 3). Since the release of the book *Visible learning – A Synthesis of Over 800 Meta-Analyses Relating to Achievement* in 2009, the New Zealand researcher John Hattie has had a huge impact on Western education. Hattie's book on visible learning consists of a synthesis of over 800 meta-analyses, of which more than 52,637 individual studies are integrated.

Although Hattie's book consists of an impressive empirical material, he also finds support from certain theoretical assumptions on what learning and teaching signify. One of Hattie's projects is, therefore, to develop a theory of what good teaching might be. Central to his teaching model we find direct instruction. Furthermore, he includes three phases of learning: surface learning, deep learning and transfer learning. While surface learning covers learning in the form of understanding of facts and knowledge, deep learning involves a deeper and more thorough learning process. The third dimension in Hattie's understanding of the learning process focuses on acquiring knowledge or constructing new approaches to the ways in which the students engage in deep learning and surface learning (Hattie, 2009, p. 29). Hattie criticizes much of today's teaching for not going beyond the level of surface learning. He does not reject surface learning as unimportant; rather, he seeks to integrate surface learning in his overall model of learning.

Nevertheless, Hattie's understanding of learning is rather narrow, first and foremost because his concept of learning is reduced to information processing and knowledge acquisition from a very teacher-led perspective.<sup>1</sup> With this perspective, there are obviously a number of aspects that are not thematized, for example, ethical aspects, creativity, autonomy and critical dimensions. Kierkegaard, on the other hand, argued that communication, which is ethical, existential, religious or similar, does require an indirect approach. For Kierkegaard, the ethical, existential and religious are subjective categories in which there are no general or objective truths. Given this, educators cannot tell children directly how they should live their life; rather, educators can only do so by indirect communication methods (Kierkegaard, 1846a/1978, volume 9, pp. 64-65). As for Hattie's *Visible learning*, one do not find such subjective categories. Learning for Hattie (2009) is, therefore, a matter of direct instruction. Such an understanding of learning also excludes passion which, according to Kierkegaard, must be part of existence ((Kierkegaard, 1846b/1978, volume 10, p. 18). Having said that, educators or teachers cannot teach in such a way that the receiver simply incorporates the passion of the teacher. The recipient must rather develop a form of passion that means something to his or her life, a personalized passion, which must be communicated indirectly so as to create space for developing an emotional relationship to that which is communicated or disclosed

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<sup>1</sup>Hattie himself is aware that his concept of learning is quite limited (Hattie 2009, p. 209).

without any form of coercion. Both learning and teaching in a Kierkegaardian perspective are therefore invisible, unlike Hattie's visible learning and teaching.

But what does it mean that the ethical, existential and religious are subjective categories? The answer is that one can know a lot about existential, ethical and religious matters, without converting this knowledge to one's own life. Therefore, factual knowledge is not the same as existential knowledge where ethical and religious matters come into existence, according to Kierkegaard. Where the latter is a subjective concern of the ethical and the religious, the former is an objective understanding. The hallmark of objective knowledge is that it can be communicated directly, but only to a certain extent. The reason being that objective knowledge also requires a form of reflection and because of that educators cannot communicate absolute directly. Hattie (2009) seems to ignore that objective knowledge also requires indirect approaches. The difference between subjective and objective knowledge is that the latter form of knowledge only requires one reflection, as opposed to subjective knowledge that requires a double-reflection (Kierkegaard, 1846a/1978, volume 9, p. 64). While the first reflection in the process of a double-reflection is concerned with understanding the relevant concepts being communicated, the second reflection tries to figure out what it actually means to apply these concepts with regard to one's own existence. This backdrop tells us that communication must be indirect, even in the paradigm of visible learning, to make sure that the recipient not only engages intellectually, but also in terms of how the newly acquired knowledge can be part of life itself. In this sense, educators must make room for the recipients to think on their own, on a deeper level of human existence. Although the knowledge is objective, some sort of effort in the form of reflection is required from the part of the receiver. This means that both subjective and objective knowledge do require reflection from the receiver, which also means that the communication must be indirect. The difference is that subjective knowledge requires a deeper kind of reflection than objective knowledge.

Against this background, the following hypothesis emerges: education is indirect by nature. Of course, there are various forms and levels of indirect kinds of communication. Once we are commanding, we are fairly direct. However, a command addresses a non-free will with no choices. For example, we may command someone to 'sit down!' or 'shut up!'. Such precepts are virtually impossible not to understand, as there are no intermediaries that complicate and hamper the interpretation. This is also the reason why commands do not belong to the kind of education that is concerned with freedom, morality, existence or the like. In order to provide space for freedom, some form of indirect communication is required.

In the following, I shall attempt to systematize Kierkegaard's theory of indirect communication by looking at the 'why', 'who', 'how' and 'what' of education.

## The Why of Education

In 1968, Theodor W. Adorno published *Erziehung zur Entbarbarisierung* (“Education for debarbarization”), which assumes as a point of departure that we adapt to the dominant system without further thought or reflection. For Adorno, this is a form of barbarity, which in short is about hatred, aggression and similar destructive primitive conditions (Adorno, 1970, pp. 120–121). It should be noted that Adorno wrote the essay in the aftermath of Nazi Germany, where barbarism flourished. People adapted to the barbarian system without resistance. This is not only blind obedience, but also a form of cultivation, and, not least, a dangerous condition. It is true that cultivation is an important factor in becoming human, which one becomes in part by knowing culture, history and the like. By getting to know one’s origins in this way, there is less danger of being alienated. Furthermore, it is important to incorporate children into existing norms and rules so that the democratic and pluralistic society does not collapse. Another important element is that the child must be led into a world that will later be part of their adult life. Nevertheless, these views of cultivation imply a pedagogy that is direct and that can lead the individual into barbarity. The main reason for this is that the pedagogy has not emphasised that the individual also must have a critical distance to whatever he or she is incorporated into.

So how are students to be cultivated, without ending up as barbarians? The question, which is highly relevant to pedagogy, assumes that everything is in perfect order and that the teacher can start from a blank slate. Yet the problem, which Adorno (1970) also underlines, is that individuals are already more or less barbarian *before* they are to go through the pedagogical processes. This is precisely why he focuses on a form of de-barbarisation, which is also a form of de-cultivation and is linked to the idea that it is society and culture that are to blame for the individual having acquired barbarian aspects. This is how the Existential Self is suppressed. To explain what is meant by the ‘Existential Self’, we can imagine looking at ourselves in the mirror. When we do, we are often focused on what we look like. Perhaps we want others to think that we look good. This is completely normal and not unimportant, but also not generally existential. However, in the mirror it is also possible to see something in one’s own face that touches us. This may of course be any number of things, from a situation we have recently experienced to a childhood memory that has impacted our lives, etc. When we then confront this vision and in a way respond to our self – perhaps we are even about to make a decision that will affect our life in the short or long term – then we have entered an existential area.

Like Adorno (who was actually awarded his Habilitation based on a dissertation about Kierkegaard), Søren Kierkegaard, who is considered the father of existentialism, believed that cultivation could be a form of deception. For example, he believed that the Cultured,<sup>2</sup> who belonged to the upper classes, thought they knew what fine art, literature and the like was. However, this individual has difficulty becoming

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<sup>2</sup>For Kierkegaard, the Cultured were Hegel and his Danish followers.

anything other than what the culture forms them into. A similar form of cultural determinism can be found in the current educational situation, where becoming cultured is often about incorporating the student into the dominant culture. Another term for this is ‘half-education’, which Adorno describes in the essay *Theory of Half Education (Theorie der Halbbildung)*. Half-education is about absorbing values, thoughts, ideologies, etc. without further thought or reflection. In short, half-education is a taken-for-granted state (Adorno, 2012, p. 209).

In this background, we can find both the legitimisation and purpose of education. Specifically, the socialised, cultured, barbarian and half-educated person must, according to Kierkegaard, be de-cultured in order to achieve a pre-cultural state in which the individual is at first placed ahead of general principles (Kierkegaard, 1843/1978, p. 54). The point is that the general – social norms or what is generally accepted and applicable in a society – must not become the middle term, or in other words the governing principle, of ethical (and, for Kierkegaard, religious) matters. That would lead to a conforming and normative society in which individuals respond within the framework of something predetermined; what we might call a third-person perspective. Instead, we must strive for a first-person perspective, as Kierkegaard and Adorno do, in which individuals respond on an individual basis and are thus independent of predetermined principles, rules and norms. This way, the individual appears as a subject, instead of as a barbarian and half-educated individual.

Of course, we can ask whether this does not bring us beyond the framework of pedagogy, for is it not the case that what relates to the subject is outside this framework? Surely, becoming a subject cannot be determined pedagogically, but must be determined at the individual level? It is true that it is the subject who must make the existential decision. But it is also the case that pedagogy can give the individual the existential options. In other words, pedagogy can provide individuals different choices they would not have had without pedagogy.

To sum up: The contribution started with Adorno’s theory of de-barbarisation, because it suggests that the individual can be frozen in destructive feelings and attitudes. Like the half-educated person, this individual is something half and inauthentic. The barbarian person is only unilaterally and negatively involved in themselves and their surroundings. Pedagogy must therefore bring this individual out of the barbarian half-state, so as to enable them to relate to themselves and thereby acquire a form of state that is not destructive but meets the world with positive engagement, integrity and responsibility. This is the modern purpose of education; a purpose that fits well with Kierkegaard’s pedagogical perspective.

## The Who of Education

Where does education start? The teacher who aims to cultivate students starts with something that is pre-determined, whether it be ideas about behaviour, socio-cultural norms, democracy, morals, etc. However, a more existential form of

pedagogical teaching starts by finding out where the student stands, existentially speaking. Kierkegaard underlines that the teacher “must be sure to find him [the student] where he is and start there” (Kierkegaard 1859/1978, p. 96). This form of teaching does not just ask for a what, how and why, but also asks who. In other words: who is the student? The art in this lies in understanding what the students themselves understand, but also something more. The teacher who does not understand more than the students is fairly helpless in terms of teaching for a first-person perspective.

What is necessary to practise this art? The teacher must be both humble and patient and be willing “for the time being to be in the wrong and not perceiving what the other perceives” (ibid., p. 97). In a modern perspective, can we say that the teacher shall appear as the leader of the class who, in a humble and patient manner, leads the students’ learning? The answer is no, because this is about existential teaching. It is therefore not learning that is in focus, at least not as we know the concept from psychology. The teacher does not relate to the student as if he or she is ignorant, as if the student needs to be taught through explanations and explications. “Being a teacher is not to say: it is so, nor is it to lecture or the like; no, being a teacher is truly to be the learned one” (ibid., p. 98). Do not misunderstand: this is not about letting go of the authority of the teacher by learning from the students. This is about bringing the student into a form of existence that is relevant to each student. To do so, the teacher must find out where the student is, existentially speaking.

But who is the student? What characterises the student the teacher is trying to teach? Kierkegaard discusses two types of students. One type is ignorant, and that is the type of student the modern curriculum tends to relate to. The other student is in an imaginary existence. Here, the teacher must base the teaching on the student’s existential existence being a delusion. For Adorno, this might be about stronger or milder forms of barbarism, while Kierkegaard perhaps would have concluded that the student was deceived by authorities (for Kierkegaard, the church leadership was particularly responsible for the deception of Christendom). In both cases, the student has become a dependent individual who responds to the world based on how the society and culture has formed them as a human being – in other words, based on a predetermined mindset.

Against this background, the first part of the teaching will consist of getting the individual out of the deception, which is caused by the society and culture. Teaching would have to consist of a de-cultivation or de-barbarisation process, in which the student is brought out of their barbarian state. This would allow the student to come into an existence in which they are present in their own life and the lives of others rather than letting themselves be governed by culture, tradition, history and the like (Kierkegaard 1843/1978, p. 46). Clearly, another form of teaching than the traditional one is needed. Imagine that the individual was not deluded but merely ignorant – what then? It would not provide much of a challenge for the teacher, beyond bringing this person to knowledge “so that he is like the empty vessel that shall be filled” (Kierkegaard, 1859/1978, p. 105). The difference between the two types of students emerges in the latter type, which does not have anything that needs to be



removed. Here the teacher can simply pour forth knowledge, which in turn will result in the student gaining greater knowledge. Where the traditional teacher simply assumes that all students are receptive to knowledge, the Kierkegaardian teacher allows for the possibility that the student may be deceived. Thus, the teaching gets a task that is about how the teacher can remove the deception that the society and culture causes. But, how is this possible? The question brings us to what this form of teaching might look like.

## The How of Education

Kierkegaard's answer is fairly unorthodox:

One can deceive a human being out of what is true and – to recall old Socrates – one can deceive a human being into what is true. Yes, only in this way it is possible to lead a deluded person into what is true – by deceiving him (ibid., pp. 104-105).

In other words, the deceived person can only be brought out of their deception through a counter-deception. Kierkegaard stresses that there is in fact no other option. There is no doubt that deception has a negative tone, and one might wonder how fruitful it is in the context of teaching. Nonetheless, it may be argued that the teacher cannot avoid deceiving their students. If there is any truth in such a claim, would it then not be highly relevant to take a concept such as deception seriously? Would it not be the case that the more awareness and knowledge the teacher has about the destructiveness and pedagogical opportunities of the deception, the less risk there is of ending up on the wrong side of the line between justifiable and unjustifiable action? Deception is not as bad as it sounds.

Furthermore, it may be argued that we cannot get around deception, whether it be in childrearing or teaching. Deception seems to be a 'natural' part of modern Western childrearing. For example, one of the first deceptions in childrearing is the dummy. Parents deceive the baby by putting the dummy in the baby's mouth, though no milk comes from it. Deception can also be used with a view to protecting small children. In many contexts, parents have good reasons to not tell their children the whole and complete truth. There may even be a need to distort the truth a bit. For example, we may imagine that a 4-year-old has watched something frightening on television. The child of course becomes frightened, a feeling that is often heightened at bedtime. In such cases, it may be appropriate to make what the child has seen seem less frightening, which adults often do by distorting the entire thing. Another example is when adults say to a child: "It is great that you help me!" The adult had likely managed just fine without the child's help. It would likely be easier to complete the task without the child's involvement. Nevertheless, we often say such things to children. Why? Apart from protecting children, adults often say such things to enhance the child's self-confidence, which is an important element of childrearing. We can therefore speak of a form of pedagogical deception that is used to build children up, not to break them down.

It is also possible to interpret Socrates' deception in this light. He deceived his interlocutors, but he actually did two things at once. First of all, he tricked his interlocutors. He simply deceived them. Secondly – and this took place through the deception – he got the interlocutors to feel smarter than they did from the outset. If he had simply deceived, the interlocutor would feel cheated, violated and perhaps stupid, but by using deception pedagogically, he was able to lift his interlocutors up. Through the deception, he helped them see that they were more skilled and talented than they first believed. Socrates' interlocutors were thus not tricked so that they would feel stupid. To the contrary, they were deceived in order to see that they were smarter than they first thought. That said, one may of course be critical of Socrates' belief that truth can be found within us.

Kierkegaard takes Socrates' ways of deception one step further, where he implies that the teacher must deceive the student with the purpose of de-deceiving the deceived. Kierkegaard explains this in the following quote:

Suppose that one is deluded, and thus truly understood that the first communication is to remove the delusion, – when I do not start by deceiving, I start with direct communication. But direct communication presupposes that the recipient concerned is fully capable of receiving; but this is not the case here, wherein the delusion is an obstacle. That is to say, a corrosive means must first be used; but this corrosive is the negative, but the negative regarding the communication is precisely to deceive (*ibid.*, p. 105).

The quote can be explained in more detail using Adorno. When the student does not have any barbarian tendencies, there is no reason to go through deception. In such cases, the teacher can use the most direct methods possible. But, things are different with the student who shows signs of a barbarian state. In those cases, the teacher must use indirect and discrete methods, in the form of a deception, an incognito or aesthetic method.

To clarify what the teacher may have to remove, we can imagine that the class is discussing a case consisting of two parents who each have a son.<sup>3</sup> Both sons are accused of a crime. They must meet in court, with the parents as witnesses. The teacher then asks the students what they would have said on the witness stand if they were the parent of one of these sons. (This is also a good way of finding out where the student stands, existentially speaking.) Like most mothers, one of the students in the class – let us call her Monica – wants her son to be found innocent, but she is willing to let facts stand. She is not willing to overlook her son's guilt, should that turn out to be the case. Thus, Monica is a witness on the basis of innocence, until facts declare the one option or the other. Even if it should turn out that her son is guilty, her love for her son would remain as strong as before. In a Kierkegaardian perspective, her attitude to truth is therefore 'up-building'. In other words, we can say that everything is in perfect order in this example, and the teacher does not need to use indirect methods. In contrast, the other student – here called Christine – is willing to deny facts, or look another way, for the sole purpose of maintaining her

<sup>3</sup>The example is from Perkins, R. L. 2002. Kierkegaard, a kind of epistemologist. In: Daniel W. Conway (ed.). *Søren Kierkegaard: critical assessments of leading philosophers*. London: Routledge, p. 233.

son's innocence. Thus, she is willing to deceive herself. Her attitude to truth is therefore not up-building. To the contrary, it is destructive and barbarian.

Like most mothers, both students want to believe that their child is innocent, but they differ completely in attitude. Where Monica will be built up by her respect for truth, Christine will be broken down by her lack of respect for truth. In other words, Monica will be built up even if her son is guilty, while Christine will have the opposite experience, even if her son should be innocent. From this, we can deduce the following: in cases where the individual is at a remove from what is up-building – which can happen when the individual is cultivated through language, cultivation, tradition etc. – there will be a need for de-cultivation. In other words, the teacher must reach Christine indirectly.

Why not go straight to the issue? Why not call a spade a spade? Certainly, the teacher can choose to address the issue directly, but must then be aware of at least two dangers. Of course the teacher can challenge Christine directly, through an alternative viewpoint that says she is in the wrong. According to Kierkegaard, nothing is likely to be achieved if the teacher impatiently rushes forward in a direct manner. Instead, direct confrontations can strengthen the other party's conviction and perhaps also cause bitterness or similar feelings (Kierkegaard, 1859/1978, p. 95). Furthermore, we must keep in mind that the teacher is speaking to a free will, which will likely oppose you if it feels that it is being told something, or feels it is about to be bound rather than freed. Therefore, teaching must be done in a way that lets the free will feel free. But, does the teacher not then steer the free will through the deception? Not necessarily. It is also possible to give the free will opportunities to be freer tomorrow than it is today. This is what we have deception for. There is nothing evil or cunning in this; it is a form of pedagogy. But, might it not be possible for the teacher to succeed by using direct methods? Perhaps, but we should not overlook the other danger in addressing Christine directly. It might be that the teacher succeeds in convincing Christine, but then the danger would be that Christine ends up assuming the teacher's standpoint.

This implies that this form of teaching is not about moving the student from one place to another. The Kierkegaardian form of teaching thus diverges from modern approaches to curricula, which amongst other things aim to lead the student to specific values. Students are thus raised to exist within a specific pattern – in other words, cultivated. In contrast, Kierkegaard's pedagogical goal is to move the students in relation to themselves. This is a very challenging task, and – as I have already noted – it is necessary for the teacher to assume the role of the learner; necessary for the teacher to know the student and thereby be able to create or find the opportunity – the right moment – when the student is ready to receive the message that opens for the student to respond for and based on herself, rather than based on what she has learned from the curriculum or from how the culture has formed her.

In other words, the teacher must first find the place where Christine stands, and start teaching there, and then teach so that she moves herself. The curious and almost magical aspect here is that there are powers in the deception that can get

Christine to move herself, without her being aware that this could not have happened without the teacher's indirect and veiled help.

But, why must the teacher use indirect methods in Christine's case? Because the relationship between the teacher and Christine is not equal; rather, it is an indirect relationship from the start. The reason for this is that Christine shows signs of a barbarian state as she is willing to hide the truth by lying. At the same time, this indirect relationship is the reason the teacher cannot use direct methods. The teacher must try to remove Christine's convictions through a counter-deception before she can be moved in relation to herself and her unique existence. But, does the relationship between the teacher and Christine not have to be equalised? That would be 'pedagogically' typical. Discussions of pedagogy appear to love to talk about the equal relationship, dialogic learning etc. However, in the Kierkegaardian perspective, this relationship is to be turned upside down. That means that the teacher in a deceptive and ironic manner pretends to not know much, while at the same time claiming that Christine knows so much more. In short, the teacher makes herself smaller while making the other larger. Kierkegaard, who was a Christian thinker, says it like this: "Thus one does not start [...] like this: I am a Christian, you are not a Christian; but like this: You are a Christian, I am no Christian" (ibid., p. 105). The quote can be rewritten in many ways, depending on the perspective. For example, it may be written thus: "One does not start by saying: I am right, you are wrong, but thus: you are right, I am wrong." The point is that this is neither an equal relationship between teacher and student nor a traditional pedagogical relationship in which the teacher, based on her authority and power, is above the student. Rather, it is a non-likeminded relationship in which the teacher places herself below the student, but as this is done ironically, we might say that the teacher is simultaneously and indirectly placing herself above the student.

The idea of making oneself smaller than one perhaps is while also making the other larger is directly tied to the Greek word for irony: *eironeia* means to conceal something while pretending to be ignorant. Thus, deception is part of the concept of irony. Some might argue that this form of irony is unethical, but it can also be viewed in a more positive light. It can be argued that the teacher is humiliating herself, as Kierkegaard did by disguising himself as, or embodying the role of, a pseudonym. The point is that one sacrifices one's reputation and good name, but this is done so that the other (in our case Christine) can be given the opportunity to be pulled away from the lie and self-deception to then move themselves in relation to their own existential standpoint. The indirect method can also be legitimated through this reasoning: by humiliating herself by entering the role as an aesthete, it is possible for the teacher to speak Christine's language, because she acts like an aesthete in the sense that she lets her ego lead her in life. Thus, metaphorically speaking, the teacher appears as a mirror in which Christine can see herself. And, is it not the case that we can only move ourselves once we have seen ourselves?

To strengthen the legitimacy of irony in teaching, it is important to underline that irony is not a tool for the exercise of coercion, in contrast to the form of pedagogy that aims to cultivate students. This form of pedagogical cultivation can be considered a form of coercion because the students are led into a predetermined thought

pattern in which they must place their trust in their subsequent actions. But, why argue that irony is not a form of coercion? Is irony not precisely about getting the receiver in one way or another to absorb the opposite of what the speaker appears to think? The answer is yes, if we only look at irony in its simple, vulgar form. In contrast, Kierkegaardian irony is a more ‘effective’ form of conversation about existential issues compared to directives, instructions, lessons, admonitions, criticism and the like. This form of existential irony is everything but lecturing. This means that it never forces the students into specific choices. If we are to speak of coercion, we might say that the seductive powers of irony forces attention and decisions about existential issues. In short, irony opens for an existential or subjective truth that is true for the individual and only for the individual. In other words, the purpose is not to trick or deceive the student into believing in a disguised secret of some kind. It is therefore also not a form of disguised coercion, which is arguably more unethical than forms of coercion that are out in the open. Instead, irony is to open up room for students to move in relation to themselves.

To sum up, the teacher helps the student on the existential path, but this help is offered through a gentle and tender form of irony, as the late theatre and film director Ingmar Bergman says so well in his autobiography *The Magic Lantern*, where he talks about his grandmother:

She wanted to know what I was thinking, listened carefully, and cut through my little lies or pushed them aside with friendly irony. She let me speak as my own, completely real human being, with no mask (Bergman, 2008, p. 55; my translation).

This quote alone nearly summarises what has been said thus far. His grandmother first gets to know Bergman by listening – by being the learner, as we spoke of earlier. Once she has developed her knowledge of the ‘student’, she can use gentle irony to push aside Bergman’s little lies, which in Adorno’s view can be referred to as a barbarian half-state. In other words, she removed something to let him come to himself, become himself, a whole human being. There is much pedagogy in these two short sentences from Bergman.

## The What of Education

The ‘what’ of education is most prominent in Kierkegaard’s writing. But, can teaching really take place with no specified content? If teaching lacks both deliberation and assessments related to questions of content, what then? We would be left with teaching consisting of lots of irony, but no content to relate to. Such a form of teaching would be both meaningless and un-pedagogical. Any teaching must therefore relate to both goals and content, as one cannot close the door on the more important and pedagogical questions about content – questions that are constantly subject to pedagogical assessment. On closer inspection, we can see that Kierkegaard too was ready to assume responsibility for the content of pedagogy, for, as he said, though the tactic is to use the aesthetic incognito – deception – the goal is nevertheless to

“bring forth the religious” (Kierkegaard 1859/1978, p. 96). In bringing teaching over to the religious dimension, Kierkegaard’s teaching is not just about how, but also emphasises content: a ‘what’.

In a more modern pedagogical sense, the religious or Christianity also cannot be the main content of the teaching. Instead, we must think of existence as a whole, as there are no objective truths associated with existing in the world. Each and every student must choose their unique way of existing, which means that for Kierkegaard too, existence is associated with subjective truth. For the teacher, this is therefore about selecting content that is associated with each individual student in the class. In contrast to more traditional teaching that tends to relate to epistemological knowledge, Kierkegaardian teaching places more weight on existential knowledge in which students are to acquire knowledge related to their existence.

What does this form of teaching look like? The Christine example can again help us explain. This example showed that Christine wanted to give testimony in court that was not up-building, but rather destructive.<sup>4</sup> To get Christine out of the destructive, as a teacher one can add a *what* and a *how*. In the first instance, this means that Christine is given an opportunity to get some understanding of *what* is meant by different ethical concepts, such as justice. It is then a question of *how* she relates existentially to the different ethical concepts, such as the concept of justice (Kierkegaard 1846a, b/1978). Concretely, we get a teaching that is direct-indirect in its form, an approach that Kierkegaard too settled on. By combining direct and indirect methods in the teaching, the teacher reaches the receiver not just at the cognitive and intellectual level, but also at the emotional and spiritual levels. On the one hand, teaching must ensure that students get some ‘tools’ that can help in their existential struggles. In other words, the teaching must open room for the students to understand *what* certain concepts mean, in order that they be able to incorporate them and, not least, make them suitable to their own lives. On the other hand, the teaching must allow room for the acquired and incorporated concept to be put into action: the *how* of students’ incorporations of the concepts. In both cases, a direct-indirect form of teaching takes place.

To provide a concrete example of teaching that provides room for *what*, the teacher may for instance use Emmanuel Levinas’s view of justice as a point of departure that can function as a ‘tool’ for each student. The teacher can for instance in a direct manner show the difference between the concepts of responsibility and justice. The teacher would thus emphasise that justice is a far more complicated concept than responsibility, as justice is directed to the one plus all others (Levinas, 2009). However, if the teacher only conveys this in a direct manner, the level of abstraction will likely be too high for many students. Therefore, it can be beneficial to use an indirect approach in addition to the direct approach, to clarify for the

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<sup>4</sup>For Kierkegaard, what is up-building legitimates the subjective truth, for the subjective truth can in itself be everything (cf. the postmodern creed ‘anything goes’), but the up-building cannot, as it relates to the ethical dimension (or for Kierkegaard, the religious dimension). Kierkegaard’s conceptualisation of subjective truth is therefore not at all self-centred; rather it is tied to the responsibility of the individual.

students what justice may entail. For example, the teacher may use an indirect method by drawing an image for the students (which Kierkegaard often does in his writing). Here is an example of how such an image can be drawn: a car drives towards the city centre. There is quite a lot of traffic. Just ahead on the right, the driver sees several cars that have difficulty exiting an intersection due to the amount of traffic. The driver wants to be considerate and chooses to stop to let some of the cars at the intersection pass. But then, the driver is hit from the rear. The whole thing ends up as a chain collision. The teacher's point is that the driver only looked ahead. The driver wanted to be responsible or considerate to the drivers stuck at the intersection, but forgot to consider those who came behind. After having been indirect in this manner, the teacher can be direct again, by pointing out that justice can have a similar issue: one cannot always just take the one person that one is closest to into consideration. One must also consider whether one's actions are just in relation to others. One must consider the ripple effect of one's actions. Many people must be considered. The example provides one way of giving the students 'tools' in which they are given the opportunity to gain knowledge about justice being about the one plus all others.

Further, the teaching must provide room for *how* students can utilise concepts such as justice etc. in practical actions, so that the concepts can be part of their existential acts. This part of the teaching will minimize the normative aspect that was relatively strongly present during the first section of the teaching. In *Works of Love* (1847), Kierkegaard opens for what I will refer to as 'the teaching of the dash' by presenting two sentences. The first sentence is as follows: "This person is standing by himself through my help" (Kierkegaard, 1847/1978, p. 263). The sentence equals the so-called visible teaching as I referred to in the introduction; however, Kierkegaard indicates that the students cannot stand on their own through this visible form of help. In other words, the teacher is too direct, and simultaneously too normative, in the 'teaching', and thus the student has been coerced into an objective truth. This is not how the teacher should teach Christine. In the unlikely event that the teacher nevertheless manages to get Christine out of an imagined and barbarian existence by being visible and direct, Christine has not become free and autonomous. For Kierkegaard, Christine has not come to herself in this way, as the teacher, through direct and clear directives, has taught in a manner that will leave Christine feeling indebted and as if she needs to thank or otherwise give recognition to the teacher for the 'gift' she received. In such cases, the gift is destroyed. The main reason for this is that the teacher brings in a disruptive element – the indebtedness – that prevents the students from getting in touch with themselves and their surroundings. The further consequence of this form of visible teaching is that the students will be led to a sort of existential existence governed by the teacher. Instead of standing on their own feet, the students must seek the support of the teacher, as if the latter was a crutch. According to Kierkegaard, helping in this manner is "really to deceive him" (ibid., p. 273). The point is that one cannot live someone else's truth about existence. Therefore, the teacher must in an ironic manner hold back words and actions that require recognition and gratitude in return.



This leads us to the second sentence, which reads thus: “This person is standing by himself – through my help” (ibid., p. 264). The two sentences are almost identical, with the exception of one small detail. In contrast to the first sentence, the second sentence has a dash. This may appear unimportant, but the small dash represents a significant difference in terms of existential teaching. How might that be so? The dash is a sign. When we encounter such signs, we may not reflect on their meaning beyond that of being simple signs. Thus, the dash hides something, much like irony hides its contents, often where the content is most obvious. The teacher who understands the teaching of the dash may also know how to give a gift. The art is in helping the student, who must not discover that she has been helped. The help must be hidden, the way the dash hides something, and must remain hidden – otherwise the student will not become free, autonomous, her own. For Kierkegaard teaching is thus invisible, unlike Hattie’s visible form of teaching.

The dash, which indicates that the teaching is invisible, opens for the entry of free will into the existential, where the subject can freely and autonomously move in proximity to herself and the world, so that the subject is internally connected to herself and the world. In other words, the students shall not be pulled into the teacher’s truth, but into their own, subjective truth. As previously mentioned, the teacher pretends that she has done nothing, but according to Kierkegaard she has really done everything for the students. This means that the teacher has helped the students stand on their own feet, be free and autonomous with regard to existential decisions and acts. This also means that the teacher takes no credit for what happened, for the moment the teacher does, it will open for the possibility of it being the teacher’s doing that the student took the leap into a specific form of existence. But, this existential leap must be taken completely alone. This is about an invisible and a selfless act on the part of the teacher, much like working without pay, to make it possible to give “in such a way that the gift looks as if it was the recipient’s property” (ibid., p. 263). In contrast, to be too visible or too direct, and perhaps even impatient, in teaching can be very problematic, especially in terms of existential questions. The reason being that there are no objective truths about existence. There is only a subjective or existential truth, which is only true for each individual.

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## Emmanuel Levinas, Autonomy, and Education

Ann Chinnery

### Introduction

This chapter explores the ways in which Emmanuel Levinas's account of heteronomous subjectivity contributes to ongoing debates on autonomy as an educational aim. While Levinas did not write much specifically about education (a notable exception being his essays on Jewish education in *Difficult Freedom* 1963/1990), he spent most of his life as an educator—as teacher and director of the *École Normale Israélite Orientale* and as a professor of philosophy at the Universities of Poitiers, Nanterre, and the Sorbonne. When one looks at how Levinas's work has been taken up by philosophers of education (e.g., Biesta 1999, 2003; Egéa-Kuehne 2008; Eppert 2000; Joldersma 2014; Papastephanou 2005; Standish 2001, 2008; Strhan 2012; Todd 2003a, b, and others), it becomes clear that his most significant contribution to our field can be traced to his critique and inversion of the modernist conception of subjectivity that has long underpinned the educational project. Levinas rejected the Enlightenment ideal of the sovereign, rational subject in favor of an account of subjectivity as emerging only in an encounter with the other. Levinas's description of subjectivity as fundamentally heteronomous thus calls us, as educators and philosophers of education, to rethink some of our deeply held, even taken for granted, assumptions about education and the educated subject.

In what follows, I first highlight some key points in Levinas's scholarly life. I then sketch his account of heteronomous subjectivity and provide a brief overview of arguments for and against autonomy as an educational aim. In the last section I explore how Levinas's work helps us see that while autonomy may be important for mitigating the risks of indoctrination and ethical servility, the emphasis on cultivating

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autonomy as the hallmark of a liberal education risks fostering a kind of ethical blindness to the other, which, on a Levinasian view, marks an impoverished rather than flourishing human life.

Levinas was born in Lithuania in 1906, studied phenomenology in Strasbourg in the early 1920s, and moved to Freiburg in the late 1920s, where he met Martin Heidegger and Edmund Husserl. Levinas's doctoral dissertation, *Théorie de l'intuition dans la phénoménologie de Husserl*, is noted for having introduced phenomenology to Jean-Paul Sartre and other French philosophers of the postwar period. From 1930 to 1960, Levinas divided his writing between Talmudic exegesis and phenomenology, and he was recognized during that time more for his Jewish scholarship than for his philosophical work. However, he continued to work on Husserlian and Heideggerian phenomenology and eventually came to be seen as a specialist in that field as well. Two publications during this period marked the emergence of Levinas's own philosophy. In his 1951 essay, 'Is Ontology Fundamental?', he critiques Heidegger and ultimately rejects the privilege traditionally accorded to ontology in Western thought. Levinas argued that Western ontology, and Heidegger's ontology in particular, is ultimately and inescapably egoistic in that it assumes a conception of the subject as a being whose main concern is its own being. Levinas countered with a claim to ethics as first philosophy and an account of subjectivity as fundamentally heteronomous—as 'pre-ontological intersubjectivity'—a position that grounded all of his work from that point on.

In 1961 Levinas published his first major work, *Totality and Infinity*, originally written for his Doctorat d'État. *Totality and Infinity* was considered a revolutionary text in that it critiqued the whole of Western philosophy and civilization as being dominated by a totalizing drive for unity—for a reduction of otherness to the same (to what is or can be known). After 1961, Levinas wrote several shorter pieces that culminated in his 1974 *Otherwise than Being or Beyond Essence* (first published in English in 1981). Whereas *Totality and Infinity* focused on the epiphany of the other's face, *Otherwise than Being* offered a fuller treatment of his account of the subject as coming into being only in response to the other, and therefore as always already subject to and responsible for the other.

Levinas's work has long been considered influential in Continental philosophy, and one finds frequent reference to Levinas in the writings of Jacques Derrida, Paul Ricoeur, Jean-Luc Marion, and Jean-Luc Nancy, especially in their work toward a post-Husserlian and post-Heideggerian philosophy. However, it is only in the past 25 years or so that there has been much interest in Levinas's work in the English-speaking world, and even more recently in philosophy of education. When considering the impact of Levinas's thought on education, it is important to note that his ethics is not one that can simply be applied to education in the typical sense of that word. As I have put it elsewhere, "one of the biggest stumbling blocks in trying to get to grips with Levinas is that he offers no practical advice, no straightforward answers or prescriptions for practice. There is no recourse to moral principle, no appeal to codes of conduct, nor is there any comfort to be had in adhering to particular norms or virtues or values" (Chinnery 2003, p. 5). Sharon Todd makes an even stronger case, saying that, "it is only through a gross distortion of, or infidelity to,

the concepts themselves that a direct application of his philosophy can be considered” (2008, p. 170). Rather, “approaching education from a Levinasian perspective becomes a question of implication”, not application (Todd 2003a, b, p. 3).

Another challenge in taking up Levinas’s thought in philosophy of education—especially secular education—is that, as we will see below, many of his ideas are more easily read through a religious lens. However, while Levinas had no objection to being characterized as a Jewish philosopher, he insisted that his confessional work was separate from his philosophical work and, for that reason, chose to work with different publishers for the different branches of his scholarship. When pressed on this point in an interview with François Poirié, Levinas acknowledged that he often chose to illustrate philosophical claims with biblical examples, but he maintained that those examples were not intended as philosophical proof:

Of course, I try to enter first into the language of the nonphilosophical tradition which is attached to the religious understanding of Jewish writings; I adopt it, but this adoption is not the philosophical moment of my effort. There I am simply a believer. ...A philosophical truth cannot be based on the authority of a verse. The verse must be phenomenologically justified. ...It irritates me when one insinuates that I prove by means of the verse, when sometimes I search by way of the old ancient wisdom. I illustrate by the verse, yes, but I do not prove by means of the verse. (2001, pp. 61–62)

However, not all Levinas scholars are convinced by his claim, arguing that his ethics is inextricably tied to his metaphysics. For the purposes of this chapter, I will simply acknowledge this tension and set it aside for the moment so we can focus on his contribution to the debate on autonomy as an educational aim.

## Education and the Educated Subject

In *Postmodernism and Education*, Robin Usher and Richard Edwards claim that education is “very much the dutiful child of the Enlightenment” and “the vehicle by which the Enlightenment ideals of critical reason, humanistic individual freedom and benevolent progress are substantiated and realised” (1994, p. 24):

The very rationale of the educational process and the role of the educator is founded on the humanist idea of a certain kind of subject who has the inherent potential to become self-motivated and self-directing, a rational subject capable of exercising individual agency. The task of education has therefore been understood as one of “bringing out”, of helping to realise this potential, so that subjects become fully autonomous and capable of exercising their individual and intentional agency. (pp. 24–25)

This modernist educational project of creating rational, autonomous subjects is the backdrop against which Levinas’s work is read by educators and philosophers of education and thus why his ethics often seems so radical and counterintuitive.

Central to Levinas’s work is a rejection of the modernist assumption that human beings are first and foremost self-governing and self-regarding individuals who only incidentally and out of necessity encounter and engage with the other. He contends instead that individual subjectivity emerges out of a relationship “older than the ego,

prior to principles” (1981, p. 117). In other words, for Levinas, one comes into being as a subject already in relation with another whose irreducible alterity (exemplified in the face) means that she or he cannot be assimilated or reduced to some version of oneself. So, rather than being connected to the other by way of essential similarity or a common humanity, we are called to a different kind of kinship. In grammatical terms, heteronomous subjectivity means being a subject in the accusative. One is subject *to* the other: it is not a matter of I think (I will, I want, I can), but *me voici*, Here I am (Levinas 1981, p. 142; Peperzak 1997, p. 199).

Levinas illustrates this by way of the biblical account of Moses’s response to the appeal of God (the absolute Other): “God called to him out of the bush, ‘Moses, Moses!’ and he said, ‘Here I am’” (Exodus 3:4). He thus inverts the commonplace conception of “no other-than-self without a self” to “no self without another who summons it to responsibility” (Ricoeur, cited in Kemp 1996, p. 46). And it is precisely in one’s response to the face, to the appeal of the other, that one finds oneself awakened to an inescapable indebtedness to and responsibility prior to any decision or choice. This condition of what Levinas calls ‘pre-ontological intersubjectivity’ thus renders subjectivity as being-for-the-other prior to being-for-oneself.

Now, at first blush, it might seem that Levinas is not talking about subjectivity at all, that he is arguing instead for a forfeiture of subjectivity and agency, or slave morality. However, for Levinas, heteronomous subjectivity is not about the other person exercising his power over me as one who can demand that I subject myself to his will. Rather, one is called to be-for-the-other in response to the face of the other in all its vulnerability, suffering, and destitution. I am called into being as an ‘I’ not by the force of a powerful counter-ego, but by the somewhat paradoxical ‘force’ of vulnerability and fragility—by the command of what Levinas calls the “beggar’s request” (1961/1969, 232–3).

It is important to note that Levinas writes in descriptive rather than prescriptive language. As he made clear in several interviews over the years (e.g., Levinas 1985; Levinas and Kearney 1986), his project was not to map out a normative ethics that tells us what one ought to do or not do in any given situation, nor to provide a guiding framework for making moral decisions. Rather, he claimed that his phenomenological analysis was intended to awaken us to what our human condition really is and always has been. “My task”, he said, “does not consist in constructing ethics; I only try to find its meaning” (1985, p. 90). However, the descriptive language he employs does nothing to soften his claim about the demand the other makes on me. In fact, if I truly recognize or awaken to the fact of being indebted to the other as the one who calls me into being, my life is always already inscribed with a responsibility that is at once inescapable and impossible to fulfill. In Levinas’s oft-repeated phrase, “I am I in the sole measure that I am responsible” (1985, p. 101). As I mentioned above, Levinas’s work came onto a scene dominated by modernist ideals and liberal education. So let us turn now to a brief discussion of the role of autonomy in education and the ways in which Levinas’s emphasis on heteronomous subjectivity contests that discourse.

As Usher and Edwards explain in the passage quoted above, autonomy is at the very heart of the modernist project and thus of liberalism and liberal education.

However, there are different views on the precise definition of autonomy and how best to cultivate it in education (e.g., Brighouse 2006; Deardon 1972; White 1982; Callan 1997). I will limit this discussion mainly to Harry Brighouse and Eamonn Callan as representatives of contemporary philosophers of education writing on autonomy. In general, autonomy refers to the freedom to determine one's own thoughts and actions and the inclination to exercise that freedom. But since we are not born with the capacity for independent thought and action, we must learn it, and this is why education for autonomy has come to play such a central role in liberal democracies.

Brighouse argues that the capacity for autonomy is "important enough to justify a requirement that all children be subject to an education designed to facilitate it", but he stops short of declaring autonomy necessary for a flourishing life (2006, p. 15). Both Callan (1997) and John White (1982), on the other hand, argue that education must not only be autonomy-facilitating—that is, it must not only enable students to develop the capacity for independent thought and action—it must actively promote autonomy as a necessary condition for a flourishing life. For Callan, drawing on John Rawls, autonomy is both personal and political. It is personal in that the autonomous subject is self-governing and able to critically assess various truth claims, theories, etc. that come her way without being coerced or unduly influenced by outside authorities. And it is political in that the capacity to exercise such independent judgment is a precondition for participating in and contributing to a just democratic society (1997, pp. 227–228, n. 8; 2014, p. 71).

For both Callan and Brighouse, one of the main risks of not cultivating autonomy is indoctrination and (especially for Callan) the vice of ethical servility. In their view, for a life to be truly fulfilling, the kind of life one chooses to pursue ought not to be determined or constrained by luck of the particular family, culture, religion, etc. into which one is born. So, if education is concerned with providing students with the knowledge, skills, and attitudes necessary to lead a flourishing life, it must foster autonomy so that whatever life one ultimately leads is both freely chosen and consistent with objectively valuable goods. Educating for autonomy obviously does not preclude the possibility that children may eventually choose the same way of life, and come to hold the same values, as their parents and community. But, for advocates of liberal education, it is of utmost importance that those children, now adults, will have arrived at their conception of the good life through a process of independent reflection after exposure to a wide range of conceptions of the good life, rather than through indoctrination or authoritarian socialization. In Callan's words, "human beings have a right to order the diverse possible constituents of the good life in their own way, to choose a life in which autonomy is pursued at the expense, say, of secure religious conviction or to reverse those priorities" (1997, p. 156).

While Callan and Brighouse may disagree about whether autonomy ought to be actively promoted in education or only facilitated, and about other more technical aspects of autonomy, both are committed to the view that it is an essential quality in an educated person. Therefore, teachers who teach in such a way as to foster subservience to authority and the uncritical acceptance of ideas have neglected their responsibilities as educators.



There are, however, a number of philosophers of education, both within and outside the liberal tradition, who reject autonomy as an educational aim. Michael Hand (2006), for instance, critiques various aspects of Brighouse, Callan, Deardon, and White's arguments as conceptually flawed and incoherent. Hand is not against autonomy per se, but he rejects it as an appropriate aim of education. Taking on two aspects of the commonsense conception of autonomy, Hand argues that while the freedom to exercise autonomy is desirable, it is not something that can be learned. We either are in circumstances in which we can exercise that freedom or we are not; and, for the most part, educators do not determine those circumstances. He also cautions that a broadly construed disposition to think and act autonomously, while something that can be learned, is not necessarily desirable, since there are many situations in which it is far better to defer to others' knowledge or experience than to rely on one's own (pp. 537–539). Hand goes on to critique various other technical aspects of arguments for autonomy as an aim of education, but the details of that discussion go beyond the scope of this chapter.

Another critic of autonomy as an educational aim is Nel Noddings, best known for her ethics of care (1984). In contrast to Hand, Noddings's concern is not with conceptual coherence, but rather with the liberal ideal of the rational individual subject. Noddings's work rests instead on an ontological claim that human beings are essentially relational creatures, so to educate for autonomy is to educate away from, not toward, human flourishing. In her words:

I am not naturally alone. I am naturally in a relation from which I derive nourishment and guidance. When I am alone, either because I have detached myself or because circumstances have wrenched me free, I seek first and most naturally to re-establish my relatedness. My very individuality is defined in a set of relations. This is my basic reality. (1984, p. 51)

More recently, Noddings has argued for a conception of relational autonomy, as a kind of middle ground between autonomous and heteronomous subjectivity. "The liberal notion that distinct individuals precede the formation of relationships is contrary to what is easily observed in human life" (2011, p. 7). For instance, she says, "It is clear that we are not autonomous...in many of the categories governing our lives. We do not choose our parents, the cultural groups into which we are born, our first language, our economic status, the genomic patterns that predict our physical characteristics and talents, or our first religion" (p. 8). But rather than educating in a way that denies the importance of such attachments, or sees them as potential impediments to a flourishing life, Noddings's relational autonomy emphasizes the self as a subject always in relation—as parent, spouse, teacher, citizen, or friend.

It is interesting to note that Noddings refers to the same biblical story of God calling to Moses that Levinas cites. But Noddings rejects the heteronomous subjectivity implied in Moses's response, 'Here I am', as an undesirable relation of subservience and obedience to a higher power, favoring instead the responsive posture 'I am here', which she describes as an expression of love flowing from the one with more power to the one with less (Noddings 2002, p. 129). The difference between the two is significant because Levinas's account of heteronomous subjectivity as 'Here I am' is based on a claim that the ability to say 'I' only emerges in the

encounter with the other, whereas Noddings's 'I am here' highlights the relation between self and other, but retains a conception of substantial subjectivity. The commonality I want to highlight, though, is that for both Noddings and Levinas an education that focuses on cultivating autonomy reflects a misunderstanding of what it means to be human. So, in the final section, let us explore the kind of human flourishing that is made possible by autonomy and heteronomy, respectively, with a particular focus on Levinas's contribution to that debate.

## Autonomy, Flourishing, and the Other

Proposing human flourishing as the primary aim of education is unlikely to meet with much objection. However, agreeing on what a flourishing human life looks like is where things get tricky. One of the main differences between a liberal education and a Levinasian-inspired education is their respective conceptions of the kind of freedom that characterizes or underpins a fully flourishing life.

For Callan and other advocates of a liberal education, the freedom to choose the kind of life one wants to pursue is a necessary precondition for flourishing, and surrendering one's judgments to the will of others or living in "fearful or unthinking conformity to the will of others" is the very antithesis of a flourishing life (Callan 2014, p. 69). For Levinas, on the other hand, freedom is connected to the somewhat paradoxical Hebraic idea that to be free is to be bound; it is the freedom that comes in the act of answering the call of the other and investing our freedom in the freedom and rights of the other (1993, p. 125).

Both Callan and Brighouse argue that an autonomous life need not be purely or narrowly self-centered, and they acknowledge that being part of cultural or religious communities that depend on the transmission of traditional beliefs and values may be central to some people's autonomously chosen conceptions of a good life. But the key question for Callan is "how far autonomy can be rejected without spoiling our lives" (1997, p. 152). However, from a Levinasian perspective, the question would be asked from the opposite end—something like, to what extent is the capacity and desire to disentangle oneself from unchosen relationships and responsibilities a fully human life? In *Outside the Subject*, Levinas wrote, "It might astonish some that—with so many unleashed forces, so many violent and voracious acts that fill our history, our societies and our souls—I should turn to the I-Thou or the responsibility-of-one-person-for-the-other to find the categories of the Human" (1993, p. 43). But this is precisely what he did; and, as Catherine Chalier put it, "he wagered on an education that does not separate human beings" (in Chalier and Bouganim 2008, p. 16). For Levinas, a flourishing life (although he typically does not use that term) is a life lived in recognition of one's inescapable indebtedness to and responsibility for the other. It is not about forming and acting on one's own conception of the good life, with the attendant goods accruing to the self, but about a radically other-centered life—a life that begins from and returns to the other. Viewed through a Levinasian lens, then, one of the risks of promoting (especially a

robust conception of) autonomy as the main aim of education is a moral blindness in which relationships and obligations to the other come to be seen as encroachments or, as Zygmunt Bauman puts it, “stumbling blocks on the self’s march to fulfillment” (1993, p. 84). Paul Standish describes it well when he says:

Levinas is not defending heteronomous practices, such as indoctrination or slavery, which amount to blatant and thoroughgoing denials of autonomy. The point is rather to contest the kind of freedom that is realized where, within the totalized conceptions of thinking he envisages, too singular a faith in autonomy and mastery develops. Freedom arises, in his view, only on the strength of the realization of one’s responsibility, out of prior obligation. Blindness to this—in other words, the presupposition of an initial neutrality as the basis of obligations freely entered into—results in an illusory freedom, for all the apparent choices it may confer. (2008, p. 58)

Levinas’s conception of heteronomous subjectivity thus does not require a complete rejection of autonomy, but it casts it in a very different light from the rational autonomous subject at the heart of liberal education. A Levinasian kind of autonomy is an autonomy that comes into view only after we recognize, or awaken to, our prior condition of heteronomy and existential indebtedness to the other. As heteronomous subjects we are always both acting and being acted on, forming and being formed by others. Therefore, as Anna Strhan argues, “if we want to encourage students to recognize their autonomy, it is also necessary to encourage awareness that autonomy is only possible through the condition of existing in community, a community that makes demands on us, impresses on us and forms us in ways we cannot always control” (2012, p. 91).

In closing, I need to acknowledge that while there has been increasing interest in Levinas, and an admirable body of Levinasian scholarship in philosophy of education published over the last 15–20 years, this work has largely been limited to scholarly audiences; it has not, as yet, had much discernible impact on policy and practice. As I said at the outset, this may be in part due to the fact that Levinas’s ethics cannot be simply applied to practice, but I also think the fact that Levinas calls into question the very assumptions on which modern education has been built means that speaking of education after Levinas (i.e., on Levinasian terms) requires both a new educational language and new frameworks for practice. This, then, is the next challenge for those of us who find his work compelling.

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## Introduction

Even beyond the borders of Germany, Klaus Mollenhauer (1928–1998) is considered a classical author of twentieth century social pedagogy (Niemeyer 1998). In addition to having worked as a social welfare worker, he also wrote a number of social-pedagogical studies as well as the highly influential *Introduction to Social Education* (Mollenhauer 1964). In the current academic debates surrounding social work, however, his arguments are rarely referenced or utilised; instead, he is considered more as a historical, critical voice, above all within the context of teaching. In a sense, Mollenhauer himself provoked this form of reception. Ten years after the publication of his *Introduction*, he wrote in the preface to a new edition: “This book bears the marks of the context in which it was written to such an extent that it only makes sense as an object of a critical engagement in the context of teaching and learning” (Mollenhauer 1976, 6). The obligation he places on the reader – to deal critically with existing ideas – is present throughout Mollenhauer’s entire thought and demonstrates his role as a strong proponent of critical pedagogy (*Kritische Erziehungswissenschaft*). He advised the coming generation to make use of his educational works for the purpose of study, and that they should emancipate themselves from his position, precisely because it is inextricably connected to its context and time. In doing so, Mollenhauer performatively demonstrates his own position within the educational sciences.

Due to the generational crisis and conflict with the younger generation, Mollenhauer distanced himself from the traditional humanistic position of the “*geisteswissenschaftliche Pädagogik*”, which was primarily oriented towards principles, thereby neglected the societal, political and social situations. Consequently,

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he turned away from a humanities-oriented approach to education and towards a social science approach with its corresponding empirical methods of investigation. Nevertheless, he was aware of the fact that a purely empirical form of researching social contexts was not going to change anything regarding the actual situation confronting the youth. It had been forgotten that the emancipation from existing cultural practices is only possible if people confront them. In this way, Mollenhauer reminds us that the older generation's responsibility to the younger involves not only presenting their ways of life, but also representing them in such a way as to allow the younger generation the opportunity to engage with them, yet without closing off the possibility of critique.

However, after having uncovered these and other 'forgotten connections' (Mollenhauer 1983, English translation: Mollenhauer 2014), he found a new research field between aesthetics/culture and education, thereby taking a second turn towards a perspective of cultural studies and cultural practices. His anthropological and methodological contributions mean that he is still an important figure in the current debate: on the one hand, when it comes to the discourse concerning the measurement of 'cultural education', and on the other, in the development of a cultural studies perspective in the educational sciences. In other words, Mollenhauer's voice is still heard today when elaborating the transformation of educational science – thereby preserving its relevance – because he is viewed as a pivotal figure in the transformation of the discipline into a cultural science (see Brumlik 2006, Meyer-Drawe 2004). In contrast to rigid empirical studies and humanistic approaches to pedagogical phenomenon, Mollenhauer developed a cultural approach. The current relevance of his thought within the education discourse was achieved with his work *Detours (Umwege)* (Mollenhauer 1986), where he made use of artworks and other artistic materials in order to make them productive for educational science.

These endeavours demonstrate the connection between research focusing on theories of action and systematic approaches to educational scholarship. He confronts pedagogy with the limits or boundaries of its endeavour due to the unavailability of aesthetic experience. Mollenhauer provokes educational research to transgress boundaries by claiming: In aesthetic objectivations – especially in literature and images – educational phenomenon are “more precisely grasped than in texts that seek to clarify the questions in the name of science” (Mollenhauer 1986, 12). Mollenhauer claimed that art, as a specific form of cultural articulation, was more suitable for dealing with the cultural practices of pedagogy, and this held true both for researchers as well as actors involved in pedagogical interactions.

In his reflections, Mollenhauer struggles with the possibilities and limitations of aesthetic education. His controversial term 'aesthetic literacy' (*ästhetische Alphabetisierung*) conceptualises the dilemma of any pedagogical interaction that grasps *Bildung* or education, following Humboldt, as an interaction of subject and world. Mollenhauer problematises the side of individuals via the difficulties tied to the concept of “identity” and the discernment of aesthetic. He explains the side of the world in terms aesthetic objectivations, which as cultural artefacts, challenge



*Bildsamkeit*<sup>1</sup> and self-activation to such an extent that appropriation and disassociation occur concurrently.

The thesis of this chapter claims that Mollenhauer's voice still resonates within educational philosophy today, above all because he pursued questions intimately tied to aesthetic and cultural education. His current relevance is not only due to the innovation of referring to works of art for educationally relevant theoretical interpretation, but more generally because Mollenhauer provides connections between aesthetics/cultural and anthropological thinking regarding *Bildung* and upbringing.

## The Connection of Pedagogy, Aesthetics and Culture: Forgotten in Order to Be Remembered

In 1983, Mollenhauer published his book *Vergessene Zusammenhänge* (Forgotten Connections, 2015), which made him an internationally renowned educationalist. Brumlik considers this book a “paradigmatic, almost revolutionary development within educational science, anticipating decades in advance the cultural-scientific turn of the social sciences” (Brumlik 2009, 291; see Biesta 2014). Often this book is considered innovative only in so far as Mollenhauer made use not only of texts but also of images for his interpretations. However, behind this approach lies a much greater transformation of educationally relevant theoretical considerations both at the action- and the science-theoretical level. The general education is thematised by means of art and aesthetics in order to provoke a renewal within educational philosophy.

Even Brumlik's view that Mollenhauer's “essence of educational science is a theory of initiation into a culture” doesn't go far enough. Mollenhauer was not only interested in how the subject enters a culture but also in how it leaves it again in order itself to become culturally formative. This is a point also ignored by those who accuse Mollenhauer of having returned to a humanities-oriented pedagogy in his later period (see ABmann 2015, 257). Such accusations are based on his argument that education cannot be critical or emancipatory from the outset. But this overlooks an important aspect of Mollenhauer's argument: one cannot free oneself from culture without already being in that culture. In other words, emancipation is only possible when one is situated within something to emancipate from. If adults do not take on their responsibility for representing their own way of life, then the coming generation will not have an opportunity to critically deal with the constructions of existing reality.

In a double sense, one might call this Rousseau's misunderstanding, even though Rousseau was only viewed very one-sidedly. Indeed, his book on education starts by explaining how man makes the nature of man degenerate; however, at once he

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<sup>1</sup>The German concept of '*Bildsamkeit*' draws directly on Rousseau's notion of 'perfectability' (*perfectibilité*), and it is misleading translated into English as 'plasticity', therefore rendering it passive.

adds that without this intervention things would be much worse, and that, by today's standards, a human left to him/herself would be completely miseducated (see Rousseau 1993, 9). After all, the conditions of our time no longer have to do with nature; instead, they are in culture, and *this is* where education must take place. "Education would be powerless and ideological if it ignored the aim of adaptation and did not prepare people to find their way in the world. However, it is just as dubious if it stops there and produces nothing more than 'well-adjusted people', as a result of which the present state, and precisely its bad sides, really asserts itself" (Adorno 1971, 109). Herein lies the criticism of critical theory and the science of education as formulated by its own proponents: criticism and emancipation require confrontation with the representation of reality. "Just as the artist depends on the historically produced material of the media he/she uses in order to 'assemble' something new, so too the child depends on those components enabling its participation as a member of society. At the same time – according to the postulates of critical theory – it would have to learn how to distance itself from this cultural material to be able to deal productively with its present time, to look to something new in the future" (Mollenhauer et al. Kursbuch 81/82, quoted after Winkler, 43).

Mollenhauer practices this process of appropriation to adaptation, while at the same time calling for self-activity, also at the level of science. The style in which he presented his thoughts in essays, commentaries, sketches and polemics performatively demonstrates that the way in which science finds expression demands its appropriation while, at the same time, allowing for a distancing from it. The proclaimed preliminary nature and transience of his thought goes so far that he hardly believes in the possibility of any systematic concept of general pedagogy (see Winkler 2002, 12). General pedagogy, he states, has become 'diffused'. "It is no longer possible, it seems to me, to bring together the scattered elements in a way which may rightly so be labelled 'systematic'" (Mollenhauer 1996, 281). Thus, Mollenhauer presents his theses by way of fragments, which are systematising, however, do not stabilise any standardised system (see Schütte/Weiß 2017).

Five years after *Forgotten Connections* was published, Dietrich Benner attempted to develop a systematic form or notion of "*Allgemeine Pädagogik*" (1987). Benner's constitutive principles of pedagogy (*Bildsamkeit* and the call for self-activity) were also present in Mollenhauer's *Forgotten Connections*. Benner's conception of general pedagogy unhinges Mollenhauer by way of a 'footnote' referring to the practice of art. The specific nature of art fits neither into Benner's praxeology nor into any general pedagogy, for it goes beyond the constraints of any system. In this incredibly dense and complicated essay from 1990, "Aesthetic Education between Criticism and Self-Certainty" captures the entire problem of the innovative, yet also problematic, connection between aesthetics and pedagogy.

This thought goes far beyond reconceiving art in the form of literature and images as 'pedagogical documents' in terms of educational theory. "In terms of methods and methodology, [Mollenhauer] broke new ground when using text and image sources from the field of art" (Brumlik 2009, 291), and he even went farther, i.e., back to the classics, albeit taking up a different perspective. The classic figures of pedagogy, namely, Herbart, Comenius, Pestalozzi, Rousseau, Schleiermacher

and Humboldt, are treated in *Forgotten Connections*, where they are confronted with the aesthetic material. If autobiographical and aesthetic objectifications by Kafka, Bernhard, Kleist, Velasquez, Dürer and Rembrandt are interpreted with a view to educational theory, then educational theory must, indeed, be ready to be irritated by them. What are these aesthetic objectifications capable of expressing that neither the texts of the pedagogical thinkers nor praxis-related experiential reports cannot? They speak a language that the sciences cannot. In so far as it is language, even if a language of art, eventually the issue of aesthetic literacy will come up. The *Forgotten Connections* are primarily about making scientists capable of understanding and interpreting the way in which artists express themselves, for the sake of their own epistemic interest. He was “certain that artistic objectifications provide better empirical material than any quantitative study” (Brumlik 2009, 293).

Mollenhauer hints to the reason why this artistic way is more appropriate when it comes to the reception, interpretation and presentation of pedagogical phenomena in the book’s motto. “The entirety of pedagogy, upbringing, has a meaning which cannot be scientifically grasped” (Blankertz 1982, quoted after Mollenhauer 2008, 7). Educational and pedagogical processes, he states, are such complex phenomena that “...if one wanted to present them separately – they would lose their specific meaning; a meaning which remains the same only by the parallel presence of all the components” (Mollenhauer 1986, 13). Scientific methods dissect and analyse, and the subject dissected into its parts is less than the whole. Mollenhauer dealt with the entire range of educational research methods. Together with Christian Rittelmeyer, he published a book in 1977 on this topic. In this text, the common methods are portrayed as conservative if they are “believed to be the only possible tools and to be valid also for the future” (Mollenhauer/Rittelmeyer 1977, 7). The critical, emancipatory question arises: “Could it perhaps be that alternatives in the research are made more difficult or impossible of which we cannot as of yet know if they are much more likely to produce new insights?” (ibid. 27). Humanities-oriented pedagogy hermeneutically generated its knowledge of education from classical texts. Socio-scientific research analytically examines by way of facts empirical data. Mollenhauer, being both sympathetic and critical of both approaches, takes cultural artefacts of art, and thus possesses fragments that contain more than the individual parts of a whole, yet which must be read not only scientifically but also aesthetically.

Mollenhauer uses Kafka’s letter to his father to grasp the failure of the entirety of *Erziehung*. In this letter, Kafka not only describes the failure of his own upbringing but, at the same time, also addresses his inability to adequately speak about this. For Mollenhauer, this self-reflection seems to be the added value of artistic products, and these products describe not just pedagogical matters of fact but also addresses the limitations of their own descriptions. In the opening quotation, Kafka announces the problem of his descriptions: “because the volume of the matter goes far beyond my memory and reason” (Kafka quoted according to Mollenhauer 2008, 9). This limitation is due to the “rational means of conceptually grasping the matter” (ibid. 11) and to the powers of recollection, which never grasps the whole of education. However, that which is fragmentary *can* be addressed and done so in

a particular way. The artistic style provides the balance between overly specific “experiential kitsch” (ibid. 12) and sweeping generalities. Resulting from the liberties of the aesthetic genre, there is no need to care about the stringency and consistency of arguments, and their obviousness need not be scientifically proven. Thus, such artistic descriptions are much closer to the impossible and paradoxical nature of education and, in a Socratic sense, take both the reader and the scientist into a “pedagogical aporia, a pathlessness” (ibid. 14), from where a new way of thinking the other may start.

Kafka, Bernhard and Sartre are the authors quoted in the autobiographic fragments to whom Mollenhauer attributes pedagogical significance, because they speak about education without a “progressive pathos” (ibid. 9). These are by no means success stories, but rather subtle descriptions of inner strife and failed identity. What Mollenhauer wants to make clear when he speaks of the failure of education is that the concept of identity is not appropriate when it comes to the aims of development and education. The concept of identity, he says, wipes out the nature of the self, making it torn, uncertain, fragmentary and not permissive of any form of contradiction. One’s self-image is not one of identity but must in principle be imagined as being an unstable and a risky sketch (ibid. 158) whose stability must be doubted. Mollenhauer didn’t consider identity to be an attainable feature or capacity but rather understood it in terms of a problem (Mollenhauer 1986, 59). For the educationalist, this means that “...identity exists only as a fiction and not as an empirically secured matter of fact” (Mollenhauer 2008, 158). The concept of identity does not stand the test of a pluralised society.

According to Mollenhauer, the failure of these educational situations is inherent in any educational process, because it is “extension and enrichment, but also restriction and devaluation of what would have been possible” (ibid. 10). Educational processes are enablement and hindrance at the same time. By allowing for one, they block other possibilities that could have been.

And aesthetic material, by way of artistic presentation, makes this clear, and it permanently demands that attention be paid not only to its content but also to its form. The “sentence, which is the linchpin of the aesthetic and argumentative structure of a section” (ibid. 30), deserves particular attention. Thus, by means of its aesthetic character and quality, we see how the material challenges the interpretation and makes it aesthetic. This way it gains in virtuosity and liberates the stringent scientific ways of observation from their methodical tunnel vision.

What is not particularly striking in textual material becomes spectacular when presented as images. The “image presents, so to speak, in a moment, what the text can only communicate spread out in time” (Mollenhauer 1986, 38). In this sense, the ability of hermeneutics is challenged anew and vitalized in a different way. This can only be accomplished via images, more precisely, stylised images, that is, aesthetic figurations. Scenes with children filmed by the scientist as fixated material can also be interpreted aesthetically and ambivalently; and yet, they lack something if they are only subjected to an analytic and not an artistic claim. They only show what the child shows us or what is immediately accessible. An image painted by an

artist (as well as a novel or a film) shows us something else – the artist’s view of the things – and, if we are lucky, it shows us how we see.

In the methodological remark on his education-oriented theoretical interpretation of an image document (see Mollenhauer 2008, 42), Mollenhauer anticipates an accusation: images are, of course, not the thing itself but rather the painter’s conception of what is painted or depicted. For Mollenhauer, it’s not the real thing that is interesting but rather its conception, i.e., not its presentation but its *representation*. For the conception simultaneously presents the “particular perspective of the producer” (ibid. 41) and a stylised generalisation in which reality is not depicted one-to-one but rather the “historically valid rules for the social construction of reality” (ibid.) appear as well. From images one can infer not only how education is conceived but also “the rules according to which ‘educational reality’ was socially constructed” (ibid.). “However, this requires the interpreter to deal not only with the contents (in the case of the image its iconographic elements), but also, and above all, that he/she directs his/her attention to the formal structures, for it is above all in these that the ‘habitus’ reveals itself – another expression for ‘rules concerning the social construction of reality’” (ibid.). Thus, the added value of an aesthetic, that is, stylised representation of reality is not only in showing but in presenting the showing.

For Mollenhauer, images harbour an educational message, which is at once a stylised depiction of the world, its reflection and its construction. An aesthetic figuration is a reflection, because, for the purpose of understanding, it must remain in the symbolic order of the world. It is a construction, because there are aesthetic shifts that deviate from this order. These two sides, which emerge at the same time, despite in a sense excluding one another, are the pivot and linchpin of Mollenhauer’s thought.

Understanding images, he says, has a double meaning for the educationalist and the practical pedagogue: “to understand the ways of life of past ages, the culture communicated by education – and as an exercise for a practical task we owe the children of today” (Mollenhauer 1986, 39). The practical task we owe the children, again, has two sides: firstly, we owe it to the children to not let our conceptions bereave them of their individual possibilities. Following Plessner, Mollenhauer formulates this as follows: “For always the child is much more than that what understanding and explaining makes immediately accessible to us” (Mollenhauer 2008, 89). To give leeway to this ‘more’ of the child, according to Schleiermacher, a good pedagogue requires a so-called ‘divinatory capability’ – a competence of foresight. Looking at images and attempting to interpret them trains our ‘divinatory capability’, making us able to “extract some of the non-conventionalised aspects of the child into the field of our attention” (ibid.). In this way, he says, we come closer to an understanding of education that “is not imagined according to the model of processing, shaping, changing of a material, but as supporting a developing potential as a dialogic relation, as call and answer, or with whatever metaphors this view has been clad with over the course of our history” (ibid. 90).

The second practical task we owe the children is the representation of culture and cultural practices in order to enable their participation. Mollenhauer elucidates this by means of Comenius’s *Orbis pictus* from 1658. This book marks the starting-

point for the representation of the world. “For 300 years pedagogy, one could say, has mirrored the world, namely in stylised depictions, a powerful aesthetic, symbolic enterprise, a gigantic collage” (ibid. 53). The modern constitution of pedagogy starts with a picture book. Why a picture book? “The image can, namely, made in the right way, simultaneously point in two directions” (ibid. 59). On the one hand, it works in the service of empiricism by providing reason with sense data, and, on the other, the image presents a structured order of the world. Both sides point to the aesthetic dimension of all forms of education: that which is perceived can be perceived in two respects – namely, as an aesthetic bodily sensual perception and as a meaningful sign within an aesthetic-symbolic order. Still today we owe it to the children to teach them how to read the signs.

### **Aesthetic Literacy: Enabling for or Hindering Aesthetic Experience**

Aesthetic education as both productive and receptive relations of individual and aesthetic objectivation/works of art splits into two sides, which, like a chiasm, are nevertheless connected: one’s own evident, sensual experience of oneself, on the one hand, and understanding or expressing a symbolic representation, on the other. The first side, under the concept of ‘aesthetic experience’, will be the cause of a furore in the philosophical as well as the educational discourse. For the second aspect, Mollenhauer invented a prominent term: aesthetic literacy.

If participation in aesthetic objectivations of culture, he says, is the goal of aesthetic education, then aesthetic products must be readable, and the young generation must be taught this capability to read (see Mollenhauer 1990b, 8). The ability to decode images, to interpret its signs and thus to read their expression can be learned and practiced. “The readability of a sign is something other than bringing together the many associations or projections that occur during the process of observing. Thus, while perhaps not the most appropriate term, aesthetic literacy is, nevertheless, a possible term for understanding the learning process, in which non-linguistic, culturally produced figurations can be localised within a historically determined field of meaning, that is, become readable as meaningful signs” (ibid. 11).

Aesthetic objects belong to cultural contexts and use these symbols, which are still recognisable, but which also – due to being aesthetically alienated – allows for other interpretations. However, before aesthetically virtuosic alienations can be liberating, the younger generation must be made familiar with the readability of the aesthetic objectivations of the existing culture. The readability of images is associated with an iconographic method that, however, always only grasps what can be compared to other things, what is divisible and generalisable – not in terms of universality but regarding the members of one cultural community.

However, what could readability mean after the arts have become autonomous if the arts speak a language that is not ‘homologous’ with the symbolisations of the



culture? Regardless of whether with a classical alphabet or an understanding of language, in the sense of body language or artistic language, “in both cases readability is tied to cognitive operations referring a signifier to a signified, and according to culturally valid rules” (ibid. 11). Talk of literacy only works metaphorically, and we will come closer to it if we understand readability also concerning “pre-literary pictographic writings” (ibid.). Those who “misunderstand the figuration in an image by Cy Twombly as childish scribbles behaves like somebody who considers hieroglyphs to be nice little pictures: he/she is illiterate” (ibid.).

The reading of images presupposes comprehensibility, a meaning and a statement that is found with any cultural product. The artist must be assumed to always want to tell something, no matter how abstract the aesthetic figuration is. One accusation might be that this is only possible with art meant to express something; contemporary art is suspected of refusing any meaning. Art that refuses any statement no longer means anything. However, even the artist’s intention to not want to say anything is, nevertheless, a statement the moment the work is presented to others. This escalation of the problem demonstrates the interwovenness of the pedagogical with linguistic philosophy, communications theory, hermeneutics and theories of art and aesthetics.

Mollenhauer himself draws the limits of aesthetic literacy, and this is not always recognised. At best, aesthetic literacy is one half of aesthetic education; however, it is what fits into the “pedagogical” (see Mollenhauer 1990a, 484), i.e., to put it into a pedagogical framework. The much larger and important part of aesthetic education – aesthetic experience – is unavailable to the pedagogue. The crucial question is if aesthetic literacy enables or hinders aesthetic experience. Literacy seems to make works of art available and is in danger of making immediate (i.e., not culturally preformed) aesthetic experience more difficult. Susan Sontag already expressed just such a criticism in her well-known essay “Against Interpretation” published in 1933. For her, “interpretation is the revenge of intellect upon art” (Sontag 2006, 13). By way of interpretation, she states, one gets a grip on the work of art intellectually speaking; however, at the same time, this capability poisons sensitivity. To this extent, aesthetic literacy would be an obstacle to aesthetic experience.

Mollenhauer sees both sides: Aesthetic figurations “can indeed always be the bearers of culturally established semantic fields, that is, cultural signs, that is, cognitively readable. Yet, at the same time, they are perceived, by means of our sensory organs, which are never completely, and above all never from the outset, trapped within the dominant cultural codes, the given formations of signs” (Mollenhauer 1990b, 13). Cognitively accessible readability stands in opposition to experiencing or feeling it, which semantically speaking does not comply with the orders. However, to keep from drifting towards the kitsch of stimulation and emotion, Mollenhauer never speaks of the emotional; instead, he speaks of self-certainty and experiences of certainty that evade verbal expression. The problem of communication is the difficulty of transforming individual aesthetic experience into an always reductive communicable language. The starting point for discussing aesthetic literacy was the fact that, on the one hand, a language is visible in art, that we recognize and interpret signs, and, on the other, it is art that also withdraws from readability, addressing us



as observers without making us understand or allowing comment. It is this latter aspect of art that rips us from an interpreting self-evidence we use to read signs. Aesthetic experience bears the potential of evoking a “fundamental disturbance of routinised social outlines of normality” (Mollenhauer 1988, 457). From Schiller’s “aesthetic state while playing” to Foucault’s “aesthetic existence”, here most of all the extraordinary position of aesthetic experience is emphasised – the “social state of suspense of aesthetic existence” (Mollenhauer 1990a, 491). It is this ‘dropping out’ that makes up both its particularity and unavailability. “The I at the moment of aesthetic experience is different from that which must survive the struggles of everyday existence” (ibid.). All pedagogical matters, whether concerning development, grasping of the world, integration into society and orientation, even including the search for identity, seems doubtful here. However, ‘dropping out’ requires having been ‘inside’. It presupposes that we are already equipped with cultural patterns of interpretation, from which we are liberated by such aesthetic experiences. “The appearance of freedom, in the aesthetic event, shines only for those already familiar with the epistemic impositions of the concepts of understanding and who are familiar with the utility expectations of social practice. This is not a task for children” (Mollenhauer 1990b, 6),<sup>2</sup> nor is it one for pedagogy. First, children need to be familiarised with cultural signs and practices before being able to liberate and emancipate themselves from them. Thus, here we are back at the starting point of the argument, without having come full circle; on the contrary, this starting point should always be taken up anew in a different way.

## Current Education-Philosophical Issues

“If they are good, aesthetic products are characterised by two things: they provoke not only the use of reason in the observer/reader/listener, but, at the same time, the use of their senses; and they are, so to speak, seismographs for the state of a culture” (Mollenhauer 1986, 10). Thus, in one sentence we find three points that demonstrate Mollenhauer’s relevance with regard to the current educational-philosophical discourse: (1.) questions of aesthetic education; (2.) aesthetic experience as a threshold experience; and (3.) pedagogy as a cultural science.

1. If *aesthetic products provoke our use of reason*, then it is about interpreting and reading them, i.e., understanding their expression. This readability is a skill that may be learned and practised and thus can become a possible task of aesthetic education. Helpful for understanding art is what Mollenhauer refers to as ‘aesthetic literacy’; a concept that is very much associated with him in the numerous reflections within the German discourse on aesthetic education. The most recent contribution to this discussion “*Einführung in die Ästhetische Bildung*” (Introduction into

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<sup>2</sup>This idea is developed further by Michael Parmentier in his provocative essay “*Protoästhetik oder der Mangel an Ironie. Eine etwas umständliche Erläuterung der These, dass Kinder zu ästhetischen Erfahrungen im strengen Sinne nicht fähig sind*”, 2004.

Aesthetic Education) (Dietrich/Krinninger/Schubert 2012) serves to emphasise this point. Drawing on Mollenhauer, the authors point out that, while aesthetic experience is inaccessible to pedagogy, aesthetic upbringing may nevertheless make sense in order to allow for aesthetic education by way of pedagogical interaction. Literacy belongs to the four dimensions of aesthetic education. It is possible, they state, to communicate knowledge via inventories of aesthetic symbols and their historical contexts. Participation in the cultural practice of aesthetics requires the cognitive competence of being able to distinguish meanings from aesthetic signs (see *ibid.* 29). Whereas Dietrich et al. emphasise education, Klepacki and Zirfas ask about learning: “Aesthetic education: what one learns and what one does not learn” (2009). The first of the four dimensions of learning discussed is Mollenhauer’s aesthetic literacy. All of these authors, however, are aware of the limited possibilities of aesthetic literacy, and, at the same time, point to the unavailability of aesthetic experience. Often the strange ambivalence that aesthetic literacy may be simultaneously enabling and hindering remains untouched.

2. If aesthetic products provoke not only the use of reason but, at the same time, *the use of the senses*, then reference isn’t merely being made to sensual (aesthetic) perception, but rather to the crucial potential of aesthetic experience brought forth in their simultaneity. For the latter, of course, arrives at self-certainty when the recipients’ search, in their attempt to understand, does not come to an end. They continue to be impressed by the work of art: it holds a certain appeal or attraction. It is this connection of stimulating *aesthesis* and the failure of reason that tears us from the world’s self-evidence, invalidates previous orders and rules, as well as starts the game of reflecting judgement. Influenced by Foucault’s later writings on the aesthetics of existence, a wave of reinterpretations of Kant’s *Critique of Judgement* and a turn towards researching ‘aesthetic experience’ was triggered in philosophy. From an anthropological perspective, Hans-Rüdiger Müller asks about an “aesthesiology of education” (*Ästhesiologie der Bildung* 1997) and an anthropology of the senses. At the same time, via the reception of Foucault, the topic of aesthetic existence has been expanded to include the art of life and self-care. The initial studies on this topic carried out by Markus Rieger, *Ästhetik der Existenz* (Aesthetics of Existence 1997), and Thomas Coelen, *Pädagogik als Geständniswissenschaft?* (Pedagogy as a Science of Confessing? 1996), exemplify both aesthetic and social-scientific approaches. The overarching topic of Malte Brinkmann’s latest compilation *Pädagogische Erfahrung* (Pedagogical Experience 2015) as well as the idea of ‘exercises’ (*Übungen*) as a forgotten pedagogical component were also inspired by Foucault. Furthermore, in his contribution to the volume just mentioned, Norm Friesen explicitly addresses Mollenhauer’s work (see Friesen 2015).

Moreover, Christiane Thompson draws on Foucault and Adorno in her educational-philosophical study on *Bildung und die Grenzen der Erfahrung* (Education and the Limits of Experience, 2009). For Mollenhauer, authors such as Adorno, Bourdieu and Foucault are interesting for pedagogues because in their works “... the irresolvable connection between educational problems and cultural products comes to the fore” (Mollenhauer 1986, 40) – a connection that pedagogy must never forget.

3. If *aesthetic products are indicators of the state of a culture*, then the educational scholars are entitled to make use of them as material for their theoretical and empirical research on education. Micha Brumlik (2006) makes it clear that in *Forgotten Connections* Mollenhauer has recovered ‘the forgotten’ of the social scientific perspective, and thereby has renewed it via a cultural scientific perspective. The difference between the social scientific and the cultural scientific views, he says, has to do with the fact that the former is interested in the functions social actions have for institutions and the latter in the significance of public actions in different frames of meaning and their transformation (see Brumlik 2006, 62). “The modest contribution of pedagogy might consist in making its issues more a part of our cultural context again.” (Mollenhauer 2008, 19). And by this he meant not only art-historical interpretations of images, but he also demonstrates that he had arrived in the age of pop culture by asking: “How must a punk hairstyle be read, and under what conditions would that be at all possible?” (Mollenhauer 1990b, 8). This, too, is a question of aesthetic literacy – and not only a question to be dealt with by children but also by adults.

The current educational-philosophical discourse struggles to obtain a cultural scientific perspective focused on aesthetic and cultural education, not to mention the limits of its research. And within this discourse, it is clear that Mollenhauer’s voice will continue to accompany the debate into the future.

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Sarah J. DesRoches and Claudia W. Ruitenberg

## Introduction

One of the voices that have contributed in recent decades to discussions of political education is that of the Belgian political theorist Chantal Mouffe. After some brief biographical notes, this chapter discusses Mouffe's distinctive contributions to political theory, the relevance of her work to the contemporary context, and its uptake in philosophy of education. We begin by casting Mouffe as a post-Marxist scholar, tracing both the Marxist lineage and departure from Marxism in her work. We argue that Mouffe's work is political through and through and cannot be understood outside of her persistent political concern with domination, inequality, and democratic contestation.

We focus on the concept of agonistic pluralism, which has been one of Mouffe's central contributions to political theory. Mouffe positions agonistic pluralism as an alternative to other models—most prominently the deliberative model—of democracy. One key feature of agonistic pluralism is that it sees conflict as not an undesirable phenomenon to be overcome by democratic consensus, but rather as constitutive of politics. A second key feature of agonistic pluralism is that it recognizes the affective nature of political conflict, that is, the role of collective passions in politics.

Mouffe's model of liberal democracy is particularly salient for political contexts in which concerns have been raised about political disengagement. While some have argued that youth are not, in fact, disengaged from politics and that "political engagement" may take place outside of party politics and other formal channels of liberal democracy (e.g., O'Toole et al. 2003), more traditional party-based politics

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is not yet obsolete and continues to shape local, regional, national, and international landscapes of legislation and other policy directions.

In education, Mouffe's work has been taken up to argue for forms of citizenship and political education that do not suppress conflict but recognize its value for vibrant democracy, without abandoning the liberal democratic framework completely (e.g., Ruitenberg 2009; Biesta 2011; Todd 2011). We propose more work can and should be done in this area as state governments at all levels (municipal, provincial, national, etc.) continue to propose curriculum frameworks that stress "personal responsibility" and "community-mindedness" rather than genuinely *political* citizenship (see Westheimer and Kahne 2004; Ruitenberg 2015). Moreover, Mouffe (2014) insists that it is not sufficient merely to leave room for questioning and contestation; agonistic pluralism seeks also to put in place new "institutions and configurations of power" (p. 153), recognizing that these, in turn, will be contested.

Finally, recent years have seen increased attention to the affective aspects of both politics and education. Work on political emotions can be rethought in light of Mouffe's caution not to confuse emotions, which are often associated with *individuals*, with the *collective* affect required for politics. Mouffe's emphasis on the ways in which power relations and antagonism constitute political identities, rather than taking place between preexisting identities, offers a way out of unproductive identity politics while acknowledging the need for political identification. Mouffe (2014) identifies as a key question for politics today: "how are collective forms of identification created and what is the part played by affects in this process?" (p. 155). From this perspective, one of the key questions for political education today is what educational processes may play a role in the fostering of collective, political identifications, and how such educational processes can accommodate affect.

## Mouffe and Marxisms

Chantal Mouffe was born in Charleroi, in the south of Belgium, in 1943. She studied philosophy at the Catholic University of Louvain, graduating in Philosophy and Humanities (*Philosophie et Lettres*) in 1965. She moved to Paris, where she attended Louis Althusser's seminars. According to James Martin (2013), Althusser's "anti-humanist reconstruction of Marxism dominated the intellectual scene and strongly influenced her intellectual formation" (p. 2). In 1975, she graduated with an MA in Politics at the University of Essex (Alpbach n.d.). While at Essex, she met the Argentine political theorist Ernesto Laclau (1935–2014), whom she married in 1975. Since 2000, Mouffe has worked at the University of Westminster in London (UK).

Mouffe's earliest published work was the edited volume *Gramsci and Marxist Theory* (1979), which included her chapter 'Hegemony and Ideology in Gramsci.' As Martin (2013) also observes, the concept of hegemony has remained important in Mouffe's reading of contingent political arrangements and tensions. One of Mouffe's most influential works, and key to understanding her later work on agonistic pluralism, was *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy: Towards a Radical*

*Democratic Politics* (1985), which she co-authored with Laclau. The work grapples with the possibility of politics and ‘the Left’ after Marxism or, more precisely, after the Marxist insistence on class and economic position had been shown to be only one of a range of relevant identities and positions—alongside, most significantly, race and gender—involved in understanding and overcoming systemic domination and inequality. As Martin puts it:

The break made by Mouffe and Laclau from the conceptual framework of Marxism was, without a doubt, profound.... But what remained of Marxism was also significant. The authors retained a focus on relations of power and domination as the driving undercurrent of radical politics and social change. But hegemony now designated the ongoing assemblage of all social identities without privilege, and no longer merely indicated the connecting of economic classes to non-class groups and ideas. (p. 3)

Mouffe is mainly known as a ‘post-Marxist’ philosopher (as is Laclau), an adjective indicating that while she does not adhere to central Marxist tenets, her work can also not be considered as anti-Marxist or separate from its Marxist lineage.

*Hegemony and Socialist Strategy* (1985) has become a fixture in scholarship on radical democracy. Laclau and Mouffe’s main concern in this text, as well as in subsequent writings, is that the ideals of liberal socialism have been hijacked by capitalist discourses. Liberal democracy as we know it, they argue, is a manifestation of economic aims rather than a vehicle for justice and equality. As Mouffe has argued in her later writing (2005), a retrieval of the foundations of socialism “can give us an insight into ways of overcoming the obstacles to democracy constituted by the two main forms of autocratic power, large corporations and centralized big governments, and show us how to enhance the pluralism of modern societies” (p. 99). This radical democratic approach to justice connects a Marxist with a post-foundationalist perspective on identity. Departing from traditional Marxism, Laclau and Mouffe (1985/2014) outline a model that reconvenes, identifies, and reassembles political identities as asymmetrical and yet bounded. They argue that “it is impossible to fix the literal sense of each isolated struggle because each struggle overflows its own literality and comes to represent, in the consciousness of the masses, a simple moment of a more global struggle against the system” (p. 8). Mouffe’s (2005) project has been that of rewriting democracy in a way that deepens how we experience the political, without destroying liberal institutions. As she explains, her aim has been to “reinscribe socialist goals within the framework of a pluralist democracy and to insist on the necessity of their articulation with the institutions of political liberalism” (p. 90).

## Agonistic Pluralism

As noted, Mouffe has referred to her perspective as ‘radical democracy.’ ‘Radical’ can be understood in two ways. The first, and most commonly alluded to in ‘leftist’ political circles, signifies an extreme departure from tradition and traditional norms. ‘Radical’ refers to a rethinking or even abandoning of oppressive, historically



engrained, norms. However, ‘radical’ can also be understood in a second sense: as a root or an original form. In the introductory paragraph to her text *Dimensions of Radical Democracy: Pluralism, Citizenship, Community* (1992) Mouffe states: “the objective of the Left should be the extension and deepening of the democratic revolution initiated two hundred years ago” (p. 1). This idea is fleshed out in the next paragraph when she expresses her dissatisfaction with the ways in which democracy is being manifested in a contemporary context: “The problem therefore is not the ideals of modern democracy, but the fact that its political principles are a long way from being implemented, even in those societies that lay claim to them” (p. 1). Highly critical of how the founding principles of liberal democracy have been manipulated and misused, Mouffe calls for their reconsideration and for a return to the founding principles of democracy. She has labeled this framework ‘agonistic politics.’

Central to agonistic politics is the conviction that working towards equitable relations in political life is premised on the acknowledgment of how hegemony and antagonism function in political spheres. Based on her earlier work with Laclau, Mouffe reconfigures politics as always entrenched in power struggles that manifest in hegemonic relations. Citizens are constructed through hegemonic discourses and conflict. Mouffe advocates for a model of political life that does not presuppose the stable identity categories of traditional social theory. As Laclau and Mouffe (1985) argue in *Hegemony and Socialist Strategy*, “it is necessary to analyze the plurality of diverse and frequently contradictory positions, and to discard the idea of a perfectly unified and homogeneous agent, such as ‘the working class’ of classical discourse” (p. 74). Agonistic politics attempts to break down constructions of totality, particularly as these subjugate minority identities and produce fictions of what it means to be a political subject.

For Mouffe, antagonistic politics brings to the forefront what is political about political life: conflict and political passion. Liberal theory has thus far been inadequate in articulating how the realities of conflict and passion shape how the realities of politics are played out. Mouffe (2013) expressly critiques liberal theory’s incapacity to deal with either emotion or conflict when she states that

the political in its antagonistic dimension cannot be made to disappear by simply denying it or wishing it away. This is the typical liberal gesture, and such negation only leads to the impotence that characterizes liberal thought when confronted with the emergence of antagonisms and forms of violence that, according to its theory, belong to a bygone age when reason had not yet managed to control the supposedly archaic passions. (p. 4)

Conflict, then, is inevitable in democracy and constitutive of the political, but it must be underscored that Mouffe is not talking about any and all conflict. While Mouffe does continue to use the term ‘conflict’ also in later work, Paulina Tambakaki (2014), who works with Mouffe at the Centre for the Study of Democracy, prefers to use more specific terms to refer to this particular type of conflict: she refers to “agonistic contestations” and stresses that these are “*agons*, not conflicts” (p. 3). The risk with the term ‘conflict’ is that it is understood to refer to violence, and that would be a misunderstanding: “Precisely because adversaries share something in

common, the ‘grammar of democratic life’, their struggle and confrontation does not take on an extreme, violent form. The very commonality they share serves as the limiting and moderating element in their confrontation” (p. 3). The mitigating potential of ‘agonistic contestations’ is perhaps most clearly exposed when considered in post-conflict contexts. In situations of reconstruction, nation-building, and reconciliation, the misconception that conflict should be avoided not only contradicts Mouffe’s view of productive democratic engagement but stifles possibilities of political transformation. Scholars such as Briony Jones (2014) and Sarah Maddison (2015) have argued that Mouffe’s conception of the political, which embraces conflict as natural and productive, provides particular benefits for societies that remain divided due to their histories of war and violence. For example, in her discussion of how Mouffe’s work applies to post-war reconstruction and development policy, Maddison argues that Mouffe’s view of the role of conflict contributes to an inclusive vision of democratic life: by bringing ‘back in’ the voices of those who are most marginalized and offering “an opportunity to provide an alternative that enables us both to deconstruct post-war interventions and to reconstruct an alternative” (p. 253). Similarly, in his discussion of ethnic conflict in Cyprus, Michalinos Zembylas (2011) makes the case that conflict between politically opposing identities provides an important foregrounding for reconciliation. Drawing from Schaap (2006), Zembylas (2011) argues that “what is distinctive about agonistic democracy, then, is not that it seeks to resolve conflict on the basis of competing identities [but that] it aims to mediate the conflict in such a way that the other is not perceived as an ethnic other-enemy to be destroyed” (p. 62). Wishing conflict away or denying its existence is particularly fraught in contexts where citizens are working to reconcile historical and ongoing tensions. Mouffe’s work offers a reconceptualization of the democratic *agon*, allowing it to be recognized as a mediating agent. Concerns about the appropriateness of an agonistic conception of democracy for post-conflict settings may be misdirected by the translation of *agon* as conflict; if *agon* is understood as ‘battle’ or ‘struggle,’ it may be clearer that there is no post-*agon* democratic society because there is no democracy without *agon*, even in ‘post-conflict’ contexts where communities seek to overcome legacies of violence.

The Greek *agon* commonly referred to a struggle or contest, for example, in sports or cultural and religious festivals. As is the case in these contexts, political agonists accept certain limits to the contest or struggle they engage in, such as a focus on the distribution of power that exists at a given time and about which disagreement is bound to persist. Political agonists do not deny each other the right to engage in the agonistic contestation, but they treat each other as (political) adversaries rather than (moral) enemies (Mouffe 2005). However, while there are limits to agonistic contestation that prevent it from devolving into violent conflict, these limits are more capacious than in the stricter set of rules that guide, for instance, democratic contestation guided by Habermasian discourse ethics or a Rawlsian understanding of the limitations of rational, public deliberation. As we will explain later in this chapter, a key distinction is the role Mouffe ascribes to *passion* in agonistic contestation.

Mouffe's distinction between politics and the political offers crucial insight into not only how her thinking deviates from traditional liberal theory but also how her definition of antagonism is built into the framework of democracy itself. Politics, by her account, are procedural, disciplinary. These are the laws, policies, and practices such as voting, running as a member of parliament, or participating in an explicitly activist organization. For Mouffe, democracy cannot be reduced to 'politics'; rather, she uses the concept of 'the political' to signal how power and conflict are implicated in every facet of our lives. The political extends the definition of politics and encompasses all interactions that involve hegemonic power relations. The political constructs the conditions in which politics are carried out. Antagonism is an unavoidable reality in this construct; when power is acknowledged as an explicit force in decision-making and social life, conflict is inevitable. For Mouffe (2014), the recognition of this inevitability is necessary for tracing a political conduct aligned with the tenets of democracy. "It is only when the ineradicable character of division and antagonism is recognized that it is possible to think in a properly political manner and to face the challenge confronting democratic politics" (p. 150).

## Political Passion

For radical democrats such as Mouffe, political passion, like struggle, is integral to the political. Liberal theorists have not ignored the need to theorize emotion as integral to the political experience, but there are important differences between how political emotions and political passions are understood in the different frameworks.

Aristotelian philosopher Martha Nussbaum has recently argued for the recognition of emotion, and particularly love, as a political virtue. In *Political Emotions: Why Love Matters for Justice* (2013), Nussbaum asserts that public emotion is polymorphous and heterogeneous: there are ways that public emotion, specifically love, is demonstrated. Ideally, she argues, while there would be constraints on how people are encouraged to feel, there is also significant space to maneuver different iterations of political love. This space permits and encourages "different citizens to inhabit the public sphere differently, as best suits each person's age, gender, goals, values, and personality" (p. 382). The ways in which love is expressed and the objects of love are determined, at least in part, by individuals' social, political, economic positioning. Political love is polymorphous because it is rooted in the individual whose expression of love is shaped in and through constructed categories of identity. Nussbaum's conception of political emotion "leaves spaces for citizens to have particular relationships with people and causes they love, in the part of their lives that is carried out apart from politics" (p. 386).

In more recent work, Mouffe (2014) provides a clear distinction between the concept of emotion, especially if understood as virtue, i.e., individual quality or character trait, and the concept of political passion. In response to several commentaries on her work in a special issue of the journal *parallax*, she writes that, in the

political domain, “we are always dealing with collective identities, something that the term ‘emotions’ does not adequately convey because emotions are usually attached to individuals” (p. 149). Later in the article, she reiterates:

by using the term ‘passions’, I want to distinguish my reflection from the issue of individual ‘emotions’. More precisely, by ‘passions’ I designate a certain type of common affects, those that are mobilized in the political domain in the formation of the *we/they* forms of identification. (p. 155)

We return to this distinction between emotion and passion in a moment, when we discuss how Mouffe’s work has been, or is yet to be, taken up in philosophy of education.

It is important to underscore that passion in the political sphere, for Mouffe, ought to maintain a clearly political target. Disagreement with the vision for the political order that has been proposed by one’s political opponent can and should be passionate, but this passion should focus on the way in which the opponent’s political ideas and proposals violate one’s idea of a just order, not on the person of the opponent. ‘Passion’ for a cause would, in Mouffe’s view, not justify physically attacking or threatening others, or destroying private property. Passionate political acts target the practices, discourses, and institutions of politics in a hegemonic social order, not individuals who hold values different from one’s own. Recent political campaigns underscore the relevance of Mouffe’s caution against the disintegration of what ought to be *political* disagreement and debate into *moral* accusations and innuendo. The 2016 US Presidential campaigns, in particular, were dominated by attempts to undermine the moral character of the other candidate rather than to express disagreement with the content of the other’s political vision. One example was Donald Trump’s comment during the October 9, 2016, debate that he was surprised to see Bernie Sanders ‘sign on with the devil,’ referring to Sanders’ endorsement of Hillary Clinton; another was Trump’s disparagement of Clinton as a ‘nasty woman.’ The point of political conflict understood as agonistic contestation is that it does not play out on this personal moral register:

When politics is played out in the register of morality, antagonisms cannot take an agonistic form. Indeed, when opponents are defined not in political but in moral terms, they cannot be envisaged as an ‘adversary’ but only as an ‘enemy’. With the ‘evil them’ no agonistic debate is possible, they must be eradicated. (Mouffe 2005, p. 76)

The repeated ‘lock her up!’ chants during the Trump campaign are a vivid illustration of such desire for eradication.

## Radical Democratic Education

Youth civic engagement is of broad and current interest. Scholars, governmental organizations, and education policy-makers continue to respond to what has been referred to as ‘crisis’ of disengagement among youth. This crisis has been measured based on indicators including voter turnout, participation in electoral campaigns,

and volunteering (Putnam 2001). Disengagement is measured by non-participation in formal political structures. O'Toole et al. (2003), however, have denied that top-down indicators provide an accurate picture of the rate of political participation among young people or, more importantly, of the nature of politics themselves. They argue, in line with Mouffe, that the political ought to be conceived as "a lived experience" (p. 53). Further, they contend that by framing politics as located only in specific spaces, we reinforce the active/passive or engaged/disengaged binary. They argue that suggesting individuals "who do not participate in [formal political arenas] are politically apathetic is too simplistic and sweeping a statement" (p. 53). This analysis provides important insights into why current assessments of youth disengagement as a crisis may be flawed, by pointing to the limitations of the dominant framing of politics.

Drawing from Mouffe's framework of agonistic politics, philosophers of education have offered an overlapping but divergent analysis: that youth disengagement is better explained as a failure of deliberative democracy to incorporate and validate diversity in its political landscape. Mandating more of the same kind of citizenship education will not tackle the underlying issues that may drive disengagement. If the dominant curriculum discourse remains that of a deliberative democracy, this limits possibilities for enlivened democratic engagement (see van den Berg 2016). Mouffe's insights have been taken up in recent literature in philosophy of education to analyze how education might forge a different analysis of political identity, one that acknowledges the significance of identity, but that also gets us out of unpromising identity politics.

While some scholarship and curricula promoting citizenship education stress that deliberative forms of education are necessary for all citizens, Biesta (2011) raises the possibility that dominant forms of citizenship education aim to regulate new citizens, constituting a narrow form of democratic enculturation. Biesta describes "the particular role of education in the liberal view of democratic politics—and perhaps we might even say the *need* for education in the liberal democratic view of politics" as "making 'newcomers' ready for participation in democratic deliberation and decision-making" (p. 149). Biesta's view of the purpose of liberal civic education points to the exclusions of a deliberative model of citizenship. Pedagogical projects that seek to create a particular kind of citizen also seek to mold a particular form of political identity. Drawing on Mouffe, Biesta (2011) reinvents education as a process of subjectification that "generates new political subjectivities and identities" (p. 152).

### ***Agonistic Contestation in Radical Political Education***

Mouffe's work focuses on societies that are not facing violent conflict, and in which 'conflict' can be understood as agonistic contestation, as explained earlier. While education on political conflict means something different in societies in the midst of violent conflict (see, for example, Ben-Porath 2009), we believe that education on

agonistic contestation is important in any democratic context. In deliberative approaches to political education, political conflict might be presented in a 'current events' context, as information necessary for well-informed citizenship. Students may be asked to understand and discuss multiple sides and contributing factors to a particular conflict, where conflict is presented as external to the classroom. As a means of quelling conflict, deliberation or dialogue is presented as a productive way to immerse students in the art of discussion by encouraging tolerance and acceptance. In this narrative, conflict is treated as a reality that lives outside the classroom and that is preferably avoided or resolved. In a radical democratic conception of conflict, the main concern raised is "how a conception of democracy that treats disagreement as necessary and fundamental to democracy, rather than as a problem to be overcome, would change political education" (Ruitenber [2010a](#), p. 41). Consequently, examinations of how political education might become more focused on agonistic contestation have given rise to new discussions of the nature of political identity.

In Todd's ([2011](#)) critique of deliberative approaches to intercultural education that focus largely on dialogue as a means of managing cultural diversity, she offers, instead, a deepened conception of plurality with the intent of framing difference as an ontological reality rather than an issue to be dealt with. As she points out, Mouffe considers ontology and the political "as having a necessary relation" (p. 108). Todd goes on to explain: "if, in other words, an ontology of plurality sets the condition for political agonism, what is political about this agonism is that it reveals itself through action and speech" (p. 108). Focusing on the narrative self, the selves that one articulates outside of narrowly conscripted political discussions, Todd takes up the work of Hannah Arendt and Adriana Cavarero to propose political education that is not scripted but rather that works from Mouffe's basic premise, that politics (and the political) are imbued with conflict. This conflict cannot be contained or explained by the clear-cut lines of identity politics. "Conflicts are not so much about positions, perspectives and worldviews, but are articulations that are contested at the very level of who I am" (Todd [2011](#), p. 111). Todd argues for a radical conception of plurality as necessary "in order both to re-imagine the boundaries of democratic education and to address more fully the political aspects of conflict that plurality gives rise to" (p. 102).

Ruitenber ([2009](#)) has proposed several interventions aimed at instilling a radical democratic ethos within political education. Her first proposal is an education of political adversaries, "in which we educate students to disagree and to regard their opponents in political conflicts as adversaries rather than moral enemies" (p. 275). This call for a reframing of how political disagreement is construed suggests that education is an important channel for cultivating the dispositions necessary to be political adversaries. Ruitenber outlines how political education might incorporate Mouffe's conception of political conflict. For political education to be properly political, there needs to be a focus on 'political emotion' as a necessary and productive affect, understanding the role of power in reinforcing social order, and being aware of contemporary political divides through historical analysis. Political adversaries must be immersed in broader discourses of affect, power, and history to be

able to situate their perspectives and direct their emotions. These interventions, as do Todd's, situate the student as a political actor. They call for identity shifts on the part of students—from passive observers of politics (with the option to engage) to actors who are already political because they are already part of and affected by a contingent and contested hegemonic social order.

### *Political Passion in Radical Democratic Education*

There are opportunities for philosophers of education to think through the educational manifestations and uptakes of political passion as distinct from individual emotion. Ruitenberg (2009) has drawn from Mouffe's work to argue for the education of political adversaries and the education of political emotions in which "students learn to distinguish between emotions on behalf of themselves and emotions on behalf of a political collective" (p. 276). However, this argument did not specifically address the conceptual distinction between emotion and passion. Moreover, questions remain about whether particular collective affects have greater political potential than others. Nussbaum (2013) has emphasized love, Stitzlein (2012) hope, and Ruitenberg (2010a) and White (2012) have focused on anger.

Mouffe's analysis of passion provides an especially significant insight into how her framework of agonistic politics has the potential to shape political identities through education. Her framing of political passion informs her post-foundationalist approach to politics and political identity. As she explains, her concept of passion allows her "to underline the dimension of conflict and to suggest a confrontation between collective political identities" (Mouffe 2014, p. 149). Ruitenberg (2010b) has suggested classrooms as spaces in which students may learn to articulate their anger. "Political reengagement requires not just that people can get sufficiently angry about injustices, but also that they have a sense of how to channel that anger politically" (p. 377). Biesta and Todd's analyses above propose methods of subjectification that place cultural plurality and hegemonic power relations front and center. Political education has the capacity to incite and harness passion and, in doing so, formalize discourses that promote identities more deeply engrained in democratic ideals.

### **Final Thoughts**

Mouffe's work, while it emphasizes the antagonistic dimension of the political, clearly takes a stand for engagement with the institutions of politics. In doing so, it is less anarchistic in orientation than the work of other scholars associated with the 'radical democracy' label, such as Jacques Rancière. Mouffe (2013) has explicitly opposed the views of Michael Hardt and Antonio Negri as well as of Paolo Virno, who have argued against engagement with political institutions and for withdrawal



or ‘exodus.’ We call attention to Mouffe’s commitment to continued—albeit contestatory—engagement with political institutions because it has important implications for political education. Education has a substantive role to play in a robust democracy if it provides a place where young people experience an unsanitized encounter with the dominant social order. Such an encounter may provoke passionate disagreement when this social order is perceived to entail injustices. From the perspective of Mouffe’s work, the role of political education is not to squelch passionate disagreement, or to relegate these passions to the private sphere. Instead, it is to play a role in “provid[ing] democratic channels for the expression of collective affects” by helping students see how and where they may take action to demand change to the injustice that moves them. Sarah Stitzlein’s (2012) *Teaching for Dissent* takes up this challenge in the US context. While some educators may hesitate to give room to political passions in educational settings, lest they get ‘out of control,’ we are inclined to agree with Mouffe (2014) that the greater risk is of suppressing these political passions, as they are likely to find expressions other than nonviolent agonistic contestation:

Emphasizing the role of passions is no doubt open to the objection that those passions can be mobilized in ways that will undermine democratic institutions. This is clearly the fear that leads many theorists to exclude them from democratic politics. But ... this is a very perilous viewpoint because refusing to provide democratic channels for the expression of collective affects lays the terrain for antagonistic forms of their mobilization. (p. 156)

Violence is therefore more likely to erupt when political passions are dismissed, or repressed. The task is to frame conflict and passion as productive and necessary, rather than destructive. As we have argued above, this is the case not only in societies that have not seen violent conflict in recent history but also in so-called post-conflict settings. Thankfully there are educational scholars who do not shy away from political passions in educational spaces, nor from the perception that agonistic contestation is a ‘negative’ practice in its criticality. Matthew Clarke and Anne Phelan (2017) show how Mouffe’s views can reinvigorate democratic debate about “what constitutes a good education or the good of education.” They argue that this debate should be part of teacher education itself, as teachers are initiated into a profession that is entwined with the contingency and thus the inevitable democratic contestation of a given social order.

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# Nietzsche on Inequality, Education, and Human Flourishing



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## Introduction

Are inequalities of talent and achievement necessarily bad for the least talented and lowest achievers? Judging by the tenor of recent policy debates concerning educational equality the answer is, ‘Yes.’ Harry Brighouse, for example, claims that “the diversion of resources away from children who are likely to do very well and towards students who are more marginal is to be welcomed from the egalitarian point of view” (2010, p. 63–64). He goes on to say that the “undermin[ing] of the productiveness of the higher-achieving children is not a serious worry” (p. 64). On the other hand, diverting resources from the lowest-achieving students would be “objectionable” (ibid). It is important to note that Brighouse’s assessment is not extreme—it is moderate compared to the “radical conception of educational equality” proposed by more aggressive egalitarians (p. 33). What is implicit in Brighouse’s view is the belief that the existence of higher achieving students has no bearing on the improvement of the lowest achieving students, or if it has a bearing, it is negative. It is assumed that the lowest achieving students need ‘resources’ in order to improve their achievement, not relationships with higher achieving students. But what if this assumption is wrong? What if lower achieving students need relationships with higher achieving students in order to succeed? If this were the case then it would be, *pace* Brighouse, unjustifiable to undermine the higher achieving students; indeed, it would not only be unjustifiable—it would be anti-egalitarian because it would also undermine the potential achievement of the lower achieving students. In other words, if the existence of higher achieving students would support the flourishing of lower-achieving students, then it is incumbent upon policy makers to do what they can to support higher achieving students. Failure to do so would hurt the very students they are supposedly trying to help.

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On first glance, the supposition that lower achieving students might actually be benefitted by relationships with higher achieving students seems doubtful. The assumption is that the lower achieving students would feel inferior and would lose motivation as they compared themselves to their higher achieving peers. But is this assumption justified? On one way of conceptualizing education—where education is seen as exclusively private, individual, and competitive—then it probably is justified. But what about on other conceptions of education? Is it possible to imagine an educational community that is communal and mutually supportive, where all students see their own flourishing as intimately connected with the flourishing of others? This chapter attempts to imagine such a community by looking to Friedrich Nietzsche's *Schopenhauer as Educator*. In *Schopenhauer as Educator*, Nietzsche describes an educational community in which not only are all members challenged to become their highest selves, they are similarly challenged to assist others in their pursuit of their highest selves. Counterintuitively, Nietzsche argues that the individuals most benefitted by this pursuit are the least talented and lowest-achievers—and the way these low-achievers go about their own improvement is to first seek the improvement of the most talented and highest achievers. This surprising suggestion has led to years of misinterpretation of *Schopenhauer as Educator* as radically elitist and anti-egalitarian. These interpretations argue that *Schopenhauer as Educator* only supports the well-being of the most talented and is indifferent at best, and hostile at worst, to the well-being of the masses. This is a misinterpretation of the text, however. In *Schopenhauer as Educator*, Nietzsche articulates a vision of community that supports the well-being of the most talented and least talented, and all individuals in between.<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup> Most Anglo-American educational theorists contend that while Nietzsche's philosophy of education may be beneficial for personal flourishing, it is not effective for societal flourishing. From this stance, Nietzsche's philosophy could be relevant to the improvement of individuals but would be irrelevant to the improvement of society as a whole. Rosenow (1989) and Johnston (1998) focus on Nietzsche's radical individualism and Nietzsche's insistence that each individual separates him- or herself from the conventions that govern the public good. However, Jenkins (1982), Hillesheim (1986), Aviram (1991), and Fennell (2005) argue further that Nietzsche is not only individualistic but elitist by advocating for an educational system that consigns the greater whole of the populace to mediocrity, drudgery, and slavery, while enabling a few elite persons to become their masters. Among political theorists, Nietzsche's reputation does not fare much better. MacIntyre (1981), Rawls (1971), Detwiler (1990), Hurka (1992), and Theile (1990), for instance, maintain that Nietzsche's philosophy is contrary to the advancement of the public good. Some argue that Nietzsche supports a radical egoism that rejects any typical moral framework that discussion of the public good could be based upon (MacIntyre 1981; Theile 1990). Others still assert that Nietzsche's ideals are elitist in that they deny the public good by advocating for the unequal distribution of capital (Rawls 1971; Hurka 1992; Detwiler 1990). This said, the multitude of elitist readings among Nietzsche scholars does not mean that there have been no interpretations of Nietzsche that are more sympathetic to his capacity to aid the public good. While considerably fewer, some theorists argue that Nietzsche's philosophy—particularly as represented in his early and middle work—is less hostile to democracy and the public good than it might seem on its face (Jonas 2009; Hargis 2010). Beyond Jonas and Hargis, there are other interpretations of Nietzsche's philosophy that are also sympathetic to democratic ideals: Owen (1995), Connolly (1981), Warren (1988), Schrifft (2000), Sassone (1996), and Bingham (2001).

The goal of this chapter is not merely to interpret Nietzsche correctly but to challenge the assumption that the best way to assist the lowest achieving students is to divert educational resources away from higher achieving students. The assumption may be the correct one, but it needs to be carefully interrogated in order to guard against a false egalitarianism that might unwittingly undermine a true egalitarianism. Nietzsche's ideas are too radical to implement wholesale, but they challenge us to think carefully about our assumptions about educational equality.

Before examining Nietzsche's ideas in *Schopenhauer as Educator*, it is important to note that many of Nietzsche's most famous and influential ideas are not found in the text. *Schopenhauer as Educator* was written in what commentators often refer to as the 'early period' of Nietzsche's development. The early period does not contain ideas like the *Overman*, the *Eternal Recurrence*, the *Will to Power*, the *revaluation of all values*, *perspectivism*, and so on. These ideas have been tremendously influential and merit serious consideration for the importance they might have for the philosophy of education. Unfortunately, a separate chapter (at least) would be needed to analyze these ideas and their relationship to the philosophy of education, and therefore I will not discuss them here. For readers who are interested in the ways philosophers of education have taken up some of these ideas, please see Yacek (2014a, b), Jonas (2009, 2013), Jonas and Nakazawa (2008), Fennell (2005), Ramaekers (2001), Smeyers (2001), Bingham (2001), Johnston (1998), Aviram (1991), Hillesheim (1986), and Rosenow (1989).

## The Received View of Nietzsche's Political Philosophy

In *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls summarizes the essence of the received view that Nietzsche is a 'perfectionist' of the elitist sort who believes that for a society to become great, the masses must sacrifice their happiness and well-being and work slavishly for the production of individual great men. For his interpretation, Rawls relies on a single passage from *Schopenhauer as Educator*: "Mankind must work continually to produce individual great human beings—this and nothing else is the task...for the question is this: how can your life, the individual life, retain the highest value, the deepest significance: Only by your living for the good of the rarest and most valuable specimens" (p. 325). Rawls summarizes this passage by claiming that Nietzsche argues that "We give value to our lives only by working for the good of the highest specimens" (p. 325). During the decades following *A Theory of Justice*, the passage Rawls quotes has been quoted time and again as an example of Nietzsche's disregard for the well-being of the masses in favor of the few.<sup>2</sup> Considering the received view's frequent reliance on the above passage to demonstrate Nietzsche's radical elitism, and considering that *prima facie* the passage

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<sup>2</sup>The exact same passage is used in Ansell-Pearson (2001), Appel (1991), Thiele (1990), Fennell (2005), Detwiler (1990), and although he does not use the exact same passage, Conway (1997) uses nearby passages in *Schopenhauer as Educator* to make the same point.

seems clearly to support the interpretation, it may be helpful to begin with an analysis of the passage.

As mentioned, Rawls summarizes the passage by claiming that “we give value to our lives only by working for the good of the highest specimens” (p. 325). This summary is misleading, because it suggests that the average individual must work sacrificially, slavishly perhaps, for the good of the few. This is far from what Nietzsche intends. To see this, one need only read a few lines beyond the above passage where Nietzsche claims that living for the good of the few is accomplished when one has learned to “love” and has “attached his heart to some great man” (SE, 163). Attaching one’s heart to a great man is a far cry from working slavishly for him. When one attaches his heart to another, the individual is devoted to the other, but the devotion is not necessarily self-sacrificial. It may be self-enriching. It is this sort of relationship that Nietzsche has in mind.

For Nietzsche, the average individual is inspired by his exemplar to find his highest self. “It is incontestable that we are all related and allied to the saint, just as we are to the philosopher and artist; there are moments and as it were bright sparks of the fire of love in whose light we cease to understand the word ‘I’, there lies something beyond our being which at these moments moves across into it, and we are thus possessed of a heartfelt longing for bridges between here and there” (SE, 161). The ‘bridges’ referred to here are the redemptive men. The individual *wants* to help produce great men, because these great men provide him with ‘bright sparks’ of inspiration. Thus, the individual is not acting self-sacrificially by working to produce the philosophers, artists, and saints, but in fact, working for his own elevation. The reason an individual’s life “receives its highest value [and] deepest significance” from its participation in the production of great men is that the great men helped him “distinguish between those things that really promote human happiness and those that only appear to do so” (SE, 142).

From this brief analysis we see that the passage Rawls and others offer to support Nietzsche’s supposed disregard of the well-being of the many and obsession with the well-being of the few cannot be maintained. The question then becomes: does the rest of *Schopenhauer as Educator* bear out the reading of the above passage that I have offered here? The answer is yes. In fact, an examination of the rest of *Schopenhauer* strengthens the interpretation offered above.

## Conformity, Genius and a Flourishing Culture

Nietzsche begins *Schopenhauer as Educator* by explaining the chief difficulty in educating individuals to overcome and transform their initial identities: their own *laziness*. When he condemns laziness in the masses, Nietzsche can easily be misinterpreted as elitist by claiming that members of the masses are fundamentally inferior and cannot rise above their laziness. In a rather dramatic sentence, he says: “When a great thinker despises mankind, he despises its laziness: for it is on account of their laziness that men seem like factory products, things of no consequence and

unworthy to be associated with or instructed” (SE, 127). From this statement it might seem as if Nietzsche considers himself one of the ‘great thinkers’ and despises the masses himself. But this is to take the passage out of context. Rather than despising the masses for their factory product-like status, Nietzsche despises the educational and political culture that created the masses. He refers to the greed of the state and how it “desires the greatest possible dissemination and universalization of [false] culture and...the dissemination of education among its citizens can only be to its advantage in its competition with other states” (SE, 165). Furthermore, when the masses *remain* lazy they perpetuate the cycle that made them lazy in the first place. According to Nietzsche, as laziness allows individuals to be turned into factory products, teachers in the schools are implicitly relieved of the responsibility of offering individuals an education that would teach them to overcome their laziness. If students are fundamentally factory products, there is no hope of giving them any other education than a factory-like version of mass education. Indeed, while teachers may decry laziness and pretend to fight against it, the system in which those teachers work finds the laziness useful because it produces conformity. For Nietzsche, this is exactly what the so-called democratic education of his time meant: a state-run institution that had no intention of elevating people through culture, but worked merely to continue the existence of the state:

However loudly the state may proclaim its service to Culture it furthers Culture in order to further itself and cannot conceive of a goal higher than its own welfare and continued existence. What the money-makers really want when they ceaselessly demand instruction and education is in the last resort precisely money.... And this is why the conditions for the production of genius have *not improved* in modern times, and why antipathy for original men has increased to such an extent that Socrates could not have lived among us and would in any event not have attained seventy. (SE, 174)

Nietzsche wants to overthrow the state’s educational project by illuminating its machinations and calling individuals to reject the factory product status which they have accepted. Nietzsche argues that every individual is unique and irreplaceable, not a factory product without individuality. “In his heart *every* man knows quite well that, being unique, he will be in the world only once and that no imaginable chance will for a second time gather together into a unity so strangely variegated as he is: he knows it but he hides it like a bad conscience” (SE, 127, italics added). If every individual knows deep within that they are unique, Nietzsche hopes that they might be inspired to discover a means by which to raise themselves above their factory-like status. But this will require “true educators” who can “serve as an examples,” which leads to the need for the same individuals to work for “the production of the philosopher, the artists and the saints within [them] and without [them]” (SE, 160). For individuals to stop being factory products is to cease taking themselves easily. They know in their hearts that they are unique and they can, if they so choose, leave their factory product-like status behind, but to do that they must be willing to quell laziness and to work for the production of their ‘true educators’—artists, geniuses, and saints who provide a vision of human cultural flourishing that educates as it also draws aloft.



The view that individuals can overcome their tendency to laziness and become their highest, truest self continues when Nietzsche says, for instance, that “*Every human being is accustomed to discovering in himself some limitation, of his talent or his moral will, which fills him with melancholy and longing, and just as his feeling of sinfulness makes him long for the saint in him, so as an intellectual being he harbours a profound desire for the genius in him*” (SE, 142, italics added). This longing is resident in the genius and the non-genius, for all people have an ideal that they are striving for but which can never be fully obtained. “Even the greatest of men cannot attain to his own ideal. That Schopenhauer can offer us a model is certain, all the scars and blemishes notwithstanding” (SE, 143). All individuals suffer the same kind of struggle, even if the ideas towards which people struggle are unique. With this in mind, let us examine the ways that Nietzsche employs Schopenhauer as a guidepost.

For Nietzsche, the way to escape our laziness and tendency to follow the herd is to discover exemplars who can guide all people—whether the few or the many—to their highest selves. “Then one finally asks oneself: where are we, scholars and unscholarly, high placed or low, to find the moral exemplars and models among our contemporaries, the visible epitome of morality for our time?” (SE, 132–133). Exemplars are individuals who have cultivated the harmony of their emotional, physical, intellectual, and spiritual selves. Nietzsche argues that only individuals of this kind can serve as guideposts to the ideal. “I profit from a philosopher only insofar as he can be an example...But this example must be supplied by his outward life and not merely in his books—in the way, that is, in which the philosophers of Greece taught, through their bearing, what they wore and ate, and their morals, rather than by what they said, let alone what they wrote” (SE, 136–137). The problem is that, as we have seen, Nietzsche believes that such examples are almost completely absent in contemporary culture. “Never have moral educators been more needed, and never has it seemed less likely they would be found” (SE, 133). What is to be done in this case? The answer is to find examples of redemptive men from the past. For Nietzsche, Schopenhauer is such an example. He goes on to explain the ways in which Schopenhauer demonstrates the ideal. Indeed, Nietzsche takes non-Greek examples like Schopenhauer to be distressingly rare in contemporary society; he even indicates that he considered it a ‘miracle’ that Schopenhauer had the strength to overcome the cultural decay that threatened him. “It is, however, nothing less than a miracle that [Schopenhauer] was able to become this human example: for he was pressed upon, from within and without, by the most tremendous dangers which would have crushed or shattered any weaker being” (SE, 137). It was only Schopenhauer’s courageous self-command and “truly antique attitude towards philosophy” (SE, 139) that protected him from failure. What he can teach us is to “distinguish between those things that really promote human happiness and those that only appear to do so” (SE, 142). He can teach us these things by helping us to envision and approach our own ideal self.

Schopenhauer assists the geniuses as well as average individuals in becoming their highest selves. For the geniuses, he offers direction with respect to uncovering their own genius, which will have been obscured by the elements in themselves that

are products of their own age. This includes both an appreciation of the creative genius of their works and also the struggle they had to endure to achieve those works. Schopenhauer teaches the genius how to embrace the difficulties of living as a genius. Nietzsche illuminates the tribulations the geniuses will have to endure by outlining the tribulations of Schopenhauer. In the end, the geniuses are not given instruction on how to create culture-defining works but how to live in a way *that makes possible* the creation of culture-defining works.

Schopenhauer also serves as a guide to the non-genius. In the case of the average individual, Nietzsche uses Schopenhauer to reveal ‘a new circle of duties.’ Unlike the geniuses who discover their own genius, the masses learn to identify genius in others when it is lacking in themselves. Their new ‘duty’ is to strive for greatness within the pedagogy—which is exactly what the geniuses do—but when they discover in themselves limitations that separate them from the geniuses, they also discover their new goal: to promote the development of true culture. According to Nietzsche, the masses, like the geniuses, must strive “to acquire power so as to aid the evolution of the *physis* and to be for a while a corrector of its follies and ineptitudes. At first only for yourself, to be sure; but through yourself for everyone” (SE, 142). Both the genius and the average individual are meant to assist in the improvement of the world (*physis*) through the elevation of culture. The genius provides this by developing new artistic, ethical, physical, and intellectual expressions; the average individual does this by “a struggle on behalf of Culture and hostility towards those influences, habits, laws, institutions in which he fails to recognize his goal: which is the production of the genius” (SE, 163).

How does Schopenhauer teach the masses this new circle of duties? He does so in the same manner as with the geniuses. “But even the greatest of men cannot live up to their ideal. That Schopenhauer can offer us a model is certain, all these scars and blemishes notwithstanding. One might say, indeed, that in his nature which was imperfect and all too human brings us closer to him in a human sense, for it lets us see him as a fellow sufferer and not only in the remote heights of a genius” (SE, 143). This is an extremely important aspect of Nietzsche’s conception of the redemptive men, the geniuses who are to be models for both the few and the many.

The geniuses contribute to the uplift of true culture in two ways. The first way is that they produce great works of art, philosophy, and morality that are awe-inspiring and ennobling. Agreeing with Goethe, Nietzsche claims that “nature’s experiments are of value only when the artist finally comes to comprehend its stammerings, goes out to meet it halfway, and gives expression to what all these experiments are really about... ‘that the *causa finalis* of the activities of men and the world is dramatic poetry” (SE, 160). Nietzsche extends Goethe’s assertions about poetry to the rest of art, as well as philosophy and morality. Thus, what makes the geniuses great is their artistic, philosophic, or ethical genius, which produces what he calls in *On the Future of our Educational Institutions* “great and lasting works” (FEI, 66). Importantly, these works are not meant to be mere self-expressions of the genius created without regard for others. On the contrary, Nietzsche is explicit that the ultimate goal of the great and lasting works is the elevation of the few *and* the many. He claims that “the artist creates his work according to the will of nature *for the*

*good of other men*” (SE, 178; emphasis added). That Nietzsche means to include the masses in this statement is clearly seen a few lines above when he claims under current cultural conditions the great and lasting works “strike home only at the few, while they ought to strike home at everybody” (SE, 178).

But there is a second way in which the geniuses contribute to a flourishing culture, which does not depend on their singular genius. As we see in the quotation above, the importance of exemplars like Schopenhauer is not only that they produce great and lasting works, but that they provide *spiritual* (*geistig*) inspiration to *all* individuals who are seeking to become their highest selves. While second- and third-rate talents who are striving to be their highest selves are separated from the geniuses by a massive gulf with respect to their artistic, philosophical, or ethical abilities, and as such are their inferiors, they are their equals with respect to their shared struggle ‘live up to their own ideal.’ In other words, if third-rate talents, for example, attempt to overcome their “scars and blemishes” in an effort to achieve their highest self, they become, in an important sense, an equal to the genius insofar as they are fellow sufferers with him, trying to attain an ideal that is forever out of reach because it is “immeasurably high” (SE, 129) above their respective selves. It is true that the ideal to which they strive is different insofar as the genius’ is a more lofty ideal on an absolute scale, but their desire to achieve their respective ideals, and their willingness to strive to overcome their personal shortcomings that prevent them from that idea, is the same. When figures like Schopenhauer provide such an inspiration to the second- and third-rate talents, culture is elevated as the second- and third-rate talents can then become similar inspirations to lesser talents. According to Nietzsche, when all people in a society are all seeking to elevate themselves by pursuing the production of the ‘philosophers, artists, and saints,’ the culture will necessarily achieve the highest level possible. When culture reaches this level even more redemptive men will be developed which will further inspire average individuals to pursue their highest selves, and thus a continual cycle of elevation exists where all are working “at first only for [themselves], to be sure; but through [themselves] for everyone” (SE, 142).

## **Democracy, Equality and the Maximization of Student Potential**

Having established Nietzsche’s cultural vision, we can now return to the question at hand: how can contemporary democracies reconcile the goals of equality with giving all individuals the opportunity to maximize their talents? Obviously, implementing the entirety of Nietzsche’s vision will not work but nevertheless there are aspects of Nietzsche’s model that are applicable to contemporary democracies. Nietzsche’s philosophy illuminates how egalitarianism can backfire on both an individual and societal level. First, to totally eliminate indicators of achievement undercuts a

primary source of inspiration for individuals. Allowing inequality in achievement ought to be desirable for its capacity to inspire others to their own, separate greatness. As inspiration springs, the goal is not to best the person that inspired us but to simply improve our own selves, which is demonstrably beneficial for democracy.

Second, society itself also suffers because (1) intellectual, artistic, or moral achievements will be less common as individuals are less likely to strive for their highest selves, and (2) individuals will not see inequalities of talent and achievement as a personal and cultural benefit. In the case of (2), it is possible that individuals will feel envious or resentful because they have been made to believe they were as potentially talented as everyone else, when in truth they were not. In these cases, the identity of the individual will be founded on the false belief that they are equal in respect to talent and achievement rather than an accurate identity based on wanting to pursue one's highest self and encouraging others to improve their highest self.

The issue is whether it is possible that individuals can learn to be inspired by others who are more talented than they are. If the ability to be inspired by others who are superior seems natural, isn't it possible that something more could be achieved if individuals could be encouraged to appreciate and celebrate the fact that some people possess unique talents and achievements? If individuals learned to appreciate excellence in their peers, they might be inspired to improve themselves. If this were their aim, they would start to become, according to Nietzsche, equals in a vastly more important respect—they would all be seeking their highest selves, refusing to settle for their lower selves. If he is right we should seek ways of facilitating this reality in our classrooms as a means of personal and societal flourishing.

## Conclusion

According to Nietzsche, every individual *must* be given the opportunity to affect cultural change, but each individual's particular role will be different. It is true that Nietzsche believes that the cultural role of the many is to make possible the existence and flourishing of the few. But this does not mean that the many are to be sacrificed on the altar of the few. On the contrary, talk of sacrifice makes no sense here. Nietzsche does not ask the many to live for the good of the few and to sacrifice their interests but to fulfill them. According to Nietzsche, when they live for the good of the few, they are living for their own good. The few inspire the many to pursue "those things that really promote human happiness and those that only appear to do so" (SE, 142). When the many seek to improve the few, they are simultaneously and irreducibly seeking to improve themselves. Nietzsche does not believe it is possible to separate the good of the many from the good of the few—they are both necessary for a culture to flourish and for each individual to be maximally happy.

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# Noddings: A Voice from the Present and Past



Susan Verducci

## Introduction

Nel Noddings is best known for her pioneering work in feminist ethics and philosophy of education. She came to national and international attention in 1984 with her book, *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Education* (2013a). In this book, Noddings replaced the traditional Western framing of ethics in terms of an autonomous moral agent seeking objective moral action with an ethics of care, an ethics based in relation. The book grew out of consideration of women's moral experience, in particular women's experience as mothers. Noddings is an award-winning author and editor of over 20 books and 200 articles across fields as varied as ethics, philosophy of education, religious studies, peace studies, and social policy. Her books have been translated into eight languages, and her ideas applied in fields such as nursing and the health sciences. Prior to her position as the Lee L. Jacks Endowed Chair at Stanford University, Noddings taught middle and high school, and worked in administration at all levels of K-19 schooling.

## Ethics of Care

### Overview

Noddings' ethics of care replaces the notion of moral agents seeking to maximize utility or perform obligations for their own sake with situated social beings in face-to-face everyday relations with others. She argues that relationships, and not individuals, are ontologically basic (2013a, p. xxi). Human encounter and affective

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response form the foundation of ethics, and moral relationships are organized in terms of connections, rather than traditional conceptions of freedom. Responding to others, providing care, preventing harm, and maintaining connection (by refusing detachment and depersonalization) characterize caring relationships.

Although the ethics of care arises from consideration of women's experience and is generally situated in feminist ethics, Noddings consistently asserts that caring is not limited to women. In the 2013 edition of *Caring*, she replaces the word 'feminine' in the title with 'relational'; *Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Education* makes clear that the ethics of care is a human ethics.

### *The Phenomenology of Caring*

Caring relationships require both a one-caring and a cared-for. Noddings (2002b) highlights the necessary contributions of both parties to the caring relationship in the following:

1. A cares for B.
2. A acts in accordance with this care.
3. B recognizes that A cares for B (p. 19).

In this interdependent relationship, receptive attention and motivational displacement characterize the consciousness of the one-caring (Ibid.). Caring attends to the particular features of the moral context and the subjects involved, not their general implications. "When my caring is directed to living things, I must consider their natures, ways of life, needs, and desires. And, although I can never accomplish it entirely, I try to apprehend the reality of the other" (2013a, p. 14). Noddings names this apprehension of the reality of others 'engrossment,' and describes it as requiring receptive attention. "I receive the other into myself, and I see and feel with the other. I become a duality....The seeing and feeling are mine, but only partly and temporarily mine, as on loan to me" (2013a, p. 30). Through receptive attention and engrossment, the one-caring comes to a felt understanding of the other's reality.

This felt understanding generates motivational displacement; "[f]or if I take on the other's reality as possibility and begin to feel its reality, I feel, also, that I must act accordingly; that is, I am impelled to act as though in my own behalf, but in behalf of the other" (2013a, p. 16). In other words, the motivations of the one-caring "are put at the service of the other" (2013a, p. 33). The one-caring acts in accordance with the conditions and understandings derived from the experience of engrossment and its resulting motivational shift.

The cared-for also plays a necessary role in the caring relationship. Whereas for the one-caring, "caring is always characterized by a moving away from self," the cared-for must move toward the one-caring to "meet" her (2013a, p. 16). The cared-for must, in some way, receive and respond to the care; she must perceive that the one-caring is doing so out of regard for her, and that she is not being treated automatically or routinely (2013a, p. 19). If the one-caring does not come across to



the cared-for in this way, then caring is not present. Noddings' writes, "[h]ow good *I* can be is partly a function of how *you* – the other – receive and respond to me" (2013a, p. 6, emphasis in the original). Both the one-caring and the cared-for are necessary and valued in the ethical relation. The relationship, although not an equal one, is reciprocal.

### *Natural and Ethical Caring*

Noddings makes two important distinctions within the ethics of care. The first is between natural and ethical caring. Unlike traditional Western moral theories, caring values emotional response. In fact, Noddings locates "the very wellspring of ethical behavior in the human affective response" (2013a, p. 3). In natural caring we respond to the other "out of love or natural inclination" (2013a, p. 5). Our moral motivation arises from wanting to be moral to remain in the caring relation and to enhance the ideal of ourselves as one-caring (Ibid.). When natural caring fails, we turn to ethical caring, in which the memory of caring and being cared for shapes the ideal of ourselves as one-caring. The ethical ideal motivates caring and guides our actions in meeting the other morally, especially when natural caring is not present. For Noddings, the ethical self is an active relation between the actual self and a vision of the ideal caring self. Feelings arise from both natural and ethical caring and provide the motivation to act on behalf of the other.

### *Caring-for and Caring-About*

The second distinction Noddings makes is between caring-for (described above) and caring-about. We care 'for' others that we come in direct contact with. We do not care for things (e.g., ideas and objects) or distant others; rather, we care 'about' them. She writes that whereas caring-for requires engrossment, displacement of motivation and commitment to particular others, caring-about moves us into the public realm of caring about ideas or distant others (2013a, p. 112). Caring-about serves as a foundation for our sense of justice and acts as a force that extends caring beyond face-to-face human encounters to material, public, international, and environmental domains. Noddings, however, warns us not to "brush aside" caring-for; justice "is dependent on caring-about and caring-about is in turn dependent on caring for" (2002b, p. 6). Caring about "must be seen as instrumental in establishing the conditions under which caring-for can flourish....Caring about is empty if it does not culminate in caring relations" (2002b, pp. 23–4). For Noddings, caring interpersonal relationships are both the foundation and consequence of moral response.

The ethics of care is not a moral theory, rather it is a moral orientation or an approach to morality. Unlike traditional Western moral theories, which typically

center on justice and the determination of principles of ‘right’ action, caring places relations at the center of moral consideration. It attends to specific contexts and specific subjects. Interpersonal to its core, caring requires receptive attention, motivational displacement, reciprocity, and interdependence. The affective aspects of both natural and ethical caring entail moral response and motivate moral action. We care ‘for’ human others that we encounter, and we care ‘about’ ideas, objects, and distant others. Caring exists in the relation itself, not in the individuals involved.

## **Caring and School Reform**

Since her original work in *Caring*, Noddings has been articulating caring alternatives for school curriculum, policies, and practices. At their most basic level, these reforms derive from the relational ontology of care and advocate for attending to students’ needs and aspirations, for wanting the best for each student for each student’s sake, and for developing school structures, policies, and practices in accordance with these ideas. She draws upon John Dewey’s progressive vision of education and Walt Whitman’s dream of a democracy that “respects every form of honest work, includes people from every economic and social class, and cultivates a deep understanding of interdependence” (Noddings 2011, p. 1). Noddings’ ethics of care can be viewed as the soil from which her extensive work on school reform grows. She writes “the primary aim of every educational institution and of every educational effort must be the maintenance and enhancement of caring....It functions as end, means, and criterion for judging suggested means” (2013a, p. 172).

## ***Cultivating Caring Adults***

*Caring* (2013a) concludes with a chapter titled ‘Moral Education.’ This chapter articulates four means for establishing the conditions for caring and the nurturance of students’ ethical ideals in classrooms and schools. The first is ‘modeling.’ Noddings warns that all members of a school community – teachers, school staff, and administrators – cannot simply talk about or ‘teach’ caring as content; they must model it in their actions. Second, students and teachers must engage in ‘dialogue.’ Noddings conceives of dialogue not simply as the sharing of ideas, but rather as inquiry itself. Dialogue is not a form of indoctrination; it is a process in which teachers *and* students are learners. ‘True’ dialogue takes place when conclusions are not known and all parties openly and mutually explore, search for meaning, or attempt to solve a problem (2002a, b, p. 287). Third, schools must provide opportunities for students to ‘practice’ caring. They can do this through service activities, through work opportunities, and through the care of plants, animals, the environment, and so on. Of course, practice also requires caring for human others in their own community. It is not enough for students to intellectually understand what

it means to care; students must practice it to continuously nurture and develop their ethical ideal. Finally, schools and teachers can establish conditions for caring through ‘confirmation’ – attributing the best possible motive consonant with reality for less-than-respectable action. “Instead of blaming, shaming, and punishing...we point a student toward his or her best self, toward a developing ethical ideal” (2013a, p. xix). Modeling, dialogue, practice, and confirmation provide the basic conditions in which teachers and schools can establish conditions that cultivate caring.

### *Educational Aims*

Noddings challenges prevailing assumptions that the aims of schooling are limited to preparing students for the workforce and to preparing the nation for prosperity (2003a, b, p. 4). She adds to this short list of aims a long list of others including: the cultivation of active and engaged citizens of a democracy (2011, 2013b); moral education (2002a); membership in home-life (2006); and happiness (2003a, b). Additionally, she argues that all school reform requires reflective and ongoing discussion of the aims and purposes of education, which she calls “aims talk” (2003a, b). Aims talk suggests that educators and reformers ought not only expand the scope of their aims but also engage in continuous recursive reference and review of their practices and policies in the light of them.

### *Standards and Curriculum*

It is not surprising that Noddings severely criticizes the ‘standards’ and ‘accountability’ movements in education (2007). Reforms grounded in a relational ontology pay attention to context and to students as individuals. Attention to the particular flies in the face of standardized curriculum and high-stakes testing. In their place, Noddings recommends differentiated curriculum on a number of levels. First, she supports the existence of varied curricular paths for students. Challenging the ‘college for all’ mentality, Noddings recommends that schools develop robust and intellectually engaging vocational paths for students whose interests, talents, and aspirations lie outside of academics as currently defined in schools (2011, 2015). Not only should there be multiple paths within schools, she also advocates multiple pathways within disciplines and classes. As an example, she draws from her experience teaching a self-paced high school algebra course in which students chose to complete a minimum course, a standard high school course or an enriched course of study. Students worked through units at their own pace under the guidance of teachers. Noddings argues that this scenario, although better than the “one size fits all” pattern, does not go far enough; she notes that the students who struggled to complete the minimum course would be “better served by a course consonant with their interests” (2013b, loc 251). The seed of this idea can be found in the original *Caring*,

where she writes, “[t]he student is infinitely more important than the subject” (2013a, p. 20). To meet the needs of such students, vocational education ought to be a valued and vibrant option. Instead of moving toward standardizing curriculum and assessment, schools should provide students with multiple pathways and opportunities to identify and develop their specific aptitudes, interests, and aspirations.

Noddings also suggests including subjects in schools that historically have been excluded. “If dialogue is to occur in schools, it must be legitimate to discuss whatever is of intellectual interest to the students who are invited into dialogue. God, sex, killing, loving, fear, hope and hate must all be open to discussion” (2013a, b, p. 183). Other subjects students should explore in schools include self-understanding, parenting, the psychology of war, house and home, gender, making a living, advertising, and propaganda (2006). These curricular reforms move topics historically considered part of the private sphere to a more central position in public schooling. They also bring students into direct engagement with their own values as well as the values of others.

Noddings argues that not only do these subjects matter for cultivating flourishing adults, they also matter for creating healthy democracies. She suggests that attending to controversy and existential issues and engaging in dialogue across difference are central to cultivating moral and democratic citizens. She puts trust in Dewey’s ‘method of intelligence;’ “through dialogue, responsible experimentation, and the evaluation of current experience, students should come to the conclusions embraced by social revisionists or to well-argued alternatives” (2013b, p. 19). To learn to productively participate in complex political processes requires developing the ability to deliberate and engage in critical thinking and civil dialogue across difference, particularly differences in values.

Noddings’ vision of school reform can be seen as connected to the ideas outlined in her ethics of care. Her reforms prioritize attending to the individual development of students’ interests and aspirations through offering and valuing multiple school pathways, including vocational opportunities. They prioritize caring for students over disciplinary content and divisions, and they prioritize interpersonal connection through dialogue, particularly in the context of difference. The caring foundation of Noddings’ ideas for school reform prepares students to become not just successful workers but also flourishing adults and moral citizens of a democracy.

## Challenges to an Ethics of Care

The ethics of care has been extended and challenged by others working in ethics and philosophy of education. One extension comes from Michael Slote from the field of virtue ethics. Slote foregrounds caring as a virtue of the highest order and an ethic of care as capable of providing a comprehensive account of morality that surpasses traditional theories (Slote 2007). He proposes that an ethic of care is better suited to influence right action than traditional western rationality. Although Noddings’ moral approach is shaped by recognition of the moral limitations of rationality, she

does not claim to replace moral reasoning with caring. Again, she asserts that an ethic of care is an approach to morality that complements other approaches. Furthermore, Noddings resists the idea that care is a virtue or characteristic of individual persons. She sees it as a characteristic of a relation.

A second distinct challenge relates to care's (in)compatibility with the ends of justice. As noted above, Noddings' ethics of care was shaped by her recognition of the inadequacy of prevailing justice perspectives to articulate women's moral experience. However, critics charge that caring as a moral approach may be unable to address issues of social justice, fairness, right action, and so on. Their worry is that an unwavering focus on face-to-face relations cannot extend beyond the relation itself. In response, Noddings expanded her concept of the ethical ideal to show that the spirit of justice arises from (and is grounded in) caring. In 2002, she wrote *Starting at Home*, which articulated the implications of caring for social policy. Other feminists, notably Virginia Held (2006) and Joan Tronto (1994, 2013), also began articulating powerful connections between caring and political, economic and social issues. Again, Noddings does not consider the ethics of care to be a comprehensive moral theory, but rather a moral approach compatible with other moral approaches, including a justice perspective.

A third related challenge aims not at the theoretical aspects of caring as a moral approach, but rather to its application in education. It challenges Noddings' faith in deliberative democracy – faith in the power of understanding and dialogue as a means toward education for social justice. Noddings' clearly believes in the power of humans to care – to care about each other, to care about the earth and its inhabitants, and to care about justice. However, she has been criticized for a homogenous and essentializing view of the realities of women from feminists, and of students from those working in critical theory (Glass and Nygreen 2011). The latter argue that Noddings' reforms do not take seriously enough the segregated landscape of schooling and the differences in the social, political, and material realities of students. To the cause of social justice education, Noddings brings Dewey's method of 'intelligence' and moral commitment. Glass and Nygreen argue that these reforms are no match for structures of schooling that serve to construct, reinforce, and perpetuate social injustice for historically disadvantaged groups. They argue that not only do Noddings' reforms leave class structures intact, but they also reinforce the very inequalities embedded in these structures. Whereas Noddings (2015) recommends students study and *discuss* civil disobedience in their history classes with those who hold different views (p. 112), critical theorists recommend that moral and democratic citizenship requires that students learn to *engage* in collective action toward social justice. Without the knowledge and skills necessary for collective action, unequal social, political, and economic structures will remain undisturbed. This critique articulates a weakness of placing interpersonal relationships as the beginning and end of moral response.

## Conclusion

Despite these challenges, Noddings' voice continues to be forceful and distinctive in feminist ethics and education. It joined developmental psychologist Carol Gilligan in opening new lines of thinking in ethics in the 1980s. It profoundly influenced work in philosophy of education and in school reform. Like Dewey, Noddings advocates for "a curriculum rich enough, flexible enough, to help each child find what he or she needs to build a satisfying and satisfactory life" (2013b, p. 17). And like Whitman, she sees the public aims of education as the development of students into democratic citizens and caring adults.

At the time of this writing in 2016, although in her 80s, Noddings continues to write, to travel, and to advocate for improvements in education.

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## Martha Nussbaum and the Fragility of Good Education

Lynne Wolbert

### Introduction

Educational philosopher Richard Smith observes that parents are required to become “ever more efficient and effective,” and should be better controlled and monitored (2010, pp. 357–358). The notion of ‘parenting’, which represents a way of speaking about childrearing as a ‘job’ that requires skills that can be improved, and the term ‘expert-parent’, which refers to the idea (and ideal) of the parent as a professional, are gaining popularity, claims Smith (see also Lambeir and Ramaekers 2007). The article titled “A Neuroscientist on How to Really Read to Kids” from the website ‘psychology today’ gives a good taste of what Smith is worried about:

Most parents read to their children. We’re steeped in studies about the benefits of reading to kids, so it’s become rather like a box we have to check as responsible guardians—the bare minimum a parent must do to ensure success. But most parents don’t intentionally read to their child to improve their language skills. No, instead we read to them to make them sleepy, or so they can have something to write down on their school reading logs. We pull out a nightly book to have a bedtime routine (as prescribed by child-rearing experts), to calm down our ADHD child, or maybe to get in some cuddle time before bed. (..) This is perhaps a start, but books can be far more useful tools. We just have to learn to stop simply reading to our children, and start engaging them. (..) From a neuroscientific perspective, each night most parents are losing an incredible opportunity to use artificial conflict as

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real-life practice. (..)As parents, we are in control of what our children practice in an intimate and powerful way. We all want kids to be proficient readers. But on a deeper level, what do we really want our children to be good at?<sup>1</sup>

Educational philosopher Gert Biesta observes how a call for a “double transformation of both educational research and educational practice” paved the way for the idea of ‘evidence-based’ education (2007, p. 2). Evidence-based education stands for a model of (scientific) research that wants to find out ‘what works’, and an educational practice that implements that which has proven to be effective. An intervention is effective when there is a secure, measurable relation between the intervention (cause) and its result (effect) (Biesta 2007, p. 7). This implies that what the intervention is supposed to bring about is clear and a given, while to the most, if not all those involved in education, the question of ‘what school is for’, and what good education is, (still) is subject of a heated debate and ongoing (empirical and theoretical) investigation. On the website [www.neuroparent.org](http://www.neuroparent.org), the website’s mission reads: “neuroparent’s mission is to educate parents about normal brain development. This is a resource to

1. Get the facts
2. Parent with intent
3. Use parenting time wisely”.<sup>2</sup>

Smith and Biesta, as well as others, object to the tendency to think about education in ways that are predominantly informed by science (‘get the facts’), risk-management (‘what a parent must do to *ensure* success’), and ‘economic’ thinking (‘using parenting time wisely’). The aim of this chapter is first to give a clear account of this current issue in philosophy in education. What is it that these scholars precisely object to and why? Second, I propose that Martha Nussbaum’s 1986 book *The Fragility of Goodness* offers fruitful insights in this issue.<sup>3</sup> I suggest that Nussbaum’s interpretation of the Greek discussion of how much ‘luck’ a good human life needs offers a possibility to counter the assumption implicit in the use of the ‘languages’ of science, risk, and economy, namely that it is both necessary and possible to *control* education.

In the section ‘[Current Issue in Philosophy of Education](#)’ of this chapter I will elaborate on the current issue, in the section ‘[Martha Nussbaum and \*The Fragility of Goodness\*](#)’ I will lay out the position Nussbaum offers in her book. In the section ‘[The Fragility of Good Education](#)’ then, the value of her argument for the current issue will be explored and in the section ‘[Implications for Education](#)’ I will evaluate what might be the implications of an idea of fragility for good education.

<sup>1</sup> <https://www.psychologytoday.com/blog/neuroparent/201609/neuroscientist-how-really-read-kids>

<sup>2</sup> <http://www.neuroparent.org/neuroparent-mission.html>

<sup>3</sup> Martha Craven Nussbaum is an American philosopher and the Ernst Freud Distinguished Service Professor of Law and Ethics at the University of Chicago. Her main areas of interest are ancient Greek philosophy, political philosophy, and ethics. Important topics in her work have been and are the emotions, the status of women worldwide, and the capability approach which she further developed working with economist Amartya Sen. See her webpage at <http://www.law.uchicago.edu/faculty/nussbaum/>

## Current Issue in Philosophy of Education

### *The Need and Possibility to Control Education*

In the introduction I gave two examples of non-academic texts that reflect a tendency of educational media, as well as educational policy, (educational) science, and educators themselves (teachers and parents) to think and write about education (both formal schooling and childrearing) as if it were something that needs to be ‘controlled’, and which it is possible to control. It is the perception of several philosophers of education that these texts make use of a scientific discourse (‘research has shown that’), a discourse of risk (‘families at risk’), and/or a terminology that originally stems from economics. All three discourses assume that education is a practice that is best kept under control by educators and that it is possible to do so (in the example in the introduction it literally says that ‘parents are *in control* of what their children practice in an intimate and powerful way’). Educational sciences, as well as (developmental and neuro-)psychology are permeated with a striving for control; threats to a good development (of the child) are preferably *prevented*, or else *contained*. Situations or things that threaten all that we have under control are called *risks*. Third, a language of economics also implies the need for control, for a lack of control is a possible reduction of ‘efficiency and effectivity’.

In the following I will give some examples of scholars who object to the ‘scientization’ of education and some who object to the discourse of risk. For purposes of clarity I have distinguished between discourses of science, risk, and economy, because different scholars emphasize different phenomena to which they object, but in actual texts they are very much interrelated and interwoven (as the above examples show). For example, science is used to calculate risks and research is done with the purpose of finding ways to prevent or diminish risks. In turn, science often expresses the value of its findings in economic terms such as profit, valorization, and so on.

### Scientization

The main reason for Smith to object to ‘parenting’ is that it implies that parents are to be fully informed and skilled when they arrive at parenthood, which is highly unrealistic, or maybe even principally impossible. Moreover, it excludes how parents can learn from their children as well (2010, p. 361). ‘Parenting’ expresses a conception of childrearing as one-sided input into the development of the child, whereas many philosophers of education emphasize the importance (and many-sidedness) of the parent-child relationship (e.g., Spiecker 1984; Suissa 2006). Stefan Ramaekers and Judith Suissa also argue that the common modern way of speaking about childrearing and parents is (a) strongly informed by the language of (developmental) psychology and related to this that (b) somehow parents should be educated to be able to do a proper job (2012, p. 3). They call this the “scientization of the

parent-child relationship,” which they claim impoverishes the ways in which we can address the rich, complex, normative, and personal dimensions of parenthood and the parent-child relationship (see also Suissa 2006). In her 2016 book *Neuroparenting, the Expert Invasion of Family Life*, sociologist Jan Macvarish states that “neuroparenting is a way of thinking which claims that ‘we now know’ (by implication, once and for all) how children ought to be raised,” hence that we now, because we ‘know’ how the human brain functions, can fully control childrearing, and thus, in principle, can ensure a good education (2016, p. 1).

## A Discourse of Risk

Several philosophers of education (e.g., Smeyers 2005, 2010; Smith 2005, 2006; Papastephanou 2006; Biesta 2013) have used the concepts of ‘risk’ and ‘risk society’ to describe the desire to make education as risk-free as possible. The term ‘risk society’ was first coined by the German sociologist Ulrich Beck, who wrote his academic bestseller *Risk Society: Towards a New Modernity* (also) in 1986. Beck writes that the “paradigm of risk society” is the search for an answer to the question how we can handle the risks that are systematically produced in the process of modernization (1986, p. 2).

Paul Smeyers argues that the tendency to speak of children and families as being ‘at risk’ seems to lead in many cases to a “climate in which the legitimacy of government intervention comes to be broadly accepted” (2010, p. 272). Also, the discourse of risk might lead to “a redefinition of what it [childrearing or education in general] is supposed to be about” (ibid). Finally, referring to both Papastephanou (2006) and Smith (2005), Smeyers argues “that trying to minimize chance and uncertainty in the interests of making the world more predictable, more controllable, and safer is self-deceptive” (ibid, p. 281). Biesta takes the discussion a step further by claiming that we should even ‘embrace’ the risk of education and see it as something positive. He argues that we should not think of education in what he calls “strong terms,” as the production of something (which can be controlled), but in “weak existential terms,” that is “in terms of encounters and events” (2013, pp. 11–12). If we think about education in such terms, the thought that we in fact cannot control the outcome of the event becomes more admissible, as well as that the ‘outcome’ itself becomes a less important part of the endeavor.

Both scholars argue that ‘risk’ is an inherent part of education, of human life, and to frame risk as something that should be eliminated ignores an inherent aspect of what education *is* (see also Wolbert et al. 2018 for an analysis of different kinds of risk-taking in child rearing). Risk and uncertainty being part and parcel of what education is, it is not always worthwhile, nor feasible (but rather ‘self-deceptive’) to strive for complete control. Neither is therefore the reduction or elimination of risk a legitimate argument, on its own, to justify educational policy or practices.

## Martha Nussbaum and *The Fragility of Goodness*

### *The Fragility of Goodness*

The central theme of Nussbaum's book is the question of luck versus self-sufficiency. Luck is defined as what happens to people as opposed to what they do or make (p. 3, related to the Greek word *tuchē*), i.e., that which is not under our control (and can be good or bad for us, i.e., good or bad luck). How much of our human lives are we able to control and plan, and how much is up to luck? And how much of a good human life *should* be up to luck? This question occupied most early Greek philosophy and literature (tragedy). Nussbaum derives three themes from this general question: (1) "the role in the human good life of activities and relationships that are, in their nature, especially vulnerable to reversal" (p. 6); (2) "the relationships among these components [of an excellent life, such as friendship, love political activity, attachment to property or possessions]" (p. 6); and (3) "the ethical value of the so-called 'irrational parts of the soul': appetites, feelings, emotions" (p. 7).

No summary can do justice to the depth and broadness of the topics discussed in *The fragility of Goodness* (FG). It would be impossible to reduce all of the various ways in which the topics are interconnected into a short summary like this one, i.e., to succinctly set out all the different storylines available in this small book chapter. Therefore, I have chosen to follow one storyline, set out in Nussbaum's first chapter, that when asking the question about luck in a good human life, four other questions have to be answered as well: (1) why has this question moved to the background of ethics?; (2) what was the position and impact of Greek tragedy on the discussion on luck?; (3) how should Plato's attempt to free the human being from luck be understood?; and (4) what was Aristotle's reaction to the Platonic position? In this section, I will give a brief overview of points 1–3, and then I will discuss Aristotle separately.

Nussbaum writes that the question of how much luck a good human life needs is both strange and not strange. It is not strange, because it is a very human and intuitive question about the good life that we all ask ourselves. How much luck do I need to bear in my life? How much can I actively plan and control? And moreover, how can I secure a good life for my children? It has become a strange question in moral philosophy though, because since Kant's philosophy the idea that a good life is a *morally* good life has taken hold, in combination with the idea that moral value is immune to luck. According to Nussbaum, it is since this paradigm shift that luck is no longer a central theme in ethics (p. 5).<sup>4</sup> In a sense, it has been one of Nussbaum's aims in this book to restore the importance of this question, and make us understand that it would be good to address it (again).

In Chaps. 2 and 3, Nussbaum shows the broadness and depth of Greek tragedy. The function of tragedy is to force people to think about the inevitability of having to cope with things that happen to them without their choosing, and to explore what

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<sup>4</sup>Until the subject was reintroduced by Williams and Nagel, among others.

human beings value. Human goods are diverse and can conflict. Moreover, because Greek tragedies tend not to offer (satisfying) solutions to the problems presented, people are forced to recognize that some problems aren't easy to 'fix' or not at all, or that the available solution doesn't necessarily solve the problem (p. 49).

This brings Nussbaum to make two points; first, she will not make a distinction between moral and non-moral claims, because the tragedies show us that all that is moral does not neatly fit in these two categories. There rather is a "messier continuum of claims judged to have various degrees of force and inevitability" (p. 30). Above that, the distinction is not self-explanatory, for different moral accounts make for different divisions between moral and non-moral. Second, Nussbaum explains that for the Greeks there was no clear division between writers of philosophy, tragedy, or poetry. All disciplines took part in the same ethical discussion of what makes a human life good, none of them any less serious than the other. This is unthinkable in modern philosophy, but Nussbaum argues that although tragedies "may be repellent to practical logic; they are also familiar from the experience of life" (p. 34). She therefore advocates a return to the use of literary texts in philosophy, a thesis she elaborates on in *Love's Knowledge* (1990).

Part II of FG analyzes the work of Plato. In the *Protagoras*, Socrates and Protagoras are eager to 'solve' the 'problems' of human vulnerability, they are in search of a *technē* (a science) of measurement that will save the human being from being vulnerable to luck. In the *Republic*, Plato defends a much more extreme conception of the best human life, namely "the life of the philosopher, whose soul the *Phaedo* describes as akin to the forms it contemplates: pure, hard, single, unchanging, unchangeable. A life then, of goodness without fragility" (p. 138).

Such a conception of the best human life implies a radically different set of values – a reduction of the plurality of values we saw in tragedies. In a sense, Plato says that reason prescribes that human beings shouldn't value things that are, or make us, vulnerable. A flourishing human being cannot be vulnerable, on the contrary, she is 'unchanging and unchangeable'. A logical consequence of the *Phaedo's* conception of the best life is for example that human beings cannot get so attached to other human beings that they can be hurt by them (i.e., be vulnerable). Note: this is something else than suggesting to tolerate goods that can make us vulnerable, but try to control this vulnerability (which was the conclusion of the *Protagoras*).

No 'ordinary' human being can ever lead the life of a Platonic philosopher. Moreover, 'ordinary' human beings wouldn't even want to; they are not willing to give up goods such as intimate relationships. According to Nussbaum, Plato nevertheless shows us two important points: (1) that human beings can be distracted or deceived by their desires, feelings, and needs, i.e., that our feelings do not necessarily always tell us the right thing to do; and (2) he reminds us that human beings *do* long to become something better than they are; it is not true that humans are happy and satisfied with their vulnerabilities and do not wish to be more in control of our lives (p. 163). Human beings would certainly wish to have worthwhile intimate relationships and never get hurt.

### *Aristotle: The Fragility of a Good Human Life*

In part III of the book (Chaps. 8, 9, 10, 11 and 12), Nussbaum discusses Aristotle's ethical position, both as an objection to Plato and as an affirmation of the wisdom of Greek tragedy. In short, Plato's *Protagoras* defended the elimination of luck by developing a science to unequivocally master our lives, and the *Phaedo* concluded that a good life necessarily has to exclude things that could render us vulnerable, while Aristotle claims that practical deliberation can never be scientific nor invulnerable. Plato needs an extra-human perspective to determine the unchangeable best life, while Aristotle demands an anthropocentric view of this best life for human beings (the person of practical wisdom, p. 290). According to Nussbaum, Aristotle's anthropocentricity implies that (a) values can be incommensurable, i.e., that there are (possibly unsolvable) dilemmas and conflicts in human lives, and (b) that priority lies with capturing the "fine detail of the concrete particular, which is the subject matter of ethical choice" (p. 301).

This conception of a flourishing life does allow for human vulnerability. There is nothing to do but to accept and value (not in itself, but for what it brings us, for example intimate relationships) this fragility. A good human life "stands in need of good things from outside" (Aristotle 2009, 1099a31–1). But, a human life is not completely at the mercy of luck: "we believe that human life is worth living, only if a good life can be secured by effort. (...) Our deep beliefs about voluntary action make it highly unlikely that we would ever discover that there was no such thing" (Nussbaum 1986, p. 321). However, Aristotle insists that a Platonic conception of the invulnerable good life is untenable, because it is forced to leave out important human values (p. 322).

The consequences of an Aristotelian conception of the good life is that uncontrolled circumstances may interfere with excellent activity (p. 327) and *eudaimonia* itself may be disrupted by the absence of certain external goods (p. 331).<sup>5</sup> This will not happen very often or very swiftly, because *eudaimonia* is, when reached, stable. But if the misfortune is great or happens frequently enough, eventually it will (p. 333).

### **The Fragility of Good Education**

In juxtaposing ancient Greek ethics with the current discontent with how education is being framed, I assume one central thing: that education is "thoroughly moral" (Biesta 2007, p. 6). Because comparing conceptions of human flourishing to ideas about education assumes that we can speak about education within the same (ethical) discourse. The question then is how the objections to the framing of education

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<sup>5</sup>*Eudaimonia* is the Greek word commonly used in ancient Greek philosophy to describe the ultimate aim, the highest good for human beings. It is often translated as 'human flourishing'.

as striving for control can be understood in light of this assumption. Is it that the proponents of such a discourse fail to grasp the thoroughly ethical nature of education (as for example Biesta 2007, and Ramaekers and Suissa 2012 imply), or *are* the proponents and opponents having a thoroughly ethical discussion about education, and do they disagree in their ethical stances on what constitutes a good life/a good education?

The first part of the question can be linked to Nussbaum's rejection of a moral/non-moral dichotomy (1986, p. 30). The languages of risk, economy, or science are generally not *explicitly* moral. However, we can ask whether this is of crucial importance for the discussion. Whether or not both sides are conscious of or explicate that the discussion is ethical, both sides do take a stand, and they disagree. I have interpreted Nussbaum's suggestion of a messier moral continuum as saying we can still, and perhaps even better, have a discussion about which claims have which importance in education without pinpointing what is a moral claim and which not. In other words, the perceived failure to recognize the ethical dimension of education is not the core of the current issue described in this chapter. Then what do they precisely disagree about?

If we compare how Nussbaum opposes Plato and Aristotle with my opposition between a discourse of control and the objections raised by philosophers of education, at first glance it seems that we can equate 'control' with Plato and the discussed scholars with Aristotle. A good education in a Platonic sense would then not be, nor have the potential to make us fragile.

However, there is one essential difference between Plato and the current desire for control. As discussed in the section '[Current Issue in Philosophy of Education](#)', according to Nussbaum, Plato's *Phaedo* rejected the possibility of 'stabilizing' a good human life with a *technē*, and argued that the consequence of a good human life that is invulnerable has to be that certain goods that are vulnerable (or can make us vulnerable) thus cannot be incorporated in a conception of the flourishing life. The modern idea of control on the other hand, made visible in the use of the languages of science, risk, and economy, does have an underlying conception of the best life that includes vulnerability, but does not accept its consequences at the same time. It strives for control to eliminate our fragility. As in the example of intimate relationships, this idea of the best life wants to have intimate relationships without the risk of getting hurt.

Nussbaum shows us with her interpretation of Plato and Aristotle that the *desire* (to have full control) is understandable but the *belief* that it is possible to have full control, e.g., have the relationship without the risk of getting hurt, is untenable. Put differently, if someone has the perfect relationship(s) and never gets hurt, that person has been (very) lucky, but it is not something that can be enforced. The scholars discussed in this chapter object, justly, to the flaw in the conception of a good human life that underlies the desire to control that permeates the discourses I have discussed.

I think that approaching the current issue from the angle that Nussbaum provides (the question of how much luck a good human life should bear/needs) sheds light on the conceptions of the good life underlying this discussion. Whereas educational



philosophers object to seemingly different trends in education (why one should be careful with the translation of science to a broader audience; why the fact that some families are ‘at risk’ does not automatically legitimize an intervention; why evidence-based education is problematic; etc.), I think Nussbaum’s interpretation of the ancient Greeks shows us what these objections have in common, namely a shared idea about how much luck a good human life needs, i.e., what the limits are of human control.

The consequences Nussbaum sketches are that if human beings do not wish to give up these fragile goods (and I think that it is safe to assume that they do not), they must accept that there is unavoidable fragility involved in pursuing these goods. What would the acceptance of the idea of human beings as fragile mean for education?

## Implications for Education

What could be the implications of Nussbaum’s interpretation of fragility for educational theory and/or practice? Firstly, it offers an argument against the unbridled pursuit of control in education. If we value goods that contribute to or are constitutive of good education that render us fragile, such as for example the parent-child relationship or the teacher-pupil relationship, then we cannot, at the same time, claim that controllable education is a real possibility. It is not only not yet within human reach but not attainable in principle. This is not to say that we do not have the desire to be invulnerable/in control, nor that we should not have this desire, as Nussbaum has Plato remind us. Nussbaum writes in the preface of the revised edition of *FG* that the fact “that a completely invulnerable life is likely to prove impoverished by no means entails that we should prefer risky lives to more stable lives, or seek to maximize our own vulnerability, as if it were a good in itself. Up to a point, vulnerability is a necessary background condition of certain genuine human goods” (2001, p. xxx).

I think this philosophical point of the fundamental impossibility of invulnerability should receive more attention in philosophy of education. My hope is that this will make clearer what kind of ‘thing’ education is, and as such will promote the use of ‘different languages’ than the discourses of science and risk, or offer a different perspective on what science and risk *are*. This is mainly a theoretical point, but it leads to a second, more practical point.

We can explore what an Aristotelian anthropocentric ethical approach has to offer for the language that one has available to think and speak about education. Nussbaum explains what Aristotelian ethical deliberation is by looking at the tragedy of Hecuba (by Euripides). Hecuba mourns for her dead grandson who died for his city, and demands a fitting burial, although this is against the will of the gods. She deliberates about what is the proper thing to do in this particular situation, and she takes into consideration the perspective of the Greek gods, the demands of the city, but also her own grief. Hecuba displays “a flexible movement back and forth between particular and general. (...) This deliberation is itself fragile, easily influ-

enced and swayed by external happenings. Aristotelian deliberation, furthermore, is well suited to the high evaluation of fragile constituents of human life. For in allowing herself to use perception, rather than conformity to rule, as her standard, Hecuba opens herself to the value and special wonder of a particular city, a particular child; therefore to the deep grief she here expresses” (1986, pp. 316–317).

I think it important to promote the use of a language for education that takes the form of an Aristotelian deliberation. Aristotelian deliberation as a method of talking about, and doing research in education implies what one might call a ‘discourse of flexibility and fragility’. ‘Flexibility’ requires moving between the particular and the general, always reflecting on general guidelines from the position of the “fine detail of the concrete particular” (Nussbaum 1986, p. 301). ‘Fragility’ implies a certain instability of discussion, influenced by desires, feelings, and incommensurable values. In other words, under the influence of the complexity of real life. A proper educational discourse requires a deep understanding of the fragility of things that are constitutive of or contribute to good education.

## Concluding Remarks

Surprisingly, very few scholars I have discussed refer to FG. For instance, Biesta’s 2013 book about the beauty of risk is reminiscent of Nussbaum’s work, for she writes that the Greek poet Pindar’s work suggests that “part of the peculiar beauty of *human* excellence just *is* its vulnerability” (Nussbaum 1986, p. 2).

Most philosophers of education discussed here give direct or indirect account of their indebtedness to Aristotle. The fact that Nussbaum’s interpretation of the fragile human life is not mentioned is remarkable, because the particular way in which she interprets Plato and Aristotle does, in my opinion, contribute to grasping what can be said in defense of the existence of human vulnerability, as well as to clarifying how conceptions of ‘risk’ and ‘effectivity’ are colored by their underlying conception of a good human life.

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# The Educational Legacy of Michael Oakeshott



Kevin Williams and Pádraig Hogan

## Introduction

This chapter addresses and evaluates two key aspects of Michael Oakeshott's theory of education. The first is his affirmation of the traditional conception of liberal education that draws on the metaphor of conversation, a metaphor that has been used by other scholars to illuminate the activities of teaching and learning. The second main feature of Oakeshott's contribution to education is his prescience regarding the rise of the culture of control in social policy. This culture was part of what in the late 1940s and 1950s he labelled 'rationalism'. It engendered a strand of profound pessimism in his thought and it continues to prompt concern in the minds of many educators in the twenty-first century.

Education for Oakeshott is an initiation via conversation into a world of personal and cultural enrichment and is of necessity liberal. It is liberal in that it is conducted in an arena which is "a place apart" (Oakeshott 1989a, pp. 69, 71–2, 76) from the business of everyday life and it also liberates us from the concerns that dominate normal living. Oakeshott's commitment to the educational potential of conversation is clear in the title of the essay 'The Voice of Conversation in the Education of Mankind' written circa 1948 (2004, pp. 187–199). In another major essay 'The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind', written in 1959, he presents a

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memorable account of what happens in human experience when genuine conversation takes place:

Thoughts of different species take wing and play round one another, responding to each other's movements and provoking one another to fresh exertions.... Conversation is not an enterprise designed to yield an extrinsic profit, a contest where a winner gets a prize, nor is it an activity of exegesis; it is an unrehearsed intellectual adventure. (Oakeshott 1981, p. 198)

He then gives explicit and eloquent expression to the relationship between conversation and education:

Education, properly speaking, is an initiation into the skill and partnership of ... conversation in which we learn to recognize the voices, to distinguish the proper occasions of utterance, and in which we acquire the intellectual and moral habits appropriate to conversation. (Ibid., p. 199)

It is indeed true that conversation is a central activity in much teaching and learning in both senses of the origin of the term. One is the sense of simply associating with different people and the second turning around thoughts and ideas in their company. As a form of association with others, conversation can refer to adults and young people mixing together in the context of organised learning and this in itself could be said to be educative. In its second sense as a shared exploration of ideas, conversation features not only in much moral education but also in the teaching of many subjects across the curriculum. It can be fruitful in promoting understanding within the major school subjects and is an essential aspect in the teaching of religion, literature, history, geography, economics and social studies. Indeed the relationship between education and conversation is captured by the term 'conversant' used to describe someone who is very much at home in a particular field. Yet in affirming the fertility of the conversation metaphor, an aspect of education that it neglects should also be noted. The focus solely on theoretical or intellectual pursuits makes Oakeshott insufficiently alert to possibilities involved in overt interaction between beings and their material environment and to the joy and great playfulness that can be a feature of this interaction. Identity creation or *Bildung*, that is, making "the most or the best" (Oakeshott 1989a, p. 47) of oneself can also assume an embodied quality. In brief, conversation as a metaphor does not yield a comprehensive view of all the education involves (see Williams 2007, 2012).

That said, how should conversation be understood in the educational context so that it becomes a genuine initiation into the world of learning?

## The Fertility of Conversation as a Metaphor in Education

Several philosophers have affirmed the potential and fertility of the metaphor of conversation to our understanding of educational endeavour. Indeed, the metaphor has recently been the subject of an entire collection of essays devoted to this theme

in Oakeshott's writings (Bakhurst and Fairfield 2016). In his most well-known work, *Philosophy and the Mirror of Nature* (1980), Richard Rorty draws on Oakeshott's conversation metaphor and on H-G. Gadamer's notion of the enduring effects of history (*Wirkungsgeschichte*). He puts both to work in dismantling traditional conceptions of metaphysics and epistemology and replacing them with a conception of philosophy itself as conversational, as distinct from truth-establishing (Chaps. 7 and 8). Highlighting the "educational" benefits of such a conception of philosophy, Rorty describes it as "edifying" philosophy, in contrast to "systematic" or foundational philosophy (p. 360ff). In a more specific sense of 'educational' there are many philosophers who have explored how Oakeshott's metaphor can enhance our understanding of the activities of teaching and learning. According to Nicholas Rengger (2001), for example, the need for initiation into the activity of conversation explains "why education is of such enormous importance to Oakeshott" (p. 259). Trent Davis (2009) believes that the metaphor has "genuine implications for the lived 'conversations' that people can and do have" (p. 398). Pádraig Hogan (2010, pp. 108–121) notes the parallel with Gadamer in the latter's notable description of human beings as being constituted by "the conversation that we are" (p. 119). Elaborating on Oakeshott's work in analysing the activity and influence of the teacher, Terry McLaughlin (2008) also refers to the notion of conversation.

The wide ranging sorts of influence over pupils that the teacher has to exert in the 'conversation between the generations' that constitutes education means that the teacher must be a *certain sort of person* who communicates not only knowledge and skill but also (parts of) him or herself. (Italics in original) (ibid., p. 225)

Tasos Kazepides (2010) makes helpful reference to the metaphor in *Education as Dialogue: Its Prerequisites and Its Enemies*, but he finds conversation less appropriate in the educational context than 'dialogue'. The precise pedagogic value of the metaphor, however, is foregrounded by K. A. Bruffee in a chapter entitled 'Peer Tutoring and the "Conversation of Mankind"' (1995, pp. 87–98). In the words of Paul Standish, we have scarcely begun

to realise the rich significance of the idea of conversation as this runs through Oakeshott's thought. The 'conversation of mankind' reconvenes the words of the dead, in reading and writing, and in so doing draws a kind of vitality from what cannot be made present. (2000, p. 168)

Of course the conversation metaphor, which Oakeshott takes from Hobbes and Montaigne, is not a new one. It also appears in the work of John Henry Newman (1901) and Matthew Arnold, two important theorists of the concept of a liberal education in the nineteenth century. The metaphor of voices is to be found in Arnold's characterisation of culture as made up of multifaceted "voices of human experience" represented by "art, science, poetry, philosophy, history, as well as of religion" (Arnold 1966, p. 47; see also Podoksik 2003, pp. 214–5). So how exactly does Oakeshott conceptualise conversation?

## Oakeshott's Conception of Conversation

Conversation, writes Oakeshott, appears “whenever talk is indulged in for its own sake, without ulterior motive” (Oakeshott 2004, p. 187) and must be distinguished from transactional or instrumental discourse, that is, discourse where our concern is with the expeditious satisfaction of wants. With genuine conversation, as he has written elsewhere, “we do not ask what it is ‘for’” (Oakeshott 1989b, p. 98) because the point of conversation lies within the activity of conversing itself, that is, in the pleasure, stimulation and enlightenment that it provides. This is why we can speak of conversation as valuable in itself, or for its own sake. Elizabeth Corey (2006) explains the spirit of conversation in its general sense in Oakeshott’s thought very well. It embraces “a focus on living in the present, a rejection of purpose and achievement in favour of enjoyment, a reading of the human condition that is both limited and expansive...” (ibid, p. 229). Many conversations are also open-ended in the sense that they have no definable end point and they can be suspended and taken up again on future occasions. This open-ended character marks a relationship between conversation and education because the principal activities with which education is concerned, in particular science and history, are also open-ended and have no terminus prescribed or prescriptible in advance (see Williams 2007, pp. 27–44).

Conversation is also to be firmly distinguished “from enquiry, from argument, from debate and from a symposium” (ibid.). It is not undertaken as a “search for ‘truth’ nor the propagation of a belief” (Oakeshott 2004, p. 188) but rather “a partnership in intellectual pleasure” (ibid.) where those who participate “must have everything in common except their opinions” (ibid.). Conversation requires a “readiness of sympathy” and a “naïve pleasure in the exchange of ideas” and a “generosity in giving and taking” (p. 193). Oakeshott takes particular pains to deny the adversarial character of conversation. According to him, the greatest enemies of conversation are the “disputatious”, “those who talk to win” (p. 189) and who suffer from “the lust to dominate” (p. 190). These are the individuals who are either unwilling or unable to listen to and hear what others have to say. To apply two terms coined by Gilbert Ryle (1973), listening is the task that is incumbent on any participant in a conversation and hearing is the achievement.

Oakeshott commends Plato for distinguishing between conversational discussion and eristic discussion. In eristic discourse “the participants are opponents; each is trying to establish his own point and to convict the other of error” (2004, p. 193). By contrast, conversational discourse is dialectical where “participants are united in a common purpose” and where the “aim of each is to show that his own view is the one which the others really believe; or conversely, that it was himself, and not the others, who began by denying a view upon which all are really agreed” (ibid.). “At once an exercise in politeness and in tactical humility”, an episode of such a conversation concludes “not when one triumphs over the other, or when each agree to differ, but when all simultaneously discover that each has been right all the time” (ibid., pp. 193–4).



There is one aspect of Oakeshott's conversational theory that needs to be noted and challenged, that is its sexist character. He condemns the potential contribution of women to conversation despite what he believes are the possession of two qualities appropriate to conversation: "they are gaily inconsequent and have little attachment to truth" (ibid.188). But "what disqualifies them is the feminine passion for management and for wanting to know where they are being taken before they get there" (p. 188). In 'The Voice of Poetry in the Conversation of Mankind' he refers to a girl who "in order to escape a conclusion, may utter what appears to be an outrageously irrelevant remark" with the aim of "turning an argument that she finds irksome into a conversation she is more at home in" (1981, p.198).

## The Value of Conversation in Teaching and Learning

An important benefit of conversation in education relates to the element of intellectual versatility that it both demands and fosters. As Oakeshott conceives the activity of conversation, its participants are challenged to practise *argumentum in utramque partem*, that is, the activity in Renaissance education whereby participants learn to attempt to appropriate and defend persuasively either side of a contentious question. Conversing involves, what he describes in the words of Eton teacher, William Corey,

the art of assuming at a moment's notice, a new intellectual position, . . . the art of entering quickly into another person's thoughts, . . . the habit of submitting to censure and refutation, . . . the art of indicating assent or dissent in graduate terms, . . . the habit of regarding minute points of accuracy, . . . the art of working out what is possible in a given time, . . . taste, discrimination, . . . mental courage and mental soberness. (Oakeshott 1981, p. 200, note 1)

It is this versatility that will enable participants in a conversation "simultaneously" to "discover that each has been right all the time" (Oakeshott 2004, pp. 193–4). Conversation both gives expression to intellectual versatility and also the opportunity to enhance further one's intellectual capacities. Yet the danger with too much versatility in conversation is that its exercise may appear to prompt a sceptical relativism and even a disregard for truth. This versatility has the potential to engender scepticism and relativism, a possibility that has been skilfully explored by Leslie Marsh (2005, pp. 252). Marsh reminds readers that in terms of Oakeshott's epistemology and of his theory of the modes of understanding (science, history, practice or practical life and art), claims to truth are modal, that is, they are embedded in distinct spheres of knowledge. Being modal, truth is plurivocal rather than univocal.

Yet the status of truth in Oakeshott's theory of conversation remains a concern among philosophers. The role of truth in teaching and learning in Oakeshott's work is addressed directly in the collection mentioned at the start of this chapter (Bakhurst and Fairfield 2016). Both David Bakhurst and Cheryl Misak express concern at Oakeshott's apparently cavalier attitude in his dismissal of truth as an aim of

conversation (see Williams 2017). In the less well-known essay ‘The Voice of Conversation in the Education of Mankind’ Oakeshott’s tone is very flippant and must give pause to educators. He goes as far as to take to task those who conceive of conversation in terms of the “search for ‘truth’” (2004, p. 188). In conversation where claims to truth are contested, he finds that agreement “to differ” is not a satisfactory outcome (p. 194). In the objectionable comment mentioned earlier he celebrates women for having “little attachment to truth” (p. 188) on the grounds that this is the right attitude in conversation. This leads us to wonder whether Oakeshott is serious or whether he is merely being characteristically provocative about those who bring too solemn an attitude to a conversation. Perhaps he should be understood as making a psychological rather than an epistemological point, namely, that the primary motivation of those who engage in conversation should be a desire for conviviality and enjoyment rather than a concern to seek truth. He could also be understood as poking fun at certain conceptions of what counts as ‘universal truth’ as in the manner of Jane Austen in the famous first line of *Pride and Prejudice*. “It is a truth universally acknowledged, that a single man in possession of a good fortune must be in want of a wife.” The truth is that, in reality, single women of modest means are often desperate to find rich husbands.

Still the criticisms of his attitude to truth by Bakhurst (2016) and Misak (2016) are telling. As Bakhurst argues, the aim of participants in conversation is normally to gain insight and insight is rooted in conceptions of truth and falsehood. He suggests that Oakeshott can appear to embrace “too aesthetic” a view of conversation that precludes the possibility of evaluating truth claims (2016, p. 14). Despite some of his provocative remarks, in her chapter on pragmatism, Misak offers a persuasive and subtle account of the profile of truth in the Oakeshottian conversation that is probably consistent with his considered view concerning its status. She attributes to Oakeshott what she describes as a “low-profile conception of truth” (p. 59), which allows us to envisage the Oakeshott’s conversation as being, in a “thin sense” (ibid.) an inquiry aimed at the pursuit of truth. The claims to truth that result from conversational encounters do not yield absolute and definitive conclusions but rather defensible and plausible argument that are open to rebuttal or indeed refutation in the light of evidence. Considered and persuasive accounts of the natural and human worlds can be offered as what Williams (2014) describes in a metaphor of Denis Donoghue’s as ‘viable’ versions of truth, in the sense that they are not contrary to reason.

The endorsement of conversation as an educational activity is consistent with the recognition of opposing views that, although perhaps incompatible, reflect a reading of some aspects of the human condition that can legitimately be affirmed by what Denis Donoghue (2002) describes as “sane and honorable” (p. 177) seekers after truth. In a different context, Williams (2014) gives an apt illustration of conversation that is conducted both in a convivial manner and prompted by a concern to discover the truth from an incident in one of Georges Simenon’s novels entitled *Maigret Tend un Piège*. After a long and sociable evening discussing over dinner the psychology of a serial killer on the loose, Maigret and a famous psychiatrist discover that they have come to a shared view of the individual’s character. The reader learns that their

insights match the psychological profile of the killer who is finally arrested. This is an example of conversation yielding truth in the mode of practical life.

Oakeshott's conception of conversation in education can be contrasted with that of Alasdair MacIntyre's. In fact it can be seen as a valuable corrective to the latter. In the final chapters of *Whose Justice? Which Rationality* (1988) and of *Three Rival Versions of Moral Enquiry* (1990), MacIntyre strongly recommends conversation in education. But he envisages conversation in both chapters as the combative presentation and defence of one's own tradition, where "we have to begin speaking as protagonists of one contending party or fall silent" (1988, p. 401). The danger with a combative or antagonistic conception is that conversation becomes what Oakeshott indicts as the exchange of points of view rather than clearly formulated ideas. To be critical "it is not good enough to have a 'point of view'... what we need is *thoughts*" (Oakeshott 1989b, p. 102). In this reference to 'thoughts' Oakeshott is identifying a requirement for something more than and other than "the possession of an armoury of arguments to prove the truth of what [one] believes" (*ibid.*).

Oakeshott's attitude towards adversarial discussion is well judged because an eristic attitude can frustrate fruitful communication. To be educationally productive, conversation must be open. Many of the features of the conversational disposition – attentiveness, tact, responsiveness, openness and availability to another person – are captured in the Italian word *disponibilità*. A full account of the conversational disposition would need to address the obstacles that ingrained sentiments can place in the path of a genuine sympathy with others. There are obvious implications of this undertaking for teachers who wish to expand the boundaries of human sympathies of their students in order and to enable them, in the words of Fred Dallmayr (2001), to take others seriously "in their lifeworlds" or "lived contexts" (p. 346). 'In genuine conversation', as Chris Lawn (1996) argues in his article on Gadamer and Oakeshott, we "learn something about ourselves as we enter sympathetically the horizon of the other" (p. 272). One task of the educator is to encourage the sympathetic imagination required to enter into conversation. The need for a conversational disposition, including willingness to listen to others and to hear what they have to say, is also very acute where religion is concerned, especially as religious and political disagreement can go together. The conversation enterprise that is education is, however, susceptible to being subverted and to the potential of such subversion attention must next be turned.

## The Culture of Control and Its Consequences

Oakeshott's insights provide a rich evaluative perspective on some dominant trends in international educational policy in the early decades of the twenty-first century, not least a culture of control that continues to gain ground as a body of managerial expertise. Such trends, already discerned by Oakeshott in the middle and later decades of the twentieth century, are inimical to the notion of education as a conversation that is open-ended and that involves interactions that may be unpredictable.

Oakeshott feared that education would become an instrument of manipulative social engineering, supported by the science of behaviourism, designed to realise the purposes of the state. He even considered that this project presaged the future “abolition of man” (1989a, p. 77). And this was before the rise of forms of state control that have become even more pervasive in the last two decades. It is a curious irony that the culture of control that Oakeshott so perceptively diagnosed and indicted in the 1950s has come to dominate education in the twenty-first century. The positivism that had its genesis at the time of the Enlightenment was designed to control nature. The positivism that developed in the 1950s, and became a pillar of educational policy in the 1980s, had a different purpose, namely, to bring social institutions under the control of government and employers. It is significant that one of Oakeshott’s most celebrated essays, ‘Rationalism in Politics’, is more about the folly of rationalism or the culture of control in education than in politics, a point perceptively noted by Efraim Podoksik (2003).

It is not surprising that Oakeshott’s work has served as a point of departure in criticising the dominance of this culture in our times. Desmond Ryan invokes Oakeshott’s essay ‘Political Education’ in his account of the “collateral damage” that was done to “the delicate eco-system” of university culture (Ryan 2002, pp. 134–5). Oakeshott’s essay explores the ecology of civil life and his insights also apply to university culture. The human interactions that occur between individuals at university can only be damaged and subverted by systems designed to measure, monitor and control them. Against the managerialism promoted by the post-1988 educational reforms in the United Kingdom, Michael Smith (1999) bases a persuasive account of the school as an educational community on Oakeshott’s work. Paul Standish (2000, p. 226) salutes Oakeshott’s ‘remarkable prescience’ in his sceptical appraisal of the way the “talk of the mission statement of the university was spreading” (ibid.). Standish endorses Oakeshott’s point about the derivative nature of ‘missions’ as shorthand for how to behave rather than programmes for action. To adapt Oakeshott’s memorable metaphor concerning the nature of ideology, a so-called mission statement is less the “quasi-divine parent” of an educational institution than “its earthly step child” (Oakeshott 1989c, p. 142). Elsewhere Standish draws upon Oakeshott’s metaphor of education as initiation into a conversation to show how university studies should be conceived (2005, p. 61). This conception is quite at odds with the “closed economy” (ibid., p. 54) of the current ideology of “proceduralism, coding and performativity” (ibid., p. 63) in higher education.

### *Controlling the Educational Conversation*

Much of what occurs in teaching and learning cannot be accommodated in terms of prescribed outcomes because “so much depends on the teacher’s judgement” especially “in responding to the rhythms of the occasion”, all of which relates more to Aristotle’s notion of practical reason – “doing the right thing, at the right time, in the right circumstances” (Standish 2005, p. 65). Standish gives an account of the teacher

in this situation that is very much consistent with the notion of the Oakeshottian conversation. The “good teacher”, he writes, “is in part the orchestrator” of propitious circumstances but she or he is “also something less centred, more exposed and perhaps more vulnerable, more open to the event” (ibid., pp. 65/66). Though there is, “no recipe”, writes Standish, “this does not mean that, for the aspiring or practising teacher, nothing can be learned: such abilities are gained by attending to examples of good practice and through readiness to learn from these” (ibid., p. 66).

The same point is made by retired primary school principal, Margaret Sutcliffe (2002). Indicting the over-prescriptive nature of the National Curriculum in the United Kingdom, she explains that every experienced teacher knows that “some of the most valuable teaching is done on the spur of the moment” (ibid., p. 156). When an appropriate teaching moment comes up in the classroom a “good teacher does not waste the opportunity but springs into action to give an instant lesson ... instead of the planned lesson” (ibid.). Unfortunately, the regime of prescribed outcomes does not accommodate this kind of spontaneity.

## *The University*

The spirit of Oakeshott’s conception of a university is far from the current reductionist view of policy-makers. The current regime of monitoring and measuring exhibits little sense that universities are first and foremost human communities. As Stephen Prickett explains, universities are “*collegial*” rather than “commercial” or “bureaucratic” institutions (2002, p. 185). Staff members in universities and schools are most of all “*colleagues*” and as colleagues “are collectively responsible for the development of their pupils, and for the advancement of their discipline” (ibid.). Richard Smith rightly argues that universities have a responsibility to respond to student concerns. This “ongoing dialogue, open and sensitive at its best” should not be “an add-on” to teaching but rather an integral part of it (Smith 2005, p. 141). The drive for efficiency that “threatens to eliminate contingency from the university” also threatens to destroy “forms of human relating, intimacy, intellectual passion, and much else” that have traditionally characterised university life (Smith 2005, p. 148). In other words, this misguided search for ‘efficiency’ is corrosive of the very notion of the university as a human community engaged in a conversational search for truth.

To endorse this critique of the culture of control in education is not to deny that there must be accountability on the part of those who are in receipt of public funds, but over-accountability and over-prescriptiveness are inimical to the conception of education as an initiation into a conversation. Nor is there anything reprehensible in expecting that educators must sometimes undertake administrative or organisational tasks. Stephen Prickett draws attention to the confusion between organisation and management. It is perfectly reasonable to expect academics to take responsibility for organising aspects of their department’s activities, but this is different from expecting them to possess management expertise in the sense of “skills in control

and motivation of people, a knowledge of the principles of economics, accountancy and bookkeeping” (Prickett 2002, p. 182). Still, the negative aspects of the culture of control recall an important lesson that Oakeshott taught for many decades. When human judgement takes second place to the rigid systems of control, what is good for human beings is overlooked. The lesson is an important part of his legacy.

And where education is publicly funded, it is not unreasonable to insist that it gives value to the taxpayer. It is possible to ensure appropriate accountability in a manner that respects the conversational nature of education and without recourse to destructive, mechanistic regimes of auditing. This can be undertaken sanely while respecting the true purposes of the conversation that is education.

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# Meaningful Access for Students: A Petersian Account of Educational Inclusion



Christopher Martin

## Educational Inclusion as a Conceptual Issue

Discussions about educational inclusion are inclined to lead to disagreement in part because, behind the appearance of moral consensus, lies uncertainty over what constitutes a meaningful education at which inclusivity should be aimed. To begin with, much of the debate about classroom inclusion is the product of *conceptual confusion* about the use of the terms 'special' and 'inclusive'. For example, there is more than one meaning to the claim that a student is in need of a special education. Is one drawing a distinction between different *kinds* of educational aims, with some aims for the majority of students and special aims for others? Or is one simply talking about making 'special efforts', of a kind above and beyond what would normally be undertaken in the majority of cases and where we are still trying to achieve common educational aims?

When educational policy-makers and leaders rely on ambiguous conceptual frameworks, they can cause real moral harm. Take, for example, the recent British Columbia Supreme Court of Canada's *Moore vs. British Columbia* (2012). The case involved a school district that has closed down a diagnostic centre for students with learning disabilities. Parents were left to use their own resources to cover the shortfall in educational support. However, the parents of one of the affected students (called J) argued that the school district was discriminating against special needs students and should cover the costs of special educational provisions paid for privately. The school district argued that the centre closure was justified on the grounds that special education resources were withdrawn from *all* special education students, and so there was no discrimination. The court ruled in favour of the parents:

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[T]he reason children are entitled to an education is that a healthy democracy and economy require their educated contribution. Adequate special education, therefore, is not a dispensable luxury. For those with severe learning disabilities, it is the ramp that provides access to the statutory commitment to education made to *all* children in British Columbia. The ‘service’ to which J is entitled under s. 8 of the B.C. *Human Rights Code* is education generally. To define special education as the service at issue risks descending into a kind of ‘separate but equal’ approach. Comparing J only with other special needs students would mean that the District could cut *all* special needs programs and yet be immune from a claim of discrimination. If J is compared only to other special needs students, full consideration cannot be given to whether he had meaningful access to the education to which *all* students in British Columbia are entitled. This risks perpetuating the very disadvantage and exclusion the *Code* is intended to remedy. (2012, p. 362)

The ruling offers some initial clarification around the conceptual question I posed above. It is now understood as a matter of law, in some jurisdictions, that a policy distinction between ‘special’ and ‘general’ education is neither appropriate nor just.<sup>1</sup> When I say I am offering a special education I should mean that I am *enabling access*, not offering a different service or dealing with a ‘distinct and separate’ case.

So, what conceptual problem remains? There is a sense in which one can be committed to the view that education is a good to which all students are entitled, and that such an education ought not be taxonomised into different types, and still remain ‘conceptually confused’ about the moral demands of special and inclusive education. In fact, so long as this confusion remains implicit, a discriminatory distinction between ‘special’ and ‘general’ education is tacitly in force even if the distinction is not explicit.

Here is why: consider a district similar to the one described above. Instead of closing a diagnostic centre, however, the district decides that the needs of students with learning disabilities are best served when diagnostic tools and interventions are focused on functional literacy and other skills related to employability. The service is streamlined. In other words, less time struggling with Shakespeare and more time decoding job ads. The district could justify this move on the grounds that, according to provincial policy, the basic purpose of education is “the optimal development of individuals as skilful, free and purposeful persons, able to plan and manage life and to realize highest potential as individuals and as members of society” (cited in *Moore vs. British Columbia*, p. 379). Some students are going to realise their ‘highest potential’ with greater ease and to a greater degree than others. The interpretation of ‘optimal development’ is therefore key. For some students a comprehensive understanding and appreciation of Shakespeare just isn’t in the cards. Better to place our bets for the future flourishing of such students on their ability to work and be productive members of society.

On this view, streamlining a service in this way – denying some special education students certain kinds of educational *activities* normally accorded to other students – entails no discrimination of the kind found in *Moore vs. British Columbia*. This is because access is driven by the developmental needs of the individual, and

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<sup>1</sup>For a discussion of some of the possible unjust consequences arising from the decision see Charney and Kraicer (2012).

individual development can take many and various forms depending on the student's particular needs and interests. We could call this a *constructivist* concept of educational inclusion – the view that what is being *accessed* through education is subjective well-being, broadly construed, and what counts as *meaningful* access is relative to each student as determined by their efforts and the efforts of the professionals, parents and others responsible for their care.

Counter to this kind of approach is what one could call a *perfectionist* concept of educational inclusion – the view that what is being *accessed* through education is related to some objective conception of well-being, and what counts as *meaningful* access is independent of the student. All children regardless of ability should have the opportunity to have certain kinds of educational experiences – experiences that speak to a particular ideal about what it means to be educated.<sup>2</sup>

On the perfectionist view children who are denied such experiences, regardless of ability, are simply worse off. The district would therefore be wrong to streamline its educational efforts away from Shakespeare<sup>3</sup> for the reason that the enjoyment of literature for its own sake is something that all students should have an opportunity to experience because such an experience puts students into contact with the 'best things in life'. On this view, inclusion means that the *aspirational* nature of educational values and aims should be maintained across all students and variations in ability is not a sufficient reason for compromising or qualifying this aspirational nature.

The disagreement here is no longer strictly about the justification of 'special' versus 'general' education. We can readily agree that this distinction is unhelpful, at least with respect to having intelligible debates about just access to a meaningful education. But the normative question remains: are there some kinds of educational activities or experiences to which all children are entitled regardless of ability? Or ought children receive whatever kind of support they need in order to attain a loosely defined educational goal, one that may vary considerably between different students? Should meaningful educational inclusion be understood along constructivist or perfectionist lines? What concept of education best explains the inclusive ideal?

Educational controversy about inclusion is driven, *at least in part*, by this unresolved conceptual question. Teachers and parents can each be steadfastly committed to inclusion in the abstract but nonetheless diverge with respect to what counts as meaningful inclusion. Defenders of full classroom inclusion, I suspect, are more likely to be constructivists about meaningful access, as they are wont to believe that education is about meeting the particular needs of individual students. There is no principled reason why regular classroom teachers cannot meet such needs. To claim otherwise is to arbitrarily value the needs of some children over others.

Critics of full classroom inclusion, I suspect, are more likely to be perfectionists about meaningful access, as they are wont to believe that education is about ensuring

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<sup>2</sup>For one perfectionist account of distributive justice see Kupperman (1987).

<sup>3</sup>Shakespeare, or whatever culturally significant achievements are relevant to the community in question. My point is not to outline a *particular* perfectionist curriculum but to show how a perfectionist concept of education has implications for what counts as meaningful access to education.

that students have educational experiences of a certain quality – access is about inclusion in some common educational enterprise – and providing such educational experiences to students with severe learning disabilities requires a degree of pedagogical expertise and skill that goes beyond the remit of the traditional classroom teacher. To claim otherwise is to place the abstract ideal of inclusion above the flourishing of students.

Two different concepts of education, each advancing different notions of what is educationally worthwhile and each offering a different picture of what meaningful access looks like. How can the debate move forward? In this chapter I offer an interpretation of R.S. Peters' account of educationally worthwhile activities that might help navigate between the excesses of both constructivist and perfectionist accounts. I then point the limitations of a Petersian account of educational inclusion.

## R.S. Peters on Educationally Worthwhile Activities

R.S. Peters aims to clarify the values that purportedly distinguish education from social practices such as childrearing, socialisation or training. He takes the view that education is a normative enterprise – one that involves selecting out those traditions, forms of experience, and activities that have distinctive value for learners. More specifically, Peters argues that education is necessarily about the promotion of a desirable or worthwhile *state of mind*. The educational value of a particular activity should therefore be assessed in terms of its merits with respect to the development of mind. The educated person, then, should be the product of careful value judgements regarding what is educationally worthwhile.

Peters therefore rejects the view that education is a mere means to economically productive workers or obedient citizens. As he puts it,

[T]hese economic and sociological descriptions of education can be misleading, if taken out of context [because] they are made from the point of view of a spectator pointing to the 'function' or effects of education in a social or economic system. They are not descriptions of it from the point of view of someone engaged in that enterprise. (Peters 1963, p. 89)

On the one hand, education should involve activities that are worthwhile or beneficial *from the point of view of the individual learner*. While an activity may be beneficial in the objective sense that, say, it increases the student's human capital, it may not necessarily be educational.

On the other hand, when Peters argues that education is good for the learner, he does not mean this in a strictly subjective sense, either. Just because an activity is enjoyable for the student does not necessarily make that activity educationally worthwhile.

An activity is not educational unless one can account for why that activity contributes to the quality of mind resulting from the activity. And for Peters, some qualities of mind are worth leading out over others and deserve emphasis.

Accordingly, socialising children to function in society, while certainly important, is not sufficient for education:

The teacher who hears that he is an agent of socialization may come to think of himself as a sort of social worker striving in a very *general* sort of way to help children fit into society. He may get the impression that the teacher's task is not to educate children, in the sense in which I will later define it, but to concentrate on helping them to get on with others and to settle down contentedly to a simply job, healthy hobbies, and a happy home life. (Peters 1963, p. 90)

But what qualities of mind *are* children entitled to? Peters argues that for an activity to be educationally worthwhile it must satisfy three criteria:

First, for an activity to be educational something of value must be passed onto the learner (Peters 1963, p. 92).

Second, it must be possible to engage with valued activities in such a way that the learner can (a) understand and (b) intrinsically value those activities.

- (a) Educationally worthwhile activities must involve *reasoned comprehension and understanding*. The learner understands the “reason why” of what he or she is taught (Peters 1973a, p. 18).
- (b) The learner should also come to *value* that understanding in an instrumental *as well as intrinsic sense*. As he puts it, “[w]e would not call a man ‘educated’ who knew about science but cared nothing for truth or who regarded it merely as a means to getting hot water and hot dogs” (1963, p. 96). In other words, the learner is capable of adopting what Peters sometimes calls a “non-instrumental attitude” toward knowledge and understanding (Peters 1973b, p. 245).

Third, education requires multiple worthwhile activities that, taken together, transform and broaden the student's cognitive perspective (1963, pp. 98–100). In other words, to be educated involves having a certain breadth of understanding. Being restricted to a narrow intellectual perspective is here seen as undesirable.

Only activities that can satisfy *all three* criteria are educationally worthwhile. But which specific activities pass the test? Peters claims that theoretical activities or disciplinary “modes of experience” such as science, philosophy and history are especially suited to education. Peters makes the case by way of contrast: “There is very little to know about riding bicycles, swimming or golf. It is largely a matter of ‘knowing how’ rather than of ‘knowing that’. Furthermore what there is to know throws very little light on much else” (Peters 1963, p. 100). Compare this with bodies of knowledge such as history, science, and literature where “there is an immense amount to know, and, if it is properly assimilated, it constantly throws light on, widens, and deepens one's view of countless other things” (p. 100). For example, the progressive acquisition of scientific understanding opens a new perspective on the natural world. Not only does that person learn many scientific facts about nature, they understand what makes a fact ‘scientific’ and how such facts are different from other kinds of facts. Similarly, acquiring an aesthetic point of view allows one to know and experience one's surroundings in a manner that is mindful of its beauty. Both forms, science and art, together contribute to a fuller picture of the world and it is this expanded perspective, argues Peters, that characterises the educated mind.

## A Petersian Account of Educational Inclusion

Peters' concept of education understands 'the educated person' as someone who has been *empowered* to engage intelligently from a variety of epistemic perspectives: scientific, aesthetic, ethical, philosophical and so on. His account of educationally worthwhile activities, if coherent and justifiable, may go some way to addressing the question of meaningful access to education.

Recall that disagreement about educational inclusion turns on the question of access, where the criteria of *meaningful* access are informed by two rival concepts of education. My proposal is that Peters' concept of education can reconcile these two concepts.

In order to see how, let's examine what a Petersian point of view might have to say about each conception. It should not be hard to see how Peters' account would find fault in the constructivist conception of meaningful access. Classroom experiences that prepare students for a productive life in modern society, while surely important, are insufficient from an educational point of view. There is no principled reason why students of diverse ability should not be initiated into transformative forms of knowledge and understanding. As Mary Warnock puts it, "inclusion should mean being involved in a common enterprise of learning" (2010, p. 32). I am inclined to think that a Petersian position points to the same general conclusion. For Peters, education is more than mere socialisation, rather it is an initiation into modes of experience through which humanity has come to understand the world. If Peters is right, and yet we continue to assume that socialisation were sufficient for special education students, we would be implicitly embracing the kind of conceptual distinction that the BC Supreme Court argued was discriminatory, for we would be endorsing 'function' as adequate for some students while reserving an education in forms of knowledge for others. There is a sense, then, that the constructivist conception could be seen to be over-emphasising the 'value' criterion at the expense of the other two criteria. Of course the learning experience should be beneficial to the individual learner, and this requires engaging with the needs and interests of particular students. However, while these needs and interests should serve as a *basis* for the development of qualities of mind, their satisfaction alone is not sufficient for such development.

To be sure, the extent to which children of diverse ability can be initiated into transformative modes of thought and experience will differ. But this is no reason to deny such an initiation. Many students, regardless of cognitive ability, should have the opportunity to take intrinsic enjoyment in whatever advances in knowledge and understanding they achieve however unremarkable and incremental they may appear to others, for on a Petersian view they *are* remarkable and worth celebrating. In short, the constructivist concept of education is a poor framework for understanding meaningful access to education because, while understandably aiming to frame access as that which is *accessible*, it underestimates the capacity of students of diverse ability to experience an educational transformation of the kind articulated by Peters.

However, this does not mean that a perfectionist conception of inclusion will do, either. Educational perfectionists, as I have said, believe that education should expose learners to the best humanity has to offer in terms of knowledge and understanding. Anything less isn't a 'real' education but a pale imitation: if I haven't experienced Shakespeare or similarly revered cultural goods I am worse off because this puts me at a serious disadvantage in achieving an objective standard of well-being.

However, a Petersian conception of meaningful access would likely see this as too austere. This is because the perfectionist conception neglects *the reason why* forms of knowledge and understanding promote a desirable state of mind. Modes of thought an initiation into modes of thought isn't about putting the learner into contact with some objective standard of the good *a la* the Greeks.<sup>4</sup> A *meaningfully* inclusive conception of education is one that is attainable for a child regardless of where they are on the continuum of ability (Warnock 2010, p. 16).

First, recall that for Peters activities are worthwhile just because they have the potential to transform the perspective of the learner. The point isn't that an understanding of *Shakespeare qua Shakespeare* is transformative, rather the agreed norms and standards that define great art are seen to line up *with* Shakespeare. The public standards and criteria that define an intellectual tradition are what should guide pedagogy, not the particular cultural activities that just happen to align with those public standards. There are a variety of narrative and story forms that do much the same job and that can be appropriately linked to the capacities and abilities of learners. We understand this intuitively when it comes to educating children of different ages, gradually increasing the challenge and difficulty of the learning process in step with the learner's developing capacities, and I see no reason why the same pedagogical considerations cannot be made for many students with even severe learning disabilities.

Second, Peters' educationally worthwhile activities are not directed at an elitist 'educated person' conceived as some kind of developmental endpoint, rather his concept of education should be understood by the inclusive educator as a regulative ideal.<sup>5</sup> The transformative effects of a Petersian education opens the learner to greater possibilities in their lives *relative to the kinds of choices and distinctions that their cognitive abilities will allow them to make*, i.e. the significance of such a transformation is relative to their individual potential. And so while a Petersian inclusive educator might be perfectionist about the *kind* of transformations a worthwhile education should engender in the student, they should remain *constructivist* about the value of such transformations in the lives of the particular students under their care. For the student with severe cognitive delay, achieving an understanding of the relationship between plot and character in story, or developing literacy skills, is just as worthwhile and transformative as the scholarly student who grasps the

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<sup>4</sup>See also Hirst (1965).

<sup>5</sup>When Peters talks about the 'educated person' it is better to read him as trying to develop an ideal conception of the person in order to draw out those criteria that define an educationally worthwhile process, not to establish what *counts* as an educated person.



distinctions between different literary theories. Note also that on this view, the development of literacy skills for the student with cognitive delay is not to be celebrated merely because it will help the student ‘get on in life’. It should *also* be celebrated because the acquisition of this skill potentially opens up the student’s capacity to value knowledge and understanding in a ‘non-instrumental’ way.

Educational policy-makers and leaders are likely to draw the conclusion that the achievements of the scholarly student has greater educational merit than other students when they confuse the place of knowledge and understanding in the lives of learners with the (often fickle) standards of disciplinary rigour and excellence that those forms take on in specialist contexts, such as the university. Peters, as far as I can tell and despite his critics, did not engage in such conflation, and I see no reason why one cannot credibly read him as advancing an inclusive conception of education. Initiating children into worthwhile and transformative modes of experience – to the furthest extent that we can and to the greatest degree that their abilities and talents will allow – is a necessary foundation for the well-lived life of any and all students and as such is an entitlement owed to all.

## Assessing the Petersian Account of Meaningful Access

I have offered an interpretation of R.S. Peters’ that may go some way in addressing confusion about what counts as meaningful educational inclusion. The stakes of such analysis are high because, as we have seen, some frameworks of inclusion lead to more just outcomes than others. Peters’ account offers criteria through which competing claims about meaningful inclusion could be assessed, serving as a correction to the excesses of what I have termed constructivist and perfectionist views. For example, on a Petersian account restricting special educational supports to functional literacy would be unjust. All children of diverse ability should be set on the path to greater knowledge and understanding, a path informed by the independent standards that define the various forms of knowledge. Such standards are important because they point the learner in the right *direction*. However, educational achievement should be valued in terms of the distance the student’s *individual* abilities and talents will allow them to go.

In what follows I want to address two potential objections to this Petersian account. I choose these in particular because they point to areas where a sympathetic reading of Peters’ concept of education isn’t enough, rather one may need to propose more serious revisions.

First, one might argue that Peters’ *justification* of educationally worthwhile activities reveals a far more exclusionary position than the friendly face I present above. I cannot go into too great exegetical detail here. In short, Peters’ answer to the question of *why* theoretical forms of knowledge are worthwhile is to point out that anyone who asks the question “why is activity X or Y educationally worthwhile” presupposes the knowledge and understanding necessary in order to *answer* questions about what is worthwhile (1973b). In other words, making decisions

about the good life requires sufficient understanding of theoretical forms of knowledge such as philosophy, science, history and so on (Peters 1966, pp. 151–156). Education, then, lays the foundation for the learner to be able to make rationally motivated decisions about what is worthwhile in their own lives.

This transcendental justification has been criticised on the grounds that it assumes a ‘life of reason’ is essential to any life worth living good. So there is a sense in which, underneath a Petersian account of educational inclusion, is a deeper form of exclusion. For many students, a life devoted to virtuosity about reason just isn’t possible or desirable.

How to respond? To begin with, Peters himself was less than satisfied with his proposed justification, and this suggests that a better (and perhaps more inclusive) justification of education is warranted. I believe that a deliberative democratic reconstruction of Peters’ concept of education and his transcendental argument is one plausible direction (Martin 2014, 2016). In my view, Peters’ educational theory should inform rules of public argumentation by which deliberants can arrive at agreement regarding what is educationally worthwhile in a diverse society. Going in the other direction, Stefaan Cuypers has rejected the transcendental argument altogether and argued for a perfectionist justification, though the extent to which such a justification can accommodate the inclusionary principle, alongside other normative questions pertaining to justice, diversity and education, requires further work (2012, pp. 15–16).

Second, one might argue that there is an individualism presupposed in the Petersian analysis that arbitrarily favours classroom exclusion. For example, my analysis has not addressed one of the most contentious issues about inclusion, which is the extent to which full classroom inclusion should be pursued as an ideal. What is the Petersian answer? One possibility is that classroom inclusion should take whatever form will be most likely to promote meaningful educational experiences in all learners. In some cases full classroom inclusion will best serve this educational goal, but in others it may not. Classroom inclusion is an empirical question about what is effective, not an ideal to be debated.

The likely objection to this view is that Peters’ criteria focus on the educational value of an activity for the development of individual minds, without fully considering the educational value of activities undertaken in a community. Having undervalued the place of community in education, it is therefore easier to rationalize removing children from the classroom. We can better understand this charge by looking at Ladenson’s account of the inclusive ethic of inclusionary care. As he puts it:

Despite their immense importance as human values, independence and productive ability are not the sole elements in a fully flourishing human life. Such a life can take place only within a caring community that values the flourishing of all, without qualifications based upon whatever an individual “live on his own”...those who support the ethics of inclusionary care would thus say that when a non-disabled student comes to understand, and to internalize, the above outlook, he benefits in the critical respect of becoming a morally better person. (2003, p. 531)

On this view, the ‘educational enterprise’ is woefully incomplete insofar as the *institutional* inclusion of all is left unfulfilled. Educationally worthwhile activities, it

could be said, can only happen in an educational community with others who are invested, for moral reasons, in one another's success. Such investment cannot happen at a distance. Peters' educational criteria miss this entirely.

Clearly, there are much neglected issues to be raised here with respect to education, self-esteem and moral recognition. However, it would be unfair to claim that these neglected issues can straightforwardly be attributed to a latent individualism in Peters' philosophy. First, modes of experience such as science and art are the result of humanity's public project of knowing and understanding. Students are initiated into these enduring communities of inquiry in order to bring about a person who is in possession of a *public* mind, i.e. a mind that can inquire and reason with others. Second, the educated person is by no means free from moral commitments and attachments. One can see from his writings on fraternity and moral community, for example, that educated persons must learn to live together peaceably through a shared moral understanding achieved through reason-giving *with others* (1966, p. 226).

Yet, one might still wish to revise a Petersian account of meaningful access in a manner more appropriately sensitive to the institutional dimension of inclusion. Perhaps such a revision would involve an explanation of how sociality requires forms of recognition other than reason-giving which, in turn, generate reasons why policy-makers should be more insistent on full classroom inclusion where possible. Another approach might be to supplement Peters' educational theory with a theory of educational institutions. I concede that this does not answer the institutional question, but that is not my intention. My point is that there are some plausible lines through which one could modify or further develop Peters' position in order to productively address problems of inclusion and educational community.

## Conclusion

A Petersian concept of meaningful access can play a helpful role in the debate over the nature and scope of educational inclusion, reminding us that *how* we conceptualise education is going to have serious implications for what *counts* as meaningful access. While Peters' own account is not without its own shortcomings,<sup>6</sup> it can nonetheless help prevent educators from drifting into a *de facto* distinction between 'special' and 'general' education, on the one hand, or a hierarchical conception of educational achievement, on the other.

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<sup>6</sup>Anyone with a further interest in Peters' account of education should treat Jane Roland Martin's critique (1981) as essential reading.

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# Plato and Aristotle



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## Use of the Words *Philosophy* and *Education*

The Greek equivalents for the words *philosophize*, *philosophical*, and *philosophy* first appeared in the colloquial language of Athens during the fifth and fourth centuries before Christ. They mean more or less friendship with and desire (*philein*) for knowledge and wisdom (*sophia*). It was first in Plato's writings of the fourth century that *philosophy* also acquired a terminological significance for an area of questioning strictly demarcated according to object and method. Plato (427–347) connected it with a way of life as well as the fate of Socrates (470–399). The later so-called *pre-Socratic thinkers* did not characterize their investigations as *philosophia* (cf. Kranz 1989), but rather as *historie* (research, reports). The aim of these investigations was “first and foremost the explanation of the external world” and “only incidentally” also referred to “man/people” (Kirk et al. 1994, p. 492). In contrast, the word *philosophy* from the very beginning emphasizes a human-oriented interest of this project: Becoming wise improves people. To philosophize signifies a caring about oneself (*epimeleia heautou*), that is, about one's own excellence (*areté*) in the intellectual competition with others. Even the word itself, *philosophy*, implies insofar an educational meaning and significance. The earliest forms of philosophizing were carried out as discussions among adults as well as between adults and adolescents.

At about the same time as the word *philosophy* entered into the Greek language, the word characterizing the tasks of *education* and *Bildung* (cultivation) starting from childhood onward, *paideia*, was first documented in a drama by Aischylos, which was performed in 467. There were already designations for specialized

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learning and training activities as well as learning processes, for example, with regard to instruction of reading and writing or for learning a musical instrument and sport. However, the emergence of a word extending beyond toward an overall excellence orientation of the adolescent signaled a new matter of concern: Education and instruction were elevated “to a for-itself conceptually formulated problem of theoretical reflection” (Fischer 1998, p. 5).

This reflection as well as the (at first quite general) striving for knowledge also displays a loss of recognition: The integration in a social texture shaped by status by means of customs and habits (ethos) and their legitimation via the myths passed on by poets has lost its previous self-evidence. Among the factors contributing to the erosion of the common grounds of conviction, the democratic participation of the freeborn men in the governing and administration of the city has played a role. In order to succeed within the conditions of democratic participation in the city, beyond the status of those freeborn and the male gender, a broad range of knowledge and, above all, the ability to speak in a convincing fashion were necessary.

Given the need to be able to convince by means of speech and argument in public as well as to acquire a wide-ranging knowledge stemming from various fields brought about, starting in the fifth century, a new kind of teacher. These teachers referred to themselves as *sophists*, the wise or the knowers. They wandered between the Greek cities as traveling instructors and offered courses for (male) adults and adolescents in exchange for what were sometimes very high honorariums. Plato permitted the most famous among them, Protagoras of Abdera (ca. 485–415), in a dialogue bearing his name, to inform us that the object of his teachings is wisdom (*euboulia*, literally: being in a state of and giving good advice). For everyone who participated in his course, he would make them “from day to day” more skillful in domestic and private as well as in public-political engagement and speech (Plato, Prot. 318e/319a). The house (*oikos*) and city (*polis*) were the two largest spheres that occupied the life of the free man. Priority was given to exerting influence in the city. Later, Aristotle (384–322) was urged, as it were, to define people as political beings by nature (*zoon politikon*: Politics 1, 5., 1253 a). For Aristotle, this includes that humans are the only beings that can not only produce sounds but also possess language (*logos*). Accordingly, the rationally grounded claim of the sophists was to offer a comprehensive higher education.

## **Plato’s View of Education from the Early Dialogues to the Philosophy King**

Plato developed his conception of philosophy and human cultivation (*Bildung* and education) in stark contrast to the sophists. He portrayed Socrates, who himself never wrote anything, as the true teacher and friend of wisdom as well as the superior opponent to the sophists. In almost all of his dialogues Plato made Socrates the spokesman of the dialogues. Here, philosophy and *paideia* (education and *Bildung*)

are connected with each other in a double sense. One can differentiate between a performative (a) and a thematizing connection (b). The performative form dominates Plato's earlier writings, the so-called Socratic dialogues. The thematizing form is most prominent in the second and third groups of the 26 real dialogues, which are usually considered as belonging to Plato's complete works.

- (a) Socrates' practices consist, as Plato demonstrates in his early writings, of questioning, testing, and refuting, which can be summed up by the concept of *Socratic method* (*elenchos*). Socrates tests the ideas and convictions of his adult and adolescent fellow citizens, and specifically their ideas regarding issues of the 'highest' significance. These are the "very general ideas" (Fischer 1997, p. 107f.) that guide people through life, for example, ideas concerning right and wrong, bravery and piety, friendship and love, the best possible ordering of the city-state, the proper kind of education, as well as that death is an evil. The examinations begin with others appearing to have knowledge about the issues just mentioned, a knowledge that Socrates lacks. The form of questioning Socrates carries out, which at times seems like an interrogation, proves, however, that the preconceived general notions and knowledge claims are untenable. Socrates insists on consistent conceptual clarity regarding the life-guiding ideas. In the course of his initial examination, however, all attempts to ascertain a clear conception of the initial opinions fail. Plato's Socratic dialogues end in an *aporia*, that is, in a dead-end. The dialogues end with the admission that no sufficient knowledge about that which was inquired was achieved, without however rendering the questions discussed trivial. The Socratic examination sets free a form of thinking that leads from unreflected operative convictions as well as unchallenged beliefs toward the insight into one's own ignorance. Socrates urges a skeptical consideration of the self-evident convictions that have until now guided one's life in an unreflected manner. This process can, if one's attention is directed to Socrates' actions, be characterized as 'education' and as '*Bildung*', when the attention is steered toward the transformation, which the person being examined also engages in.

The performative coincidence of philosophizing with the process of education and *Bildung* should not be confused with instruction along the lines of a transfer of knowledge, for example, regarding geographic relations. Nor is the Socratic method an exercising practice for the correct use of language. Socrates denies ever having been anyone's teacher (Plato, Apology 33 a). He only claims, in contrast to his fellow citizens, to be aware of his own ignorance. That is why he questions those who seem to have knowledge about the important issues, for example, the artisans, the poets, the politicians. In Plato's stylized portrayal of Socrates' life practice, the love of wisdom arises from the awareness of a deficit; one that motivates the search for justified convictions that are secured according to general rational grounds. For the success of one's own life as well as that of the cohabitation in the city-state is at stake. The unveiling of ignorance bears relevance for the habitual collective cohesion, that is, the political and not just personal life. The illusion of knowledge about what really matters in life inevitably brings about an



authoritative attitude. This attitude impedes common deliberation. It blocks the capability of restraining oneself, the shame (*aidos*) which complements the compliance of right (cf. Plato, Protagoras 223, Sophists 229 f.). Plato's Socratic philosophy and education can be understood insofar as a 'negative' practice of destructing hubris and legal incapacity.

In the present day, the basic ideas of the Socrates method live on in educational concepts, which see the central task of education as preventing people from becoming trapped in fundamentalist systems of conviction that are, for instance, political-ideological, worldview, or religious in nature. Today, such systems also quite often include the hidden orientations of pedagogical activities and institutions harboring economic aims. The fundamental idea underlying the Socratic-Platonic integration of philosophy and education has been taken up in a variety of ways by the current discourse. In contrast to *positive* concepts of education, which presuppose unquestioned aims, values, and norms, the Socratic way emphasizes that education and *Bildung* have the task to raise a reflective and problematizing attitude (cf. Ruhloff 1979; Schönherr 2003; Fischer 2004). Regarding the educational studies as a scientific research discipline, the Socratic inheritance was brought into contact with Kant's critique of reason, for example, in Fischer's "transcendental-critical-skeptical" way of investigation (Fischer 1989). It analyzes the presuppositions upon which the validity of scientific and everyday pedagogical statements and practices depend. Fischer criticized the empirical and hermeneutic explorations of pedagogical matters for being uncritical toward the claims to truth and the research findings. Referring to the Socratic-Platonic impulse, Fischer critically reviews this insufficiency. Educational studies are dependent on a form of reflection that examines the (unreflected) presuppositions of educational knowledge (cf. Fischer 1989).

(b) While the early Socratic dialogue is directly involved with philosophizing, Plato later pronounces, in an explicatory fashion, a philosophy as *doctrine*. Education and *Bildung* take up a central role in this doctrine. The important source for this is his text concerning the essence of the state, the Republic, stemming from his middle period. Derived from the leading question concerning the search for an appropriate concept of justice, he develops a concept of the just city-state, where philosophy can exert itself without, like in the case of Socrates, being put to death. Such a city-state must, as Plato developed the notion, be guided by philosophers. The way to philosophy, in the strict sense, involves a long path of education. Even if it turns out that only very few men and women are suitable, from childhood onward, all citizens must be educated. This education has to be based on philosophical thinking and involve legitimate rational argumentation. The postulate that a philosophically guided city-state assigns status on the basis of education holds for at least two of the three different groups that Plato mentions. Plato only goes into detail when it comes to the education of the guardians and the further education of the philosopher king. The future responsible persons for material subsistence within the republic do not receive any special attention. An education that is controlled by philosophy and tailored to the becoming of philosophers should ensure that all citizens enjoy the greatest possible happiness

as well as the longest possible existence of the state. From this perspective, Plato submits the arts, as the source of the traditional linguistic-literary and musical education as well as the overestimated gymnastic training, to a radical critique. Educational aims and activities are judged according to whether they strive toward attitudes and capabilities that are suitable to a rationally organized city-state. In order to fulfill their guardian function, whose task it is to ensure the inner order and protect against outside enemies, this means men and women must live together without private income, without family, and without personally identifiable progeny. From the ranks of the guardian, the most capable individuals are raised, in preparation for the role of ruler or philosophy king, according to an even longer process of education and *Bildung*. Proficiency in this task is only in a much later state of adulthood. Plato rejects expressly gender-specific characteristics as educationally irrelevant and, in so doing, alienated his contemporaries as well as the vast majority of the educational tradition of the ensuing two-and-a-half-thousand years. The education of philosophers is not exclusively directed to the practice of government. According to Plato's political fantasy, the governing class should, at least temporarily, be relieved of their practical duties in order to dedicate themselves exclusively to the task of philosophy. As such, the risky Socratic practice of philosophizing is changed into an independent theory – a preliminary sketch of the battlefield between 'theory' and 'praxis', which remains present in the European tradition.

Due to its interrelationship with the project of designing a just republic, education receives a social selective function. Plato attributes the difference in aptitude to a great degree to nature while using them to determine the qualitative differences and duration of the educational requirements. However, these natural differences cannot be ascertained independent from educational tasks; for only through instruction, trials, and tests do they come to light. Because, however, the educational process is, from the very beginning, tailored to the class order, with unequally distributed rights, and because the proportion of the natural endowments cannot be unequivocally determined, the occasional correction of class assignments is permitted. For that matter, those governing are allowed to tell a lie when it comes to the assignment of the classes in order to secure satisfaction when it comes to the respective social status and unity of the republic. This problem remains virulent in modern societies.

Just as the sophists, Plato frees the question of education from the integrative prejudice of social patterns. However, he in no way questions all of the traditional conceptions of order, especially not that of slavery, even if he at least does not want anything to do with the enslavement of Greeks by other Greeks. The sophists' concepts, according to Plato's polemic representation, result in a training aimed at ego-centric self-assertion; something that several Sophists propagate as the right of the stronger. Against the abandonment of the sober and political order by the individual striving for advantage, Plato assumes an indispensable order of beings for the world of knowledge and for the good life. Only philosophy is capable of clarifying about this order, even though it cannot claim definitive knowledge. Basically, the percep-

tibility and being of this connection of order appears to be guaranteed via the general idea of the good, which ties everything together. It expresses “the perceptible truth” and lends the necessary strength to those who know (Poleiteia, 6 B., 508e). The knowledge of this is what education should be oriented toward.

Education has to overcome a fundamental difficulty; for access to knowledge of the true and good order is initially disguised from mankind. In contrast to the optimism of modernity, which since the European Renaissance assumes the orientation of mankind toward *Bildung*, Plato’s educational philosophy begins from a more pessimistic position. Its point of departure is the reality of *Unbildung* or lack of education. *Unbildung* (*apaideusia*) is a force of resistance. Initially, it stands in opposition to pedagogical efforts. It is introduced as the destiny of mankind and not as just an age-related deficit. That is implied in the allegory of the cave, the image-oriented representation of education. The allegory describes “the human nature in relation to *paideia* and *apaideusia*” (Politeia, 7th book, 513a ff.). The primary human condition is determined via the lacking awareness of one’s unknowing. In the condition of unknowing, people are impressed upon – without any resistance – by the perception of shadows on the cave wall in front of them, as if they had been from the very beginning chained and were forced to look in only one direction. The shadow images that they see originate from an event occurring behind their backs. On their own, they are unable, however, to turn around. They do not even feel the need to do so, because they are comfortable and safe, and they have never known a different state. They appear to be lacking in nothing. Already the perception of shadow images is dependent on an intellectual capacity that has nothing to do with education, but rather only steers us in the right direction. Here the painful act of freeing from the chains and the *turn* (*periagoge*) of the intellectual capacity against the light begins. Reluctantly guided by the educator in the beginning, an individual is eventually led up the steep and long path out of the cave. In the allegory, this path finally leads to freedom and the sight of the sun, the symbol of the idea of the good. It is identified as the cause of being, life, and knowledge. Three stages of the educational path are differentiated. After the initial state of belief (*pistis*) of images comes a stage of belief (*doxa*) supported by sensory perception, exemplified via the perception of the causes of what the chained people see, and as the symbol for an understanding of the relationships within the everyday lifeworld tied to the senses. The real world is only accessible to a kind of thinking essentially detached from sensory perception. The allegory represents this thinking in terms of exiting the cave, which in Plato’s explication means via the curriculum of higher education (*Bildung*). This education is divided into two sections. The introductory threshold is the ability to perform mathematical operations without appeal to sensory perceptions. The first phase of higher education takes up the mathematical disciplines arithmetic, geometry, the not yet developed, yet postulated stereometry, astronomy, and music theory or theory of harmony. The common features of these research areas are that they have to do with objects and relations that can only be explored via thinking and not perception, even if they can be applied to that which can be perceived. These disciplines also have practical value and uses, for example, when it comes to war strategy. However, its state of knowledge does not depend on this. A

criterion of *Bildung* is that it can refrain from purposes of utility. The mathematical disciplines liberate from the entanglement with perceptual desire. The highest aim of education is not met by them, however. They all operate on the grounds of the intellect (*dianoia*) with its theoretical assumptions and ‘hypotheses’ that are not called into question. Reason (*nous*) in the form of philosophy, in contrast, transcends thinking that is grounded on assumptions. Philosophy is the special discipline of unconditional thinking. Plato conceives of it as a methodologically driven ‘art of differentiation’ in the handling of concepts under the designation ‘dialectic’. The dialectic “neutralizes the assumptions” (Republic 533c f.). From the viewpoint of education, the dialectic forces ‘the eye of the soul’ from the ‘barbarous morass’ in which it was buried. After this escalation, a philosophizing oriented toward the idea of the good alone fulfills the whole purpose of education and *Bildung*.

In a city-state not ruled by philosophers it is extremely unlikely that philosophers come to be. They will be at best a rare exception as Plato makes plausible referring to his rich experience (Republic, Book 6). The realization of a just polis via proper education, Plato explains, is nonetheless fundamentally possible. It can succeed if the polis corresponds to a just mental constitution of the citizens, so that the reasonable judgment (*sophrosyne*) guides the courageous striving (*thymos*) and prevails in the face of opposing appetites (*epithymia*). Although in this ideal general tendency the educational and politically desirable goals would be more or less achievable, Plato does not assign any unlimited duration to his educational-philosophical city-state, for “everything that has come into being must perish” (Republic, Book 8, 546a). He specifically speaks about probable inexactitudes of the mathematically correct investigation of the matching relations which are sketched out by nature and must be attended to in the siring of offspring. From this follows improper assignments to the social classes as well as disagreement among the guardians and ruler.

In Plato’s later writing *Nomoi* (The Laws), the skeptical openness of the Socratic beginning (that is also still recognizable in his Republic) is abandoned in favor of a tendency toward rigid regulations in the form of law-like provisions. The trust in the unifying force of reasonable argumentation appears, for the most part, to have been lost. With the establishment of the Academy, Plato created the institutional support for a social community that dedicated itself to higher *Bildung*, scientific achievement, and philosophy. It endured for around 900 years before it eventually succumbed to “the politically successful Christendom” (Szlezák 1996, Sp. 386). As an organized community of those striving for wisdom, under the guidance of philosopher, the Academy was a kind of analogue to the biologically regenerative city. In the handed-down tradition and regeneration of the striving for knowledge over the generations, something that Plato attributed to Eros had remained alive. Eros, in the form described by Plato, is a yearning for immortality, which can only be achieved by mortal beings via the ‘reproduction and procreation in the beautiful’ and good. It is not exhausted in the bodily appetites, which however are not rejected, as suggested by the expression “Platonic love” (cf. in contrast, e.g., Plato, Charmides 155 d/e). For mortal beings, the erotic yearning for perfection can only be fulfilled in the pedagogical regeneration of the striving toward knowledge of the good, that is, in a shared philosophizing. This connection relativizes the pairing of Plato’s educational philosophy to the conception of making philosophers state leaders.

## Aristotle and the Question of Areté

Aristotle, Plato's most notable student, attended the Academy for many years, from adolescence onward. Unlike Plato, education was not one of the central themes of his universal works. Aristotle's interests included the whole spectrum of knowledge fields of his time, to which he added the exploration of the living and living beings. The ancient tradition attributes 106 writings to Aristotle, some of which possess the quality of lecture notes. We do not have any of the texts he released within his lifetime. The style of his treatment of pedagogical topics differs strongly from that of the Platonic dialogues. Aristotle discusses such issues from the position of an uninvolved, a describing observer and explorer, whereas Plato is himself noticeably involved in the educational-philosophical questions he discusses. Aristotle writes about educational questions in connection with his theories of ethics and politics. For him, these subject areas, unlike for Plato, became relatively independent philosophical fields of knowledge. The differentiation between *theoretical* and *practical* reason, which has shaped the entire tradition, goes back to him. This distinction has been taken shape in the later Plato, not in the earlier Socratic dialogues. Plato's speculative sketch of a city-state, whose organization is oriented toward the highest aim of the philosophical *Bildung* of mankind, is subjected by Aristotle to an analysis of reality. There is no room for bold postulates like gender equality or the abolishment of private property for the public officials. In other words, Plato's sketch of a republic is scathingly criticized by Aristotle (Aristotle, *Politics*, 2, 2–6.).

The guiding question, from the viewpoint of education, however remains: how can people become excellent (to get *areté*)? And how is this *areté* connected to the question of appropriate political constitution? In contrast to the Socratic-Platonic approach, Aristotle does not attribute the main problem to a lack of knowledge. He proceeds from the general assumption that *areté* is based on three factors: natural endowment, habituation, and instruction (Nicomachean Ethics X., 10.). Natural endowment is beyond the sphere of education. Instruction, thus knowledge, certainly belongs to good action but cannot bring it forth by itself. They can only become active in connection with a corresponding habitus (*hexis*), which must already be acquired through the practice of good habits as well as which in the political coexistence, if need be, brought about or maintained through the force of law. "Whoever does not broadly pursue the goals in life found in ethics [...] will not recognize the truth in the setting up of these goals" or "as practical truth pertaining to oneself" (Müller 1982, p 286).

Decisive for the specific determination of both the best political constitution as well as the functionality belonging to this way of educating is the question concerning the desirable form of life (*bios*) (cf. Aristotle, *Politics*, 7th Book). A good life is unequivocally desired by all people. Happiness (*eudaimonia*) is in and of itself worth striving toward (cf. N.E., 1st Book). Happiness or a "successful life" (A.W. Müller) can be searched for in various life forms, which have different levels of value. Its realization or failure to obtain is a matter of the praxis. Praxis, in the strict sense, is to distinguish between making (*techne*) and producing (*poiesis*).

Theoretical, scientific knowledge deals with objects and relations that are immutable and the knowledge of which can be proven with logical necessity. However, when it comes to practical knowledge, we are confronted with contingent relations. Political constitutions and forms of education, for example, unlike falling bodies, act one way or another. Objects of practical knowledge are the issues related to human existence. Happiness, *eudaimonia*, and good action (*eupragia*) are one and the same. In the everyday sense, praxis is understood as standing in opposition to theory. Aristotle reinterprets this view. Contrary to the widespread public aristocratic ideal of man, whose “superiority” in activities of politics and war is manifest (Bien 1989, Sp. 1284), he argues:

But the active life is not necessarily active in relation to other men, as some people think, nor are only those processes of thought active that are pursued for the sake of the objects that result from action, but far more those speculations and thoughts that have their end in themselves and are pursued for their own sake. (Politics, Book 7, 1325 b)

As such, the “philosophical way of life [...] becomes the highest human possibility” and the “practical-political life moves down to the second rung” (Bien 1989, Sp. 1283). The notion of a nobility acquirable via *Bildung*, which circulated in the Renaissance and again in the pedagogical concepts of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, helped keep this connection alive. Theory as a form of life, and thus as praxis, implies, according to Aristotle, that education of the free persons, who alone can claim it, are oriented toward contemplative leisure (*schole*). Education intends the “proper use of contemplative leisure” (Politics, 7, 14., 1333 b). Contemplative leisure is relieved from the necessary work, and the space reserved, not for the artisans, nor the slaves, but for the free persons for the active and pleasurable ‘unfolding of human powers and capabilities’. Contemplative leisure coincides with the experience of happiness and is dependent on peace (Welskopf 1962, p. 276). Productive activities like the handcrafts have no purpose in and of themselves, but rather produce a good separate from the acting person. The pleasure of a satisfying life-fulfillment in contemplative leisure also does not characterize learning in childhood and adolescence. Learning is unavoidably tied to displeasure. As a result, it is also not a game (Politics, 8, 5.). Playing is connected with the recovery from work. A praxis of contemplative leisure would be the contemplation as to what meaning work and play have for a good human life and who is entitled to it (cf. Arendt 2002).

Aristotle did not present a systematic educational doctrine. His statements about the education of the youth follow in awareness that pedagogical questions are controversially discussed. Neither about the objects of education nor about whether the training of the intellect or rather the formation of character is emphasized, is there, as he notes, any agreement. His own considerations look for the meaning between preexisting contrary views and extreme values. Basically, education guarantees the conformity with the respective constitution of the *polis*, without having to judge the actual constitutions as equally good. Education is conceived as relevant to the constitution. It is understood “as a ruling activity,” which introduces the coming generation to the question regarding the handling of the purposive overall order of the polis (Benner 2001, p. 125). The idea of a hierarchic, practical world and praxis order



contrasts sharply with the foundational tendencies of the modernity. It is specifically incompatible with an educational problem tied to Rousseau. To assume the needs and rights of the individual is basically a reversal of the Aristotelian concepts. Wilhelm von Humboldt demands “Bildung” to be as little as possible oriented toward the bourgeois relations, so that rather “the constitution of the State, so to speak” can test itself on the educated persons.

Other Aristotelian concepts remain present in the contemporary discourse. This also holds for his theory of learning. Contrary to the current reductions, for example, from education to the processing of information, it has been argued that learning takes place as process of experience on the grounds of a prior understanding or knowledge. Learning cannot, therefore, be conceived in terms of writing on a tabula rasa. Conveyed by the Anglo-Saxon philosophy, more recently Aristotle’s praxis-philosophical differentiations are receiving renewed attention. The orientation “on the categories of *poiesis* and *praxis*” are reclaimed for an appropriate discussion of pedagogical questions (Müller 2008, p 12). This orients itself away from an understanding of education in terms of production, as it has presently become dominant in educational policy. The question “what is education” cannot, according to this concept, be answered prior to and independent of the clarification of “what is good education” (ebd., p 8).

Like the reflections stimulated by the works of G.E.M. Anscombe, the German-speaking philosophy of education has over the past several decades brought a scientific-theoretical accentuated discourse involving Aristotle into contact with Wittgenstein’s theory of language-games. This discourse refers to the claims to the truth of educational statements. On the one hand, education cannot be meaningfully discussed without the inclusion of normative issues. However, it seems equally impossible to arrive at evidential claims as well as to abandon the realm of reasoning altogether (cf. Ruhloff 1979). Given this dilemma, the connection to a theory of justification of practical sentences is offered by Aristotle in his *Rhetoric*. In connection with Wittgenstein’s conceptions regarding the function of language-games and “certainty,” argumentational-theoretical concepts of education have been developed (cf. Helmer 1996; Dörpinghaus 2002; Koch 2004). There exist parallels between these rhetoric approaches and the earlier mentioned continuation of the Socratic-Platonic skepticism (Schönherr 2003). Referring to Aristotle, it is argued that educational knowledge about contingent pedagogical matters can be constituted. The Socratic-Platonic reference focuses, in contrast, its attention on the critical analysis and on ignorance – both are equally important for educational practices and educational studies or research.

## Conclusion

In the philosophy of education, initiated by Plato, a distancing of thought takes place in contrast to the socialized habitual life patterns that bring about prejudice. Saving the questions of truth from corruption via circulating opinions is a leitmotiv



in the fifth and fourth centuries emerging educational philosophy and philosophy of *Bildung* in Greece. Their questions and theorems do not overcome the “connection of guilt tied to privilege” (T.W. Adorno). The dependency of a more humane cultivation of ‘unfree work’ was, at the time of the emergence of philosophy, more or less thematized, and Socrates executed the orientation of the question toward conceptual generality of claims to truth. The theorems and postulates connected with early educational philosophy, however, were not referred to a general humanitarian perspective. In no way did it imply something along the lines of a universal human right of an education of high quality. To this extent, we cannot speak of ‘humanism’. On the basis of new research concerning the political economy of the era, the discrepancy between general truth claims and social privileging cannot be explained with simple models, such as the reflex of a “slaveholder society” (Marx). Belonging to the heritage of the early educational philosophy is an acceptance of inequality, which according to Aristotle also permits a reduction of ‘education’ to the training of ‘living instruments’ (slaves) to be used by those citizens born free and well-to-do. With a view to the global relations, this is today still the dominant reality. However, it is from the early philosophical enlightenment that the critique from historical reality arises.

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# Fazlur Rahman, Islamic Philosophy of Education and the Islamisation of Knowledge



Yusef Waghid and Nuraan Davids

## Rahman's Thesis on Islamic Philosophy of Education

Both Wan Daud (1997) and Ahmed (1989) consider Rahman's thesis on the Islamisation of knowledge as a "promising intellectual agenda of Islamic resurgence and one of the most controversial issues that has captured the imagination and elicited strong reaction of Muslim intellectuals and activists across the globe since the late 1970s" (Wan Daud 1997: 2). It is within the ambit of Islamic revivalism that Rahman postulated his thesis on the Islamisation of knowledge. Of course, the Islamisation of knowledge idea was most poignantly pursued by scholars like Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas and Ismail al-Faruqi.

The reference to Islamisation was first made by al-Attas and al-Faruqi at the World Congress on Islamic Education in 1977. To al-Faruqi (1982: 18), Islamisation represents an integration of "new knowledge into the corpus of the Islamic legacy". Al-Faruqi's (1982) proposal of Islamisation involves a detailed 12-step work-plan, which incorporates the mastery of modern disciplines, the mastery of Islamic legacy, a survey of the *ummah's* (community's) major problems, to recasting the disciplines under the framework of Islam and the dissemination of Islamised knowledge. The objective of his understanding of Islamisation is to reapproach the disciplines – such as sociology, economics and anthropology – so as to foreground Islam. Al-Faruqi (1982) defines Islamisation as an actionable theory through which the reform of education should be the Islamisation of modern knowledge itself. To him, Islamisation means the recasting of every discipline on the principles of Islam in its methodology, in its strategy, in what it regards as its data, its problems, its objectives, and its aspirations.

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Unlike al-Faruqi (1982), however, Wan Daud (2009) maintains that the theory of Islamisation has little to do with the reworking of textbooks, or the restructuring of academic disciplines, but fundamentally to do with the reconstituting of the right kind of human being – that is, a human being who exhibits just action – an idea borrowed from the Malaysian scholar, Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, which we will discuss later in this chapter. According to Wan Daud (2009: 8), Islamic epistemology recognises that knowledge – “stripped of the faulty opinions, doubts, and conjectures, as well as negative influence of the various human interests generally termed as *hawa*, is indeed universal”. Others like Halstead (2004: 521–522) describe Islamisation as a key process in countering the influence of western secularism on Islamic institutions. In turn, Abushouk (2008: 39) explains that Islamisation stems from the premise that because contemporary knowledge has been designed by western scholars who have their own cultural, historical and secular worldview, it is neither value-free nor universal. In this sense, therefore, Abushouk continues, Islamisation can be described as a revivalist response to modernity and its secular impact on Muslim society.

Yet, Fazlur Rahman’s involvement in the *Islamisation of knowledge* agenda cannot be denied as an impetus to his notion of Islamic revivalism. While al-Faruqi (1982) considers Islamisation as a direct response to what he considered as the malaise of the *umma* (community), Rahman’s (2011: 450) argument for an Islamisation of knowledge is motivated by “a feeling that the modern world has been developed and structured upon knowledge which cannot be considered Islamic”. Instead, Rahman (2011: 450) is of the view that the modern world has misused knowledge; “that there is nothing wrong with knowledge, but that it has simply been misused”. Al-Faruqi and Rahman are in agreement, however, that an Islamisation of knowledge provides a resurgent alternative to modern society and its impact on Islamic society. Rahman was critical of Muslim orthodoxy, most notably the influences of authoritarianism, and a general conservatism and uncriticality in relation to the interpretation of Islamic foundational sources. This criticism culminated in his phenomenal book, *Islam and Modernity* (Rahman 1982), in which he enunciates his understanding of Islamisation in relation to the re-education of Muslims. For him, firstly, Muslims have erroneously distinguished between religious or traditional sciences and the rational or secular sciences (Rahman 1982: 33). Rahman (1982) posits that if such a separation were to be defended, rationality would be disassociated from intuition. That is, to accept such a bifurcation is tantamount to arguing that religious sciences are not rational, and rational sciences are not religious. For Rahman (1982: 148) such a bifurcation of knowledge view is incommensurate with the unity of knowledge idea propounded by Muslim scientists who attached a high positive value to their intellectual pursuits such as the study of the universe and creation in relation to the Qur’an. In his words,

... the Quran, has a special point of view on the ultimate nature of studies of the universe (as it has on the studies of [wo]man and history), but the fact that it encourages these studies is important. As such, they are to be regarded in general as an integral part of Islamic intellectualism. (Rahman 1982: 148)

In other words, for Rahman, rational thought impinges heavily on religious thought and vice versa. Thus, for him Islamic philosophy of education is synonymous with a notion of “Islamic intellectualism” constituted by an analysis of the Quran and its responsiveness to moral, religious, social, historical, judicial and theological concerns and/or problems (Rahman 1982: 5). Put differently, for Rahman (1982: 7) an analysis of Qur’anic meanings – what he refers to as intellectual *jihad* (literally, striving) – is an effort to understand its implications for societal and historical practices, concomitantly with an examination of the latter (i.e. socio-historical situations) and its influence on Qur’anic interpretation. To Rahman (2011: 449–450), the fact that human beings have been granted the capacity to use their ‘*aql*’ (intellect, reason) means not only that they can discover knowledge, but that they have a responsibility to continually discover knowledge.

Inasmuch as an analysis of Qur’anic meanings impact socio-historical conditions, so does an interpretation of such conditions influence an understanding of Qur’anic texts. What this means is that an Islamic philosophy of education is at once concerned with connecting Qur’anic analyses (hermeneutics) with socio-historical situations and vice versa. In sum, Rahman’s (1982) philosophy of education is constituted by at least three dimensions: first, (Islamic) education is enframed by intellectual efforts to analyse Qur’anic meanings and its relevance to socio-historical conditions; second, an examination of the socio-historical contexts in which Muslims find themselves ought to be constantly re-examined so as to rethink the guiding rules of the Qur’an vis-à-vis such situations; and third, any attempt at finding meanings responsive to particular situations should be looked at without erroneously separating what is considered as religious or traditional from what is rational or secular. In the next section we examine as to how such a Rahmanian understanding of Islamic philosophy of education has framed the Islamisation of knowledge debate.

## **Islamisation of Knowledge as Enframed by Rahman’s Islamic Philosophy of Education**

Elsewhere, we have argued that Islamisation of knowledge offers a paradigm of knowledge construction in terms of which knowledge is conceived within an Islamic worldview (Waghid and Davids 2016: 220). Now, although Islamisation had been articulated in opposition to the secular, Rahman (1982) argues for a contrary position whereby all forms of knowledge are considered as integrated, including the secular, which in his view should remain subjected to Qur’an (re)interpretation and an Islamic metaphysics (Waghid and Davids 2016: 221). Put differently, all forms of knowledge should be regarded as Islamised if subjected to both Qur’an (re)interpretation and a metaphysical perspective of Islam. When conceived through the lenses of Rahman’s notion of Islamic philosophy of education, Islamised knowledge (including secular knowledge) is open-ended in the sense that knowledge does not have to attain the level of finality or certainty (Wan Daud 1997: 15). Although

Wan Daud (1997: 15), drawing on the ideas of Islamisation of Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas, argues against Rahman's open-ended view of knowledge, namely that "[k]nowledge of the fundamental credal matters such as the nature of God, revelation, religion, [wo]man and his destiny, of ethical and legal matters, are not open for further revision and correction ...", he posits that knowledge is subjected to "further elaboration and application" (Wan Daud 1997: 15). In other words, Islamised knowledge, following Wan Daud, is certain and final but its elaboration and application remain open to intellectual scrutiny. We surmise that Rahman himself would take issue with such a criticism in the sense that an interpretation of religion itself (which includes elaboration and application) cannot be closed on the basis that socio-historical situations vary as new meanings are construed. By implication, interpretations of religion cannot remain absolute, Rahman posits (1982: 145): "It is obviously not necessary that a certain interpretation once accepted must continue to be accepted; there is always room and necessity for new interpretations, for this is, in truth, an ongoing process".

Rahman (1979a, b: 186–187) couches Islamic philosophy of education as a discourse that should not privilege religious sciences over rational sciences. In other words, following Rahman, there is no justification to consider theological or religious sciences as more important than philosophical or rational sciences and vice versa. Rather, all forms of knowledge are organically related and any claims to exclusive self-sufficiency or absolutism, and "blind imitation" undermine the possibility of thinking and creativity (Rahman 1979a, b: 187). In other words, any defensible notion of an Islamic philosophy of education cannot be subjected to a fractured understanding of tradition as it has nothing to do with reason (Rahman 1979a, b: 191). Hence, for Rahman, a philosophy of Islamic education remains subjected to a non-separationist view of knowledge and that religious sciences or traditional sciences and rational or philosophical sciences are intertwined. More poignantly, a philosophy of Islamic education is aimed at counteracting "blind adherence" to "the basic ideas of Islam in such a way as to open the door for the influence of new ideas and for the acquisition of modern knowledge in general" (Rahman 1979a, b: 217). Instead, he avers that a philosophy of Islamic education ought to encourage Muslims "to accept the intellectualism and the humanism of the modern West as a genuine development from the apogee of Islamic civilization itself ..." (Rahman 1979a, b: 220). By implication, a philosophy of Islamic education, following Rahman (1979a, b: 215) draws on multiple strands of education with the intent to rethink Muslim intellectualism progressively according to the demands of what it means to achieve justice in societies. Put differently, a philosophy of Islamic education involves a rethinking of knowledge in an integrated way that can be responsive to the just concerns of any given society.

## Islamisation of Knowledge in Practice

Understandings of an Islamisation of knowledge have taken different forms in different contexts. As noted by Shaw (2006: 48), curriculum reform integrating the Islamic epistemic traditions within the disciplines of the social sciences and humanities, for example, has yet to be devised imaginatively in the Gulf States and Saudi Arabia. In Iran, the Ayatollah Khomeini introduced the Islamisation of the curriculum in schools and universities after the Cultural Revolution in Iran (post-1980), on the basis that Western curricula alienated students from their Islamic roots (Levers 2006: 159). In this instance, an Islamisation of knowledge was interpreted and implemented through a renewed focus on Islamic identity, and concepts such as, “justice, equality, morality, devotion to family, absence of malice and avarice, and cooperation with the state ... advocated as attributes of an Islamic society” (Levers 2006: 166). Yet, although Islamic texts on themes such as the family in Islam, psychology from an Islamic viewpoint, Islamic economics, Islamic law and Islamic political thought were introduced in specific faculties in universities to supplement the existing curriculum in the social sciences, university textbooks for scientific and technical subjects remained unaltered (Levers 2006: 161). By implication, the envisaged Islamisation in the aftermath of the revolution has not had the desired consequences, more specifically at the levels of fusion between the traditional and “modern” curriculum (Waghid and Davids 2016).

While the example of the Islamisation of knowledge in Iran might be best described as a supplementary position, a more maximally integrated approach is encountered in Malaysia. The Islamisation agenda in Malaysia, pioneered by the Muslim Youth Movement (*ABIM*) in the 1970s and 1980s, was influenced primarily by Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas’s intellectual, academic and historical aspirations to transform the lives and thoughts of the majority-Muslim Malay community and had a strong sociocultural impetus. During this phase of Islamisation, *ABIM* strongly advocated a discourse of Islamic universalism and its significance for a pluralistic Malaysia, which involved adhering to the democratic teachings of Islam, promoting equal and complementary roles for men and women and promoting social justice for all, irrespective of ethnic and religious affiliation (Bakar 2009: 38). The main focus of *ABIM*’s Islamisation programmes was education through their nationwide network of kindergartens and schools (and later Islamic teacher training colleges and universities) through which they advanced the idea of the Islamisation of modern knowledge (Waghid and Davids 2016). For the majority-Muslim Malays, Islamisation meant that the curriculum in secondary schools and universities was organised to produce citizens who were intellectually, spiritually, emotionally and physically balanced and harmonious, with a strong belief in God (Hashim 1996: 8).



Zain et al. (2016: 20) explain that an Islamised curriculum at the International Islamic University Malaysia (IIUM) follows two concurrent processes: ‘omitting’ the western-based curriculum and ‘infusing’ with Islamic inputs – as shown in the example below:

Omitting process	Infusing process
Eliminate the philosophy from western view	Remember the Islamic history and civilisation
Eliminate non-Islamic values, e.g. Darwinism, nature	Instil Islamic values and good ethics
Eliminate destructive knowledge (e.g. the making of nuclear bombs)	Infuse knowledge that will increase <i>Tawhid</i> (Oneness) and bring human beings closer to Islam
	Infuse constructive knowledge (for the sake of being beneficial to mankind)

Zain et al. (2016): 20

The Islamisation agenda has not been limited to Muslim-majority countries; it has also been attempted in Muslim-minority countries, such as South Africa, specifically in privately managed, Muslim-based schools. As Waghid and Davids (2016: 232) observe, the idea of Islamisation has been familiar to Muslim schools since the 1970s and took root at a number of schools when a Cape Town-based school hosted the Sixth International Education Conference on Islamisation of Knowledge in 1996. Discussions and ideas from this conference led to a number of schools agreeing, in principle, to implement an Islamised curriculum. The Islamised curriculum, however, needed to be integrated with the South African national curriculum, which at that time was grounded on an outcomes-based approach to education, leading to various interpretations and adaptations of an ‘Islamised’ curriculum. While certain schools changed their names to reflect a more pronounced Islamic identity and ethos, and introduced Islamic subjects, others changed the routine and structure of their school day to incorporate daily prayers and the recitation of the Qur’an. Waghid and Davids (2016: 234) maintain that although private Muslim schools in South Africa advocate an allegiance to an integrated Islamised curriculum, in reality, their curricular changes are commensurate with that of a supplementary approach to Islamisation. There are a number of possible reasons for the lack of consensus on an ‘Islamised’ curriculum or the implementation thereof. On the one hand, teachers have not been trained in teaching an ‘Islamised’ curriculum. On the other hand, the educational qualifications of teachers are varying and, at times, non-existent. While some might have a formal qualification in education, others might have a qualification as a *madrassah* teacher or a certificate in Arabic or *fiqh*, or others may be teachers by virtue of being *hafiz* (one who has memorised the Qur’an) (Waghid and Davids 2016).

Of course, as hinted at earlier in this chapter, Rahman had his critics, and one of his most vehement opponents in advancing a philosophy of Islamic education vis-à-vis the practice of Islamisation of knowledge was the Malaysian scholar, Syed

Muhammad Naquib al-Attas. We now turn to a discussion of al-Attas's notion of the Islamisation of knowledge concept and his alternative view of Islamic philosophy of education.

## **Towards a Critique of Rahman's Islamisation Approach: An Analysis of al-Attas's Islamisation Agenda**

Western civilisation, according to al-Attas (1991: 43–44) “has recast the knowledge and rational and scientific spirit to fit the crucible of Western culture”, and as a result, have become fused and amalgamated with all the other elements that form the character and the personality of Western civilisation. This fusion or amalgamation states al-Attas (1991) has produced a dualism that has, in turn, produced a disunity. In other words, because there exists conflicting cultures, values, beliefs and philosophies, harmonious unity within Western culture is not possible. By contrast, from an Islamic worldview, where there is no separation between the social, intellectual and the physical, there is therefore, as al-Attas (2005: 33) contends, “no conflict between societal and individual aims because there is unity of purpose”. And unity, according to al-Attas (2005: 33) has two facets – external unity, which discerns itself in the form of community and cohesion, and internal unity, which reveals itself in the form of spiritual lucidity, way beyond the confines of communal or national identities.

Hence, following on the above, and contrary to Rahman's recognition of secular knowledge as an integrated aspect of Islamic knowledge, al-Attas (1991: 45–46) couches Islamisation as

... the liberation of [wo]man first from magical, mythological, animistic, national-cultural tradition, and then from secular control over his [her] reason and his [her] language.

Whereas Rahman recognises secular knowledge as rational knowledge and hence important to Islamisation, al-Attas is fundamentally critical of secularism which he considers as alien to Islam in the sense that it belongs and is “natural only to the intellectual history of Western-Christian religious experience and consciousness” (al-Attas 1993: 25). Although al-Attas does not misrecognise the integration of rational and religious sciences, for him, Islamisation of knowledge “means the deliverance of knowledge from its interpretations based on secular ideology; and from meanings and expressions of the secular” (al-Attas 1991: 43). Consequently, he calls for an extension of knowledge that includes comparative religion from an Islamic perspective; an understanding of other religions, cultures and civilisations in relation to Islam; Islamic languages; and Islamic history, such as to desecularise knowledge and by implication enacting its Islamisation (al-Attas 1991: 43). To al-Attas, explains Hashim and Rossidy (2000: 25), knowledge is not totally and purely the product of the human mind and experience but is also based on revealed truth. For this reason, continues Hashim and Rossidy (2000: 25), knowledge continuously

requires direction, supervision and confirmation from the revealed truth – “This is so because the metaphysics of Islam is not only based upon reason and experience but also firmly grounded upon Revelation” (Hashim and Rossidy 2000: 28).

Moreover, whereas a Rahmanian conception of an Islamic philosophy of education advocates for a rethinking of knowledge in response to societal injustice, al-Attas (1991: 34) makes a case for *adab* as the “the capacity for discernment of the right and proper places of things”. Unlike Rahman, al-Attas (1991: 34) blames injustice in societies on a loss of *adab* that resulted in “confusion and error in knowledge of Islam and the Islamic vision of reality and truth ...”. Rahman, on the other hand, attributes societal injustice to the impotence of traditional Muslim education and its failure to recognise the secular (Wan Daud 1997: 18). Both Rahman (1982) and al-Attas (1991) seem to concur that the problem in societies involves a lack of a plausible conception of knowledge, although al-Attas’s (1991) position is to deny the secular and Rahman’s (1982) thesis is to invoke secular knowledge and understandings. Of course, Rahman was not uncritical towards secular knowledge on the basis that such knowledge can inhibit the modernisation of a philosophy of Islamic education (Rahman 1982: 134). His claim that such knowledge should be integrated into a comprehensive understanding of knowledge suggests that he is remiss of its potential to corrupt an Islamic conception of knowledge.

## Implications for Contemporary Debates in Philosophy of Education

As Waghid and Davids (2016: 220–221) argue, Islamisation, as both an ideological and epistemological construct, has undoubtedly assumed its forms in relation to the (de)secularisation of knowledge. One of the key concerns that the propagation of the Islamisation of knowledge raises is whether the modernisation of Islamic knowledge necessarily needs to be couched within the debate of a secular/religious dichotomy. And following on this, an extended concern might be to ascertain what exactly is understood by a secularisation and desecularisation of knowledge, and indeed whether an Islamisation of knowledge might yield the intended Rahmanian results of providing a resurgent alternative to modern society and its impact on Islamic society. In this regard, we echo the concern of al-Attas (1991), that an Islamisation of knowledge cannot simply mean the transplantation or extrapolation of secular knowledge into Islamic sciences and principle. Practices such as these, argue Hashim and Rossidy (2000: 30), “will only yield perpetual conflicting results and meaningless efforts because the essence of foreign elements or disease remains in the body of knowledge that makes it impossible to recast it in the crucible of Islam. Moreover, they contend, that transplanting between two distinct and contradictory elements and key concepts will produce neither secular knowledge nor Islamic one” (Hashim and Rossidy 2000: 30).

On the one hand, therefore, we would agree with Hashim and Rossidy (2000: 22) in their contention that the phrase “Islamisation of knowledge” is to a certain extent misleading “because it gives the connotation that all knowledge, including Islamic traditional knowledge based on the Qur’an and the Sunnah, which were developed by Muslim scholars over the millennium are not Islamic and therefore, needs to be Islamized” (Hashim and Rossidy 2000: 22).

If one considers societies in which attempts have been made to implement an Islamisation of knowledge, then often what one sees is a supplementary curriculum, rather than an integrated curriculum, which takes into account an embedded Islamisation of knowledge. Levers (2006: 159) reports that with the cultural revolution in Iran (post-1980), instigated by the Ayatollah Khomeini, the emphasis on Iranian nationalism and identity in school textbooks was minimised. Instead, explains Levers (2006: 166), attention was focused on “concepts such as justice, equality, morality, devotion to family, absence of malice and avarice, and cooperation with the state ... advocated as attributes of an Islamic society”. Despite the Islamic Republic of Iran support of an Islamisation of knowledge, Levers (2006: 172) maintains that the education system continues to offer a lack of space for individuality, self-expression and critical thinking in the school curriculum, coupled with an overemphasis on overtly ideologically driven curricular content that undermines creative thought.

Despite concerns being raised by non-Muslims regarding their own religious rights and cultural values, as discussed by Bakar (2009: 41), the Islamisation of knowledge in Malaysian educational centres seems to have enjoyed the greatest impact. The Malaysian example according to Hwang (2008: 159) represents a maximal form of Islamisation. In this regard, sufficient emphasis has been placed on an integrated Islamised curriculum in schools and universities under the auspices of a government intent on promoting the idea of Islamisation of knowledge. In the 1990s, the government initiated curricular reforms and launched an integrated curriculum for secondary schools in order to inculcate universal religious values in all young people (Hwang 2008: 159). Through the educational efforts of the Muslim Youth Movement (*ABIM*), continues Hwang (2008: 160), the state’s curriculum for Malay Muslims became integrated with an Islamic philosophy of education in schools. (Hwang 2008: 160). Likewise, at the higher education level, members of the Muslim Youth Movement (*ABIM*) became influential in the development of the International Islamic University of Malaysia (IIUM), which largely influenced by the Islamisation agenda of Ismail al-Faruqi, as well as the International Institute of Islamic Thought and Civilisation (ISTAC) under the then directorship of Syed Muhammad Naquib al-Attas (Waghid and Davids 2016: 230).

While the aforementioned examples are located in Muslim-majority countries, attempts at an Islamisation of knowledge have also been made in Muslim-minority countries, such as South Africa – specifically in private Muslim-based schools. These attempts have taken the form of sporadic supplementary programmes, to changes in the daily routine of learners, which might offer more spaces for prayers

and devotional activities. At this stage, there seems to be little consensus among schools and teachers what an Islamised curriculum might look like, or might achieve (Waghid and Davids 2016).

What interests us, and might hold particular implications for contemporary debates in philosophy of education, is Rahman's open-ended approach to knowledge construction, as encapsulated in his statement that an individual can "discover knowledge and can go on discovering knowledge" (Rahman 2011: 450). Such a view of knowledge presents particular spaces and opportunities not only for the pursuit of knowledge but the interpretation and reinterpretation thereof. And if knowledge is continually being discovered and rediscovered, then it means that knowledge is perpetually open to critical engagement, deliberation and dissent. Such an understanding of knowledge might be better placed to address issues of social injustice, marginalisation, discrimination and humiliation, not only in relation to Muslims but to all people. To this end, if the discovery and rediscovery knowledge does not lead to renewed forms of meaning-making, then it would seem that not only are human beings guilty of misusing knowledge but of neglecting the knowledge that ought to lead to and cultivate humane forms of thinking, being and coexisting.

## Conclusion

In this chapter we have mainly been concerned with Fazlur Rahman's exposition of an Islamic philosophy of education that accentuates the significance of rethinking knowledge for the purpose of being responsive to societal injustices. Similarly, we have shown that his Islamisation of knowledge idea primarily revolves around establishing an integrated conception of knowledge. Yet, seems to be remiss of the potential harm secular knowledge can cause to a comprehensive Islamic conception in the sense that secular knowledge per se misconstrues knowledge of Islam itself. Finally, a Rahmanian philosophy of education can address issues of societal injustice around the modernisation of knowledge idea. However, it seems to have fallen short from addressing issues of desecularisation and corruption of knowledge in Muslim societies in particular. However, we cannot deny his tremendous contribution to a theory of knowledge vis-à-vis a philosophy of Islamic education.

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# Jacques Rancière



Charles Bingham

Jacques Rancière (b. 1940) brings disparate strands of critique together—aesthetics, politics, literature, and importantly, education. He has been prominent among Anglo cultural theorists since the late 1990s, and has since the early 2000s also become influential among educational theorists. In this chapter, three major tasks will be carried out. First, Rancière’s philosophical trajectory and major contributions will be outlined. Included will be major themes that appear in his work. Next, specific attention will be paid to Rancière’s educational contributions. His work will be situated in relation to other educational theorists. Subsequently, Rancière’s primary and unique educational ideas will be discussed. Finally, an interpretation of Rancière’s work will be offered in its current context, in an era when teaching has been under assault. It will be argued that Rancière’s major work, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*, must be understood as embracing, rather than refuting, teaching.

## Rancière’s Philosophical Trajectory

Rancière studied philosophy under his mentor, the structuralist/Marxist Louis Althusser, at the École Normal Supérieure in Paris. After publishing *Lire le Capital* with Althusser, however, Rancière turned to denounce Althusser with the publication of *Althusser’s Lesson* (1996; Rancière 1974). This latter work reflects on the milieu of student uprisings in 1968 Paris and rejects the pretense of a theorist who guides the masses. In 1999, he joined the philosophy department at the Centre Universitaire de Vincennes, subsequently the University of Paris. He retired from there in 2000, professor emeritus.

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Among the major continental theorists of the post-structuralist, post-Marxist era, Rancière is the first to open up the literary/political/aesthetic trinity with an extensive educational component. Thus one need not translate his theory *into* education, rather one can grapple in the mother tongue with the work of a superb theorist who also theorizes education. Rancière's major works include the following. *The Philosopher and His Poor*, wherein he argues that Western philosophy has, since Plato, defined itself as at odds with laborers (2003). *The Nights of Labour* documents workers' manifestations in the context of coming to voice, rather than in the context of following some sort of theoretical orthodoxy (1991b). *The Politics of Aesthetics* describes the aesthetic dimension to reconfiguring human sensibility in order to bring about political acts (2004). And importantly, Rancière's book on education, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*, chronicles the pedagogical adventure, and the educational theory, of Joseph Jacotot (1991a).

In *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*, published in 1987 and translated into English in 1991, Rancière uses the historical figure of nineteenth-century schoolmaster, Joseph Jacotot, to theorize education and its relation to truth, emancipation, and equality. In this work, the story is told of Jacotot, an exiled French schoolteacher who discovered in 1818 an unconventional teaching platform that spread across Europe. Many considered Jacotot's deviation from instructional norms, as his radically egalitarian pedagogy, dangerous to the social fabric. Jacotot, knowing no Flemish, found himself teaching students whose language he did not know. Finding success with this 'ignorant' method, Jacotot went on to formulate a philosophy of 'universal education', the foundation of which was both a linguistic radicality and an epistemological break. 'Universal education' was founded on (1) the arbitrariness of language and (2) the separation of will from intelligence.

Jacotot's was a philosophy of 'intellectual emancipation' finding great currency among a wide set of educators. As Jacotot professed, one need not teach that which one knows, and one should refrain from knowing what one teaches. Indeed, one must *not* teach what one knows. When one teaches what one knows, there is a "particular inequality that normal pedagogical logic operates" (Bingham and Biesta, 4). However, when one teaches that which is unknown to the teacher, "the teacher is first of all a person who speaks to another, who tells stories and returns the authority of knowledge to the poetic condition of all spoken interaction" (Bingham and Biesta, 6). Such a pedagogy would enable even illiterate parents to teach their children how to read and write. It should be noted that *The Ignorant Schoolmaster* is written with a vacillating voice that blurs the boundaries between Rancière's thought, on the one hand, and the subject matter of Jacotot's teachings and philosophy, on the other. Educational scholars as well as general cultural theorists tend to treat the work as a statement of Rancière's theoretical perspective in spite of this vacillating voice.

## Key Rancièrian Concepts

Before outlining some of Rancière's major educational contributions, attention to key Rancièrian concepts—ones that inform his overall oeuvre—is warranted. Rancière is an extremely consistent thinker, with the exception, perhaps, of his turn-around with regard to Althusser's thought. Thus, each of Rancière's key concepts serves to elucidate various elements even in works where these concepts are not specifically mentioned. 'Police' is Rancière's name for the management of human modes of life, society, and human passions. Rancièrian policing has nothing to do with human beings who are employed by the state, but rather the ordering of what gets to count as discourse and purposeful action. Rancière's "police", writes Eric Méchoulan, "as power practices and social life styles, builds inequalities, but such a construction has to appear natural" (Méchoulan 2004, 4). The 'distribution of the sensible' is a phrase of Rancière's that further clarifies the police order. This distribution "refers to the implicit law governing the sensible order that parcels out places and forms of participation in a common world... [it] produces a system of self-evident fact of perception based on the set horizons and modalities of what is visible and audible as well as what can be said, thought, made, or done" (Rancière 2004, 85). Whereas the distribution of the sensible offers up modalities of perception, the police order represents an organization of bodies based upon this distribution.

As Rancière writes,

This is what a distribution of the sensible means: a relation between occupations and equipment, between being in a specific space and time, performing specific activities, and being endowed with capacities of seeing, saying, and doing that 'fit' those activities. (Rockhill and Watts 2009, 275)

'Dissensus' is Rancière's term for the creation of a fissure within the distribution of the sensible and within the police order. A critical artistic work, for example, can lead to dissensus when it produces a new perception of the world, and creates a commitment to its transformation. "Dissensus", writes Rancière, "is the demonstration (*manifestation*) of a gap in the sensible itself... [It] makes visible that which had no reason to be seen; it places one world in another..." (2010, 38). Dissensus consists of three parts: the production of sensory inconsistencies, the development of an awareness of these inconsistencies, then a mobilization of individuals based on these inconsistencies. Central to both Rancière's educational theory and his political understanding of the police and dissensus is his notion of 'subjectification'. "Subjectification" "...is the process by which a political subject extracts itself from the dominant categories of identification and classification. By treating a wrong and attempting to implement equality, political subjectification creates a common locus of dispute over those who have no part in the established order" (Rancière 2004, 92). Subjectification is the coming into subjectivity of one who has participated in dissensus.

Rancière's 'presumption of equality', as well as the 'arbitrariness of language', are themes of Rancière's work that have special resonances with education. With regard to the presumption of equality, it is not that all people *are* equal. That is, Rancière does not offer some philosophical, psychological, or political justification for the sameness of all people. Nor does the presumption of equality mean that all people need to be allotted resources in a similar fashion. Thus the presumption of equality is not an ontological or political claim. It is rather a subjunctive claim, one that sets up a presupposition by which subjects might formulate language and actions by which they participate in politics and prove, through verification, that equality is a fact. The presumption of equality provides a means for a verification of equality. And as Rancière notes,

A verification of equality is an operation which grabs hold of the knot that ties equality to inequality. It handles the knot so as to tip the balance, to enforce the presupposition of equality tied up with the presupposition of inequality and increase its power (Rockhill and Watts 2009, 280).

In constructing an intervention on language, Rancière follows what has become an inevitable path in French theory after the "linguistic turn" (Rorty 2004). Namely, it now seems incumbent on French theorists to offer a unique commentary on, or a usage of, language theory. While Rancière has refused the notion that his work has a theoretical anchor in language theory, he has stated that his thinking grew when, after studying Joseph Jacotot, "I became more sensitive to the fact that words are never definitions of things or states of things but are like weapons exchanged in combat, in dialogue" (Rancière 2013). Thus language is arbitrary. There are no words that are more privileged than others to tell a given story. The philosopher's words are not any more important than the joiner's. The sociologist's words are no more important than the poet's. The teacher's words are not any more important than the student's.

All of the above concepts are discernable, if not explicitly mentioned, in Rancière's major educational work, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*. However, this educational work also brings various of its own themes to the fore. Each of these themes constitutes a major educational contribution by a theorist whose work has a uniquely educational dimension.

## Rancière Among Educational Theorists

Jacques Rancière, with the publication of *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*, positioned himself as an unprecedented educational theorist. He established an iconoclastic approach to education through his recuperation of Joseph Jacotot. Rancière's work can be seen in contrast to three prevalent educational perspectives that dominated the twentieth century into the beginning of the twenty-first century. Education has commonly been described in one of three ways. These ways roughly correspond to the traditional, progressive, and critical models of education. As a traditional

project, education is conceived as a platform for disseminating a common set of learnings. These learnings will, in turn, enable citizens to share a common language for use in the public sphere. Such learnings may or may not derive from the experiences of the students since traditional education is not concerned with the private lives that students have had in the past, but with the common knowledge that needs to be fostered so that they can speak with others in the public sphere.

Progressive education shares the same liberalist tendencies of traditional theory, but progressives are more concerned about the bridge to be constructed between private experience and public life. So while the progressive orientation shares the desire to create a common body of knowledge that will enable citizens to communicate in the public sphere, progressives insist that a common body of knowledge can only be understood from the particular experience of each particular person. Thus one must link private experience to public discourse. Critical education, in turn, considers traditional and progressive models to be lacking. For criticalists, education itself is identified as a tool that has been used by various oppressive interests to foster inequality. Education must be changed so that it no longer serves hegemony. Education must be re-fashioned so that it no longer impedes democracy, emancipation, and enlightenment.

In contrast to these three views, Rancière offers a divergent alternative. First, Rancière's recuperation of Jacotot is at odds with the traditional figure of a knowledgeable teacher whose role it is to disseminate his or her knowledge. Instead, Rancière's teacher is 'ignorant', willingly unknowledgeable about subject matter. Further—and here is where numerous readers of Rancière go astray—Rancière's account has little to do with progressive pedagogy. As Rancière puts it, "The distinction between 'stultification' and 'emancipation' is not a distinction between methods of instruction. It is not a distinction between traditional or authoritarian methods, on one hand, and new or active methods on the other: stultification can and does happen in all kinds of active and modern ways" (Bingham and Biesta, 6). And finally, Rancière's contribution is not to be confused with the work of unveiling carried out by critical pedagogy. Rancière is explicitly critical of Pierre Bourdieu's theory of reproduction, "a discourse deriving its authority from the presumed naivete or ignorance of its objects of study" (Rancière 1991a, xi). Insofar as criticalist education is largely indebted to such notions of reproduction, and to programs by which educators might combat reproduction, Rancière's pedagogical logic is different still from critical pedagogy.

In contrast, Rancière offers an assault on the very notion of educational epistemology. While other paradigms have worked within such an epistemology, Rancière claims that any schooled epistemology is a matter of inequality. He wants to break with "the particular inequality that normal pedagogical logic orchestrates..." where instruction normally serves to "split the intellect in two, to consign to the everyday life of students the procedures by which their minds have heretofore learned everything they know" (Bingham and Biesta, 4). Rancière insists that knowledge of the teacher must not correspond with knowledge of the student. Instead, the will of the teacher must be matched to the will of the student without their knowledges being commensurated. It is the commensuration of knowledges that leads to knowledge

comparisons and student stultification. Only through a de-tethering of knowledge-knowledge comparison can intellectual emancipation obtain.

Having stated above that Rancière offers an assault on ‘educational epistemology’, it is appropriate here to comment upon such an assault and mention its significance within the contemporary educational scene. At present, the very idea of how legitimate knowledge is supposed to be accessed in contemporary society is dominated by the educational institutions. That is to say, schools and universities promote an ideology about the way knowledge should rightly be accessed. This ‘schooled’ way of accessing knowledge might be termed as ‘educational epistemology’, an epistemology that favors prioritizes educational institutions as the primary means for knowledge acquisition. Rancière rightly comments upon this educational epistemology in the way quoted previous paragraph, as an epistemology that relegates nonschool knowledge to a position somehow different from schooled knowledge, and schooled knowledge as preferable and procedurally distinct from what people have ‘learned heretofore’. His assault on educational epistemology is thus a confirmation that there is in fact no ‘split of the intellect’. The knowledge of a schooled mind is not different from that of an unschooled mind.

One can summarize in a straightforward way the importance of this contribution—this assault on educational epistemology—to current educational debates by contrasting it to the three dominant approaches outlined earlier: the traditional, progressive, and critical. Each of these educational approaches is concerned with *employing* educational epistemology to various ends, but these mainstream approaches are in no sense eager to assault such an epistemology head on. In the case of traditionalists, the educational epistemology is seen as a way to improve the unrefined state of those who are not educated. In the case of progressives, the educational epistemology is seen as a way to ameliorate the rift between natural experience and the static inheritance of culture. And in the case of criticalists, the educational epistemology is seen as a means to combat hegemonic ideology that otherwise subverts the unschooled mind. But in none of these dominant approaches is educational epistemology itself questioned. Rancière’s educational contribution to modern debates includes this unique epistemological assault on the school.

## Unique Educational Themes

Having briefly outlined Rancière’s key contributions and the distinction between his work and the work of other educational theories, two distinct themes of Rancière’s educational work will be detailed: educational emancipation and educational truth. At least since Immanuel Kant’s essays ‘What Is Enlightenment?’ and ‘On Education’, emancipation has been construed as an Enlightenment goal of education. Schools have been construed as places fostering “man’s release from his self-incurred tutelage” and a release from “man’s inability to make use of his understanding without the direction of another” (Kant 1982, 1992, p. 90). The Enlightenment project of the school has been an effort to bring students to a

place of autonomy and rational thinking. However, Rancière's work demonstrates that this Enlightenment project of emancipation is problematic. Emancipation, so construed, is "something that is *done to* somebody" (Bingham and Biesta, 30). So while emancipation "is oriented towards equality, independence and freedom, it actually installs *dependency* at the very heart of the 'act' of emancipation" (Bingham and Biesta, 31).

In contrast, Rancière proposes a form of emancipation that is done actively. Rancière notes that "nobody escapes from the social minority save by their own efforts" (1995, 48). This form is proposed both in politics and in education. In politics, Rancière documents the emancipation of French workers *by* French workers, "who, in the nineteenth century, created newspapers or associations, wrote poems, or joined utopian groups were claiming the status of fully speaking and thinking beings" (Rancière 2003, 219). This sort of political emancipation does not happen with the help of others; it happens at the hands of French workers themselves. Likewise in education, the students of Jacotot do not achieve intellectual emancipation with the help of someone else. Rather, they read, speak, and write French through repetition and verification *on their own*. Intellectual emancipation in education is thus a practice wherein explication no longer takes place. It is a practice where students take up a position as speakers, speakers who have as much right to make sense of the world as any other person, any other explicator who might pretend that students are somehow not equal to the task.

Another significant contribution is Rancière's educational conception of truth. Once again, Rancière departs from traditional, progressive, and critical models. Each of these dominant models partakes in an Enlightenment orientation toward truth. Each considers truth to be a desirable, attainable goal, one that can be arrived by perfecting the insight of humans through the enlightening process of education. For these dominant models, education is a vehicle by which one arrives at truth. Rancière demonstrates that this Enlightenment model of truth is shored up by the notion that truth needs to be explained in schools. Thus, the Enlightenment model of truth—embraced by dominant educational theory—actually reinforces the notion that education should be explanatory.

Rancière uses language theory and anti-explanatory pedagogy in tandem to posit an educational alternative to Enlightenment truth. That is to say, Rancière demonstrates how truth takes on a new role when Jacotot's universal teaching and Jacotot's thesis on arbitrary language are combined. With regard to language, truth, and Jacotot's pedagogy, Rancière writes,

Truth is not told. It is whole, and language fragments it; it is necessary, and languages are arbitrary. It was this thesis on the arbitrariness of languages—even more than the proclamation of universal teaching—that made Jacotot's teaching scandalous. (1991a, 60)

Rancière uses Jacotot's example to demonstrate the fact that truth does not depend on the particular language of a particular expert. No one has a monopoly on explicating truth because truth is not amenable to explication. Whereas explanatory pedagogy assumes that language can be a vehicle toward truth, Rancière reminds us that such a perspective depends on a rather simple, language-as-clear-window paradigm.

Significantly, Rancière demonstrates that the school has become a symbol for the Enlightenment orientation toward truth. The school, as an institution, is positioned as a place where people speak with words that are more knowledgeable than the words spoken outside of school. Those knowledgeable words, in turn, are supposed to bring students to truth. This model informs schools, and it also informs society at large. Rancière argues that we now have a ‘society pedagogicized’, where society itself takes cues from the school as to the availability of truth. Truth is, in general, assumed to be attainable through language because in an era of compulsory schooling, each person learns—in school, early on—that truth can be explained through language in a classroom. Thus, when Rancier and Jacotot insist on the arbitrariness of language, he insists that the school is not a primary place for attaining truth because the language of the teacher is no more privileged than the language of any other person.

## Rancière and the Assault on Teaching

Rancière’s primary educational work, *The Ignorant Schoolmaster*, is often interpreted as a text that promotes independent student learning without the aid of teachers. That is, readers of the text often assume that Joseph Jacotot does not teach his students anything because he does not speak Flemish and they do not speak French. It is important, however, *not* to insert Rancière’s text directly the current educational milieu of what Gert Biesta has called “learnification” (2005, 2011, 2012). Coining the term “learnification”, Biesta has documented a particular “language of learning”, “...including the tendency to refer to teachers as facilitators of learning, to teaching as the creation of learning opportunities, to schools as learning environments, to students as learners and adults as adult learners, to the field of adult education as that of lifelong learning” (2012, p. 37). Indeed, learning has become a preferred term in education as a number of powerful discourses have recently coalesced, without necessarily having conspired, to promote the learner while simultaneously demoting the teacher. As Biesta points out, the new language of learning has been bolstered by discourses of constructivism, critical pedagogy, informal learning, lifelong learning, and of neoliberalism (2012). With an omnipresent preference for learning, teaching appears to be fading in importance. If students can learn on their own, or learn online, it would seem that teachers are not necessary.

Some interpreters of Rancière’s work claim that *The Ignorant Schoolmaster* is primarily about discarding teachers, that Joseph Jacotot’s students were empowered because they became solitary learners in need of no teacher. Chambers notes the following for example:

When a student picks up a book and reads it for herself (even, as in the case of Jacotot’s teaching experiments, a book written in a language other than her mother tongue), then she is using the method of equality. This capacity for anyone to read the book without having someone else telling them what it means—this is the power of equality, and this is all there is to equality. (Chambers 2013, p. 644)



However, as Biesta correctly points out, one should not interpret *The Ignorant Schoolmaster* as a treatise on some different sort of education (in press). The work of Rancière should rather be understood as a project of intellectual emancipation, a political work rather than pedagogical statement. Nevertheless, educators continue to see in *The Ignorant Schoolmaster* some sort of educational model that coincides with the current trend toward learning and away from teaching. Especially if one heeds the comments that Rancière has himself made regarding his own interest in this text and his lack of interest in studying education per se, one must conclude that *The Ignorant Schoolmaster* is a work of political philosophy that just happens to use universal education as an emancipatory platform.

Not only can it be said that Rancière's work is more about intellectual emancipation than it is about education. It can also be said that lining Rancière up with the push toward learning gets Rancière's education platform wrong. To show this, the remainder of this chapter will detail what has elsewhere been called the 'logic of learning' in order to show that Rancière's work is actually antithetical to such a logic. Below five elements of the logic of learning will be detailed. It will be shown at each element how Rancière's work breaks from such a logic.

**Element 1** That learning *has* a logic. This element is perhaps the most essential aspect of the logic of learning. That learning has a logic might be said to derive from a long-standing tradition of theorizing *how people learn*. From Plato, to Rousseau, to John Dewey, to Maria Montessori, to Howard Gardner, educational thinkers have been offering up various figures-of-the-child in order to make the teacher better equipped to do his or her job (Bingham and Biesta 2010). Current discourses on learning have not given up this idea that learning *has a logic*. Indeed, as teaching is assailed and learning is championed, such assailing and championing is often done in the name of this or that figure-of-the-child, a child who, assumedly, does not need a teacher in order to learn. That learning has a logic is not to say that learning has *one* particular logic. Many educational thinkers opine differently about what the logic of learning is. But it is to say that learning is observable enough, or theorizable enough, or at least figure-izable enough, that we can talk about its logic—whatever the particular logic might be.

Rancière, in contrast, offers no logic of learning. Indeed his famous statement in *The Ignorant Schoolmaster* indicates the extent to which Rancière does anything but detail a new logic of learning. As Rancière notes, the intellectual adventurer learns not by some rule, but by no rule at all, "from proximity to proximity" (Bingham and Biesta, p.4).

**Element 2** Learning is instrumental. The logic of learning conceptualizes the learner as one who will acquire skills and knowledge to serve specific purposes. This instrumental aspect of learning can be seen in numerous practices in educational institutions of all levels. From elementary schools to universities, the use of learning outcomes is a prime example of the instrumental nature of learning. Learning outcomes indicate demonstrable behaviors that students will obtain by the end of a certain period in their education. A typical learning outcome, this one from

the University of Illinois Urbana-Champaign Library's 'Tips on Writing Learning Outcomes', states the following: "Students will be able to develop topic-relevant vocabulary in order to search databases with maximum flexibility and effectiveness" (Outcomes). While learning outcomes vary from subject to subject, and while learning outcomes are articulated in numerous ways at various levels of education, the central premise of any learning outcome is that students will gain a specific skill or disposition after they have finished their learning. Learning itself is thus posited as instrumental to specific, observable outcomes.

Rancière's perspective once again diverges distinctly. For Rancière, the act of intellectual emancipation derives from what he calls the 'presumption of equality'. A Rancièrian educational project rejects the idea that students will use learning to get to a more 'advanced' or more 'proficient' state. Rancière is insistent that equality is not arrived at because when equality is arrived at, then stultification is the inevitable result. Instead, Rancière formulates equality in the presumptive thus rejecting the very notion of instrumental learning.

**Element 3** Normation. Normation refers to the tendency to talk about learning as either on or off track, either right or wrong, either successful or unsuccessful. Discourses on learning, be they school-based, clinically based, or entrepreneurial, commonly entail the normative message that learning has a certain trajectory—and deviance from this trajectory means learning does not happen as effectively as it might otherwise happen. Thus in schools, one encounters the labels of 'slow learner', or 'exceptional learner', implying that the rate of learning has some 'natural' speed, and that any speed not commensurate with the natural one needs special attention. As another example, this time in psychological discourse, one finds entries in the DSM of attention deficit hyperactive disorder that are clearly aimed at learners: "...often avoids, dislikes, or is reluctant to engage in tasks that require sustained mental effort (e.g., schoolwork or homework...)" (American Psychiatric Association 2013). There are also the ubiquitous, if costly, seminars that barrage teachers' emails daily, such as this one I received lately: "Strategies to reach students in poverty". The implication of this particular seminar is that students in poverty learn differently than other students.

Also in this case, Rancière's presumptive statement of equality demonstrates a refusal of learning's logic, this time a refusal of normalized goals or paradigmatic ends. As in his other political works, the presumption of equality creates a political bond between social actors that does not explain who or what is the most 'normal'.

**Element 4** *That Teaching is the Same as Instruction*. Following the logic of learning, teaching is defined narrowly as instruction. This aspect of the logic of learning can be witnessed by looking to the beginnings of learnification in higher education, in particular, it is helpful to look to the widely cited article of 1995 by Robert Barr and John Tagg, published in *Change: The Magazine of Higher Education* (1995). Entitled, 'From Teaching to Learning: A New Paradigm for Higher Education', this

essay offered an argument as to why educators in post-secondary institutions should focus on learning rather than teaching. Barr and Tagg posit a binary of learning/teaching. Then they argue that there must be a shift from teaching to learning. In doing so, Barr and Tagg create a stereotype of teaching by assimilating teaching to *direct instruction*. Thus while any reasonable consideration of teaching would not assume that teaching consists completely, nor even primarily, of direct instruction, the 'new paradigm' of learning premises its own necessity on a rather thin misrepresentation of teaching-as-instruction.

That teaching is not the same as instruction in Rancière's work is most obviously demonstrated in the opening premise of Jacotot's teaching. Clearly, the French speaking teacher has no means to instruct the Flemish students whose language he cannot speak. Thus insofar as there is in Rancière a sort of teaching without instruction, the fourth element of learning's logic does not ring true.

**Element 5** Authority resides, or at least should reside, as the possession of the learner. This aspect of learning's logic derives both from the Cartesian model of the self's autonomy and from the constructivist image the acquiring mind. It is also related to the belief that authority is a substance rather than a relation. The self-authorized learner finds his or her place in practices of self-regulated learning, online learning, as well as the continuous progress model of learning I experienced as a child. Following this logic of authority-as-substance, authority presents a zero-sum game: If the teacher 'has' more authority, then the student 'has' less.

Once again, the learnification trend uses a logic that has nothing to do with Rancière's. Rancière's work breaks the either/or dyad that either students have authority or teachers do. He does this by positing will to will under the condition of the ignorant master. For Rancière, it is not that the authority of knowledge is given over to students at the expense of the teacher's authority. It is rather that both student and master meet in an alternative relation of authority, will to will, absent the typical arguments about knowledge authority.

## Conclusion

Jacques Rancière has made significant contributions to educational thought through his educational writings as well as through his wide-ranging philosophy. His writings will continue to inform educational philosophy because the themes he raises in the areas of philosophy, social theory, aesthetics, politics, literature, and education remain consistent. As has been shown, Rancière's work has garnered attention both from those who wish to hear in his writing an echo of previous educational trends as well as those who more correctly consider Rancière's educational philosophy as a distinctly political endeavor. His new writings will no doubt continue to inform his older ones, and his educational import will continue to grow as a result.

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# John Rawls



Brian Coyne and Rob Reich

## Introduction

John Rawls's magisterial *A Theory of Justice* (1971) and its follow-up *Political Liberalism* (1993) constitute the most important defense of contemporary liberal political philosophy. Rawls, it is often said, revived the very field of political philosophy in the twentieth century. Though he wrote surprisingly few words about education, his model of a just society has powerful implications for important contemporary issues in education policy and the philosophy of education.

Rawls's project begins from an assumption that modern societies are characterized by deep disagreement about ultimate aims, about religious and moral doctrines that inform citizens about how they live as individuals. This pluralism of values gives rise to a fundamental political problem: how might citizens divided over religious and moral issues of the deepest importance nevertheless affirm a shared and stable political order that delivers justice for all?

This same disagreement on ultimate ends is also what gives rise to many of the most pressing questions in education policy and philosophy. In this chapter, we consider how Rawls's philosophy can inform debates in education policy and philosophy such as what justifies the public provision of education; what constitutes a fair distribution of educational opportunity; what space a democratic society should make for particularistic, including religious, schooling; and how tensions between educational choice and aspirations for common schooling can be resolved.

To put Rawls's project in perspective, start by considering that in a theocratic state, or even in a procedurally democratic state where a single set of values was the agreed-upon basis of the social order, answering these questions would be relatively

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easy. Public education would be justified by, and focused on, the need to instruct children in the state's official values. A Christian nation, for example, would systematically privilege a Christian education. Education would be distributed fairly if all children got a relatively equal instruction in the society's official creed, and particularistic schooling would be acceptable only to the extent that it did not contradict that creed. In a democratic state where not only is there no universally agreed-upon set of values but this pluralism of values must be respected, not just grudgingly tolerated, these questions become far more difficult. The same point holds true with other questions of fairness and justice: they are deeply challenging precisely because we must find answers that work in a condition of diversity of beliefs and ultimate values.

Rawls's work provides an answer to how a stable and just political order might be affirmed by citizens who are profoundly divided on religious and moral questions. He calls his answer 'justice as fairness'. The blandness of this label belies the sophistication of the argument. As developed in *A Theory of Justice* (1971) and *Political Liberalism* (1993), justice as fairness demands a key role for education. More specifically, Rawls writes that "Society's concern with [children's] education lies in their role as future citizens, and so in such essential things as their acquiring the capacity to understand the public culture and to participate in its institutions, in their being economically independent and self-supporting members of society over a complete life, and in their developing the political virtues" (Rawls 1993, p. 200). This chapter first discusses three aspects of Rawls's justice as fairness and its relationship to educational policy: fair equality of opportunity, liberal neutrality, and political virtues of citizens. The following sections explain how these concepts can be used to make contributions to debates on questions of education policy and philosophy and conclude with an evaluation of these contributions.

## **Rawls's Idea of a Just and Liberal Society**

### ***Fair Equality of Opportunity***

The fundamental question that animates Rawls's work is what kind of state we could expect a reasonable person, understood as a free and equal citizen, to affirm and accept, rather than merely submit to. A just political order is, for Rawls, one that could win the affirmation of any reasonable person despite background pluralism of religious and moral doctrines. The question then becomes how society must be organized for this criterion to be met.

In *A Theory of Justice*, Rawls defends two principles of justice, which together he calls "justice as fairness", and he argues that a society whose core social, political, and economic systems, what he refers to as the "basic structure of society", are based on these principles will best meet his proposed definition of justice (Rawls 1993, p. 11).

First Principle: "Each person is to have an equal right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others."

Second Principle: "Social and economic inequalities are to be arranged so that they are both (a) reasonably expected to be to everyone's advantage, and (b) attached to positions and offices open to all". (Rawls 1971, p. 60)

Rawls does not claim that all inequalities—inequality of income, for example—are automatically unfair or unjust. What must be equal is the opportunity structure. Rawls defends what he calls 'fair equality of opportunity', which stipulates that, in order to be acceptable, inequalities must be 'attached to positions and offices open to all'. Consider two positions in society of unequal pay and social prestige: the CEO of General Motors and a janitor at a GM factory. To be consistent with justice, both positions must be equally open to all and the existence of this inequality must in some way advantage the less advantaged person, in this case the janitor. The idea of the positions being "open to all" is crucial, but Rawls recognizes that the phrase has two possible interpretations (Rawls 1993, p. 65). One interpretation is what describes most democratic societies today: both positions are formally open to all, in that there are no restrictions based on characteristics like race, gender, and class. However, facts about society make it the case that, if two infants with equal native intelligence are born in the same year but to families at opposite ends of the socio-economic spectrum, the infant born at the high end has a vastly greater relative chance of ending up as CEO, and the infant born at the low end has a vastly greater relative chance of ending up as janitor. Even if those tasked with choosing the next CEO chose solely based on merit, the infant born into the higher end of the socio-economic spectrum (in terms of class, race, gender, etc.) has, because of other inequalities in the social system, a much greater chance of converting this native intelligence into the skills needed to become CEO. Rawls calls this situation "careers open to talents", meaning that positions are assigned fairly based on talent, but there is in this scenario no guarantee that talents (Rawls uses the word "talent" to mean skills and knowledge developed during life, as opposed to naturally endowed intelligence) are distributed independently of the social position into which a person is born (Rawls 1971, p. 73). In short, Rawls recognizes what any educational policy expert knows: circumstances outside the schoolhouse (family and neighborhood characteristics) create predictable inequalities in school performance and opportunity, even if the schoolhouse is formally open to any child.

Rawls argues that, in a system like this, we should not expect a person born into social disadvantage to accept her low social position as an adult. A caste system that automatically assigned adults social positions based on circumstances of birth is obviously unacceptable to those on the losing end, and Rawls argues that inequalities in a system in which all positions are formally open to all but in practice the overwhelming majority of high-status positions go to people born into high positions is similarly unacceptable. To expect people who lose out in such a system, who have lost out merely because of their circumstances of birth, to accept their poor and unequal outcomes is to ask them to accept something less than equal citizenship in their society (Rawls 1971, pp. 102–103). It is to allow morally arbitrary circumstances of birth to shape life chances and outcomes.



Inequalities of social and economic position are acceptable, Rawls argues, when all positions are not just formally open to all but when there is ‘fair equality of opportunity’. Fair equality of opportunity can be explained statistically: it exists if the two infants discussed above, born into opposite ends of the social spectrum but with equal native intelligence, have roughly equal chances of ending up with high or low status positions as adults. It is impossible to measure native intelligence, but since we assume that native intelligence is not distributed unevenly across race, class, or sex, fair equality of opportunity requires that educational opportunity be distributed equally, or at least without regard to social position at birth. Family income or social status ought not determine educational prospects.

Education is, of course, one of the most significant ways in which native intelligence is developed into the kinds of skills, experiences, and capacities that in fact determine one’s eventual standing within society, and so, as Section ‘[Contributions of Rawls’s philosophy to questions in education policy](#)’ discusses in detail, the idea of fair equality of opportunity provides an important way to understand and evaluate educational systems.

### *Liberal Neutrality*

Pluralism is a standing condition of modern society. We should expect citizens to be divided on fundamental religious and moral values. Rawls calls a person’s set of values her “comprehensive doctrine”, a term he means to include religions but also encompass any system of beliefs by which a person makes her life choices (Rawls 1993, p. 13). In light of this pluralism, Rawls argues that political institutions must remain ‘neutral’ among these competing doctrines; to base fundamental political doctrines on any one comprehensive doctrine would be to privilege that group of citizens in the very architecture of the state. This principle is broadly consistent with idea of separation of church and state familiar from the practices of modern democratic states. Rawls’s core idea here is that no citizen, understood as free and equal, could be expected to accept any law or policy based exclusively on a comprehensive doctrine that she does not share.

Rawls of course recognizes that all laws and policies are based on some value or another: a prohibition on murder, for example, is based on the belief that people have a right not to be murdered. The idea of liberal neutrality thus depends on a contestable line between, on the one hand, values unique to a particular comprehensive doctrine and, on the other hand, values that any reasonable person could be expected to accept, what Rawls calls “political values” (Rawls 1993, p. 138). The belief that people have a right not to be murdered is a canonical example of the second kind of value, as are beliefs that things like hunger, poverty, and illiteracy ought to be eradicated. In contrast, a belief like the Hindu belief that cows are sacred is a value unique to a particular comprehensive doctrine, and it therefore cannot ground a law prohibiting the eating of beef, even if the majority of citizens of the country are Hindus. A state can be said to have achieved the goal of liberal neutrality

if all of its laws and policies are supported by political values (which Rawls also calls ‘public reasons’) and all of its reasonable citizens can therefore be equally expected to affirm these laws.

### *Political Virtues of Citizens*

The basic structure of a liberal democratic society must be just in order for it to be legitimate to its citizens. But how might that society remain *stable* over time, continuing to receive the affirmation of every new generation of citizens? Rawls’s answer here is that citizens must develop political virtues in their dealings with one another and that these virtues must be cultivated in the youngest citizens.

According to Rawls, “the political virtues [are] necessary for [citizens] to cooperate in maintaining a just political society” (Rawls 1993, p. xlvi) and he underscores their importance, noting that they are “very great virtues” which “constitute a very great public good, part of society’s political capital” (Rawls 1993, pp. 157, 171). The core political virtues are reasonableness, a sense of fairness, civility and tolerance, and mutual respect. Taken together, the political virtues make it possible for citizens not merely to affirm a belief in equality but actually to treat their fellow citizens as equals, even those who hold comprehensive doctrines radically different from their own. Citizens must be willing to listen to other arguments and points of view and articulate defenses of their own and must believe that political differences can and should be settled through debate, voting, and, compromise (including, sometimes, losing) rather than violence (Rawls 1993, 448ff.).

The idea of political virtues also puts a limit on the principle of liberal neutrality. The state is only required to be neutral among *reasonable* comprehensive doctrines. For Rawls, a doctrine is “reasonable” if it is broadly compatible with a liberal society and the political virtues just discussed (Rawls 1993, pp. 58–61). A doctrine that required political institutions to promote one’s religious views, for example, would be an unreasonable doctrine in a liberal society. A liberal state, according to Rawls, must simultaneously inculcate in young people the qualities that make an adult a reasonable citizen of a pluralistic democracy while at the same time not doing anything that violates neutrality among reasonable comprehensive doctrines.

As will be discussed in the next section, liberal neutrality and the political virtues both impose obligations on the state with regard to education. The idea of liberal neutrality imposes a negative requirement on education: the state must avoid privileging one doctrine over another in its educational systems. The idea of the political virtues imposes a positive requirement: the state must ensure that its educational system reliably cultivates the political virtues in its citizens and contains or prevents the spread of unreasonable doctrines. There is, inevitably, a tension between these two requirements, one that is at the heart of many of the most difficult contemporary questions of education policy and philosophy.

Overall, these three features, the idea of fair equality of opportunity, the idea of liberal neutrality, and the idea of the political virtues of democratic citizenship, form

important parts of Rawls's answer to the key question from which we started: what kind of state can a reasonable citizen be expected to endorse? Education is crucial to both sides of the question: education policies are part of what makes the state endorsable by the citizens, but education is also what makes the citizens able to endorse the just state. The next section looks at how these schematic demands can be used to gain traction on contemporary questions of education policy and philosophy.

## **Contributions of Rawls's Philosophy to Questions in Education Policy**

In the introduction, we identified some key questions in the philosophy and policy of education for which Rawls's theory can potentially provide useful insight:

- What justifies the public provision of education?
- What constitutes fair distribution of educational opportunity?
- How can tensions between educational choice and aspirations of common schooling be resolved?
- What space is there, if any, for particularistic schooling alongside common or secular schools?

In this section, we use Rawls's theory—in particular the three key ideas discussed in the previous section—as a lens through which to examine these questions.

### ***What Justifies the Public Provision of Education, and What Constitutes Fair Distribution of Educational Opportunity?***

It is taken for granted that modern societies should provide education to their citizens, but Rawls's philosophy helps give a sense of why the provision of this particular public good is so important, which in turn can inform debates about how much education (in terms of quantity, quality, and equality) the state needs to provide.

First, a state must provide education because, without universal and roughly equal access to education, justice cannot be achieved. In particular, fair equality of opportunity requires that access to education not depend on the arbitrary circumstances of the socioeconomic position of one's birth. The role of education in achieving fair equality of opportunity is to ensure that talents as an adult are cultivated without regard for socioeconomic position at birth.

The idea of fair equality of opportunity can inform debates about whether public provision of education should be sufficientarian (requiring a minimum threshold for all but permitting inequalities above this minimum) or egalitarian (focused on ensur-

ing some degree of equality of educational outcome). The idea of fair equality of opportunity means that fair distribution of educational opportunity will necessarily require some degree of focus on both. If the state provided no education to anyone (a form of equality, after all), the outcome would surely be that privately funded educational opportunities, and therefore adult levels of cultivated talent, would be strongly correlated with socioeconomic position at birth. Assuming that the state does provide public education but also does not prohibit high-quality, expensive private schooling, the general level of public schooling in a just society must be sufficiently high that public school students (including, presumably, students from poor backgrounds) are not at a disadvantage later in life when competing for high-status positions against people who had expensive, high-quality private educations. Fair equality of opportunity does not require that all children receive an absolutely equal education—even in a fully just society, factors such as teacher talent can likely never be fully equalized. What the ideal of fair equality of opportunity does require is that the quantity and quality of education not be shaped by socioeconomic position at birth. It does not take any special sociological knowledge to know that this requirement is not met in any real society. It does, however, provide a useful goal that can help orient and evaluate potential reforms to public education systems.

Public education must also be oriented toward children's future roles as citizens. In addition to ensuring that all students gain proficiency in standard academic subjects, education is, along with the family, the crucial way that children acquire the political virtues necessary both for their own success within a just, liberal society and for the long-term success of society itself as stable and just. Children must grow up to see themselves as free and equal citizens of their society who possess and exercise basic freedoms of conscience, speech, and association, develop a sense of justice, and cultivate the talents that allow them to compete on fair terms for social advantage. And they must also grow up to see others—all others, regardless of characteristics like race, gender, class origin, and comprehensive doctrine—as free and equal in the same way. Cultivating these beliefs requires more than a focus on sufficiency. As has been recognized in the United States at least since *Brown v. Board of Education*, if one school gives its students a solid education but the neighboring school gives its students an education twice as good, it will be difficult for the students at either place to grow up with a sense of equal citizenship and self-worth (Rawls 1971, p. 107). That inequality is, of course, especially problematic when students are separated according to other characteristics that track social status, like race, but the same concern would hold with unequal schools divided only by a characteristic like place of residence (see Koski and Reich 2006 and Allen and Reich 2013).

### ***What Role Is There for Particularistic Schooling?***

Are private schools incompatible with justice? Rawls's justice as fairness shows why private education is potentially problematic, namely that it permits socioeconomic status to influence educational opportunity. But Rawls's theory also shows

why a complete ban on private education would be impermissible. The first principle of justice's requirement that all people "have a right to the most extensive basic liberty compatible with a similar liberty for others" would seem to permit parents to transmit their religious and moral convictions to their children (Rawls 1971, p. 60). Honoring this liberty will very likely include the permission to educate one's own children in a way at least somewhat different from the standard public model.

For many people, the choice to give their children a particularistic education is based on their own (often religious) comprehensive doctrine. The idea of liberal neutrality clearly means that the state should make a good faith attempt to preserve room for families to educate their children in their own traditions provided this education prepares the children to support themselves in the larger society and does not conflict with the core political virtues. More difficult questions arise about comprehensive doctrines that do conflict with the political values, what Rawls refers to as unreasonable comprehensive doctrines. Consider, for example, a white supremacist group that wants to establish its own private schools. Should the liberal state tolerate those who are intolerant? Cases like this are where the tension between liberal neutrality and the importance of the political values come most strongly into focus. Liberal neutrality means of course that the state cannot ban parents from passing their beliefs onto their children simply because the majority of citizens find those beliefs deviant or immoral. But some beliefs, such as racism, are repugnant precisely because they contradict and threaten the state's just and liberal character. Navigating this tension would require an inquiry into exactly what kind of racist education the children would be getting. If they were taught that their own heritage is superior but that they nevertheless ought to treat all people with equal respect, then the principle of liberal neutrality might require the state to allow the school to exist. However, the importance of the political virtues means that the state could prohibit a school that teaches children that members of other groups are not free and equal citizens. To take another example, a religious school that teaches that women cannot be priests is acceptable, but a school that teaches that women cannot be President would be unacceptable. While both teachings contradict the political virtues of belief in full equality of all people, the inequality in the former is exclusive to the religious sphere, while the latter teaching threatens to undermine equality in the society as a whole (see Callan 1997, pp. 28–39).

## Conclusion and Evaluation of Rawls's Contribution

In the previous section, we discussed several broad ways in which Rawls's idea of justice as fairness can contribute to a debate on questions in education policy. To summarize:

- Fair equality of opportunity is only realized when the socioeconomic position an adult occupies is not determined by that person's socioeconomic position at

birth. While other factors such as discrimination can prevent this goal from being achieved, education plays a preponderant role, and the liberal state must ensure that inequalities in its public education system do not contribute to a lack of fair equality of opportunity.

- Liberal neutrality requires that the state avoid privileging any comprehensive doctrine in public schooling. Assuming that private schooling is allowed, the state must ensure that the education children receive in private schools, especially private schools based on parents' comprehensive doctrines, does not prevent them from developing the political virtues they will need to become reasonable citizens as adults.
- The public education system must inculcate the political values in all children in public school, both through the content of lessons and through equality between schools.

As should be clear, these contributions are highly schematic and would need significant empirical and theoretical work to be translated into specific policy recommendations, both because of the inevitable messiness of real-world situations and the fairly high level of abstraction of Rawls's theory. What exactly is the best way to inculcate the political virtue of openness to debate? Is a particular private school's curriculum genuinely in conflict with the political virtues? How much inequality between public schools would undermine citizens' belief in equal citizenship? The contributions of Rawls' philosophy in general, and his concepts of fair equality of opportunity, liberal neutrality, and political virtues in particular, to questions of educational policy and philosophy are best understood as establishing the goals of an educational system in a modern democratic society. It thus offers a language with which citizens and policymakers can debate key questions of education policy and philosophy without claiming to settle any of these questions for good. Rawls's claim is that these goals, and this language of debate, are 'political' in the sense that they are accessible to any reasonable person in society and do not depend on any prior consensus about values, a consensus that, in a diverse modern society, we can never assume or expect. Evaluating the contributions of Rawls's theory to education thus means asking whether the theory can successfully serve this bridging function between people who disagree deeply about ultimate values.

This is, after all, one of the major goals of Rawls's theory overall: to establish a language through which people who have fundamental disagreements about the ultimate questions of life can debate, disagree, and still function politically. Education, especially of one's own children, is an issue on which this deep disagreement is to be expected as much as any other. Thus education is one of the greatest tests of Rawls's claim that a liberal society is possible in the long term. If progress despite deep disagreement is possible on education, it should be possible on almost any issue.

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# Jean-Jacques Rousseau (1712–1778)



Kerstin Jergus

## Introduction

Jean-Jacques Rousseau is regarded as one of the most important figures of educational theory. Mainly, this is to be traced back to his work *Émile ou de l'Éducation* (1762b), which had a huge impact already in his lifetime. In Paris, it was immediately banned shortly after publication and in Geneva it was burned. The same happened to *Du Contrat Social*, which had been published the same year. The close connection of politics and pedagogics is central to the understanding of this voice from the past of philosophy of education. To this day, the ongoing discussion about Rousseau's work is inexhaustible, already fuelled in his lifetime by both the radicalness and contrariness of his writings. Rousseau's sharp criticism of the foundations of the Enlightenment movement, presuppositions he at the same time shared, contributed as much to the controversiality of his work as his unsteady life – amongst others as a music copier, private secretary, tutor and writer – as well as his many discords with friends, supporters like Diderot or Hume.

Rousseau was born the son of a clockmaker (his mother died shortly after his birth) in the Republic of Geneva, which he turned his back on very young after two quit apprenticeships. Through the acquaintance with his motherly friend as well as lover Mme de Warens, he converted to Catholicism (and returned to Calvinism in 1754). He long lived in Paris (since 1742) where he initially kept company with the Encyclopaedists Diderot and d'Alembert. He styled a theory of notation of his own and composed pieces of music. However, he soon fell out with Diderot and the other Enlighteners, who he contemptuously called *Philosophes*. For 23 years, he lived with Thérèse LeVasseur in cohabitation before marrying her civilly in 1768; they gave their five children to a foundling hospital. In later years, Rousseau dressed and lived

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in a simple manner, e.g. in Armenian costume and spent his last years after his expatriation from Paris and Geneva at various places. He died in 1778 shortly after having moved to Ermenonville. Acclaimed by Robespierre and the French Revolution as a paragon and authority, his remains were transferred to the *Panthéon* in 1784. The distribution and process of reception of his writings began – also because of the conflicts around his writings – already in his lifetime and has been continuing since.<sup>1</sup>

## Rousseau and the Enlightenment Movement: Society, Anthropology, Alienation

In the Paris of his time, Rousseau became famous overnight by answering the question of the Académie de Dijon, whether the progress in science and arts had contributed to moral betterment. In his *Discours sur les sciences et les arts* (Discours 1, Rousseau 1750), Rousseau rejects the belief which was then held as common sense of the flourishing Enlightenment movement, namely to achieve improvement in the human affairs by science and arts. The academy awarded him the prize. Rousseau criticises – in Enlightenment manner – the depravity of society of which he recognises as pretence and vanity – refined by science and arts. But Rousseau does not stop with this cultural criticism of his contemporary society. Out of his ‘*Non*’, he develops a radical criticism of society as such. For, Rousseau regards the set out decay not as a momentary state which could be overcome by the advance of reason-based insights. He rather assumes that society always alienates humans from themselves. Social relationships cause humans to see themselves in the light of other people’s assessments, leading them to stage, pretend and compete. In Rousseau’s view human misery is not to be enhanced by means of social civilisation but conversely results from it. All struggles about subjection and domination, all inequality between humans originate in social relationships which withdraw the humans from their self-identity (cf. Oelkers 2008).

Against this background Rousseau relates to an abstract ideal of the human being, which he describes as ‘state of nature’ and is elaborated in his second *Discours* ‘*Discours sur l’Origine et les Fondements de l’Inégalité parmi les hommes*’ (1755). As opposed to the understanding of his already then existing deriders, Rousseau with this figure of the ‘noble savage’ did not echo the ‘back to nature’ call. On the contrary, neither did Rousseau take the possibility of a historic state of nature for granted nor did he consider its future existence to be empirically probable. The ‘noble savage’ is as a constructed ideal figure in the strict sense a

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<sup>1</sup> Whereas some examinations of Rousseau connect his unsteady, partly pathological character with the disputable systematics of his teachings, Cassirer (1954) assumes that the radicalness of his life rather corresponds with his writings. The following thoughts will focus on the architecture of Rousseau’s work with a view on pedagogical systematics and leave the discussion about Rousseau’s character and conduct of life aside.

non-social being that is closer to the animal, because he does not require the other. His existence is not determined by the wishes of others. Even though Rousseau's approach is similar to a Platonic position, as it shows the social conditions as aberrancies, Rousseau does in contrast not aim at the reference point of the eternal or divine good order, which is withdrawn from the human existence. Whereas for overcoming the 'wrong' social conditions a Platonic point of view will seek for realisation and internalisation of the eternal or divine order, Rousseau goes ahead in a radically modern way. He sets the human being – the non-socialised human being (*l'homme naturel*) – as the transcendent point of reference for judging and criticising social conditions.<sup>2</sup>

Rousseau's criticism of science and arts in the first *Discours* is primarily also a problematisation of Enlightenment's optimism. In the second *Discours* Rousseau develops this problem further by identifying the appearance of private property as the origin of all inequality between humans and of the resulting dependencies. Rousseau sees the origin of dependence and superiority already laid out in the first acts of property and barter. However, Rousseau does not criticise this against the background of an egalitarian concept of human rights or from the point of view of a just form of social conditions. Rousseau's criticism is related to the imbalance of needs and abilities that is imminent in barter and dependence.<sup>3</sup> Rousseau's criticism of civilised society is not related to a specific form but to the social in general – as a danger for human's self-identity, for human's humanity as such: "Man is born free and everywhere he is in chains" (Du Contrat Social P, III, p.352: "*L'homme est né libre, et par-tout (sic) il est dans les fers*").

Rousseau's anthropology is in a way an abstract anthropology, since it has an ideal point of reference: Only if there is an equilibrium of desires and abilities the human being can be truly human and free: "The truly free man wants only what he can do and does what he pleases. That is my fundamental maxim" (*Émile*: 84). In the light of this figure of identity – correspondence of volition and ability – rational agreements as well as imagination can be problematised: Mere 'rationalizing', as Rousseau calls it sarcastically, cannot guarantee, that the gained understanding will achieve obligingness. Against the background of an equilibrium of desires and abilities as a reference point Rousseau adds the role of the sentiment to Enlightenment's orientation on rationality and reasonable understanding, whereby Rousseau helps to prepare the ground for the romantic counter-movement against Enlightenment: Not only argument but also sentiment – in particular conscience respectively – can distance the human being from the social struggles about subjection and domination. To Rousseau, with imagination there is ambivalence,

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<sup>2</sup>On the traces of religious Christian figures of argumentation in Rousseau's work, particularly on replacing the role of the divine order by the figure of the human educator in *Émile* as well as on the privileged relationship of human beings in educational processes resulting thereof: cf. Osterwalder 2012; Oelkers 2008.

<sup>3</sup>Cf. Tröhler 2008 for a discussion of the close ties between early capitalism and Rousseau's criticism of social relationships as well as Rousseau's specific manner of educationalisation of political and social problems.

too: Through imagination wishes and needs may arise which exceed human abilities and thus lead to his misery.<sup>4</sup>

The correspondence of desires and abilities is at the same time the point of reference for Rousseau's concept of freedom: Freedom means independence from social relationships. Therefore, Rousseau neither sketches an alternative or utopian society in a narrower sense nor does he refer to a 'lost paradise'. His concept of freedom pre-eminently works as a measure of criticism of civilisation and social relations as such. This measure can effectively be laid out as independent of the respective concrete form of society. From there, Rousseau opens the discussion, how the human being can achieve identity with himself under social conditions and how, thus, human alienation from himself can be avoided.<sup>5</sup> Rousseau radicalises the modern question about the shaping of a good society by the human being (as opposed to divine order or also to Platonic orientation on truth) by binding the question about justice to a human measure. Rousseau's work is focussed on human inner independence, which is permanently endangered by social ties. To maintain inner freedom under the conditions of the civilised social is, therefore, the core as actually the cause of educational influence.

## Rousseau on Education

This background of a fundamental criticism of social relationships, which corrupt true humanity instead of encouraging it, is radically continued in his work *Émile* (1762b). Right at the beginning one can read: "Everything is good as it comes from the hands of the author of things: everything degenerates in the hands of man" (*Émile*: P, IV, 245; "*Tout est bien, sortant des mains de l'auteur des choses, tout dégénère entre les mains de l'homme*"). With this sentence Rousseau breaks with the doctrine of original sin precisely by not ascribing moral decay, the possibility of human lapses and the – in Rousseau's eyes – inevitable tendency to misery to human sinfulness but to the social conditions under which humans are obliged to interact. It is against this background that Rousseau sketches out an educational course that rests on the premises of *Perfectibilité* and *Éducation naturelle* entailing four phases of education.

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<sup>4</sup>On the role of imagination in Rousseau's *Émile* cf. Shuffelton 2012. The ambiguity of imagination lies in its double role: Imagination may lead to envy or compassion. To form the latter, educational arrangements such as *Émile's* education are needed; cf. White 2008.

<sup>5</sup>Rousseau's anthropology as well as his educational thinking is clearly androcentric and more or less tacitly endorsing patriarchal gender roles, which was objected by early feminist criticisms like Mary Wollstonecraft as well as it is subject of contemporary debates between Rousseau scholars and feminist readers of Rousseau (cf. Lange 2002).

## Perfécibilité: *The Ability of Becoming Human*

In his second *Discours*, Rousseau introduces a figure which is decisive for modern philosophy of education: *Perfécibilité*. The point of reference for perfecting – in contrast to perfection – does not lie in a concrete anthropology nor in social values and norms or in a religiously orientated salvation. *Perfécibilité* refers to the accordance of volition and ability, which is always on the verge of being upset, but which is the prerequisite of human inner independence and self-identity. Thus, Rousseau forgoes any kind of content-related measure or norm, which could serve as an educational goal. Rather, education is to ensure human's development which is orientated on the formal criterion of achieving identity with himself.

Thus, the element of uncertainty is introduced into educational thinking, in fact in two ways: Firstly, there is the openness of human development stated by *Perfécibilité*, which does not stake the educational core in a certainty about future necessities that precedes the educational process. The educational course is, therefore, not guided by the rehearsal of social norms and necessities but, instead, is open – it aligns itself with the inner freedom of the individual from all social expectations. Rousseau does precisely not aim at a different future society as an utopian projection of true human existence. He concedes that societies will change, which is why they can be no reference point for current education. Rousseau has indeed developed the concept of a truly human form of society mainly in his contemporaneously published *Du Contrat Social* (1762a), which has its point of reference in the *volonté generale*. But this can – in sharp contrast to the will of all, *volonté de tous* – only come about inasmuch as it rests on the identity of volition and ability of every individual. *Volonté generale* is, therefore – Rousseau saw its enabling only realisable in smaller, and especially not in his contemporary forms of government – in itself 'good' and 'right', because it does not represent the majority of particular interests (as in democracy) nor a general good as against particular volition (as in the *polis*). Instead Rousseau puts forward the entity of law, which – if orientated towards the *volonté generale* – is a truly human and more just form of government, because it does not produce social dependencies through representation and obedience. Inasmuch as the *volonté generale* only comes about by authentic accord on the basis of the self-identity of every individual, there can be – theoretically – no conflict of particular interests. It would be inappropriate to accuse Rousseau at this point of, in an utopian way, negating the empirical existence of particular wishes. In Rousseau's outline, *volonté generale* is a consequential possibility, if one takes its foundation into account: The self-identical human being cannot develop individual interest which would cheat or disregard others, because after all the development of self-identity is – according to the author's concept – carried out through the education process.

Secondly, Rousseau introduces with *perfécibilité* a dimension of uncertainty into educational theory, because it marks a potentiality. Self-identity does not – especially not under the conditions of social civilisation – come by necessity. It is permanently in danger of being failed. To avoid this failing of self-identity and to

ensure inner independence of the human education comes at stake. Although education is embedded in the political dimension of another society, it is not staked about the alignment of education along the necessities of civic society – unlike for the later reception of Rousseau’s work especially by Pestalozzi and the German Enlightenment pedagogy. Rousseau rejects this education to the *bourgeois* and juxtaposes education to the *citoyen*. In Rousseau’s view the core as well as the measure of educational processes is to be humanity under the conditions of civilised society, the inner independence of social norms and relationships. This independence can only be achieved if the human being is self-identical and does not follow social expectations, which means desires and abilities must be brought into accordance.

Rousseau therefore vehemently opposes the educational concepts of the Enlightenment movement about the reason-based conveyance of rational understandings and judgements, as he finds it in Locke’s *Some Thoughts concerning Education* (1693). Rousseau problematises rationalisation and argument as the basis for reasonable judgement on two levels with regard to education: Firstly, Rousseau doubts that reasonable *ratio* can carry out the obliging of judgements. Explanations and arguments always open up the space for dissent and dispute as they only will occur if there is a different view of things possible. Explanations and arguments always might lose bindingness by counter-arguments. Reasonable arguing, therefore, can hardly be the orientation and method of educational practices. In contrast Rousseau emphasises the role of emotional insight. Understanding facts and arguments requires direct experience of their truth. Thus, Rousseau introduces an individual-centred and holistic view into educational thinking – which was taken up by the later nineteenth-century reform pedagogy – comprising the senses, body and mind.

Secondly however, it is according to Rousseau’s view – and he thereby prepares the ground for a fundamental shift in modern pedagogical thinking – useless to reason with children. Children are not able to follow the logic of an argument. They are no ‘little adults’. Their thinking, their feeling and consequently their understanding proceeds in a completely different way than that of adults. Rousseau, therefore, limits in a way the mightiness of knowledge and social norms: The adult perspective is fundamentally different from that one of children. Reasons do not reach them, for children think, recognise and comprehend in a way that is unique to them and radical different to adults. In Rousseau’s educational theory children are not an end on the way to good civic society, yet, they have an end in themselves. With this argument educational theory is entrusted with a completely new task and starts in a way as epistemological project: The mere foreign or unknown childhood initiated the still continuing issue of gaining knowledge about childhood and educational addressees.

## Éducation Naturelle: *Negative Education*

Inasmuch as social relationships and social norms are to be put at a distance, the educational relationship must not be in shape of a social condition. The character of *Émile* grows up in the countryside and in more or less social isolation. *Émile* is removed from parental care and encounters only a few people of the rural household who are selected by the fictive educator whose role is taken in his treatise by Rousseau himself. Though, the ‘natural’ of education does not refer to the supposedly untouched nature. Rather it depends on the medium and style of education. In order to avoid the social influence of obedience, power and cheat, all chances for experience must be learned as natural and out of human control. For this reason, Rousseau opposes mere instruction and impartation of knowledge. This mode of ‘positive education’, as Rousseau sees it advocated by his Enlightenment contemporaries, is to be rejected as instruction adds something to children’s comprehension, which does not come from within themselves and must inevitably be beyond their understanding. Instead, Rousseau figures with his ‘natural’ education a negative education method, which can also be described as indirect education. “The first education then ought to be purely negative. It consists not at all in teaching virtue or truth but in shielding the heart from error and the mind from vice” (*Émile* (P, IV, 245; “*La première (sic) éducation doit donc être purement négative. Elle consiste, non point à enseigner la vertu ni la vérité, mai à garantir le Cœur du vice et l’esprit de l’erreur*”).

One would misinterpret *éducation naturelle* by understanding it as a form of teleological self-unfoldment which would proceed without educational activity – as later advocated by Montessori and other reform pedagogues. In fact, Rousseau sketches out educational influence – in opposition to the knowing position of ‘positive education’ – rather to be orientated towards the vital support of *perfectibilité* and preventing the failure of self-identity. The educator does not impart knowledge he has found right and valid regardless of whether and in what way it can be of meaning to the child. He refrains himself and his educational practices are guided by the task to enable his educatee’s inner freedom. Any convenience for domination and submission must be avoided. In this manner, the true and authentic speech is of an important role. *Émile* has to be taught the meaning of things without any ambiguity or ambivalence: The human being speaks in clear, unmistakable and unambiguous language. He is authentic in his words and does not disguise, because he by virtue of his education is incapable of doing so (cf. Starobinski 1988). The human being – this is the central point of criticism of Derrida’s reading of Rousseau (1977) – *is* his language, language presents him.<sup>6</sup> The educational relationship, therefore, must not be experienced as part of social relations. The educator’s appearance and performance have to be as immutable as things are. Learning and experience are mediated through things and environment, which are as well as human

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<sup>6</sup>On the relevance of the pedagogical induction of an unambiguous language and ‘right’ hearing with Rousseau cf. Lavery 2011.



encounters arranged in an absolutely pedagogical ‘learning environment’ around *Émile*. The power of educational influence completely disappears in this arrangement, which *Émile* is to experience as natural and not as socially conveyed. “Do you see what a new empire you are going to acquire over him? How many chains have you put around his heart before he notices them!” (*Émile*: 233).

### *The Development of Childhood and the Education of Émile*

It is against this background that Rousseau drafts a course of development which is orientated towards the premise of human inner independence. His phase model is, however, not based – unlike present-day developmental psychology – on empirical research on children’s development levels. In *Émile*, human self-identity marks the differentiation criterion between different levels (cf. Schäfer 2002). Insofar as in each phase, which Rousseau divides in four – infancy, childhood, prepubescence, adolescence – the relation of desires and abilities is changing, new balancing is needed every time: “Each age, each condition of life, has its suitable perfection, a sort of maturity proper to it” (*Emile*: 158). The developmental stages are, thereby, not aimed with a deficit-orientated perspective at the not-yet-existence of a future final state like the completed adult. Rather, the fundamentality of the ‘unknown child’ notably comes to the fore: Each phase has its own value in regard to the respective achievement of self-identity as equilibrium of desires and abilities.

Rousseau assumes that education begins with birth. Infancy is the first phase of human development. The crying and babbling of the infant are to him already pre-language forms of communicative expression – thus, the stark contrast to Enlightenment’s reasoning education comes into view. In this phase, desires and needs predominate, without there being an adequate repertoire for their satisfaction. That is why the educator is an extension of the infant’s body; he must enter into interaction with, and understand his or her needs in lieu of, the infant. Doing so is not about fulfilling all needs. This would, according to Rousseau, only signal to the infant the option of dominating others. The educator’s task is to distinguish representative for the infant between needs that must be satisfied and needs that merely serve for subjection or manipulation of the environment. The educator is inasmuch a ‘tool’ for the infant’s needs as he puts them into accord with the adequate form of satisfaction and, thus, makes it possible for the infant to experience a feeling for the harmony of desires and abilities. It is against this background that Rousseau vigorously pleads for an extension of the infant’s movement space by turning against the in his time common wrapping-up of babies and by advocating both more infant’s mobility and breastfeeding, which was also rather frowned upon.<sup>7</sup>

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<sup>7</sup>Tosato-Rigo (2012) argues that the importance of corporal education played a decisive role in the uprising physical education of Rousseau’s time where the evolving of childcare studies – mainly aiming at avoiding child mortality – more and more came into objective of physical doctors whereas Rousseau’s *Émile* transformed the medicalisation of pedagogy to a pedagogues’ object.

With 3 years of age phase two begins, the phase of childhood. Caused by the speaking of the child there is a change in the relation of desires and abilities. Although in this phase, too, desires outweigh the possibilities of their fulfilment, there is also a developing stronger independence and a form of self-awareness as an individual being through the disposability of language. Rousseau assumes that in this phase actual education begins and with language the child gains cognitive faculty. The educator in his influence must, therefore, especially be concerned to the child's wishes remaining correspondent to the conditions of their fulfilment. According to Rousseau, all situations and *Émile's* experiences must, therefore, be characterised by the experience of necessity, instead of letting the social character of the pedagogical relationship in the form of command and obedience become focal. The situations arranged by the educator must appear to *Émile's* experience as opposition of the world limiting the child's volition. Thus, *Émile* is to learn to adjust his desires to the possible.

Phase three – prepubescence – begins between the ages of 12 and 15 and is characterised by a prevalence of powers over desires. To Rousseau, this is a decisive time because in this phase knowledge can be imparted to the child. However, this knowledge is related to a new criterion, which occurs in this phase for the first time – utility. Knowledge can only be introduced in this phase in order to compensate for the imbalance between abilities and desires. The abundance of powers is canalised by learning crafts, which *Émile* and the educator perform simultaneously. For the purpose of directing the increased abilities Rousseau recommends reading, especially Plato's *Politeia* and *Robinson Crusoe*. Knowledge acquisition is, thus, always orientated towards necessary utility.

The fourth phase of adolescence is characterised by a fundamental change, in which the social dimension of *Émile's* relationship to the world emerges. Especially sexuality and bodily desire, which develop at about the age of 15, again alter the balance between desires and abilities. Since sexual passion is to a great extent related to others, Rousseau therein sees the founding stone of moral insight. Due to his previous education *Émile* now is able to understand that others also feel and that he is part of a social context. This allows him to gain insight into his social connection to others. Now, everything in education depends on guiding the feelings to the right path: Compassion is to be evoked instead of envy, pity is to be cultivated instead of presumptuous pride, friendship instead of strategic calculation, self-love (*amour de soi*) instead of selfishness (*amour-propre*).<sup>8</sup> This needs carefully planned encounters, in which *Émile's* orientation towards other people leads to the appropriate attitudes.<sup>9</sup>

At this point the educational relationship changes in a decisive way: Whereas so far experienced by *Émile* as natural or non-social respectively, since the words,

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<sup>8</sup>The difference between *amour-propre*, which is the dangerous part of sentiments leading to selfishness and self-superiority amongst others and *amour de soi* plays a decisive role in Rousseau's concept of education. The latter is the true and striven for mode of inner independence.

<sup>9</sup>In this phase, religious education occurs, too, which Rousseau describes in the digression 'The Profession of Faith of a Savoyard Vicar'. It is especially this part of *Émile* which contributed the ostracism of Rousseau by parliament and church.

actions and encounters were laid out by the educator as immutable like mere things or laws of nature, the educator now discloses the social character of this relationship to *Émile*. The educator changes the mode of his address and reveals himself as *Émile*'s lifelong companion so far, he discloses his duty with *Émile*'s education and, thus, speaks to *Émile*'s heart. In Rousseau's hypothetical experiment, *Émile* is touched by the insight into the educator's sacrifice and recognises the necessity of this relationship. Following this, *Émile* asks for a contract in order to ensure further education by the educator. On this new basis the educational relationship between the two is continued, they travel various countries in order to acquaint *Émile* with politics, language and culture.

*Émile* marries *Sophie*, who is chosen by *Émile* on the basis of the clear conception of a wife prepared by the educator. Although Rousseau anticipates the sprouting romantic ideal of love as a precondition of conjugal union, he, however, depends on the difference of the sexes between the public and the private entailing the anthropological argument of female inferiority. *Sophie*'s course of education is outlined in the fifth book of *Émile*, and it is thoroughly guided by the notion that women are not able to achieve inner independence. *Sophie*'s education is directed at preparing her for being a wife and mother. In Rousseau's view women will never be able to take an independent position towards the expectations and judgements of others. With that, Rousseau's anthropology figures out to be cleft concerning the possibility of being human which was characterised by self-identity, autonomy and inner independence.

That the educational relationship – and, thus, the indirect, all the more effective power of the educator over the educatee – is indispensable is shown by the lifelong lasting relationship between them (cf. Cooper 2004). *Émile* will permanently stay in contact with the educator and ask for his advice.

## Conclusion: Rousseau's Voice in Philosophy of Education

Listening to Rousseau's voice in philosophy of education means literally to listen to a voice from the past, though no voice could be less present than his one. Rousseau's pedagogy is radically modern insofar it seeks for an appropriately human existence and education, which stakes a radical difference between the individual self and social conditions. With it, the ongoing debate arises, how an adequate pedagogical answer can be found in the light of human openness to the future on the one hand and social contingency on the other hand. Yet, Rousseau's answer is, considering its radical orientation towards individual happiness in a mere *eudaimonian* sense, a rather a pre-modern answer. Despite transforming the Platonic good into plain humanhood the religious traces oriented towards the transcendental are evident in Rousseau's criticism of society.

Rousseau's work is, however, radically modern, insofar as his criticism of society positions the human being as the absolute reference point for truth, freedom and

justice.<sup>10</sup> Particularly, Rousseau's thinking can be regarded as a crucial point in the history of modern educational thinking: By introducing the concept of *perfectibilité* as the human condition Rousseau alters the foundations of pedagogical perspectives. Educational principles and practices are now to be proven and regarded in the light of their social and powerful conditions which are contrary to the individual. Further, by the notion of human *Perfectibilité*, which by Herbart has been introduced into pedagogical terminology as *Bildsamkeit*, the central role of uncertainty in educational processes is highlighted. By his conviction that educational influence – in particular under the auspices of Enlightenment-style impartation of knowledge – can certainly cause harm to the goodness of the human being Rousseau as one of the first has limited educational optimism.

The impact of these shifts entailed a different view on intergenerational relationships. Certainties and knowledge are untied from their unquestioned validity and must be orientated towards their adequacy with regard to the abilities and desires of the educatee instead of those of the educator. The introduction of the difference between children and adults, the resulting ongoing effort for insight and understanding of educational addressees as well as the distancing of a deficit-striven perspective on the child became fundamentals of educational theory (cf. Wain 2011). The notion of a gradual human development has influenced modern developmental theory, romanticism and the child-centred concepts of reform pedagogy at the end of the nineteenth century with its biologicistic view on the self-evolvement of the child as well as progressivism (cf. Oelkers 2008).

In the lens of this the role of power came to view within the educational relationship, which with Rousseau takes the shape of an exclusive dyad of a privileged relationship between humans. In Rousseau's *Émile* the problem of the intersubjective relation in educational processes comes to the fore: Whereas the child is no longer limited in his or her purely receptive role but treated as an independently acting being provided with his or her own dignity, the power of the educator as well as within educational relationships is nowhere shown and at the same time deproblematized more clearly than in the fictive course of education like *Émile's*. The manipulative role of the educational influence and *Émile's* lifelong indispensability of guidance and supervision by the educator contradict the premise of independence which Rousseau claimed to be the core and measure of human being and education. Rousseau's impact in philosophy of education might not at least arouse from the contradictions within his work which radical elaborate the consequences of fundamental issues of modern educational theory and practice.

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<sup>10</sup> Kant admired Rousseau for this approach and described it as a decisive turning point for his own thinking (cf. Cassirer 1945). Cassirer lines out the links between Rousseau and Kant, especially that this critique of theory-based reason stretches forward to Kant's '*Praktischer Vernunft*'.

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Katariina Holma

## Israel Scheffler's Antireductionism and Today's Narrowing Scope of Education

During the past decades, many political philosophers and philosophers of education have expressed their concern with respect to the narrowing scope of education in today's democratic societies. Martha Nussbaum expresses this concern as follows:

Radical changes are occurring in what democratic societies teach the young, and these changes have not been well thought through. Thirsty for national profit, nations, and their systems of education, are heedlessly discarding skills that are needed to keep democracies alive. If this trend continues, nations all over the world will soon be producing generations of useful machines, rather than complete citizens who can think for themselves, criticize tradition, and understand the significance of another person's sufferings and achievements. The future of the world's democracies hangs in the balance. (Nussbaum 2010, p. 2)

In this chapter, my aim is to reconstruct a Schefflerian approach to this question. Israel Scheffler (1923–2014) was one of the leading figures of Anglo-American philosophy of education during the second half of the twentieth century.<sup>1</sup> Scheffler has made remarkable contributions in many different fields of academic philosophy, such as epistemology, the philosophy of science, the philosophy of language, the philosophy of religion, and of course, the philosophy of education. His philosophy

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<sup>1</sup> Scheffler was Victor S. Thomas Professor of Education and Philosophy at Harvard University. He was appointed to Harvard in 1952, serving there until his retirement in 1992. Scheffler holds M.A. and B.A. degrees from Brooklyn College, an M.H.L. and a D.H.L. (hon.) from the Jewish Theological Seminary of America, and a Ph.D. from the University of Pennsylvania. He was the author of 17 books including *The Language of Education* (1960), *Reason and Teaching* (1973), *Four Pragmatists* (1974), *Of Human Potential* (1985), *In Praise of the Cognitive Emotions* (1991), and *Symbolic Worlds* (1997).

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of education draws from his insight into these other fields of philosophy. The roots of his thinking lie in the philosophical traditions of pragmatism and analytic philosophy. Characteristic of all his work is that he does not compromise either the wide and pluralist focus or the analytical rigor of philosophy.<sup>2</sup>

In 1950s and 1960s Scheffler – with such scholars as Paul H. Hirst and R.S. Peters – was one of the pioneers in analytic philosophy of education. Scheffler promoted the idea of bringing the methods from general philosophy to the philosophy of education (Scheffler 1966, p. 4; 1960, pp. 4–10; 1973, p. 9; Siegel 2001, p.142). He stressed a particular challenge in the philosophy of education: educational discourse involves various contexts with different vocabularies and conceptual systems (Scheffler 1960, pp. 8–9). For him, one of the fundamental tasks of the philosophical analysis of educational discourse was “the disentangling of different contexts in which education is discussed and argued, and the consideration of basic ideas and appropriate logical criteria relevant to each” (Scheffler 1960, pp. 8–9). However, his idea of the relevance of linguistic analysis was not reduced to this, but he saw the analysis of language as a vital tool for gaining deeper understanding of our educational thought and practice. For him (1966, p.7), the analysis of language was actually “to ‘look through’ language at the whole range of traditional issues, issues concerning fundamental notions such as truth, belief, and judgment, value and obligation, intuition and verification”.

Along these methodological lines, Scheffler’s famous *The Language of Education* (1960) provided an influential analysis of educational definitions, slogans, metaphors, and proposals for relevant principles for their critical evaluation. In this book, he also argued for the idea of teaching as conceptually separated from such psychological notions as “setting up conditions under which learning will most effectively take place”, or such social-scientific notions as “transmission of the content of a culture” (1960, pp. 104–105). Instead, his emphasis was on the moral concerns crucial for the adequate idea of teaching (1960, pp. 98–99).

In relation to the current concern on the narrowing scope of education, Scheffler’s philosophy is rewarding at least in three respects. Firstly, Scheffler (1973, pp. 126–135) develops further the Deweyan idea of schools as “standing apart from current social conceptions and serving autonomous ideals of inquiry and truth” and should thus be autonomous from any short-term ends of current society. On this basis, Scheffler elaborates the idea of education, which has the responsibility “to criticize, enlighten, and create” and which, thus, “has its own dignity and its own direction to follow”. In Scheffler’s view, education in a democratic society can never be used merely as a tool for achieving, say, national or global economic goals.

Secondly, Scheffler’s conception of human nature, related to his theory of symbolism as well as his understanding of the intertwined nature of reason and emotion, provides a view of human nature that points to wide-ranging possibilities – and requirements – for education. We humans approach phenomena with an embodied apparatus involving reason, emotion, and bodily skills and reactions, all of which, in combination, affect knowing and understanding (Holma [in press](#); Scheffler 1991,

<sup>2</sup>On Scheffler as a philosopher of education, see also Holma (2014) and Siegel (2001).



pp. 3–17). Scheffler's (1985, 1997) theory of symbolic representation follows the same lines, and he emphasizes that the symbolic systems we create are not only linguistic but also, for example, pictorial, kinetic, or ritual. Again, we may witness Scheffler's strong tendency against reductionism in this instance in relation to human nature and its potential.

Thirdly, Scheffler's epistemological and ontological insights provide a philosophically coherent basis for his educational philosophy. Scheffler (1973, p. 60) argues that the scope of education must be interpreted as widely as civilization itself. And civilization for Scheffler is a wide notion indeed, as he argues against reductionism – both within the realm of science and outside it as well. It is also important to note that Schefflerian pluralism and fallibilism do not imply relativism. On the contrary, his reformulations of the notions of rationality and objectivity preserve the possibility of critical inquiry in all fields of human understanding without connecting either of these notions to the possibility of certainty or fixed starting points of human knowledge. Therefore, his antireductionism, deep fallibilism, and his interpretation of the interconnected notions of rationality and objectivity provide important arguments for resisting any short-term educational aims that narrow the focus of our understanding.

In what follows, I will concentrate in more detail on three aforementioned dimensions in Scheffler's philosophy: his conception of the autonomous role of education in a democratic society, his conception of human nature, and his pluralist and fallibilist – yet not relativist – epistemology and philosophy of science. Scheffler's broad conception of education rooted in his wider philosophical framework provides the needed conceptual tools for opposing the current neoliberalist tendency toward reducing the value of education to that of economic discourse.

## Education in Scheffler's Antireductionist Framework

[T]he notion that education is an instrument for the realization of social goals, no matter how worthy they are thought to be, harbors the greatest conceivable danger to the ideal of a free and rational society. (Scheffler 1973, p. 134)

For Scheffler, a democratic society needs various autonomous spheres of activity. One crucial reason for this seems to be that it helps society in resisting the threat of totalitarianism, which looms when one sphere with its specific ends and vocabularies takes over one or many of the other spheres. For example, in the 1970s Scheffler (1973, pp. 18–30) was concerned about an increasing “tendency to reconstrue intellectual work as political ideology, continuous with political action”. He compares the demands of political activism of those times in the USA with the situation where philosophy is under the domination of state or church. On the surface, these two threats to the autonomy of philosophy may seem different from each other particularly in terms of their relationship to democracy. The aims of political activism in the USA during those times were mostly connected to democratic values. This is often contrary to political systems where state or church dictates the contents of philosophy,

as they are not usually committed to the democratic values in the first place. However, within the Schefflerian framework the democratic form of life is in danger in both cases, because – for it to flourish – the autonomous spheres of activity in society are necessary.

It is important to note that autonomous does not mean isolated. The adequate relationship between the spheres is dialogical and creative. As Scheffler describes the relationship between philosophy and education, his own two fields of interest:

The philosophers's job is not to deduce purported educational implications from his general doctrines any more than it is to derive purported legal, historical, or scientific implications. His task is to bring to bear philosophical methods, conceptions and traditions in seeking to understand the independent concerns of his object realm. Education, in particular, must be taken as seriously in its own right as science is taken by the philosophy of science. This does not mean that education must also be taken as fixed and unalterable, any more than science is so taken by philosophers of science. The relationship sought is a creative one – in learning from a genuine inquiry into education, philosophy's scope is extended and enriched; in striving for philosophical critique and perspective, education may attain a deeper and wider self-consciousness with inevitable bearings on practice. (Scheffler 1973, p. 19)

In the same spirit, Scheffler (1973, pp. 134–135) criticizes the interpretations of Dewey that claim that the role of education in a Deweyan philosophy should be understood as instrumental in relation to the wider aims of society. Scheffler argues that for Dewey, education can be understood as an instrument for the realization of social goals, only if the notion of society is “not society as it happens to be, but a reformed society, illuminated by an ideal imagination and a critical intelligence that it is the school's office to foster”. There he emphasizes that in a democratic society, the task of education “is not only to serve but also to criticize, enlighten, and create”.

Of course, the role and responsibility of education in a genuine democracy is enormous. In many of his writings, Scheffler stresses that education, which focuses merely on techniques or skills, is fundamentally misguided. As he writes:

[W]e talk of ‘citizenship’ as if it were a set of skills, whereas our educational aim is, in fact, not merely to teach people *how* to be good citizens but, in particular, to *be* good citizens, not merely *how* to go about voting, but *to* vote. We talk about giving them “the skills required for democratic living,” when actually we are concerned that they acquire democratic habits, norms, propensities. To take another example, we talk of giving pupils the “ability to think critically” when what we really want is for them to acquire the habits and norms of critical thought. (Scheffler 1960, pp. 98–99, emphases in original)

In other words, the task of education is not only “to provide persons with techniques but, more importantly, to provide techniques with critical, informed, and humane persons” (Scheffler 1973, p. 135). Of course, this is easier said than done, and one can reasonably ask, what resources can we find from Scheffler's philosophy that would help us in understanding the conditions of educating humane persons? In my view, two lines of his thinking would be worth further development here: his arguments on the intertwined nature of cognition and emotion, and his theory of symbolism as the primary characteristic of the human mind.

In following the path of many earlier pragmatists, especially William James, Scheffler (1991, pp. 3–17) emphasizes the fundamental interdependence of reason

and emotion<sup>3</sup> in our thinking, feeling, and acting. The rejection of the dichotomy is based on pragmatist epistemology in turn grounded on evolutionary theory, where reason, emotion, and bodily sensation and skills are seen as adaptive instruments for getting useful information about the circumstances in which we live. Pragmatism sees perception, reason, and emotion as interrelated parts of the apparatus developed for surviving and succeeding in the surrounding world. From the pragmatist perspective, emotions have an important function in our system for achieving new knowledge (epistemic and moral), but they are fallible, as are both reason and perception as well.

In his contribution concerning the intertwined nature of reason and emotion, Scheffler (1991) demonstrates, for example, how the emotional stance of surprise indicates that we have realized something that we have not known before, and how the emotional stance of joy is connected to the scientist's success in verifying her hypotheses. These emotions keep us motivated in cognitively demanding activities, such as scientific or philosophical work, or critical thinking. Even though Scheffler himself does not develop this idea further, the intertwined nature of reason and emotion can be seen as crucial also in developing the theory of how to educate persons who are motivated and capable of using their techniques and skills in a critical and democratic spirit.<sup>4</sup>

Scheffler's (1985, p. 18) theory of symbolism, for its part, is closely related to his antireductionist philosophy in general, as he develops the theory of our symbolic systems not only as linguistic, but as including "also non-linguistic vehicles of representation, comprehending the graphical or diagrammatical, the pictorial and the plastic, the kinetic and the ritual". For Scheffler (1997, p. 3) symbolism is "a primary characteristic of mind, displayed in every variety of thought and department of culture". He (1985, 18) rejects any suggestion that these symbolic systems could possibly be reduced to one system, as "the symbolic systems constructed by human beings are not simply changes rung upon some universal matrix, itself sprung from the givens of physics".

This brings us to the third point, Scheffler's antireductionist and pluralist philosophy of science and epistemology. His philosophy of science has been antireductionist and pluralist from the start, but in 'A Plea for Pluralism' (2000), 'My Quarrels with Nelson Goodman' (2001), and 'Worlds of Truth' (2009) he further develops this position and terms it 'plurealism'.<sup>5</sup> To put the point of plurealism roughly, it combines Goodmanian pluralism with Peircean fallibilist realism. Scheffler agrees with Nelson Goodman that by using different and incommensurable symbol systems, equally true descriptions of the world may be presented. Nevertheless, he disagrees with Goodman's statement that we should, in conclusion, reject the notion of an independently existing reality.

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<sup>3</sup>Some current theories of psychology define the notion of cognition as involving emotion. However, Scheffler uses the term cognition as referring to thinking.

<sup>4</sup>I have further elaborated this idea in Holma (2012) and Holma (2015). About the type of personality a genuine democracy requires, see also Winnicott (1950).

<sup>5</sup>On Scheffler's plurealism and its educational implications, see also Holma (2004).

Scheffler seems to think that Goodman would not have refuted realism, if he had not mistakenly assumed that a realist must always be a ‘monist’. By monism Scheffler refers to one who believes that science will converge to one symbol system which can, at some point in the future, explain everything. As he (2009, p. 64) describes the monist assumption that he takes as false: “The prospect of wholesale reductions that would reduce the total number of scientific specialties at a given time to any appreciable degree, much less to one, is a fantasy of science fiction”.

According to Scheffler, this kind of monism can be rejected without rejecting the ultimate assumption of ontological realism. As he (2000, pp. 165–166) writes about his plurealist position, it “agrees with [Goodman] in rejecting the notion of one world, but disagrees with him in that it holds whatever worlds there are to be independent of their corresponding versions. We have then to reckon with a variety of unreduced domains of entities, for each of which there are credible versions short of certainty but commanding a greater or lesser degree of confidence”.

In Scheffler’s view, not only is science pluralistic, but philosophy is pluralistic, too. He (1997, p. 5) entirely rejects “the restrictions of philosophy to logic, science, or language as objects of study”, as the realm of philosophy reaches any human interest. In addition (2009, p. 3), the concepts of philosophy are plural, too, as they must “be chosen out of an infinite array of alternatives”. And, finally (2009, p. 3), its solutions are plural, as “for any systematic interpretation preserving the preferred truths of some object domain, there will be incompatible others that do the same”. Within the field of the philosophy of education, Scheffler (1973, p. 19) stresses “the need and opportunity for a variety of programs and styles to flourish, all embraced within the continuous neighborhood relating philosophy and education”.

It is important to note, however, that Scheffler’s pluralism either in philosophy or in science does not imply relativism, not to mention nihilism. As he (2009, p. 3) states in relation to pluralism in philosophy: “An adequate interpretation is a triumph of insight and order available to all – hence an instance of intellectual process”. This possibility of avoiding relativism is based on his (1982) famous reinterpretation of the notion of objectivity.

Scheffler makes a distinction between the notions of certainty and objectivity. The objectivity of the statement or theory can be evaluated in light of such criteria as impartiality, evidence, and good reasons, without any demand of certainty or its derivation from the fixed starting points of knowledge. Rationality, for its part, can be defined as a human capacity to evaluate these criteria. For a belief to be counted as rational, it must be objectively assessed, and for a judgment to be counted as objective, it must be supported by reasons. In rejecting – along Peircean lines – the possibility of certainty, as well as the conception that knowledge can be derived from any fixed starting points, and without rejecting the possibility for objectivity and rationality, Scheffler’s pluralist and antireductionist view avoids the danger of slipping into any nihilist version of relativism.

In short, Scheffler’s conception of the human, as well as his conception of the world in which we live, takes quite seriously the multifacetedness and multidimensionality of the human condition. Only within this framework does the significance of

Scheffler's (1973, p. 60) statement emerge, insofar as "the proper scope of education is as large as civilization itself". As he states:

If we narrow the scope of education, we narrow our operative conception of civilization and we impoverish the meaning of participation in civilized community... A limitation to the cognitive and the academic, not to say the hard core of science, mathematics, and technology, would, in my view, be a disaster. (Scheffler 1973, p. 60)

In the following section, I will discuss the potential of Scheffler's philosophical view in resisting the current tendencies of narrowing the focus of education in more detail. In my view, Scheffler's philosophical approach on the whole provides us not only with compelling arguments for resisting too narrow a scope of education, but a wide and coherent philosophical framework in which one can understand the potential of education for a democratic society on the one hand, and the danger of narrowing our understanding of education on the other.

## **Schefflerian Tools for Resisting the Narrowing Scope of Education**

The Schefflerian understanding of humans as symbolic meaning makers in a rich and manifold reality provides us with a conception of education that is fundamentally different from contemporary neoliberalist discourse stressing the mostly economic values as being crucial for the realization of any other values. If we consider this essential characteristic of neoliberalism in the light of the Schefflerian framework, the first and most obvious problem is that it bypasses the importance of various autonomous spheres of society. These spheres should be in a dialogical and creative relationship with each other in order to maintain and develop the democratic form of life.

Within the field of education, a too narrow conception of human nature and potential may lead to educational designs that do not provide a rich enough medium for growth into the traditions of various symbol systems of science, art, morality, and religion, *and* for developing these systems as well as creating new ones. Another important reason for keeping all these fields within the field of public education is that, in the Schefflerian framework, all these fields are subjects of free and rational inquiry and development. Therefore, to keep these fields within the public sphere of education may have another crucial benefit for democracy: it may prevent democracies from segregation, radicalization, and irrationality, especially within the field of religion and morality.

Furthermore, Scheffler states that democracy needs persons who have not only internalized the ideal of democracy and their duty in maintaining it, but, in addition, persons who have such a rich conception of human life that they can find ways for creating the conditions of meaningful life, for example, when the environmental crisis forces us to give up our lifestyles based on the idea of economic growth. Scheffler's (1960, pp. 98–99, 1973, p. 135) warning about education, which focuses

mostly or merely on techniques and skills and abandons the wider conception of educating “critical, informed, and humane persons”, is thus more than topical today. An adequate understanding of the intertwined nature of reason and emotion is crucial here, as the opposition between these two “distorts everything it touches”. In Scheffler’s words:

Mechanizing science, it [the opposition of cognition and emotion] sentimentalizes arts, while portraying ethics and religion as twin swamps of feeling and unreasoned commitment. Education, meanwhile – that is to say, the development of mind and attitudes in the young – is split into two grotesque parts – unfeeling knowledge and mindless arousal. (Scheffler 2009, 125)

In my previous work, I have developed the idea of the harmfulness of the opposition of reason and emotion in education and have argued that the philosophy and practice of education should be more aware of the ways that reason and emotion work together (Holma 2012, 2015). For example, the tendency to avoid emotional discomfort can lead to ‘rationalization’, the process by which the reasons one gives for one’s actions are not real, but instead are based on self-deception. That is to say, one’s own rationalizations in response to difficulties in accepting or interpreting emotions can distort one’s interpretations. This, as well as many other shortcomings deriving from inappropriate interplay between reason and emotion, is crucial in the education of democratic citizens.

Contemporary reductionist tendencies have yet another implication, which can be addressed by Schefflerian tools. By this I refer to the empiricist inclination that aims to reduce educational research to the narrowly understood research on learning, based on empirical psychology or even the neurosciences. From the viewpoint of Scheffler’s philosophy, educational research could never be justifiably reduced to these realms of science. This is both due to his plural notion of philosophy and science, and because empirical sciences do not have conceptual tools for addressing normative questions always embedded in the practice of education.<sup>6</sup> As a democratic society necessitates the autonomous sphere of education; it also necessitates autonomous science with its various fields of study. The autonomous fields may, in addition to their other benefits, protect us from errors that may arise from a distorted perspective of some of these spheres.

A unifying feature in all these Schefflerian concerns is his deep fallibilism. For Scheffler, we are always in danger of reducing reality to what we happen to know

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<sup>6</sup>A basic reason for this irreducibility is that empirical sciences can provide us only descriptive knowledge, whereas the main aim of philosophical, or pedagogical, knowledge, is normative understanding. From this perspective, philosophical and empirical perspectives can, and actually must, interact with each other, but they can never replace each other. As an example from the birth of pragmatist philosophy: the very starting point of the Peircean epistemology – on which the tradition of pragmatism is based – was Peirce’s inspiration from the new theory of Charles Darwin. From the perspective of evolutionary theory, Peirce rejected both rationalism and empiricism, and formulated the epistemological position of fallibilism. As can be easily seen, there is no danger that Peircean epistemology could be reduced to the evolutionary theory or replace it, simply because the former is normative and the latter is descriptive. About this irreducibility in educational research, see Holma and Hyytinen (2015).

and think about it now. Due to this common distortion of our thinking, we are inclined to delimit human potential to what humans have already found out about themselves, education to what we now happen to think as fundamental for the survival of our societies (e.g., economic growth), and reality to our current understanding of it, at worst, to the current results of science (Holma 2011, pp. 544–547).

## Conclusion

Current neoliberalist trends throughout the world tend to frame educational aims in the vocabulary of economic growth and productivity. Without denying the importance of the role of economics in human welfare, one can reasonably ask, whether the focus is too narrow for preserving democracy and elaborating the conditions for a good human life. Contemporary democracies are struggling with ecological crises, shrinking budgets, floods of refugees, and without education that is wide-ranging, preserving and developing what is best in human civilization to foster both criticality and creativity in all these realms, we may soon be facing a disaster that Scheffler (1973, p. 60) predicted long ago.

One can of course ask, why and how might education rescue us from the enormous problems that the human race is now facing. The question can, however, be turned the other way around. If we want to adhere to the hope that it would be possible for humans to live together in peace and harmony (or at least relatively so), can we bypass the resources and potentials that education offers? What other means do we have? And if we believe that education matters, is it not extremely important to try to achieve a profound understanding about the relationship of education to democracy and the meaningful life of its members?

Israel Scheffler's philosophy of education stresses the autonomous sphere of education – as independent of any short-term political ends – as a fundamental part of a democratic society. He defends the scope of education which is as wide as civilization itself, including science, humanities, art, ethics, and religion. Within the Schefflerian framework, all these realms of human understanding should be approached in a critical and fallibilist spirit. Furthermore, he emphasizes that education cannot focus merely on skills, that is, without aiming to contribute to the development of mature personalities of the subjects of education. Indeed, such a short-sighted focus on skills alone can never be sufficient for a genuine democracy.

Scheffler's antireductionist philosophy provides us with perspectives of human nature and the world in which we live that reach beyond our current limited understanding. In this framework, education is an important medium not only for transmitting to the younger generations the various traditions and symbol systems past generations have created, but also to enquire into and create new understanding of ourselves as humans and the world within which we live. In the current world crises, we need the creative ways of renewing what is best in the traditions of human civilization more than ever, as well as new insights in how to live harmoniously together in a world of decreasing ecological and economic resources.



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# Stiegler and the Future of Education in a Digitized World



Joris Vlieghe

Bernard Stiegler (born 1952) is one of those philosophers for whom life and thought are very closely related, if not intertwined. When incarcerated in the 1970s for an armed robbery, he commenced a philosophy study by correspondence. The transformation he went through forms an important backbone to his thought (he has commented on this experience in his book *Acting Out* (2009)). Finding himself there in utter solitude and deprived of all life comfort, it is no surprise that his first philosophical work precisely dealt with the way in which material and technological circumstances shape our experience of time (Stiegler 1998). Since then, Stiegler has become one of the most influential thinkers France knows today.

As much as he is an academic philosopher (holding, among other positions, a prestigious post as visiting professor at Goldsmith College London), Stiegler is first and foremost a public intellectual and activist. He appears in many films and documentaries, he regularly casts his voice in the French media and he interferes in major political debates. In order to deal adequately with today's societal challenges (the growing problem of consumerism, marketization and the impact of digital technologies), Stiegler has founded in 2005 the movement *Ars Industrialis*. This think-tank has an explicitly political goal, viz. an 'industrial politics of the spirit'.<sup>1</sup> The main objective is to defend human civilization against the evils of industrial capitalism (Stiegler 2014). Stiegler also created his own philosophy school in 2010 in the small town of Epineul-le-Fleurriel, where he teaches local secondary school students, as well as PhD students (on-line).

This testifies to his ongoing concern with the fate of education in the contemporary world. Stiegler has taken a particular interest in how we raise the next generation, in view of the ubiquity of new media technologies in the life-world of the

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<sup>1</sup>The groups' manifesto can be found here: <http://arsindustrialis.org/manifesto-2010>

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young. However, rather than holding these technologies themselves responsible for what is going wrong in the world, it is his firm conviction that the elder generation has a responsibility for using these technologies wisely, and in such a way that a good future for the new generation can be guaranteed. Stiegler founded the *Institut de Recherche et d'Innovation* (IRI, Institute for Research and Innovation) at the Centre Georges Pompidou in Paris, which is aimed at experimenting with various new forms of learning and teaching. As a philosopher, Stiegler has by now gained international recognition (also within the field of philosophy of education, as evidenced by an interview with Stiegler which opens a recent special issue on digital pedagogies (Kouppanou 2015)). Unfortunately, the scope of his educational initiatives remains limited to the French speaking world only.

Stiegler's oeuvre is a large and complex one. A first reason for this complexity is the enormously varied range of schools of thought he draws from. Stiegler is an eclectic thinker *par excellence*. Second, he has a predilection for constantly inventing neologisms, and has created his own highly sophisticated jargon, which might frighten off readers not familiar with his work. In the following I will introduce the main influences on Stiegler's thought, and the key ideas and terminologies to be found in his work. After that, I will zoom in on one particular educational issue which, as I just mentioned, is of central importance to him: the consequences of the introduction of digital technologies on education. In the last section I critically evaluate the relevance of his work for the field of philosophy of education.

## Stiegler's Technocentric Account of Subjectivity

As already indicated, Stiegler's first philosophical writings dealt with technology and time. Here, Stiegler is clearly influenced by traditional *phenomenological* thinkers, and notably by Husserl and Heidegger. These authors argue that time as human beings experience it is something altogether different from time as defined in a physical sense (clock-time). For instance, the first time we spend a whole hour in a waiting room attending a visit to a physician, we might find this an extremely boring experience that seems never to come to an end. After frequently going through the same experience, however, it might seem time flies by – even if physically speaking it concerns the same amount of minutes and seconds. This implies that every experience we have 'now', is always colored by past and future experiences (memories and expectations): the time spent in the waiting room has a different feel because we can relate it to past experience, and because we know the tedious experience will (soon) come to an end. As Husserl would say, every experience in the now is structured on the basis of *retentions* and *protentions*. Moreover, time is not just a milieu in which we happen to find ourselves. It constitutes us from the inside as human subjects. For instance, as Heidegger has shown, the fact that we know that we will die, and that our time will come to an end, makes our existence into a properly humane life: we must take life seriously and take utmost responsibility for all the decisions we make.

Although Stiegler fully agrees with Husserl and Heidegger on this point, he also criticizes these authors for not having paid enough attention to the extent to which *technologies* shape human subjectivity. Traditional phenomenologists, Stiegler (1998) claims, have a limited view of technology: it is just a matter of objects and tools at our disposal. However, as he goes on showing, the very possibility of relating to the past and the future in the now is predicated upon the use of material memory supports. Next to primary retentions (e.g., my experience of reading this sentence is structured by my experience of reading the sentence I have *just* read) and secondary retentions (e.g., my experience of reading this text is structured by my experience with all the academic texts I have read in my life), there is a third form of retention which Husserl has left out of the picture, but which is far more important: the artificial supports of memory that are *external* to our consciousness. Stiegler most provocatively claims that the invention of, say, calendars and monuments is not merely an extension of an internal memory capacity humans have always had. It is the other way around: it is only thanks to writing down stuff in order to remember the past and to plan the future that humans were able to develop memory in the first place. Often we tend to regard our memory as something private and pure – an internal realm we alone have access to. For Stiegler, ‘our’ memory only comes about as the result of relying on already existing technologies, concrete material stuff out there which Stiegler also calls *hypomnemata* (in reference to Plato’s discussion of the invention of script technology).

More generally, Stiegler argues that technology is not a creation of humankind, so much as humankind is actually created, or at least co-constituted, through the coming into being of technologies. To be more exact on this point, Stiegler (1998) defends the view that the main factor deciding on human evolution is not so much genetic selection, as it is the development of ever new technologies (*epiphylogenesis*): internal factors such as our genetic code are of less importance than the changes in the technological milieu we live in. A good example, which is key to Stiegler’s thought, is the invention of script technology. The fact that the brains of people capable of reading are substantially different from non-reading brains (Dehaene 2010) has nothing to do with genetic mutations. We are not biologically programmed or predisposed to read. But, ever since script was invented and started to play a crucial role in human culture, humans born in literate societies have been trained in such a way that they literally became different creatures than their ancestors.

Script technology, and more precisely alphabetic writing (invented by the Phoenicians and fine-tuned by the Ancient Greeks), is a unique invention, the importance of which is often overlooked. It is no coincidence that two other important phenomena saw the light of day at exactly the same place and time: democracy and philosophy (scientific thought). Alphabetic writing is a superior memory technology that allows for remembering things past and anticipating the future: the alphabet, in contradistinction to for instance ideographic writing systems, permits us to fix exactly mathematic formulas, the steps in a complex argument, the precise content of an agreement or a law, etc. This has enormous consequences. For instance, instead of just expressing our thoughts and feelings in speech, we can now take a distance to what we and others say. This comes with a deepening, if not with the

creation of reflective capacities – necessary for philosophical and critical thought, as well as for democratic discussion and decision-making. Therefore, the particular shape subjectivity and culture has taken is strongly influenced by the unique characteristics of alphabetic script technologies. One of Stiegler's main concerns is that today script technologies are increasingly substituted with digital ones. As such, we are witness to another *epiphylogenetic shift* which potentially has far-reaching implications for what it means to be a human creature.

It is important to note here, that the word 'technology' doesn't refer only to the newest (mechanical, electrical or digital) tools, but to *all* tools humans use to make their way in life: a stone-axe is as much technological as a computer is. Moreover, the word 'tool' might be misleading here as it seems to imply an instrumental relation. At this point Stiegler is (without referencing to it) very close to the so-called *post-phenomenological* school of thought, of which Don Ihde (2016) is perhaps the most well-known advocate. For post-phenomenologists the body comes to replace conscious subjectivity, and hence the main focus of analysis should not be so much our knowledge about the world, as it is our interactions with the world supported by technologies. In this regard, connections between Stiegler and *posthumanism* (a recent school of thought discussed in the second section of this handbook) can also easily be made.

## Proletarianization, Grammatization, Transindividuation

Stiegler himself, however, would likely define his departure from traditional phenomenology in terms of *deconstructivism* and *poststructuralism*. Deconstruction is all about showing that binary oppositions which structure our worldview cannot be upheld upon closer scrutiny (Cf. Derrida 1989). Ever since the dawn of civilization human beings have defined themselves in terms of a self-sufficient and pure consciousness that positioned itself as distinct from the body and from the material world, and that moreover saw its highest calling as becoming master over this world. This binary opposition is a false one, Stiegler holds. Unique human qualities such as memory, but also consciousness, reason and agency are dependent upon the invention and interiorization of particular technologies, i.e., upon the creation and appropriation of possibilities that *first* need to be materially realized in the world outside.

Stiegler's step beyond phenomenology is also inspired by the poststructuralist insights of Michel Foucault. With Foucault Stiegler holds that what we can say, think and do is not something fixed – i.e., determined by an invariable human nature. Instead, our subjectivity (i.e., who we are) is dependent (or *contingent*) upon conditions which change throughout the course of history. When these conditions alter, forms of *subjectification* change. To this Foucauldian position Stiegler adds the importance of modifications in technological conditions for processes of subjectification. Furthermore, Stiegler takes Foucault's (1978) ideas regarding the invention of educational technologies, and more exactly the *school*, in a surprisingly new

direction. Over and against a popular reading of Foucault which one-dimensionally identifies the school as an apparatus that is devised to seize power over the lives of the young and to turn them into well-disciplined and productive subjects (Cf. chapter on the body in the third section of this handbook), Stiegler gives a far more positive account. Disciplinary regimes are not only repressive. They are also productive in that through the prolonged and repetitive introduction to dominant technologies our subjectivities are shaped in a particular way. The example of learning how to read and write at school is, again, a most illustrative case. For Stiegler (2006, 2010a), the school is a most important milieu, as it is here that, thanks to intense training and exercising, the prevailing societal and cultural technologies become our own.

In order to understand this argument in favor of the school correctly, it is necessary to refer here to yet another intellectual tradition Stiegler draws from: *Marxism*. More exactly, Stiegler reads Marx's ideas regarding the *proletarianization* of the producer in his own, idiosyncratic, way. Analyzing the lamentable situation of the oppressed nineteenth-century working class, Marx maintains that exploitation is (partly) caused by the fact that the working class is alienated from its own labor force. For instance, it matters nothing whatsoever that one actually knows that one is producing spare parts for trains or steel bridges. And therefore, workers no longer recognize themselves in the fruits of their labor. Today, Stiegler claims, we witness an analogous *proletarianization of the consumer* (Stiegler 2010b, 2015). We constantly rely on technologies, but without having any notion whatsoever of why they operate in the way they do. For instance, we use calculators to do a division, but we no longer know or understand the rules behind arithmetic operations, let alone that we would have any insight into how a machine can perform these operations for us. The know-how is delegated to a machine that remains a black-box, and so this know-how is completely *exteriorized*.

In view of this analysis, it should be clear that the school is indeed of vital importance, not so much because it instills discipline, as because it offers students the opportunity to get acquainted with the logic that commands the technologies we constantly count on. Consider once more script technology, and more specifically the most basic level of reading and writing instruction. Repetitive reading and writing exercises are meant to literally *inscribe* the rules constituting literacy into our bodies and minds. They become part of our second nature. Referring here to the original meaning of the word grammar (from the Greek verb *graphein*, which means to graft something on a writable surface), Stiegler (2006, 2010a) argues that schooling *grammatizes* certain abilities into our bodies and minds. Preventing us from becoming mere consumers of a technology, and therefore from not being ourselves in control, schooling brings about a deep-seated understanding of how particular technologies operate: we get a first-hand sense of their intrinsic possibilities and limitations (Cf. Vlieghe 2015). This is not only the case for script technologies, but for *all* technologies.

However, getting acquainted with the grammar behind the societally and culturally dominant technologies is crucial for yet another reason. In line with the idea that there is no eternally fixed essence which defines us as human beings, it is more accurate to speak about *ever-ongoing processes of subjectivation*, instead of about

subjectivity. Drawing from the work of Gilbert Simondon, Stiegler (1998) uses the term *psychic individuation* to refer to our never finished identity. Now, individuation at the level of the individual subject should always entail a social, cultural and temporal dimension: individuation should in principle involve *transindividuation*. This means that in our subject-constitution we relate to the whole history, which lies the groundwork for the technologies that define us as subjects in the present. Transindividuation is a question of becoming part of what Stiegler calls *long circuits* – transgenerational chains that transcend the merely individual level.

In order to see the importance hereof, consider again the proletarianization of the consumer taking place today. This process could be described in terms of closing off long circuits. For instance, one is able to use a calculator, but without understanding how to multiply or divide numbers. Or one is able to apply Pythagoras' theorem, but without really understanding why this theorem holds true. In order to really understand, one always has to go back to the beginnings, and – through a long and possibly painstaking process of initiation – connect to the whole history behind the technologies we rely on. A sound individuation as a subject capable of performing arithmetic and geometric operations requires long-circuits of transindividuation within and in dialogue with the whole history of mathematics.

All this might seem utterly fogyish, and yet Stiegler claims that long-circuits of (trans)individuation are actually the very precondition for *societal and cultural rejuvenation*. If our use of technologies is short-circuited, we become total slaves to these technologies, as we have no ability to relate to them with critical distance. This is especially the case because from eternity there have been forces present in society which seek to take control over our productive capacities. In the Ancient Greek world, sophists played this role (Stiegler 2010a). Today, mass-media are responsible for trying to control our minds, to rob us from the capacity of knowing how to do things (*savoir faire*) and knowing how to live (*savoir vivre*), and to turn us into passive consumers who mindlessly do whatever it is commercial enterprises profit from. As such the possibility of critically taking distance from given ways of giving shape to our lives and thus of the coming into being of *new* forms of life, individually and collectively, withers away. Instead, we all become *synchronized* to the dictates of a market-driven society, and we can't even begin making a representation of what an alternative could look like.

To prevent this from happening, we need a profound understanding of the principles that make our technologies operate, and to make these principles our own. Long-circuited connections with what the past generations have bequeathed us, as well as practices that lead to grammatization, are necessary for the process of individuation and (trans)individuation to go on. Therefore, it is education, and more exactly school education, which has a crucial role to play today: to conserve the past in order to make the coming of the new possible. Hence, as the title of one of Stiegler's major books (2010a) goes, our task today is: *Taking Care of Youth and the Generations*.



## The Digital Pharmakon and the Role of Education in the Contemporary World

One of the main concerns the elder generation is facing today is the far-reaching impact of the newest, i.e., computer or *digital* technologies. In line with his view that technologies are not solely instruments at our disposal, but that they have the power to (de)form us in profound ways, it is of the utmost importance to come to grips with how exactly new technologies operate. And this implies, for Stiegler, understanding how they are different from the technology that was dominant beforehand, i.e., *script*. Therefore, I have to turn a last time to Stiegler's account of reading and writing.

As previously explained, alphabetic script has given rise to the subject form we know today. Another unique characteristic of script that has not been discussed so far is that there is potentially a perfect symmetry between writing and reading, i.e., between the productive and consumptive side of script (Cf. Vlieghe 2015). To see this, one must consider that writing consists of the following two operations. On the one hand, it converts time into space: thoughts and feelings, which typically evolve in time (e.g., conclusions come after premises), get solidified in a static spatial object (e.g., on a single piece of paper). Time gets *spatialized*. On the other hand, writing converts the analogous (i.e., the infinite complexity of thought and speech) into something discrete (a finite construct based on a code consisting of about 26 signs) (Stiegler 2010c). Reading consists of the reverse operations: the reader must re-convert discrete signs into the thoughts and feelings analogous to the ones the author had. Likewise, in the act of reading, space gets *retemporalized*. In that sense there is a deep reciprocity between producing script and consuming script. And, therefore, one can only be said to be a genuine reader if one is also able to write – in the same sense that people who know how to read the music score of a Beethoven symphony (and who know how to play an instrument) will have a completely different and much fuller experience compared with what the mere amateur has. Therefore, the lack of musical literacy in our times, so Stiegler argues, constitutes a regrettable impoverishment (Stiegler and Rogoff 2010).

As is the case with all technologies, the risk of proletarianization is lurking around the corner. There is always the risk of merely consuming script (or music) without having any sense of what it means to produce it. This is, when one reads without deeper understanding of what, for instance, writing a book or a poem is really about (or listens to a symphony without any knowledge of how this music is composed). In order to really appreciate and understand texts, one must (at least potentially) be able to write these texts oneself. An example Stiegler (2010a) is keen on referring to is the *Enlightenment* idea(l) of a “republic of literate people” (*République des lettres*): for him a modern democracy is dependent upon the willingness by the whole of the populace not only to read *but also* to write. Being able to read is not sufficient in order to foster minds that are as critical and enlightened as the authors one studies.

When the digital becomes the new prevailing medium we are faced with a similar risk of proletarianization. In a digitized society one can perfectly function without having any insight into how computers operate – i.e., without knowledge of the software (algorithms) and hardware (electric circuits) that underlie the programs we use. With the invention of ever new consumer-friendly apps, things get worse, as ever more intuitive interfaces hide the programs that are running. In that sense the digital isn't different from script (or music for that matter). On a deeper level, however, digital technologies have *particular* disadvantages compared to script. First, digital technologies short-circuit the process of retemporalization (Stiegler 2010a). Recall that the ideal reader is also a writer who performs *herself* the reverse operations which constitute a text (i.e., an author materializing analogous thoughts into digital space), and that this is thanks to embodying the grammar regulating the translation of thoughts into visible signs (and vice versa). When relying on black-boxed digital technologies, we delegate retemporalization to a machine, and become mere users. A very simple illustration of this is that we can immediately read and understand the meaning of the *written* word 'cat', whereas it is highly unlikely that one ever will be able to immediately understand 011000110110000101111000 (the binary equivalent for cat) without the aid of a computer translation program. Differently put, where script ideally requires that reader-writers literally embody the grammar behind this technology (one can read c, a and t because one can form these signs oneself), it is impossible to grammatize binary code. Encoding and decoding get short-circuited (cf. Vlieghe 2015).

Second, the use of digital media goes together with a new attention regime (Stiegler 2010a). One of the consequences of learning to read and write in a traditional way is that it also fostered the capacities of *caring* and *paying attention*. At school students must engage in a long, repetitive, and strenuous process of learning *to get things right*. This applies both to forming the letters of the alphabet the way they should look, or to writing a well-constructed essay. Now, in order to read and write well, we must learn to be concerned for the quality of what we do, and we must learn to have patience and to concentrate on one task over a long period of time. With the ubiquity of digital media, we no longer need to care to the same degree (the letters we type are uniform and always right, spell-checkers, templates and copy-paste functionalities can do a lot of work for us, etc.). The direct satisfaction of our needs provided by digital media (immediately looking up every piece of knowledge one lacks with the help of Wikipedia, ordering online every commodity we crave for, etc.) destroys the capacity of relating to our own lives in terms of longer periods of time. We are no longer able to wait – i.e., *attendre*, from which the word *attention* stems (Ibid.). And so, the whole nature of attention itself changes completely: the *deep attention* required for reading a difficult text is counterproductive for users of digital technologies. They rely on *hyper attention* (a terminology Stiegler draws from Katherine Hayles (2007)): a constant vigilance and sensibility for new stimuli (and related to this, a willingness to give up, immediately, the thing one was working on). The problem is, of course, that hyper attention and deep attention are mutually exclusive modes of consciousness.

In view of this, Stiegler might seem to be fully opposed to the use of digital technologies. As explained in the introduction, the opposite is true. Like all technologies, digital technologies are *pharmaka* (Stiegler 1998). This Greek term should be taken in its literal, ambiguous meaning: like the word ‘drugs’ in English, *pharmakon* refers to something which both poisons and heals. If we take too much of a medicine, we might get even more sick or might die. For instance, script technology is a *pharmakon* and thus potentially a risk. As Plato, who introduced this term, already indicated: script *might* make us lazy and *might* have detrimental effects on human memory. Or, it *might* instill in us a passive and uncritical attitude, just parroting opinions written down by others without truly understanding or caring for them.

Analogously, we should be very careful about the digital *pharmakon*, but at the same time we should not demonize it. It is the responsibility of the existing generation to teach the next generation using digital technologies in such a way that the above described dangers are circumvented. After all, if we like it or not, the digital has become the new prevailing technology, and when used properly, it has a lot to offer which script-based technologies never could. What is needed is to form the next generation in a similar way we – the generation of digital immigrants – were formed ourselves when being introduced into a script-based culture. The newcomers need to understand and become familiar with the grammar behind the technologies they rely on, from a first-hand perspective (Cf. Vlieghe 2015). This entails more than just being introduced into a practical and thus superficial knowledge about how to use stuff (mere consumption). Rather, the young need an education which offers them a sense of how this technology works, so that they get inscribed in long-circuits of transindividuation, and so that they develop the capacity for taking a critical distance. Only then, the new generation can begin anew, and in unforeseen ways, with the dominant technologies that support our subjectivity. Moreover, this education should also generate care and attention. This is, we should look for concrete educational practices that foster deep attention and sustained interest and love for things – or, in sum, *savoir vivre*.

## Originality and Limitations of Stiegler’s Work

Stiegler’s analysis has a lot to offer to contemporary philosophy and theory of education. The debate regarding the meaning of digital technologies tends very often to either denouncing them as profoundly anti-educational (e.g., Carr 2011) or as the solution to all our problems (e.g., Gee 2007). Stiegler holds an original position in that he fully appreciates the importance of technologies for our subject-constitution *without* giving in to an unwarranted optimism or pessimism: how the future will evolve all comes down to the responsibility the adult generation takes for using the new prevailing societal and cultural technology wisely. As such Stiegler is, in spite of his belief in the formative (and potentially deforming) power of technology, not a technodeterminist. He is truly convinced that education can make all the difference. An innovative and important contribution of Stiegler consists of regarding

*attention* not as psychological but as a fundamentally educational category. Very often attention is considered as a capacity with invariable characteristics (e.g., one assumes that children have a maximum attention span of 15 min). Stiegler, on the contrary, argues that attention is a matter of formation and therefore a main task for education. In this regard, Stiegler is also most original in highlighting the importance of the school. As he shows, it is a *unique* place which allows for the new generation to take a critical and potentially emancipatory perspective on the main societal and cultural technologies. This point has recently been developed in Masschelein and Simons's (2013) work on the school. His analysis has also contributed to a materialist turn in educational theory (cf. Fenwick et al. 2015), which emphasizes the importance of bodily and technological dimensions of education over and against a purely cognitive account of education.

Much of Stiegler's criticisms of modern western culture might not sound new or original, as critical theorists have been fulminating time and again against 'cultural industries' (e.g., Adorno and Horkheimer 2011) for destroying our humanity and making us slaves to capitalist society. Nonetheless, Stiegler has made an original contribution to this line of thought by showing that there is *nothing inherent bad or oppressive* to prevailing cultural technologies: they are *pharmaka* and as such *one and the same* technology can be a source of enlightenment and real human progress, as well as the vehicle of individual and collective stupefaction, and cultural and societal impoverishment. As a last original contribution to educational philosophy, it should be noted that Stiegler shows how philosophy is not an activity apart and aside from education (i.e., a discipline which merely should be *applied* to education), but intricately concerned with the phenomenon – and the fate – of education. When he addresses the most fundamental philosophical questions, such as *what does it mean to be human?*, or *what does it mean to be a subject?*, his answer involves very concrete educational processes, as should be clear from the analysis of literacy initiation discussed in this chapter. Moreover, philosophy is not merely an exercise in abstract thought: for Stiegler, it is essentially about understanding our contemporary condition and about responding to the challenges of the present – especially to the issue of the need for schooling in digital times.

These things said, it should also be remarked that Stiegler is not fully true to his own principles. To take a simple example, in his mind, television seems to be *always and without exception* a source of alienation (cf. Stiegler 2010a). Because television, in contradistinction to digital devices, doesn't offer opportunities for an active engagement with the content it offers, it can only turn us into passive consumers and permanently deform us. It should be added that at times Stiegler's analyses are also imprecise (many youngsters use digital devices in the same way many people use televisions) and inaccurate (if we can never retemporalize binary coded information without the aid of machines, how then can digital literacy ever become equivalent to script literacy?).

Returning to the example of the television, my point is not to disagree with his claims, but to show that according to Stiegler's thought this technology, and maybe many others, should not classify as *pharmaka* (i.e., poison and cure). They are inherently bad, and this constitutes a major problem for Stiegler's whole account of

technology and education. On the one hand, Stiegler argues that there is no outside to our technological conditions: we become but who we are through the repeated use and appropriation of historically contingent technologies. On the other hand, it seems that the philosopher can take a position outside of the technological conditions that define us and that, starting from this position, technologies can – and should – be judged as educationally desirable or corrupt. So it seems Stiegler adheres to a clearly normative perspective, and this perspective is downright conservative, if not reactionary.

More exactly, it seems like script and book technologies are in the end superior, and that an intensive use of the internet must lead to a deformation of attention. In that regards it is telling that Stiegler keeps referring to Hayles' (2007) concept of hyper attention – without ever considering the potentially positive potential of hyper attention Hayles describes. Furthermore, his emphasis on transindividuation often comes down to the claim that the preservation of the ways of life of the existing generation is more important than the possibility of renewal and rejuvenation. However, in spite of these criticisms, Stiegler remains one of the few philosophers who has engaged in such a profound way with our contemporary, digital, condition, and its impact on the education of the new generation, and who has drawn attention to the great responsibility the existing generation has in regards with safeguarding a truly human culture.

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# Taylor



## On the Educational Project of Overcoming Modern Epistemology

Hanno Su

### Introduction

As outspoken philosopher of modernity, Charles Taylor is one of the most influential contemporary philosophers and intellectuals of our time—known not only for his originality but also for the copiousness of covered topics ranging from cultural diversity to intellectual history and from religion to language. In his arguments on social and political life, Taylor is not just debating fundamental questions of various philosophical traditions, but he is also reaching for topics of interest to a broader public. Accordingly, in philosophy of education, although not exclusively, the relevancy of his work is seen in the unique take on moral and political philosophy.

This chapter contrasts this predominant interest in Taylor's practical philosophy by focusing a less common educational discussion of his theoretical philosophy. Consequently, it reads Taylor's seminal work on the modern self (Taylor 1989) from an epistemological angle, emphasizing the narrative of the epistemic self rather than the moral self. Further, it picks up Taylor's crucial involvement in debates on realism and the role of epistemology in philosophy, for which Taylor's reaction to Rorty's critique of traditional epistemology is pivotal (Taylor 1987/1995). As matters between these two sharp critics of Cartesian dualism seem to have rapidly reached an impasse and new positions are to be sought and created (Dreyfus and Taylor 2015), I set out to extract from that discussion an integrated view of epistemology and education in terms of social knowledge practices.

This sets the tone for an educational philosophizing that is explicitly generative and that helps both to redescribe the philosophical project of epistemology as well as articulating an understanding of a specific educational philosophy. Critically

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assessing the educational relevance of Taylor's overcoming of modern epistemology opens an intricate way to look at educational philosophy as a certain hindsight, a *special way to look at things* in order to articulate educational structures. It thereby goes up against the presumably straightforward ways of characterizing philosophy of education by means of a kind of 'folk realism'; in other words, it goes up against attaining the demarcations of philosophy of education by singling out education as determinate subject matter, by then mapping a subdivision of philosophy to this section of the world, and by eventually using philosophy to work on the represented problems.

In leaving those mapping and application strategies behind and in establishing the perspective of educational philosophy, we do not just ask any questions about education, but we specifically "ask *educational* questions about education" (Biesta 2011, p. 190). However, this does not have to stop there, as the same focus also encourages asking educational questions about basically anything. Such a move toward the question of an educational philosophy will place educational problems already in the middle of the core problems of modern epistemology—how to talk about reality and the possibility of knowledge through internal representations of the outside world. Thus, by redescribing the Taylorian overcoming of epistemology as *educational epistemology*, I will pick up these interconnections and explore what it means to *expressively build up an educational stance* in the sense of an educational philosophy that is finding its own style of problematizing.

## Taylor's Philosophy of Modernity in an Educational View

Covering numerous fields of contemporary philosophy, Taylor's philosophy of modernity is never just a disjointed bulk of philosophical deliberations. Rather, he is diligently elaborating interconnections between his thorough observations of modern philosophical ideas and their history. Among the broad range of Taylor's philosophy of modernity, two interconnected topoi stand out: his work on theorizing multiculturalism as prominently displayed in the "canon-establishing essay" (Blum 2001, p. 555) on *The Politics of Recognition* (Taylor 1992/1994) and his historical analysis of the formation of the modern self in his "landmark work" (Smith 2009, 3) on the *Sources of the Self* (Taylor 1989). However, in both cases, his efforts to theorize modernity as an "Age of Pluralism" (Tully and Weinstock 1994) do not stand alone. In view of his other writings, rather, the historically oriented systematicity of Taylor's ongoing work is at display.

In his exploration of the ethics of authenticity based on the three "malaises of modernity" (Taylor 1991)—individualism, disenchantment through instrumental reason, and consequentially the industrial-technological society—Taylor is embedding his explicitly Canadian stance on multiculturalism (Taylor 2012) into the broader ethical debate of modern philosophy, especially as involvement in the liberalism-communitarianism debate (Keeney 2016). In his later writings, his politically interested diagnoses of the times takes a turn toward religion and Taylor

reconfirms his influential voice on current sociopolitical issues. Culminating in *A Secular Age* (Taylor 2007) he elaborates his critical account on the place of religion in the public sphere. Accompanied by his readings of Hegel, Taylor's analysis of the self is unfolded to be the broader project of the "number one problem of modern social sciences" (Taylor 2004, p. 1): the observation of modernity. In his recent *The Language Animal* (Taylor 2016), he systematizes his ongoing concern with philosophical anthropology which orients his readings of the philosophical discourse on language. Once again, he offers an encompassing and historically versed view on the human condition and its modern predicaments.

Continuously working in the intersection of these two modern strands—diversity and identity—Taylor is one of now many philosophers (like Nancy Fraser, Axel Honneth, Jessica Benjamin, or Judith Butler), who build on the Hegelian concept of recognition to issue social inequality and injustice from the perspective of the development of selfhood. For Taylor, speaking about multicultural societies, especially cultural recognition, is prerequisite for equality and to the same extent a crucial factor in the formation of the self. In our identities, he claims, we are "partly shaped by recognition or its absence" (Taylor 1992/1994, p. 27). This means that the formation our "identity crucially depends on [...] dialogical relations with others" (p. 34). This "*dialogical* character" (p. 32) of recognizing and being recognized could elegantly frame both the recognition of diversity and the recognition in processes of subjectification. In encountering the other, one is "allowing oneself to be interrogated by the other" (Graaf 2008, p. 759), while seeing "identity formation as a narrative achievement" (Higgins 2003, p. 141) in face of diverse preexisting cultural narratives.

The educational connection to Taylor's work reflects these two aspects to a large degree and appears to work out rather seamless and almost frictionless. Early on, Taylor's critical account of individualism and modern subjectivist philosophies gained some traction in discussions of the role of authenticity or equality in education. Since in his take on multiculturalism from the angle of mutual recognition Taylor is "arguing for the significance of culture to individual identity" (Houston 1996, p. 190), especially regarding minority cultures, his work offers a conceptual tissue connecting both the politics of difference and diversity and the "theory of the dialogical formation of identity" (Blum 2001, p. 546). To a social and moral perspective on education, such a notion prepares not only for a profound take on authenticity in an dialogical perspective (Splitter 2009), but also for articulating the formation of the self throughout the course of life (Zhao and Biesta 2012) in a globalized world (Golomohamad 2004).

On first sight, this might seem like a direct path to moral and political education, as general philosophy informs democracy and citizenship education by declaring topoi like tolerance and openness to dialogue the aim of education or implementing curricula truly fitted to a multicultural and diverse society. However, combining Taylor's stance on recognition and selfhood from an educational perspective (Bingham 2006; Balzer 2014) rather means to focus less on the content or the aims, but on the process or the practice of education (Smeyers and Burbules 2006).

Nevertheless, this might be more of an observation of the educational discourse than an observation of the relevance of Taylor's work for philosophy of education and call for a broader discussion of Taylorian perspectives on educational and social philosophy (Balzer et al. 2018). Insofar as education is, in the most general perspective, dealing with two frames, it is, first, traditionally regarded in the context of sociopolitical prerequisites and goals. And at least since Comenius' *omnes omnia omnino excoli* or Rousseau's second discourse, this is pursued with a special sensitivity to matters of social inequality. Taylor's plead for a *Politics of Recognition* fits right into this debate. Second, education is in its presuppositions and its consequences conditioned to individuals as learners in processes of becoming. Here, Taylor's narrative of the subject in *Sources of the Self* fits right into that.

## Overcoming Modern Epistemology

Although drawing educational arguments from the more political and anthropological branches of Taylor's philosophy is rather straight forward, there is another viable connection to education: Taylor's epistemological stance. Arguing about whether Taylor's *Overcoming Epistemology* does indeed overcome epistemology, Siegel (1998, 2017) and Williams (2015) proceed from an educational interest in Taylor that is grounded in questions of rational and critical thinking. On a general level, critical reasoning seems to be in accord with an account that favors the reflexivity of the modern subject and brings about a specific understanding of education. In a sense, we can relate this to an autonomous, self-sufficient, and critical reasoning against "trusting the opinions you have acquired through your upbringing" (Taylor 1987/1995, p. 4). Along these lines, it is assumed that the "relevance of epistemology to (philosophy of) education" (Siegel 1998, p. 19) roots in asking what sort of knowing should or could be favored in education and how "students gain [this] knowledge, and the ability to engage in rational inquiry" (p. 20). Conceptions like these are connecting epistemology to the educational debate by *reflecting the role of knowledge in education*. Being embedded in a critical account of modernity, however, Taylor's epistemological deliberations could also open a debate on linking epistemology and education in the sense of *epistemological deliberations on educational philosophy*.

For Taylor, the critique of epistemology might arguably have been an important undercurrent of his philosophy of modernity all along. At the core of the modern self lies the epistemological problem of the Cartesian quest for certainty in the dualistic setting of inner mental states representing the outside world. And this view is conversely anchored in "the depths of our modern culture" (Taylor 1987/1995, p. 6). The modern subject, which is in its "reflexive turn [...] indissolubly linked to modern representational epistemology" (p. 5), can fulfill the "modern ideal of freedom as self-autonomy" (p. 7) only after having "fully distinguished himself from the natural and social worlds" (p. 7).

As thereby “ideally disengaged” (p. 7) subject, it cuts the epistemic ties to the world in which epistemic certainty was sought previously. By turning inward, “[n]ow certainty is something the mind has to generate for itself” (p. 4). Since “the modern ideal of disengagement requires a reflexive stance” (Taylor 1989, p. 174), consequently (but paradoxically) the modern epistemological model bases its “strength [...] not just on its affinity to mechanistic science but also on its congruence to the powerful ideal of reflexive, self-given certainty” (Taylor 1987/1995, p. 6). Reflections like this connect Taylor—via the shared reference to the greats of twentieth-century philosophy Heidegger, Wittgenstein, and Merleau-Ponty—to other North American contemporaries like Richard Rorty and Hubert Dreyfus. Overall concern of this debate seems to be the mutual interest in reevaluating the “old epistemology” (p. 2) which established the notion of “knowledge [...] as correct representation of an independent reality” (p. 3).

In their joint publication *Retrieving Realism*, Dreyfus and Taylor recently revisited this issue that once actuated a tricky discussion between them and Rorty. In this debate of “who has really confuted classical epistemology” (Dreyfus and Taylor 2015, p. 40), the issue is not *that* one has to “break with the representational epistemology” (p. 55) but *how* this could be achieved. So both parties passionately distance themselves from the (Cartesian) “old mediational epistemology” (p. 66) of gaining knowledge of outer reality “through some inner states” (p. 2). Both sides claim they have done so, but despite seeing their common interest they do not see the other side following through. On the one side, there is Rorty who is “just walking away” (Dreyfus and Taylor 2015, p. 67) from the “philosophical distinction between the in-itself and the for-us” (Rorty 1994, p. 30) that so pervades classical epistemology. He might, however, still be a “prisoner of a new inner-outer picture” (Dreyfus and Taylor 2015, p. 132). On the other side, there are Taylor and Dreyfus who argue that we must philosophically work through “these deep, pervasive, half-articulated, taken-for-granted pictures which are embedded in our culture” (p. 41). But they might hold on to the “notion of truth about reality under some privileged description” (Rorty 1979, p. 378) and that those descriptions work better than others “because they represent reality more adequately” (Rorty 1994, p. 22).

However, Dreyfus and Taylor see the intractability and ask “[h]ow to pursue this debate further” (Dreyfus and Taylor 2015: 41) and introduce a third position. While for Rorty “the only way to escape the imperialism of modern science” (p. 154) is to reject the category of truth, Dreyfus and Taylor opt for a position they call “plural realism” (p. 130) in an attempt to mediate between classical scientism and Rorty. By stating that “the valid claims of modern science to grasp things as they are in themselves do not conflict with the plurality of revealing perspectives” (p. 154), they are clearly mapping the core idea of Taylor’s engagement in multiculturalism or anti-imperialism.

This means to shift the epistemological argument to a social justice argument. Allegedly, “[o]ther cultures do not ask about the universe as it is in itself” (p. 150) and “have no notion of a view from nowhere” (p. 150). Therefore, Dreyfus and Taylor put not only the scientific way of coping with life but also modern (Western) culture in a privileged position. Irrespective of Taylor’s orientation toward

anti-imperialism, this implicitly strengthens Western epistemic hegemony in pointing out its exclusivity. Claiming an epistemic superiority of the scientific view from nowhere holds modern western science to be *the* provider of truthful insights based on the western preference for unity over diversity. Thus, reflecting on “what we impose in order to cope” (p. 155), the question arises whether a “preference for unity is just another prejudice we should overcome” (p. 155). Privileging one vocabulary over another on the grounds of corresponding to the world is undermining the epistemic gains and the social desirability of “epistemological diversity” (Ruitenbergh and Phillips 2012).

## Toward a Generative Account of Epistemology

In what follows, I will join the general plea for a way out of this gridlocked situation. However, I will emphasize the bridge to epistemic pluralism differently. Instead of simply applying concepts of plurality regarding cultural identities and their knowledge constructs, i.e., instead of running on pluralist ideas that invite the problem of self-privileging mechanisms through the backdoor, I will discuss how articulating a generative understanding of philosophizing could divert the focus of this debate from the status of truth and reality to an *educational account of epistemology*.

This crucially shifts the focus away from talking about *constructs* or worldviews that might or might not represent reality toward talking about philosophizing as *process* of creating new ways to look at things. I will push away a little the compelling societal question whether philosophy should refrain from its immense interest in *the* truth and the subsequent self-image of having a privileged perspective that is imposing “the right” view (from nowhere) on “local knowledge” (Geertz 1983). Setting aside the differences, what the Rorty-Taylor debate as a whole has to offer is that it underlines the urgency of questioning the roots of our adopted epistemic habits in order to assess its relation to educational philosophy.

For educational philosophy, thinking about knowledge should (almost naturally) take a different form than the formula of the justified true belief. Educational philosophy’s interest in knowledge is not about systematizing our ways of making convictions true or not. Maybe it is not even about how to figure out what should be considered true, how to differentiate true statements from false ones, or how to distinguish knowledge from mere beliefs, opinions, and sentiments. Rather, educational philosophy challenges the standard figure of justified true belief by being prone to a more *generative* account of knowledge, as it is interested in knowledge-related *practices* or practices that go along with the process of *becoming* knowledgeable.

Approaching this distinction, we might take our clue from discussing sociology and its concept of society. Most often, sociology builds its central concept (implicitly) around the image of grown persons coming together and forming a kind of cohesion or solidarity. But this view of society falls short. In connecting the concepts

of the self and society, Taylor points out that (early modern) understandings of society work with a “picture of society [...] of individuals who come together to form a political entity [...] with certain ends in view” (Taylor 2004, p. 3). He marks such “an atomistic construal of society as constituted by, or ultimately to be explained in terms of individual purposes” (Taylor 1987/1995, p. 7) as a direct consequence of the image of inwardness and disengagement as it merged early modern liberalism and epistemology.

Moreover, this social atomism reduces the concept of society along the line to an oversimplified image of a compound of preexisting, somehow ready-made elements arguing their relations on the ground of preformed beliefs. If we follow Elias’ compelling argument, such a (standard) sociological account fails to acknowledge to the full extent that humans are becoming beings (Elias 1987/2001, pp. 20–22.). It fails to provide an understanding of society that starts out from educational processes, instead of just recognizing an educational dimension at some point (as maybe interesting detail, important functional aspect of society, or later add-ons to an already functioning theory). Thus, analogously, we might say that the conceptual framework of educational philosophy seems to favor a *generative epistemology* that is deviant to standard epistemology. Such an enlargement approach to knowledge lies besides the traditional “JTB epistemic tripod” (Brandom 2000, p. 97), as it is inherently nonfoundational and not about the conditions of *justification* and *truth*, or not even about *beliefs* at all. So thinking of this (post-epistemic) type of epistemology as *educational* is not without initial appeal to it.

## Articulating Educational Philosophy

This type of coupling of epistemology and educational philosophy could be examined even further, as the argument in the Rorty-Taylor debate might (implicitly) be reaching for an educational problematization of knowledge, already. I want to address two aspects of an engagement in such a constructive reading of all the critical effort against Cartesian dualism. *First*, I want to point out how in epistemological terms the modern subject stands for both the engaged first-person perspective in which sensations are recollected *on the inside* and, at the same time, the disengaged view from nowhere that oversees the world *from the outside*. *Second*, this two-faced epistemology of the modern subject corresponds to two forms of naturalism and expressivism: one about expressing the vastness of nature as *surrounding* universe and the other as expressing one’s nature as *inner* depth.

*First*, Taylor’s tale of the modern disengaged subject articulates a crucial contribution to the project of overcoming traditional epistemology. Modern inwardness and disengagement as distilled by Descartes means just “becom[ing] aware of our own activity and of the processes which form us” (Taylor 1989, p. 174). As subjects, we are separating ourselves from the world and generating an observatory stance toward the external world. In disengaging from the world, we turn inward and we “disengage from them and objectify them” (p. 175). Thereby, since presupposing a



“being *to* whom it appears, *for* whom it is an object” (Taylor 1987/1995, p. 9), we eventually “establish [our] identity” (Taylor 1989, p. 178).

However, taking an even firmer grip on this issue than Taylor, the epistemology of disenchantment of the world gets disenchanting itself for building on paradoxical grounds. The subject appears to be the *inside* and, miraculously, also the *outside*. Turning inward it takes “*inner* appearance[s]” (Dreyfus and Taylor 2015, p. 15; emph. H.S.) as the underlying basis for all knowledge. Thus, “the whole point of the reflexive turn is to achieve a quite self-sufficient certainty” (Taylor 1989, p. 156) as a safe ground for all the modern epistemic acrobatics. However, posing as the center of undoubtable certainty it takes on the “view from nowhere” (Nagel 1986) toward the world which is “grasped from *outside*” (Dreyfus and Taylor 2015, p. 14; emph. H.S.).

We might rephrase Descartes’ half way skepticism as follows. Turning inward is double sided. In separating itself from the world around it, the subject disengages from the world around it as it turns inward to itself. By establishing its identity, it becomes an observer with a first-person standpoint. From there, it gains that small grain of certainty through introspection which serves as the starting point for becoming the disengaged and objectifying third-person onlooker from the outside. The epistemic subject is at the same time *the* perspective for any knowledge and *no* perspective at all.

*Second*, this double-sidedness of modern epistemology is mirrored by two understandings of naturalism and, respectively, expressivism. Taylor reminds us that the establishment of a scientific world view goes hand in hand with a “split-screen vision of nature” (Taylor 1989, p. 416). On the one hand, we get to know nature as vastness of an independent universe on the outside, “which scientific discovery continually reveals [...] stretching far beyond our imaginative powers in both the gigantic and the miniscule” (p. 416). On the other hand, there is a tendency to think of “human nature as intrinsic source” (p. 374) whose “impulse we feel within” (p. 416). Whereas we might term the former *scientific naturalism* of outer nature, the latter is that *humanistic naturalism* of inner nature which is firmly connected to the hermeneutic counter program against the early modern upcoming of scientific epistemology.

Analogously, the respective establishment of an “expressive view of human life” (p. 374), in general, splits up into an *outer expressivism* and an *inner expressivism*. Turning to the outside, such a view would come close to a philosophy of our scientific practices of “*articulating the world*” (Rouse 2015; emph. H.S.). But to think of our epistemic practices of talking (and writing) about the world as just a matter of linguistic representation of the world would come short. Scientific expressions are “never just a matter of ‘mental’ representation” (p. 25), but about “extending and refining the inferential entanglements of scientific concepts and other discursive elements with other domains of discursive practice” (p. 25). And even much more than working on academic prose, e.g., in laboratory approaches “[s]cientific practices rearrange our surroundings so that novel aspects of the world show them-



selves” (p. 215). Turning to the inside expressive practices would be practices of *articulating ourselves*. In this self-referential process, the “sense of depth in inner space is bound up with the sense that we can move into it and bring things to the fore” (Taylor 1989, p. 390). This results in the “expressivist idea of articulating our inner nature” (p. 389), which as “inexhaustible inner domain” (p. 390) is the ground of our “expressive self-articulation” (p. 390).

The question, though, is whether in both readings this surmounts to ascribing a “creative role to expression” (Taylor 1992/1995, p. 107), which brings it closer to a Neopragmatist account of an expressive epistemology. In the case of articulating myself, it seems clear that “[b]ringing things to speech can’t mean just making *externally* available what is already there” (p. 107; *emph. H.S.*). Expressively reworking former descriptions of ourselves, we do not use “present redescrptions to make true statements about [our] earlier sel[ves]” (Rorty 1994, p. 25), but we engage in “practices of *disengaged* self-remaking” (Taylor 1989: 389) that make “our traditions and habits [...] objects for us [and] subject them to radical scrutiny and remaking” (Taylor 1989, p. 175). In other words, *in* articulating ourselves we are “finding new and more interesting ways of expressing ourselves” (Rorty 1979, p. 359). Frequently, we become different in the process of such a “‘Sartrean’ redescription which changes the redescrber” (Rorty 1994, p. 25).

In the case of articulating the world, however, Rorty claims “there are no scientifically interesting ‘Sartrean’ redescrptions” (Rorty 1994, p. 25) that change the redescrber, since scientifically we use “redescrptions to make true statements about the state of [e.g.] the solar system antecedent to my redescrptions” (Rorty 1994, p. 25). This, surprisingly, brings Rorty closer to an exceptionalism of the scientific worldview, to which Taylor (and Dreyfus) seem to adhere. But there are scientific redescrptions that “redescrbe the familiar in unfamiliar terms” (Rorty 1994/1999, p. 87) and change the redescrber (i.e., the scientific observer) along the way. Just think about how redescrbing the solar system as heliocentric challenged the cultural narrative of humans-as-center-of-the-world narrative or how Darwin’s redescrptions of the outer world could not leave the self-image of the redescrbing humans unaffected.

Thus, for Taylor (and Dreyfus) as well as for Rorty, the project of overcoming epistemology might be running into yet another inner-outer structure. This means, in pursuing a generative epistemology we have to be even more diligent in making the important semantic transition away from gaining knowledge about the world toward carrying out knowledge practices in the world. Redescrptive philosophizing, surely, might still have knowledge or becoming knowledgeable or promoting societal change as motivational starting points. But it proceeds just by refraining from being preoccupied with how theory accurately portrays reality. Instead of working on closing the gap to reality, the generative account of redescrptive philosophizing is ever increasing the distance to the present philosophical problematic whose descriptions it is letting become strange.

## Educational Epistemology

In my argument, I picked up the question how to ask educational questions about education and asked in what way Taylor's philosophy or, strictly speaking, his critique of modern epistemology helps us to gain a new perspective on the relation of epistemology and education. Especially enterprises of explicitly nonscientific epistemology could open an important conversation about the special connection educational philosophy has (or could have) with epistemology. The developed figure could be taken to frame the role of Taylor's epistemology regarding "language and educational research" (Frowe 2001). Redescribing Taylor's attempt to overcome epistemology shows that this debate does not have to be a project of analytic philosophy alone, but can also be explored further by drawing from the twentieth-century continental philosophy or Neopragmatism. Accordingly, articulating philosophy is not only nonfoundational but also nonrepresentational by thoroughly questioning the inside-outside structure.

Moreover, questioning the epistemological fabric of modernity by overcoming epistemology can be conceived as a project of an educational philosophy all along. From such a focus on redescriptive theorizing, overcoming epistemology is not the attempt to disestablish epistemology altogether. Rather, it is about organically exceeding tradition by shifting the weight to a "(neopragmatist) social epistemology" (Derry 2013) that can be articulated as generative account of epistemology. In general, this enables us to talk about knowledge practices instead of evaluating relations of correspondence. Commonly, one might characterize educational philosophy by employing a high specificity regarding its object and pair it with a high generality regarding its findings, i.e., as philosophy of education it produces universally valid assertions on a specific set of educational issues. Refraining from any metaphors of imaging the world, however, induces a high generality regarding possible observable objects. In a nonrepresentational view, the question what makes educational philosophy a distinguishable enterprise instead of dissipating into scatters of research could not be derived from its object, i.e., from the demarcations of education out there. We could not simply assume that we already know where to look for education and how to distinguish it from that what is not education (e.g., using toothbrushes). In contrast, a generative account of educational philosophy retains the high generality regarding possible objects by redescriptively developing a high (educational) specificity in its way of looking at things. This way, we can not only ask educational questions about education but basically about everything. For example, we can articulate that in the practice of using bamboo toothbrushes we find an understanding of ourselves as having become educated or cultured subjects that are caring about their health in terms of hygiene, long-term effects, or even as something we can influence in the first place, and at the same time are caring about the environment for example in terms of plastic reduction.

The extending question put forward here is: in what way such redescriptions themselves can be paralleled to educational processes. Taking an even broader stance, nonrepresentationalist epistemology in either form serves as a reminder for modern philosophy to constantly work through its '*forgotten connections*'—to bor-

row an image Mollenhauer (1983/2013) uses to impressively recollect the submerged historic and systematic connections of education. Analogously, a recollection regarding the epistemological framework of educational philosophy could be seen as both revitalizing those historic reconstructions as well as carving out reconstructions in the nowadays fractured field of research styles to give new meaning to a universal theory of education (Bellmann and Su 2017). In a direct evaluation, such an educational approach to philosophizing could be understood as invitation to find new ways to carefully and confidently place educational philosophy into the academic system, which it almost traditionally struggles to fit into (Biesta 2011).

Shifting our talk from a generic talk about philosophy of education to a specific *educational philosophizing* as a particular mode of philosophizing enables us to ask in what ways redescribing epistemology is itself an educational endeavor. Redescriptions enlarge our internal and external expressive range and, regarding their dialogical structure, open the social and cultural realm to us and others in new and interesting ways. Giving this project an even stronger educational ground and maybe articulating a little too confidently, this redescriptive project could be continued as *educational epistemology*.

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# Wittgenstein, Science and the Social Sciences



Richard Smith

## Introduction

The social sciences – perhaps even the very idea of social science – are experiencing something of a crisis. On the one hand, there is a considerable degree of scepticism, bordering on outright hostility, towards them on the part of governments and governmental funding bodies. In the USA, for example, the National Science Foundation is now prevented by the House of Representatives, following a vote in May 2012, from funding research in political science. In the USA, again, the establishment of the ‘What Works Clearinghouse’ and the idea that education research in particular must be ‘evidence-based’ marginalises theoretical research, especially that with a sociological or philosophical basis, since ‘what works’ and what counts as ‘evidence’ are construed on the model of medical research, with randomised control trials as the ‘gold standard’ and the supremacy of purely or predominantly empirical research taken for granted (Cartwright and Hardie 2012). In the UK, it is now over 30 years since the Social Science Research Council became the Economic and Social Science Research Council when the Secretary of State for Education at the time, Sir Keith Joseph, decreed that the word ‘science’ was ‘misleading for a subject that cannot provide testable answers’. This appears to have masked his view that the social sciences were “packed with people committed to the left in British politics” who disagreed with his own ideas on, for example, the cycle of deprivation (Denham and Garnett 2001, 379–80).

Perhaps this hostility to the social sciences is partly caused by what some identify as the increasing unwillingness of social scientists – still so called, naturally – to be compared with the model of the natural scientists. (Of course it might be the other way round: perhaps it is the hostility which their discipline encounters that

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induces social scientists to repudiate the comparison with natural science.) Fay (1996 p. 1), in rejecting the comparison, writes that the question of how far social science is or should be like natural science has become less interesting today, partly because for many people

natural science no longer induces the kind of reverence it once did. Implicit in much previous philosophizing about social inquiry was the presupposition that natural science is the benchmark against which all cognitive endeavors must be measured. But in the current intellectual climate natural science has lost this privileged position.

It has lost that position, Fay thinks, because we live in an age of growing repugnance towards the military-industrial complex and the degradation of the environment and of scepticism concerning the benefits of technology, and accordingly increasing wariness of the science that underpins them.

At the same time, and perhaps at least partly as a further response to the kind of pressure noted above, many researchers and writers who identify themselves as social scientists still appear more than happy to see social science model itself on the approaches and procedures of the physical sciences. Thus there is much interest in ‘big data’, that is massive data sets that can be analysed by computer to expose patterns, trends and correlations, for instance, between social disadvantage and low education attainment, in ‘learning analytics’, the application of data (which may well be ‘big’) in order to maximise learning, in randomised control trials (RCTs) along the lines of their successful use in medicine and in neuroscience. This is not the place to offer detailed critique of these trends: for randomised control trials see Cartwright and Hardie (2012) whilst for neuroscience see Schrag (2011) and Smeyers (2016).

In this chapter, I note some of the ways in which Wittgenstein in his later and arguably more influential writing is astute (albeit sometimes cryptically) about the fundamental confusions at the heart of many elements of the ‘scientific turn’ that had captivated him in his earlier work and offers us well-judged ways of dissolving the pseudo-scientific myths that enthral and mislead many who regard themselves as members of the social science community. He is exceptionally and, it is sometimes tempting to say, uniquely helpful to us as we resist scientism, that is *faith* in science and excessive respect for science – particularly the expectation that every question is susceptible to scientific solutions and that scientific knowledge should be taken as the model for all knowledge. This of course is not to reject or even to denigrate science itself, though Wittgenstein, who was knowledgeable about science, having trained as an engineer and having worked as an aeronautical scientist in Manchester and elsewhere, often expresses extreme hostility to science in his later writings:

It isn’t absurd, eg, to believe that the age of science and technology is the beginning of the end for humanity; that the idea of great progress is a delusion, along with the idea that the truth will ultimately be known; that there is nothing good or desirable about scientific knowledge and mankind, in seeking it, is falling into a trap. (*Culture and Value*, p. 56)

It is usual to connect this with Wittgenstein’s feelings about the way science and technology had contributed to the horrors of two world wars (he had witnessed these



with his own eyes as a front-line soldier from 1914 to 1918), especially through the development of the atomic bomb, and with his apocalyptic phrase ‘the darkness of this time’ in his Preface to the *Philosophical Investigations*. A deeper scepticism however is evident in such remarks as the following, also from *Culture and Value* (p. 40):

What a curious attitude scientists have –: ‘We still don’t know that; but it is knowable and it is only a matter of time before we get to know it!’ As if that went without saying. –

This is a telling example of the naïve scientism that Wittgenstein would have us guard against.

It is important to note that both the scientism against which Wittgenstein reacts in his later work and what we might call scientism now have long roots. The word ‘science’ to designate the kind of unified field of knowledge and research that we are familiar with today was not widely used until well into the nineteenth century. Until then it was called ‘natural philosophy’, and Wittgenstein’s philosophical predecessors, as we would now think of them, were absorbed by mathematics and geometry more than by the empirical approaches that come to mind when we think of science in our own time. Descartes, for instance, records in his *Discourse on Method* that geometry strikes him as the most rigorous form of ‘obtaining clarity in any subject’, and published an appendix to the *Discourse* in 1637 called *La Géométrie*. His invention of a systematic way of linking Euclidean geometry with algebra still bears his name as the system of Cartesian co-ordinates. Spinoza resolved to write his own philosophical treatise *more geometrico*, in the manner of geometry. Gottlieb (2016, p. 138) writes that “falling in love with geometry seems almost to have been an occupational hazard of seventeenth-century philosophy”: that love affair, as we shall see, continued well into the twentieth century.

## Scientism in Educational Research

Here is an extended example of how educational researchers often assume that their work must conform to scientific criteria for truth and accuracy. Many studies appear to show a correlation between parental involvement in their child’s schooling and the educational standards that the child achieves. Parental involvement is, in short, a good thing. But correlation is one thing and causation another. Can we say that parental involvement *causes* better results – which will naturally have to be in the quantifiable form of higher marks in tests and exams? One problem here is that the various studies do not enable us to say just what kind of parental involvement is effective. Is it, for instance, a matter of the parent or parents ensuring that the child does her homework? Is it instead a matter of the parent(s) listening to the child read aloud, or of the parent(s) reading to her? If so, at what stage in the child’s development? Furthermore might there be a difference between on the one hand reading aloud somewhat mechanically, stabbing the finger at successive words in the text, so that the child knows she is supposed to be learning something here, and on the

other reading with a sense that the book – including its pictures – is meant to be relished and enjoyed? (We moved our older son to a different school when we discovered that the teacher required him to cover up the pictures on the left-hand page: using these as clues to the text opposite was, she said, ‘cheating’.) Is it important that the involved parent asks ‘What did you do at school today?’ or is it more important to be punctilious in attending parents’ evenings at the school? Or do we want to say in the end that it all comes down to the general truth that children need to see that their parents think education is valuable and to be taken seriously (but not necessarily solemnly)? Even asking a child what she did at school today can surely be counter-productive if it feels to the child like an inquisition to which they will be bound not to have the correct answer. (Children often reply to this question by saying what they had for lunch: perhaps because it is at least a definite and incontrovertible answer.)

The existence of all these variables and complexities means that we are a long way from being able to assert that parental involvement *causes* better results, in the form of better grades or anything else. To repeat: correlation, however regular, even if we can find it, does not demonstrate causation. There is a pleasingly old-fashioned example of this point often used by philosophers of science. A factory hooter sounds at 5.00 every evening at a factory in Glasgow, and all round the country workers promptly leave their factories at the same moment. This happens, let us suppose, from Monday to Friday every week apart from national holidays. Still the Glasgow hooter has not *caused* workers to clock off in Birmingham, Bristol and Newcastle.

To search for causes in the social sciences is problematic, then, if a properly causal connection is taken to mean, at least, that an intervention  $x$  will always be followed by an outcome  $y$ , and *as a result* of  $x$ . Yet, some researchers find it a matter of regret that social science has not come up with causal connections of this sort (not yet, perhaps they will say, it is only a matter of time before we get to know it!), and so they continue their search for the chimaera. Even the physical sciences, we should note, do not always work with the kind of idea of causation these social scientists are hoping to discover. Dissolving magnesium in sulphuric acid certainly causes, in the sense required, the production of hydrogen gas, but the same is not always true in medical science. Your doctor may be confident that your insomnia is caused by stress, but she does not suppose that stress always causes insomnia. The same is true of smoking and lung cancer. Not all smokers, not even those who smoke heavily for many years, contract lung cancer. But we hardly want to stop claiming that smoking causes lung cancer – that is, unless we work for the tobacco industry, which has for a long time fallen back on the fact that smoking does not fit the magnesium in sulphuric acid model of causation. Yet we hardly want to make a concession here – to the tobacco industry or the determined smoker – and say merely that there is a significant connection between smoking and contracting lung cancer. That does not seem sufficient here. Cigarette packets in the UK are now required by law to carry the unequivocal message: Smoking Kills. Similarly, there are signs on UK motorways that say Tiredness Kills. As with the case of smoking, the implicit causal connection between driving when you are tired and being involved in a fatal accident is not disconfirmed by the fact that large numbers of

people drive when they are tired without disastrous results. Only ‘the bewitchment of our intelligence by means of language’ (*Philosophical Investigations* §109), here the language of science, persuades us to stop thinking in causal terms in this case or in the case of smoking and lung cancer. The messages on the cigarette packets and the motorways are well conceived, implying causation in an ordinary, everyday sense of the word.

To emphasise this point, putting it in slightly different way: we can and do talk about causation when it does not conform to any supposedly scientific paradigm. As Nancy Cartwright (1997 p. 104) writes: “About causation I argue...there is a great variety of different kinds of causes and even causes of the same kind can operate in different ways”. She goes on to note that:

The term ‘cause’ is highly unspecific. It commits us to nothing about the kind of causality involved nor about how the causes operate. Recognizing this should make us more cautious about investing in the quest for universal methods for causal inference. (ibid. p. 105).

The prime candidate for such a ‘universal’ method of causal inference would naturally be a putatively ‘scientific’ one. It is worth noting that Cartwright’s criticism applies even to what has become a very popular such candidate: the INUS account of causation, associated particularly with J. L. Mackie, according to which an event C is perceived to be the cause of event E if C is “an insufficient but necessary (or non-redundant) part of a condition which is itself unnecessary but sufficient for the result” (Mackie 1974 p. 62). There is no space here to do justice to the problems that have been found with the INUS account. For a clear overview, which is particularly insightful about the importance of “the background of knowledge that is taken for granted” and the crucial role of blame in attributing causality, see Meyer 2000 (pp. 13 ff.). Cartwright (2007 pp. 34–35) simply notes “INUS conditions are not causes. The INUS formula represents an association of features, a correlation, and we know that correlations may well be spurious”.

## The ‘Scientific’ Wittgenstein

It is important to note that Wittgenstein’s attitude to science, which can be characterised as a growing sense of how science is prominent amongst the pictures that hold us captive (*Philosophical Investigations* §115), is connected to many of his central concerns in his philosophical writing throughout his life. In the early *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus* (1922), it is fair to say that Wittgenstein himself was ‘captured’ by scientific models and ideas that were making a major impact at the time. Albert Einstein did important work in atomic theory in the early years of the twentieth century, culminating in the publication of his ‘General Theory of Relativity’ in 1916. J.J Thomson was awarded the Nobel Prize in 1906 for his work in identifying subatomic particles in cathode rays. Ernest Rutherford, Niels Bohr and Gilbert Lewis made important discoveries about the structure of atoms between 1909 and 1916; Rutherford famously ‘split the atom’ in 1919. It should not be too

surprising that a trained scientist and engineer such as Wittgenstein, who had been fascinated by the philosophy of mathematics and corresponded with Gottlob Frege, perhaps the most eminent thinker in this field at the time, should be influenced by scientific and mathematical ‘pictures’. Essentially, the *Tractatus* is a work of logical analysis dedicated to discovering elementary propositions, understood as the basic building blocks of language. This is usually called his ‘picture theory’ of meaning since it conceives propositions as meaningful insofar as they picture states of affairs or empirical facts. Because those elementary propositions are analogous to the place of atoms in the world that the physical sciences investigate, Wittgenstein’s theory in the *Tractatus* is often described as logical atomism. Wittgenstein did not use this phrase himself but the word *Sachverhalte* which he uses in the *Tractatus* and is usually translated as ‘states of affairs’ is translated by some as ‘atomic facts’ (Hunnings 1988). Furthermore, Bertrand Russell, who was a major influence on Wittgenstein and acknowledged the influence Wittgenstein had on him in turn, was happy to call himself a logical atomist (Klement 2004).

Wittgenstein’s own title for the *Tractatus* was *Logisch-philosophische Abhandlung* (literally *Logical-Philosophical Treatise*). He adopted the Latin title for the English translation on the suggestion of the philosopher G.E. Moore. It is sometimes said that Moore was struck by the Spinozian flavour of the last part of the *Tractatus*, and Spinoza’s great work of moral philosophy had been titled *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* (Moore had published his own work on moral philosophy in 1903 as *Principia Ethica*). It is significant too that Spinoza had conceived his philosophy as proceeding *more geometrico*, in the manner of geometry, just as Descartes had taken mathematics and geometry as the model for how to deal with the ambiguities and uncertainties of philosophy. Perhaps in the Latin title of the *Tractatus*, there is also an allusion to Whitehead’s and Russell’s *Principia Mathematica*, published in 1910, which itself pays homage to Isaac Newton’s *Philosophiæ Naturalis Principia Mathematica* (‘The mathematical principles of natural science’, what we now call ‘science’ being known as ‘natural philosophy’ in Newton’s time.). At any rate, the early Wittgenstein was not the only philosopher to be held captive by the ‘picture’ of science. And when he writes later in the *Philosophical Investigations* that “a picture held us captive” (§115), then, it is the ‘scientific’ picture – science here including geometry and mathematics – that he has in mind, and it is he himself, he confesses, that was held captive by it.

The picture that captivates Wittgenstein in the *Tractatus* extends beyond its title and beyond the nature of the theory that he expounds there to the way in which he presents it (if indeed these two sides of a text can ever be entirely separate). Commenting on the literary style of the work, Muñoz-Suárez (2016) notes that Wittgenstein had trained as an engineer and comments that.

Perhaps this explains why the *Tractatus* looks like the work of a sort of conceptual engineer. In it, Wittgenstein describes reality as an immense device whose pieces perform together, giving rise at different levels to different configurations and abstractions, among them language and thought. Like cogs in a machine, all the aphorisms in the *Tractatus* serve an overall aim.

The *Tractatus* has a literary style that is variously described as austere, succinct, extremely concise, “formidably compressed” (Monk 1991, p. 156), cryptic and highly abstract. There is an “almost total absence of arguments proper, in the usual sense of the word, not to mention the absence of examples which would be useful in coming to the aid of the reader” (Frascolla 1994). Instead of arguments, there are statements that are intended to be axiomatic or self-evident. As is familiar to anyone who has opened the book, the statements are numbered (e.g. 1, 1.1, 1.11, 1.12 and 4.1272, 4.12721, 4.1273) in a hierarchy such that every lower level proposition expands on or comments on the proposition directly above it in the hierarchy. Wittgenstein makes copious use of logical notation and truth-tables, which unfortunately I cannot reproduce here. The style of the book is less reminiscent of Spinoza’s *Tractatus Theologico-Politicus* than of Euclid’s *Elements of Geometry*. Here, just as Wittgenstein sets out in his *Tractatus* basic axioms whose truth is intended to be self-evident, so Euclid sets out at the beginning of Book 1 of the *Elements* what he calls ‘Definitions’, ‘Postulates’ and ‘Common Notions’. Here are a few of the ‘Definitions’:

7. A plane surface is (any) one which lies evenly with the straight-lines on itself.
8. And a plane angle is the inclination of the lines to one another, when two lines in a plane meet one another, and are not lying in a straight-line.
9. And when the lines containing the angle are straight then the angle is called rectilinear.
10. And when a straight-line stood upon (another) straight-line makes adjacent angles (which are) equal to one another, each of the equal angles is a right-angle, and the former straight-line is called a perpendicular to that upon which it stands.

The reader, whatever her understanding or lack of it of the technicalities in the *Tractatus* – and it must be said that the fact that few readers will be able to follow all of the logical technicalities is no criticism of Wittgenstein – is left in no doubt that something dauntingly and compellingly rigorous – ‘scientific’ in the popular sense of the word – is going on in the *book*.

## Wittgenstein’s Turn Away from Science

Wittgenstein’s later repudiation of the scientific ‘picture’ is accompanied, as that earlier ‘picture’ was, by a theory of language and meaning, but now a very different one. In the *Philosophical Investigations*, he writes that it is a mistake to look for a perfect language, pure and crystalline like the language of logic and science. Now he abandons his aspiration to find one, ideal kind of language to which all language should conform. He is more impressed by what he calls “the multiplicity of language-games ... the multiplicity of the tools in language and of the ways they are used, the multiplicity of kinds of word and sentence” (*Philosophical Investigations* §23). The early pages of the *PI* have much to say about this. Wittgenstein offers a

list, including ‘Singing catches—Guessing riddles—Making a joke; telling it—Solving a problem in practical arithmetic—Translating from one language into another—Asking, thanking, cursing, greeting, praying’. In the next paragraph, he warns us that if we do not keep the multiplicity of language-games in view, we will perhaps ‘be inclined to ask questions like: “What is a question?”’ or, we might say, questions like ‘what is a cause?’, in expectation that there is a paradigm to be discovered, no doubt derived from what is currently a high-status language-game, that of science.

In a well-known summary of his new view of language, Wittgenstein writes:

every sentence in our language is in order as it is. That is to say, we are not *striving after* an ideal, as if our ordinary vague sentences had not yet got a quite unexceptionable sense, and a perfect language awaited construction by us. (*Philosophical Investigations* §98)

It is an idea that is repeated elsewhere in the *Philosophical Investigations*, for example, at §§123–124 where we read “A philosophical problem has the form: ‘I don’t know my way about’... It [ie philosophy] leaves everything as it is”. This needs some clarification, not least because it appears to limit the role of philosophy so severely as to make it effectively useless. What then are we to make of Wittgenstein’s insistence that ‘every sentence in our language is in order as it is’? Surely, we come across sentences from time to time which strike us as not being in order. Here are some: ‘Social science, as the word “science” implies, is a precise discipline’. ‘Learning phonics skills is the first important step in learning to read’. ‘Depression is an illness like any other’. ‘Education should stream children on the basis of their natural ability’. Wittgenstein’s apparent endorsement of ‘every sentence in our language’ is unfortunate, suggesting that each of the four sentences above is beyond reproach. Indeed, each of them might seem to some people at least to express simple common sense: to the lecturer in a Social Science Research Methods module, whose students reported her words to me with glee; to the writer of a UK Department for Education (2013) leaflet, *Learning to read through phonics: Information for parents*; to the doctor who spoke these words to a colleague of mine as he typed the prescription for anti-depressants; to the student who recorded her faith in the idea of ‘natural ability’ in an undergraduate essay.

Yet each of these statements can be challenged. The important point here is that the challenge is essentially on the grounds that the writer is in the grip of a *theory*. The first sentence shows the speaker holds a remarkably naïve theory about science as well as about social science: in particular one that shows no awareness of the way that the term ‘social science’ came into being as theorists and researchers sought in the nineteenth century to dignify the new discipline with the aura of the physical sciences (see Smeyers and Smith 2014). The second is questionable. Phonics as a reading ‘method’ is contentious (you would not know this from the Department for Education leaflet). Depression may often at least be a response to difficult circumstances in a person’s life, and to call it an illness immediately assumes that a medical doctor is the appropriate person to ‘treat’ it as she would tonsillitis or gout, that is through medication. The idea that there is such a thing as ‘natural ability’, a kind of stable attribute of the individual, perhaps expressed in terms of IQ, ignores the

possibility that ability may be acquired, for instance, through practice or good teaching. It is linked with the discredited theories of psychologists such as Cyril Burt.

The idea that ‘our language is in order as it is’, then, is one more warning that we are not to go looking for an ideal or perfect language: particularly one strongly coloured by theories, scientific or otherwise. *For the most part*, our ordinary language does not need to be replaced by something more ‘scientific’. We can talk of the sun rising and setting when ‘in fact’, as we might be tempted to put it, the sun is stationary and it is the earth that is moving. We can enjoy the distinctive smell of what we call the good sea air even if a biologist correctly informs us that much of that smell comes from dimethyl sulphide released by bacteria eating dying photoplankton. We can say we are standing on solid floor even if “we have been told by popular scientists that the floor on which we stand is not solid, as it appears to common sense, as it has been discovered that the wood consists of particles filling space so thinly that it can almost be called empty” (*The Blue Book* p. 45). It is worth quoting this passage further. Wittgenstein continues:

This is liable to perplex us, for in a way of course we know that the floor is solid, or that, if it isn’t solid, this may be due to the floor being rotten but not to its being composed of electrons. To say, on this latter ground, that the floor is not solid is to misuse language. For even if the particles were as big as grains of sand, and as close together as these are in a sandheap, the floor would not be solid if it were composed of them in the sense in which a sandheap is composed of grains. Our perplexity was based on a misunderstanding; the picture of the thinly filled space had been wrongly *applied*. For this picture of the structure of matter was meant to explain the very phenomenon of solidity.

## Some Implications for Social Science

It is usual, and by no means wrong, to say that the central feature of Wittgenstein’s later work is his new way of thinking about language: his move from conceiving of propositions being connected ‘atomistically’ to states of affairs to his conception of ‘language games’, as noted above, and to his insistence that “For a large class of cases – though not for all – in which we employ the word ‘meaning’ it can be defined thus: the meaning of a word is its use in the language” (*Philosophical Investigations* §43). Now this is certainly helpful to the social scientist or educational researcher: it gives them a way of understanding how we play different ‘language games’ with the notion of causality, for example. Thus the language game played by physical scientists when they identify a catalyst’s part in a chemical reaction is rather different from the language game we play when we talk of smoking causing lung cancer, and different again when we talk of how the football team’s run of bad results caused the sacking of their manager. This we have seen in § III above; and it is worth repeating the further, crucial point: none of these ways of talking or thinking about causation has any claim to be the primary or essential sense of causation, as if the other ways were secondary, derivative or inferior.



It is equally true, however, and certainly it is especially helpful to the social scientist and those in cognate disciplines, to register the force and significance not just of Wittgenstein's changing views of how language has meaning but of his growing dissatisfaction, so marked in his later work, with science as the paradigm of all knowledge and his identification of it as prominent amongst the 'pictures' that had held him captive. There is space here to note only three such aspects of his dissatisfaction with science. The first is what Wittgenstein calls "our craving for generality" (*Blue Book*, p. 18). We might think here of the widespread tendency these days to suppose that explanations will be found 'in the genes' for a wide range of aspects of human behaviour, from Attention Deficit Hyperactive Disorder (ADHD) to criminality. Or we might think of the way that some people are excited by the expectation that neuroscience will supply the key to our understanding of human learning – and thus answer the question of the purpose of education. The discussion of causality above is another instance of the assumption of generality, here the idea that there must be one true account of causality to which all talk of causality will have to conform. Wittgenstein writes that by 'our craving for generality' he means

The method of reducing the explanation of natural phenomena to the smallest possible number of primitive natural laws ... Philosophers constantly see the method of science before their eyes, and are irresistibly tempted to ask and answer questions in the way science does. This tendency is the real source of metaphysics, and leads the philosopher into complete darkness. I want to say here that it can never be our job to reduce anything to anything, or to explain anything (*ibid.*).

The idea that it is not our job (as philosophers) to explain anything may sound strange, but this is a second aspect of Wittgenstein's escape from the capture of science. It is a matter of doing justice to the fact that not all understanding and knowing comes down to explaining. In science it often does. We explain someone's slurred speech: he suffers from a particular condition (perhaps he has had a stroke) of which this is a symptom. We explain the distinctive flora and fauna of Australasia: it became separated from the great land-mass we call Pangaea at an early stage when that land-mass began to divide, and so Australasia had a long time over which its particular flora and fauna could evolve. But in social science, our understanding and knowledge typically take a different form. When we seek to understand puzzling behaviour in a strange culture (the way children dress up on the last day of October and go round houses demanding treats and threatening 'tricks', say), we are not asking what caused the behaviour: we are asking what it *means*. The rituals of marriage, of university graduation ceremonies (why are these young people wearing strange clothes in which fur figures predominantly?) or of the game of cricket are not to be understood in terms of what brought them about. It is not much help to the bewildered foreigner watching her first game of cricket to start by saying "Well, in 1702...and the 'wicket', if you think about it, looks a bit like a wicket gate...". The modern game of cricket is governed by various rules and conventions, for instance, that if the ball hits the wicket (broadly speaking) this is not good for the batsman, and the person who has thrown (or 'bowled') the ball has secured an advantage for his or her side. Just as to understand the word is now, for Wittgenstein, in most cases to understand its use, so to make sense of human behaviour is to grasp that it is for

much of the time constituted by ‘rule-governed behaviour’. Thus making sense of it consists of understanding those rules or, to use a term that is perhaps more helpful, those conventions.

This is to say – the third aspect of Wittgenstein’s escape from the capture of science – that this later Wittgenstein has a more generous conception of knowledge than the author of the *Tractatus*. In *On Certainty* (260), he writes “I would like to reserve the expression ‘I know’ for the cases in which it is used in normal linguistic interchange”: that is to say, scientific discourse or ‘interchange’ is no longer to be taken as the model or paradigm. Let me give a vivid and, I think, rather moving example of this from the twenty-first century UK (and if some in this increasingly disunited kingdom would specify that it is an English – rather than Scottish, Welsh or Northern Irish – example then I concede the point to them).

A sportswear retailer called Sports Direct has been the subject of government investigation following complaints that it paid the workers at its warehouse less than the minimum wage; that staff there were penalised for matters such as taking a short break to drink water, and for taking time off work when they were ill. The investigation was conducted by the Select Committee of the UK Government’s relevant department, which is called Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS), following earlier revelations by BBC journalists. The Chair of the Select Committee, Iain Wright MP, appeared on the BBC programme *Inside Out* on 10 October 2016. He spoke about how workers at the warehouse complained that they were ‘treated like cattle’ and talked about the distress their working conditions had forced them to endure. He described them as ‘incredibly brave’ for coming forward to give evidence to the journalists who first uncovered the story. There is a possible question here concerning how much credence should be attached to the stories the workers told. Might they for instance have exaggerated their distress, perhaps in order to win compensation? Mr. Wright said: “When someone’s looking at you in the face, and crying, and saying ‘nobody’s listening to me’ ... we knew from looking in their eyes that they were telling the truth”.

How can we *know* the truth in cases like this? Shouldn’t there be more *scientific* ways of establishing the veracity of the workers’ testimony, such as lie detector tests, footage from CCTV in the warehouse, or at least the cross-examination of witnesses, and corroboration of their accounts by other witnesses? Against such demands for greater certainty – indeed for what we might call hyperbolic certainty – we have Mr. Wright’s calm assurance: “*We knew from looking in their eyes that they were telling the truth*”. In similar vein, Wittgenstein writes that there is such a thing as “imponderable evidence” (*Philosophical Investigations* p. 228): that is, evidence that cannot be precisely calculated, weighed and measured, but which is good evidence nonetheless.

Imponderable evidence includes subtleties of glance, of gesture, of tone ... I may recognize a genuine loving look, distinguish it from a pretended one (and here there can, of course, be a ‘ponderable’ confirmation of my judgment). But I may be quite incapable of describing the difference. (ibid.)

This is no more than what the social science researcher understands perfectly well. She talks with 9 year-olds about their experiences of the culture of assessment

and testing at school. How does she know whether she is hearing the truth, or what they think they are supposed to say? The anthropologist records what the natives say about the traditions of the cock-fight, but what is there to prove that this isn't just the story they always tell visitors (it fits with Europeans' prejudices and makes them happy, and the islanders are kindly people who do not want to disappoint the tourists)? She knows from looking in their eyes, and whilst she may not, on this occasion or that, see enough to form a sensible judgement, if she does not look into their eyes she does not see at all.

## Conclusion

Thus Wittgenstein invites us to follow his journey, to shake off the bewitchment of science and scientific language and to return to searching for the meaning of what we find rather than its cause. Ordinary human understanding, such as the Chair of the Select Committee was satisfied with, will not give us the certainty that science promises, but it is the search for scientific certainty that is causing the problems rather than leading us in the direction of the answer.

Here, in the form of little more than a coda, or perhaps an extended end-note, is something rather odd. Many of the standard textbooks on the philosophy of social science – and here I am referring only to those for which I have great respect and which my undergraduate students find helpful – have little or nothing to say about Wittgenstein. Vernon Pratt's *The Philosophy of the Social Sciences* (1978) mentions Wittgenstein in two endnotes only. One is to the effect that the *Philosophical Investigations* 'may also be read as offering a defence of logical positivism'. The other notes that 'Concepts are given their sense by their role in a way of living, and, since ways of living differ, so do concepts', with the suggestion that a kind of conceptual relativism is thus implied. Martin Hollis's *The Philosophy of Social Science: An Introduction* (1994) tells the reader that the *Philosophical Investigations* "makes fertile use of the notion of a 'game' in discussing human action" (p. 18) and helpfully connects this with the idea of rule-governed activity, which is expanded upon later in the book (pp. 152–7). Brian Fay's *Contemporary Philosophy of Social Science* (1996) has just two references, one explaining that those being interpreted and those interpreting them must both be persons, and citing Wittgenstein's well-known remark that if a lion could talk we would not be able to understand what it said (p. 26). The other employs an analogy from the *Tractatus*: an eye looking out at the world will not see itself (p. 42). Michael Root's *Philosophy of Social Science* (1993) makes no mention of and no reference to Wittgenstein at all. The only introductory textbook on the philosophy of social science I know that draws substantially on the work of Wittgenstein is Roger Trigg's *Understanding Social Science* (1993), but although there are over a dozen references to Wittgenstein they nearly all relate only his discussions of rule-governed activities and forms of life.

If Wittgenstein is deeply helpful to us as social scientists in liberating us from the 'capture' of science, as I have argued in this chapter and for showing us how such

liberation may be effected, it is surprising that this is barely represented in the standard introductions to the philosophy of social science; and perhaps the fact that it is so little represented there goes some way to explain why our liberation from the language and fantasies of science is still far from being complete.

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## Introduction

The Slovenian philosopher and psychoanalyst Slavoj Žižek currently captures media attention mainly by his physical presence, a think-fast-talk-fast communication performance and his versatile interpretations of heterogeneous common phenomena. In his references, he mixes theoretical and political considerations with popular culture in a challenging way. In this regard, he is a media phenomenon, not only starring in several documentaries about him,<sup>1</sup> but at the same time speaking at Occupy Wall Street protests and being interviewed for the release of a 1000 pages Hegel interpretation in newspapers or for the relevance of communist ideas nowadays (see Žižek 2012). But since his first widely noticed book *The Sublime Object of Ideology* in 1989, he is probably recognized as both, one of the most provocative and productive political philosophers these days. Therefore, Pfaller states “Nothing is too stupid or too trivial in order to teach him something – [...] nothing is too high or too low in order to be excluded from the scope of his philosophy. This creates an extremely egalitarian atmosphere in Žižek’s approach” (Pfaller 2007: 42.44). Žižek however rarely talks about subjects of educational theory or disciplinary issues. While his thinking is not at all being considered to be genuine ‘philosophy of education’, it still contributes to very relevant aspects of educational theory.

First of all, Žižek’s re-readings – just to mention Hegel’s idealism or Lacan’s psychoanalysis – are capable of bringing new insights into the theoretical framing

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<sup>1</sup>E.g. Taylor (2005) or Chales de Beaulieu and Farkas (2006).

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of educational processes. His highlighting of a different concept of negativity hints at a re-considering of crucial concepts like subjectivity. The way Žižek uses new interpretations of past voices can be seen as another ‘deconstruction’ method, offering a different option for the way we rely on the ‘historical past’ of educational thinking to analyse our present situation. Secondly, the roots of current discussions about the economization of knowledge, educational systems, lifelong learning, culture etc. (see Simons and Masschelein 2008; Wall and Perrin 2015) can be located in a materialistic tradition of theorizing the changes of (pedagogical) ideas in close relation to changes in the political, social and economic background of society. With a view to this, a Žižekian perspective can bring back a critical macro perspective of a changing order of global capitalism into the analysis of its broad effects on everyday life. Thus, the changing structure of desires and of consumer attitudes are seen as having their impact on the way of satisfying intellectual needs or on the form of political articulations. Thirdly, Žižek’s dedication to popular culture, particularly to the film, has the potential to open the contemporary educational discourses up to a not yet exhaustively debated but seemingly very relevant issue. From his psychoanalytical point of view emerges the idea that this type of media provides access to ideology as the always problematic designations of society and of subjectivity. Therefore, the relevance of Žižek’s work for educational questions and issues has to be read in terms of uncomfortable irritations and interventions with regard to actual ideas of the subject and the subjectivation process in the midst of social contexts. So, he shakes clear-cut pedagogical attributions, especially in terms of autonomy, rationality and emancipation, which neglect the inconsistency and conditionality of every theoretical and practical access.

### **“Do You Lack Something?” – Theoretical Intersections of Mind and Materiality**

Žižek especially combines a Hegelian concept of negativity and a Lacanian approach to the constitution of subjectivity (see Parker 2004: 36ff). Therefore, he is able to re-read and vindicate even the Cartesian Cogito. In the contemporary poststructural influenced philosophical thinking, it seemed to be a foregone conclusion that a new starting point has to be found. Though, Žižek rather works out the unseen and unthought aspects of past voices that come along with a different notion of how we find and attach meaning to the world around us. In the following, we will address three topics to briefly render the key ideas to describe the relationship that we establish with ourselves, with others and with the world: lack and desire (section “**Lack and desire**”), the mirror stage (section “**The mirror stage**”) and cogito and negativity (section “**Cogito and negativity**”). Those key ideas still deal with the connection of mind and materiality, but rather shed a different light on what in Educational Philosophy is called ‘education’ or ‘Bildung’.

## *Lack and Desire*

One of the main aspects in Žižek's use of the category of 'subject' can be illustrated by referring to a children's book, written and illustrated by Shel Silverstein. In *The Missing Piece* Silverstein (1976) tells the adventures of 'It': "a circle with a point for an eye and a triangular gap for a mouth, a subject in search of a missing piece that would fill in the gap" (Žižek 2001: xviii). As 'It' feels incomplete and therefore is not happy, 'It' decides to go rolling, looking for its missing piece. Being forced to roll slowly by its imperfect conditions, 'It' has all the time to meet other life forms (worms, beetles, butterflies), face the different elements (heat, rain, snow, oceans) and hurdles on its way (holes, walls, swamps, mountains). Keeping singing that it is looking for its missing piece, 'It' meanwhile experiences attentiveness, ignorance and rejection. When 'It' finally finds a perfect fitting piece to become a whole circle with, they further on are rolling together much faster than before. So 'It' cannot stop for encounters and is no longer able to sing. After all, 'It' slows down and carefully sets its missing piece free again to roll on alone singing his old song – "Oh I'm lookin' for my missin' piece" (Silverstein 1976).

As Pierlott (2011) in accordance with Žižek (2001) says, Silverstein's story is dealing with the concept of Platonic love that can be found in Plato's dialogue "Symposium" when Aristophanes holds his speech. He tells a myth of the origin of human desire that is explaining why love makes partners feel 'whole'. The image of two lovers being the other half of each other is an allegory for the idea of unity.

Silverstein's story about 'The Missing Piece' points out a different view on the subject here: The subject is constituted by a fundamental lack and therefore is driven by desire, which is always organized in interaction with the Other, as Lacan (1998: 235) phrases it. Yet the ideal of love, happiness and strength could not be achieved by the idea of becoming one perfect circle (as an image for the ideal form). Although 'It' finds just its perfect 'missing piece', 'It' still is experiencing a rupture: the memory of how it was when something had been missing. Consequently, at the origin of the subject there never has been a 'whole' which now is lost and has to be restored – Or more precisely: There is no origin; for it is the irreducible function of the 'missing piece' to make 'It' move. This eventually means that for the desire-driven subject the objects of desire are itself dynamical and contingent. Lacan calls these objects 'object small a' while the symbolic order that is providing orientating patterns for desire is called the 'Big Other' (similar to Hegel's 'objective spirit'). For Žižek, this is the paradox insight into the structure of subjectivity: that the desired object will enable a kind of fulfilment or pleasure *insofar as it keeps open* the experience of a lacuna between desire and its fulfilling (see Heil 2010).



## *The Mirror Stage*

Jacques Lacan (1901–1981) puts the answer to the question how the ‘missing piece’ serves as a stimulating source of subjectivity in his concept of the ‘mirror stage’. This term describes the genesis of subjectivity in an irreducible dependence from the Other. Thus, the subject does not emerge with the fact that it is able to refer to itself as an ‘Ego’. For Lacan ‘everything’ begins with the bodily exposure to a lack: The (6–18 month-old) infant experiences a vexatious incapacity of regulating its physical processes on its own (see Lacan 1973: 63ff.). McMillan (2015: 553) notes: “Consequently, from the very beginning of subjectivation, the demands of the body cannot but be expressed in language, and it is this separation of the body from itself that creates the subject: the subject exists as the effect of our particular failure to re-establish the fantasy of bodily coherence.” So, by visually identifying itself, the infant establishes an imaginary relation to the image reflected. Lacan’s point here is that this consolidation is a crucial effect of imagination: The ‘Ego’ is situated on a fictional line, which cannot be extinguished by the individual (see Lacan 1973: 64). In the mirror, there is not ‘the real me’ but an image looking at me from a point that ‘I’ cannot be at – an “unoccupiable point” (Copjec 2015: 34). So, Žižek (2008b: 116) emphasizes in general: “[T]o achieve self-identity, the subject must identify himself with the imaginary other, he must alienate himself – put his identity outside himself, so to speak, into the image of his double”.

In the progression of this model, the confrontation with symbolic regimes achieves importance. The symbolic regimes refer in a broad sense to social interaction, respectively to discursive orders implying hegemonic cultural norms or common articulations that arrange the controversies about naming ‘myself’ and the ‘world’. In summary, the mirror stage stresses a constitutive – although powerful and fragile – intertwined process: The imaginary identifications of the subject, its meanings and desires, are always situated in social practices or symbolic regimes, in demands and dramaturgies. This is the reason why Žižek (2008a: 245ff.) accentuates that our enunciations are always emerging from the outside, from a constantly controversial ‘point’ that is representing the Other’s desire ‘for us’. Consequently, this means that the subjective point of view never can be clearly identified by ‘positive’ knowledge. It is always structured by signifying processes which cannot close the lacuna of imaginary identifications and the symbolic matrix. To phrase this crucial incompleteness, Žižek uses the concept of the ‘real’. This is a metaphor for a non-identical, failing dynamic that is inherent in every signifier we use to describe our reality. It expresses the experience that there is always something withstanding the full identification – as ‘my knowledge’ or ‘my desire’ as a clear cultural or social identity etc. (see Žižek 1999: 54ff.; 2008c: 127). The ‘real’ is indicating that we do not *have* reality, but *signify* it – in relevance to all three registers: the imaginary, the symbolic and the real – and therefore always miss it. Thus, for Žižek, Psychoanalysis is “never simply about the individuals and their (more or less intimate) problems – these are inscribed, from the very outset, into the socio-symbolic field that Lacan calls the ‘the Other’” (Zupančič 2008: 3).

The crucial point for educational philosophy may be seen here, e.g., in the fact that terms like autonomy, individuality, learning, participation, competencies etc. are not at all immaculate or superior concepts which can easily be implemented in pedagogical settings or research. Similar to what Laclau and Mouffe (1999) indicate, there is no necessary connection between the concept and the signified or what ‘really’ happens. Every identification just fixes the contingency of signifying processes at a particular point: “providing a ‘quilt’ or fixing effect to grasp the reality we are seeking to portray” (Žižek 2008b: 95). As a result, pedagogical reflection in these terms is not about building on concepts to figure out matters and means for a project of a better world. It is rather about critically reflecting the precarious demands and legitimations we are dealing with in our everyday life and in our professional settings. In relation to this context and in the light of Žižek’s ideas, Cooley (2009: 383) for example tries “to rethink how we view, analyse, and confront educational problems” and Taubman (2010: 196) works on “an ethics of teaching”, which deals with the ambiguous experience of quotidian routines – especially in institutional settings like in schools and universities.

### *Cogito and Negativity*

To put it short, Žižek highlights the impossibility of using or producing an evident or definite knowledge base of subjectivity and of the world around us. From this perspective, it should be supposed that he would reject a concept like René Descartes’ (1596–1650) idea of a *res cogitans* that is asking for a foundation of the self. With the upcoming of ‘postmodern’ and ‘poststructural’ theories the Cartesian Cogito was used as a foil for critical demarcations against the illusion of the modern supremacy of the rational self (see McMillan 2015: 549). Žižek, on the contrary, frames this concept for rendering some aspects of the Hegelian negativity. He focuses precisely on the consequences of the sceptical dynamic of the Cartesian subjectivity and “bring[s] to light its forgotten obverse, the excessive, unacknowledged kernel of the cogito, which is far from the pacifying image of the transparent Self” (Žižek 1999: 2). This reading is directly linked to what Georg W. F. Hegel (1770–1831) calls the “night of the world”.<sup>2</sup> The implications of this excessive level accentuate again a disruptive dimension, on which every idea of absolute knowledge is collapsing (see Žižek 2006a: 14, 2008a: 16). This does neither mean that subjectivity is just the effect of a heteronomous subordination to social demands nor does it point to a sovereign self-confident and non-compliant actor. Instead, the concept ‘subject’ strains the always problematic status of making decisions in the light of the impossibility to close the gap between the signifying process and the signified object (see section “A Žižekian guide to ideology”). Due to this

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<sup>2</sup>“The human being is this night, this empty nothing, that contains everything in its simplicity – an unending wealth of many representations, images, of which none belongs to him – or which are not present”.(Hegel, cit. Žižek 1999: 29).

constitutive moment of emptiness, the cogito fails to finally overcome the ‘night of the world’ in the name of the ‘light of reason’. But this is not a conclusion; it is just the condition of subjectivation: The sceptical Cogito fails fundamentally in separating reason and rationality from phantasmagorical representations and madness – but its reality is to proceed (with) the difference. As Michael Wimmer (2014: 308) remarks, the act of decision is nothing but regulating imaginations and delusions. Consequentially, there cannot be an absolute opposite between ‘Bildung’ – for Hegel: “[t]he life of formative discipline” (Žižek 1999: 106) – and the abyssal moment, here termed madness. In the process of forming subjectivity, in which we are irreducibly engaged and confronted with ‘the Other’, there is no neutral base (like nature, God or our intellect) for a comparison between the ‘truth of reality’ and the volatile and passionate parameters of our perceptions and reflections.

### **“Emancipation or Expertise? Yes, Please!” – Contributions to Pedagogy and Philosophy of Education**

The pedagogical value of Žižek’s approach, as we outlined it, can be seen in reflecting the constitutive function of the “lack within subjectivity” (McMillan 2015: 545). In this regard, the elementary problem is to concentrate on subjectivation meaning the transit from the ‘night of the world’ into our everyday universe of socio-symbolic orders or forces (see Žižek 1999: 35). Žižek argues on the one hand that our thinking, speaking and acting cannot simply be understood as an interaction with others. The way we discipline our desires, acknowledge norms and meanings, attitudes or requirements etc. – on account of that what we are not fully aware of – “is grounded on our accepting and relying on a complex network of rules and other kinds of pre-suppositions” (Žižek 2006b: 9). On the other hand, this is also the threshold for his materialistic diagnosis, that our present universe of reason is elementary embedded in the excessive and antagonistic dynamics of the contemporary capitalist society (see Wall and Perrin 2015: 18). This brings back the question of the relationship between education and madness (section “[Education and madness](#)”) and comes along with the question of ideology (section “[A Žižekian guide to ideology](#)”).

### ***Education and Madness***

Tony Wall and David Perrin (2015) provide the first pedagogical introduction to a variety of Žižek’s theoretical viewpoints in book form.<sup>3</sup> They use his arguments in confronting the critique of hegemonic neo-liberal claims in education inspired by

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<sup>3</sup>We also want to mention the Anthology “Žižek and Education”, edited by Antonio Garcia, which is already announced as forthcoming in two volumes (see: <https://www.facebook.com/ZizekAndEducation/>; Accessed: 11 Sep 2016).

Marx with a paradox double-bind: ‘we’ as lecturers and scholars agree to the critique on actual tendencies to structure the educational sector like business companies, and we deprecate a look at pedagogical issues (e.g. learning, autonomy, courses) primarily under aspects like efficiency, investment and profit. We are complaining about considering pupils, students or even researchers as customers, stakeholders and so forth. But we also accept the criticized implemented educational policies (like the modular design of knowledge or its representation in credit points) – and act like this stated socio-symbolic matrix is self-evident. We doubt that ‘Bildung’ can be unitized in educational systems which are reproducing inequality on the one hand, but on the other hand we still have to deal with complaints from different actors if the failing of students indicates that we did not deliver the promised learning competencies. To this ambiguous situation “Žižek exclaims ‘we do know what we do, but still do it!’” (Wall and Perrin 2015: 2). This statement aims at the concept of subjectivation: There is no ‘pure’ educational domain being unambiguous and rational, and so our decisions are performing the difference between reason and ‘madness’ (as a philosophical notion). Consequently, our articulations and aspirations are at the outset entangled in the socio-symbolic order: that what we want to overcome also organizes our desire.

In here we find the reason why this theoretical frame does not pose a sovereign or a resigned position: it is because the socio-symbolic order itself is not an ‘absolute’ realm. It works through the processing of its incompleteness and contradictions; it prevails through our speaking and acting while we *claim* it to be effective, disciplined, individual, critical, subversive etc. Žižek urges us here to realize that our stances and interventions are still an imaginary identification entangled in the socio-symbolic order. But as the identification of ourselves and the world is marked by a disruptive gap, this indicates even to radicalize our analytical perspectives in reference to the variety of antagonisms in different social spheres. Therefore, we will point out a few exemplary analytical references in the following, before we draw attention to Žižek’s concept of ideology with regard to the way he discusses movies (see section “A Žižekian guide to ideology”).

To particularly exemplify our previous statements about the link between education and madness we will shortly refer to Aaron Cooley’s examination of Žižek’s ‘In Defense of Lost Causes’ (2008c). To relate this work to educational issues, Cooley mentions three examples that all seem to describe a ‘mad’ situation. His first example is quite in accordance with McMillans intro (see McMillan 2015: 545). Both evoke the picture of educational situations as a ‘struggle’ for an educational relationship between teachers and learners, as Cooley puts it. In taking over Žižek’s concept of the ‘desire’, he locates the struggle where teachers attempt to regulate the desires of their students and students resist to this by “slipshod writing” (Cooley 2009: 385) – and reformulates this as a matter of “civility in the classroom” (ibid.: 386). In his second example, where Cooley takes Žižek’s suggestions to the realm of education, he examines the “educational connection” (ibid.: 386) between the US government’s whitewash of torture and its impact on the development of the moral and political identities of young people. Finally, Cooley brings up the consequences of the specific knowledge economy that political common sense has led to in the

past decades by sparing out the worldwide growing inequalities because they would not affect 'us'. In seizing a contemporary educational debate here, Cooley resumes: "The predictable strategies of resistance from the educational left that are offered to defend against the commercialization of schools, the ills of teaching to the test, and the abominable lack of public investment in education, all fall short" (Cooley 2009: 391). He suggests that it might just be the flipping inverting Žižekian view that could be sensitive enough for analysing the complex fragments and contradictions in those geopolitical events and drifts. It could make us change our focus to the predicaments that underlay those that may look like the obvious ones on first sight. In order to work towards a transformation, he therefore proposes the educational philosophers to take over Žižek's method, to change the choreography of political urges and to "enter the policymaking arena as if it were a mixed martial arts cage with the method of combat open and the outcome unknown" (ibid.).

The contemporary predicament of the educational economy of knowledge and its political impact, Cooley draws on, is expanded by Christiane Thompson (not in reference to Žižek), by taking a closer look at the American 'What Works Clearing-House' (WWC) within the American Department of Education. The WWC "is responsible for producing reviews concerning scientific studies" (Thompson 2015: 658) and therefore rates the quality of those reviews especially as a service for the practical or applied fields of education. Thompson, among other things, shows the functioning of this program of efficiency that we would take for Žižek's description of the functioning of ideology: "The neutrality feigned by that kind of scientific objectivism is fueled by the promise of efficiency, which has given the WWC its name" (ibid.: 659). The seemingly obvious evidence of that 'what works' does not prove the idea is right or true. It just proves that the political frame is determining what 'a good idea' to solve problems is and thus legitimises to go on the same way.

In an interview with Paul Holdengräber 2014 in Denmark,<sup>4</sup> Žižek links this critique to Kant's idea of the 'public use of reason'. He poses that the basic idea of Bologna reform of schools and universities would be to get rid of this public use of reason. Instead of a free debate we have a certain frame determined in advance and let experts decide. Maybe, it is this diagnosis that also led Cooley to contend that "the drift and pull towards a policy of de-politicization in education is the worst of common sense in action" (Cooley 2009: 385). Žižek's objection is that intellectuals would not in this sense be experts and provide answers to questions formulated by others but on the contrary question the very way a problem is described. In this sense also, Thompson outlines the '*ecology* of pedagogical knowledge' in opposition to the '*economy* of pedagogical knowledge': "An ecology of pedagogical knowledge expands upon the analysis performed under the focus of economy and models or condenses them to problems, and in doing so it opens them up to shared reflection and deliberation." (Thompson 2015: 661).

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<sup>4</sup>The interview is available on YouTube (see Det Kongelige Bibliotek 2014).

## *A Žižekian Guide to Ideology*

In the documentary ‘The Pervert’s Guide to Ideology’ (2011), Žižek leads us through several movies and shows the crucial moments that condense their stories. His interpretations do not explain the narrative lines of the film but demonstrate the implicit knowledge working in our perception and portraying ourselves, others and social conditions. While the means of analysis may be taken from Lacan, the method Žižek practises here reminds of the Hegelian Dialectics as he sees it. This shall be illustrated by an incident taken from the mentioned documentary.

In the starting scene from the movie *They Live* by John Carpenter (1988), John Nada, a homeless worker in Los Angeles, finds sunglasses that make him see ‘the real messages’ behind the advertisements, that basically are orders to perceive oneself as a consumer, as a subject of pleasures. Žižek now does not follow the classic tradition of critique of ideology that assumes cleared up minds would result in a change of behaviour. According to him, it is important to see that ideology is not a false representation of reality but in a way is determining the structure of material and social processes as it is itself determined by the structure of the desire (see Heil 2010: 108). Ideology is not imposed on us but is ‘our spontaneous relationship to our social world’. It is our way to perceive meaning – and enjoy our illusions. Ideology thus is not what is thought to confuse the otherwise straight view on the world but is precisely the idea that we could step out of ideology and then see how things really are: This idea is itself ideological – and would be ‘the ultimate illusion’, as Žižek asserts. His comment, that ideology is functioning just where it is supposed to be overcome, is an inversion. Taken from the Hegelian dialectic thinking, the claimed fact is united with its opposite (see Gamm 1997).

To put it in a nutshell, there is no position outside the symbolic order. Therefore, there is no outside of the ideology as well. The subject is constituted by organising his or her desire midst of ideological invocations – as McMillan puts it: by “anxiety that drives identifications and thus acts as the catalyst of belief and behaviour” (McMillan 2015:546). The claim for a pedagogical or political concept of emancipation therefore is ambivalent because the idea of a liberation potential has to be mobilized always from within ideological positions. In contrast to the popular reception of Foucault’s concept of ‘De-Subjectivation’ within educational philosophy, which intends an experimental attitude and “the art of not being governed like that and at that cost” (Foucault 2007: 45), Žižek points out the ineluctably controversial behaviour when one is relating to ones own self and to the world in always ideologically shaped representations, contexts and situations. So for him, a subversive moment can also reside in an ‘over-identification’ with the ruling ideology, where ideology can collapse with different results. Žižek explains with reference to Stanley Kubrick’s movie *Full Metal Jacket* (1987), that taking an order word by word – like the ‘good Soldier Švejk’ – leads to chaos rather than accomplishment (see Heil 2010: 77f; see also Žižek 1997). Another example from this movie shows how the ‘overconformist’ Private Leonard Lawrence (called ‘Paula’) ends up in

self-destruction. The decisive point for Žižek is that within every kind of *affirmation* of the desired ideological objects, there is at the same time a *distance* to the ideological appeal. This distance or lack neither promotes emancipatory aspects in a literal sense nor does it mean that our affective attachment to the world could be fully rationalised (see Butler 2007: 4f.; Vogt 2008: 154). We may know about the harmful consequences of smoking – and still we like it. So what Žižek’s concept of ideology ultimately puts at stake here is the limitations of the prevailing paradigms that go along with the contemporary economy of knowledge in education.

## “Less Than Nothing” – The Contribution of a Žižekian Perspective

McMillan condenses the specific Žižekian contribution to educational issues, “that any critical pedagogical practice that seeks to evoke radical transformation should not merely engage with the discursive frameworks through which the learner interprets the world, but should facilitate exploration of both the affective dimensions of these narratives and the potentially ‘traumatic’ elements that threaten to disrupt them” (McMillan 2015: 547). This point aims at the persistence and power of the complex socio-symbolic networks within our stubbornness, which causes massive problems if we have to change the fixing points that sustain our (private or professional) habits, thoughts and desires. But if we take it serious, this subjectivation implies an irreducible process of alienation. Then, every perspective on radical transformation cannot be expressed just as an act of enlightenment that comes along with emancipatory learning opportunities as a pedagogical strategy. We are faced with an antagonistic situation: Subjectivity is from the very outset a conflictual process of formation – and therefore an elementary socio-symbolic transformation, because there is no somehow formed substance at the beginning of the process or at the end. Simultaneously, the essence of global capitalism, which is deeply inscribed in our everyday lives, claims multiple transformations of identifications and subject positions (see Žižek 1999: 127ff.). So it seems that contemporary capitalism always is able to incorporate new dynamics, even critical or revolutionary attitudes, in its logics of competition, consumption and commodities (see Wall and Perrin 2015: 26).<sup>5</sup>

What can make a difference? – The answer, according to Žižek, can only be paradoxical: The stubbornness of antagonism itself. In the process of relating oneself to the world, there will be a persisting mismatch between desire and its ‘object small a’ that keeps the antagonistic process going (see section “[Lack and desire](#)”). The structuring idea of an inconsistency that concerns us and ‘makes us move’ – with

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<sup>5</sup> Boltanski and Chiapello (2007), for example, are explaining how ideas like autonomy and creativity have switched their meaning in the twentieth century: from the articulation of subversive interventions against the process of alienation in contemporary fordism to the point of promotion of the postfordist conditions of production.



reference to the subject, but also to society<sup>6</sup> – acquires a powerful configuration in the current economic and political conditions. Consequently, Žižek claims that a transforming and therefore always political act is just situated as a moment in the midst of reason and madness (see sections “[Cogito and negativity](#)” and “[Education and madness](#)”). As a gesture of interruption it cannot be derived from the existing socio-symbolic orders. The act is “always an interregnum of virtuality and possibility” (Finkelde 2009: 179; Vogt 2008: 160f.). Here is also the point for critical remarks, as Heil (2010: 143) stresses it: The entanglements and fuzziness of Žižek’s concepts itself complicates not only the reception of his works<sup>7</sup> but also their – theoretical *and* practical – application. It is often not quite clear on which level we can adjust our analysis when we talk about ideology, transformation, subjectivation etc. as distinct matters. But it is precisely the obstinate refusal to the idea of unambiguous references that indicates Žižek’s productive systematic theoretical interventions.

## Conclusion

The resistance of Žižek’s theoretical contributions to clearly defined conjunctions with contemporary pedagogical programs is indicated also in his works in other (disciplinary) fields. The (individual, social, political) effects of lack and desire, of a generating absence, seem to be part of his own writings, too. Apparent insensitivity or even discrepancies in his talks and writings resist any affirmative attempt to easily collect his ideas. Notwithstanding made and meant for ‘practical reasons’, his philosophy still eludes pragmatic approaches: He does not deliver conclusions, that easily can be inserted in actual topics of philosophy and practice of education. Žižek’s provocative writings are “rather a series of theoretical interventions which shed mutual light on each other, not in terms of the *progression* of an argument, but in terms of what we could call the *reiteration* of the latter in different discursive contexts” (Laclau 1989: xii).

In his unusual re-reading of past voices, he also brings disavowed authors back into a serious theoretical reflection (e.g. Lenin: see Budgen et al. 2007). This is thwarting the recourse of “set or prescribed answers” (Wall and Perrin 2015: 5), precisely to open up the contingent symbolic areas of our analytical and daily struggles. By this, Žižek deconstructs the hegemonic theoretical and political strategies to bring to light what stays unsaid, unheard or outrageous with reference to past and present voices and issues. With this approach he tries to free their possible but unrealized options from readings that themselves have become ideological mainstream. This uncomfortable challenge of common perspectives, the inability or reluctance

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<sup>6</sup>Žižek (2008c) never gets tired of emphasising the permanence of ongoing social divisions and contradictions as society in principle.

<sup>7</sup>Another issue is Žižek’s struggle to cultivate anti-capitalist positions, which brings him into quarrels with Laclau and many other thinkers (see Heil 2010: 139ff.).

to identify completely with a specific theoretical or social position, does not only point at the very inception of philosophical thinking in the interstices of socio-symbolic orders (see Žižek 2006a: 7f.). It is the crucial and opening political feature that offers a critical perspective within and on educational philosophy. Nonetheless, a broad international reception is still to come.

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**Section II**  
**Schools of Thought**  
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# Introduction: Section 2 – Philosophy of Education: Schools of Thought



Christiane Thompson and Joris Vlieghe

It has been argued that we live in a post-theoretical and post-paradigmatic era (Reichenbach 2014). The argument says that theories and paradigms no longer structure the current academic discourse. The central debates between major schools of thought that once steered the discussion, such as the encounter between Gadamer and Derrida in 1981 (Michelfelder and Palmer 1989), are not as prominent as before. Rather, one might feel exhausted with the ever-repeating critical charges that are brought forth against certain schools of thought, e.g., the charge of idealism against phenomenology or of relativism against postmodernism. Another observation is that the differentiation within thought traditions makes it difficult to view these schools in terms of a programmatic identity. Moreover, it seems that the significance of philosophical reflection has diminished given the prominent role of empirical research methods that dominate the educational studies. Eventually, in times where modern democracy is challenged by political and economical crises, it might feel pointless to center one's knowledge interest around different philosophical approaches and trends.

Nevertheless, there are still good reasons to include a section on traditions and schools of thought in this handbook. One reason is to present the current state of the educational-philosophical discourse in such a way that new developments and challenges become observable and debatable in the first place. The aim is not to reignite wars of attrition that have haunted the landscape of educational-philosophical studies but to map this highly diversified field. This requires moving beyond quasi-paradigmatic labelings, such as the “continental” versus the “analytic” tradition (cf. Standish 2007).

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Even though it is impossible to fully recover the current state of the art – and every selection of schools and traditions remains disputable – the editors of this handbook have decided to include chapters that go beyond the occidental tradition of the philosophy of education. The aim is to widen the scope of systematic thought on education – toward traditions that have developed in particular religious, cultural, and regional contexts. This section comprises chapters on Jewish and Islamic philosophies of education, on Eastern and African educational-philosophical perspectives, as well as on indigenous philosophy of education. These chapters call for the continued and extended reflection of central educational-philosophical issues, such as the mind-body relationship, the relationship of human beings to nature, as well as the relationship between philosophy and religion.

The demand to abandon Western-Centrism is important to an academic field that has undergone a considerable global expansion. In the current discourse of the philosophy of education, there is a growing consciousness for the fact that ‘international’ cannot just mean ‘English speaking’. What is required, instead, is to bring together and to translate the respective language traditions. In this regard, the reference to schools of thought and traditions serves a very important function in the discourse: it is hoped to engender dialogue.

Dialogue is a communicative exchange on a shared concern – even if this concern is interpreted in very different ways and leads to controversy and fierce debate. In our view, dialogue depends on ‘reference points’ that clarify where the dialogue partners stand. This section provides these reference points from different schools of thought. Furthermore, it presents the pluralization and differentiation that have occurred within the respective paradigms. Take, for example, the concept of ‘reification’ that has undergone changes from the first to the second and third generation of critical theory. As of consequence, the chapters of this section move beyond the idea of ‘representative master thinkers’ within different paradigms (for this we refer to the first section of the handbook). Rather, schools of thought are considered as loosely coupled contexts of dialogue and debate. As such, the chapters on phenomenology, critical theory, Marxism, and pragmatism commit themselves to the plurality of developments within these traditions.

When working on this section, it became obvious how dependent the educational-philosophical exchange is on *the reading and interpreting of texts*. In other words, schools of thought are constituted by a group of readers. This emphasizes the importance of ongoing translations (see, e.g., Standish and Saito 2017) – between languages as well as between different approaches and perspectives (Thompson 2016). Translation, then, is an important topic in order to secure the ground of dialogue and exchange. The chapter on ‘Modernity and Education’, for example, provides access to the German tradition of *Bildung* by focusing on three figures (Humboldt, Schiller, and Hegel) that deserve more attention in the international educational-philosophical forum. The chapter on ‘Feminism’, in turn, provides a comprehensive overview of the different developments and issues with an extensive and nearly exhaustive survey of the literature from different national discourses.

Yet, some chapters of this section are not limited to recapitulating the *traditions* of educational-philosophical thought. Rather, they demonstrate how schools of thought have developed as a *critical confrontation with and turn against* present societal and cultural conditions, and more exactly the inequalities that come with modern societies: The phallogentrism and the logocentrism of Western philosophy have subduced in unjust social and political structures, such as in different pay scales for men and women or the limited access to education for particular groups. Hence, the chapters on postmodernism/poststructuralism, feminism, and posthumanism problematize the oppositions we have held dear for a very long time, for example, humanity versus animality, the properly humane as opposed to technological supports, as well as sex and gender differences. The chapters on Marxism and critical theory present the processes of reification within modern capitalist societies and the shortcomings of philosophical idealism for addressing contemporary educational issues.

One of the challenges of this section has been to adequately reflect the relationship of philosophy and education. To be sure, educational-philosophical traditions are bound to philosophical paradigms – from a conceptual but also a historical point of view. However, as the chapter on ‘Analytic Philosophy’ demonstrates in a very clear and vibrant way, philosophy – with its task of self-enlightenment – is essentially an educational matter. All of the central philosophical issues – epistemological, ethical, anthropological, etc. – are directly connected to educational questions: questions on the forms and ways of knowing, questions about how to lead one’s life, questions regarding what it means to be human and to live together with non-human animals and things, etc. However, it is also important to bring into view the differences between philosophy and education: regarding the treatment of concepts or the relation to educational practice. Recently there has been a discussion concerning the importance to form a stronger disciplinary core surrounding education and pedagogy (Hodgson et al. 2017).

In this context, it is important to note the different policy and practice backgrounds of the schools and traditions presented in this section of the handbook. Take, for example, the tradition of pragmatism and its strong intertwinement with policy and practice in the United States in contrast to the analytic tradition in the UK that unfolded in the context of a professional reform and academization of teacher training. Or consider the relationship to traditions of self-mastery that are typical for Eastern cultures of education. For that matter, see also the disciplinary development of the Germanophone ‘Pädagogik’ and ‘Geisteswissenschaft’ (see, e.g., Biesta 2015). From here, we come to see very diverse or even opposing constellations of philosophy *and* education.

For Marxist and critical approaches, for instance, the *connection between philosophy and education or educational practice* is a very tight one, as the task of emancipation, which is key to both schools, is profoundly educational: structural oppression can only be overcome and real autonomy and justice realized, if people somehow become conscious of what it is that holds them back from claiming and



achieving a better life both for themselves and others. Even if such ideas are criticized, for instance, by poststructuralist approaches, autonomy and justice remain important: not as idea(l)s beyond discussion, but rather in terms of contingent discursive constructs, which themselves become an educational issue. In other words, educational practices become a site where these terms can be renegotiated and reshaped.

Other chapters have sought to look for a unifying strategy in order to draw a comprehensive picture concerning the relation of philosophy and education. For example, ‘ubuntu’ has been put forward as a key concept to understand African philosophies of education. In the chapter on Jewish philosophy of education, the concept of ‘modernity’ serves as an analytic tool to describe a contested field of knowledge claims. The chapter on Islamic philosophies of education crystallizes around the legitimacy of different sources of knowledge. Alternatively, a trope borrowed from a well-known tradition is used to give a synthetic account of another ‘school’: Plato’s image of the philosopher as being freed from the cave is used to provide an outlook of the complex manifold called Eastern philosophies of education.

From another angle, the chapters on indigenous and non-Western philosophies of education problematize the idea that there is an ‘obvious’ link between philosophy *and* education – or at least not in the terms as we are accustomed to from a modern Western perspective. These chapters call for a reevaluation of preferences deeply embedded in the educational discourse, such as the dominance of reflection and theory. To be sure, a further task of the philosophy of education will be to critically reflect and re-constitute itself in the light of this criticism: What are the appropriate instruments and forms of educational theory and practice? The chapters of this section touch upon this question when presenting further possible developments of the respective schools of thought.

Altogether, the section on schools and traditions is not oriented toward unity and identity. Instead of presenting a well-ordered field of generally recognized scholarship, it attempts to provide an insight into a contested terrain that questions unequivocal classifications. The section is indebted to what has been described as an antifoundationalist perspective (Heyting 2001). In the end, this ‘messiness’ of incompatible and shifting positions – of different traditions but also within them – is related to the inherent openness of philosophy and of education, and it testifies to the impossibility of having a final say about the field that they constitute.

In this context, the editors of the handbook are very much aware of the limitations of this project. The section on schools of thought is structured in exchange with the other sections, especially with the part on ‘voices of the past and the present’. The aim was to cover as many fields and debates as possible, but also to limit repetitions.

We thank the authors of this section for having taken up this challenging task. As described above, the contributions form a multifarious landscape of perspectives and schools that (re-)shape the educational-philosophical field.

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# Eastern Philosophies of Education: Buddhist, Hindu, Daoist, and Confucian Readings of Plato's Cave



David Lewin and Oren Ergas

It is not possible to provide a comprehensive account of the educational philosophies and theories that fall within the wide-ranging rubric of 'Eastern philosophy of education'. This disclaimer acknowledges the need to be selective, and so in what follows we have chosen to focus on certain Eastern traditions that have seemed to provide the most enduring and substantive contributions to educational thinking. This inclusionary/exclusionary task should not be understood as disavowing other potentially important contributions and traditions (e.g., Shintoism, Sikhism, Jainism, Baha'i) nor that the categories 'Eastern' and 'tradition' can be offered without significant reservation.

Furthermore, the reader would be faced with a bewildering array of ideas without a conceptual frame with which to interpret less familiar contexts. We employ Plato's allegory of the cave as the methodological and pedagogical vehicle to frame and to drive the discussion that follows because it allows us to explore certain key ontological, epistemological, and ethical features within our selected Eastern pedagogies, providing the balance between meaningful encounter and coherent interpretation. If philosophy is concerned with what it means to be human, then philosophers of education are sometimes said to take up the question of what it means to *become* human: humanization. Our traditions define humanization through a set of practices and/or understandings. Thus, we will focus our attention both on the goal and the practices and processes by which the goal might be achieved. Our chapter includes three parts: the first part will briefly introduce key elements of Plato's allegory of the cave. Part two will include four sections that examine Buddhism, Hinduism, Daoism, and Confucianism in turn. It is important to note,

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however, that each of these traditions is more of a tree with several branches, reflecting diverse schools of thought. This general difficulty becomes severe when discussing Buddhism and Hinduism (the former more appropriately conceived as *Buddhisms* and the latter a broad term that includes several belief systems), requiring us to select specific teachings/aspects within each tradition. Part three will offer some brief statements that may be surmised from our analysis, pointing to shared features of an ‘Eastern philosophy of education’.

## Part 1

### *Plato’s Cave Allegory*

The allegory of the cave appears at the beginning of the seventh book of Plato’s *Republic* (Plato 2012, 514a–520a).<sup>1</sup> The allegory presents a dualism between ignorance and knowledge, and an ascent of the mind that has ontological, epistemological, and ethical significance. The process of escape and return to the cave makes the allegory richly symbolic for educationalists.

Socrates likens the human condition, “in respect of education and its lack” (514a), to that of prisoners captive in a cave. The cave represents the sensual, tangible world. It is the only world that these prisoners know since they are shackled in such a way that their heads face the cave wall onto which shadows are projected. Behind the prisoners is a fire, and between the fire and the prisoners is a walkway with a low wall, behind which people walk carrying objects or puppets “of men and other living things” (514b). Having no idea of what is going on behind them, the prisoners know only what they see, which they take to be reality. However, their blindness is twofold. Not only are they unaware of the false nature of the shadows, they have no idea that there is a real world that exists outside the cave. The allegory goes on to elaborate how one of the prisoners is forced to turn his eyes toward the fire that is casting the shadows. He is then pulled further toward the cave entrance, and taken outside of the cave, leading to the dual realization of Truth that is at one and the same time the falsity of the cave-world. The freed prisoner is Plato’s ideal ‘educated person’ – the philosopher that has escaped the world of temporary, constantly changing appearances and has realized the world of ideal forms that are eternal, absolute, and unchanging Truths. The freed prisoner then returns to try, unsuccessfully, to educate his former inmates of the poverty of their condition.

The most common reading of the allegory is dualist in which the sensual world is one of ignorance, and the world outside the cave illuminated by the light of the

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<sup>1</sup> Since the cave allegory follows Plato’s discussion of the metaphor of the sun (507b–509c) and the divided line (509d–511e), it seems plausible that the metaphor of the sun sets out our ontological condition, the divided line a methodological interpretation of stages of knowledge, and that the concern of the cave is primarily epistemological of the process of moving from ignorance to knowledge.

sun is of reason and true knowledge. Metaphors of the ascent of the mind from ignorance to knowledge are a common trope within the Western tradition, found, for example, in Moses' ascent and encounter with Yahweh on Mount Sinai in Exodus, as well as the Neoplatonic influence on Western mystical theology in figures such as Augustine, Bonaventure, and others (Turner 1995). Such metaphors of ascent from shadows to light seem to affirm a dualism between body and mind, where the world of ideas and reason endures, while the body and the sensual realm in general is destined to pass away. The idea that true being exists in a timeless transcendent realm can be detected in most forms of religious and philosophical expression. Since Nietzsche, Western philosophers have been increasingly suspicious of the identity between being and the timeless, though Eastern traditions, as we shall see, also have varied and complex relations to the dualism behind the ascent from body to mind (or, relatedly, from matter to spirit). In general terms, Buddhism and Hinduism lend themselves more directly to images of ascent from the mutable to the immutable yet in ways that challenge the substantiality of the dualism of the cave allegory. Consequently, the allegory of the cave will be used in different ways, sometimes as illustrative, and other times as a contrast against which Eastern ideas can be explored. The main questions we will attempt to address in this reading 'with and against' the cave allegory will be: What are the problems of the human condition such that require education (in the cave allegory's terms, what does each tradition present as the state of being a prisoner? What characterizes our cave-world)? What kind of practices (educative path/curriculum) are offered to ameliorate this problem and what are their aims (corresponding with, what parallels the philosophers' way out of the cave, the nature of the world outside the cave, and the philosophers' ethical choice to return to the cave and free the prisoners)?

Interpretations of the ethical themes found within the cave allegory are varied and complex. On the face of it, the good life seems to entail an escape from the cave such that the form of the good, symbolized by the sun, is apprehended directly. It should be remembered that, in Plato's allegory, the philosopher who is freed returns to the cave in order to free the others who remain trapped. This final aspect of the story speaks of an important ethical call, but also of an educational task. Having offered a brief characterization of Plato's allegory, we now move to examine our four Eastern traditions in order to see the ways in which they relate to the story.

## Part 2

### *Buddhism: The Cave as a Creation of the Mind*

The interest in Eastern philosophies of education in the passing decades is becoming more noticeable (Eppert and Wang 2008; Ergas and Todd 2016) yet within these traditions it is Buddhism that seems to be drawing the most attention (Hattam 2004; Hyland 2014; Todd 2015). The reasons for this specific interest are diverse and cannot be elaborated here. However, we will mention two important aspects that help

locate what we intend to offer here: (a) Buddhism is essentially an educative tradition (Thurman 2006). Its foundational teachings, such as the Four Noble Truths, are structured and organized in a way that makes it, at least theoretically, applicable to a direct discussion of ontological, epistemological, existential, and ethical questions that lie at the heart of education. (b) The dramatic rise in the contemporary research of mindfulness practice and its growing applications in schools invite both the examination of the roots of the practice within Buddhism, and a philosophical perspective on the ways in which such *meditative* practice and its contemporary interpretations are shaping educational theory and practice (O'Donnell 2015).

## Background

Buddhism begins with Siddhattha Gotama (not yet the Buddha) who lived between 563 to 483 BCE. The Buddha was raised as a prince, yet at the age of 29 he set out to live as an ascetic, renouncing his luxurious life and leaving his wife and child. This was the consequence of a series of life-changing encounters, sending him away in search of an answer to 'why we suffer?'. For 6 years, the Buddha roamed India with groups of ascetics, practicing various kinds of meditations, and yogic practices, fasting to near death, yet to no avail. Disappointed yet determined, he left his group and sat to meditate vowing to continue the practice until he found the answer he sought. Throughout the night he meditated until he became the 'Buddha' – the awakened one. What did he awaken from? What did the Buddha find that night and what does it have to do with education and philosophy of education? What parallels do we find between the Buddha, Socrates, and the cave allegory?

It is important to begin by saying that the Buddha did not initiate *Buddhism*. After his enlightenment, he spent the rest of his life teaching, yet Buddhism took its more organized form only in the centuries that followed as the Buddha's teachings were written. This led to the development of different schools of thought to the point at which there is no one Buddhism but rather many different and diverse Buddhisms (Gethin 1998; Williams 1989). A common division includes early Buddhism and Mahayana Buddhism (from which Vajrayana as well as Zen Buddhism emerged). In our analysis, we will focus on fundamental teachings that are usually accepted by all Buddhist schools of thought.

## The Human Condition

The foundational teaching of Buddhism to which all its diverse schools of thought subscribe is known as the Four Noble Truths that is repeated a number of times throughout the Buddhist Pali canon.<sup>2</sup> The Buddhist tradition at times compares the

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<sup>2</sup>See Dhammacakkappavattana Sutta (The Discourse That Sets Turning the Wheel of Truth, Samyutta Nikaya 56.11), Maha-parinibbana Sutta (Last Days of the Buddha, Digha Nikaya 16), Mahasaccaka Sutta (The Greater Discourse to Saccaka, Majjhima Nikaya 36).

Buddha to a physician in the way he articulated The Four Noble Truths revealing a structure of a medical diagnosis (Gethin 1998, p. 63) that we apply here to an educational path:

1. The First Noble Truth – *dukkha* is often translated as ‘suffering’ or perhaps more appropriately – *dis-ease*. This dis-ease may be the equivalent of the prisoners’ condition in Plato’s cave proposing the need for education. This epistemological condition of ignorance symbolized by the cave is, however, *created* by our own minds through *uneducated* perception (Gethin 1998, p. 70). Human dis-ease manifests in our being possessed by a constant dissatisfaction. We are beset by a restlessness of either wanting things that we do not have (e.g., money, house, spouse, tenure) or wishing to disown things that we do (e.g., sickness, job interview, problematic relationship). Even when seemingly satisfied, undergirding satisfaction is the wish to prolong satisfaction; hence, ‘satisfaction’ itself holds the seed of dissatisfaction.
2. The Second truth – *samudaya* (origin/cause) – locates the source of the human problem within the uneducated human mind that suffers from ignorance (*avijja*).<sup>3</sup> The ‘educational’ responsibility then focuses on liberating the mind from an epistemological error (Olendzki 2011). Our minds witness the world of appearances (just as the prisoners in the cave), yet with every appearance the mind superimposes its cravings/aversions over perception. As Gethin writes, “craving goes hand in hand with a fundamental ignorance and misapprehension of the nature of the world” (1998, p. 73). Very much like the cave allegory, we confuse appearances with ‘things as such’. Acting upon such false perception, our morality becomes ignorance-laden. Two interesting aspects of *avijja* help further elaborate the second truth as well as point to parallels and distinctions between Plato and the Buddha:
  - (a) The understanding of *Ignorance*. The etymology of the term *a-vijja* reveals a parallel between Plato and the Buddha that runs as a thread through Buddhism, Yoga, and Daoism. *Vijja* connotes with knowledge but *a-vijja* is not lack of knowledge but rather its negation. We are thus not speaking of ignorance as a lacking of knowledge but rather as holding views that are the opposite of *right* knowledge. This aligns clearly with Socrates’s preference of unknowing (*aporia*) over the holding of wrong views. The ideal of knowing in both cases then is the liberation from viewing appearances (*doxa*) as if they are real.
  - (b) Dualism vs. non-dualism. The difference between Plato and the Buddha lies in the relationship between the ‘two worlds’. Whereas in Plato’s allegory there is an emphasis on the ‘world of appearances’ *against* a ‘world of forms’ the flavor one gets within Buddhism, especially in its later Mahayana interpretations, is one that stresses the codependence of the knower and the

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<sup>3</sup>The cause of *dukkha* is associated with ignorance (*avijja*) or with craving (*tanha*). Both are possible entry points within the twelfthfold cycle of dependent origination (Loy 1988). Here we leaned toward the former given the clearer linkage to the cave allegory.



known (a theme that will be stressed in the section discussing Yoga). In a number of interpretations, these ‘two worlds’ coexist (Loy 1988). They are seen as two as long as the *uneducated* mind engages with them (Olendzki 2011, p. 68). Hence the problem we have is that our uneducated mind engages with the appearances and *creates* the cave. Liberation from ‘the cave’ is the liberation from the ignorance of our own mind. It is thus far less clear here whether objects have an ontological status without a mind that perceives them.

3. The third Noble Truth – *nibbana* – is a term that connotes diverse meanings including Truth, cessation of *dukkha*, ‘extinguishing of desires’, and others (Rahula 1959). When the ‘fire’ of our cravings is extinguished, or perhaps seen as an impersonal constant flux that ceases to be that which guides our actions, the cave will cease to exist with it. Perhaps the most important thing to understand here is that the meaning of a realization of the nature of appearances as insubstantial is automatically a realization of the nature of the insubstantiality of the seer of appearances. The ‘self’ that confuses appearances with things as such confuses itself as a ‘thing as such’. Enlightenment may thus be seen as the realization of the insubstantiality of knower and known, thus contrasting Plato’s dualism with a non-dual epistemology.

*Nibbana* constitutes the ideal of ‘the educated person’ that is reflected in a mind that has recovered from the human *dis-ease* of ignorance. This would be the equivalent of the philosopher’s escaping the cave and knowing the ‘good’. This points to a clear affinity between the Buddha and Plato that both viewed knowledge and virtue as unified. However, we believe that the Buddha would be more explicit in viewing knowledge as the means and virtue as its educational aim, given his anti-intellectualism manifested in a resistance to engage in metaphysical-philosophical discourse when it was not clearly linked to the liberation from suffering (see Gombrich 2009).

4. The Fourth Noble truth – *magga* (path) – may be likened to the Buddha’s curriculum. This curriculum is the eightfold path that culminates in the unification of wisdom and compassion. It is also known as the ‘middle path’ for it stems from the Buddha’s own experience from which he concluded that liberation will be achieved neither by extreme austerity nor by indulgence in sense pleasures (Rahula 1959, p. 45). Importantly, the emphasis on the human condition as dependent on how we perceive (from the mind *in here*), far more than on that which is perceived (*out there*), proposes a substantial shift in our perspective about education. Education becomes primarily an individual’s commitment to the purification of his or her own mind. The metaphorical journey out of the cave is understood as a path of the purification of the mind and its recovery from an epistemological error.

When the mind is transformed so that it awakens from the spell of *avijja* we are said to embody: Right understanding, Right thought, Right speech, Right action, Right livelihood, Right effort, Right mindfulness, and Right concentration. This

eightfold path is conventionally grouped into ethics (*sila*), mental discipline (*samadhi*), and wisdom (*panna*). In Buddhist terms, Plato's 'good' (the sun) is expressed in the unification of wisdom (*panna*) and compassion (*karuna*) that can be seen both as expressions of the purification of the mind, and as the pedagogical means for realizing this aim. Wisdom and compassion that must reciprocally balance each other (Rahula 1959, p. 46) are expressed in selfless action, altruism, and benevolence. The path that leads from self-centeredness of a mind that confuses things 'as such' with things as the mind *itself* perceives, to a mind that dispels the 'self' around which it had centered, will be inclined to wise and compassionate action. Such action would perhaps manifest in the return of the philosopher to the cave after enlightenment and transform this solitary act into a deeply ethical and socially engaged endeavor. Such, indeed, is at least the ethos of Mahayana Buddhism that posed the role model of the *bodhisattva* – one who engages in the Buddhist path, attains enlightenment, and dedicates his or her life to the liberation of all sentient beings based on endless compassion. This socially engaged ethos has become one of the central themes within contemporary Buddhism and within its educational interpretations (Eppert et al. 2015; Hattam 2004).

Given the contemporary interest in mindfulness practice, we offer some reflections on the place of mindfulness within the Buddhist tradition and comment on the relation of these practices to philosophy of education. As was noted earlier, *Right mindfulness* is the seventh constituent of an eightfold path that spans the full gamut of ethical living. However, the exponential rise in scientific research of the benefits of mindfulness *practice* and its growing incorporation in diverse educational settings (recently depicted in the *Handbook of mindfulness in education* (Schonert-Reichl and Roeser 2016)) has paradoxically led to both a growing awareness to *and* a hiding of its Buddhist origins (Ergas 2014). Philosophers of education have been responding to this movement in diverse ways that position Buddhism at the center of contemporary debates. This includes the appeal to Buddhism as a tradition from which to elucidate and rejuvenate educational practice (Eppert et al. 2015; Todd 2015) as well as a critical response to what has been derogatorily termed the 'McMindfulness' phenomenon (Purser and Loy 2013) – the extraction of mindfulness from its Buddhist ethos and hence its transformation into a school 'pathology proofing practice' (O'Donnell 2015). We believe this field will continue to develop in the coming years.

### ***Hinduism Through the Case of Classical Yoga: Absorbed in the Cave to Seek Liberation***

Of the diversity of belief systems that go under the term 'Hinduism' (e.g., advaita Vedanta, Purva Mimamsa, Shaivism) we will focus only on Patanjali's classical yoga for two main reasons: (a) This tradition will be more familiar to the reader given the pervasiveness of yoga practice in Western industrialized countries as well

as its contemporary applications within schools. (b) Of all four traditions discussed here, we suspect that classical yoga would be the one closest to the fundamental views presented in Plato's cave allegory.

Our analysis will be based on Patanjali's *yogasutra*, a text containing 196 aphorisms dated arguably to the third or fourth century CE. This text, written by a sage named Patanjali of which very little is known, is a compilation of diverse traditions of Patanjali's times. Essentially, like the cave allegory it provides us with a full worldview, along with a path toward an Absolute Truth, broadly understood here as an *educational path*.

## A Dualist Worldview

Most interpreters understand classical yoga as depicting a dualistic ontology-epistemology (Feuerstein 2001; Iyengar 1993; Larson and Bhattacharya 1987).<sup>4</sup> Such interpretation immediately locates us within the context of Plato's cave allegory. By pointing to the distinctions between these two forms of dualism, we will be able to inform our understanding of both perspectives. The dualism of classical yoga lies between *objective* nature (*Prakriti*) and *subjectivity* – the Seer or Self (*Purusha*).<sup>5</sup> Nature is the phenomenal. It is comprised of basic elements known as the three *gunas* – *tamas*, *rajas*, and *sattva*. The three are never in balance hence the phenomenal world is in constant flux in which things are tied in a chain of causality. The Seer, however, is of an entirely different ilk. It is beyond Nature, which means it is unconditioned, eternal, and never changing.

The most important thing to understand here is our own makings in this setting. A human being comprises of both Nature and the Seer. Supposedly, this would align well with Plato's or Descartes's body/mind dualism, yet that is where yoga offers a substantially different position. Thoughts, sensations, emotions, and feelings that are associated conventionally with the mind and the body all belong to Nature. They are all objects that can be observed and essentially are no different from the desktop or the paper at which you are looking. They are *not* our True identity, that is, "...the transcendental Self, Spirit, or pure Awareness, as opposed to the finite personality" (Feuerstein 2001, p. 458). The 'finite personality' that we experience normally in our day-to-day life is nothing but Nature, which has absolutely nothing to do with the Seer/Self. In fact, the aim of yoga is this very realization.

## The Human Condition and Its Problem

The 'educational' problem here is mistaking the phenomenal with the Real, a concern that is clearly shared by Patanjali and Socrates. The affinities, however, are deeper for in both cases the educational path is grounded in the fact that wrong

<sup>4</sup>It is however important to note Whicher (1998) as a critic of such position.

<sup>5</sup>The translations of *prakriti/purusha* vary (Feuerstein 2001; Iyengar 1993)

epistemology-ontology cannot but result in unethical action in the world. In this sense, both Patanjali and Socrates were concerned with correcting our misperception so that moral living will flow from the knowing of Truth. However, given the different views on the kind of dualism involved here, the error is conceptualized differently, and the 'educative' path differs.

According to yoga, the layperson travels in the world with the sense that he or she is seeing reality as such (as the prisoners in the cave) yet in effect he or she is looking through a Nature-mind through which all one can see is a Nature phenomenal reality. The mind is trapped in a hall of mirrors that it takes to be Real. Every sense perception seen *out there* invokes a movement *in here* that is owned by a Nature mind that conceives of this experience as 'my' experience. Prosaically put, if, for example, someone insults or flatters you, you perceive it based on your Nature-mind, and understand their words as referring to your 'real' identity. You then feel the insult and react, or feel the palpitation and rash resulting from that person's flattery, and you react to that. You would think of this as reality as such, yet classical yoga states that it is all simply a phenomenal world governed by causality and change – an endless drama of constant emotional turmoil with no way out.

The problem then, very much like in Buddhism, is human suffering and how it can be overcome. Overcoming suffering in yoga's case will result from disengaging from a false identification with Nature and dwelling in the Seer. This is the gateway to perceiving the Real, which is nothing like this drama that is created by the interplay of a mind that is part of the world of appearances. What we see here then is a clear affinity between Patanjali's yoga and the educative path of the cave allegory as we understand both to be concerned with a shift from identifying with the phenomenal, changing, and tangible world to that of the eternal, unchanging, and intangible world. At least conceptually speaking the Real that Patanjali speaks of would seem to resemble the eternal and unchanging world of forms that are outside the Platonic cave. However, this is where the affinity ends as we show by examining the educational path of yoga.

### The Educational Yogic Path

In contrast to Plato's allegory, Patanjali would by no means count on philosophizing as an educative path toward escaping the cave. This can be clearly shown by turning to the yogasutra itself. 'Yoga', Patanjali (2001) tells us in sutra I.2, 'is the restriction of the fluctuation of consciousness',<sup>6</sup> and in I.3 'then the Seer abides in its essential form'. What are these 'fluctuations of consciousness'? Patanjali elaborates in sutras I.5-11 (p. 218): they include sense impressions, thoughts, ideation, cognition, memory, psychic activity – pretty much all mental activity with which a mortal human being would be familiar (Feuerstein 2001; Raveh 2012). Strangely, even 'right knowledge' is included here. Patanjali lists it alongside: error, metaphor, deep sleep, and memory. Our highest reasoning and logical argumentation – essentially the

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<sup>6</sup>We use Feuerstein's translation. See Patanjali (2001).

activity and results of *philosophizing* as we tend to understand it – are still considered by Classical yoga's ontology to be 'fluctuations of consciousness' that belong to Nature. While yoga will clearly distinguish between 'higher' ideation that is the result of *buddhi* (roughly equivalent to Plato's Reason) and a lower mind (*manas*) based on which we engage with the world reflecting our desirous nature, both will remain Nature's manifestations (Feuerstein 2001 p. 240; Iyengar 1993, p. 35). As such, they are a hindrance to the realization that the yogi seeks. In other words, the escape from the Platonic cave, mythical as it already is, is nothing even remotely close to our highest imagination. The highest realization and ultimate goal of yoga is to stop all mental activity including the most philosophically rigorous (Raveh 2012, p. 26). Only by the stopping of such internal motion can the unchanging Absolute truth be revealed, as the Seer is not moved by Nature. The state of such realization is *kaivalya* – 'aloneness' that Muller (1899, p. 309) viewed as *separation* between Seer and seen. While the Sanskrit word for yoga is derived from the verb *yug* translated as *integration*, what the yogi is in fact after, is a separation from Nature, and a full identification with the Seer – an utter content-less awareness.

What we see here is a complete mistrust of conceptualization and language. It is clear then that some other means must be proposed for our liberation. Indeed, the yogic postures with which many may be familiar emerge as one alternative vehicle for such a path. Yet this familiar aspect of the yogic path is, in fact, only *one* limb (*anga*) out of eight that constitute the yogic path (*ashtanga yoga*) that are elaborated in *yogastura* II.29 (Patanjali 2001, p. 224) and include moral precepts, practices of purification, postures (*asanas*), breath exercises (*pranayama*), disengagement of the senses, and three phases of growing concentration within meditation. With the exception of the moral precepts that are associated with the yogi's moral conduct with his own self and with others, these practices constitute an austere regime that the yogi practices on his own or with a Guru. In a most paradoxical twist, at least traditionally, liberation awaits the yogi *not* by climbing outside the cave but rather by deliberately entering the (Himalayan) cave and working directly with the mind that again, like in Buddhism, seems to be responsible for the creation of the cave of misperception.<sup>7</sup>

Patanjali's *yogasutra* points to the uncanny not only in its trajectory of a mystical experience but also in its third part (2001, pp. 226–230) that discusses magical spiritual powers (*siddhis*) that the yogi will gain through practice. Nevertheless, contemporary yoga practice is a pervasive phenomenon and its growing applications in schools as well as the scientific research of this domain are becoming noticeable.<sup>8</sup> We believe that this, like the growing pervasiveness of mindfulness practice, along with concerns of over-commercialization and the transposing of a practice

<sup>7</sup>I acknowledge Daniel Raveh for this idea that he suggested in a personal correspondence.

<sup>8</sup>In this context, it should be noted that the interpretation offered here follows more of a mythical orientation, which highlights the yogi as *retreating* from the world. However, contemporary interpretations have opposed this orientation, stressing the yogi as a socially engaged being, highlighting the moral precepts as well as postural yoga as *socially* oriented ethics (Iyengar 1993; Whicher 1998).

from its origins warrant a serious engagement for philosophers of education. It is specifically here, and perhaps in Daoism that appears next, that we find a fruitful direction for such engagement in exploring what has become the ‘trademark’ of contemporary yoga practice – postures and their educative role.<sup>9</sup> Contemporary yoga authorities in this domain elaborate how the body can be viewed as a vehicle for education in ethics based on postural practice grounded in yoga texts (Iyengar 2005). This orientation combined with contemporary accounts of the body (Shusterman 2008) appears to provide a substantial path toward the further analysis of educational theory and practice as some have begun to demonstrate (Helberg et al. 2009; Martin and Ergas 2016).

### ***Daoism: Following the Way Out of the Cave***

Daoism presents a particular challenge to the approach taken in this chapter. Unlike Buddhism and Yoga which allow for relatively systematic discussions and can to some extent be rendered in educational terms while also being read with and against the cave allegory, Daoism resists such systematization. Of all four traditions discussed here, it is perhaps the most distant from Plato’s cave and hence from the world of a ‘Western’ reader. We will nevertheless attempt to provide some kind of a coherent picture, within a worldview that thrives on paradox.

#### **The Human Condition**

The human condition for Daoism is simply one of unity with the Dao, the ‘way’ of nature. The Dao, way, or path could be understood as a way out of the cave into the light of real understanding. The Daoist sage would then be the wise figure who assists the student in finding the way out the cave, of distinguishing truth from error, with truth being understood as following the way, and error being a willful departure from it. However, this dualistic interpretation which suggests a division between the real and the illusory (or right and wrong paths) is somewhat foreign to the Daoist way. This is partly because the Dao refers not just to the way or path but also to the ultimate source of all. It is the source of both the darkness and the light, the yin and yang as classical Chinese cosmology sees it. In a certain sense, Dao contains all, and departure from it is illusory. So, if departure from the true way is illusory then the dualism between appearances and realities in Plato’s allegory is also, in a sense, insubstantial. The achievement of Dao is, paradoxically, through nonachievement or nonaction, through simplicity, spontaneity, and unity with the Dao. This unity resists ideas of becoming, growing, or developing, images that education often assumes.

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<sup>9</sup>Of the 196 versus of Patanjali’s yogasutra, only two focus on this aspect. This is hence a development of later texts.

To come to a clear conceptual grasp of all of this might be to miss the point since, as the first line of Daoism's central text, the *Daodejing* states, "The Tao that can be told is not the eternal Tao."<sup>10</sup>

### The Way of Learning

It is common to contrast Daoism's lack of explicit moral precepts with the Confucian emphasis on virtue, ritual, and social order. However, this might be a rather too philosophical interpretation to Daoism. Some have argued that morality plays a more important role within Daoism than typical readings of the *Daodejing* would suggest (Palmer 1991, p. 11). Other texts, such as the *T'ai Shang Kan Ying P'ien* (The Writings of the Exalted One on Response and Retribution), extol the Daoist to the right path and speak of the dangers of proceeding on an evil path. But on the whole, Daoism seems to be more concerned to deconstruct the idea of ethical systems implicit within philosophical paths and images of Platonic ascent. So, although Dao can be seen as playing a role similar to *eudaimonia* (human flourishing) in ancient Greek thinking (Yu 2007) – as a regulative ideal – it can also be read as primarily descriptive, not requiring conformity to a particular path or set of virtues, indicating that the path is inscribed in the activities of the world (both human and nonhuman). Particularly, within the writings of Lao Tzu and Chuang Tzu, we find a nondualist recognition that, just as water flows downwards, so all of nature, including human beings, follow the rhythms of the Dao.

The idea that the ethical way is a natural expression of the Dao might seem to negate the need for becoming, or indeed for learning. In one sense, attending to the Dao is the principle mode of learning, even though sages can assist with the sensitivity and attention required for that learning. Ignorance, from the Daoist perspective, is more of a resistance or insensitivity to the Dao. But in fact, Daoists engage in a more subversive and playful logic in order to break open common ideas about progress, development, knowledge, and learning. Our expectations are challenged in order to reveal the rationalist framings that encumber human thought and action. Thus ideas of progress and advancement (through learning or otherwise) have always struck a discordant note within Daoism. In contrast to Confucian ideas where learning is more an acquisitive and positive process, Daoist learning entails an emptying or even 'unlearning', an idea that resonates with Socrates practices of *aporia*. As Chap. 48 of the *Daodejing* states,

In the pursuit of learning, every day something is acquired.  
In the pursuit of Tao, every day something is dropped.

Less and less is done.  
Until non-action is achieved.  
When nothing is done, nothing is left undone.

The world is ruled by letting things take their course.  
It cannot be ruled by interfering.

<sup>10</sup>The Feng and English translation is used here. See Lao Tzu (2011).



This image of emptying, or doing nothing, is reminiscent of Socratic ignorance, which could be interpreted as liberation from a kind of false image of a self who is able to acquire knowledge. Learning is not a process of accumulation because the Dao resists reification into representational or conceptual knowledge. The practice that Daoism advocates is known as *wu-wei*, nonaction. This is not simply passivity, but rather letting Dao regulate activity. Thus, the emptiness of *wu-wei* entails harmony with the Dao. This realization of learning seems to anticipate concerns about the dependencies and deficits implied in ideas about learning and teaching. The acquisition of knowledge through a planned educational process is an impediment to the Dao and so the image of ascent out of the cave toward a particular conception of knowing could be misleading. Daoist knowledge (*zhi*) is more akin to mastering, a mastering that – in typical Daoist rhetoric – must be achieved without mastering. This means that the world is not an object to be mastered by a knowledgeable subject, but that mastery is achieved through letting the Dao into itself through nonaction (Moeller 2004, 112). Practicing *wu wei*, the Daoist submits to the Dao, thereby achieving mastery without mastery. Becoming less, Daoist learning is as much unlearning.

### Daoism as Nondual

Within the unity of the Dao, there are tensions and changes, expressed in the cyclical movement of the Yin/Yang which, although perceived as an irreconcilable duality (i.e., a world of appearances), appears ultimately as complementary and interdependent: hence ontologically nondual. Consequently, although it is possible not to be aligned with the flow of the Dao, ethical concepts such as failure, wrongdoing, or lack of resolution seem out of place. No wonder, then, that Daoism, like Confucianism, is sometimes said to be quietist or fatalist in orientation. Since it emphasizes a kind of naturalism, Daoism has an intrinsic suspicion of human rationality which reflects the performative conception of language it assumes. Feng Youlan, of the ‘New Daoist’ school, claims a trans-rationality for Daoism (rather than irrational or a-rational) aligning mystical ideas of negativity that transcend the categories of conceptual reasoning (and has therefore been compared with Wittgenstein and Heidegger) (Moeller 2004, 22–24). More than anything, overthinking marks humanity’s separation from nature, a separation that paradoxically is insubstantial, even unreal. Learning to live with and *as* nature is, then, centrally Daoist, a learning to become nothing. But the nondualist tension with dualism recurs since, in a sense, we can do no other than be who we are. Human action, whether gentle or violent, rational or trans-rational, expresses itself as part of the Dao. If Plato’s image of the ascent out of the cave to become fully human is interpreted as a progressive ascent from ignorance to knowledge, it seems at odds with the nondual acknowledgement that everything is already part of the Dao. Conventional readings of the allegory presuppose the very idea of separation that Daoists would not recognize. By contrast, then, for Daoists the cave might be seen as a suitable dwelling place. This might accord well with other philosophies of education that resist a developmental or progressive view of childhood, as the

preparation for adulthood, where childhood and adulthood are simply phases of a flow, rather than hierarchically organized. Still, Daoism calls for a sensitivity to the world and the rhythms that guide it.

Although Daoism tends to avoid extremism, legends of ingesting precious substances, such as jade, cinnabar, and gold, in the pursuit of longevity might seem at odds with the naturalism of the Dao. Within the history of Daoism, the Daoist quest for immortality has sometimes been understood as a more literal pursuit than Buddhist liberation or Hindu Moksha, revealing the apparently inescapable need to define human existence in terms of a lack. Here Plato's ascent imagery is more clearly relevant, where immortality is the unchanging world. The Dao can be followed through meditative and physical practices, which are often intermixed. The traditional lineages of Daoist practitioners suggest an important aspect of Eastern pedagogy not much discussed: the relative importance of oral and direct transmission in contrast to the reliance of the written word in the West. Space prevents fuller discussion here of that vital aspect of Eastern pedagogy, though drawing attention to the efforts of the Chinese Cultural Revolution (1966–1976) to destroy that history by cutting that direct link to the lineages of great Daoist masters should encourage us to pay attention to the important recovery of Daoism (and even more of Confucianism) within China today. Across the world, the Daoist traditions and pedagogies are conveyed through the practices of Tai Chi Chuan, Chi Gung, and other related practices, many of which seem to fuse the development of *wu wei* with practices of longevity. The challenge for the future may be to ensure the popularized 'new age' or 'perennialist' Western appropriations of Daoist ideas which tend to reduce Daoism to universal system of self-help and cultivation are able to reconnect with the more established and ancient traditions. Daoist ideas around cultivation of virtue should be given more attention by educationalists (Culham 2015).

## ***Confucius: The Superior Path from the Cave***

### **The Human Condition**

Taking pleasure in learning is a principle assumption of Confucius' most well-known text, the Analects (Confucius 1893, 1: 1). It seems to be a natural aspect of human nature to take pleasure in the cultivation of the self by being respectful to others, particularly elders (Confucius 1893, 14: 42). This is one reason why Confucianism is often characterized as hierarchical and authoritarian, entailing the attenuation of critical thinking in favor of deference. Education might then be less as an emergence from the cave than being contained by it or even dragged into it. Following the 1978 reforms in China, Western educators are reported to have found Chinese teaching and learning practices that "contrasted markedly with current Western practice, though not necessarily with much earlier Western practice. These included teacher-centered whole class teaching, very large classes, apparent passivity on the part of learners with low levels of active learner participation, and much

use of teacher-led chanting, rote-learning and mimetic methods” (Starr 2012, 4). Images of mass education anywhere in the world lend Plato’s allegory a figurative realism that is striking. However, recent changes in Chinese social, cultural, and economic circumstances suggest these characterizations to be at best outdated, though more likely neo-colonial impositions and misrepresentations. Several scholars of Chinese thought and Confucianism have recently argued that these perceptions distort our understanding of both ancient and modern pedagogical approaches in China and that Confucian thought is not by any means antithetical to critical inquiry (Tan 2013; Kim 2003; Starr 2012). It is no surprise, then, that scholars have found similarities between the political and social interests of philosophers such as Dewey and Plato to resonate with Confucian theory, encouraging a revision and revival of interest in it (Sim 2009; Tan 2016).

The similarities between Confucius (551 to 479 BCE) and Socrates (470 to 399 BCE) are particularly notable. Both lived at similar times and despite neither writing anything down, they had enormous influence on Eastern and Western philosophical traditions, respectively. Understanding the need for rights to balance with social obligations is a common theme between Plato and Confucius (Dionisio 2014, 42). For Confucius, it is for the purpose of service to the state, in harmony with the individual, that education primarily exists. This order is expressed both through the harmony of the cosmos and those within it, again suggesting a correlation between the concerns of ancient Greek and Chinese philosophers (Wolf 1999).

### Confucian Education

The primary educational goal of Confucian education and central to the general philosophy is the development of *Junzi*, which has been translated as ‘gentlemen’, ‘superior person’, or the ethically well-cultivated person. Clearly, the image of escape from Plato’s cave can be associated with realization of *Junzi* which can be regarded as the goal of Confucian life. In the Han Dynasty (206 BCE to 220 CE), five principles of virtue were established on the basis of Confucian thought which have been influential: humaneness or benevolence (*ren*), righteousness or justice (*yi*), wisdom or knowledge (*zhi*), integrity or honesty (*Xin*), and ceremony or proper rite (*li*). This list might not look so out of place in an Aristotelian context. But a central component of virtue that will seem rather foreign to modern readers is that of ‘proper rite’, *li*. Approaching the world with appropriate sensitivity to rite, ceremony, or propriety might seem related to convention or custom rather than a question of morality, since “it is by the Rules of Propriety that the character is established” (Analects 8: 8). One explanation for this concern for rite could be the expectation that education should primarily serve to develop an elite rank of officials and civil servants in order to administer a large and enduring empire, a concern that correlates with Plato’s description of the guardian class in *The Republic*. It could be argued that Confucius’ concern for rite performs a social and civil function making administration in those circumstances more effective. But to regard rite as only a historical contingency would miss the deeper links between humanism, harmony,

and hierarchy which define the core of Confucian thought (Starr 2012, 8). There is ongoing debate about whether rite (*li*) stands in an instrumental relation to the core virtue of humaneness (*Ren*) (Li 2007), but even if *Ren* is the principle virtue, the order and respect of *li* is not incidental. Performance of rites with the appropriate level of respect is suggestive of a virtue in and of itself. In relation to this propriety, traditional Chinese culture regards the elders, parents, or rulers with particular deference, strikingly illustrated by the concept of teaching itself.

The Chinese character 教 *jiao*, which means to teach, is composed of 孝 *xiao* ‘filial piety’ plus the causative element 文. In other words, to teach can be literally understood as being ‘to cause someone to be filially pious’ (Starr 2012, 8). Thus, *Junzi* requires a virtue that Western educational theorists tend to avoid: filial piety. Little wonder, then, that Chinese education systems are sometimes characterized as less concerned with critical thinking and as lacking in egalitarian principles. While there are examples of educated women in Confucian history, for example, Ban Zhao (45–115 CE) (Berthrong and Berthrong 2000, 70), in general the conceptions of authority, piety, and deference appear to have encouraged traditional roles for men and women within a larger social hierarchy (Galtung and Stenslie 2014, chapter 37). Of course these issues are not unique to Confucianism. It is also worth keeping in mind that filial piety extends to the state as a whole, which in this context seems to include everything that is beneath heaven. In other words, the virtues of the family are also virtues of the state and of the cosmos itself.

Considering again Plato’s cave, this account of Confucian moral education may strike one as remaining in the cave rather than stepping into the light of truth. But, of course, this very much depends upon one’s conception of the allegory. The development of *Junzi* through *Li*, *Ren*, and the other virtues can certainly be framed in terms of the ascent of the individual out of the cave, and despite the misgivings about the patriarchy and deference play a role in establishing the proper ordering of things such that truth can prevail. While Confucians may be less concerned with metaphysical and ontological questions of truth vs. appearance, the ethical and spiritual ordering of the cosmos through the development of virtues can at least suggest some important connections between a Confucian and a Platonic cosmology.

### Part 3

#### *Toward an ‘Eastern’ Philosophy of Education?*

Reading with and against Plato to examine Eastern philosophy of education has revealed certain interesting tensions between: knowledge and ignorance; subjective and objective; nature and culture; dualism and nondualism. Put simply, we have explored whether the cave is suggestive of a state of illusion or ignorance and whether what is at stake is both epistemological and ontological. One wonders

whether analytical distinctions between knowing and being can be upheld or whether the compression into nondualism makes the distinction untenable.

To be human is to know. The prisoners cannot resist knowing, but their knowledge is of shadows framed by unknowing or ignorance. To understand our own ignorance is an important insight that cuts across Plato and these four traditions. Differences between the cave allegory and the diverse traditions are in many cases reflected in the substantiality of knower and its/his/her conceptualization.

Knowing is being, an idea that is most evident in questions around understanding the good life. Knowledge of virtue can only be practiced, having little or no substantial reality in a purely intellectual realm. In this sense, we detect a less intellectualist approach within the traditions reviewed in comparison to Plato. That is, most notably in Daoism and in Buddhism as well, there is a preference for the one who acts virtuously even if he or she would not be able to justify their virtue based on philosophical argumentation. This clearly points to a perspective that is characteristic of these traditions that are more suspicious as to the relation between language and world (a theme that had taken center stage only in later developments in Western philosophy). This is most famously captured in Eastern aphorisms such as: ‘When the wise man points at the Moon, the idiot looks at the finger’ as well as ‘Those who know do not speak’.

It is thus clear that an educational path that follows in the footsteps of these traditions will rely on a curricular-pedagogical approach that addresses the human mind based on means that are other than conceptualization and in fact attempt to ameliorate, reduce, or even stop this tendency at least for certain periods of time. Meditation, yogic postures, tai chi, compassion meditation, and other contemplative practices, engaged in solitude or in communion, can be viewed as pedagogies that follow this orientation. They seek to detach the practitioner from identifying necessarily with a reason-based substantial knower characteristic of Plato-Descartes-Kant and appeal to a body-heart-mind as an insubstantial process of knowing. They bring into view the possibility of direct pedagogy, sometimes wordless, sometimes unwritten, and often at the fringes of language. Although twentieth century phenomenology draws us somewhat closer to this kind of engagement with philosophy of education (Lewin 2015), nevertheless a leap may still remain as those working from the position of Eastern traditions are required to mobilize the uncanniness of a post or pre-discursive meditative experience to the world of philosophical argumentation.

Overall, we find that the four traditions reviewed very briefly in this chapter open an incredibly rich and nuanced terrain for the future of philosophy of education. This applies to the analysis of the curricular-pedagogical approaches that are proposed by them as well as to the substantially different premises from which these traditions engage in the understanding of human existence and its aims. The current contemplative turn in education and the emergence of a ‘post-secular age’ may be signs that this orientation will prove both fruitful and necessary for the further development of the field (Ergas 2017; Lewin 2016).

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# What Is Indigenous Philosophy and What Are Its Implications for Education



Lesley Le Grange and Carl Mika

## Introduction

Indigenous philosophy might be viewed as a collective term for the philosophies of the indigenous peoples of the world – peoples who have and continue to experience a oneness with places they inhabit (or that inhabits them) over the long term. The strong connection to local places suggests distinctive philosophies of disparate indigenous communities. An indigenous metaphysics comprises three interlocking cosmic registers: the physical world, the human world and the sacred world. For indigenous peoples, the physical world is the land and they believe that they are constituents of the land – the land is not something that is possessed or exploited for economic gain. The human world concerns peoples' relations with one another, the enactment of ceremonies, ways of living and the ability to change. The spiritual is not only metaphysical because it is the foundation of both spiritual and physical well-being of all of life – wisdom of this is shared through oral tradition by elders. The three interlocking worlds are dynamic and fluid and as a consequence indigenous cultures are not stable or fixed, although they are anchored. The interlocking worlds are localised, relying on the distinctiveness of peoples' own histories and landscapes. Moreover, flowing from this ontology is a particular view of knowledge – knowledge is living, active and dynamic and can therefore not be owned, possessed or controlled. Knowledge is intimately embedded in how we relate to one another and the more-than-human-world. The first sense in which the term indigenous philosophy might be used is as a signifier for the distinctive philosophies of local indigenous communities.

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When the term Indigenous<sup>1</sup> is invoked, it holds the danger of homogenising the values, beliefs and worldviews of local indigenous communities, thereby eroding the distinctiveness of local philosophies. However, contemporary Indigenous scholars have argued that indigenous peoples across the world share common beliefs and experiences of colonisation, which could be harnessed so as to internationalise Indigenous philosophy/knowledge. As Wilson (2008: 15) writes:

The first peoples of the world have gained greater understanding of the similarities that we share. Terms such as Indian, Metis, Aborigine or Torres Strait Islander do nothing to reflect either the distinctiveness of our cultures or the commonalities of our underlying worldviews. Indigenous is inclusive of all first peoples unique in our own cultures but common in our experiences of colonialism and our understanding of the world. When using the term Indigenous research, I am referring specifically to research done by or for Indigenous peoples.

The second sense of Indigenous philosophy therefore concerns doing philosophy from the standpoint of all colonised peoples of the world and has a decolonising agenda aimed at decentring (not destroying) Western philosophy by giving legitimacy to Indigenous philosophy in the academy. In line with this understanding when we as authors write about Indigenous philosophy we are not separated from the values or ethics that take place when conducting this Indigenous philosophical research. Within the Indigenous research paradigm, axiology (ethics) is relational. Chilisa (2012) avers that a relational axiology is based on the 4Rs: relational accountability, respectful representation, reciprocal appropriation, and rights and regulation during the research process. Relational accountability concerns the fact that all parts of the research process is connected and that the research is accountable to all relations. Respectful representation relates to how researchers listen to, acknowledge and create space for the voices and knowledges of Indigenous peoples. Research appropriation relates to ensuring that the benefits of research accrue to both the communities that are researched and the researchers. Rights and regulation refers to observing ethical protocols that accord ownership of the research process to Indigenous peoples of the world. Therefore, we aim to consider the role of indigenous thought in education from the standpoint of the values mentioned and by reiterating the ontology of interconnection that lies at the heart of most indigenous beliefs, and we simultaneously emphasise the reciprocity and animacy of the non-human world that cannot help but impinge on thought and writing.

In this chapter, Indigenous philosophy will be explored in detail with a particular emphasis on its implications for how knowledge is viewed. Such an exploration promises to illuminate how education is viewed and practised by indigenous communities, but also has implications for how education might be rethought and practised in a contemporary world. The latter is important because even though

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<sup>1</sup>We use indigenous (with a small 'I') to refer the local communities that are connected to particular places for many years including how their cultural beliefs and knowledges are embedded in the places they inhabit or that inhabits them. Indigenous (with a capital 'I') refers to the internationalization of the term, and it is invoked to depict the common experiences of colonialism shared by indigenous peoples across the world.

Indigenous knowledge concerns ways of knowing that existed prior to colonialism, it has re-emerged in contemporary times because of a growing awareness of the marginalisation of subordinated peoples' knowledges in an era of globalisation. In this chapter, we discuss problems created by language when terms such as Indigenous is invoked, we discuss two senses in which term Indigenous philosophy might be used and provide some concluding thoughts.

## Problems with Terminology

There are both benefits and drawbacks to be had from the notion and expression of 'Indigenous worldview' or 'Indigenous philosophy'. 'Indigenous philosophy' is undoubtedly a shorthand signifier that can threaten to ride too seamlessly over the local thinking and knowledge that it aims to protect. When we are using the term, then, we need to keep in mind how it can unwittingly play into homogenising discourses. In a most fundamental sense, the term 'indigenous' alone can be apprehended as a particularly non-indigenous one (Battiste and Henderson 2000; Corntassel 2003); it may reflect a Western<sup>2</sup> tendency to try and organise what are diverse conceptual frameworks into one schema, so that thereafter they can all be referred to rather too economically. In opposition to the term, knowledge, thought and experience are so thoroughly grounded in the specific location that they cannot be generalised (Battiste and Henderson 2000). Moreover, such labels can render identity itself static, not simply by referring identity to set criteria (Corntassel 2003) but, in a more spiritual way, by setting the people and entities behind the term up so that they are easily referred *to*, rather than forming part of their original local territories. In other words, indigenous peoples are conceptualised through the use of the term; and therefore they may no longer retain a lived experience with their own terrain.

However, there are both strategic and real reasons for adopting the 'Indigenous' discourse when theorising around a common philosophy. There are specific differences from the West as to how indigenous peoples view the world such as the belief that things are interconnected and one (Mahmoudi et al. 2012; Calderon 2008) – a univocity. There are, of course, variations on that common utterance; some writers prefer a conceptual demarcation between objects while noting that they are connected (Callicott 1997; Durie 1994), and others will express entities as if they are thoroughly collapsed (that is, one). The consequences of the latter are huge and diverge greatly from the Cartesian view of the world (Ermine 1995). In indigenous thought, the main disciplines of health, law and education are reliant on the oneness of the world. In Aotearoa (New Zealand), for instance, the *whare tapa wha* (house of four walls) (Durie 1994) emphasises that one's well-being depends

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<sup>2</sup>When we use the term Western, we refer to the Eurocentrism entrenched in much of Western philosophy. We acknowledge that Western philosophy is not monolithic and that there are points of resonance that some of Western philosophy, e.g. poststructuralism, new materialism and speculative realism might have with Indigenous philosophy.

on the balance between spiritual, psychological, familial and physical components of existence. In fact, these elements are not separate in themselves, but constitute each other so that the distinction between them is somewhat artificial, although the division is useful when defining indigenous concepts within Western contexts. For Maori, the issue of health is rather more complex than the depiction of a house allows; more generally, attempting to describe indigenous existence in all its complexity is curtailed by the strictures of rationalism, whereby indigenous statements about holism are made to conform to various colonising discourses that silently underpin text. With this in mind, the Indigenous philosopher is forever trying to overcome not just the outward idea of colonisation but also the colonising mode of representation available to him/her.

Despite these limitations imposed by both text and by the fragmenting idea that the indigenous writer decides to take to task, what seems to remain important for indigenous peoples is that, regardless of the way interconnection is expressed, there is indeed an interconnected world that needs to be acknowledged as such. Thus, Indigenous philosophy is particularly useful when it is used to address its antithesis – fragmented thinking and conceptualising – and it takes on a political as much as a theoretical hue. As Arola (2011) points out (but in specific relation to American Indian philosophy), a regard for the ethics and politics of any idea of the ontological prior is called for with Indigenous philosophy, so that it does not simply comprise an abstract study. Moreover, Indigenous philosophy, in its resistance to colonisation, can be drawn upon to develop what may be thought of as ‘counter-colonial’ philosophies. These speculative propositions are embryonic and keep colonising discourses within their sights whilst proposing that the writer incorporate something more positive that originates directly from the writer’s cultural origins. This type of thinking accords with Kincheloe’s (2011) ‘critical ontology’, with an emphasis on each indigenous group drawing on the consequences of the common utterance of interconnectedness to ultimately explain resistance and the more positive aspects of worldview from their own vantage point.

Very little has been written about Indigenous philosophy in terms of its relationship to its Western counterpart. The emphasis of the former on metaphysics, one suspects, would incur some critique from more orthodox Western philosophy. Here, we meet one of the main points of difference between the two, both substantively and discursively. Indigenous philosophy does not distinguish between the idea of something and the thing itself (Mika 2015); thus, the entities that comprise the creation stories of various groups are at once both ential and able to be represented. They are present whilst being conceptualised and discussed. In the dominant Western canon, though, we are delivered the very strong message that metaphysics is solely a discipline of study. Adorno (2001) makes his view very clear, for instance, that primordial entities do not in themselves constitute metaphysics; Cassirer (1953) and Bakhtin (1981) urged distance from the things themselves; and Kant is well known for shunning metaphysical speculation (Fuchs 1976). In general (although not exhaustively by any means), Western philosophy has been premised on the

insertion of a unit of representation between the self and the thing being discussed, so that it can be discussed objectively. Immediately, Indigenous philosophy must deal with this most fundamental Western demarcation between the entity itself and that entity's presentation if it is to claim to be 'philosophy'. Due to indigenous peoples' unwillingness to make this distinction, Indigenous philosophy is not considered to be 'philosophy' in many universities. With Western philosophy's disdain for Indigenous worldview in mind, Garfield and Norden (2016) proposed that philosophy departments in universities be more honest about their position and should call themselves 'Western' philosophy departments. These authors suggest that other groups have as much right to term their worldview 'philosophy' as the West does; rather than forming part of a Culture Studies theme, the Indigenous worldview is capable of being theorised (whilst simultaneously being real) to the same degree that Western philosophy is.

Not only must indigenous peoples deal with the term 'indigenous', then, but it would seem that 'philosophy' is also contentious. This inconvenience that language ends up posing is not a new one for indigenous peoples, who have also had to consider whether their law is in fact 'law', or whether what they enact in their teaching and learning amounts to 'education'. It is a difficulty that is compounded by the Indigenous proposition that the world is indeed interconnected, because the silos and disciplines that Western thought holds dear are not so commensurate with indigenous thought (see for instance Pere (1982)). Indigenous thought is less wedded to indicating where one practice begins and ends – philosophy is immediately law and education, education is immediately law and philosophy and so on. A possible colonising practice occurs in attempting to indicate the commencement and conclusion of a discipline. In the context of this chapter, then, 'philosophy' by its very nature as a label separates one phenomenon out from all others, and it may therefore be problematic for indigenous thought. On the other hand, 'philosophy' as a way of describing the pursuit of wisdom may be quite convivial with indigenous groups, who would then insist that such wisdom is given by the world to which one is forever connected. In its etymology, 'philosophy' resonates well with the collapse of the entity and its presentation that could be at the base of much indigenous thinking. It is the task of indigenous peoples, then, to claim the term 'philosophy' with their own critique at hand and on their own terms. A similar response to the notion and practice of 'research', incidentally, has been suggested by various writers (see Smith 2005; Pihama 2001; Ermine et al. 2004); however, there may be other issues at stake with language, and the tendencies it opens up, that need to be addressed by each discrete indigenous group. In a Maori context, for instance, it is possible that a Western term has already accrued to it so much historical matter and expectation that it is not usable by indigenous writers. This complex issue is beyond the scope of this chapter, but it suggests the need for indigenous groups to consider their own philosophies of language and the relationship of language to the world and its objects, away from the conventional view that language is simply a means of conveying a Platonic idea.

## Two Senses of the Term Indigenous Philosophy (of Education)

### *Indigenous Philosophy of Education and Philosophical Sagacity*

Once sense in which we might understand Indigenous philosophy of education is as a distinctive construct of each indigenous community. However, instead of discussing the philosophies of different indigenous communities we shall discuss more generally how philosophy is produced in such communities with specific attention to the wisdom of the elders.

As mentioned, the physical, human and sacred worlds are intertwined in Indigenous philosophy. Insights into the interconnectedness (the oneness) of these worlds have been provided by elders over many generations and passed on through oral tradition. These wisdoms shared by elders are regarded by some as philosophy in its own right, known as philosophic sagacity. One of the advocates of philosophic sagacity, Oruka, based the idea on research he conducted on Kenyan wise men and wise women. For Oruka (1990) philosophic sagacity is the “thoughts of wisemen and women in any given community and is a way of thinking and explaining the world that fluctuates between popular wisdom and didactic wisdom” (p. 28). He argues that “one way of looking for the traces of ... philosophy is to wear the uniform of anthropological field work and use the dialogical techniques to pass through the anthropological fogs to the philosophical ground” (p. xxi). Oruka views philosophic sagacity as distinct from ethno-philosophy, since sages do not simply transmit the thoughts of their communities, but rather critically evaluate what might be unquestioningly accepted by members of communities. One of the difficulties with philosophic sagacity is that one cannot easily distinguish the source of the field reports when the researcher is a trained (Western) philosopher – Are the field reports a record of the philosophic ideas of the sages or a reconstruction of them by a trained philosopher (as was the case with Oruka) after engagement with the ideas of the sages (Gratton 2003)? Bodunrin (1984) has sympathy with Oruka’s notion of philosophic sagacity, but argues that together with ethno-philosophy it comes perilously close to non-philosophy because it is based on the views of everyday people. The latter criticism is of course only valid if viewed from the perspective of Western philosophy. From the perspective of the Indigenous world, the wisdom of the elders is philosophy.

In line with the notion of philosophical sagacity, education for indigenous peoples involves the transmission of Indigenous knowledge, primarily through symbolic and oral traditions. Indigenous knowledge comprises complementary modes of knowing and caring about the sensory and spiritual realms, and it is this sensibility/spirituality that is the essence of Elders’ wisdom. According to Battiste (1986), this sensibility/spirituality is transmitted in the oral tradition from the spirits to the elders and from the elders to the youth. Indigenous languages play a crucial role in the transmission of indigenous knowledge. Battiste and Henderson (2000) aver that indigenous languages are not only the vital links to Indigenous knowledge, but are also descriptive of indigenous peoples’ relationship with their ecosystems. They

write: “Knowing as ecosystem is not a knowing derived from curiosity or the need to control, but rather a knowing derived from caring about other people and about the world” (p. 49). Importantly, when indigenous knowledge is transmitted it is not done in written form and is not distant as is the case with codified knowledge produced in Western education. Instead, the transmission of indigenous knowledge is intimate and oral. Battiste and Henderson (2000) point out that language for the Mi’kmaw,<sup>3</sup> for example, is not just a knowledge base, it is essential for the survival of the community. They argue that language reflects the Mi’kmaw philosophy of how we should live with one another, treat one another and how the world works and fits together. What distinguishes Mi’kmaw language from English, for example, is that it is a verb-based language and focuses on the processes, cycles and interrelationships of all things (Inglis 2002). In contrast, English is a noun-based language that identifies objects and concepts in terms of their use or their relationship to other things (Battiste and Henderson). In summary, the link between the wisdom of elders (philosophic sagacity) and education within indigenous communities is clear because education involves the intimate oral transmission of Indigenous knowledge to the youth by elders. Language is intimate to this transmission of Indigenous knowledge. In fact, education (transmission of Indigenous knowledge) and language acquisition is one process.

An additional kind of philosophy that may or may not draw on the wisemen and women appears to be more transcendent in nature. In other words, it infuses the wisdom of the elders with Western notions of philosophy. It is less well explored in the literature of Indigenous meta-philosophical analyses than its more ethno-philosophical counterpart. In indigenous thought, it veers towards a sort of necessary ‘harm’ because it involves withdrawing from the world in order to talk *about* it. Although this intellectual detachment might seem like an inevitable part of the academy – and, indeed, a necessary aspect of education – it carries with it certain risks because it asks the Indigenous student or researcher to tacitly disavow their ontological oneness with the world and instead to rise above the latter. It involves an idealism that sits uneasily with traditional indigenous thought. It is especially abstract and engages with the idea that things in the world can be made into concepts and studied from that perspective. It aligns nicely with dominant Western philosophy with one major exception: the Indigenous thinker in this scenario must determine how to situate him- or herself back within the conceptual matter at hand. Here, it is not just the indigenous ontological idea that is at stake; it is moreover the mode of *presentation* of the idea so that it once more assumes a vital link with the indigenous thinker. The Indigenous (philosopher) writer, for instance, may decide to counter coloniality by critically evaluating a colonising idea. However, the act of evaluating the idea might itself be colonising and not of the indigenous thinker’s world and therefore become a strongly Cartesian entity. The task of the indigenous thinker in this case is to remind him- or herself of their immediate and indivisible link to the idea even as they represent it through the stark mode of the mind.

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<sup>3</sup>Mi’kmaq is the last Eastern Algonquian language to be still spoken with any degree of functional use to the world (Inglis 2004).



The Indigenous idealism that characterises this form of philosophy is typical of education in general. Education in its dominant form is unethical both against and for the Indigenous student because it deliberately emphasises a quietly confident ascent above the fully worlded phenomena that should be considered. Instead, a more authentic education informed by an Indigenous philosophy hopefully aims to see the disappearance of the atomised subject – rather than subjectivity being individual, it is ecological. It would ethically signify a shift from the arrogant ‘I’ (of Western individualism) to the humble ‘I’ – to the ‘I’ that is embedded, embodied, extended and enacted. In the case of the Maori term for education, ‘Ako’, for instance, the human self is constituted by the ‘external’ world in which it is embedded. Thrupp and Mika (2012) aver that ‘Ako’ is therefore not just a process of teaching and learning through the human realm; but what teacher or learner does is to mediate that which originates prior to teacher or learner. Exactly how one implements this value, which would probably be conceived of as ‘supernatural’ in dominant Western thought, is uncertain. But even here, the Indigenous thinker is ethically required to consider him- or herself as part of the idea that governs such a transformative project. Thus, the ethical call extends to all nodes of thought, including metaphilosophy that might conventionally be conceived of as rarefied and not having any particularly concrete impact on the world.

Because knowledge itself is embodied, it is less cognitively derived, and education therefore plays a crucial role in either acknowledging or ignoring its animacy. Moreover, from an Indigenous philosophical stance, knowledge originates in the self-organisation of the world, and this additional dimension of knowledge would need to be respected as an ethical necessity in education. Questions around the relationship of knowledge to phenomena and the place of the self in attending to this intimate relationship could indeed be posed for the Indigenous student, who may gravitate more readily towards responding to them than to questions that are simply conceptual. That latter assumption that underpins dominant views of knowledge in education at present may be unethical to the extent that it is incomplete and colonising from an Indigenous worldview. From an indigenous perception, ‘education’ should hence become less self-conscious because it is itself one phenomenon of many interconnected phenomena. It may need different approaches that recognise its distinctiveness, but ultimately it calls for the Indigenous student or thinker to remain immersed within a holistic ontology.

### *Indigenous Philosophy as a Decolonising Project*

We have discussed the importance of the local/particular in relation to Indigenous philosophy, or the tie between indigenous thought and the places that indigenous peoples inhabit or that inhabit them. However, some indigenous scholars have argued for the internationalisation of the term Indigenous, that is, that Indigenous/colonised peoples should use the spaces that globalisation affords for sharing common experiences, beliefs and world views. Such scholars argue for inserting the

capital 'I' in the word Indigenous. Indigenous with a capital 'I' has reference to peoples who share common experiences of colonialism, and so it is a word that holds political implications. Scholars such as Wilson (2008) and Chilisa (2012) argue that the upshot of the internationalisation of Indigenous (with a 'capital I') is an Indigenous paradigm. This Indigenous paradigm is an emerging and evolving one based on commitments, worldviews, beliefs and values held in common by the world's colonised peoples.

The second sense in which Indigenous philosophy might be understood as an emerging alternative research paradigm to that of Western paradigms. This emerging Indigenous research paradigm captures the common beliefs, values and experiences of the world's colonised peoples and provides the impetus for the struggle to have these included in the academy. And so, we begin with a discussion on paradigms and what might be understood by an Indigenous research paradigm.

In general, paradigms are distinguished from one another based on different views of reality (ontology), different views of knowledge (epistemology), different values (axiology) and different views of how research should proceed (methodology). With this in mind, the Indigenous research paradigm is elaborated upon in terms of these constructs: ontology, epistemology and methodology. Axiology was discussed in the introduction of the chapter. Notice that these different constructs that are one in reality are merely separated conceptually to clarify what is meant by an emerging Indigenous paradigm. So, let us begin with a discussion on ontology. As mentioned, ontology concerns ideas or theories about reality. The ontology of Indigenous peoples of the world is a relational one, where everything in the cosmos is connected. In southern African, this idea of connectedness is captured in the Shona word *Ukama* which mean relatedness. Murove (2009) argues that ubuntu (humanness) is the concrete form of ukama (relatedness) in the sense that "human interrelationship within society is a microcosm of the relationality within the universe" (p. 316). Chilisa (2012) points out that when social reality is investigated by Indigenous researchers, the reality is understood in relation to the connections that humans have with the living and the non-living (the more-than-human-world). An Indigenous ontology is therefore based on a holistic worldview rather than an atomistic one. This discussion on ontology provides the platform for a detailed discussion on indigenous knowledge and its protection.

Knowledge is not so easily discussed without a return to that more fundamental metaphysics of interconnection, because it needs to be clarified alongside its origins. Cajete (2000) and Deloria (2001) both argue for a return to the basic tenets of holism when discussing knowledge; Deloria in particular suggests that a discussion around knowledge without its ontological premise can result in self-colonising ideas and argues that a type of mental and spiritual disorder can end up afflicting Native scientists if they ignore interconnection. Knowing how to do something is therefore often immediately thought of as embodying a connection with the thing being crafted or made. This direct relationship between the artefact and the creative self may be traced through genealogical links between the material being fashioned and the fashioner. Creating a piece of work requires the self to be aware of this link at all times, and there may be various ceremonies performed, or spiritual modes of

approach relating, to the gathering of the material; what is often scientifically thought of as inanimate stuff is acknowledged as living and retaining to itself its own way of working with the human artist or fashioner. The belief that the material in some way chooses and collaborates with the human diverges greatly from the dominant canon of knowledge for two main reasons: first, matter in Indigenous belief has agency and calls to the attention of the human self; and secondly and relatedly, it possesses its own life. The human creator has some degree of autonomy in relation to the outcome of the process, but the artefact is seen as allowing the fashioner to do some things and preventing him or her from doing others. It is hardly surprising that seemingly inert stuff is placed on an equal footing with the human it comes into contact with, given that Indigenous thought often does not privilege the human self in any particular act and that the 'stuff' is not inert after all.

The interconnection of the world's dimensions extends to those realms that are not immediately perceptible, and yet these realms are also part of the current, discernible world. The degree of that otherworldly reach can only be speculated on, but it is likely that knowledge itself is imbued with the 'supernatural'. Knowledge for indigenous peoples may then mean that the fashioner of an object has to refer to those worlds and pay homage to them, whilst carrying out his or her craft. Knowledge in this case is highly dependent on what the observer can perceive of an object *and* what remains beyond his or her grasp. Indigenous experience in this instance is perhaps less concerned with 'knowledge', and more with the manifestation of the object as a part of its environment. It would thus be the way the object displays itself to the human self that becomes most important. He or she would be guided by what the object opened up for perception and may even be guided by the intermeshing of all elements that relate to the object. Of course, speculation on that idea becomes complex when we reiterate that one object is completely constituted by the world in its entirety, and the fashioner of a new object or craft must then, at some point, simply allow the object to display itself in whatever way it sees fit.

The more rarefied, abstract knowledge that is often in Western philosophy is equally related to the holism of Indigenous metaphysics although the divisions of concrete and abstract are unhelpful in Indigenous philosophy but are sometimes invoked by different indigenous groups: in Maori thought, for instance, Marsden (1985) indicates that "abstract rational thought and empirical methods cannot grasp the concrete act of existing [for Māori] which is fragmentary, paradoxical and incomplete" (p. 163). Here, we brush up once more against the problem of language in attempting to present the full world through equating portions of it with colonising language. Marsden's supposition may best be understood in relation to the idea that 'abstract rational thought' is in fact immediately concrete and paradoxical, where the strict delineation between abstract/concrete and rational/paradoxical is irrelevant. As indigenous peoples are beset by colonising ideas about knowledge, however, it can be just as useful to briefly and strategically invoke these binaries as it is to use the terms 'Indigenous' and 'philosophy'. In a counter-colonial era, we can take from Marsden's assertion that it is not good practice to separate the abstract realm from the concrete when knowledge and existence is being described.

The representational problems that arise with terms and concepts for the indigenous philosopher stand alongside the tendency of Western knowledge to *substantively* oppose indigenous propositions about their own forms of knowledge. That is, dominant Western views of knowledge do not align with those of indigenous groups. Where Western knowledge aims to conceptually fragment elements (Calderon 2008; Deloria 2001) and to seek greater certainty about a component (and thus culminate in a fragmented form of knowledge), Indigenous knowledge mostly seeks to keep these elements together. Working with an object, then, is dependent on keeping the fashioner's idea of it as close to the object's display of itself. The carving of a piece of wood, for instance, brings together all of the object itself: the appearance of the object to the carver, and the idea of how the object should appear in the future (how it should be carved, in other words). While we as Indigenous writers can separate these phenomena, they are one; the object, its outcome, and its appearance are in fact inseparable. Thus, even when objects are not apparent – if an Indigenous writer is dealing in the world of ideas – objects are still present in some form or another, and they possess a connection with the realm of ideas and with their future presentation in a particular form (Mika and Tiakiwai 2016).

Of all aspects of experience, it is perhaps epistemology that is most widely traversed in discussions about Indigenous experience. But an Indigenous epistemology, as we have seen, is related to its ontology. An Indigenous epistemology is a relational one in the sense that knowledge is not an individual pursuit and is never owned by an individual. As Wilson (2008) writes:

An indigenous paradigm comes from the fundamental belief that knowledge is relational. Knowledge is shared with all of creation. It is not just interpersonal relationships, or just the research subjects I may be working with, but it is a relationship with all of creation. It is with the cosmos; it is with the animals, with plants, with the earth that we share this knowledge. It goes beyond the individual's knowledge to the concept of relational knowledge ... you are answerable to all your relations when you are doing research. (p. 56)

Unlike dominant approaches to Western research where the researcher comes to know by separating herself/himself from world, Indigenous researchers come to know through sensibilities embedded in complex relations in the world and may sometimes refer to this arrival at knowledge as a method.

Methodology refers to ideas or theories about method – ideas or theories about how we should proceed when conducting research, and Chilisa (2012) argues that methods produced within the Indigenous research paradigm incorporate both decolonising methodologies and third-space methodologies. By decolonising methodologies, Chilisa means methodologies that resist the production of 'universal' knowledge, critique Eurocentric Western research approaches, produce and are informed by Indigenous knowledge systems. Another strategy she refers to is that of coalition, where methodologies are produced through partnerships between and among Indigenous researchers and 'Western' researchers, who share common goals with Indigenous researchers. Third-space methodologies are produced in what Homi Bhabha (1994) called 'spaces in between'. In such spaces, dominant Western methodologies are decentred and productive ways are found for Western and Indigenous methodologies to be performed together giving rise to new knowledge

spaces and new, 'hybrid' methodologies. For example, Aborigines in Australia's Northern Territory have for many years through their own performative modes mapped their country by identifying every tree and every significant feature of their territory. Today some Aborigines are doing the same using the latest in satellites, remote sensing and Geographical Information Systems (GIS). By representing their local knowledge on digital maps they are able to make their ways of knowing visible in Western terms – "a new knowledge space which will have transformative effects for all Australians" (Turnbull 1997, p. 560). Similarly, in South Africa San trackers are being equipped with digital devices (as part of the CyberTracker programme) to record animal sightings, a local example of traditional African ways of knowing working together with sophisticated Western technologies (Le Grange 2009, 2015).

So how might third-space methodologies play out in the classroom? We shall discuss an example in science education that opens up ways of thinking and doing bicultural education. The context is where students who come with indigenous cultural frames have to learn the culture of Western science in schools. Jegede and Aikenhead (1999, p. 55) suggest that the teacher needs to take on the role of cultural broker, that is, he/she should help learners mediate or negotiate cultural borders. They suggest that in some instances the teacher needs to be a *tour-guide* cultural broker and in other instances a *travel-agent* cultural broker. When cultural border crossing (from life-world culture to school science culture) is difficult for the learner, the teacher needs to take on the role of a *tour-guide*, whereby the teacher takes learners to the principal sites in the culture of science and coaches them on what to look for and how to use it in their everyday lives. In doing so, the teacher uses an extended repertoire of methods. In other instances, where learners require less guidance when border crossing, the teacher may take on the role of *travel-agent*, whereby the teacher provides learners with incentives such as topics, issues, activities or events that create the need to know the culture of science. In other words, border crossing occurs through academic bridges and less through guidance.

In South African classrooms, learners experience cognitive dissonance when learning about certain phenomena in science classrooms. For example, the scientific perspective that lightning is caused by the discharge of electricity between clouds or from a cloud to the earth is in conflict with learners' cultural understanding that lightning is caused by, for example, witchcraft. Two strategies may be useful in helping learners to deal with cognitive perturbation in this instance. The first strategy is what Bajracharya and Brouwer (1997, p. 436) termed "a narrative approach". This approach involves arranging learners in small group discussions on questions such as 'Is lightning caused by witchcraft?' What this approach does is to provide to a small degree a conceptual ecocultural paradigm that can serve as the basis for the teacher to take on the role of cultural broker. The second approach is one that was introduced by Aikenhead (1996), where border crossing is made concrete by asking learners to divide the page in their notebook in half to form two columns: 'My ideas' and the 'Culture of science ideas'. This strategy/activity enables the learner to consciously move back and forth between the indigenous world and the world of Western science: "switching terminology explicitly, switching language

frameworks and conventions explicitly, switching conceptualizations explicitly” (Jegade and Aikenhead 1999, p. 57). The teacher is able to assess learners’ recordings and navigate his/her own changing roles of *tour-guide* and *travel-agent* so as to facilitate learners’ border crossings.

But, hybrid knowledge spaces could also hold potential dangers as is evident in the case of ethnobotany. Smith (2005) argues that Indigenous knowledge, which was once denied by Western science as irrational and dogmatic, now is one of the frontiers of knowledge. For example, the field of ethnobotany that has emerged involves botanists working closely with indigenous communities in the collection and documentation of plants for medicinal remedies. Ethnobotany involves moving beyond traditional scientific inquiry, deploying qualitative research methods such as interviewing community experts, observing practices, and developing word banks and other resources (Smith 2005). The recent interest in ethnobotany in the global knowledge economy is the commercial potential of the knowledges of indigenous peoples about medicinal plants. If the necessary intellectual property protocols are not carefully observed, then the protection of such knowledges are threatened.

We have noted that an emerging Indigenous paradigm has become possible because of the internationalisation of Indigenous knowledge. However, it is important to also discuss implications that the internationalisation of Indigenous has for philosophy (of education) on a broader level. As noted, Indigenous scholars across the world are using the spaces that globalisation affords to build solidarities. These scholars invoke Indigenous (with a capital ‘I’) to reclaim the term Indigenous so that it represents the experiences, beliefs and commitments that the colonised peoples of the world have in common. This development has an overtly political agenda to advocate for cognitive justice in the light of epistemicide that colonisation has produced. Santos (2014) refers to epistemicide as “the decimation of knowledge” or “the murder of knowledge” (p. 92). He writes:

Unequal exchanges among cultures have always implied the death of the knowledge of the subordinated culture, hence the death of the social groups that possessed it. In most extreme cases, such as that of European expansion, epistemicide was one of the conditions of genocide. The loss of epistemological confidence that currently afflicts modern science has facilitated the identification of the scope and gravity of the epistemicides perpetrated by hegemonic Eurocentric modernity. (p. 92)

Part of the project of seeking cognitive justice is decolonisation. Poka Laenui (2000) suggests five phases in the process of decolonisation: *rediscovery and recovery*; *mourning*; *dreaming*; *commitment* and *action*. Rediscovery and recovery is the process whereby colonised peoples rediscover and recover their own history, culture, language and identity. Mourning refers to the process of lamenting the continued assault on the world’s colonised/oppressed peoples’ identities and social realities. It is an important part of healing and leads to dreaming. Dreaming is when colonised peoples invoke their histories, worldviews, and Indigenous knowledge systems to theorise and imagine alternative possibilities – in this instance, a different philosophy (of education). Commitment is when academics/students become political activists who demonstrate the commitment to include the voices of the colonised – in this case, the ‘inclusion’ of Indigenous philosophy (of education) in the university



curriculum. Action is the phase where dreams and commitments translate into strategies for social transformation, in this instance, cognitive justice. It is important to note that the cognitive justice means that Western philosophy (of education) needs to be decentred. Decentring does not mean destroying Western philosophy but questioning its dominance so that it becomes a philosophy of education and not the philosophy of education. Indigenous philosophy in this instance informs an education pathway that focuses on learning indigenous ways of knowing, (un)learning Western ways of knowing or learning interculturally without one way of knowing dominating the other. The latter is akin to what some Elders in Canada's Mi'kmaw nation refer to as "two-eyed seeing" (Aikenhead and Michell 2011, p. 142, Le Grange and Aikenhead 2017, p. 33).

## Conclusion

Indigenous philosophy and Indigenous education cannot be discussed without direct and sustained reference to its metaphysics. A continual reference to what lies beneath the obvious recognises the world's complexity. Reflections on knowledge therefore cannot proceed without incorporating the deeper insights held by both the wise person of one's community and, in some measure, by the Indigenous academic thinker. Education moves carefully and ethically when it consciously reflects on education processes against the backdrop of both Indigenous and colonial thought. Put differently, when we are educating Indigenous students about one particular idea or object, we need to encourage continuous speculation on what gave rise to that idea or object. Given the complexity of the co-existence of the indigenous and the colonial, the task of education is to urge the thinker to cast their gaze to the other whilst simultaneously considering the concept or object through their own traditional lenses – what some indigenous elders have called two-eyed seeing (Le Grange and Aikenhead 2017). The impetus for education is always the obvious/immediate from which the Indigenous student, teacher, writer and researcher proceeds. The potential located within this complexity should lie at the heart of education, which is really an existential immersion within the world whilst it is being consciously contemplated.

There are two senses in which we have invoked the term Indigenous philosophy of education (acknowledging that such invocation might be contested). The first sense acknowledges that there are disparate philosophies of different indigenous groups located in different parts of the world. The knowing and being of such indigenous communities are embedded in the places that they inhabit (and that inhabit them) and in the languages that they speak. The philosophies of such communities are articulated by elders as a complementary mode of sensory and spiritual realms. The transmission of this sensory-spiritual knowing (Indigenous knowledge) is done by elders who share this knowing with youth through intimate oral communication. As mentioned, because language actively reflects the philosophies of such individual communities, education is tantamount to language acquisition. The fact that each



Indigenous community/group speaks a different language implies that there are nuanced differences among their philosophies and therefore education of different Indigenous communities has distinct features. Education for these singular communities is about the transmission and learning of a community's embeddedness in the sensory and spiritual dimensions of the particular places they inhabit and the right to self-determination of such communities. This sensory-spiritual knowing has enabled indigenous communities to survive for centuries without harming the earth.

The second sense Indigenous philosophy of education relates to is the internationalisation of Indigenous knowledge and the inserting of a capital (I) in the invocation of Indigenous. Rather than focusing on the distinctive philosophies of particular indigenous communities, the emphasis shifts to the common experiences, beliefs and commitments of the world's colonised peoples. The second sense of Indigenous philosophy education clearly has an overtly political agenda. The role of philosophy and education is a decolonising one: it involves righting the mistruths told about colonised peoples by Western philosophers, it concerns decentring (not destroying) Western philosophy (of education) so that Indigenous philosophy (of education) can hold a legitimate place in the academy, and it is about telling the stories of pain, suffering and loss as precursors to healing.

Both senses of Indigenous philosophy of education are important, not only for indigenous philosophers of education but for all philosophers of education and for all education communities. From local indigenous communities, we can learn much about how to live lightly on earth and how to respect all life (the rock and human alike), particularly at a stage characterised by the threat of ecological disaster to the earth, and in an era where human arrogance has reached its zenith, evidenced by the fact that humans have become so dominant that as a species it is capable of destroying all life, leading geologists to postulate a new geological epoch, the Anthropocene. An emerging Indigenous paradigm that the internationalisation of Indigenous knowledge has made possible advances the project of legitimating the 'inclusion' of Indigenous philosophy (of education) in the academy and in decentring Western philosophy (of education) so the latter becomes one way and not the way of doing philosophy of education.

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# African Philosophy of Education Reconsidered: Implications for Pedagogical Encounters



Yusef Waghid

## Introduction

In this chapter, I take my cue from Stanley Cavell (1979), who says that philosophical inquiry is not merely about giving thought to a set of related problems, but rather a way to examine a set of texts, including what can be identified as problems within texts, whether written or oral. Ontologically speaking, African philosophy of education comprises texts that are situated in the sub-texts of Négritude, African Americanism and Africana-ism as advocated through the seminal thoughts of Leopold Senghor, W.E.B. du Bois and Lucius Outlaw, respectively. And, firstly, an examination of the aforementioned texts is tantamount to doing African(a) philosophy of education on the grounds that these texts are aimed not only at deprecating stereotypical value judgements that depict Africans as uncivilised, but more importantly at cultivating dialogues amongst all Africa's people – the latter involving experiences of an educative kind. Secondly, I argue that one such text, namely Africana-ism – as a gathering term for all other texts – delineates African(a) philosophy of education into three traditional genres: ethno-philosophy of education as enunciated by Richard Bell, critical philosophy of education as espoused by Paulin Hountondji and sagacious philosophy of education as advocated by Henry Odera Oruka. Combined, these genres make up African(a) philosophy of education on the basis that any philosophy of education in the first place is concerned with human actions. Thirdly, I argue that African(a) philosophy of education also has a strong moral, socio-political and economic imperative, aimed at engendering justice, democratic engagement and human development on the African continent, respectively. In relation to the notion of *Ubuntu* (or a particular kind of communitarian philosophy of education) articulated through the seminal thoughts of Mluleki Munyaka and

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Mogethi Motlhabi and Magobe Ramose, I show how justice, democracy and human development can be enacted. I specifically focus on *Ubuntu's* inherently democratic bias that can disrupt inhumane forms of human injustices on the African continent, and conclude my defence of African(a) philosophy of education by examining some of its implications for a more just society, and hence for educational experience with its unconstrained pedagogical encounters.

## **Textual Analysis: Négritude, African Americanism and Africana-ism**

Firstly, *négritude* emerged as an ideological response and more specifically as a cultural and intellectual denunciation of oppressive colonial rule and white supremacy. Irele (2003, p. 38) describes *négritude* as a testimony to the injustices of colonialism and the black [wo]man's refusal of western values and religious indoctrination. On the one hand, as an intellectual movement, much of its literature "is dedicated to a rehabilitation of Africa, a way of refurbishing the image of the black [wo]man" (Irele 2003, p. 42). On the other hand, as an expression of cultural autonomy, Leopold Senghor's version of *négritude* is inclined towards accentuating the emotions through which humans can apprehend reality (Senghor 1970). In other words, discursive reasoning is not enough to understand the world, as it does not penetrate what is hidden, but also intuition as it is through the senses that human consciousness can be understood (Senghor 1975). Moreover, Senghor's *négritude* considers solidarity and communion – that is, communitarianism – as more important to African identity and society than individual autonomy (Masolo 2004, p. 489).

Secondly, as an extension of *négritude*, African Americanism gained momentum as a concern about race through the denial of people's sense of humanity. Du Bois (1997, p. 270) describes 'race' as

a vast family of human beings, generally of common blood and language, always of common history, traditions and impulses, who are both voluntarily and involuntarily striving together for the accomplishment of certain more or less vividly conceived ideals of life.

Initially, Du Bois's conception of race shifted from mere talk of colour towards socio-historical and political action, such as being attentive to the social and economic exploitation of people of colour such as African Americans (Bell 2002, p. 52). According to McGary (2004, p. 597), African Americanism is an experience on the part of black people to gain recognition and equal respect in the midst of a society that devalues their worth. Building his theory on the thoughts of W.E.B. du Bois – who contends that being 'black' and 'American' are not contradictory in terms of belonging to the human race – he argues that African Americanism is a struggling experience against a lack of recognition in the face of hostility, racial discrimination, poverty, inhumanity, oppression and stereotypes. In his words, African Americans "must constantly struggle to maintain a healthy sense of self in a hostile society that causes them to experience self-doubt and a range of negative

states” (McGary 2004, p. 598). However, as noted by Bell (2002, p. 52), the depiction of blacks, in this instance African Americans, along the lines of race is the culmination of the articulation of *négritude*. Put differently, African Americanism can be represented as the pinnacle of *négritude* in terms of which African Americans are bound by a common history, suffered a common disaster in slavery – the zenith of discrimination, insult and oppression that remain rooted in the memory of the “Negro” (Du Bois, in Bell 2002, p. 53). It is for this reason that African Americanism (like *négritude*) seems to have been associated with an enactment of human experiences that denounced disrespect, inequality and injustice. Although Du Bois’s idea of African Americanism as a response to racism and injustice seems laudable, his prejudice towards commonality makes his view vulnerable to notions of difference and otherness. Appiah is quick to remind us of Du Bois’s reductionist view of race, which treats collective identities as similar (such as blacks experiencing racial oppression), without taking into account that those other than racially ‘black’ can also suffer dehumanisation (Appiah 2003).

Thirdly, in an attempt to assemble various representations of African philosophy, in a similar manner to how Cavell (1979, p. 77) thinks of a word having a grammatical schematism or point of application within a context, Lucius Outlaw (2004, p. 90) introduces the notion of *Africana-ism*. For Outlaw, the heuristic promise of African(a) philosophy is that it ‘gathers’ representations of the concept under an umbrella term. As a gathering notion it collects and organises representations – that is, philosophical and related articulations, practices and traditions of Africans on the continent, African-descended persons and peoples (like African Americans) and the African diaspora, and of persons who recognise the legitimacy and importance of African and African-descended peoples (Outlaw 2004, pp. 90–91). African(a) philosophy in a Cavellian sense recognises the applications of the concept in varying contexts, thus invoking the concept’s historical and cultural foci. According to Outlaw (2004, p. 94), the latter involves “processes of retention and reinterpretation of cultural practices that originated in Africa, development of new ones, and appropriation and adaptation of elements and practices from cultures of the non-African peoples with whom blacks folks have been in sustained contact”. Hence, *Africana-ism* is situated within ethno-historical life-worlds – including beliefs, art, folklore, music and language – of African and African-descended peoples.

I now move on to a discussion of African(a) philosophy of education.

## African(a) Philosophy of Education

Earlier I borrowed Cavell’s (1979, p. 3) understanding of doing philosophy, which involves understanding a ‘set of texts’. And the ‘texts’ related to African philosophy involve descriptions of *négritude*, African-Americanism and *Africana-ism*. As an extension of such an understanding of African philosophy, African philosophy of education – following Cavell – involves understanding, explaining, analysing, examining, evaluating, commenting on, judging, criticising and being attentive to

problems of and about education in texts vis-à-vis “the [African] human voice” (Cavell 1979, pp. 4–5). More specifically, doing African(a) philosophy of education involves being attentive to ‘criteria’, referred to by Cavell (1979, p. 9) as specifications in terms of which a person judges ‘whether something has a particular status or value’ – in this instance, problems in and about education on the African continent. And such specifications are attended to rationally, consistently, coherently, impersonally and non-arbitrarily – a matter of following a rule (Cavell 1979, p. 14).

Now considering that some problems of education on the African continent vis-à-vis the texts of Africana-ism are identified with exclusion, injustice, gender inequality and sexual harassment (Assié-Lumumba 2007, pp. 1–2; Moja 2007, pp. 65–66), doing African(a) philosophy of education should involve being attentive to such human predicaments as they unfold in textual narratives. Of course, this does not mean that everything about African(a) philosophy of education is confined to written texts only, as much of the discourse is also reported through the oral tradition. In this regard, Cavell (1979, p. 5) clarifies that texts of an oral kind would be acceptable for analysis and judgment. This implies that African(a) philosophy of education should attend to the history, arguments and criticism (criteria in a Cavellian sense) of such concepts and respond appropriately to the predicaments that confront Africa’s education and its peoples. I have identified three ways (genres) in which African(a) philosophy of education can be responsive to the human predicaments that constitute Africa’s education.

Firstly, ethno-philosophy as an instance of African(a) philosophy of education is both universalistic and pluralistic in its ways of seeing the world: Universalism implies that there is only a unique (singular) concept of black (African) identity and consciousness, whereas pluralism recognises the plurality of African cultures, thus neutralising the universalistic idea (Bell 2002, pp. 24–25). Paradoxically, ethno-philosophy has been guided by both universalism and pluralism to counteract colonialism and dependence (Bell 2002, p. 24). As a manifestation of ethno-philosophical thought, oral accounts of traditional worldviews (stories, songs and mythologies) and ethnographies of the ritual practices of Africans have been transcribed into a written mode (Bell 2002, p. 24). What follows is that African(a) philosophy of education with a strictly ethno-philosophical bias would be concerned with the potentiality of a unique African identity and the recognition of the cultural differences of Africans. This means that an identification of race, gender and acts of injustice would determine how an African(a) philosophy of education would respond to exclusion and inequality, for that matter. The universalistic idiosyncrasies associated with being black, woman and sexually violated would be determinant factors in combating exclusion and inequality. Similarly, disrespect towards multifarious cultures should be contested through the recognition of a dimension of cultural differences associated with ethno-philosophical thought. Thus, doing African(a) philosophy of education with an inherent partiality towards ethno-philosophical thought would involve evaluating and commenting on the beliefs and activities found in religions, legends, folk tales, myths, customs, superstitions, poems, taboos, songs and dances in an attempt to thwart exclusion, inequality and multiple forms



of injustice. It is for this reason that I concur with Oruka (2003, p. 121) that “ethno-philosophy may not be without a useful role in African philosophical history”.

Secondly, critical philosophy as an instance of African(a) philosophy of education partially rejects ethno-philosophical practices in the forms of traditional cultural beliefs, popular folk behaviour, moral tales, legends and proverbs in the oral tradition (Bell 2002, pp. 27–29). By far the most ardent proponent of such a philosophy is Paulin Hountondji (1996), who in *African philosophy: myth and reality* takes issue with a strict emphasis on ethno-philosophy, with its focus on myth through the oral tradition. For Hountondji (1996, pp. 104–105), African(a) philosophy cannot develop as an intellectual activity if it remains confined to only memoirs and other oral narratives:

[P]hilosophy ... is a perpetual movement of critique and counter-critique rather than quiet certainty, it is clear that philosophy can flourish and fulfill itself only in a civilization with writing (in the empirical sense). Purely ‘oral’ writing, on the other hand, without of course entirely prohibiting criticism, tends to contain it with narrow limits and to perpetuate a conservative, traditionalist culture, jealous of its heritage and exclusively concerned to increase it quantitatively, without ever questioning it ... Philosophy, a critical reflection *par excellence* cannot develop fully unless it ‘writes its memoirs’ or ‘keeps a diary’.

My interest is in Hountondji’s articulation of African(a) philosophy as a form of ‘critical reflection’. ‘Critical reflection’, Hountondji (1996, p. 67) avers, aims to “promote and sustain constant free discussion about all the problems concerning their discipline ...”. The promotion of ‘free discussion’ involves engaging African(a) philosophy in dialogue with Western and Eastern thought (Hountondji 1996, p. 67). In other words, it is the primary task of critical African(a) philosophers to embark on ‘demythologizing’ African thought from an overemphasis on the oral tradition, which in any case intellectually prejudices and prevents it from becoming an authentic discipline (Hountondji 1996, p. 66). And, engaging critically in reflection about African texts should be closely bound to addressing problems of racism, poverty, non-participation, alienation, sexism, inhumanity and underdevelopment on the African continent.

Thirdly, the notion of sage philosophy (philosophic sagacity) seems to represent what Cavell has in mind with the idea of scepticism. To view something as being sceptical is to recognise the inconclusiveness associated with that something (Cavell 1979, p. 429). This means that something is being perceived ‘in the face of doubt’ – that is, with strangeness and suspicion such that there is no ‘best case’ and always are alternatives (Cavell 1979, pp. 440, 448). In a Cavellian way, philosophic sages are “rigorous indigenous thinkers [men and women] without the benefit of modern education [and] are nonetheless critical independent thinkers who guide their thought and judgements by the power of reason and inborn insight rather than the authority of the communal consensus” (Oruka 2003, p. 121). Sages are capable of rigorously, critically and reflectively analysing a problem in the face of accepting or rejecting an established communal judgement on the matter (Oruka 2003, p. 122). More poignantly, “philosophic sagacity is skeptical of communal consensus, and it employs reason to assess it” on the basis of open-mindedness and tentative rationalism (Oruka 1990, p. 45). To be open-minded and tentatively rational is to adopt a

philosophical approach that is responsive to the strange and to act suspiciously towards traditional ‘truths’, and “reflexively presents and re-presents the story of Africans” being in the world (Bell 2002, p. 35). According to Hallen and Sodipo (1997, p. 13), sages are constantly requested by their communities to offer advice and to counsel them “about business dealings, family problems, unhappy personal situations, and the future, as well as about physical and mental illness”. In this way, African(a) philosophy of education with a sagacious bias has the potential to address educational matters, as the latter have a futuristic orientation as well. That is, it is quite conceivable that some parents would seek advice and counsel on matters pertaining to their children’s moral educational upbringing.

### ***Ubuntu* as an Enactment of Justice, Democracy and Human Development**

Thus far, I have shown how African(a) philosophy of education manifests in three genres: ethno-philosophy, critical philosophy and philosophic sagacity. These different and interrelated genres of African(a) philosophy of education can be attentive to some of the predicaments on the continent, particularly exclusion, inequality and various forms of injustice. I shall now offer an account of how *Ubuntu* (human interdependence and humanness) as a particular communitarian notion of African(a) philosophy of education can engender justice, deliberative democracy and human development in relation to some African practices and institutions.

The *question* arises: How is *Ubuntu* connected to Africa(a) philosophy of education? Considering that the aforementioned genres of ethno-philosophy, critical philosophy and sagacious philosophy constitute African(a) philosophy of education, it can be argued that *Ubuntu* – a term derived from the indigenous languages of Africa’s peoples – has some connection with such a philosophy of education: First, ethno-philosophically, *Ubuntu* is linked ontologically to the traditional value systems of black Africans – that is, a ‘gerundive’ or verbal noun that denotes a dignified state of being and becoming; second, *Ubuntu* is epistemologically underscored by such critical actions that include sharing and mutual care that can result in the alleviation of human suffering and prejudice and, third, the concept is an exemplification of the ‘human-ness’ that is achievable through affirming one’s humanity in a Cavellian and sagacious sense, by recognising the humanity of others (Ramose 2003, p. 643). According to Munyaka and Motlhabi (2009, p. 63), *Ubuntu* is present in most African languages and is recognised as *Ubuntu* in IsiNguni, *Botho* in Sesotho, *Vumunhi* in XiTsonga and *Uhuthu* in TshiVenda. It is derived from the word *mntu* (a person, a human being), and it involves both human acts and dispositions concerning a person’s self-realisation and manifestation as a human being and the realisation of the well-being of others in community (Munyaka and Motlhabi 2009, p. 65). This realisation of individual self in association with other persons (community) is most appropriately captured in the following cultural expression of

mutuality: *Umntu ngumuntu ngabany' abantu* [Xhosa] or *motho ke motho ka batho ba babang* [Sotho] – meaning, a person is a person through other persons (Munyaka and Motlhabi 2009, p. 65).

According to an African understanding, all persons are endowed with *isidima* (dignity); hence, *Ubuntu* is a recognition that all people deserve mutual respect by virtue of their equal humanity (Munyaka and Motlhabi 2009, p. 66). As aptly stated by Ramose (2002, p. 42), “Ubuntu understood as be-ing human (humane-ness); a humane, respectful and polite attitude towards others constitutes the core meaning of this aphorism”. To come back to the meaning of *Ubuntu* as the recognition that an individual person is such on the basis of his or her relation to others in community, it can be claimed that the concept is strongly oriented towards the collective – that is, “it points to the interdependence that exist amongst people” and “promotes the spirit that one should live for others” (Munyaka and Motlhabi 2009, pp. 70, 72). In the words of Shutte (2001, p. 12),

[t]he idea of community is the heart of traditional African thinking about humanity. It is summed up in the expression *umuntu ngumuntu ngabantu*, a person is a person through persons. This means that a person depends on personal relations with others to exercise, develop and fulfil those capacities that make one a person. At the beginning of one's life one is only potentially a person. One's life, if all goes well, is a continual becoming more of a person through one's interaction with others. Personhood comes as a gift from other persons ... Community, as an interpersonal network of relationships, is thus the fundamental value in traditional African thought.

The aforementioned understanding of *Ubuntu* seems to resonate with Cavell's notion of humanity in the sense that a person has the capacity to acknowledge others “simply on the grounds of his [her] humanity, acknowledgement as a human being, for which nothing will do but my revealing myself to him [her] as a human being ... his or her *semblable* [fellow] ... [and] that others count, in our moral calculations, simply as persons” (Cavell 1979, pp. 434–435).

That *Ubuntu* is a philosophy of tolerance, compassion and forgiveness is confirmed by the following dictums: *umntu akalahlwa* – one cannot completely discard a person for wrongdoing; *umntu akancanywa* – one cannot give up on a person (Munyaka and Motlhabi 2009, pp. 70, 72). Such a view of *Ubuntu* confirms the acknowledgement of human fallibility – that is, as Cavell reminds us, “that a human being may lack the capacity to see [other] human beings as human beings” (1979, p. 378). In other words, human fallibility is a ‘human possibility’, and forgiveness applies to those humans who bear an ‘internal relation’ with other human beings, yet also treat them unjustly (Cavell 1979, p. 376).

Bearing in mind that *Ubuntu* is intertwined with actions such as upholding human dignity and respect, exercising sharing and mutual care, and cultivating humanness through recognising oneself in solidarity with others – with the possibility of forgiveness being offered – people, justice, democracy and human development are very much attainable. Firstly, taking into consideration that, in African higher education institutions, women remain underrepresented as students, faculty, researchers and administrators, coupled with a lack of representation in decision-making structures (Moja 2007, p. 60), respecting human dignity as demanded through *Ubuntu*

could counteract such forms of deliberate exclusion from education. Justice would stand a better chance of being realised in the face of such inequality if human dignity could be restored, which would lead to the engendering of organisational cultures that include women's representation in African higher education.

Secondly, deliberative democracy, following Seyla Benhabib (1996, p. 68), is the result of "free and unconstrained public deliberation of matters of common concern". People are considered as moral and political equals as they embark on a procedure of "free and reasoned deliberation" (Benhabib 1996, p. 68). Such a process of deliberative democracy is characterised, firstly, by equal participation of individuals in a collective; secondly, by all individuals having the same opportunities 'to initiate speech acts, to interrogate, and to open debate; and thirdly, by all individuals having the right to initiate reflexive arguments in the discourse' (Benhabib 1996, p. 68). Such a view of democracy seems consistent with an application of *Ubuntu* on the grounds that the latter allows individuals space for collective (and deliberative) participation, critical reflection about one another's views and opinions in an atmosphere of openness, and a revision and re-examination of one another's views until a plausible conclusion is reached. The very practice of *Ubuntu* is aimed at engaging individuals collectively, without disrespect being showed towards one another through the silencing of dissenting or minority views. Again, the commensurability between democracy and respect is highlighted by Benhabib (1996, p. 79), who avers that "[t]he norms of moral respect and egalitarian reciprocity allow minorities and dissenters both the right to withhold their assent and the right ... to challenge the agenda of public debate". Ramose (2002, p. 113) cogently reminds us that *Ubuntu* involves *lepatata* (summoning people to participate) and *kgotlalkgorollegotla* (engaging people in deliberations). Again, the similarity between *Ubuntu* as a democratic practice is justified in terms of the following statement:

The [idiomatic] expression, not unfamiliar in the deliberations of the *kgotla*, is that *le seke la mo thlakola pele a fetsa go nyela*. Literally, it means that the unclean anus of someone defecating may not be cleaned until the person has completed the process. We can therefore see that one were simply not to be summarily silenced on the ground that one was talking nonsense. Important lessons, for example, in reasoning and rhetorics, could be drawn even from nonsensical talk. The *kgotla* as a traditional parliament was thus a form for free and serious discussion aimed at making laws and finding communal solutions to the problems at hand (Ramose 2002, p. 113).

Thirdly, human development, following Martha Nussbaum (2000, p. 5), can most appropriately be enhanced through a recognition of human capabilities, that is, "what people are actually able to do and to be – in a way informed by an intuitive idea of life that is worthy of the dignity of the human being". Her focus on human capabilities is spawned by the lack of opportunities women in developing countries have in "leading lives that are fully human" (Nussbaum 2000, p. 4). For her, "too often women are not treated as ends in their own right, persons with dignity that deserves respect ... Instead they are treated as reproducers, caregivers, sexual outlets, agents of a family's general property" (Nussbaum 2000, p. 2). That is, women are subjected to unequal social and political circumstances that give them unequal human capabilities. So, instead of asking about their satisfactions and what resources

they are able to command, we should inquire “about what they are actually able to do and to be” (Nussbaum 2000, p. 12). Nussbaum’s argument that human development can most appropriately be addressed along the lines of human capabilities seems to resonate with *Ubuntu*, because the latter considers all people with dignity and therefore worthy of respect. In a similar way, Cavell (1979, p. 434) accentuates the importance of acknowledging others – that is, recognising that people have capabilities according to which they act. In his words, “[there is] a surmise that another [person] may be owed acknowledgement [recognized for his or her capabilities] on the ground of his [her] humanity”. For this reason, *Ubuntu* is considered “a person’s self-realization and manifestation as a human being” (Munyaka and Motlhabi 2009, p. 65).

## Implications of *Ubuntu* for Pedagogical Encounters

I now turn my attention to a discussion of African(a) philosophy of education, more specifically *Ubuntu* in relation to pedagogical encounters. In the same way that some people are subjected to exclusion, inequality and inhumanity on the African continent, teaching and learning can also be vulnerable to these constraints. In this section, I focus on how teaching and learning in a pedagogical encounter will unfold if informed by aspects of *Ubuntu* – that is, I show how an emphasis on mutual respect and care, deliberative engagement and treating others humanely (with a recognition of their fallibilities) can engender more credible pedagogical relations amongst university students and teachers.

Firstly, *Ubuntu* recognises respect for individual autonomy in relation to community. This implies that an individual has a responsibility, what Gyekye (1997, p. 66) refers to as a caring attitude, towards other persons. Similarly, other persons in the community reciprocate their sense of caring towards an individual. This *Ubuntu* relationship between an individual and other persons is guided by “solidarity, reciprocity, cooperation, [and] interdependence” (Gyekye 1997, p. 67). Again, Gyekye (1997, p. 69) avers that “an autonomous, self-assertive being ... care[s] for her own well-being or needs just as she cares for the needs of others ... [t]his is because the concern for the interests and needs of others cannot imply the dissolution of the self”. Thus, in a pedagogical encounter, a student learns autonomously without relinquishing her right to challenge and question, otherwise her autonomy will be undermined. Assumptions that Africans merely imitate without questioning might be true, but indefensible in terms of the individual autonomy they ought to exercise in a communitarian (*Ubuntu*) pedagogical encounter. It is not surprising to note Gyekye’s (1997, p. 109) pedagogical description of learning on the basis that

... individuals [for instance, African students] ... consciously and systematically employ the mind and are irresistibly attracted to, or fascinated by, ideas, apply themselves with unrelenting assiduity to conceive and produce them, argue them, and battle with them, always prepared to abandon their own intellectual positions in the face of the superior ideas or arguments of others.

Such a pedagogical encounter in which individual students mutually respect others' thoughts on the grounds that they can be persuaded by other persons' thoughts through reflection and argumentation is testimony that an *Ubuntu* pedagogical relationship is informed by the practice of critical learning – that is, to argue, and to modify one's views in the light of more convincing 'truths'. Like mutual learning, teaching is equally based on the notion of reciprocity. It is often erroneously assumed that a university teacher with epistemological authority does not have to consult with students in African institutions because of the cultural practice of obeying elders to which students remain subjected. However, Gyekye's (1979, p. 122) description of elders' authority is that "[t]he chief (or ruler) is required by the first injunction not to abuse or insult his subjects but rather to respect them: that is, the chief should recognize their equality as beings, even if they are not equal in directly wielding political power". Gyekye (1997, p. 123) continues by describing that the elder as political authority "rule[s] with the consent of his people ... willing and prepared to listen to their complaints or to what they have to say about any matters that concern them". What follows is that university teachers as educational authorities equally are expected to listen to students without treating them with disrespect – that is, unjustly. In other words, university teaching based on the customary notion of *Ubuntu* encourages a reciprocity of knowledge exchange that puts to bed the idea that knowledge in African higher education institutions should be merely about transmission and the unquestioning transfer of knowledge from pedagogical authorities, like university teachers, to passive students. Hence, an *Ubuntu* pedagogical encounter relies on mutual respect between university teachers and students who engage with each other equally about ideas they mutually share and care about.

Secondly, *Ubuntu* governance within tribal communities traditionally uses "basic ideas of democracy" (Gyekye 1979, p. 129). Although a chief is appointed through hereditary succession, the chief relies on the people for his rule – that is, there is "active participation of the people in running the affairs of the community ... [without any] distance between the government and the governed" (Gyekye 1979, p. 128). Consensus is aimed when dealing with disagreements, divisions, disputes and deliberations. According to Gyekye (1979, p. 130),

[*Ubuntu*] allows everyone an opportunity to speak his mind and promotes patience, mutual tolerance, and an attitude of compromise – all of which are necessary for democratic practice, in which everyone is expected to appreciate the need to abandon or modify his position in the face of more persuasive arguments by others.

Even more pertinently, *Ubuntu*

... allows for many to participate in making decisions about the affairs of community. Anyone, even the most ordinary youth ... will offer his opinion or make a suggestion with an equal chance of its being as favorably entertained as if it proceeded from the most experienced sage (Gyekye 1979, p. 127).

What follows is that deliberative engagement along the lines of mutual respect for a diversity of views, trust, the recognition of persuasive arguments and compromise is of interest for African communities. Similarly, pedagogical encounters in higher educational settings have much to gain from such a democratic enact-



ment of *Ubuntu* amongst African communities. In *Ubuntu* pedagogical encounters, teachers and students would listen attentively to what the other articulate and would not hesitate to take each other's views into controversy. In other words, disagreements and disputes would not be seen as detrimental to teaching and learning, but rather teaching and learning would happen under conditions of trust and mutual appreciation for each other's perspectives. No one in such a pedagogical encounter would be affronted if challenged, as even the most 'ordinary' view would be appreciated and responded to in an atmosphere of mutual tolerance and in the recognition that someone else has something worthwhile to say. Teachers and students would also be prepared to modify their views in the light of more persuasive arguments and would not hesitate to abandon some of their implausible perspectives – a view of educational (pedagogical) encounters that considers critique and equal recognition of voice as enabling conditions for more plausible views to ensue.

Thirdly, *Ubuntu* implies that people should be treated humane-ly, that is, they should be recognised as persons associated with human dignity and equal respect (Wiredu 2002, p. 313). Wiredu (2002, p. 314) posits that every (African) person "has the right to do his/her own thing, with the understanding, of course, that ultimately one must bear the consequences of one's own choices". To bear the consequence of their own actions is to acknowledge that not only do persons have individual rights, but also that they would face the consequences of their actions in the event that they have erred – that is, persons in the African sense are fallible. No wonder then that Wiredu (2002, p. 315) makes that claim that persons (humans) are "entitled to help from others [that is, other persons – onipa hia moa]. Entitlement to help from others is itself an acknowledgement that persons are vulnerable as humans and rely on the assistance of other humans to sustain their humanity'. Thus, in pedagogical encounters, teachers and students should realise their fallibilities and vulnerabilities and that not all views would necessarily appeal to all others. It is then that human dignity, equal respect and support of another's view, especially if such a view is underdeveloped, would be highly relevant. For once, antagonism and irconcilability would be ruled out, as the possibility is always there to treat people humane-ly – that is, with dignity and respect and the recognition that something worthwhile might yet ensue – on condition that support is rendered.

Thus, in a pedagogical encounter, students and teachers are highly supportive of one another and, whenever views and ideas are undeveloped, they (teachers and students) do not ridicule one another or treat one another with hostility. Collegial support through *Ubuntu* is encouraged in African university classrooms on the grounds that equal respect and dignity towards others are upheld. Quite aptly, Cavell (1979, p. 440) remarks: "[T]o humanize this creation ... one might undertake ... the return of the human [that is, to treat ourselves and others with dignity and respect]".

Of course, African(a) philosophy of education seems to be hampered in some African communities by excessive authoritarianism, what Wiredu (1980, p. 4) refers to as the "unquestioning obedience to superiors, which often meant elders" in Ghanaian society. Likewise, Wiredu (1980, p. 15) also notes the presence of an "unanalytical, unscientific attitude of mind [including superstition]" that pervades some sectors of African society. Inasmuch as such grotesque cultural practices



would work against any possibility of an African(a) philosophy of education, Wiredu (1980, p. 24) himself acknowledges “some of the more positive aspects” of African culture, such as *Ubuntu*, that would affect human actions more favourably. Thus, although not discounting the presence of anachronistic cultural practices that in many ways undermine the implementation of *Ubuntu* in some African communities, I was more intent on showing what positive understandings of African(a) philosophy of education could bring more “dignity, respect, contentment, prosperity, joy, to [wo]man and his [her] community” (Wiredu 1980, p. 6) – more specifically how *Ubuntu* has a positive impact on pedagogical encounters in university settings.

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# Education and Modernity



Christiane Thompson

I have little control over myself and my moods. Chance has more power here than I. The occasion, the company, the very sound of my voice draw more from my mind than I find in it when I sound it and use it by myself. Thus its speech is better than its writings, if there can be choice where there is no value. This also happens to me: that I do find myself in the place where I look; and I find myself more by chance encounter than by searching my judgment (Montaigne 1992: 26–7).

This chapter begins with a passage from Michel de Montaigne's *Essays*, because this may be taken as a point of departure for the experience of modernity. Written by the end of the sixteenth century, Montaigne's *Essays* throw a skeptical glance on human life and human affairs. He scrutinizes human behavior, virtues, but also education and friendship in his tentative and experimental texts. The examination of common life practice is carried out in accordance with the skeptical tradition as an exercise of the mind. It discloses that traditions are questionable and that humans tend to overestimate the scope of reason. Along with the skeptical examination the question arises as to how to lead one's life.

The abovementioned passage stems from the essay 'Of Prompt or Slow Speech'. Montaigne contemplates about the ego and makes it clear that his experience with the ego does not justify considering it as self-consciousness or substance. Rather, the ego experiences itself from elsewhere – chance has a considerable influence. The intellectual introspection bears little fruit. So Montaigne's skepticism differs very much from that of Descartes,<sup>1</sup> the central thinker of modern philosophy. Instead of being a method of certainty, Montaigne employs skepticism as an examination or inspection of the self, an examination that may call for changing one's life.

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<sup>1</sup>It was Descartes who employed skepticism and doubt in order to arrive at the *foundation* of science: With any doubt that I raise, Descartes argued, I cannot doubt the fact that it is me who executes this doubt (Descartes 1960).

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Skepticism is a form of life that brings openness and questionability into the farthest reaches of life.

Both thinkers – Montaigne and Descartes – provide hints as to the evolving role of Reason in the modern age. It is the path of enlightenment, i.e., the quest to build life on the grounds of rational reasoning: How can a social order take shape that stands in accordance with knowledge and science? Montaigne and Descartes have become important points of reference for this project and have shaped and formed this tradition. While the reference to Descartes is linked to the regulation of method and system-building in science, Montaigne has time and time again been brought up to call into question the trust into rationality or scientific rationalization, e.g., by thinkers like Voltaire, Nietzsche, and Horkheimer.

Montaigne's skeptical take on the ego is also important because it shows how modernity – as a liberation from answers thus far provided by the tradition – is linked to education or *Bildung*. When former answers regarding human existence no longer prove convincing, when the investigation of everyday life, as Montaigne shows, displays the misconceptions about what we think we know about ourselves, then it becomes indispensable to explore human existence, i.e., to practically engage in (other) possibilities of existence. Kant will voice this in the cosmopolitan framework of philosophy: What can I know? What shall I do? What can I hope? What is it to be a human being? (Kant 1968: 25).

This chapter will elaborate on how education or '*Bildung*' is closely related to the abovementioned quest of modernity. The concept of '*Bildung*' is closely linked to the English term 'liberal education'. Both of them are anchored in the humanist tradition of the '*artes liberales*', the free arts. '*Bildung*' is frequently linked to the German speaking educational tradition and its relevance in the social and political development of the civil society. Yet, it can be argued that the way *Bildung* is linked to the liberation project of the Enlightenment makes it a general reference point to reflect on the modern framework of education. In other words, the concept of *Bildung* articulates a *general* dimension of modern life in Western democracies. This could also be the reason why '*Bildung*' has recently been discussed quite intensively in the international context.<sup>2</sup>

In order to set out the concept of *Bildung*, it is necessary to delineate more clearly the notion of modernity. With Montaigne, it has already become clear that 'modernity' is about the loss of reliable traditions and secure/assured knowledge. In the following, some references to conceptual history are used in order to elaborate the structure of 'modern experience' (1). In short, this structure is about a different relation to time, a particular consciousness of change. In the second part of the chapter, Schiller, Humboldt, and Hegel's respective contributes regarding the relation of modernity and education will be examined (2). In the final part of the chapter, the borders or limits of modern *Bildung* are presented without, however, overlooking our contemporary entanglement with it (3).

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<sup>2</sup>Among the many contributions, I will name exemplarily: Cleary and Hogan (2001), Løvlie (2002), Peukert (2002), Reichenbach (2002), Thompson (2005). In the context of pragmatism and its relation to the German tradition, see English (2013).

## The Signature of Modernity

The development of modern education is closely related to the promises of civil society and its close relation to the ideas of humanity and rational self-determination – ideas that have their roots, as already mentioned, in the tradition of the ‘*artes liberales*’ (see Herbrechter 2018, in this volume).<sup>3</sup> In modernity, a new experience of time takes shape. This time can no longer be grasped as a ‘period’ or ‘era’. Rather, the terms ‘modern’ and ‘modernity’ describe a particular mode of change that concerns all aspects of human life. Basically, modernity describes an experience of time that questions the legitimacy of prior or traditional life forms. The theological idea of ‘*ordo*’, i.e., a creational order that grants every being its place in the world, is delegitimized. This development has also to be seen in relation to the religious wars, the rise of capitalism and industrialization, as well as the scientific exploration and subjection of nature in early stages of the modern era.

The rise of modern science brought forth a worldview where simply everything is at the disposal of human beings. A thoroughgoing research will bring out all of nature’s secrets (Bacon 1990). Humans cease to be the referent spectator and admirer of God’s orderly creation – as described by the humanists in Renaissance (Pico 1990). Being a clever and inventive creature, man systematically explores nature and extends his scope of action. Thereby, the limits of action are increasingly extended: Action is not grasped from given frameworks and conditions anymore. Rather, human action is increasingly oriented toward what is not yet real, what is possible. The example of the atom bomb is quite illustrative in this regard: The idea of using the power of the atom precedes the technological abilities to (safely) do so. Furthermore, this technological program *exceeds* human action in a way that was formerly inconceivable (i.e., tens of thousands of years). In this regard, Hans Blumenberg has spoken of a ‘reflected curiosity’ taking shape in the modern era. In his view, this curiosity is not about the expectation of discovering something new, but rather in the “never ending question, how we are to go on from here” (Blumenberg 1988: 271). This quote marks a reflective dimension within the human explorations. In the following, the link of this dimension to *Bildung* will be explicated from the perspective of conceptual history.

The conceptual historian Reinhart Koselleck (1984, 2004), whose works are also translated into English (Koselleck 2004), has intensively researched the formation of ‘modern experience’ in the way that historical consciousness was described by the contemporaries. At the second half of the eighteenth century “time becomes a dynamic and historical force in its own right” (Koselleck 2004: 214). When d’Alembert and Diderot went about their master project of the *Encyclopedia* in their quest for progress, they referred to a time consciousness that links human action to the principles of formability and of self-exploration.

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<sup>3</sup>They are astronomy, music, arithmetic, geometry, dialectic, grammar, rhetoric. It was Cicero who translated this ‘study program’ into the Roman tradition – and he linked this study program to the concept of the ‘*homo humanus*’, that is, the idea of humanity. For centuries, the *artes liberales* would form the basis of Western education.

Koselleck strongly emphasizes a shift in experience, viz., that it is increasingly oriented toward the expectation of what is to come. One's own present is grasped in the mode of change and transformation as is shown with reference to Schlegel: "No time has ever been so strongly, so closely, so exclusively, and so generally bound up with the future than that of our present" (Schlegel 1971, op. cit. Koselleck 2004: 219). Time is perceived as a permanently overtaking movement, which never stops to delegitimize the foregoing time as tradition: "My thesis is that during *Neuzeit* the difference between experience and expectation has increasingly expanded; more precisely, that *Neuzeit* is first understood as a *neue Zeit* from the time that expectations have distanced themselves evermore from all previous experience" (Koselleck 2004: 237).

To be sure, Koselleck's general description of modernity has to be read in context with the complex sociopolitical and economical frameworks of the time: The discovery of a New World, the success and superiority brought about by technological innovation, the development of commerce, etc., play into what can be described as 'progress'. To this progress, education or *Bildung* form a correlate; for to attribute to human beings the power of history and practice required a conceptualization of 'becoming'. '*Bildung*' and education precisely take up this role – in philosophical discourse as well as in the wider social and political public discourse (Vierhaus 1972). Without going into further social-historical details, '*Bildung*' can be seen as a leading category of modernization. It connects individual and social development and takes up the promise of a better future. With *Bildung* human practice is bound to the acquisition of knowledge, to judgment and reflection, as well as to morality and culture. The self of *Bildung* is related to the quest of giving oneself a history.

As a 'carrier' of the modern idea of progress, *Bildung* gains a central role for the social and political discourse. Its basic philosophical consequence for subjectivity shapes the project of modern anthropology: *Bildung* is the relation of the self to itself and to others, the articulation of the question of one's own existence. Ricken (2006) speaks of the 'anthropological matrix' of *Bildung*: "individual life is altogether conceived as a relational and epigenetic process of self-determination" (Ricken 2006: 185, see also Meyer-Drawe 1998, Masschelein and Ricken 2003).

As mentioned above the question of how to lead one's life can no longer be answered on the grounds of tradition and preceding experiences. Social status no longer determines one's course of life (even if social advancement is – until today – related to social background). Rousseau has described this 'open becoming' paradigmatically in his educational novel 'Emile': "We do not know what nature allows us to be" (Rousseau 1963: 156). This statement not only makes obvious the disintegration of theological and metaphysical references that formed the basis for premodern conceptions of *Bildung* (Buck 1984), but it also demonstrates that the individual has to explore himself or herself. He or she has to find out about his or her abilities and interests – they are not simply given. *Bildung* amounts to a process of experience that allows us to find out about ourselves.

In the following, I would like to draw on three different theoretical references that offer philosophical descriptions of modern *Bildung*: Schiller, Humboldt, and Hegel. To be sure, there are more conceptions and ideas available in the modern tradition. These authors are chosen for several reasons. First of all, they all offer us a view on

the process of *Bildung* as experience. This is to say that these thinkers offer translations of the former perspective of conceptual history into systematic argumentation. Secondly, these three thinkers were all concerned with the claims of rationality within modernity. Thus, they are a compelling source for reflecting on the possibilities and limitations of Western rationality. Thirdly, these authors (who are not included in the chapters in section ‘[The signature of modernity](#)’ of this Handbook) still exert a strong influence on the current debates in philosophy and education – especially in the German-speaking context, but also elsewhere.<sup>4</sup> It seems these thinkers still have something to offer to us in our current educational-philosophical efforts.

In the following, *Bildung* as process of self-determination is presented in the context of the thinkers’ influential works. It is shown that the recognition of human rationality and sensibility (Schiller), the sociality of language (Humboldt), as well as the negativity of experience (Hegel) mark essential reference points in thinking modern education.

## Modern Reflections on *Bildung* with Schiller, Humboldt, and Hegel

### *Friedrich Schiller’s Letters on ‘Aesthetic Education’*

Schiller’s letters on *Aesthetic Education* stem from 1793.<sup>5</sup> The point of departure for the letters is Kant’s ‘Critique of Judgment’ (Kant 1987) and what this text means for art and beauty. In his third Critique, Kant had attempted to connect theoretical and practical reason: How can nature and freedom, sensuality, and morality be related in a critical philosophy? Kant works on this problem developing a theory of ‘reflecting judgment’.<sup>6</sup> Kant thinks of ‘reflective judgment’ as a faculty to judge our (singular) experiences, and in doing so it finds rules concerning how all our experiences relate to one another. In this context, Kant also takes into consideration the dimension of pleasure/displeasure in our experience with objects (‘aesthetic judgment’).

Schiller sees in Kant’s connection, that is, between the realms of nature and freedom by judgment, a way to escape the one-sidedness of rationality in Enlightenment, and he gives this project a political and philosophical-historical interpretation. With the experience of the French Revolution and the terror coming along with it, Schiller regards the revolution as failed. He interprets it as a final point of human develop-

<sup>4</sup>For Schiller, see, e.g., Rancière (2006), Zirfas (2014), Weber (2011), Løvlie (2002).

<sup>5</sup>They are dedicated to Prince Christian of Schleswig-Holstein-Sonderburg-Augustenburg. The letters were destroyed in a fire at the castle Christiansborg in Copenhagen. One year later, Schiller rewrote the letters, and the new versions incorporated considerable changes.

<sup>6</sup>In his ‘Critique of Judgment’, Kant distinguishes ‘reflective’ from ‘determinant’ judgment. The latter follows the logic of subsumption: The universal is given and judgment ‘subsumes’ the particular under the universal. In the former, the particular is given and judgment is oriented toward the universal.



ment, viz., as a turning away from the absolutization of reason. Schiller describes this as an alienation, as a history of decay in modernity, a history of ‘fragmentation’ (Schiller 2000: 23). Both the specialization in the field of science and the rationalization of the world of work exemplify this. In this situation, Schiller poses the question of a fulfilled human history, and he is convinced that this question can only be adequately posed when considering the relationship of sensibility and morality. The task then is as follows:

It is therefore not going far enough to say that the light of the understanding only deserves respect when it reacts on the character; to a certain extent it is from the character that this light proceeds; for the road that terminates in the head must pass through the heart. Accordingly, the most pressing need of the present time is to educate the faculties of sensation or sensibility (*Empfindungsvermögen*), because it is the means, not only to render efficacious in practice the improvement of ideas, but to call this improvement into existence (Schiller 2000: 33).

Here, Schiller rejects all forms of education that skip sensibility when relating to our experience. According to Schiller, it is the task of education to involve sensibility in our experience. This means that we need to be or need to feel addressed by experience. Schiller uses the expression that the “road that terminates in the head must pass through the heart”. This receptivity as opening of the head through the heart becomes a genuine task of *Bildung* in a time that precisely misjudges the role of receptivity. The quoted passage presents the very fundamental significance that Schiller attributes to sensibility for the end of enlightenment and human flourishing.

Schiller constructs a dualistic anthropological model to develop his idea of aesthetic education or *Bildung*. According to Schiller, human being is a being of conflict, for human being is determined by two driving forces: forces that mutually contradict and exclude each other. One driving force is the so-called *sensuous drive*.<sup>7</sup> This concerns human’s receptivity and the possibility to be affected by something. Human being is open and can be addressed by the world (*Stoff*). This drive provokes all kinds of states (*pathe*) and sensations: the world of emotions, anxieties, and passions. The other drive is the so-called *formal drive*, which captures understanding and rational thought. The drive of form suspends sensations, for it strives toward rational understanding of the world, to disclose its essence and form historically relevant knowledge.

According to Schiller, human being is in danger of self-alienation from a one-sided orientation that prioritizes either sensibility or reason. The sensuous drive comes with the risk that humans get lost in their feelings, and that they are driven and overwhelmed by external influences. In this case, it is impossible to take a critical stance toward the world. The formal drive, however, goes together with the risk of uncompromised rational domination: sensibility is suppressed and brings about barbarianism – as Schiller notes with respect to the French Revolution.

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<sup>7</sup> It is challenging to translate Schiller’s thoughts into English, e.g., his concept of ‘*Trieb*’, which is not to be conflated with the psychoanalytic idea of a ‘dark force’ that is primarily attributed to the ‘nature’ of man. Schiller precisely wants to problematize the nature-culture divide.

Schiller views modern civilization – with its views of science, economy, and bureaucracy – as a one-sided expression of the formal drive.

In his anthropological model, Schiller describes humans' rational and sensuous sides as incompatible. According to Schiller, there is no superior authority in order to establish a balance between the drives, to put them in a proper relationship. This is why human being is an incomplete and fragmented being – a being that is separated from unity and completion. Basically, human beings are condemned to alienation, to a rupture of the self. This is why Schiller describes humans' reconciliation (with themselves) as a *precarious ideal*.

On the one hand, for Schiller it is clear that human beings can never reconcile sensibility and rationality, for they remain bound to contradicting drives. On the other, he also points at a *mere appearance* of reconciliation where the drives are active without mutual erasure. In other words, Schiller interprets aesthetic experience as a place where reconciliation can *appear symbolically*. By providing *visions* of reconciliation, aesthetic experiences have an educational, i.e., productive, effect on us.

Schiller uses the concept of play in order to describe the educational dimension of aesthetic experience; for it is play where reality takes a new shape. It is a characteristic of play that it modifies the limits of reality – or that it forms other realities.<sup>8</sup> Play changes the mode of reality and this is why they are suitable for humans' imagination of reconciliation. Let me use the game 'Don't be upset, man!', a German version of 'Ludo' (both derived from the Indian game 'Pachisi'), as an example.

In this game, the figures are moved over a board while being threatened by the other players' figures. If the opponents capture a piece – especially when the piece is close to the final 'safe' zone – the player will feel the exact opposite of what the game's title warns against: she will feel upset. So anger management is part of this game: Whoever, for instance, sweeps away all the pieces from the board in frustration ends the game. Likewise, someone who shows no emotional commitment or real interest in playing also effectively impedes the game. Anger and emotional involvement represent integral parts of the game, and this is where the contradicting drives take up a mode of resonance.

More specifically, we can imagine ourselves feeling real anger while playing the game; an anger that is *bracketed* by the fact that we know it is a game. Therefore, we might qualify our anger – at the same time – as childish or funny. Here, sensuous and formal drive stand in interrelation while the limits of reality become blurred: it is no longer clear whether I am upset or not. Playing offers different possibilities for interpreting reality, making rationality and sensibility present, at the same time, without taking them as the only determinant of the situation. This, however, opens up questions about ourselves, about our relations to others, about different ways to (re)act. For Schiller, this is the path of aesthetic education, i.e., of (unreachable) human fulfillment.

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<sup>8</sup>When a spectator begins to comment on a game of chess the players might feel provoked by this intrusion into the game. This is to say that they attempt to draw the limits of the game; however, the fact that they start speaking about it can also be taken as a starting *game on the rules of the game*. See Schäfer and Thompson (2014).

Play and aesthetic experience, for Schiller, are closely related. It may not come as a surprise that the same holds for the confrontation with art. Take, for instance, questions like, ‘What is art?’ or ‘Why does a work of art appear to us in this or that way, and how does it affect us?’ These are all questions that relate to the state of indeterminacy. Art cannot be pinned down. It invokes very different scenes and dimensions of reality. As might have become clear above, it is the ‘in-between’, the indeterminacy between formal and sensuous drive that makes them educationally productive (see with respect to Adorno: Thompson 2005).

Schiller’s descriptions are not so much about idealistic imagination, but rather serve as a strategy to point toward the significance of a particular mode of experience. This mode of experience is important since a final reconciliation of humans’ inner conflict is impossible: In aesthetic experience we get in touch with our dual nature without being able to clarify what is going on. However, we get an idea about the one-sidedness of rationality or sensibility in our lives (and how this one-sidedness is destructive).<sup>9</sup>

### ***Wilhelm von Humboldt’s ‘Theory of Bildung’***

Wilhelm von Humboldt is famous for his anthropological and linguistic writings as well as for his political activities in the state of Prussia. Even if his career as minister of education was a short one,<sup>10</sup> his writings have been very influential in the German educational context. Humboldt’s main idea is that *Bildung* is an end in itself and that it should not be treated as a means to an end. *Bildung* is *not for* something. Rather, it is about the question what to do with ourselves.

In his famous fragment ‘Theory of human being’s *Bildung*’<sup>11</sup> (1793), Humboldt declares *Bildung* as *that* human enterprise that will surpass the fragmentation and specialization of science. *Bildung* is described as the interaction of ego and world; an interaction that is regarded as free and not regulated. According to Humboldt, ‘*Bildung*’ is seen as a process where the ego follows forces or drives, engages with the surrounding world, and changes through this engagement. It is not clear from the beginning, where the road will take the ego.

Let us take the learning of a foreign language as an example. *To turn toward* the other and foreign language is the point of departure for *Bildung*. There is a move toward the other, a form of interest that draws the ego in the other language. There is an experience of alienation here: Others speak this (for me) foreign language as their own language. To approach the language of others will also alter one’s own language, a language that is foreign to others. We do not simply learn grammar and

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<sup>9</sup>Schiller will end with a model concerning the “utopia of an aesthetic state”. This shows the connection between aesthetics and politics that has recently been discussed by Rancière (2006).

<sup>10</sup>Humboldt soon withdrew from his political duties, because his liberal ideas contradicted the restorative political forces of the time.

<sup>11</sup>Humboldt did not select this title.

vocabulary. We also experience the difference of languages, their plurality. They refer to differing sensuous worlds. Finally, we also experience ourselves differently in another language: beginning with our individual expression in the other language. While speaking a foreign language, we experience ourselves as other or different.

For Humboldt it is important that we see *Bildung* as something inextricably linked to the individual. This is to say that we all have very different paths of learning this or that foreign language. It is precisely this individual confrontation that constitutes our experiences with the world. This is why Humboldt is critical toward pedagogical programs (and some interpreters have concluded from this that Humboldt has adults and not children in mind). The crucial point for Humboldt is that the development of humanity cannot spring from a general idea of reason but from the plurality and manifold experiences of individuals. Emphasizing difference and the manifold (instead of referring to shared measures or belief systems) is quite a ‘modern’<sup>12</sup> move.

In particular, Humboldt’s linguistic studies provide strong support for a pluralistic interpretation of humanity and culture: Humboldt is of the opinion that languages shape different realities that are irreducible and plural in nature (see Koller 1999, 2012; Thompson 2009). In a way, Humboldt anticipates the linguistic turn, because he presents language as “the forming organ of thinking” (Humboldt 2002, III: 191). From the perspective of education, Humboldt’s focus on language emphasizes *Bildung* as a permanent individual confrontation with the plurality of life forms. This is to say that the individual is confronted with her or his own ‘worldview’ – including its limitations and restrictions. In other words, the confrontation with other languages and thus other worldviews enables us to see the particularities and limits of our own language.

In summary, Humboldt’s reference to languages presents *Bildung* as an experience of difference and problematization. Foreign languages – and this means foreign worldviews – confront us with ourselves. They also confront us with the question of how a common life is possible. With this question the self-evident worldviews are challenged. This is how modern experience is articulated from the perspective of education.

Let us use the example of the slang language ‘Sheng’ in Kenia. This language may be seen as a modern challenge in Humboldt’s sense. ‘Sheng’ is a language predominantly spoken by young adults in Nairobi and is a ‘mixture’ of Swahili and English. What is special about ‘Sheng’ is the fragile character of the language community due to the rapid pace of change and the formation of new expressions. Sheng is described as an attempt by the younger generation to speak their ‘own language’ – a language that differs from the language of the elder generation. Currently, Sheng is not socially accepted form of communication, thus it is scorned.

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<sup>12</sup> *Bildung* does not have to be seen as a metaphysical or teleological idea, as some interpreters see it (see Menze 1965, who placed Humboldt in close relation to Leibniz’s Monadology). Dietrich Benner (1990) has argued that Humboldt was after an open idea of practice (which lies in contradiction to teleological ideas). There are further readings placing Humboldt beyond the ‘humanist illusion’ (Schäfer 1996).

The conflict of language marks simultaneously a generational difference as well as a problem of *Bildung*. The current clash of the new language with the official languages (Swahili and English) primarily involves experiences of difference. It is heavily discussed what properties belong to a language. This discussion, however, is accompanied by the experience that speaking a language marks belonging and affiliation. What does it mean to have different belongings among people who live together? What does it mean that only some languages are allowed and taught at school? The language conflict refers to social issues and conflicts – social conflicts that become apparent by the language conflict. So the discussion is not primarily about language proficiency but about how to live together. *Bildung* is about confronting oneself with the question of how to live together: in the task of coming to terms with the conflict and the differing worldviews associated with them. To be sure, this does not provide a ‘solution’ concerning the question of ‘Sheng’. Rather this calls for the reflection on the life forms and sociality in a group of peoples from more than 40 ethnic groups.

### *Hegel’s Phenomenology of Experience*

Hegel’s ‘Phenomenology of Spirit’ offers itself for an educational-philosophical reading precisely because it is concerned with the science of the experience of consciousness. The main insight of the *Phenomenology* is that truth cannot be put in the pocket like a coin (PhG 40). Hegel criticizes his philosophical predecessors – especially Kant (1990) – for not having placed the acquisition of knowledge in connection with the experience that consciousness has with itself. Deceit and dogmatism start where we think that knowledge simply exists: “The dogmatism of thought in the knowledge and study of philosophy is nothing else but the view that truth can be captured in a statement that is a fixed result or that can be known without mediation” (see Hegel PhG 41). The *Phenomenology* takes place as a continuous dialectical confrontation, where consciousness recognizes that it has to leave its (former) standpoint: By being confronted with the knowledge of the object the latter changes because the consciousness of the object changes.

The educational-philosophical point is the insight into this change of consciousness. Thus, the process of *Bildung* is about the readiness to give up one’s own standpoint. It is the questioning of the given, the moment of negativity, that is constitutive for *Bildung*. Conceptually, Hegel grasps this as ‘alienation’ as well as “relinquishment (*Entäußerung*) of the self” (Hegel PhG 359ff.). These concepts entail that which is known to us has to become strange – in order to bring about confrontation.<sup>13</sup> Hegel’s view implies thus a criticism of Enlightenment. Kant’s famous dictum ‘*sapere aude*’ envisions the ‘enlightened self’ as an independent and autonomous being in social practice. In light of this call for autonomy, Kant cannot thematize

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<sup>13</sup> In this context, one may also refer to Plato and Aristoteles and their idea that philosophy starts with wondering (*thaumazein*).

how individuals confront themselves with opinions and experiences in order to change their point of view (see Gelhard 2017). For Hegel, this is precisely the starting point for *Bildung*; *Bildung* is part of the power play within social practice.

In Hegel's *Phenomenology*, the general motif of *Bildung* is failed identity. Consciousness can never gain the state of self-fulfillment. It is permanently in movement – it has the experience that it cannot come to rest, as it has to keep looking for itself in confrontation with others. As can be seen in the dialectic of master and servant, the subject does not live in accordance with itself because it is determined by the other. What Hegel describes is that we have to go beyond ourselves – and this is even the case when using the simplest words. For example, we say in strong conviction that “it is night” to find out very soon that this sensuous certainty fails us (Hegel PhG 84). So we are called to go beyond this former state of thinking, to not close ourselves in with what we thought is simply true. The path of our experience is structured by challenge and by our readiness to giving up the formerly self-evident views and insights (of objects and of ourselves).

Reading Hegel's ‘absolute spirit’ not as a formula of idealistic fulfillment but as the strongest presence of negativity and fallibility, we encounter a very different Hegel (Gamm 1997) than sometimes portrayed. The metaphysical absolute is replaced by the consciousness of unrest: “The language of inner conflict is, however, the absolute language and the true existing spirit of this entire world of *Bildung*. This self-consciousness is related to the exasperation that distorts its distortion. In an immediate way, it is absolutely identical precisely in the absolute conflictuality, the pure mediation of pure self-consciousness with itself” (Hegel PhG 384). What Hegel portrays here is the priority of nonidentity over the idea of knowledge as ‘final identification’. For Hegel, conflict and contradiction form the inner heart of knowledge production. To put it differently, the more we confront ourselves with the contradictions the richer is our view of reality.

Let me use the ‘principle of charity’<sup>14</sup> as an example in this regard. This principle requires speakers who are in conflict with one another to place their opponent's argument in the best light. This is to say that the opponent's utterances should not be taken up in a sophistic fashion. The principle calls for an ethos that turns its back to controversial rhetoric. It places the speakers in difference to their own position. They are forced to think of the other position as their own. Therefore, the principle demonstrates truth as difference (Gamm 1986) – a difference that is characteristic to every speaking.

This is in accordance with Hegel's relinquishment of the self. By confronting our position with its strongest opposition, we gain more insights of what we think ourselves – and furthermore, can see more clearly the relations to the position of the other. This not only widens the argumentational scope of the field that lies before us, it can also make us susceptible to other approaches, other placements of ‘relevant arguments’. In other words, there might be a recognition of otherness and difference. So the example of the principle of charity demonstrates the admittance of the other.

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<sup>14</sup>Among others, Neil L. Wilson (1959) has re-established this principle, which has advanced as a central reference in the analytic philosophical tradition. See also Quine (1960).

Committing myself to the position of the other, I might arrive at seeing everything (the confrontation, my own position, the other) in a different way.

In this reading of Hegel, a strong emphasis is placed on the notion of negativity; for negativity is crucial in order to bracket consciousness' presupposed self-assertion, viz., the way it claims truth and knowledge. According to Hegel, truth and knowledge require exposition. The experience that we have in this exposition is the crucial point about *Bildung* as 'relinquishment of the self'.

### ***Bildung* and the 'Ethos of Modernity'**

In the first part of the chapter, it has been argued that '*Bildung*' forms the core of modern experience, for modernity is characterized by the breakup of traditional order. What comes up is the question of practice and along with it: '*Bildung*'. This concept precisely thematizes the task of human being's self-determination within the open and optimistic idea of modern progress. '*Bildung*' captures the endless self-transgression in modern experience. It is about the never-ending promise of becoming.

Referring to Schiller, Humboldt, and Hegel, different variations of modern *Bildung* have been presented. Schiller's letters on aesthetic experience present humans as beings of alienation and rupture. There is an irreconcilable tension of sensibility and rationality, of the sensuous and the formal drive. In play this tension presents itself as bracketed, it *appears* as being resolved; for in play a complex reality takes shape and allows for multiple sensuous and rational references. In this network (or root work) of references the answer to the question of who we are and what is going on in the situation at hand is opened and can be reformulated. This is the starting point for the transformation of the self, and Schiller was of the opinion that the transformation provoked by play will overcome the domination of rationality and recognize the aesthetic utopia of the state.

Humboldt describes the close relationship of language and *Bildung* in the roles they play in the constitution of reality. As speaking creatures we engage in a worldview; a worldview that is experienced as alien when confronted with another one. Humboldt's idea that all languages are different and irreducible forms a strong picture of modernity (until today). It connects *Bildung* with astonishment and liminality: We are confronted with the limits of our understanding – limits that might impact or affect our own lives; for it is a problem, then, to simply suppose a 'universal' that would encompass all particular world views. The experience of irreducible plurality requires us to confront ourselves with the language of the other. *Bildung* is precisely the mode of this confrontation (and not a result). Following Hegel, the experience of consciousness of itself has been placed in the foreground. Hegel sees it as a problem that consciousness places the limits and problems outside itself. The *Phenomenology* shows that consciousness can never reach identity with itself. We can only come to know ourselves on the terrain of otherness.



The readings in the second section present *Bildung* as a relation of difference: *Bildung* is not realized, but rather it exists in the form of a confrontation, of negativity and irreducible plurality. It has been argued that all three thinkers take identification and positive self-determination as a problem. Schiller determines humans in the context of a dual anthropology; Humboldt sees the ego at the edges of its worldview; Hegel, finally, describes the path of consciousness as relinquishment of the self. In each of these three positions, a criticism of metaphysics has been put forth in order to determine the significance of these readings for today.

With these readings in mind it is possible to criticize common philosophical views of modernity. It was Habermas who – in a famous lecture course on modernity (Habermas 1991) – presented modernity as determined by a limited concept of rationality, on the one hand, and who criticized the post-metaphysical thinking (Nietzsche, Heidegger, Derrida, Foucault) in its criticism of humanism as well as of philosophy, on the other. For Habermas, the modern criticism of Reason has maneuvered philosophy into a dead end, e.g., when Foucault discusses humanism as effect and process of disciplinary power. What Habermas suggests is to resituate modernity using the concept of dialogical reason. His own approach of ‘communicative action’ is, so to speak, the result of a particular philosophical reading of modernity.

The readings provided, here, show that modernity has indeed a much wider scope. The exemplary readings from Montaigne (1992) to Schiller (2000), Humboldt (2002), and Hegel (1970, 1990) emphasize the *opening* of Reason and the primacy of a skeptical reflection that can also serve as a point of departure for thinking *Bildung*. In these readings, there is space for difference, dispute, and dialogue. While Habermas’ view of communicative action is very strongly driven by the idea of consent, the readings presented here connect modernity to notions of negativity and irreducible difference. These concepts indicate that there is an auto-deconstructive move within modernity itself – and it might be this move that allows us to go back to these thinkers to provide (ever new) readings of a philosophy of *Bildung*; for is it not precisely the modern concept of experience that sets out the self in a permanent mode of transformation?

Lyotard, a thinker who discussed the margins of modernity, described the structure of experience as follows: “I am not anymore what I am and I am not yet what I am” (Lyotard 1998: 85). The modern experience of the self is about withdrawal. It is about the impossibility to declare one clear standpoint from which we could judge all our life or that of others. In a nutshell, this thought contains all the phenomena of educationally relevant modern *diachrony*, e.g., generational difference<sup>15</sup> in modernity. To be sure, the notion of diachrony is used, here, to name the problematization of tradition and the inconclusiveness of modernity. This also includes the readings of Hegel and other figures presented in this chapter. In other terms, the

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<sup>15</sup>The example of generational difference can illustrate what is meant by ‘educational diachrony’: What is important to learn, according the older generation, is not accepted by the younger generation. Moreover, what the older generation thinks cannot suffice for the following generation because there will be new developments. The notion of generational difference is also important when it comes to framing theories of *Bildung* in order to escape solipsism in educational theory.

move to go back to these authors and engage with them can precisely be seen as modern, i.e., as an attempt to grasp the conceptual frameworks of experience. Thus, what is argued here is that the mode of educational-philosophical reflection in this chapter rests on the modern notion of experience, the notion that we have not anymore and not yet said what there is to say about Schiller, Montaigne, etc. This kind of educational-philosophical reflection complements the approach of conceptual history that was also presented in this chapter, and it is about reconstructing how concepts (of time and progress) shaped modern experience around the 1800s.

So far I have not only argued that the concept of *Bildung* has to be grasped and explicated in the context of modern experience, which is in turn connected with plurality, negativity, and the overcoming of the one-sidedness of rationality, but I have also argued that the form of engagement with philosophical authors and texts in order to ‘re-actualize’ their meaning for us is itself part of modernity. So there is space for speculation and conceptual experimentation (in a positive sense), which is something different from how Habermas has presented modernity – as a very clear and evident *positioning* of a discourse. If modernity, however, is not to be understood as a discursive succession of philosophical positions, but rather as a form of ‘ethos’ – understood in terms of a certain comportment to the past, present, and future that is conscious of the inconclusive side of modernity – then we arrive at the notion of *Bildung*.

In his shorter texts on Enlightenment, Foucault has developed this notion: the ‘ethos of modernity’ (Foucault 1984, 1996). Going back to Kant’s famous text on Enlightenment in the *Berlinische Monatsschrift*, Foucault emphasizes that the important move in this text is to *claim the question of the present*: What are the conditions and the phenomena that we live in today? How do we relate to them? So modernity is about the work of the present, and Paul Rabinow, the editor of ‘What is Enlightenment?’ (where Foucault takes up this ‘ethos of modernity’) has, indeed, pointed out an intimate relation between *Bildung* and ethos (Rabinow 2003: 3). In his own book, Rabinow explores a form of philosophical research that is founded in this ‘ethos of modernity’, which he refers to as ‘*Wissensarbeitsforschung*’ (Rabinow 2003: 83). Rabinow presents this, literally translated, ‘researching knowledge work’ as a kind of ‘fieldwork in philosophy’. The outstanding task involves the further elaboration of the current modes of educational-philosophical inquiry and to reconstruct how and in how far they are indebted to a particular notion of modernity. To be sure, this task has to wait for another opportunity. In the final paragraphs of this chapter, some inherent problems and limitations of the modern conception of *Bildung* should be expressed.

Over the course of this chapter, it has been argued that modernity has an auto-deconstructive move because it is bound to its inconclusiveness. This idea is in accordance with the way contemporary thinkers such as Derrida have conceptualized the history of metaphysics, that is, as something that cannot be overcome. However, it has not yet been discussed whether current (post-metaphysical) approaches employ other modes of philosophical reflection than presented here. In this context, one would have to reflect on the notion of immanence as proposed by

Deleuze and Guattari (see Sanders 2018, in this volume) or the notion of impotentiality by Agamben (Vlieghe 2013; Lewis 2013). Are these intellectual projects of a *different kind*? How do we speak about difference in the broader field of philosophy (of education)?

Our time might be particularly challenging in view of the current fragmentation of knowledge and discourse. The experience within the academic world, i.e., its integration into capitalism, but also the ongoing devaluation of knowledge and research that is so clearly visible in current politics can give the impression that the inconclusiveness of modernity has collapsed on itself. The openness of and commitment to progress has turned against itself: It has turned modernization into the pressure of adaptation.

This is the assessment that Adorno (2003) reaches in his analysis of *Bildung* and modernity. Turning toward the history of the civil society, Adorno shows in his ‘Theory of *Halbbildung*’ that the promise of freedom and equality for civil society was abandoned and (violently) overturned. Do the current developments still fit the analysis that Adorno provided at the end of the 1950s? While this is, indeed, a ‘modern question’, it is still unclear how it should be addressed. Without providing a further reading of Adorno, it might be argued that the current developments of a ‘post-factual era’ can be presented as a dialectic of modernity. However, this statement cannot serve as a substitute for the need and significance of further analyses into the current situation of public and academic discourse. So it is an important task to grasp this crisis of academia (which appears, at the same time, as a crisis of democracy and *Bildung*).

It has been argued in this chapter that it might be productive to draw on the philosophical traditions of modernity and *Bildung* in order to work on questions and problems, even if we might come to the conclusion that our attempts have failed. For this experience might also be telling – for as Montaigne claims: “We are never at home, we are always beyond. Fear, desire, hope project us toward the future and steal from us the feeling and consideration of what is, to busy us with what will be, even when we shall no longer be” (de Montaigne 1992: 8).

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# Marx and the Philosophy of Praxis



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## Introduction

In the introduction to the first book in a contemporary series dedicated to Marx's contributions to pedagogical thought, the authors acknowledged that it was a "bleak time" for Marxist theory and research "in regard to education" (Green and Rikowski 2007, p. 3). Their sentiments were not without basis. In the halcyon days of postmodernism's apogee when the ideals of human liberation and social transformation were regarded as 'modernist', 'essentialist' forms of outmoded and 'totalizing' demagoguery, Marx was typically relegated to history's chilly attic of misguided dreams.

Yet, by the time the third text in the series was published in 2011, Marxists "had unexpectedly, unbelievably, come in from the cold" and there was an evident revival of interest in Marx's thought within the educational realm (Jones 2011, p. 1). Several events in the intervening years fueled this renewed interest including the 2008 global financial meltdown, the collapse of the world's largest economy, and the government bailout of American banks dubbed 'too big to fail.' And, there were, of course, various uprisings and anti-austerity movements challenging neoliberal economic policies in countries across the globe. Then came the Occupy Movement whose mantra 'We are the 99%' pointed to the obscene global disparities of wealth both between and within 'developed' and 'developing' nations. Expressions of popular outrage directed at the "deepening social contrasts highlighting social insecurity profiled against conspicuous elite greed" are increasing (Green 2012, p. x). Capitalism has reentered

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common parlance and is being debated in contexts beyond specialist academic and marginalized radical discourses. It is being named as a deeply problematic system and is “less securely empowered” as the “unspoken silent signifier for political economy of *the-way-it-is*, the TINA dispositional default which cancels possibilities for recognition or thinking through alternatives” (Ibid, p. xii).

However, recognition of capitalism’s ‘problems’ is not enough; they require serious scrutiny. The guiding thread of such educational analyses

must be the contradictions of capitalist political economy, the structures, forms, and processes of the ways in which value is created through routine exploitation, demutualization, and concomitant devaluing of the creators, while empowering property and accumulated value for corporate and individual *haves* at the expense of the *have-nots*, thereby devaluing humanity in general (Green 2012, p. x).

As Kumar (2012) argues, capitalism is about the “perpetual destruction of human creativity and bringing into the ambit of capital circulation every possible aspect of our life”; neoliberalism simply “represents the most callous and aggressive form of this capital-on-offensive” (p. 1). Neoliberalism has ushered in the corporate domination of all aspects of society, subjecting the world’s population to the judgment, whims, and morality of capital. It supports state enforcement of the unregulated market, offers limitless concessions to transnational corporate entities, establishes the market as the patron of educational reform, and permits wealthy interests to control most of social life in the pursuit of profits for the few. Its quest for ‘flexible’ labor has resulted in precarious conditions for many, including the well educated, for which the guarantee of social and economic security is nothing more than a faint memory of a bygone era. As we write, the gap between the rich and poor continues to widen as we observe, with horrifying regularity, a grotesque concentration of social, political, and especially economic power in the hands of the few.

In this context, we suggest Marx’s enduring relevance should not be underestimated. Most of his life was spent studying capitalism for he was committed to its abolishment so the potentialities of humankind could be realized for the benefit of all rather than being exploited by the few. Of course, today’s global capitalism is different from those earlier industrial forms he analyzed but it is “certainly not less class based” (Standing 2014, p. 10). Moreover, Marx’s “sketch of history remains remarkably prescient” and it continues to ground “many of the most persuasive visions of our own moment” (Kunkel 2017, p. 32). As such, Marx’s *fundamental* insights into capitalist formations still carry considerable conceptual weight. It is, therefore, imperative neither to approach his *oeuvre* as an inert body of ideas for mere contemplation nor to simply describe his philosophical influence on educational thought. Rather, his materialist formulations can be engaged as educative tools – Marxism as education – for challenging the reproduction of capital.

The guiding thread woven throughout this chapter is the ‘philosophy of praxis’ – a dialectical synthesis of theory and practice oriented toward transforming extant social relations. Praxis emphasizes the reflective human capacity to alter the natural and social world, sheds light on the historical specificity and structural foundations of that world, our ideological formation within it, and the conditions in which antagonisms take root. In so doing, it helps us to grasp the mutually constitutive



relationship between subjectivity and the objective, material world. In what follows, we begin with an overview of the key tenets of historical materialism in order to contextualize the philosophy of praxis and then proceed to examine how two of the most cited figures in educational thought – Antonio Gramsci and Paulo Freire – incorporated and expanded upon Marx’s revolutionary formulation.

## Historical Materialism

Historical materialism is not a phrase Marx himself used – he preferred ‘the materialist conception of history’, – and while scholars have long debated the degree to which there exists a conceptual continuity between the ‘early’ and ‘late’ Marx, few would refute the materialist core of his worldview reflective of his focus on modes of production, the production of ideology, and forms of consciousness.

### *Modes of Production and Capitalist Social Relations*

For Marx and Engels (1978), the “first premise of all human history” is the existence of humans who distinguish themselves from animals based on how they “*produce* their means of subsistence” and “their actual material life”. This mode of production is a “definite form of activity”, a “definite form of expressing their life”. What humans ‘are’, therefore, coincides both “with *what* they produce and with *how* they produce”, and depends “on the material conditions determining their production” (pp. 149–150). The human necessity to produce and reproduce thus underwrites all social relationships.

A mode of production comprises the entire complex of social life at a specific stage in history, including human actors as productive forces – that is, how they work to produce forms of sustenance – as well as relations of production which refer to the sum total of social relations humans establish in the production of their material lives. Taken together, productive forces and relations of production (the latter includes the economic relations between groups of people – i.e., forms of class structure) constitute the conditions in which people work to produce/reproduce the world. From a materialist perspective, history can be viewed as a succession of various modes of production each of which generates different sets of relations between the exploiting and exploited classes.<sup>1</sup>

The capitalist mode of production is based on private ownership of the means of production and was quite different from the ancient and feudal systems that preceded it. Within societies shaped by slave and serf labor, exploitation is blatant; the threat of physical violence ever-present. Under capitalism things *appear* to be

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<sup>1</sup>This notion of a succession of modes of production enabled Marx to critically historicize economic categories (e.g., wages and profits) that were conceptualized as timeless by political economists such as Adam Smith and David Ricardo.

different. Workers are legally 'free;' they are not bound to the capitalist in the way the slave is to the master nor the serf to the lord and are presumably able to sell or withhold their labor power. However, this freedom is illusory insofar as they become dependent on the sale of their labor capacity or risk "begging, vagabondage and robbery" as their "only source of income" (Marx 1973, p. 507). Within capitalism, then, exploitation is concealed and depends not on outright coercion but on the economic necessity to sell one's labor to capitalists for a wage.

The basic principle of capitalism is the "sanctification of private (or corporate) profit rooted in the extraction of surplus labor (unpaid labor) as surplus value from the labor-power of workers" (Hill 2012, p. 72). Labor-power is a commodity bought and sold on the market. Yet, it is different from other commodities since it is able to create value. This is its usefulness to capital for it is the extraction of surplus value from waged labor for the purpose of producing capital – wealth used to make more wealth – that is the ultimate aim.

In theorizing capitalism as a *social* relation, Marx identified the historical specificity of value-producing labor. For Marx (1967), the value of any given commodity is determined by "the labour-time socially necessary ... to produce an article under the normal conditions of production, and with the average degree of skill and intensity prevalent at the time" (p. 41). Commodities are exchanged in the market at costs that correspond to the necessary labor time embodied in them. However, surplus value is realized when a commodity is sold or exchanged for more than its labor value. When an individual works beyond what is necessary to ensure his or her survival, he/she is generating surplus value. To "extract the greatest possible amount of surplus-value, and consequently to exploit labor-power to the greatest possible extent" is the "directing motive, the end and aim of capitalist production" (Marx 1967, p. 331, as cited in Kelsh and Hill 2006, p. 4). Capitalists "must exploit their workers if they are to remain in business" since "exploitation is the fuel that moves capitalist production and exchange". Without "surplus value there would be no wage employment, no capitalist production, and the system would grind to a halt" (Saad-Filho 2003, pp. 35–36).

This remains the case despite manifold changes to the technological 'means of production' that have led some to conclude that we now live in an era of immaterial economies (cf. Lazzarato 1996; Hardt and Negri 2000). The notion of immaterial labor posits a constitutive change in capitalist relations brought about by the innovations of new technologies, the growth of service industries, and of knowledge work and suggests that a reconceptualization of labor and value is necessary because the relationship between them has changed since Marx's day. However, we agree with Ollman (2004) who acknowledges that while capitalism has "changed a great deal since Marx wrote" in many ways it "has changed not at all since that time". As he further notes,

the main structures of capitalism – that workers have to sell their labor power to capitalists in order to survive, that capitalists use their control over this labor to produce value and surplus value, that everything that workers produce carries a price and goes into the market ... have changed hardly at all since Marx wrote. And these are the basic structures, relations and processes ... that Marx devoted most of his life to studying.

Here Ollman implies that while some theorists of immaterial labor state that capital no longer relies on the exploitation of labor as the source of new value, there has not,

in fact, been a *substantive* transformation in the capital-labor dynamic. When the market capitalization of prominent exemplars of the immaterial economy (e.g., Microsoft, Amazon, etc.) is considered alongside Marx's economic formulations, calling immaterial labor exploitative is, arguably, justified. Not only can the 'waged immaterial labor' of the type done by Google or Amazon employees be regarded as exploitative, so too can all of the 'unwaged immaterial work' being done, for example, by so-called 'users' of social media sites and services (Brown 2013). Additionally, Fuchs is quite persuasive in his contention that the unpaid work done by 'users' on platforms such as Facebook, Twitter, Snapchat, etc., constitutes a situation of "infinite over-exploitation" (2011, p. 298). That 'users' do not often recognize the work they perform on social media sites as *work* further emphasizes the need to understand Marx's essential insights into the labor-capital relationship for while the location of production and the technological means of production may have changed, the exploitative relationship between owner and (un)waged worker has not.<sup>2</sup>

Unfortunately, the fundamental, exploitative basis of capitalism is rarely addressed in dominant educational discourses that too often ignore or render incomprehensible the historical specificity of the capitalist mode of production; capitalism simply becomes naturalized and normalized. Schooling is part of the way in which students (especially working class students) "mistakenly naturalize the social system, personalize success and failure, and, relating it to their schooling experiences, internalize the demands of the methods of production as self-evident laws of nature" (Green 2007, p. 18).

Since capitalism is a system based on the imposition of universal commodification, including, centrally, the buying and selling of human labor, it tends to reduce all activity to the law of value and the socially imposed law of exchange. Under "this classificatory grid – this 'classing' of the world – human subjects figure only as so much labor power" (Dyer-Witheford 1999, p. 9). This form of reductionism, unique to capitalism, has a totalizing grip on the planet. While other dominations such as sexism and racism are also reductive, neither "patriarchy nor racism has succeeded in knitting the planet together into an integrated, coordinated system of interdependencies. This is what capital is doing today ... it is subsuming every other form of oppression to its logic" (Ibid, p. 10).

The power of historical materialism lies in its ability to reveal how all forms of social oppression under capitalism are mutually interconnected and linked to its central organizing principles. In the totalizing logic of commodification, the specific antagonism is between labor and capital. The relationship between labor and capital, however, is not symmetrical. While capital depends on labor that it must permanently exploit, Marx illustrates how capital is relative, historically specific, and, therefore, historically surmountable. Capital, as a "relation of general commodification predicated on the wage relation, needs labor. But labor does not need

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<sup>2</sup>Some have suggested that the very notion of immaterial labor has worked to obscure the basic reality of life in which the condition for survival still depends upon the ability to sell one's labor power and has assisted capital in establishing the ideology that in a world of immaterial labor, capitalism has moved beyond exploitation (Camfield 2007; Cotter 2008).

capital. Labor can dispense with the wage, and with capitalism, and find different ways to organize its own creative energies” (Dyer-Witheford 1999, p. 68).

Indeed, Marx envisaged education and free time as essential to the development of one’s full potential and humanity. Whereas, capitalism created conditions in which “man’s own deed becomes an alien power opposed to him, which enslaves him instead of being controlled by him” and in which a singular, particular sphere of activity is “forced upon him”, in a noncapitalist society, nobody would be confined to one exclusive sphere of activity but could become “accomplished in any branch he wishes”. It would be possible for one “to do one thing today and another tomorrow, to hunt in the morning, fish in the afternoon, rear cattle in the evening, criticise after dinner, just as I have a mind, without ever becoming hunter, fisherman, shepherd or critic” (Marx and Engels 1978, p. 160). This points to the ideal of a nonalienated existence, one in which individuals forge alternative forms of social production that ‘humanize’ humans and transcend the dehumanizing tendencies of capitalism which produces divided selves.

Through the notion of alienation, Marx established a contrast between extant alienated labor in which labor-power is transformed into a commodity and the worker reduced a mere ‘thing’ and the ideal of nonalienated labor encapsulated in his concept of ‘species-being’ by which he meant the humanness of humanity, as constituted by our capacity for collective and creative production. The source of alienation in capitalist society stems from the fact that the “overwhelming majority of people” have to labor for a wage “in order to ensure physical survival” and a semblance of dignity while a minority “owns and controls the means of production”. A worker, therefore, hands over “effective control of his or her labor – in other words, his or her species being” (Brook 2011, p. 97). For Marx, the full development of humanity can only be realized outside of capital’s value form. And, since it is the working class that is radically alienated from its species being, it is in a unique and powerful position to challenge capital at its core.

The primacy Marx accorded to class has been the subject of much debate and those working in the Marxist educational tradition have often been castigated for privileging it over other conceptual categories. While it is beyond our purview here to engage these debates in depth as we have elsewhere (cf. Scatamburlo-D’Annibale and McLaren 2004, 2009), resistance to historical materialism is generally premised on the assertion that foregrounding class undermines other ‘forms’ of ‘difference.’ However, constructions of ‘difference’ (e.g., race, gender, etc.) are structurally implicated in the international division of labor. Social class is the “inevitable and defining feature of capitalist exploitation, whereas the various other forms of oppression are not *essential* to its nature and continuation, however much they are commonly functional to this – and however obviously racialized and gendered capitalist oppression is” (Hill 2012, p. 74). Having a concept of class

helps us to see the network of social relations constituting an overall social organization which both implicates and cuts through racialization/ethnicization and gender ... [a] radical political economy [class] perspective emphasizing exploitation ... takes the issues of ... diversity [and difference] beyond questions of conscious identity such as culture and ideology, or of a paradigm of homogeneity and heterogeneity (Bannerji 2000, p. 7, 19).

It is not Marxism that recognizes no differences; rather, these differences are abolished by capitalism that turns all humans into vessels of production. ‘Difference’ is encapsulated in the production/reproduction dialectic of capital, resulting in an acutely polarized labor market in which disproportionately high percentages of ‘people of color’ (especially, ‘women of color’) are trapped in the lower rungs of domestic and global labor markets and provide capital with its super-exploited labor pools. Undermining the “significance of class as a category that cuts across diverse forms of social divisions as well as the way it impacts and influences the systemic aspects of the world within which we live” disconnects “everyday human existence from the larger system where labor-capital conflict constitutes the basis of existence ... [it] is largely this disconnection, which has allowed the intrusion of capital in every aspect of our life (and now in its most aggressive form under neoliberalism) to become normative” (Kumar 2012, p. 3).

It is not that “some individuals manifest certain characteristics known as ‘class’ which then results in their oppression; on the contrary, to be a member of a social class just is to be oppressed”, and in this regard, class is “a wholly social category” (Eagleton 1998, p. 289). Although all categories are social, class is the “quintessence of the social”; unlike other categories, class cannot be determined except by the “position of the individual in society, and cannot be reproduced except through participation in the functioning of an economic system ... Class ... was created by capitalism” (Kagarlitsky 2000, p. 95). Class, then, is not merely another ideology serving to legitimate oppression; rather, it denotes exploitative relations between people mediated by their location in relation to the means of production.

Class has an objective existence as an empirical category and a subjective existence in terms of how it is lived and interpreted. Forms of ‘culturalism’ that have taken hold in contemporary educational thought cleave class from the relations of production and treat it merely as a subjective phenomenon that is culturally determined. Class is effectively cut off from the political economy of capitalism in which those who control and benefit from collectively produced resources only do so because of the value generated by those who do not. Culturalist narratives often confuse class with ‘class consciousness’, the latter of which is conditioned by social forces. Merely because individuals might not consciously articulate their sense of self/identity in terms of class or possess ‘class consciousness’ does not negate the fact of their objective location within larger class structures. This much Marx well understood for he postulated a clear distinction between the objective nature of class and the subjective aspects of class consciousness.<sup>3</sup> Writing about the French peasantry, he noted that

In so far as millions of families live under economic conditions of existence that divide their mode of life, their interests and their culture from those of the other classes, and put them in hostile contrast to the latter, they form a class. In so far as there is merely a local interconnection among these small peasants, and the identity of their interests begets no unity, no national union and no political organisation, they do not form a class (Marx 1978, p. 608).

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<sup>3</sup>Although Marx himself rarely used the phrase ‘class consciousness’, he did distinguish between a class in itself and class for itself in the ‘18th Brumaire’ and elsewhere.

Marx took great pains to “stress that social class as distinct from economic class necessarily includes a political dimension, which is in the broadest sense of the term ‘culturally’ rather than ‘economically’ determined” and that “class consciousness does not follow automatically or inevitably from the fact of class position” (Hill 2007, p. 82). This goes to the distinction between class ‘for itself’ and ‘in itself’. A ‘class-for-itself’ consists of members who are conscious about their commonalities; they form a group with shared interests and pursue them collectively. A ‘class-in-itself’ refers to members of a group who share a similar position in society’s economic structure but are largely unaware of their membership in the group and who consequently do not pursue their interests in a collective manner. In the contemporary world, it is the capitalist class that “does not lack class-consciousness, the subjective appreciation of its common interest, and its relationship within the means of production” (Hill 2007, p. 83).

### *The Production of Ideology*

Within historical materialism, ideology is not a ‘thing’, nor an ossified set of ideas; it is an embodied, lived, and dynamic set of social practices. Marx drew attention to ideology as an *epistemology*; he focused on the methods of knowledge production that de-historicize and depoliticize social understanding and serve to abstract and fragment social life. Marx and Engels expose the practices of ideologists who disembed “everyday ideas, events, and experiences” from their “originating social relations and interests” (Bannerji 2011, p. 53). Considering ideology as an epistemological maneuver used in the process of de-contextualization, Marx and Engels reveal how this is accomplished by the use of what they call ‘tricks’. Bannerji (2011) paraphrases them thusly:

We can begin by ‘considering the course of history’ by ‘detach[ing] the ideas of the ruling class from the ruling class itself and attribute[ing] to them an independent existence.’ Having detached them from their specific social and historical locations, we now ‘confine ourselves to saying that these of those ideas were dominant at a given time, without bothering ourselves about the condition of production and the producers of these ideas.’ Now we have a set of ideas or discourses independent of their social ontology. They appear to generate each other, appear even *sui generis*, but are claimed to be shaping, even creating, the very social realities that gave rise to them in the first place ... Only ‘if we ignore the individuals and world conditions which are the source of these ideas,’ says Marx, then we truly produce ‘ideology’ (p. 53)

Ideological methods/tricks sever ideas from their historical emergence and articulation within specific social/power arrangements. This “pulling apart of the social world is a political project” for such fragmentation “obscures the relationships between various social phenomena” and “experiences of exploitation” (Carpenter and Mojab 2011, p. 11). In an educative sense, Marx’s epistemology underscores a recognition that knowledge itself is historically specific and always in the making:

Rather than relating knowledge as if it were a thing to be acquired or possessed, with Marx’s epistemology, knowledge is a tool that we use to delve deeply into reality, and it is

a tool that we constantly test in order to ascertain whether it is enabling us to develop a more complex and comprehensive understanding of the world and our existence and experiences within it. We also test it to determine whether it enhances our ability to transform ourselves simultaneously with our immediate social relations, i.e., the social relations within which we are learning (Allman 2007, p. 61).

Although Marx's main focus was the method by which ideology is produced, he was also concerned with the thought content/ideas generated. Since they are ideas of ruling, they must be engaged as part of political practice. This requires contextual understanding and directs attention to who is producing ideas, for whom, for what purpose, and under what material conditions. In the realm of education, such a formulation directs us to examine where our social forms of consciousness are derived from; to ask how do we know what we know and where do our forms of knowledge come from? It accentuates the ontological dimensions of the 'social' and seeks to illuminate the material conditions undergirding the production of particular knowledges so as to reveal the contradictions that enable the circulation of certain ideas to the exclusion of others. It inquires not only as to what is said, but also into "what is not said, into the silences and the suppressed or missing, in order to uncover the concealed operations of power and the socio-economic relations connecting the myriad details and representations of our lives" (Ebert 1996, p. 7). In this sense, it is intricately linked to Marx's theory of consciousness.

### *Marx and the Social/Forms of Consciousness*

Marx's theory of consciousness grew out of what, in retrospect, may appear to be an abstract philosophical debate about Hegelian idealism. After Hegel's death, a group of radical philosophers (the 'Young Hegelians') – of which Marx was initially a member – began to challenge his idealist worldview. However, Marx eventually broke away from the group over a fundamental question: Who makes history and how is it made? In the Hegelian system, history was made, determined, and advanced by and through the development of human consciousness that existed exclusively in the mind or 'spirit'. Idealism essentially separated ideas from the material world and then designated them as "the creators or causes of real phenomena" (Allman 1999, p. 36). Ideas were perceived of as temporally prior to reality and the categories of thought used to interpret the world treated as if they were the underlying dynamic – the driving forces of history.

As a prominent 'Young Hegelian', Feuerbach developed a form of materialism that transformed the traditional subject of idealist philosophy into a predicate, and the traditional object, 'man', into a subject. By privileging 'man' rather than mind/spirit as the focus of philosophical contemplation, Feuerbach believed one could produce a more radical, secular worldview – a corrective to the abstractions (and quietist, conservative aspects) of Hegelian metaphysics. While Marx was initially drawn to Feuerbach, he eventually became a critic of both idealism and materialism for they created a dualism, a separation between thought and reality that led to a



reified way of thinking that he sometimes described as ‘thingness’. Marx believed the real world and consciousness should be understood relationally rather than as separate ‘things’. The “real world was, and always would be, changing and developing, and therefore it was historically specific” (Allman 1999, p. 37). Unlike the idealist view of history that in every period looks “for a category”, Marx and Engels (1978) believed it was necessary to remain “constantly on the real *ground* of history”. Rather than explaining “practice from the idea” it is important to explain “the formation of ideas from material practice” (p. 164).

While for Hegel and the Young Hegelians alike consciousness determined life and the course of history, Marx believed it was not the consciousness of humans that determined their being, but their social being that determined their consciousness. Consciousness is therefore understood as a social product but this does not undermine the capacity for human agency as some have claimed. For Marx, one of the flaws of both Hegel’s idealism and Feuerbach’s materialism was a passivist view of human existence. In both, human agency was the subtext rather than the ‘engine’ of history; “history and reality moved around and passed people, as if people were passive observers of a world moving without them” (Carpenter and Mojab 2011, p. 120). Marx believed that just as circumstances help to form human beings, human beings also help to form circumstances; they are not passive actors of historical processes. Consciousness and the activities of real people cannot be separated: “men are the producers of their conceptions, ideas, etc., – real, active men, as they are conditioned by a definitive development of their productive forces” (Marx and Engels 1978, p. 154).

This nonreductive materialism represented a decisive shift from Feuerbach’s formulations in which reality and sensuousness remained ‘objects’ to a materialism rooted in sensuous, human activity and practice. At issue here, however, is more than a theory of consciousness. In Marx and Engels’ new materialism, the active subject is restored to real-life processes, methods of inquiry that pertain are in the world, not separated from it and hence enable a form of practice explicitly linked to political possibilities. By combining a revolutionary approach to both being (ontology) and knowledge (epistemology) and positing “the inseparable unity of active existence with thought”, they had “created a theory of praxis (rather than simply one of consciousness) that linked thought and action” (Allman 1999, p. 40).

## Gramsci and the Philosophy of Praxis

The ‘philosophy of praxis’ is the theoretical nucleus of much of Gramsci’s thinking. An oft-ambiguous concept, the phrase was deployed as a linguistic camouflage and “euphemism to deceive the censor” (Hoare and Smith 1971, p. xxi). Imprisoned by fascist dictator Benito Mussolini, most of Gramsci’s *oeuvre* was composed in prison and subject to redaction. Hence, his use of the philosophy of praxis was essentially “a synonym for Marx’s historical materialist method” (Hill 2008, p. 7) as well as part of his polemic against deterministic and mechanical interpretations of Marx (Allman 1999).

Gramsci understood that humans do not make history in a cultural interregnum disinfected of the social, rather human agents

make their own history, but they do not make it as they please; they do not make it under self-selected circumstances, but under circumstances existing already, given and transmitted from the past. The tradition of all dead generations weighs like a nightmare on the brains of the living. And just as they seem to be occupied with revolutionizing themselves and things, creating something that did not exist before ... they anxiously conjure up the spirits of the past to their service, borrowing from them names, battle slogans, and costumes ... (Marx 1963, p. 1).

For Gramsci, the consciousness transforming potential of a philosophy of praxis may assist in lifting the weight of historical nightmares alluded to by Marx, leaving in their stead collectives free to envision and create new relations within which they could realize their “human potential to plan and direct” the historical future (Allman 1999, p. 11). However, the explanation of why individuals and collectives revert to modes of thought/action conjured from the hymns of nightmares past is explored by Gramsci via his interpretation of hegemony.

In Gramsci’s work, hegemony and its dialectical foil, counter-hegemony, are the conceptual anchors that ground an appreciation of the importance of ‘education’ – understood in the broadest sense possible – to either the defensive maintenance or revolutionary transformation of a given social order (Mayo 1999). One of his central insights is that physical force is, by itself, an insufficient mechanism of suasion. Like other socialist intellectuals of his era, Gramsci was trying to grasp why worker’s revolutions had not occurred in the West. Through his various investigations, he concluded that within Western ‘democracies’ there had to be two stages of revolution since power is exercised and consent manufactured not just through the political state, as was the case in pre-revolutionary Russia, but also within the sphere of ‘civil society’ inclusive of educational institutions.<sup>4</sup> In modern capitalist nations with ‘liberal-democratic’ institutions such as those that existed in the 1920s Italian context he examined, the dominant class gains consent to its rule, in large part, through the exercise of ‘hegemony’. Given that reality, Gramsci maintained that any socialist movement would have to undertake an extended campaign of organization and education in order to wrest cultural and political leadership from the dominant capitalist class. The building of oppositional or counter-hegemonic movements must therefore take place in the context of struggle in which class resistance and intellectual combat are dialectically related (McNally 1997; McLaren 2000).<sup>5</sup>

Hegemony denotes those processes through which beliefs commensurate with the interests of the dominant class are woven throughout the entire social fabric.

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<sup>4</sup>Gramsci distinguished between the state which he viewed as an oppressive instrument used by the dominant class to exert control – through force when necessary – and civil society which is the sphere in which a dominant class seeks to garner consent to its rule through institutions such as schools, media, etc.

<sup>5</sup>As some of us have argued elsewhere, while some suggest that Gramsci precipitated a conceptual shift from Marx’s class-based focus to a form of neo-Marxism in which the struggle for cultural/discursive hegemony trumps class struggle, such interpretations are, arguably, suspect for they take Gramsci’s critiques of certain overly economistic/deterministic versions of Marxism to mean that analyses of economic/class relations are epiphenomenal to cultural considerations (Scatamburlo-D’Annibale and McLaren 2008).

Achieving hegemonic control of a population is the condition of a dominant class no longer having to resort to force so as to manipulate the thought processes and actions of the ruled. Rather, it refers to the “consent of the led, a consent which is secured by the diffusion and popularization of the world view of the ruling class” (Bates 1975, p. 352). Hegemony is thus a commonly shared value consensus but one which is, nonetheless, constructed in the interests of the ruling class (Gramsci 1971). Securing consent is not a one-time process. As a result of the dominant class’ constant need to repopulate and regenerate the ideological content of civil society’s collective consciousness with perspectives congruent to its interests, as well as to immunize against ideas that may challenge it, the work of hegemony is ongoing since it is never absolute nor uncontested but open to challenges by opposing forces seeking to make evident the fallacies, oppressions, and exploitations lying just beneath the ideological veneer of taken-for-granted ‘normality’.

The creation and maintenance of hegemony is a matter of intellectual and moral leadership and is materially produced by conscious agents. Gramsci (1971) made a distinction between ‘organic’ and ‘traditional’ intellectuals. Organic intellectuals are those which a major social class creates for itself; they are tasked with promulgating the ideas and objectives of the class from which they are derived in order to provide it with “homogeneity and an awareness of its own function not only in the economic but also in the social and political fields” (p. 5). Traditional intellectuals were those ecclesiastics, scholars, etc., who “experience through an ‘*esprit de corps*’ their uninterrupted historical continuity and their special qualification” and hence fancy themselves as “autonomous and independent of the dominant social group” (Ibid, p. 7). For Gramsci, this independence was illusory and he exposed as mythical the notion of intellectuals as a distinct social category independent of class; similar to arguments made by Marx and Engels in *The German Ideology*, he believed their ignorance of their own location within the capitalist division of labor was the source of their erroneous theoretical musings. However, Gramsci’s major preoccupation was the extent to which the working class could generate its own intellectual force, one capable of leading people in counter-hegemonic struggles on behalf of their class interests (educating them to become a class-for-themselves) that could potentially abolish capitalism’s exploitative economic and social order.

Gramsci distinguished between common sense, ideology, and the philosophy of praxis. He stressed that “all men *(sic)* are philosophers” (1971, p. 323) insofar as all people hold some conception of the world. However, common sense is “fragmented due to the limitations and contradictions of our lived relations” (Allman 1999, p. 112). Those who create ideological forms of knowledge draw upon those fragments, offering partial explanations, but they “do so with a coherence capable of organizing people and cementing the hegemony of a particular ruling group” (Ibid). For Gramsci, the philosophy of praxis was a superior conception of the world, a thorough understanding of the social as shaped by the material conditions of production, a form of knowledge that stands in opposition to ideology since it attends to the analysis of the *origin* of ideas and thus has a contextualizing rather than decontextualizing impetus.

In relation to socialist struggle, Gramsci (1971) implied that leaders should problematize people's already existing thought (common sense); his political strategy is therefore based on a radical/critical education process that is collective and dialogical:

An historical act can only be performed by 'collective man,' and this presupposes the attainment of a 'cultural-social' unity through which a multiplicity of dispersed wills, with heterogeneous aims, are welded together with a single aim, on the basis of an equal and common conception of the world ... great importance is assumed by the general question ... of collectively attaining a single cultural 'climate' ... and must be related to the modern way of considering educational doctrine and practice, according to which the relationship between teacher and pupil is active and reciprocal so that every teacher is always a pupil and every pupil a teacher. But the educational relationship should not be restricted to the field of the strictly 'scholastic' relationships ... This form of relationship exists throughout society as a whole ... Every relationship of 'hegemony' is necessarily an educational relationship (pp. 349–350).<sup>6</sup>

In such a context, the notion of the organic intellectual takes on a collective character within a working-class social formation in which the role of theory is organically linked to the ebbs and flows of daily proletarian life and in which these intellectuals live their lives in an ongoing state of praxis (Fischman and McLaren 2005). Moreover, Gramsci's prioritization of an organic form of education emphasizes willfully ignoring the institutional boundaries that have historically confined it so as to denude the ideological distortions that cage human creativity and activity in ways that limit its transformative potential.

By actively engaging politically with others, rather than imposing ideas on them, organic intellectuals begin with people's concrete perceptions of their world (their limited praxis) and help them achieve a more critical conceptualization – one that lays bare the mystifications of 'common sense'. Gramsci, like Freire years later, urged organic intellectuals to forge a relational knowledge of, and with, the masses of workers to help them become self-reflective. His understanding of the indissoluble link between theory and practice requires active participation in all facets of the quotidian (and sometimes extraordinary) struggles of the working class and an investment in their future beyond the social universe of capitalism.

Organic intellectuals of the working class not only resist hegemonic processes but also strive to displace the existing order by leading the 'class-in-itself' to more elaborate forms of understanding capital's incessant drive for expansion, the antagonistic relation between labor and capital, and the political and ideological nature of class rule. The characteristics of consent and coercion that underwrite Gramsci's model are dynamic categories and therefore are capable of being adapted in counterhegemonic practices in which workers may be educated about the persuasive power of capitalist hegemony. In the contemporary context, this means acknowledging the root of capitalist exploitation within the extraction of surplus value and the potential for resistance that resides with workers on whom the system of capital

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<sup>6</sup>This conception of the educational relationship is one of Gramsci's many mediations on Marx's third Theses on Feuerbach – namely that the educators must be educated.

depends, even in the technology-driven world of the 'information economy' that supposedly thrives on 'immaterial' labor (Fischman and McLaren 2005).

As well, these organic intellectuals serve as role models who articulate the possibilities of workers to act as members of a 'class-for-itself' in order to secure a more equitable system of societal organization which, for Gramsci, took the form of a socialist society committed to uprooting value production and breaking from capitalism's pernicious logic (Ibid). Although the philosophers of praxis/working class organic intellectuals may at first be a small group, their historical task is to help others develop a revolutionary way of thinking about the relationship between 'knowledge' and 'being', to become themselves philosophers of praxis in the struggle to regain their humanity.

## Paulo Freire and the Liberation of the Oppressed

Like Gramsci, Freire was greatly influenced by Marx's theory of consciousness and his conceptualization of ideology – not as a thing – but rather as explanations, actions, and symbols that are “really only partial and fragmented and therefore distorted” (McLaren 2015, p. 141). In *Pedagogy of the Oppressed*, Freire analyzes the relationship between oppression and liberation in the context and historical development of capitalism and capitalist schooling. His pedagogical project seeks to transform individuals from being objects of educational processes and the mere receptacles of knowledge via what he called the 'banking method' of education, to empowered subjects able to participate actively in their own self-liberation. Although there have been attempts to domesticate Freire in the service of liberal/neoliberal education, his own writings (rather than interpretations of them) reveal a commitment to social transformation:

Dehumanization, which marks not only those whose humanity has been stolen, but also (though in a different way) those who have stolen it, is a *distortion* of the vocation of becoming more fully human. This distortion occurs within history; but it is not an historical vocation. Indeed, to admit of dehumanization as an historical vocation would lead to either cynicism or total despair. The struggle for humanization, for the emancipation of labor, for the overcoming of alienation, for the affirmation of men as persons would be meaningless. This struggle is possible only because dehumanization, although a concrete historical fact, is not a given destiny but the result of an unjust order that engenders violence in the oppressors, which in turn dehumanizes the oppressed. Because it is a distortion of being more fully human, sooner or later being less human leads the oppressed to struggle against those who made them so (Freire 1970, p. 28).

Similar to Marx's notion of 'humanization', Freire's pedagogy is dedicated to the historical, material, and situationally specific needs of humanity. His contact with Brazilian peasants in his early years shaped his subsequent assent to popular revolts against economic exploitation in Latin America and elsewhere. A central task is challenging both the logic of commodification and the pursuit of profit:

The oppressor consciousness tends to transform everything surrounding it into an object of its domination. The earth, property, production, the creations of men, men themselves, time – everything is reduced to the status of objects at its disposal. In their unrestrained eagerness to possess, the oppressors develop the conviction that it is possible for them to transform everything into objects of their purchasing power ... money is the measure of all things, and profit the primary goal. For the oppressors, what is worthwhile is to have more – always more – even at the cost of the oppressed having less or having nothing. For them *to be is to have* and to be the class of the ‘haves’ (Freire 1970, p. 44).

For Freire (1970), it is the location of the oppressed within structures of domination that positions them as agents of transformative change for they most acutely “suffer the effects of oppression” and therefore grasp the “necessity of liberation” (p. 29). But liberation will not be gained “by chance but through the praxis of their quest for it, through their recognition of the necessity to fight for it” (Ibid).

As in Marx and Gramsci, the concept of praxis is central to Freire and similar to Gramsci, he understands revolution to be a process with a significant educational component. He stresses that pedagogy must be forged *with*, not *for*, the oppressed and that educators/leaders must engage dialogically with them. Like Gramsci’s working class organic intellectuals, the task of educators is to work with people so they develop their capacity for praxiological modes of thinking that ultimately lead to action. Their role is not to tell people what to think but to enable them to think critically. The pedagogy of the oppressed has two distinct stages:

In the first, the oppressed unveil the world of oppression and through the praxis commit themselves to its transformation. In the second stage, in which the reality of oppression has already been transformed, this pedagogy ceases to belong to the oppressed and becomes a pedagogy of all men in the process of permanent liberation ... In the first stage this confrontation occurs through the change in the way the oppressed perceive the world of oppression; in the second stage, through the expulsion of the myths created and developed in the old order, which like specters haunt the new structure emerging from the revolutionary transformation (Freire 1970, p. 40).

Freire (1970) recognized, however, that the first stage must deal with the “problem of the oppressed consciousness” insofar as the perceptions of the oppressed may be “impaired by their submersion in the reality of oppression” and “conditioned by the myths of the old order” (p. 30, 31). Hence, “critical and liberating dialogue, which presupposes action, must be carried on with the oppressed” and the content of that dialogue “can and should vary in accordance with historical conditions” (Ibid, p. 52). At all stages of the pedagogical process, the oppressed must see themselves as fully engaged in the “ontological and historical vocation of becoming more fully human” (Ibid.).

Moreover, the insistence that the oppressed engage in “reflection on their concrete situation is not a call to armchair revolution. On the contrary, reflection – true reflection – leads to action”; this action constitutes “an authentic praxis” which becomes the “new *raison d’être* of the oppressed” (Freire 1970, pp. 52–53). In order to achieve this praxis, however, it is “necessary to trust in the oppressed and their ability to reason”, (p. 53) in their ability to critically comprehend the conditions of their being and how they are shaped by the dehumanizing social relations established by the oppressor. While Freire contends that leaders must trust the capacities

of the oppressed, he does not imply they simply accept their perceptions of reality. Rather, the perceptions must be “re-presented as a problem” since they may be “permeated by the dominant class’s ideology” (Allman 1999, p. 95).

This form of “[p]roblem-posing education is revolutionary futurity . . . it affirms men as beings who transcend themselves, who move forward and look ahead . . . for whom looking at the past must only be a means of understanding more clearly what and who they are so that they can more wisely build the future” (Freire 1970, p. 72). It also “posits as fundamental” that those subjected to “domination must fight for their emancipation . . . The world – no longer something to be described with deceptive words – becomes the object of that transforming action by men which results in their humanization” (Ibid, p. 74). This unmasking of deceptive words (ideology) is not merely a scholastic exercise or the simple attainment of critical consciousness for its own sake. It must involve action for it is only “when the oppressed find the oppressor out” and become involved in organized collective “struggle for their liberation” that they are truly engaged in praxis (Ibid, p. 52). The “correct method for revolutionary leadership” is not to implant ideas in the minds of the oppressed; the “correct method lies in dialogue”. The belief “of the oppressed that they must fight for their liberation is not a gift bestowed by the revolutionary leadership, but the result of their own *conscientizacao*” (Freire, pp. 53–54).

This conscientization necessarily entails ideology critique but more than this it calls for a critical awareness of the exploitative basis of capitalism and the need to transcend a mode of production rooted in the selling of labor-power. As Freire (1970) writes:

To achieve critical consciousness of the facts that it is necessary to be the ‘owner of one’s own labor,’ that labor ‘constitutes part of the human person,’ and that ‘a human being can neither be sold nor can he sell himself’ is to go a step beyond the deception of palliative solutions. It is to engage in authentic transformation of reality in order, by humanizing that reality, to humanize men (p. 185).

Contrary to liberal reformists who often equate conscientization with innocuous forms of ‘consciousness raising’ and have attempted to disinter Freire from the Marxist soil that nurtured him, Freire had little use for forms of social activism that left untouched the fundamental structures of society. For him human beings “do not get beyond the concrete situation, the conditions in which they find themselves, only because of their consciousness or their intentions, however good those intentions may be”. Praxis, in short, does not limit itself to a “simple verbal denunciation of social injustice . . . while still leaving intact the structure of society” (Freire 1985, pp. 154–155).

## Conclusion

The philosophy of praxis signals both an epistemological and ontological shift in the way we think about ‘knowledge’ and ‘being’ and the relationship between them; it is a method of analysis and a conception of the ‘social’ that involves a holistic, dialectical comprehension of reality. It allows us to grasp the ways in which capital



(and capitalist schooling) imposes on our lives certain forms of knowing, doing, and, indeed, ‘being’ and how its ideological practices preclude us from thinking about how we might realize, individually and collectively, our capacities for ‘becoming’ more human.

Its radical thrust lies in the recognition of the agenic potential of people to change the inherited circumstances that shape their existence and its commitment to overcoming a particular form of social being – a capitalized and commodified life. In this sense, its intent is to assist educators in imagining a vision of the world outside of capital’s value form, a space where labor would no longer be alienated and exploited and where labor would cease to be a compulsory activity and instead become a striving that encourages the full development of human capacity. It also poses a challenge to (i) idealist forms of educational thought that engage neoliberalism as a form of ‘cultural’ pedagogy but largely overlook that neoliberalism *is a class practice*, that it is “in the first instance” a set of “political economic practices” (Harvey 2005, p.2) promoted by capital’s organic intellectuals and (ii) those who invest themselves in discourses of scholarly ‘neutrality’ in which educators are expected to speak and write dispassionately and/or merely descriptively. For Marx, Gramsci, and Freire, it is not enough to simply interpret social realities; rather, there is a *pedagogical* mandate to transform them since the philosophy of praxis openly acknowledges that

there is no such thing as a *neutral* educational process. Education either functions as an instrument which is used to facilitate the integration of the younger generation into the logic of the present system and bring about conformity to it, *or* it becomes ‘the practice of freedom,’ the means by which men and women deal critically and creatively with reality and discover how to participate in the transformation of their world (Shaul 1970, p. 15).

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# Critical Theory and Its Aftermath



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Within the field of philosophy and theory of education there exists a plurality of theoretical perspectives that attribute the term ‘critical’ to themselves in some way, shape or form. ‘Critical Theory’ in a narrower sense was adopted to refer to those writings associated with the Institute for Social Research – the ‘*Institut für Sozialforschung*’ (henceforth: IfS) – founded in Frankfurt in 1923 (cf. Jay 1973; Held 1980; Wiggershaus 1988; Demirovic 1999; Honneth et al. 2006). This tradition, also named the ‘Frankfurt School’, was labelled ‘Critical Theory’ over the course of the 1950s in the field of German-language sociology. Due to the different social movements around 1968, this school of thought came to be the object of increasing public attention. However, the thought of a ‘Frankfurt School’ as a somehow homogeneous strand of theory is misleading. Rather, it must be viewed as a cluster of different and often conflicting perspectives (cf. Dubiel 1992: 12f.; Rush 2004; Rieger-Ladich 2014: 66f.). For this reason, it cannot be the aim of this contribution to give a complete overview of these positions and writings.<sup>1</sup>

With its aim of being not only socio-critical but also self-reflexive, Critical Theory has developed different understandings of ‘critique’. Nonetheless, a few central themes can be identified. First of all, critique in this context can hardly be compared to scientific procedures in the tradition of critical rationalism. Critique here is not a scientific method that considers the falsification of scientific statements

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Translated by Teresa Behrends.

<sup>1</sup>In this chapter, we refer exclusively to the developments of theoretical approaches following the research of the IfS. For this we outline, in particular, the German-speaking reception.

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to be its main task. Instead, the term stands for the – both analytical and normative – objective of questioning forms of power and domination embedded in modern society. Understanding the effects and mechanisms of the latter is then part of a discussion that can itself be understood as an unorthodox self-reflection of Marxism (cf. Horkheimer 1937/2002: 213ff.). Thus experiences of suffering and injustice, as opposed to propositions to be falsified, constitute the onset of critique. It aims at historically constituted social structures and the specific mediation of social forces and individual dispositions. In order to question these elements of force within society, concepts such as exploitation, alienation, reification or disregard come into play. Critique thereby focuses on the analysis of social forms of domination whilst simultaneously searching for possibilities to change and overcome them.

In the following, we focus on selected aspects of Critical Theory that have opened up new ways of thinking for a philosophy of education that are not yet fully explored. The second part focuses on the educational discussion at different points in time, how it has profited from a new political climate influenced by Critical Theory and how the reception made use of certain motifs and works. Finally, we emphasise the possibilities of combining critical perspectives in the field of educational philosophy rather than putting the different positions against each other.

## Critical Theory of the ‘Frankfurt School’

The history of what would be known as Critical Theory in the field of social sciences and research is often divided into different phases. Max Horkheimer’s appointment as director of the Institute of Social Research (IfS) in 1931 is often portrayed as the starting point of the development of this research perspective. The IfS was founded in 1923 by Felix Weil in Frankfurt am Main and financed by a foundation, therefore, enabling it to work independently. Around the time of his appointment, Horkheimer also became professor of social philosophy at the Goethe University Frankfurt. Taking this as our point of departure, we will outline some of the problems treated by the IfS during its foundation phase (section “[From inception to exile](#)”). We will focus on some of the theoretical shifts that are linked to the members’ experiencing the rise of National Socialism and the Holocaust (section “[Radicalisations of critique](#)”). This unprecedented historical situation significantly impacted the development of the IfS during the post-war period and its effects continue to influence it to the present day. Subsequently, we shall outline the generational succession of the ‘Frankfurt School’ represented first and foremost by the theoretical advancements of Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth (section “[The aftermath: reconstructions of critical theory](#)”).

## *From Inception to Exile*

A fundamental idea that oriented the group around Horkheimer follows a specific understanding of philosophy and social theory as ‘our time comprehended in thoughts’, which goes back to Hegel. This points to the goal of theoretically grasping society as a whole. Rather than analysing the social problems and crises of their times as isolated phenomena, the group around Horkheimer was, instead, trying to view them on a much broader scale, taking into account the general mediatedness of a multitude of particular social problems and society as a whole.<sup>2</sup> ‘Their time’ was formed by the economic crises and political struggles at the turn of the twentieth century, the devastating effects of the First World War, the failure of socialist ideas and their authoritarian manifestation in the Soviet Union as well as the collapse of the Weimar Republic (cf. Dubiel 1992: 12; Türcke and Bolte 1994: 10ff.). In these days, the disparity between the humanistic ideals implied by the Enlightenment, democracy and Reason, on the one hand, and social reality, on the other, became apparent. The analysis of these discrepancies was in principle led by the intention to continue with and renew Marxian economics (cf. Keckeisen 1983: 119).

This led to a second *leitmotiv*. As Marx states in the last thesis on Feuerbach: it isn’t enough to merely comprehend ‘our times’ in thoughts. Thus follows the demand for a significant change in social praxis as a main task of social theory. But in their perception of the society surrounding them, the social scientists at the IfS also noticed that those aspects (i.e. effects of class struggle or technological advances) considered to be agents of change in Marx’ prognosis did not in fact lead to the envisioned human emancipation from natural and social dependencies. Though society and its power structure were stricken with massive social inequalities, in addition to catastrophic events, the “powers of resistance that ought to have been mobilized were pulled in by the capitalist means of production” (Lehmann 2015: 20). Horkheimer once expressed this quite simply in 1932: “The world now has more raw materials, machines, and skilled workers, and better methods of production than ever before, but they are not profiting mankind as they ought. Society in its present form is unable to make effective use of the powers it has developed and the wealth it has amassed” (Horkheimer 1932/2002: 4).

In principle, there was a shared objective among early members of the ‘Frankfurt School’ to find explanations for the social calamities of the time in “the basic structure and the utmost aggravation of the pathologies of modern societies in order to draw conclusions for a practise of change” (Peukert 2015: 166). But to speak of a ‘founding date’ and Horkheimer as *spiritus rector* is misleading insofar as it tends to obscure the difficulties that, nonetheless, existed in developing a common ground for their diverse theoretical endeavours. Far from insinuating an identity of theoretical perspectives, we nevertheless would like to present two possible leads favouring

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<sup>2</sup>Because of the complexities of institutional and other relationships, we will not elaborate on the comings and goings of employees and associates of the IfS from different disciplines like psychology, sociology, (social) philosophy, economics and political science, art, literature and music studies.

the idea of a common theoretical basis, the various differences notwithstanding. First, one can speak of a certain *stance* or *mindset* common to all of these authors. This stance can be thought of as an underlying scepticism in the face of power structures that consider human beings, first and foremost, as disposable variables in the realm of economics and politics (cf. Horkheimer 1937/2002: 207; Winter and Zima 2007: 14). According to Leo Löwenthal, the connecting motif can be found in a certain negative and critical attitude prompting an “unrelenting analysis of the existing” (Löwenthal 1980: 80). Such a holistic horizon, however, makes such an analysis a complex and open-ended search for appropriate forms of theorisation.

This leads to a second trait or feature that these works can be said to share: the result of this search for reflexive modes of expressing this sceptical stance of refusal, as described above, is *the struggle to come up with a comprehensive theory of society and the individual*. The focus here lies on the struggle itself, since the traditional form of a materialistic theory of society had lost its driving force. Horkheimer and his colleagues were forced to look for changed theoretical positions as they grew more and more sceptical of Marxist concepts of social progress. Still the Marxian perspective was not dismissed altogether, but in fact radicalised in terms of a critical self-reflection of the materiality and historicity of all practical and theoretical discussions. Critical Theory, therefore, not only aims its critical trajectory at the historically conditioned forms of economic and political practice but also at the production of scientific knowledge itself. What is also at stake in this brand of critique is the position of the theorist herself as well as her intention to enable the formation of critical consciousness through an enlightened reflection of social grievances. This intention itself remains inseparable from the rationality and irrationality of an interest-based social practice. Theoretical concepts such as ‘reason’, ‘autonomy’ and ‘need’ are deeply interwoven in the socioeconomic structure of capitalist class relations (see Horkheimer 1937/2002).<sup>3</sup> In this respect, critical thinking is directed towards opposing dynamics. On one the hand, it does not abandon the historical perspective describing the social situation as a consequence of man’s struggle with himself and others as well as with the external natural circumstances as historically conditioned. On the other, this social situation is experienced as a “second nature” confronting the individual with its force and resistance (cf. Lehmann 2015: 21f.; Wiggerhaus 1988: 69).

In order to be able to work with this contradiction, the IfS sought to supplement its theoretical works with empirical social research. For Horkheimer this meant broadening the range of phenomena considered relevant to a theory of society: “namely, the question of the connection between the economic life of society, the psychological development of individuals, and the changes in the realm of culture in the narrower sense (to which belong not only the so-called intellectual elements, such

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<sup>3</sup>Early on, Walter Benjamin, who was only loosely associated with the IfS throughout his lifetime, sometimes with tragic consequences, demanded a revision of the Marxian thesis of the historical conditioning of all interpretation – applying not only to the phenomena to be analysed but also to the position of the researcher himself. For any proposition claiming to be true remains “bound to a nucleus of time lying hidden within the knower and the known alike” (Benjamin 2002: 463).



as science, art, and religion, but also law, customs, fashion, public opinion, sports, leisure activities, lifestyle, etc.)” (Horkheimer 1931/95: 12). This effort to include various parts of everyday life, socioeconomic aspects like social class as well as individual and collective cultural expressions required an interdisciplinary programme. As a result, Horkheimer considered the cooperation between different disciplines of theoretical and empirical sciences to be an indispensable strategy for the IfS.

The reception of psychoanalytic concepts was able to bridge these different disciplinary perspectives. It was Erich Fromm (1932: 23) who used a Freud-Marxist social psychology to explain influences of economic conditions on personal dispositions. His focus on the social conditions of the psyche results in a ‘characterology’ that claims to offer explanations as to why a majority of the population acts counter to their own objective interests (cf. Fromm 1932: 56). The analytic potential of this approach appears in the empirical works on the problem of *conformism, authority* and *prejudice*. Fromm (1980) was in charge of the first empirical study at the IfS in the late 1920s, which set out to find answers to the question why these social psychological phenomena were particularly prevalent among workers and employees – the segment of the population that would have been expected to be more immune to the fascist ideas that were on the rise at the time of this study. Because of the disillusioning findings that resulted in the concept of the ‘authoritarian personality’, the reactionary attitudes in the majority of the population became overt. A second collection of studies was thematically similar and is known mostly for Fromm’s contributions concerning the implementation of the authoritarian personality within the workings of the modern family (cf. IfS 1936).<sup>4</sup> Special emphasis was placed here on the thesis that in order to understand processes of submission in familial contexts, which Fromm already conceptualises as socially mediated, these are not to be understood merely in terms of repression. Instead, submission is linked to libidinal investments through ideology. Conformist behaviour is promoted by the promise of power yields and the possibility of compensating the erosion of traditional orientations in modern societies by means of (re)assurance through alternative authoritarian mechanisms. Another internationally known study grew out of the research project *Studies in Prejudice* conducted – in cooperation with researchers from the University of California at Berkeley – by those members of the IfS who had immigrated to the United States in the 1940s. The results from previous studies were developed further by Theodor W. Adorno. *The Authoritarian Personality* (1950) was an inquiry into the degree of susceptibility among Americans for antidemocratic propaganda, predispositions for ethnocentric prejudice and other authoritarian tendencies. As in earlier studies, the research was “guided by the following major hypothesis: that the political, economic, and social convictions of an

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<sup>4</sup>From the very beginning, Herbert Marcuse had been contributing to the work on the programmatic integration of psychoanalysis into a critical theory of society. His contributions to the studies of the IfS initially focused on the history of ideas. It was not until 1955 that he tried to combine this integration of psychoanalysis and critical theory with a utopian idea of the “liberated eros” (cf. Marcuse 1955).

individual often form a broad and coherent pattern, as if bound together by a ‘mentality’ or ‘spirit’, and that this pattern is an expression of deep-lying trends in his personality” (Adorno et al. 1950: 1). Although its methodological design and the generalisability of the results have frequently been called into question, it can be stated that the basic propositions, especially of this study, are of increasing relevance again today in the face of new populist movements and authoritarian regimes across the globe. The study also was an important source for discussions concerning the problem of authority and the difficulties with the collective memory of the National Socialist regime in post-war Germany, especially around 1968 (see section “[Critique of education: critical theory as philosophy of education](#)”).

### *Radicalisations of Critique*

According to Horkheimer, Critical Theory and its inquiries are led by the shared normative aim to find a way for society to implement “reasonable conditions of life” (Horkheimer 1937/2002: 199). The accounts of the atrocities committed during the NS-regime, antisemitism and violence against everything that the fascist regime perceived as deviant, and above all the widespread approval thereof among the German population at the time, caused the protagonists of the Frankfurt School to radicalise their theoretical position. In the end, it was civilisation itself that was at stake for Horkheimer and others. The *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, which Horkheimer and Adorno had been working on during the mid-1940s, may be the most prominent example of this intensification of negativity in their theoretical approach. The book relentlessly deconstructs the claims of the Enlightenment in an attempt to come to terms with the fact that the Enlightenment was unable to prevent the barbarity of the Nazi regime. It traces the genealogy of the instrumental use of concepts such as reason, liberty or truth, in which the ‘wholly false totality’ of society appears as both knowledge and practice. The authors’ objective here is to decipher this identitarian and instrumental calculus that has been predominant in Western societies since the disenchantment of mythical world views through progress and knowledge. Moreover, they analyse how this sort of calculus inscribes itself in spheres of politics, markets and culture but also in seemingly unconstrained everyday interaction (cf. Horkheimer/Adorno 1947/2002). As to the functioning of this enlightenment rationality, which had fueled the organized mass destruction of human beings in the first half of the twentieth century, Adorno writes: “There is nothing innocuous left”. (Adorno 1951/2005: 25). No such concept – whether it be reason, utility or humanity – can be assumed to contain a nucleus impartial to socioeconomic and historical conditions, which could somehow ensure the meaning and ‘innocent’ use of the concept. Each concept attains its relevance only in the ever-changing conditions of its particular usage and is, therefore, rendered problematic at its core. This also means that critical reflection, in terms of a goal and in terms of an intellectual practice, may not be dismissed, although it cannot hope to come to a final conclusion. It also implies that the search for change cannot make use of either the enlightenment

concepts themselves or whichever promising alternative. All that is left, according to Horkheimer and Adorno (2002: XVIff.), is a relentless form of critical self-reflection that cannot come to a halt in any given form or concept.

In this argument, the critical theorist needs to focus on what is both the problematic nature and the possibility of critique itself: on the delimiting dynamics of a use of instrumental reason submitting any object qua identification to domination. Critique in the sense of Horkheimer and Adorno is always all-encompassing insofar as it points to the reification of all natural, individual or collective expressions in the name of comparability and identity, fungibility and exchange value. For them “public life has reached a state in which thought is being turned inescapably into a commodity and language into celebration of the commodity” (Horkheimer and Adorno 2002: XIV). Moreover, both diversity and difference are used, disciplined and destroyed according to the “friend or foe” formula (cf. *ibid.*: 137ff.; Adorno 1951/2005: 131f.). This, in a dialectic turn, contradicts the concept of reason itself. As it turns out it is reason itself, as a praxis, that is responsible for the irrational developments contradicting the rational goal of emancipation “which aims at [...] an alteration of society as a whole” (Horkheimer 1937/2002: 208). For the authors of the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* (as well as for Herbert Marcuse 1964/2002), it seems impossible to separate the focus on epistemological views from the analysis of historically conditioned social structure, technology or *Lebenspraxis*.

Adorno’s further writings all adhere to this critical perspective and can be considered paradigmatic for the first generation of Critical Theory, radicalising the concept of negativity. His renunciation of affirmation, of any notion of reconciliation, nevertheless, tries to preserve a transformative view. This is achieved paradoxically by conceding to the historical and social conditionedness of thought, to the fact that thinking is always necessarily entwined in power relations. In terms of this radically negative dialectic, Adorno emphasises that criticism can only be of the immanent type. It is impossible for the individual to take a position outside of the social conditions surrounding him precisely because these social conditions are the determining force of him becoming a subject in the first place. The modern experience of reification and alienation<sup>5</sup> is inscribed in the individuals to the point that “the possibility of breaking out of it without unbearable internal conflict, even just in one’s mind, is ever shrinking” (Adorno 1965/95: 18). Adorno calls this a “triumph of integration” and ideology. Accordingly, the critical stance itself is, even in its innermost being, identifiable with the object of its criticism that it is trying to break away from theoretically and practically.

This radicalness is a recurring theme also in Adorno’s later works, in his antisystematic effort to systematize his philosophical positions in the *Negative Dialektik* (1966a/97) and the *Minima Moralia* (1951/2005), as well as the unfinished *Ästhetische Theorie* (1973/2000). It is also what shaped his role in the public dispute about positivism in German sociology (*‘Positivismusstreit’*). Together with Jürgen Habermas (who became a member of the IfS in 1956) Adorno criticised the perspective and methodology of Karl Popper and others (cf. Adorno et al. 1969/93) accusing

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<sup>5</sup>For current contributions to this debate, see Jaeggi 2005; Honneth 2015.

them of ‘fetishizing’ a formal-logical concept of science without taking into account the limits of formal logics or the social relations of productions that science is embedded in (cf. Adorno 1969/95: 280ff.). On the one hand, Adorno agrees with Popper and his criticism of an all too easy transfer of methods from the natural to social sciences and the basic relevance of working in a problem-oriented fashion versus misled beliefs in objectivity and normative neutrality (cf. Adorno 1962/95: 550f.). Contrary to Popper, on the other hand, it is central to Adorno’s position that the social sciences work with a concept of society at large and its reproduction through antagonistic processes on different micro-, meso- and macro levels.

### *The Aftermath: Reconstructions of Critical Theory*

As we have seen, for those belonging to first generation Critical Theory was centred around the assumption that all thought and action is embedded in its social conditions and their normativity in an all-encompassing fashion. It is precisely here that a point of contention emerges for the generation coming after Horkheimer and Adorno, whose protagonists will choose alternative theoretical paths. Here, too, we will have to limit our remarks to sketches portraying the two internationally known theorists that have shaped the project of Critical Theory since the mid-1960s: Jürgen Habermas and Axel Honneth.<sup>6</sup>

The diversity of their research had a big impact internationally and across (sub) disciplines in the social sciences and humanities. Both their inaugural lectures (Habermas 1968: 301ff.; Honneth 1994) refer to and, by the same token, adapt the programme that Horkheimer had announced in the 1930s: an “interdisciplinary endeavor of a critical diagnosis of social reality” (Honneth 1994: 88). But both also turn away from the postulate of radical negativity that was eminent in the theoretical framework of their predecessors, who had seen society riven by fundamental antagonisms, humanity dominated by an omnipresent principle of exchange, reason paradoxically turned into unreason and who were critical of ideology as a societal “total context of deception/delusion” (*‘universaler Verblendungszusammenhang’*) (Adorno 1973/2000: 252).<sup>7</sup> Both pursue the issue of how the “trace of immanent transcendence in everyday culture” (Honneth 1994: 90) can be conceptualised, which in turn can motivate critical research. They both stand for the reconstruction of Critical Theory and for a specific turn in its programme trying to avoid the first generation aporias (cf. Peukert 1993). Profiting from the influence of other

<sup>6</sup>Habermas succeeded Horkheimer in 1964 and was appointed chair of philosophy and sociology at the Goethe University Frankfurt. Honneth has been a professor for social philosophy in Frankfurt since 1996 and has served as director of the IfS since 2001.

<sup>7</sup>This concept reflects the fact that societal integration is imposed primarily by economic principles – a fact which is, throughout society, ideologically obscured, so that the experience of the corresponding contradictions, for example, between processes of alienation and the postulate of self-realisation, cannot be adequately expressed (cf. Adorno 1966a/97: 364).

international theorists, the leading paradigms in Critical Theory become the theory of communicative action for Habermas (a) and a concept of intersubjective recognition for Honneth (b).

(a) For Habermas, a social-scientific critique aiming at possibilities for emancipation is rendered impossible by the verdict of a historical and societal totality. In order to free himself from the theoretical necessity to conceptualise a pervasive subjection of inner and outer human nature to such a totality, he makes two important theoretical decisions. First, he disbands the prominent position of the Enlightenment concept of reason and its continuation in the philosophy of consciousness in German idealism. This allows him to analytically decouple the moral and cognitive development of the individual, on the one hand, and the internalisation of historical and societal forms of rationality, on the other. He then abstracts the levels of societal development from particular forms of everyday practice (cf. Habermas 1987: 382f.). Habermas is trying to separate the excessiveness of the structures of domination from the historically conditioned processes of communication and learning. The shift in his theoretical approach moves the focus from the subject to intersubjectivity, on the one hand, and from the modern concept of reason to communicative action, on the other. It is the structure of language itself that makes the difference (cf. Habermas 1971: 314): a language-based interaction does not simply follow the logic of reification, exchange and utility but needs to refer to the autonomy and responsibility of the individual. This “expresses unequivocally the intention of universal and unconstrained consensus” (ibid.). Habermas’ *Theory of Communicative Action* therefore “describes structures of action and structures of mutual understanding that are found in the intuitive knowledge of competent members of modern societies” (Habermas 1987: 383). These structures are seen as founded in human nature, on an anthropological level, as well as in the sedimentations of intersubjective communication processes.

A second pillar of Habermas’ theory is the differentiation of the concept of practice itself. In Marxian thought, this is located in the economic sphere of relations of production. In Habermas’ view, this reduces action to instrumental forms. His theoretical shift in the paradigm of production and interaction is supposed to overcome this perspective of an integration of all societal action in an all-encompassing system. By taking into account the differences between forms of action in this manner, it becomes possible to describe the conditions of social progress (cf. Iser 2008: 163; Honneth 1994: 94). This concerns another differentiation Habermas makes: his understanding of the concept of ‘work’ as an instrumentally rational action bound by technical rules and strategic analytical knowledge is opposed by his concept of communicative action. Communicative action is “symbolically mediated interaction” (Habermas 1968: 62) that can develop its own rational dynamic rather than being completely determined by social structures. It requires the intersubjective negotiation of shared values and mutual recognition (cf. ibid.: 62ff.). Ultimately, there is “a potential located within the individual and the human species – a potential for communicative reason constructed for intersubjectively mediated self-reflection, that stands opposite to the power and force of functional systems and which expresses itself historically not only in postconventional ethics but also in

modern legal systems and constitutions” (Peukert 2015: 185; cf. Peukert 1993: 164f.). The pathologies of modern societies stem from the powerful mechanisms of integration of economic, political, administrative systems or systems of mass culture that colonise different social arenas with their own instrumental rational action. Habermas’ thesis of colonisation thereby stresses the precarity of everyday communicative interaction and its validity (Habermas 1987: 113ff.374ff.).

(b) Axel Honneth’s adaptation of the Hegelian “struggle for recognition” (Honneth 1992: 7) presents another shift in Critical Theory. Honneth starts out by pointing out a deficit he sees in Habermas’ effort to fundamentally relate sociocritical analysis to normative principles of communication. For Honneth, criticism becomes relevant only in response to the “experience of infringement of intuitive concepts of justice” (Honneth 1994: 99). It is a ‘moral sensitivity’ that constitutes the starting point for theoretical and social-scientific criticism of social grievances. This type of moral sensitivity precedes communicative action rather than being triggered by the deformations of symbolic interaction. The painful experience of a “violation of identity claims acquired through processes of socialisation” (ibid. 98) is the primary precondition for connecting negativity and practical resistance (cf. Iser 2008: 162ff.). In the framework of Honneth’s concept of intersubjective relationships of recognition, subjective experience is situated in the context of the social organisation and distribution of appreciation. Critical analysis thus pertains to the damage to human identity formation that is done in the context of pathological developments of society and reason. This damage can be articulated in terms of injustice, discrimination or disadvantage and provokes reactions of outrage and shame on a corporeal level. In order to answer the always problematic question as to what can count as legitimate and reasonable in differing social contexts, Honneth distinguishes between three forms of intersubjective recognition. “The communicative preconditions of successful identity formation are: emotional attention and care in intimate relationships such as love or friendship, the legal recognition as a morally competent member of society and finally the social recognition of individual achievements and abilities” (Honneth 1994: 104). Honneth refers to the historical achievements in the extension of relationships of recognition – in the fields of family and friendship, politics and law, workplace and market relations. By the same token he refers to the dynamic contexts in which criticism of normative injuries is triggered, for example, in terms of disrespect for individual achievements or the discrediting of processes of self-realisation and solidarity (cf. Fraser and Honneth 2003; Honneth 2007).

In light of these negative images of social relations, the claims of the Enlightenment are still relevant, as Honneth points out: “To name the legacy of Critical Theory would entail to pinpoint the explosive charge contained in the thought of a social pathology of reason still pertinent for present-day theory; as opposed to the tendency to reduce social criticism to a normative, situational or local utterance of opinion, one would have to make clear its interrelation with historically conditioned reason” (Honneth 2007: 30).<sup>8</sup> This critical endeavour has

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<sup>8</sup>It is still a matter of debate whether Honneth’s work itself can live up to these standards. For an overview of the development of Honneth’s theory of recognition, see: cf. Iser 2008: 162ff. For a critical examination, see Fraser and Honneth 2003; Bedorf 2010.

neither been abandoned nor completely fulfilled, as indicated by the numerous international debates in fields like social philosophy and sociology, philosophy of language and discourse, aesthetics, ethics, legal studies (cf. Benhabib 1986; Honneth et al. 1989; Demirovic 2003; Rush 2004; Winter and Zima 2007; Forst et al. 2009) – as well as philosophy of education.

## **Critical Theory and Educational Thinking: Passages and Lines of Reception**

One can pose the question concerning the relationship between Critical Theory and educational reflection on different levels. First it needs to be noted that the authors of the ‘Frankfurt School’, especially those of the first generation, have themselves commented on issues pertaining to education and philosophy of education. A common theme here is the emphasis on the necessity to connect basic conceptual debates with sociocritical reflection. Therefore, most of their thoughts on the subject were overtly critical of the actual forms of educational studies predominant in Germany until the 1960s (see Adorno 1971: 133ff.). During this period of widespread search for alternative concepts of educational practice, new theoretical perspectives appeared on the scene (section “[Translations: from critique to educational programmes](#)”) that eventually became referred to as ‘critical educational studies’ (*Kritische Erziehungswissenschaft*). These approaches draw more upon Habermas’ theory than the theories and ideas developed by the first generation. As a response to this, further developments, in turn, called for a deeper reflection and wider reception of Adorno’s work in the field of philosophy of education. Another strand in the reception of Critical Theory constitutes a more philosophical debate concerning the concept of *Bildung* that draws on the work of Adorno (section “[Negativity and experience – connections to a philosophy of Bildung](#)”).

### ***Critique of Education: Critical Theory as Philosophy of Education***

Critical Theory refers to questions of education because it does not analyse social formations along the lines of ‘objective’ structural conditions. This is precisely the deficiency it sees in Marxist thinking, insofar as Marxism underestimates and does not sufficiently reflect the subjective dimensions of capitalist societal integration – i.e. the processes working on a psychological level and their repercussions on social demeanour. On a theoretical and methodological level, this opens up a space for concepts of psychoanalysis to step in, whereas on another, more thematic level, this causes Critical Theory to make education an object of attention.



The first work published by the group of authors at the IfS, ‘Studies about Authority and Family’ (*Studien über Autorität und Familie* 1936), is a theoretical and empirical enquiry into historically specific forms of mediation of society and the individual. Erich Fromm describes the family as the “psychological agent of society” (Fromm 1932/1999, S. 42) and, thereby, dismisses Freud’s view that the family and its inner dynamics is itself the root cause of individual personality formation. Educational practices are initially viewed as places where the reproduction of certain functions of society takes place. At the same time, these processes are not seen as simple, tension-free assimilation. Family, as a social institution, is much rather a room where contradictory elements are mediated. In this way, the authors of the study can show how the overall societal change towards a growing authoritarianism that was taking place at the time (see section “[From inception to exile](#)”) was generated by the interplay of individual, educational, social and family factors. So, already at this point in the history of Critical Theory, the possibility arises to frame the question of progressive and emancipatory change as a question of educational concepts.<sup>9</sup>

As Adorno’s later works and especially his radio essays show, the mediation of individual and society in relation to an authoritarian horizon is one – if not the most eminent (cf. Friesenhahn 1985) – educational problem for Critical Theory. The radio lectures – published posthumously (see Adorno 1971) – are perhaps Adorno’s best-known work in the German-speaking field of education. Although he explicitly takes a stand concerning questions of contemporary education, this is not to be misread as moral self-assurance or practical orientation for those working in the field of education.<sup>10</sup> The common theme of these essays can be identified in Adorno’s effort to promote a debate about urgent problems that are not sufficiently considered by educational studies in his view. The famous and often cited sentence “the premier demand upon all education is that Auschwitz not happen again” (Adorno 1966b/2005: 191) poses the question of accountability that Adorno himself could not answer in a non-conflictual way. Here, ‘Auschwitz’ does not just stand for barbarity as opposed to civilisation but, just as in *Dialectic of Enlightenment*, for a dialectic turn, i.e. for the worst excesses of rationalisation resulting in the rationally planned and calculated mass murder of European Jews and other persecuted groups. “If barbarism itself is inscribed within the principle of civilization, then there is something desperate in the attempt to rise up against it” (ibid.). Adorno says this in order to emphasise that one has to be conscious of this desperate element so as not to fall prey to a mere “idealistic platitudes” (ibid.). His aim is to invoke sensitivity for a problem that is

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<sup>9</sup>Especially Fromm was interested in educational concepts, and from the 1950s onward he became involved in educational projects, for example, in Cuernavaca, Mexiko: “He propagated A. S. Neills ‘Summerhill’, cooperated with Ivan Illich and Paolo Freire in Illich’s ‘Centro Intercultural de Documentación (CIDOC)’ and reflected on the pedagogy of Father Wasson, who managed an orphanage in his neighbourhood in Cuernavaca” (Funk 1983: 114; cf. Claßen 1991).

<sup>10</sup>Although this has not kept readers from ‘finding’ both in the texts (see section “[Translations: from critique to educational programmes](#)”).

just as urgent as it seems to be unsolvable. But it is precisely this sort of sensitisation for the entwinement of psychological dynamics and the greater social context that becomes an educational problem. The only remedy against the reproduction of the “authoritarian” and “manipulative character” (ibid.: 199) would be ‘autonomy’ – understood as “power of reflection, of self-determination, of not cooperating” (ibid.: 196), though there is no way of pointing out the specific educational means to achieve this. Adorno often expresses such reservations against educational solutions for social problems (e.g.: 195), but without implying that he does not still see these problems as educational.

Adorno and Horkheimer also adapted this idea of a dialectic turn from progressive developments into new forms of domination and oppression in relation to the concept of *Bildung*. In a speech given in 1952, on the occasion of a matriculation ceremony, Horkheimer stated that education was undergoing a crisis resulting from the process of civilisation itself (cf. Horkheimer 1985: 411). *Bildung* represents, for Horkheimer, a specific relationship between inner and outer nature rather than mere individual development as in idealistic concepts. The formation implied in *Bildung* has – through the historical developments of industrialisation and modernity – turned into a kind of treatment or processing, so that nature (including human nature) now appears as nothing more than the raw material to be handled in an instrumental fashion. Put differently, in these historical circumstances, education refers to the domination of nature and self. Confronted with this diagnosis, Horkheimer then sketches out an alternate concept of *Bildung* that consists in a certain form of dedication (‘Hingabe’) to objects closely tied to the reflection of their social contexts and collective debates around them. In doing so, Horkheimer emphasises the proximity between *Bildung* and political involvement (cf. ibid.: 416 ff.).

In comparison, one of Adorno’s well-known texts on the topic – ‘Theory of decayed *Bildung*’ (*Theorie der Halbbildung*, 1959a/97) – appears to take up where Horkheimer’s speech left off: addressing the same issues as well as the problems insinuated therein. Adorno understands *Bildung* in terms of the subject’s relation to culture (ibid.: 94). At the same time, he stresses the ambivalence in the concept of culture referring to certain antagonisms within society: in cultivation, the productive work or processing of natural resources, on the one hand, and culture in the arts and humanities as well as the noninstrumental production of cultural assets, on the other. The philosophical idea of *Bildung* once represented the emancipatory potential embedded in this antagonism in the sense of human enlightenment. In contrast, the social reality of *Bildung* is torn between assimilation and a calculus of fungibility, on one side, and social distinction and hierarchisation, on the other. Yet another difficulty lies in the fact that even the perception and reflection of these antagonisms are obscured for individual experience. What remains is ‘anachronism’ – i.e. the confrontation of the actual social reality with what the concept of *Bildung* is supposed to mean – in order to be able to refer to the critical nucleus in the concept of *Bildung* (cf. ibid.:121).

## *Translations: From Critique to Educational Programmes*

The German<sup>11</sup> reception of Critical Theory began during the formative years after the Second World War when the ‘Frankfurt School’ had considerable impact on the political and cultural climate of the new German republic (cf. Demirovic 1999). Within the German public consciousness, the suppression of both guilt and memories of National Socialism represented the prevailing attitude for much of the post-war period. Until the 1960s the working through the Past<sup>12</sup> was not seen as a political, biographical and educational task. But for the so-called *68 generation* the confrontation with their parents’ past deeds also leads to a general questioning of the bourgeois family and contemporary educational practices. In the search for suitable references in social theory, they (re)discovered the publications of the IfS, especially Adorno’s works, but also writings by Fromm, Horkheimer and Marcuse. Psychoanalysis, in connection with Marxist social criticism, similar to the earlier perspectives of Wilhelm Reich and Siegfried Bernfeld, gave rise to new points of view on educational relations and practices (cf. Baader and Hermann 2011). ‘Antiauthoritarian Education’ became the label for the new concepts of education that made an effort to better meet the ‘natural needs’ of children in the hopes that they would become confident individuals, also politically speaking, and that the intergenerational (re)production of the ‘authoritarian personality’ could be stopped (cf. Claßen 1973 and also, referring to international sources: Schroedter 2007).

Alongside these more practical considerations in the communes and in the *Kinderladen-movement*, educational studies were beginning to take note of Critical Theory around the same time.<sup>13</sup> The predominant strand of theory in German-speaking academic discourse during the first half of the twentieth century was the *Geisteswissenschaftliche Pädagogik*. By the 1960s, more and more doubts were voiced concerning the ontological determination of pedagogy and the isolated focus on an idealised ‘reality’ of education. Whilst some were trying to overcome this by promoting a ‘realistic turn’ to more empirical research, authors like Herwig Blankertz, Klaus Mollenhauer and Wolfgang Klafki, among others, made an effort to use the theoretical means provided by Critical Theory to enable a critical self-reflection of the *Geisteswissenschaftliche Pädagogik* (cf. Heyting and Winch 2004,

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<sup>11</sup> In the following section, we will focus on the German-speaking field of social sciences since the Frankfurt School was considerably influential here, though its impact went further than that. The writings and ideas of Critical Theory have been widely received in many different international contexts, as well, which cannot be discussed here in detail. For further reading, see, for example, the contributions in Kohli 1996, Sünker and Krüger 1999 and Gur-Ze’ev 2005 as well as further references in Peukert 2015; for an overview of the Brazilian sources, see Pucci and de Oliveira Silva (2015).

<sup>12</sup> See Adornos lecture of 1959b (2005): *The Meaning of Working through the Past (Was bedeutet: Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit)*.

<sup>13</sup> Moreover, different perspectives aiming at a sociocritical reflection of education and/or *Bildung* also referred to Marx and Hegel. Especially, the critical philosophy of education of Heinz-Joachim Heydorn (1970/2004; cf. Bünger et al. 2009) can be read in light of parallels and differences to the educational reception of Critical Theory.

314ff.).<sup>14</sup> Jürgen Habermas served as the central point of reference for this endeavour, especially since he promoted a critical, emancipatory interest for the sciences in his inaugural lecture in 1965 (Habermas 1968: 301ff.) and an even more in-depth treatment in *Knowledge and Human Interests* (Habermas 1971). The above-mentioned authors adopted this emancipatory stance (see Klafki 1971: 262ff.; 1992). Contrary to the sciences with a more practical or a more technical orientation, they established the profile and scientific self-conception of a ‘critical science of education’ (*Kritische Erziehungswissenschaft*) through an emancipatory turn of traditional concepts and methods.

From the late 1960s onward, this perspective grew increasingly influential,<sup>15</sup> due in part also to political tendencies of the time towards a reform of certain parts of the educational system. On a theoretic level the concept of emancipation refers to the problem of its specification (cf. Keckeisen 1983, S. 128 ff.). Again, Habermas became an important point of reference in this debate. His understanding of human interaction as a basic anthropological form independent of instrumental forms of action like ‘work’ enabled the educational discourse to conceptualise communicative action as a principle that could be seen as a remedy against the excesses of instrumental reason (cf. Peukert 2015: 183). According to this view, education itself was understood as communicative action (cf. Mollenhauer 1972) but also as an effort to create the competence necessary for the individual to communicate and develop informed relations to one’s self, the world and others. But this leads to the classic paradox of education: in order to create something, educational programmes need to presuppose precisely what they are trying to create, and in this case that would be communicative action and the individual ability to engage in it.<sup>16</sup> Generally speaking, it should be noted that in terms of this particular strand of educational studies “the reception of Critical Theory did not so much adopt the radical critique of reason of *Dialectic of Enlightenment* but rather certain key concepts like ‘emancipation’, ‘autonomy’, ‘responsibility’ and ‘criticism’” in order to apply them to a “much needed modernization of political culture” (Peukert 2015: 192). Accordingly, one can speak of a selective reception – if not a ‘non-reception’ – in this context (cf. Baader and Hermann 2011; Schäfer 2004). The disillusionment with the results as well as the political changes over the course of the reform of the school system, just as with this theory-immanent background, gave rise to numerous new variations on critical pedagogics and educational studies (see Paffrath 1987; Sünker and Krüger 1999).

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<sup>14</sup> Important sources are: Dahmer and Klafki (1968); Mollenhauer (1968); Blankertz (1963/1985).

<sup>15</sup> In particular, the expansion of the secondary and tertiary education sector, which was developed up to the mid-1970s, and the expansion of comprehensive schools, through which the Federal Republic of Germany sought to connect with international structures in the education system (see Peukert 2015: 187).

<sup>16</sup> In his critique of the educational reception of Habermas, Jan Masschelein (1991: 196ff.) has pointed out that such problems are related to a traditional philosophical understanding of action centred around the subject, which obscures the ethical implications of the Habermasian concept of intersubjectivity.

Contemporary perspectives linked to Critical Theory are trying to overcome the problems and deficiencies of the *Kritische Erziehungswissenschaft* described above. Instead of using only select concepts, Andreas Gruschka aims at explicitly describing a ‘negative pedagogy’ (Gruschka 1988). Drawing on the *Dialectic of Enlightenment* and *Negative Dialectics*, his objective is to incorporate the impetus of critical self-reflection that has not yet been fully explored for educational theory. For Gruschka, the fact that education’s encounter with Critical Theory had comparatively little impact is symptomatic for educational thinking in itself: the claim of directly linking theory and practice is traditionally embedded in educational thinking. This causes educational theory to shy away from thorough analysis of problems and inquiry into possible reasons for the failure of specific programmes. Instead, it all too easily soothes itself with postulates of seemingly ‘right’ forms of practice. By focusing on the conceptualisation of the ‘right thing to do’, pedagogy forgets to ask whether such concepts can in fact be redeemed. It can learn from Critical Theory how the socially conditioned irreconcilability of theory and practice can become productive when seen as a frame for critical self-reflection. The goal here is to scientifically reconstruct – and also find empirical explanations for – the interrelation and mediation of requirements and reality in order to understand “why pedagogy isn’t what it claims to be” (Gruschka 2015: 44). To understand the contradictory praxis that gives rise to the difference between what is and what ought to be, qualitative research uses the methodology of ‘objective hermeneutics’, which was developed by Ulrich Oevermann (1983) and draws on Adorno’s works. Besides providing insight into problematic educational cases, the task of critique here is to find options for practical improvements (see Gruschka 2015: 48 ff.).

Further theoretical developments connected to Critical Theory shed light on topics like heterogeneity and inequality, inclusion and difference. Annedore Prengel (1999) sees an important source for her ‘pedagogy of diversity’ not only in Honneth’s writings on the concept of recognition but already in Adorno’s thoughts on the motif of the ‘nonidentical’. This shows that Critical Theory’s objection to the formation of bourgeois-capitalist society is not confined to issues of the labour movement that more traditional Marxist theory used to be focused on. Its theoretical concepts are rather open to a wider scope of issues ranging from feminist to anti-racist or other political perspectives concerned with anti-discrimination and diversity. Moreover, since Honneth’s theory of recognition contains the theme of the basic human need for reciprocal recognition, it has been adapted both for educational concepts and in philosophy of education (see, for example, Hafeneger et al. 2013; Schäfer and Thompson 2010). It is important to point out that in the discussion surrounding the ‘recognition of the other’ the concept of recognition does not – as in the concept of tolerance – simply point to the mutual respect for one another’s specific individual or group identity. Instead, it interrupts and transcends such a logic of ascription and identification of group membership and identity categories. Recognition, understood in this way, is an ambivalent phenomenon infused with power and a form of constituting relations to one’s self and others. In this interpretation of the concept of recognition – and in light of *theories of subjectivation* – the discussion goes well beyond the ideas promoted by Honneth (cf. Balzer and Ricken 2010).

## *Negativity and Experience – Connections to a Philosophy of Bildung*

The strand of theory concerned with a philosophy of education is, even more than Gruschka's 'Negative Pedagogy', very cautious when it comes to programmatic designs. It is primarily concerned with the question of *Bildung's* scope as an expression of human self-realisation in the face of an indetermined relationship with one's self and the world. According to this view, not only Critical Theory's earlier works appear as a radical questioning of *Bildung*. Especially the form of critique prominent in Adorno's thought can be interpreted in light of a theory of *Bildung*. The above-mentioned text *Theorie der Halbbildung* bids farewell to the idealistic concept that categorically places *Bildung* outside of social forms of power. Here, the mere possibility and preconditions of *Bildung* are tied to processes of socialisation in which, for example, the 'culture industry' plays a substantial role in shaping the individual's experiences, one's ways of thinking and perceiving. Nevertheless, this reasoning is not just stating a completely closed 'context of deception' (*Verblendungszusammenhang*) eliminating even the slightest potential for *Bildung*. The paradoxical position of critique cannot be itself determined by the person inhabiting that position in the face of "objective deception" (Gamm 1985; cf. Adorno 1951/2005: 50). Therefore, critique, in an epistemological sense, and criticism of society are two inseparable analytical pathways. All thought – including critical thought – finds itself entwined in the social logics of disposing of and identifying 'things'. According to Adorno, this type of thinking necessarily cuts off everything that remains incommensurable with these logics. But the fact that this rational grasp can never completely take hold of the self, the other and the world opens a space of self-critical potential in which the identification can be turned against itself in order to "transcend the concept through the concept" (Adorno 1966a/1997: 27). Transposed to the realm of *Bildung* in terms of the interrelationship of the I and the world, this means that this interrelationship would be called to question its own formation, its own social conditionedness.

Current reflections referring to the concept of educational experience (*bildende Erfahrung*) also follow the path just sketched out and critically adapt the traditional concept of experience connecting it to some of Adorno's thoughts (see Pongratz 1986; Schäfer 2004; Thompson 2006, 2009). Central to Humboldt's neo-humanist concept of *Bildung* is the basic interrelationship of 'self-action' and 'receptiveness' (*Selbsttätigkeit* und *Empfänglichkeit*). If this is not to be conceptualised as a pre-social resource centred in the individual and its 'pure' and unobscured access to the world, then the eminent question is how to conceive of the experiences of experience obscured by sociocultural dispositives (cf. Kappner 1984: 20).<sup>17</sup> *Bildung* in this sense means the experience of the conditionality of experience, and enables at best

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<sup>17</sup>Adorno's *Aesthetic Theory* (1973) tackles the related question, whether modern art can be the place where the issue of impeded experience can or ought to be broached so that experience becomes accessible by way of its inaccessibility.



self- and sociocritical reflexive processes. Other themes that have inspired recent advances in the theory of *Bildung* are the manifold aspects of the concept of the nonidentical as well as the meaning of sensuality and corporeality. As a dialectic of identitarian perception and inevitable deception, the ideas of ‘mindfulness’ (*Eingedenken*) in light of the nonidentical and the “somatic dimension” (Adorno 1966a/1997: 203) call for new discussions about the presumed self-assurance of the subject of *Bildung* and its non-affirmative access to the world in the educational process (cf. Meyer-Drawe 1990; Koller 1999; Huhtala 2016).

## Critical Theory of Education Across Theoretical and Practical Borders

As much as Critical Theory is itself subjected to modern claims of self-understanding – due to its own problematisation of the contradictory consequences of the Enlightenment – it cannot easily be subsumed under categories like ‘modern’ or ‘postmodern’, which are often seen as dichotomous worlds of thoughts (cf. Wellmer 1993). It also seems plausible to view the relation between various critical theories – such as (post)structuralist, materialistic or cultural studies – not as mutually exclusive but rather in terms of discursive axes. The shared refusal to be confined to one theoretical place or approach to research, for instance the self-reflexive analysis of the manifold contexts of power and domination, currently open spaces for further discussions relevant to educational issues (Snir 2017; Gur-Ze’ev 2005; Dammer et al. 2015).

The above-mentioned philosophical ideas already point towards a type of thinking that recognises the fact that educational theory cannot rely on domestic concepts and traditions alone to describe educational thought and practice. Following these ideas, a philosophy of education would entail working on an open, transdisciplinary and critically informed (re)search. This openness and ‘estrangement’ of familiar educational programmes and conceptualisations can also be understood as a certain ‘boundary work’ seeking to question concepts such as emancipation, reason, subject etc. in terms of their limitations and delimitations in the context of societal formations. To illustrate this, the spectrum of critical reflections that can be linked to the critical theory includes (a) various forms of criticism of capitalism, its contradictions, (re-)production of injustice and inequality; (b) the problem of authority and authoritarianism, discipline or other forms of power and (political) resistance; (c) feminist and postcolonial deconstructions of concepts like rationality, recognition and desire, which question, e.g. the specific situating of the subject (cf. Masschelein 1998; Pongratz et al. 2004; Allen 2016).

Therefore, the reception of international critical perspectives – that in many different ways take into account the problem of the foundation of the critical position itself – seems to make sense in light of the project of a thorough and unrelenting analysis of social grievances (cf. Boltanski 2010). Moreover, the proximity to



Foucauldian analyses of power mechanisms and practises are discussed. These discussions focus, for example, on problems surrounding autonomy and self-realisation, pointing to the ideology and reversal of these concepts, especially in institutional educational contexts. Perhaps, what we are currently facing is precisely, as Judith Butler puts it with regard to Foucault and Adorno, the challenge “to rethink critique as a practice in which we pose the question of the limits of our most sure ways of knowing” (Butler 2001).

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# Phenomenology and Education



Malte Brinkmann and Norm Friesen

## Phenomenological Philosophy

Edmund Husserl (1859–1938) is widely regarded as the founder of phenomenology as a transcendental philosophy of consciousness. Phenomena do not simply *exist* for phenomenology, but *appear as something*, according to the *intentionality* of consciousness, which links subject and object. Referring to intentionality as the ‘shibboleth of phenomenology’, contemporary phenomenologist Bernhard Waldenfels explains that it simply means “that something shows itself *as something*, that something is meant, given, understood, or treated in a certain way... The formula *something as something* means that something (actual, possible, or impossible) is linked to something else (a sense, a meaning) and is at the same time separated from it” (2011, p. 21). Something appears as close or distant, strange or familiar, in memory, in taste or touch, or in plain view. A plurality of meanings arise according to one’s position, interest, and context and in keeping with spatiotemporal, intersubjective, and (im)material structures. As Husserl observed, such structures, in turn, can be said to represent ‘regional ontologies’ for various disciplines for phenomenological investigation.

Intentional engagement is constituted as *experience*, and many phenomenologists profiled below understand phenomenology specifically as the study and theory of *lived experience* (*Erfahrung*). However, the meanings that arise in and through such experience are not simply ‘subjective’ or ‘arbitrary’. Experience, as Husserl explains, occurs between the active making of meaning and its passive reception, arising both through ‘active passivity’ and ‘passive intention’ (2001). Also, in being

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directed to something in the world, experience is not the accumulation of sense data, but set in a context, and delimited by a 'horizon'. Every experience is situated in a horizon which encompasses earlier experiences, memories, and schemas and also anticipations and expectations as well as their fulfillment or disappointment (cf. Gadamer 2013).

Husserl's famous call to return to the 'things themselves' represents a rejection of the scientism, reductionism, and historicism of both the natural and human sciences and calls for a decisive turn to the lifeworld (Husserl 1970a). It also entails a method rather different from the experimental and observational methods of the former and the historical hermeneutic methods of the latter. The phenomenological method is that of the 'reduction' or *Epoché*, which takes three principal forms: the eidetic reduction, the skeptical *Epoché*, and the phenomenological attitude. In the first, meanings are multiplied by considering a range of perspectives, schemas, and theoretical models which can be playfully and imaginatively varied and applied. Husserl uses the simple example of the possible variations of a table's color, shape, and size, explaining that through an initial "abstin[ence] from acceptance of its being, we change the fact of [our] perception into... pure possibility" (1970b, p. 70). The skeptical *Epoché* appears initially as its opposite, namely, as the heuristic or provisional *exclusion* of possible interpretations, particularly those that might be considered dogmatic. Ranging from the understandings of the natural sciences and psychology to everyday discourses, phenomenology asks that researcher "keep strictly to that which shows itself, no matter now meager it may be" (Heidegger 1925/2009, p. 47). This abstemious exercise in 'letting-appear' or 'letting-see' is also known as 'description' (*Deskription*). The third form of the reduction, the phenomenological attitude can be regarded as the culmination of the *Epoché*, as a broadening of the particularly of the skeptical and eidetical methods to a more general attitude in which the world is not "accepted as actuality" (Husserl 1970b, p. 32), but becomes, "in a quite peculiar sense, a phenomenon" (p. 152).

Heidegger's critique of Husserl's conception of intentionality and of Husserl's grounding of phenomenology in transcendental consciousness is based on a hermeneutic phenomenology of being (*Dasein*) in which aspects of the phenomenological method (*Deskription*) are reconfigured as an existential process of understanding, as the explication of self and of being. In the late Heidegger, this "hermeneutic of *Dasein*" becomes a kind of "phenomenology of *Ek-sistence*" with the latter representing a kind of "standing out into the truth of being" (1998, 249)—and with language itself becoming the "house of being" (1982). Through phenomenology, philosophy critically breaks with the natural sciences and conceptualizes reality not in positive functional terms, but in negative ones reflecting a play between disclosure and concealment. "Being" appears only in a negative sense in the ontological difference between different "beings" (1976). Heidegger's post-human ambitions, namely, the de(con)struction of Western metaphysics, and the construction of the human not as identical with but as separate from being—rather than as identical with it—have had an enormous impact on recent continental philosophy (e.g., in Foucault, Derrida, Deleuze, Waldenfels).



Finally, Merleau-Ponty takes the experience of the body—which Husserl saw as a phenomenon of empathy and as the ‘zero-point’ of orientation in the world—and develops it as the foundation of social intercorporeality, contra Husserl’s egological and transcendentalist emphases. In *The Phenomenology of Perception*, Merleau-Ponty (1966/2013) describes corporeality as an ambiguous, social event situated between ownness and alienness. In *The Visible and Invisible*, Merleau-Ponty moves beyond what he came to see as his own dualistic emphases, focusing instead on the unity of the “flesh” of body and world, and the chiasmus that at once separates and joins this metaphorical flesh (1968).

In the wake of Husserl, Heidegger, and Merleau-Ponty, phenomenological philosophy has been taken up and reworked, above all in French philosophy. The challenges of the linguistic turn and structuralism, already recognized by Merleau-Ponty, have been addressed by Foucault and Derrida. While Foucault takes up Husserl’s critique of science and Heidegger’s philosophy of care (*Sorge*), he simultaneously recasts them through his conceptions of archaeology and genealogy, in terms of discourse, epochal *epistemes*, and practices of the self. At the same time, Derrida has corrected the ‘presentism’ of phenomenology, insofar as he notes a temporal displacement in the form of *différance*, in the absence highlighted through the presence of the word.

## Beginnings and the Anthropological Turn

The following paragraphs trace the connections between phenomenological philosophy and studies of education. There are numerous points of contact between the two disciplines or traditions (cf. Lippitz 2003a; Brinkmann 2016a, b, 2017a, b). The “phenomenological movement” (Spiegelberg 1960), of course, has not only influenced education but has also impacted psychology, sociology, and literary studies among other disciplines. Husserl’s notion of the various ‘regional ontologies’ of phenomenology has, in effect, been realized and elaborated—at least to some extent. The history of phenomenology developed here begins very early and has since branched out in a number of different fields and directions and is characterized by a turn toward philosophical anthropology relatively early in its development.

### *Aloys Fischer: Descriptive Pedagogics*

In his 1914 paper *Deskriptive Pädagogik*, Aloys Fischer formulates one of the earliest programmatic accounts of the relationship of pedagogy and phenomenology. Fischer is a representative of the *Münchener Schule* (Munich School) that developed around Theodor Lipps. The Munich School critically rejects Husserl’s egological conception of consciousness that claims the primacy of primordial experience and refers instead to the primacy of ‘reality’ or ‘*Real-Ontologie*’. In taking the ‘real’ as



their starting point, these early Munich phenomenologists broke away from Husserl's subject-centered perspective and anticipated ideas later introduced by Merleau-Ponty in his interpretation of the lifeworld.

Phenomenology, Fischer believed, is not a normative 'science' of practice. It is instead a *descriptive* one: It tries to grasp the subject matter at hand before this matter is defined theoretically or understood in relation to normative goals or judgments. He maintains that description can lead to pure facts (*Tatsachen*), free from presuppositions and prejudices. Of course, this is a proposition that is often problematized today. Fischer points out that describing a student's practice in school requires a highly developed pedagogical and humanist-psychological awareness: "[It] comes very seldom as a natural gift and can only be attained as the result of sound practicing" (1914/1961, p. 140). Fischer also identifies an important epistemological problem that affects educational studies (*Wissenschaft*) to the present: That education, unlike disciplines with clearly defined objects of research (e.g., geology), is notoriously insecure about its own subject matter. The method of description for Fischer is a way to reach intersubjective validation of experiences and a way to redefine *experience* as the subject matter of education. Fischer's thoughts and research have identified issues indispensable to phenomenological-pedagogical thinking and reflection to this day (cf. Brinkmann 2017a, b).

### ***Otto Friedrich Bollnow and Dutch Phenomenology***

After World War II and the years of Nazi terror, the phenomenological movement was in a weakened position in Germany, leading to a shift in orientation from the specifically phenomenological to the more broadly anthropological. Anthropology in this context refers to the science (*logos*) of concepts and notions of mankind (*Anthropos*) and operates on historical, philosophical, and linguistic levels. Otto Friedrich Bollnow, one of the main representatives of pedagogical anthropology, combined Heidegger's phenomenology with philosophical, linguistic, and anthropological emphases, as well as with a critical reception of existential philosophy and *Lebensphilosophie* (literally: "philosophy of life"). *Lebensphilosophie* focuses on life in its vitality, multiplicity, and emotional irrationality. It pays special attention to its elemental contexts (e.g., the lifeworld) and (dis)continuities within the life course (e.g., birth, growth, death). For example, in his book *Existentialism and Pedagogy: An Essay on Discontinuous Forms of Education*, Bollnow highlights phenomena that are part of what he calls an "education of discontinuity" (Bollnow 1959), including crisis, awakening, encounter, and failure. He carried out only a few studies which can rightly be called descriptive phenomenologies. These explore the phenomena of practicing (*Übung*), as well as human space and the 'pedagogical atmosphere'. In contrast to Fischer, Bollnow did not consider the ontological 'reality' of these phenomena as "pure" empirical facts. Instead, he theorized his object, education, in terms of expressions of life itself according to the understandings of *Lebensphilosophie*. Accordingly, 'the pedagogical' for Bollnow is almost entirely

reducible to the emotionally charged ‘pedagogical relation’, a notion developed before World War II by Herman Nohl, and one that reappears in the work of Max van Manen.

In the Netherlands, particularly in Utrecht, scholars similarly influenced by philosophical anthropology, existentialism, and *Lebensphilosophie* were developing broadly phenomenological approaches to pedagogy, psychology, criminology, medical practice, and other disciplines. These scholars included educationist M.J. Langeveld, who advocated for the development of the ‘anthropology of the child’ as an educational sub-discipline (1968a). Langeveld attempted to understand school and curriculum from the perspective of the child (1968b) and based his work on explicit epistemological linkages between phenomenology and pedagogy, approximating Husserl’s vision of ‘regional ontologies’. A second important Dutch figure was F.J.J. Buytendijk, a veterinary physician and theoretical psychologist who worked closely with the German Helmuth Plessner and who produced book-length phenomenological studies on *Woman* (1968) and on the subject of pain.

Despite (or perhaps because of) their contemporaneity and proximity, these Dutch scholars did not produce any writings that explicated the method and theory underlying their studies. They did not explicitly locate their work in the German tradition of philosophical phenomenology, nor was their work particularly germane to English-language notions of ‘method’ as a process applicable to any number of potential objects of research. Max van Manen has since positioned himself as interpreting the thought of these scholars for the English-speaking world and as advocating for their approaches to phenomenology and pedagogy.

## **From Existentialism to Lifeworld Theory: Phenomenology in Twentieth-Century Germany**

In West Germany in the 1960s and 1970s, German scholars developed concepts which reflected their changing intellectual and cultural circumstances, and which are critically differentiated from Bollnow’s anthropological and hermeneutical pedagogy. Günther Buck, Werner Loch (a student of Bollnow), Heinrich Rombach, Eugen Fink, and Egon Schütz all refer centrally to Husserl, Heidegger, and Hans-Georg Gadamer and have developed novel phenomenological approaches toward theories of learning, *Bildung*, and education (cf. Brinkmann 2016a, b, 2017a, b).

### ***Learning as an Experience (Günther Buck)***

Günther Buck’s study *Learning and Experience* was first published in 1967 and has since become a classic in German pedagogy (1989). Buck examines the experience of the process of learning from a historical perspective (referring, for example, to

Aristotle, Bacon, Hegel, and Husserl). Buck also develops his own theory of learning, which he frames with a hermeneutic of practice or action (*Handlungshermeneutik*). Buck's theory of understanding and learning as well as his theory of experience in *Bildung* are strongly influenced by Gadamer. From a hermeneutic perspective, understanding and learning are situated within a temporal horizon. Referring to Husserl's analysis of intentionality, Buck describes the structure of these experiences as involving cycles of experiential anticipation and fulfillment—or alternatively, disappointment or negation. The structure of experience is always based on previous experience, but it is also open to what is new or different—what can be delimited through the extension or expansion of the horizon that surrounds it (*Horizontwandel*). As our horizon is changed in an experience, future anticipations change, as do our understandings of experiences from the past.

In *Learning and Experience*, Buck presents a very precise account of the structure of learning-as-experience. Buck defines the 'negation' implied in disappointment or failure as a 'determinate negation', as a Hegelian dialectical annulment that is at once particularized and produces something positive. Such a negation nullifies a given intention and brings a moment of discontinuity into the continuity of experience. In this way, we not only experience something outside of ourselves, but we also experience ourselves reflexively: "Only in experience, in its turning back on itself, which at the same time is a change in our capacity to experience, lies the actual educative power of experience" (Buck 1989, p. 3). It is in this way that learning from experience consequently becomes learning as experience.

### ***Werner Loch: Learning and the Life Course***

Following the ideas of philosophical anthropologist Helmuth Plessner, Werner Loch developed a biographically based theory of education. Loch takes as his starting point a non-essentialist anthropology that sees the human being as an "open question." He then proceeds to conceptualize the phenomena of education *structurally*, both in biographical and intergenerational terms, as well as in terms of the process or experience of learning itself (Loch 2001). Similar to Buck, Loch succeeds in establishing an original, pedagogically significant conception of learning which goes well beyond the theory of his teacher, O.F. Bollnow. Like Hubert Dreyfus (discussed below), learning for Loch is concerned with 'knowing-how' (rather than with 'knowing that' or with 'propositional knowledge') and thus can be understood in terms that are both non-empirical and non-cognitivist. The lived body becomes important both as a category of reflection and as a phenomenon in and of itself, and learning is connected to sedimented habits and the habitus in general. To obtain this knowing-how, supportive and helping educational practices are important—as well as those educational practices that may be experienced as inhibiting and limiting. Loch works toward a determination of the negative aspects within educational processes. These are aspects which Buck has referred to as 'negativity' and which have attracted also attention in more recent German approaches (see below). In terms of

methodology, Loch points out the ‘poetic’ and ‘creative’ function of the phenomenological method and contrasts it to methods of hermeneutics and psychoanalysis.

### ***Heinrich Rombach and Eugen Fink: Structural Existentialist Phenomenology***

Towards the end of the 1960s, Heinrich Rombach and Eugen Fink developed new phenomenological perspectives on the lived experience of *Bildung* and education by using a type of reflection they christened ‘categorical reflection’ and by focusing on structures and what they referred to as ‘elemental phenomena’ (*Grundphänomene*).

Rombach developed a structural phenomenology (*Strukturphänomenologie*). He advocated a shift from anthropology to structural anthropology and from phenomenological pedagogy to structural pedagogy. Following Heidegger’s later thinking on humanism and ‘the human’, Rombach described humankind as (a) structure and as existing within structures, with the implication that one must give up a subject-centered and explicitly *human* science perspective as well as an explicitly sociological one (1979). Rombach distinguishes between various kinds of experience (e.g., political, economic, aesthetic) and contrasts them with the specific domain of *pedagogical* experience. Within education, concern and care, learning, wonder and astonishment, questioning and advising become basic phenomena for Rombach. Rombach’s distinction between *types* of experiences, which is important for educational reflection generally, was originally introduced by Rombach’s mentor in Freiburg, Eugen Fink.

Fink earned his doctorate under Husserl and Heidegger and remained Husserl’s loyal assistant, even when Husserl (of Jewish descent) was persecuted by the Nazis. Fink saw educational studies as a cultural practice that is to be sustained both as a field of study and also as a collection of practical life lessons (*Lebenslehre*). In his social phenomenology, Fink differentiates six fundamental co-existential elemental phenomena: play, power, work, love, death, and education. He sees these as connected to social, co-existential, and embodied practices in the time and space of society, and as an expression of care regarding *Dasein* after the ‘end of grand narratives’, to borrow a phrase from Lyotard (1984). Fink’s fundamental thesis sees ‘man as a fragment’, as something which exists neither as a complete being nor as an object. One can only experience oneself in relation to the world and to oneself in a fragmentary way. In this way, Fink shatters the totality of man and world or of man and nature as suggested by the human sciences has been shattered.

*Bildung* for Fink can no longer be *Allgemeinbildung* or general *Bildung* in a holistic sense; it can only be fragmentary. For this conception of *Bildung*, negativity (as defined above) is not an operation of consciousness but an existential trait of experience. *Bildung* can then be described as kind of coping with this ‘negative’ existential predicament. Accordingly, *Bildung* becomes a practical-existential experiment of meaning of a provisory nature: It is an existential and co-existential

practice, an engagement in the production and creation of meaning that is at most *provisional*. *Bildung* is also a reflective practice, given that the method of phenomenological variation can mark and compare different modes of experience in politics, arts, love, time, and labor. At the same time, the phenomenological reduction as a dimension of *Bildung* enables us to free ourselves from what are generally simply taken as facts and it opens up a broader perspective on what is possible. Phenomenology as a method for Fink is inseparable from the structures and dynamics of education and *Bildung*, forming a true ‘regional ontology’ in the sense anticipated by Fink’s teacher, Husserl.

Fink describes educational practice in terms of a ‘community of questioning’. This community is determined by power, by society, and culture, and it has as its reference point the collective predicament of ‘not-knowing’ and ‘not-knowing-how’ (1970). According to Fink, the relation between the generations is one that is also marked by ‘alienness’ (a notion also developed by Waldenfels, see below). Under conditions of alienness and insecurity, the community of questioning of the young aims toward future situations and considers options or possibilities to overcome difficulties particular to their situation. Education is thus characterized by difference and controversy concerning interpretations of such difficulties and situations. Fink’s theory of *Bildung* and education offers connections to Foucault and Derrida and to other poststructuralists who were themselves influenced by phenomenology.

### *Egon Schütz Bildung and the ‘Anthropological Circle’*

Fink’s student Egon Schütz developed his teacher’s approach into to “existential-critical pedagogy” and deepened it in the context of his many studies on anthropology, ethics, and aesthetics (Schütz and Brinkmann 2016). Schütz adds five existentials to the six co-existentials identified by Fink, seeing them as modes of human ‘relationship to being’ (*Seinsverhältnisse*): freedom, reason, historicity, language, and the lived body. The core of Schütz’ theory can be said to be constituted by the ‘anthropological circle’ as a fundamental mode of and limitation to human self-understanding. This ‘anthropological circle’ (also outlined in the final chapter of Foucault’s *History of Madness*, 2009) can be explained as follows: Theoretical, practical, scientific, and everyday definitions and conceptions of humankind can never lead to complete self-transparency. Humans remain subject to their finiteness and corporeality particularly where reflective and projective processes of self-formation (*Sich-Bilden*) and self-imagination (*Sich-Einbilden*) are concerned. Taking this anthropological circularity into account, Schütz describes *Bildung* as an existentially risky act of limited freedom, which takes place under the conditions of finiteness, corporeality, and co-existentiality.<sup>1</sup> Schütz sees education as a

<sup>1</sup> See also the archive of Egon Schütz at Humboldt-University Berlin: <https://www.erziehungswissenschaften.hu-berlin.de/de/allgemeine/egon-schuetz-archiv>

co-existential experiment, in which humans engage in practices of dealing with themselves and with one or multiple others as incomplete or imperfect beings. He applies the phenomenological methods of reduction and variation to develop this further: One's own view as well as different scientific theories and models are to be critically evaluated in terms of their anthropological presuppositions. The pre-meanings and pre-judices identified through this process are then bracketed in a skeptical *epoché*. Following this step, perspectives can be varied and stepping back from one's own approach and others' theoretical conceptions enables a variation of different views on the thing itself (*die Sache selbst*).

Viewed from the perspective of methodology, Schütz and Fink can be seen to clearly differentiate phenomenological research in education from a *pedagogical hermeneutics* (*hermeneutische Pädagogik*). Phenomenological description, unlike many other research frameworks—including others hermeneutic in nature—necessarily relies on intentionality; it is able to study acts and experiences only insofar as they are intentionally structured. Hermeneutics, for its part, practices a reconstructive interpretation (*Auslegung*) of something that is given as a text. As Loch puts it, phenomenological description aims at “working out how a human creature, who is equipped with a lived body, soul, consciousness and conception of self and thus becomes a self, can express sense-giving intentions at all” (2001, p. 1198; cf. Brinkmann 2015, 2017b).

## Conceptual and Methodological Plurality in the English-Speaking World

In the English-speaking world, phenomenological discourse in education has been defined by either an affirmation of or resistance to the dominant psychological and sociological paradigms, with notably little emphasis on the traditions, theories, and structures commonly associated with *Bildung*. English-language contributions are typically much more disparate and eclectic than the ones reviewed above, and include prominent researchers and methodologists from both cognitive and humanistic psychologies.

Starting in the 1970s, a wide range of texts and influences from the German sociology and the human sciences—including works of Dilthey, Husserl, and Gadamer—appeared in translation and have been gradually taken up by educational researchers and also by those developing qualitative research methods in education and psychology. Since that time, a range of approaches to phenomenology both as an empirical method and as offering insight for pedagogy and other practices have emerged. These range from relatively ‘egological’ articulations of phenomenology as a transcendental study of verifiable essences to a broadly Heideggerian interpretation of learning as ‘concernful coping’.

The survey of this pluralism provided below is not intended to be exhaustive, but rather broadly representative. The contributions considered include Hubert and

Stuart Dreyfus' 'model of learning' as the gradual acquisition of skillful coping or expertise. Particular methods also include 'phenomenography', developed by Ference Marton at Gothenburg University and popular in the UK, and the 'phenomenology of practice', and the 'descriptive phenomenological method' developed (respectively) by Amedeo Giorgi in the USA and van Manen in Canada. These also include Clark Moustakas' 'transcendental phenomenology', as well as 'interpretative phenomenological analysis' primarily associated with Jonathan Smith in London. With the exception of van Manen, these methodological variations emphasize an empirical, often positivistic rigor—all relying on data derived from informant interviews. In addition, none of these methods—again with the possible exception of van Manen's earlier methodological conceptions (e.g., 1989)—view education as representing a 'regional ontology' to which phenomenological methods are ontologically linked.

### *Hubert Dreyfus, Learning as Skillful and Concernful Coping*

Philosopher Hubert Dreyfus and his students and mentees (e.g., Mark Wrathall, John Haugeland) have engaged in a particularly productive and influential interpretation of the phenomenological tradition in general and of Part One of Heidegger's *Being and Time* in particular. Dreyfus, his co-authors, and many of his students do not see phenomenology as a research method, but instead regard it as offering a powerful refutation of and an alternative to broadly 'Cartesian', 'representationalist' theories of mind. They see these theories as being manifest in both scientific and popular discourses primarily in the form of 'computational cognitivism', a term which includes cognitive neuroscience, and which remains influential, especially in America. In developing this critical alternative, Dreyfus' work also articulates a widely referenced theory of learning and mentoring. Dreyfus' approach to Heidegger, as well as to learning as 'skillful coping', proceeds from an important and bold interpretive claim: That it is "our nature... to be world disclosers", meaning that Heideggerian *Dasein*—in contradistinction to Fink's and Schütz's interpretation—is individually embodied, situated, and directed by 'everyday concernful coping'. *Dasein* as individual consequently discloses "open, coherent, distinct contexts or worlds in which we perceive, feel, act, and think" (Dreyfus and Spinosa 2006, p. 265).

Dreyfus' 'model of learning' is most prominently articulated in the 1986 book co-authored with his brother Stuart, titled *Mind over Machine: The Power of Human Intuition and Expertise in the Era of the Computer* (Dreyfus and Dreyfus 1986). As in his other texts, this book is framed by a critique of the cognitive and computing sciences and artificial intelligence—particularly of models of expertise or 'expert systems' that were then fashionable. Adopting a stance reminiscent both of Loch's 'mode of knowing-how' and Schütz's 'co-existentiality', Dreyfus and Dreyfus present a five-stage model of learning as the acquisition of types of 'know-how'—forms of concernful coping in the world. These stages begin with close adherence to pre-



existing rules or plans, initially confirming rationalist empiricist accounts of mind and knowledge. But through gradual increased situated awareness, the final stages of “proficiency” or “expertise” are characterized by an intuitive grasp of situations based on deep, tacit understanding and by a kind of “ongoing mastery which... cannot be expressed in situation-free, purpose-free terms” (1992, p. 250).

These characterizations, like the model as a whole, confirm Dreyfus’ central premise that we are not simply aggregators of perceptual data, but ‘disclosers of worlds’, and the model has also been widely taken up in education—receiving the greatest recognition in healthcare and management. This model is seen, for example, as fruitful in the study development of “clinical problem-solving skills” or as providing richer understandings of “competency building” processes in professional development (e.g., Bergum 1997; Benner 2001). Dreyfus himself has also applied his model, albeit with mixed results, in discussions of the online world in general and online teaching and learning in particular (2001).

### ***Max van Manen: The Phenomenology of Practice***

Max van Manen has developed both a phenomenological method for empirical research and the outlines of a phenomenological approach to ‘pedagogical practice’. Van Manen characterizes his method as a “hermeneutic phenomenology”: an “abstemious reflection” that has as its goal an explicitly foundational “primitive or originary contact with the primal concreteness of lived reality” (2014, pp. 26, 41). Following Husserl, van Manen sees this reflection as abstemious or methodical in that it involves the phenomenological *epoché* or reduction. This is a process for which he outlines at least nine possible paths or approaches, including heuristic, hermeneutic, methodological, experiential, and ontological reductions. Van Manen’s abstemious reflection is hermeneutic in a heuristic sense in that it occurs through the composition, revision, and reflective interlinking of concrete but creative descriptive *texts*. These are texts which van Manen characterizes as (among other things) simultaneously vocative (or appellative) and evocative: “In the reflective process of writing the researcher not only engages in analysis but also aims to express the noncognitive, ineffable and pathic aspects of meaning that belong to the phenomenon” (2014, p. 240). “This task of reflection and imagination”, van Manen continues, “is mediated by empirical material drawn from life, such as anecdotes, stories, fragments, aphorisms, metaphors, memories, riddles, and sayings” (2014 pp. 240, 248). Despite its foundationalist emphases, van Manen links his methodology with conceptualizations from a wide range of philosophers, particularly French post-structuralists such as Jacques Derrida and Maurice Blanchot.

In defining ‘practice’ in his phenomenology of practice, van Manen is all-inclusive: “A primal notion of practice”, he explains, “refers to our ongoing and immediate involvement in our everyday worldly concerns” (2007, p. 15). Thus *unlike* other phenomenologists in education such as Fischer or Schütz, and *like* phenomenologists such as Dreyfus, the later van Manen comes to see his descriptive

phenomenology as a method that does *not* exist in a one-to-one relationship with education or pedagogy as its object. Instead, it appears in his most recent books as significant for the broadest range of involvements or forms of participation—all of which he regards as ontologically primary and simultaneously as the empirical ground for all phenomenological investigation.

However, unlike other popular understandings of practice (e.g., of Pierre Bourdieu or Étienne Wenger), van Manen understands practice in terms of ‘our pragmatic *and* ethical concerns’ (emphasis added). The ethical dimension is ultimately indispensable to van Manen’s account of practice, and it is unclear how it might apply to the term in its broader, cultural, ethnographic sense. Regardless, this ethical emphasis is pervasive in his work on *pedagogical* practice, where van Manen has focused on traditional human science notions of the *pedagogical relation* between adult and child and especially on the adult’s pedagogically *tactful* engagement within it. The pedagogical relation is seen by van Manen—as it was by Nohl, Bollnow, and Langeveld before him—as a singular relation that is simultaneously personal and professional, that arises *sui generis* between adult and child and in which the adult acts intentionally for the sake of the child’s present circumstances and his or her likely future (Friesen 2017). In this context, the adult’s actions are to be guided by ‘tact’ which van Manen characterizes in terms of ‘pathic’ understanding: situated, relational, embodied, and enactive forms of ‘non-cognitive’ learning and knowing. Indeed, both pedagogical engagement and research work for van Manen can be said to focus on a kind of ethically charged tactful engagement with their objects—with their common goal being to affect the student or the reader in ways that are pathic or non-cognitive, rather than in ways more immediately accessible to explicit awareness or cognition.

### ***Amedeo Giorgi and Clark Moustakas: Transcendental Psychological Methods***

Amedeo Giorgi’s *descriptive phenomenological analysis* works through what he calls ‘situated structural descriptions’. Giorgi views such descriptions as ultimately irreducible to any single interpretation. Giorgi’s is a ‘pure’ phenomenology, seeing its task as the description of objects of consciousness through the exercise of the phenomenological reduction, with the aim of arriving at ‘scientific’ essences, with the emphasis on the natural sciences that this brings in English. It “follows Husserl as strictly as possible: it uses intuition, it is descriptive, it acknowledges eidetic findings and it employs the pretranscendental reduction along with imaginative variation” (2007, n.p.). Giorgi’s method interprets Husserl’s contributions in isolation from the myriad aspects of phenomenology developed subsequently, including those hermeneutic-anthropological (e.g., Heidegger) or phenomenological-pedagogical (e.g., Fink) in emphasis. Recent examples of studies using Giorgi’s descriptive phenomenological analysis include *The Phenomenology of Koan*

*Meditation in Zen Buddhism* (Grenard 2008) or *The Lived Experience of Early-Stage Alzheimer's Disease: A Three-Year Longitudinal Phenomenological Case Study* (Robinson et al. 2012).

Given its transcendental ambitions, it is not surprising that Clark Moustakas' *transcendental phenomenology* follows Giorgi in its rather single-minded focus on Husserl's earlier accounts of his method, and its avoidance of subsequent developments in phenomenology and the human sciences. Moustakas, like Giorgi, also worked as a psychologist and developed his method through book-length studies on (and including) *Loneliness, Creativity and Love* (2004). In his transcendental approach, Moustakas encourages open-ended questions and dialogue as a form of data gathering, asking the researcher to focus on the 'naïve' descriptions available in these data. These descriptions are then subject to a type of phenomenological reduction, bracketing or *epoché*. In describing this process, Moustakas speaks of the researcher as working to attain a 'transcendental consciousness' that is open and purified, and through which the researcher can engage in 'an authentic encounter' with the object in question (1994, p. 85). In other words, Moustakas (like Giorgi) conceives of 'the transcendental' in terms of its most idealist and egological articulations in Husserl—conceptions that has been widely rejected in both phenomenology and philosophy since Husserl's time. These difficulties are exacerbated by the relatively matter of fact, point-form manner in which Moustakas and others present the results of their 'transcendental' investigations. These factors, along with Amedeo Giorgi's aspirations to 'scientific essences', can be seen to have encouraged a search for methodological alternatives in phenomenological research.

### ***Jonathan A. Smith and Ference Marton: Interpretative and Educational Variations***

Jonathan A. Smith's *interpretative phenomenological analysis* appears to be one of the alternatives just mentioned appealing to an explicitly cognitive and constructivist epistemology rather than to any egological 'transcendental consciousness'. Smith's approach shares with cognitive psychology and its constructivist variants a concern with mental processes, specifically those of 'sense-making'. Sometimes known simply as IPA, Smith's method has cognition as a central analytic concern and integrates aspects of symbolic interactionism of George Herbert Mead and John Dewey to understand how this process occurs in both social and personal worlds. It thus takes questions such as 'how do transgendered persons think of sex?' or 'how does HIV impact one's sense of self?' and discusses them in the context of structured or semi-structured interviews. It then analyzes participant responses in terms of what is called a 'double hermeneutic', in which the researcher tries to make sense of the participants who are in turn trying to make sense of their worlds. In this context, the researcher is asked to adopt both an "empathetic" and a "critical"

hermeneutic stance, with each presumably entailing a particular type of “bracketing” or *epoché* (Smith et al. 2009).

Finally, there is Ference Marton’s phenomenography. Although Marton emphasizes that his “phenomenography” is *not* “an offspring of phenomenology” (1986, p. 40), it is in many ways overtly positioned as a Husserlian ‘science of consciousness’. Like Giorgi’s descriptive phenomenology and Smith’s interpretive phenomenology, phenomenography has as its focus participants’ conceptions of the world around them, conceiving of these as the products of intentionality. In place of a pursuit of Husserlian ‘essences’, phenomenography derives ‘categories’ from this empirical data. Although Marton himself disavows any reliance on phenomenological bracketing, his method is dependent on a set of collaborative and also explicitly comparative or eidetic techniques intended to minimize the influence of preexisting theory and individual preconceptions.

Unlike Giorgi, Moustakas, and Smith, who developed their methods as phenomenological *psychologies*, Marton and his method are firmly situated in *education*. In this sense, Marton, like van Manen, can be said to have made broadly phenomenological contributions to educational theory. One particularly prominent example is Marton’s distinction, developed in the mid-1970s, between ‘surface-level’ and ‘deep-level learning’ or ‘processing’ in reading. In superficial reading, consciousness has as its intentional object *the sign* itself, or the rote learning of the text; in deep processing this object is replaced by *the signifier*, or the intended meaning of the text (Marton and Säljö 1976). Although rather reminiscent of Craik and Lockhart’s 1972 computational (and thus non-intentionalistic) notion of deep and surface encoding of stimuli in memory, Marton’s distinction is still widely cited.

## Contemporary Developments in English and German

As Marton and Smith both illustrate, when conceived of in terms of a research method, phenomenology has proven—and continues to prove—to be highly adaptable. This is further illustrated by ongoing work undertaken by both van Manen’s students and those of the generation of Fink, Rombach, and Waldenfels. Van Manen’s students, for example, are showing that his hermeneutic phenomenology can be adapted to the study of the widest range of experiences—from ones aesthetic in nature to others that might be deemed pathological. These same students have continued his work on both method and practice. Friesen (2011) has recast van Manen’s nine modes of reduction in the form of the basic ontological distinctions invoked in the everyday use of the pronouns ‘I’, ‘you’, and ‘we’ and applies these in critiquing cognitivist conceptions of learning and the self. Further directions are being explored by other phenomenologists in the field of education not necessarily connected with the phenomenologists covered thus far, with Samuel Rocha (2015) and Eduardo Duarte (2012), for example, experimenting with the imaginary and aesthetic aspects of phenomenological study and writing, and Gloria Dall’Alba (2009), Glen Sherman (2016), Mark Vagle (2015), and Oyvind Standal (2016)

working to connect phenomenology and a range of educational and methodological themes and emphases.

In the German-speaking world, scholars connected to Rombach and Fink have taken contemporary issues—ranging from biologicistic ‘neuro-pedagogies’ to ‘practicing’ as an exercise in power/knowledge—and addressed these phenomenologically, integrating insights of Merleau-Ponty, Levinas, Derrida, and, in particular, Waldenfels and Foucault. Bernhard Waldenfels’ notions of sociality, corporeality, responsivity, alterity, genealogy, and power, as well as his expansion of Husserl’s concept of intentionality have played a central role in this integrative work. Wilfried Lippitz (2003b) combines Levinas’ insights into otherness and their radicalization in Waldenfels’ notion of the ‘alien’ together with ‘exemplary’ lifeworld description to produce pedagogical phenomenologies of relationship with oneself and between generations. Käte Meyer-Drawe (1984/2001) also refers to Merleau-Ponty and his phenomenology of intercorporeality in order to rethink learning as ‘re-learning’ or ‘learning anew’ (*umlernen*) in connection with intersubjectivity. In so doing, Meyer-Drawe has also articulated a powerful genealogical critique of learning as an exclusively neurological phenomenon. Her work has inspired related phenomenological investigations of “learning-as-experience” by scholars connected with the University of Innsbruck in Austria who have developed a method of observation and description they refer to as “vignette research” (e.g., Agostini 2016). Finally, based on a phenomenological theory of practicing (*Übung*; see Brinkmann 2012) and attention (Brinkmann 2016c), Malte Brinkmann is examining temporal and corporeal experiences of power within learning and education by using video research. He works to develop the approaches of Fink, Schütz, and Lippitz further—toward a historiography, epistemology, and methodology of the phenomenological movement in education (see Brinkmann 2015, 2016a, 2017a/b).

## Conclusion

The epistemological question of the subject matter and the core of pedagogy as a discipline and profession on the one hand and the methodological question of adequately researching these concerns on the other were first raised in Aloys Fischer’s *Descriptive Pedagogy* (1914/1961). Subsequent work has followed paths both divergent and convergent, with some retaining the normative anthropological impulses of the human sciences through to the present (e.g., van Manen), others focusing on existential and ontological concerns (e.g., Fink, Rombach), and still others reaffirming moments in Husserl’s earliest methodological conceptions (e.g., Marten, Moustakas, Giorgi). Today, phenomenology is applied anew to reevaluate key theories of learning, practicing, and education to show them as lived experiences that are situated within the horizons of corporeality, responsivity, foreignness, and power relations. In German-speaking Europe, phenomenology has come to represent a discipline that connects education with broader questions of *Bildung*. In the English-speaking world it has gradually expanded to offer a plurality of variations

and possibilities for qualitative researchers. Its adaptability and longevity both as a philosophical orientation and a method strongly suggest that phenomenology will remain a vital and changing but philosophically grounded source of insight into education and other contexts of human care and formation.

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# Pragmatism and Its Aftermath



Stefano Oliverio

## Introduction

In what may have been the first comprehensive volume on the relationship between the pragmatist tradition as a whole and education, John L. Childs (1956) argues that “[i]n no sphere of American life has the influence of pragmatism been greater than in that of education” (p. 4). Indeed, “we can grasp the meaning and the worth of what has come to be known as ‘the new education’ only as we understand the salient features of the philosophy which *gave it birth*” (Ibid., p. 5. Emphasis added).

Childs makes almost incidentally a momentous statement: in his outlook not only does there seem to be an intimate bond between pragmatist philosophy and the new education but the latter *was born* from the former. In this sense, a sort of ‘genetic relationship’ is postulated. A couple of decades later, Sidney Hook (1973), the standard-bearer of pragmatism in the epoch of its academic eclipse, assumed a different position: on the one hand, he curtly contested that “a metaphysical or epistemological position has logical implications for educational theory and practice” (p. 15); on the other, he recognized that “there is an organic connection in Dewey’s own thinking between his philosophical ideas and his educational proposals”, although “they are not related as logical premise to logical conclusion” (p. 40). More recently, Randall Curren (2009) has given a negative answer to the question of “whether there is a distinctively pragmatist approach to philosophy of education” (p. 499).

Despite the different focus of their reflections, considering together Childs, Hook, and Curren allows one to identify a sort of (admittedly sketchy) map of the positions regarding the relationships between pragmatism and (philosophy of)

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education, ranging from the genetic dependence of the latter on the former to a substantial unconnectedness. In this chapter, while no genetic relationship between pragmatism and specific educational movements is advocated, the endeavor is that of highlighting how it has introduced into the philosophical discourse some ideas which have reverberated on education (and still do).

The motifs which have marked pragmatism as a ‘school’—despite some incontrovertible differences among its representatives—are epitomized by Richard Bernstein (1991), who has listed “five interrelated substantive themes that enable us to characterize the pragmatic *ēthos*” (p. 326): anti-foundationalism, fallibilism, the social character of the self and the nurturing of critical communities, the awareness of chance and contingency, and plurality (Ibid., pp. 326 ff.). Bernstein has also pointed out how classic pragmatists “were robust naturalists stressing the *continuity* of human beings with the rest of nature” and insisted on “the need for philosophy to be informed by, and open to, the significance of novel scientific developments” (Bernstein 2010, pp. 8–9). In the wake of these considerations, in section “Themes and motifs of classic pragmatism and their educational import” some major themes of classic pragmatist philosophy will be discussed and their import for (philosophy of) education explored.

Section “Neo-pragmatism and the linguistic turn” will be devoted to the ‘aftermath’ of pragmatism: as it will be impossible to present the multifarious ways in which neo-pragmatism has been resuming and reviving the classic pragmatist heritage in the light of some outcomes of the analytic tradition (Cometti 2010; Malachowski 2013; Misak 2013; Calcaterra et al. 2015), the focus will be rather confined to some traits that distinguish the neo-pragmatist stance.

In the final section, in the light of some recent debates, I am going to indicate what seems to be the topicality of a pragmatist attitude in contemporary educational scenarios.

## Themes and Motifs of Classic Pragmatism and Their Educational Import

Dewey has argued that philosophy is “a conversion of [a] culture as exists into consciousness, into an imagination which is logically coherent and is not incompatible with what is factually known. [...] If American civilization does not eventuate in an imaginative formulation of itself, if it merely re-arranges the figures already named and placed, in playing an inherited European game, that fact is itself the measure of the culture which we have achieved” (LW 3, p. 9).<sup>1</sup> Accordingly, pragmatism should be construed as an imaginative formulation of American civilization in a specific

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<sup>1</sup> Citations of the works of Dewey are from the critical edition published by Southern Illinois University Press (Dewey 1969–1991). Volume and page numbers follow the initials of the series. Abbreviations for the volumes used are: EW *The Early Works* (1882–1898); MW *The Middle Works* (1899–1924); LW *The Later Works* (1925–1953).

phase of its development. Born in Cambridge (Mass.) in the 1870s, with the meetings of the Metaphysical Club—a circle of scholars of different background<sup>2</sup>—pragmatism can be read as a way of articulating a philosophical response to the challenges that the US society had to face in the aftermath of the Civil War and, subsequently, over the last decades of the nineteenth century and the first decades of the twentieth century, with the emergence of industrialism (understood as the social outcome of the development of science and technology), the rocketing urbanization, and the massive immigration; all these phenomena were reshaping the US society and invoked adequate responses to keep the American experiment alive.

The classic pragmatists were well aware of this background: in his introduction to Mead's *Mind, Self, & Society* (1967), Charles Morris writes: “Darwinism, the experimental method, and democracy are the headwaters of the pragmatic stream” (p. x). This outlook echoes Dewey's preface to *Democracy and Education* (MW 9, p. 3) and represents a valid snapshot of the intellectual and cultural forces from which pragmatism emerged as a philosophy (of education). It should be complemented, however, with the reference to a typical philosophical element: pragmatism is characterized by a fundamental anti-dualism. This habit of thought has been hegemonic throughout the history of Western metaphysics from its very inception and was re-launched by Descartes with the *res cogitans/res extensa* opposition, reverberating on most epistemological debates. A vast array of dualisms (body/mind, experience/thought, impulse/reason, action/theory, etc.) has consequently dominated the modern philosophical reflection, and the antithesis between philosophical schools has been constant (fundamentally epitomized in the contrast between an empiricist and a rationalist strand).

Although all the pragmatists are characterized by a clear anti-dualist stance, it is John Dewey to be most committed to smoking out and dissolving the dualisms that have been plaguing the Western tradition. Dewey is particularly careful in detecting not only their theoretical untenability but also their “disastrous effect” (LW 3, p. 27) at the socio-political level: indeed, the separation of the domain of mind (=thought = knowledge) from that of body (=experience = action) has been matched and strengthened by a division between a leisure class dedicated to the ‘pure’ task of knowledge and the menial masses, who should therefore accept a subordinate and passive role in society.

The very disconnection of theory and practice—which pragmatism completely overthrows in its original move—is the sign of the dualistic flaw of Western history. In Dewey's understanding, instead, all the “various metaphysical, epistemological, and axiological distinctions” of our tradition should be regarded “as functional relationships rather than as oppositional dichotomies” (Alexander 2006, pos. 3211), that is, they are differences in function emerging within the continuum of natural events.

In this perspective, in the following three subsections the engagement with some major notions of pragmatism (inquiry, belief and habit, and mind and the social self)

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<sup>2</sup>The leaders of the club were William James, Charles Sanders Peirce, and Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. For a popular presentation of the Metaphysical Club, see Menand (2001).

can be construed also as the exploration of how the classic pragmatists contribute to deconstructing some deep-seated dualisms of modern thought (respectively, action/thinking, body/mind, and individual/society).

### *The Attack on Cartesianism and the Method of Inquiry*

Peirce has noted that pragmatism is “scarce more than a corollary” (CP 5.12)<sup>3</sup> to the definition of belief provided by Alexander Bain as “that upon which a man is prepared to act”. For Peirce “the rational purport of a word or other expression lies exclusively in its conceivable bearing upon the conduct of life” (CP 5.412). It is proper to situate these ideas against the backdrop of the Peircean polemic against Descartes, which will grant us a major access to the peculiarities of the pragmatist mindset.

Presenting what he means by inquiry, Peirce notes that it is “a struggle to attain a state of belief” (CP 5.374). Belief is “a calm and satisfactory state” (CP 5.372) that appeases the irritation of doubt. In this sense, inquiry is intermediate between a prior (disrupted, that is, called into doubt) belief and a new belief emerging from inquiry. However, it is not any doubt that can trigger a genuine inquiry, as Peirce remarks by scornfully criticizing those “philosophers [who] have imagined that to start an inquiry it was only necessary to utter a question whether orally or by setting it down upon paper, and have even recommended us to begin our studies with questioning everything” (CP 5.376). Instead, we do not need a futile questioning but “a real and living doubt”, without which “all discussion is idle” (CP 5.376).

In this criticism of the idea of radical doubt a fallibilist attitude and the refusal of any foundationalism are manifest. The Cartesian strategy aimed at thoroughly dismantling any previous knowledge in order to attain an Archimedean point on which to rebuild science. In this sense, the Cartesian pursuit expresses the “search for certainty” that Dewey (LW 4) denounces as the ill of the Western philosophical tradition and a major source of the “epistemological industry” (MW 1, p. 122; MW 10, p. 23; LW 14, p. 179). In rejecting the Cartesian foundationalism, Peirce replaces it with an experimental outlook:

Philosophy ought to imitate the successful sciences in its methods, so far as to proceed only from tangible premises which can be subjected to careful scrutiny, and to trust rather to the multitude and variety of its arguments than to the conclusiveness of any one. Its reasoning should not form a chain which is no stronger than its weakest link, but a cable whose fibres may be ever so slender, provided they are sufficiently numerous and intimately connected. (CP 5.265)

It is to be highlighted how for Peirce doubting “is not a thing you can do in a minute” (CP 6.498), on command, so to speak, but it “is an art which has to be acquired with difficulty” (Ibidem). The pragmatic attitude requires one not to be “content to

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<sup>3</sup> Citations of Peirce are from the *Collected Papers* (CP) edition (Peirce 1931–35).

*ask himself* whether he does not doubt” but rather it urges him to invent “*a plan for attaining to doubt, [to elaborate] it in detail, and then [to put] it into practice, although this may involve a solid month of hard work*” (CP 5.451. Emphasis added). In this perspective, education for inquiry (a major pragmatist theme) is interwoven with a cultivation of the art of the experimental doubting.

The meaning of doubt resonates in Peirce’s distinction of teaching and learning institutions, only the latter being genuinely scientific:

In order that a man’s whole heart may be in teaching he must be thoroughly imbued with the vital importance and absolute truth of what he has to teach; while in order that he may have any measure of success in learning he must be permeated with a sense of the unsatisfactoriness of his present condition of knowledge. The two attitudes are almost irreconcilable. (CP 5.583)

Charles Wright Mills (1966, p. 163) has spoken of a ‘laboratory habit of mind’ intimating that Peirce breaks the Cartesian mould by appealing to a view which is ultimately grounded in the social practices of scientific laboratories. In fact, Peirce distinguishes four methods of fixing belief (tenacity, authority, truth agreeable to reason, and science), and it is noteworthy how the succession of these methods is marked by an increase (a) in their social tenor and (b) in the cultivation of the art of doubt. Scientific inquiry is the best way of establishing beliefs precisely because it dovetails these two features with each other. In this sense, it is built on and promotes cooperative habits of mind and a fallibilist attitude, which is rooted in the conception that inquiry is a self-correcting enterprise thriving on the work of public criticism and on the testing of hypotheses and theories.

The notion of community of inquiry has become current in many educational theories and pedagogies, sometimes within a clear Peircean lineage as with Matthew Lipman’s and Ann Sharp’s *Philosophy for Children* approach (see Lipman 2003; Oliverio 2012, 2017), in other cases by referring solely to a Deweyan matrix as with the COI (Community Of Inquiry) framework in distance education developed by Randy Garrison and other representatives of the school of Alberta (for a general introduction to the COI framework see Randy et al. 2010). More generally, in the Peircean concept of a cooperative and self-correcting undertaking we find a primary source of the idea—which Dewey (LW 7) and Mead (2008) will develop—that education for reflective thinking is modeled after the paradigm of science as experimental inquiry, although relevant differences between Peirce’s and Dewey’s views of inquiry should not be gainsaid (Talisie 2002).

Due to space constraints, it is impossible to examine here other dimensions of Peirce’s anti-Cartesian stance, but it should be pointed out how the notion of belief is itself as anti-Cartesian as possible. According to Peirce, “[t]he essence of belief is the establishment of a habit, and different beliefs are distinguished by the different modes of action to which they give rise” (CP 5.398). Connecting belief with habit, understood as a rule of action, entails a marked distance from the Cartesian epistemology. Belief is diametrically opposed to the Cartesian notion of ‘idea’. This latter was the pivot of a ‘mediational epistemology’, that is, “an understanding of the place of mind in a world such that our only knowledge of reality comes through

the representations we have formed of it *within ourselves*” (Taylor 2005, p. 26. Emphasis added). Cartesian representationalism—which re-emerges today in the theories of cognition as symbol-processing (for a philosophical-educational assessment of these see Bredo 1994)—is the epistemological counterpart of the separation between mind and body, organism and environment. This stance goes hand in hand with the gulf between theory and action that is sanctioned in what Dewey calls “the spectator theory of knowing”, in which “thought [is] viewed as an exercise of a ‘reason’ independent of the body” (LW 4, p. 195). The overcoming of the split between mind and body, thought and action, means that “learning must have a firm biological basis and mind is not separate from the body, its feelings, desires, and interests” (Garrison and Neiman 2003, pos. 469).

In the next subsection, I will valorize this biological dimension by appealing to James’s and Dewey’s treatment of education within a Darwinian horizon.

### ***The Influence of Darwin on Education and Learning As the Formation of Habits***

There is a sense in which one of the main tenets of pragmatism could be captured in a pun: it is the passage from knowledge as copying to knowledge as coping. The former is the view according to which the truth of knowledge consists in the agreement between thought and reality, theories and facts. The agreement is here construed in terms of the adequacy of the ‘copy’ (idea or internal representation) to what it is the copy of. Instead, to use the vocabulary of James’s *Pragmatism*, “[t]o ‘agree’ in the widest sense with a reality *can only mean to be guided either straight up to it or into its surroundings* [...] Any idea that helps us to *deal*, whether practically or intellectually, with either the reality or its belongings [...] will agree sufficiently to meet the requirement” (James 2000, p. 93). Theories become, accordingly, “*instruments, not answers to enigmas, in which we can rest*” (Ibid., p. 28).

James pinpoints wider existential and even ‘onto-cosmological’ implications: “The essential contrast is that *for rationalism reality is ready-made and complete from all eternity, while for pragmatism it is still in the making, and awaits part of its completion from the future*. On the one side the universe is absolutely secure, on the other it is still pursuing its adventures” (Ibid., p. 113). In an educational perspective, this antithesis reverberates in that between education understood as the process of the conformation of people (usually the youth) to a world as it is and to a past that has to be replicated and perpetuated; and, on the other hand, education as the process of the ‘enablement’ of people, which provides them with the formative powers to in-habit and take part in the making of a world still open to the future.

Eric Bredo (2002) has sagaciously pointed out ‘the Darwinian center’ to these Jamesian visions. In *Talks to Teachers on Psychology* (1899), James illustrates the role that the theory of evolution has played in the abandonment of the old image of reason and of the human being, and he indicates the educational dividends of this



revolution: “[...] man, whatever else it may be, is *primarily a practical being*, whose mind is given him to aid in adapting to this world’s life” (James 1899, pos. 33788. Emphasis added). This implies regarding education as consisting in “*the organization of acquired habits of conduct and tendencies to behavior*” (James 1899, pos. 33841). The pedagogical fruit of this evolutionary view of the mind is summarized, for James, in the maxim “[*n*]o reception without reaction, no impression without correlative expression” (James 1899, pos. 33879), that is, anything which is merely ‘delivered’ to the pupil’s ear or eye without changing his/her active life is doomed to be educationally inane.

What has been presented here is an admittedly partial and perhaps tendentious account of James’s *Talks*, insofar as it has privileged only those parts in which pragmatist motifs crop up. Randall Curren has driven a good point home when noting that “[i]t would be an immense stretch to find pragmatist philosophy in James’s *Talks to Teachers*” (Curren 2009, p. 496). However, one can sustain Dewey’s pragmatist appropriation of this book, when he refers to its merits in emphasizing “the active and the motor” (LW 14, p. 338) in education and in considering pupils as principally ‘behaving organisms’. Moreover, he remarks that “[i]t was the work of James and others to lay a foundation on which later educators have carried forward in marked degree the new type of education thus foreshadowed” (LW 14, p. 339).<sup>4</sup>

It is possible to interweave the two threads of the argumentation developed thus far (the anti-Cartesian and the Darwinian) by stating that pragmatism has represented an attack on the typical modern epistemology by drawing the philosophical consequences of Darwin’s revolution. In a series of three papers appearing in 1908–1909 Dewey illustrates the “bearings of pragmatism upon education” (MW 4, pp. 178–191) on the basis of its differences from the theory according to which it is “the business of thought to mirror with theoretical or speculative exactness an outside world” (MW 4, p. 179). The mirror-theory of knowledge was developed in modernity in two different directions: “the transcendental theory of pure knowledge”, in which knowledge “simply represents the deposit that results from the exercise of a purely theoretic faculty” (Ibidem), and the theory of the mind as a blank slate. The two philosophical strands of modernity found their educational translation in the differentiation between an elite education aiming at pure knowledge and ‘culture’ in the eulogistic sense; and education for the ‘masses’ as the “mold[ing]” of “their minds [...] into passive and obedient conforming to the existing [environment] about them” (MW 4, p. 181). In contrast, in pragmatism

[m]ind is, so to speak, a device for keeping track of the increased differentiation and multiplication of conditions, and planning for, arranging for in advance, ends and means of activity which will keep these various factors in proper adjustment to one another. This explains the fact that all intelligence involves a peculiar combination of the sensory and receptive factor (emphasized by the passive theory of education) with the active, intellectual factor—emphasized by the theory of pure rational activity. (MW 4, p. 184)

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<sup>4</sup>Dewey partly qualifies this positive comment by stating that “while James praised the promising new, he was as regards school-keeping still the child of his age and time” and, consequently, many of his pedagogical tips are “looking backward not forward” (LW 14, p. 339).

From this reading of pragmatism against the backdrop of the modern epistemological dualism some relevant educational ‘guidelines’ stem: (a) “[e]very educative process should begin with *doing something*” (MW 4, p. 185); (b) senses are trained by the engagement in activities; and (c) the same principle obtains for “[t]he more intellectual side of education [...] All thinking at its outset is planning, forecasting, forming purposes, selecting and arranging means for their most economical and successful realization” (MW 4, p. 187).

Speaking of the ‘bearings of pragmatism upon education’, Dewey seems to intimate that, although innovations in educational practice should not be read merely as the translation of a philosophical stance—the point made by Hook—pragmatism can operate as “a working hypothesis in educational theory” (MW 7, p. 329) and grants a philosophical framework for reconnecting some educational reforms to a broader intellectual horizon. For instance, interpreting the emphasis on doing through the lens of pragmatism helps one avoid the simplifications of the discourse of the ‘learning by doing’. Not only does the notion of ‘learning by doing’ have a much longer history (Knoll 2011, pp. 287 ff.), but it risks being an inadequate representation of the core of a pragmatist stance in education: it is not the stress upon ‘doing’ per se, which is important, but the recognition both of the articulation of action and thinking, paradigmatically embodied in modern science, and of the situated character of knowledge, namely, of the fact that knowledge is not something merely occurring ‘in the head’ but is a phase in the reconstruction of experience, that is, of the organism/environment transaction.

In the same vein, characterizing learning as habits-formation can be misleading if we lose sight of the sophisticated pragmatist view on habits. These are not mechanical ways of acting, forms of readymade behavioral response but rather ‘rules of action’, in Peirce’s vocabulary, or “arts”, with a Deweyan expression (MW 14, p. 15), that is, ways of “assimilat[ing] objective energies, and eventuat[ing] in command of environment” (MW 14, p. 15–16). Learning consists, accordingly, in the forming of flexible habits, which are the outcome of a readjustment between the organism and the environment through paths of inquiry and not of drill-and-practice pedagogical methods as in the Thorndike paradigm (Koschmann 2000; Tomlinson 1997).

In the understanding here advocated, pragmatism as a philosophy (of education), on the one hand, contributes to the elicitation of the meaning of educational methods and practice and, on the other, preserves them from being misused and drained of their democratic-emancipative potential.

### ***The Social Character of the Self and the Democratic $\tilde{\text{E}}\theta\text{os}$***

Peirce’s implacable attack on Descartes’s intuitionism and on his idea that we have immediate intuitive knowledge of our selves is the source of one more major shift initiated by pragmatism, namely, the break with “the modern, consciousness-centered conception of human subjectivity” (Biesta 1999, p. 476). This Peirce tenet

found a peculiar inflection in the work of Dewey and George Herbert Mead, who, being close collaborators and friends, developed *together* their view of ‘the bio-social mind’ (Baggio 2015) and a theory of the social character of the self. As in Part One of this *Handbook* a chapter is entirely devoted to Dewey, I will refer here initially to Mead’s ideas on mind and self, hinting at their educational import and showing their connection to another of the aforementioned ‘headwaters of the pragmatic stream’, namely, democracy as a social ideal.

The mind for Mead (1967) is not a pre-existent human faculty or endowment but an emergent phenomenon of human interactions. As he notes, “[t]he thought process is *dependent on intercourse*. This is very important in education. The social relationship comes before thought, thought arises out of the consciousness of social relationship, of separation” (Mead 2008, p. 85).

If, commenting on Peirce, the social matrix of inquiry has been highlighted, we reach here the social insurgence and, therefore, rootedness of the mind and thought themselves. A crucial implication is that education is ‘essentially’ social interaction, communication, that is, in Deweyan terms, “participation, sharing” (LW 1, p. 132). And as, “[w]hen communication occurs, all natural events are subject to reconsideration and revision [...] [and] turn into objects, things with a meaning” (Ibidem), education is a process of collaborative and participatory meaning-making and not of meaning-transfer in which the educatee, in a broad sense, is the addressee of the delivery of some contents. It is within this process that Mead sees the emergence of that kind of experimental mindset which is pivotal for pragmatism: “[T]he scientific attitude is one which was essentially derived from education; that of preparing the younger generation that it may take its place in the life of the community” (Mead 2008, p. 148).

As well as the mind “[t]he self is something which has a development; it is not initially there, at birth” (Mead 1967, p. 135). In particular, the self emerges through the internalization of what Mead calls “the generalized other”, namely, “the attitude of the whole community” (Ibid., p. 154), the set of the rules of social communication and conduct. In this perspective also the typically pragmatist reflection on democracy receives its full significance. Indeed, as Mead argues,

[i]t is possible for the individual to develop his own peculiarities, that which individualizes him, and still be a member of a community, provided that he is able to take the attitude of those whom he affects. [...] One may say that the attainment of that functional differentiation and social participation in the full degree is a sort of ideal which lies before the human community. The present stage of it is presented in the ideal of democracy. (Mead 1967, p. 326)

In the same vein, Dewey coins his definition of democracy as “more than a form of government” and “primarily a mode of associated living, of conjoint *communicated* experience” (MW 9, p. 93. *Emphasis added*) and states that it is “not an alternative to other principles of associated life” but “the idea of community life itself” (LW 2, p. 328).

It is to note that Dewey introduces his memorable definition in order to provide a ‘deeper explanation’ for the ‘familiar fact’ of “[t]he devotion of democracy to education” (MW 9, p. 93). While this is usually traced back to the need for a literate

citizenry, as the government rests upon popular suffrage, Dewey refers to an intimate bond between democracy and education, which is incomprehensible outside the argumentative device that ties together social interaction, communication, education, and democracy, the latter being the most developed stage of the community life.

Both Dewey and Mead developed their views at the crossroads of two influences, creatively synthesized (especially by Dewey) in one argumentative pattern: on the one hand, in the Chicago at the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth century they both joined the settlement movement and, in particular, the experience of Hull House. In this way, not only did they acquire a first-hand knowledge of the conditions of poor people and workingmen, mostly immigrants, in a rapidly industrializing city and not only did they realize how this represented the chief challenge for a society aspiring to be democratic, but they also became familiar with the response that Jane Addams, the Hull House co-founder, had been providing in terms of a social re-definition of the idea of democracy and, therefore, of an intimate connection with new educational tasks:

As democracy modifies our conception of life, it constantly raises the value and function of each member of the community, however humble he may be. [...] We are gradually requiring of the educator that he shall free the powers of each man and connect him with the rest of life. [...] As the political expression of democracy has claimed for the workingman the free right of citizenship, so a code of social ethics is now insisting that he shall be a conscious member of society, having some notion of his social and industrial value. (Addams 1902, pos. 12911 and 13009).

When Dewey and Mead construe the democratic ideal in terms of the need for differentiation as well as social participation they have in mind also the challenge of the socialization of immigrants without erasing their peculiarities but rather by liberating these as a factor of growth for the community as a whole.

On the other hand, this is only part of the story and, more specifically, that part related to the highlighting of the “prepolitical dimension of social communication” (Honneth 1998, p. 770), grounded in the social division of labor. But, as Honneth argues, Dewey understands “democracy as a *reflexive* [*sic*] form of community cooperation” (Ibidem. Emphasis added) and the ‘reflective’ character is rooted in “his research in the logic of science”, which allows Dewey to develop “an epistemological argument that proposes regarding democracy as a condition for increasing the rationality of solutions to social problems” (Ibid., p. 773). In this sense, “[t]he political sphere is not [...] the place for communicative exercise of freedom but the cognitive medium with whose help society attempts, experimentally, to explore process, and solve its own problems with the coordination of social action” (Ibid., p. 775).<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>5</sup>I have extrapolated Honneth’s considerations from the wider context of his reflection showing the productivity of Dewey’s theoretical device in comparison with Arendt’s and Habermas’s. While Bernstein (2006) establishes a parallelism between Arendt’s and Dewey’s tenets on democracy, I concur with Honneth’s emphasis on their differences. And I think that also from an educational viewpoint Dewey’s understanding is still more promising. On these differences see also Biesta (2006), who highlights, instead, some limitations of Dewey’s idea of democratic education in comparison with Arendt’s.

In other words, Honneth helps us to see the complex view that Dewey has of democracy as rooted in a pre-political dimension—“a form of democratic ethical life anchored [...] in the consciousness of social cooperation” (Ibid., p. 776)—within which, however, habits of inquiry should be cultivated in order to promote an intelligent management of social problems. We could interpret the first aspect, that is, democracy as the bond that links together all the members of society, ‘however humble they may be’, as the Addams-Dewey-Mead side of the coin (=the level of democracy as social ethics), whereas the model of the scientific community and the understanding of democratic procedures in terms of a cognitive medium is the Peirce-Dewey-Mead side (=the level of democracy as a reflective and experimental undertaking and a community of inquiry).

If appropriated in the perspective of this two-side differentiation, the ingenious re-signification, in *Democracy and Education*, of the notions of ‘social efficiency’ and ‘social control’, which have raised many misgivings, manifests its productivity: the former is “nothing less than that socialization of mind which is actively concerned in making experiences more communicable” (MW 9, p. 127), while the latter is “the formation of a certain mental disposition; a way of understanding objects, events, and acts which enables one to participate effectively in associated activities” (MW 9, p. 41). Larry Hickman (2006, p. 71) has forcefully summarized Dewey’s position in a passage that could be considered as a sort of chart of the trajectory—portrayed in this subsection—from the social character of the self to democracy as a cognitive medium for experimental inquiry:

Socialization occurs, for good or ill. Beyond that, when socialization meets the two criteria that Dewey has suggested [=varied and numerous shared interests; fullness and freedom of interplay between groups *S.O.*], social efficiency emerges and grows, expressing itself as the expansion of mind. And, beyond that, when experimental habit-formation enters the picture, then it may properly be said that there is social control.

## Neo-Pragmatism and the Linguistic Turn

Even the fiercest critics of his interpretations of the pragmatist legacy recognize that Richard Rorty has represented the single most important driving force to (re-)situate pragmatism at the center of the philosophical stage. He attained this goal essentially through a double move: first, by combating the view of pragmatism as a parochial movement, he showed that authors like James and Dewey had anticipated—and often better settled—questions debated among the most influential philosophers of the twentieth century, both in Analytic and Continental philosophy. Secondly, he shifted the focus from ‘the cult of experience’ (Jay 2005) to the ‘linguistic turn’, meaning by this “the view that philosophical problems are problems which may be solved (or dissolved) either by reforming language or by understanding more about the language we presently use” (Rorty 1967, p. 3).

Actually the phrase ‘the linguistic turn’ could be slippery if incorrectly understood: the point is not merely to replace the reflection on ‘mind’ and ‘experience’ with that of ‘language’, if this continues to be understood in a transcendental way,

namely, in reference to a common structure that is clearly identifiable and over which the users of a language have the command before they can use it (Rorty 1991c). Or, to put it differently, the inquiry into what language is and what its use is in our coping with the world—as if it were possible to study its ‘adequacy’ from without—risks surreptitiously perpetuating the view that there is some vantage point outside language that allows us to compare it with reality. What Rorty has in mind by grafting pragmatism onto the linguistic turn is, instead, that the latter can provide more sophisticated insights to fully develop the pivotal pragmatist theme of communication (uncoupling it from a vocabulary still dominated by the old-fashioned notion of experience); and the former, with its anti-foundationalist, fallibilist, and anti-representationalist stance contributes to avoiding any relapse into forms of transcendental reflection.

In this perspective, the attention is to the contingent, historically situated linguistic practices in which we are immersed and that we cannot explore and criticize with a ‘view from nowhere’ but we rather inhabit and transform through a continual (and always tentative) re-definition of our vocabularies, through re-descriptions which allow us to better tackle society’s challenges.

Although Rorty (1990) was fairly Hookian (1973) in inviting us not to over-philosophize education, we can establish a parallelism between the previous outline of his philosophical stance and his educational ideas. The stress upon our being immersed in contextualized socio-linguistic practices leads Rorty to a peculiar inflection of Dewey’s idea of education as socialization: he reads it in terms of Hirsch’s (1988) ‘cultural literacy’, that is, as a process of familiarization of the youth with the social discourses of their elders through the piling up of linguistic information and the acquisition of some ‘vocabularies’ thanks to the access to texts and narratives (Rorty 1999, p. 118). This is the phase (typical of primary and secondary schooling) that he defines the “gathering of raw material” (Rorty and Ghiraldelli jr. 2008, p. 189), to which another ensues (at the college level), the ‘individualization’, when education is primarily “a matter of inciting doubt and stimulating imagination, thereby challenging the prevailing consensus” (Rorty 1999, p. 118). This second phase roughly corresponds to what has been called above the ‘re-definition of vocabularies’.

There can be the tendency to read this dual distinction of the educational process in terms of one of Rorty’s (1989) most famous ideas, namely, that of the ‘liberal ironist’: thus, the process of socialization would be serviceable to instigate the sense of solidarity with one’s own group (the liberal moment), while the process of individualization would be conducive to a self-creation tendentially destitute of any significance for society (the irony moment). As Ramón del Castillo (2014) has noted, this oversimplifies the picture: irony, as the awareness of human contingency, is not completely incompatible with socialization because irony is connected with a historicist stance, which should be promoted at all educational levels. Indeed, “[a] society that transmits its convictions ‘without reservations’ cannot be a decent or a civilized society” (del Castillo 2014, p. 72). On the other hand, there can be a ‘social side’ in the individualization process insofar as the ironist can develop a broader



awareness of the existence of cruelty and, thus, can *indirectly* contribute to the realization of a more decent society.

What is most noteworthy in Rorty's Hirschian re-appropriation of Dewey is that he seems not only to accept a sort of "acquiring" (MW 3, p. 236) schooling but—and more importantly—to completely abandon the idea of a reconstruction of education on the basis of the model of scientific inquiry, which Dewey considers as pivotal for democracy in education (MW 3, p. 236 ff.). In the reading here proposed, this is closely related to Rorty's linguistic turn and to his rejection of the notion of experience. As Bernstein (2010, p. 132) highlights with a remarkable 'educational' metaphor, "[e]xperience is our great teacher". And, playing Peirce against Rorty, he adds that the "brute compulsiveness" of experience (what Peirce calls Secondness), that is, "the way in which experience 'says NO' [...] is required to make sense of the self-corrective character of inquiry and experimentation" (Bernstein 2010, p. 134). To confine oneself to speaking of "conversational constraints" means "ignor[ing] the facticity, the surprise, the shock, and brute constraint of our experiential encounters" (Ibidem).

Rorty ends up rejecting the very vocabulary of inquiry because he seems to see it as ultimately doomed to perpetuate the Platonic search for objectivity, which should be instead replaced with a more humane aspiration to solidarity (Rorty 1991a). This is one of the major dividing lines with another prominent representative of neo-pragmatism, Hilary Putnam. As a reader of Isaiah Berlin (1996) and, accordingly, operating on the basis of the opposition between Platonism and Romanticism, Rorty considers pragmatism as a heir of Romanticism and wants to substitute the language of creation for that of discovery, the emphasis on literature for that on the experimental method and science, whose value is spelled out by him merely in terms of its being an example of human solidarity (Rorty 1991b). In this view, Rorty bravely disconnects what classic pragmatists tend to keep united: democracy and science, the latter understood, though, not in the Platonic meaning of *epistēmē* but in the sense of inquiry. In Rorty's outlook, democracy will thrive more on the exposure of citizens to narratives of the achievements of our democratic societies (at the school level) and on the cultivation of our poetical creativity (at the university level) than on the promotion of experimental habits of inquiry.

In contrast, not only does Putnam counter what he sees as Rorty's relativism but he arrives at endorsing an 'epistemological justification of democracy', emphasizing that democracy is a 'cognitive value' insofar as it is "a requirement for experimental inquiry in any area. To reject democracy is to reject the idea of being experimental" (Putnam 1992, p. 180). Although, in a Rortyan perspective, it could be plausibly objected to Putnam that Dewey would never have spoken of 'an epistemological justification of democracy', both due to his aversion to the very idea of 'epistemology' and because he was deeply aware of the contingent character of the democratic adventure, Putnam's reference to the close relationship between democracy and science is crucial. As Len Waks (1998) has argued, Rorty's post-experimentalist pragmatism risks leaving us without an adequate method to tackle



the problems of social cooperation, which are the ones that Dewey (and Addams and Mead for that matter) had in mind when elaborating his ideas about democracy. In this sense and *contra* Rorty, education for inquiry should be considered as a still valid part of the pragmatist legacy and a pillar of the democratic project.<sup>6</sup>

### **The In-between of ‘Tough-Mindedness’ and ‘Tender-Mindedness’: Engaging with Education ‘Pragmatically’**

Within the framework of a re-assessment of the pragmatist tradition as a whole, as well as of the search for a new start away from the debates between the advocates of a classicopragmatist stance (committed to the idea of experience) and the representatives of a neo-pragmatist approach (focused on language),<sup>7</sup> Colin Koopman (2009) has invited us to “seek in pragmatism’s meliorism a unique and insightful tradition of cosmopolitan philosophy” (p. 48).

In certain respects, this interpretation of pragmatist meliorism in terms of cosmopolitanism is convergent on some tenets of Thomas Popkewitz (2005, 2008), who, however, speaks from a completely different vantage point. He is interested in how “the pedagogical projects throughout the 19th century to the present” have promoted the education of the “reasonable person who is cosmopolitan” (Popkewitz 2008, p. xiii). Indeed, one is not reasonable but *s/he* is to be *made* so “and that is where the schooling and its pedagogy becomes central. That ‘making’ is treated as a unity of ‘all children learning,’ and that unity is the crux of cosmopolitanism” (Ibidem). Cosmopolitanism is the project of re-forming society by forming the child through science (which should contribute to the planning of life) and specific constructions of reason and human agency. By focusing in particular on Dewey, he notes that “[p]ragmatism embodied this faith in science that circulated in the later part of the nineteenth century as a process in developing desired outcomes [...]” (Popkewitz 2005, p. 24). In his interpretation, Dewey’s “[p]ragmatism was a device to intervene in childhood with the intent of ultimately influencing what society should be” (Ibid., p. 18). By espousing a different view in comparison with Koopman, Popkewitz is attentive to how, precisely in pursuing its goal of an educa-

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<sup>6</sup>It is to note that, without accepting the Rortyan strategy, the need to weaken the exclusively experimentalist, science-oriented thrust by complementing it with insights from other philosophical traditions has emerged also from within the Deweyan philosophical-educational scholarship. To pick out a representative instance, Paul Fairfield has raised the question of “how well [Dewey’s] experimental conception of experience stands up today” (Fairfield 2009, p. 82). In advancing reservations about the one-dimensionality of Dewey’s conception, Fairfield invokes a Gadamerian stance: “[E]xperience ‘in the genuine sense’, as Gadamer aptly put it, is indeed experimental yet not only in Dewey’s scientific understanding of the word [...] but in the sense that it is profoundly transformative. Ultimately it is oneself and one’s point of view that experience transforms, in the sense not only that one has resolved a problematic situation but that one has become changed in one’s being” (Ibid., p. 86).

<sup>7</sup>For a reconstruction of this debate see Hildebrand (2014).

tion for *all* children, ‘leaving no child behind’, pragmatism as a form of cosmopolitanism leads to practices of abjection, understood as “the casting out and exclusion of particular qualities of people from the space of inclusion” (Popkewitz 2008, p. 6).<sup>8</sup>

The perspective from which Popkewitz engages with pragmatism draws our attention on how some themes—e.g., the strategic role of science for the reconstruction of society and education for inquiry and reflective thinking as a condition for education for democracy—should not be uncoupled by an exploration of the practices of exclusion associated with them, which could end up undermining the democratic tension, especially if they go unnoticed. Rather than as a mere dismissal of the conclusions of the previous section about the permanent legacy of (classico)pragmatism in terms of the promotion of democracy through inquiry, positions like those endorsed by Popkewitz should be taken—at least, this is the suggestion here put forward—as an enrichment of the pragmatist conceptual device, in order to shirk possible simplifications or naïveté.

At the same time it is to note that, with his historical perspective, Popkewitz examines pragmatism as “an important symbol of progressive education and today’s reform” (Popkewitz 2008, p. 69) and, therefore, much in the vein of the approach of Childs, from which I have taken my cue. In the wake of the argumentation developed in other parts of this chapter, it should be asked, instead, whether the topicality of pragmatism as a philosophy of education may reside not so much in its relationship with specific educational practices but rather in the conceptual tools it provides us when engaging with some relevant aspects in the current educational discourse.

From this viewpoint, it is precisely the emphasis of the (classico)pragmatist tradition on science which is a major resource. William James establishes his understanding of pragmatism within a reflection on how the progress of science had furthered “the growth of naturalistic or positivistic feeling” (Ibid, p. 12), that is, the craving of people for scientifically robust explanations of the world, while not extinguishing the desire to have a cordial relation also with an idealistic view of existence. James identifies the main significance of pragmatism precisely in its role as “the mediating way of thinking” (Ibid., p. 23) between the tough-mindedness typical of science-oriented philosophical temperaments and the tender-mindedness of those who are not ready to sacrifice any reference to values and principles on the altar of scientism.

This mediating function continues to be—however updated—urgently needed also in contemporary educational scenarios, as I would like to argue in reference to at least two distinct levels, that of theoretical reflection and that of the understanding of educational professionalism.

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<sup>8</sup>While Popkewitz deploys a Foucaultian strategy to reveal the processes of abjection inscribed in the pragmatist projects of progressive education, Koopman invokes, instead, an integration of Foucault’s and Dewey’s devices, as he argues that “genealogy (understood as the historical practice of problematizing the present) has a natural place alongside pragmatism (understood as the philosophical practice of reconstructing the present)” (Koopman 2009, p. 214).

As to the former, in order to counter the excesses of evidence-based education, the pragmatist tradition continues to offer us valuable conceptual instruments to combine the need for a scientific approach in education with the ideals and aspirations of democracy (Biesta 2010, pp. 28 ff.). In a similar vein, Bellmann (2007) has shown that, far from undergirding the philosophy of PISA, Dewey's pragmatism "can be used as a tool to find out something about our present" (p. 434) and to make explicit the theoretical assumptions and the normative presuppositions of many educational 'reforms'.

More generally, there is presently the risk of backsliding into a calamitous search for certainty in educational research and practice, forgetting an important pragmatist lesson concerning the scope of a science of education. Indeed, James (1899) and Dewey (LW 5, pp. 1–40) seem to be at one in rejecting the idea that the results of scientific research can be "converted into an immediate rule of educational art" (LW 5, p. 9). On a more specific level, nowadays, when the "attraction of psychology" (Smeyers and Depaepe 2013) can become fatal and the hegemony of the neuroscientific discourse risks turning into a neuromania (Legrenzi and Umiltà 2011), more topical than ever does the warning of William James become, namely, that of not thinking that

psychology, being the science of the mind's law, is something from which [teachers] can deduce definite programmes and schemes and methods of instruction for immediate school-room use. Psychology is a science, and teaching is an art; and sciences never generate arts directly out of themselves. An intermediary inventive mind must make the application, by using its originality. (James 1899, pos. 33573)

James's reference to the idea of art and to the need for a mediation of an inventive mind introduces the second aforementioned level. A mistaken orientation to science (assumed as the purveyor of certain truths just to be imported into the educational contexts in order to make them more 'monitorable' according to the standard criteria of efficiency and efficacy) brings with it the idea that the professional in education should be a sort of technician who, equipped with the relevant expertise and the adequate, evidence-based, strategies, could pursue pre-established goals. This is a view of the role of the practitioner to which as early as in 1929 Dewey objected in his *The Sources of a Science of Education* and whose untenability was denounced, more recently, by Donald Schön (1991). Consciously inscribing himself in a Deweyan lineage (see Schön 1992), Schön emphasized that—in all professions but all the more so in education—the practitioner has to do not with mere problem-solving, that is, with situations predefined in their problematic character and for which we are already in possession of the correct, 'scientifically certified', responses, but with situations which are indeterminate and unique and with which we have to engage through a 'reflective conversation' by mobilizing what he calls 'artistry'. It could be plausibly argued that, like Dewey (LW 5, p. 6 and p. 23), also Schön thus draws the profile of a practitioner who, instead of being a technician, operating according to a deterministic model (Biesta 2010, pp. 32 ff.), is an 'artist' with a scientific attitude and inquiring habits: if the artistry-theme refers us to the need to avoid any narrow-minded and reductionist scientism, the inquiring stance prevents

us from re-lapsing into a merely charismatic (or a vapidly idealistic) view of the educational undertaking, disconnected from the development of an experimentalist attitude conducive to the growth of communicable professional knowledge. And this balanced complementing of art and science—which matches, at the level of professional practice, the typical pragmatist epistemological stance—is pragmatism at its best, due to its mediating role between philosophical temperaments.

By valorizing a remark of Carol Nicholson (2013, p. 250), who has invited us to read pragmatism “as a way of thinking that is best described in terms of adverbs rather than nouns ending in ‘ism’”, it could be maintained in conclusion that, rather than specific educational theories and practices derived from it (*pace* Childs), what can be learnt from pragmatism is a specific way of ‘inhabiting’ the educational undertaking in all its dimensions (theoretical, methodological, and practical) and a method of sieving educational proposals in reference to their potential to live up to the needs of contemporary times.

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# Analytic Philosophy of Education and the Concept of Liberal Education



Stefaan E. Cuypers

## What Is Analytic Philosophy?

### *Character and History*

The label ‘analytic or Anglo-American philosophy’ is used in contrast with the label ‘continental or European philosophy’. These labels designate two main traditions of thought in contemporary Western philosophy. This is not a deep philosophical contrast but a conventional and sometimes contested distinction that roughly separates two ways of doing philosophy on the opposite sides of the English Channel and Atlantic Ocean. Both traditions started around 1900, the continental one with E. Husserl’s book *Logische Untersuchungen* (1900/1901) and the analytic one with G.E. Moore’s article ‘The Refutation of Idealism’ (1903). Analytic philosophy has its origins in British empiricism and American pragmatism, whereas continental philosophy is rooted in the German idealism of Kant and Hegel as well as the critical philosophy of Marx and Nietzsche.

Although the labels ‘analytic’ and ‘continental’ might be misleading and tendentious, they nonetheless broadly indicate two different styles of doing philosophy. While continental philosophy tends to engage directly with existential concerns, cultural critique and prospects for emancipation, analytic philosophy is disposed to occupy itself primarily with language, logic and science. Somewhat exaggerated, one can say that the first movement copes with the meaning of life, whereas the second deals with the *Wissenschaftliche Weltauffassung* (the scientific conception of the world). One can add that continental writing is often much more literary in exposing sweeping hypotheses and (de)constructing grand theories, and that analytic writing, in contrast, is mostly literal and logically rigorous in arguing for

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limited conclusions. Again somewhat overstated, there is much more tolerance of cognitive vagueness and emotive persuasion in the continental than in the analytic tradition. Yet, the distinction between these two traditions is perhaps not really fruitful, and we should not lay too much weight on such a polarized view of philosophical schools.

There are four periods in the history of analytic philosophy<sup>1</sup>:

- (1) 1900–1930: logical analysis (G. Frege, B. Russell, G.E. Moore, L. Wittgenstein)
- (2) 1930–1945: logical positivism or empiricism (*Wiener Kreis* philosophers, A.J. Ayer, W.V.O. Quine)
- (3) 1945–1960: ordinary language philosophy (J.L. Austin, G. Ryle, L. Wittgenstein)
- (4) 1960–today: pluralist or eclectic analysis

The period of direct relevance to analytic philosophy of education is the third one. After some general remarks about analytic philosophy and its first two periods, I will focus on the methodology of this postwar period.

The most general characterization of analytic philosophy is that it is the philosophy which took the ‘linguistic turn’.<sup>2</sup> Analytic philosophy turns from the objects and phenomena to the way we *think* and *talk* about them as the primary subject matter of study. Philosophical questions are questions of language. Since semantics and not syntax is of primary interest, analytic investigations often do not distinguish between the words (e.g., ‘cat’ and ‘dog’) and the concepts (CAT and DOG). Until 1960, analytic philosophy is synonymous with ‘linguistic’ philosophy. Analytic philosophers approach problems against the background of either the ideal (artificial) language of logic or the ordinary (natural) language of speakers and hearers, and they try to (dis)solve these problems by the method of logical or ordinary language analysis.

The initial period built on the new developments in mathematical logic during the nineteenth century. Logical analysis decomposes the surface structure (or grammar) of a sentence into the distinct elements of its depth structure (or logic). The logical form of a potentially misleading sentence, such as Russell’s example sentence ‘The present king of France is bald’, can be laid bare by means of quantificational, symbolic logic to dissolve problems of meaning, reference and existence.<sup>3</sup> In the second period, (emigrated) philosophers of the *Wiener Kreis* combined the formal techniques of logic with the basic tenets of empiricism to rationally (re)construct a scientific conception of the world. For the logical positivists, analytic philosophy is a second-order discipline that has no material object of study of its own. For them, philosophy is a kind of handmaiden that rationally analyses the first-order (linguistic) activities of the (natural) scientist. Explicating scientific concepts, such as those of natural law and probability, and formulating a (verification) criterion of meaning for claims to a posteriori knowledge are for them the central philosophical tasks.

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<sup>1</sup> Soames 2003 and 2006.

<sup>2</sup> Rorty 1967.

<sup>3</sup> See Scheffler 1954, pp. 10–13 for a concise illustration of Russell’s logical analysis.

## *Classical Methodology*

Analytic philosophers are united into one recognizable group not by a common doctrine but by a shared methodology. They use a technique, or cluster of techniques, known as ‘logical (or linguistic) analysis’ or, more generally, ‘philosophical analysis’. The adjective ‘logical’ can get a strong or weak reading. In its strong sense ‘logical’ stands for ‘(analysis) in terms of symbolic logic’, whereas in its weak sense it stands for ‘(analysis) in terms of logically necessary and sufficient conditions’. Below I come back to this distinction, but first I comment on the technique of philosophical analysis in general.

This classical technique should be interpreted in the broad sense so that philosophical analysis not only includes the clarification of concepts but also the evaluation of arguments. Hence, philosophical analysis comprises both analysis of concepts and analysis of arguments. Besides aiming at conceptual clarification, the drawing of clear distinctions, and the avoidance of equivocation, analytic philosophy aims at the evaluation of arguments, logical rigor, and attention to detail in the steps of reasoning. In short, the business of analytic philosophy is conceptual analysis and argument-evaluation.<sup>4</sup>

Correct reasoning involves good arguments. A good argument fulfils three conditions. First, it does not commit informal fallacies. Begging the question (*petitio principii*), attacking the man (*ad hominem*) and equivocation are among the most important fallacies our reasoning should avoid. Second, a good argument is formally valid. An argument is valid when its deductive steps from the premises (Pr) to the conclusion (C) comply with the rules of formal logic.<sup>5</sup> In a formally valid argument, the conclusion follows deductively (—) from the set of premises:

Pr<sub>1</sub>  
Pr<sub>2</sub>  
⋮  
Pr<sub>n</sub>  
—  
C

Third, a good argument is sound. A valid argument is not automatically true. Validity is not synonymous with truth, and validity itself offers no guarantee of truth. Validity is a property of whole arguments, whereas truth is a property of individual premises and conclusions. Yet, logicians use the concept of truth to define the concept of validity. To say that an argument is valid is to say that *if* its premises are true, *then* its conclusion must also be true. So, for a valid argument, it would be impossible for its premises to be true and its conclusion false. But an argument with one or more premises which are actually false and a conclusion which is also actually false might still be valid. The validity of an argument is a necessary but not a sufficient

<sup>4</sup>Coffman and Hedberg *n.d.*

<sup>5</sup>Tomassi 1999, chap. 1.

condition for its soundness. The soundness of an argument has to do with the actual truth of its premises and conclusion. A sound argument, then, is a valid argument of which all premises are actually true (and, consequently, of which the conclusion is also actually true). Hence, if one rejects the truth of the conclusion of a valid argument, then one has also to reject the truth of at least one of its premises. In sum, analysing or evaluating an argument involves a triple task: first, checking whether the argument commits informal fallacies or not; second, certifying whether it is valid or not; and, third, verifying whether it is sound or not. (Sometimes the demand for the truth of the premises will be too strong. In order to have at least a valid and plausible argument, one has to retreat to the weaker demand for the plausibility of its premises.)

The last part of argument-evaluation calls for the technique of conceptual analysis. In order to verify an argument's (un)soundness, one has to determine the truth or falsity of its premises. A premise consists of at least one sentence or proposition ( $p$ ).<sup>6</sup> Yet, in order to ascertain whether or not a proposition is true, one has to establish first its meaning. One cannot determine whether or not  $p$  is true unless one knows what  $p$  means. A proposition consists of at least two concepts ( $c_1, c_2 \dots c_n$ ). So, to establish the meaning of a proposition, one has to clarify first the meaning of the concepts out of which it is composed. And clarifying the meaning of concepts is precisely the business of conceptual analysis. Thus, the crucial question about an argument's (un)soundness—about the truth value of its premises—gives rise to other preliminary questions:

- (1) Is  $p$  true?
- (2) What does  $p$  mean?
- (3) What do  $p$ 's constituents  $c_1, c_2 \dots c_n$  mean?

Prior to the question of truth comes the question of meaning, with which conceptual analysis is occupied. Also independent of its role in argument-evaluation, conceptual analysis can be used as an autonomous technique for clarifying central concepts in philosophy, such as the concepts of knowledge, personal identity, moral rightness and, last but not least, the concepts of education and teaching (as we will see in the next section).

Answering the question 'What does concept  $c$  mean?' is the task of conceptual analysis. In the third period of the history of analytic philosophy, the one of direct relevance to analytic philosophy of education, the attention of analytic philosophers shifted from the ideal language of logic to the use of everyday, ordinary language as the instrument of analysis and clarification. In this postwar period, the technique of logical analysis acquired another identity. Instead of its association with '(analysis) in terms of symbolic logic', the adjective 'logical' became associated with '(analy-

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<sup>6</sup>To clarify some terminology, a sentence (consisting of words) expresses a proposition (consisting of concepts). Loosely speaking, a proposition (concept) is a direct bearer of meaning, whereas a sentence (word) is an indirect bearer of meaning (via the meaning of the proposition (concept) it expresses). For my purposes, there is no need to distinguish between meaning as reference (extension) and meaning as sense (intension).

sis) in terms of logically necessary and sufficient conditions'. Analytic, linguistic philosophy became synonymous with the analysis of ordinary language. This type of linguistic analysis is closely connected with conceptual analysis. Ordinary language philosophers are not so much interested in the vocabulary or grammar of a specific natural language (e.g., English) as they are interested in the conceptual structure which different natural languages (e.g., English, French and German) have in common. They want to discover and systematize the (logically) necessary and sufficient conditions for the application of a concept *c* by means of investigating the use of the corresponding word *w* in different contexts and at different times. This linguistic examination of *what we do (or should) say when* in using word *w* and applying the corresponding concept *c* is a good way to get a grip on what we do (or should) mean by *w* and *c*. Thus, an analysis of concept *c* gives an answer to the question 'What does concept *c* mean?' because it is an analysis of *c* in terms of its necessary and sufficient conditions that specify *c*'s meaning.

Concept *c* applies to X, if and only if such-and-such individually necessary and jointly sufficient conditions are satisfied by X. The standard form of a conceptual analysis looks like this:

— if and only if —.

The first blank is called the *analysandum*, or the 'target' concept being analyzed. The second blank is called the *analysans*, or 'that' what does the analyzing, namely, a set of conditions each of which is necessary and which jointly are sufficient. If *x* is a necessary condition for *y*, then *y* is a sufficient condition for *x*. A necessary condition for *c* is something that must be satisfied if *c* is to occur; *only if* such a condition is present, then *c*. For example, oxygen is a necessary condition for combustion. A sufficient condition for *c* is something such that if it is satisfied, then *c* will also occur; *if* such a condition is present, then *c*. For instance, having a daughter is a sufficient condition for being a parent. A conceptual analysis is then an 'if and only if' or equivalence claim and, thus, a kind of definition.

Take as an example the analysis of the concept of bachelor<sup>7</sup>:

X is a bachelor, if and only if

- (1) X is a human
- (2) X is male
- (3) X is an adult, and
- (4) X is unmarried

If one thinks that divorced men or widowers are not bachelors, then (4) should be replaced by the stronger condition (4') X has never been married. Again, if one thinks that priests are not bachelors, then (5) X is ineligible to marry should be added as an extra condition.

Clear thinking involves concepts with good analyses. A good (noncircular) analysis basically has to meet three criteria. First, the *analysandum* and the *analysans* should be equivalent in meaning. This is evident. The *analysans* can involve neither

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<sup>7</sup>Earle 1992, pp. 5–6.

more nor less meaning than the analysandum. Also, if the analysans would have another meaning than the analysandum, then the analysans could not possibly clarify the analysandum. Second, the analysans should be more intelligible than the analysandum. The analysis can clarify only if the concepts used in the conditions (the analysans) are clearer, or simpler, or more familiar than the target concept (the analysandum). Third, the analysis should be correct. To test whether the analysandum and the analysans are really equivalent, one tries to give or construct so-called “counterexamples” to the analysis. A counterexample is a coherent (imagined) scenario in which one side of the analysis holds but the other does not. For the most part, constructing a counterexample comes to the same thing as conducting a thought experiment. If a counterexample can successfully be constructed, then the analysandum and the analysans are not really equivalent. Alternatively, if no counterexample can be constructed, then this failure is good evidence for the correctness of the analysis.

Take as another example the standard analysis of the concept of knowledge:

Subject S knows that  $p$ , if and only if

- (1) S believes that  $p$
- (2)  $p$  is true, and
- (3) S is justified in believing that  $p$

Against this analysis of knowledge as justified, true belief (JTB), E. Gettier constructed counterexamples (to sufficiency).<sup>8</sup> A so-called “Gettier-counterexample” describes a scenario in which S fulfills all three conditions but still does not know. B. Russell already gave the following case: “There is the man who looks at a clock which is not going, thought he thinks it is, and who happens to look at it at the moment when it is right; this man acquires a true [justified] belief as to the time of the day, but cannot be said to have knowledge”.<sup>9</sup> If the man has no reason to distrust the clock, his belief might be justified as well as true. Consequently, the JTB analysis of knowledge is incorrect and has to be modified or expanded, if not abandoned.

The necessary and sufficient conditions of the analysans are not empirical conditions. The conditions for knowledge, for example, are neither (fully) psychological nor neurophysiological conditions. Empirical conditions are a posteriori discoverable and contingently true. By using the methodology of conceptual analysis (and argument-evaluation), analytic philosophers seek, in contrast, to discover a priori necessary truths.<sup>10</sup> What is essential to X is contained a priori in the content of X’s concept. Conceptual analysis is not based on empirical generalization but on intellectual scrutinization of conceptual content. To deliver a priori knowledge, conceptual analysis does not need the contribution of the empirical world. If the analysandum and the analysans are identical in meaning, then the analysis is correct or true by meaning alone. In a word, analytic philosophers are ‘armchair’ investiga-

<sup>8</sup> Gettier 1963.

<sup>9</sup> Russell 1948, pp. 170–71.

<sup>10</sup> McGinn 2012.

tors: without being roused from their armchairs, they discover the essence of the world by analyzing the constituents of thought—i.e., concepts.

### *Paradigm Breakdown*

But what exactly are concepts? There are problems not only with the ontology but also with the structure of concepts.<sup>11</sup> It is unclear what kind of things concepts are. Three proposals have been defended: concepts are abstract objects (Platonic forms or Fregean senses), concepts are mental representations (ideas), and concepts are epistemic abilities (concept possession is some sort of dispositional, epistemic condition). All these proposals have ontological and epistemological difficulties. But more importantly perhaps, it is even unclear how concepts are structured. The classical methodology of conceptual analysis assumes that concepts have a definitional structure in that their contents are definable by necessary and sufficient conditions. Alternative theories hold that concepts have a probabilistic structure (the prototype/exemplar theory), that they are structured holistically (the ‘theory’ theory) or that they do not have any structure at all (semantic atomism). All these theories about conceptual structure remain highly controversial.

The assumption that concepts are definitionally structured by singly necessary and jointly sufficient conditions has received philosophical as well as empirical criticism.<sup>12</sup> I leave the empirical critique aside, to concentrate on two major philosophical objections. It is alleged, firstly, that conceptual analysis cannot properly deal with functional (artifact) concepts or disjunctive concepts (e.g., a strike in baseball, which can be *either* a ‘called’ or a ‘swinging’ strike) and that it has difficulties with unclear cases (e.g., ‘Is a tomato a fruit?’). But most importantly, it is claimed, secondly, that conceptual analysis fails because it cannot satisfactorily specify the defining necessary (and sufficient) conditions. Wittgenstein made this devastating critical point.<sup>13</sup> He asked: What is the conceptual analysis of, for example, the concept of game? What does fill the blank in the scheme ‘X is a game, if and only if ———’? Take the following sample of games and their defining features (schematically represented as A, B, C, D):

game 1 (e.g., board game): A B C

game 2 (e.g., card game): B C D

game 3 (e.g., ball game): A C D and

game 4 (e.g., Olympic games): A B D

If one looks at these different games, then one cannot find one single feature F—such as amusing, competitive, or pastime—that is common to all of them. There just is no necessary condition that all and only games satisfy. What one sees when

<sup>11</sup> Margolis and Laurence 2014.

<sup>12</sup> Smith and Medin 1981. For the empirical critique, see pp. 33–51.

<sup>13</sup> Wittgenstein 1953, part I, pp. 66–71.

looking at these games are similarities, overlap, and criss-cross relationships. Such similarities are what Wittgenstein calls “family resemblances” because the characteristics of family members overlap and criss-cross in the same way. So, games do not have a unique essence but they form a family. Since the concept of game is a family resemblance concept, there is no feature F that can be specified as the necessary condition to fill in the blank of the scheme above. Wittgenstein generalizes this insight: if all concepts are family resemblance concepts, then conceptual analysis in terms of necessary (and sufficient) conditions is doomed. However, some analytic philosophers take his pessimism to be uncalled for and argue that he is wrong.<sup>14</sup>

Logical analysis either in its symbolic or conceptual mode was for more than half a century paradigmatic for doing philosophy in the analytic style. From around 1960 until today, analytic philosophy witnessed and still witnesses a paradigm breakdown, caused among other factors by the anomaly Wittgenstein allegedly pointed out. The fourth period in the history of analytic philosophy is an era of pluralism and eclecticism.<sup>15</sup> At least four strands are woven together. For one thing, weaker forms of conceptual analysis have been proposed: for instance, giving only (some) necessary conditions or only (some) sufficient ones, drawing up an open-ended list of criteria for the application of a concept, establishing coherent, mutually supportive connections between the central elements of our conceptual scheme. For another, new developments in symbolic logic, in particular the rise of the possible worlds approach to modal logic, reinvigorated the use of strictly logical analysis and formal modelling. In addition to possible worlds semantics, direct reference theory also made a significant impact. For still another thing, analytic philosophy became more detached from linguistic philosophy and loosely associated itself more with philosophy of mind (cognitive science) and even metaphysics. For a last thing, some ‘analytic’ philosophers, such as R. Rorty, H. Putnam, and J. McDowell,<sup>16</sup> returned to one or other form of idealism. This retreat from the foundationalist epistemology and realist ontology of earlier analytic philosophy is partly due to the growing influence of American pragmatism and postmodern anti-realism.

## What Is Analytic Philosophy of Education?

### *The Analytic Turn*

The two founding fathers of the analytic approach in the philosophy of education are Israel Scheffler (1923–2014) in the United States and Richard S. Peters (1919–2011) in Great Britain.<sup>17</sup> Although Scheffler published the programmatic manifesto

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<sup>14</sup>For example, McGinn 2012.

<sup>15</sup>Williamson 2014.

<sup>16</sup>Rorty 1980, Putnam 1981, McDowell 1994.

<sup>17</sup>The ‘London Line’, a term coined to refer to Peters’ group and their work, includes P.H. Hirst, R. Dearden, R.K. Elliott, D. Cooper, and J. White. The second generation of analytic philosophers



'Toward an analytic philosophy of education' in 1954, educational philosophy only definitely took the 'analytic turn' some years later around 1960 at the end of the third period in the history of analytic philosophy.<sup>18</sup> The importation of ordinary language philosophy from mainstream analytic philosophy at that time really revolutionized the philosophy of education.

There are perspicuous as well as subtle differences between the two cofounders. Scheffler, much more than Peters, is a mainstream analytic philosopher in his own right. Conversely, Peters, much more than Scheffler, is a purely educational philosopher working within the analytic paradigm. Scheffler's background is primarily in logic and philosophy of language (in this domain he mainly worked on subjects such as linguistic ambiguity and vagueness, metaphor and symbolism). Influenced by American pragmatism and logical positivism, he made substantial contributions to epistemology (on topics such as truth, objectivity and justification) and philosophy of science (on themes such as explanation, falsification and confirmation).<sup>19</sup> By contrast, Peters' background is primarily in classics, psychology, philosophy of mind, and social and political philosophy. The more subtle divergence between them as to the use of philosophical analysis comes to the fore when one compares Scheffler's book title *The Language of Education* (1960) with Peters' *The Logic of Education* (1970; coauthored with Paul H. Hirst). Whereas Scheffler opts for a linguistically driven type of analysis, Peters directly goes for a conceptual analysis in terms of logically necessary and sufficient conditions. Below I will concisely contextualize the analytic turn in the philosophy of education in the light of Peters' analytic paradigm.<sup>20</sup> Of the two founding fathers, Peters is the purest philosopher of education who devoted all his energy exclusively to the promotion and expansion of the analytic approach to educational philosophy.

This then new, revolutionary approach differed from the older styles of doing philosophy of education in three ways. First, the analytic approach is ahistorical. It focuses on structural themes instead of historical figures in the philosophy of education such as Plato and Rousseau. Central themes for analysis are, among others, education, teaching, and the curriculum. Second, the analytic approach is anti-synthetic. It does not aim at an overall view of the place of education in the search for wisdom and the meaning of life against the backdrop of one or other world-image. As against devising global religious or ideological educational programs, conceptual analysis proceeds in a piecemeal and neutral way. Third, the analytic approach is practically relevant. It works bottom-up from actual problems in educational practice and policy. Philosophical analysis wants to be a toolbox philosophy

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comprises, among others, D. Carr, T. McLaughlin, and J. Wilson in Great Britain and R. Barrow, H. Siegel, and E. Callan in North America.

<sup>18</sup>Hardie 1942 and perhaps also O'Connor 1957 are important forerunners.

<sup>19</sup>For instance, Scheffler 2000. See also, Holma 2004.

<sup>20</sup>For the full story, see Cuypers and Martin 2013. I draw upon material I wrote for this book in what follows.

for education and not a top-down philosophy applied to the domain of education.<sup>21</sup> So, the new, revolutionary approach identifies philosophy of education as an ahistorical, neutral, analytic method to handle (and hopefully resolve) concrete issues on the educational work floor.

This intellectual revolution in the 1960s and early 1970s had a double effect: the introduction of the analytic paradigm did not only establish philosophy of education as a respectable branch of philosophy at large but also as a contributory component of educational theory as such. On the one hand, revolutionized educational philosophy could participate in the growing prestige of analytic philosophy at large. From mainstream analytic philosophy, it imported the ideals of rigor, clarity, and argumentation as well as the goals of truth and progressing knowledge. Precisely because the analytic approach has a much more neutral and scientific character than the other approaches mentioned above, *analytic* philosophy of education could establish itself as a respectable branch of genuine philosophy, as opposed to woolly wisdom, spiritual improvement or dull history of ideas.

On the other hand, revolutionized educational philosophy could be taken seriously as an integral part of educational theory as such. On a plausible view,<sup>22</sup> education is a subject in its own right next to other subjects studied in the social sciences, though educational theory (or educational studies) is not a distinct academic discipline in the sense of having a single type of truth criterion and one determinate methodology. Education is a hybrid field of study where a group of separate disciplines meet for the purpose of dealing with practical problems of an educational nature. Educational theory by its very nature is, therefore, interdisciplinary. Obviously, one needs experimental data and empirical evidence to draw general conclusions and to construct educational hypotheses on the basis of such generalizations. Yet, to adequately deal with educational issues, one has to acknowledge that conceptual analysis and value judgements are indispensable. And it is in relation to these nonempirical aspects of the educational sciences that *philosophy* of education plays its vital role. Any attempt to solve educational problems involves, thus, the contribution of different types of expertise and various styles of methodology, namely, conceptual analysis and philosophical justification, besides empirical evidence from the social sciences, especially from psychology and sociology.

Now, educational philosophy, precisely for the reason that it is based on the analytic paradigm, could establish itself as an equal partner to the social sciences of psychology and sociology. Moreover, it could itself contribute to the academic seriousness and respectability of educational theory. In contrast to the low academic standing of older types of educational studies—undifferentiated ‘mixed bags’ of descriptive propositions, normative claims and directive exhortations—the partnership of the analytic methodology of philosophy with the empirical methodology of

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<sup>21</sup> The reaction of Peters’ ‘London Line’ to the 1967 Plowden report on *Children and Their Primary School* is a noteworthy example of the real-world impact of the analytic approach on British educational policy. See Peters 1969a.

<sup>22</sup> Scheffler 1963 and Peters 1973.

the social sciences did much to establish the credibility of interdisciplinary educational studies in view of the acknowledged prestige of the scientific paradigm at large.

The analytic approach is impersonal and unemotional, precise and orderly, piecemeal and careful. As such, it complies with the requirements of logic, rationality and scientific forms of study. Consequently, this new, revolutionary approach is a natural ally of 'rationalism' in the philosophy of education. It is then no coincidence that spokesmen of the analytic paradigm, in particular Scheffler and Peters, criticize and oppose radical or extreme educational progressivism or child-centered education. This 'left-wing' educational philosophy is to be contrasted with the traditional, subject-centered, teacher-directed 'right-wing' educational philosophy.

Following such educators of the past as Jean-Jacques Rousseau and John Dewey, progressivism holds a distinctive view on the status of childhood, the nature of the child, the curriculum and the role of the teacher. Childhood is not a stage on the way to adulthood but a state on its own. Because children are seen *as children*, one respects them as individuals and recognizes their differences. Connectedly, the child has a specific nature or self with its own needs and interests and with individual talents. It unfolds 'from within' an innate potentiality, as an acorn growing into an oak. Accordingly, the child-centered educationalist defends an integrated curriculum, with curriculum units of a topic or project type based on the child's needs, interests and talents. The learning should not stand under the control of an external authority but proceed *vom Kinde aus* in harmony with the child's own nature. Because the child is a natural enquirer who learns by experience and discovery, the role of the teacher is not that of an instructor but that of a sympathizing by-stander or at most a facilitator.

Although both Scheffler and Peters criticized this progressive picture of educating children, they themselves did not defend the other extreme of rote learning traditionalism and pure formalism.<sup>23</sup> While preserving what is best in the progressive or humanistic educational philosophy, they argued for a sensible middle position which allocates a central place to the ideal of rationality. Reason plays a pivotal role in all types of education. Educating for life is educating for the life of reason, in which the ideals of reasonableness and the concern about truth take central stage. Again, there is a subtle difference between Scheffler and Peters as to the understanding and development of the ideal of rationality. Whereas Scheffler primarily conceives of rationality as exercising critical thinking, Peters predominantly identifies it with possessing forms of knowledge and understanding. This contrast should not be exaggerated, though, since it is only a matter of emphasis. For both of them, the core business of rationality is and remains reason-giving and rational justification.

### ***Exemplary Analysis of the Concept of Education***

Though conceptual analysis is of central importance to analytic philosophy of education, it is not an end in itself. It is only meaningful if it is done at the service of problems that crop up in educational practice and policy. This practical domain of

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<sup>23</sup> Scheffler 1964 and Peters 1969a.

education is inevitably shot through with value judgements and moral questions. Yet, although normative issues—such as evaluating educational aims, determining the value of (possible) curriculum subjects, distinguishing good from bad teaching(methods), children’s rights, and the equal distribution of educational opportunities—have the full attention of philosophers of education, they cannot be adequately addressed before these issues themselves are sufficiently analyzed and conceptually clear. In this sense, questions of conceptual analysis take precedence over questions of normative grounds or justification. So, conceptual analysis is a necessary preliminary to answering other more important questions about educational practice and policy. It is indispensable theoretical groundwork before anything else sensibly can be said, decided or done in the practical domain of education. Peters’ classic *Ethics and Education* (1966) is the best illustration of this relation between theory and practice.

Key concepts in analytic philosophy of education are, to name but a few, though central ones, ‘education’, ‘teaching’, ‘indoctrination’, ‘curriculum’, ‘learning’, ‘development’, and ‘schooling’.<sup>24</sup> As an example of how the classical methodology (section “**Classical methodology**”) is applied in the philosophy of education, I briefly reconstruct Peters’ analysis of the concept of education.<sup>25</sup> Take the standard format: — ( *analysandum* ) if and only if — ( *analysans* ). What exactly is the *analysandum*? To make what is to be analyzed more precise, Peters appeals to Ryle’s task-achievement distinction (roughly, a kind of process-product distinction).<sup>26</sup> Educational processes relate to being educated as tasks (internally) relate to achievements. Being educated is the achievement or successful result relative to the performance of task activities, i.e., the realization of educational processes. For convenience, I built the task or process aspect into the analysis of ‘being educated’:

S is an educated person, if and only if

- (1) S is in a desirable state of mind which is realized in a morally unobjectionable manner and (partly) produced by S’s voluntary intentional action, and
- (2) S possesses ‘knowledge that’ and understanding of the ‘reason why’, both of which are produced by S’s learning processes (partly) assisted by educational processes; in addition,
  - (2a) S must take delight in knowledge and understanding for their own sake and must care about their standards of excellence
  - (2b) S’s knowledge and understanding must be (sufficiently) all-round and versatile, and
  - (2c) S’s knowledge and understanding must (sufficiently) actively transform S’s attitude to life and the world

Notice that (2a–c) are additional ‘nested’ necessary conditions into (2), which qualify the type of knowledge and understanding required for being educated. (1) and

<sup>24</sup> Peters and Hirst 1970, Winch and Gingell 1999.

<sup>25</sup> Peters 1967 and 1970. See also, Carr 2003 and 2010.

<sup>26</sup> Ryle 1949, pp. 131–135

(2) are the two central necessary (and sufficient) conditions or criteria: the desirability or value criterion and the cognitive criterion. We avoid circularity in condition (2)—note the conceptual circle in the analysis: ... educated ... if and only if ... educational ...—by substituting ‘*educational* processes’ with a plurality of more specific processes such as, given the inculcation of the basic skills of literacy and numeracy, instruction and correction, teaching and explanation, the dialogical method of question and answer as well as conversation.

Is this a good analysis? Until 1970, Peters thought that the analysans adequately specifies *the* meaning of ‘education’. In the light of the distinction between being (merely) trained and being (really) educated, the value and cognitive criteria define the *essence* of education in a culture-free way.<sup>27</sup> Below I will indicate the direction in which he changed his mind. Undoubtedly, the analysans makes the target concept of education more intelligible. The analyzing concepts of a worthwhile state, knowledge and learning systematically unpack and clarify the opaque concept of education. Although these analyzing concepts need to be analyzed further themselves, they are clearer and simpler than the concept of education. Moreover, the analysans offers the perhaps surprising insight that, in the end, all education is *self*-education. Although the internal learning processes can be assisted by external educational processes, the instigation of and control over the constitutive learning processes is ultimately only in the learner’s own hands. Also, the knowledge and understanding possessed are ultimately only for the benefit of the educated person him- or herself who tries to make something out of his or her own life.

Is the analysis correct? Counterexamples to necessity can be alleged against both criteria. First, some communities regard education as a *bad* state to be in. The Amish community, for instance, sees secondary and higher education as conceited, if not as corrupting. Apart from instilling the basic skills of literacy and numeracy, vocational training and the passing on of the (spiritual) ways of their ancestors, nothing else should be done in bringing up children. Nothing good can come from ‘worldly’ knowledge. So, the proposition that education is desirable or worthwhile is not an a priori necessary truth. Second, we speak of ‘Spartan education’ without implying that Spartans had differentiated forms of theoretical knowledge and/or rational understanding. Spartan children got an education which did not include more than the transmission of practical (military) skills and mythic folklore. Also, our notion of ‘specialized education’ puts the additional, nested, necessary conditions for knowledge and understanding under pressure. Hence, the proposition that education involves the development of (higher-level and/or all-round) knowledge and understanding is not an a priori necessary truth.

These counterexamples indicate that the analysandum and the analysans of Peters’ analysis are not really equivalent. To deal with this problem, he retreats to the weaker claim that the value and cognitive conditions are only sufficient but not necessary. We can also speak of ‘education’ in their absence, but when they are present we positively are entitled to apply the concept of education. To clarify this conceptual situation, Peters makes a distinction between an (original) more general-

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<sup>27</sup> Peters 1969b, pp. 34–35.

ized conception of education and a (later) more specific conception of education. The more generalized notion refers to all kinds of bringing up or rearing children, whereas the more specific notion is synonymous with our conception of an educated person in Western culture. Accordingly, Amish and Spartan education resort under the former notion, whereas 'liberal education' under the latter. Although Peters seems to safeguard in this way his analysis as applicable, at least, to the specific conception of education, this conception of being educated fulfilling the desirability and cognitive criteria can itself be *contested*. Perhaps the concept of education is then in the end nothing but an essentially contested concept without any a priori necessary truth in it.

### *Post-Analytic Era*

A. Edel already in 1972 concludes his stock-taking paper 'Analytic philosophy of education at the cross-roads' with the complaint that the analytic method only 'yields an unsatisfactory half-house' because it leaves out empirical and valuational, as well as socio-historical components of educational issues. In combination with the analytic paradigm breakdown at large (section "[Paradigm breakdown](#)") and the attendant anti-foundationalism and anti-essentialism,<sup>28</sup> analytic philosophy of education, in the late 1970s, came under pressure and lost its predominance. The decline of the analytic approach made, as a consequence, the emergence of new perspectives in the philosophy of education possible. In this post-analytic period, educational philosophy took a more 'practical turn' and was more concerned with the 'political implications'. The general climate of the 1980s and 1990s was more utilitarian and instrumentalist. The political and institutional circumstances changed rapidly. This period witnessed the increase of bureaucratic control by the government as well as the rising influence of managerial conceptions of educational administration. Many educational philosophers resisted an unquestioning acceptance of the market and consumer conceptions of narrowly neo-liberalistic education. Both for their critique and their alternatives, they drew not only on post-empiricist Anglo-American philosophy but also on continental intellectual traditions such as phenomenology, existentialism, (neo-)Marxism, structuralism, critical theory, and postmodernism.

As of today, the situation has not altered much. Recent social changes have, of course, engendered new challenges to be dealt with in educational philosophy. The present-day scene features philosophical reflection (and empirical research) on the ways in which educational systems try to cope with, for example, multiculturalism

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<sup>28</sup>Evers (1993) criticizes the analytic method on the bases of the untenable analytic (or conceptual)/synthetic distinction (in the line of Quine) and the hopelessness of delivering necessary conditions for concept application (in the spirit of Wittgenstein). These bases are, however, controversial. See Russell 2008 for a defense of the distinction and McGinn 2012 for a defense of conceptual essentialism.

and cosmopolitanism, globalization, changing notions of citizenship (such as digital citizenship) and the family, environmentalism, as well as with, for example, new conceptions of vocational education, the rise of information and communication technology (ICT) and the restructuring of higher education in both European and North American contexts. All these current issues are approached from different theoretical viewpoints and explored in diverse styles of reflection and research. In our day, philosophy of education is eclectic and cross-cultural in character.<sup>29</sup>

Still, some contemporary analytic philosophers of education argue that in the context of the heterogeneous and multifaceted present-day scene, the analytic paradigm is not just one of the alternatives to choose from among the different paradigms that are available. They claim that within the multi-paradigmatic structure of contemporary educational philosophy, the analytic paradigm is *primus inter pares*—the first among equals.<sup>30</sup> These philosophers roughly give the following argument, no doubt provocative and controversial.

All other paradigms—such as phenomenology, Marxism or postmodernism—*asymmetrically depend upon* the basic, analytic paradigm. That is to say, whereas all other paradigms, in a sense to be explained immediately, depend upon the analytic one, the latter does not depend upon any of the others. In that way, one cannot avoid engaging with the analytic methods and claims of an analytic philosopher such as Scheffler, Peters, or Hirst. In the light of this asymmetrical dependency thesis, the analytic paradigm is, in a specific sense, *foundational*. The sense in which the term ‘foundational’ is used here should not be misunderstood. The paradigm is not epistemologically foundational in the sense of trying to establish a set of infallible axioms for educational theory. It is, moreover, neutral as to the ontological commitments one holds at the foundations of one’s metaphysical world-view. Yet, the analytic paradigm is *conceptually* foundational in the sense that it deals with basic concepts that are constitutive of the discipline—the philosophy of education—*itself*. In that sense, too, all other paradigms depend upon the analytic one for the demarcation of their discipline and the identification of their central issues.

## What Is Liberal Education?

As a further example of the analytic approach, it is worthwhile to briefly look at an analysis of liberal education and its justifications. This example highlights the important point that analytic philosophy of education is not limited to (descriptive) questions of conceptual analysis but incorporates (normative) questions of justification as well. According to a classical view,<sup>31</sup> the concept of liberal education is coextensive with that of moral education and even with that of education *simpliciter*.

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<sup>29</sup> A good example of the contemporary methodological pluralism is Heyting, Lenzen, and White 2001, a collection of essays on children’s rights.

<sup>30</sup> Among others, Siegel 1988 and 1997. The following argument is taken from Cuypers and Martin 2013, p. 227.

<sup>31</sup> Oakshott 1989.



However, the term ‘liberal education’ is highly ambiguous, and, hence, *the* concept of liberal education does not exist. Several conceptions can be distinguished historically and systematically.<sup>32</sup> One can only hope to give a sufficiently clear regimentation of some (of the most important) conceptions of liberal education and to say something useful about one or other selected (important) conception. One confusion should be cleared out of the way immediately. Liberal education is not the education *of* future liberals (children that will grow into liberal adults) *by* present-day liberals against the backdrop of a political theory of (neo)liberalism, although the term is also used in this context.<sup>33</sup>

## Conceptions

The ideal of liberal education is constitutive of European civilization from classical antiquity until today. During its history the ideal underwent several changes. Liberal education in Western culture originated in classical antiquity with the Greek ideal of *paideia* and the Roman teaching of the *artes liberales*. The medieval system of the seven liberal arts declined in the Renaissance when liberal education became exclusively associated with the *studia humaniora*. In Germany, during the Enlightenment, liberal education became associated with *Bildung* and *Selbst-Bildung*. This turn toward the self-realization of the individual is not necessarily related anymore to the pursuit of knowledge by means of the liberal arts curriculum or even the humanities. Despite the ambiguities inherent in the liberal education ideal and the dilemmas for its implementation in a modern liberal democracy, reference to this ideal is today made, for example, to counteract economy-based educational systems and to set up educational trajectories for creating citizens and cultivating humanity.

Systematically, three distinct conceptions of liberal education can be distinguished:

- (1) education for pursuing knowledge for its own sake
- (2) general education and
- (3) nonauthoritarian education

One way to sort out these conceptions is by interpreting liberal education as ‘liberating’ education, and to ask what such an education is liberating *from*. Liberal education by its liberating force wants to set the mind free from certain constraints. The first conception wants to liberate from pragmatic instrumentalism and mere vocational training, the second from too narrow specialization and excessive compartmentalization, and the third from indoctrination and dogmatism.

The first conception is reminiscent of the classical Greek *paideia* ideal in that it is based on a distinction between theoretical knowledge pursued for its own sake and knowledge pursued for practical ends. Since human beings are *rational* animals

<sup>32</sup>For the detailed picture, see Cuypers and Martin 2013, chap. 5. Below, I have drawn from this chapter.

<sup>33</sup>By, for instance, Levinson 1999.

whose perfection lies in the free development of their proper function, the value of the rational and theoretical overrides that of the practical and technical. The second conception harks back to the ideal of acquiring an all-round knowledge and understanding on the basis of a classical liberal arts curriculum. Liberal education as general knowledge acquisition aims at the open and comprehensive development of the mind by means of acquiring a whole spectrum of knowledge. The third conception is closely associated with education in the light of the ideals of (*Selbst-*)*Bildung* in that personal autonomy and critical thinking play pivotal roles in educational procedures. Whereas according to an extreme (but less plausible) version of this conception, self-realization depends wholly on individual experience and authentic choice, according to a more moderate (but more plausible) version, experience and choice, to be intelligible at all, must be informed by reason, knowledge, and a public understanding of the world. On the latter view, liberal education is certainly not the same as anarchic education.<sup>34</sup>

Arguably, the first ‘for its own sake’ conception has not so much application in the context of knowledge acquisition in schools as in that of the advancement of knowledge in the universities,<sup>35</sup> while the third (moderate) nonauthoritarian conception seems to presuppose the second general conception. Consequently, the second conception of liberal education as general education seems the most basic one. Note that the content of this second conception matches the content of Peters’ more specific conception of an educated person in Western culture (section “[Exemplary analysis of the concept of education](#)”).

## *Justification*

Although liberal education as general education clearly excludes narrow specialization, it is not clear what it positively includes. How broad must a person’s spectrum of knowledge be for him or her to be called ‘liberally educated’? Hirst, Peters’ closest collaborator, introduced the so-called forms of knowledge thesis in his 1965 landmark paper ‘Liberal education and the nature of knowledge’ to answer this question. The thesis says that the domain of human knowledge can be differentiated into a number of logically distinct forms of knowledge none of which can be reduced to any other. These non-arbitrary divisions within the knowledge domain can be made on the basis of distinctive types of conceptual schemes, truth criteria and testing procedures. This non-arbitrary differentiation into forms of knowledge is to be contrasted with the unifying ideals of mythology, religion and ideology, all of which involve forms of awareness that are comparatively undifferentiated. The differentiation of knowledge is one of the great achievements of Western civilization. The

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<sup>34</sup> Suissa 2006.

<sup>35</sup> Moreover, the dichotomy between ‘for its own sake’ and ‘for practical ends’ is inadequate because practical activities can also be pursued for their own sake on the one hand and theoretical activities can also be infected by purely instrumental, practical ends on the other.

thesis differentiates between seven (or eight) distinct forms of knowledge: mathematics, physical sciences, human sciences, history, literature and the fine arts, religion, and philosophy (as well as moral knowledge).

However, given that this knowledge domain is enormously vast and that the *homo universalis* has become a psychological impossibility in the present-day knowledge society, which (sub)disciplines should be selected from the seven (or eight) different disciplines picked out by the ‘forms of knowledge’ thesis? Which kinds of knowledge are of most worth for the liberally educated person? This calls, of course, for a *justification* of which (sub)disciplines to include in—and, consequently, which others to exclude from—the liberal education curriculum.<sup>36</sup> Arguably, to deal with this issue of the content of liberal education, one should select, as the central core of an all-round understanding, *that* body of knowledge which is relevant for any person to cope with ‘the human condition’. In this way, all persons would have an interest in this body of knowledge on the basis of their existential concern. Such a selection of (sub)disciplines would then represent a kind of ‘survival kit’ or ‘life manual’ not only for the elite few but for everyone. A plausible view holds that the content of that body of knowledge, which is relevant for any person to cope with the human condition and life’s predicaments, is constituted by the *humanities*.<sup>37</sup>

With respect to the justification of the humanities as the core content of liberal education, one could argue that there exists a kind of asymmetry between the humanities and the natural sciences regarding their respective relevance for elucidating the human condition. Although physics (especially astronomy) and biology (especially Darwinian theory), for example, also contribute to the clarification of the human condition, the human sciences address the existential concern directly. In the light of a recent catalog of arguments for the value of the humanities,<sup>38</sup> it transpires that an appeal to existential concern as a justificatory basis is an original one.<sup>39</sup> It offers a non-instrumental justification because the humanities, as the body of knowledge which is relevant for any person to cope with life’s predicaments, are not ‘useful’ in the sense of being pursued for the sake of some practical or extrinsic end. Yet, the intrinsic value of the humanities is neither fully captured by the subjective value of taking pleasure in studying them nor by the objective value of possessing humanistic knowledge for its own sake. The value of the humanities is, at least to a considerable extent, firmly anchored in the *existential* value of them in coping with real life experiences. The heritage of the humanities is, in that sense, partially constitutive of a worthwhile life. It can, therefore, plausibly be claimed that an appeal to existential concern for the justification of liberal education as education into the humanities has a distinctive persuasive power in comparison with other justificatory arguments.

<sup>36</sup> See, for example, Hook et al. 1975 and Bailey 1984 for a detailed treatment of the justificatory issue(s).

<sup>37</sup> For my purposes, there is no need to distinguish between the humanities in a narrow sense (only including literature and the fine arts, history, religion, and philosophy) and in a broad sense (also including the ‘human sciences’, i.e., the social sciences).

<sup>38</sup> Small 2013.

<sup>39</sup> Cuypers (forthcoming) details this claim as follows. This article gives the full argumentation.

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# Contemporary Conceptions of Jewish Education: A Philosophical Analysis



Hanan A. Alexander

What does it mean to obtain a Jewish education today, to receive an initiation into one interpretation or another of Judaism as a religious tradition, or to acquire a Jewish political or cultural affiliation through formal or informal learning? These are questions in the philosophy of Jewish education. In this context, philosophy entails clarifying the concepts and logic of educational research, policy, and practice (Soltis 1978); considering conflicts among ideas or assumption associated with curriculum, teaching, and learning (Popkewitz and Fendler 1999); or translating theological or ideological beliefs and values into instructional aims, content, or methods (Fox et al. 2003). Philosophers have long presumed that education involves the transmission or transformation of worthwhile knowledge across the generations (Plato 2008; Peters 1967). Understanding a conception of education, therefore, Jewish or otherwise, requires conceiving a perspective that offers criteria as to what should count as worthwhile knowledge. These criteria are often described as standards of criticism because they are used to determine the relative merit of ideals and values and the degree of truthfulness in beliefs and attitudes (Alexander 2001b: 44–50). Hence, to address questions about the meaning of various conceptions of Jewish education, one must account for how one or another view of Jewishness understands such criteria.

The term ‘Jewishness’ in this context denotes putative commitments to Judaism as a religion, according to some theology or interpretation, to the Jewish people as a national, cultural, or ethnic community, according to one or another political philosophy or ideology, or to some combination of the two. Contemporary conceptions of what it might mean to be Jewish divide broadly into three categories, therefore, centered on how each views the relation between these two basic historical strands of Jewish identity, one religious and the other political. Whereas anti-modern

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interpretations conceive Jewishness in both religious and political terms, modern views tend to emphasize either religion or politics, and postmodern attitudes seek to deconstruct the distinction altogether (Alexander 2003, 2011).

Each orientation emphasizes a different account of the logic to justify the sort of knowledge that merits transmission or transformation across the generations, often influenced by or in dialogue with one or another influential philosophical or intellectual movement of the day, with consequences for curriculum content, instructional authority, pedagogic styles, and gender relations. Anti-modern Judaism is grounded primarily in hermeneutic scholarship which emphasizes the exegesis and eisegesis of sacred texts, both legal and literary, sometimes in dialogue with medieval interpretations of ancient pagan philosophers such as Plato, Aristotle, or Plotinus (Wolfson 1977). Modern Jewish experience, on the other hand, tends to rely either on Enlightenment understandings of Jewish history and sociology or counter-Enlightenment interpretations of Jewish memory and tradition (Berlin 1998). The Enlightenment approach draws on lower criticism to establish the texts and artifacts to be interpreted by means of higher historical criticism and on quantitative or qualitative research methods to collect behavioral data that can be assessed according to prevailing sociological theory. The counter-Enlightenment stance, on the other hand, references nationalist interpretations of collective memory or traditional commentaries on sacred texts and traditions. Finally, postmodern critique employs dialectical or conflictual reasoning to tease out and address unequal power relations among Jews and between Jews and non-Jews.

To understand how each of these orientations might conceive education requires some historical background. The Hebrew Bible, which recounts the Israelite narrative dating back to the tenth century BCE, if not before, emphasizes the responsibility of parents in transmitting Israelite narratives and customs to their children (e.g., Deut. 6:4–7; 20–25; Prov. 24:27–34; 27:23–27). It also alludes to schools established by priests and prophets in the centuries between the rise of the Davidic dynasty in the tenth century BCE and the destruction of the first Jerusalem Temple and Babylonian exile in the year 586 BCE (Judg. 17:10; Ps. 15: 19, 119; 78:1–4). The descendants of these exiles, who came to be known as Jews since they hailed mostly from the ancient Israelite province of Judea, returned to the land of Israel around 444 BCE (Alexander 2001a).

With the rebuilding of the Jerusalem Temple, worship moved gradually from the sacrificial cult to the recitation and study of sacred texts, until texts overtook sacrifice with the destruction of the second Temple by the Romans in the year 70 CE. The Hebrew Bible was canonized into what became known as Written Torah (Five Books of Moses, Former and Latter Prophets, and Writings) around the second century BCE (Bickerman 1949). In Hebrew, this text is sometimes referred to as 'Mikra'. A parallel tradition also emerged at this time that interpreted and applied Written Torah to changing circumstances. This Oral Torah was recorded in the second century CE in a legal code independent of the biblical text that became known as the 'Mishnah' (Cohen 1987). This code organized Jewish life into 613 'Mitzvoth' or divine commandments that are binding on all Jews from the age of 13. The case law of this oral tradition developed in the centuries that followed into what became



known as ‘Talmud’, although the term later came to refer to other forms of higher Jewish learning as well (Neusner 2004).

Although there were competing Judean sects during the first century CE (Bickerman 1949), according to the rabbinic tradition that prevailed the classical curriculum of Jewish schools was formally established when high priest Yehoshuaben Gamla appointed teachers of children for every village and town in ancient Israel (Babylonian Talmud, Bava Batra, 21a). The sages summarized this traditional curriculum by stating that a child is fit to study Mikra at 5 years of age and Mishnah at 10, to observe Mitzvoth at 13, and to study Talmud at 15 (Mishnah Avot 5:21). Ever since, scholars have interpreted these four terms—Mikra, Mishnah, Mitzvoth, and Talmud—according to their various understandings of Jewish life to describe the content that is sufficiently worthwhile to merit transmission or transformation across the generations through education (Alexander and Glick 2003). To be sure, anti-modern, modern, and postmodern approaches to contemporary Jewish belief and association do not emphasize each of these terms in equal measure or interpret them in the same way. Still, one would not be too far wrong to use them as a basis for organizing alternative ways of conceiving what it might be to obtain a Jewish education.

Accordingly, this chapter contains five parts. In the first part, I explain the roles of religion and politics in Jewish life to clarify why noting an emphasis on one or the other is a useful way of distinguishing among contemporary conceptions of Jewishness. In the second, third, and fourth parts, I examine how the logics of alternative anti-modern, modern, and postmodern accounts of Jewish life understand these key curriculum concepts and their consequences for authority, pedagogy, and gender. In the final part, I consider the consequences of this analysis for addressing the question of what it might mean to receive a Jewish education today. I answer that this entails engaging learners with some aspect of Jewish life in dialogue with some dimension of modern life, both broadly conceived, by means of a logic or hermeneutic intended to facilitate attachment to one or another account of what it might mean to be Jewish today. This is an exemplary case of what I have called “pedagogy of difference”, which holds that to know oneself requires engaging others who are different, but to genuinely engage others one must also know oneself (Alexander 2015: 87–138).

## Religion and Politics in Jewish Life

Being Jewish has historically rested on two interconnected conceptual pillars, one political, the other religious, both broadly conceived.<sup>1</sup> The Book of Exodus (19:6) describes the Children of Israel as “a kingdom of priests and a holy nation”—a

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<sup>1</sup>The division between politics and religion is somewhat anachronistic in the ancient near eastern context in which matters of governance and worship were intimately intertwined. The distinction evolved over time, in part as an extension of Augustine’s Christian differentiation between the

political community with a sacred purpose. The eleventh-century Provençale sage, Rabbi Shlomo Yitzchaki, whose classic biblical commentary often reflects earlier rabbinic interpretations, understood the term ‘priests’ in this context to mean ‘ministers’, not descents of Moses’s brother Aaron, who according to tradition was the first high priest. According to the sixteenth-century Italian sage, Rabbi Ovadia Sforno, to be ‘holy’ means to be set apart or distinctive. In the traditional view, then, the mission of the Israelite nation is to lead the whole of humanity to understand the word of God. This is why the nation was to follow both political and religious leaders, judges as well as prophets, kings along with priests, where political power was always to be justified according to the dictates of faith. As the emphasis moved from the sacrificial cult to the study of Torah, both written and oral, the need for individual Jews to understand their religious obligations came to the fore, and the necessity for literacy and hence some form of universal education became paramount.

As Jews dispersed throughout the Diaspora during the centuries following the destruction of the second Temple, this intermingling of politics with religion survived until Napoleon emancipated the Jews at the beginning of the nineteenth century. Throughout the medieval period, Jews lived in independent corporate communities under the protection of—and too often also persecuted by—local Christian and Moslem rulers, each justified by their own religious traditions. Rabbinic scholars with expertise in Jewish law emerged as the religious leaders of medieval Jewry, while lay-leaders of one variety or another served as political heads of the community. This preserved the unity of the national and religious ties that had bound Jews together since biblical times.

This ancient arrangement was forever altered by the two revolutions of modernity, Enlightenment and Emancipation. The one challenged the religious foundations of Jewish life, the other its political underpinnings. The eighteenth-century European Enlightenment altered Jewish faith by asserting a new form of skepticism which admits only those statements that can pass an objective test grounded in reason (Gellner 1992). Moral and intellectual authority, in this view, rests on the rationality of autonomous individuals, not on the word of a transcendent God (Kant 1989, 1997). This intellectual revolution set the stage for a new sort of politics in nineteenth-century Europe known as Emancipation that liberated individuals from religion to choose their own life paths according to the dictates of reason. This new politics undermined the corporate identity of Jews who were now offered citizenship in modern nation-states independent (at least in principle) of religious or ethnic affiliations. These modern Jewish citizens were now empowered to choose whether

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Cities of God and Man (Augustine 1998), which became a bedrock of eighteenth-century political philosophy and nineteenth-century Protestant theology that influenced the scientific study of Judaism. For the present purpose, both terms should be understood broadly to include overlapping notions of culture, custom, language, and narrative, the one emphasizing affiliation and sovereignty, the other faith and ritual.

or in what ways they would continue to adhere to the beliefs and customs of traditional Judaism.<sup>2</sup>

Anti-modern, modern, and postmodern conceptions of Jewishness constitute three broad responses to these two crises of modernity. The first sort of conception, often associated with various forms of ultra-Orthodoxy, rejects both modern revolutions seeking instead to preserve the longstanding traditional ties between faith and affiliation. The prefix ‘anti’ in this context involves both a chronological and a conceptual connotation. On the one hand, it means ‘before’, denoting a self-perception on the part of those who hold these views that their understanding of Judaism accurately preserves the traditions revealed by God at Sinai. On the other hand, it also means ‘against’ or ‘opposed to’, expressing an unwillingness to accept the two revolutions of modernity as offering any positive contribution to Jewish life. Indeed, this attitude even entails a fear that these modern developments will lead to an unraveling or erosion of tradition. This is why the Hebrew word for ultra-Orthodox is ‘Haredi’, meaning fearful, not only of God but also of modernity.

The second way of thinking emphasizes either religion or politics as primary form of Jewish attachment, but not necessarily both. On the one hand, liberal Jewish religion—Progressive, Reform, Reconstructionist, Conservative, modern Orthodox—tends to reconceive Jewish faith in consideration of Enlightenment reason while encouraging the political affiliation of Jews to modern (non-Jewish) nation-states. On the other hand, various interpretations of Zionism favor political affiliation with a Jewish state as the primary form of Jewish connection grounded in several influential counter-Enlightenment trends. These views either reject religion altogether; witness Political, Cultural, or Labor Zionism; or leave it essentially unaltered by the challenges of Enlightenment, as seen very often in Religious Zionism (Alexander 2003).

Drawing on assumptions associated with critical social theory (Marxism, neo-Marxism, postcolonialism), which takes left-leaning counter-Enlightenment thinking to its logical conclusions, and with several Jewish thinkers also influenced by trends in continental philosophy, the third approach views the distinction between these two aspects of Jewish identity as a false dichotomy imposed by one or another meta-narrative—rabbinic, liberal, or Zionist—which can lead to overly instrumental or nationalist consequences. These hegemonic or nationalist orientations often seek to preserve a status quo in which power and privilege are not allocated equitably, whether among various Jewish groups—Ashkenazi versus Mizrahi; male versus female; heterosexual versus gay, lesbian, and transgendered; rational versus

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<sup>2</sup>As the influence of these two Western European revolutions spread eastward, and nineteenth-century counter-Enlightenment trends began to emerge, a movement of Jewish intellectuals arose in Central and Eastern Europe known as “Haskalah” or Jewish Enlightenment. A precursor to both modern Zionism and religious liberalism, this movement sought to preserve the Jews as a separate cultural collective, on the one hand, especially by reviving the Hebrew language for secular purposes, and to promote Jewish integration in the surrounding economy, on the other, through mastery of local vernaculars and adapting to modern values and dress. Naftali Hertz Wiesel, whose advocacy of an education that balanced secular with Jewish learning will be discussed in Part Three, was an early member of this movement (Litvak 2012).

mystical; etc.—or between Jews and gentiles, especially Jews versus Arabs or Israelis versus Palestinians. Associated with such trends as Jewish renewal (including post- or trans-denominationalism and neo-Hassidism) and post-Zionism, adherents to these approaches strive to reconceive Jewishness in ways that minimize these injustices or, if possible, eliminate them altogether. The prefix ‘post’ in the term postmodern, like the prefix ‘anti’ discussed previously, has both chronological and conceptual connotations. Chronologically, it means ‘after’ or ‘following’, since critiques of both Enlightenment and Emancipation could only be conceived once those modern developments had emerged. But the term also refers to a contrary or opposing position, since postmodernism draws on the various versions of critical social theory to cultivate skepticism about modern beliefs and practices that entail embedded forms of inequality and injustice (Alexander 2011).

## Anti-modern Conceptions of Jewish Education

Ultra-Orthodoxy is a form of Jewish fundamentalism that takes a particular interpretation of sacred scripture as the literal word of God and so also the absolute truth. All forms of Jewish Orthodoxy—neo-Orthodoxy, modern Orthodoxy, and religious Zionism—embrace rabbinic exegesis as the correct understanding of the Hebrew Bible and are ambivalent to one degree or another about Enlightenment ideas (Salmon et al. 2006), but ultra-Orthodox Judaism is distinguishable by its complete rejection of Enlightenment and Emancipation altogether (Sofer and Stern 1996).

Many scholars consider the nineteenth-century sage Rabbi Moses Sofer, known also as the Hatam Sofer, to be the founder of this way of thinking. Concerned about the dangers to the life of *Torah* posed by modernity, Sofer founded an academy in Pressburg, Hungary (today’s Bratislava, Slovakia). As a slogan, he chose the rabbinic dictum “*hadash assur min hatorah* – innovation is forbidden by the Written Law”. In its original context, the term *hadash*, which means new, refers to the first fruits of spring grain harvest. According to the Hebrew Bible, first fruits are to be left for the priests and Levites, since they were allocated no portion of land from which to feed themselves and their families. These fruits were their rightful property in compensation for their service to God, and so forbidden—*assur*—to the farmer or landowner harvesting them. However, modernizers also used the word *hadash* to mean ‘modernity’. Sofer played on this ambiguity to suggest that modernity itself, and all of the potential change associated with it, is forbidden by divine decree (Samet 1972).

According to the tenets of ultra-Orthodoxy, only its view of Judaism constitutes the true word of God, as revealed simultaneously at Sinai in both Written and Oral Torah. However, the term ‘Orthodox’ appears nowhere in the Bible or rabbinic literature. It began to be used by Jews only after the rise of Reform Judaism in Germany during the nineteenth century, probably under the influence of eastern Christianity. The word itself is of Greek origin and indicates an emphasis on uniformity of belief that is uncharacteristic of rabbinic Judaism, which has historically

stressed practice over doctrine. It was not until the twelfth century, in response to the intellectual challenge of philosophical rationalism, that Jewish philosophers even tried to canonize a core of essential Jewish beliefs; and they achieved no agreement among themselves as to what should be included in this core (Kellner 1999). Pre-modern Jewry benefited from a dynamic conversation with the economic and intellectual environments in which they lived. The fruits of this interaction can be seen in medieval Jewish philosophy, mysticism, and biblical commentary. In abandoning this creative interaction, ultra-Orthodoxy represents a new, isolationist Judaism that is a reaction against the perceived dangers of modernity to the life of Torah.

Not surprisingly, the schools and academies that follow Sofer's ultra-Orthodoxy focus almost exclusively on a limited interpretation of the traditional terms 'Mikra', 'Mishnah', and 'Mitzvoth'. Strictly speaking, this approach is not fundamentalist in the sense that its followers read the Bible literally. Rather they read particular rabbinic interpretations *as if* they were the literal meaning of the biblical text. This view also favors interpretations of Jewish law derived from the oral tradition denoted in this context as 'Mishnah' that are viewed by its adherents as stringent and designed to separate them from both non-Jews and other Jews who are not ultra-Orthodox (Finkelman 2011).

Indeed, ultra-Orthodox scholars tend to embrace what is sometimes called a positive theory of law, which holds that the unequivocal meaning of a legal text is to be found within a legal tradition alone without reference to any external sources of authority, such as ethical or political theories. (Austin 1995). This position in legal philosophy actually emerged under the influence of scientific and historical positivism, or the view that the truth about nature, society, and history are only to be discovered within the confines of empirical rationality (Dilthey 1989; Comte 1988). This is an Enlightenment idea that seeks precise and definitive results to legal deliberations similar to those found in the exact sciences. However, in the ultra-Orthodox context, this view takes on a decidedly Hegelian meaning that texts can only be properly deciphered within the organic context of the cultures and traditions in which they were written (Phillips 1976). Jewish education, according to this view, involves inculcating adherence to an insular, rigid, and absolute account of positive Jewish law, born of a deep opposition to Enlightenment ideas (Alexander 2011).

If not already included in their understanding of 'Mishnah', then, ultra-Orthodox scholars would also agree that the term 'Talmud' refers to the study of traditional Talmudic texts, both law and lore, read in their various versions and interpreted through the lenses of multiple rabbinic commentaries. This said, additional aspects of higher Jewish learning, understood in a variety of different ways, are also sometimes included under this rubric. For example, followers of the twelfth-century Jewish philosopher Moses Maimonides and other like-minded scholastics include the rational contemplation of God as conceived by Aristotle as the highest form of 'Talmud' (Twersky 1972). By the same token, adherents to one or another interpretation of Jewish mystical traditions such as followers of various Hassidic sects may include the study of Cabbalistic texts and other contemplative, spiritual, or even

magical practices under this heading, although they often delay exposure to the most sensitive mystical traditions until the age of 40 (Scholem 1995a).

Both medieval approaches to Talmud, rational and mystical, entail a hermeneutic that Simon Rawidowicz (1957) has called *interpretatio* as opposed to *explicatio*. The Hebrew equivalents of these terms are *d'rash* as opposed to *p'shat*, or in English, eisegesis versus exegesis.

*Explicatio* eases the burden of a text by paraphrasing an older statement in a language more accessible to a contemporary reader. This is often accomplished by explaining problems in the text itself, such as when words or phrases are repeated in a manner that might be seen as superfluous or when alternative versions of a narrative contradict one another. This hermeneutic stance is motivated by the deep identification of a commentator with the text under consideration and a desire to convey its meaning and purpose faithfully to like-minded readers.

*Interpretatio*, on the other hand, attempts to reconceive the meaning of text by reading into it meanings that might not be readily apparent or juxtaposing it to documents from other worlds or ways of thinking. This hermeneutic is driven by both attachment to and alienation from a text. An act of reconciliation is involved in this case, which inevitably leads to a revolution from within planned and executed with the purpose of reshaping one's way of thinking. Although this innovated spirit may have characterized the hermeneutics of medieval Jewish life, when faced with the two crises of modernity, the ultra-Orthodox response involves freezing those medieval innovations in order to embrace them as if they were the one and only original meaning of the texts under consideration (Alexander 1992).

One important consequence of this anti-modern conception of Jewishness is that instructional authority is primarily hierarchical, derived from scholars assumed to have the greatest mastery of rabbinic sources according to the relevant ideological nuances of particular ultra-Orthodox subcommunities (Heilman 1992). Pedagogic styles, by contrast, are surprisingly egalitarian (at least among male students), emphasizing a traditional dyadic form of independent study known as 'havruta', in which as they mature, students engage one another in posing and addressing questions concerning the interpretation of sacred texts (Heilman 1983; Holzer and Kent 2014). Owing to the strict sexual ethic of this position, according to which religious piety is closely associated with carnal purity, there is a separation of genders in ultra-Orthodox schooling. Males and females not only study separately, the curriculum for each gender is also distinct, with a stronger emphasis on Jewish law in the curriculum for men than for women (Stadler 2009). This said, recent years have witnessed new opportunities for ultra-Orthodox women to assume professional positions, some even with religious authority, for example, as legal advisors in the deliberations of rabbinic courts (Lupo 2003).

Another influential consequence of this view is a principled rejection of the theological legitimacy of the Zionist state. The destruction of the second Jerusalem Temple along with the subsequent exile from the land of Israel is considered to be a divine punishment for baseless hatred among Jews during their war with the Romans in the first century. "Because of our sins we were exiled from our country, and banished from our land," reads a key passage of classical Jewish liturgy (Birnbbaum

1951: 331). Unlike the Christian belief that the messiah was sent by God in the form of Jesus of Nazareth, classic Jewish theology holds that the messiah has yet to arrive. The ultra-Orthodox interpretation of this doctrine entails the idea that only God can return the Jewish people to its land, which will only transpire with the coming of the messiah prior to the divine redemption of the whole of human kind (Scholem 1995b).

This form of anti-Zionism has no direct relation to more recent critiques of modern Zionism grounded in various forms of critical social theory which will be discussed in Part Four of this chapter. Social critics often fail to take account of the fact that Zionism constitutes a revolution within Jewish history and theology, one that was profoundly rejected by the ultra-Orthodox. Quite ironically, with the Nazi destruction of European Jewry, the largest Haredi community in the world has taken root under the protection of the State of Israel.

Although this anti-modern trend originated among Ashkenazi Jews in Eastern Europe, it has become increasingly influential in recent decades among Mizrahi Israelis as well, whose ancestors hail from North Africa and the Middle East (Ravitzky 2006). However, Mizrahi ultra-Orthodoxy never embraced the anti-Zionism of its Ashkenazi counterpart. With religious Zionists, Mizrahi rabbis view the establishment of the State of Israel as the harbinger of redemption. Ultra-Orthodox political parties representing both Ashkenazi and Mizrahi Jews participate actively in Israel's parliamentary democracy, and Haredi schools and academies receive funding from the Israeli government, which in recent years has sought to integrate Haredi Jews into mainstream Israeli life (Rosenak 1992).

## Modern Conceptions of Jewish Education

Although they are often combined in a variety of ways, modern conceptions of Jewish education can be broadly divided into two groups. One places a primary emphasis on religious liberalism, which stresses a variety of updated approaches to Jewish religion over Jewish political identity. The other highlights Zionism, which prioritizes Jewish affiliation in terms of several divergent political ideologies over religious faith and observance.

Religious liberals view the onset of modernity as a positive and unavoidable development. To the question of whether to be modern or Jewish, they respond that it is possible, indeed desirable, to be both. Liberals embrace the terms of Emancipation by deemphasizing the collective side of Jewish consciousness in order to be accepted as citizens in modern secular (non-Jewish) states. On the other hand, they reject the conclusion based on Enlightenment critique that faith should be abandoned, arguing instead with liberal Protestants that religion should be reformed to privilege the autonomy of the individual (Kant 1960; Cohen 1972).

This orientation emerged under the heading 'Reform Judaism' in mid-nineteenth-century Germany (Weiner 1997). The term 'reform' can be confusing in this context, because it is sometimes taken to refer to the entire process of liberalizing



rabbinic religion, but it also became the name of one of the denominations that emerged from this process. The term 'liberal' is only slightly less confusing. It too is used to refer to the entire category, but liberal Judaism is also one of the non-Orthodox movements founded in Germany during the mid-nineteenth that has survived, especially in countries affiliated with the British Commonwealth. Together the Reform and Liberal movements refer to themselves as 'Progressive Judaism', which emphasizes individual autonomy over divine authority or historical development in choosing whether and how to observe religious rituals (Borowitz 1984).

The terminological confusion is exacerbated by the fact that the other large movement in this category calls itself 'Conservative'—a term probably associated with the British conservative philosophy of its early twentieth-century American leader Solomon Schechter. Sometimes known as the other face of liberalism, this political philosophy emphasizes tradition in addition to, and sometimes even at the expense of, the individual (Alexander 2015: 87–138; Burke 2009; Gray 2002). Although more accepting of historical and sociological scholarship in Jewish life than Orthodoxy, for most of the first half of the twentieth century, this trend adhered fairly closely to classical rabbinic tradition (Gordis 1978). This is probably why by the middle of the twentieth-century Conservative Jews with progressive leanings sought to found Reconstructionist Judaism in the spirit of American pragmatism (Kaplan 1972). But progressive elements have continued to gain sway within Conservative Judaism until the present day as well, which has witnessed a number of bold decisions over the past half century, including enabling women and homosexuals to participate equally in worship and to receive rabbinic ordination. In Israel and England this approach goes by the name 'Masorti' or 'traditional' Judaism. In Hungary it has close ties to the 'Neolog' tradition represented today by the beautiful Dohány Street Synagogue in Budapest. These movements emphasize the role of historical development and contemporary sociology in deciding whether to preserve or change traditional practices (Dorff 1979; Gilman 1993).

Neo- or modern Orthodoxy is a final orientation in this category. Founded by Samson Raphael Hirsch in late nineteenth-century Germany, this movement hews closely to what it perceives as classical Jewish practice. For this reason, many are inclined to include it in the Orthodox camp, which is where Hirsch saw himself (Hirsch 1972). I refer to this view as liberal, however, because it embraces a positive disposition toward modernity, and encourages its members to integrate into the modern nation-state in the public sphere, while maintaining strict observance of Jewish law in the private domain. The leading spokesperson for this trend in twentieth-century North America was Joseph Soloveitchik, who sought a synthesis between strict observance of Jewish law and modern religious existentialism (Soloveitchik 2006).

If religious liberalism accepted the political terms of Emancipation and challenged the Enlightenment's theological critique, and ultra-Orthodoxy opposed both, Zionism rejected the political terms of Emancipation and, at least in its secular version, accepted the Enlightenment's critique of religion. Secular Zionism is first and foremost a political ideology. Jews can only become fully enfranchised,

according to this attitude, in the context of a Jewish nation-state, in which Jews qua Jews can assert political power to protect themselves and their families and to advance their collective interests. Anti-Semitism may be so deeply embedded in European consciousness, in this view, that Jews may never be completely accepted, even if they abandon their Jewish identity altogether. A Jewish state could address the problem of anti-Semitism by normalizing Jews as citizens in their own state (Hertzberg 1969: 204–225).

Political Zionism of this kind is often tied to a cultural form of Zionism that sought to preserve the moral values of the Hebrew Bible by transforming Jewish religion into a modern national culture. One key ingredient in this cultural revival is language. Ancient Israelite culture was created in Hebrew, which survived for centuries as a language of worship and sacred study. For the new national Jewish culture to take hold, it required the transformation of Hebrew from a language of prayer and learning to one of daily life (Fellman 1973). Secular Zionism does not reject Enlightenment ideas altogether, but only the view of Emancipation politics that Jewish life as a minority culture could thrive in large diverse democracies, since the public square of such a society will always favor the majority. In this view, political sovereignty is required for a culture to survive and flourish (Zipperstein 1993).

Inspired by Kant's contemporary Moses Mendelssohn (1983), who held that the modern Jew should reserve religious observance for the private sphere, while reflecting a neutral enlightened culture in public, Naftali Hertz Wiesel set the stage for modern conceptions of Jewish education. In his acclaimed 1785 *Words of Peace and Truth*, Wiesel argued that the emerging schools of modern Judaism should offer instruction in subject matter drawn from both Jewish life and secular society (Wiesel 1886). Hirsch approved this curricular orientation a century later when he reinterpreted the rabbinic dictum "It is good to combine the study of *Torah* with the ways of the world" (Mishnah Avoth 2:2), to mean that students should study both the written and oral traditions of Mikra and Mishnah, along with content drawn from modern sources that can be associated with the curriculum category of Talmud (Hirsch 1995). In this respect, liberal responses to the crises of modernity have sought to preserve, and in many cases advance, the innovative spirit of medieval *interpretatio* that has been frozen by ultra-Orthodoxy. However, alternative accounts of both liberal Jewish religion and modern Zionist politics differ over what content should be drawn from modern sources and how it should be studied in relation to Jewish life.

Three approaches have emerged within modern Jewish education to balance the study of non-Jewish with Jewish sources (Chazan 1984:19–36). One view holds that political liberalism and modern human and natural science are the primary arbiters of truth and goodness. Those who do not want their children to live in a Jewish Ghetto should see to it that their children receive a broad liberal education. Fortunately, it is possible to read Judaism as entirely consistent with modern science, liberal democracy, and secular humanism. The curriculum should therefore emphasize the natural and human sciences together with a liberal or humanist

interpretation of Jewish content. This position is most prevalent among Reform and secular Zionist educators (Aloni 2008; Cohen 1964).<sup>3</sup>

The second view places equal weight on both the secular and the Judaic portions of the curriculum. This position holds that truth and goodness can be found in both traditional Judaism and modern thought, although it does not expect to find total harmony between them—neither of which is monolithic in all events. Secular learning is often dubbed ‘general studies’ by advocates of this orientation, emphasizing their belief that these studies are common to the general public, whereas ‘Jewish studies’ are of parochial interest primarily to Jews. The educational task is to equip students with enough knowledge of Jewish tradition and modern civilization to enable them to identify conflicts and tensions within and between these complex cultures, and to address them as they see fit. This approach is found mostly among Conservative or Masorti Jewish educators and the liberal wing of Modern Orthodoxy (Ackerman 2008; Heschel 1953; Rosenak 1987).

A third attitude holds that the Judaism of the written and oral traditions are the primary arbiters of truth and goodness. Modern political and scientific ideas should be studied only to the extent that they do not contradict *Torah* Judaism. Secular studies may be important to earning a living, and young Jews ought to become sufficiently integrated into modern societies to enjoy civil liberties and avoid persecution. However, modernity should not be embraced at the price of abandoning Jewish faith and observance. Hence, the Judaic portions of the curriculum take precedence over the secular. Secular studies should emphasize disciplines that do not threaten ‘classical’ Jewish belief. These include technical subjects that are useful for gainful employment, not humanities and social sciences. This position is influential among the religious Zionists and more conservative segments of Modern Orthodoxy (Arand 2000).

All three of these approaches to this balancing act view the curriculum category of Talmud—understood as higher Jewish learning in general, not a particular classic rabbinic text—in terms of an intellectual engagement between Jewish and modern thought. The German Reform theologian Hermann Cohen, for example, interpreted Judaism in light of his Kantian leanings at the turn of the twentieth century (Cohen 1972), while by the middle of that century Reconstructionist theologian Mordecai Kaplan sought to engage Judaism with the pragmatism of John Dewey (Kaplan 1972) and modern Orthodox founder Joseph Soloveitchik struggled with tensions between Judaism and religious existentialism (Soloveitchik 2006). Similarly,

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<sup>3</sup>Humanistic Judaism in Israel is distinct from Reform Judaism in the Diaspora, among other reasons, because of the Zionist emphasis on Jewish sovereignty. In an environment where the local language and public culture reflect a national conception of Judaism, there is a greater opportunity for rich Jewish engagement and integration between secular and Jewish sources. Studied in Hebrew as a native language, even math and science, not to mention literature and philosophy, can take on Jewish cultural meaning, and the distinction between secular and Jewish sources is blurred. In Israel, however, Reform Judaism has much in common with robust Jewish humanism in this regard.

leading Zionist thinkers, both secular and religious, brought leading modern political theories to bear on their conceptions of Jewish politics (Hertzberg 1969).

These orientations differ, however, when it comes to the curriculum categories of 'Mikra', 'Mishnah', and 'Mitzvot'. The first approach draws on scientific studies of Jews and Judaism grounded in modern history and sociology. Concerning the classical category of Mikra, this orientation emphasizes the historical criticism of the Hebrew Bible over traditional commentaries. Its attitude toward Mishnah and Mitzvot entails a sociological and humanistic understanding of Jewish customs and ceremonies that stresses their ethnic or ethical as opposed to theological significance, the one addressing relations among human beings, the other a response to divine command. The second approach seeks content that draws on both modern Jewish history and sociology as well as traditional exegesis and eisegesis. The category of Mikra, in this view, involves the study of both biblical criticism and traditional commentaries, while Mishnah and Mitzvot include both humanistic and traditional interpretations of Jewish holidays and rituals. Finally, advocates of the third orientation prefer a Judaic curriculum that stresses traditional exegesis and eisegesis, allowing the modern academic study of Jews and Judaism only so long as it does not challenge traditional doctrine. Mikra, according to this perspective, entails study of traditional biblical interpretations. The approach to Mishnah and Mitzvot is traditionally theological, emphasizing the obligation to obey the Divine commandments.

In contrast to anti-modern Jewish schooling, in which instructional authority is hierarchical but pedagogic styles are egalitarian and dyadic (at least for males), the greater the tendency of a modern approach to Jewish education toward religious progressivism or secular humanism, as opposed to modern Orthodoxy or religious Zionism, the more instructional authority becomes diffuse and individualistic while pedagogic styles becomes didactic, following the teaching models of modern schooling. This said, modern Jewish education has also given rise to several important pedagogic innovations, including congregational education that supplements state schooling with afternoon and weekend classes (Aron 2011) and experiential learning, such as summer camps, youth movements, and educational tourism (Bryfman 2011). Concerning gender, whereas boys and girls are strictly separated among the ultra-Orthodox, the greater the tendency toward progressivism or secularism within modern Jewish education, the more males and females are integrated in the classroom. This includes a strong egalitarian ethos, not only a common curriculum, leading to full political and religious enfranchisement of women, as members of the Israeli parliament, for example, or ordination as rabbis (Epstein 2011). Indeed, it has been argued that a chief accomplishment of modernity in Jewish life, especially its political expression in the State of Israel, has been the education and enfranchisement of women (Ackerman 2008). A recent extension of this inclusive attitude has been a growing acceptance of the LGBT community within Jewish political, educational, and religious institutions, in Israel and abroad.

## The Postmodern Condition and Jewish Education

Postmodernism in the broadest sense is usually thought to address how discourses of power saturate and corrupt every aspect of our lives, our pursuit of knowledge; our interpretations of the world and of human conduct; our understanding of language and law; the stories we tell ourselves and our children about who we are and how we ought to live and the religious, cultural, artistic, and other forms in which we express them; our interpersonal and gender relations; our sexual attitudes and orientations; and our institutions of personal and social governance. Those who embrace this complex array of attitudes, suspicions, questions, and analyses ask us to be aware of the myriad ways in which we dominate one another and to consider whether or to what extent we can conceive social relations that ameliorate if not all at least some of the most egregious effects of this domination (Alexander 2011).

An heir to left-leaning Hegelianism, postmodernism embraces the skepticism of Marxism and neo-Marxism concerning the unequal distribution of power embedded in economic, political, and social relations. However, it abandons the optimistic attitude of modern critics such as Karl Marx (Marx and Engles 1998), Max Horkheimer, and Theodor Adorno (Horkheimer and Adorno 2007) that liberation from the corrupting influence of power can be achieved for the more pessimistic view that discourses of power are present in all human endeavors. With Friedrich Nietzsche (1989), postmodern critics doubt the possibility that any grand narrative can adequately explain the meaning and purpose of human existence, since each such narrative is itself encumbered by unequal power relations. According to this analysis, the anti-modern and modern responses to Enlightenment ideas that have most influenced contemporary Jewish education embrace hegemonic assumptions concerning such issues law, autonomy, and sovereignty.

From a deconstructionist perspective, for example, the ultra-Orthodox idea that Jewish education should promote a heteronymous commitment to a limited set of religious rituals is deeply problematic. Any attempt to close the meaning of a text or limit the possibility of new understandings is a morally perverse act of domination that undermines the inherent freedom of the reader to find in the text whatever meaning he or she deems appropriate. Jacques Derrida (1998) applied postmodern skepticism to the meaning of language and the interpretation of texts. He argued that there is no essential relation between signifiers—linguistic symbols such as words and phrases that purport to say something about human experience—and that which they allegedly signify. Rather, any assertion that language means this as opposed to that is an act of domination. The task of interpretation, on this account, is to deconstruct the techniques used to impose meaning, not to uncover propositions embedded in authorial intent or the public context of speech.

Similarly, from a poststructuralist viewpoint, it is an illusion that liberal Jewish education can provide knowledge relevant to making autonomous choices based in reason. According to Michel Foucault (2001), the ‘knowledge’ transmitted as well as the ‘choices’ made, indeed even the very idea that people are capable of ‘free choice’, cannot be separated from the power relations in which they are embedded. The liberal Jewish trend to reread ancient texts in light of the study of modern

history and sociology or to combine these with an appreciation for traditional rabbinic interpretations should be problematized, because both entail dominations. The latter is tied to rabbinic power over Jewish life and the former to European colonialism. Both are nothing more than false ideologies. One replaced the authority of biblical religion with that of the rabbis and the other the power of rabbinic tradition with Enlightenment knowledge. Even the view that an individual person has the capacity to choose freely is embedded in Enlightenment power discourses, since the idea of a self that is unencumbered by socioeconomic class, culture, or language, is unimaginable other than in the context of a liberalism that reflects the interests of modern secular society.

Finally, in keeping with what Jean-Francois Lyotard (1984) called 'the postmodern condition', Zionist education too often imposes a single meta-narrative on the trajectory of Jewish history, in this view, one that leads ultimately and inevitably toward a return of the Jewish people to political sovereignty in the land of Israel (Gur-Ze'ev 2003). But this homogeneous story does not allow for the many complexities of Jewish history, the variety of languages Jews have spoken, the diversity of religious and cultural lives in which they have expressed their Jewishness, or the multiplicity of localities and communal structures in which Jews have lived and in many instances continue to live. Nor does it ring true to many Jews today, even those who among their many identities choose to affiliate as citizens of Israel. Indeed, some would argue that by eschewing the traditional Jewish ambivalence toward power and placing it at the center of collective Jewish existence, Zionism has exacerbated not ameliorated anti-Semitism, and by secularizing and nationalizing religious forms of cultural expression, Zionism has not redefined traditional Jewish values for a new age but robbed Jewish life of its most essential ideals, beliefs, and practices (Boyarin 1997).

Another trend on the margins of postmodern thought that has impacted Jewish education during the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries can be found in the writings of Martin Buber, Franz Rosenzweig, Emmanuel Levinas, and Hannah Arendt. Also influenced by counter-Enlightenment tendencies in continental philosophy, these philosophers were less enamored with the vicissitudes of power than the likes of Derrida, Foucault, and Lyotard. Indeed some became outspoken critics of the more radical consequences of critical social theory. But unlike many modern Jewish philosophers such as Hermann Cohen (1972), who sought to discover Enlightenment ideas in Jewish sources, these thinkers sought to identify themes in Jewish particularity with broader human significance, the transmission of which across the generations might have transformative implications (Alexander 2014).

For Buber, one such theme was to be found in the relationship between the Hebrew Prophets and the biblical God. Buber believed that the sort of existential meeting reflected in that relation was revived during the late eighteenth century in the connection between the rabbis and followers of pietistic Eastern European Jewish sects known as Hassidism (Buber 2015). He called this an I-Thou or subject-subject relation. In contrast to I-It or subject-object interactions, which are maintained for some instrumental purpose, I-Thou relations entail a meeting in which each subject embraces the uniqueness of the other unconditionally in a moment of



mutuality in which the other ‘fills the firmament’ (Buber 1996). Although these moments of spontaneous spirituality could not be contained by the formalities of religious ritual, in Buber’s view, it is possible to embrace sacred texts as one would another person, such that they become sources of meaning and purpose in one’s life, and to build communities organized around this sort of existential meeting. He hoped that the labor Zionist communities known as Kibbutzim would become models of this type of social life (Schaefer 1973) and envisioned Israel as a binational state grounded in Jewish-Arab dialogue (Hazony 2001). In a famous letter to Buber, Rosenzweig suggested that rituals could also be embraced as subjects, provided that they were engaged as sources of personal commandment rather than externally imposed law (Rosenzweig 1955).

Whereas Buber and Rosenzweig completed their most original contributions between the two world wars, Levinas and Arendt were both post-Holocaust philosophers whose work was heavily influenced by the devastations of Auschwitz. In Levinas, this influence took shape in a critique of the totalizing ontology of Western philosophy as seen, for example, in the writings of Martin Heidegger (1996) and Edmund Husserl (1960). This ontology reduces the other to an ‘alter ego’ of oneself, the essence of which is identical to me. In contrast, Levinas held ethics to be first philosophy, not ontology, according to which each person is inescapably responsible for others who are different (Levinas 2005). Deeply rooted in rabbinic sources, Levinas’s responsibility for the other does not require a response as in Buber’s interpretation of biblical mutuality. Levinas held that a Jewish state in the land of Israel is permitted not promised, therefore, provided that the state takes responsibility for non-Jews as well as Jews; and he found it difficult to forgive Nazi intellectuals such as Heidegger who were unwilling to take responsibility for the Jews among them who are the perennial others of European society (Levinas 1990). This idea of Jews as European outsiders was also developed by Arendt in her anti-nationalist political theory in which the Jew is depicted as the quintessential pariah. Stripped of all national aspirations, this sort of Jew could serve as a model for the cosmopolitan social critic. Among other reasons, this is why Arendt was opposed to Zionism (Arendt 2008).

Two movements in Jewish life have come to the fore in recent decades in response to these postmodern ideas: Jewish renewal (including post- or trans-denominationalism and neo-Hassidism) and post-Zionism. Jewish Renewal describes a trend within contemporary Jewish life that seeks to reinvigorate what it views as a moribund and uninspiring Judaism with mystical, musical, and meditative practices drawn from a variety of traditional and untraditional Jewish sources. This movement brings Hassidic practices to egalitarian settings, a phenomenon sometimes referred to as neo-Hassidism. Hence, its approach to Mikra includes a combination of Cabalistic and feminist interpretations of the Hebrew Bible. Its orientation to Mishnah and Mitzvoth is highly eclectic as many followers of this trend augment traditional Jewish worship with ecstatic practices such as meditation and dance; some even borrowed from other faiths, such as Buddhism and Sufism. The movement’s understanding of Talmud, again as a curriculum category not classical text, is heavily influenced by left-leaning political thinking which incorporates such



social views as environmentalism and pacifism. Influences from this movement can be found within many of the Jewish denominations, which it seeks to transcend. Hence, Jewish renewal has also been associated with post- or trans-denominational (Kaplan 2009).

Post-Zionism includes a variety of sociological, historical, and philosophical critiques of Israeli society based loosely in critical social theory, especially postcolonialism (Silberstein 1999), and to a lesser degree in Buber's binationalism (Hazony 2001) and Arendt's cosmopolitanism (Butler 2014). Zionism is a hegemonic ideology, according to this critique, based on nineteenth-century European nationalism that imposed itself on the indigenous Arab people of Palestine. In this endeavor, Zionists have been agents first of the British, who acquired a mandate to rule the region from the League of Nations—predecessor to the United Nations—in 1917, and later of the Americans, who have sought to dominate the region more recently for their own political-economic gain. This ideology was created for the purpose of controlling the local Arab population by inserting European power into the region. Zionism on this account is a form of colonialism, the corrupt power relations of which seep into every aspect of the Israeli state (Sternhell 1998). Schooling in Israel, Palestine, and elsewhere ought to promote a form of counter-education that seeks liberation from the oppression imposed by this hegemonic regime (Gur-Ze'ev 1999). Regarding the classical categories of Jewish education, Mikra, Mishnah, Mitzvoth, and Talmud, this approach can lead in two directions. On the one hand, it can lay the foundation for an anti-modern ultra-Orthodoxy, at least in joining the traditional opposition to the very idea of modern Zionism, although as mentioned earlier this tendency often misses the theological character of the ultra-Orthodox critique of Zionism. On the other hand, it can tend toward a highly eclectic cosmopolitan form of Judaism in keeping with Jewish renewal.

## Conclusion

What might it mean, following this analysis, to acquire a Jewish education today? One answer entails engaging learners with some aspect of Jewish life (religious, political, or both) in dialogue with some dimension of modern life (viewed positively, negatively, or with ambivalence) by way of some logic or hermeneutic—exegesis, eisegesis, or a combination of the two—in order to facilitate attachment to one account or another of what it means to be Jewish. In keeping with the model set forth more than two centuries ago by Naftali Hertz Weizel, these elements were found in each of the conceptions considered here.

For some, this attachment is extraordinarily thick, occupying a highly significant portion of how they define themselves; for others, it is exceptionally thin, playing but a minimal role in how they conduct their lives (Walzer 1985). According to several interpretations, this attachment entails adhering to a heteronomous authority from on high; according to others, it involves embracing sources out of which one can define one's personal autonomy. While one approach may conceive the process

of acquiring such an attachment in terms of the transmission of a preexisting tradition across the generations, another may see it as a transformation of that tradition to meet the felt needs of a new generation. Many understand this attachment in mainly religious terms and even more see this affiliation as primarily political, ethnic, or cultural. Some view it as a combination of both.

Yet however these various conceptions may conceive the substance of today's Jewishness, they cannot help but do so in light of the two revolutions of modernity that continue to define the current Jewish condition. This is so even though the very assumptions of Enlightenment and Emancipation are being subjected to hard scrutiny today and even when the Jewish responses to these phenomena are consequently undergoing serious reconceptualization.

I have often called this dialectical educational process pedagogy of difference, which has roots in Jewish as well as other traditions (Alexander 2015: 87–138). It entails initiation into sources of primary identity or attachment alongside juxtaposition to views that may be in tension with those very sources. In the present case this entails engaging the standards of criticism associated with one or another account of historical Judaism, such as rabbinic *interpretatio* and *explicatio*, with products of modern culture, such as the natural and human sciences. Indeed, the several models by means of which Jews and Judaism have engaged modernity outlined here, which constitute the very heart of contemporary Jewish education, offer exemplary cases of how such a pedagogy can function. By viewing a tradition from both the inside and the outside, as it were, this pedagogic process allows for the possibility of criticism in the current context in which no universal agreement exists concerning appropriate standards of critique (Alexander and McLaughlin 2003). It also encourages dialogue among competing viewpoints in diverse societies, out of which it is possible to construct ways of living together across difference in peace (Alexander 2015: 107–124).

Although the term 'pedagogy of difference' is most apt to the extent that the sources of primary attachment in question are open to the possibility of adapting to that which is learned through this process of critical engagement, it can even be witnessed among more closed ultra-Orthodox attitudes, which adjust received tradition often unconsciously in order to resist rather than embrace the pressures of modern life. This diversity of Jewish educational orientations demands not only dialogue between various sources of Jewish and modern life but also among alternative accounts of what it means to be Jewish today. In a world increasingly engulfed by intercultural conflict, it must surely involve dialogue among Jews and non-Jews as well.

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# On an Ethical Enunciation of Islamic Philosophy of Education



Nuraan Davids

## Introduction

The question – some might say, the controversy – about what Islamic philosophy actually is, might best be answered by looking at the very text, which Muslims consider as the irrefutable word of God, namely, the Qurān. In this text, one encounters terms like *‘ilm* (knowledge), *hikmah* (wisdom), *‘aql* (intellect), *tafakkur* (contemplation) and *hūda* (guidance) – terms which are generally associated with actions of inquiry and hence attuned to philosophical inquiry. It is therefore important to bear in mind that, although the Islamic faith came into contact with a number of other civilisations – such as Greek, Persian, Syrian, Egyptian and Indian cultures – thanks to the rapid expansion of the Muslim Arab civilisation, following the death of the Prophet Muhammad, these contacts should be not overestimated in relation to their philosophical influence. While the seminal thoughts of Socrates, Aristotle and Plato are widely evident in the works of Islamic philosophers, such as al-Kindi, al-Fārābī, ibn Sīnā (Avicenna), **ibn Rushd** (Averroes), ibn Miskawayh, al-Ghazzālī’ and ibn ‘Arabi, philosophy in Islam is focused expansively on hermeneutical expositions of the Qurān and most commonly related to the notion of *hikmah* (wisdom).

Since it is not possible to discuss an Islamic philosophy of education without taking into account the Qurān as its starting point, the first section looks at the Qurān as the primary source code of Islamic education. This is followed by a discussion of how the Qurān conceives of knowledge and education, and what it hopes to achieve through its insistence on the pursuit of education. Since there can be no Islam without those who believe in its tenets and philosophy, the third section explores the constructions of Muslim in relation to Islamic education. Finally, the

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last two sections look at a philosophy of Islamic education and discuss its intimate connection to what it means to be and act as an ethical being. The decision to employ an ethical lens in this chapter is motivated by an understanding that inquiry into what education is, and what it ought to achieve, is consistently connected to notions of justice, human wellbeing, the social good and defensible social relations. Hence, in addition to analysing what an Islamic philosophy of education constitutes, the chapter aims to show that conceptions of education as espoused in the Qurān can neither be divorced from the propagation of good character, nor from the practising of just action and relations.

## The Qurān as the Foundational Text of Islam

There are numerous names associated with the Qurān. These include, says Arkoun (1994: 30), *al-kitāb* (the Book), the writings ‘descended’ from the sky in the course of the ‘Blessed Night’, *al-dhikr* (‘the warning’), *al-furqān* (‘the discrimination’) or the discriminating proof – that is, the revelation. In turn, Lunde (2002, p. 25) describes the Qurān as the foundation stone of Islamic society and its constitution and permeates all aspects of life – encapsulated in the verse: “We have sent down to you the Book explaining all things” (*al-Nahl*, 16: 89). However, as Al-Hasan et al. (2013, p. 11) explain, because the Qurān generally speaks about universal concepts, the specificity of conduct and behaviour expected of Muslims is reflected in the life example of the Prophet Muhammad. Muslims consider the *Sunnah* (lived example of the Prophet Muhammad) as a critical factor in the sustenance of their faith and the preservation of their identity. Abu Zayd (2004, p. 43) explains that, while both the content and expression of the Qurān are divine, the content of the *Sunnah* is therefore also divine, but its form is human. To this end, Abu Zayd (2004) reports, “Muslim jurists maintain that the Qurān is in need of the *Sunnah* more than the *Sunnah* is in need of the Qurān”. Ramadan (2001, p. 78) clarifies that the Qurān, together with the lived example of the Prophet Muhammad, defines the points of reference for all Muslim spheres of life – the individual, the social, the economic and the political. In Islam, differentiation between what is right and what is wrong cannot be left to a particular society, because society, or the individuals who constitute a society, has inherent weaknesses and might be inclined towards behaviour, which might be right or wrong (Al-Hasan et al. 2013; Al-Qaradawi 1985).

In drawing on its literal meaning – *Qurāis*, derived from the Arabic root verb *qar’a*, which means ‘to recite’ – Arkoun (1994, p. 30) explains that the Qurān has the sense of reciting rather than of reading. When the Qurān was first revealed to the Prophet Muhammad, it did not presuppose a written text. Hence, the instruction in the first revelation to: “Recite! (or Read!) in the name of your Lord and Cherisher” (*Iqrā or al-‘Alaq*, 96: 1). Because the principal idea of the Qurān is that of a recitation conforming to a discourse that is heard rather than read, Arkoun (1994, p. 30)



prefers to speak of Qurānic discourse and not of text in the initial phase of enunciation by the Prophet. Although Muslims consider the Qurān as the direct speech of God, rather than simply *from* or *about* Him, it is important to recognise, says Abu Zayd (2010, p. 282), that the Qurān was spoken, proclaimed and written down in a specific historical situation, in the intellectual milieu and the language of the seventh century. To this end, Abu Zayd (2010, p. 286) is emphatic that “one cannot find the meaning of a religion in the text but in the interaction between the text and the historical process, in the interaction between the believer(s)/the communities with their holy texts”.

Although the Qurān was compiled into a single text, says Esposito (1988, p. 21), it was not edited or organised thematically. Consisting of 6000 verses, the Qurān has no palpable chronology; it is a series of revelations and guidelines encompassed in a complex narrative structure. With the destruction of all partial compilations so as to avoid any dissent about the authenticity of the revelations, explains Arkoun (1994, p. 35), the compilation overseen by the Caliph, Uthman, was declared complete and closed – that is, the Closed Official Corpus (see Arkoun 1994). To Asad (2003), the Qurān should not be considered a compilation of individual injunctions and exhortations but one integral whole. This means that it has to be considered an exposition of an ethical doctrine in which every verse or sentence has an intimate bearing on other verses or sentences. As such, continues Asad (2003), the real meaning of the Qurān can only be grasped if one correlates every one of its statements by means of frequent cross-references, always subordinating the particular to the general and the incidental to the intrinsic.

Fakhry (1991: 11) explains that the early commentators of the Qurān, or the Traditionists and jurists

naturally engaged in analysis and interpretation involving a large measure of intellectual activity in the broad sense, but such an activity was closely linked to the original sources of religious Truth, i.e. the Qurān and the Traditions, and lacked for that reason the character of genuine dialectical or rational activity, with its double imperative of coherence and comprehensiveness.

Analysis and interpretation of the Qurān rely largely on Qurānic exegesis (*tafsīr*), jurisprudence (*fiqh*) and scholastic theology (*kalām*), to give impetus to ethical theories, scriptural morality, theological theories, religious theories and philosophical theories (Fakhry 1991, p. 1). Alongside analysis of the Qurān, traditional Islam accepts the possibility of giving new opinions or independent judgement (*ijtihād*) according to traditional legal principles. These are always based on the principles of analogy (*qiyās*), consensus of opinion (*ijmā*) and judicial preference (*istihsān*) (Nasr 2010, p. 18). According to Kamali (1997, p. 215), the essence of consensus of opinion (*ijmā*) lies in the natural growth of ideas:

It begins with the personal *ijtihād* of individual jurists and culminates in universal acceptance of a particular opinion over a period of time. Differences of opinion are tolerated until a consensus emerges and in the process, there is no room for compulsion or imposition of ideas upon the community.

Significantly, both consensus and dissensus emerge as corollaries of individual autonomous action in the form of independent critical judgement (*ijtihad*). That is, a consensus of ideas is a desirable outcome of engagement but not necessarily an enabling condition for engagement.

Following on the above, this chapter departs from the premise as articulated by Sinha (2003, p. 182), that it would be quite presumptuous to expect to find well-formulated or articulated theories of education in either the Qurān or the *Sunnah* – as espoused through the life and example of the Prophet Muhammad. The best one can do, as Sinha (2003, p. 182) observes, is to find general statements about knowledge and then follow Abu Zayd's (2004, p. 11) suggestion to shift away from considering the Qurān as only a text, but to move, instead, towards the Qurān as discourse or discourses. Abu Zayd explains that while it is indisputable that the Qurān is the 'speech of God', the discourse structure of the Qurān reveals a multiplicity of voices (Abu Zayd 2004, p. 19). It also recognises and distinguishes between two types of knowledge, which are hierarchical in nature: the *'ilm al-'aqliyah* (acquired knowledge), which is rational and which is attainable through the use of *'aql* (intellect), and *'ilm al-naqliyah*, which refers to revealed knowledge – as one encounters in the revelations to the monotheistic prophets (Hashim 2004, p. 31). On the one hand, therefore, adherents to Islam are exposed to a pre-determined type of knowledge as made manifest in the Qurān and through the revelations of the numerous Abrahamic prophets. On the other hand, Islam acknowledges that individuals, by virtue of their capacity to think and reason, bring their own type of knowledge to how they enact their lives. In Islam, both types of knowledge – that is, revealed and acquired knowledge – are necessary because the Qurān persistently reminds its readers not only to pursue knowledge but also to think and reflect upon it: "Why do they not reflect on themselves? God did not create the heavens and the earth, and everything between them, except for a specific purpose, and for a specific life span ..." (*al-Rūm*, 30: 8). To this end, the Qurān also differentiates between 'those who know' and 'those who reflect' from those who are 'heedless'.

The Qurān, says Abu Zayd (2004, p. 37), is not in itself a book of law: "[L]egal stipulations are expressed in discourse style, which reveal a context of engagement with human needs in specific time, which, in turn, opens up the appropriation of the 'meaning' intended into every paradigm of meaning". This implies that the Qurān cannot be treated as a monolithic text of laws unrelated to the flexibility of varying contexts. However, the problem with treating the Qurān as a text often has the implication that interpretation is considered as absolute without the consideration of the context in which revelation occurred. Thus, one finds that a textual interpretation of the Qurān only is seemingly oblivious of the contextual relevance that also affects an understanding of the divine revelation. Hence, the discourse approach to understanding and implementing the Qurān seems salient as both the text and context of varying proportions are considered in and through interpretation. In the next section, I pay attention to how the Qurān conceives of knowledge and education and why the pursuit of education is elevated to an obligatory status in Islam.

## Conceptions of Knowledge and Education in the Qurān

Following on the distinction between ‘acquired’ (*‘aqli*) and ‘revealed’ (*‘naqli*) forms of knowledge, Bakar (1992, p. 268), drawing on al-Ghazzālī, posits that the common thread that connects *aqli* and *naqli* sciences, is reason. Yet, others like Qutb al-Din assert, “there are revealed teachings which may be established independently by reason” (Bakar 1992, p. 269). Since human reason interprets these (non-) revealed truths, such truths are not un-situated for the reason that human reason is shaped by social conventions and the historical context within which it operates. Hence, no knowledge is value-free. Similarly, Wan Daud (1989, p. 12) posits that, regarding knowledge, there is no bifurcation between what is called ‘non-revealed’ or ‘acquired’ sciences (*‘aqli*) and revealed sciences (*naqli*). To bifurcate knowledge into *‘aqli* and *naqli* would imply that, through human reasoning, *naqli* must reveal knowledge in a specific way (i.e. by putting aside their prejudices, feelings), and *‘aqli* does not involve divine revelation. By implication, for the reason that no knowledge acquired by human beings is value-free, knowledge cannot be separated into isolated ‘non-revealed’ knowledge, on the one hand, from transmitted knowledge, on the other hand. This non-bifurcation between *‘aqli* and *naqli* is also cogently articulated by Al-Attas (1991, p. 20) who posits

... that from the earliest periods of Islam, Muslim thinkers have repeatedly made attempts to classify the sciences, and their various classifications were successfully increased in scope and content with the increase in knowledge ... At the same time the harmonious unity of the two kinds of knowledge has always been emphasized and maintained. No single branch of knowledge ought to be pursued indefinitely exclusively of others, for that would result in disharmony, which would affect the unity of knowledge, and render its validity questionable.

However, the integrality of revealed sciences and non-revealed sciences does not imply that these sciences are equal or that there is no priority in the categorisation of these sciences. For Muslims, divine revelation brought by the Prophets ranks higher than the ‘non-revealed’ sciences for the reason that revealed knowledge comes from God (*al-‘Alīm* or the Knower of everything), whereas the non-revealed sciences are developed through human reasoning. But even such a view seems ambiguous as even revealed knowledge depends on human interpretation for its enactment. Consequently, one finds that “Muslim scholars (such as Jalal al-Dīn al-Suyūti, Ibn Hazm and al-Ghazzālī) throughout the centuries have produced countless works on the categorization of the sciences where they seek to arrange various disciplines of knowledge according to their scheme of priorities ...” (Wan Daud 1989, p. 68). What is significant to note is that these scholars did not discount the role of reason in the construction and/or categorisation of both revealed and non-revealed sciences, or knowledge. Put differently, considering that all forms of knowledge require the element of human interpretation for its enactment, the distinction between what is revealed and what is not revealed is merely a prioritisation

of knowledge in order to accentuate the importance of God's agency in the transmission of knowledge. What follows from this is that a philosophy of Islamic education does not bifurcate between different kinds of knowledge, as both revealed knowledge and what is considered non-revealed knowledge can be used in the enactment of ethical practices, and the prioritisation of knowledge is merely an affirmation that God's agency cannot be ignored in either forms of knowledge. The latter is affirmed in the following verse: "And whomever God guides, he is rightly guided, and whomever He leads astray You will not find patrons for them, apart from Him" (*al-Isra'*, 17: 97).

Scholars, like Al-Attas (2005, p. 24), describe knowledge as the arrival of meaning in the soul and, concomitantly, the soul's arrival at meaning. To Al-Attas, human beings derive meaning from themselves and the world around them when they recognise their place in relation to God and their place in the order of creation. Thus, Islamic education, according to Al-Attas (1977, p. 11), is the "recognition and acknowledgement, progressively instilled into man, of the proper places of things, in the order of creation, such that it leads to the recognition and acknowledgement of God in the order of being and existence". However, to Al-Attas, the mere acquisition of knowledge does not mean the attainment of education. Education comes about when the knowledge acquired includes moral purpose – that is, when an individual practises *adab* (right action). In Islam, *adab* is manifested through sets of moral behaviour or virtuous action – all geared at extending respect and courtesy towards oneself and the other. In terms of Qurānic exegeses, the concept of *adab* is tied to conceptions and enactments of justice:

O you who believe, you shall be absolutely equitable, and observe God, when you serve as witnesses. Do not be provoked by your conflicts with some people into committing injustice. You shall be absolutely equitable, for it is more righteous. You shall observe God. God is fully cognizant of everything you do. (Chapter 5, verse 8)

In recounting a well-known *hadith* (report describing the words or actions of Prophet Muhammad), Bukhārī relates that the Prophet Muhammad said, "The best of you are those best in character". In this sense, *adab*, therefore, is considered the decorum through which Muslims are expected to live a just life. Inasmuch, then, as the Qurān is interested in three types of knowledge for humankind, namely, knowledge of nature, knowledge of history (and geography) and knowledge of humans themselves (Rahman 2009, p. 23), an educated individual is one who is able to differentiate between right and wrong action. And unless knowledge leads to awareness of oneself as being always in relation to God and His creation (which includes all others), then one cannot lay claim to being educated. In turn, as the twelfth-century philosopher, al-Arabi, points out, one cannot know one's Lord, unless one's Lord is made known to one – that is made visible through the creation of the universe, through the self and through scripture (essentially, the Qurān).

In the next section, I consider whom the Qurān has in mind when it talks about Muslims.

## Muslims and Islam

Etymologically, the word Islam (like Muslim) is derived from the Arabic verb *aslama*, which signifies to submit, accept or surrender. Muslim thus refers to a person who engages in an act of submission, acceptance or surrender. According to Arkoun (1994, p. 15), Islam means “to give something over to someone” or, more specifically, “giving one’s whole self over to God” or “entrusting all of oneself to God”. Following on this – at least, etymologically – a Muslim is considered to be someone who follows Islam and submits or surrenders to the will of God. Yet, if one understands the descriptor, Muslim, to refer to an individual who surrenders to the will of God, then it actually is non-specific in terms of any religious affiliation. Certainly, the Qurān does not offer any explicit definition of the term ‘Muslim’. Instead, it often embarks on the following types of dialogue:

Say: “O people of the Book, let us come to a common understanding between us and between you; that we serve none except God, and that we do not set up anything with Him, and that none of us takes each other as patrons besides God.” If they turn away, then say: “Bear witness that we have submitted”. (Chapter 3, verse 64)

Wadud (1999, p. xviii) shares that she used to think that ‘Islam’ and ‘Muslim’ were one and the same – that is, that all Muslims had the goal to be in a state of engaged surrender to God. Yet, what she found was that situations may arise where one might be forced to choose between the two – either being Muslim or be in a state of engaged surrender. She reflects that, at times, choosing to be Muslim might not always mean to surrender to God. Concomitantly, surrendering to God might mean slipping out of favour with those who claim to be Muslim. Following on this dichotomy, Wadud (1999, p. 1) asserts that no method of Qurānic exegesis is fully objective. Each exegete, she contends, makes some subjective choices in which some details of their interpretations reflect their subjective choices and not necessarily the intent of the text. Yet, as is the case between what might be understood as Islam or Muslim, no distinction is made between text and interpretation. Part of the explanation for the lack of distinction between text and interpretation, say Douglas and Shaikh (2004, p. 5; 8), resides in the poorly nuanced use of the word ‘Islamic’. They contend that because the descriptor ‘Islamic’ is often used interchangeably and inconsistently to describe doctrines of Islam as well as the practices of Muslims, the description often fails to take into account that which pertains directly to Islam, as in its tenets of faith, as opposed to that which its adherents perform in the cultural or social realm, which can more accurately be categorised as ‘Muslim’. Emanating from the arguments of Wadud (1999) and Douglas and Shaikh (2004) is the question, then, of who is a Muslim and why might being a Muslim not speak to what Islam is.

Many would be in agreement that Islam, like other religious traditions, cannot possibly lay claim to a singular or monolithic interpretation or practice. Notions of diversity and pluralism are explicitly advocated in the Qurānic verse:

O humankind, indeed We have created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed the most noble of you in the sight of God is the most righteous of you. Indeed God is Knowing and Acquainted. (Chapter 49, Verse 13)

Following on this verse, the propagation of differences among people would necessarily imply differences in understanding, beliefs and practices – not only across all of humanity but across and within Muslim communities and societies, whether in Muslim-majority or Muslim-minority countries. Consequently, as Moosa (2003, p. 114) points out, the proposition of a multiplicity of ‘Islams’ has suggested that there are many discursive traditions through which Muslims imagine themselves – that is, how they understand themselves and how they enact those understandings. To this end, as is made evident through the actions and practices of individuals and communities, there are multiple representations of being Muslim.

The prevalence of multiple identities and practices means multiple interpretations of the foundational text, the Qurān. In turn, the pluralistic interpretation of the Qurān implies that the signifier of Muslim cannot be tied just instrumentally to the identity of a person who professes his or her allegiance to the Qurān and Sunnah, since such a view of Muslim merely confirms an individual’s confessional stance. Instead, a Muslim is one who reflects upon him- or herself in relation to his or her Creator and in relation to others. A Muslim is not one who merely submits or surrenders to a Higher Being – the Qurān is clear in its evocation that those who read it have to do so with comprehension, understanding and critical engagement. It is equally clear that being a Muslim is inherently connected to a Higher Being – so that the qualities of a Higher Being are made apparent in the actions of what it means to be a Muslim. In this respect, God is described in relation to 99 names, known as the *asma-ul-husna*. These names ascribe a range of virtuous descriptors to God, which include being compassionate, loving, merciful, generous, peaceful and all embracing. A Muslim, as a trustee or vicegerent of God (*khalīfatullāh fī al-ard*), is expected to embody and manifest the 99 names or virtues:

Behold, thy Lord said to the angels: “I will create a vicegerent on earth.” They said: “Wilt Thou place therein one who will make mischief and shed blood? – Whilst we do celebrate Thy praises and glorify Thy holy (name)?” He said: “I know what ye know not”. And He taught Adam the names of all things; then He placed him before the angels, and said: “Tell Me the names of these if ye are right.” They said: “Glory to Thee: of knowledge we have none, save what thou has taught us: in truth is Thou who are perfect in knowledge and wisdom.” He said: “O Adam! Tell them their names”, God said: “Did I not tell you that I know the secrets of heaven and earth, and I know what ye reveal and what ye conceal?” And behold, We said to the angels: “Bow down to Adam”: and they bowed down .... (Chapter 2, Verses 30–34)

However, to fulfil the responsibility of God’s representation on earth requires a particular understanding and knowledge of God – that is, one cannot enact or manifest the trust of another being without having some understanding of and belief in what that trust might entail or desire. This means that conceptions of *khalīfatullāh fī al-ard* are embedded in both knowledge and comprehension of who God is and what it means to believe. In this regard, the Qurān makes particular reference to the notions

of *ra'y* (rational argumentation) and *ijtihad* (autonomous reasoning). As an ethical principle, *ijtihad* (autonomous reasoning) speaks to the individual's inherent ability and right to think and decide for him- or herself – without the interference of others. In terms of Qurānic exegeses, the principle of autonomous reasoning is addressed within many facets. It is especially made explicit in the verse: “Let there be no compulsion in religion: Truth stands out clear from error ...” (Chapter 2, Verse 256), which exemplifies the paradigmatic foundational ethic in Islam, that the decision to be Muslim and to accept the trust of the covenant is entirely an individual's decision. The provision of *ijtihad* (autonomous reasoning) in Islam is not only in relation to the individual's right to make his or her own choices, and to use the knowledge of the names of all things, but also to contemplate about Islam and about his or her relationship with God. Equally important is that *ijtihad* sets the context for measures of engagement and deliberation when the Qurān and the *Sunnah* are not as explicit in relation to particular contemporary challenges.

## Islam, Philosophy and Education

Halstead (2004, p. 518) explains that the rapid expansion of Muslim Arab civilisation in the 100 years after the death of the Prophet Muhammad brought the faith into contact with Greek, Persian, Egyptian, Syrian and Indian cultures, which led to the incorporation of those cultures into Islam. One of these incorporations or importations into the Arabic language was the term *falsafa* or philosophy. As a result, there have been a number of intellectual developments in the Islamic world, such as the rational theology of the *Mu'tazilites* (school of speculative theology) and the more systematic philosophy of *al-Kindi* (known as the father of Islamic or Arabic philosophy), who asserted the supremacy of reason over revelation in matters of morality, and al-Farābi (Muslim philosopher), who asserted the insufficiency of revelation and the priority of philosophy over religion in many areas of knowledge (Halstead 2004, pp. 518–519). However, the general perception of philosophy is that it is a foreign importation. That being said, asserts Nasr (2010, p. 166), Islam has established an influential philosophy within the scholarly domain of Abrahamic monotheism and the Qurānic revelation while integrating into its intellectual tradition those aspects of Greek philosophy that adhered to a Muslim Unitarian worldview. Consequently, Nasr (2010) elaborates, for the majority of traditional Muslims, the term ‘philosophy’ still implies *al-hikmah* (wisdom), which they associate with the prophets as well as the Muslim saints and sages.

Accepted Muslim opinion, continues Halstead (2004, p. 519), has leaned towards the understanding that anything outside the divine truth of the Qurān is unessential. According to Fakhry (1997, p. 3), the philosophers and theologians soon found themselves in disagreement despite their community of purpose in their quest for religious truth. The Aristotelian worldview, explains Fakhry (1997, p. 3), with its twin tenets of causality and the uniformity of nature which, in the words of Aristotle, ‘does nothing in vain’, was perceived by the theologians to be contrary to the



Qurānic worldview. The Qurānic worldview referred to holds that not only is God unaccountable for any of His actions, but He can effect His designs in the world without any limitations. Halstead (2004, p. 518) contends that until the time of al-Ghazzālī (1058–1111), the debate was fairly evenly balanced between the philosophers and rationalists. On the one hand, the philosophers and rationalists asserted that rationality was separate from religion and could in fact provide objective support for religion. On the other hand, the theologians, commonly known as the al-Ashʿariyya, maintained that rationality was valid only within the boundaries defined by religion. This balance between the philosophical and rationalistic schools of thought, however, was disturbed with the immense influence of al-Ghazzālī, who reasserted the dominance of religion over reason and gave superior status to revelation as a source of knowledge (Halstead 2004, p. 518). During later centuries, in most of the Arab world, philosophy as a distinct discipline became assimilated into either Sufism in its intellectual aspect or philosophical theology (*kalām*) (Nasr 2010, pp. 141–142).

Considered as the first philosopher of Islam, as well as the first writer on philosophical ethics, al-Kindī's starting point was not the Qurān and the Traditions (*hadith*) of Muhammad, but Greek philosophy. Al-Kindī is reported by the classical bibliographers, says Fakhry (1997), to have written a number of ethical treatises reflecting a profound interest in Socratic thought. In addition to a treatise on *Ethics*, he is credited with a work on *Paving the way to virtue*, as well as an extant tract, *Fī al-hilāl lī-dafʿ al-ahzān* (On the art of dispelling sorrows). Of his Socratic writings, a tract on the *Excellence of Socrates: A dialogue between Socrates and Aschines* and a short collection, *Alfāz Sughrāt* (*Socratic utterances*), which have survived, are mentioned in the classical sources. The first systematic writer on philosophical questions in Islam, continues Fakhry (1998), was al-Farābī, who had also contributed to ethical discussions. He appears to have followed Aristotle's lead in dividing the virtues into moral (practical) – which includes temperance, courage, liberality and justice – and intellectual, which includes practical reasoning, good judgement, sagacity and sound understanding. Echoing the Aristotelean argument, al-Farābī also argues that justice consists of the equitable distribution of 'common goods' in the city or the state.

In understanding what an Islamic philosophy of education is, one has to consider what Shahed Ali describes as "the source of any system of education ... [and which can] be traced to its philosophy of life and ... [which] is organically connected with the ethical and moral values that spring from that philosophy" (cited in Cook 2010, p. xxviii). In the case of Islam, the source of its education is the Qurān and the *Sunnah*. Waghid (2011a, p. 27) posits that an Islamic philosophy of education "does not only contain a body of knowledge which embeds the ontological, epistemological and ethical premises of Islam, because philosophy can also be considered as an activity which addresses major problems which can then explore for their implications for pedagogy". Moreover, he contends, if an Islamic philosophy of education were to exist, "it would have to comprise multiple derivatives, as there is not one universal, absolute understanding of Islamic theory and practice ..." (Waghid 2011a, p. 27). Following on Waghid (2011a), one would therefore have to refer to

Islamic *philosophies* of education, as opposed to an Islamic philosophy of education. These philosophies are evident in what Noaparest (2014, p. 2) describes as the three main strands in Islamic philosophy. The first one, he continues, is developed by relying on Aristotle's legacy. Scholars who belong to this strand are called peripatetic philosophers, such as al-Kindi, Averroes and Avicenna, further developed by al-Farābi, pursued by al-Amirī and Abu Ya'qub al-Sijistānī and culminated with ibn Sīnā, who became the prototype of the philosopher-scientist for all later Islamic history. The second strand of philosophers, according to Noaparest (2014, p. 2), is primarily based on the Platonic tradition, which is called the 'philosophy of illumination' led by Shahab al-Din Suhrawardi. The third strand commences with the works of Mohammad Shirazi, also known as Mulla Sadra, and Sadr al-Muta'lehin. To this end, philosophy, states Zaman (2016, p.8), serves "as a lens within which we may speculate on questions dealing with the purpose of education, how it conceives relations between God and man, what is known, and whether there are limits to formal reasoning". To Zaman (2016), such questions make a distinction between 'philosophy of Islamic education', which infers the interests of the larger subfield of philosophy of education, and 'Islamic educational philosophy', which denotes a narrower focus limited to questions of pedagogy and practice.

Following on the above, Waghid (2011a, p. 27) offers the following explanation:

My understanding of a philosophy of education as an activity is situated in the view that Muslim thinkers throughout Islam's intellectual epochs used particular modes of inquiry to pursue exegeses, whether through *tafsīr* (exegetical analysis), *ta'wīl* (deep exploration) and/or *ijtihād* (rigorous mindful action). In a way, the latter practices can be considered as constitutive of a philosophy of education because through these actions major problems or issues are examined and then their pedagogical implications can be determined.

What one encounters in Waghid's (2011a) argument for multiple philosophies of Islamic education or modes of inquiry resonates with other similarly held views, such as those by Biesta (2001, p. 125), who asserts that philosophy of education "is not there to provide ultimate answers". Instead, "[i]t exists to raise and introduce doubt'. Such a view of an Islamic philosophy of education would, in turn, find credence in the Qurānic injunctions 'to know', 'to question' and 'to reflect'. A view of multiple philosophies would simultaneously make explicit the multiplicity of human experiences, thinking and practices, as encountered within all religious traditions. In this regard, one is reminded of Dewey's (2004) elucidation of philosophy as being responsive, as being an idea of what is possible, rather than an account of an accomplished fact.

### ***Islamic Philosophy of Education***

Apparent from the preceding discussion is that conceptions of Islamic philosophy of education immediately place the individual in relation to others (creation) and God. For the purposes of this chapter, I am particularly interested in Islamic philosophy of education as it pertains to educational and, hence, human practices. In

this regard, one finds that Islamic education is connected to at least three discernible yet interrelated epistemological and ethical practices: *tarbiyyah* (socialisation), *ta'lim* (critical engagement) and *ta'dib* (social activism) (Waghid 2011b). These three practices do not only provide Muslims with the foundational understandings of their faith but underscore that understandings of faith are inherently couched in the social expression thereof. In this sense, conceptions of *tarbiyyah* (socialisation), *ta'lim* (critical engagement) and *ta'dib* (social activism) – as constitutive of Islamic philosophy of education – are made visible through the practices and lived experiences of Muslims.

Firstly, therefore, Muslims are expected to socialise themselves into an inherited body of knowledge as enunciated in the foundational source of the Qurān, as well as the *Sunnah* (life experiences and examples of the Prophet Muhammad). The Qurān and the *Sunnah* have been subjected to (re)interpretations that culminated in several juristic, theological and ethical texts, such as Imam al-Shafi'i, Abu Hanifah, Ahmad ibn Hanbal and Imam Malik together with the theological works of Jalal al-Din al-Suyuti and ethical texts of al-Ghazzālī that have gained prominence in the Arab and Muslim world since the demise of the Prophet Muhammad. Often, the socialisation of Muslims into the aforementioned sources of knowledge has taken the path of memorisation of especially the Qurān and several Hadith texts. In this respect, Muslims, through education, might be immersed into existing traditions and ways of acting, without necessarily being conscious of the socialisation. Children who attend madrassah (Muslim school), for instance, might not be aware that by doing so, they are becoming part of a historically embedded tradition that originates from the very inception of Islam. Similarly, teachings (whether at madrassah or in the home) in terms of how to greet, how to eat, how to perform ablution or how to perform prayer are all constitutive of the socialisation practices of Islamic philosophy of education. However, through practices of socialisation, children and students are, as per Qurānic injunctions, to think and reflect upon what they are learning. As such, *tarbiyyah* (socialisation) has in mind producing people who can think and act in accordance with knowledge as it is both transmitted and constructed vis-à-vis legitimate sources of knowledge. *Tarbiyyah*, therefore, does not have in mind an uncritical acceptance of particular ways of acting and being. The socialisation into sources of knowledge, therefore, necessitates a concurrent internalisation of what is being memorised and learnt, so that these might be reflected in the individual's conduct and his or her relationships with others. Hence, *tarbiyyah* (socialisation) aims to engender a particular type of person – that is, one who adheres to a particular code of conduct and set of virtues, as encapsulated in the Qurān and the *Sunnah*.

Secondly, knowledge, explains Al-Attas (2005, p. 23), only becomes education when it is accompanied by moral purpose. In turn, moral action can only be derived from and informed by *ta'lim* (critical engagement) and *ta'dib* (social activism). In this sense, *ta'lim* (critical engagement) is based on an understanding that Muslims who have been socialised into knowledge of the primary sources of Islamic education are encouraged to ask questions and reflect about their learning. As the Qurān (*al-Nahl*, 16:44) aptly states, “And we have revealed to you the message so that you

make it clear to people and that they may give thought". This is a clear vindication that uncritical acceptance of things is discouraged and that Islamic education obliges Muslims to reflect, contemplate and question understandings. In other words, Muslims are encouraged to challenge and think about what they encounter without uncritically accepting 'truths' at face value. Put differently, Muslims' learning depends on how they engage critically with texts and how they contemplate new understandings of their education. By implication, the assumption that a philosophy of Islamic education merely fosters doctrinaire thinking whereby knowledge should be internalised unquestioningly is indefensible. Interpretations of the Qurān and the *Sunnah* are varied, which confirms the plurality of understanding that has characterised Islamic education – as embodied in the four mainstream Sunni schools of thought or *madhāhib*, namely, the *Hanafīyya*, the *Malikiyya*, the *Shafiyya* and the *Hanbaliyya*. These four *madhāhib* (schools of thought) are in agreement with regard to the basic fundamental principles of Islam, but differ with regard to the domains of worship and social affairs. The practice of *ta'lim* (critical engagement) is based on the view that human experience, and by implication understanding, is flexible and cannot be assumed to be absolute and unchallengeable. Rather, interpretations are varied, and *ta'lim* (critical engagement) affords Muslims to look at their understandings with openness and the possibility that things could be otherwise. In this sense, *ta'lim* (critical engagement) is associated with doing things in community, that is, engaging with others and being attentive to the views of others.

Thirdly, *ta'dib* (social activism) is linked to an Islamic philosophy of education on the grounds that memorisation, reflection and openness to the unexpected cannot solely be associated with such a practice. Put differently, knowledge of Islamic content and ways of how such knowledge should be enacted cannot remain confined to the level of cognition. In this regard, Muslims are encouraged to engage in practices of contemplation, criticism and reflection: "Why do they not reflect on themselves? God did not create the heavens and the earth, and everything between them, except for a specific purpose, and for a specific life span" (*al-Rūm*, 30: 8) or "Will they not then ponder on the Qurān? If it had been from other than God they would have found therein much incongruity" (*an-Nisā*, 4:82). To Al-Attas (1991), *ta'dib* (social activism or just action) is the most appropriate term to denote Islamic education because it involves the quest to cultivate truthful and just human action in relation to knowledge. More specifically, Al-Attas (1991, p. 34) contends that knowledge of Islam should be accompanied by 'right and proper action' (just action) in a Muslim community so that one's 'proper' understanding of knowledge directs one to act with truth and justice in a community. In other words, Islamic education has a socially just orientation whereby Muslims are urged to act ethically in all their daily encounters, so that their actions should be endeared towards the cultivation of a virtuous society, that is, one that recognises the plurality of views of others albeit against their own, as well as connecting hospitably towards those whom they might not always consider as favourable in order to build a just and peaceful society.

Thus far, the focus has been on conceptualising an Islamic philosophy of education by drawing on the foundational source of the Qurān. In this regard, I have explored a philosophy of Islamic education as connected to at least three

interrelated practices, namely, *tarbiyyah* (socialisation), *ta'lim* (critical engagement) and *ta'dib* (social activism). Furthermore, I have explained that while Muslims are socialised into particular practices and ways of being and acting, they are also reminded to exercise their reason and to focus on their individual relationships with God and with others. In the next section, I will turn the attention to looking at an Islamic philosophy of education as ethical enunciation of what it means to be Muslim.

## Islamic Philosophy of Education as an Ethical Enunciation

The Qurān's emphasis on the pursuit and acquisition of knowledge, and hence education, is intimately connected to the pursuit of being a 'good' Muslim, which is essentially understood as an ethical being. The notion of an ethical being is that of an individual being attentive to him- or herself and to others, so that the individual recognises his or her place in existence. In this regard, the Qurān states: "Ye are the best of peoples, evolved for humankind, enjoining what is right, forbidding what is wrong ..." (*al-Imrān*, 3: 110) According to Qurānic exegeses, the striving towards a 'best of peoples' is encapsulated in practices of justice, equity and compassion. Stated differently, the socialisation into the inherited sources of Islam (i.e. the Qurān and the Sunnah) has to be made visible in the social activism of what it means to be an ethical being. To this end, the Qurān states: "Be just; that is nearer to righteousness" (*al-Mā'idah*, 5: 8) and is emphatic on just human relations, "O you who have believed, be persistently standing firm in justice, witnesses for God, even if it be against yourselves or parents and relatives" (*an-Nisā*, 4: 135). To al-Qaradawi (1991), the first principle of moderate and justly balanced thought is a comprehensive philosophy of Islam, which is characterised as being a creed and a way, knowledge and action, worship and interaction, culture and character, truth and strength, as well as an invitation and political engagement. Islamic doctrine, states Al-Qaradawi (1991, p. 9), appeals upon Muslims to exercise moderation and to reject and oppose all kinds of extremism, which includes excessiveness, religiosity and austerity.

At this stage, it might be apposite to look more closely at the way in which justice ought to manifest in ethical relations. Firstly, just human relations are attained when humans express a willingness to engage with one another. It does not make sense to claim that justice ought to guide human relations if humans, in the first instance, do not show the willingness to engage the other. One way of making oneself known to the other is to demonstrate a willingness to be known by others, that is, to subject oneself to scrutiny. Injustice happens when the self remains obscured to the other, because obscurity has the effect whereby the one or the other would remain inconspicuous, incomprehensible and unintelligible and, hence, unknown. To be willing to engage with others is a recognition that one's relationships with others are of mutual consent in the sense that one and the other agree to be known to the other. It is for this reason that ethical human relations geared towards the

attainment of justice (*'adl*) cannot unfold without inclusion of the other. This implies that just human relations can happen only on account of showing a willingness to want to engage the other even if it means that the other – with whom one might engage – be considered most abominable. Willingness to engage humans implies that one considers it important for humanity to engage those whom one might find most repulsive, such as perpetrators of atrocious crimes against humanity. How else will human beings address even the most detestable situations confronted by humanity if a decision has been taken in advance not to engage the other? Besides, what is the possibility that justice will ensue if recourse to exclusion and alienation is deemed the most appropriate form of action? In this regard, condemnation and exclusion of the other is neither desirable nor conducive to ethical human relationships. In fact, willingness to engage is a precondition for human engagement with the possibility that justice can ensue.

If *shūrā* (mutual, deliberative engagement) is considered as a Qurānic injunction in terms of which humans ought to resolve their affairs, then simply excluding them on the grounds that one considers them undesirable to engage with is to be remiss of the argument that mutual engagement only implies engaging with those with whom we share similar ways of being and doing. Sameness and agreement cannot be preconditions for human engagement as such engagement is conditional upon willingness to engage even if those with whom one engages are considered to be most repugnant. In any case, limiting one's engagement to interacting and participating only with those with whom one shares similar values and beliefs means that one might never know or encounter other than what one already knows. Consequently, the willingness to engage with all others is in fact a condition for just human action. In addition, willingness does not merely imply all people should engage in *shūrā* (mutual, deliberative engagement) with the understanding that disagreement and criticism should not be part of the engagement. Of course, willingness to engage, like engagement itself, would benefit from disagreement and criticism, as these are human qualities that enhance a willingness to engage and deliberative engagement. It is in this regard that al-Fanjārī (in Alibāsīc 1999, p. 243) avers that critical opposition is compulsory for meaningful and just *shūrā* (mutual, deliberative engagement) to take place.

Secondly, just human action implies that non-coercion – “[l]et there be no compulsion in religion” (*al-Baqarah*, 2: 256) – is a condition of such relations. Coercion undermines human freedom and advocacy and cannot be associated with just action. Condemning and restricting people on account of one's disagreement with them, or that others should be coerced to think and do like one, are actions that work against just action. Therefore, non-coercion as just human action implies that one should engage with criticisms of Islam with argumentation and the provision of counter-evidence – *qul hātū burhānakum* (“say, produce your proof if you are truthful”) (*al-Baqarah*, 2: 111).

Thirdly, along with non-coercion in human relations of an ethical kind, one should also consider the notion of *ikhtilāf* (diversity, pluralism, disagreement). In the first place, a philosophy of Islamic education, according to the Qurān, should encourage differences as these are “God-intended and they cannot be eliminated”



(Alibāsīc 1999, p. 258). This makes sense because reconciling with others in the enactment of human relations is a condition of justice that would prevent humans from denying one another's right to be different. And, reconciliation also implies that human beings are still willing to engage despite their differences and points of departure. A denial of *ikhtilāf* (disagreement) is a form of injustice as people are sanctioned into some form of absolutism that does not allow space for any form of dissent. In this regard, we concur with al-Awwā (in Alibāsīc 1999, p. 292) that Qurānic verses that refer to *ummah* (*community*) refer to such a united community in creed (*'aqīdah*) and not political, social, economic, literary or medical community (*ummah*).

In sum, ethically just human relations would most appropriately be enacted if individuals connect their reasons for engagement to notions of willingness, non-coercion and disagreement. And, when Muslims do the aforementioned, they enact their roles as humans in society in acknowledgement of their commitment to God and His Creation. In turn, an educated individual, therefore, if he or she is to act ethically and justly, is one who is able to exercise *ijtihād* (independent critical judgement). In other words, such a person is able to formulate and articulate particular responses to contemporary social issues so that the response is always geared towards just and fair action as well as inclusion. The Qurānic provision of *ijtihād* (independent critical judgement) is not only in relation to the individual's right to act autonomously – connecting to the pronouncement: “[l]et there be no compulsion in religion” (*al-Baqarah*, 2: 256) – it also sets the context for measures of engagement and deliberation when the Qurān and the Sunnah are not explicit regarding particular contemporary challenges. On the one hand, therefore, there are particular dogmas or undisputed truths within Islam – as there are within all other religions – that elude critical questioning. The six articles of faith, namely, belief in the oneness (*tawhīd*) of God, belief in the angels, belief in the divine books, belief in the prophets, belief in the day of Judgement and belief in God's predestination, might not be interrogated, since these are explicitly expressed in the Qurān. The six articles of faith, as Arkoun (1994, p. 64) explains, define what it means to be Muslim.

To accept the six articles of faith, therefore, implies compliance with the fundamental virtues associated with God and His message, as articulated through the Qurān and the Sunnah. As such, to live as an educated and ethical Muslim means to live by the virtues and practices of justice (*'adl*), righteousness (*birr*), mutual consultation (*shūrā*), compassion (*rahmah*), patience (*sabr*) and forgiveness (*maghfirah*). These virtues or practices are all incommensurable with actions, which speak to any form of exclusion or discrimination. This is confirmed in the verse:

O humankind, indeed We have created you from male and female and made you peoples and tribes that you may know one another. Indeed the most noble of you in the sight of God is the most righteous of you. (*al-Hujurat*, 49:13)

This verse explicates, firstly, gender equality (humanity having evolved from male and female); secondly, it intimates that human equality and coexistence depend on how humans engage with one another; and, thirdly, the verse advises humanity to discern people by piety rather than by any other criterion such as status, wealth or



lineage. As an ethical text, this verse lucidly accentuates the Qurān's preference for an ethical code that is commensurate with equality and diversity, pluralism and dialogical engagement and moral virtue – all aspects of religious ethics that invoke the virtues of recognising otherness, tolerance, peace and dialogue.

In conclusion, the propagation of differences among people would necessarily imply differences in understanding, beliefs and practices – not only across all of humanity but across and within Muslim communities and societies, whether in Muslim-majority or Muslim-minority countries. To this end, the advancement of peaceful human coexistence is only realisable in an Islamic philosophy of education that is non-intrusive and recognises all people irrespective of their religious, cultural, ethnic and ideological differences.

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# Postmodernism and Poststructuralism



Claudia W. Ruitenberg

## Introduction

When students ask me to explain ‘postmodernism’ and ‘poststructuralism’, I am often inclined to give the answer Jacques Derrida gave when François Ewald invited him to comment on the term ‘deconstruction’: “It is never indispensable, and I would rather not” (Derrida and Ewald 1991/2001, p. 67). The terms ‘postmodernism’ and ‘poststructuralism’, it seems to me, are used too often and with too little nuance, both by those who claim to be proponents and by those who claim to be opponents. Consider, for example, Francis Fukuyama’s (1995) claim that “many postmodernists seem to think that their critique of traditional philosophy leads to a kind of de-politicized, de-ideologized *faut de mieux* [sic] liberalism” (p. 36) or Kristján Kristjánsson’s (2000) claim that “after the person’s self and its emotions have been disposed of, the only irreducible in the postmodernist scheme of things becomes the body: as the ‘site’ at which all the diverse forms of power and oppression are ultimately registered” (p. 69). Neither of these claims is supported by evidence based in the analysis of particular texts by particular thinkers; the objects of critique are unspecified ‘postmodernists’ and ‘the postmodernist scheme of things’. Indeed, it is ‘never indispensable’ to use these broad –isms, as it is generally more helpful to discuss particular ideas by particular thinkers, regardless of the school of thought or collective tendencies with which they have associated themselves or, more often, with which others have associated them. So, with these caveats in mind, this chapter discusses how postmodernist and poststructuralist work, or work that has been classified as postmodernist or poststructuralist, has influenced educational theory and practice.

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## Postmodernism

One of the difficulties with the term ‘postmodernism’ is that it is used to refer to an artistic development as well as to a historical period or social condition and a philosophical approach or framework. A book that is often mentioned as one of the first in which the term ‘postmodern’ was used and had a clear meaning was Charles Jencks’ *The Language of Post-modern Architecture* (1977). Jencks discussed architecture that resisted and protested the dominant modernist approach to architecture, with its emphasis on functionalism, simplicity, and geometric purity. This resistance to modernism became a new movement that spread rapidly in the arts at large (literature, visual, performing, cinema, etc.). Jean-François Lyotard (1982/1984) picks up on this sense of the postmodern when he explains:

A postmodern artist or writer is in the position of a philosopher: the text he writes, the work he produces are not in principle governed by preestablished rules, and they cannot be judged according to a determining judgment, by applying familiar categories to the text or to the work. Those rules and categories are what the [postmodern] work of art itself is looking for. The [postmodern] artist and the [postmodern] writer, then, are working without rules in order to formulate the rules of what *will have been done*. (p. 81)

This questioning of preestablished rules and methods resulted in work that was more whimsical and playful than the sober functionalism that was so characteristic of modernist art and architecture; texts were less linear and did not follow established structures of narrative plot but rather experimented with them, trying to reformulate the boundaries of what constituted narrative or the novel. The terms ‘postmodern’ and ‘postmodernism’ in reference to artistic and literary developments are not uncontested, and they have affected the teaching of art, literature, and literary theory, but they are not my primary concern in this chapter. The term ‘postmodern’ in philosophy is an indication of certain philosophical tendencies, not of the time or social condition within which authors who displayed these tendencies lived and worked. This explains why Nietzsche is sometimes referred to as a postmodern philosopher, although he lived in the condition of modernity rather than postmodernity (Koelb 1990). Lyotard also cautions against the assumption that postmodern thought takes place within a postmodern era: “‘Postmodern’ is probably a very bad term, because it conveys the idea of historical ‘periodization.’ ‘Periodizing,’ however, is still a ‘classic’ or ‘modern’ ideal. ‘Postmodern’ simply indicates a mood, or better, a state of mind” (Lyotard 1983/1986, p. 209). Let me move on, then, to the sense of ‘postmodernism’ that is more germane to education: the shift from modern optimism to postmodern doubt.

## Postmodern Doubt

Within philosophy, the most distinctive sense of the ‘postmodern’ is probably Lyotard’s (1979/1984) definition: “Simplifying to the extreme, I define *postmodern* as incredulity toward metanarratives” (p. xxiv).<sup>1</sup> Examples of such ‘metanarratives’ are “the dialectics of Spirit, the hermeneutics of meaning, the emancipation of the rational or working subject, or the creation of wealth” (p. xxiii). All of these are examples of overarching teleological narratives of progress; whether the *telos* is greater justice, greater liberty, greater wealth, or greater knowledge, organizing society according to one of these narratives means we are improving in some way. The difficulty is that the ‘we’ benefiting from progress often turned out to come at the expense of a ‘they’ who were left behind, actively harmed, or simply forgotten in the story of progress. Disappointment in the broken promises of metanarratives thus led to a loss of faith. Elsewhere Lyotard (1988/1993) explains the deception and doubt that motivate the postmodern attitude as follows:

We can observe and establish a kind of decline in the confidence that, for two centuries, the West invested in the principle of a general progress in humanity. This idea of a possible, probable, or necessary progress is rooted in the belief that developments made in the arts, technology, knowledge, and freedoms would benefit humanity as a whole. ... After two centuries we have become more alert to signs that would indicate an opposing movement. Neither liberalism (economic and political) nor the various Marxisms have emerged from these bloodstained centuries without attracting accusations of having perpetrated crimes against humanity. (pp. 77–78)

In the western world, the main examples of these crimes perpetrated by proponents of what were supposed to be narratives of progress are the totalitarian Nazi and Stalinist regimes. The Nazi regime showed that technical rationality, which was supposed to have set human beings free from religious dogma, could be used to advance a murderous ideology. Stalin’s regime, also responsible for the deaths of millions, was supposedly guided by a Marxist metanarrative aimed at greater social justice.

The deception in the failures and harms of regimes supposedly guided by metanarratives of progress had a profound effect on educational thinkers. David Orr (1994) observes: “The designers and perpetrators of Auschwitz, Dachau, and Buchenwald ... were the heirs of Kant and Goethe, widely thought to be the best educated people on earth. But their education did not serve as an adequate barrier to barbarity” (p. 7). Nel Noddings (1992) concurs: “Intellectual development could not ensure against moral perversity” (p. 11).

Gert Biesta (2012) writes that postmodernism’s intervention in modernism was about recentring ethics and politics, after technical rationality and other metanarratives of progress had shown the destructive potential of a focus on knowledge unguided by ethics and politics. Postmodernism, he writes, can be seen

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<sup>1</sup> “En simplifiant à l’extrême, on tient pour « postmoderne » l’incrédulité à l’égard des métarécits” (Lyotard 1979, p. 7).

as a critique of the epistemological worldview, that is, a critique of the idea that our most basic, fundamental and original relationship with the world is a knowledge relationship and that everything else—including ethics and politics—is derived from and based upon it. (p. 582)

In direct response to those who confuse postmodernism with moral relativism, then, Biesta writes that “postmodernism comes with an explicit ethico-political imperative which could be summarised as ‘Thou shalt not totalise’. This imperative is neither about relativism, nor does it express an absolute or a truth. It rather summarises a lesson learned” (p. 582).

The incredulity of metanarratives (*grands récits*), according to Lyotard, heightened awareness of ‘small stories’ (*petits récits*) that showed the singularity of individual voices and lives that had previously been excluded—or worse. In education, postmodern incredulity took aim at, for example, the metanarratives of psychology. John Morss (1996) discusses how the work of, especially, John Shotter and Kenneth Gergen exemplified postmodern doubt:

For Shotter, psychology of orthodox varieties has been modernist. It has sought for universal, abstract theories of human activity—the kinds of theory that allow for detached contemplation of the experience of others. In contrast to this, a postmodern attitude would for Shotter involve practical, socially involved and responsible consideration of human lives. ... For Gergen, a valid psychology would accept a plurality of stories, whereas modernist psychology has been dominated by the ‘grand narrative’ of scientific progress. (pp. 43–44)

With the focus on multiple stories characterized by their differences rather than their consistency with a larger narrative thread, critiques emerged of psychological grand theories. Carol Gilligan’s (1982) famous critique of Lawrence Kohlberg’s theory of supposedly universal stages of moral development is an example of a feminist disruption of a psychological metanarrative.

Another educational example of postmodern incredulity is Elizabeth Ellsworth’s (1989) essay ‘Why Doesn’t This Feel Empowering? Working Through the Repressive Myths of Critical Pedagogy’. Ellsworth recounts her experience of teaching a Media and Anti-Racist Pedagogies course at the University of Wisconsin-Madison in 1988. This experience led her to conclude that central assumptions and practices of critical pedagogy—which she had hitherto supported—actually served to “perpetuate relations of domination” (p. 298). Ellsworth recounts:

As an Anglo, middle-class professor in [this course], I could not unproblematically ‘help’ a student of color to find her/his authentic voice as a student of color. I could not unproblematically ‘affiliate’ with the social groups my students represent and interpret their experience to them. In fact, I brought to the classroom privileges and interests that were put at risk in fundamental ways by the demands and defiances of student voices.

The way in which Ellsworth’s ‘small narrative’ interrupts the neo-Marxist emancipatory metanarrative of critical pedagogy is an enactment of the postmodern incredulity Lyotard describes.

Sociologist Frank Furedi (2006) believes that this emphasis on the critical intervention of the ‘small story’ in the larger narratives of progress is evidence not of the value of the voices of the many but, instead, of a lack of faith in the public’s educability:

One of the distinctive features of the contemporary so-called postmodern era is the loss of conviction in the idea that the public is capable of being enlightened. ... We live in an era where clear statements about people's ability are obfuscated by a vocabulary that relies on terms like 'special needs students', 'differently abled people', 'non-traditional students' and 'the intellectually challenged'. This confusing language coexists with the rhetoric of flattery that declares that everyone is special and creative. But at a time when normal university students are routinely described as vulnerable, it is evident that the mental capacity of the public is not held in high esteem. (p. 151)

Furedi's suggestion that postmodern doubt extends to doubt about whether "the public is capable of being enlightened" is worth unpacking, as it speaks directly to different conceptions of education. Furedi is right that the postmodern attitude is a loss of conviction; however, it is a loss of conviction not in people's ability to be 'enlightened' but rather in the desirability and appropriateness of 'enlightenment' as the mode, objective, and indeed metanarrative of education. Postmodern thinkers call into question the metanarrative of 'enlightenment' as progress from darkness to light—i.e., from obscured thinking to clear thinking—based on an awareness of the necessary context specificity of conceptions of who is considered an 'educated person', what should be considered 'core knowledge', and what texts should be part of the curricular canon (see, for instance, the debate between E. D. Hirsch's (1988) *Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know* and critical responses such as Eugene Provenzo's (2005) *Critical Literacy: What Every American Ought to Know* and Herbert Kohl's (1992) 'Uncommon Differences: On Political Correctness, Core Curriculum, and Democracy in Education').

The passage also illustrates well how significant language use is for postmodern thinkers; Lyotard (1979/1984), for instance, analyzes 'language games' as "the minimum relation required for society to exist" (p. 15). This perspective stands in sharp contrast to the disdain that authors such as Furedi have for what they perceive to be a vacuous political correctness. Furedi assumes that language is merely 'vocabulary', a representational layer separate from the linguistically independent world outside of it. This is a view challenged especially by poststructuralist scholars, as I will discuss in the next section.

## Poststructuralism

In philosophical conversations, including those in philosophy of education, the term 'poststructuralism' is often seen as more precise than the term 'postmodernism', both because it avoids the confusion with postmodern artistic developments outlined above and because it positions the work as critical in relation to *structuralist* modernist perspectives rather than in relation to all modernism. As Standish (2004) summarizes: "Poststructuralism comes about in part as a complication or



unravelling of the structuralism of Saussure and Lévi-Strauss, but in so doing it draws extensively on the influence of Nietzsche” (p. 488). ‘Saussure’ is a reference to Ferdinand de Saussure (1857–1913), the Swiss founder of structural linguistics. In structural linguistics, language is viewed as composed of signs, and each sign consists of both a signifier—the carrier of meaning such as the sound (phonic signifier) or the black marks on a page (graphic signifier)—and a signified, the corresponding meaning. There is no necessary connection between the signifier and the signified; this connection is based on human convention. As Blake et al. (1998) put it, there may be a historical explanation but “there is no philosophical reason why the English word for river must be *river*” (p. 16). According to de Saussure, meaning is differential. “To understand, say, the meaning of the signifier green ... is to know how to draw practical distinctions between green and not-green. ... Meaning is relational and the primary relation for analysis is the relation of difference” (Blake et al., p. 17). De Saussure claimed that these differential relations are not disordered, but form certain structures, such as binary pairs. In addition to de Saussure, Standish also mentions Claude Lévi-Strauss, the French anthropologist who, as Michael Peters and Nicholas Burbules (2004) put it, argued that cultures and societies, like languages, are “organized by structures that the participants may not be aware of, but which nevertheless give their social practices and institutions coherence and meaning” (p. 15). Poststructuralism is best understood as a critical response to structuralism or, more precisely,

as a specifically philosophical response to the alleged scientific status of structuralism—to its status as a mega-paradigm for the social sciences—and as a movement that ... sought to decenter the ‘structures,’ the systematicity and scientific status of structuralism, to critique its underlying metaphysics and to extend it in a number of different directions, while at the same time preserving central elements of structuralism’s critique of the humanist subject. (p. 8)

As Peters and Burbules observe, it is important to understand poststructuralism’s critical response not as sheer opposition; poststructuralism is not anti-structuralism and does not seek to overturn all of structuralism’s insights.

Nonetheless, one of poststructuralism’s significant departures from structuralism is that it shifts its focus on what language *means* to what language *does*. Rather than analyzing how people understand language and make meaning, post-structuralist philosophers have asked, for example, whether binary structures are as stable as they appear at first glance, what the effects are of a reliance on language that works through binary differences, and how subjectivity is produced by the discourse. For example, Michel Foucault (1969/1972) argues that discourses should be seen not “as groups of signs (signifying elements referring to contents or representations) but as practices that systematically form the objects of which they speak” (p. 49). This view on discourses as practices has inspired many discursively oriented studies in educational contexts examining how discursive practices ranging from textbooks to teachers’ spoken language to the visual discourse of the school environment make students into certain kinds of subjects. Blake et al. (1998) explain further:

A discourse is a collection of statements (involving knowledge or validity claims) generated at a variety of times and places, in both speech and writing, and which hangs together according to certain principles as a unitary collection of statements. A great variety of discourses can be generated within any one language. And, moreover, a single discourse can include statements in a variety of different languages. (Think of scientific discourse). ... [T]he poststructuralist claims that we are constituted as subjects within an indefinite plurality of disparate discourses. (p. 14)

This being ‘constituted as subjects’ within discourses is highly significant, as it indicates an understanding of language not as representation of an independent external world *that remains untouched by this representation*, but of language as having an effect on that external world, especially through its framing of our access to it. Education most obviously involves educational discourse, and, as Lynn Fendler discusses in her chapter ‘Educationalization’ in this *Handbook*, we can witness today the tendency to construe social problems within discourses of education. Being constituted as subjects within educational discourses that now capture a wide range of social phenomena, we begin to imagine that “the amelioration of those problems is accomplished through pedagogical intervention” (Fendler).

## Deconstruction

Recalling my own admonition that it is generally more helpful to discuss particular ideas by particular thinkers rather than the broad label ‘poststructuralism’, I turn now to some of the key ideas of Jacques Derrida. Derrida’s work, which is also typically classified as poststructuralist, shares with Foucault a focus on discourse and discursivity but takes a different angle. As I have argued elsewhere (Ruitenber, 2005), this can be explained well through one of his oft-cited and oft-misunderstood claims: “*il n’y a pas de hors-texte*” (Derrida 1967/1976). Spivak translates this as “there is nothing outside of the text” and “there is no outside-text” (p. 158). Some believe that Derrida claims here that all there is is the world of language, but this is not the case. If Derrida claims that we can never separate our experience of the world from language, this does not mean that there is no world to be experienced at all, but rather that we do not have any non-discursive access to it. Derrida (2002) himself also denies that his claim means that all there is is language:

On the one hand, I always think it necessary to recall the dimension of language, and, at the same time, essentially what I do and what begins with a deconstruction of logocentrism consists in, and calls for, a beyond-language, or an outside-language. Often my work is interpreted as the work of someone who says, in the end, everything is language, there is only language, there are no things, there is nothing beyond language; this is an absolute linguisticism. A very paradoxical reception of work that begins by doing the opposite. But I think that the two need to be done. One must constantly recall a certain irreducibility of the textual or discursive dimension of language, and, at the same time, recall that there is the textual something that is not discursive, a trace that is not linguistic. (p. 33)

Unfortunately, Spivak's translation "there is nothing outside of the text" does not quite dispel the 'linguisticist' interpretation of "*il n'y a pas de hors-texte*". Instead, I might suggest the less literal "there is nothing that escapes text", or "there is no extra-textual realm" (Ruitenberg 2005, p. 42). Attridge proposes the literal translation "there is no outside-the-text" and comments that it means that "there is nothing that completely escapes the general properties of textuality" (in Derrida 1992, p. 102, n. 21).

The reason I dwell on Derrida's claim and its translations is that it is particularly helpful for understanding the focus on discourse of poststructuralist thinkers and how this 'discursive turn' involved a critique of the materialist orientation of Marxist thinkers. Derrida's claim and its various translations and interpretations also goes some way to explaining the subsequent (re)turn to materiality among new materialist thinkers, who have argued that poststructuralists have been too focused on discourse. Sara Ahmed (2008) begins her analysis of the new materialist critique of poststructuralist feminism with the following observation:

I have had numerous conversations with friends, colleagues, participants at conferences, which have involved the use of quite casual forms of expression, which evoke a position that is not held by the speaker. One example of this is the expression, 'I don't think everything is just social', which has been repeated to me a number of times. ... I would suggest that the word 'social' here works metonymically: it acquires significance in part through its nearness to other words such as language, discourse, culture. The speech act might express that familiar or even habitual anxiety that feminism and poststructuralism have reduced 'everything' to language and culture, in what is often referred to as 'textualism', and have forgotten the 'real' of the real world, or the materiality of what is given. (p. 25)

Karen Barad (2003) provides a clear example of this anxiety when she writes:

Language has been granted too much power. The linguistic turn, the semiotic turn, the interpretative turn, the cultural turn: it seems that at every turn lately every 'thing'—even materiality—is turned into a matter of language or some other form of cultural representation. (p. 801)

As the above discussion clarifies, any claims that poststructuralism involves a denial of materiality and amounts to linguisticism are baseless. Poststructuralists argue that material structures—whether those are social structures or biological structures—do not determine and are no more foundational than discourse and culture. They do not, however, replace this with the inverse claim that discourse and culture determine or are more foundational than material structures.

Ian Munday (2011) refers to the claim, "*il n'y a pas de hors-texte*", to critique dominant conceptions of success and failure in educational discourse. He writes that understanding the referent of language as not something outside of language but as something that is, itself, always already affected by and tethered to language, we can break the expectation of successful educational communication that represents the 'outside world' in a transparent, stable, and assured manner. Munday writes:

Teachers are often told not to speak too much and when they do speak they should be as clear as possible, otherwise meaning will go awry, their utterances will not be understood. ... The issue that is at stake here concerns whether when teachers speak (particularly when they, heaven forefend, speak 'for a long time'), they are generally misunderstood. ... Yet,

As Derrida shows, the very possibility of communication is dependent on the iterability of language, and this iterability requires a necessary division that means words are not at one with themselves. Consequently, trying to pin words down through excessive adherence to clarity is destined to failure, but this is only ‘failure’ because communication is thought of here as something that must be full and transparent. (p. 413)

The language that teachers (and textbook writers, curriculum designers, educational administrators, and so forth) use depends for its intelligibility on previous iterations and remains susceptible to subsequent iterations. It thus cannot be understood and analyzed as a text whose context consists of non-discursive elements such as geographic and historical context, and which is affected by other non-discursive conditions, but must be understood as part of a practice that is discursive through and through, and whose discursivity cannot be eluded.

The discussion around “*il n’y a pas de hors-texte*” also illustrates how the binary pairs success/failure and within-the-text/outside-of-the-text do not hold. This constitutive failure of binary structures is known as deconstruction (see Biesta 2009). In relation to Munday’s paper discussed earlier, I might say that the binary success/failure deconstructs itself, as the very idea of ‘success’ is dependent on the idea of ‘failure’, without which it would be meaningless. Biesta (2009) discusses the dominant conception of success and failure in education as follows:

If we want to teach our students that 2 and 2 makes 4, if we want them to learn how to drive a car, how to weld, how to administer anaesthesia, if we want them to understand how the convention of the rights of the child came into existence, what racism is and why it is wrong, what democracy is and why it is good, what evolution theory and creationism are about, or why deconstruction is not a method and cannot be transformed into one, our aim is to get it ‘right’ and, more importantly, our aim is for our students to get it ‘right’. Teachers have a special ‘trick’ for getting it right. It is not called effective teaching but assessment. (p. 398)

Assessment understood as the reliable verification that certain knowledge or skills have been mastered is, as Biesta acknowledges (p. 402, n. 5), a legitimate part of education, but it cannot be the sole model that shapes all of education, as that would reduce education to training and socialization. Education, as Biesta, Munday, Standish, Masschelein, and other educational scholars who have written from post-structuralist perspectives have argued, necessarily involves a risk, openness, and weakness that take its irreducibly discursive, and thus iterable, nature into account.

Returning to the new materialist critique of poststructuralism I discussed earlier, Ahmed (2008) notes that “the new materialism reintroduces the binarism between materiality and culture that much work in science studies has helped to challenge” (p. 35). From a poststructuralist perspective, the binary of matter (or materiality) and culture (or associated terms like discourse) is untenable and deconstructs itself. This means that all discourse has material traces and effects that are not reducible to discourse itself, and that all matter is already ‘contaminated’ by discourse and cannot be considered in a purely material, a-cultural realm. In the context of educational contexts and practices, Ahmed’s perspective is worth noting, as studies of ‘embodied’ pedagogy or students’ ‘embodied’ learning are not a-discursive any more than studies of policy or textbook discourse are a-material.

To put it most succinctly: deconstruction is the failure or self-undoing of the boundaries that purportedly keep the two sides of a binary pair apart. Note that deconstruction is not an action or intervention that a scholar performs on a text or even a binary pair; no, as Derrida (1991) explains, deconstruction *happens*: “Deconstruction is not ... an *act* or an *operation*. ... Deconstruction takes place” (pp. 273–274, italics in original). The role of the poststructuralist scholar is, in Biesta’s (2009) words, to *witness* this happening. In the close scrutiny of boundaries in binary pairs, these boundaries reveal themselves to be unstable, porous, and flawed.

One of the areas in which this deconstructive perspective has played out forcefully is gender studies and queer theory, as the binaries that have traditionally structured the social organization of sex (male/female), gender (masculine/feminine), and sexuality (heterosexual/homosexual) have all been shown to deconstruct themselves. The social (and legal, medical, etc.) organization of sex, gender, and sexuality has relied on the stability of these markers and identities and has assumed people can be classified—and ought to be classifiable—reliably and permanently according to these binary pairs. A failure to be classified or classifiable in these binary schemas was seen to be a form of deviance or abnormality on the part of the subject. From a deconstructive perspective, masculinity is not the opposite of femininity but rather dependent on it; masculinity not only relies on femininity as its ‘constitutive outside’—which is to say that ‘masculinity’ is not intelligible in the absence of ‘femininity’—but is also always touched and affected by it.

As I have written elsewhere (Ruitenberg 2005), a binary conceptual demarcation is a border that cannot possibly be what it is intended to be: indivisible. Derrida (1993) writes:

where the identity or indivisibility of a line ... is compromised, the identity to oneself and therefore the possible identification of an intangible edge – the crossing of the line – becomes a *problem*. There is a *problem* as soon as the edge-line is threatened. And it is threatened from its first tracing. The tracing can only institute the line by dividing it intrinsically into two sides. There is a problem as soon as this intrinsic division divides the relation to itself of the border and therefore divides the being-one-self of anything. (p. 11)

Touching on both sides it is meant to keep apart, the border is, from the moment it is drawn, two. The border is never indivisible, never individual, always two. This is the case for borders between more abstract concepts such as presence and absence as much as for borders between concepts with a more immediately felt personal and political relevance such as masculinity and femininity.

## Poststructuralist Perspectives on Equality and Justice

Let me conclude this chapter with a discussion of how poststructuralist thinkers approach questions of equality and justice in and through education, as this showcases some of the notable differences between structuralist and poststructuralist approaches. The topic of equality and justice in education is one where the persistence of more modernist, structuralist perspectives, and in particular the Marxist

heritage, manifests itself clearly, for example, through the work of Antonio Gramsci and Paulo Freire. In much educational scholarship, injustice is taken to be an issue of unequal power between identifiable groups. As Naomi Hodgson and Paul Standish (2009) explain:

In educational research concerned with social justice the group or individual is seen as without power and the research process is concerned with empowerment – the giving or getting of power. It is perhaps the neo-Marxist understanding of power that characterizes much of the desire to work ‘for social justice in education’. (p. 315)

Structuralist approaches to social injustice in or through education may focus, for example, on empowering girls in science education, emancipating immigrants through literacy classes, giving voice to working class students, enabling black students to resist racial oppression, highlighting the stories of gay and lesbian teachers, and so forth. Poststructuralist scholars do not deny that people lead unequal material lives: that some students live in large houses, while others live in small apartments; that some students are slammed into school lockers for looking or talking a certain way, while others do the slamming or walk away; that some students have a passport of the country in which they live, while others have passports of other countries, or no passport at all. The poststructuralist interruption comes from not assuming that these material conditions are associated with stable identities and subjectivities, but rather questioning how material conditions as well as the discourses that circulate turn people into certain kinds of subjects. Poststructuralist scholarship “resists those categories of identity around which discussions of social justice ossify and instead questions the truth on which they are based” (Hodgson and Standish 2009, p. 325).

One of the distinctive perspectives that poststructuralist scholars bring is on subjectivity or, more precisely, on becoming-a-subject. From a poststructuralist perspective, we are not preexisting medical subjects who enter into medical discourses and practices, but rather we become medical subjects (e.g., ‘patients’) by entering into, participating in, and recirculating these medical discourses and practices. Likewise, we are not preexisting educational subjects who enter into educational discourses and practices, but rather we become educational subjects (e.g., ‘students’) by entering into, participating in, and recirculating these educational discourses and practices. Foucault’s work has had the most sustained focus on the practices by which human beings become subjects. In his own words, his “objective ... has been to create a history of the different modes by which, in our culture, human beings are made subjects” (Foucault 1982, as cited in Rabinow 1984, p. 7). This focus on becoming-a-subject does not mean that human beings are seen as culturally determined or without agency; the subject still has agency, but this agency is not autonomous. In Judith Butler’s (1997) words, “Agency exceeds the power by which it is enabled” (p. 15).

The modernist focus on autonomy in education thus meets a poststructuralist critique that questions the possibility of this autonomy. In addition, and taking up Biesta’s (2012) point that postmodern interventions predominantly have an ethical purpose, the poststructuralist critique of the focus on autonomy also questions the *desirability* of the narrative of autonomy. The subject is reminded of its fundamental dependence on others as well as on discourses, practices, and structures not of its own making.

In education, the poststructuralist attention to how human beings become subjects enables different questions. For instance, instead of asking how girls can be empowered to pursue science education, it might ask how certain knowledge has come to be classified as ‘science’, how science has come to be associated with masculine characteristics, and how both girlhood and masculinity have been constructed and are constantly produced and reproduced discursively. Instead of seeking to give voice to working class students, poststructuralist scholarship might ask how the binary of voice and voicelessness, of speaking and silence, plays out in education. It might ask also how particular kinds of labor come to produce ‘working class identity’ and how the working class subject is a gendered and racialized subject. In other words, poststructuralist research in education resists binaries of oppressors and oppressed, of haves and have-nots, and of the educated and the uneducated, because it seeks to disrupt the certainty with which we pursue curriculum reform, educational policy change, and educational research ‘for social justice’. It calls attention to that which is excluded from each of our attempts at social justice and, thus, to the very conception of justice that animates the attempts. “A closer reading of poststructuralist literature should raise questions about the nature of the justice that is the concern of much educational research” (Hodgson and Standish 2009, p. 325).

Daniel Vokey and I have previously analyzed the nature of justice in writing about equality and justice in education (Ruitenberg and Vokey 2010). We distinguish the conceptions of justice as harmony, as equality, as equity, and as difference—or, more accurately, justice as *alterity*. This last conception is the one that can be found in poststructuralist scholarship. Instead of asking how a stable subject might become more ethical or act more ethically, poststructuralist ethics is more likely to ask how subjectivity itself is constituted by ethical acts and relations. If, as Derrida (1993/2002) writes, we take justice to be not a structure but “the experience of the other as other, the fact that I let the other be other, which presupposes a gift without restitution, without reappropriation, and without jurisdiction” (p. 105), then how can justice possibly be done in education? The answer, perhaps unsurprisingly, is that it can never fully be done. Biesta (2001) writes:

We could argue that the only way to do justice to the other, the other whom we dare to educate, is by leaving the other completely alone. It is not difficult to see that this neglect (which would not even count as a border-case of education) would make the other unidentifiable and unrecognizable. (p. 51)

Education is, by definition, an intervention, and, as such, it does not leave the other alone and always risks doing injustice to the other. As it seeks to minimize the injustice it does to one group of students, it creates a new injustice by seeing students as members of social groups and thus misrecognizing their uniqueness. As it seeks to minimize the injustice it does by misrecognizing an individual student, it neglects to attend to the exclusion of those who never become a ‘student’ in the first place. Where modernist approaches to education and educational research brought the confidence and optimism of structural progress, the postmodern doubt that I discussed above characterizes poststructuralist approaches. Poststructuralist scholars do not give up on justice, but they imagine it less as a stable target to aim



for—whether in form of the education of the oppressed, equal educational opportunity, or education for individual autonomy and freedom—and more as an idea that haunts educational theory and practice, spurring it to return to question and rethink itself again and again.

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# Feminism



Rita Casale and Jeannette Windheuser

The history of feminism is the history of a theoretical and political movement. Even though from a European perspective the French Revolution already signals the start of an organised women's rights movement, the present analysis takes the mid-twentieth century as its point of departure. In so doing, the epistemic and the historical developments following the Second World War will be discussed in three phases using a historical-conceptual approach. The reconstruction of the contemporary history of feminism according to equality feminism, difference feminism and gender feminism draws upon a canonisation that established itself within the feminist historiography of the 1990s and, above all, corresponds to the European and Anglo-American context.<sup>1</sup> Aware of the situatedness of one's own epistemic access, this canonisation will initially be adopted as well as both historically and conceptually examined. At the same time, in the second part the attempt will be made, by means of the analysis and reconstruction of the institutionalisations process of feminist theory and politics, to revise the prerogative of interpretation of such a Eurocentric canonisation.

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<sup>1</sup> See Habermas (2002).

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## The History of Ideas of Feminism After 1945

### *Equality Feminism*

Gender equality was the central aim of first-wave feminism (1848–1918), which promoted liberal and socialist positions. At the conclusion of the Second World War, Simone de Beauvoir's work *Le Deuxième Sexe* represented the theoretical reference point of equality feminism. The text was published in 1949 in a fairly conservative climate in France, where, on the one hand, women were granted the right to vote, and, on the other, the scope of action they had during the war was being lost. Once the men came back from the front, the women were once again banished to the domestic sphere. The analysis of the *situation* of women in *Le Deuxième Sexe* – the historical, cultural, economic, biological grounds for their immanent imprisonment in the realm of the natural – acts as a provocation toward the attempt in the 1950s in Europe and the USA to make marriage and family central factors of societal consolidation. From the perspective of an existential ethics, the aim of de Beauvoir's critique is women's *freedom*. Freedom is understood in terms of transcendence, that is, as the liberation from the imprisonment in nature, which is viewed as the sphere of immanence. *Equality* comprises the *conditio sine qua non* for freedom. The emancipation of the woman is similar to the freedom of the man in that it is an emancipation from nature achieved through *work*. In her analysis, work represents, following Hegel, both the processing and objectification of nature, thus is itself the precondition for the transcendence of nature, i.e., for freedom. In a capitalist society, work takes place in an alienated form. Nevertheless, for de Beauvoir, work retained its freeing potential. It forms the precondition for the equality of the sexes; an equality to be realised both politically and economically speaking.

Betty Friedan's liberal feminism is to be situated in this tradition, as well. Her book *The Feminin Mystique* (1963), much like Simone de Beauvoir, takes aim at the conservative gender hierarchy with its conceptions of the family that had taken hold during the McCarthy Era in the USA. Her massive assault on the concept of 'occupation: housewife' targeted the individual self-liberation of women by means of economic independence. As a co-founder of NOW (The National Organization of Women, 1966), Betty Friedan set the tone for second-wave feminism (1968–1980).

The theoretical and political prerequisite for equality feminism is the critique of the *patriarch*. For equality feminism the male domination of women, and thus the exploitation connected with it, operate in a patriarchal society not only at the economical and political levels but also at the sexual level. If equality feminism acted at the political level pushing for the recognition of women's rights as human rights,<sup>2</sup> then at an economical level it did not merely strive to achieve the financial independence of women. It also criticised the devaluation of reproductive work, which is understood in terms of both housework and the psychical work performed associated

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<sup>2</sup> Gerhard (2001/1990).

with the cohesion of the family. The analysis and critique of the function of the so-called *work of love*<sup>3</sup> is followed by the demand by equality feminism for a *sexual politics*, the consequence of which leads to a calling into question of the postulate of equality itself.

The immediate political goals pursued by equality feminism in sexual politics include combating sexual violence as well as decriminalising abortions. However, more generally, the self-determination of sexuality is claimed. Works such as Shulamith Firestone's *The Dialectic of Sex* (1970) or Kate Millett's *Sexual Politics* (1969) transform the sexual into the political. The politicisation of sexuality leads to a critique of a central tenet of liberal society: the separation of the public and private spheres. One of the central themes of the international second-wave feminism is the motto formulated by Millett: 'the personal is political'.

Criticism of the hierarchical relations of gender in the private as well as public spheres leads to a radical confrontation with representatives of the student movement and, above all, with the Marxist tradition, which derived the question of gender from the question of class. In contrast, the difference between class and gender as well as patriarch and capitalism is emphasised.<sup>4</sup>

Initially inspired by Beauvoir's principle of equality,<sup>5</sup> second-wave feminism as a whole shifted its focus from women's rights to women's liberation. Whereas equality feminism takes up the central themes of freedom, socialisation ('One is not born a woman, but becomes one') and reproduction/work, difference feminism deals with the shift of the political to the sexual. Sexuality becomes the crux of the question of women's rights.<sup>6</sup>

## *Difference Feminism*

Already in first-wave feminism one finds the concept of 'mental spiritual motherhood',<sup>7</sup> which emphasises the difference between masculine and feminine. Second-wave feminism emerges from the observation of sexual difference as *difference*,<sup>8</sup> which is distinguished from that which is given, i.e., the other of history. When the feminine in a patriarchal society is reduced to the second gender, to *other than* man, to his mirror, then difference feminism is not content with an emancipation of women that confirms the specularity of the female sex in terms of a second sex. For difference feminism, the liberation of women cannot be modelled upon the masculine conception of transcendence. A precondition for this is rather the nega-

<sup>3</sup> Duden and Bock (1980/1977).

<sup>4</sup> Lonzi (1996/1970).

<sup>5</sup> In particular, see Firestone (1970), Brownmiller (1975), Schwarzer (2002/1975).

<sup>6</sup> Wischermann et al. (2010, p. 101).

<sup>7</sup> Allen (1982), Jacobi (1990).

<sup>8</sup> Due to the ambiguity of the term in English, those instances referring to the understanding associated with difference feminism in the Italian and French traditions will be denoted.

tion of the universal character of freedom, which is assumed by the model of emancipation tied to work. In this sense, the sexual difference is to be understood as the affirmation of the division of the human species. The human species is the divided sex – the sex not unified. Difference is the concept used to characterise the distinction in the sexual (*Geschlechtlichen*). The sexual difference refers to the position of women in the symbolic order and becomes the point of departure for the possibility of a relational connection. Here, alterity is understood in terms of difference – one that makes it possible to think of a formation of the subject that goes beyond the universal model of patriarchal societies.

First, let us turn to *difference as the division in the symbolic order*: amidst the student revolution (1968–1970), several women in France (among others Luce Irigaray 1985/1977a; Julia Kristeva 1980/1969 und Hélène Cixous 1976/1975), who stemmed from the group Psy-et-Po (*Psychoanalyse et Politique*), took the opportunity to shake up the conventional understanding of politics. The change of the order of representation presupposes the calling into question of the identity character of the symbolic order. This critical treatment does not limit itself to the political understanding of the student movement and the Marxist inspired organisations. It is perpetuated along with the entirety of the tradition of Western thought, which is subordinated under a phallogocentric logic. Following Martin Heidegger and Jacques Derrida's critique of Western philosophy as a metaphysics of presence, they accuse the Western tradition of conceiving of Being as having a specific signifier: the phallus. The phallus has become the primary signifier of a symbolic order that identifies Being with that which is visible. In this order, according to Jacques Lacan, the woman does not exist. Her gender is one that isn't one.<sup>9</sup> The sexual difference characterises first and foremost this negativity in the symbolic order. In *Speculum* Luce Irigaray (1985/1974) attempts to give a face to the invisible and a language to the unsayable. The sexual difference, then, becomes the name for another symbolic order.

If Lacan's psychoanalysis assumes the centrality of the mirror stage for subject formation, then the representatives of difference feminism, with the help of the *Speculum*, show something that cannot be seen in the mirror: the sexual difference as the *terra incognita* of Western philosophy and the psychoanalysis of Freud and even Lacan.

The sexual difference becomes a presupposition for a relational ethics: Difference as relational connection.<sup>10</sup> Toward the end of the 1970s, Adrienne Rich (1976) and Nancy Chodorow (1978), among others, dedicated themselves to the analysis of the meaning of the relation to the mother, considered from the perspective of an object relation, for the reproduction of gender-specific divisions of labour as well as for the emergence of bonding relations.<sup>11</sup> The mother-daughter relationship becomes the foundation for an ethics of care, which Carol Gilligan (1982) formulated via a critical reading of Lawrence Kohlberg's theory of moral development.

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<sup>9</sup>Irigaray (1985/1977a, b).

<sup>10</sup>For a reconstruction of the history of such an ethic, see Dingler (2016).

<sup>11</sup>Later Benjamin (1988).

Since the 1980s in Italy, a *pensiero della differenza sessuale*<sup>12</sup> has developed that is based on two pedagogical concepts: the practice of *originating from oneself (a partire da se)*<sup>13</sup> and the practice of *affidamento*.<sup>14</sup> The practice of *from out of oneself* describes a movement of thinking, which emerges from the experience of one's own corporeality and situatedness. In the practice of *affidamento*, this movement is embedded in a generational logic. It refers to a symbolic relation to the mother. In this symbolic relation, that is, in the linguistic mediated relation to the mother,<sup>15</sup> the recognition of the mother's authority as the possibility of a feminine genealogy is at issue. In her symbolic relation, the mother is observed not only reproductively, but also attributed a generative function. The practice of *from out of oneself* and *affidamento* is understood in terms of symbolic politics of relation, in which the freedom of the woman is first made possible.<sup>16</sup>

## ***Gender Feminism***

The discussion about the character of sexual difference, i.e., whether it is a product of culture or nature, lies at the heart of gender feminism, which has above all established itself in the North American and German contexts. The issue concerning the relation of nature and culture with a view to gender identity and the gender binary was already discussed in the 1950s in the area of medical psychiatry and in the 1970s in the field research inspired by anthropology. When medical psychiatry was dealing with the separation of bodily identity and sexual identity in the case of transsexuality,<sup>17</sup> the feminist anthropology was attacking the androcentric canon of anthropological field research,<sup>18</sup> which was above all dominant in the USA. With the publication of Gayle Rubin's text *The Traffic in Women: Notes on the Political Economy of Sex* (1975), the debate surrounding nature and culture was conceptually conceived in terms of a 'sex/gender system'. Making reference to the analyses of Lévi-Strauss on familial relationship and those of Marx and Engels on the economic and moral meaning of family, Rubin underscores the significance of the obligatory heterosexuality for the production and stabilisation of the gender order. The equation of the gender binary and symbolic order is considered as the common denominator between the three central streams of gender feminism: The ethnomethodological-sociological, the linguistic-philosophical deconstructive and the

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<sup>12</sup> Diotima (1987).

<sup>13</sup> Diotima (1996).

<sup>14</sup> Diotima (1995).

<sup>15</sup> For a variety of different accents, see Irigaray (1985/1974), Kristeva (1980/1969), Muraro (2006).

<sup>16</sup> Cigarini (1995).

<sup>17</sup> Becker-Schmidt and Knapp (2000, p. 71).

<sup>18</sup> Wischermann et al. (2010, p. 231).



scientific-theoretical deconstructive forms of gender feminism.<sup>19</sup> While difference feminism discusses the patriarchal gender order, assuming the phallus as the primary signifier, gender feminism sees the gender binary as constituting the epistemic matrix of gender relations. For difference feminism, the 'difference' represents the unsaid and, at the same time, the utopian surplus of feminist theory and praxis. Gender feminism sees in the difference of the genders, fixed as gender binary, the reason for the hierarchy of the genders. In this case, the utopian moment consists in the idea of an overcoming of the gender identities.

The ethnomethodological-sociological gender feminism investigates empirically the reproduction of the gender binary and the supposed hierarchy of genders, both in everyday practices and with regard to the scientific codification of naturalised stereotypes. In the now classic analyses carried out by Candace West, Don Zimmermann and Sarah Fenstermaker, gender was processualised<sup>20</sup> and indicated the interactive character of the production of difference.<sup>21</sup> At the heart of this approach lies the question about how sexual identity emerges. Carol Hagemann-White's social-constructivist investigations of socialisation processes (1984) conducted in the 1980s are to be situated in this context within the German-speaking countries. In the 1990s, the ethnomethodological approach was, above all, adopted by the sociology of knowledge, which has dealt with, among other things, the production of hierarchies in highly qualified careers.<sup>22</sup>

The target of the linguistic-philosophical deconstructive gender feminism is the normalisation by means of naturalisation of the gender binary. The dimension of desire lies at the heart of the analysis, which mediates sex and gender. It is about a mediation that in no way possesses a natural character. It is not biological gender that explains the nature of desire, but rather its cultural form. The explicitly political concerns of such an approach, whose theoretical highpoint was the publication of Judith Butler's *Gender Trouble. Feminism and the Subversion of Identity* (1991), lies in the recognition of the forms of sexuality and forms of life of those who are politically and culturally marginalised in the name of a normalising heterosexuality. In her analysis, Butler deconstructs the fixation of the norm of heterosexuality through a series of performative, interactive speech acts.

The object of the scientific-theoretical deconstructive gender feminism is the critique of the production of knowledge of natural facts in late capitalism. Following Bruno Latour, Donna Haraway, who – above all due to her publication *Simians, Cyborgs and Women: The Reinvention of Nature* (1991) – can be viewed as the central theorist of the third current of gender feminism, attacks the dualistic logic of scientific and technological production. This logic is articulated in the demarcation between humans and animals, between organisms and machines and between the material and immaterial. This kind of logic obstructs access to the phenomena that have emerged from the entanglement of knowledge and technology in late

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<sup>19</sup>For a comprehensive presentation of the three currents, see Becker-Schmidt and Knapp (2000).

<sup>20</sup>West and Zimmermann (1987).

<sup>21</sup>West and Fenstermaker (1995).

<sup>22</sup>Wetterer (1992).

capitalism.<sup>23</sup> It is about hybrid entities (e.g. embryos in test tubes, the HIV virus, the ozone hole) that neither completely belongs to nature or culture. In order to investigate such phenomena, an epistemology is necessary that overcomes the dualisms of subject-object, idealism and materialism, as well as realism and nominalism.

Haraway's work expands the gender feminism's critique. Now, the focus is no longer just on the gender binary of the heterosexual matrix, but also the dualistic normalising logic of scientific and technological production.

## The Institutionalisation of Feminism After 1945

If one wants to pursue the second step in the analysis and reconstruction of the institutionalisation of the positions outlined above, then it should be noted that it involves a non-linear relation. It is about the institutional translation of concepts and critique, how it was formulated in the political theory and praxis of feminism, which itself leads to new, unanswered questions. Knowledge concerning gender, both in its production and its dissemination, is subject to a circulation process (Sarasin 2011), and therefore translates, implements, shifts and glorifies both that which is thought and that which is said under specific economic, political and societal conditions.

The following reconstructs this process of institutionalisation of feminist theories and practices (especially in education and *Bildung*), taking into consideration the historical and social conditions, which in the time after the Second World War shaped the knowledge-historical horizon of both feminism and the gender questions and were subsumed under the following three conceptions: human rights, post-colonialism and human capital.

### *Human Rights*

The second half of the twentieth century begins with a significant institutionalisation of the feminist demands in which women's rights is explicitly incorporated into the 'Charter of the United Nations' (1945 (UN) as well as in the UN's 'International Declaration of Human Rights' (1948).<sup>24</sup> Initially, it referred to an international standard that by means of the 'International Bill of Human Rights' (1976) became international law. Gender is recognised three times in the documents: first, in the sense of a principle of equality, which grants men and women equal rights; second,

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<sup>23</sup> Haraway (1988)

<sup>24</sup> The inclusion of women was thanks to the involvement of the handful of women who took part in the drafting. The majority of the nations who signed the Charter and Declaration had not yet introduced legal equalisation of the sexes as clarified in the documents—in particular when it came to voting rights (Jain 2005).

as a non-discrimination principle, including other characteristics such as ‘race’, skin colour, political opinion or social background; third, in the form of protective measures for women against unequal treatment and violence.<sup>25</sup> What’s more, from the perspective of education and *Bildung*, there is the decisive article concerning the special protection for mothers and children, the right to education and both the free choice of profession and free exercise thereof.<sup>26</sup> With the adoption of the Beijing Declaration at the Fourth World Conference on Women in 1995, it becomes clear how the actual violence against women and girls as well as the still pending equality requires the further specification of their rights. At the same conference, the so-called platform for action strategies for the realisation of the already existing rights were implemented.<sup>27</sup> This includes, in particular, institutional organisations concerned with the advancement of women and girls and the measures regarding gender mainstreaming, which is, above all, a strategic approach towards the equality in national and international public institutions.<sup>28</sup> The specific protection against gender-specific oppression is expanded via the 2011 and 2016 UN resolutions concerning the protection against discrimination based on ‘sexual orientation and gender identity’.

In this way, gender equality, freedom from discrimination and protection against violence are transnationally institutionalised, which is tied to the fundamental demands of the women’s movement concerning human rights, as they have been negotiated since the French Revolution.<sup>29</sup> Already in 1791, Olympe de Gouges, in her *Déclaration des droits de la femme et de la citoyenne*, criticised the ‘universal’ declaration of human rights from 1789. It ignored the relation of equality and difference in the gender relations.<sup>30</sup> As Carol Pateman (1988) has historically reconstructed using the example of the emergence of the modern social contract, the exclusion of women was constitutive for the development of civil society and modern democracy. In the feminist (human) rights debate, in particular, the relation of legal philosophy and legal practice is analysed<sup>31</sup> and the ‘male bias’ in the human rights declaration criticised (Okin 1998). At the same time, the feminist human rights debate has to come to terms with its own ‘cultural bias’, as the post-colonial feminist critique shows (Grewal 1999).

The philosophical debate concerning the question of human rights for women is, above all, characterised by the distinction between *equality in difference* vs. *equality*

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<sup>25</sup> Preamble, Art. 1 Charter of the United Nations; Art. 2, 12, 16 Declaration of Human Rights.

<sup>26</sup> Art. 25, 26, 23 Declaration of Human Rights. These regulations experience pressure via the ‘Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women’ (1979), the ‘Convention on the Rights of the Child’ (1989), the ‘Vienna Declaration on Human Rights’ (1993) and the ‘Cairo International Conference on Population and Development’ (1994), by means of which further equal opportunity and protective measures will be initiated.

<sup>27</sup> <http://www.un.org>

<sup>28</sup> United Nations (2002).

<sup>29</sup> Offen (2000).

<sup>30</sup> Gerhard (2001/1990, 1990), Scott (1996a).

<sup>31</sup> Cornell (1991), MacKinnon (1983), Young (1990), Nussbaum (1999).

*of equals*. In her declaration, de Gouges already makes reference to an equality of diversity, as it was later advocated for – visible in the previous reconstruction – in the new women's movement from the perspective of difference feminism by the Italian philosophical group Diotima (1989) and Luce Irigaray (1990).<sup>32</sup> In contrast, for equality feminism – as we have seen – the demand for human rights for women consists in the equal access to the public and thus political as well as economic spheres.

Since in the 'Declaration of Human Rights' from 1948, the principle of non-discrimination is introduced alongside the principle of equality, a connection can be made to the gender-theoretical debate carried out in the 1980s and 1990s regarding the recognition of different sexual orientations and gender identities. First, this concerns access to fundamental rights (including the undiagnosing and decriminalisation of non-heteronormativity, the sex-independent marriage, the right to adoption by homosexual couples) and second the critique of a heteronormative concept of humanity as the point of departure for human rights (Butler 2004).

The institutionalisation of feminist human rights demands is to be seen in their historical connection to the wider social movements of their time. The relation is by no means free of conflict, as Sara Evans (1979) already demonstrates in the case of the USA regarding the Civil Rights Movement and the New Left, as well as Gayle Rubin (2001/1982) shows for the common, yet separately affected gay liberation and feminism during the so-called Sex Wars.<sup>33</sup> Toward the beginning of the 1980s, the interpretational sovereignty of white feminists is called into question by black activists and authors, who attack the separation by class, gender and 'race' in the feminist and leftist movement (among others, Combahee River Collective 1982/1977). Regarding human rights, two phases of analysis and critique can be identified, whereby the former from the end of the 1960s till the mid-1970s focused on the political and economic suppression of women, and the latter, starting in the mid-1970s turned its attention towards sexual violence as well as reproductive and sexual self-determination (Lonzi 1996/1970; Dalla Costa and James 1972; Rubin 1975; Irigaray 1985/1977a).

After the economic as well as socially constitutive separation of the reproductive and productive spheres in the nineteenth century, the patriarchal structures of the welfare state, which institutionalises the separation of spheres in the family income, stand over and against a feminist demand for autonomy (Fraser 2016). The second phase of the critique expresses itself, especially in the campaigns for legalised

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<sup>32</sup>Caravero (1990), Irigaray (1993/1984, 2008), Zakin (2007); also see MacKinnon (1987); MacKinnon indicates that the freedom to be treated regardless of gender runs counter to the protective freedom of systematic subordination.

<sup>33</sup>In the late 1970s and early 1980s, there was an inner-feminist fight between anti-porn and sex-positive positions. This fight involved, among other things, the conflicts between homosexual emancipation (including lesbian, gay and SM-practices) and the fight against sexual violence.

abortions<sup>34</sup> as well as in the confrontation with reproductive rights and sexual violence.<sup>35</sup>

Through these institutionalisations in the contexts of *Bildung* and education, it once again becomes possible to grasp the twofold demand of equality and difference, which is also expressed in the understanding of the meaning of the institutions. On the one hand, by means of the demand to accept educational institutions and according to the social handling of reproduction, the public, institutional and political equality of women and the issues affecting them is demanded. On the other, the exclusion of women and the anti-statist critique of representation of the social movement lead to the development of separatist – that is, different – connections<sup>36</sup> among women. These changes in the conception of education and *Bildung* are to be situated within this dual development.

The important institutionalisation of human rights for women in education affects the steadily growing influx of women into the institutions of higher education since the 1970s.<sup>37</sup> The claim to the right of education already played a major role in the older women's movement, and it enabled the establishment of the so-called feminine/maternal courses of study and occupations (Kleinau and Mayer 1996; Kleinau and Opitz 1996; Scott 1996b).

Philosophical and historical interpretations of classic pedagogical figures, as well as social scientific investigations about co-education demonstrated the limits of the concept of equality as a model of emancipation. In the first case, the classical figures' contribution to the establishment of a bourgeois understanding of education and *Bildung* is brought to light (see Schmid 1993; Kuster 2005; Casale 2012). In the second case, co-education is shown to be a significant accomplishment in the equality of women, and, at the same time, as an instance of the reproduction of hierarchal gender relations. Above all, it was the feminist research on co-education that contributed to the analysis of this historical, social and cultural problem, which has, among other things, called attention to the gender-specific 'hidden curriculum' (Frazier and Sadker 1973; Kuhn and Wolpe 1978).

In addition to the deconstruction of the canon and the conceptual change of educational institutions, the epistemologically inspired feminism itself has changed our understanding of *Bildung*, education and knowledge. In particular, their supposed neutrality has been criticised. *Bildung* and education are subjected to a dichotomous and hierarchal order of gender (Rendtorff 1998). Understood in terms of a *situated*

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<sup>34</sup>LeGates (2001). 1971 published in France *Le Nouvel Observateur* the statements of hundreds of women who had had abortions, in 1972 a similar campaign is published in the German journal *Stern*. About the Pro-choice movement in the USA, also see Staggenborg (1991). For an international comparison: McBride Stetson (2001).

<sup>35</sup>Two radical positions are taken up by Firestone (1970) and Brownmiller (1975). Firestone sketches out in her feminist connection of Marxist and sexual revolution a utopia, where women are to be liberated from the 'tyranny of procreation'. In her research on rape, Brownmiller assumes that it is connected with the male gender and thus the masculine order.

<sup>36</sup>This cannot always be absolutely distinguished from one another, like the West German '*Kinderladenbewegung*' Baader (2015) was reconstructed.

<sup>37</sup>OECD (2015).

*knowledge*, moreover, an argument is being made for an epistemological perspectivism (Harding 1986; Haraway 1988).

Beyond the increased equal opportunities in the educational system, extra-institutional practices alter our understanding of *Bildung*. In the groups of women where ‘consciousness raising’ is practiced, both the separation of subject and object and of mind and body is called into question (Koedt et al. 1973). In particular the Italian women’s movement treats other forms of *Bildung* and knowledge transfer, which presupposes sketches of feminine genealogy and authority (Milanese Feminists 1977/1974). This includes the debate in the French-speaking context regarding language as an expression of a phallogocentric logic and the nascent *écriture féminine*, which proceeds from the feminine body as primary signifier (Cixous 1976/1975; Irigaray 1985/1977b).<sup>38</sup> In addition to the attempt to design a language originating out of the sexual difference, new language practices are being developed that, first and foremost, call the generic masculine into question (e.g. via the naming of both sexes or new ways of spelling, such as ‘s/he’ (Miller and Swift 2000/1980)). In the 1990s, attention was drawn to the performative force of language (Butler 1990, 1997). The aim is a gender undisambiguation of the language (via changes to the word suffix with \_ or \*, and in Swedish via the introduction of new a gender-neutral personal pronoun ‘hen’), which above all affects languages possessing grammatical gender (Hornscheidt 2011).<sup>39</sup>

The feminist confrontation with reproductive and sexual self-determination and the protection against sexual violence leads to conceiving of the woman’s body as a site of political, social and economic negotiation, as well as individual and collective experience.<sup>40</sup> For the new women’s movement, this debate is politically connected with the demands for reproductive rights, which affects family planning, contraception and abortion. In this sense, it goes beyond legal questions and involves sexual education.

Sexuality is decoupled from procreation and, in critical debate with the representatives of the so-called sexual revolution, thought of and practiced as the discovery of the feminine body and feminine desire (Lonzi 1971<sup>41</sup>; Firestone 1970; Koedt 1970). Awareness raising projects and women’s healthcare centres are being established as autonomous/self-organised institutions.<sup>42</sup> The liberation of feminine sexuality accompanies the new insights regarding the structures and mechanisms of male violence against women (Brownmiller 1975; Alcoff and Gray 1993). State

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<sup>38</sup> In the 1970s till the 1980s, Mary Daly searched in the English language for ‘another language’, which was associated with the female passed along practice of weaving (see Caputi et al. 1987).

<sup>39</sup> For the aesthetic meaning of gender in school-based educational processes see Windheuser (2013).

<sup>40</sup> An artistic implementation of the topic was provided via a print by Barbara Kruger 1989 (no title) with the words: “Your body is a battleground”.

<sup>41</sup> See Brückner (2014).

<sup>42</sup> Boston Women’s Health Book Collective (1971), Nelson (2015). Medical-historical and psycho-analytical distortions of the female body and gender relations have also been analysed Duden (1998/1987), Benjamin (1988).

institutions, one's own family and partners are perceived as unlikely to be helpful; instead, as domestic violence, its concealment and the lack of adequate legislation show, they are more likely to be identified as accomplices or collaborators. A consequence of this is the establishment of women's shelters, which above all focus on self-determination (Pizzey 1974). This has pedagogical consequences to the extent that girls become the future recipients of the girls' empowerment.

Alongside the women's movement, LGBTIQ<sup>43</sup> activists are also fighting against discrimination and for the de-criminalisation and de-psychiatrisation on the basis of sexual orientation or identity as well as for an end to the compulsory medical treatment of intersexuality. In this way, the international medical and psychiatric classification system (ICD-10 and DSM-5) has changed, and marriage, family and adoption rights in some countries have been altered. On the international scene, recognition of LGBTIQ rights through the UN and other transnational organisations is occurring (Lavinás Picq and Thiel 2015). Even in this context, approaches to sexual *education* are being developed.

Both the women's movement and the later LGBTIQ movement have achieved institutional effects, in that they pushed forward the legal equalisation and the anti-discrimination legislation at the national and international levels,<sup>44</sup> and in that they have opened up new theoretical points of access and fields of research. In the end this means that women's studies and gender research have been able to establish themselves since the 1970s (initially emanating outward from the USA and Europe), and starting in the 1990s the establishment of professorships for gender and queer studies (Hark 2005).

At the same time, empirical investigations show that the economic and political inequality of the sexes and sexual violence<sup>45</sup> against women has in no way been overcome (World Economic Forum 2016; OECD 2015; UNESCO 2012).

## *Post-colonialism*

Feminist theory and politics as depicted above are primarily anchored in the academic and socially motivated context of the 'West', i.e., the 'global north'. The hegemonies and exclusions associated with it are the objects of post-colonial critique. Post-colonialism is understood in terms of a historical, theoretical and political concept: it is historical because it describes the situation of decolonised states or territories in terms of their pre-colonial and colonial historical development, their colonial history and its effects, as well as its neo-colonial developments. The prefix

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<sup>43</sup>Lesbian, Gay, Bi-Sexual, Transsexual, Intersexual, Queer.

<sup>44</sup>About the establishment of 'state feminism', i.e., of women's rights in national legislation, in an international comparison: McBride Stetson/Mazur (1995), Outshoorn and Kantola (2007).

<sup>45</sup>For the educational studies discussion, moreover, the continued gap in the connection of generations and gender is fairly significant in the debate on sexual violence against children Windheuser (2014).



'post' does not mark an end; instead, it considers the traces of what took place in the past as manifested in the present. Theoretically speaking, the goal is to investigate the process of colonisation, the continuing de-colonisation and neo-colonisation. Post-colonial theory has been influenced by post-structuralist and Marxist approaches, and it focuses analytically on the epistemic violence as well as the material relations of the post-colonial situation.

The concept of post-colonialism is political to the extent that it expresses a critical resistance against colonialism, its ideologies and effects (Dhawan and Varela 2005). Important proponents of post-colonial theory are Edward Said, Homi K. Bhaba and Gayatri C. Spivak. In his analysis of *Orientalism* (1978), Said exposed the Orient as a specific projection of the West. Bhaba, with his concept of cultural hybridity, divides the colonial conception of cultural identity (1994). Spivak is above all associated with the feminist perspectivisation of post-colonial theory (1988a, 1995). She criticises the Western claim of representation and denounces Western ignorance towards economic relations that have emerged out of the colonial history and neo-colonial present (Spivak 1999). Feminist or international human rights-oriented interventions from the perspective of the former colonial states – which according to this perspective are located in the UN as well – repeat a discourse of the North, which once again brings the post-colonial woman into a spectating position. In this position, she is violated twofold by means of neo-colonial economic exploitation and via patriarchal gender relations (Spivak 1995, 1988b). Proceeding from her break with the conception of a Western-male subject position developed in *Can the subaltern speak?*, Spivak additionally deals with questions of post-colonial pedagogy. Her critique primarily focuses on the Western academic canonisation and historiography (Spivak 1990). As an educational challenge, she attempts to learn to hear the subaltern and how to unlearn one's own privileges, and, among others, through this to practice undoing subaltern space.<sup>46</sup>

Post-colonial cannot restrict itself to the historical experiences of colonisation and its effects, but must also deal with the effects of colonisation on cultures and societies (Ashcroft et al. 2000). This extends its perspectives to include questions about racism, diaspora and migration in a globalised world (Hall 1990, 1992). According to this perspective, a critique of feminism's cultural bias cannot be reduced to the post-colonial perspective, as the earlier interventions by black feminists in the USA and by feminist migrants in European countries show (Combahee River Collective 1982/1977; Hooks 1984; Spelman 1988; Gümen 1996).

The anti-racist and post-colonial critiques become the starting point for Critical Whiteness Studies, in which feminist epistemic figures are brought to bear on and who appeal to the experience within their own situatedness. *Whiteness* can be understood as an experiential knowledge of blacks or enslaved/exploited people – a form of knowledge that already began with the establishment of colonialism and slavery and was brought forth by the affected persons. Within the black community this knowledge was primarily passed on verbally (Hooks 1992). Till this day, female domestic servants/workers continue to offer us, as an 'outsider within', a specific

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<sup>46</sup> Spivak (1990, 1999).

perspective in which they through caring for the children both belong and do not belong to the family (Collins 1990). Critical Whiteness Studies are, for this reason, historically as well as empirically connected with the experience of black women, and moreover, with the critique of hegemonic-white feminism. Black activists direct their attention to the previously unmarked position of white activists. Characteristic of this theoretical perspective of Critical Whiteness Studies is their perspectival change in which Whiteness, just like racism, becomes the object of analysis.<sup>47</sup>

While the women's movement within the context of the New Left located itself in the marginalised position as over and against men, and, as a result of this experience, distanced itself from a Marxist approach, it nevertheless, in light of post-colonial and anti-racist theory, has to contend both with the category 'race' and, as a result of the global economic inequality, once again with the meaning of class. The theoretical connection of these central 'categories of the modern' (Klinger 2008) are given an analytical framework via Kimberley Crenshaw's (1989) concept of *intersectionality*. Crenshaw's approach is based on a critical race theory and the anti-sexist prescribed legal studies, and uncovers the fundamental problem tied to anti-discrimination law, according to which simultaneously or multiple instances of discrimination are not adequately taken into account. Crenshaw conceives of intersectionality in terms of an analytic instrument in order to comprehend how racism, sexism and classism intersect (Crenshaw 1991).

Post-colonial theory, critical whiteness studies and intersectionality shift the feminist theory and politics in that they neither make reference to a universal patriarchy nor to a given global sisterhood. Decisive topics of feminist politics lose their universal claim when, for example, racist practices are uncovered in the context of contraception and abortion (Davis 1982). Furthermore, even international efforts against trafficking or female genital mutilation can be called into question (as paternalistic) when they come from an unmarked 'white' point of view (Murray 1998; Lionnet 1992).

Against this background, the aim for *Bildung*, education and their research is to make their own post-colonial assumptions about history, curriculum, language and praxis into objects of investigation. This also includes the economic conditions of social coexistence, to the extent that women in the global North profited from the exploitation in the neo-colonial context. Here, the phenomena of brain drain via migrant academics or the transnational care chains should be looked at.<sup>48</sup> And in light of the increasing presence of women on the labour market, without such transnational care chains to address the reproductive work that still needs to be accomplished, this would not be manageable.

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<sup>47</sup> Morrison (1992), Walgenbach (2005).

<sup>48</sup> S. Hochschild (2000, 2003).

## *Human Capital*

From an economic perspective, the time following the Second World War, to the second women's movement of the 1960s and 1970s, and even up to the new millennium is characterised by the transition from a 'state organised capitalism' (Fraser 2009) to neo-liberalism. In this connection, the concept of *human capital* stands for a new (at first economic) valuation of capital in which the labour force is conferred a new significance in the creation of value. Labour force – understood as human capital – comprises the entirety of the physical, social, cognitive, psychic and cultural assets of population (Becker 1964; Mincer 1958; Schultz 1961). From this perspective, national economic calculations have to incorporate both untapped and even future human capital, i.e., women as an unused resource for the production process and children in terms of resources to be trained. The basis for this is rational-choice theory. It is assumed that the individual (monetary and non-monetary) costs and benefits will be analysed in order to make decisions in both the market and non-market sectors (Becker 1964). Similarly, demographic policy decisions are to be assessed from the perspective of whether investments in education, healthcare or social projects promise future returns. While the state organised capitalism, as Nancy Fraser locates it in the OECD welfare states and ex-colonial development regimes in the post-war period, operate in the market and social reproduction with intervening top-down strategies, the neo-liberal is placed on top of this in order to create incentives for individuals, to act in the sense of an entrepreneurial self (Bröckling 2016/2007), to view oneself as a market actor.

State-organised capitalism was characterised by a gender-specific division of labour that called for the exclusion of women from the productive sphere.<sup>49</sup> At the same time, reproductive work – a precondition for the labour force of production – was covered by unpaid female labour (already accounted for in the male family income) and the welfare state arrangements. In contrast to this, in neo-liberalism, women's labour becomes integrated into the productive sphere – that is, in the production of goods – and yet continued to operate from the assumption of unpaid care services.<sup>50</sup>

From a feminist perspective, neo-liberalism is characterised in terms of a paradox: on the one hand, female procreativity, private care, education and other reproductive activities are viewed as a prerequisite for the so-called population quality and supported by means of the reconciliation of work and family life as well as

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<sup>49</sup>Federici (2009): The analysis of gender relations in capitalism in terms of the separation of spheres is above all attributed to the feminist Marx critique, as it has been articulated since the 1970s by the activists of the 'Wage for Housework' campaign, comprising Selma James, Mariarosa Dalla Costa und Leopoldina Fortunati, and the feminists of the Bielefeld School Werlhof et al. (1983).

<sup>50</sup>This is accompanied by the dismantling of the social security system, as it was assumed in the welfare state Brodie (2004). Under the premises of human capitalism, all areas of life are to become objects of the 'work on oneself' toward the optimisation of one's own market value. In so doing, the separation of public and private disappears Boltanski and Chiapello (2007).

public educational institutions.<sup>51</sup> On the other hand, the naturalisation of human capital is faced with a gender-neutral support of productivity and competitiveness (Casale and Forster 2011). In this regard, a paradoxical achievement of feminist demands for equality and recognition can be postulated, which accompanied the failure of difference feminism's demands for another order. Difference works, if only as a biological or identitary establishment in the contemporary discourse.

While the two women's movements struggle against a state-organised capitalism – which was shaped by the separation of spheres, androcentrism and paternalistic social security – and the subordination of women justified by the family wage, the neo-liberalist double-earner family model represents a new challenge (Fraser 2016). This affects the integration of feminist critique in economic strategies, e.g., in which previously private tasks and responsibilities become public and women receive equal access to the professional life.<sup>52</sup> At the moment, the question to be asked is: To what extent did feminism and gender theory, as well as the entire social movements since the 1970s, contribute to the formation of a neo-liberal regime? It is worth noting initially that it has come to a significant shift in the relation of reproduction and production, to the extent that specific areas of education and *Bildung*, as well as of the social life have experienced an enhancement regarding their monetary wage. Care is retrieved from the unpaid arena in which institutions more and more look after toddlers and children outside of the regular school hours and also nursing care for the elderly is increasingly becoming a waged labour (OECD 2011). Furthermore, social skills and informal education are becoming more valuable (Boltanski and Chiapello 2007). Luc Boltanski and Ève Chiapello refer in this regard to a shift from social to artistic critique between the late 1960s and 1980s. Thus, the effect of the justified critique of authoritarian and paternalistic structures in business and political institutions has been replaced by the hard-earned security via autonomy and creativity. And despite their best attempts to the contrary, the anti-capitalist social movements<sup>53</sup> have thereby contributed towards the neo-liberal optimisation of the welfare state.

Fraser's analyses take on a central role in the feminist debates. Accordingly, the feminist cultural success legitimates the structural reconfiguration of capitalism. The 'dangerous liaison' between feminism and capitalism (Eisenstein 2005) certainly did promote gender justice (*Geschlechtergerechtigkeit*) in the area of wage labour and in the recognition of women and non-heteronormative identities. At the same time, however, a shift took place from the struggle for redistribution to cultural rec-

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<sup>51</sup> In so doing, government support is increasing – especially in Scandinavia and Germany – when it comes to the reconciliation of family and work. This involves the financial support of (better earning) young parents and the expansion of public care facilities for toddler and pre-school kids, as well as supervision after school see OECD (2011, 2016). This data also shows that gender-specific divisions of task still exist. Against this background, it is worth re-considering the supposed 'youth crisis' and thesis of 'feminisation' Forster et al. (2011).

<sup>52</sup> Hochschild (2003), Eisenstein (2005), Rosen (2007), Hess (2013), Fraser (2016).

<sup>53</sup> For Boltanski and Chiapello this includes women's-, homosexual-, anti-nuclear- and environmental movements.

ognition under the given conditions. Fraser holds feminism primarily responsible for this. Feminism strives to overcome the androcentric separation of the private/public, yet without taking the economic assumptions for it into consideration (Fraser 2009).

With regard to the supposed feminist neglect of the economic conditions, queer- and gender-theoretical approaches are falling under criticism. Tove Soiland and Rita Casale accuse them of a culturalisation of the political and epistemic claims of feminism.<sup>54</sup> Demands for autonomy, equality and recognition undergo specific translations in neo-liberalism, which express themselves in the withdrawal of state responsibility in the economisation of *Bildung* and education as well as in part of the care sector. Globally speaking, the proportion of exploitation has intensified along the categories *gender, class and 'race'*. In the global North, the anti-racist and anti-sexist social criticism is changing into an individually enforceable anti-discrimination legislation. The integration in the productive sphere is regimented through *gender and diversity management*. The question of care, in contrast, is spatially and temporally postponed: spatial in that neo-colonial practices of the global care chain are being installed. Care is additionally temporally pushed back through new technologies of reproduction (e.g. egg freezing).

Women play in multiple respects a central role in such processes: they belong integrally to the carriers of care drain and brain drain.<sup>55</sup> The educational advancement of the latter is accompanied by a shift in the former. The institutionalisation of feminist theory and politics has, above all, moved along the path of equality and the expansion of the productive sphere, and thus also lead to a further valuation of wage labour. Against this background, the integration of feminist demands in an existing economic-political system has taken place, so that it, as a whole, has lost some of its character of difference.

As the relation between the central concepts of feminist theory production and the social impact of feminist critique on institutions in the two parts of the article shows, feminism has to be described both as a theoretical *and* political movement. Therefore, feminism exceeds disciplinary boundaries, especially due to its transdisciplinary nature and both its academic and non-academic background. Emphasising feminism as a movement reflects the fact that neither theory production nor institutional changes taken alone correspond to the surplus that feminism represents as a historical process for modern societies. The importance of feminism for educational studies, philosophy of education and educational practice has to be explained in terms of an entanglement of the following: the critique of patriarchal and misogynous structures, the ideas and practices explicitly related to different understandings of generational relationships, the importance of the mother-child relationship for the formation of the subject, the critique of the patriarchal family-model as well as the institutional and curricular changes in the educational institutions. Regarding the idealistic concept of *Bildung*, feminist theories deconstruct the modern under-

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<sup>54</sup> Soiland (2010), Casale (2008, 2014).

<sup>55</sup> See OECD/IOM (2014): Brain drain is, moreover, characterised in terms of gender in that, above all, highly qualified women have little ambition to return to their countries of origin.

standing of knowledge, primarily by pointing out the role of the body in the production and acquisition of knowledge. That feminists claim to think of a subject theory that goes beyond the Cartesian and idealistic traditions remains one of the central challenges facing the philosophy of education.

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# Posthumanist Education?



Stefan Herbrechter

## The Posthumanization of the Education System

One might be very tempted to dismiss posthumanism as another Anglo-American theory fashion and to simply wait for this latest ‘postism’ to go the way of all the previous ones. If there was no globalization with its tangible effects both at an economic and a media and cultural level, this might be possible or even a sensible thing to do. But the fact is that, even in disciplines that have always been predominantly focused on their respective national spaces, cultures and institutions such as the humanities and social sciences – which includes education, of course – global flows nowadays increasingly provide the main political and institutional impulses. This occurs through global competition via mechanisms of international ‘transparency’ and ‘accountability’ (cf. university league tables, or international studies of education systems like the OECD’s PISA studies), which connect comparative educational standards with business location and correlate local training standards with an increasingly global competitive and mobile workforce. This puts national education systems under pressure to open themselves up to international and global benchmarking. Education, as a still predominantly national institution is forced, due to more flexible tax legislation under the conditions of global neoliberalism, to make major investments to convince mobile international and global corporations and elites that the right political decisions are being taken to provide attractive educational opportunities and business locations including a flexible and skilled workforce ready for the so-called knowledge society (cf. Zajda et al. 2008; Novelli and Altinyelken 2012; Meyer and Benavot 2013; Zajda 2015; Zajda and Rust 2015; Lingard et al. 2015).

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International comparison is thus regularly used to break up apparently too rigid or obsolete local structures within educational systems and to create greater transparency, accountability, flexibility and competitiveness (all classic ideologemes of neoliberalism). The aim is to prevent or maybe reverse the culturally and financially disastrous losses to educational investment through so-called brain drain. The pressure on education systems under these conditions of competition and free market ideology as well as fashionable notions like for example ‘transferable skills’, which are aimed at streamlining and adjusting national workforces with regard to global employability and mobility, in my view, already constitute a context which one might wish to call ‘posthumanist’. The posthumanist school and university, in this rather reductive economic sense, together with the accelerating and intensifying digitalization and ubiquity of (new) media technologies, therefore, in a sense, are heavily implicated in and are affected by the ongoing process of ‘posthumanization’.

Already in 1996, Bill Readings’s *The University in Ruins* provided a critique of the neoliberalization of the university. Readings’s debunking of the vacuity of neoliberal ideologemes like ‘excellence’, however, was not enough to prevent the further managerialization and the global reach of the ‘corporate university’. In fact, similar trends have been spreading throughout the entire education system ever since, so that the traditional and fundamental link between humanism and education, for better or for worse, has become much more tentative. If universities all over the world are anxious to invest ever more money in marketing to improve their ranking and to attract lucrative international students and establish satellite institutions all over the world, as well as setting up distance learning environments, this is happening in the form of a repackaging of the (humanist) notion of education as ‘knowledge transfer’, with a view to the proclaimed advent of a global ‘information society’. At the same time, mobility, transparency, flexibility and multiliteracy are used to sell an entirely instrumentalized form of education as individual investment and as ‘lifelong learning’ to the global constituency of ‘customers’. This means that the previous humanist consensus that education most importantly serves to help develop some idea of ‘personality’ has almost entirely disappeared.

This is the historical context in which the phrase ‘posthumanist education’, in my view, now has to be placed. In my *Posthumanism: A Critical Analysis* (2013; German edition 2009), I introduced some differentiations which I believe are still helpful to understand the emergence and the development of the *discourse* of posthumanism. A distinction should be made between “posthuman” and “posthumanist”, in which *posthuman* refers to a more or less fictitious *figure*, usually represented as either a spectre, a desirable ideal or simply human destiny (cf. also Braidotti 2013); while *posthumanist* refers to something like a current task, namely a questioning or an ongoing deconstruction of the entire intellectual *tradition* and the *set of values* that humanism is based on (cf. Badmington 2000). Posthumanism, in sum, therefore works like a discourse, with its own posthuman objects and its construction of a new social reality. Within this discourse, one should further differentiate between a variety of positions with regard to the changing nature of social reality (i.e. a variety of *posthumanisms*): namely a popular posthumanism and a critical

posthumanism, on the one hand, as well as a posthumanism ‘with’ and ‘without’ technology, on the other hand. Popular posthumanism is based on the idea of present or future transformation of humans into ‘posthumans’ and can be seen at work in a number of popular science magazines, television debates, YouTube videos and ubiquitous science fiction scenarios (all of which are increasingly merging into what might be called a new ‘cultural imaginary’). *Critical* posthumanism means above all a questioning of the current ambient ideas and trends with regard to the process of ‘posthumanization’, especially its motivations and ideological presuppositions. Critical posthumanism thus provides a kind of ‘psychoanalytic’ reading of current desires and fears of human transformation and self-understanding. It understands the prefix “post” as a symptom of a usually repressed lack of meaning at the core of the human (cf. Herbrechter and Callus 2008). The commonsensical understanding of posthumanism, however, focuses on technological change. This posthumanism “with” technology usually constitutes an approach based on the idea of an autonomy or autopoiesis of technological development, while a posthumanism “without” technology is of course not literally to be seen as “luddite”, but intends to divert the emphasis of the discussion away from technocentrism and technological determinism towards a more general anthropological (and postanthropological) trajectory (cf. Herbrechter and Callus 2007).

Another clarification with regard to the meaning of critical posthumanism concerns the historical dynamic of all things posthuman. More specifically, critical posthumanism problematizes the prefix ‘post-’ – in analogy with Jean-François Lyotard’s notion of the ‘post-’ in ‘postmodern’ – in the sense that it questions the very possibility of overcoming or transcending a humanist world picture. In this sense, posthumanism is clearly distinguished from transhumanism. As the prefix ‘trans-’ indicates, transhumanists like Hans Moravec, Vernon Vinge or Nick Bostrom argue for a transcendence of the human as such – a kind of transformation of humans into something else (i.e. into a new species, superhumans, artificial intelligence). Popular posthumanism often plays with such transhumanist scenarios. In its critical variety, however, posthumanism places the emphasis on a re-evaluation of humanist tradition and refers back to *proto*-posthumanist approaches, which already exist in various humanist traditions and antihumanist stances. It is therefore necessary to be aware of existing posthumanizing tendencies within humanism itself (and their critique) in order to keep a critical handle on the actual potential of and resistance to the excesses of current posthumanization processes and scenarios.

## Posthumanism and Pedagogy

The academic debate about posthumanism from the start has had an important educational component, even though this might have remained somewhat in the background until more recently. The first academic use of the term, in 1977, by the American literary and cultural theorist Ihab Hassan, occurred in the context and the



genre of what he called a ‘university masque’. With regard to what Hassan refers to a nascent posthumanism in the university he says:

There is nothing supernatural in the process leading us to a posthumanist culture. That process depends mainly on the growing intrusion of the human mind into nature and history, on the dematerialization of life and the conceptualization of existence. (Hassan 1977: 835)

And he continues:

At present, posthumanism may appear variously as a dubious neologism, the latest slogan, or simply another image of man’s recurrent self-hate. Yet posthumanism may also hint at a potential in our culture, hint at a tendency struggling to become more than a trend... We need ... to understand that the human form – including human desire and all its external representations – may be changing radically, and thus must be re-visioned. We need to understand that five hundred years of humanism may be coming to end, as humanism transforms itself into something that we must helplessly call posthumanism. (843)

The essential link between education and humanism lies in education’s historical aim of preparing children for majority (*Mündigkeit*; cf. Adorno 1971). And it is by no means a surprise that there are many current attempts to defend humanist objectives within education especially in the face of humanism’s demise (see for example Nussbaum 1997; Nida-Rümelin 2013). However, what seems to be irreversibly broken is the previous social and cultural consensus about humanist ideals and values – even though it has become increasingly obvious that these were in fact never as universalist or universalizable as they were made out to be. Humanism’s ambition to be universal in reach, based on the essentialist notion of a common *human nature*, was in fact always underwritten by a very specific *normativity* (i.e. white, male, European, cosmopolitan, enlightened, rational). It is precisely this universalist norm that has become contested and untenable, or has simply lost its implied addressee and thus its appeal, in the age of global migration, multiculturalism and radical pluralism of values. From a sociocultural point of view, posthumanism emerges precisely out of this (postmodern) discussion about pluralism, but, crucially, adds another component to it. This component is based, on the one hand, on technological development, and, on the other hand, on environmental change. Both developments lead to, what might be called, the emergence of a *postanthropocentric* world picture, as can be seen in the idea that humans are, from now on (but, in retrospect, have always been) only one group of actors among many other nonhuman forms of agency. Although this has always been the case, the spreading awareness that humans and ‘their’ environment (humans and nonhuman animals, humans and machines, objects, etc.) form units and are in fact *networked* is relatively new. When taken seriously, this has far-reaching consequences for ‘our’ current and future human self-understanding and thus, of course, for the education of future generations.

This is not to say that the current turn towards the posthuman and posthumanism within the theory and philosophy of education is without precedent. There have been previous attempts – mainly following the poststructuralist ‘ends of man’ or ‘death of the subject’ debate, on the one hand, and Donna Haraway’s ‘cyborg

manifesto', on the other hand – to engage with the new figure of the posthuman (without addressing the full implications of posthumanism as such, however). The poststructuralist-deconstructive route is maybe best represented in the interventions by Gert Biesta, while the cyborg-route was pioneered in Noel Gough's and John Weaver's work. However, only now are there volumes or collections appearing that provide an overview of the wider implications of posthumanism for educational theory and practice. The earliest strategic use of posthumanism in relation to educational theory is probably by William Spanos in his *The End of Education: Toward Posthumanism* (1993), whose starting point is the poststructuralist critique of the ideology of 'disinterestedness' that underlies the discourse of humanist education. In a similar vein, Biesta, in 'Pedagogy Without Humanism; Foucault and the Subject of Education' (1998), builds on the poststructuralist critique of the liberal humanist subject and the ends of man debate (cf. Derrida 1982; Jean-Luc Nancy and Philippe Lacoue-Labarthe 1981) as an attack on the "manipulative" character of humanist pedagogy (see also Biesta 2006). This philosophical trajectory based on a critique of power and a deconstruction of the liberal humanist subject is supplemented in the work of a number of other education theorists with a discussion of the social implications of "cyborgization" as introduced by Donna Haraway in the mid-1980s (cf. Haraway 1991). As early as 1995, Noel Gough, in 'Manifesting Cyborgs in Curriculum Enquiry' (1995) proposed to use the figure of the cyborg and the genre of science fiction as a way of opening up new forms of narrativization for science teaching – an approach which in later publications he supplemented with a turn to actor-network-theory, or ANT (see Gough 2004). This line of argument is also taken up by John Weaver in *Educating the Posthuman: Biosciences, Fiction, and Curriculum Studies* (2010), which calls for an engagement with posthumanism and the challenges posed to the idea of human nature by biotechnology and the new biosciences. In line with the erosion of human exceptionalism and the acknowledgement of nonhuman forms of agency, there are also more recent attempts to rethink education from other theoretical positions, which, nevertheless, may be subsumed under the label posthumanism, namely *new feminist materialism*, the already mentioned actor-network-theory (cf. Fenwick and Edwards 2010; 2011) and object-oriented-ontology (cf. Snaza and Weaver 2015).

In a special issue of *Gender and Education* (2013) on 'Material feminisms: new directions for education', the editors explain that:

The radical shifts occurring across the social sciences make this an exciting time for educational research. New material feminisms, post-humanism, actor network theory, complexity theory, science and technology studies, material culture studies and Deleuzian philosophy name just some of the main strands that call us to reappraise what counts as knowledge and to re-examine the purpose of education. Together these strands shift the focus away from individualized acts of cognition and encourage us to view education in terms of change, flows, mobilities, multiplicities, assemblages, materialities and processes. (Taylor and Vinson 2013: 665)

Two other recent publications are worth mentioning here to show the extent to which the discussion about posthumanism has entered educational and curriculum theory. In *Education out of Bounds: Reimagining Cultural Studies for a Posthuman*

*Age* (2010), Tyson Lewis and Richard Kahn argue for what they call “exopedagogy” – i.e. a pedagogy that goes beyond the “bounds” of anthropomorphism and which takes into account the entire “bestiary” of “posthuman (zoomorphic) monsters” (10ff). Similarly, and most recently, *Posthumanism and Educational Research*, edited by Nathan Snaza and John Weaver (2015), starts from the premise: “What would a world be that did not insist on human superiority or dominance and that did not disavow the human’s ecological entanglements?” (3; see also Snaza et al. 2014).

In the following, I propose to briefly discuss some of these different positions, spell out the stakes and implications of the phrase ‘posthumanist education’ and relate them to a few curricular aspects. I begin with a discussion of comments made by Peter Sloterdijk – whose importance for education theory in my view has not been sufficiently recognized. I am referring especially to the controversy surrounding his so-called Elmau Speech which takes as its starting point the current crisis of human “technologies of domestication” (*Zähmungstechniken*).

## Humanism as a Technology of Domestication

In recent years Peter Sloterdijk’s work has increasingly relied on the term “anthropotechnics” (cf. Sloterdijk 2009). In his ‘Response to Heidegger’s “Letter on Humanism”’ (the subtitle to his Elmau speech, entitled ‘Rules for the Human Zoo’), Sloterdijk recalls Heidegger’s critique of humanist metaphysics. Heidegger chastises humanism’s *Seinsvergessenheit* (forgetting of being) in the face of the modern technological challenge. Consequently, Sloterdijk puts forward his own technical or rather media-technological definition of humanism, which he understands as “telecommunication in the medium of print to underwrite friendship” (Sloterdijk 1999: 12) and as a “chain letter through the generations” (12), whose underlying “communitarian fantasy” of “participation through reading the canon reveals a common love of inspiring messages” (13). At the heart of this media technological illusion lies “a cult or club fantasy: the dream of the portentous solidarity of those who have been chosen to be allowed to read” (13). However, this ‘reading nation’ has been thrown into a deep crisis by the processes of globalization and digitalization. Sloterdijk describes the resulting squeeze in these words:

If this period [i.e. humanism] seems today to have irredeemably vanished, it is not because people have through decadence become unwilling to follow their national literary curriculum. The epoch of nationalistic humanism has come to an end because the art of writing love-inspiring letters to a nation of friends, however professionally it is practiced, is no longer sufficient to form a telecommunicative bond between members of a modern mass society. (14)

The disintegration of the humanist (phatic) bond is accompanied by growing fears that humanism actually might always have been relying on somewhat negative values as its main motivation, namely on the fear of a people governed by natural *Verwilderungstendenzen* [“a tendency towards the bestialization of humanity” (15)]. Basically, humanism understands itself as a melioristic antidote to humans’ inherent

barbarity: “Anyone who is asking today about the future of humanity and about the methods of humanization wants to know if there is any hope of mastering the contemporary tendency towards the bestialization of humanity” (15). Humanist education based on reading therefore amounts to what Sloterdijk calls *Zähmungstechnik* [technology of domestication], which is supposed to immunize humans against the spectre of the “unconstrained homo inhumanus” (15).

From this rather provocative analysis Sloterdijk draws two conclusions, which, in my view, have profound effects on any posthumanist educational programme. Behind the opposition between humanism and posthumanism and their respective fantasies or desires, according to Sloterdijk, lies the question of “anthropodicy” – that is “a characterization of man with respect to his biological indeterminacy and his moral ambivalence” (16). This implies the view that humanism is basically a specific media technological communication model, and that it is precisely the technical inadequacy of this model which has provoked the current crisis: “Above all... from now on the question of how a person can become a true or real human being becomes unavoidably a media question, if we understand by media the means of communion and communication by which human beings attain to that which they can and will become” (16). What is at stake in a move towards a posthumanist notion of education relies therefore on a return to the ‘underdetermination’ of the human – the openness and ambivalence of the human – while the specific pedagogical challenge lies in a fundamental change of media technologies. The pedagogical question that arises out of Sloterdijk’s analysis is: how does one prepare humans today, i.e. in the age of biopolitics, new media, digitalization and climate change, for the enormous and planetary challenges that lie ahead?

Sloterdijk understands the contemporary crisis of (European) national bourgeois humanism as an opportunity for a (transhumanist) thinking to emerge, where Heidegger’s critique, as well as that of a number of poststructuralist thinkers, such as Derrida, Lyotard, Foucault, Lacan, may be giving birth to new posthumanist schools of thought. What distinguishes these emerging posthumanisms from the earlier Heideggerian and poststructuralist critiques of humanism is, on the one hand, the reopening of the question of technology (in following but also going beyond Heidegger, especially as far as interdisciplinary approaches negotiating between the sciences and the humanities are concerned), and, on the other hand, the overcoming of Heideggerian or even Foucauldian anthropocentrism that remains inscribed in even the most radical antihumanist critique. Once humans begin to take the notion of postanthropocentrism seriously, fundamental ontological, ethical and environmental questions necessarily arise – questions that must inevitably affect any future-oriented pedagogy. For Sloterdijk, this epochal question should be articulated as follows:

What can tame man, when the role of humanism as the school for humanity has collapsed? What can tame men, when their previous attempts at self-taming have led primarily to power struggles? What can tame men, when, after all previous experiments to grow the species up, it remains unclear what it is to be a grown-up? Or is it simply no longer possible to pose the question of the constraint and formation of mankind by theories of civilizing and upbringing? (Sloterdijk 1999: 20)

In answer to the last question, Sloterdijk, conscious of writing in a time of what might be called (following Agamben, in his rereading of Foucault) the age of generalized “biopolitics” (cf. Agamben 1998), proposes a rethinking of a humanist *Zähmungsgeschichte* [history of taming] as a history of ‘breeding’ (Sloterdijk here alludes to the return of eugenics as a result of biotechnological advances).

Globalization, digitization and biotechnology in the process of a complex media-technological convergence produce an emergence of humans from their previous humanist state of ‘self-domestication’ and lead to a post- (or maybe trans-) humanist form of ‘self-cultivation’:

With the thesis of men as breeders of men, the humanistic horizons have been pried apart, so that the humanist can no longer only think, but can move on to questions of taming and nurture. The humanist directs himself to the human, and applies to him his taming, training, educational tools, convinced, as he is, of the necessary connection between reading, sitting, and taming. (Sloterdijk 1999: 22)

Posthumanist educationalists would thus necessarily have to start by questioning not only existing humanist taming technologies and adapt them for ‘our’ time, but they would equally have to query the very idea or necessity of and motivation for ‘taming’ as such. However, if Sloterdijk’s analysis is correct, would the very possibility of pedagogical thinking and pedagogical reason not break down altogether? Which minimal consensus about values, what minimal notion of humanity and which minimal idea of education for humans could still be established or presupposed, once the idea of ‘self-cultivation’ through educational reproduction was abandoned? Is the phrase ‘posthumanist education’, in this sense, not a contradiction in terms?

The current “intellectual discomfort in the human zoo” (Sloterdijk 1999: 25) – the (theme) park-like conditions that Sloterdijk refers to as the anthropotechnological “spheres” that humans have been creating to protect themselves and which allow for their “hominization” in the first place – demands a posthumanist thinking in the face of a “zoo-political task” (25). Interestingly, in his interpretation of the crisis of humanism Sloterdijk, almost instinctively, returns to the very beginning of European humanist thought – Plato – and explains that:

Plato’s dangerous sense for dangerous ideas finds the blind spot of all high culture pedagogies and politics – in particular, his admission of the actual inequality of people before the knowledge that power gives. (25; translation modified)

What transpires here, however, is that Sloterdijk turns out to be not so radical a thinker of a progressive posthumanist project for a transformed democratic education, after all, but someone who remains profoundly caught up, rather like Heidegger, in a feeling of late humanist frustration. He seems to place himself, somewhat nostalgically, in the position of a (reluctant) observer of the current ‘archiving’ process of the humanist tradition. It is this nostalgic tone which in the end poses the greatest challenge for a *critical* posthumanism whose aim must be the development of a *positive* educational programme, without this kind of *ressentiment*:

Everything suggests that archivists have become the successors of the humanists. For the few who still peer around in those archives, the realization is dawning that our lives are the confused answer to questions which were asked in places we have forgotten. (27)

A cynic might be tempted to say Sloterdijk has thus replied to Heidegger's letter in a somewhat melodramatic fashion. Despite its critical disguise, however, this reply has simply performed a continuation of the humanist trajectory while invoking its end. The letter, in this sense, has not failed to arrive at its destination. However, taking Sloterdijk's own analysis seriously, one would have to write very different kinds of 'letters' – on other media platforms, for example. The question would be to what extent these would still afford letter writing. Rhetorical and stylistic consequences necessarily would arise and the very idea of a correspondence would be challenged. It is this new (media) situation which constitutes one of the main starting points for a *critical* posthumanist education – namely the move from literacy to what might be called *mediacy*.

### ***Critical* Posthumanist Education**

So can there be a posthumanist education at all? This is where I need to come back to the meaning of the term *critical* in the phrase 'critical posthumanism'. One reaction to Sloterdijk's reply to Heidegger would thus need to be performative, so to speak. The humanist founding and legitimating gesture of writing letters – a gesture on which 'men' and 'republics of letters' have been relying and to which they cannot stop 'replying' (which of course includes my own humble response here) – always presupposes a certain ideal of literacy at the core of any humanist understanding of education. Given the requirement of this most important of humanist technological *dispositifs* – i.e. literacy – how would a *critical* posthumanist education look in terms of curriculum (if, indeed, the notion of curriculum can escape its posthumanist deconstruction)? If we follow the logic of postanthropocentrism I outlined above, a focus on proliferating environmental issues including ethical, political as well as epistemological aspects seems to suggest itself. In the remaining part of this section I would like to briefly turn to each of these aspects (i.e. ethical, political and epistemological).

We can assume that the crisis humanist education finds itself in has been caused by changes both to the (humanist) system as well as to the (humanist) subject that supported this system and in turn was supported by it. In terms of the system, this crisis has been exacerbated by neoliberal globalization and the resulting global competition in educational standards. In terms of the subject, new media technologies have led to a change in the fundamental self-understanding of humans as well as to new forms of subject positionings or interpellations (to extend Louis Althusser's term). How would a critical posthumanist pedagogy support, as well as provide possibilities for a critique of, these emerging new subjectivities and thus enable them to critically and creatively address their new systemic environments. This requires, in my view, an ethical-ecological, a political-technological and an epistemological-cognitive conceptualization, which need to be associated with their respective appropriate learning contents. To recapitulate, this move is based on the understanding of the 'post-' in 'posthumanism' not as a displacement, an overcoming of or a

detachment from the humanist tradition, but as a critical reappropriation, a per-laboration or rewriting of it.

In the biotechnological age and the time of generalized biopolitics, a posthumanist and postanthropocentric ethics must, by definition, be 'organic', in the sense that it should be concerned with life, its affirmation and its survival. A posthumanist ethics is therefore, on the one hand, characterized by the awareness of human-induced climate change with its global impact on the geosphere, biodiversity, resource extraction and the associated problems of sustainability (cf. the emerging geological debate around the Anthropocene (see for example Clark 2015; Malone et al. 2017)). This aspect is so central – a question of survival, not only for the human species, but for the entire life-supporting environment with its nonhuman actors (animals, plants, machines, objects, etc.) – that ecology is in fact becoming the new core educational subject. Instead of being just a new subject, however, ecology functions more like a complex of ideas that informs every teaching practice and curriculum, in any school or university from the very outset. Whether natural sciences, social sciences or humanities, at the beginning of any subject-specific training there has to be an engagement with postanthropocentric questionings designed to develop an environmental consciousness. For the humanities in particular, this means a shift towards teaching the history of hominization from a postanthropocentric standpoint that also addresses and critically evaluates the idea of human exceptionalism and incorporates a focus on environmental entanglement as well as the importance of nonhuman forms of agency.

One step in this direction would be creating a responsiveness to the work that has emerged out of (critical) animal studies, and which would address and reverse the literal disappearance of animals from human-centred environments throughout modernity (with the exception of some selected companion species, zoos, nature television programmes and, of course, ever-increasing meat consumption). The affective changes that the *deanimalization* (both material and psycho-social) and the segregation of human and nonhuman environments have produced throughout modernity need to be critically addressed and if possible reversed, to create a human self-image that recognizes the entanglement of human and nonhuman animality at both a material (embodiment) and ethical-ecological level (biodiversity as an intrinsic good). As long as animals are primarily seen and dealt with as goods and industrial products, the process of human denaturation cannot even begin to be taught appropriately. The technophantasm of a complete separation between spirit and matter, as promised by transhumanists for example (which merely continues in the tradition of two millennia of Christianity and dualist metaphysics), will have to be detracted and its cruelty and exclusionary character exposed as part of a long history of the displacement of physicality and the devastating effects this has had on our fellow animals as well as on our human self-image. An ethical-ecological education therefore has to critically respond to the positive *and* negative aspects of posthumanization, especially with regard to issues of sustainability, redistribution and social justice, in which the interest of humans may not automatically be considered as a priori central. As an example, let me refer at this point to the extremely



valuable work by Helena Pedersen which engages with educational theory and animals in the classroom (Pedersen 2010a).

The presence of nonhuman animals in education, according to Pedersen, “makes visible the coercive and exclusionary implications” of current education policy, and “requires education to seriously scrutinize its own embeddedness in reproductive practices and thought patterns and take effective measures toward its transformation” (Pedersen 2010b: 693). The benefit of engaging with posthumanist theory, for Pedersen, lies in the fact that it “complicates many assumptions surrounding the relations between education and democracy and provides new perspectives on the notion of ‘voice’ in a context where individual and collective voices of disadvantaged or subordinate groups (human or animal) are marginalized or silenced” (687). In this context, the decisive challenge that posthumanism poses is: “What would it mean for democracy education to respond to the ‘voices’ and lived experiences of nonhuman animals?” (ibid.). Posthumanist approaches to animals in education, on the other hand, should address the implications for formal education if approached as a web of socio-material relations where humans, animals, scientific knowledge, technologies and artefacts interact under shared conditions in a biosocial space (cf. Pedersen 2015). Practically, for a truly posthumanist education this means that the constitutive speciesism at work in existing pedagogy does not only have to be addressed as such but would need to be actively undone, deconstructed, in order to jam, so to speak, what Agamben (1998) refers to as “the anthropological machine”. This alone would begin to tackle humanist education’s implication within the (re)production of human self-understanding based on exceptionalism (cf. also Pedersen 2010c).

In connection with this ecological trajectory of postanthropocentrism the question of the distribution of and access to resources – material, biological, as well as cognitive and media technological – also needs rearticulation. This entails the second aspect, namely the political-technological dimension of any posthumanist pedagogy worthy of its name. For our current situation, this means a reorientation not only as far as the accessibility of the latest technologies are concerned (for the purpose of communication, commerce, mobility, health, leisure), but it requires a kind of second ecological shift towards postanthropocentrism with its new understanding of humans and nonhumans in relation to an emerging global media technological environment. The most advanced approach in this respect, in my view, can be found in Bernard Stiegler’s work (1998, 2016), in which he refers to the “originary technicality” of the human (not unsimilar to Sloterdijk’s “anthropotechnics”), and in which he insists on the co-evolution of humans and technology.

The question of technology – as it was so insistently formulated by Heidegger – today returns with a vengeance and with increased urgency (i.e. in the context of global bio-media-politics). It returns as the increasingly urgent question of human self-understanding, in the face of ever greater disappearance and ambient extinction threats. So, while all human being is ‘technical’ (Stiegler) – in the sense that it was the technical supplement or prosthesis that made us human in the first place, and that, today, in the ‘fourth age of technology’, promises to make us posthuman – the ‘essence’ of technology is still nothing technical but instead stubbornly remains ‘poietic’ (i.e. transformative, creative, ‘challenging forth’). It is important, however,

when speaking of technology, technicity or the technical not to forget the processes of mediation which is their *raison d'être*. It is more than plausible that early techniques developed in the Stone Age may have started the hominizing process. The techniques that have been developed since then through trial and error and steady perfecting, however, beyond their simple instrumental character have had an ontological and medial side effect: ontological, in terms of developing a specific human self-understanding (e.g. in the sense of a modern *homo faber*) and medial, in that they allow the development of externalized media of communication. Marshall McLuhan (1994) referred to this media-technological understanding of technicity as 'extensions of man'. However, as indicated above, even though technicity and mediality might overlap, they are not quite identical. During the course of modernity the relationship between technicity and mediality, for example can be said to have 'flipped'. The development of technics and technology is basically congruent with the development of modernity – namely with industrialization, rationalization and globalization. Three aspects that play a special role in this process are language, culture and embodiment, which thus render an identification of this process with technicity problematic and instead are better understood as changes in mediality.

This is even more relevant since, for Stiegler (following Heidegger), "*every technical object is pharmacological: it is both poison and remedy at the same time*" (Stiegler 2013: 421). A 'pharmacology' (e.g. the understanding of what Stiegler refers to as '*épistémè numérique* [the episteme of the digital]' as *pharmakon*) thus involves a critical analysis of the socio-political use of technologies in view of their fundamental ambiguity (as remedy, poison, scapegoat and, as I would add, as *media*). The digital, for Stiegler, is precisely such a challenge which concerns "la vie de l'esprit" [the life of the mind], which is essentially based on "exteriorization", that is to say, on "the conditions of its expression, which are also those of its impressions" (Stiegler 2014: 14): "we claim that digital evolution of technical exteriority and the processes of interiorization that it produces in return constitute a new age of the mind, a new mind that would be made possible by this new form of writing that we believe the digital to be, and which forces us to rethink the mind itself in its totality" (14; my translation). This digital (r)evolution and the constitution of a "knowledge society", according to Julien Gautier and Guillaume Vergne, "with their promises and above all, for the moment, with their dangers, put the educational system into a new central and at the same time problematic situation":

In particular, the new technologies whose development oscillates between stultifying mass industry and unprecedented democratization of access to knowledge, seem to spell the end of a school whose aims seem to have become obsolete and whose methods are deemed archaic. However, does a solid formation of judgment and of culture not appear so much more primordial since we have entered an age that leaves us more and more to our own devices, with our minds weighed down by a constant flow of information and incessant solicitations. (Gautier and Vergne, in Kambouchner et al. 2012: 13–14; my translation)

The question of what teaching might mean in the digital age, for Stiegler, is the question of education's 'pharmacological' desire to '*prendre soin*' [take care] of the mind, to control and form the mind's capacity for attention and taste. This means that it is essential to address the "toxic" effects of digital technologies and to place

them within the service of a “knowledge society” and exploit their potential of new forms of “transindividuation” for positive political ends (Gilbert Simondon’s term, see Gautier and Vergne 2012: 17).

It follows, therefore, that the third aspect of a posthumanist pedagogy is aimed at the development of a new aesthetic. This includes the above-mentioned ethical-ecological and political-technological aspects. It arises out of the changing forms of mediality and the new methodological issues raised by them. As indicated, Sloterdijk’s insistence on the centrality of changing media, through digitalization and globalization, from a literary to a posthumanist, i.e. post-literary, value system, does not necessarily lead to nostalgia or a sense of loss, but may as well constitute a chance or even a necessity. This is, for example, Michel Serres’ attitude in *Petite Poucette* (2012). In this short educational treatise addressed to ‘Thumbelina’ – the name he gives to the generation growing up with the new haptic environment of keyboards, screens and mobile media – Serres states that:

Without us noticing a new human was born within the brief interval that separates us from the 1970s. He or she does no longer have the same body, the same life span, no longer communicates in the same way, no longer perceives the world in the same way, no longer lives in the same nature, no longer inhabits the same space... . Since they no longer have the same head as their parents, he or she knows otherwise. (Serres 2012: 13; my translation)

For Serres, the move away from the ‘format-page’ (the format of the page but also the formatting page – of which screens are the latest but also possibly the last remainder) opens up the possibility of new forms of intelligence based on invention, which, for Serres is measured by its opposition to and distance from knowledge per se.

In the same measure as the global media system converges in new media, a new form of media literacy thus becomes a central educational demand, both for the purposes of the system itself, as well as for its critical observation and thus for a creative intervention within it. Mostly this new skill-set is still referred to as “literacy”, or as “new literacies” and “multiliteracies” (Buckingham 2003; Cope and Kalantzis 2000). The demand for new literacies for new media-technological environments, with their new forms of sociality, cooperation and participation, whether they serve to improve the use of stationary media (e.g. computer terminals), or the rapidly increasing number of mobile media (smart phones, tablets, etc.), is closely related to media convergence, i.e. the transition from mass to open and p2p media. Henri Jenkins, one of the pioneers of media convergence, was asked to translate the challenges of this new participatory media culture into a rationale for a media education for the twenty-first century. Jenkins’s intervention was designed to lead to a reorientation within the debate between traditionalists and sceptics about how a future-proof media education would have to proceed. The goal, as Jenkins writes, was to “shift the focus of the digital-divide discourse from questions of technological access to those of opportunities for participation and the development of cultural competencies and social skills needed for full involvement” (2009: xiii). To this end, Jenkins focused on:

*new media literacies*: a set of cultural competencies and social skills that young people need in the new media landscape. Participatory culture shifts the focus of literacy from individual

expression to community involvement. The new literacies almost all involve social skills developed through collaboration and networking. These skills build on the foundation of traditional literacy and research, technical, and critical-analysis skills learned in the classroom. (xiii)

What at first glance looks like a radical change in Jenkins's approach, however, is largely taken back at the end of this passage and relinked to traditional *literacies* developed through humanist educational practice. Even the pioneer of virtual reality and of the notion of virtual communities, Howard Rheingold, in his book on the subject, *Net Smart* (2012), bases his argument on an expansion of current literacies and advocates their "supplementation" by skills that optimize the usage of the internet: "attention, participation, collaboration, the critical consumption of information (aka, 'crap detection'), and network smarts" (Rheingold 2012: 5).

Thus, whether we are dealing with arguments for developing new forms of literacy (e.g. 'ludoliteracy', i.e. enhancing literacy through gaming practices and strategies) or for integrating new participatory forms of media skills into the educational programme (see e.g. 'peeragogy'), these conceptualizations all have one thing in common: they present themselves in terms of continuity with the idea of the literate. In my view, all these varieties of new literacy remain caught up in the dynamic of Sloterdijk's notion of (humanist) domestication. Even if this taming process might no longer affect humans exclusively it nevertheless remains an attempt at taming the potential for change in digital and new social media. These attempts might thus all be described as weak defences in that they stress the idea that traditional literacy skills are more in demand than ever as people move into the digital age, in which we apparently do not read less, but indeed more – even though we have less and less time for more and more reading material. Of course, this does not only have stylistic, grammatical and pragmatic effects on language use, but also on cognition and the attitude towards media more generally. These effects are fundamentally *aesthetic* in nature and concern the existing linguistic and cultural ecology more generally (think for example of the dominance of English in the emerging new social media world or the spreading of a global popular culture by global mobile media).

The positive argument that lies behind the drive towards an adequate integration of digital media within current pedagogical theory and practice (cf. Buckingham 2007) is thus merely the reverse side of the often quite grotesque attacks on the 'dumbing down' potential of new and, by implication, all screen media (a thesis that is well known at least since the advent of commercial television). The dumbing down argument usually refers back to the idea of an assault on the reading culture of humanism (cf. for example Mark Bauerlein's *The Dumbest Generation: How the Digital Age Stupefies Young Americans and Jeopardizes Our Future* (2009)).

In my view the potential benefit of a *critical* posthumanist education lies entirely elsewhere. If one takes the potential for change contained in new media and digitalization seriously (keeping in mind the context of globalization in which these new media are functioning), there are indeed high risks but also great benefits. And this is where the political task for a posthumanist education lies: namely in taking the potential seriously and thinking it through so to speak before negating or stressing any continuities. This is also the way I understand Gautier and Vergne in their

preface to Kambouchner, Meirieu and Stiegler's discussion of the "digital school", in *L'Ecole, le numérique et la société qui vient* (2012):

There is no time any more to ask ourselves whether standards are 'going down' or 'rising', nor whether we need to place the child, the teacher or knowledge at the centre of the system, nor whether we should introduce new technologies in school or not. (2012: 12; my translation)

In the face of the 'digital revolution' which leaves the new 'pharmacological' exploitation of technologies of memory ('hypomnemata'), described by Stiegler, to the economy, a posthumanist education would have to reclaim the critical and creative potential contained in new media technologies for pedagogical purposes. Some early attempts of this were already made in the 1980s, and can be found, for example in Gregory Ulmer's work, which argued for a shift from literacy to "electracy" (cf. Ulmer 1989, 2003; Holmevik 2012).

Katherine Hayles, whose *How We Became Posthuman* (1999) is usually seen as the beginning of a critical engagement with the cybernetic vision of posthumanism, in her more recent work deals with the cognitive changes and their (among other aspects, pedagogical) potential of digitalization. In *How We Think* she starts from the assumption that "we think through, with, and alongside media" (2012: 1) and shows how this has already affected the current educational programme, especially in the humanities. Her starting point corresponds to the posthumanist self-understanding and positioning laid out above: "The ability to access and retrieve information on a global scale has a significant impact on how one thinks about one's place in the world" (2). In the intensified interaction between human and computer and the new subjectivities and forms of embodiment that arise from this process, Hayles claims that we are witnessing a shift towards "extended" and "distributed cognition" (3). Consequently, she argues for establishing 'comparative media studies' as a new and central subject for schools and universities, which helps investigate the mentioned co-evolution of humans, technology and media (or, as Hayles calls it, 'technogenesis').

Even though Hayles also still relies on the metaphor of expanding *literacies* to designate new competencies, she nevertheless focuses on the cognitive changes that are produced by new forms of reading behaviour. She proposes a three-tiered system of reading: traditional (humanist) "close reading", "hyper reading" and "machine reading" (Hayles 2012: 11):

Hyper reading, which includes skimming, scanning, fragmenting, and juxtaposing texts, is a strategic response to an information-intensive environment, aiming to conserve attention by quickly identifying relevant information, so that only relatively few portions of a given text are actually read. (12)

This form of reading behaviour if formalized and pedagogically supported correlates with "hyper attention, a cognitive mode that has a low threshold for boredom, alternates quickly between different information streams, and prefers a high level of stimulation" (12). This is virtually the opposite of what is going on in 'close reading'. While "hyper attention" is often (mis)interpreted as a deficit (if not a pathology, cf. ADHS), it would be preferable for educational purposes to focus on hyper

reading as a cognitive (and possibly evolutionary) survival technique in the age of “information overload”, because “attention as a focus for inquiry opens onto a complex and urgent set of issues, including the relation of human to machine cognition and the cycles of epigenetic changes catalyzed by our increasing exposure to and engagement with digital media” (Hayles 2012: 12).

Bernard Stiegler sums up what is at stake in a more enlightened educational engagement with the ‘post-literary’ potential of new digital media and the ‘new attentional forms’ they produce (for better or for worse):

If in fact an appropriate therapeutic response to this pharmacology of attention is conceivable and able to be transindividuated, then the question would be to what degree can and even must these digital relational technologies also give birth to *new attentional forms* that pursue in a different manner the process of psychic and collective individuation underway since the beginning of grammatisation; new forms that make this network society arrive at a new stage in the individuation of this plural unity of the *logos* where the attentional forms we recognize as our culture abound? (Stiegler 2012: 8; see also Stiegler’s latest work on the very ambivalent effects of digitalization on the ideas and practices of work in an increasingly ‘automated’ society, cf. Stiegler 2015a, b and 2016)

## Conclusion

The either feared or anxiously awaited pharmacological and neuronal ‘rewiring’ of humans through digital media technology is necessarily related to changes within our human self-understanding. A critical posthumanism should of course not start from the purely ‘neurocentric’ or cognitive assumption, that this change might be fully explained by a correlation of neurological adaption and media-technological change, but instead should also emphasize the cultural, contextual and aesthetic aspects of current transformations. The main task remains to learn to critically and fairly assess the potential for change in order to draw the right conclusions for post-humanist education policy. As Hayles proposes:

The trouble, as I see it, lies not in hyper attention and hyper reading as examined but rather in the challenges the situation presents for parents and educators to ensure that deep attention and close reading continue to be vibrant components of our reading cultures and interact synergistically with the kind of web and hyper reading in which our young people are increasingly immersed. (2012: 69)

But what if it is exactly this rational attitude of compromise that is stopping us from seeing and understanding the true transformational (i.e. critical-creative) potential of the digital, and what if it was exactly this critical-creative potential that was needed to solve the massively complex and entangled problems that our future and the survival of the planet hold? One cannot help but think that it might be our inveterate humanist reflexes themselves that have led us into the current situation, and that it could be precisely the concealed, posthumanist, potential of an entirely other form of reason, hiding behind the dynamics of new media technology, that we need to do justice to if we want to even begin to tackle the entirely new form and



dimension that future crises may have. Herein lies, in my opinion, the urgency of the posthumanist challenge to rethinking education – namely, in developing a new impartiality outside anthropocentrism, wary of our most strongly and invisibly ingrained humanist reflexes.

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**Section III**  
**Revisiting Enduring Debates**  
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# Introduction: Section 3 – Revisiting Enduring Educational Debates



Ann Chinnery, Naomi Hodgson, and Viktor Johansson

Debate is arguably a central aspect of philosophy. There are a number of topics, however, on which the weighing of argument and counter-argument does not reach a final conclusion, but only a temporary settlement before the issue raises itself again. Understanding the historical development of such debates in philosophy of education is crucial to an appreciation of contemporary discussions in the field of education more broadly. They are debates that seem to have been always there and that continue to challenge new developments. Each chapter in Section 3, Revisiting Enduring Educational Debates, situates the debate related to a particular topic, considers its relevance, and highlights how it continues to influence educational theory and practice today.

Each author for this section, invited to contribute based on their expertise in the topic, explores a range of positions on and approaches to the topic to draw out potential points of tension between them. Readers will thus not only be able to locate themselves within the international debates, but also be invited to consider future directions for study in these areas. The chapters in this section vary in both tone and scope, but each includes the following aspects:

- Emergence of the topic as an educational concern
- Historical changes in framing/addressing the topic as an educational concern

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- International dimensions
- Predominant approaches to understanding the topic within philosophy of education
- Key points of recurrent debate on the topic in philosophy of education
- Current state of the debate

When read together, the chapters can be seen as exploring three broad subthemes: (a) the politics of education and the educated citizen; (b) education and human being; and (c) knowledge and the curriculum. Introducing the chapters through the lens of these subthemes demonstrates the contribution of philosophy of education to these enduring educational debates.

Philosophy of education has always developed in response to a particular, concrete political reality. The philosophy of Socrates, Plato, and Aristotle, for example, engaged in various ways with educational aspects of the political problems of their day, but the questions they raised recur today in response to our own sociopolitical conditions. Perhaps the most obvious example of such an enduring debate is on the relationship between citizenship and education. This is reflected in Quentin Wheeler-Bell's chapter on democracy and education. The chapter shows how rich and complex educational articulations of political concepts can be, and how demanding it can be to approach them through this lens, for both philosophers of education and educators. Penny Enslin and Mary Tjiattas take up the concept of citizenship directly in their chapter, in which they discuss the different notions of citizenship education that have been informed, variously, by liberalism and republicanism, and show how philosophers today discuss it in relation to nationalism and patriotism. These issues recur in the chapter 'Refugees, Statelessness, and Education' by Niclas Månsson. He shows how philosophers have addressed transnational immigration as an issue in education by appeals to various conceptions of citizenship. This overlooks, he argues, the existential dimension of the condition of refugees, which raises it as an educational-philosophical matter rather than just an issue for education. Also challenging the language in which we conceive of the relationship between politics and education, Chris Higgins shows how conceptions of the private and the public in education have been debated since Plato in response to the conditions of the time. Higgins relates this to the idea of the common school to show that the school that has emerged in actuality serves neither the public nor private exclusively.

Education philosophers' analyses of their conditions have often led to the creation of new concepts that become matters of further debate and thus issues in themselves. This becomes clear in Claudia Schumann's chapter on cosmopolitanism and globalization, in which she shows how different notions of cosmopolitanism respond to various understandings of the 'globalized world'. We see how cosmopolitanism itself becomes an educational concept to which philosophy responds. Similarly, multiculturalism has been subject to various philosophical and political treatments, and is a recurrent issue for philosophy of education, in part due to shifts in the way we think about diversity. Reflecting on personal experiences, Judith Suissa draws out historical shifts in how we have conceived issues of diversity

in education, and how philosophical reflections on multiculturalism have become a challenge for philosophy of education.

Another example of an educational and political issue giving rise to a particular conceptualization, which then becomes an object of scrutiny in philosophy of education itself, is found in Sheron Fraser-Burgess' chapter on identity politics and belonging. Here, questions of belonging, initially raised regarding persons with disabilities, have been conceptualized and taken up in political and educational practice in terms of a 'politics of belonging', a term that itself is now problematized. Fraser-Burgess shows how the development of new conceptualizations of political issues in education gives rise to further forms of educational thought and practice. Not all of the topics addressed have as long a history as these, however; some are the result of more recent shifts in politics, ideologies, and societal structures. Ian Munday's chapter on performance and performativity treats one such, relatively recent yet prominent, development. As in many of the other debates, the very terms 'performance' and 'performativity' are highly contested. As Munday argues, this has not only led to a variety of philosophical positions in relation to the issues, but also to confusion about the meaning of the terms and how they are used. These chapters demonstrate how philosophy of education not only struggles with challenging issues, but also has the potential to clarify both what is at stake and the great variety of meanings involved in using the same terms, especially when those terms are contested.

As seen in relation to the long history of debates on the relationship between politics and education, questions of what it means to live a good life, and what it means to be human, endure and recur in philosophy (of education), taking on greater urgency in the face of political, economic, and social change. A number of chapters take up questions of education and human being and address the ways that the object of these enduring debates has changed and the shape they take today, from both normative and more descriptive, phenomenological perspectives.

The concept of *Bildung* has been central to humanist educational philosophy and theory. Heikki A. Kovalainen recounts its history, and its resonance in different linguistic contexts, and asks whether this rich conception of education is compatible with educational assessment as we understand and practice it today. Drawing on philosophical sources and a practical example from Finland, Kovalainen challenges the assumption that *Bildung* and assessment are antithetical. The tension between rich conceptions of education and human flourishing and the constraints imposed by the societies and systems in which we are raised and educated is encapsulated in the 'nature-nurture' debate. Koichiro Misawa surveys the emergence of this debate in a late nineteenth century Anglo-American natural-scientific conception of nature. He shows, however, that this tension as a focus of educational-philosophical thought can be traced back at least to Ancient Greece. Drawing on Aristotle and John McDowell, Misawa highlights the false dichotomy of the nature-nurture debate in the idea of 'second nature': although we acquire particular traits and virtues through 'nurture'/culture, these become natural to us. Beginning again with Aristotle, Johan Dahlbeck takes up a different register of human nature in his consideration of the current emphasis on character in education. Dahlbeck considers the Western

tradition of virtue ethics and how it shapes the understanding of free will in contemporary character education before positing a Spinozan alternative to the current Aristotelian/Kantian rendering.

The enduring concern with *Bildung* and character and virtues education reflects a general human concern with ‘well-being’. As Doret de Ruyter states, whether understood as the subjective positive evaluation of one’s life or a conception of what it means to be an educated person, well-being is a concern of most educational theories. De Ruyter provides an overview of different conceptions of well-being and the normative claims they make about how educators can best enhance the well-being of children. Educational theory and practice concerning well-being and character education draw increasingly on psychological frameworks, however, and there is a danger that this overlooks the philosophical aspects of these areas of human life. Liz Jackson, in her chapter on care and justice, draws out these aspects, referring not only to accounts of ethics in the Western tradition – from liberal framings of justice that give little or no space to emotion, to care theories that afford it a more central role – but also to approaches in the Eastern tradition that intersect with and challenge them. In debates concerning educational justice ‘capability’ has been a highly influential concept. Ashley Taylor’s chapter considers both its most familiar form, in Capability Theory, and its broader philosophical treatment.

Educational debates around injustice and inequality – concerning race, sexuality, gender, religion – are perhaps more commonly found in sociology. The frameworks according to which such research is undertaken, however, often go unquestioned. Carrie Paechter addresses this in her chapter on gender. She raises issues with the unquestioned adoption of the thought of Judith Butler – developed with a focus on adult sexuality as a condition of political participation – in research regarding children’s identity. In addition to the pertinence of the topic itself, the chapter is an important reminder that our theories are as much a construction as any form of knowledge or identity. We must remain aware, then, not only of what we *do* do when we theorize, but also of what we *don’t* do, of what is left out. In Stefan Ramaekers’ chapter, ‘Parenting, Childrearing, Upbringing: Philosophy of Education and the Experience of Raising a Child’, he considers what is left out of our understanding of what it means to raise children by the shift to the language of ‘parenting’. But also he raises the issue that the pedagogical context of childrearing and family life has largely been left out of philosophy of education, particularly in its Anglophone form. Similarly, Joris Vlieghe draws our attention to our neglect or suppression of the body in accounts of education; it is either treated negatively, or not at all. Identification of this suppression is not new; both Freud and Nietzsche remarked upon it. Vlieghe provides an overview of those schools of thought – phenomenology, feminism, post-structuralism – that have attended to the physical nature of our being human. His account of ‘physical education’ itself shows that although there have been recent attempts to treat the body positively in educational terms, it remains problematic, and further work is required to give it its due in our theorizing.

As the introduction so far indicates, the recurrence of debates in philosophy of education is driven not only by pressing policy issues of the day, but also by the very



language in which those debates are constructed. The matter of what – and whose – knowledge we pass on to the next generation constitutes a further important facet of this. In his 1884 essay, ‘What knowledge is of most worth?’, Herbert Spencer posed the question that lies at the heart of ongoing debates over curriculum and conceptions of the educated person: ‘In education, then, this is the question of questions ... The first in importance, though the last to be considered, is the problem – how to decide among the conflicting claims of various subjects on our attention’ (p. 13). David Bridges tackles the matter head-on by looking at the school curriculum and the normative character of decisions about what should be included, as shaped by three particular points of reference: the good life, the good society, and the good person. He then considers debates over who should control the curriculum and explores two contrasting conceptions of the curriculum: one that sees it as analogous to a production line, the other to a research site. This leads nicely into Alis Oancea’s chapter on the practice of educational research. In contrast to long-held assumptions about the division between theory and practice, Oancea presents an argument for considering educational research as a form of practice.

The next three chapters address themes that are now receiving greater attention in philosophy of education. John Tillson’s chapter on religious education asks how children ought to be influenced with respect to religions, focusing especially on the moral and legal permissibility and desirability of various answers to that question. Michael Bonnett examines the increasingly important role of environmental education in philosophy of education. He discusses core concepts such as sustainability, ‘place’, anthropocentrism, ecocentrism, eco-justice, instrumentalism, post-humanism, post-ecologism, and scientism, and the various perspectives that inform debates around these ideas. Gerard Lum’s chapter on vocational education looks at the global trend toward so-called competence-based approaches to education. The widespread influence of these approaches, from kindergarten through to higher education, Lum argues, has revitalized philosophical disputes about the knowing-how/knowing-that distinction and the relationship between theory and practice. Pulling back again to a wider view on questions of knowledge and the curriculum, Emma Williams charts the historical debates on knowing-how and knowing-that, focusing in particular on the limited and reductive ways such conceptions of knowing often find their way into educational policy and practice. She then takes the debate in a different direction by offering a renewed, richer account of knowing by acquaintance informed by Heidegger’s phenomenology. In the next chapter, Anna Kouppanou addresses the debates about technology, digitization, and education. She introduces key questions in the philosophy of technology and offers alternative conceptualizations of technological artifacts and human beings. In the final chapter of this section, Viktor Johansson explores philosophy for children, the role of children in philosophy, and how childhood itself may impact philosophy. He invites readers to think of philosophy for children not as a particular discourse or movement, but as something that comes to us as a gift, an unexpected encounter with a particular child in which we – adult and child alike – are “struck by a question we don’t even know how to begin to answer, by the expression of an idea we [have] never heard of, or by the child trying to find ways to express something never said before”.

It is this encounter with and between different expressions of ideas – on topics on which we feel we have a common-sense understanding, or on others that seem utterly intractable – that gives these educational-philosophical treatments of recurrent debates their purchase in today's conditions. Debate has not only been a constitutive element of philosophy since at least Plato, but also is arguably a major part of what makes it educational.

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# Education and Democracy



Quentin Wheeler-Bell

## Democracy and Education

Democracy is a contested concept. Generally, democracy is interpreted as a political system that promotes self-government; however, once we unpack these terms a number of questions emerge (see Cunningham 2001). For example: what counts as ‘a political system’? What counts as political? What does it mean to self-govern? Is self-government an individual process, a collective process, or both? What are the social conditions for democracy? And, what aspects of society should be democratized? Each of these questions—as well as others—raises deep disagreements that influence how scholars interpret democracy, and its value: not only do scholars disagree over the meaning of democracy, they also disagree over the value of democracy (especially in nondemocratic or quasi-democratic contexts). To respect these disagreements, I shall leave the definition of democracy and education undefined. Instead, I shall highlight the different debates around education and democracy, which will also explain how the definition of democracy is contested.

To bring to life these debates, I want to focus on three major areas of concern over the relationship between democracy and education. The first concern is: How should we conceptualize the role of education *within* a democracy? As I shall explain, attempts to address this question are generally focused on the role of education within a democracy as well as the process through which democracy legitimates the education system. The second major concern is: How ought we to understand education *for* a democracy? Education *for* democracy is generally concerned with an education for social justice in which the focus is on the role of education in ‘creating citizens’. The final concern is: How do we conceptualize the role of

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education *without* democracy? Philosophers often neglect this concern, but here the focus is on the role of a ‘democratic education’ in contexts where democracy is either nonexistent or the social conditions for democracy are being systematically eroded. In the end, by framing our discussion through the lens of an education *within, for, and without* democracy, I hope to invite the reader into the rich, yet contested, debate over the relationship between education and democracy. Thus, we shall begin our discussion with the role of education *within* a democracy.

## Education *Within* a Democracy

Education *within* a democracy addresses the role of education within a democracy as well as the process through which democracy legitimates the educational system. Generally speaking, when addressing the role of education *within* a democracy, scholars tend to focus on: What ought to be the reasons why we educate children within a democratic society? Often the debate on education *within* a democracy is conflated with the discussion over the aims of education. However, we want to separate these two debates because the debate over the aim(s) of education tends to conceptualize aims from a context-independent standpoint—i.e., What aims should guide education regardless of context? (see Brighouse 2005; Peters 1970). When thinking about aims *within* a democracy, however, the debate is contextually specific. Here our attention is on: How should democracy reasonably determine the aims that ought to govern education *within* a democratic society?

We shall begin our discussion with John Dewey, who has put forth one of the most influential arguments for education *within* a democracy (and *for* democracy). Because of the influence of this book, I shall spend some time explaining Dewey’s argument and two specific criticisms—in addition, doing so will set the tenor for the rest of this chapter. In *Democracy and Education*, Dewey (1966) interprets education and democracy as coextensive ideas. This means, for Dewey, no separation exists between education *for* democracy and education *within* democracy. This is because democracy, according to Dewey, is a cooperative activity of social inquiry aimed at solving collective problems. And in order to solve collective problems, the public must be educated about said issues (Dewey 1955). Democracy, for Dewey, is more than a form of governance or institutional arrangements: democracy is a form of associational living of conjoined communicated experiences held together more by its ethos (e.g., habits, norms and dispositions), rather than its social institutions. For Dewey, the democratic ethos is manifested and cultivated within forms of associational living that contribute to the ‘growth’ of a democratic society. And since all individuals belong to a social group or forms of associational living, every individual ought to learn the knowledge, habits and skills needed to ensure such associations contribute to experiences that expand human growth. In this sense, citizens must not only learn about their rights and responsibilities but also develop the habits and dispositions needed to engage in associational living aimed at solving social problems. Thus, education’s primary and almost sole function, for Dewey, is

ensuring the production of a democratic society. As Dewey argues, “democracy has to be born anew every generation, and education is its midwife” (cited in Campbell 1995). Consequently, according to Dewey, embedded within democracy is an educational principle: democracy depends upon citizens learning the necessary habits and skills to form publics, participate in associational living, and collectively solve social problems in a manner that expands human growth.

Dewey seems to have two different explanations as to why education and democracy are coextensive. The first justification is straightforward: democracy depends upon an educated citizenry, thus the purpose of education within a democracy is to create citizens. The second justification is more circuitous, and is based upon Dewey’s conception of an educative experience. Educative experiences, for Dewey, are those that contribute to growth—in fact, Dewey makes the strong argument that education is growth (see Dewey 1997). For Dewey, education is growth because learning experiences should open up opportunities for further growth, and learning should open up opportunities for further learning. However, learning is also about learning something that is socially situated. Thus, as we learn more and open up opportunities for further growth, we gain a greater understanding of the social practices supporting that which we are learning about. For example, learning history, according to Dewey, is not merely learning a set of facts: learning history entails learning how certain ideas have come about as well as how to participate within the community of historians (Dewey 1966, pp. 207–219). For Dewey, then, learning how to participate within communities is what ties education to democracy: democracy depends upon associational living, and individuals are inherently part of associational living, thus learning how to engage in communities of associational living is the same as learning how to engage in democratic practices.

Dewey’s coupling of democracy and education has sparked major disagreements. Here I shall only focus on two problems: *Dewey’s illiberalism* and *the problem of conflating democracy and education*. Some argue that Dewey’s conception of democracy is illiberal, and so is his educational theory. For instance, Eamonn Callan (1981) argues that “Dewey’s democracy is somewhat repugnant to the value of individuality” because it places too much emphasis on “the desirability of social solidarity” at the expense of valuing individuality (p. 171). This problem extends into Dewey’s conception of education insofar as Dewey inadequately conceptualizes the educational value of learning beyond participating within a particular community. For example, Callan argues that Dewey misconceptualizes the importance of teaching art to students because he only focuses on the shared values and interests giving rise to art, rather than on the artistic imagination “untrammelled by whatever interests are widely shared in society at a particular point in time” (Callan 1981, p. 175). In the end, Callan concludes that “Dewey did not go wrong in believing that fraternity was desirable...His fundamental error was in assuming that to accord it its proper importance it was necessary to promote massive social solidarity at the expense of human diversity” (p.174).

The second criticism is that Dewey conflates education and democracy, and as a result, he overlooks key tensions between education and democracy. This criticism is less about Dewey’s relationship to liberalism, and more about Dewey’s

misunderstanding of the role of education within a democracy. To understand this criticism, we need to revisit the two ways Dewey connected education with democracy. The first way was fairly straightforward: democracy does depend upon citizens acquiring the habits and dispositions to participate in democratic associational living, thus the purpose of education is to cultivate democratic citizens. This argument, however, assumes education is only valuable to enhance civic participation, and thus, neglects the importance of other nonpolitical purposes of education—such as education for personal enjoyment. To Dewey's credit, he does acknowledge the value of teaching children certain subjects beyond civic participation; however, this brings us to the more circuitous way Dewey connects democracy with education.

The second way Dewey connects democracy with education is problematic because it undermines Dewey's own distinction between 'publics' and 'community'. Dewey distinguishes between publics and community in order to explain that not all associational forms of living are a "public". Communities are more general forms of associational living with a set of shared values and actions; whereas 'publics' are a particular form of community in which individuals form collective associations aimed at solving social problems. In other words, 'publics' are associations aimed at *solving social problems*; whereas 'communities' need not be aimed at solving social problems. This distinction is important because Dewey tends to assume that learning an activity to participate within a certain community is what connects education and democracy. However, Dewey provides little evidence that the learning to participate within a community inherently translates into learning the habits and dispositions to participate within the public sphere. For example, learning history to participate in the community of historians does not inherently translate into an enhanced ability to engage in public life. Dewey, however, seems to assume these habits are the same, which is why he assumes democracy and education are mutually constitutive. At this point, if Dewey is going to maintain a distinction between the community and the public—as he should—then he must also distinguish between an education *for* public engagement and the other aims of education. This also entails acknowledging a plurality of educational aims, which cannot be reduced to their value for democratic life. Moreover, if there are a plurality of educational aims, then Dewey must decouple the relationship between democracy and education, and distinguish between education *within* a democracy and education *for* a democracy. This distinction, as I shall explain, is central to understanding the current debate around education and democracy. And, the importance of this distinction can be seen in the debate between democracy and liberal rights.

### ***Democracy and Liberal Rights***

Besides John Dewey's *Democracy and Education*, Amy Guttmann's (1999) book *Democratic Education* provides one of the most comprehensive arguments for education's place *within* democracy—as well as education *for* democracy. Guttmann

argues that education should aim towards the “conscious reproduction of a democratic society”, which she defines as “the ways in which citizens are or should be empowered to influence the education that in turn shapes the political values, attitudes, and modes of behaviour of future citizens” (p. 15). According to Gutmann, educational practices are democratically legitimate when they uphold two principles: *nonrepression* and *nondiscrimination*. Nonrepression, as Gutmann argues, “... prevents the state, and any group within it, from using education to restrict rational deliberation of competing conceptions of the good life and good society” (p. 44). Nondiscrimination, on the other hand, “prevents the state, and all groups within it, from denying anyone an educational good on grounds irrelevant to the legitimate social purpose of that good” (p. 45). Stated differently, nondiscrimination, according to Gutmann, means “no educable children may be excluded from an education adequate to participating in the political processes that structure choice amongst good lives” (p. 45). Gutmann lays out these two principles to provide a basic threshold for determining when an educational decision is democratically legitimate. She also argues these basic principles set normative standards for addressing several educational issues.

Political liberals have criticized Gutmann for unduly limiting the purpose(s) of education. Harry Brighouse, for instance, argues that Gutmann neglects a tension between democratic legitimacy and liberal rights (see Brighouse 1998). As Brighouse argues, while democratic legitimacy requires providing children with a civic education, an education that respects the rights of children (i.e., a liberal education) entails respecting the nonpolitical aims of education—like the intrinsic appreciation of learning. According to Brighouse, since Gutmann reduces the purpose of education within a democracy to the process of democratic legitimacy, she overlooks the tension between democratic legitimacy and liberal rights. Moreover, Brighouse argues, to respect the liberal rights of children, democratic decisions must take a child-centered perspective (i.e., what’s in the best interest of children) rather than a socially centered perspective (i.e., what’s in the best interest of society). However, Gutmann’s position takes a socially centered perspective because she places the interests of society over the interests of children. One key issue raised by Brighouse is: while there is a plurality of educational aims, democracy must deliberate over the aims of education, and how to prioritize these aims. However, reasonable democratic decisions must be made from a child-centered perspective, rather than a socially centered perspective.

Meira Levinson (2011) provides a different dimension to Brighouse’s critique of Gutmann. Levinson argues that Gutmann conflates education *for* a democracy with education *within* a democracy. Education *for* a democracy, Levinson argues, “...is that which enables the next generation of citizens to participate in, promote, and preserve representative democracy in the future” (p. 135). Whereas education *within* a democracy “...focuses on what makes an educational system democratically justified, in a particular on the extent to which public schools must be subjected to adult citizens’ democratic deliberation and control in order to be legitimate” (p. 125). For Levinson, separating education *within* a democracy from education *for* democracy is necessary because “democratically legitimate control over education within a



democracy may well undercut children's legitimate claims to receiving an education that equips them for democracy" (p.135). In this sense, Levinson is highlighting a tension between democratic legitimacy and civic education itself. For example, for Gutmann democratic legitimacy and civic education are mutually constitutive because legitimate democratic decisions *must* promote a civic education. For Levinson, however, democratic legitimacy can be achieved at the cost of civic education. In this case, democracy could arrive at legitimate decisions; however, these decisions can come at the cost of an education *for* democracy—such as, a national curriculum that does not focus on civic education.

### ***Radical Democracy***

While radical democrats acknowledge the separation between education *within* and *for* democracy, they tend to reject the philosophical foundation of political liberalism and liberal democracy. To be clear, the term radical democracy is contested—like the term democracy. Furthermore, not all radical democrats reject political liberalism or liberal democracy. Nonetheless, one of the distinct features of radical democracy is its attempt to move the debate on education *within* democracy in a more *critical* direction. And by “critical” I mean they are focused on two interrelated issues: the role of education in the reproduction of domination and oppression, and the ways education can be used as a means of social transformation (see Apple 2012). In this sense, radical democrats argue that while education is *within* a democracy, education is also *within* structural practices that reproduce domination (i.e., radical, class, or gender domination). Furthermore, some forms of domination are not mere abnormalities within democracy—they are structurally connected to the reproduction of democracy itself (see Apple 1995). For example, one way class domination is reproduced is through the structural connection between education and the capitalist labor market, via credentializing. In addition, the process of credentializing is a major means by which individuals are able to access political positions of power. As a result, the structural connection between education and the labor market also reproduces class domination—which also is embedded within various forms of racial and gender domination (see Dale 1989). The point here is: if various forms of domination are structurally embedded within democratic societies, then it's problematic to proceed from the assumption that the purpose of education within a democracy should be to consciously reproduce a democratic society.

Following this line of reasoning, Kenneth Howe (1997) critiques Gutmann's principle of nonrepression for being too thin, and thus unable to prevent education from reproducing oppression. As Howe argues, a democratic decision-making process could uphold Gutmann's two principles and still end up with a curriculum or deliberative process that fails to empower marginalized and oppressed groups. In this sense, Howe argues that the principle of nonrepression should be replaced with a principle of nonoppression, which aims to: “protect groups that are threatened with marginalization and exclusion from meaningful democratic participation”

(p. 69). The principle of nonoppression is meant to “define injustice and to mediate among the claims of different groups” (p. 77). The general argument is that democracy could make legitimate decisions yet these decisions could reproduce oppression; as a result, we need different normative principles for regulating educational decisions when oppression exists.

Radical democrats also critique the liberal/democratic approach to education *within* a democracy for neglecting the *issue of social transformation*. By social transformation, I mean that if domination is structurally embedded within the design of social institutions, like schools, then it is problematic to apply normative principles to preexisting educational arrangements. This being the case, social institutions must be transformed in order to ensure oppressed groups are able to have a real and effective opportunity to participate within the democratic process. Here the central question is: What principles ought to govern the empowerment of marginalized groups to participate in the process of deepening democracy within education? Kathleen Knight Abowitz (2010) advances an argument along these lines, in which she argues for a “qualified faith in public schools” in which we break the assumption that public schools must be state-run schools. This assumption, according to Knight Abowitz, is problematic because the structure of state-run schools reproduces racial domination and limits the participatory parity for communities of color—i.e., their ability to participate fairly and equally in the democratic process of structuring the educational system. As a result, we must begin to look beyond state-run public schools, and envision different educational arrangements—like public charter schools—which could transform the educational system in ways that advance participatory parity for disenfranchised groups (also see: Abowitz 2014; Fung 2006).

In many cases, radical democrats are not challenging the importance of democratic legitimacy or certain liberal rights; instead, they are contesting the facts scholars take for granted when constructing and applying their normative principles.<sup>1</sup> More specifically, radical democrats are arguing that once oppression is acknowledged as a fact within society, we must rethink the normative principles as well as the institutional arrangements that must be constructed to ensure oppressed groups are given an equal and fair opportunity to contribute to the process of education *within* a democracy.

## Education *for* Democracy

While education *within* a democracy is generally focused on the process of ensuring the educational system is democratically legitimate, education *for* democracy focuses on the role of education in ‘creating citizens’. Overall, education *for* a democracy deals with a social justice education. The argument for civic education

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<sup>1</sup>I am not saying radical democrats agree with (political) liberalism. Rather, they may agree with certain liberal rights. See Terry Pinkard (2007) for a useful discussion on this distinction.

parallels both Dewey's and Gutmann's argument, which was: democratic legitimacy depends upon ensuring its citizens are educated and able to effectively participate within democracy. Consequently, a democratic society has an obligation to provide all individuals with a civic education. To be clear, arguments for civic education are not made at the expense of acknowledging other educational aims; here scholars are only focusing on the aim of creating citizens. In this section, I want to focus on three debates within civic education: (1) *civic education, pluralism, and diversity*, (2) *civic education and power*, and (3) *pedagogic practices for civic education*.

### ***Civic Education, Pluralism, and Diversity***

The debate over *civic education, pluralism, and diversity*, by and large, revolves around the contours and limits of liberal tolerance. Here the primary question is: How should education promote liberal democratic values, like autonomy, while respecting diversity? Eamonn Callan's (1997) book *Creating Citizens* is a seminal book which attempts to address this tension. According to Callan, a tension exists between a political education and liberal rights because civic education requires teaching children how to become autonomous agents; however, respecting diversity entails respecting nonautonomous ways of life. Callan tries to address this tension by arguing for a 'minimalist conception of liberalism' in which autonomy is acknowledged as a good promoted within liberal democracies; however, liberal democracies are justified in teaching the value of autonomy so long as teaching children to become autonomous would not make their lives bad. Simply put, a liberal civic education can respect 'nonautonomous' ways of living while still promoting civic education, because autonomy does not harm or undermine an individual's ability to participate in nonautonomous ways of living.<sup>2</sup>

Some liberals, like Stephen Macedo (2003) and Jason Scorza (2007), advance a more 'tough-minded liberalism' or 'strong liberalism', which entails preserving liberal tolerance while also recognizing and responding to intolerance and other threats to liberal values. For Macedo and Scorza, unlike Callan, liberal democracy should not only acknowledge the value of autonomy but also actively promote and nudge groups to value autonomy. Thus, rather than assuming nonautonomous ways of living are worthwhile, liberals should own up to the fact that they view such lifestyles as less valuable. In this regard, as Macedo argues, promoting the value of autonomy is deemed justified because "our civic ideals are not narrowly political...they are surely within the range of legitimate discretion of democratically constituted educational aims" that should be promoted (p. 239). The difference between 'minimalist liberals' and 'strong liberals' revolves around how we should teach children liberal values, like autonomy: minimalist liberals believe autonomy can be promoted while

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<sup>2</sup>Rob Reich (2002) and Walter Feinberg (2000) provide an additional discussion on liberalism and diversity.

acknowledging the value of nonautonomous ways of life; as a result, we should teach children the value of autonomy, while also acknowledging that nonautonomous ways of living are worthwhile. Strong liberals, conversely, argue that liberals should own up to the fact they deem nonautonomous ways of life as less than valuable. Moreover, they believe the value of autonomy is actually wide enough to respect reasonable ways of living the good life; as a result, it is completely justified to unequivocally promote an autonomous civic education.

### *Civic Education and Power*

While the liberal debate on civic education tends to focus on the moral dimensions of tolerance, scholars who identify with the ‘radical’ or ‘critical’ democratic tradition believe a focus on tolerance alone is too limited, and more attention should be given to challenging various forms of power and domination. For example, Barbara Applebaum (2011) argues for a social justice education based upon what she calls “a white complicity pedagogy”. According to Applebaum, white privilege can be reproduced both consciously and unconsciously, thus a social justice education must help white students “...be willing to contemplate how they are complicit in sustaining the system even when they do not intend to or are unaware that they do so” (p. 4). For Applebaum, a white complicity pedagogy requires moving beyond the limited notion of responsibility embedded within the liberal tradition—wherein individuals are only responsible for their intentional actions or inactions. For Applebaum this notion of responsibility reproduces white privilege because it only holds whites responsible for their intentional racist actions, and thus excuses them from their larger role in reproducing racial domination and white privilege.

Extending the discussion on civic education and power, others have argued that civic education must teach children how to challenge various forms of domination and injustice permeating society. For instance, Meira Levinson (2012) argues for an “action civics” education wherein students—specifically, students of color— “learn the language of power”. For Levinson, learning the language of power is a dual process, which includes: learning how to gain access to “the halls of power as they are currently structured” as well as “master strategies for amassing and deploying collective power...so as to change the political opportunity structures themselves” (p.92). In a similar vein, Sarah Stitzlein (2013) argues for a “citizenship education for dissent”. Such an education would teach students how to do “...more than just participate in civic and public life, she also critiques established systems to understand them, identify when they perpetuate injustice, and challenge and alter them when they do so” (p. 168). In addition, I (2012) have argued for a critical civic education that cultivates “the spirit of activism”. I argue children need the habits, skills, and abilities to transform society. And such an education requires identifying the normative principles that ought to govern society (including the political economy), helping students identify feasible institutional arrangements and political strategies (specifically social movements) that would move us toward the ideal

society. In sum, scholars focusing on power and domination envision a civic education that helps students acknowledge the various forms of domination and injustices present in society, as well as the morally appropriate educational and political means for helping students learn how to transform society and advance democracy.

Finally, others have challenged the basic logic of civic education. For example, drawing upon post-structuralism and post-Marxism, Gert Biesta (2011) argues that civic education operates from the assumption that its task is to produce good citizens. For Biesta, this logic leads to a “domestication of the citizen” insofar as it results in the “pinning down of citizens to a particular civic identity” and “leads to the erosion of more political interpretations of citizenship that see the meaning of citizenship as essentially contested” (p. 141). For Biesta, citizenship should not be equated with particular social institutions or identities because this closes off the possibility of radically challenging the very institutions and social identities that frame citizenship in the first place (also see: Biesta 2015). Nuancing Biesta’s discussion on citizenship, Claudia Ruitenberg (2015) argues for a civic education that acknowledges the “dialectic between inequality and equality”. For Ruitenberg, Biesta is correct that the very definition of citizenship can be contested, which means we should avoid a priori conceptions of citizenships. However, she believes citizenship must be embedded within social institutions, which requires establishing relations of inequality. For example, democracies must determine who can and cannot vote; and such decisions inherently exclude someone, thus creating an inequality. And while democracy requires respecting the fact that anyone can contest who can and cannot vote (*equality*), institutionalize voting criteria inherently exclude someone from being able to vote (*inequality*).<sup>3</sup>

According to Ruitenberg, this dialectic is inherent to democracy itself. Thus, unlike Biesta who interprets citizenship as fundamentally contested, Ruitenberg advocates for a civic education that operates on two interconnecting levels. First, civic education curriculum or policy “...acknowledges and addresses citizenship as the democratic, political role of holding the state to account” (p. 5). And second, such an education “...positions citizenship as something that can be enacted now rather than something for which the student is being prepared” (p. 5). The post-structuralism and post-Marxist critique of civic education should not be interpreted as an attempt to jettison civic education; instead it is foregrounding the political nature of citizenship and pushing the civic education debate to consider the pedagogical implication of teaching children how to act democratically and be open to the contestation of the very notion of citizenship.

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<sup>3</sup> See Razmig Keucheyan (2014) for a useful overview of the different strains within the critical tradition.

## ***Pedagogical Practices for Citizen Education***

The final aspect of education *for* democracy we shall discuss is *pedagogical practices for citizen education*. Educating citizens raises complex ethical concerns for teachers. Ideally teachers should help children develop well-informed, reasonable, yet autonomous decisions; however, this requires teachers avoid indoctrinating children or presenting unfair and unbalanced perspectives, while also teaching children how to distinguish between reasonable and unreasonable arguments. Diana Hess and Paula McAvoy's (2014) book *The Political Classroom*, which combines social science with philosophical analysis, is one of the most comprehensive books addressing the moral tensions teachers face when educating citizens. As Hess and McAvoy argue, civic educators must deal with "the political education paradox", which they describe as: "the need to provide students with a nonpartisan political education on the one hand with the need to prepare them to participate in the actual, highly partisan political community on the other" (p. 4). According to Hess and McAvoy, the political education paradox is best addressed when teachers are viewed and view themselves as learners, which entails being well-informed about content knowledge needed to teach political issues. In addition, teachers set high aims and pay close attention to the needs of their students. And finally, they work collaboratively with other teachers to create effective pedagogical practices for a political classroom (p. 204–215).

Adding a different perspective to pedagogical practices for civic education, Katy Swalwell's (2013) book *Educating Activist Allies* is an ethnographic study explaining the moral dilemmas two social justice teachers face when teaching civic education within "elite schools". As Swalwell explains in her study, teaching social justice to privileged students faces different ethical issues than teaching social justice to the least advantaged, and often teachers are unsure how to provide privileged children with a social justice education that challenges their privileges. For example, Swalwell explains how social justice teachers in elite schools struggle with ensuring they have sound pedagogical practices that encourage inquiry and problem solving on the one hand, while on the other hand, disturbing student's privileged worlds by 'bursting their bubble'. While Swalwell's book is not philosophical per se, she acknowledges the philosophical and normative questions raised in her study as well as the need for philosophical exploration around this issue.

## **Education *Without* Democracy**

Unlike the debate over education *with* and *for* a democracy, education *without* democracy explicitly focuses on the tension between the *ideal* of democracy and the *real* conditions undermining democracy, or preventing democracy from emerging. When thinking about democracy *without* education the concern is how to provide an 'education *for* democracy' when the conditions for democracy are severely strained

or nonexistent. Thinking about education without a democracy is important because scholars tend to assume the social and background conditions for civic engagement are present. However, when these conditions are threatened or absent, we must reconsider the civic knowledge, skills, habits, and dispositions that children and adults must learn to revitalize or bring into existence a democratic society—if so desired. Here I shall address three different ways of conceiving of an education *without* democracy: (1) When the conditions for democracy are severely strained—such as war-times, genocide, or famine. (2) When the conditions for democracy are nonexistent—such as authoritarian states. (3) When the ‘common sense’ conception of democracy is distorted, and thus the professed ideals of democracy are inadequate at analyzing the conditions undermining democracy.

### ***Education and the Weakening of Democracy***

When the conditions for democracy are severely strained, certain background conditions are weakened; and as a result, being civically engaged faces a higher level of risk than typically associated with civic involvement. For instance, as Sigal Ben-Porath (2006) explains in *Citizenship Under Fire*, the civic virtues associated with democratic participation depends upon a level of peace, which is often taken for granted in discussions on civic education. However, in war-time situations, such as the Israel/Palestine conflict, such peace is limited. According to Ben-Porath, war-time situations require us to rethink certain facets of civic education. A civic education appropriately responsive to war-time conditions, according to Ben-Porath, requires an “expansive education”, which “is fundamentally aimed at cultivating a commitment to civic engagement in the process of such mutual justification and at endorsing a host of views that maintain both democratic and national commitments” (p. 121). For Ben-Porath, expansive education depends upon “the *process* of mutual justification”; and *process* should be emphasized because civic education must focus more on developing the skills associated with democratic citizenship as well as how to mobilize civic values in a climate in which peaceful conditions are either undermined or nonexistent.

### ***Education Without Democracy***

One area that needs further investigation within the civic education literature is the type of civic education needed when the conditions for democracy are nonexistent—such as authoritarian states. While philosophers have insufficiently addressed this issue, critical social science research has highlighted the tensions and normative issues for providing education *for* democracy within contexts where democracy does not exist. For example, Min Yu’s (2016) ethnographic study of migrant children schools in China details the ways in which teachers and community members mobilize within a



nondemocratic society to create schools that serve migrant children—children excluded from traditional schools in China. As Yu explains, these migrant schools are operating as ‘counter-public spheres’ or ‘counterhegemonic spaces’: spaces where teachers, students, and parents are developing the ‘collective identity’ required for even seeing oneself as capable of making democratic demands. In this case, education *for* democracy is taking place within a context *without* democracy, and part of what is occurring is individuals are learning how to see themselves as a person deserving equal respect and mutual justifications. What Yu’s study highlights is that democratic practices must be embedded within social practices; however, democratic practices can exist even when the larger social context is not democratic (also see Kurasawa 2007). This study, nonetheless, raises interesting philosophical questions, such as: What makes democracy universally valuable? Should an education for democracy be provided within nondemocratic contexts?

### *The Distortion of Democracy*

The last condition of education *without* democracy we shall discuss occurs when ‘common-sense’ concepts of democracy, held by the general public and philosophers, are themselves distorted or compromised; as a result, certain situations undermining democracy are systematically neglected, or distorted because the principles themselves are inadequate. A prime example here is the assumed link between democracy and capitalism. Often philosophers either assume democracy depends upon capitalist markets or their conception of democracy inadequately conceptualizes what it means for democracy to regulate the political economy. Kenneth Strike (2003), for example, develops an argument for legitimacy in public education which assumes capitalist’s labor markets are necessary for democracy. Strike treats the political economy as separate from democratic control; and as result, he inadequately addresses the ways capitalism undermines democracy and educational legitimacy (see Wheeler-Bell 2014). Liberal egalitarians, like Brighouse and Swift (2006, 2011), on the other hand, inadequately conceptualize what it means for democracy to control the political economy. For instance, they treat the least advantaged as passive recipients of justice—i.e., as individuals in need of preestablished goods. As a result, their conception of justice and democracy overlooks the fact that justice requires the least advantaged be able to democratically control what (educational) goods are produced, how (educational) goods are produced, and how goods are distributed (see Forst 2007; Laden 2013; Pereira 2013; Young 2011). In sum, as critical theorists argue, our common sense conceptions of democracy can often become ideological, and when this occurs, accepted democratic principles can operate in a manner that distorts and/or overlooks the practices undermining democracy—in our case, capitalism (also see: Chari 2015; Wright 2010). What is important here is that our common-sense conception of democracy can become either inadequate for addressing neoliberal capitalism (or some other problems) or can treat certain systems as inherently compatible with democracy. When this occurs, we are

not only facing a crisis within democracy but also a crisis in our collective imagination: the inability to imagine what democracy could look like beyond particular social systems, like capitalism. This in turn creates a crisis in education *for* democracy because we are unable to honestly teach students how to address the conditions that are undermining democracy.

## Conclusion

One of the essential insights gleaned from John Dewey's understanding of democracy is that democracy is a creative process. Democracy must renew itself to address new social problems: renewing democracy is not merely about applying commonly held beliefs about democracy to new social problems (although this is sometimes necessary); but, it also entails being open to radically rethinking our commonly held beliefs. Rethinking commonly held beliefs is necessary because sometimes our inability to deal with new social problems is a result of the commonly accepted beliefs themselves (Dewey 1939). In this sense, Dewey is reminding us to constantly interrogate what it means for education to exist *within* a democracy, what does it mean to educate *for* democracy, and what does it mean to educate *without* democracy. And even more radically, Dewey believes we must be open to the possibility that new problems may arise which challenge the very three questions just mentioned.

If Dewey was correct, which I think he was, we should not see the debate over education and democracy as an endless circle. Rather, the ongoing debate is a sign of a continued faith in democracy: a faith that new issues and problems require us to revisit old traditions and values, and rethink said values so we can collectively solve new social issues. And one important task of educational philosophy is to clarify the issues and problems facing society, and do so in a manner that helps equip the public with better tools for addressing social problems facing democracy. Hopefully this chapter clarifies some of the debates and current issues facing education and democracy, and contributes to renewing our collective faith in democracy and education.

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# Citizenship



Penny Enslin and Mary Tjiattas

## Introduction

This chapter focuses on normative conceptions of citizenship and their implications for moral and civic education. In the course of providing accounts of the historical emergence of different conceptions of citizenship, it will make note of important conceptual links between notions of citizenship and agency, democracy, general will formation, political authority and legitimacy, rights and duties, and moral and political standing that are involved in different conceptions of citizenship. It will then turn to a discussion of the cognitive and affective capacities that these notions of citizenship involve, and discuss the role of education in the development of citizens, emphasizing contemporary analyses and debates. It will conclude by exploring the idea of global citizenship and its implications for citizenship education.

## Citizenship: A Genealogy of the Concept

A citizen is a member of a state or polis who is accorded status or standing expressed in a set of rights and duties that accrue to her as a citizen. The significance of this has been long recognized. For Aristotle, whose *Politics* (1984) incorporates the first extended theory of the citizen, the centrality of citizenship follows from his belief

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that man is, by nature, a political animal — “kata phusin zoon politikon” (Aristotle 1984, 1253a1–15). Not only is he uniquely able to perform the functions of a citizen, but doing so is necessary to his personhood. So the functions of citizenship correspond to distinctively human activities. This ideal of the active, engaged citizen is taken up by key figures in Western thought, most notably, Rousseau. In contemporary writing, it is reflected in Oldfield’s (1990) assertion that failure to participate in politics makes one an incomplete and stunted being.

According to many political theories, citizenship is not only the status accorded to beings for whom active participation in public life is a central element of a good life, but is also a fundamental condition of authoritative or legitimate government.

Aristotle is also the first political philosopher who advanced a conception of citizenship that recognizes the intricate conceptual links between citizenship and legitimate political authority. As many have noted, Aristotle arrived at his views of man and citizen by breaking explicitly with central assumptions of Plato and, in doing so, inaugurated a long-lived tradition. Plato (2000), in his reflections on the proper relations between rulers and ruled, was not faced with a challenge that has been at the centre of political theory for much of the history of Western thought, namely, how to justify the authority of those who govern over autonomous, rational individuals who are nonetheless held to be bound to comply. This is because Plato assumes that, as long as the rulers have superior natural talents, there is no problem about their being fit to rule, and so no question about their legitimacy (Plato 2000, Book 5, 462 A/B).

For Aristotle, however, all citizens are by nature equal. So the problem for him (and egalitarian positions in general) is: On what ground is it legitimate for some to rule over others? If egalitarianism is assumed, then political authority, to be legitimate, must result from the authorization of those citizens over whom authority is claimed. This abiding view is endorsed by Rousseau, for whom the “concurrence of obedience and freedom” is “the essence of the political body” (Rousseau and Gouretich 1977, SC 3.13.5). The fundamental problem is to “find a form of association ... by means of which each, uniting with all, nevertheless obey only himself and remain as free as before” (Rousseau and Gouretich 1977, SC I.6.4), one which will provide security (through authoritative constraints on the conduct of each member) without infringing personal autonomy. The notion of citizenship is central to Rousseau’s solution to this problem of how self-determination can be compatible with political authority.

## **Citizenship and Political Authority: Republicanism and Liberalism**

The widespread agreement that citizenship and political legitimacy are inextricably interwoven has not by itself resulted in a convergence on a single theory of citizenship and legitimacy.

Canonical republican views (as represented by Aristotle, Rousseau, contemporary communitarians and some deliberative democrats) emphasize ‘the liberties of the ancients’, especially active participation, and treat citizenship as intrinsically (not merely instrumentally) valuable. On this view, ongoing citizen participation is required in order for the state to exercise its functions legitimately. Not only must its institutions be regulated by principles of justice, but it must enjoy the authorization of its members. Freedom as non-domination by the will of others is of paramount concern. Political authority is legitimate only when the laws reflect the universal will of the people. In Rousseau’s words, the agency of the people is the locus of the general will. “The People subject to the laws ought to be their author” (Rousseau and Gouretich 1977, SC 2.6.10). Subjects in the society of the general will “obey no one, but only their own will” (Rousseau and Gouretich 1977, SC 2.4.8), and so are free. Republicanism thus takes as central the claim that the authorization to exercise public power is linked to collective decisions of citizens. The capacity to participate in the general will is also the source of rights and duties. This is because for decisions to be binding and for authority to be legitimate, citizens must participate in advancing proposals and defending them with considerations that others can acknowledge *as reasons*. For authority to be acceptable in a community of equals, it must be democratized. So democratic procedures of collective decision-making play a justificatory role. Moreover, when, in a community of equals, the ordering of reasons gives priority to reasons of the common good, civic unity, the constitution of a *we* is the result (Cohen 2010, p. 55).

In contrast, liberal conceptions of citizenship (grounded in the ‘liberties of the moderns’) endorse a more restricted notion of citizenship, at the extreme taking it to be exhausted by the set of rights that the polis owes its members. These are held to be formidable and possibly inviolable constraints on what political authority may do with respect to citizens. Citizenship is ‘the right to have rights’. Classical liberal views focus on limitations of state authority, which are taken to be grounded in basic liberties. Basic liberties are invoked both to determine the legitimacy of authority and to provide an instrumental justification for it. The proponents of this view seek to motivate the establishment of institutional checks and balances, and the division of political power. The conception of citizenship, accordingly, is passive and private. Citizens are bearers of rights, but are obliged, as citizens to be only minimally active participants in the political order. In great part, they discharge their duties by refraining from interfering with the activities of others. Active political participation is required only to the extent to which it is necessary to safeguard the private domain, which is taken to be a realm of personal fulfilment, joy, love etc. Citizens may set their own ends; they espouse very different conceptions of the good, and their right to do so is basic. Political duties are rights based, and political participation is, at best, instrumentally valuable and, under favourable conditions, only episodic (Ackerman 1991).

It is, incidentally, worth noting that those who endorse liberal conceptions of citizenship can differ on the rights that they attribute to citizens. For example, the rights endorsed by Locke are largely negative, while those endorsed by T.H. Marshall (1950) include economic rights.



## Contemporary Debate

The idea that democratic procedures and citizenship are essential to political legitimacy pervades current discussions of liberals and republicans alike.

One of the central questions of contemporary debates concerning citizenship is whether a thicker (more republican) conception of citizenship, involving active exercise of citizenship participation in decision-making and the cultivation of civility and reasonability, is necessary for its legitimating function. If so, the question arises of whether such a conception is compatible with fundamental commitments of liberalism (e.g. the priority of basic liberties and the right over the good). One specific form of this question is whether requiring citizen-virtues of citizens is compatible with respect for the individual liberty and autonomy insisted on by liberals. This question can be discerned in influential contemporary writing in political theory.

There is a broad consensus in contemporary political philosophy (which includes Rawls, Scanlon, Habermas, Benhabib) that if there is to be an inclusive, public basis of justification for dealing with fundamental social and political questions in pluralist societies, their citizens must be able to recognize the force of justificatory reasons, and be willing to engage in respectful deliberation with each other on a range of matters of common concern. Moreover, for Rawls, for whom justice is the central concern of political philosophy, virtues of citizenship are required in order for society to be well ordered. Principles of justice will be satisfied, and there will be a stably just society only if citizens have shared political values and a commitment to a common conception of justice, which includes standing motivations to support just institutions based on publicly justifiable reasons.

This overlaps with some aspects of republicanism, but diverges from republicanism in other ways. Rawls (1993, pp. 205–6) distinguishes between ‘classical republicanism’ (a thin republican view that he takes to be compatible with his own liberalism) and ‘civic humanism’ (a thicker republicanism represented by Aristotle, some aspects of which he takes to be incompatible with liberalism). ‘Classical republicanism’, as he describes it, is the view that citizens of a democratic society must have the ‘political virtues’ and be willing to participate in public life if basic rights and liberties are to be preserved. This requires “...active participation of citizens who possess the political virtues needed to maintain a constitutional regime” (Rawls 1993, p. 205). Although this is a thinner republicanism than ‘civic humanism’, it goes beyond minimalist liberalism (as expounded by, e.g., Locke). Rawls insists, among other things, that norms of respect receive constitutional protection and that ‘principle dependent sentiments’ be a focus of public education. His view that civility implies a moral duty for citizens also augments classical liberalism (see Nussbaum 2015, p. 16). But he does not endorse the distinguishing claim of ‘civic humanism’, which is opposed to liberal principles, namely, that the obligation to participate stems from man’s essential nature as a social or political animal, for whom taking part in democratic politics is “the privileged locus of the good life”

(Rawls 1993, p. 206). Rawls follows Kant in rejecting Rousseau's claim that a 'civil religion' is a condition for citizenship. He does so on the ground that it imposes a particular conception of the good on everyone, thus usurping their right to make their own decisions, and failing to accord persons the respect due to them as autonomous beings with the capacity to set their own ends and form and revise their own conceptions of the good.

This thinking leads naturally to the idea of deliberative democracy (Cohen 1995, p. 1996), according to which political decisions are to be made on the basis of free public reasoning among equals. Deliberative democracy requires a framework of social and institutional conditions that facilitates free discussion among equal citizens and bases the authorization of public power and the exercise of public power on its responsiveness and accountability to such discussion. For contemporary theorists of deliberative democracy, decisions are to be supported by reasons acceptable to others. Offering reasons to others is the way one expresses respect for them as equal members of a deliberative body.

The deliberative conception of democracy offers a robust rendering of the idea of recognizing that citizens are free and equal: everyone's interests are to be recognized and their reasons respected. This requirement effectively connects institutions and practices that are involved in the exercise of political power to a system of public reasoning among citizens, to public, democratic deliberative processes essential to both the rationality and the legitimacy of collective decision-making (Rawls 1993, p. 390; Cohen 1995, p. 1). Contemporary theorists, in exploring this possible solution to the problem of reconciling autonomy and authority, have developed a distinctive notion of public reason.

Rawls, taking as his starting point the notion of a just society whose institutions are justifiable on the basis of standards acceptable to all, and assuming that in pluralistic democratic societies political justification is more difficult to demonstrate, provides an extensive account of reasons that can be expected to be available to all. This notion of public reason, providing as it does a public basis of justification, is crucial to the legitimacy of political institutions in pluralistic societies. Public reason is central to Rawls's elaboration of his 'political liberalism', but it has often been misunderstood. It should therefore be noted that public reason is only one kind of reasoning in which citizens engage in constitutional democracies (Nussbaum 2015, p. 16). Political liberalism gives citizens latitude to appeal to reasons that depend upon their comprehensive doctrines in their everyday lives and in many aspects of their interactions in civil society and the political domain. It is only when issues of 'constitutional essentials and matters of basic justice' are under discussion, that citizens have special duties, based on respect and reciprocity, to display virtues of reasonability and civility, central to which is the ability and willingness to provide reasons that are not only intelligible to others, but also function as *reasons* for them (Postema 1995). For an individual's reason to be accorded weight in public reasoning, it must be 'a reason others can share'. Reasonable people, Rawls says are "... willing to govern their conduct by a principle from which they and others can reason in common" (Rawls 1993, 49n.1).

In contemporary, pluralist constitutional democracies, in which there is a diversity of comprehensive doctrines, this notion of reasonability imposes substantial constraints on what can be taken to count as a 'public reason', excluding many of the reasons that people actually have for choosing and acting as they do (See, e.g., Benhabib 1996, p. 68; Holmes 1988, p.233; Cohen, J. 1996, p. 95, 1998, p. 186; Bohman 1996). Nagel (1997) says that the ideal of acceptability to all is attainable by putting ourselves in others' shoes. Similarly, Scanlon (1982) claims that "... the source of motivation that is directly triggered by the belief that an action is wrong is the desire to be able to justify one's actions to others on grounds they could not reasonably reject" (1982, p. 116).

But questions arise: Why should a restricted form of justification be the standard of political legitimacy? Why should people refrain from acting on their most cherished beliefs (which they take to be true) in deference to beliefs to which they are less committed? How can claims that public reasons trump others be justified? Political liberalism's constrained conception of public reason may seem to oppose to the idea of 'enlarged thought' and at best gives rise to a problem of reconciling the different considerations we take as reasons in different contexts (See, e.g., Nagel 1997, p. 5).

In short, there is a question of whether political liberalism can provide a context-sensitive limiting of the range of reasons that does not unfairly advantage comprehensive views that are liberal and secular.

So, it is not surprising that the contemporary idea of public reason has met with strong objections. On traditional conceptions of public reason, such as Kant's, the links between public reason and 'enlarged thought' are clear. Public reason involves distancing oneself from one's own immediate and parochial concerns in order to attain a more impartial (and self-correcting) point of view. This does not require that one leave one's own reasons behind; rather, one embeds them in a larger set. In contrast, the contemporary conception of public reason proposes substantive and procedural constraints on candidate reasons. On the account proposed by political liberalism, differentiating public reasons from reasons in general involves 'methods of avoidance', 'conversational constraint', and 'selective repression'. Is this a preferable way of respecting everyone?

Although Rawls is the best-known contemporary theorist of public reason, his position overlaps significantly with various contemporary accounts of deliberative democracy, all of which are committed to democratic states having significant obligations to prepare citizens for participation in civic decision-making. These positions require appropriate agencies, such as educational systems, to develop citizens' capacity for practical reasoning and give them a broad understanding of economic and political structures.

For Rawls, the ideal of democratic politics requires that we be able to justify our actions to others in terms they could reasonably accept. This ideal of democratic politics commits citizens to rational norms of conversation and the duty of civility. Effectively, this means that they have a duty to provide "public reasons" (Rawls 1993, p. 218) and to submit voluntarily to restrictions in the interests of inclusion, neutrality and tolerance. The Rawlsian conception of a person as citizen is,

accordingly, a conception of someone who is able to participate in social and political life, exercise its rights and respect its duties. Benhabib (1996) identifies the content of practical rationality as normative presuppositions of deliberative democracy and shares with Rawls an emphasis on discursive norms and the sharing of reasons.

It should perhaps be noted that liberal and republican ideals of citizenship alike, committed as they are to universal or unitary ideals of citizenship, have been subjected to criticism by proponents of multiculturalism who insist that they are inimical to cultural practices and norms, and are thus exclusionary. These charges have initiated an independent set of debates, which are somewhat orthogonal to those discussed above, posing as they do a radical challenge to the very concept of the ideal of citizenship as traditionally conceived. Multicultural theorists like Young (1995) argue for a non-unitary, differentiated model of citizenship that would recognize the status of individuals as members of particular groups and incorporate them into political communities *qua* members of groups (as well as individually). This is based on the claim that differentiated citizenship and group rights are necessary means for inclusion in pluralistic societies, especially for members of groups that have been oppressed historically. The contrast with positions like that of Rawls's political liberalism, which are similarly motivated by 'the fact of pluralism', is stark: Rather than attempting to accommodate diversity by delimiting a sphere of possible consensus, based on public reason, multiculturalists emphasise difference, and take this to be indispensable to accommodating particular identities. However, several theorists (Beiner 2006; Kymlicka 2002) warn, against these claims, that the means multiculturalists insist upon would effectively undermine the very political, social and cultural arrangements to which admission is being sought (namely, a shared political community). And since citizenship involves treating people as equals, 'differentiated citizenship' would undermine the integrative function at its core.

## **Citizenship and Education: What Capacities Do Citizens Need?**

The requirements of citizenship education implied by different political theories are not the same. They vary substantially, depending on the social and political ideal that is assumed. While we explore these requirements here, we note that some have objected to the idea of citizenship education itself, including its politicization of values education (see Kristjánsson 2004).

The strong republican (civic humanist) view requires the inculcation of capacities required for the formation of a general will, including the capacity to recognize common interests, giving equal weight to the interests of each, and the disposition to pursue them. It also requires the resistance to the vices that threaten the motivation to act on the general will (Rousseau and Gouretich 1977, SC 4.1.6). Oldfield (1990) is one contemporary representative of strong republicanism. He proposes that

citizenship needs to be authoritatively inculcated. Through the formal education system, civic virtues are to be internalized in children, who are thereby moulded into citizens. Sandel (1996) echoes these ideas in talking about the “formative politics that cultivates in citizens the qualities of character self-government requires” (1996, p. 6).

Classical liberal conceptions of citizenship, on the other hand, require only education about rights, since they do not specify duties of citizenship, other than refraining from interfering with the rights of their fellows.

Most recent views on citizenship education seem to occupy a middle ground between those of strong republican and classical liberal views. Contemporary liberal theorists focus on education for autonomy and are concerned to distinguish various conceptions of autonomy and their promotion within educational institutions (especially schools). These accounts are attentive to tensions between promoting autonomy as critical inquiry and respecting diversity while also trying to foster cultural coherence under conditions of growing diversity among the citizens of liberal democracies (see McLaughlin 1992).

In his later work, Rawls himself has focused on what he takes to be the core civic virtues of civility and reasonableness. In contrast to ‘civic humanists’ like Rousseau, Rawls’s conception of civility and the virtues it involves permits individuals to choose both their own ends and the extent of their political involvement. Although the implications of political liberalism are weaker than those of civic humanism, they share with it a commitment to the inculcation of civic virtues. For Rawls, citizens have an indispensable role in ensuring the stability of a just (well-ordered) society. The dispositions and attitudes this requires include those that would support just institutions, and in particular, the two principles of justice he identifies as central to justice as fairness. Political virtues are those that dispose citizens to perform their crucial role in the stability of a just society. Only if citizens have suitable moral dispositions will the basic structure continue to meet requirements of justice. Fair practices cannot be achieved by laws or principles alone. Justice also requires that citizens possess and practise political virtue, including reasonability. This involves both cognitive and moral capacities: for rational judgment, and a sense of justice and a conception of the good.

Rawls’s requirements of children’s education seem to be rather modest, and they are justified solely by the state’s interest in their role as future citizens. In particular, he lists: knowledge of constitutional and civil rights, preparation to be self-supporting, fully cooperative members of society and encouragement of the desire “... to honor the fair terms of social cooperation in their relations with the rest of society” (Rawls 2001, p. 156). Rawls seems to be confident that citizens will acquire political virtues and knowledge of political principles simply by living in just societies. Ideas implicit in the public culture will gradually become apparent, and indeed compelling, to them. This sanguine attitude has been questioned by commentators otherwise sympathetic to his overall position. Is it realistic to expect, especially in actual, rather than ideal societies that mere exposure to, and participation in, political activity is sufficient to foster political virtues? Some find it more plausible that targeted mechanisms are called for.

In discussing ‘the seedbeds of civic virtue,’ Kymlicka (2002) rejects the idea that families, associations of civil society and markets, could function as adequate sites of citizenship education (2002, pp. 302–307). One deficiency common to all of these (Costa 2011) is that children who are most vulnerable, whose circumstances are least advantageous are also least likely to be beneficiaries of ‘invisible hand’ cultural mechanisms which are often at work in families, civil society and markets. They are the least likely to be systematically exposed to educative elements in the general culture. A failure to develop civic knowledge (about, e.g., legal and political structures and mechanisms) would diminish the worth of their civil liberties and consolidate their position of relative disadvantage. This is at odds with Marshall’s interpretation of citizenship as a social right that includes a right to the very education that makes agency as a citizen possible (Marshall 1950).

Educational institutions are, for many, the proper site of the development and exercise of the dispositions involved in civility and reasonability (Brighouse 2012). It is through educational interventions that children learn to obey laws (provided that society is one with democratic institutions with reasonable protections of individual rights), to engage in political participation and to do so in a way that demonstrates respect for others and a willingness to engage in public reasoning. Rawls’s concept of public reason requires children to be taught to reason critically and to develop the ability to put themselves in others’ shoes. As citizens, in deliberating with others about matters of basic justice and constitutional essentials, they should have the capacity to refrain from appealing to (private) reasons they know are not acceptable to other reasonable people. It should be part of citizenship education, therefore, to teach students “...to offer and consider publically accessible reasons and see how those relate to private reasons” (Brighouse 2012, p. 201).

In order to do this, students need to acquire both knowledge and cognitive and affective skills. Gutmann’s work (1987) has advocated education for democratic citizenship that fosters the ability of children to think critically about authority so that they can “...live up to the democratic ideal of sharing political sovereignty as citizens” (Gutmann 1987, p. 307). A central point of civic education is to raise free and equal citizens who appreciate that they have both rights and responsibilities to fellow citizens. Key goals include the development of an ability to deliberate and the disposition to participate.

Future citizens require an education that fosters the ability to judge, to weigh and consider reasons and evidence, to evaluate arguments, to be adept at individual and collective decision-making. As Rawls and others (e.g. Kitcher 2011) have stressed, they also require a general understanding of science, economics and the political context in which decisions are made. In addition, theorists like Young (1996) emphasize the importance of empathy and the development of the capacity to appreciate a wide range of perspectives. Such an educational policy differs from one advocated by civic humanism, insofar as it does not promote political participation as the highest or best form of human life.

Peterson believes that civic education programmes in Western democracies display an allegiance to civic republicanism – through their concern to teach students to participate in deliberative practices and to introduce them to concepts of civic

virtue, civic obligations and the common good. The United Kingdom, the US, Canada, Australia and the Council of Europe have all proposed frameworks for civic education that emphasise its formative role in producing democratic citizens. This is well illustrated by the Crick Report in the UK, the Scottish Curriculum for Excellence, the Australian Statement of Standards in Civics and Citizenship and the CIVITAS framework in America (Peterson 2011, pp. 24–30).

Within such civic education programmes, would citizenship education focused on civility and reasonability be sufficient to address the requirement for both cognitive and affective citizen capacities to be developed? Some have expressed doubts about Rawls's account of reasonable citizenship, on the ground that it eschews the cultivation of feelings of national identification (e.g. Miller 2007). Without such feelings, some allege, the stability of a just society cannot be secured. White (1996) claims that patriotic sentiments are beneficial to a democratic society, arguing that they are required to motivate citizens to support redistribution: "If they feel themselves to be part of the same community as those in need, their emotional bonds with time may outweigh narrower considerations of advantage and disadvantage. National sentiment can help to provide this bonding" (1996, p. 331).

Rawls requires that citizens display commitment to political values that have their source in democratic traditions of their society. They have a natural duty to support just institutions, but do not have a duty to be patriotic, which would be incompatible with pluralism in modern democratic societies. Hand's observation (2011) that love of country can hinder civic judgment, clouding critical scrutiny of its history, its place in the world and its government's actions, indicates how the affective and the cognitive dimensions of citizenship may collide. And globalization prompts further doubts about the viability of promoting national identity in citizenship education.

## Citizenship and the Global Sphere

The conceptions of public reason previously considered (especially that of Rawls) tended to apply to and presuppose the public sphere of the nation state, and political citizenship was assumed to be citizenship of a particular nation state. But is the nation state the *sine qua non* of democratic citizenship? Many political theorists take this as given and treat national identity as a precondition of citizenship and participation in a deliberative democracy. Globalization, however, puts pressure on the idea that democratic requirements and practices apply only within the nation state, that national citizenship alone sets the bounds of inclusion. In an increasingly integrated global system, the flow of information, people, goods, money, disease and environmental degradation across national borders has brought with it new global problems as well as collaborative practices, structures and norms. Rules with global scope set standards of conduct across schemes of co-operation that include trade agreements and conventions on trade, economic security, labour regulation, collective security and peacekeeping, election and corruption monitoring, human



rights and education. The sovereignty of national governments has been diluted both by voluntary agreements to collaborate with other states and international organisations, and by transnational economic and political activities that governments do not have the power to control, as well as by the increasing wealth of transnational corporations.

Recognizing these 'facts of globalization' leads to the questioning of widespread statist assumptions that the geographical boundaries of nation states demarcate autonomous, sovereign powers and that citizens are to be defined exclusively by their standing and obligations to their own national state and to their co-nationals. But, geographical boundaries of nation states no longer coincide with the boundaries of common interests. New forms of association occasioned by globalization challenge the assumption that matters of political legitimacy involve only members of bounded states, and raises questions about both liberal and republican conceptions of citizenship, thus demanding reconceptualization of basic political concepts (Bohman 2007). What is the source of legitimacy of decisions to be achieved and demonstrated in non-traditional political spaces, in which participants don't make up a '*demos*'? Who constitutes the 'justificatory community?' (G.A. Cohen 1991). Some political theorists (including, e.g., Bohman 1997; Kuper 2004; Fraser 2008) are sensitive to these changes.

The reconstruction required to meet the consequences of globalization is not only conceptual, but also practical and institutional. Global politics and institutions are increasingly "enduring and institutionally dense" (Cohen and Sabel 2006, p. 166), providing scope for an increasing involvement of will beyond the institutions of the state. Although there is no agreement on what new institutions are required to supplement the diminished powers of nation states the idea of a world state is widely rejected (whether because of a general scepticism concerning the possibility or legitimacy of cosmopolitan political institutions (e.g. Nagel 2005) or because current forms of international political authority are undemocratic (e.g. Bohman 2007)). Conceptual revision towards a post-Westphalian notion of citizenship should not therefore presuppose a world state, but should be based on conceptions of transnational civil society and public spheres, and the normative power of human rights.

For those who hold out hope for a cosmopolitan global order, transnational civil society and public spheres are much more promising routes than states, especially in the light of emerging globalized forms of domination. Such associations are seen as necessary (though not sufficient) conditions for transnational democracy (Bohman 2007, p. 62). Publics constituting the global citizenry can provide forums for the associative life of civil society and the diffusion of public opinion, in which the pool of reasons available to deliberation can be enlarged and transformed. Whereas in the case of a single *demos* publics provide access to influence over states' sovereign power by mediating public opinion through the collective deliberation of the *demos*, in transnational politics, the democratizing effects of publics consists in the creation of communicative networks as dispersed and distributed as the authorities with which they interact. Networks open up informal channels of influence, especially for civic and corporate NGOs, but while they are decentred and

transnational they lack sufficient popular legitimacy. Human rights have a crucial role to play in supplying the missing normative basis of political community that constitutes humanity as the global demos. International institutions already hold actors accountable to widely endorsed norms of human rights that extend the traditional republican view that rights are in the first instance attached to a responsive political community. Such international institutions justify thinking of humanity as an emerging political community, in an international system constituted by a human rights framework (Benhabib 2007).

Benhabib argues that transnational constitutionalism is indispensable for the creation of a reflexive, deliberative, dispersed order that is continuously subject to deliberative assessment of citizens (2007, p. 156). This process is necessary for the constitution of authoritative decision-making in a public sphere that is open to democratic control. This is far from the image of a world state and as a nascent transnational order it does not yet constitute a fully fledged polity. Its contours and the accompanying forms of citizenship that it requires will take time to develop. Whatever the institutional form of a global public sphere as an authoritative transnational structure turns out to be, the consensus is that it will be a complex structure that allows for 'distributed will formation'. Such a structure has been variously described as 'deliberative polyarchy' (Cohen and Sabel 2004), 'vertically dispersed sovereignty' (Pogge 2002) and 'plurarchic sovereignty' (Kuper 2004).

## Educating Global Citizens

In the post-Westphalian world of global association, future global citizens need to be educated to participate in decisions not only about local issues but also about matters that go beyond the concerns of the members of the nation state and extend to issues that affect distant others. The frame of the nation state is no longer adequate as the context for interpreting citizenship, as the context in which democratic citizens address matters of shared concern. Many of the cognitive and affective capacities considered earlier in our account of the liberal and republican traditions still apply, but some reconceptualization of the concept of citizenship *education* is required to match the notion of global citizenship adumbrated in the previous section. So enlarged thought and the democratic principle of equal standing among those who participate in processes of will formation can no longer be confined to awareness of the needs and interests of fellow national citizens, as a far wider public connects future citizens to others implicated in shared global problems. This suggests that the more minimal forms of citizenship that are restricted largely to inculcating civility are not sufficient. Education for global citizenship must develop a critical understanding of transnational institutions and the conditions of their legitimacy. Preparation for a maximal form of citizenship in a directly deliberative polyarchy calls for learning to exercise wide participation and capacities for problem-solving to make global institutions democratically accountable, for 'globalization from below'. Critical discussion of the actions of transnational institutions must

include a thoroughgoing, serious investigation of global issues (Singer 2002; Sachs 2008), as well as wider understanding of the contexts and perspectives of others.

The global citizenry needs to be sufficiently informed and motivated to be able to engage a far wider range of institutions and issues, to be aware of the needs and perspectives of others no matter how different they may be. Citizenship education, in addition to fostering commitments to global objectives, needs to ensure that students receive adequate exposure to issues that clearly depend for their successful treatment or resolution on worldwide co-operation and interaction, such as human rights, climate change, sustainability, and conflict and migration. This requires a robust conception of civic education, a sense of membership of a global community and ability to access and participate in will formation in complex, polyarchic structures, some overlapping and permeable to one another, that allow for distributed will formation. Global citizenship is multilayered and complex, requiring a form of civic education that expands respect, reciprocity and civility far beyond the multiculturalist dispositions now widely accepted as integral to citizenship education within national states. Varying global contexts require development of citizenship education to address local conditions and regional histories. So, for example, citizenship education in the Arab and Muslim world should “extend the current understandings of democratic citizenship education towards invoking a culture of acceptance and hospitality” integrated with Islamic discourses (Waghid and Smeyers 2014, p. 542).

These requirements point to curriculum reform to accommodate outward-looking perspectives and engagement. The broad understanding of economic and political structures standardly required for citizenship in liberal democracies will need to be extended to take in a more global perspective including the histories, languages and literatures of other societies, international politics, and critical literacies that embrace understanding of the media as a globalized institution that both fosters globalization and offer ways to learn with pupils elsewhere on the globe. Successfully educated people will think of themselves as global citizens with obligations that extend beyond national boundaries. And if the historical meaning of citizenship embraces not only citizen capacities and the exercise of citizenship as agency, but also equal standing and a right to the social dimensions of citizenship, as articulated by Marshall, this will have radical implications for global redistribution of educational resources as a necessary dimension of post-statist, global citizenship.

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# Refugees, Statelessness, and Education



Niclas Månsson

## Introduction

Transnational migration is not new. It has been a constant element of human existence. In recent years, the issue of migration, voluntary and nonvoluntary, has been a frequent subject of public discourse in many countries, especially with regard to nonvoluntary migrants as refugees and asylum seekers. They come from different places such as Syria, Somalia, Afghanistan, and Iran, fleeing from war, genocide, political and religious persecution, harassment, discrimination, and torture. The numbers of refugees worldwide is at the highest level since World War II, and, according to the United Nations Refugee Agency (UNHCR), more than 51 million people are forcibly displaced refugees or asylum seekers or internally displaced persons (Zetter 2015). Approximately 95% of this forced displacement occurs in the global south, and over 50% of those refugees live in urban areas (Zetter 2015). The majority of people fleeing their homes are internally displaced persons. The 1951 Refugee Convention does not consider them refugees, however, because they are not outside their own countries or states. Even though internally displaced persons flee their homes on the same grounds as refugees, they stay in the territory of their home country and do not seek refugee status in another state (Zetter 2015; Kugelmann 2010).

The refugee situation has evolved since World War II and the Cold War era, and the legislation does not seem congruent with today's refugee situation. A refugee can be defined in at least two different ways: There can be *de jure* refugees, reflecting UNHCR's legal definition, and *de facto* refugees, reflecting the empirical

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situation worldwide (Kugelmann 2010). According to the 1951 Refugee Convention, a *de jure* refugee is someone who

owing to a well-founded fear of being persecuted for reasons of race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion, is outside the country of his nationality and is unable or, owing to such fear, is unwilling to avail himself of the protection of that country. (UNHCR 1990, p. 6)

The convention stipulates the legal criteria of refugee status using a definition of being ‘at risk’. Thus, less than half of the world’s forcibly displaced people are refugees in a *de jure* sense. *De facto* refugees are refugees—for instance, asylum seekers—whose applications are pending or have been denied but who cannot be expelled due to humanitarian reasons. Such refugees are not included in the formally recognized status of refugees according to the Refugee Convention (Zetter 2015; Kugelmann 2010). Their legal and personal situations depend on the laws of the countries they are in. In some countries, *de facto* refugees receive the same social and political rights as *de jure* refugees, but in other countries *de facto* refugees have no social or political rights. Although different categories of refugees have different legal statuses and different political and social rights, they all differ from voluntary migrants and nonmigrants. Refugees have all been deprived of their legal status as citizens—either they have lost it (*de facto* refugees) or they cannot enjoy its associated rights (*de jure* refugees)—and thereby their right to political belonging and agency (Krause 2008; Kugelmann 2010).

Migration policies for providing safe havens usually place refugees and asylum seekers in detention centers, often at the margins of society, situated far from the average citizens who enjoy the unrestricted right to reside in their own countries. This type of center is usually called a ‘camp’ because it can contain a certain amount of people in a specific area (Turner 2015). Refugees thus come to live in fenced camps or in territories set aside as refugee settlements. The camp can be defined in different ways and can take different forms, such as the government-run camps in Turkey that host approximately 217,000 Syrian refugees, the Grande-Synthe camp near Dunkirk in France that accommodates up to 2500 migrants, or an old, abandoned school in a small town in Sweden that offers shelter to approximately 100 people. But camps are temporary (in some cases, some might say ‘permanently temporary’) solutions to house people who are “out of place” (Bauman 2002, p. 113; Turner 2015, p. 2). Thus, refugees are in a state of being neither/nor rather than either/or. They do not belong to the host country, and they no longer belong to the country they left; although they inhabit the territory, they are “in it, but not of it” (Bauman 2002, p. 113).

Even though the question of refugees cannot be confined to Europe, the issue in Europe deserves some attention because the European Union has become a geopolitical hotspot with regard to refugees seeking safe haven. A so-called ‘immigration crisis’ erupted in Europe in the middle of 2000, culminating in 2015 with a massive increase in displaced persons seeking asylum, the largest since the end of World War II (Guild et al. 2015; Peters and Besley 2015). In the wake of the crisis, EU member states are taking new measures to develop restrictive and defensive immigration



policies to keep the unsolicited and uninvited migrants out. The focus on national security has eclipsed the focus on solidarity for the forcibly displaced populations within the European Union. The increasing needs for state security and border control have led to stricter asylum policies, preventing refugees from being granted temporary or permanent residence and making it more difficult to obtain asylum in the European Union (Kraler et al. 2015). These measures have not been able to stop people from entering the EU (or countries outside the EU, for that matter). As Zetter (2015, p. 3) points out, “Given the global scale of irregular migration, there are likely to be millions more forcibly displaced people who have not traveled through legal challenges or registered their claim for protection with authorities”. These nonvoluntary migrants are not seen as refugees in the legal sense; they are *de facto* refugees.

The state of affairs of people being on the move is complex, and it influences different societies in different ways. The refugee situation also influences educational praxis and educational research and raises the question of how educators should respond to the refugee crisis (Devine 2015). The question concerns not only the growing numbers of refugee children in schools and of people involved in adult education or other sorts of educational measures—or even how the crisis affects ideas of national identity and notions of solidarity and social coherence; the question also concerns understanding and taking responsibility for the crisis the refugees are facing and what it means to be in but not of a place.

When it comes to the question of refugees, educational research has generally focused more on migrants (refugees included) and the process of admission, inclusion, and citizenship, rather than on the existential state of the refugee living in a condition of statelessness. Even if the processes of admission, inclusion, and citizenship are important issues, the focus seems too narrow because it only includes *de jure* refugees and misses those who remain outside the political community (Krause 2008; Parekh 2014). Since refugees have no legal or effective citizenship and thus cannot enjoy its associated rights, they live more or less outside humankind. They are Agamben’s *Homo Sacer* (1998) incarnate, as their political and legal status is considered a temporary state. With the help of the works of Hannah Arendt and Giorgio Agamben on refugees and citizenship, I will show that even if questions of admission, inclusion, and citizenship are important when it comes to issues concerning refugees and education, the existential dimension must be illuminated as well (cf. Parekh 2014). Without ignoring the legislative dimension, our including the existential dimension is fundamental for keeping alive the educational questions about the past and the present, the local and the global, and inhabitants and migrants. Hence, in the analyses that follow, I will explore the complexity that surrounds the question of refugees in educational research.

## Refugees and Educational Research

Educational research on refugees usually takes its point of departure from the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which, as Brown (2013, pp. xiii–xiv) expresses it, says that “we all have a responsibility to protect, educate, and provide

solace for the displaced (migrants, asylum-seekers, refugees, stateless, and undocumented) among us”.

Empirical studies on refugees and education usually focus on the relation between education and refugees in their homelands or in their host countries, describing how education actually works during conflicts. In such situations regular education tends to be disturbed or disrupted, and there are no guarantees that the home country or host country will want to start a systematic education for children who inhabit different detention centers or camps (see, e.g., Demirdjian 2012; Brown and Krasteva 2013). The studies usually describe actual educational conditions or situations and successful or unsuccessful educational efforts and either suggest or discuss policies and practices for the promotion of social justice and educational opportunities for refugees.

Educational research with a philosophical approach generally focuses more on what education can do for refugees in terms of enabling them to be included in and a part of society, rather than on life in the camp. That education is an important tool for social inclusion is widely recognized, but integrational measures take varying forms. A more liberal tradition of integration is based on a vision of individuals as autonomous beings and views social participation as a free and autonomous choice. A more communitarian approach proposes a collective solution and takes care not to disregard a person’s language, culture, religion, tradition, values, ethnicity, and so forth when it comes to social inclusion and social relations (Vertovec and Wessendorf 2006). The discussion of inclusion and education usually relates to questions of multiculturalism, the multicultural society, and multicultural education in liberal democracies. It does so for at least two reasons: (a) because states are more ethnically diverse due to migration and (b) because the increased legal and political status of minorities has led to greater acceptance of cultural diversity (Enslin and Hedge 2010, p. 387). The term multicultural society applies to a society that contains a variety of ethnic and national cultures and where there is a flow of cultural propositions and liberties of cultural choice. A multicultural democracy needs an increased recognition of diversity in order to promote a sense of unity and recognition of an overarching set of values, ideals, and goals to which all citizens are committed. Below, in relation to the question of refugees, I will discuss three traditions that all show how it is possible to invoke such ideals in education.

### ***Multicultural Education, Citizenship Education, and Cosmopolitan Education***

I am aware that this short description of the traditions—multicultural education, citizenship education, and cosmopolitan education—does not include or represent the diversity and the complexity of their content. I will describe and discuss the main characteristics of the chosen traditions in relation to the question of education

and refugees in order to clarify how these traditions respond to the refugee crisis. I will begin by describing multicultural education.

According to Gutmann (2009), multicultural education is not just an educational task directed to students; it is also a way of schooling society toward the very guiding principle of multiculturalism—namely, civil equality. A multicultural education that builds on ideals of freedom, justice, equality, equity, and human dignity helps students learn about, and of, other cultures and to develop positive attitudes toward cultural diversity and tolerance (Levinson 2009; Enslin and Hedge 2010). With tolerance comes respect for other cultures and the different ways people lead their lives. Multicultural education also promotes social change, especially by eliminating racism, prejudice, and discrimination.

Citizenship education is much in line with the guiding goals of multicultural education; that is, it aims to foster a caring and enlightened population, with citizens who participate in discussions concerning society (Banks 2008). Citizenship education is about bridging the gap between the individual as an autonomous subject entitled to the rights inherent in the human condition and the citizen as one entitled to the civic and political rights recognized by the national constitution of any given liberal democracy. People are both individuals and citizens of the societies to which they belong; hence, human rights and citizenship are strongly connected or interdependent.

Multicultural education and citizenship education carry their own internal tensions. In her mapping of multicultural education, Levinson (2009) points to one such tension involved with the goal of preserving minority groups' cultures, or ways of living, saying that the goal "may require the implementation of an *exclusive* curriculum that teaches the beliefs of the minority group culture *instead* of the beliefs of other groups" (p. 437). This example shows, according to Levinson, how one goal within multicultural education works in opposition to other goals, "such as increasing individual autonomy or promoting mutual respect" (p. 437). On the other hand, some cultures might need a more preserving goal in order not to lose their language and cultural identity. Gutmann (2009) sees a challenge to civic equality when "some multicultural conditions successfully challenge the democratic framework itself" and suggests "the need for a guiding principle other than civic equality" (p. 422). Other scholars do not use universal principles or goals as Gutmann does; they acknowledge that existing structures are not enough for an inclusive education since the universal goals of multicultural education belong to the dominant culture (Enslin and Hedge 2010).

Multicultural education and citizenship education are used as arguments against the dehumanization of refugees. Since these types of education are not possible without identity politics, they risk estranging people rather than dissolving categories such as 'we and them', 'inside and outside', and 'the familiar and the strange'; "the preservation of bounded membership within ethnic and citizenship boundaries" comes with identity (Zembylas 2010, p. 34; see also Månsson and Langmann 2011). Critics might argue that this is the case with multiculturalism and democracy

in general, since they are principles for the regulation of social life from above. These traditions offer little or no space for inclusion of refugees, at least not for de facto refugees because they live outside the legal realm and thus do not belong to the political community.

When it comes to arguments against the dehumanization of strangers and for the promotion of equality and social justice on a global scale, the idea of cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan education comes to mind. Cosmopolitanism denotes a vision, or an idea, of the world that sees all humanity as belonging to the same community as citizens of the world, a community that transcends local loyalties and traditions. The idea is to connect an abstract universalism (shared values such as freedom, justice, and equality) with a specific moral commitment that serves to govern a well-ordered society, or city-state, where citizens, irrespective of religious, cultural, or political affiliation, belong to the same polity on equal grounds and with equal entitlements and obligations (for an overview, see Held and Brown 2010). There is, however, a tension between an abstract universalism and the specific commitment. As Peters (2010) points out, there is a certain risk that the abstract principle of cosmopolitanism “mask a Eurocentrism of values and take the place of analysis anchored in the geopolitical realities of the contemporary world” (p. 3). Hence, cosmopolitanism needs to be rethought against the background of the emerging spatial policies of late-capitalist globalization in order to develop a new form of cosmopolitanism that responds to “the mounting pluralism in societies around the globe” (Todd 2009, p. 25). The cosmopolitan idea has been appealed to in the field of education as a form of critical global awareness or as the basis of citizenship education (Strand 2010). The notion of cosmopolitanism is, in other words, a benign form of globalization. Whether in its classical or its newer strand, “educational cosmopolitanism is devoted, by and large, to the world of human beings and/or human emergencies” (Spector 2014, p. 425).

There is no doubt that classical and new aspects of cosmopolitanism and cosmopolitan education express a humanitarian and moral response that capture mankind as such and include all human beings in a global community as citizens of the world. They therefore have the potential to also embrace the refugee (both de jure and de facto). However, when it comes to the situation of the refugee de facto, at least according to the empirical situation worldwide, cosmopolitanism seems to overlook the fact that such refugees live more or less outside of humankind and do not share the world with the rest of humanity. They are in it but not of it, and they are not part of the juridical and political system that surrounds them. According to Biesta (2015), these refugees fall outside the rationale or world view of cosmopolitanism because the very existence of de facto refugees makes it evident “that the world is...not an ordered and encompassing (kosmos) political entity (polis) but is actually full of cracks” (Biesta 2015, p. 1381). These refugees represent ‘the cracks’ Biesta is talking about in that they are neither foreigners nor citizens. Asylum for people who effectively live in limbo—as neither/nor rather than either/or—“is a demand that in a fundamental sense cannot be met by a system because it constantly exposes the insufficiency of systems and will continue to do so” (Biesta 2015, p. 1382).

To conclude, multicultural education and citizenship education are political and juridical responses to migration rather than to the refugee crisis in that they look at admission, inclusion, and citizenship from a more national or local perspective. Even though the education system is one of the critical arenas in society through which the incorporation of refugees is organized, the focus on the processes of admission, inclusion, and citizenship obscures the existential conditions or circumstances refugees face living in a state of statelessness. With the devotion to humanity and human rights, cosmopolitan education seems to be a proper political and moral response to the refugee crisis because it goes beyond the processes of admission and takes a global perspective on inclusion and citizenship by welcoming all humankind to share the same world together, despite differences. In this sense, there is a cosmopolitan response toward the other as neither/nor (see, for example, Todd 2009). However, with its focus on citizenship, humanity, and human rights, cosmopolitan education does not encompass *de facto* refugees because their empirical reality does not really fit cosmopolitan education's rationale.

When it comes to developing an understanding of refugees and statelessness—or the state of temporariness, which is a more appropriate description of the current global situation—the works of Arendt and Agamben on refugees and statelessness are important. Their views on refugees and human rights offer ways of thinking differently about the educational response to the refugee crisis, as they go beyond traditions that really cannot approach terms like otherness, human rights, and citizenship without reference to identity or commonality. Arendt and Agamben perceive the state of the refugee not only as a legal issue but also as an existential matter (Parekh 2014). Agamben uses Arendt's perspective on statelessness—namely, that the common conception of human rights contains a paradox: that is, it supposes each person in his or her natural condition to be the source and bearer of inborn rights while presupposing that person to be a citizen with membership in a nation-state (Gündoğdu 2011; Parekh 2014). Both Arendt and Agamben demystify the “cosmopolitan aura of human rights” (Gündoğdu 2011, p. 2), which turn out not to be universal “but in fact the property of citizens” (Schuilenburg 2008, p. 88; see also Todd 2009).

## Refugees, Statelessness, and the Making of the Nonhuman

According to Arendt, the key to understanding the refugee as a stateless individual is to grasp his or her political significance. In her description of the state of mind of being a Jewish refugee, Arendt does not only describe her own experience; she also highlights the plight of the stateless human being who has no legitimate legal or political status (Arendt 1943). In *The Origins of Totalitarianism*, Arendt (1951/1994a) gives witness to the emergence of an increasing number of people (i.e., refugees) whose condition literally places them outside the law. According to Arendt, in addition to a juridical dimension that entails the loss of political community, the state of statelessness has an existential dimension that entails the loss of identity, expulsion from common humanity, and the loss of agency (Parekh 2014).

According to Arendt (1951/1994a), refugees experience two kinds of loss, one juridical and one political: the loss of their homes and thus of “a distinct place in the world” and the loss of governmental protection and thus of legal status in their home countries and “in all countries” (p. 173–174). When Arendt discusses the juridical state of the refugee as a stateless person, she is not referring to a number of rights protected by the law: the stateless person’s deprivation is much more profound in that they are deprived of the right to have rights—the fundamental right to belong to an organized community: “Once they had left their homeland they remained homeless, once they had left their state they became stateless; once they had been deprived of their human rights they were rightless, the scum of the earth” (Arendt 1951/1994a, p. 147).

Standing outside the law, being neither citizens nor foreigners, the stateless reveal a crisis of human rights rather than being protected by human rights: “If a human being loses his political status, he should, according to the implication of the inborn and inalienable rights of man, come under exactly the situation for which the declaration of such general rights provided” (Arendt 1951/1994a, p. 180). But according to Arendt (1951/1994a), that is not true. Instead of becoming a part of the nation they are admitted to, refugees’ “statelessness spread[s] like a contagious disease” (p. 165). Being neither a citizen nor a foreigner, the stateless person’s nonpolitical condition also affects the person’s identity and existential mode (Parekh 2014).

In an existential sense, statelessness deprives people not only of governmental protection “but also of all clearly established, officially recognized identity” (Arendt 1951/1994a, p. 167). This third kind of loss, which is existential rather than juridical or political, reduces stateless people to mere humans thrown back into a state of nature, so to speak. Being a mere human does not mean being human among peers: it means being less than human, deprived of human rights, suffering “rightlessness” and profound “loss of political status” (p. 175). Expelled from common humanity, a condition engendered by statelessness, refugees live politically, economically, and socially outside the common world, even though they are physically in it. According to the totalitarian ideology, they are superfluous:

The totalitarian attempt to make men superfluous reflects the experience of modern masses of their superfluity on an overcrowded earth. The world of the dying, in which men are taught they are superfluous through a way of life in which punishment is meted out without connection with crime, in which exploitation is practiced without profit, and where work is performed without product, is a place where senselessness is daily produced anew. (Arendt 1951/1994b, p. 155)

The condition of being stateless also diminishes a person’s right to express an opinion, to speak, and act in a political manner as ordinary citizens may do (Arendt 1951/1994a, p. 176). Because of the severe limitations on the possibility to act politically, which amount to a deprivation of political agency, the refugee is no longer free.

Agamben (1998, 2008b) agrees with Arendt in his comment on the connection between the fates of the rights of man and the nation-state. Rather than serving to protect the human, the rights of man are connected to the rights of the citizen rather than the rights of the refugee. The refugee presence signals a crisis of the rights of man. The rights of man, or human rights, are thus not compatible with the (merely) human: the political and legal status of refugees is under consideration or ques-

tioned because refugees have fewer rights than citizens of the nation-state. A person is not a true human being, so to speak, until he or she becomes a citizen. This seems to be why Agamben (1998, 2008b) wants to separate “the concept of the refugee” from “the concept of the rights of man” (Agamben 1998, p. 78) instead of reconsidering human rights, as Arendt does.

Agamben (1998) goes back to the formulations of human rights in the eighteenth-century declarations. In his discussion on the juridical state of the refugee, in particular the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen, he shows how these declarations highlight the fissure between political and natural life. When Agamben argues on questions regarding the relation between the nation-state, citizens, and refugees, he uses the ancient distinction between *zoē* (naked life) and *bios* (political life). This distinction separates the (merely) human life, which is called simple or natural life, from the qualified life of an individual or group belonging to a political community. Agamben uses the figure of *Homo Sacer*, from ancient Roman law, to describe the form of life called naked or simple life (Agamben 1998). *Homo Sacer* is comparable to the bandit, the outlaw who has been excommunicated and stripped of his right to belong to a political community. Once a person is excommunicated, he or she loses his or her juridical identity and is assigned the identity of an outlaw. Hence, the refugee does not live outside society, even though he or she is not considered to belong to the society. When a person is expelled from a political community, the existential conditions of his or her life change such that his or her life is less valuable than other people’s lives.

According to Agamben (1998), the distinction between *zoē* and *bios* rests on the biopolitical. Instead of distinguishing biopower from sovereign power, as Foucault did, Agamben sees sovereign power as biopolitical, as it is defined as power over life. When life becomes biopolitical, *zoē* becomes part of the qualified life—but only through a person’s excommunication. Biopolitics is not grounded in the community or the people: it rests on the power to declare the state of exception. Hence, biopolitics operates under the logic of the “ban” (p. 23), where the separation between *zoē* and *bios* is constituted by the simultaneous exclusion and inclusion of bare life. *Zoē* is trapped in a certain status known as “inclusive exclusion” (p. 12). The life of *Homo Sacer* is not only bare life but also a life trapped in a special relation to the law, a life lived in the ‘exception-zone’—the “inclusive exclusion (an *exceptio*) of *zoē* in the *polis*” (p. 12). With this in mind, *Homo Sacer*’s possibilities for agency seem remote, if not nonexistent (as for Arendt’s stateless person).

*Homo Sacer* is not only a figure in ancient Roman law; it is a recurrent figure in modern history. One example is Agamben’s reference to the racial laws and the legal status of Jews in Nazi Germany, where Jews were deprived of all dignity: “The Jew is a human being who has been deprived of all *Würde*, all dignity; he is merely human—and for that reason, non-human” (Agamben 2008a, p. 68). Another example is the Taliban fighters at the Guantánamo Bay detention camp, who are neither prisoners nor convicted, and as such, subject to detention for indefinite periods of time (Agamben 2005). Stripped of political and legal rights, the Jew and the Taliban fighter share the fate of the refugee: existing in a state of exception, as less worthy than other human beings.



This political strategy that leaves the refugee in a state of exception produces a boundary that separates the outside from the inside. If there are no limits, or restrictions, to what it is possible to do to a person living outside the law, the refugee stands without legal protection. In order to understand the consequences the refugee faces, the refugee has to be regarded as “the central figure of our political history” (Agamben 2008b, p. 93). Further, in order to go beyond current refugee politics, the refugee must be considered for what he or she is: “nothing less than a limit-concept that at once brings a radical crisis to the principles of the nation-state and clears the way for a renewal of categories that can no longer be delayed” (p. 94).

What the renewal of these categories means is not clear, however (see Schuilenburg 2008). What is clear is that Agamben is experimenting with going beyond biopolitics, or with escaping the gaze of sovereignty, by developing an alternative ontology based on relations not as we know them but “beyond every figure of relation” and beyond “the limit relation that is the sovereign Ban” (Agamben 1998, p. 33). It is in this respect that Agamben (2007) develops the notion of “whatever singularities” (p. 5), which manifests the rethinking of community. *Whatever singularity* is a manifestation of a community that allows a formation without the affirmation of identity; it is no more than a co-belonging of singularities. *Whatever* being is “neither particular nor universal; the example is a singular object that presents itself as such, that *shows* its singularity” (p. 9). It is a community of singularities who share nothing more than their singularity.

Agamben sketches the contours of a common community—a community to come—but they remain vague and seem hard to operationalize. It is clear, however, that Agamben wants to challenge or even dissolve normative distinctions—such as nature and politics, human and nonhuman, and normality and exception—by which the world is constructed and understood and that he wants to go beyond the point where mere humans (such as refugees) are the main focus for political control and management:

Only in a world in which the spaces of states have been thus perforated and topologically deformed and in which the citizen has been able to recognize the refugee that he or she is – only in such a world is the political survival of humankind today thinkable. (Agamben 2008b, p. 95)

### ***Beyond Education for the Included***

The thoughts of Agamben, developed with Arendt’s understanding of statelessness, can help us understand how different forms of domination manifest in discourse practices and are materialized in human relations, such as in education, for Agamben’s thoughts help us diagnose new forms of domination in contemporary politics that are either “hidden in benign humanitarian and liberal claims” (Zembylas 2010, p. 42) or protected by the UN Declaration of Human Rights.

Since education is one of the most important tools for social inclusion and social participation, it is also a crucial issue for the integrational measures taken in order

to meet the needs of refugees arriving in unknown places. The deliberative claims of education, social justice, and citizenship are governed by an idea or perhaps several different ideas that promote a certain social fabric in order to control plurality and a democratic way of life, and these ideas create possibilities for those who are supposed to be included in society. The transformation and structuring of social reality based on an “assumed sameness” of those who are supposed to be socialized is similar to the transformation of new members of society into governable subjects. In this process, citizenship becomes a marker of difference that specifies the juridical and political state of the person and risks strengthening rather than dissolving group identities. In this situation, it becomes obvious that education is a place for the included (including *de jure* refugees) rather than for *de facto* refugees, who are unprotected by the law.

Even though multicultural education, citizenship education, and cosmopolitan education have some differences, they also have something in common: their devotion to humanity, human rights, and citizenship. According to these traditions, a proper educational response to the refugee crisis is to be found in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which expresses that “we all have a responsibility to protect, educate, and provide solace for the displaced...among us” (Brown 2013, pp. xiii-xiv). Both multicultural education and citizenship education, with their focus on admission, inclusion, and citizenship, build their ideas of a just education within the existing political and juridical system and, it seems to me, focus more on migration and not particularly on refugees. A cosmopolitan educational perspective takes its response to the refugee crisis a step further by invoking a global perspective on citizenship that captures all mankind belonging to the same global community, without bringing any negative attention to local differences. The empirical situation of refugees seems to be given less attention, however, than globalization, human rights, and citizenship. The situation of *de facto* refugees does not really fit the picture of the cosmopolitan citizen of the world, which is shaped by a critical global awareness and based on citizenship and human rights.

With regard to citizenship and human rights, there is a need within educational research to focus on the parallel processes of the preservation and protection of human rights and citizenship and the making of the nonhuman. If a person is considered not truly human until he or she becomes a citizen, there is a need to either reconsider human rights, as Arendt does, or to detach the concept of the refugee from the concept of the rights of man, as Agamben suggests. Thus, Arendt’s and Agamben’s views on the “nonpolitical” and “nonjuridical” condition of refugees offer ways of thinking differently about the educational response to the refugee crisis, since they go beyond traditions that cannot come to terms with “whateverness” without reference to identity or commonality. A responsible educational response to the refugee crisis should start not from what we already know but from what we do not really know and travel toward a state that has not yet been. It would offer a view of education that is not built on the same power structures as society, where mere humans become the subject of political control and social security, and would go beyond education only for the included.

## Concluding Remarks

In this chapter, I have explored the question of how the current issue concerning refugees, or the refugee crisis, influences educational research (and thereby, presumably, educational praxis). As I said earlier, an educational response to the refugee crisis is not only about the number of refugees receiving education or how the crisis affects ideas of national identity and notions of solidarity. It must also involve understanding and taking responsibility for the problems refugees face and for their condition of being in but not of the place. The educational approaches I have addressed in this chapter—multicultural education, citizenship education, and cosmopolitan education—provide important contributions toward understanding how education can be more inclusive and more just. By including newcomers to a multicultural and democratic society, they focus on the juridical and political processes of what it means to be a refugee or what it means to become a citizen, but they seem to (more or less) forget the existential state of the refugee. The traditions described in this chapter do not include a notion of the state of the refugees but only notions of how the refugee can be one of us, a peer among peers in a pluralistic democracy. I have raised the question of the existential state of the refugee in order to give another perspective on the issue. Although we need not neglect the processes of admission, inclusion, and citizenship, we must try to understand the loss of human significance and agency the refugee faces as a nonvoluntary traveler who is denied equal access to society and the same rights as ordinary citizens if we are to share the world of the refugee and thus be able to approach the refugee in a common world rather than from a position outside the refugee's world.

Sharing the world of the refugee is a question of proximity—rather than one of deliberation and achieving consensus—through which there is the possibility to meet the refugee on his or her own terms and in his or her own rights, as a human among humans. The potential for sharing an unknown person's world is by no means certain, as living together in a world of difference has its obstacles. Nationality, religion, ideology, culture, and so forth have all been proven important elements in refocusing the concern for the refugee toward a concern for the well-being of society. There is, in the works of Arendt and Agamben, a call for a renewal of categories such that the refugee is not reduced to a lawless figure revealing a crisis of human rights. The refugee, or rather, acknowledgement of the state of the refugee, can instead be considered a vehicle for social and political change or transformation. Even though the borders have their own tragedies, they also have their own dynamics that might provide opportunities for something new to be born. Hence, educational concern for refugees must comprehend the existential question of what it means to be a refugee in order to sustain the conversation between the past and the present, the inside and the outside, the local and the global, and newcomers and residents.

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# The Public and Private in Education



Chris Higgins

## Introduction

The purpose of this chapter is to examine the origins, conceptual contours, and current state of the perennial debate over the public and private in education. The problem is that there is no single such debate, since the contrast between public and private constitutes one of the West's 'grand dichotomies', one "used to subsume a wide range of... important distinctions" emerging out of different "universes of discourse, each with its own complex historical cargo of assumptions and connotations".<sup>1</sup> Indeed, given their "protean" nature (Weintraub 1997, p. 2), concepts of public and private can be seen as central to every chapter in the history of Western education.<sup>2</sup>

Consider first the long prehistory of modern, mass, compulsory schooling. For centuries, education was understood primarily as civic education, as the shaping of dispositions for successful participation in public life. Three brief examples will suffice to show the dominance of civic rationales from ancient Rome to the Renaissance. As Bruce Kimball (2010, p. 32) remarks, Cicero's *De Oratore* (On the Orator) served for two millenia as the "classic expression of the idea of liberal education understood as a preparation for someone seeking to lead the political and social affairs of a republic". In the twelfth-century *Metalogicon* of John of Salisbury, Chambliss (1987, pp. 3–4) notes, the "aim is not to study [the] arts for their own sake, but for... examples of human conduct" and for "the sake of doing 'good works'". Similarly,

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<sup>1</sup>I am quoting from Weintraub (1997, pp. 1, 3) who credits this phrase and idea to Bobbio (1989), apparently preferring "grand dichotomy" as a translation of Bobbio's "la grande dicotomia".

<sup>2</sup>Higgins and Knight Abowitz (2011b) examine five key ambiguities in the concept of the public.

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Grafton and Jardine (1986, pp. 1–2) characterize the humanistic education of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries as aimed at the “the active man of affairs”.

The history of education takes a dramatic turn in the late eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, as we see not only the increasing equation of education with formal education and a widening participation in formal education but also a new role for a new kind of state. Without denying such factors as the invention of the printing press, the Reformation, and changing conceptions of childhood, it is the needs of the new, centralized nation states that primarily drive universal, compulsory schooling.<sup>3</sup> In the rapid shift from an artisan-merchant to an industrial mode of production, the new states needed an institution capable of training a skilled, differentiated workforce accustomed to a new time discipline and work rhythm; amidst constant geopolitical conflict, the new states needed a citizenry willing to march to war and thus an institution capable of fostering a strong allegiance to a more abstract polity (e.g., Germany rather than, say, the Principality of Waldeck and Pymont).<sup>4</sup> Modern schooling is, thus, state education, and public in that sense.<sup>5</sup>

As modern mass, schooling has evolved, the public/private contrast has only become more central to our educational thinking. With the rise of the ‘common school’ in modern democratic nation states, educational debates have gravitated to questions of liberty and solidarity, equality and diversity: To what extent can the state legitimately compel participation in common schools? What are the limits of allowing citizens to opt out of common schools before this begins to erode public life? Do common schools actually function according to their own democratic rhetorics, namely, (1) to bring citizens together productively across differences and (2) to ensure meritocratically that individual life opportunities are a product of individual effort and talent rather than of accidents of birth (socio-economic status, religion, race, gender, etc.). These are questions about the conditions of democratic, public life.

In recent years, the very idea of public education has come into doubt as scholars have turned their attention to the new logics of privatization operating in this rather late stage of capitalism typically tagged with the catch-phrase ‘neo-liberalism’. As Blacker (2013, pp. 25–27 and *passim*) explains, neo-liberalism is a superstructural, “justificatory fantasy” accompanying four basic shifts in the structure of capital: (1) “the globalization of labor and consumer markets”; (2) “the propping up of demand...through the massive... pusher-like extension of consumer credit”; (3) the rise of casino capitalism (i.e., “the mass migration of capital from production to... the highly leveraged, phantasmagoria of speculative finance”); and (4) “an increased

<sup>3</sup>On the rise of print culture and changing conceptions of childhood, see, e.g., Postman (1982, Part 1). For a colorful encapsulation of the Protestant argument for mass literacy, see Massachusetts’ “that old deluder Satan” Law of 1647 (in, e.g., J. W. Fraser 2001, p. 8).

<sup>4</sup>Here I am following the pocket history offered by Kieran Egan (2008, p. 6). For a thorough treatment of the symbiosis between modern schooling and state formation, see Green (1990). On the relation of modern schooling to the rhythms of industrial work, see, for example, Thompson (1967, p. 84ff).

<sup>5</sup>That non-government-run schools arise as exceptions only prove the rule.



adventurism toward accumulation by dispossession as stressed elites seek to marketize, financialize and finally burglarize erstwhile public resources such as criminal justice, health, and education systems”.

In education, the justificatory project is hinged on the rhetoric of ‘choice’, a project launched in the writings of Milton Friedman, from the cautiously titled ‘Role of Government in Education’ (1955) to the ultimately impatient if not imperious, ‘Public Schools: Make Them Private’ (Friedman 1997). Meanwhile, educational versions of ‘accumulation by dispossession’ are not hard to find. In the United States, while the initial frontal assault of the voucher movement has been slowed by that pesky little thing called the Establishment Clause, profiteers have nonetheless made deep inroads through charter schools and through the privatization of what has emerged as the main activity of contemporary schools, testing. One recent estimate valued the testing business at \$2 billion annually, noting that just one company, Pearson, spent \$8 million lobbying US lawmakers over a 5-year period (Strauss 2015; on Pearson’s grander ambitions, see Kamenetz 2016).

As even this brief history makes clear (cf. Feinberg 2012), our thinking about education – from early forms of civic education to modern state schooling, the dialectics of democratic education, and the new forms of privatization – is inseparable from our thinking about the public and private. Without further specification, then, a review of the public/private question in education becomes a review of education itself. In order to frame a more tractable object of inquiry, we will need to make some distinctions.

## What Makes a Public School Public?<sup>6</sup>

Let us begin with the classical, economic distinction between private and public goods. Ironically, the concept of ‘public goods’ is classified by economists under the category of ‘market failures’. The idea is that market mechanisms are disrupted by the presence of “non-rivalrous” goods (e.g., looking at a painting in museum) for which “each individual’s consumption... leads to no subtraction from any other individual’s consumption of that good” (Samuelson 1954, p. 387). Market efficiency is further undermined by so-called ‘free riders’ who consume ‘non-excludable’ goods (e.g., fish, in public waterways) without paying, who benefit

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<sup>6</sup>This section draws in part on Higgins (2011b, pp. 455–457). For a special issue devoted to this question, see Higgins and Knight Abowitz (2011a). As we explain, it is hard even to pose this question given “the banality of the phrase [‘public school’] in some contexts and its sacredness in others” (Higgins and Knight Abowitz 2011b, p. 365). Educational discourse displays a number of creative ways of dodging the question, including:

*nominalism* (the public schools are those schools designated as such), *formalism* (a school counts as public if it is funded by tax dollars, overseen by elected officials, and so on, regardless of how well it realizes its public mission), *sentimentality* (our public schools ensure equal opportunity, an educated electorate, and social unity), and *indirectness* (the public school does not favor any particular view of the good life). (Higgins 2011b, p. 455, emphasis added; see also Higgins and Knight Abowitz 2011b, pp. 365–369)

from positive ‘spillover effects’ generated by the investment of others (e.g., when one house’s renovation lifts real estate values for the whole block), or by passing on the costs of negative spillover effects (e.g., pollution). For economists, then, public goods are those we secure collectively because their lack of rivalry and excludability makes them inimical to market logics. It is hard to generate a market in lighthouses when you cannot stop non-paying boats from seeing the beacon and when their seeing it saps none of its power to alert others.

Interestingly, it is not at all clear that modern mass schooling, with its thoroughgoing tie to credentialism (see, for example, Collins 1979), meets either of these criteria. The credential market is clearly rivalrous (Labaree 1997; Donoghue 2008, pp. 111–138). The more holders of a particular degree, the less exchange value it has. This makes admissions rivalrous and exerts a downward pressure on earlier stages of schooling even if they feature open admissions: if getting into the school wasn’t rivalrous, getting out, with the marks necessary to win the right spot at the next level, surely is. There could even be rivalry for educational goods when we bracket off credentialing. Imagine that the best piano teacher in the area says that she will give lessons to adult beginners for free, but only has room for ten students. Education comes closer to meeting the requirement of non-excludability, but only by way of spillover effects. While it is easy to limit who has access to (formal) educational institutions and experiences, the effects of education tend to radiate far beyond the individual student. We are all grateful to the teachers of J.D. Salinger and Jonas Salk. Economically speaking, then, formal education would seem to fall short of counting as a ‘pure public good’, instead constituting at best a so-called ‘common resource’ or mixed (rivalrous, non-excludable) good.

This is, to say the least, a deeply uninspiring conclusion. Surely the idea of public education names an aspiration greater than that of a partial market failure! This is where a further distinction offered by Charles Taylor (1995) proves helpful. For Taylor, this economic approach fundamentally misses the point. What the economists call public goods, he calls “convergent” goods (Taylor 1995, pp. 190–191). These are goods, as we have seen, that we tend to secure collectively since it is all but impossible to do otherwise. But they are still essentially private goods, objects of separate private valuations that happen to converge. National defense, for example, matters to me and it matters to you and it makes sense to pursue it together. Against both private (non-convergent) goods and convergent (private) goods, Taylor sets a category he calls ‘common goods’. These are goods that matter to me because they also matter to you. Taylor (1995, p. 190) identifies two varieties of common goods: “mediately common goods”, where what we value emerges only within an inter-subjective space of shared meanings, and “immediately common goods” where the good is precisely that we share some experience or meaning. Think of how strange it would be to speak of a good conversation as the convergence of two independent rational actors’ separate interests in conversing. While *Homo economicus* enters into relationships because they satisfy pre-existing preferences or serve as instrumental means to realizing another preference, human beings find themselves already situated in relationships within which they are able to perceive horizons of value, meaning, and purpose.

Like Taylor, Walter Feinberg (2016, p. 85) distinguishes individual values held individually (private goods), and “neighborhood effects” or “shared values held individually” (convergent goods), from genuinely “common values”. However, Feinberg (2016, pp. 85–86) adds a helpful further distinction, pointing out that common values can be held both unreflectively and reflectively. While many of our common values remain hidden to us as the “implicit background conditions that generate shared judgments and emotional responses”, Feinberg (2016) wants to reserve the term “public values” for that subset of common values that we are able to lift into the foreground and subject to critical reflection. The development of concepts such as ‘sexual harassment’ and ‘rape within marriage’ is illustrative. Such concepts were impossible to formulate while we were still in the grips of deep (and deeply problematic) common values such as the idea that a woman’s place is in the home and that a wife is a husband’s property. Until we were finally able to surface these ideas and subject them to critical reflection, it was difficult to name, and perhaps even to think, why consent still mattered in marriage or why it was unacceptable to fill workplaces with images, utterances, and actions casting women as sex objects.<sup>7</sup>

Taylor’s and Feinberg’s distinctions immediately throw educational controversies of the last several decades into relief. It turns out that most defenders of public education in fact share a key assumption with the privatizers, namely, that the chief good of education is the private one of relative social mobility for individuals and families. The heated disagreement over the degree to which these private goods should be seen as convergent, and thus whether market mechanisms or common, social provision is most appropriate, serves to disguise a tacit agreement to beg the question of what might truly public, educational goods.

Before turning to this question, let me add two qualifications. First, I certainly do not mean to trivialize these debates, which involve basic questions of liberty, equality, and distributive justice. In the United States, we see increasing economic stratification, ongoing structural racism, and a system through which, as Richard Rorty (1999, p. 121) observes, “an increasingly greedy and heartless American middle class [has let] the quality of education a child receives become proportional to the assessed value of the parents’ real estate”. We have private schools for the super rich, lavish quasi-public schools for the pretty rich, and bleak public schools for the poor and working classes. By quasi-public, I mean government-run schools with ample physical, emotional, and intellectual resources, located in wealthy (and often mostly white) enclaves where parents pay the equivalent of private school tuition in the form of expensive homes and high property taxes to live in exclusive neighborhoods. In contrast, children living in poor neighborhoods will typically encounter behaviorist pedagogy, a curriculum narrowed to transmission of skills needed for low-wage jobs, and physical environments that range from the deeply anesthetic to the outright unsafe.<sup>8</sup> These are crucial, pressing matters, but the point is that we

<sup>7</sup>Here I am following Feinberg (2012, p. 16).

<sup>8</sup>The most famous chronicler of such conditions is of course Jonathan Kozol, from *Death at an Early Age* (1967) through *Savage Inequalities* (1991) to *The Shame of the Nation* (2005). For

need not choose between calling for distributive justice in the credential market and questioning the complete economization of contemporary education with its concomitant assumption that the goods of education are merely convergent. Education, we must insist, is a longstanding and robust sphere of valuation with its own distinctive goods, some of which may prove to be true public goods.<sup>9</sup>

The second caveat is that, even were we to conclude that educational attainment was merely a convergent good, the pursuit of justice related to its distribution seems like a perfect example of Taylor's 'mediately common goods', since our appreciation of justice requires the community of its seekers. What then are the truly public goods of education? With this refined concept of a public and public values in mind, let us now look at the historical project of the common school.

## The Common School: Ideals and Realities

The ideal behind the nineteenth-century, US common school movement is as simple to state as it is hard to realize. I offer two passages, one from Horace Mann himself and one from Lawrence Cremin, characterizing Mann's project:

According to the European theory, men are divided into classes,—some to toil and earn, others to seize and enjoy. According to the Massachusetts theory, all are to have an equal chance for earning, and equal security in what they earn. (Mann 1957, p. 84)

In [the common school] would mix the children of all creeds, classes, and backgrounds, the warm association of childhood kindling a spirit of mutual amity and respect which the strains and cleavages of adult life could never destroy. (Cremin 1957, p. 8)

In this prime example of nineteenth-century, New England trash talk, Mann captures the way in which schools could become instrumental to distributive justice.<sup>10</sup> Notice though that, at least in theory, it might be possible to provide this equal opportunity in separate schools. A century later, *Brown vs. Board* was to famously reject this as a live possibility in a structurally racist society.<sup>11</sup> But even for Mann

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example, on the new behaviorism in high-poverty, majority-minority schools, see Kozol (2005, Chapter 3); on their dumbed-down, no-collar vocationalism, see Kozol (2005, Chapter 4); on the anesthetic qualities of such schools, see Kozol (2005, Chapter 7).

<sup>9</sup>As Michael Walzer has argued, justice requires a twofold struggle against both the monopolization of goods in any one sphere and against the dominance of one sphere over others. The more the boundaries between spheres dissolve and one set of goods becomes a universal currency translatable into standing in the other spheres, the greater the chance that a society will suffer a form of tyranny even worse than simple inequality. For a defense of spherical integrity in education, see Blacker (2007).

<sup>10</sup>With hindsight, the trash talk now seems unjustified since, while income inequality remains a problem in Europe, the problem is even more severe in the United States (OECD). The GINI coefficient for the United States is just shy of 0.4 (where zero is perfect equality and 1 is perfect inequality). The GINI values for EU countries range from 0.25 (Denmark) to 0.36 (Estonia).

<sup>11</sup>*Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954).

himself, as Cremin suggests, ‘common’ refers not only to equal provision but also to learning together across differences.

The theory is that congenial, early contact with those who are different from us will instill the dispositions needed for later public life, namely, the ability to show care for the ideas and values of others precisely when they differ from our own. However, Cremin’s rendition starts to dissolve into pure sentimentality unless we temper it with some hard truths. Take race as the main ‘cleavage of adult life’. In the United States, *de facto* segregation of the ‘public’ schools (via seemingly voluntary residential segregation which relies on the proxy of wealth when not backed by overt housing discrimination by landlords, banks, and insurance companies) has undone any gains accomplished by *de jure* desegregation. Already by 2004, the resegregation of US schools was such that you would have to go back to 1968 to find a lower percentage of African-American students in majority white schools. In 2009, 50% of African-American and Latino students attended ‘high-poverty’ schools, compared to 7% of white students.<sup>12</sup> Meanwhile, more than 2 million African-American students attend what Jonathan Kozol, following Gary Orfield, calls ‘apartheid schools’, in which 99–100% of the students are non-white.<sup>13</sup>

The common school ideal is not only subverted by *de facto* segregation and stratification across schools. Schools that do possess a more racially and socially economically diverse student body may simply divide and stratify within the school through tracking (also known as ‘streaming’ and ‘ability grouping’). Even if we thought that tracking constituted a beneficial form of differentiation, rather than a practice doomed repeatedly to prove the Pygmalion effect, it certainly belies Cremin’s talk of inter-group mixing. As has been excessively documented, the hierarchies of school tracks closely mimic social hierarchies of race and class. Consider the decade long studies conducted by Jeannie Oakes’ team in four mid-sized US cities.<sup>14</sup> Not only do track placements follow standardized test scores that themselves follow racial patterns, but even at the same ‘achievement level’ majority (white and asian) students are more likely to be placed in advanced classes than minority students. In Rockford, Illinois, 27.1% of majority students scored in the top two deciles, compared to only 4.8% of minority students. But even that small cohort of minority students making it to the 9th and 10th deciles were less likely to be placed in upper track courses than their majority counterparts. In the 9th decile, 79% majority students were tracked to advanced classes, but only 59% of minority

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<sup>12</sup> See Aud et al. (2010, p. 39). To be exact, 47% of African-American students and 52% of ‘Hispanic’ students attend ‘high-poverty’ schools, defined as schools 75% of whose students qualify for free and reduced lunch.

<sup>13</sup> See Kozol (2005, p. 19). Kozol cites two studies conducted by Gary Orfield and colleagues at Harvard’s Civil Rights Project.

<sup>14</sup> For an overview of these mixed-methods studies (in connection with desegregation lawsuits) in Rockford, Illinois; San Jose, California; Wilmington, Delaware; and Woodland Hills, Pennsylvania, see Oakes (2005, pp. 233–234), who provides an overview noting that Welner (2001) offers the most comprehensive presentation of their findings.

students; in the 10th decile, 85% of majority students were placed in advanced classes, but only 63% of minority students.<sup>15</sup>

Even in heterogenous schools where interaction across race and class occurs, there is cause for pessimism since it is the quality of interaction that matters. Recall the conditions that Gordon Allport attached to his famous ‘contact hypothesis’. “Allport consistently stressed that at least five formidable criteria must be fulfilled”, Merry and New observe, “before stereotypes could be challenged” and “positive emotions could be experienced”:

(1) equal status between persons of different backgrounds in a particular situation; (2) common goals around which members of different backgrounds are united; (3) intergroup cooperation, in which competition is avoided or minimized (4) the mutual recognition of some authority that can facilitate interactions and adjudicate in matters of disagreement; and finally (5) there needs to be informal, personal interactions between persons of different backgrounds, particularly between members of conflicting groups if intimacy, respect, and meaningful interaction are to be achieved and sustained. (Merry and New 2014, pp. 207–208)

How many schools, even among those that manage to put kids from different racial and socio-economic backgrounds in the same room, meet these five criteria? One can imagine the right drama teacher or sports coach creating an extracurricular oasis that meets these conditions, but the fact remains that the unequal status of the groups is reproduced within the school walls and schooling is by its nature competitive, individualistic, and largely inimical to intimate, meaningful interactions. Meanwhile, it is hard to share Cremin’s and Mann’s optimism when, after a century and a half of the common school, we see a surge of nationalism, xenophobia, and scapegoating across a range of Western Democracies.

Considerations such as these have led some scholars to conclude that the very notion of public education is best seen as an instrument of mystification.<sup>16</sup> For others, the concept still serves an authentic regulative function. Feinberg (2012, p. 87) sees public schooling as one necessary component of a larger set of educative pro-

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<sup>15</sup> See Oakes (2005, p. 234, Table 11.2). As Oakes (2005, pp. 228–236) shows, ample research over the two decades since the first edition of *Keeping Track* confirms the prevalence and continuation of racial disparities in tracking policies.

<sup>16</sup> See, for example, Michael Merry’s (2013, 2014, 2016) critique of diversity and publicity rationales for the schools and his egalitarian defense of voluntary separation. For a critical response, see Abowitz (2016). Indeed, there is a line of thought skeptical not merely of the common school but of the very existence of the public. Alasdair MacIntyre’s (1987) search for the last real example of an educated public takes him back to the Scottish Enlightenment. Richard Sennett (1978) similarly dates the *Fall of Public Man* to the end of the eighteenth century. Thus, Walter Lippmann (1993) concludes that the public is a ‘phantom’ whose spectral existence aids manipulators of ‘public opinion’ who rely on the myth of a public sphere in which individuals express, contest, and revise judgments. For a thinker such as Nancy Fraser (1992), while it is not necessary to jettison this idea of the public sphere, it is necessary to supplement it with the idea of counter publics, discursive arenas in which subaltern groups work to articulate the revision of common values needed to make the mainstream public genuinely inclusive of the difference they represent. For a development of this idea, see Warner (2005). For explorations of educational counterpublics, see Knight Abowitz (2001, 2003) and Suissa (2016).

cesses that work to reproduce a public or “an authoritative body of (mostly) strangers” that engages in “direct and indirect communication” so that, without negating their “separate affiliations and cultural identities”, they can work together to shape a common future. Public schooling, for Feinberg, serves to stabilize existing common values and to cultivate the skills of reflection and dialogue necessary to make such values explicit so that they may be tested and revised. On this view, education constitutes not only a public good but a foundational public good. It meets the criteria of Taylor’s common goods since the ‘we’ precedes the valuing. We must recognize ourselves as bound together by a common fate in order to concern ourselves with the reproduction of the conditions of that recognition. It is foundational because the good in question is not only a reflective value held in common but the good of sustaining the form of life in which such collective, but not homogenous, reflective valuation may continue.

## The Individual Versus the Blob

Having pointed out the widespread conflation of public and convergent educational goods, having suggested that, while education and public life are theoretically connected in a very basic way, it has been very hard to realize that connection in practice, one might assume that modern education has at least tended to nurture our private lives. Perhaps if education has struggled with its civic mission, it has least seen to the tasks of individuation and self-cultivation. To see why this assumption proves to be false, we must consider another distinction, this one from Hannah Arendt.

In the discussion so far, the private has figured only as a negative concept, as a lack of public standing.<sup>17</sup> Arendt (1998, p. 58) begins here as well, emphasizing the root sense of privation: “To live an entirely private life means above all to be deprived of things essential to a truly human life: to be deprived of the reality that comes from being seen and heard by others”. Notice, though, that Arendt warns only against an *entirely* private life. To have no opportunity to engage in the public realm and appear before others in word and deed – to never experience release from “the weightless irrelevance of [our] personal affairs” (Arendt 1977c, p. 4) would be, she boldly declares, to live something less than a fully human life. Arendt (1977a, p. 186) is, however, just as quick to point out how untenable it would be to live our lives forever exposed to “the glare of the public”. Human beings need spaces of withdrawal and privacy, “humane corner[s]” where one can encounter, if not public happiness, than at least the “*petit bonheur*” possible “within the space of their own four walls, between chest and bed, table and chair, dog and cat and flower pot”.<sup>18</sup>

<sup>17</sup>The discussion of Arendt that follows draws in part from Higgins (2011b, pp. 457–458).

<sup>18</sup>The quotations are from Arendt (1998, p. 52). On public happiness, see Arendt (1977b, p. 224 and passim). On the young’s special need for shelter from the glare of the public, see Arendt (1977a, pp. 186–187). Even if we thought that adults needed no such protection, Arendt (1998, p. 71) points out that,



For Arendt, then, private life has its place and its charms. The good life includes both appearances in public space and opportunities for privacy.

Can we conclude, then, that at least modern education is succeeding at half of its job? For Arendt, the answer is no, employing a helpful tripartite distinction to make her point. It is Arendt's thesis that in modernity we have all but lost both publicity and privacy, both having been overrun by what she calls the 'social'. We can capture Arendt's conception of public life with the metaphor of a table around which individuals gather. The table stands in for the common world, the world of meanings (stories, practices, spaces) and their material supports (languages, institutions, and the built environment) that possess a stubborn (though by no means permanent), reassuring reality beyond subjective caprice. Because there is one table at which we sit, we can come together, but notice that by definition this will mean that we each pull up a chair from a different angle. Having something in common and seeing it from different perspectives go hand in hand.

To get a feel for the social, by contrast, picture the same scene – now take away the table! As Arendt (1998, pp. 52–53) puts it:

The public realm, as the common world, gathers us together and yet prevents our falling over each other, so to speak. What makes [modern] society so difficult to bear is not the number of people involved, or at least not primarily, but the fact that the world between them has lost its power to gather them together, to relate them, and to separate them. The weirdness of this situation resembles a spiritualistic séance where a number of people gathered around a table might suddenly, through some magic trick, see the table vanish from their midst, so that two persons sitting opposite each other were no longer separated but also would be entirely unrelated to each other by anything tangible.

Modernity is, to alter the metaphor a bit, like a long ride on a crowded subway car. Crammed together but far apart, the social affords none of the restorative withdrawal of private life nor the enlivening qualities of public life. Being part of 'the blob', as one of Arendt's interpreters (Pitkin 1984) dubs it, leaves us simultaneously distanced both from our own natality (that small and often misplaced part of ourselves that is never done being born, that is capable of origination, that chafes at habit and custom) and the distinctiveness of others. The social is, in effect, the private writ large. It is "getting and spending" (Wordsworth 1965) as a collective pastime. Instead of the "theater of display and witness" (Curtis 1999, p. 71), we are left simply 'Dancing with the Stars'.

The schools struggle, as we saw, to embody public goods, but it is not clear that they fare any better in helping students individuate, a process that requires articulation between public and private spheres and a rhythm between public provocations to self-enactment and private spaces of regroupment. Thus, we begin to see the contours of a second debate related to privacy and publicity in education. Where the

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A life spent entirely in public, in the presence of others, becomes, as we would say, shallow. While it retains its visibility, it loses its quality of rising into sight from some darker ground which must remain hidden if it is not to lose its depth in a very real, non-subjective sense.

For a detailed exploration of Arendt's views on the relation of education and public life, see Higgins (2011a, Chapter 7).

first concerned education as an object of common or merely individual valuation, the second cuts the other way targeting individuation itself as a worthy aim of education, with socialization as its foil. To what extent does schooling promote self-cultivation? Can schools simultaneously promote socialization and individuation? How shall we assess these seemingly rival educational aims?

## Socialization and Individuation as Educational Aims

The critique of socialization as an educational aim far predates the modern marriage of schooling and socialization. In Book VII of Plato's *Republic* (1991, p. 193 [514a]), Socrates offers his interlocutors an allegorical drama depicting our 'nature' and 'condition' in its 'education and want of education' (*paideia* and *apaideusia*). Famously, Socrates casts us as prisoners who are bound from an early age in the dark corner of a cave and come to mistake mere shadows (of puppet-like artifices illuminated by firelight) and echoes (of deceiving sounds made by the puppeteers) for reality itself. When Glaucon remarks on the "strange image... and strange prisoners", Socrates simply replies that, "they are like us" (p. 193 [515a]). And in fact the Allegory has resonated with generations of readers, themselves the largely passive recipients of education understood as transmission of the conventional names for conventional things. Indeed, the text not only critiques enculturation in general but even presages the pathologies of modern schooling and testing. The shadow school will not only reward those who can correctly name each image as it flickers across the cave's back wall but will single out those who can game the test, offering:

honors, praises, and prizes for the man who is sharpest at making out the things that go by, and most remembers which of them are accustomed to pass before, which after, and which at the same time as others, and who is thereby most able to divine what is to come (p. 195 [516c-d])

The true *paideia*, Socrates concludes, is not a matter of "putting sight into blind eyes" but of turning the soul from appearances toward reality (p. 197 [518c]). Far from defining education, Plato suggests, this socializing of the young into the mores and conventions of the community constitutes a dangerous form of miseducation, dangerous because it not only turns the soul toward appearances but also because it offers these up as if they were the real articles. This creates an insularity so deep, an inertia so profound that, even were the prisoners released from their shackles and told of their troglodytic condition, emancipation would still require being "dragged... by force along the rough, steep, upward way" (p. 194 [515e]).

Whether or not Whitehead (1978, p. 39) was right when he quipped that all of Western philosophy "consists of a series of footnotes to Plato", Plato's critique of socialization certainly looms large in the history of education. After all, the dominant interpretation of the dominant educational tradition, liberal learning, is Socratic in spirit: "Each of us", as Oakeshott (1989, p. 24) puts it, "is born in a corner of the

earth, and at a particular moment of historic time, lapped round with locality” and liberal learning invites us into a conversation that can emancipate us from such caves of convention. As Bruce Kimball (1986) demonstrates, however, this represents only one ‘philosophical’ strand in the tangled tradition of liberal learning. It was not Socrates but Isocrates, and especially Cicero, who inspired the ‘oratorical’ strand of liberal education that dominated for more than a millennium. The philosophical strand, Kimball shows, only begins to emerge in the High Middle Ages and does not fully coalesce until the Enlightenment when Socrates would be claimed retroactively as its patron saint. On Kimball’s reading, the modern debate over liberal learning then proceeds as a series of compromises and syntheses of these oratorical and philosophical visions of the educated person.<sup>19</sup>

As it turns out, this defining tension in our oldest educational tradition is none other than that between socialization and individuation. Here is how Kimball (adapted from 1986, p. 228) characterizes the major tenets of each ideal:

The oratorical (or *artes liberales*) ideal:

(1) Training citizen-orators to lead society (2) requires identifying true virtues, (3) the commitment to which (4) will elevate the student and (5) the source for which is great texts, whose authority lies in (6) the dogmatic premise that they relate the true virtues, (7) which are embraced for their own sake.

The philosophical (or liberal-free) ideal:

(1) Epistemological skepticism underlies (2) the free and (3) intellectual search for truth, which is forever elusive, and so all possible views must be (4) tolerated and given (5) equal hearing (6) with the final decision left to each individual, (7) who pursues truth for its own sake.

On the oratorical conception, the learner is socialized into a tradition of eloquence and judgment with the aim of serving society. On the philosophical conception, the learner is promised the tools to critique tradition. Paradoxically, Plato is more likely to be assigned reading in the oratorical tradition, offered to students as a font of wisdom. A purely Socratic invitation to liberal learning might well ask students to jettison the baggage of the past, including Plato’s dialogues, to think for themselves.

Ralph Waldo Emerson (1983a, p. 57) captures this latter idea well in ‘The American Scholar’ when he declares, “I had better never see a book, than to be warped by its attraction clean out of my own orbit, and made a satellite instead of a system”. Emerson picks up the theme again in “Self Reliance” when he reminds his readers that “the highest merit we ascribe to Moses, Plato, and Milton is that they set at naught books and traditions, and spoke not what men but what they thought” (Emerson 1983b, p. 259). To imitate such men, Emerson (1983b, p. 279, spelling modernized) explains, is a contradiction in terms: “Shakespeare will never be made

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<sup>19</sup>Thus, though I drew on Oakeshott’s colorful description of provincialism to introduce the Socratic spirit in modern theories of liberal learning, Oakeshott best fits what Kimball (2010, p. 228 and *passim*) calls the “*artes liberales* accommodation” in which neo-humanists combined the rationale of the liberal-free ideal (see below) with an “appeal to classical letters and texts”.

by the study of Shakespeare". Indeed, "Plato himself", as Kimball points out, "maintained that one cannot learn philosophy by reading his or others' works".<sup>20</sup>

By 1902, John Dewey (1996) was already good and tired of what he perceived as the false choice of "individual nature vs. social culture" (p. 274), rehearsing in *The Child and the Curriculum* the all-too-familiar slogans perpetually bandied back and forth: mastery of subject matter vs. self-realization (p. 276), interest vs. discipline (p. 277), guidance and control vs. freedom and initiative (p. 277), and conservation of past achievement vs. change and progress (p. 277). According to Dewey, this debate makes no sense. We might as well ask basketball players which they value more, the ball or the hoop. As Dewey puts it:

The fundamental factors in the educative process are an immature, undeveloped being; and certain social aims, meanings, values incarnate in the matured experience of the adult. The educative process is the due interaction of these forces. (p. 273)

Dewey never denies that this interaction entails *practical* difficulties. It is no easy thing to create the conditions for educational experiences that close the gap between "the narrow but personal world of the child" (p. 275) and "the impersonal but infinitely extended world of space and time" (p. 275), between a world unified by the "practical and emotional bonds of child life" and the "fractionize[d]" (274) world of the subject matter bound together only by a highly "abstract principle of logical classification and arrangement" (p. 275). What Dewey objects to is the turning of this practical challenge into a theoretical dichotomy.

Given that "by the late 1940's and 1950's, progressive education had become the conventional wisdom in the United States", it is easy to conclude that Dewey's intervention was successful (Cremin 1988, p. 241). However, as he makes clear in his Kappa Delta Pi lectures (Dewey 1938), delivered three and half decades after the appearance of *The Child and the Curriculum*, Dewey sees the progressives as just as prone as the traditionalists to dogmatism (p. 22) and sloganizing (p. 91). Worse, progressivism has become the name not for the overcoming of the dichotomy but merely for another swing of the pendulum, back toward the child. "Many of the newer schools", Dewey (1938, p. 22) laments, "tend to make little or nothing of organized subject-matter of study; to proceed as if any form of direction or guidance by adults were an invasion of individual freedom, and... the past had little or no role to play in education".

For E.D. Hirsch (1987, p. xv), such nuances are beside the point. He lumps Dewey in with the Rousseauian, child-centered movement that led him to eschew what he claims is the crucial, if admittedly unexciting, activity of 'piling up information'. In particular, Hirsch argues, students need to pile up the broad, superficial understanding of the terms, names, and dates likely to be presumed of readers by authors in 'mainstream' publications. "This shouldn't sound too controversial",

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<sup>20</sup> Kimball (1986, p. 223) is referring to Plato's *Seventh Letter* (341c–d) but might have also pointed to the critique of writing in the *Phaedrus* (275d–e and following). See Plato (1961a, pp. 1588–1589; 1961b, p. 521ff).

Hirsch (1987, pp. xv, xvi) says, since “all human communities are founded upon specific shared information” and even disparate cultures share the idea that “the basic goal of education is acculturation”.

Maxine Greene sees the matter very differently. What Hirsch casts as a story of progress – children from a range of social backgrounds acquiring the background knowledge needed to participate not only in their home culture but also in a second, national/print culture – Greene (1995, p. 73) recasts as a story of a fall: “We are first cast into the world as embodied beings trying to understand. From particular situated locations, we become open to fields of perception”. “We reach out into the world”, she continues, “touching, listening, watching what presents itself to us from our pre-reflective landscapes, primordial landscapes” (p. 73). For Greene, we are situated but not solipsistic: “on the original landscape where an individual is grounded... there is always a sense of consciousness being opened to the common” (p. 75). But then we begin “distancing”, “symbolizing”, and “abstracting” (p. 75). Our early encounters with the world become “obscured by the sediments of rationality” (p. 73). What Hirsch sees as missing from the schools, Greene finds in all too ample supply, leading her to this conclusion: “Much of education as we know it is an education in forgetfulness. Distracting the young from their own perceived landscapes, we teachers insist on the givenness of predetermined explanatory frames” (p. 74). For Greene, this is best understood as a fall not from subjectivity into objectivity but from “the true conditions of objectivity” (p. 74) to its conventional semblance. In our early knowing, it is the world we want to explore, not some private menagerie; but “our conceptualizations are grounded in” what Greene, following William James, calls “vividness or pungency, the vital factor in reality” (p. 74). Thus, Greene counters the traditional tale of growing up, suggesting that true maturation entails “growing in childlikeness” (Dewey 1916, p. 55), whereas it is precisely the putting away of “childish things” that leads us to see “through a glass darkly” (1 Corinthians 13).<sup>21</sup>

Scholarly opinion is divided on whether and how the aims of socialization and individuation might be reconciled. For Dewey, as we saw, no theoretical reconciliation is necessary, only the cultivation of the teacher’s ability to see the subject matter

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<sup>21</sup>About a Romantic view such as Greene’s, we should ask two questions: Does the author think that it is possible to return to the prelapsarian state? and Is the claim that the fall might not have occurred in the first place? Regarding the first question, Greene (1995, p. 76) makes a point of acknowledging, with Robert Frost, that “there is no ‘going back’”. On the other hand, the point of the essay is that aesthetic experience affords some contact with our earlier extra-conventional ways of making sense of the world. For Greene (p. 76 and *passim*), meanings from childhood come through the gateway of imagination where they infuse adult sensibilities with added depth while also being revised in the process. There are two ways of taking the second question. Greene’s is not a Peter Pan theory of education. But does Greene advocate a form of unschooling? Might it be possible on her view to grow up without becoming distanced from our ‘primordial landscapes’? It is hard to say but, given that she ties the fall into rationalization and conventionality with the moment we “enter into the life of language” (p. 73), this would seem to be an inevitable detour. The path to maturity, for Greene, would lead through ‘the life of language’, where we encounter both Dewey’s schematic ‘recognition’ and an antidote in the form of imaginative literature. On Dewey’s distinction between recognition and perception, see Higgins (2008).

simultaneously through a logical and psychological lens. As newcomers learn to participate directly and indirectly in social practices (Dewey calls them ‘vocations’ and ‘occupations’), they learn how to engage the world in socially valuable ways while simultaneously fulfilling their ‘dominant vocation’ of ‘intellectual and moral growth’.<sup>22</sup>

Kieran Egan (2008, p. 32) is less optimistic noting that:

It is true that being a social animal, we find our fulfillment within society, but we will always find some conflict between society’s need to homogenize and constrain and our individual desire for freedom and exploration of our uniqueness.

Egan sees modern schooling as tied in a knot around three conflicting aims. To socialization and individuation (which he calls ‘individual development’), he adds a third, the “academic ideal” or “shaping the mind through disciplined forms of understanding” embodied in canonical texts (p. 33). Each of these aims, Egan shows, has serious internal problems, and we have built our schools upon the vain hope that knotting them together might ‘prevent each other from doing too much damage’. What emerges is a bizarre system of mutual undercutting:

We socialize, but we undercut indoctrination by the academic program calling society’s values into question and by commitment to individual development reducing society’s claims on any particular individual; we pursue an academic program, but we undercut intellectual élitism by egalitarian pressures from socialization and by attention to other dimensions of individual development; we encourage individual development, but we undercut its fulfillment by the homogenizing pressures of socialization and by the standardizing brought about by a common academic curriculum. (p. 28)

Surely we can do better, Egan concludes, than a system whose success is its failing *equally* to socialize (whether this be to pass on cultural heritage and inculcate civic virtue or simply to fulfill its role in social sorting and vocational placement), to create disciplined, critical thinkers, and to help students achieve self-knowledge and actualize their unique gifts.

Richard Rorty (1999) sees socialization and individualization not as rival educational aims but as distinct and equally valuable educational processes. “Primary and secondary education”, Rorty argues,

will always be a matter of familiarizing the young with what their elders take to be true, whether it is true or not. It is not, and never will be, the function of lower-level education to challenge the prevailing consensus about what is true. (p. 118)

By contrast, he suggests, “non-vocational higher education is... a matter of inciting doubt and stimulating imagination, thereby challenging the prevailing consensus” (p. 118). For Rorty, then, while the two processes conflict, they are complementary over time and form a natural sequence: “Socialization has to come before individuation, and education for freedom cannot begin before some constraints have been imposed” (p. 118). Unlike Greene, Rorty imagines no true childhood self before socialization and, unlike Plato, no terrain beyond our interconnected cultural caves.

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<sup>22</sup> See Dewey (1916, p. 310). For a detailed exploration of Dewey’s theory of vocation, with a focus on the vocation of teaching, see Higgins (2011a, pp. 113–130 and 241–154).

“There is no such thing as human nature”, he writes, “only the shaping of an animal into a human being by a process of socialization, followed (with luck) by the self-individualization and self-creation of that human being through his or her own later revolt against that very process” (p. 118). Is Rorty right, however, that we can cold-start the engine of critical thinking and creative self-fashioning at the age of 18 and what are we to make of Rorty’s own warning that we currently make genuinely higher education available only to a relatively small elite?

## Conclusion

We began with the observation that every chapter in the long history of education can be understood through the protean concepts of public and private. We then focused our inquiry on two specific problematics within this ‘grand dichotomy’. First, we turned to the question of whether education is a public good. Following Taylor and Feinberg, we saw how the common economic approach confuses this question with others: how to distribute private educational goods equitably, whether private educational goods are best pursued collectively, whether such overlapping educational goods should be provided by government-run schools? In the common school ideal, that we ought to learn together across our differences so that we might later form a public capable of productive deliberation and caring contestation, we found a candidate for a genuinely public educational good. However, we also found a troubling history of failing to live up to this ideal.

This led us to consider a second problematic defined by the tension between the educational aims of socialization and individuation. That this is a distinct problematic can be seen in multiple ways. First, consider how not only the meaning but the valuation of the terms public and private shifts. In the first, the question is how to achieve the public, understood as dialogue across difference and shared responsibility for our common fate, in light of our rampant egoism. In the second, the question is how we can defend “the private vision” (Greene 2007) in the face of modern schooling, arguably the most powerful institutional instrument of socialization ever invented.

That these two problematics are distinct is also clear from the fact that we have both a personal and a collective interest in both socialization and individuation. The collective interest in socialization (e.g., a skilled, differentiated workforce, a common language, and sense of solidarity) and personal interest in individuation (my wanting to make something good of myself and my life) are perhaps the most obvious. But there is also a personal interest in socialization, since I want to belong and internalize group mores enough to succeed. And there is also a collective interest in individuation. This comes out in one way in the gray dystopia of Ursula Le Guin’s *The Lathe of Heaven* (1984), a be-careful-what-you-wish-for story in which a man whose dreams can alter reality is asked to dream an end to human conflict and winds up erasing difference. It comes out in another way in democratic theory, for example, in David Blacker’s (2007, Chap. 5) defense of the idea that democracy requires



individuals who engage in experiments in ‘Cartesian inwardness’, meditative practices aimed at radical doubt of received ideas and the fabric of common sense.

Distinct though they might be, our two lines of inquiry have led to the same surprising conclusion, that modern schooling paradoxically fails both to secure truly public goods and to foster robust individuality. Even as they struggle to live up to their mission to reproduce a democratic public, the schools also struggle to cultivate “self-reliance” (Emerson 1983b) and independent thinking. Privatization and conformity proceed apace as education has become an instrument of what Hannah Arendt calls the ‘social’.

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# Cosmopolitanism and Globalization in Education



Claudia Schumann

*Where have we received the image of cosmopolitanism from?  
And what is happening to it?*

(Jacques Derrida 2010: 413).

## Entering the Global Era

This chapter will look at different theorizations of cosmopolitanism and globalization in education. Within philosophy of education the discussion on different cosmopolitanisms and cosmopolitan imaginaries is by far more developed and differentiated than comparable discussions on globalization which will also influence the weight put on the two concepts respectively in the present chapter. Globalization, in this context, is often understood as the empirical-factual development, shaping our presence, the world we live in and want to prepare our children and (future) citizens for, to which cosmopolitanism in one form or another helps us articulate a moral, ethical, or political response. Not all authors, however, perceive of the relationship between globalization and cosmopolitanism in this way. In order to be able to adequately contextualize the present discussion on cosmopolitanism, it seems nevertheless useful to first outline some of the main aspects that characterize what has come to be called the 'globalization of education'. Only against this background can the revival of the old idea of the cosmopolitan in recent decades be understood, including the various insistences on a necessary distance between the concept of globalization and the concept of cosmopolitanism in education. The chapter will therefore start with an outline of those characteristic features which have come to mark the present globalist era, including a sketch of different strands of globalism and globalization in education, before we enter into the vast body of work engaging with historical conceptions of cosmopolitanism as well as the more contemporary, so-called new cosmopolitanisms and cosmopolitics as they inform philosophy of education in the present.

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Far beyond the scope of educational policy and theory, in the general media as well as public discussion, the idea has become popularized that a mere national orientation in education is no longer sufficient. In order to successfully navigate the challenges of contemporary life, from social media to the job market, the global has come to inevitably and irreversibly infiltrate the local. Even basic everyday routines have become tightly connected to places, cultures, and actors in the world that only a few decades ago might have appeared much too far removed in both time and space so as to exert influence over our local lives in this manner. Sociologist Anthony Giddens prominently defined globalization as “the intensification of worldwide social relations which link distant localities in such a way that local happenings are shaped by events occurring many miles away and vice versa” (Giddens 1990: 64). When speaking about globalization in this broad sense, we mostly refer to the empirical reality of the tremendously increased economic and cultural mobility and exchange in the last decades. The term ‘globalization’ had been in use earlier, but gained wider attention through the publication ‘Globalization of markets’ by economist Theodore Levitt in 1983. Transnational companies and businesses operate across national borders with growing access and influence in markets other than the countries they are placed in and budgets that often exceed that of individual nation-states. While the term globalization was used by Levitt primarily in a context concerned with those changes in the global economic system which aid these processes of increased global activity, globalization as a phenomenon remains notoriously complex and many-faceted leading to an incalculable amount of interpretations and definitions.

For present purposes it shall suffice to state that besides the predominant economic dimension, there are also political, cultural, technological, and environmental aspects which are addressed under the heading of a globalizing world. The Internet, the new media, and the new technologies have enabled an international flow of ideas which allows for the spreading and dissemination of news and other information in unprecedented speed. Traveling has become cheaper and is used by a much wider segment of the public. Yet, mobility has not only increased in the sense that travel for business and tourist purposes now allows for much more frequent and intensified cross-cultural contact, but migrants and refugees are forced to transgress borders trying to survive or safeguard lives worth living for themselves as well as for their dependents that often remain behind in areas ravaged by war, exploitation, poverty, and broken political systems. This in turn leads to a growingly diverse population in those Western countries which have become the desired destination of many of the refugees. In this cultural sense, on the one hand this increased diversity is celebrated to a multiplication of choices of lifestyle and for consumption according to individual taste (restaurants, music, religious holidays, etc.). On the other hand, it is discussed as contributing to different local cultures slowly being replaced by dominant, homogenizing global cultural trends (cf. for example George Ritzer’s ‘McDonaldization of society’ (1993)).

On a political level, the growing influence of supranational political organizations and associations, prominently for example the United Nations and the European Union, shape and transform policies with local and national impact, as for example in the worldwide promotion of human rights and human rights education.

Already in 1995, David Held interpreted the growingly enmeshed and interconnected world economy as well as interstate political structures as a call for a cosmopolitan model of democracy in order for democracy to remain sustainable in the new global world order (Held 1995). Twenty years later, Wendy Brown's assessment is less hopeful and states that neoliberalism has succeeded in undermining the very basis of democracy (Brown 2015). Last but not least, the world's continuously growing interconnectedness is probably nowhere else as tangible as in the environmental costs of the industrial revolution. The environmental damage committed by one nation in one part of the world is no longer contained as a problem in that region and for that nation-state, rather the repercussions and consequences affect other peoples and often most harshly in the poorer, more vulnerable parts of the world.

## Globalizing Education: A Contested Concept

How do these processes and developments become translated and visible in education? Joel Spring defines globalization of education as the "worldwide networks, processes, and institutions affecting local educational practices and policies" (Spring 2015: 2). As Spring shows, the influence of international intergovernmental and nongovernmental institutions as well as multinational testing and learning corporations has shifted the discourse on education in a direction which prioritizes the understanding of education as the cultivation of human capital in the knowledge economy and more generally the economization of education. The World Bank's educational agenda (cf. *Education Strategy 2020*, (Spring 2015: p. 37)) through its networks shapes national policies emphasizing education for the knowledge economy and lifelong learning allocating to the state the task of performance assessment and control. Also the OECD, another supranational organization of similar reach and influence as the World Bank, understands education primarily in economic terms, the primary purpose and interest of education being interpreted as the preparation of skilled workers for the labor market (cf. Rizvi and Lingard 2006: 259). Philosopher of education Michael Peters has written extensively on the implications of this new understanding of an economy of knowledge. The improvement of skills through early educational investments and life-long learning is assumed to lead to better jobs and thus better standards of living for all. Testing through global institutions such as the International Association for the Evaluation of Educational Achievement (IEA) purports to make the educational efforts and achievements of different nation-states comparable with each other so that their comparative successes and failures can be judged against a more and more uniform worldwide benchmark. The IEA's declared mission is to develop international benchmarks. In this way, large-scale assessment tests such as Programme for International Student Assessment (PISA) and Trends in International Mathematics and Science Study (TIMSS) contribute to shaping a more and more homogeneous world educational culture, defining, for example, that 'literacy' in terms of the knowledge and skills to meet real-life challenges is to be more highly valued than comprehensive



knowledge in distinct school subjects. In this way, the tests impact national policies: in order for the nation-states to remain competitive in the global comparative assessment schemes, they cannot avoid to adjust their own educational policies according to the interpretation and focus of education suggested in the tests.

When we now turn to the discussion on cosmopolitanism in philosophy of education, the reference to globalization will remain constantly present. Cosmopolitanism has often been conceptualized as an (educational) response to the challenges of globalization. As Fazal Rizvi has described, “the new interest in cosmopolitanism is based upon a recognition that our world is increasingly interconnected and interdependent globally, and that most of our problems are global in nature requiring global solutions” (Rizvi 2009: 253). By thus conceptualizing cosmopolitanism as “a set of principles with which to interpret and respond to the contemporary conditions of globalization” (Rizvi 2009: 253), Rizvi and others might distinguish carefully between educational cosmopolitanism as a mere reaction to globalization and economization of education from a responsible moral, ethical, or political response to these conditions. The reactive moment nevertheless is retained, together with the emphasis on the new global mobility and interconnectedness as requiring new modes of ‘cosmopolitan learning’ (Rizvi 2009; Sheller 2011). The preceding discussion, however, should have cautioned us to not fall prey to the common usage of globalization as an “ideological device that states and governments employ as an excuse for imposing certain policies that would otherwise fail to gain public acceptance or support” (Papastephanou 2012: 38). As Marianna Papastephanou firmly emphasizes, our conception of cosmopolitanism need not necessarily “depend on globalization; even less is it included in it, directed by it, or answerable to it” (Papastephanou 2012: 27). Her “eccentric cosmopolitanism” is not developing the normative “Ought” to the “Being (the so-called empirical Is)” (Ibid.) of a globalist reality we presently find ourselves in. To her mind, it is “rather a potentiality placed *side by side* with the actuality on which it can shed critical light” (Ibid.). Papastephanou reclaims cosmopolitan thought in its own right, independent of the contemporary globalizing state of the world and its theorization in what she calls the ‘globalist’ discourse, which tends to either praise the new possibilities for conviviality in diversity or warn about the hegemonic, homogenizing detrimental effects of globalization. In contrast to the trends in this globalist discourse, what globalization is and entails, who the leading actors and interests are, is a question that should be open for discussion in research rather than a taken-for-granted reality whose impact we can merely passively experience and endure, and which cosmopolitanism is meant to articulate an adequate political, social, moral, or cultural answer to.

## Old and New Cosmopolitanisms

Let us now ask with Derrida, “Where have we received the image of cosmopolitanism from? *And what is happening to it?*” (Derrida 2010: 413). As David Hansen and many others have been keen to emphasize, the idea of cosmopolitanism, while



finding its most comprehensive articulation in the Mediterranean region, is by no means an exclusively Western project. The notion has been developed in similar ways in Eastern and Southern philosophies, and many cross-cultural processes of translations and mutual influences have shaped the concept over the centuries (Hansen 2011: 6). The first mention of the idea of the ‘citizen of the world’, the ‘kosmopolites’, is generally attributed to the Cynic philosopher Diogenes of Sinope (c. 412–323 BC). As legend has it, when meeting Alexander, the Great, Diogenes is said to have introduced himself as ‘Diogenes, citizen of the world’ instead of the way which would have been common at the time as ‘Diogenes of Sinope’ (cf. Kleingeld/Brown 2014). The cynics in general challenged social rules and attachments in their philosophy as well as in their practiced way of living, questioning customs of arranging family relations, ownership and property, and rejecting the importance of upholding conformity for social status. This critical practice and the challenging engagement with the local community already foreshadows many of the negative criticisms that cosmopolitanism was charged with, promoting footloose detachment, rootlessness, homelessness, and a general absence of a sense of responsibility and concern for anyone and anything other than the self. It is important to stress, however, that Diogenes’ vision is a rather demanding version of cosmopolitanism, which not least in its rejection of any focus on economic gain does in no way reduce to “mobility beyond locality or to a moralized Other orientation” (Papastephanou 2012: 101).

The idea of an allegiance to humanity, as a universal moral obligation toward all fellow human being, prior to particular local responsibilities, was further expanded in Stoic philosophy, in the writings of Zeno, Cicero, Seneca, and Marcus Aurelius. Building on this tradition, and its later full-blown political and legal articulation in Immanuel Kant’s *Perpetual Peace: A Philosophical Sketch*, Martha Nussbaum was one of the first influential contemporary intellectuals who prominently argued for a cosmopolitan education. In her mind, “we have great power over racism, sexism and other divisive passions that militate against cosmopolitan humanism, if we will only devote enough attention to the cognitive moral development of the young” (Nussbaum 2002: 23). Nussbaum’s approach has received criticism for its rationalist angle and rather narrow focus on certain Western ideals of liberalism, as promoting just another form of Western imperialist universalism. Even Nussbaum herself came to reject her cosmopolitan educational project in favor of a renewed patriotic education, claiming that it puts an excessive demand on us to care for strangers as for our close family and friends. It is important to note, however, that her later rejection is connected to the earlier strict version of cosmopolitanism she proposed, and that many other, not less demanding, but yet more livable interpretations of cosmopolitanism are available and have been proposed in the literature (cf. Schumann 2016a, b). Klas Roth (cf. Roth/Burbules 2011; Roth/Papastephanou 2012), for example, has worked extensively on developing a Kantian reading of cosmopolitanism within philosophy of education which goes beyond the narrow universalism of the interpretation put forth by Nussbaum, thus demonstrating the continued importance, relevance, and applicability of Kantian thought for contemporary cosmopolitan education.

In recent decades a variety of so-called ‘new cosmopolitanisms’ has entered the scholarly discussion in cultural studies, social theory, philosophy, and political sci-

ence. As transformations and extensions of the Greek and Kantian tradition, they retain central aspects of the classical and modernist versions, but inflect its universalist aspirations with socio-historical particularisms. Kwame Anthony Appiah's 'rooted cosmopolitanism' explores such a hybrid perspective between universalism and particularism, aiming to temper "a respect for difference with a respect for actual human beings" (Appiah 2006: 113). Similarly, Seyla Benhabib in *Another Cosmopolitanism* develops an account which emphasizes "the significance of membership within bounded communities" (Benhabib et al. 2006: 2). Postcolonial theorist Homi Bhabha in his 'vernacular cosmopolitanism' is concerned with subaltern agency and those Others who have become part of the cosmopolitan community as a result of modernity's colonial past and future: people living in exile, of the diaspora, refugees, and migrants (Bhabha 2000, 2001). In the educational literature, while economic and political-legal cosmopolitanisms are also discussed, it is certainly the moral and cultural interpretations of cosmopolitanism which have had the most widespread influence.

## Educational Cosmopolitanisms

In recent times, Torill Strand has suggested to distinguish between three distinct usages of cosmopolitanism in philosophy of education: "as a *metaphor* for a way of life; it signifies a many-faceted and contested moral, political and legal *ideal*; it also indicates an outlook or a *perspective* on our common and contemporary social reality" (Strand 2010: 105). In all these three senses, cosmopolitan perspectives have been developed within philosophy of education. There is, however, one robust theme in which the different models developed in the field seem to come together. As David Hansen states, the "notion of educational cosmopolitanism [...] resonates most closely with concerns associated with moral and cultural cosmopolitanism" (Hansen 2011: 11). Also Marianna Papastephanou emphasizes, albeit in a critical manner, that "most educational efforts converge on a crucial point, namely, the primacy of culturalist cosmopolitanism" (Papastephanou 2012: 87). In the following, when looking at different approaches within philosophy of education, even if in an exemplary manner, this predominance of culturalist interpretations will be visible. However, we will find that some authors have also developed convincing arguments for transgressing this obvious, yet nevertheless narrow trend so as to include more strongly politicized understandings of educational cosmopolitanism.

### *Cosmopolitanism on the Ground*

Following, among others, Appiah's rooted cosmopolitanism David Hansen carefully works out a conception of cosmopolitanism "on the ground" (Hansen 2011: 73), taking distance from utopian ideologies and returning to an appreciation of the

generative intersections of the known and the new in everyday life. Taking his inspiration from close-up observations of teachers' interactions with their students, he finds that "in their shared aspiration to get at the meaning of education, and to perform the work well, these educators stand between the universal and the particular, between the global and the neighborhood. They stand between the naïve and the cynical, between the local and the parochial. They stand in a cosmopolitan space" (Hansen 2011: 118). This cosmopolitan space, or as Hansen poetically characterizes it, the 'cosmopolitan prism' is explored from a multitude of perspectives in his work. Spanning a variety of voices throughout history, from Confucius, Socrates, de Gournay, Montaigne to Emerson, Hansen reconstructs a "cosmopolitan lineage of philosophy as the art of living" (2011: 23). Instead of traditionalist reactions to cosmopolitanism, Hansen argues for a creative and responsive engagement with the changing global reality. For him, "cosmopolitanism constitutes an orientation in which people learn to balance reflective openness to the new with reflective loyalty to the known" (Hansen 2011: 1). This philosophical project is not just a theoretically worthwhile endeavor, but also a practical pedagogical project, as Hansen exemplifies in his discussion of curriculum as a cosmopolitan inheritance and in teaching practice.

### *Critical Cosmopolitanism*

In the tradition of Frankfurt School Critical Theory, several authors have taken upon themselves to advance a cosmopolitan perspective in education which retains a pronounced normative dimension. Critical cosmopolitanism as developed by Gerard Delanty, for example, is not so much meant as a critique of other approaches to cosmopolitanism; rather, it deepens the understanding of criticality to mean the world becomes disclosed to us through critique. Beyond a description of an everyday reality this "stronger claim for critical cosmopolitanism" aims to give "an account of social and political reality that seeks to identify transformational possibilities within the present" (Delanty 2012: 38) and defends that a key aspect of cosmopolitanism is "the transformative vision of an alternative society" (Ibid.: 40). Following in this line, learning and teaching has been explored from a cosmopolitan perspective in relation to human rights declarations (Schumann/Adami 2014), in relation to the idea of reification (Schumann 2012) and to the more complex stories of border crossing as portrayed in popular graphic novels (Schumann 2016a, b), and in relation to the idea of reflexive modernity and globalism (Rönnström 2012) and classroom communication (Wahlström 2016).

### ***Conflict and an Agonistic Cosmopolitics***

In some distinction from Hansen's cosmopolitanism on the ground as well as from the critical cosmopolitanisms discussed above, Sharon Todd's *Towards an Imperfect Education* (2009) argues more strongly that before highlighting new forms of everyday conviviality and learning or normative demands on those, we need to shift our focus and put the notion of conflict rather than consensus at the center of our thinking. In her re-conceptualization of educational cosmopolitanism as an 'agonistic cosmopolitics' (Todd 2009, 2010) she proposes a more strongly politicized interpretation which takes as its task to the "facing humanity in all its imperfection" (Todd 2009: 3). In contrast to liberal and humanist idealization, she argues that we need to confront ourselves with "the particular ways humanity is lived and experienced" – not in order to "demolish the working towards more just forms of coexisting" but to reframe cosmopolitan commitments in a way that start from "imperfection as central to humanity" (Todd 2009: 3). Her hope is that this will give us a more realistic view of what is achievable and how we can accomplish the goals articulated in the more normative laden approaches to cosmopolitanism. Todd's emphasis on 'dissonance' (Todd 2010) surely shifts the discussion from examples of successful forms of conviviality across contemporary differences to "the difficulties and imperfections that all interhuman exchange entails as an indelible feature of our cosmopolitan existence" (Todd 2009: 155). Following authors such as Pheng Cheah (2011), Walter Mignolo, and Bonnie Honig, her "agonistic cosmopolitics diverges from cosmopolitanism's view of dialogical models of democracy based on harmony and consensus and from its view of universalism as a non-political, immutable series of claims about rights and humanity. It instead embraces both democracy and universality, but with a strong emphasis on the pluralistic nature of social life" (Todd 2009: 226).

### ***Migration, Mobility, and Eccentric, Ethico-Political Cosmopolitanism***

The influential postcolonial theorist Homi Bhabha criticized Martha Nussbaum's stoic and Kantian interpretation of cosmopolitanism for a provincial universalization of liberal values, and for drawing her cosmopolitan circles in a concentric manner: extending from the self to the family, out to the nation, and finally to the global. His 'vernacular cosmopolitanism' (Bhabha 2000, 2001), in contrast, starts from the margins, the in-between, and the displaced. Following Bhabha's critical intervention, Marianna Papastephanou proposes a revised, eccentric conception of educational cosmopolitanism, arguing that the "established and easily digestible meanings of cosmopolitanism – the most popular being the perception of cosmopolitanism as mobility, border crossing, readiness to live and work abroad, and openness to anything foreign" (Papastephanou 2012: 2) are not demanding enough. The "'eccentric' ethico-political ideal" (Ibid.: 1) she develops forms a counterweight to the "globally enriched self"

(Ibid.) dominating the discussion and makes stronger demands than “tolerance, respect, charity, duty, and moral/legal obligation” (Ibid.). In contrast to pragmatic and culturalist approaches, her re-definition stresses relational over individualistic and diachronic over synchronic aspects of cosmopolitan commitment. With postcolonial sensitivity, cosmopolitanism is here not constructed as the opposite or beyond of the nation-state, but remains complementary with patriotism in the sense of “ethical commitment to locality” (Ibid.: 173). Beyond the liberal understanding of cosmopolitan education as a fostering of respect for human rights and diversity, Papastephanou’s rendering requires a thicker understanding of moral obligation which encompasses questions of redistributive justice arising out of historical and present moral debt as well as environmentalist dimensions as integral to educational cosmopolitanism.

## Summary

How is education in the twenty-first century then to be thought? As a reaction or response to globalization, preparing future citizens for the new mobile and diverse society, or as drawing on historical and contemporary sources for developing a counterweight to existent and growing global inequality and injustice, with an eye not just to human inter-connectedness but also to environmental concerns regarding the relations between human and nonhuman world? While not underestimating the importance of articulating adequate philosophical analyses and responses to recent social, political, economic, and cultural developments, and a critical assessment of the growing influence of new powerful supranational actors on the educational scene such as IMF, World Bank, or the OECD, we also need to be able to retain a critical distance from the acute sense of urgency and novelty which frequently accompanies the appeal to globalization in broader educational discourse. In order to do justice to the complexity of both the reality and ideology of a globalizing world as well as to the philosophical ideal of a cosmopolitan education, we should not naively fall into the trap of conceiving of globalization and cosmopolitanism as mere positive potential or negative threat for education as has happened in the at times polarizing debate. Instead we need to carefully consider the multiple critical approaches and the points of departure for resistance and transformation which have been articulated from ethical, social, cultural, and political cosmopolitan frameworks against the recently prevailing unilateral economic interpretations of current educational challenges.

As Derrida formulated at the beginning of the renewed theoretical interest in cosmopolitanism:

Being on the threshold of these cities, of these new cities that would be something other than ‘new cities’, a certain idea of cosmopolitanism, *an other*, has not yet arrived, *perhaps*.

- If it has (indeed) arrived.
- ... then, one has perhaps not yet recognized it. (Derrida 2010: 421)

If we take Derrida by his still urgent words, the most pressing task of this chapter was to give recognition to the complexity of the on-going discourse on globalization and cosmopolitanism in philosophy of education. The approaches discussed are by no means comprehensive of the vast literature that has emerged on these topics over the last two decades, and the continuing lively academic discussions (Papastephanou 2016; Strand 2015). Nevertheless, the selected authors can stand as hopeful exemplars for the vital multitude of ways in which *other* ideas of cosmopolitanism have been and will continue to be thought since Derrida's reminder that "these new cities [could] be something other than 'new cities'".

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# Multiculturalism and Diversity



Judith Suissa

## Introduction

In the following discussion, I will explore how different orientations within philosophy of education are reflected in the ways in which philosophers of education, predominantly those working within the analytic Anglophone tradition, have engaged with multiculturalism. In this context, it seems natural to focus on multicultural education, rather than on the concept of multiculturalism per se. However, it is important to clarify what is generally meant by multiculturalism, not least because the conceptual distinctions, ideas and values underlying any definition of multiculturalism will inevitably inform accounts of what multicultural education is or should be. It is helpful, then, to begin by noting the distinction between the descriptive and the normative sense of the term 'multiculturalism'. While the term 'multicultural' or 'multiculturalism' is often used simply to describe the cultural diversity of a given society, institution or practice, in its normative sense the term reflects a positive evaluation or promotion of such cultural diversity and an acknowledgement of its significance for individuals and groups. In addition to this conceptual point, it is helpful to note the historical and political context in which the term 'multiculturalism' became prominent. As Ali Rattansi notes (2011, p. 12), the term entered public discourse in many Western European states, as well as in Australia and Canada, in the 1960s and early 1970s, referring to "policies by central state and local authorities that [were] put in place to manage and govern the new multi-ethnicity created by non-white immigrant populations, after the end of WW2". In the USA, the term seems to have entered public vocabulary somewhat later, associated with demands for cultural recognition by minority ethnic groups.

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While multiculturalism can be used in a general sense to include political demands for rights and recognition by a diverse range of marginalised groups, including women, gays and lesbians, and the disabled, most theoretical work on multiculturalism tend to focus on ethnic and religious minorities within pluralistic states, minority nations within multi-nation states, and indigenous peoples.

This brief account goes some way towards explaining why most of the literature to which I will be referring in the following discussion is situated within a Western context, as well as suggesting significant differences between countries in the ways in which multiculturalism is articulated and defended. Notably, in the USA, where debates around multiculturalism were tied to the battle for cultural recognition that grew out of African Americans' fight against racial discrimination, expanding to include indigenous peoples and other non-White ethnic groups, 'issues of race have always been significant, and sometimes paramount' in these debates. In Europe, in contrast, as Rattansi puts it, "'race' is the elephant in the room" in discussions of multiculturalism (2011, p. 10).

There are a number of ways in which philosophers of education can contribute to clarifying, exploring and defending educational aspects of multiculturalism. Some of this work is oriented towards the body of political theory and philosophy that provides the conceptual framework for justifying multicultural positions and policies, whereas some is oriented more towards the theory and practice of multicultural education. In the following discussion, I will address some central themes within both these approaches that have been illuminatingly developed by philosophers of education. I will end by reflecting on some historical shifts within the discipline, as well as some recurring tensions.

First, a story:

When I was seven, my primary school teacher, in the early weeks of December, distributed brightly coloured squares of paper to the class and told us to "draw something that you would eat at Christmas dinner". I looked around at my classmates and tried to decipher the markings they were busily filling up their paper with, but I couldn't identify anything that I could copy. After a while, Mrs. Bell loomed over my desk and looked down at the blank piece of paper in front of me. "Come on Judith, why haven't you started drawing?" I had never been to a Christmas dinner and had no idea what people ate at them. "I don't know what you eat at a Christmas dinner", I mumbled, to be met with an impatient brush-off from Mrs. Bell: "Of course you know; you could draw a turkey, or a Christmas pudding". My friend Sarah was drawing something vaguely round and brown with a leaf on top of it and she helpfully turned it around so that I could see. I reached for the brown crayon and got on with it.

I like to think that, over 40 years later, children from non-Christian minorities are unlikely to experience similar incidents in a typical English classroom. We live in 'multicultural Britain' (although at the time of writing, the multicultural ideal seems somewhat under threat); a phrase intended here not in its descriptive sense – for the Britain in which I grew up was a fairly diverse place – but in the normative sense captured by the phrase "the acknowledgement and promotion of cultural pluralism..."

from the *HarperCollins Dictionary of Sociology* definition. Yet just what constitutes cultural pluralism, why it should be promoted or celebrated, and what this means for the provision, control and content of education, continues to be a topic of considerable debate.

## **Educational Policy and Political Philosophy**

As philosophers of education, our orientation is both to educational policy and practice, and to the discipline of philosophy. How these two strands are reflected in the work of individual philosophers of education is a matter of considerable stylistic and substantive difference, but when it comes to addressing issues of multiculturalism and diversity, it is within the sub-discipline of political philosophy that most philosophers of education have tended to situate their work. This relationship to political philosophy can take different forms, ranging from drawing on normative political theory in order to articulate and defend specific educational policies, to reflecting on educational reality in order to problematise or challenge some positions within political philosophy. So while political philosophy can provide conceptual resources with which to understand the values underlying versions of multiculturalism, work by philosophers of education has often contributed to this project by problematising some of the relevant conceptual distinctions.

### ***Integration and Assimilation***

The distinction between ‘integration’ and ‘assimilation’ is often seen as central to understanding the shift towards multiculturalism in Western states, conceptualised as reflecting a shift from policies of ‘assimilation’ of minorities and immigrant groups, towards a policy of ‘integration’. Yet Eamonn Callan’s work has problematised the neat distinction suggested by this contrast. In ‘The Ethics of Assimilation’ (Callan 2005), Callan articulates the connection between multiculturalism, diversity and integration, noting how: “A wholesome regard for diversity has been taken to require a wholesale rejection of assimilation” (p. 274). He goes on to discuss just what is involved in assimilation for individuals who may choose to assimilate, and how assimilation may involve “a creative effect whereby the host culture is diversified, not a one-way homogenizing effect” (ibid). After exploring in some detail the complex relationship between assimilation and self-respect, Callan concludes that “assimilation has to be evaluated with a close eye to the variable contexts in which it occurs” (p. 475).

In later work, Callan develops these conceptual connections further, explaining how multicultural policies are often regarded as a corrective measure for past imposition of assimilation measures on minority groups (see Callan 2015, p. 164).

## ***Recognition***

Callan's discussion also draws attention to the concept of recognition, which has been at the heart of contemporary philosophical work on multiculturalism at least since Charles Taylor's influential essay 'Multiculturalism and "the Politics of Recognition"' (1992).

Leonard Waks articulates the connection between multiculturalism and recognition in an educational context: "The term 'multiculturalism' arises in circumstances where there are distinct ethnocultural subgroups residing within the polity, whether on their own native grounds, in immigrant enclaves, or dispersed throughout the population, and making claims for cultural and political recognition (...). In its normative sense, the term denotes recognition of the personal identities and group loyalties tied to these subgroups, and of their claims for differentiated rights, including differentiated educational rights" (2007, p. 28).

Yet while Taylor's own work has explored some educational implications of the politics of recognition, these aspects have been further developed and challenged by philosophers of education. Taylor's central argument is that identity is constructed intersubjectively, and that "a person or group of people can suffer real damage, real distortion, if the people or society around them mirror back to them a confining or demeaning or contemptible picture of themselves. Nonrecognition or misrecognition can inflict harm, can be a form of oppression, imprisoning someone in a false, distorted, and reduced mode of being" (1992, p. 25). One obvious educational implication of this view concerns the way individuals from minority groups are represented in the curriculum. Rene Arcilla (1995) summarises this approach as follows: "Our multiculturalist initiatives in education should be principally concerned with exposing and criticizing images and terms that stunt possibilities for self-definition, particularly for members of cultures that already suffer from a history of discrimination" (p. 8). On this account, a more appropriate educational approach to guide my primary school teacher's interaction with her pupils in the run-up to Christmas would have been one which recognised the existence in the school community of non-Christian children, and allocated classroom time to engaging positively with their cultural and ethnic heritages. Yet Arcilla also questions the implication, emerging from this account, that an appropriate multicultural education can allow students' authentic selves to emerge through encounters with others, and draws on Derrida to suggest that the quest for a definitive form of self-knowledge is bound to fail due to the aporetic and always indefinite nature of the language in which we define ourselves in dialogue with others. The danger, to use this example, would be that such forms of 'recognition' risk reifying neatly defined definitions of cultural, religious or ethnic group identities, thus failing to do justice to the complex, fluid and dynamic sense of self of those who 'belong', nominally, to such groups. For Arcilla, this is not a reason to reject multiculturalism, but rather to embrace an education that celebrates what eludes identification. As Arcilla's work demonstrates, while the idea of multicultural education can be seen, as Dhillon and Halstead (2003) argue, to "flow[s] naturally from the prime liberal values of 'justice,

freedom, and equality” and the liberal principles of “toleration, respect for persons, and in particular the notion of rights” (p. 152), it is not only within the framework of liberal theory that these ideas can be and have been developed.

Other philosophers of education have challenged Taylor’s conceptual link between recognition and multiculturalism. Lawrence Blum (2001) is critical of the way in which Taylor’s account of recognition “ties it intimately to ethnocultural identity” (p. 539). Blum draws on examples of how individual and group identity are expressed and played out in concrete educational situations in order to question Taylor’s account. As Blum puts it, “recognition, as a value in education, has a significance that transcends ethnocultural identities and multiculturalism; and multicultural concerns in education transcend those of recognition” (ibid). Blum argues that “From the point of view of recognition, we must distinguish between an identity feature that is important to the individual himself, and an identity feature that is socially important, or important to a significant reference group outside the individual in question” (pp. 548–49). His analysis is significant not only for reflecting on educational contexts in order to problematise and enrich work in political philosophy, but also for putting concerns about race at the centre of the discussion. Given these insights, it is worth reflecting on the question of whether, in my own example, it was my Jewishness or my whiteness that was the most salient feature of my identity, and how the answer to this question may have been very different in different social and historical contexts. As Blum notes, “the ethno-raciality of people of colour is a much more socially salient feature of their identity than is the ethno-raciality of ‘white’ people [...] Hence it is more difficult for individual persons of colour than for whites to be relatively indifferent to their ethno-raciality” (p. 548). Yet “the thrust of Taylor’s recognition argument appears to be directed toward the individual’s self-identity, not to her socially salient identity(ies)”. Therefore, Blum concludes, “the argument about individual recognition is much less conceptually linked to multiculturalism than Taylor, and most of his readers, have presumed” (ibid).

### ***Group Rights and Cultural Belonging***

In a similar vein, Walter Feinberg’s work has added an important educational dimension to Will Kymlicka’s argument about liberalism and culture. Kymlicka’s work on group rights is of central significance to multiculturalism. Kymlicka (1989) has refuted critiques of liberal theory that associate it with a simplistically individualistic notion of the self, arguing that cultural belonging and community are essential for the development of individuals’ identities and choice, and thus that liberalism demands the recognition of group rights, particularly of cultural minorities. If one accepts this account, then clearly, as Feinberg notes, “liberalism is no enemy to multicultural education” (1995, p. 203). Yet the notion of “learning through culture”, Feinberg argues, is significantly different from the espoused aim of multicultural education as “learning about culture” (p. 204). Whereas the second idea presents no

difficulty for liberalism, the ideal of multiculturalism that suggests that “difference will be celebrated in a way that enables children to learn through their own cultural practice” is harder for liberals to accommodate (pp. 204–5).

A consideration of educational policy and practice in fact complicates the distinction between group rights and individual rights for, as Dhillon and Halstead point out (2003, p. 149) “provision of state funding for religious schools may be claimed as a group right by Catholics and Muslims, but the choice whether or not to send their children to such schools is exercised by parents as individuals”.

### *Liberalism and State Schooling*

I have considered ways in which philosophers of education have reflected on educational practice and policy in order to develop, and in some cases to problematise, the conceptual distinctions and theoretical positions articulated by political philosophers.

Other work offers a more explicit defence of particular education policies on the basis of normative political theory. Before I discuss some of this work, it is worth recalling that at a time when multicultural policies were being adopted in many Western states, in light of growing immigration and demands from minority groups for inclusion and recognition, the dominant body of work in political philosophy was the version of liberal theory associated with John Rawls. It is not Rawls’ *Theory of Justice* that is the most pertinent conceptual framework for theorising issues of diversity and multiculturalism, but his later *Political Liberalism*, where his central question is: “How is it possible that there may exist over time a stable and just society of free and equal citizens profoundly divided by reasonable though incompatible religious, philosophical, and moral doctrines?” (Rawls 1993, xviii).

While Rawls himself had notoriously little to say about education, philosophers of education have contributed significantly to his project by showing how a commitment to the principles defended by Rawlsian liberal theorists can justify particular forms of educational provision and regulation.

Rawls claims that whereas comprehensive liberalism may “lead to requirements designed to foster the values of autonomy and individuality as ideals to govern much if not all of life”; in contrast, “political liberalism has a different aim and requires far less” (1993, p. 199). Yet philosophers of education have challenged this claim, arguing, as Meira Levinson (1999) does, that “insofar as accepting the burdens of judgement requires that people gain sufficiently critical distance from their own conception of the good to realize that theirs is not the only reasonable way of life, Rawls’ political liberalism requires at least a rudimentary level of autonomy” (p. 17). Similarly, Eamonn Callan (1996) points out that “To retain a lively understanding of the burdens of judgement in political contexts while suppressing it everywhere else would require a feat of gross self-deception that cannot be squared with personal integrity” (p. 12), concluding that acknowledging the kind of political education demanded in order for citizens to accept the Rawlsian burdens of

judgement leads to a collapse of the distinction between comprehensive and political liberalism.

A significant body of work in philosophy of education associated with this approach therefore defends the provision and control of compulsory schooling in and by the liberal state. Meira Levinson (1999) perhaps provides the most systematic defence of the conceptual connection between political liberalism, the common school, and multiculturalism. In arguing that political liberalism implicitly invokes autonomy, and that sustaining liberal institutions and values therefore requires a form of compulsory liberal schooling (p. 8), Levinson defends a conception of the common school as a community whose normative structure is “autonomy driven” (p. 61). This position leads her to reject models of educational provision that may seem ostensibly to be in keeping with multicultural ideals, but where school choice and the existence of state-funded faith schools has led to a “divided pluralism” (p. 113); i.e. a “pluralistic national community composed of a number of mutually uninterested monoreligious, monocultural, monolingualistic, and/or mono-economic subcommunities”, where multiculturalism “itself is not treated as a public good” (ibid). Likewise, the French model, where “students’ private commitments and beliefs are excluded from the public sphere of the classroom” is, on Levinson’s view, ultimately illiberal. A “truer form of political liberalism” for Levinson (p. 119) is expressed in the multicultural ideal whereby students from diverse communities come together in the shared public space of the school and, through their teaching, curriculum and encounters with diversity, “embrace the virtues of toleration, mutual respect, and critical reflection” (p. 119). My own example clearly illustrates that many state primary school classrooms in 1970s Britain fell far short of this ideal model of the multicultural, liberal state school. Yet while aspects of multiculturalism are now widely embraced in state school curriculum and practice, we should be wary, as I will discuss further below, of assuming that the common state school is, or indeed can be, a neutral space. Such concerns are in fact more urgent than ever given recent developments in British education policy, such as the UK Government’s Prevent Duty for Schools (Department for Education 2015) and the requirement to promote ‘fundamental British values’.

Rob Reich is another philosopher of education who has considered the implications of liberal theory for questions about the control and provision of schooling in multicultural societies. Reich has argued for what he calls “multicultural accommodations” in schooling as a way of achieving justice for cultural minorities (Reich 2003, p. 318). In discussing the limits of state intervention, he criticises arguments developed by Kymlicka and other defenders of “cultural rights”, on the grounds that “respecting cultural groups [...] may not respect the autonomy of future adults born into the group” (p. 310). This argument is made, like all the above arguments, in the context of a defence of the liberal state which, Reich argues, “should be reluctant to grant rights to separate schooling or to permit broad exemptions from educational requirements such as mandatory attendance. The liberal state should maintain, at the very least, regulatory authority over schooling and attempt to provide an education that aims, among other things, to foster the development of autonomy in children, as well as civic virtues, such as tolerance and civility” (p. 311).



Walter Feinberg has written extensively on the common school and multiculturalism, with a particular focus on religion and faith schooling, defending the ideal of a public school as a “place where one should learn the skills and attitudes required for living together in a democracy” (2003, p. 386). For Feinberg, “A public school must aim to reproduce a public” (ibid). Thus, like Reich, Feinberg is not against liberal state funding for faith schools, but argues that “any support for religious schools must be predicated on the school advancing individual and social autonomy, and that this would require accountability to public as well as to religious bodies” (p. 388).

These discussions illustrate how when central concepts associated with liberal theory, such as autonomy, are considered within an educational context, one inevitably comes up against a discussion of children’s and parents’ rights. For many liberal philosophers of education, the argument for compulsory public schooling in multicultural societies rests on a conception of children’s rights akin to Joel Feinberg’s (2007) seminal account of “the child’s right to an open future”. In the context of debates over separate schools – particularly religious schools – within liberal societies, Walter Feinberg’s argument is that “Children have a right to grow up with a reasonable possibility that they will have opportunities to develop beliefs that are different from their parents” (2003, p. 393). In other words, the liberal principle of respecting individuals, even those with illiberal beliefs, “does not entail the requirement that society aid them in transmitting, through publically supported church education, their illiberal views to their children” (ibid).

## Historical Shifts and Tensions

Questions about the institutional form, control and governance of education have always been at the heart of work in philosophy of education and defences of the ideal of the common school can be traced at least as far back as Dewey. Yet there are interesting distinctions, when it comes to multicultural themes, between some of the work discussed above, and earlier work in the discipline.

### *Theoretical Resolutions*

As the above discussion indicates, many of the questions addressed by philosophers discussing multiculturalism are variations on the classic dilemma at the heart of liberal theory, namely: what should the liberal state do about illiberal communities within it? When it comes to education, this discussion often takes the form of debates as to whether, or to what extent, state schools should or can be ‘neutral’, in the sense so central to Rawlsian political liberalism. In some cases, the discussion is explicitly framed in this way, as in Dhillon and Halstead’s (2003) entry for the *Blackwell Guide*, which notes:

A critical question is whether the state itself should endeavour to adopt a neutral stance with regard to culture, or whether there are any circumstances in which the state can justifiably align itself with the culture of the majority.... (p. 149)

Similarly, McDonough and Feinberg, in the Introduction to their edited collection (2003), note that the contributors are concerned with “the question of the aim of education in societies which want to advance a liberal – democratic agenda, and how those aims might need to be constrained within the context of religious or cultural groups that have a different agenda” (pp. 2–3).

Yet early work that addressed such issues tended to approach them as problems or dilemmas to be resolved, as in the following extract from John Harris’s 1982 paper, one of the earliest papers on this theme to appear in the *Journal of Philosophy of Education*: “Multicultural society cannot hope to treat its citizens as equals unless it is also prepared to show equal concern and respect for their cultures”. Yet,

The problem arises in connection with any culture which does not equally respect its own members. It looks as though a society committed to equality and containing such cultures or sub-cultures within it, is caught in a genuine and uncomfortable dilemma. [...] Are we to respect cultures and thereby endorse the unequal treatment of persons, or insist on equality for individuals at the expense of insult and injury to their culture? Or, is there perhaps some way of dissolving rather than resolving these questions? (p. 224)

The educational questions following logically from such liberal dilemmas are, it is implied, questions to be resolved – or at least dissolved – at the theoretical level, in order to offer helpful guidance to educational policy makers and practitioners. A similar assumption seems to be operating in work that addresses the implications of multicultural commitments for the curriculum. Thus Yael Tamir (1995) points out that given that one of the aims of multicultural education is “to allow minority communities to protect their ongoing existences as distinct communities” (p.503), and given how central language is to issues of cultural identity, the questions arise: “Yet how many languages should a child learn? What should be the curricula for children of mixed cultural–linguistic origins? What kind of language skills should children have in both the minority and the majority language? Is bilingualism (or trilingualism) an intellectual asset or a burden?” (ibid). One response to these questions could be: ‘Which children? Which languages? Where? Bilingualism is surely sometimes an asset and sometimes a burden...’. Yet the idea that one could determine such answers and that they could be used to guide the establishment of centralised curriculum, provision and control of schooling is, I believe, symptomatic of the fact that most philosophers of education are already assuming a state schooling system. This is reflected in the language of Tamir’s paper which is replete with phrases such as “all children should”.

### ***Philosophy and Empirical Research***

A related feature of this early work in philosophy of education is the absence of any concrete examples of educational practice. It is notable that more recent work in the field has engaged much more closely with empirical research. Thus for example

Meira Levinson, in spite of her earlier arguments in defence of the common multicultural school as the best way to realise a pluralistic autonomy-based liberalism, acknowledges in later work that although she herself has argued that “it is hard for students to learn to be mutually tolerant and respectful of other people, traditions and ways of life unless they are actually exposed to them” (1999, p. 114), it is clear that “Merely bringing people together into a common space does nothing to help them get along” without conscientious efforts on the part of educators (2007, p. 630). Levinson cites a range of empirical studies that show that “the more we are brought into physical proximity with people of another race or ethnic background, the more we stick to ‘our own’ and the less and the less we trust the ‘other’” (ibid).

### *Education and Schooling*

In most work in the field, the institution of schooling controlled and provided by the liberal state is an unarticulated and undefended assumption, and most discussions of multicultural education are therefore actually discussions of multicultural schooling. So while discussions of group rights within the liberal state raise questions about the educational rights of parents and children, discussions of these questions tend to revolve around legal issues to do with the establishment, control and provision of state schools. It is important to note, though, that once one takes seriously the insight that the liberal commitment to autonomy means that children have a right to develop into autonomous individuals, one has to at least consider the argument that parents may have no right to pass on *any* of their belief systems to their children. Yet very few philosophers of education consider pedagogical relationships beyond those of formal schooling, such as that between parents and their children. One of the few to do so within the liberal tradition is Matthew Clayton, who in his 2006 book *Justice and Legitimacy in Upbringing* argues that a commitment to political liberalism entails that it is illegitimate for parents to induct their children into a substantive vision of the good. While Clayton does not equate education with schooling, he is still, like most of the philosophers considered above, working firmly within the framework of liberal theory. In the context of debates on multiculturalism, however, it is important to consider work that goes beyond, or even challenges, some of the classic liberal positions discussed above.

### *Critical Multiculturalism*

Philosophers of education have discussed multiculturalism and multicultural education in the pages of philosophy of education journals, books and edited collections. Yet there is also a significant body of literature on multicultural education that, while its authors may not self-identify as philosophers, addresses similar philosophical and political questions. An important shift within this body of work is that

from liberal multiculturalism to critical multiculturalism. May and Sleeter (2010, p. 4) characterise the phase of liberal multiculturalism, prominent in the 1970s and 1980s, with a focus on “getting along better, primarily via a greater recognition of, and respect for, ethnic, cultural, and/ or linguistic differences”. This approach is reflected in work by philosophers of education in this period, which seemed to embody the hope that if schools were the kinds of places where children from diverse groups encountered each other as equals and learned to respect each other’s cultural and other differences, this in itself would lead to a more tolerant society, as reflected in Pratte’s statement: “I wish to suggest that schools can be utilised as vehicles for fostering tolerance and understanding among culturally diverse groups” (1978, p. 114).

May and Sleeter state that “a key weakness” of liberal multiculturalism is its “inability to tackle seriously and systematically... structural inequalities, such as racism, institutionalized poverty, and discrimination” (2010, p. 3). In allowing educational policy, curriculum and pedagogy to focus on the ethnic and cultural histories and practices of minority groups, liberal multiculturalism, in May and Sleeter’s view, “abdicates any corresponding recognition of unequal, and often untidy, power relations that underpin inequality and limit cultural interaction” (p. 4). The period when liberal multiculturalism was at its height in Britain, leading to enthusiasm for all forms of ‘diversity’ in the curriculum, often got translated into what Modood and May (2001) describe as “the welcoming of people of other cultures by encouraging their cultural practices, usually in superficial ways (later lampooned as ‘a multiculturalism of the three S’s’: saris, samosas, and steel bands)” (p. 306).

Recent work by philosophers of education has explored the shifting and occasionally conflicting aims within these different phases of multiculturalism. Thus Robert Fullinwider, in the *Blackwell Companion to the Philosophy of Education*, explores the epistemological positions underlying – or implicitly assumed by – much literature on multicultural education, particularly critical multiculturalism. Fullinwider is very dismissive of what he sees as the central assumption that “when students understand the causes of their beliefs, and whose interest they serve, this is supposed to be liberating” (2003, p. 495), arguing that education ought to provide students with “a platform for assessing the soundness or accuracy of beliefs in the first place”, irrespective of the need to understand the “causal stories about power and interest” behind them (ibid). Ultimately, he concludes, the strength of multiculturalism “has been its unremitting commitment to closing the achievement gap and fostering respect across ethnic, racial and ‘cultural’ boundaries. Its weaknesses derive from its intellectual insularity and limited conceptual tools” (p. 498).

However, I believe Fullinwider misinterprets the educational orientation of critical multiculturalism. It is notable that in the work of Kincheloe and Steinberg (1997) and other theorists in the tradition such as Henry Giroux and Peter McLaren, the prime audience for arguments such as those referred to by Fullinwider is actually not students but teachers (see e.g. Giroux 1992, 1988; Kincheloe 1993). The point they are making is not that understanding the causes of their beliefs and the power structures behind them will *in itself* be liberating for students; rather, the point is that in the absence of an understanding on the part of teachers of how structures of

power operate in society, and where they are situated within these structures, their ability to offer an educationally transformative or liberatory experience will be limited, and they will therefore inevitably end up reproducing the dominant power structures and socio-economic inequalities. The critical multicultural teacher, Kincheloe says, “is a scholar who spends a lifetime studying the pedagogical and its concern with the intersection of power, identity and knowledge” (Kincheloe and Steinberg 1997, p. 29). It goes without saying that the critical multicultural teacher is also committed to rigorous intellectual disciplinary knowledge; knowledge that can provide students with “a platform for assessing the soundness or accuracy of beliefs” (Fullinwider 2003, p. 495); but what theorists of critical multiculturalism are calling for is a pedagogy that goes beyond this. Whereas “Mainstream conservative liberal and pluralist multicultural educators have been relatively uninterested in probing the connections that unite the sphere of politics, culture and the economy with education”, therefore viewing their task as “merely addressing prejudicial attitudes towards women and minorities”, critical multiculturalists acknowledge that “racial, sexual and class forms of oppression can be understood only in structural context” (Kincheloe and Steinberg 1997, pp. 31–32).

An important element of critical multiculturalism, then, is the demand that educators and educational theorists reflect on their own positions within structures of power, privilege and oppression. Some acknowledgement of this point is evident in recent work by philosophers of education, in that it would be a lot rarer today to find philosophers of education referring unreflectively to ‘our culture’ and ‘our education’; phrases that were far more common in the 1960s and 1970s, as in the following extract from the Harris paper referred to above:

We must now return to the issue at hand, to the question of how a culture like our own, which is avowedly and rightly willing to do all it can to show equality of concern and respect to all its citizens and which recognises that it cannot hope to do this unless it is also willing to show equal concern and respect for their cultures, is to cope with the paradox which constituent discriminatory cultures present. (1982, p. 227)

This passage follows a discussion of how

The suppression by Britain of slavery in the last century and the open attacks by the Royal Navy on the slave ships of other nations might well be seen, and was seen, as a flagrant, high-handed and insensitive rejection of the deeply held beliefs and cultural practices of other societies. These societies might well have claimed that they were entitled to the same concern and respect for their practice of slavery as Britain claimed for the rejection of such a practice. (ibid)

Both these quotes illustrate a lack of reflection in the part of the author on his own position of power and privilege, and what it means, from this position, to talk of ‘our culture’. They also betray a historical blindness, well documented by critical philosophers of race such as Charles Mills (2007), who has developed the concept of “white ignorance” to “map a non-knowing grounded in white racial privilege”. A familiarity with important historical studies, such as C.L.R. James’ *The Black Jacobins* (1938), would have revealed to Harris that Britain’s “attacks on slave ships of other nations” were in fact part of a colonial war with the French to gain control

of the strategically vital trade ports of the slave colonies of the West Indies, and that the claim that the British can be credited with bringing about a “suppression of slavery” is dubious, to say the least.

As noted, a great deal of recent work in philosophy of education shows a greater awareness of these issues of privilege and power. Lawrence Blum’s work is notable in this regard, not only for its explicit foregrounding of questions of ‘race’, but for his use of the phrase ‘multicultural concerns’, which I find a more fruitful phrase than the phrase ‘multiculturalism’ or ‘multicultural education’. It suggests that, rather than multiculturalism embodying a set of aims, or leading to a clear set of policy prescriptions, there are multicultural concerns that teachers, philosophers and theorists should be alert to, whatever educational context they are working in; and that these require an attention to specific moral, political and personal aspects of the situation. This requires us to constantly probe and question the different ways in which we understand and experience issues of culture and identity, and to create and nurture educational spaces in which to develop what Jose Medina (2013, p. 7) calls “democratic sensibilities”, that “require free and equal epistemic interaction among the heterogeneous groups that are part of society”.

Recent work by philosophers of education that reflects these concerns is often focused more explicitly on social justice pedagogy than on multiculturalism. A notable example here is the work of Barbara Applebaum, who succinctly articulates the shift to critical multiculturalism in stating: “In order for multicultural education to be successful, individuals from dominant groups, in our case both students and teachers, must be persuaded that they are dominating and must realize that this domination must cease” (1996, p. 186).

Similarly, Walter Feinberg, in arguing that “the act of decentering and coming to terms with otherness” is a central aim of public education in a multicultural society, notes that this is “more difficult and, therefore, more in need of systematic development” for members of the dominant group, “because their behaviour is taken as the norm” (1995, p. 214).

Philosophers have also problematised the simplistic rejection of liberalism often associated with critical multiculturalism, pointing out that liberalism itself, while committed to the fundamental value of basic freedom for individuals, does not entail “a posture of blindness or even hostility to group-based identities and categories” (Macedo 2003, p. 415).

## **Back to School**

Back in Mrs. Bell’s classroom, I am left wondering what, if anything, she could have done differently. The fact that I recall this incident, and my own discomfort, so vividly, suggests that there was something troubling going on; something that perhaps a different form of pedagogical interaction could have avoided. Philosophical work on multicultural education – a term that was becoming familiar amongst educational theorists as I sat staring down at my blank sheet of paper – shows just why

this approach represented significant progress. Theoretical work on recognition, for example, makes sense of the simple point that there is a form of injustice involved in failing to recognise the experience, identity and knowledge of minority groups, and suggests how multicultural education can address this. Yet as the above discussion shows, the concept of recognition on its own cannot address the issues faced by individuals from minority groups within pluralistic educational settings. Had Mrs. Bell been aware of the fact that I was Jewish and begun the lesson by saying, “Now, everyone draw something that you would have to eat at Christmas dinner, or on Hanukkah”, I am not sure that my discomfort would have been eased. We did not pay much attention to Hanukkah in our home, and I wouldn’t have had a clue what you were supposed to eat during this very minor Jewish festival.

In terms of the integration/assimilation dilemma, while I certainly didn’t feel like an immigrant, having been born in England and with English as my mother tongue, it would have been quite useful for me to have learned what people ate at Christmas dinner. Perhaps Mrs. Bell could have simply said “Here are some things people eat at Christmas”, named them, described them, then asked us to produce some imaginative artwork on this theme. As it was, I did not find out until several years later what that brown blob with a leaf on top actually tasted like or how you were supposed to serve and eat it. Had this been explained to me, perhaps I would have felt more equipped to deal with the strange rituals involved in a Christmas dinner, were I ever to be invited to one. But then again, even if Mrs. Bell had taken the diversity of her own classroom into account, there is nothing to say that this would have fostered the attitudes of toleration and recognition that underpin the aims of multicultural education. This is not only because, as Meira Levinson (2007) points out, merely bringing people together is unlikely to achieve these aims, but also because “it is a real danger in diverse common schools that teachers and students become complacent about their inclusivity. They fail to think about whether the groups they choose to focus on because they are represented in the building are the most significant ones for students to learn about” (p. 632).

The fact that children at British primary schools today are unlikely to learn about Christmas without also learning about Diwali, Hanukkah, Eid and Chinese New Year, however problematic the superficial presentation of ‘cultures’ implied here, surely represents progress. Yet while children from minority groups in British schools today are probably less likely to feel confused and alienated by tasks like making festive decorations, this is not to say that they are not still experiencing alienation, disempowerment, systematic disadvantage and discrimination.

Recognising these systematic injustices and inequalities requires a reflexivity about our own position as we try to create and explore spaces for critical education and critical thinking about education. Perhaps Mrs. Bell would have been a more sensitive teacher had she been aware of her own position as a member of a majority group. But I also need to consider why it was that it did not occur to her that I would not know what people ate at Christmas dinner. I expect that part of the reason for this was that I was a white child in a predominantly white Christian context, thereby passing as one of the majority. There was, as far as I remember, one non-white child



in my year at school; a boy from Mauritius called Farhan. I don't know what his teacher asked him to draw in the Christmas decoration class, and I certainly don't think that assuming that because a child is Black or Asian she will not be familiar with certain cultural rituals is any less problematic than assuming that because a child is white, she will. But it is important to remember that, as Rattansi (2011) notes, "The issue of multiculturalism was racialised from its inception. To a large degree, [it] has its origins in responding to the populations that had previously resided in Europe's colonies and which had by and large been regarded as innately inferior races" (p. 9).

The kind of constant vigilance and sensitivity to how issues of diversity and identity intersect with issues of power and privilege has not always been a concern of philosophers, and there is certainly a lot more we can do to address the lack of diversity within our own discipline. In the mammoth 1999 four volume collection *Major Themes in the Analytic Tradition* (Hirst and White 1999), which, as the blurb states, "represents the major ideas and arguments which have come to characterise philosophy of education", out of 91 chapters, only 13 are written by women, and as far as I can tell, all the authors are white. While there is still a long way to go, the field today is definitely more diverse. Yet there are other kinds of diversity, beyond the politically significant ones of race and gender, that perhaps we should be concerned about if we want to nurture the "epistemic friction" (Medina 2013) that is so vital to our discipline and to democracy. Perhaps more diversity in terms of the intellectual traditions and positions we engage with, and the educational settings – particularly those that challenge the dominance of state schooling – we consider, would be a welcome development.

A piece of writing in philosophy of education that incorporates a personal narrative where the author reflects on her own experience and identity would have been unlikely to be published in a mainstream academic publication 40 years ago. So there have been welcome developments in the discipline (although no doubt there will be those who disagree).

My own view is that good philosophy of education has always done what good multicultural education and critical pedagogy do, namely develop and nurture the intellectual resources for exploring and questioning the common-place understandings and assumptions of educational discourse, thus constituting both what Giroux (1988) calls a "language of critique", and a "language of possibility".

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# Identity Politics and Belonging



Sheron Fraser-Burgess

## Introduction: Identity, Identity Politics and Culture

Although the term, *identity*, has roots in Western philosophy and more recently in psychology, *identity politics* is a highly contested expression in social science fields, such as in education, in political theory and in philosophy. Bernstein (2005) traced its origin as a formal term to 1979, where social science scholars coined the phrase as a label for the activism of persons with disabilities who challenged prevailing societal views and theorization of their self-perception. Over the next two decades, scholarly sources broadened the term to mean pejoratively a category of collective action that included violent ethnic conflict and activist nationalism (Bernstein 2005, p. 59). Beginning with the semantic and philosophical provenance of identity as it relates to the coining of the term, *identity politics*, this work considers contestations of theory and interpretation about particular identity groups and in opposition to the dominant or majority population. It explores its discursive dependence on the ever-evolving constructions of gender, race or ethnicity, and lesbian, gay, bisexual, transgender and queer (LGBTQ) orientation as discrete identity categories. Primarily in the United States as one socio-political context and to some extent globally, it will be shown that these kinds of petit social movements along the lines of identity prove to be necessary disruptions of the political order. As such, this chapter underscores that associations with identity as specific forms of joint group membership *ipso facto* give rise to political activism in order to bring about social change. For each group, persons in the minority, on the margins of society, or who are less powerful draw on their sense of belonging to an identity group to seek political status and broad recognition for their way of life (Taylor 1994). Throughout

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the discussion, higher education and K-12 schools broadly as quintessential democratic institutions of family and society serve to be the context within which citizens and other persons seek redress and legitimation.

## The Identity Concept

Delineating theorizations of the concept of identity assist in representing the genealogy of its meaning as being in discursive engagement with major Western ideas of the self and its relationship to society, community and government. In conflict with different social and cultural understandings of the same, the political differences that arise come to be associated with the emergence of identity politics, which ultimately has educational implications in a multicultural society. In this sense, identity can be subsumed within culture, as an anthropological concept.

Noted anthropologist Geertz (1973) defines culture as the “interpretive in search of meaning” (5). It is “a historically transmitted pattern of meanings embodied in symbols, a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate, and develop their knowledge about and their attitudes toward life” (Geertz 1973, p. 73). A culture consists of a system of possible beliefs, values and history of a people or social group and can manifest a worldview as a distinctive way of life (Moody-Adams 1997). As members of a cultural community, individual members identify to a greater or lesser extent with its way of life (Wiredu 1996).

In comparison with culture, identity is a variable social construction of the significance of a given involuntary trait or attribute within a designated socio-political and cultural context. Psychological theories of identity (Tatum 1997; Roquemore and Brunsmma 2002) elucidate the specific cognitive and affective process of identity formation as distinctly oppositional in nature, being as much defined by holding in-group beliefs as well as not being in possession of the relevant out-group traits. Among the questions that identity raises in this regard is the meaning of inhabiting the marker (e.g., race/ethnicity, sexual orientation and gender) for those holding the attribute or trait. Additionally, what is the significance of the socio-biological component of these attributes for the political status that they acquire in a given context? Tajfel’s (1978) social identity theory holds that self-association is constituted by emotional attachment to the said group in its representation, valued artifacts, and history as well as participating in a shared knowledge base of significant history, experiences, traditions, etc. Social psychology provides a framework within which identity group membership can be understood as gradational or on a continuum.

While it is not always the case, the social construction of identity can overlap with public issues that influence legislation and federal and state policy (Bernstein 2005; Kymlicka 1995). Political philosopher Amy Gutmann (2003) defines identity groups as “politically significant associations of people who are identified by or identify with one or more social markers. Gender, race, class, ethnicity, nationality, religion, disability, and sexual orientation are among the most obvious examples of

shared social markers around which informal and formal identity groups form” (p. 9). By setting apart a group on a designated basis, identity demarcates a segment of the culture associated with bearing the signifiers of identities (e.g., phenotype, social class, religious beliefs). In fact, from the point of view of the subject, identifying with any of these social groups equates to belonging to this group. Austin (2005) describes this component as the assumptive aspect where the subject self-identifies with a group on the basis of markers that are in-common.

### **Out of the Philosophical Roots of Individualism**

As will be discussed below, conceptual, theoretical and empirical dimensions of identity have considerable political implications in the current American social and historical context. However, identity politics exclusively as political activism is a marked departure from the meaning of personhood in classical political philosophy and theory in which individual agency and self-formation are central. As will be shown, these varying understandings of identity become the provenance of opposing political orientations animating identity politics.

Among the major areas of the discipline, traditional philosophy historically has been concerned with the conditions of rationality, persistence of the self and the nature of being for persons. These areas of inquiry form major domains of the philosophical ideals of the Enlightenment which relate to the ascendancy of reasons over sentiment or sacred texts. Descartes’ (1596–1650) claim to the cogito, as the existent rational self, established the Western intellectual standard of personhood. Another highly influential thinker in this regard was John Locke (1632–1704). In the American, British and some would argue broader Western context, it is difficult to identify a figure who has had greater influence on the founding principles of liberal political society, thought and its institutions including that of education. In work on this modern philosopher, Balibar and Sandford (2013) illustrate the very distinct interpretation of “identity” and “difference” in terms of personhood in John Locke’s *Essay Concerning Human Understanding*. Locke’s individualistic self-formation was consistent with his philosophical worldview in every respect. On this account, identity is the individual mind’s capacity to structure its memories, experiences and thoughts in a bundling that constitutes personhood and that sets one apart ontologically as being discrete and qualitatively unique in mind. It is related to a theory of knowledge where the mind’s apprehension of experiences was the sole basis for the reason and inductive logic of knowledge claims as compared to abstract Cartesian deduction. In the classical political liberalism of the Enlightenment, persons were in possession of individual autonomy and inherent rights that required substantive consent for modification or alternation by the government or any cultural or social group. Therefore, the end of education was to cultivate this capacity for personal liberty through reason and foster the attributes of a citizen who was prepared to carry out the related duties and fully exercise its associated rights.

Locke’s political philosophy, grounded in the grand Enlightenment elevation of individual human capacity to make sense of their world through employing their mental faculties, and its underlying account of personhood, as the identity of the subject, heavily influenced the American education ideal for centuries to come.

Notably this account of identity gave rise to a philosophy of education iconically represented in the notion of ‘educating the man’ in Richardson (2011) work, *Some Thoughts Concerning Education*. Holding that the child’s mind was like a ‘white paper’, the work presented the pupil as an independent learner for whom individual experiences informed the acquisition of all forms of knowledge inclusive of virtues and academics. It was both an important precursor to experience-based education and contributed to the over-emphasis on cultivating reason and logic as one primary aim of education. As would be shown later in Locke’s work to justify the codification of racial inequality in the American colonies, this account of the selfhood implicitly applied exclusively to white males (Richardson 2011). Lastly, it is clear that the male gender bias there incorporated beliefs about the intellectual inferiority of women into the cannon of Western thinking about who was worthy of an education.

The contemporary discourse, in contrast, associates identity with shared traits on the basis of which an individual’s sense of self is held in joint meaning with like others. It explicitly considers the societal and institutional implications of the group marker and the need to seek redress on these grounds where there is perceived bias, racism and injustice. The shift away from the individual understanding of identity to a social sense demarcates the political battle lines that are drawn. It exists between those who advocate for the rights of others on the basis of group membership and those who support the individual rights of Locke’s classical liberalism and in its resurgence in neoliberalism. In education, the politics of identity unfolds along these parameters.

## The Politics of Group Identity

According to Alcoff (2006) in a seminal examination of the concept, *identity politics* asserts the significance of social group membership for the individuals that identify with them in securing political goods. Alcoff maintains that, “The concept of identity politics does not presuppose a prepackaged set of objective needs or political implications but introduces identity as a factor in any political analysis and argues for reflexive analysis of how any given identity may affect one’s actions, beliefs and politics” (Alcoff 2006, p. 147). It is as Omi and Winant (2015) similarly describe as the politicization of the social. Crenshaw (1991) underscores that “identity-based” politics involves both finding strength and solidarity in shared experiences and awareness of systemic oppression. The former refers to the inward-facing or internal aspect that one derives from possessing the social marker in a given way and viewing oneself as belonging to group on this basis.

Identity groups participating in group-based politics also exhibit an outward-facing or external aspect of Crenshaw’s (1991) awareness of the group’s social status. Identity group members are able to recognize that previously isolated and individual acts of violence, bias or prejudice can be part of a systematic pattern of oppression. The external aspect is also relational and intersubjective in that activism



requires a counterpart or opposing identity group in relationships of power (e.g., dominance, sub-ordinance); hierarchy (e.g., social status, social class); difference (e.g., racial, ethnic, gender); or a combination thereof.

Although the term ‘identity politics’ did not emerge in the public square until 1979, according to Bernstein (2005), in the late twentieth century the political activism of two separate constituencies represented the increasing salience of social markers to society and to education broadly conceived. These groups were the women’s movement and the advent of multiculturalism, which would develop into multicultural education. The two influences would later merge with movements for cultural rights, immigrants and sexual orientation into the broad social activism that constituted identity politics in the American political landscape.

### *Gender Identity Politics and Feminism*

The women’s movement is one prominent example of the convergence of political and social factors that historically have animated a politics of identity in the American context. The feminist movement illustrates the philosophical ideas that can be in tension within such movements and their implications for education. Offen (1988) proposed as the basic definition for feminism that there was the “impetus to critique and improve the disadvantaged status of women relative to men within particular cultural situations” (Offen 1988, p. 133). Historically, the American feminist movement sought to secure universal education and suffrage in the early 1900s (Offen 1988). Feminist theory of the last half-century has been framed most clearly and vocally in opposition to patriarchal policies and sources of the oppression of women and, securing “individual equality of rights with men” (Offen 1988, p. 155). To the extent that this activism has sought disparate and distinct political outcomes for women on the basis of gender, it is engaging in identity politics.

Appealing to gender as a justification for a feminist political stance entails ontological and epistemological assertions that run counter to modern philosophy’s transcendent discourse of the idealized rational agent (Bordo 1990). Ontologically, feminist theory makes the claim there are unifying attributes, lived experiences or perspectives that characterize the female gendered category of being in the world. Positively, the unitary feminine identity offers a basis for social solidarity for a given subset of women. Concurrently, there has also been a dialectic internal to feminist theory and scholars to define the meaning and political implications of gender and the basis of the commonality for which political status and equality with males similarly were being sought. Offen (1988) called into question whether political advocacy was seeking to secure freedom, autonomy and range of choices for the individual woman or legitimation of the maternal and relational dimension of being that was more characteristic of women’s lives. Nicholson and Fraser (1990) maintained that any such formal social construction was by its intentionality, arbitrary and heterogeneous and relegated other forms of social location, such as race or ethnicity to the societal margins.

Reframing modern philosophy as a male-gendered project, feminist epistemology maintains that there are different ways of knowing than strict adherence to logic and the linear reasoning of analytic epistemology (Duran 1991). In broad strokes, the Cartesian subject inhabited a privileged positionality that transcended time and space and was therefore able to attain objectivity. In a direct challenge, Duran (1991) argued that feminist epistemology seeks to take into account “the grounded, interpersonal, nuanced manner in which knowledge is acquired” (Duran 1991, p. 155). Similarly, Harding’s feminist standpoint theory made the bold assertion that there is a feminist counterpart to traditional scientific methods that is vying to be a more knowledge-conducive research methodology. This advantage holds because women inhabit a privileged epistemic position by virtue of a history of marginalization in the sciences. Broadly categorized as feminist philosophy of science, Harding’s view was one of a constellation of feminist epistemologies theorizing a situated knowledge discourse (Duran 1991; Ford 2007; Haraway 1988; Belenky et al. 1996).

Educational institutions have been sites of gender identity politics in higher education and in K-12 schooling. Women Studies departments have been primary locations of feminist politics at work. Maher and Tetreault (2001) address this clear relationship among gender, its interdisciplinary study and cultivating gender-based forms of political activism in the classroom. Maher and Tetreault maintain that ‘voice’ is the central concept of feminist pedagogy. Feminist pedagogy is present when the environment is created in the classroom such that students experience a freedom to speak for themselves in this and any public space and to bring the lens of their lived experience and the questions it raises to the courses and the broader society (Subramaniam and Middlecamp 1999). In this way, they are liberated from the putatively silencing, homogenizing and hegemonic discourse of traditional pedagogy. Feminist pedagogy provides the social space for legitimation of these forms of difference. Fisher (2001) proposed a distinct teaching methodology arising from a feminist worldview. Acknowledging many influences in Freire, Dewey and Gramsci, Fisher distinguished feminist teaching as differing from these extant theories in a “political discourse adequate to feminism” (Fisher 2001, p. 28).

### **Pedagogy and Voice**

In K-12 pedagogy, the prominence of voice as a pedagogical aim, can be traced both to the feminist work of Carol Gilligan and to a postmodern theory of education. Gilligan’s (1982) work is said to give “voice” to the projects and priorities of women (Maher and Tetreault 2001). In Gilligan’s view to give voice is to acknowledge the significance of the subjectivities of each person’s experience constituted by personal narratives of oppression and realization of identities. Burnette-Bletsch (1997) discussed the emphasis on identity or social context of the learner that informs feminist pedagogy where students and teachers each “brings a unique perspective to the learning process based partly upon individual experience, race, gender, socio-economic class, and sexual orientation” (Burnette-Bletsch 1997, p. 213). This

approach redistributes the authority in the classroom so that “no one holds a monopoly on knowledge or can claim an objective viewpoint” (Burnette-Bletsch 1997, p. 213).

### **The Intersection of Race and Gender**

Feminism, grounded in counter ontological and epistemological assumptions, is one movement that problematized identity status as a political issue. Crenshaw’s (1991) seminal work proposed that the intersection of race and gender can create an axis of oppression. Its effects in aggregate are not identifiable by appealing to either identity category alone. Hooks’ (1994) conceptualization of intersectionality posited the idea of the double victimization of black women and that as an implication, gender was not the sole determinant of a black women’s identity. True liberation could be achieved through a Freirian critical consciousness fostered in resisting the structural barriers that inhibit subject formation (Delpit 2006).

Proposing that black women’s lives are circumscribed by both gender and race, Hill-Collins (2000) argued that black women had in common shared experiences that were characterized by common themes. This embodied and situated perspective is the distinct standpoint of black feminist epistemology (Hill-Collins 2000, p. 53). A nomenclature of black feminist epistemology provides the language to describe the black female social location and the value of lived experiences for knowledge acquisition. It is a claim to the legitimation of historically based but not delimited black feminist thought and to the demarcation of shared possibilities emerging out of intersecting sources of oppression.

### ***Racial Politics, Identity and Education***

Similar to gender, the meaning of racial identity in American society has unfolded in highly politicized ways that also reveal the social, political and economic axes of identity group conflict. In the ante-bellum period, post-Reconstruction, and through the Jim Crow era, racial conflict animated the American charter, because “Race and racism in the United States have been shaped by centuries-long conflict between white domination and resistance by people of color” (Omi and Winant 2015, p. 3). Comprehensively representing this historical transformation is beyond the scope of the piece (Taylor 2013; Shelby 2005; Ford 2007). Rather, this section aims to chart the emergence of identity politics as one phase in this sordid racial history. Identity politics resists the socio-political dominance of the racial majority and seeks cultural legitimacy for a plurality of racial and ethnic groups. In this struggle for cultural influence, political power and social equality, schools and higher education institutions have been one clear front.

## White Supremacy, Nativism and Pluralism

It is reasonable to situate the discourse of racial identity politics in the United States broadly in terms of stark historical divisions along racial and ethnic lines. In this sense, the present sociopolitical contours of racial categorizations are rooted in centuries of oppression, where blacks lacked the comparable political power of whites to secure their rights and even advance social justice against racism and discrimination in its various forms of structural inequality. Ongoing debates in the public sphere about equal educational opportunity are in this vein.

While racial identity formation in the United States has undergone periods where the definition of race was static rather than being mutable, fluid or socially constructed as it is today, the most salient precursor of the racial categorization in America has been the black versus white racial divide (Omi and Winant 2015). It was reified in slavery and further cemented in Jim Crow laws in the South. Additionally, mid-twentieth century state and federal laws fostered racial animus. Further, housing covenants in the West, Midwest and Northwest advanced a *de facto* segregated society, for almost a full century or more after the end of chattel slavery (Wilkerson 2010). Racial tensions were also manifested at a time of significant European migration in the early twentieth century. Premised on the racial implications of mass immigration, there were at least two opposing views of nativism versus pluralism. On the one hand, there were those who sought to preserve an American way of life that equated to a form of white supremacy. The nativists sought full assimilation of immigrants into American culture and religion. Co-occurring with this ideology in the late nineteenth and early twentieth century were American Indian boarding schools. In being removed from reservations and forcibly immersed into a language and culture that was alien to their own, many Native American tribal members lost touch with their cultural identity.

In contrast to assimilation, philosopher Kallen and Chapman (1956) was one prominent advocate of cultural pluralism in which immigrants would be able to maintain their cultural distinctiveness. Kallen and Chapman (1956) argued for non-interference in the proliferation of discrete cultural and ethnic minorities. As would become evident, cultural pluralism was also a flawed ideology. It was premised on a popular veneration of colorblindness. Presupposing an American ‘melting pot’ as a national ideal, it disavowed race as a significant factor in policy and politics. Indeed it was believed that taking race into account in institutional policies would be counter to democratic axioms of equality and that of a shared American identity (Shelby 2005). Sugrue (2010) describes the paradoxical stance as a “profession and performance of anti-racism” such that, by the late 1960s Americans claimed colorblindness as a response to racism while ostensibly living and functioning in racially segregated enclaves (Sugrue 2010).

On this view, race, as a static and *bona fide* demographic category, according to social science and left and anti-racist political theorists did not pose a *prima facie* challenge to existent social and economic structures (Omi and Winant 2015). Racial activism equated to a bid to participate in this hierarchy on a race-blind basis. It follows that while assimilation explicitly subscribed to *de facto* white supremacist

thinking, pluralism, in a seemingly more benign tolerance for politically inert racial or cultural distinctiveness, also landed there as well (Feinberg 1998; Sugrue 2010). Scholars associate the civil rights movement and the Supreme Court's *Brown vs. Board of Education* (1954) decision as integrationist advocacy of this sort because of their quest for acceptance by a majority white society (Ford 2007; Omi and Winant 2015). Particularly in the ending of *de jure* school desegregation and the passage of the Civil Rights Act (1965), the fight for racial equality was led by high profile spokespersons such as Martin Luther King (1928–1968) and later Reverend Jesse Jackson and Al Sharpton whose protests aimed to promote awareness of the dire economic conditions of poor and working-class blacks in urban areas. In addition, the protests of groups such as the NAACP and Southern Christian Leadership Conference were part of city-by-city black activism that continued into the early 1990s (Sugrue 2010).

### **Education, Multiculturalism and Identity**

Distinct from the internecine racial battles waged on the legal front prior to the 1970s, a sustained effort emerged from the academy to transform K-12 schooling and higher education into more racially inclusive spaces. Although originally gaining prominence in the 1940s in the United States, multiculturalism was notably promoted by Canadian Prime Minister, Pierre Trudeau (1919–2000), in the early 1970s as a label for the kind of society that this nation state sought to exemplify (Fraser-Burgess 2005). Ironically in the United States, the latter emergence of multiculturalism is owed to the Civil Rights Movement as well as the women's movement (Fullinwider 1993). As a label for the targeted effort to counter minority exclusion from the major institutions of American society and culture, it encompassed varied and multiple initiatives in education and became the subject of ongoing debates in the political philosophy discourse. However, ambiguity about the sense of culture upon which multiculturalism was predicated would follow its disciplinary expansion to include sexual orientation and eventually social class, becoming a template for a politics of identity in civic spaces and the broader public sphere.

In the American education context, theorizing multiculturalism initially involved curricular innovations that included the histories, experiences and accomplishments of a broadly representative cadre of ethnicities in American society (Banks 1981). Multiculturalism in the early stages provided curriculum for ethnic studies classes. The content featured the culture and history of select ethnic groups and was intended to promote a more diverse social studies curriculum. Initially its focus was also fostering ethnic pride through offering an anthropologically sound historical and cultural knowledge base for various ethnicities (Banks 1981). This iteration sought to counter the social stigma that was associated with membership in these groups and to encourage the ethnic pride so vilified by Schlesinger (1992) and the like as being a threat to a shared national identity. Feinberg (1998) alternatively crafted a more inclusive account. Conceding that one's membership in cultural or identity group is within the realm of the privacy and freedom of association that liberalism

so values, Feinberg argued that schools have a higher ethical and political task. It is to provide the deliberative and critical space that prepares all students to subject their beliefs to critical scrutiny, holding no belief system as sacrosanct. Like Gutman (2003), Feinberg subsumed cultural identity within national identity.

Multicultural education as an interdisciplinary field of teacher education sought to address the minority versus majority gap in the general school environments, assessment textbooks and culture (Banks and Banks 1993). Although still informed by a multiethnic focus it entered the larger public debate through challenging the achievement gap and the contributing education policies, racism and systemic factors (Howard 2010). To make this case effective, psychology, anthropology and sociology are domains upon which multicultural education drew. The goal was to equip the predominantly white teaching force to engage in culturally relevant teaching in which schools related the curriculum and classroom experience to the background and culture of children of color for their academic success (Ladson-Billings 1992).

In higher education, multicultural education was indicative primarily of a quest for an inclusive Western canon (Fraser-Burgess 2005). It was this movement in the early 1990s, inflected by postmodernist critique of the Enlightenment tradition, and the hegemony of its colonialist roots, that ushered in a social justice dimension to multicultural education (Hyttén 2006). On this view, identity politics was a politics of difference that drew attention to the stigmatization associated with belonging to identity groups that were neither dominant nor in the majority. The activism focused on curriculum or education policies that would empower minorities, women and persons in the LGBTQ community. In this sense, multicultural education not only sought to disrupt the dominant narrative in educational institutions in which minority and black identity remained subordinate to a Western discourse of white supremacy but also to subvert the very notion of mainstream norms that marginalized cultural groups.

The multicultural education movement in education was the genesis for this kind of politicking. In both K-12 and higher education, efforts to promote a more culturally inclusive and broad-minded curriculum have expanded to contemporary movements. Multiculturalism entered the public square as the basis for social activism as the very meaning of identity politics as it openly challenged the white, male, monocultural dominance of American institutions and the perception of their formative and benevolent role in American history (Fraser-Burgess 2005). Activists appealed to claims of multiculturalism in the quest to reverse the historical marginalization of the 'other' (e.g., women, blacks, LGBTQ) from the mainstream culture; affirm the value of deviation from the majority norm; and counter the prevailing view of these differences as deficient in some way. Dhillon and Halstead (2003) allude to the position of multiculturalism in the historical genealogy of cultural pluralism. In its latter form the concept of culture that multiculturalism presupposed conflated the "political, social, cultural, moral, educational and religious in its bid to transform the status of these identity groups" (Dhillon and Halstead 2003, p. 147).

Paramount at this time were social movements promoting multiculturalism such that it became increasingly important in liberal political theory as a consequence of

the educational reforms associated with multicultural education. Political liberal theory in the late twentieth century was clearly engaged with the question of whether its institutions should accommodate the distinctive cultural traditions of minority groups, inclusive of race (Appiah 2005; Gutmann 2003; Benhabib 2002; Macedo 2000; Taylor 1994.). Political liberalism's high regard for individual rights then faced a conundrum. To what extent should individual rights demand accommodation by the associated cultural group. The dilemma arises clearly when the cultural group incorporates values or practices that are antidemocratic or oppressive or if giving pride of place to the group's way of life conflicts with non-group members' individual rights. It is for this reason that identity politics also represents the challenges and benefits that diversity poses for the majority and the democratic citizenship of its members.

Liberal political theorists distinguish between the broad sense of "culture" that this movement implied and anthropologically based distinctions, arguing that there were grounds for accommodation of the latter but, particularly because of the educational implications, the former was more contentious (Fullinwider 2003). Gutmann (1996, 2003) has been one of the political theorists who articulated a distinctively democratic liberal view of privileging civic unity and the role of cultural diversity as it is reflected in schools in a democratic society. Indefensible is multiculturalism as described above that is designed to cultivate 'separatist' cultural, religious, racial or gender identities. These multicultural claims designed to "bolster the self-esteem of students on the basis of membership in a separatist culture" are divisive and fail to promote mutual respect (Gutman 2003, p. 9). A multiculturalism that is compatible with democratic education is one that presents the opportunity to "understand and appreciate the social contributions and life experiences of the various groups that constitute society" (p. 9). While Gutmann (2003) asserts that social markers can contribute to the collective identities of individuals and groups, she maintains that the group identity does not constitute the whole of the individual estimation of the desirable form of life. Cultural identity is fluid and does not characterize the totality of a person. It follows then, in her view, that political liberalism is not obliged to grant recognition to identity-based claims as such.

In support of multiculturalism, Kymlicka (1995) exemplified a strong conception of group difference in proposing that liberal democracy ought to recognize a cadre of minority rights. Kymlicka (1995) proposed the creation of group-differentiated rights that grant privileges to individuals in some identity groups on the basis of this membership. These rights would apply to ethnic groups, national minorities and religious minorities. Giving pride of place to individuals' horizon of meaning as the context within which personal choice and autonomy are framed is a matter of the justice so valued by political liberalism (Kymlicka 1995). For these group members, the freedom of choice that liberal political theory so values is realized in the history, language and culture of one's social location. This line of thinking constitutes a liberal defense for "a wide range of self-government rights" for such groups (p. 121).

For racialized minorities in the United States Kymlicka's proposal has had limited application in that racial/ethnic cultures in American multiculturalism were neither national minorities nor one of many ethnicities that would qualify as a



poly-ethnic group that is present in a nation state through immigration. Indeed Kymlicka, for whom the context of reference was Canada, conceded that African-Americans as an identity groups were outliers in that they were neither voluntary immigrants nor “fit the national minority pattern” (Kymlicka 1995, p. 24).

Thus, it cannot be said conclusively that liberal political theory has reached a consensus regarding the appropriate role of social activism on the basis of membership in an identity group. Rather a curious *détente* manifested in the implied linguistic orthodoxies of referring to ‘others’ has settled on the discourse. Labeled ‘political correctness’ it represents a catchall term for semiotic practices that conform to the self-perceptions of those inhabiting various identities. It is this studious attention of the idioms of identity that can come to represent a tacit acquiescence to the politics of identify. It is the kind of concession that can appear to be either nominal or substantive as it influences the norms of interactions and communication across the major sectors of society (Bucholtz and Hall 2005).

## Conclusion

The identity politics that Bernstein (2005) describes refers to the mobilization of the members of different groups to seek political acknowledgment of their differences from the majority. It is an effort to restructure social institutions so that they instantiate more representative values and incorporate other norms and practices than those of the majority alone. As such identity politics in the American context is an ever-evolving construct and new identity groups reappear and the relative positions of identity groups changes. This ongoing jockeying for social position is true in education as well. Sleeter and Grant’s (2008) work is one example of teacher education text that offered approaches to multicultural education along the lines of gender, race social class, as well as single ethnic group studies. Later texts such as Gollnick and Chin (2013) incorporated sexual orientation and student exceptionalities.

As the field has progressed, multicultural education has broadened its purview to interrogate the cultural homogeneity associated with American culture. Championing forms of difference, it traded in binary oppositions in which the dominance of majority culture oppressed those who did not conform to its mores. It challenged the fact that Western culture was coextensive with high culture while ethnicity equaled that which was exotic and distinct from the mainstream. In conjunction with political debates and education scholarship, multicultural education and its categories of difference continue to shape larger public debate about identity and its political implications.

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# Performativity and Education



Ian Munday

## Introduction

‘Performativity’ is a term coined by the French Philosopher Jean-François Lyotard in his most famous work *The Postmodern Condition* (1984). It is an unusual concept in philosophy of education for several reasons. Firstly, given that *The Postmodern Condition* looks at the role and status of knowledge in the university, ‘performativity’, its most famous concept, arises from a work in philosophy of education rather than a work of ‘straight’ philosophy. Lyotard would never have thought of himself as a philosopher of education, but that is beside the point. Second, the term is as popular with sociologists of education as it is with philosophers (see Ball 1998; 2003). Indeed it is arguably the work of the former that has led to the third unusual feature of a term deriving from philosophy of education, namely, that it has become ubiquitous within the study of education per se – it is just as likely to feature in discussions of schooling as meditations on the state of the university.<sup>1</sup> Given performativity’s status within the study of education, it is worth beginning with what, over the last several decades, it has commonly come to mean in that domain.

On the whole, performativity is associated with the measurement of students’ progress through formal testing, which is seen as “the key arbiter of educational quality” (Craft 2011, p. 25). A good ‘performance’ becomes synonymous with a good set of results or ‘outputs’. Stephen Ball, the sociologist most closely associated with the critique of performativity, argues that the activities of the ‘new technical intelligentsia’ ultimately:

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<sup>1</sup>It should be noted that the discussion of performativity in sociological work by Ball and others is much more nuanced and sophisticated than the common understanding that has followed from it.

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...drive performativity into the day-to-day practices of teachers. They make management, ubiquitous, invisible, inescapable—part of and embedded in everything we do. Increasingly, we choose and judge our actions and they are judged by others on the basis of their contribution to organisational performance, rendered in terms of measurable outputs. (Ball 2006, p. 151)

As a consequence of this process, schooling has become dedicated to fixing the individual student in regards to her ‘value’. This has led to teach to the test pedagogies that are synonymous with behaviourist control involving rewards and punishments (see Craft and Jeffrey 2008, p. 578). Performativity is also seen as being synonymous with setting measurable targets in regard to the development of skills and knowledge that will lead to economic gains. These developments have taken place at an international level through the activities of organisations such as the OECD.

Though what has just been described deals with part of the picture, in this chapter I argue that it presents an overly simplistic (or vulgar?) understanding of performativity when read against Lyotard’s original account in *The Postmodern Condition* (1984). It is Lyotard’s rendering of performativity that tends to be the focus for philosophers of education. Consequently, it is important to show the ways in which performativity covers concerns that extend beyond a focus on improving exam results and ensuring accountability. This will involve looking more closely at what Lyotard had to say about performativity and putting his work in a philosophical context. The discussion will then move on to some of the ways in which philosophers of education have taken up the concept to try and analyse and understand educational practices and discourses. Given the vast array of work on performativity, providing a literature review of everything that has been published since *The Postmodern Condition* would lead to incredibly thin fare. I have selected five relatively distinct positions into play so as to illustrate what is at stake in regard to thinking about, and in some cases beyond, performativity.

## Lyotard’s Performativity

In *The Postmodern Condition*, Lyotard examines the processes of delegitimation undergone by the grand narratives of modernity, arguing that the postmodern world largely behaves in accordance with a system that has exiled them. The narratives in question relate to the place and role of knowledge in the university. They include the self-legitimising speculative narrative present in the work of Hegel (among others) and the narrative of emancipation: the notion that scientific progress will benefit mankind and improve the lives of individual subjects. Lyotard argues that these narratives have been replaced by the logic of performativity, which has taken hold of knowledge:

The production of proof, which is in principle only part of an argumentation process designed to win agreement from the addressees of scientific messages, thus falls under the

control of another language game, in which the goal is no longer truth but performativity—that is the best possible input/output equation. The State and/or company must abandon the idealist and humanist narratives of legitimation in order to justify the new goal: in the discourse of today's financial backers of research, the only credible goal is power. Scientists, technicians, and instruments are purchased not to find truth, but to augment power. (Lyotard 1984, p. 46)

For Lyotard truth and justice have been replaced by effectiveness and efficiency. The narratives of legitimation that provided frameworks for the former concerns are no longer credible and we have moved from a 'modern' to a 'postmodern' condition. This is what leads Lyotard to issue the pronouncement for which he is most famous: "Simplifying to the extreme, I define *postmodern* as incredulity toward metanarratives" (p. xxiv). It should be noted that the first phrase in the sentence 'Simplifying to the extreme' is usually left out of the citation in the form that has achieved such popularity. This perhaps partly explains why Lyotard is often taken to be the arch exponent or celebrant of the relativism and performativity that the Enlightenment makes room for (or alternatively gives birth to).

This would be a misreading. Lyotard, despite giving his assent to the plurality that accompanies the demise of all-encompassing theories, does not celebrate what has appeared in their place. Bearn presents Lyotard's philosophy in 'aesthetic' terms maintaining that "it is not painted in the slack polychromatic colours of eclecticism" and neither is it "painted the reassuring black of a glorious tragedy". Ultimately, we are told: "Lyotard's philosophy is painted a melancholic grey" (Bearn 2000, p. 232).

Bearn does not say as much, but Lyotard's philosophy cannot embrace 'tragedy'. 'Tragedy' would imply a nostalgia for something substantial that has now been lost. When Lyotard notes the postmodern incredulity to grand narratives he is not suggesting that all-encompassing systems were ever fit for purpose—they simply appeared credible. Consequently nostalgia gets us nowhere in either a philosophical or practical sense. Why then, can we not celebrate the current state of society and education? The problem can perhaps be stated in this way—performativity is a grand narrative of sorts, just a hollowed out one. Performativity 'functions' like a grand narrative: "If a form of knowledge could not be translated into bits of information, it was bound to become more and more invisible to the system. . ." (231). Performativity provides just as overwhelming and brutal a systematic horizon as any grand narrative that preceded it. 'Openness' and 'diversity' are the order of the day but are only deemed acceptable when read against this horizon.

During *The Postmodern Condition*, Lyotard makes a series of predictions regarding the intensification of performativity in the university sphere that may be seen as indicative of quite extraordinary prescience. Michael Peters (2004, p.36) describes it as a 'prophetic prognosis'. In regard to research, Lyotard imagines that a fixation with effectiveness will be accompanied by a vulgar positivism in which large cash investments are required to justify scientific claims: "No money, no proof – and that means no verification of statements and no truth" (Lyotard 1984, p. 45). Consequently, an 'equation between wealth, efficiency and truth' will be established. In this climate, research will become ever more oriented towards producing "technological



applications” (ibid) in which good work is judged in terms of saleable outputs. Lyotard predicts that universities will become more closely aligned with private companies who will also have their own research teams (ibid). This state of affairs is coterminous with the development of digital technologies. These technologies, which started out as instruments for human use, have come to reshape how we view knowledge, namely, as data that can maximise efficiency (44). Technological logic privileges efficiency (conceived of as less expenditure of energy) over concerns with “the true, the just or the beautiful” (ibid). On this account, research that is not ‘efficient’ will gradually disappear from the university scene.

For Lyotard, just as research in the university will increasingly feel the impact of technological and market logics, so will teaching. He argues that the acquisition of knowledge, through its conversion into data, has become exteriorised from the knower and the focus of education turns to ‘skills’ and ‘no longer ideals’ (48). Therefore: “The old principle that the acquisition of knowledge is indissociable from the training (*Bildung*) of minds, is becoming obsolete and will become ever more so” (ibid.). The university will become dedicated to producing technicians who can operate and develop machines (51). What it means to be a student will therefore be transformed. The student population will be divided into a ‘professional intelligentsia’ a ‘technical intelligentsia’ and a large community of adults seeking retraining (48). Lyotard’s most radical prediction in regard to teaching relates to the medium in which it will take place: “To the extent that learning is translatable into computer language and the traditional teacher is replaceable by memory banks, didactics can be entrusted to machines linking traditional memory banks (libraries, etc) and computer data banks to intelligent terminals placed at the students’ disposal” (50). Lyotard sounds the “knell of the age of the Professor” (53) and anticipates the emergence of learning analytics.

We will come back to these predictions at the end of the chapter. In the meantime it is perhaps obvious that performativity, as Lyotard imagines it, does not directly focus on behaviourist approaches to boosting assessment in schools. Indeed, Lyotard had nothing to say about schooling at all, though his points about performativity apply to society at large and this includes school education. It is therefore fair to say that the fixation with maximising the quality of outputs in schooling belongs to the same social condition. This sometimes seems to be missed by educationalists who take performativity in its narrower sense. For example, creativity experts can give the impression that performativity is part of a professional malaise rather than a social arrangement. They look at how performative educational practices in schools are at odds with a creative economy (Robinson 2001; Craft 2011); as though the economy did not behave in consonance with the logic of performativity (see Munday 2014, for a fuller discussion). Lyotard’s understanding of performativity partakes in a philosophical tradition whose members examine something deeper at the heart of culture that is not restricted to professional life. It is therefore, in some ways, aligned with significant philosophical precursors, which will be the focus of the next sections of the chapter.

## Philosophical Influences

Lyotard's performativity diagnosis is not wholly original. What he describes is, in certain respects, analogous to Nietzsche's account of nihilism, Heidegger's discussion of the 'technological understanding of Being' and various distressed discussions of the state of modernity written by the founding members of the Frankfurt School. Let us briefly consider each of these.

Nietzsche writes: "*the highest values devalue themselves*. The aim is lacking, and 'Why' finds no answer" (Nietzsche 1967, p. 9). The collapse of relevance, meaning and truth will bring about a destructive force that will sweep through Europe. The account of nihilism is in part predictive: "What I relate is the history of the next two centuries. I describe what is coming, what can no longer come differently: *the advent of nihilism*.... For some time now our whole European culture has been moving as toward a catastrophe, with a tortured tension that is growing from decade to decade: restlessly, violently, headlong, like a river that wants to reach the end..." (ibid.). The lack of real goals and purposes lets nihilism in. This is due to: "the formulation of value as the opposite of its opposite that Nietzsche—again—saw as the core of nihilism. What do we stand for? We are no longer sure: only that it is not what others represent. We are the reds, which means that we are definitely not the blues" (Blake et al., xii). If there is no overriding aim intrinsic to what we do, success and failure, efficiency or inefficiency are the only imaginable outcomes. This is nihilism. A successful school or university is not a failing one and vice versa.

Following Nietzsche (to some extent) Heidegger sees nihilism as intrinsic to what he calls the technological understanding of Being. In an interview with Brian Magee on the subject of Heidegger's philosophy, Hubert Dreyfus nicely expresses what is at stake here:

We don't seek truth any more but simply efficiency. For us everything is to be made as flexible as possible so as to be used as efficiently as possible. If I had a Styrofoam cup here, it would be a very good example. A styrofoam cup is a perfect sort of object, given our understanding of being, namely it keeps hot things hot and cold things cold, and you can dispose of it when you are done with it. It efficiently and flexibly satisfies our desires. It's utterly different from, say, a Japanese tea-cup, which is delicate, traditional, and socialises people. It doesn't keep the tea hot for long, and probably doesn't satisfy anybody's desires, but that's not important. (Dreyfus 1987, p. 267)

So knowledge has become efficient and disposable like a Styrofoam cup. What does not conform to these criteria and is 'inefficient' (though it may indicate a richer mode of existence) is relegated to the past and becomes somehow quaint. Knowledge as such, and this is a view replicated in *The Postmodern Condition*, has become 'information'. Language as "an instrument of information increasingly gains the upper hand" (Heidegger 1991, p. 124). People become 'thinking machines' that contribute to the 'building of frameworks for large calculations'. However, information is not innocent for whilst it 'informs, that is appraises, it at the same time forms, that means arranges and sets straight'. Information therefore takes on a colonising force that brings everything under control, shaping it in its own image: "As an

appraisal, information is also the arrangement that places all objects and stuffs in a form for humans that suffices to securely establish human domination over the whole earth and even beyond this planet” (ibid.).

Members of the Frankfurt School such as Adorno give a similar account to Heidegger’s. Reason in Western civilisation has succumbed to a fusion of domination and technical rationality. During this process no social subject (proletarian or not) can become the agent of emancipation. In *Minima Moralia: Reflections from Damaged Life* (the title says it all!), Adorno writes:

For since the overwhelming objectivity of historical movement in its present phase consists so far only in the dissolution of the subject, without yet giving rise to a new one, individual experience necessarily bases itself on the old subject, now historically condemned, which is still for-itself, but no longer in-itself. The subject still feels sure of its autonomy, but the nullity demonstrated to subjects by the concentration camp is already overtaking the form of subjectivity itself. (Adorno 2006, pp. 15–16)

The image of the concentration camps as the horrific progeny of modernity is also present in Lyotard’s writing on ‘Auschwitz’ (see *Heidegger and the Jews* 1990), which captures a condition (rather than simply denoting the place). Auschwitz (the place) was, of course, extremely ‘efficient’.

Though Lyotard’s discussion of performativity is not without its influences, its force and originality comes in part from the discussion of the state of the university and the predictions pertaining to what will eventually happen to that institution. Moreover, his position notably differs from those adopted by the aforementioned writers. Both Nietzsche and Heidegger take a backward look to elements of (an imagined?) pre-Socratic culture, so as to reimagine the future. In the case of Heidegger, this can seem nostalgic, whereas Nietzsche’s turn to ‘Tragedy’ is less so. Adorno seems rather cowed by instrumental rationality, whilst Lyotard (certainly in his earlier work) is not quite so gloomy. What fuels hope in *The Postmodern Condition* derives from a surprising approach to the pragmatics<sup>2</sup> of knowledge (the application of linguistic rules that accompany competing accounts of what constitutes knowledge). This involves rather original and, indeed, contentious readings of Austin’s and Wittgenstein’s philosophies of language.

## Why ‘Performativity’?

In the notes to *The Postmodern Condition*, Lyotard acknowledges his debt to the philosopher J.L. Austin, who coined the term—‘performative utterance’. Lyotard writes:

The term performative has taken on a precise meaning in language theory since Austin. Later in this book, the concept will reappear in association with the term performativity (in

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<sup>2</sup>Pragmatics is a branch of linguistics concerned with language in use.

particular, of a system) in the new current sense of efficiency measured according to an input/output ratio. The two meanings are not far apart. Austin's performative realises the optimal performance. (Lyotard 1984, p. 88)

Lyotard's reference to Austin can be partly explained by the structure and findings of the series of lectures that makes up the latter's *How to do things with Words*. Austin attempts to categorise performative utterances that 'do' things, as distinct from constative utterances that state things. Examples of the former include 'I christen this ship the...', 'I now declare you man and wife' and 'I promise'. Austin notes that to utter such sentences is:

...not to describe my doing of what I should be said in so uttering to be doing or to state that I am doing it: it is to do it. None of the utterances cited is either true or false: I assert this as obvious and do not argue it. It needs argument no more than 'damn' is not true or false: it may be that the utterance 'serves to inform you' – but that is quite different...When I say, before the registrar or altar, etc., 'I do', I am not reporting on a marriage: I am indulging in it. (Austin 1976, p. 6)

By focusing on the kind of utterance that 'does' something, Austin brings attention to an area of language that had been previously ignored by philosophers. When stating that performative utterances do not describe anything, he is trying to show the limitations of the descriptive theory of language. Implied in the notion of the description or statement is the implication of a distance between language and world, between words and actions, whereas the example of 'I do' (said at a wedding) allows no such division – to speak *is* to act, to indulge. In making this point, Austin introduces the binary distinction between performatives and constatives (which can be true or false). Having made this distinction, Austin focuses on performative utterances and is obliged to consider the "constraints or conditions that they operate under which ensure that they communicate or do their work as perfectly as they do, as perfectly as the most unobjectionable true-or-false statements do theirs" (Cavell 2005, 158). Austin argues that the success of performative utterances, though not divorced from questions of truth or falsity, is subject to conditions of infelicity or unhappiness. Infelicity occurs when the performative utterance fails to achieve its intended effect. Failure results from some lack or inadequacy within the 'total speech situation'. An example might be a wedding in which the figure presiding over the ceremony does not have the legal authority to marry the participants. The conditions do not allow for the words to have their intended effect, and the performative utterance is therefore unhappy.

When Lyotard notes the similarity between Austin's performative and his own concept of performativity, the reasons for this seem fairly clear. Neither Austin's performative nor the systematic performativity described by Lyotard are straightforwardly dealing with truth claims. Rather, what is at stake is success measured by internal cohesion; that what actors perform adheres to certain normative procedures that can be measured in terms of success. The effectiveness of a speech act is the measure of Lyotard's performativity.

## Lyotard, Austin and Habermas

So far, I have provided a rather brief and sketchy explanation of why Lyotard draws on Austin's theory of the performative. This account misses something of what is going on, or what is being performed, in Lyotard's allusion to Austin. A deeper explanation is alluded to by Jameson in his foreword to *The Postmodern Condition*. Jameson argues that Lyotard provides "a thinly veiled polemic against Habermas's concept of a 'legitimation crisis' and vision of a 'noise-free', transparent, fully communicational society" (Jameson 1984, p. vii). The significance of Austin's performative to this scenario is that his theory of speech acts and treatment of the performative utterance plays an integral role in the development of Habermas's theory of communicative action.<sup>3</sup>

For Habermas, Enlightenment concerns with reason and justice should not be met with incredulity, but can be reconstructed communicatively (Steuerman 1992, p. 103). If the necessary linguistic conditions are in place then this will revive the possibility for 'critique' that the Enlightenment project engendered. This involves an attempt to reconstruct universals via pragmatics. Habermas therefore "proposes an analysis of the conditions of possibility of communication as the starting point for a critical theory" (ibid.). He believes that the development of 'communicative competence' will lead to mastery of the 'ideal speech situation', a concept he borrows from Austin (Habermas 1970, p. 363). Here there is potential to develop felicitous conditions that can bring about rational consensus in regards to issues around truth and freedom.

Lyotard is troubled by Habermas's project because he believes that 'consensus' is what performativity feeds on. The last thing that is needed is the "regularization of the 'moves' permitted in all language games" (Lyotard 1984, p. 66). To slip (however briefly) out of performativity's grip, we must divert our attention to small micro-narratives or: 'different language games'<sup>4</sup>—a heterogeneity of elements' as: "They only give rise to institutions in patches" (Lyotard 1984, p. xxiv). The response must be a more 'active' form of action than Habermas allows for: "'Traditional' theory is always in danger of being incorporated into the programming of the social whole as a simple tool for the optimization of its performance; this is because its desire for a unitary and totalizing truth lends itself to the totalizing and unitary system of the system's managers" (Lyotard, p. 12). This is why Lyotard petitions for an 'agonistics' to trump Habermas's consensus which will, if you like, work against

<sup>3</sup>This is not fully developed until the publication of *A Theory of Communicative Action* in 1981 and postdates the initial publication in French of *The Postmodern Condition*.

<sup>4</sup>'Language game' is a term drawn from Wittgenstein's philosophy, and it is used to refer to forms of language that are smaller and simpler than the whole of language. The word 'games' refers to the active, lived dimension of language in use and to play a language game is to partake in 'a form of life'. Lyotard's treatment of this issue is rather controversial as his language games are 'islands' partitioned off from the colonising force of performativity Wittgenstein's vision of language is less pure when he talks of "a complicated network of similarities, overlapping and criss-crossing" (Wittgenstein, *para.* 66).

the spirit of performativity that itself relies on consensus. Here: “to speak is to fight” (Lyotard 1984, p. 10). Strategic pragmatic dissonance at a local level might, briefly, fend off the otherwise overwhelming consensual force of performativity.

## Performativity and Philosophy of Education

Having taken something of a detour from issues that are more obviously educational it is necessary to make a case for why seeing performativity in its rich philosophical context is important for educationalists. By presenting performativity as a dominant colonising language game, Lyotard shows us how difficult it is to slip from its clutches. Performativity so often creeps into and dominates educational discourse in spite of academics’ expressed distaste for it. I have often sat through meetings in which talk of effectiveness and outputs has dominated discussions, whilst, at the same time, the participants who spoke this language so fluently would express distaste for target culture and performativity. Moreover, in the performative language games the current predilection with efficiency and effectiveness is presented in stridently positive terms. Think of ‘excellence’, ‘quality’ or the current favourite ‘what works’.

As mentioned above, work emerging from the ‘creativity movement’ (see, for example, Craft 2011) purports to offer a challenge to performativity culture. Ironically, writers in this area seem more concerned with showing how ineffective school cultures are, in both economic and pedagogical ways, than with querying the very notion of effectiveness (see Munday 2014). The version of creativity they advance is entirely in keeping with what Lyotard describes as ‘imagination’, which will be drawn upon to constantly renew and update the system (Lyotard 1984, pp. 51–52). It can sometimes feel as though the educational scene is occupied by Nietzschean doubles who promise a brighter future that transcends performativity, when they are, perhaps unwittingly, its agents. This is beautifully captured by Blake et al.:

But beware the numerous false dancers here ... enthusiastic facilitators and earnest enablers, transferrers of skills and critical thinkers, motivators and school improvers, progressives in various guises, beware find-the-learning-style-that-suits-you-best, the onanism of learning-to-learn.... Beware: as-a- teacher-you-must-plan-your-lessons, you must state clearly the aims of the lesson, specify the learning outcomes, list the resources you will use, describe the method you will use, you must keep the class moving so that the children’s attention doesn’t wander, you must not stray from your plan, and so, with this careful planning, and with the inspection that ensures you are fully accountable, what is taught and what is learned become channelled to predetermined ends. These are highly realistic counterfeits of education. (Blake et al. p. 117)

Seeking better or truer accounts of education has been one of the goals of philosophers of education, and we shall come to these shortly. However, tracing the history of the concept ‘performativity’ within philosophy of education presents a number of difficulties. The fact that it is embedded in a rich philosophical history is a case in point. Philosophers of education who draw on Heidegger’s work on technology (see Standish 1997) or Nietzsche’s discussion of nihilism (see Blake et al. 2000) may

only passingly allude to it, yet they write about very similar, though not always identical, concerns to those discussed by Lyotard in *The Postmodern Condition*. In addition to this, Lyotard's position on performativity evolved in work that followed *The Postmodern Condition*, a point I shall come back to.

Another complicating factor is that a myriad of things have happened in education since the publication of *The Postmodern condition* that can be associated with performativity. Taking a deep breath, these include (a) a fixation with exam grades as the measure of quality/success; (b) the emergence of 'audit cultures' in education and the policing of academics and teachers outputs; (c) league tables for schools and universities; (d) statistical comparison of countries' education systems based on PISA scores, what Gorur (2016) refers to as 'performative statistics'; (e) the growing importance attributed to the 'impact' of research; (f) the fixation with learners and learning (what Biesta (2009) calls the 'learnification' of society) as opposed to a focus on 'children' or 'students' or 'pupils' and the content of what is being learnt; (g) lifelong learning; (h) attributing a higher value to publication linked to large funded projects; (i) the notion that volume of outputs trumps judgement of quality; (j) the emergence of the entrepreneurial academic who hones and monitors their career by devoting considerable time to strategically placing themselves in the public eye via contributions to twitter or blogs so as to maximise personal effectiveness; (k) seeing conferences as networking opportunities in a manner that mimics the commercial sphere; (l) increasingly coming to see knowledge as 'information' or 'data'; (m) the emergence of 'parenting' as a verb and its subsequent establishment within ordinary usage – the word 'effective' can be put before it without blinking; (n) the ubiquity of student satisfaction surveys as a means of 'rating' and quantifying good teaching; (o) the idea that the principal function of universities is to help students become employable; (p) an emphasis on 'methodology' in the humanities and social sciences and its detachment from content; (q) a concern with 'outreach', in which academics go out into the community to effectively influence it in some way or other; (r) an ever growing managerialism; (s) performance related pay in which outputs are measured and teachers and academics are rewarded accordingly; (t) the emergence of 'What Works' centres in universities; (u) the transplanting of methodologies drawn from medical research (such as randomised controlled field trials) across social science domains so as to assess 'what works'; (v) attempts to find algorithms which could ultimately replace teachers due to their better receptiveness to learning needs; (w) predictions regarding the emergence of SMART schools in which teachers become mere technicians ensuring the smooth running of the system; (x) a focus on 'skills' as opposed to knowledge; (y) the playing down of the role of judgement in favour of measurability; and (z) the effect of neoliberal economics on education.

Philosophers of Education have produced critical work that examines these matters and it is pretty much impossible to touch on everything they have covered in the space of one chapter. The way in which these ideas and practices are discussed differs in sophistication and degree of nuance. It encompasses passionate denunciations of the educational system (see Fielding 1999), nuanced discussions of technology, which consider its affordances alongside its more malign aspects (see Burbules and



Callister 2000), and accounts which dispense with a focus on value-laden issues, to ways in which ideas such as ‘quality’ are mobilised (see Simons and Masschelein 2006). These approaches are not part of an evolving dialectic on performativity (no such thing exists) and are radically discontinuous. Given the limitations of space, I believe a more fruitful approach is to bring together five distinctive approaches to performativity by philosophers of education as this will bring out some significant tensions.

## Playing New Games

It is hard to imagine a philosopher of education coming out in favour of performativity. This is perhaps because the wrongness or badness of ‘performativity’ has come to accompany the word through its various iterations; one might as well try and make a case for murder as champion performativity. Though plenty of academics, policy-makers, politicians and practitioners will sing the praises of all manner of things that have come to be associated with performativity (see the above list), they will not employ that term or give voice to the connotations it conjures. Rightly or wrongly, not every killing will be seen as a murder.

As discussed earlier, though Lyotard is no celebrant of performativity, he does not present the state of education as a glorious tragedy. This is because the grand narratives that have been usurped by performativity culture exercised a form of hegemony over the ways which we understand the world and therefore took on a repressive and delimiting power. Though their erosion (Lyotard does not maintain they have been fully eradicated) gives birth to the hollow narrative of performativity, it also makes room for smaller narratives and alternative understandings of the world. The extent to which such narratives are, or will come to be, colonised by performativity is a concern for Lyotard, and has become a focus for work in philosophy of education. Two of the more well known figures in this regard are Richard Edwards and Robin Usher. These authors explore adult education by identifying doubleness in a postmodern condition which, they argue, both constrains and promises freedom. They explore this through an investigation of lifelong learning.

As mentioned above, Lyotard more or less predicts the emergence of ‘lifelong learning’ (he does not use the term), and sees it as part of an educational future characterised by performativity. Once education is no longer seen as an end in itself, higher education institutions will become centres of retraining for adults trying to keep pace with the demand for new skills required by a post-industrial economy. In their discussion of lifelong learning, Edwards and Usher do not want to deny Lyotard’s prescience in this matter: “There is an emphasis on learning oriented to what Lyotard termed *performativity*: learning that seeks to optimize the efficiency of the economic and social system” (Edwards and Usher 2001, p. 279). Moreover, in this spirit educational institutions will “seek to commodify and manage learning by becoming more business-like, corporatist, and consumer oriented”. Edwards and Usher are not looking to celebrate this, but believe that simultaneously (and para-

doxically) it is accompanied by something that we might see in positive terms, namely, the “decentering of knowledge” and “a valuing of different sources of knowledge (including knowledge that would not have been considered worthwhile)” (ibid.). This challenge to a discipline based liberal form of education is presented as a mark of epistemological experimentation in which the “contested and constructed nature” of knowledge is “constantly brought to the fore” (280). Moreover, such experimentation leads to the overturning of traditional knowledge hierarchies in which “experiential, informal, and community based learning” (ibid) become legitimate sources of knowledge. Therefore:

...performativity has the paradoxical result of simultaneously closing and opening possibilities. Performativity therefore, like lifelong learning and the postmodern of which it is an aspect, has multiple significations and significances. It contributes to both the strengthening and loosening of boundaries and to both an economy of the same and to an economy of difference. It is within these interlocking and interrelated economies that the lifelong learner is now (dis)located. (p. 281)

Edwards and Usher see what has happened to the undermining of disciplinary knowledge as a sort of emancipation from the grip (manceps) of a gendered paternalistic ‘liberal’ education. If we have become incredulous to the idea that knowledge can be mastered (they play on the notion of a ‘Masters’ degree), then this is something to be celebrated.

## The University of Excellence

Though Edwards and Usher’s argument is not without nuance, there are reasons for being distrustful of what they have to say. For a start, they seem to believe that the new knowledges they allude to (no examples are provided) are in keeping with Lyotard’s discussion of micro-narratives and language games (282). The idea that they represent the sort of alternative comportment to language that Lyotard has in mind is a little hard to swallow. For a start, the authors acknowledge that such knowledges are bound to performativity. If so, then they are presumably ‘mastered’ by that language game. Moreover, the celebration of the ‘new’ is surely caught up in the nihilistic dialectic diagnosed by Nietzsche – whatever is ‘new’ is not ‘old’, nothing of substance is affirmed.

Whereas Edwards and Usher can seem celebratory about the current state of education, there are interesting contributions which are more in keeping with the greyness that accompanies Lyotard’s understanding of performativity. A rather well-known example of this is Bill Readings’ *The University in Ruins* (1996). Readings describes what he calls ‘The University of Excellence’. ‘Excellence’ here is just the sort of empty signifier that Blake et al. (2000) associate with contemporary nihilism. Despite the inevitable positive connotations that accompany ‘excellence’, nothing of any obvious substance is affirmed. However, Readings does not hark back to some notion of a golden age in which the university was once whole or complete. The idea of the enlightened universal subject, who once embodied the

institution, can no longer appear credible in the light of good work on feminism and on race (Readings 1996, p. 10). However, the gap in this regard, generated by genuine progress, is filled by another subject who does not 'represent' anything, namely, the university administrator. She/he will oversee the performativity targets (p. 8) and keep everyone on track.

Readings has no grand ambitions to resuscitate an older idea of the university, or resurrect it from the ruins. Any such goals are naïve and misguided. However, he is unwilling to give up on the possibility for thought which once, every now and again, may make its self known. Readings imagines the conditions under which this might happen and argues for an 'institutional pragmatism' (18) in which accountability may, however briefly, take precedence over accounting. Transgressive possibilities lie with teaching and obligations that call on the educators to do justice to unexpected utterances that emerge from it: "The transgressive force of teaching does not lie so much in matters of content as in the way pedagogy can hold open the temporality of questioning so as to resist being characterised as a transaction that can be concluded" (19). Teaching therefore becomes committed to justice not truth.

As Bearn notes, Readings' rather desperate vision is perhaps more in keeping with work by Lyotard which followed *The Postmodern Condition* (see Lyotard 1988, 1990, 1991 and 1993). Lyotard ceased to have faith in the possibility for little narratives to upset the apple cart. They are too easily be consumed by the performative 'genre of discourse'. Think here of his essay 'Marie Goes to Japan' in which the protagonist feels victimised by the constant empty imperative to reinvent everything (a good performance must be 'new') and dreams that she is "an underground cavity full of black cold, still water" (Lyotard 1999, p. 5). Lyotard's last bastion of hope comes through an ascetic withdrawal whereby we question/negate everything including thought in the hope that something new to thought will come out of it. That way, we accept the occurrence of what is not yet determined. Lyotard describes such philosophical work in terms of "Peregrinations in the desert" (Lyotard 1991, p. 74).

## An Intense Education

As we have seen, Lyotard's later work and Readings' *University in Ruins* privilege dissonance or negation. In 'Pointlessness and the University of Beauty' (an essay that has been cited several times already), Gordon Bearn offers a way of thinking beyond performativity which exceeds negative terms and discursive boundaries. To do this, he draws upon an affirmative Deleuzian ontology which contrasts with Lyotard's philosophy of absence. For Lyotard, we have meaning on the one hand, which quickly gets incorporated into the performative genre of discourse and, in contrast, "a universal lack of difference, an indifferent blank nothingness" that sits on the other side of language (Deleuze quoted in Bearn 2000, p. 242). Bearn, following Deleuze, argues that the other side of representation should not be thought of as an immense blank, but a swarm of intensities or "non-conceptual differences"

(Deleuze 2004, p. 15). Our experiences of such differences is sensual not rational. Such intensities infuse and make possible our language and thought, yet linguistic differences never fully capture them. Think of the difference between a close up camera shot of a kingfisher and the flash of red and blue that whooshes and whizzes across the water. We may call this the ‘same’ kingfisher, but we do so from this side of representation.

Performativity is blind to the ‘swarm of intense differences’ because it, like any genre of discourse, can only ‘regiment’ intensity and ‘tie it in a knot’. However, though such blindness may stifle us, it can never fully control intensities, which are always threatening to break through. The goal of Bearn’s vision is to release intensities. This release should characterise ‘The University of Beauty’. In keeping with the affirmative thrust of his argument, this will not simply involve a departure from certain activities that are often associated with the culture of effectiveness such as various forms of vocational training. It is not the training that is the problem but the genre of discourse that has tied it in a knot and made our understanding of training anaemic and technical (Bearn, p. 254). All sorts of activities, whether they take place in the humanities or sciences or indeed whether or not they involve training for a vocation, can be diffused through intense particles. What matters is that the fires of the imagination are ignited and burn “with a fire that does not consume” (p. 247). Moreover, the university should be an intensity machine breaking through disciplinary boundaries. This approach should be playful, as this will help us break free of received representational frameworks for thinking.

Bearn does not naively predict the demise of performativity. Rather, he imagines a future in which performativity is more porous than we might think to new and rich ways of experiencing things. For Bearn, to be freed from the constraints of goal-directed thinking requires no subtraction, but must be thought of in terms of what happens in the middle, where we get lost in a swarm of different thoughts, ideas, feelings, worries and enjoyments. Goals (the point of things) do not exactly disappear, but their determining quality is hijacked by the multiplicity of experience: there are an indeterminate number of goals/points. Moreover, there is a general goal that defies teleological boundaries—the goal of becoming intense.

## The Other Performativity

Bearn’s Deleuzian discussion of the possibilities for education is powerful, but it is not the only candidate for a more affirmative approach to performativity. As discussed above, Lyotard acknowledges his debt (as regards the concept of performativity) to the philosopher J.L. Austin. Other writers such as Derrida (1988), Butler (1997, 1999) and Cavell (2005) follow Austin to explore the ways in which the ‘performative’ (in a rather different sense) dimension of language can be affirmed (see Munday 2009, 2010, 2011a and 2011b). Indeed, it is worth noting that readers new to the concept of performativity may quickly find themselves confused if they type it into a search engine. This is because performativity is also a term used in

Gender Studies in which gender is seen as a performance as opposed to something constituted by our biological make-up (see Butler 1997). This understanding bears little resemblance to Lyotard's meaning, though it shares the same influence, namely, Austin's philosophy of language. Anyway, the work of these authors on performativity provides a stimulus for ways of thinking about education that moves beyond a focus on effectiveness and measurable outputs, but does not succumb to nostalgia for authenticity (see Munday 2011a). Given the limitations of space, I will only consider how Derrida's philosophy can be taken up for this purpose (Cavell's discussion is very technical,<sup>5</sup> whereas Butler's work on gender takes its cue from Derrida).

Derrida's most famous treatment of Austin appears in his essay 'Signature event context'.<sup>6</sup> The former finds much to admire in Austin's philosophising. When Austin shows how issuing a performative utterance is not to report on language, but to indulge in it, he appears to recognise the impossibility of adopting a stance that is external to language. This is why Derrida notes that:

As opposed to the classical assertion, to the constative utterance, the performative does not have its referent (but here the word is certainly no longer appropriate, and this precisely is the interest of the discovery) outside of itself or, in any event, before and in front of itself. It does not describe something that exists outside language and prior to it. (Derrida 1988, p. 13)

Derrida argues that Austin has shattered the concept of communication as a purely semiotic, linguistic or symbolic concept. Communication is no longer considered in terms of 'transference of semantic content' or fixed in its orientation towards truth. Rather, we perform the world into being through language. All meaning is textual—there is no outside text.<sup>7</sup> However, Derrida is close to Lyotard when he argues that Austin takes a step backwards by fixating on external contextual factors that must be in place for the performative utterance to be happy—for it to 'succeed'. This ignores the 'iterability' of language (18) and the ways in which words are not bound by context. It is not the case (as Austin might have it) that the context determines the force of words. Rather, words carry their old contexts with them prior to their entry into a potentially unlimited number of possible new contexts. In this sense, words are not at one with themselves and there are countless ways in which they can come to mean and do things differently.

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<sup>5</sup> See Munday (2009) for a detailed reading of this.

<sup>6</sup> It should be noted that Derrida has been heavily criticised for his reading of Austin. Searle's damning rejoinder 'Reiterating the Differences: A Reply to Derrida' (1977) is perhaps the most well-known critique. These disagreements are deserving of their own chapter and there is no space to rehearse them here.

<sup>7</sup> This is a literal translation of Derrida's famous formulation "Il n'y a pas de hors-texte". As Attridge notes, "this phrase does not mean 'the things we normally consider to be outside the text do not exist' but 'there is nothing that completely escapes the general properties of textuality, différance etc.'—that is, as Derrida goes on to explain, no 'natural presence' that can be known 'in itself'. But it is also true that here is no inside the text, since this would again imply an inside/outside boundary" (Attridge in Derrida 1992, p. 102). The more famous (though less exact) translation is "there is nothing beyond the text".

So much of what constitutes performativity (in Lyotard's sense) is about controlling context so as to assure effectiveness and the measurement of it. We find this in the 'well-made lesson' (Standish 2005) as much as in rigorous adherence to success criteria, whether this applies to marking exam scripts or assessing the 'quality' of publications. The iterability of language thwarts these processes, as something unexpected will arrive to disrupt things. Here is Standish:

Derrida explores ways in which the idea of profession requires something tantamount to a pledge, to the freely accepted responsibility to profess the truth. The professor enacts this performative continually in her work: what she says is testimony to the truth; as work it is necessarily an orientation to a to-come. The academic work of professing must then be something more than the (purely constative) statement of how things are. (Standish 2001, p. 18)

Derrida's argument is subtle; professing<sup>8</sup> the truth is about orientating students towards something that neither professor nor student can necessarily predict in which the constative (truth) will always be performed as the to-come (an aspect of the future) rather than a statement of that which is secure, of the past, somehow originary. The professor's role here is to show "hospitality" (Derrida 1999, p. 51) to what arrives in language, rather than turning away from whatever fails to meet the performance criteria. It is in this that the promise of education in an age of performativity resides.

At a superficial level, Derrida's approach may sound rather like Lyotard's 'per-egrinations'. Though both thinkers advocate a philosophy of absence (there is no talk of intensities that precede and infuse language), for Lyotard if anything comes out of the abyss it will be "incomprehensible: as terrifying as dread or as wonderful as grace" (Bearn 2000, p. 242). In contrast, Derrida's iterability, which implies the ongoing reconstitution of the world, is an ordinary dimension of how words are used. Context cannot control meaning as language is always already out of joint. This is something to be affirmed and a prerequisite for educational experiences infused with hospitality to what arrives.

## Does 'what works' work?

Having considered some largely divergent approaches to performativity by philosophers of education, perhaps we should come up to speed and look at how the focus on effectiveness and efficiency diagnosed by Lyotard is currently staged in the wider educational domain. This is arguably captured in the fashionable 'what works' slogan. In the last 20–30 years, there have been many calls for educational research to move away from 'insular' academic concerns and hone in more directly on practical outcomes (see, for example, Berliner et al. 1997). This has often led to analogies with medicine which is presented as an exemplary instance of an area

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<sup>8</sup>This account of professing is radically at odds with what tends to count as 'professionalism' today.

which has a strong culture of research-led practice (see Hargreaves 1996). The favoured instrument in medical research is the randomised controlled field trial, an experimental form of quantitative research, where control groups are subject to ‘interventions’ that respond to perceived ‘problems’. In the USA, RCTs have become the dominant method for conducting educational research (see Slavin 2002). In the UK context, RCTs are the favoured approach in the ‘What Works’ Network. This network is made up of 7 independent What Works Centres and 2 affiliate members which together cover policy areas that receive public spending of more than 200 million pounds.

The growing popularity of RCTs raises some fundamental questions for educationalists. According to the rhetoric, RCTs are value neutral and politically innocent. They will provide sure evidence of ‘what works’. Are such claims justified? There have been a number of responses within philosophy of Education to this view. Gert Biesta has written two much cited articles on this topic called ‘Why “What Works” won’t work’ (2007) and its follow-up ‘Why “what works” still won’t work’ (2010). The Educational Research network based in Leuven has also published a book with the title *What Works Doesn’t Work* (2006) containing chapters by prominent philosophers and historians of education. As is perhaps clear, the focus here is not ‘just’ on the wrongness of seeing education in terms of effectiveness. Rather, the authors consider the various ways in which research that is conducted to demonstrate effectiveness fails on its own terms.

A good place to begin considerations of why ‘what works’ may not work is Paul Smeyers’ chapter ‘The Relevance of Irrelevant research: the irrelevance of Relevant Research’ (2006) in which he looks at research on class size in education. Smeyers notes the interesting irony that even advocates of experimental research in this area seem to acknowledge the myriad problems with establishing whether larger classes lead to more effective educational outcomes. For example, he notes the extensive number of obstacles that Goldstein and Blatchford, staunch advocates of this form of research, identify as obstacles to establishing a causal relationship between class size and attainment (Smeyers 2006, p. 101). These include such things as how “the sample population may differ from the target population” and “in the case of randomized controlled trials the expectations about the effects of class size may be partly responsible for observed effects” (ibid). Smeyers attributes the irony at work here to a kind of repression within a research community that has turned in on its self. Finding out ‘what works’ is perhaps not really what is at stake, but “the demand for a particular kind of research within a particular societal climate” (97). The climate in question is the “demand for performativity, which so strongly characterizes present-day society” (106). For Smeyers, this climate is repressive because it invalidates certain lines of enquiry and types of concern that are essential for conducting good research. For example, experimental research cannot, according to Smeyers, really deal adequately with issues such as “the workload of teachers” or “the feelings of happiness of the students’ (102), yet case studies are ruled out as they cannot be generalized (103). For Smeyers issues pertaining to value and judgement are swept away, yet both are integral features of good research. When these matters are ignored, the only people who ‘what works’ research works for are the people who conduct it.



In his discussion, Smeyers draws upon Richard Smith's discussion of judgement (see Smith 2017) to support his argument. Smith looks at what has happened to 'judgement' in our contemporary culture. He maintains that professional life is now so "governed by the application of norms and criteria as a matter of routine" that it is "closed to opportunities for the use of judgement" (Smith 2017, p. 101). For Smith judgement is now taken to be subjective and elitist (102) and has become associated with deviant connoisseurship. This is partly on display through the sort of language that helps to perform the dominant sensibility into being. Here, Smith calls out the popular expression 'judgement call' in the context of "situations where, remarkably it seems, the right course of action cannot in any straightforward way be read off a set of data and applied algorithmically" (105). Two ideas are central to Smith's attempt to resurrect judgement. Firstly, he invokes Aristotle's familiar distinction between *techné* and *phronesis* (106). *Phronesis*, or practical wisdom, has a clear moral dimension which is missing from technical reasoning:

In our judgements we *ought* to be flexible, attentive, alert: the doctor *ought* not to jump to the conclusion that this patient is to be treated exactly like other patients who have the same problem. These *oughts* do not rest simply on the thought that flexibility and so on will lead to more successful outcomes: this is not a disguised form of instrumental reasoning. Rather the demand is to be properly responsive to, or do justice to, the case or person under consideration. In this lies its ethical nature (108)

Alongside, *phronesis*, Smith draws our attention to the importance of the "minor premise or practical syllogism" (ibid.) and points to the ways in which the ordinary, everyday aspects of our lives are spent in a struggle in which we try and fend off self-delusion in the pursuit of seeing things in the right way. He cites Iris Murdoch's project to achieve "a refinement of desire in daily living" (Murdoch in Smith, p. 109) and notes that this cannot be reduced to a skill or technique: "as Plato observed, the skilled doctor makes a skilled poisoner" (ibid).

The sort of practical/moral experimentation that Smith has in mind is occluded from research (of a different 'experimental' hue), which overleaps judgement and the moral dimension inherent to it in favour of a wrongheaded notion of efficiency. A not wholly dissimilar sensibility is at the heart of Gert Biesta's article 'Why "What Works" Won't Work'. Biesta offers a critique of the epistemological foundations of RCTs and looks for an epistemology that "might be appropriate for an adequate understanding of the role of knowledge in professional action" (Biesta 2007, p. 11) He argues that RCTs are in the grip of a traditional 'representational' epistemology in which the world is presented to consciousness. Here the researcher identifies a problem, at a distance, and then seeks a solution.

Biesta finds an alternative 'practical' epistemology in the work of Dewey and argues that the latter's theory of knowing is not premised on the clear separation of knower and known, researcher and researched (p.12). Rather knowing (as opposed to a static 'knowledge') is something dynamic that emerges through acting in the world and is concerned with "the *relation* between our actions and their consequences" (ibid.). This notion of 'knowing' is not just about trial and error but 'intelligent action' (14). Knowledge and reflection come into play when the smooth running of our habits breaks down and we do not know what to do – when we

‘encounter a problem’. However, the problem (rather than the solution) only becomes clear when we act (p.15). On this account, we do not know what the problem is until we have found the solution.

On Biesta’s account, we cannot discover knowledge of “reality; but only the relationship between actions and consequences here and now. We do not learn truths about the world but about what has been possible”. ‘Inquiry’ (Dewey’s term) can tell us what worked, but not what works. If we experiment with different lines of action, then this can help us to address future problems. However, this is not about following recipes but addressing unique problems in a changing world. Whilst old knowledge can guide us, the effectiveness of what we do must be constantly reappraised. This, however, does not mean that we should embrace and begin with a recipe on the proviso that it may not work next times as the means and ends of our activities are connected in ways that researchers are sometimes blind to. We can only evaluate ‘means’ by ends that are attained and the “upshot of this is that neither in our role as researcher nor in our role as professional educator should we accept given problem definitions and predetermined ends” (17). Moreover, we should look beyond whether or not something is achievable and consider whether or not we should achieve it, for action “in the social domain can only become intelligent action when its intrinsic relation with human purposes and consequences – that is when the political nature of inquiry in the social domain – is fully taken into account” (ibid.).

For Biesta, then, RCTs are epistemologically weak because problems are taken for granted as real problems prior to seeking solutions. Researchers simply put an intervention into motion and are not responsive to the ways in which problems themselves might be reframed through ‘intelligent action’. Moreover, as means are separated from ends, researchers make the mistake of thinking that there are simply more or less effective ways of getting to a predetermined ‘positive’ result. Claims about neutrality repress the value-laden aspects of the research leading to potentially damaging consequences.

## Conclusion

During the course of this chapter, I have tried to draw a distinction between a narrow shallow understanding of performativity and a broader deeper one. The latter account, which is in keeping with Lyotard’s discussion, points to a deep-rooted effectiveness culture, which cannot adequately be captured by talk of league tables or teach to the test pedagogies. These things may be manifestations of a particular condition but too much focus on them misses the extent of performativity’s reach. Indeed, the alternatives to performativity in its shallowest sense (provided by the likes of creativity experts) marks either a philosophical deficit or a cynical attempt to present an intensification of performativity as the antithesis to it.

But, let us for a moment, and at the risk of undermining what has just been said, introduce a note of mild scepticism, particularly in regards to Lyotard’s predictions

about university education. Readers may feel that they are too exaggerated or all-encompassing. For a start, talk about ‘the’ university is a problematic move due to the rather inevitable fact that there will be radical differences between institutions within countries never mind across them. Moreover, there is no ‘robust’ comparative research looking at the global manifestation of performativity.

One could argue that there are all sorts of aspects of education, which may appear to jar with performativity. However, it can be easily shown how they have been infected, or, at best, significantly marginalised by it. Though universities will tolerate time spent on academic ‘outputs’ such as this one, work deriving from large scale funded projects is thought to represent the ‘gold standard’ of research. Academics within Humanities departments still write books on Jane Austen and the French Revolution. However, this kind of work may be dismissed as ‘hobby research’ and these individuals may well be required to seek large funding grants and establish links with departments engaged in more ‘useful’ activities that may generate ‘impact’. In the UK context, the REF<sup>9</sup> currently, and ironically given it is obviously bound to performativity culture, still values scholastic achievement. Yet who would feel confident that the growing emphasis on the ‘impact’ of research will not eventually overwhelm the research culture. Partnerships with commercial companies and professional bodies may not be compulsory, but it ‘is’ the sort of thing that is likely to make the average university manager salivate. Though Professors are still being employed, it is worth noting the growing popularity of online MOOCS and universities across the planet are committed to developing students’ digital literacies. Whilst students in the Social Sciences will continue to study theory, entire courses are dedicated to the more pressing priority of developing research ‘skills’ and handling data. The retraining of mature adults has become commonplace within universities, and this sits alongside the notion that universities are becoming ever more concerned with employability. Last, but not least, the logic of effectiveness and efficiency has come to permeate university life to such an extent that almost everything academics do is monitored, measured (how many outputs have you produced this year?) and judged to make sure that they are maximising their time and potential.

In a similar vein, schooling, one may argue, has not been fully colonised by performativity. Yet, whilst students will study subjects like literature, their ‘learning’ in this area will be conceived of in terms of developing literacy skills (potentially useful for economic development) rather than becoming literate. Whilst there has been ever-growing emphasis on inclusion in schools, how often is this conceived of in technical, instrumental terms? The emergence of such things as dyslexia toolkits (Reid et al. 2013) is revealing here. Whilst teachers are still being employed, as we speak, tech wizards are trying to create algorithms that will eventually replace them or augment them anyway (Williamson 2015).

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<sup>9</sup>The REF stands for Research Excellence Framework. It was first carried out in the UK in 2014 and is undertaken by the four UK higher education funding bodies. The REF is a review process carried out by selected senior academics who review institutions in accordance with judgements regarding the quality of “outputs”, “impact” (the ways in which research influences the world beyond academia) and the research “environment” present in each centre.

In spite of all this, the most interesting work on performativity does not express defeat and gives reason for limited hope. It does this whilst being neither naively optimistic nor anachronistic in its ambitions. Authors such as Readings, Bearn and Standish push against the borders of the performative language game and find it porous. By showing how ‘what works’ does not work, Smeyers, Smith and Biesta give us reason to wonder if performativity may one day be devoured by irony.

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# Bildung Versus Assessment



Heikki A. Kovalainen

## Introduction: Varieties of *Bildung*

Are there concepts that are basic to educational theory? According to the German educational theorist Jürgen-Eckardt Pleines (1989, pp. 63–78), *Bildung* is such a term, alongside education (*Erziehung*) and teaching (*Unterricht*). But what is *Bildung*—and why use the term in an English setting? Hoping to gain an overview of the main meanings, we can trace two main strands of how *Bildung* has been conceptualized. In the first place (and often in contemporary discussions), *Bildung* refers to an individual process of character development aiming at perfection of one's personality. In this sense, the term connotes the ideal of attaining one's full humanity, with varying emphases on interaction with other human beings. The second usage (found through a critical reading of history) centers less on personality than on acquaintance with the surrounding reality. Thus understood, *Bildung* names the ethico-ontological process whereby the individual in her particularity merges with the general or universal, viz. the objective world.<sup>1</sup> The two stripes of *Bildung* will result in different answers to the question concerning the interrelationship between *Bildung* and educational assessment.

In educational philosophy, *Bildung* is classically rooted yet it has much to offer to contemporary education. The ways in which *Bildung* is basic to educational philosophy, however, is a complex issue. The first complexity is tied with language: the term '*Bildung*' figures very differently in the Anglophone and German-speaking worlds of education. In Germany, *Bildung* has virtually always been highly central to educational philosophy. It has a long history reaching from medieval mysticism

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<sup>1</sup> It is in this sense that G. W. F. Hegel, for instance, contributes to the theories of *Bildung*. Due to lack of space, however, we will not deal with Hegel in the present chapter.

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to Enlightenment classics as well as twentieth-century critical theory. Some readers of the present chapter will link the term with the tradition of the *Bildungsroman*, which denotes classical texts—Goethe as the preeminent example—about a protagonist setting on a spiritual journey, often with help from exemplary friends, for his true self.<sup>2</sup> This tradition runs parallel to the stripe of philosophy of education in Germany under the umbrella of *Bildung*. In German history of ideas, moreover, the birth of educational theory (*Erziehungswissenschaft*) is congruent with the history of *Bildung*.

In the Anglophone world of education, in contrast, *Bildung* is nothing like the masterterm it is in German. Important general works in philosophy of education, for instance, *The Oxford Handbook of Philosophy of Education* (Siegel 2009) or *The Sage Handbook of Philosophy of Education* (Bailey et al. 2010) make only oblique references to *Bildung*, and neither book counts the term in their indices. But this is not the whole truth. Recently, the notion of *Bildung* has been called to rescue education from the demands of efficiency and measurability. Rebekka Horlacher, for one, records *Bildung* as a “fighting word”, particularly as an argument against the ubiquitous trend of measurement in education, often targeted against the recent dominance of PISA measurements (Horlacher 2012, p. 135).

Assessment, unlike *Bildung*, does not have a unified conceptual history, yet it is tied with different ideas having philosophical underpinnings. It refers to an educational process whereby the students’ achievement of educational standards is evaluated. Historically, the concept of assessment is tied, in particular, with the idea of *measurability*. This is the notion that whatever new knowledge students or learners acquire, its fruits must be visible and hence assessable. In the history of ideas, this notion finds its early modern roots in British empiricism, and it has been developed later by the American pragmatists, and in the twentieth century, in the schools of behaviorism and outcomes-based learning.

The question of measurability leads us into asking what the *empirical criteria* for judging the success of education are. In the first place, the nature of standards to be used in educational assessment must be clarified. Do the standards refer to a body of knowledge to be acquired, or do they also include values or skills? If it is knowledge that the students are to master, how are the respective emphases between different subject areas (i.e., the humanities and the natural sciences) to be placed? Finally, how universal are the standards to be met; are they local, domestic, or international? In today’s education, the contents of the educational standards may also be affected by the increasing demands for efficiency, accountability, and performativity. Depending on how strict the demands for measurability and performance are, educators will set different standards for educational assessment.

In the present chapter, we ask two systematic questions. First, is there an inherent tension between the concept of *Bildung* and the contemporary practices of educational assessment? I argue, on the one hand, that if assessment means primarily

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<sup>2</sup>The genre of the *Bildungsroman*, with specific text-analytical approaches to works of fiction vis-à-vis the philosophical concept of *Bildung*, would merit a separate study and is only mentioned in the current chapter.



formal and objective assessment, this is difficult to reconcile with the aims of *Bildung*. On other hand, *Bildung* ideals can be harmonized with educational assessment, if by assessment we mean informal or internal assessment. Second, then, we ask how the notion of *Bildung* may be applied to contemporary educational settings so as to accommodate the demands of assessment. To be successful, *Bildung* must use evaluative elements, and this involves both self-evaluation and evaluating others. Furthermore, if educational assessment uses standards that require learning not only knowledge and skills but also attitudes and values, then *Bildung* ideals will be receptive to the demands of educational assessment.

A note on translation: As regards the English equivalents of *Bildung*, a dictionary suggests terms such as ‘education’, ‘culture’, ‘formation’, and ‘cultivation’, but none one of these capture the full range of meanings of *Bildung*. In contemporary philosophy of education, there has been some discussion regarding the affinities between *Bildung* and *liberal education*—and the parallelism is justified *prima facie* by the fact that one meaning of *Bildung*, classically speaking, is education in the liberal arts. The differences between liberal education and *Bildung*, however, are just as remarkable as the similarities, and they will be discussed below. If we look at translations of *Bildung* in different languages, we only rarely find close equivalents. Swedish is an exception, since we find *bildning*; in Norwegian, the closest equivalent would perhaps be *formasjon*; in Danish, *dannelse*. In the Romanic languages such as Spanish and Italian, we have *formación* and *formazione*, respectively. An intriguing example among the Scandinavian countries is Finnish, which belongs to a different language family, and translates *Bildung* as *sivistys*. In what follows, we will use the Finnish school system as a test case of how the demands of *Bildung* and assessment may be synthesized.

## Paradigms in the History of *Bildung*

The senses of *Bildung* are not solid through history. In order to gain proper insight into the multiplicity of the term, a brief history of *Bildung* must be presented. The term rises to prominence in the eighteenth century—through the work of Herder, Goethe, and von Humboldt, in particular—yet its usage originally stems from medieval mysticism. One can trace at least three different paradigms in the history of *Bildung* (the fourth one will reach to the present day).<sup>3</sup>

The first phase involves the term’s original usage and dates back to Meister Eckhart. Etymologically, *Bildung* stems from althochdeutsch ‘abbilden, Bildnis’ (to build/form, an image) and ‘Gebilde, Gestalt’ (a building/construct, a form). In Eckhart’s usage, *Bildung* refers to *imago dei*: becoming like the image of God. This is a philosophically complex idea whereby we receive God’s presence in our being—we are formed and made *of* God and allow Him be present in our soul. This

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<sup>3</sup>In tracing the historical transitions in the different usages of *Bildung*, I am indebted to the *Historisches Wörterbuch der Philosophie* (for bibliographical details, see the references).

etymology is noted, with important additions, in the Brothers Grimm's classic *Deutsches Wörterbuch*, where the word is given four meanings, indicated by the Latin expressions (1) *imago*, (2) *forma* (3) *cultus animi, humanitas* and (4) *formatio, institutio*; that is (1) image, (2) form (3) cultivation of the soul and (4) formation (cf. Nordenbo 2002, p. 341). These translations already suggest the multivalence of the term *Bildung*. It connotes both a process whereby something is formed as well as the final product. To begin with, *Bildung* refers to the process of self-cultivation whereby the individual person attains to full humanity. At the same time, the term refers to the liberal arts (*humanitas*)—viz. the content of what is to be learned through the process of *Bildung*.

Should we consider the interrelationship between *Bildung* and educational assessment vis-à-vis the original senses of *Bildung* just delineated, a simple observation can be made. If *Bildung* is taken to refer to the *liberal arts*—or more specifically, to a list of things to be learned—it follows that whether or not a person may be taken to have succeeded in *Bildung* is, at least in principle, a matter of checking whether she knows what she is supposed to know. This is only one side of the issue, however. We come to a different conclusion regarding the measurability of *Bildung*'s success, if we understand the term as the process of an individual person striving to attain her full humanity. There is no given mold for anyone's humanity: what some person may be or become is up to her to define, and this could be difficult to assess.

The second historical phase involves the thorough transformation of *Bildung* from a religious/classical concept into a secular, humanistic, and pedagogical notion. After early modern appearances in Klopstock, Leibniz, and Pestalozzi, *Bildung* is more elaborately developed by Johann Gottfried Herder (Ritter 1971, p. 923). For Herder, *Bildung* is virtually synonymous with *Kultur*—which (as we note in passing) English readers will readily translate as self-culture.<sup>4</sup> In Herder's hands, *Bildung* becomes the masterterm of his anthropologico-hermeneutical philosophy of life (Ritter 1971, pp. 923–924). Herder's contemporary Goethe broadens the usage of *Bildung* from the humanities to the natural sciences—and he may be counted as the inventor and the father figure of the *Bildungsroman*. Goethe's concept of *Bildung*, indeed, is both an anthropological and an organicist notion. In the *Metamorphosis of Plants*, Goethe talks about “the animal and human *Bildung*” (*thierische und menschliche Bildung*) (Goethe 1790, p. 18), suggesting there to be no stark division between man and nature.

In the Enlightenment period, Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835) stands out as the key classic on *Bildung* not least because he establishes general education in Germany both in theory and in practice. As a Prussian diplomat, von Humboldt was once responsible for the Prussian education service, organizing everything from elementary schools to universities, along neo-humanist principles (Nordenbo 2002, p. 347). Man's true purpose, for Humboldt, is “the maximum formation of abilities and skills into a harmonic whole” (Humboldt 1981, pp. 64, Bd. I). Humboldt places

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<sup>4</sup>Self-culture, indeed, is the English equivalent of *Bildung* often used by commentators working in Anglophone contexts. The term was also used by Ralph Waldo Emerson, to whose work we shall return.

remarkable emphases on the freedom of the *Bildung* process—which goes to explain his stress on university autonomy as well. An enlightened reader will easily recognize the Humboldtian *Bildung*-ideals as the bedrock of modern academia, yet the same reader easily forgets that Humboldt’s treatment of *Bildung* is not confined to the humanist ideals of self-development *qua* anthropocentrism. Quite the contrary, *Bildung*’s ultimate aim is “to appropriate as much world as possible and to unite himself as closely as he can with it”, or in other words, to “[join] our ‘I’ with the world” (Humboldt 1981, pp. 235–236, Bd. I). Self-cultivation is successful, then, if and only if it happens in a thorough-going interaction with the world:

The ultimate task of life is to endow the concept of ‘humanity’—in our person, both in our lifetime and beyond it through the traces we leave behind by our activity—with as rich a content as possible; this is only done by associating with the world in the most comprehensive, lively and free interplay possible. (Humboldt 1981, pp. 235–236, Bd. I.)

Is the *Bildung* tradition confined to Germany?<sup>5</sup> In the introduction, we noted the culturally bound character of *Bildung*, yet the question should be asked as to whether international figures may be included within the tradition. In my view, we may count international figures who were influenced by *Bildung* classics, and who, in turn, leave their mark on the subsequent *Bildung* tradition.<sup>6</sup> One such a figure is the American essayist Ralph Waldo Emerson (1803–1882). Emerson notes the difficulty of translating *Bildung* into English, and the difficulty is not only a linguistic matter: “Culture—how much meaning the Germans affix to the word & how unlike to the English sense” (Emerson 1965, p. 303). Throughout his career, the essayist develops a philosophy of self-culture, ranging from his early Unitarian sermons to the 1841 essay ‘Self-Reliance’ as well as the important later essay ‘Culture’ (1860). Emerson paraphrases both Humboldt’s emphases on versatility of interests as well as the need to appropriate as much of the world as possible. In “Culture”, “Our excellence is facility of adaptation and of transition through many related points, to wide contrasts and extremes” (Emerson 1860, p. 73). Second, take a journal entry from 1851 titled “End of Culture, Self-Creation”: “In some sort, the end of life, is, that the man should take up the universe into himself, or, out of that quarry leave nothing unrepresented, and he is to create himself” (Emerson 1975, pp. 440–441; cf. Emerson 1884, p. 131).

The third historical phase in the treatments of *Bildung* extends from the last decades of the nineteenth century to the first half of the twentieth century, involving critical commentary on the term from authors such as Nietzsche, Adorno, and

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<sup>5</sup>In principle, this question could be broadened to concern any varieties of education or self-cultivation to be found in different cultural traditions, including Eastern thought. In this chapter, however, I have decided to confine my treatment of *Bildung* mostly to its explicit appearances—not because talking about other traditions would not be helpful, but because I have wanted to keep the terminology as clear as possible.

<sup>6</sup>In some texts in philosophy of education, appeals are made to John Stuart Mill as an exemplar of *Bildung*. We have some reasons, however, for resisting an appropriation of Mill into the *Bildung* tradition, since his closest allegiances (British empiricism and utilitarianism) as well as some of his followers (e.g., the American pragmatist William James) suggest that he is writing in a different tradition.

Horkheimer. Within this tradition, *Bildung*—or false varieties thereof—is subjected to criticism rather than viewed as desirable. To be sure, the borderlines between this stripe of *Bildung* and that discussed above are blurry, since authors from Goethe to Emerson also present criticisms of deficient *Bildung*. In Emerson’s wording, to take one example, “Our culture is not come ... none are cultivated” (Emerson 1965, p. 470). Analogously, in “Culture”: “Very few of our race can be said to be yet finished men” (Emerson 1860, p. 88). Nietzsche was much indebted to Emerson, and he inherits from the American essayist not only the affirmative vision of life but also the observation that human beings as they are not spiritually liberated. Nietzsche adopts the same strategy with regard to *Bildung* as with Christianity: he voices fierce criticisms of both while suggesting that a true and authentic version of what he criticizes may still be found. ‘Commonly shared *Bildung*’ (*die gemein gewordene Bildung*) represents for Nietzsche ‘prelude to barbarism’ (*Vorstadium der Barbarei*). He voices charges of “Halb-Bildung”, “Bildung-Philistertum”, and false “Gebildetheit” as “the enemy of ‘true Bildung’” (*als Feind der “wahren Bildung”*) (Ritter 1971, p. 927.).

Finally, we should mention Theodor W. Adorno (1903–1969), who inherits Nietzsche’s concepts of *Halbbildung*. Adorno, indeed, is one of the authors who poses the question as to whether *Bildung* is possible in the (post)modern world. *Halbbildung*, for Adorno, means that people shy away from ‘truly cultural’ objects. Why is this? According to Adorno’s diagnosis, people are unwilling to be engaged with real experiences, which prevents them from encounters with authentic culture. Real experience, to the contrary—and borrowing a phrase from Goethe and Hegel—involves *self-externalization* (*Entäußerung*), experiencing the ‘Non-I’ in the outer reality, and only this experience makes the development of individuality possible. However, amidst the mass culture dominated by the products of the cultural industry, people fail to reach out toward the outer reality of the “Non-I”, rather contenting themselves in the easy familiarity of stereotypes (Stojanov 2012, p. 130).

## ***Bildung* in Contemporary Philosophy of Education**

The fourth phase of the *Bildung* traditions has its roots in the latter half of the nineteenth century while coming to full fruition in the twentieth century.<sup>7</sup> In Germany, this phase involves the systematic establishment of didactics as “theory of *Bildung*” (*Didaktik als Bildung-Lehre*), brought about by authors such as Otto Willman, Wilhelm Dilthey, and Paul Natorp (Ritter 1971, p. 928). Against the historical background, an important paradigm shift takes now place, since *Bildung*—from now on—will be grounded not only in classical sources but also scientifically. To be sure,

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<sup>7</sup>On my interpretation, all the historical senses of *Bildung* delineated in this chapter have some contemporary representatives as well, and it would be an oversimplification to claim that the traditions are by now dead. The appearance of new paradigms of *Bildung*, then, does not presuppose disappearance of the old.

*Bildung* still connotes the philosophical crux underlying the problem of culture. But alongside this meaning, the term now comes to epitomize the scientific grounding of what the German-speaking world of education terms *Pedagogik*. In this setting, *Bildung* names the systematic study of the laws of human development, and this discipline lays the groundwork for practical didactics in different subjects. When philosophers of education, then, seek to compile *Allgemeine Pedagogik* in the second half of the twentieth century, they turn to *Bildung*.

In this context, however, a terminological caveat must be presented. German educational discourse often adopts the word *Bildung* as a synonym for *education*. This choice is made perhaps because educators want to preserve a link to the historical *Bildung* tradition, yet it possibly clouds conceptual differences. Horlacher (2012, p. 145) notes that the debates of the OECD and the World Bank on *education* are translated into German as “*Bildung*”. The former documents, however, are much concerned with the efficiency and measurability of education, while the latter tradition stresses different things. Thus, Horlacher (2012, p. 145) suggests that it would be worth examining “whether these are two contrary models that can hardly be brought into agreement or whether this is merely a case of education policy rhetoric aiming to make standardized empirical research issues palatable to the German public”.

In order to understand something of the tension between *Bildung* and assessment in Germany, we must here briefly review the country’s stand against standardized testing and how this has changed in response to the mediocre test results by the German students. As Neumann et al. (2010, p. 545) explain, the emphasis on *Humanistische Bildung* had been so strong in Germany that it was believed that individuals carry the desire to develop within themselves—with no need for standardized testing. Given the alarming test results in the 1990s, however, a reform of science education was initiated, whereby the traditional German notion of education would be replaced by the notion of *scientific literacy* (Neumann et al. 2010). This term denotes, according to the PISA study, “the capacity of the students to apply knowledge and skills in key subject areas and to analyze, reason and communicate effectively as they pose, solve and interpret problems in a variety of situations” (OECD 2001, p. 20). While the notion of scientific literacy does not consider the social or ethical aspects of *Bildung*, it may still be seen as an attempt to broaden the horizons of *Bildung* from the humanities to the natural sciences, so as to succeed better when the learning results are assessed.

Can we find *Bildung* on the shores of contemporary Anglo-American educational philosophy? Here the rise of liberal education must first be addressed. Paul Standish (2007) documents the challenges brought against progressivism by the advocates of liberal education in the second half of the twentieth century. In particular, R. S. Peters (the UK) and Israel Scheffler (in the USA) criticize progressivism for its inherent child-centeredness. For Peters, child-centered education concerns itself too much with the *manner* and too little with the *matter* of education (Standish 2007). His idea, in a nutshell, is that placing too much emphasis on the interests of the children—and how they can best learn at schools—undermines the importance of *what* is to be learned. In lieu of this, Peters offers his stripe of liberal education,

with freedom reinterpreted so as to give real content to the students' well-being and experiences of happiness (cf. Degenhardt 2010). Here we have a vision of education placing emphasis on the students' personal experiences of well-being, which suggests a similarity to certain aspects of the *Bildung* tradition.

How does the *Bildung* tradition relate, more precisely, to this history of liberal education? Certainly, there are important similarities, and among them, we may count at least the *prima facie* fact that one meaning of *Bildung* is education in the liberal arts. As far as content of education is concerned, both traditions (with Peters's liberalism as my example) underscore cultural initiation and development of mind; in a word, education or *Bildung* understood as partaking in the conversation of mankind, viz. culture (see Standish 2007). Liberal education, like the *Bildung* tradition, takes freedom to mean that the mind should function in *as rich a way as is possible*—and this is the way to avoid lapsing into conservatism, a passive reception of what has been previously said.

Finally, a word on the differences between *Bildung* and liberal education. A critic of liberal education might note, first, that stressing the students' personal happiness or well-being are admirable aims in education, but they are different from the holistic development of one's humanity underscored in the *Bildung* tradition. Another key difference between *Bildung* and liberal education emerges from the ways in which these respective traditions relate to the objective world around us. The characterizations we have given of liberal education lack the insistence on generality and universality—let alone familiarity with the objective world—that one finds in the *Bildung* tradition. In my view, this is the most important difference between the two traditions that should restrain us from a simple synthesis between them. Finally, there is a minor point of disagreement in the timing of the respective origins of the two traditions: liberal education, somewhat surprisingly, is often timed to begin with Isocrates, a Greek thinker of the fourth century BCE (Degenhardt 2010, p. 125), while the history of *Bildung* usually begins with the first medieval appearances of the term.<sup>8</sup>

## ***Bildung* and Assessment: Tension or Harmony?**

How does *Bildung* relate to assessment, if we probe the question vis-à-vis contemporary educational practices? Let us begin by clarifying the basic terminology and state-of-the-art concerning educational assessment. Following Halliday (2010, p. 370), in 10 years one may find more than 25,000 publications on assessment, with more than 10,000 articles in refereed journals and over 3000 books, and 5 English language journals are devoted to the theme. In these texts, distinctions are made between *informal* and *formal*, *formative* and *summative*, as well as *internal*

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<sup>8</sup>This is surprising inasmuch as the phrase 'liberal education' inevitably carries not only the classical idea of freedom but also the newer idea of political liberalism. It goes without saying that this complicates further the relationship between *Bildung* and liberal education.



(sometimes termed relative) and *external* (sometimes termed absolute) assessment. One gains a different picture concerning the relationship between assessment and *Bildung* depending on the type of assessment one has in mind.

The title of the present chapter suggests a certain antithesis between *Bildung* and assessment, so allow me first to explain what is at stake in this. If we understand assessment as an objective and formal procedure carried out at the end of a course, through a final test with clear correct answers for example, this seems antithetical to the aim of personal character development inherent in the idea of *Bildung*. Similarly, if assessment is done externally, following, for instance, national standards, this procedure is ill-suited to assessing the individual, cognitive, and affective development of the students. How about if broach the relationship between assessment and *Bildung* vis-à-vis contemporary challenges faced by the latter? Pressed by the increasing demands of accountability and efficiency in today's education, educators and educational institutions sometimes adopt a narrow definition of *Bildung*, whereby the term is reduced to mastering certain contents of knowledge, rather than presenting *Bildung* as a free choice (cf. Horlacher 2012). This danger is manifest, as Horlacher (2012) notes, in recent books such as *Bildung: Alles was man wissen muss* (Schwanitz 2009) or *Die andere Bildung: Was man von den Naturwissenschaften wissen sollte* (Fischer 2011).

*Bildung* and assessment, however, may also be harmonized through a more flexible interpretation of assessment. If instead of formal and summative assessment, we turn our attention to informal and formative assessment, it becomes easier to see how the aims of *Bildung* and assessment can be synthesized. If a high school teacher, for example, requires from her students a learning diary written during their attendance on a given course, the teacher will be able to respond not only to objective learning standards but also to individual aims—and original ways of completing the diary—in her course-work assignment. The same goes for offering spontaneous feedback to the students in day-to-day teaching environments; assessment *qua* responsive attention to the students is something a good teacher engages with in any event, so in this sense there need not be a fundamental tension between *Bildung* and assessment either.

What are the standards of learning to be used in educational assessment, then, if we reinterpret the term as compatible with *Bildung*? Instead of 'knowledge', we may turn to 'competency' or 'skills', which have been recently suggested, indeed, as alternatives to the very idea of *Bildung*. Stafford A. Griffith (2008) adds the important remark that the standards may also include *values and attitudes* that are of increasing importance in today's world. As examples, he mentions "character building, patriotism, a service perspective, tolerance, non-violence and respect for human rights and human life" (Griffith 2008, p. 101). These values involve such a broad scale of different attitudes that they may be seen to approach the ideals of *Bildung*.

To conclude this section, if we understand standards of learning involving not only knowledge but also attitudes and values—and assessment, in turn, as the evaluation of whether these standards have been met—we may synthesize *Bildung* with contemporary practices of educational assessment. Taken in this sense, educational



assessment may involve subjective (and intersubjective) elements; it is part of *Bildung*, for instance, understood as individual development of character, that one does not know in advance how *Bildung* will play out. Evaluating such phenomena involves not only objective but also subjective criteria, and self-evaluation may play a role in the process.

## Assessment with *Bildung*: Test Case from Finland

How about a concrete example of the synthesis between *Bildung* ideals and assessment practices? We will now turn to a test case from the educational system of Finland—having gained remarkable international attention during the last few decades and the new school curricula having been adopted in August 2016. Let us examine two documents, *The Fundamentals of the Finnish High School Curriculum for 2016* and *The Fundamentals of the Finnish Primary School Curriculum for 2015* (both published by *Opetushallitus*, the National Board of Education). These documents contain elaboration on the subject-specific learning standards, in particular, objectives of what is to be learned. The high school documents are followed by all the schools nationwide, while the primary schools will have the possibility of creating their local curricula alongside the national curriculum. These documents serve as an example of how the Finnish *Bildung* system meets the demands of educational assessment today—although their newness as such does not suffice to explain the international attractions of the Finnish educational system.

Before we look at the documents, they should be set in a historical context. Since we are dealing with *Bildung*, we must first make recourse to the father figure of the Finnish school system: the philosopher and statesman J. V. Snellman (1806–1881) who played a crucial role in laying the groundwork of Finnish culture. Swedish by birth, Snellman wrote his works in Swedish, but he made his name in Finland and contributed decisively to the birth of the Finnish nation-state. In the present context, Snellman is indeed a fitting figure since one of his masterterms is *bildning* (in Finnish, *sivistys*)—which would translate as *Bildung*—and which Snellman interprets, in a Hegelian vein, as historically evolving engagement with truth. Snellman reads *bildning* (again following Hegel), as the constant struggle between different views, and he considers both the study of philosophy and natural science crucial for *bildning*. He also stresses that the fruits of *Bildung* must be borne in the world outside rather than in one's solitary thoughts.<sup>9</sup>

In Snellman's lifetime, the initiative was made in Finland by Uno Cygnaeus, in 1861, of a grammar school system accessible to all Finns, regardless of their social class or gender. Today, Finland counts itself among the rare countries where all teachers, including primary school teachers, must complete a master's degree,

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<sup>9</sup>J. V. Snellman has been abundantly studied in Finland but not so much in international settings (or even in the English language). For one English work on Snellman, however, see Snellman-Institute 2006.

which means that the country makes remarkable investments in the education of not only students but also teachers. When teacher education was established (first in the University of Helsinki in 1947 and then in the Universities of Turku and Oulu), philosophy of education was dominated by empirical-experimental educational research. This was a period of behaviorism and outcomes-based learning, and these schools of thought influenced Finnish teacher education in its early days. From now on, teacher education—and analogously, work at schools—was to be based on top-notch scientific research. At present, the days of behaviorism are over, yet the trend of fusing research with teacher education still persists, with contemporary teacher education in Finland drawing, among other things, from neuroscience, and social and cognitive psychology.<sup>10</sup>

How do the national curriculum documents read, then, in the light of the remarks on Finnish educational philosophy just presented? Let us first take a look at what the curriculum documents term their ‘value basis’. I will maintain the Finnish word *sivistys* in the text; as we have noted, the term translates as *Bildung*:

The value basis of the Fundamentals of the High School Curriculum is provided by the Finnish *sivistys*-tradition, according to which studying and learning are ways of renewing society and culture. *Sivistys* consists of skills of problem-solving, both by individuals and communities, using ethical reflection, setting oneself in another’s position and using deliberation based on knowledge. Part of *sivistys*, moreover, lies in the skill and will to deal with conflicts between human aspirations and the prevailing reality, searching for solutions in an ethical and compassionate way. *Sivistys* manifests itself as care-taking, open-mindedness, versatile grasp of reality and in the commitment to act for positive change. The *sivistys*-ideal of the Finnish high school means striving for truth, humanity and justice. High school teaching develops value-based skills by dealing with the tensions between explicitly stated values and reality. (Opetushallitus 2015, p. 12)<sup>11</sup>

Reading through the quotation, one is struck by the fact that they maintain at least as much of Snellman as of contemporary educational research. *The Fundamentals of the Primary School Curriculum* contains almost the same wording, but it also includes some additional phrases forging further links to *Bildung*. “Primary teaching supports the student’s growth toward full humanity, which is described by search for truth, goodness and beauty—as well as justice and peace” (Opetushallitus 2014, p. 15); note how this text contains not only the *Bildung*-ideal of attaining to full humanity but also the Platonic trinity of truth, goodness, and beauty as well as the more modern emphasis on justice and peace. Secondly, “The perspectives offered by ethics and aesthetics guide in the meditation of what is valuable in life... Part of *sivistys* is the attempt at self-regulation and taking responsibility for one’s own development and well-being” (Opetushallitus 2014, p. 16).

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<sup>10</sup> It must be noted, however, that the last decades in Finnish education have witnessed increasing emphasis on policy-making, assessment, and accountability. In a sense, there is some distortion of perspective if we study national curriculum documents, since those documents are commissioned by the National Board of Education—which is also a political actor in the field (with close ties to the Finnish government).

<sup>11</sup> All the translations of the Finnish documents are mine.

If the value bases are thus lofty, how about the sections on assessment? *The Fundamentals of the Finnish High School Curriculum* begins the section on assessment by stating: “Evaluation of students’ learning aims at furthering their learning” (Opetushallitus 2015, p. 228). The high school document highlights how “the students should understand what they are supposed to learn and how they are being evaluated. Through assessment, the students are encouraged to set their own goals and choose appropriate working methods. Providing feedback and carrying out evaluation during the studies are part of the student-teacher interaction” (Opetushallitus 2015, p. 228). In comparison, *The Fundamentals of the Primary School Curriculum* reads: “According to the law concerning primary schooling, the aim of student evaluation is to guide and encourage learning and to create better preconditions for self-evaluation. The students’ learning, working methods and their behavior are to be evaluated in versatile ways” (Opetushallitus 2014, p. 47).

Admittedly, these texts are removed from the lofty value bases quoted above, but they are not entirely distinct from *Bildung* ideals. Both documents underscore self-understanding, active initiative, setting one’s own goals, self-evaluation, and versatile assessment—all of which may be seen to figure, amidst the varieties of *Bildung* discussed above. Certain texts under assessment are even more in line with *Bildung* ideals: “The school plays an important role in determining what kind of conception of themselves the students will form as learners and as human beings” (Opetushallitus 2014, p. 47). Here, the discourse on one’s conception of humanity contains echoes of *Bildung*. Finally, the documents stress how assessment is a tool not only for the students but also for the teacher to “carry out self-evaluation and reflect on their own work” (Opetushallitus 2014, p. 47).

## Concluding Remarks

In contemporary discussions on philosophy of education, assessment and *Bildung* are often seen as antithetical, but we have looked at some ways in which they might be harmonized. While we have thus offered a synthetic approach to the relationship between *Bildung* and assessment, the case is not thereby closed. The practices of educational assessment are under constant evaluation in contemporary societies, and while the fact *that* assessment of educational process is needed will probably not change, the *what* and *how* of assessment will continue changing. This means that the interrelationship between assessment and *Bildung* will also undergo changes depending on how assessment practices are reconciled with society’s demands.

Secondly—and in spite of any synthetic interpretations—*Bildung* remains a complex concept that cannot be applied to contemporary settings without leaving some questions open. With the hope of doing justice to the polyphonic voices within what has been written and still is written on *Bildung*, I will end with three points of disagreement in the contemporary literature on the topic:

1. What role, if any, does the world—or the objective world—play in the project of *Bildung*? Is *Bildung* ultimately about bringing us in touch with the world or ourselves—or both?
2. Is *Bildung* possible in the postmodern world? And if it is, will it have to be a-teleological, or are there some ways in which a teleological vision of *Bildung* can be kept alive?
3. Can *Bildung* play a role in a world dominated by the demands of efficiency, accountability, and measurability?

With regard to the first question, a student of *Bildung* will find authors, on the one hand, understanding the term primarily as having to do with character development (e.g., Løvlie 2002; Lysaker 2008), while on the other hand, there are authors stressing *Bildung*'s engagement with the objective world (e.g., Nordenbo 2002; Kovalainen 2010). Respecting the latter point, it should be noted that classical authors as diverse as Humboldt, Emerson, and Adorno underscore the importance of world-acquaintance in the process of *Bildung*. For Adorno, contact with the world means, among other things, contact with real cultural works—which sounds like an idea concrete enough to provide tools for evaluating *Bildung*'s success. In general, if contemporary *Bildung* theorists manage to give concrete content to the ways in which the process of education should be in touch with objectivity, that content should also help in setting standards for educational assessment.

The second question, in turn, makes us ask questions about the worldviews of contemporary societies. Various authors there are, for instance, Reichenbach (2002) and Gur-Ze'ev (2002) who seem to think that teleological *Bildung* is an ideal of the past. On Gur-Ze'ev's view, *Bildung* presupposes transcendence and religiousness, which is no longer possible in a disenchanted world (Gur-Ze'ev 2002). Following the same author, however, *Bildung* may yet be possible if it is to be understood as a *negative utopia*, educating individuals, "in the face of a spiritless world, to revolt, to become [quoting Horkheimer] 'people who will be able to revolt even against their own group in which they were raised'" (Gur-Ze'ev 2002, p. 403). Thus a rearticulated critical theory can become today's *Bildung*, challenging any educational alternatives whose overt or covert aim is to buttress the present societal order.

Finally, we will end with a few remarks concerning the third question. In the remarks aimed at formulating a synthesis between *Bildung* and assessment above, we have leaned on the example of the Finnish educational system. The picture presented is perhaps too clean, and we have had no space for addressing the increasing demand for assessment and accountability in education in today's Finland. To respond to this deficiency, we might turn to Pasi Sahlberg, an influential educator and policy-maker in Finnish education, who has sought to explain Finland's success in the PISA studies. One of his observations is that Finland has, from early on, replaced *test-based accountability* at schools with *trust-based accountability* (Sahlberg 2011). Sahlberg's idea is that standardized testing will not generate trust between teachers and students (or within either group), while creating an atmosphere of mutual trust will contribute to better learning results. Moreover, national standards *combined with* local freedom of teachers to choose their working methods

has produced good results in Finland. The example shows that investing in humanist ideals can also improve learning results. Whether such practices will apply to countries other than Finland remains a question for present educators and researchers of education to solve.<sup>12</sup>

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# Nature and Nurture



Koichiro Misawa

## Introduction

It is tempting to ask questions such as ‘Do genetic factors outweigh environmental factors or vice versa?’ and ‘To what extent are the features of human life and differences between individuals attributable to our genes or to the circumstances in which we grew up and live?’ The debate over the relative importance of nature and nurture in our lives, especially during our development, dates back at least to antiquity in some sense; currently, however, the debate is increasingly rendered obsolete. Although the question of how much weight ‘nature’ or ‘nurture’ carry with regard to certain human behaviour and characteristics continues to receive scientific and public attention, few people within and outside of academia would deny the mutual dependence of the two. One might say, therefore, that there no longer exists such thing as a nature-nurture controversy: the so-called nature-nurture debate is a pseudo problem. Does it follow that the age-old issue has been resolved leaving only further detailed scientific (e.g. genetic) studies on specific human traits and features, and that no further questions remain for philosophers to address?

It is unsatisfying to conclude that the case is already, or can shortly be, closed by the continuing advancement of natural-scientific investigations; moreover, the advances made do not ensure that philosophical enquiry can only give way to such empirical approaches of the natural sciences. Unless what is most at issue in that long-running debate is fully appreciated, the near-consensus view—that nature and nurture interact—does not even make clear sense. This chapter thus aims to show that what is really at stake in the nature-nurture debate is *human nature* and that the question of whether human nature is nearer to nature or nurture is fundamentally misplaced. The real difficulty of this perennial issue lies in appreciating the sense in

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which human beings are *natural animals* in a *normative environment*, a viable understanding of which necessitates thinking of a *philosophical* kind.

This chapter first sketches out the current framework of the nature-nurture debate that is dominated by natural-scientific investigations (section “[The natural-scientifically inspired nature-nurture debate today](#)”) and then maps in a very broad outline the shifting conception of nature in Western thought, from which the modern sense of nature and accordingly what we call the natural sciences sprang (section “[A brief history of the nature-nurture issue as an educational concern](#)”). After providing a brief overview of attempts in philosophy of education to resist such a natural-scientific domination (section “[Approaches to the nature-nurture issue within the philosophy of education](#)”), the chapter attends to the Aristotelian conception of ‘second nature’, which has become widely known mainly through the work of the contemporary philosopher John McDowell, in order to recast the nature-nurture controversy from the perspective of what does or does not make us the beings that we are, in and in relation to the realm of the natural and the realm of the normative (section “[Nature, nurture and second nature](#)”). Spelling out some tenable and untenable ‘educational implications’ of the notion of second nature (section “[Lessons from second nature for philosophers of education](#)”), this chapter concludes with some thoughts on the justification and future development of the detailed analysis of the idea of second nature, which illuminates a linkage between nature, education and the human condition (section “[The future of the philosophical study of nature and nurture](#)”).

## **The Natural-Scientifically Inspired Nature-Nurture Debate Today**

Evelyn Fox Keller (2010) claims that “the particular form in which we (at least in the English-speaking world) today tend to frame discussions of the roles that nature and nurture play in development” is “specific to a time and a culture” (pp. 15–16). The time is the late nineteenth century; the culture is Anglo-American.

According to the standard view, this particular historical moment was marked by Francis Galton’s *English Men of Science: Their Nature and Nurture* (1874). In that book, Galton *disjoined* nature from nurture and declared: “how small has been the influence of nurture; the child had developed into manhood, along a predestined course laid out in his nature” (p. 15). The influence of his cousin, Charles Darwin, is plain to see. Although Darwin was much more careful and perceptive than his supposed followers (e.g. Midgley 2011), it seems hard to deny that since the appearance of Darwin’s theory of evolution through *natural* selection and random genetic variation, the pendulum between the separate domains of nature (considered innate or, more recently, genetic in origin) and nurture (considered acquired or, rather ambiguously, environmental) has swung to the ‘nature’ side.

This does not necessarily indicate that the nativist idea that nurture acts on nature has defeated all attempts to proclaim the independent influences of nurture in terms

of the importance of (say) social, cultural and educational elements, but that the nature-nurture debate is now commonly considered the exclusive subject of natural-scientific investigations. So much so that the nurturist view that nature turns on nurture to be actualised is also often offered against that background. The remark of the influential science writer Matt Ridley (2004) typically represents the nature-nurture issue so framed:

Somehow the adherents of the ‘nurture’ side of the argument have scared themselves silly at the power and inevitability of genes and missed the greatest lesson of all: the genes are on their side. (p. 6)

This chapter is not intended to diminish what the experimental psychologist Steven Pinker (2002) calls “[n]ew ideas from four frontiers of knowledge—the sciences of mind, brain, genes, and evolution” (p. 31); yet it aims to suggest that room remains for a lively alternative to the natural-scientific ways of shaping the nature-nurture issue. Pinker (2002), who vigorously condemns the analogy of the mind as a blank slate, further argues that those sciences of our time “are breaching the wall [between biological nature and cultural nurture] with a new understanding of human nature” (p. 31).

To shed light on how human nature fits in nature and/or nurture, however, would require a historical study of the very notion of nature, which is itself one of the most challenging concepts in philosophy. A cursory sketch suffices to reveal that the conception of nature that makes the above dispute between the nativist and the nurturist an ‘in-house’ dispute is also specific to a particular time and culture, thereby enabling us to reconsider what it means to be and to become a human being and how (best) to educate our children.

## A Brief History of the Nature-Nurture Issue as an Educational Concern

Long before the rise of the ‘natural’ sciences in the modern sense, nature had been a fundamental topic of philosophical enquiry, and reflection on the concept of nature at times involved deliberating about its associated concept, nurture. Keller (2010), albeit with reservations, writes:

Indeed, we often see the nature-nurture debate traced back to ancient Greek discussions about *physis* (timeless nature, what *is*) and *nomos* (law, custom, culture); about *sumphuton* (innate, internal, or native) and *epikteton* (adventitious, artificial, or acquired); sometimes the debate is even linked to Confucian and neo-Confucian discussions about *hsing* (often translated as nature or innate) and *hsui, yang, or chih* (various expressions for nurture, cultivation, or culture)... (p. 15)

In the course of Western thought, the complementary usage of the two concepts, nature and nurture, can be found in Plato’s dialogues—for example, in the words of Protagoras (*Protagoras*, 351A). In the *Meno*, Plato put forward a somewhat polarised usage of the two concepts by opening the dialogue with Meno’s question, “Can you

tell me, Socrates, whether virtue is something teachable? Or is it not teachable, but something that comes from practice? Or is it something neither from practice nor from learning, but something that comes to human beings by nature, or some other way?" (*Meno*, 70A). Plato had Socrates, as usual, set aside the question of whether virtue can be taught in favour of centring on the question of what virtue is.

Aristotle took a different tack. At the opening of Book II of the *Nicomachean Ethics*, he claims that virtue is of two kinds: "that of the intellect and that of character" (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1103a14). The former is closely tied up with 'teaching' and the latter with 'habituation':

Intellectual virtue owes its origin and development mainly to teaching, for which reason its attainment requires experience and time; virtue of character (*ēthos*) is a result of habituation (*ethos*), for which reason it has acquired its name through a small variation on '*ethos*'. From this it is clear that none of the virtues of character arises in us by nature. For nothing natural can be made to behave differently by habituation. ... So virtues [of character] arise in us *neither by nature nor contrary to nature*, but nature gives us the capacity to acquire them, and completion comes through habituation. (*Nicomachean Ethics*, 1103a15-25, emphasis added)

There is nothing occult or mysterious about the last sentence quoted here; it states that we are born, not with virtues of character, but with the faculty to gain them, implying that they are something *acquired*, and yet once acquired, they operate in our life as if they were something *natural*. As discussed further in "[Nature, Nurture and Second Nature](#)", John McDowell captures this "acquired-but-fixed" (Gaynesford 2004, p. 54) feature by invoking the concept of "second nature", which, according to McDowell (1998), "is all but explicit in Aristotle's account of the acquisition of virtue of character" (p. 184) and which, in his view, extends beyond the ethical character towards rational-conceptual capacities in general.<sup>1</sup> Nonetheless, as McDowell (2000) acknowledges, the concept of second nature is "only implicit in Aristotle's thinking" (p. 107); not because Aristotle missed the significance but rather because he had no need to care about it, as the significance arises only in the *modern* sense of nature. McDowell (2000) contends that "the concept of second nature acquires a philosophical significance in the context of a temptation to suppose that *whatever is natural is as such empty of meaning*" (p. 107, emphasis added).

No doubt the appearance of such a 'natural-scientific' conception of nature has brought a new dimension to the way we think about nature and nurture, and its influence has been pervasive and unparalleled from the age of the so-called Scientific Revolution onwards. Bruce Aune (1995) pithily summarises the emergence of such a new notion of nature: "The impact of empirical discoveries on the classification and identification of natural objects has resulted in a new view of nature that is profoundly different from those of the ancient Greeks, the medieval schoolmen, and the rationalist metaphysicians of the eighteenth century" (p. 350).

Alongside this gradually developing understanding of nature there arose, out of the context of the philosophical dispute between rationalism and empiricism, a

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<sup>1</sup> McDowell (1996) argues: "Moulding ethical character, which includes imposing a specific shape on the practical intellect, is a particular case of a general phenomenon: initiation into conceptual capacities, which include responsiveness to other rational demands besides those of ethics" (p. 84).

famous metaphor that has repeatedly served the interests of many proponents of the ‘nurture’ argument. That metaphor is usually associated with the following passage in John Locke’s *An Essay Concerning Human Understanding* (1690):

Let us then suppose the mind to be, as we say, *white paper*; void of all characters, without any ideas: —How comes it to be furnished? Whence comes it by that vast store which the busy and boundless fancy of man has painted on it with an almost endless variety? Whence has it all the materials of reason and knowledge? To this I answer, in one word, from EXPERIENCE. In that all our knowledge is founded; and from that it ultimately derives itself. (Book II, chap. 1, emphasis added)

Often called the ‘blank slate’ view of the human mind, this has been taken as the doctrine that the mind is a *tabula rasa* or blank slate—that is, a blank sheet of paper waiting to be written on by experience. Locke used this metaphor, however, not in the context of the nature-nurture debate, but in the context of epistemology, as an empiricist counter to the rationalist view that our concepts and knowledge can be gained independently of sense experience. In this respect, the question of whether ‘innate ideas’ (like those of God and mathematical rules) are reachable a priori without the help of sense experience was actually outside the context of the nature-nurture issue.

It is worth noting, however, that the implications and overtones of the blank slate metaphor have extended far beyond the epistemological background and have pervaded a range of scholarly and practical discourses on, say, politics, ethics and education. For example, the notion of a blank slate can appear to lend credence to democratic ideals rather than hereditary privilege, to adaptive flexibility rather than innate tendencies. Important and influential to the subsequent discussions related to education was, among others, Jean-Jacques Rousseau’s view that “children are born as a moral blank slate” (Winch and Gingell 2008, p. 143). With his admiration for Nature “which never lies” in opposition to fellow men “who are liars” (Rousseau 1984, p. 79), the Rousseauian image of children as a moral blank slate laid the path for child-centred or progressive education, which has since exerted a lasting influence on educational thought and practice.

However, such a Rousseauian analogy between human moral development and the course of nature came under attack by more ‘scientifically minded’ intellectuals in later periods who were doubtful of the view that casts conforming to nature and being natural as right and good and who were doubtful of the view of nature as divine, which is often associated with deistical beliefs. In the nineteenth century, for instance, John Stuart Mill (1874) wrote an essay entitled ‘Nature’ and discredited in it the Rousseauian idea (e.g. p. 10, p. 51), considering it “silly” to “expect common human morality from nature” (p. 28). For Mill, unlike for Rousseau, nature “cannot be a proper model for us to imitate” (ibid.); therefore human nature is likewise to be regulated and ameliorated, “the duty of man is the same in respect to his own nature as in respect to the nature of all other things, namely not to follow but to amend it” (p. 54).

Mill’s observation that nature or conformity to nature has nothing whatever to do with right or wrong has a close affinity with the theory that Darwin developed in *On the Origin of Species* (1859). Darwinism, Ernst Mayr (1997) writes, “by supplying a mechanism for evolution while at the same time denying any finalistic or vitalistic

view of life [i.e. any cosmic teleology], became the foundation of a new paradigm to explain ‘life’” (p. 13), and the paradigm still dominates the intellectual scene as a prominent natural-scientific theory. From such a theory, however, Darwin’s supposed followers have generally drawn the conclusion in the opposite direction to that endorsed by Mill<sup>2</sup> with regard to the relative importance of nature and nurture in human life and development—that is, in the direction of the ‘nature’ side.

The most radical move in this direction was, as mentioned, made by Francis Galton, who popularised the alliterative expression ‘nature and nurture’ as a pair of exclusive alternatives. Galton (1874) was confident to afford decisive priority to nature over nurture: “In the competition between nature and nurture ... *nature certainly proves the stronger of the two*” (p. 16, emphasis added). Grounded in this conviction, Galton opened the way towards what he coined ‘eugenics’ (the literal meaning of which is ‘good birth’ and yet the connotation of which gave rise to the attempt to exterminate, based on distorted thinking, certain diseases, disabilities and ethnic groups). We should never forget the horrific history of the eugenics movement in the real world (e.g. the programme of Nazi Germany in the early half of the twentieth century), which has made us take a strongly negative attitude towards eugenics.

Of course, eugenics policies must be out of the question. But the ‘natural’ sciences, despite some ethical restrictions on their research subjects and practices, have continued making tremendous progress to a stage at which no one seriously involved in the issues regarding nature and nurture today can ignore such natural-scientific achievements, including those individuals that take sides on ‘nurture’. The continuing advancement and flourishing of such fields as evolutionary biology, genetics, behavioural genetics, cognitive psychology, neurosciences, genomics and epigenetics, all of which in some way or another tell us much about ‘human nature’ in terms of, for example, the formation of human traits and behaviour as well as of heredity, has forced those who are engaged in education to reconsider how (best) to educate our children and philosophers of education in particular to ponder again the human condition in ways that clarify how the subject matter of philosophical enquiry includes, or differs from, the achievements of those natural-scientific investigations.

## **Approaches to the Nature-Nurture Issue Within the Philosophy of Education**

Appeals to discoveries in the natural-scientific disciplines can easily be found in the field of education, both in practice and in research. Nowadays, as Volker Kraft (2012) describes, “concepts like neuropedagogy or neurodidactics raise no

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<sup>2</sup>Mill (1874) prioritised ‘nurture’, maintaining: “It is only in a highly artificialized condition of human nature that the notion grew up, or, I believe, ever could have grown up, that goodness was natural: because only after a long course of artificial education did good sentiments become so habitual, and so predominant over bad, as to arise unprompted when occasion called for them” (p. 46).

eyebrows” (pp. 386–387); rather, for instance, the newly established journal *Mind, Brain, and Education* (launched in 2007 jointly by interested biologists, educational researchers, and cognitive and developmental scientists) has earned a high ‘impact factor’—higher than, say, *Journal of Philosophy of Education*.<sup>3</sup> Such a tendency has apparently come to entrench even the educational disciplines that are commonly seen as distant from the latest natural-scientific research. For example, the esteemed historian of education Richard Aldrich (2014) claims that “current developments in the neurosciences and in technology have rendered the traditional nature-nurture debate obsolete and that historians of education have a duty to engage in the shaping of possible, probable and preferable futures” (p. 852).

This current state does not indicate either that the nature-nurture debate is now over by celebrating new scientific findings as a panacea for education or that nothing remains for philosophical—i.e. non-empirical—enquiry to illuminate central educational issues. But what is it that philosophy can actually do?

Philosophy is a characteristically non-empirical intellectual enquiry, and education, however defined, is a characteristically normative enterprise. It should not be surprising, therefore, that philosophers of education have, by and large, resisted the idea of incorporating the nature-nurture issue completely into the topic of natural-scientific understanding, a resistance to the culture of what is often termed in philosophy ‘scientific naturalism’.

John White (1974), for example, argues: “The ‘nature-nurture’ issues cannot be settled by empirical research” (p. 50). How much sense does it make to say or even ‘prove’, for instance, that 70% of one’s intelligence is determined by nature (one’s genes) and 30% by nurture (the environment)? White questions the assumption that he takes to be built into the empirical research (such as in many twin-studies), the assumption that a high correlation between the IQs of monozygotic twins who were reared apart in different ways by different people demonstrates that their genetic make-up overrides their environments. White (1974) conceives this assumption as unjustified:

[S]uppose, to make the issue more clearcut, there is even a correlation of 1.0: each twin has exactly the same IQ as his [*sic*] co-twin. This in itself would not support the genetic case. For suppose one twin from each pair were given intensive coaching in answering intelligence tests and as a result, when both these twins and their co-twins were retested, the coached twins scored on average 20 IQ points above their co-twins. This would, of course, significantly reduce the correlation between IQs. (p. 49)

White is, of course, correct in that it makes no sense to quantify the relative contribution of nature and nurture to a particular individual’s intelligence. But, as Brian Yapp (1989) states: “the real issue is about quantifying the factors that lead to the *differences between people*” (p. 319, emphasis in original). That is, it does make (natural-scientific) sense to examine, for instance, what percentage of the *variations* existing among the population arises from genetic factors. A great deal of more

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<sup>3</sup>As of 2018, the impact factor of the *Journal of Philosophy of Education* is 0.805 and that of *Mind, Brain, and Education* is 1.271.

recent natural-scientific work may further discourage this philosophical complaint. Drawing on the evidence available, Pinker (2002) asserts:

The effects of differences in genes on differences in mind can be measured... Identical twins are far more similar than fraternal twins, whether they are raised apart or together; identical twins raised apart are highly similar; biological siblings, whether raised together or apart, are far more similar than adoptive siblings. (p. 47)

Has the time long gone when philosophers could ‘intrude’ on the work of natural scientists, for instance, with respect to epistemological assumptions regarding particular methods and empirical evidence? Given the continuing development of methods, tools, techniques, processes, experiments, etc., in the ever-growing natural-scientific investigations (into nature and human nature), ‘scientific naturalism’ certainly seduces philosophers away from their purely armchair ‘methods’.

Although ‘naturalism’ has its variants and is used in a variety of senses, the scientific naturalism in question is that which is “the current orthodoxy, at least within Anglo-American philosophy” and which has the following two themes: “*An Ontological Theme*: a commitment to an exclusively scientific conception of nature” and “*A Methodological Theme*: a reconception of the traditional relation between philosophy and science according to which philosophical inquiry is conceived as continuous with science” (De Caro and Macarthur 2004, p. 1; p. 3, emphasis in original). It is plausible to see that such a naturalisation of central philosophical concepts and domains has put considerable distance between general philosophy and philosophy of education. For example, W. V. Quine’s ([1969] 1985) highly influential declaration of naturalised epistemology—that “[e]pistemology, or something like it, simply falls into place as a chapter of psychology and hence of natural science” (p. 24)—has never been the central object of attention and enquiry among philosophers of education, for this naturalistic picture leaves little room for normative deliberation (Misawa 2013, p. 41). Rather than being preoccupied with the human subject as a natural—i.e. physical and biological—phenomenon, philosophers of education have been gripped more by the lines of thought that attend to different social, historical and cultural contexts that surround us in our everyday life.

Along these lines, many philosophers of education have turned their backs on the natural-scientific understanding of nature and human nature, the understanding that no longer places human beings outside of *nature*’s order: the species *Homo sapiens* is part of nature through and through. In this way, philosophical approaches to questions about, specifically, human nature as favoured in philosophy of education have diverged from their natural-scientific counterparts, neither of which has mutually supportive commitments. Pinker (2002) makes the rather broad observation:

During [the 20th-century] the doctrine of the Blank Slate has set the agenda for much of the social sciences and humanities. ... The social sciences have sought to explain all customs and social arrangements as a product of the socialization of children by the surrounding culture... (p. 6).

Philosophers of education have rarely employed the naïve idea of a blank slate itself; nonetheless, a tendency has certainly existed in the discipline to suppose that



‘nature’ and ‘human nature’ are also social products. Michael Bonnett (2012) illustrates the discipline’s inclination: “In recent times under the influence of post-modernism, ideas of nature and a natural order ... have become regarded by some simply as social constructs...” (p. 287). More recently, Sune Frølund (2016) echoes the point: “A dominating trend today... is to see concepts like nature and naturalness as social constructions and even constructions serving ideological purposes” (p. 655).

Of course, it is of grave importance for philosophers of education, as Bonnett’s and Frølund’s treatments of nature and naturalness exemplify, to continue producing the work that does full justice to distinctively human phenomena, thus addressing the meaning of nature and our relationship to it in a way that natural scientists normally do not; furthermore, it is of immense help, as Bonnett and Frølund again demonstrate, to make philosophical points about the shifting conception of nature (and, connectedly, of human nature) with particular attention to philosophical traditions other than Anglo-American analytical one, such as continental philosophy and non-Western schools of thought that are far less ‘contaminated’ by scientific naturalism. Equally, to challenge and undermine the presuppositions on which natural-scientific investigations bloom is in effect what is and will be expected of the philosopher of education, as seen in the work of Andrew Davis (2004) and Paul Smeyers (2016).

The remainder of this chapter, however, attends to the Aristotelian conception of second nature that McDowell has re-invigorated to meet the challenge head on (from within contemporary analytical philosophy)—the challenge raised by the seeming separation between the two (i.e. natural-scientific and philosophical/normative) approaches to nature and human nature that stand in the way of a deeper understanding of the human being as a natural animal in a normative environment. The idea of second nature has begun to make its way into the field of philosophy of education and has been brought to wider attention most recently by the collected papers from the symposium entitled, ‘Second Nature, *Bildung*, and McDowell: David Bakhurst’s *The Formation of Reason*’, which appeared in an issue of the 50th anniversary volume of the *Journal of Philosophy of Education* (2016).

## Nature, Nurture and Second Nature

As we have seen, the nature-nurture issue makes little sense without due recognition of what nature means and of its relation to human nature. The development of modern science and its understanding of nature have given rise to a troubling dualism between the experiencing (*norm-laden*) subject and the disenchanted (*natural*) world, producing accordingly a number of misleading problems. The nature-nurture dichotomy can be cast as one of those problems, *disjoining* nature from nurture and thereby making the concept of *human nature* resemble an oxymoron. Thus, although McDowell hardly pursues matters of education, his proposed Aristotelian notion of

second nature,<sup>4</sup> which is invoked to exorcise the pseudo picture of empirical content—i.e. of the place of minds in the world— can not only serve to dispel the wrong dualism of nature and nurture but also give us a better clue as to how we understand nature, nurture and human nature more comprehensively.

The modern dualisms, the source of which is the conception of nature that surfaced only with the advent of modern science, have entailed and bifurcated the two kinds of intelligibility. In his ground-breaking book *Mind and World*, McDowell (1996) argues:

Modern science understands its subject matter in a way that threatens, at least, to leave it disenchanted, as [Max] Weber put the point in an image that has become a commonplace. The image marks a contrast between two kinds of intelligibility: the kind that is sought by (as we call it) natural science, and the kind we find in something when we place it in relation to other occupants of ‘the logical space of reasons’, to repeat a suggestive phrase from Wilfrid Sellars. (p. 70, note deleted)

These contrasting kinds of intelligibility have unavoidably introduced “the problem of ‘placing’ or ‘locating’ normative phenomena in the scientific image of the world” (De Caro and Macarthur 2010, p. 2), thus shaping the form of questions such as ‘What place can one find for the normative in the natural world?’ and ‘How can minds be in touch with the (natural/outside) world?’ McDowell aims to make these questions less appealing by rejecting the equation of the realm of natural-scientific intelligibility with the logical space of *nature*, thereby making it possible to combine *freedom*—capacities of ‘spontaneity’, to use Kant’s term, that are not bound by what is made intelligible by natural science—with *naturalness*. McDowell (2000) claims that “there is no tension between freedom and nature, even though we have to recognize a tension between freedom and conformity to law” (p. 100).

The tempting and virtually accepted equation that McDowell rejects can be lessened by the notion of second nature that nearly comes to the fore in Aristotle’s account of the formation of ethical character. McDowell (1996) expounds this:

We cannot credit appreciation of [the rational demands of ethics] to *human nature* as it figures in a naturalism of disenchanted nature, because disenchanted nature does not embrace the space of reasons. But human beings are intelligibly initiated into this stretch of the space of reasons by ethical *upbringing*, which instils the appropriate shape into their lives. The resulting habits of thought and action are *second nature*. (p. 84, emphasis added)

As noted, McDowell (1996) generalises this point to hold all rational-conceptual capacities, and, as an antidote to scientific naturalism or “a naturalism of disenchanted nature”, sometimes calls his own position “a naturalism of second nature” (p. 86). McDowell (2008) articulates the sense in which human beings live not merely as evolved, physical and biological organisms but also as minded, sentient and thinking beings, at one and the same time, without any threat of incoherence:

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<sup>4</sup>It is to be noted that the notion is Aristotelian, not Aristotle’s: “No term corresponding to that of ‘second nature’ appears in Aristotle’s works” (Gubeljc et al. 2000, p. 41). In addition, from Augustine to Rousseau, the notion “had primarily a negative connotation”: “Until the end of the eighteenth century the term ‘second nature’ is predominantly used to signify the corruption of (first) nature” (ibid., p. 41).

Consistently with being *non-natural* in a sense that connects with their belonging to freedom, conceptual capacities can be seen to belong to *our second nature*. And though sensibility is natural in a sense that belongs with its being something we share with non-rational animals, the operations of our sensibility can be informed by capacities that are distinctive to our nature. (pp. 219–220, emphasis added)

In McDowell's view, conceptual capacities are actualised in perceptual experience as a (passive) receptivity,<sup>5</sup> which is made possible by the acquisition of our second nature mainly through initiation into our first language, which makes human beings inhabitants of the space of reasons composed of the *sui generis* character of responsiveness to reasons. The inhabitant of the space of reasons is a perfectly natural animal. There is nothing spooky about this and the 'What Place?' questions are to be dissolved.

It is tempting to read 'educational' dimensions into the conception of second nature by appeal to which McDowell accommodates 'the natural' and 'the normative'. The temptation may well be reinforced, for example, by McDowell's favoured use of the term *Bildung* and his account for the process of acquiring a second nature as a rather dramatic "transformation": "[Human beings] are born mere animals, and they are transformed into thinkers and intentional agents in the course of coming to maturity" (McDowell 1996, p. 125).

Yet, McDowell himself avoids—indeed, abhors—constructing any positive theory or doctrine from here. There seems a lot more going on, however, in McDowell's discussions of the notion of second nature (and its related ideas) than his own premise about the distinctive qualities of human beings such as mind, reason, personhood, normativity and our second nature, all of which cast philosophically thought-provoking light on the nature-nurture issue in question and the conception of education itself more generally. Indeed, as mentioned earlier, the idea of second nature has come to receive renewed attention from the philosophy of education community, even if that perspective is not McDowell's own focus.

## Lessons from Second Nature for Philosophers of Education

David Bakhurst's work (e.g. Bakhurst 2011, 2012) has stimulated reflection on McDowell's philosophy in ways that make connections with issues of education. While acknowledging McDowell's reluctance to develop a theory of second nature, Bakhurst (2011) seems to open such a door:

... I do not think [McDowell] believes that, having made room to acknowledge the importance of *Bildung*, the philosopher must simply step aside and leave it for the psychologist, linguist and cognitive scientist to make good on the notion. (p. 10, note deleted)

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<sup>5</sup>This thesis is not without controversy. Whether perceptual experience has conceptual content is one of the major topics of interest across the contemporary philosophical world.

Lifting the notion of *Bildung* and its kindred notions like second nature out of the context from which McDowell never departs is a task that needs to be done (by philosophers of education) if we want to reformulate the nature-nurture issue in the light of human second nature.

In order not to rest satisfied with some superficial or superfluous ‘educational implications’ of the idea of second nature, however, we must mark off right from wrong lessons to be drawn.

First, to cut first nature off from second nature is a wrong lesson to take from the idea of second nature. That is, it is not correct to see first nature as belonging in the realm of natural-scientific intelligibility and second nature as belonging in the space of reasons. Refusing to offer a unified conception of ‘nature at large’, McDowell (2000) claims:

[T]he idea of second nature belongs on both sides of the distinction I am chiefly concerned with, between what can be made intelligible by placement in the space of reasons and everything else. The distinction cannot be equated with a division between first and second nature. (p. 99)

McDowell (2008) actually “regrets” the labels he used for what he wants to say with the idea of second nature—the labels such as “naturalism of second nature” and “Aristotelian naturalism” (p. 216). McDowell (2000) emphasises that: “The only use to which I put the idea of second nature in *Mind and World* is to affirm that responsiveness to reasons as such is natural too” (p. 98). The real lesson is that the concept of ‘first nature’ has only a restricted sense of nature and much of first nature is given some meaning in the logical space of reasons wherein second nature to our human species abounds. This is not to deny, of course, that a particular individual’s genetically heritable ‘first nature’ which is inborn causes, independently of her second nature acquired after birth, some physical and biological symptoms, as in the case of Huntington’s disease and cleft lip. But much of what is considered as ‘first nature’ actually figures as a projection from an aspect of the space of reasons (as in the case of many psychological traits like intelligence, personality and resilience); second nature tacitly informs first nature as it figures in the space of reasons. That is, the nurturist idea of ‘nature via nurture’ is correct not only in the natural-scientific context of how genes are expressed in a changing environment, but also in the deeper context of how the second-natural light draws over the first-natural propensities.

Second, to appreciate educational possibilities of the transformative process is a right lesson to take, the process through which we acquire rational-conceptual capacities that enable us to live in the space of reasons whose structure is *sui generis*. Many reject this as incoherent, however. For example, Alasdair MacIntyre (1999) is highly sceptical of this process and tries:

to undermine the cultural influence of a picture of human nature according to which we are animals and *in addition* something else. We have, on this view, a first animal nature and in addition a second distinctively human nature. The force of the ‘and’ is to suggest that this second nature can, at least in the most important respects, only be accounted for in its own terms. (pp. 49–50, emphasis in original)

In the similar vein, Sebastian Rödl (2016), against Bakhurst's McDowellian thinking, objects that "the idea of a change from animal to person is incoherent" (p. 84). Yet, as seen, our second nature never disfavours our first nature; human beings living in the *sui generis* character of the space of reasons are *natural animals*.<sup>6</sup> Remember that first nature (awaiting actualisation) is never cut off from second nature, at least for the most part.

## The Future of the Philosophical Study of Nature and Nurture

This chapter has focused on the Aristotelian concept of second nature as a key that can stop us from adhering to a particular (natural-scientific) way of understanding nature and nurture, thereby challenging us to reconsider the linkage between nature, education and the human condition. Much more remains to be said on this point, and further enquiry should be encouraged on (at least) the following three grounds.

First, the idea of second nature enables and requires us to address the scope of the natural-scientific understanding of nature, which is an urgent but neglected matter.

Second, the idea can be approached from a variety of intellectual traditions, including non-Western cultures, some of which may reveal second nature to be rather thin. For example, the East Asian tradition of Confucianism, in which the author of this chapter is embedded,<sup>7</sup> has potential sources that can engage with Western debates about second nature, which, much to my regret, this chapter could not explore in detail.

Finally, examining how and how far the notion of second nature does or does not extend beyond McDowell's sense is a necessary task for philosophers of education.

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<sup>6</sup>For more on this, see Misawa (2014a, b).

<sup>7</sup>This is not a correct description, however. For, the Japanese context in which the author grew up and lives is a complex mixture of the views of Confucianism, Buddhism, Shinto, Christianity and many others through historical and current borrowings and interchanges with 'other' traditions. We thus need to avoid drawing a grossly oversimplified picture of 'Confucian thought' or 'Japanese thought'. It is worth noting as an example, however, that 'Japanese thought' could offer a sharp challenge to the widespread assumption of the traditional 'Western' view of nature (and accordingly nurture) delineated in this chapter. Akira Yanabu focuses directly on the issue of the sameness and difference between 'nature' and '*shizen*' (自然), the former of which is generally taken to be the source of meaning and contemporary usage of the latter. Based upon a detailed analysis of their relations, he draws the conclusion that 'nature' and '*shizen*' are *not* equivalent in meaning, arguing that the meaning of the latter ultimately and unconsciously relies on the implicit association of the traditional use of the term with the translation of 'nature' in the nineteenth century. Among the differences between them, for example, while "nature" is taken to be an object of knowledge, "*shizen*" is not, for the latter implies that there is no clean break between the Self and the Other (Yanabu, 1977/1995, p. 58). For more recent and educationally relevant philosophical discussions about the East Asian traditions of learning, development and education, see the special issue of *Educational Philosophy and Theory* 48, no. 1 (2016) on 'the Confucian Concept of Learning'. The 'Introduction' by Duck-Joo Kwak, Morimichi Kato and Ruyun Hung is a useful guide to grasp a broad picture of non-Western thoughts.

McDowell (2008) resists the idea that “second nature includes an evaluative and normative level in the reality that human beings confront” (p. 223), conceiving nature as ‘partially enchanted’ (rather than ‘fully enchanted’). Such an analysis will not only help us extricate ourselves from the simplistic—and indeed outdated—binary opposition between nature and nurture but also better understand the *social* and *natural* beings that we are.

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# Becoming Virtuous: Character Education and the Problem of Free Will



Johan Dahlbeck

## Aims of Character Education: The Cultivation of Virtue

In recent years, character education and virtue ethics have undergone a form of renaissance in the philosophy of education (Sanderse 2015). Virtue and character are Aristotelian notions that amount to key components of an ethical life according to Aristotle. The Aristotelian conception of the highest good to strive toward (in life as well as in education) is expressed through the notion of *eudaimonia*. *Eudaimonia* is commonly taken to denote a form of happiness in the sense of a life well lived or a flourishing life. The path leading up to *eudaimonia* is a path laid out along the virtues. In this sense “it is impossible to achieve *eudaimonia* without being morally good – without actualizing the moral virtues” (Kristjánsson 2007, p. 15). If we can become virtuous – that is, if we manage to live according to the virtues – we will become happy in the *eudaimonistic* sense. Accordingly, the premier aim of Aristotelian character education may be taken to be the cultivation of ethical virtues in children and students. What, then, is it to be virtuous more specifically?

Aristotle construes ethical virtues as intermediary states balancing between deficiency and excess. The art of living a well-balanced life is kept in check by the desire to strive for acting on virtues placed between two extreme poles, both of which are equally undesirable. For instance, the virtuous person will strive to always act generously, avoiding both the deficiency of greed (personified by the miser) and the excess of wastefulness (personified by the wasteful and careless person). To live guided by ethical virtues such as generosity is to live a flourishing life. To achieve this kind of life is an end in itself, which is why *eudaimonia* is conceived as the highest good to strive for. This means that *eudaimonia* is desirable for itself and not for the purpose of attaining some other good and, correspondingly, that all other

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goods are desirable for the sake of *eudaimonia* (Kraut 2014). This makes *eudaimonia* the ultimate end (*telos*) of human life, and to be able to strive for this kind of perfection is what distinguishes the human being from other forms of life naturally incapable of this kind of intellectual happiness.

Traits such as generosity, honesty, and courage are instrumental for the realization of a flourishing life, but in and of themselves they are merely parts of a greater machinery geared at “the formation of somebody’s character, which accommodates a whole range of virtues and in which cognition and emotion ideally form a unity” (Sanderse 2015, p. 383). This implies that the virtues are simply expressions of a kind of wisdom of life and that they may be understood in terms of “particular rational responses to the various temptations, trials and tribulations characteristic of human life” (Carr 1991, p. 33).

David Carr suggests that “virtuous agents are those who respond at the right time, to the right objects, towards the right people, with the right motive and in the right way” (2003, p. 219). A person who does this has acquired a virtuous character. This, however, requires training, and so it would be fair to characterize Aristotelian character education as “a form of moral education focusing on the development of virtues” (Kristjánsson 2015, p. 2). The notion that a virtuous character hinges on the ability and determination to make sound moral choices (as is implicit in Carr’s claim above) is central for many contemporary accounts of character education. As such, to be moral is to be able to make moral choices (i.e., to have moral agency), even when the moral choice is the most difficult and least readily available option. To be able to make moral choices, in turn, seems to require a capacity to choose freely.<sup>1</sup> At least this is what most people assume is what makes us morally responsible for our actions. If we did not have the ability to choose freely between a moral and an immoral way of responding to any given situation, it is difficult to see how we could be held morally responsible for our choices.

This leads us up to one of the most acute challenges of contemporary character education. It can be formulated in the form of the following question: how can we reconcile the fact that in order to act virtuously we appear to need to refer to the concept of a free will, while, at the same time, there are convincing philosophical arguments (aligned with a contemporary scientific understanding of natural causation) discrediting any viable notion of an unconstrained or uncaused will?

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<sup>1</sup>Correspondingly, to be able to make choices is generally taken to be what constitutes being free. For a choice to be genuinely autonomous, in turn, it is generally required that one is the cause of one’s choice. Accordingly, in the context of educational theory, Kenneth A. Strike offers the following three conditions of freedom:

1. “A person must be able to do what he chooses. This includes possessing relevant abilities and skills of execution as well as not being prohibited or physically prevented from taking a chosen course of action.
2. A person must possess those reasoning skills which enable him to evaluate various courses of action. This is a matter of having learned to apply those criteria relevant to making various sorts of judgments.
3. A person must be psychologically constituted such that it is possible for the exercise of such reasoning skills to become the actual determinates of choice and action” (1972, p. 274).

Taking its cue from this important question, this chapter will proceed along the following lines. First, I aim to substantiate the link between contemporary character education and the concept of the free will so as to illustrate the interdependency between the two. This assumed interdependency is informed by a broader overlap between the metaphysics of free will and central educational concerns.<sup>2</sup> Having done so I will scrutinize the concept of a free will, raising some philosophical concerns about its validity in a contemporary educational context. This involves looking at the philosophical stakes involved in proposing a unique capacity to intervene with the causal order of nature. At this point, I will suggest that there is a way out of this conundrum, and I will continue by proposing a radically different understanding of the will, offered by the seventeenth-century rationalist Spinoza. Spinoza's naturalistic notion of the will is not of an uncaused and unrestrained will, but of a form of understanding, acceptance, and affirmation of the causal order of nature. The chapter will close by looking at some of the practical consequences of grounding contemporary character education in a Spinozistic conception of the will.

As the chapter outline above illustrates, the focus of this chapter is limited to discussing a western philosophical tradition of virtue ethics and its role in shaping the understanding of free will in contemporary character education. It should, however, be noted that there are indeed other virtue traditions with a long and rich history that offer different points of view on the question of free will and character formation. Two notable examples of such traditions are Confucianism and Buddhism. Both Confucianism and Buddhism represent broad (and varied) traditions of thought furthering theories of virtue as a point of departure for their ethics. From a Buddhist perspective, "a Mahayana meta-ethics supports those who argue for greater attention to perception, emotion, and imagination in programs of moral education, in contrast to the more usual exclusive emphasis upon will and deliberative reason" (Vokey 1999, p. 105).<sup>3</sup> From a Confucian perspective, the goal of character education is primarily to make students consistent in their desires, not to have them practice on decision-making. Accordingly, "the task of Confucian mind can be posed in terms of knowing as being aware, rather than choosing. Thus, we can say that learning in the Confucian sense is not concerned with deliberation for a choice, but with recognition" (Kwak 2016, p. 18). In many ways, this is aligned with ancient Greek traditions of self-cultivation insofar as it eschews the modern inclination toward deliberation of the will.<sup>4</sup> In the context of moral education, this means that "...the education that Confucius had in mind is primarily *moral* education, as his goal was to help his students to become virtuous persons" (Huang 2011, p. 141).

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<sup>2</sup>Stefaan E. Cuypers, for example, contends that "[t]he complementary issues of manipulation and autonomy in the metaphysics of free will cover, to a large extent, the same domain as that of indoctrination and authenticity in the philosophy of education" (2009, p. 124).

<sup>3</sup>For a helpful discussion on how the four cardinal western virtues of prudence, justice, fortitude, and temperance correspond to Buddhist virtues (identifying both similarities and differences), see Keown (2007, pp. 101–104).

<sup>4</sup>For an informed discussion on the relation between (and, to a degree, convergence of) Socratic and Confucian senses of self-cultivation, self-knowledge, and ethics of learning, see Kwak (2016). For a brief comparison of the Confucian ethics of virtues and Aristotelian ethics, see Chen (2002).

While it is difficult to assess the impact of Confucian and Buddhist virtue ethics on western models of character education, it may be argued that what has been termed ‘the postsecular turn’ in contemporary education – describing “a turn towards integrating previously separated spheres of knowledge acquisition within new paradigm of secular-spiritual synergies” (Wu and Wenning 2016, p. 553) – coincides with a revival of eastern traditions of thought in education.<sup>5</sup> This may be explained in part by the fact that these traditions of thought can open up for “a form of yearning, searching, and enlightened attitude about the shortcomings of both religion and secularity” (p. 566). In this chapter, my aim is to trace the western conception of the free will in character education – from an Aristotelian understanding of moral agency to a Kantian notion of the free will – and to trouble this tradition from within, as it were. I will therefore contrast the dominant understanding of the free will, not with eastern traditions of wisdom, but with Spinoza’s rationalistic and naturalistic understanding of the will, a concept of the will that follows from his commitment to causal determinism.

## Challenges of Contemporary Character Education: The Free Will Problem and the Question of Moral Responsibility

Aristotle’s conception of moral agency and responsibility – as laid out in Book III of the *Nicomachean Ethics* (*NE*) – is not immediately recognizable as corresponding with the commonsensical notion of the free will, signifying that we are free to do as we choose. In fact, Aristotelian ethics have undergone a radical transformation so as to accommodate a version of the free will that was not prevalent in classical Greek philosophy. This transformation is generally attributed to Aquinas – and other Christian thinkers – who, in the thirteenth century, sought to reconcile Aristotelianism with a (largely Augustinian) concept of the will to which all vices could be causally related (Kent 1995).<sup>6</sup> Contemporary character education owes much to this transformation, and personal decision-making is central for many models of character education drawing (however loosely) on the Aristotelian cultivation of virtue (Ravven 2013, pp. 1–55). This transformation may be summarized as moving from a naturalistic understanding of the will – where decisions follow naturally from the character of a person – to an understanding of the will as a capacity setting humans apart from the rest of nature (while bringing her closer to God) insofar as it grants her the ability to intervene with natural causation.

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<sup>5</sup>For a brief overview of the shifting historical role and the recent revival of Confucianism in Chinese public education, see Wu and Wenning (2016, pp. 559–565).

<sup>6</sup>Accordingly Carr writes: “The Christian idea of the will as something which operates as an independent source of motivation and choice and which is open to the influence of good or evil is quite different in these crucial respects from Plato’s *thumos* and probably makes its first entrance into western thought with St Augustine” (1991, p. 37).

Despite the naturalistic elements of his understanding of the will, Aristotle is generally recognized as having offered the first theory of moral responsibility (Eshleman 2014).<sup>7</sup> To be free, on Aristotle's account, is to be the cause of one's actions. When we are the cause of our actions, we are morally responsible and we can choose to act virtuously or not. Aristotle (1984) writes:

For where it is in our power to act it is also in our power not to act, and *vice versa*; so that, if to act, where this is noble, is in our power, not to act, which will be base, will also be in our power, and if not to act, where this is noble, is in our power, to act, which will be base, will also be in our power. (*NE*, Book III, 1113b)

To become morally responsible for one's actions, insofar as we acquire the power to act and the power not to act, is part of one's moral development. This requires understanding how we function and how we are constrained by things that are external to us. When we understand this clearly, we will be in a position to make moral choices, and we will be able to act virtuously. As Carr puts it, for Aristotle "moral wisdom of knowledge is a knowledge of how to make right moral choices" (1991, p. 59). There is a sense, then, in which we might find the seed of a free will argument in Aristotle. What is important for Aristotle, however, is not whether we always make the right decisions or not. Good decision-making is merely the natural outcome of having developed a virtuous character. The main objective of moral education, from a classical Aristotelian point of view, is to have students cultivate a virtuous character, and they will cultivate their character by increasing their understanding of themselves and the world. This means that "once character is set, people cannot do otherwise than they do" (Ravven 2013, p. 169), a conclusion that makes Aristotle into a naturalist insofar as "human beings act necessarily according to their character and that natural (including mental) processes operate by necessity" (*ibid.*).

As indicated above, however, many contemporary models of character education are less focused on the cultivation of a virtuous character (in the Aristotelian sense) and more focused on learning how to act. This action-oriented form of moral education is commonly taken to be informed by Kantian ethics, oriented around identifying patterns of acting that correspond with moral principles. Heidi M. Ravven notes that "in the American context, the Aristotelian notion of personal character has been reshaped through the lens of free will", in the sense that "character educators use a (Kantian) model of choosing actions that accord with principles (or virtues) to which children have freely committed themselves, rather than a model that involves training behavior" (2013, p. 44). The focus on personal decision-making, Ravven claims, reveals the "foundational nature of the free will perspective in America" (p. 51). It also shifts the focus from the formation of students' characters to the setting up of an educational framework of praise and blame. Moral choice, in this tradition, is not so much a matter of acquiring a virtuous character as it is a matter of the individual orientation of the will in a natural world where we have the freedom to act for good or for evil.

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<sup>7</sup>Cf. Aristotle (1984), *NE*, Book III, 5.

What, then, is the problem with grounding character education in the assumption that humans have free will in this latter sense? This question may be approached from at least two, equally relevant, perspectives. It may be approached in terms of a philosophical problem, and it may be approached as an educational problem. From a philosophical point of view, the notion of a free will is problematic insofar as it relies on an understanding of human freedom where to be free is to be exempt from natural causation. That is, if freedom is understood in terms of freedom from constraint and the subsequent understanding of the will is understood as being uncaused or spontaneous, then we come up against the philosophical problem of having to explain how it is that humans have the ability to act contrary to laws or regularities that bind the rest of nature. From a Kantian perspective, for instance, being 'a transcendently free person' ultimately means that one "stands outside the realm of natural laws" (Giesinger 2010, p. 517) insofar as it concerns a kind of freedom that "cannot be attributed to any natural human sentiments or dispositions but [that] can be attributed [...] to the noumenal self which lies beyond any empirical knowledge we may have of our inner phenomenal nature" (Carr 1991, p. 80).<sup>8</sup> There are, however, conceptions of human freedom that do not introduce this kind of tension with a naturalistic understanding of the world, and so one way of coming to terms with this problem would be to appeal to a different concept of freedom.

From an educational point of view, the notion of a free will is problematic as it appears to render all aspects of moral education into matters of personal choice and, in extension, because it makes moral education almost exclusively concerned with the question of praise and blame. The most obvious problem with this, from an educational point of view, is that it risks rendering moral education into a paternalistic form of conditioning (primarily driven by the child's fear of being blamed) and "as mere training as opposed to authentic education"<sup>9</sup> (Cuyper 2009, p. 135). There is also a deeper underlying tension between free will and education in the sense that for a free will to be genuinely free, it needs to be uncaused and spontaneous, and for education to be effective, it needs to assume that actions and thoughts can be externally influenced (and willfully manipulated). Johannes Giesinger frames the free will problem in terms of a pressing educational paradox:

It seems that what he [the learner] thinks, what he wants and how he acts can never be truly *his*, since it is brought about by education and other factors beyond his control. *On the other hand*, if we consider the learner as endowed with a free will, then it might seem impossible to educate him at all. (Giesinger 2010, p. 515)

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<sup>8</sup>Similarly, Allen W. Wood offers the following helpful explanation of transcendental freedom: "When we think of ourselves as appearances, we are determined, but when we think of ourselves as moral agents, we transport ourselves into the intelligible world, where we are transcendently free" (2008, p. 135).

<sup>9</sup>Authentic education, on Cuyper's view, is conceived as "opposed to indoctrinative education" insofar as it "consists of necessary educational interferences that are conducive to the attainment of the primary educational aim of transforming children into morally responsible agents" (2009, p. 135).

That is to say that “if his [the learner’s] present and future actions stem from a will that is genuinely free, then they will be independent from any educational influence” (ibid.). In order to escape this dilemma, Giesinger proposes “a reason-based understanding of freedom” (p. 525) where “a person is free if she acts on reasons she accepts as valid” (p. 520). This assumes a weaker concept of freedom (than the one given above) in the sense that the learner’s reasons “are not (yet) part of his identity” but that through education “those reasons that one is prompted to accept become *one’s own* in a strong sense” (p. 522). Education, in this context, concerns the process by which “the child’s basic freedom can be cultivated to become full-blooded autonomy” rather than the process by which “an unfree object can be transformed into an autonomous subject” (p. 525).

To act freely on this view is not simply to be able to make a choice, but to be able to make a choice *for the right reasons*. Whereas everyday choices are frequently made out of habit or as direct results of one’s social milieu, an autonomous moral choice is taken to be the end result of a deliberate educational process. As Stefaan E. Cuypers puts it: “For that reason, the ‘free man’ not only is a free chooser but also possesses an authentic code of conduct in the light of which he chooses” (2009, p. 126). Being informed by R. S. Peters, Cuypers goes on to propose that “a choice (or decision) is autonomous if and only if its agent both has control in making it and is authentic with respect to it” (ibid.). To be authentic with respect to one’s choice, on Cuypers’ account, means that one’s choice “causally issues from antecedents springs of action, such as beliefs and desires, which are ‘authentic’ or ‘truly the agent’s own,’ as opposed to being inauthentic or alien” (ibid.). That is, for a choice to be considered authentic in this sense, the moral agent needs to be its true cause. For a choice to be caused entirely by the moral agent, however, the moral agent would seem to need to be placed “outside the realm of natural laws” (Giesinger 2010, p. 517) insofar as things that abide by natural laws are always necessarily caught up in, and at least partially determined by, natural chains of causation.

The relevant educational concern related to the issue of authenticity is of course the problem of indoctrination. If a child is manipulated into holding certain values, in what sense can these values be labeled authentic? Cuypers offers the example of religious practices being habituated early on in the child’s life as an illustration of this problem:

The child [...] may not be able to refrain from a certain religious practice – her relevant actions would express choices stemming from unsheddable, antecedent causal elements that are not truly the child’s own – because of the way in which the religious training took place. (2009, p. 127)

The problem with this explanation, of course, is that it is unclear how one distinguishes between the “causal elements that are not truly the child’s own” and those that are. For Kant, for instance, being morally autonomous means being unconditionally free where genuine freedom is grounded in a transcendental and non-empirical realm and where one’s moral reasoning is therefore necessarily untouched by the phenomenal world of appearances.<sup>10</sup> As Giesinger (2012, p. 777) points out,

<sup>10</sup>Cf. Kant 1999, A532–58/B560–86.



however, this raises an educational issue insofar as it is not entirely clear if and how the noumenal self can be educated given that it is construed as being necessarily unaffected by external empirical influences. Assuming that a person's character can in fact be molded through education, it appears difficult to draw any sharp line between inculcating moral values (that the child will come to be the true cause of over time) and manipulating the child into adopting someone else's values (that the child will never be the true cause of). This amounts to what R. S. Peters calls 'the paradox of moral education' where he stipulates (paraphrasing Aristotle) that children "can and must enter the palace of Reason through the courtyard of Habit and Tradition" and that the most pressing problem facing the educator concerns how to inculcate good habits "in a way which does not stultify the development of a rational code or the mastery of the 'language' of activities at a later stage" (2015a, p. 52). Peters' response to this paradox is to propose a distinction between habits that are mere automatized responses to external stimuli and habits that are, in Cuypers' words, "*rationally* permeated tendencies to act", meaning that "they have reasons behind them, and although they usually operate automatically, we are at liberty to stop them" (2009, pp. 128–129). As Cuypers remarks, however, the question remains as to what the conditions of "the initial instillment of these prerequisite elements of adequate moral habits" (underpinning our reasons for acting) are (p. 129)?

In response to this question Cuypers (and Haji and Cuypers 2004) proposes a future-oriented and "relational view of authenticity" where it is claimed that "although pertinent psychological elements instilled in the child during the prenatal stage are not authentic per se, they can be authentic with an eye toward future moral responsibility" (Cuypers 2009, p. 134). Going back to the core problem of where this authentic moral ability comes from, it remains difficult to explain the seemingly supernatural tendency underpinning the notion of the free will insofar as it is conceived in terms of an unexplainable self-caused thing (*causa sui*) in a world of otherwise externally caused things. This brings us back to the related problem of moral responsibility. As Cuypers goes on to argue, it becomes problematic to assign moral responsibility unless we can determine that a particular action *A* "stems from psychological antecedents that are constituents of *S*'s [*S* = a normative agent] authentic evaluative scheme" (p. 135). Given that determining the causal origin of an action *A* as being within *S* appears to require circumscribing the regularities of natural causation, it is questionable whether a convincing account of moral responsibility will hold sway in the face of a naturalistic (scientific) understanding of the world.

This brings us right up to the enduring determinism-indeterminism debate in which the problems of free will and moral responsibility are both ultimately couched. Very briefly, determinism (*qua* causal determinism) refers to the philosophical view that there is only one possible future which follows from the assumption that everything that happens is determined by prior causes to act and behave in certain determinate ways (van Inwagen 1986). Indeterminism, in contrast, refers to the view that there is more than one possible future and that things are therefore not predetermined by prior causes to act and behave in certain determinate ways; in other words things could have been otherwise than they are. Indeterminism thereby

“suggests the absence of lawfulness in human activity” (Gavin 1992, p. 126). As is clear from the above, determinism leaves little room for anything uncaused and spontaneous, whereas indeterminism allows for uncaused actions and spontaneity in nature.

Besides the seemingly unbridgeable divide between determinism and indeterminism, there is also the well-known debate between the compatibilist and the incompatibilist view on moral responsibility. Compatibilism refers to the view that causal determinism and free will are not mutually exclusive but that a person may be held responsible for actions even if she is causally determined like anything else in nature. Incompatibilism, on the other hand, holds moral responsibility and causal determinism to be mutually exclusive insofar as moral responsibility entails being the causal origin of one’s conduct.

In metaphysical terms to be the cause of oneself (or at least of some of one’s actions) is required for moral responsibility to make sense. If my behavior is caused by something external to me, it is difficult to see how I can be held responsible for it. For someone to be the complete cause of his or her actions is, however, very difficult to conceive as this appears to require a kind of self-determination that natural things are not generally attributed with. This line of thinking relies on what Galen Strawson refers to as the Basic Argument stating that:

- (1) Nothing can be *causa sui* – nothing can be the cause of itself. (2) In order to be morally responsible for one’s actions one would have to be *causa sui*, at least in certain crucial mental aspects. (3) Therefore nothing can be truly morally responsible. (Strawson 1994, p. 5)

There is an interesting tension between the fairly straightforward and simple claim that no one can be the complete cause of him- or herself (insofar as we are all to some extent products of our heredity and our upbringing) and that no one can therefore be the complete cause of his or her conduct, and the commonsensical view that morality requires moral responsibility in precisely this sense. Carr, for instance, writes: “In fact I hold the common-sense view that most of us are for most of the time quite responsible (in the sense that, amongst other things, we could have chosen to do something other than what we actually did) for the wrong-doing we commit [...]” (1991, p. 17). Without actually disputing the truth of the Basic Argument, Carr turns to a commonsense view so as not to undermine the central place of moral responsibility within western traditions of moral philosophy. The question is, however, if the question of praise and blame is as crucial as one might be led to believe that it is. In order to clarify, the point at stake is not whether we have the capacity to act so as to prevent bad things from happening but whether it makes sense (philosophically) to blame someone for not acting in a morally acceptable way. Carr puts it succinctly:

- If ideas of this sort are taken completely serious then it may well be appropriate to constrain the individuals in question, to submit them to psychiatric treatment, to re-educate them out of the attitudes they have acquired in vicious environments or even to try to eradicate whatever might be understood to have caused the delinquent behaviour in those environments, but it is really not to the point to blame or hold agents responsible for actions concerning which they could not have known better. (1991, p. 34)

On Strawson's view, the question of moral responsibility turns out to be not so much an issue of what is true or false in a logical sense, but of the importance of *the experience of choice* as such.<sup>11</sup> In order to illustrate, Strawson describes a scenario where a person is walking up the steps leading to a shop with the intention of buying a cake. When, at the door of the shop, this person is being intercepted by someone presenting the opportunity of investing the same money in charity instead, Strawson argues that the experience of having a choice is strong enough to make us disregard the logic of the Basic Argument telling us that we can never be truly morally responsible for our actions. He argues that "[l]arge and small, morally significant or morally neutral, such situations of choice occur regularly in human life" and that "[t]hey are the fundamental source of our inability to give up belief in true or ultimate moral responsibility" (1994, p. 10). Accordingly, "they are the fundamental rock on which the belief in true moral responsibility is founded" (p. 11).

Returning to the context of contemporary character education, it is obvious that the tension between a strong belief in free will and moral responsibility and the strong logic of the Basic Argument remains largely unresolved. While it is difficult to conceive of children and students as being the true cause of themselves, it appears to be equally hard to abandon the notion that children and students have free will and that they are (to some extent at least) morally responsible agents. It is a paradox that refuses to be settled because if one were to accept the Basic Argument, one would also need to accept the fact that "[i]t is exactly as just to punish or reward people for their actions as it is to punish or reward them for the (natural) colour of their hair or the (natural) shape of their faces" (p. 16). And this, it seems, is no easy thing to have to accept.

The force of the Basic Argument, on Strawson's account, is that it really doesn't hinge on whether we accept determinism or not. From the perspective of compatibilism – where determinism and free will are taken to be compatible – it may be argued that a person is considered responsible for an action as long as he or she is not constrained by alien influences such as acting under threat, under post-hypnosis suggestion, or being afflicted by mental illness, etc. At bottom, however, regardless of how we conceive of the particular circumstances surrounding our decision-making, the question remains as to how the compatibilist understanding of responsibility can assist in grounding actions in a person as its true cause. As Strawson concludes in response to the compatibilist position: "One does what one does entirely because of the way one is, and one is in no way ultimately responsible for the way one is. So how can one be justly punished for anything one does?" (p. 17). From the perspective of incompatibilism – where the assumption is that free will exists and that therefore determinism is false – the question of moral responsibility is still not answered in a satisfactory sense. As Strawson asks: "If my efforts of will shape my character in an admirable way, and in doing so are partly indeterministic in nature, while also being shaped [...] by my already existing character, why am I

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<sup>11</sup> Similarly, Young Pai concludes that "[t]he feeling of being able to act contrary to his [the agent's] character may be nothing but an illusion, but it is a psychological fact" (1966, p. 143).

not merely lucky?” (p. 18). Strawson’s conclusion is that the notion of moral responsibility cannot be sufficiently defended from either of the two perspectives:

In the end, whatever we do, we do it either as a result of random influences for which we are not responsible, or as a result of non-random influences for which we are not responsible, or as a result of influences for which we are proximally responsible but not ultimately responsible. The point seems obvious. Nothing can be ultimately *causa sui* in any respect at all. (p. 19)

To the extent, then, that contemporary character education still relies on this problematic notion of moral responsibility insofar as “character educators use a (Kantian) model of choosing actions that accord with principles (or virtues) to which children have freely committed themselves” (Ravven 2013, p. 44), there appears to be a need for a serious discussion on the possibility of a coherent character education that does not rely on the notions of free will or moral responsibility without at the same time lapsing into complete value nihilism.

In the context of moral education, the unwillingness to seriously consider the plausibility of moral responsibility and free will may be attributed to a fear of legitimizing what R. S. Peters calls “a universal get-out” (2015b, p. 70), rendering any vice permissible and morality itself redundant. Peters refers to the tendency to attempt to escape from moral accountability as *a social malaise*, closely related to a fashionable and opportunistic referral to causal determinism insofar as it concerns “a denial of responsibility coupled with a story about the causes of actions and standards” (p. 60). People who succumb to this tendency, Peters claims, “justify, or excuse, their failure to take responsibility for their own lives by an appeal to causes” (ibid.). Fearing the spread of this social malaise, Peters paints a dystopian picture of a world without moral responsibility:

If the word goes round that people cannot help doing things because of their class or their upbringing, their conditioning in the carry-cot or some such thing – then they may tend to sit about like angry young men, blaming everyone but themselves, but doing nothing about their condition. Their plight illustrates neatly the contention with which I began: that a social malaise can be the product of half-truths and of intellectual confusion. (p. 63)

At this point it is important to remind of the metaphysical prerequisites of a free will in terms of the demands it places on our understanding of nature. While a naturalistic understanding assumes that all things are explainable in terms of the same basic kind of regularities, the free (uncaused) will requires a kind of bifurcation of nature. That is, while most known things abide by the same regularities (such as efficient causation), certain things (such as the human will) are attributed the ability to circumscribe these (otherwise universal) regularities and, by so doing, indicate the existence of a parallel world where different rules apply. The problem that this gives rise to is that it becomes difficult to explain these different rules and that they therefore appear as entirely exceptional and supernatural. While the exceptionality of the human will is commonly referred to, there are seldom explanations for this alleged exceptionality. For example, when Peters states that he “would want to distinguish carefully between causes proper such as movements of the body and brain, and things like deliberating, deciding, having reasons, understanding truths, etc.,

which are often also called ‘causes’” (2015b, p. 66), he fails to provide any rational explanation for this distinction, making it a brute fact.

Disregarding the lack of explanation behind this bifurcation of nature, we might still fear the practical results of denying free will and, for this reason, agree with Peters’ appraisal concerning the social malaise of irresponsibility. The important question, then, is whether Peters’ dystopian image is the likely result of denying spontaneity in nature. Would the denial of a free will lead to social collapse and the end of morality? On the other hand, if, as David Gordon concludes, “[a]ny teacher who sets himself the task of getting all his pupils to freely decide to do what they in fact ought to do, has set himself an impossible task” (1975, p. 415), the question is: what paths of inquiry remain open for character education? Is there no way to conceive of a coherent form of character education without at the same time assuming the existence of a free (uncaused) will?

Returning to Aristotle, we saw earlier that the Aristotelian will may be conceived in terms of a naturalistic understanding of the will, where decisions are taken to follow naturally from a person’s character. The will, in this sense, is not free insofar as it is always the outcome of a person’s character disposition. At the same time, Aristotle (1984) construes justified praise and blame as being conditioned by voluntariness (*NE*, Book III, 1114b). For an action to be voluntary, it needs to be caused by the agent performing it, and it needs to be not caused by ignorance. For an action not to be voluntary, in contrast, it needs to be caused by something external to the agent or by ignorance. Character education, from a classical Aristotelian point of view (as well as from the point of view of Confucianism and Buddhist virtue ethics), therefore focuses on formation of character, where a person’s choices are conceived as the natural outcome of his or her character. If a person makes bad choices, it is either because he or she was forced in the direction of that choice (by external causes) or because of lack of knowledge. To amend this lack of knowledge would therefore be the goal of character education.

Contemporary western models of character education, being clearly influenced by a more Kantian understanding of the will, have tended to focus less on the cultivation of character and more on the individual student’s ability to make the right choices. This has accentuated the problematic aspects of the concept of a free will in a way that classical Aristotelian ethics largely avoids. Since Aristotle’s ethics rely on pre-modern notions such as the *telos* of human existence, where every human being is believed to be naturally predisposed to strive for “their true or most fully realised form” (Sanderse 2015, p. 393), in a sense which is clearly not compatible with a post-Copernican worldview, it begs the question of whether the modern Kantian amendment to Aristotelianism is the most viable alternative for contemporary character education.

It is to this end that I would like to conclude this chapter by turning briefly to Spinoza, being both a virtue ethicist and a causal determinist (as well as a necessitarian), in order to investigate the currency of such an alternative. What is particularly interesting about Spinoza in this context is his refusal to adapt his ethical theory (as well as his metaphysical framework) to the modern yearning for a free will that can act as a guarantor for moral responsibility while still being firmly grounded in a western Enlightenment tradition of thought.

## A Spinozistic Approach to Character Education and Virtues: Understanding and Accepting Natural Causation

Spinoza's *Ethics* (1985a) may be read as a general guide to the formation of a good character where a good character is characterized by an adequate understanding of natural causation. It begins with an overarching metaphysical system establishing that everything that exists is an expression (mode) of nature (substance) and that what define these things is the striving to persevere and flourish in being (E3p7<sup>12</sup>). All things are the same in this regard. Spinoza moves on to his account of the human mind (being another thing determined to strive for perseverance) in order to establish a path to human freedom and happiness. By conceiving of the human mind as a finite mode, he equates it with the mind of any other finite mode, albeit relatively more complex than most other known minds. For Spinoza, there is nothing exceptional about a human being that would warrant an elevated status from the perspective of nature *qua* substance. This has led some commentators to label Spinoza an anti-humanist (Melamed 2011). This is not to say, however, that Spinoza is uninterested in matters concerning human well-being, quite the opposite, but it serves to highlight the fact that he refuses to adjust his account of the human being according to popular fictions and superstitions. This is evident from the fact that Spinoza's account of the affects follows his general metaphysical outline. Accordingly, he states that he will "consider human actions and appetites just as if it were a question of lines, planes, and bodies" (E3pref), illustrating that rationality and ethics are inseparable concepts for Spinoza.

Freedom, for Spinoza, is not opposed to determinism. On the contrary, Spinoza defines freedom as follows: "That thing is called free which exists from the necessity of its nature alone, and is determined to act by itself alone" (E1D7). In a letter to G. H. Schuller, Spinoza remarks that: "So you see that I place freedom, not in free decision but in free necessity" (Letter 58, S: p. 909<sup>13</sup>). On Spinoza's view, total freedom entails total self-determination. The only thing that is self-determined in this sense is substance (E1p14), being both self-caused and self-sustained. Everything else is necessarily caused by something else and is dependent on other things for its existence (E1p28). This means that human freedom is necessarily limited by external causes and that the human will is just as causally determined as anything else in nature. Accordingly, Spinoza's definition of the will corresponds with his definition of appetite (except in relation to the mind only), as the striving to persevere (E3p9s). The act of willing something for Spinoza is not understood as a spontaneous act or an uncaused choice, but as an instantiation of the desire to persevere in being conditioned by specific circumstances (precluding any real sense of

<sup>12</sup> Passages in Spinoza's *Ethics* will be referred to using the following abbreviations: D(-efinition), p(-roposition), s(-cholium), and pref(-ace). Hence, E3p9s refers to the scholium of the 9th proposition of Part 3 of the *Ethics*. All references to the *Ethics* are to Curley's (1985a) translation.

<sup>13</sup> References to Spinoza's correspondence are to Shirley's translation in *Spinoza: Complete Works* (2002).

voluntariness). Spinoza concludes: “This, then, is that human freedom which all men boast of possessing, and which consists solely in this, that men are conscious of their desire and unaware of the causes by which they are determined. In the same way a baby thinks that it freely desires milk, an angry child revenge, and a coward flight” (Letter 58, S: p. 909).

To be free, on Spinoza’s account, is therefore to understand the causes of one’s decisions. The more I understand, the more freedom from external causes I acquire. In the context of character education, this would mean that the aim is to help students understand natural causation so that they may come to see in what sense they are determined to act the way they do.<sup>14</sup> This obviously circumscribes human agency severely, and naturalizing the will also renders moral responsibility problematic. Being confronted about his denial of moral responsibility, Spinoza contends: “As to his final remark, that ‘on this basis all wickedness would be excusable,’ what of it? Wicked men are no less to be feared and no less dangerous when they are necessarily wicked” (p. 910). As is evident from this brief quote, Spinoza seems relatively unconcerned by the consequences of his naturalistic conception of morality. In his *Metaphysical Thoughts* (CM), he concludes: “If only those were fit to be punished whom we feign to sin only from freedom, why do men try to exterminate poisonous snakes? For they only sin from their own nature, nor can they do otherwise” (CM II, 8/C: p. 331).<sup>15</sup>

It seems that Spinoza does not share R. S. Peters’ concern regarding the dangers of denying the reality of moral responsibility. Perhaps Spinoza can even offer a way of reconciling the Aristotelian concept of virtue with a thoroughly naturalistic understanding of the will in an educational setting where the cultivation of a virtuous character need not be synonymous with personal decision-making. Instead, a virtuous character, on Spinoza’s view, is marked by an understanding of the natural limitations of a human being, an understanding that in itself may lead to a sense of *eudaimonia*.

*Eudaimonia* for Spinoza is a form of happiness best described as the tranquility of mind resulting from understanding and accepting natural causation. It follows from this that a virtuous character is the result of a life characterized by an affirmation of this understanding. The striving to persevere of the individual may then join with the striving of others so as to form a community founded on reason rather than one held together by superstition and fear. The construction and maintenance of such a community would be the goal of a Spinozistic character education, and as long as the free will is construed as a supernatural force intervening with the common order of nature, it poses a threat to the well-being of such a community.

<sup>14</sup>For an in-depth discussion of Spinoza and moral education, see Dahlbeck (2016, 2017).

<sup>15</sup>References to Spinoza’s *Metaphysical Thoughts* (CM) are to Curley’s (1985b) translation.



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# Well-Being and the Upbringing and Education of Children



Doret de Ruyter

## Introduction

The present and future well-being of children is a central concern of parents and teachers. Parents hope, for instance, that their children will be healthy, have a care-free childhood, will find a good partner and a job, be happy and live in a peaceful society. These generally phrased hopes are most likely held by all parents, although their specific hopes will be influenced by the culture and circumstances in which they live as well as their own views on what it means to live a good life. For instance, what is characteristic of a good partner can range from being caring, being able to make a decent income, to coming from the correct religious tradition or a good family. Typically, teachers do not only see their work as a way of making a living but also want to do good with their work: they want to contribute to their pupils' possibility to lead a good life by enhancing children's knowledge and understanding, skills and dispositions and like to see children doing well in their classrooms.

It is therefore not surprising that philosophers of education have analysed aspects of and developed theories about upbringing in families and education in schools or similar institutions in light of the (future) well-being of children. Certainly, not all use the term 'well-being' and they defend different concepts and conceptions of children's well-being. Plato, Aristotle, Pestalozzi, Rousseau, Herbart, to mention a few influential thinkers of the past, used different words and developed diverging (educational) theories, but these were based on views what it means to live one's life well. Which ideas or theories can or cannot be regarded as a conception of well-being depends on the connotation and denotation of the concept 'well-being'. If it is accepted (as I do) that it refers to ideas ranging from subjective positive evaluations

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of one's life (which might be the primary conception of well-being that people have in mind) to living or functioning well as a person, then many educational theories are included (maybe most). For instance, R.S. Peters' explication of the educated person or Dewey's aims of democratic education could be regarded as conceptions of well-being. Or think of the recurring call for *Bildung* and identity formation in schools to overcome the one-sided attention on knowledge transmission and the teaching of skills. Of course, we should be careful not to bring everything under the concept well-being, because that would turn it into a vacuous term and make discussions muddier than clearer. Thus, I will confine myself in this contribution to the views that are explicitly presented as conceptions of well-being.

Philosophers of education are not the only academics interested in this issue; philosophers, psychologists and sociologists also investigate (children's and adults') well-being. In the past decades, the attention to well-being has increased in these academic disciplines as well. This is particularly true for theoretical and empirical research into happiness, which might not be surprising given the enormous increase in wealth and material circumstances in the Western world since the Second World War and the findings of empirical research that the feelings of happiness or satisfaction with life have not increased to the same extent. This gave an impetus to new paradigms like positive psychology and new research lines like happiness studies in sociology to empirically investigate the state of happiness of people and peoples and also to develop theories about the ways in which these states can be improved, for instance, through education.

This contribution begins with an overview of three clusters of theories of well-being. I will then focus on issues discussed within philosophy of education. Well-being features in discussions on education in primarily two ways: (a) well-being as an aim of education, which first explores the characteristics of an adult who has well-being and then asks the question what the role of educators should be or how education can contribute to realising well-being of future adults; (b) the well-being of children when they are children, which begins with defining 'childhood well-being' (which is also influenced by a conception of childhood) and then explicates what is beneficial or detrimental to the well-being of children.

Parents have the prime (legal) right and duty to meet the needs of their children and to raise their children in such a way that they can live well in the future, but the state also has responsibility for the (future) well-being of children. This is visible in the laws against child labour, child protection services and compulsory schooling that many countries have since the turn of the nineteenth century (which, to be sure, were not ratified for the benefit of children only but also society at large) and acknowledged by the Convention of the Rights of the Child (CRC) that has been ratified at the end of the twentieth century by most countries in the world (except for the USA). What the role of the state should be is primarily a political (philosophical) question, but philosophers of education can contribute to the evaluation of the content (or intent) of policies of the state. This is the topic of the final section.

## Theories of Well-Being

This section describes three clusters of well-being theories that are defended by philosophers (of education) and can be found in other academic disciplines as well, namely, subjective, objective and mixed theories (see, for instance, Huppert and So 2013 for psychology and sociology). These theories provide not only a definition of well-being, for instance, that well-being means that a person's desires are satisfied, but also make normative claims about the way in which people can best enhance their well-being<sup>1</sup> or in our case what educators best do to enhance the well-being of children.

### *Subjective Well-Being Theories*

We can distinguish two main types of subjective well-being theories, namely, ones that focus on positive feelings or emotions and ones that focus on the interests of people.

Hedonism is an example of the first normative theory. It suggests that people should pursue a positive state of mind, for instance, being exhilarated, or deeply satisfied. The unqualified version of hedonism, which does not make judgements about the grounds of one's happiness, is subject to serious criticism (e.g. Noddings 2003). Firstly, it reduces people to one-dimensional beings and can justify practices that aim to enhance enduring positive feelings by diminishing other human potentials, for instance, by drugging them or keeping them innocent. Secondly, it reduces desires to pleasure, and people also have desires that do not (immediately or constantly) lead to positive feelings, but that contribute to their well-being, such as the desire to study or work. Thirdly, people also have desires that do not enhance their well-being in the long term, like the desire to smoke or to have sex with a stranger while one does not have sufficient protection. Therefore, the satisfaction of desires simpliciter is not a sufficient account of well-being.

Proponents of recent positive emotion theories of well-being have acknowledged these criticisms and defend that people will only be truly happy if their positive emotions are the result of activities that require high-quality human capacities (but see also J.S. Mill 1863). This view is, for instance, defended by the positive psychologists, who, as we shall see, are object of many concerns of philosophers of education. Its founder Martin Seligman in his later work (e.g. Seligman 2010 and Seligman et al. 2009) departed from his more simple theory of happiness to a richer account and replaced 'happiness' by 'flourishing' (although positive emotions are still the final aim), suggesting that there are five elements of well-being, namely, Positive emotion, Engagement, positive Relationships, Meaning and Accomplishment (PERMA).

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<sup>1</sup> See Haybron (2008) for a clear distinction between a descriptive, psychological interpretation of happiness and both subjective and objective theories of well-being.

A subjective theory in which human well-being does not have these hedonic connotations is the informed desire theory. There are two characteristic aspects of this theory. Firstly, people need to fulfil the desires that benefit their interests. This requires reflection on the present desire(s) taking into account all the other desires she has and can predict she will have as well as willpower to fulfil the desire beneficial to her interests. Secondly, the desires include longings that are not related to an appetitive state or whose fulfilment does not give psychological satisfaction. For instance, the desire of parents to look after their chronically ill child and give up their prospects of a career or a rich social life may contribute to their well-being, while it does not make them particularly thrilled. The informed desire theory is almost a type of objective theory, for it suggests that people weigh their desires against a non-subjective standard. Griffin (1986), the originator of the informed desire theory, in fact suggests it might be better to give up the distinction altogether.

### *Objective Well-Being Theories*

According to objective theories, persons live a life of well-being if they realise goods that are deemed to be objectively good for all people (Arneson 1999) or if they develop or have developed their human capacities to the full. Central to these theories is the idea of optimal functioning, the pursuit of excellence or the best in oneself (see, for instance, Kraut 2007; Kristjánsson 2015). Of course, theories about what constitutes optimal functioning or the pursuit of excellence may differ.<sup>2</sup>

According to neo-Aristotelian virtue ethics, which is currently the most dominant objective theory within philosophy of education, “to flourish is to fulfil one’s potential as a human being” (Kristjánsson 2015, p. 13). Kristjánsson describes flourishing as an ongoing activity that constitutes the realisation of human excellences, i.e. virtues of character and thought. Virtues are constitutive of human flourishing, but not sufficient as persons also need luck. Satisfaction or positive emotions are not regarded as necessary for flourishing: while being a virtuous person may be accompanied by positive emotions, these are “the icing on the cake”, as Kristjánsson suggests; they do not constitute “the true essence of flourishing” (2015, p. 13).

### *Mixed Well-Being Theories*

Mixed theories of well-being combine an objective standard as proposed by the objective theories with the subjective theories’ claim that satisfaction with one’s life is a necessary condition for well-being (see, for instance, Badhwar 2014).

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<sup>2</sup>This observation is in fact one of the main criticisms against the so-called ‘objective list theories’.

Mixed well-being theories can be developed from a subjective theory and add objective criteria as an improvement. For instance, John White defends a particular version of a desire-fulfilment theory (2011, p. 92), in which the values on which well-being rests are intersubjective. He defines well-being or a flourishing life as “a life spent in whole-hearted and successful engagement in worthwhile relationships and activities” (e.g. 2011, p. 124). White rejects the informed desire theory of well-being on the basis that people may be mistaken in their beliefs of what they should desire. Even if people fulfil desires that are wholeheartedly felt, autonomously chosen and reflected upon on the basis of the relevant information, and feel happy, they still may not live flourishing lives. White suggests that well-being depends on the satisfaction of desires that are deemed to be valuable by a collection of people who form – in a loose way – a social practice. What is valuable or worthwhile is what this collection of people believes to be of value and what they desire (2002, p. 452).

One can also take an objective theory as one’s departure. My view on well-being (de Ruyter 2007, 2015) begins with the assumption that human flourishing requires the actualisation of goods, among which health and social relations, intellectual, creative and physical pursuits. However, these objectively identifiable goods are general and therefore require a personal interpretation. To be able to give a personal interpretation, a person needs to optimally develop her human potential, e.g. her physical, cognitive, emotional, social, moral and creative capacities. However, if flourishing is regarded as a conception of well-being, I suggest that it is necessary that people are satisfied or content with the life they live: the way in which they express their capacities has to be worthwhile and meaningful *to* them. This does not mean that they are happy (all the time), but they are in general or overall content with their lives.

## Education and Well-Being

As said, I will address two questions with regard to the relation between education and well-being: well-being as an aim of education and the enhancement of the well-being of children by educators. For this, I will use the theories just described. This is one way in which well-being in relation to the upbringing and education of children can be explicated. Another way would have been to explore philosophical, cultural or societal influences on the conceptions of well-being and concomitant views on activities of parents and teachers. It can, for instance, be expected that theorists who defend a liberal conception of (the aims of) education propose different ideas than those who adhere to communitarian philosophies. Similarly, parents and teachers living in individualistic societies will have different views on what it means to live one’s life well than those who live in collective societies. Furthermore, these views are influenced by religious and cultural traditions. Such an analysis and evaluation of ideas about well-being, upbringing and education would also have been illuminating, but I had to choose and wanted to stay close to the theories of well-being as explicitly discussed within philosophy of education.



## *Well-Being As an Aim of Education*

The theories of well-being lead to different ideas about what parents and teachers should do to assist the development of children towards a happy or flourishing life. Furthermore, a difference can be made between the upbringing by parents and the education of teachers. Parents are regarded as having the primary responsibility for children's well-being and entrance into the world (to use an Arendtian phrase) and for the development of children's dispositions and their acquisition of values. In most societies, teachers are primarily given responsibility for furthering the knowledge and skills of children, although there is increasing call, also of philosophers of education (for instance, Biesta 2010), that teachers do not only have responsibility for the qualification of children, but that they should also contribute to children's socialisation into culture and morality as well as the identity or subject development of students. It is argued that education in schools concerns the whole child and thus should include all aspects that make possible that children will be able to lead a life that is good for them.

I will give a very concise description of the main characteristics of education for well-being following the well-being theories, acknowledging that it is a formal and rather simple typification and that diverse more specific ideas can or have been developed.

Positive emotions theories propose that parents and teachers need to discover which qualities children should develop that will give them the most happiness as adults. These are the qualities that allow them to do well so that their positive feelings dominate. For instance, according to positive psychologists educators should help children to discover their character strengths and assist them to develop these strengths and to find a path in life that is not only meaningful but also makes possible to best express their strengths – in work, choice of partners to become a happy person.

Informed desire theories suggest that the responsible adults need to assist children to become good choosers, who are able to decide what (course of action) is in their long-term interest. This presupposes that educators have responsibility to assist children in becoming persons who are knowledgeable, can critically reflect on the information that is being provided by others (be it the media, peers, their parents and teachers), are able to make autonomous choices and have willpower and determination to fulfil the desires that serve their long-term interests.

Neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists argue that parents and teachers should enhance the flourishing of children by habituating the virtues, thereby forming the character of children. They suggest that parents and teachers need to be wise mentors in assisting children in the habituation of virtues and the development of fine emotions. Presenting exemplars of virtuous persons (or of course being one oneself) helps children not only to understand what it means to be a virtuous person but also helps to ignite a desire to become a virtuous person themselves.

Following the mixed theories that White and de Ruyter have proposed, educators have to introduce children into the objective goods, by presenting them with knowledge and the opportunity to experience good relationships and worthwhile activities,

present a framework of values to children with which they can evaluate what is worthwhile to pursue, assist the development of capacities and dispositions (that could be called virtues), and to discover which values they can underwrite and which activities and relations are satisfying to them by giving them freedom to explore.

It should be noted that there is certainly overlap in the educational ideas and practices that can be or are developed on the basis of the theories of well-being, particularly when one would ask defenders for a complete description of upbringing and education practices. For instance, neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists focus in their publications about education for flourishing on explicating what character education consists of, but they do not deny that acquiring knowledge and skills is necessary to develop into a flourishing person (see Kristjánsson 2015). There are also shared assumptions, for instance, that the basic needs of children need to be met. Children need safety and security (in their relationship with their parents as well as their environment), they need food and proper clothing for the environment in which they live.

The same seems to be true for the proposals on the education in schools. For example, Noddings (2003) argues that schools should have a curriculum that aims for personal happiness (leading a good and meaningful life), happiness at home as well as in public life. This requires a wide range of knowledge, skills and various dispositions, also with regard to the well-being of others – she explicitly rejects an individualistic conception of happiness. The new curriculum for happiness should, for instance, have subjects like home economics, nature study and spirituality education, replacing current subjects that aim for higher-order levels of knowledge that are not necessary for living a happy life (like higher-order algebra), and current subjects like English, maths or biology should be reconceived in light of the new aims. White (2011) and Reiss and White (2013) also believe that the curriculum needs a fundamentally new design to equip each child to lead a life that is personally flourishing and to help others to do so too (2013, p. 1). They suggest that these aims should be the starting points instead of the subjects. For instance, children need to learn how they best meet their basic needs, should be offered (imaginary) activities to discover which worthwhile activities suit them most, need to learn how to form good relationships, and they should receive civic education and education for work. To achieve these aims, children also need to acquire background knowledge and to develop among others understanding, imagination and (altruistic) dispositions.

The proposals to ground the content and design of the curriculum on the aim of children's well-being (see also Seligman et al. (2009) for a positive psychology curriculum) have been criticised by various philosophers of education. It is possible to distinguish two objections, namely, that what is (or should be) taught to children is evaluated by a value extrinsic to school education and that deciding the content of the curriculum on the basis of well-being makes instrumental things that have intrinsic value (as well).

According to the first objection, we should not value the teaching of knowledge, skills and dispositions because they lead to well-being, but because they have intrinsic value (or have intersubjective value). Using well-being as a criterion to decide

what needs to be taught to children means that a criterion is used that lies outside the value of these things in themselves. For instance, paintings or novels have aesthetic value and should be evaluated not on the basis of the joy they bring to the person but on the basis of their aesthetic qualities. The second objection is that if we regard knowledge, skills and dispositions as instrumental to well-being and see well-being as the aim of education, things that are valuable but that do not lead to well-being are taken off the curriculum. If it could not be defended, for instance, that reading novels and discussing their ins and outs in the classroom is necessary or at least conducive to the well-being of people, this practice does not have a necessary place in schools. These objections are often taken together. Cigman (2012), for instance, suggests that the question which knowledge is instrumentally valuable (to well-being) is obscure and possibly meaningless (p. 459). Following Whitehead she argues that schools should teach about life in all its manifestations and see the acquisition of knowledge as an intrinsically valuable aim in which well-being has a central place. Kristjánsson (2015, 2016) and Suissa (2009) have similar objections to the instrumental value given to the development of virtues and moral dispositions.

These objections in my view apply to the positive emotions theory, but not to the objective theories of well-being. The criterion for the positive emotions theory is indeed that we should teach children those things that will make them happy as adults (which does not have to make children as children happy – I will return to this). In this view the content of the curriculum is indeed made instrumental to feelings of well-being and curriculum subjects are evaluated by external reasons. In contrast, according to the objective theories of well-being, well-being is constituted by having knowledge and skills and engaging in activities and relationships that are evaluated by the worth of these activities themselves, not by the external criterion that they make a person happy.

But, does it make sense to defend well-being as an aim of education or is it meaningless as Cigman suggests? There might be two reasons to agree with Cigman. Firstly, the well-being of children in the future is dependent on those future adults (and the circumstances in which they live at that time) and cannot be created by parents or teachers. Therefore, it cannot be achieved by education or upbringing. One can only say that these pave the way or facilitate the possibility that children will be able to live well as adults. However, if one interprets ‘aim’ not in the sense of a goal, but as a final justification of why one educates children and why education has the content it has, then well-being could be regarded as an aim of education. The defender of well-being as an aim of education can agree that the acquisition of knowledge, capacities and dispositions by children is indeed what parents and teachers pursue or aim for, but can argue that if the educators are asked why they do so, they will likely answer that they do so to further children’s future well-being. Secondly, one can agree with Raz, who suggests that there is no “independent force to care about people’s well-being. Given that well-being consists in successful pursuit of *valuable* goals and relationships there is an obvious reason to pursue whatever it consists in, i.e. those valuable goals and relationships. But I could not think of a general reason for pursuing well-being, one’s own or that of others, beyond that”

(2004, p. 292). Thus, again it is not well-being that is the aim of education, but the introduction of children into worthwhile activities and good relations.

I agree with the two points, yet it is convenient to use ‘well-being’ as a shorthand term. However, to avoid confusion and to ensure that well-being theories are not put on one pile, but are each evaluated on their own merits and problems, it would be wise to consistently use the terms happiness for the subjective well-being theories (although for the informed desire theories satisfaction might be more appropriate) and flourishing for the objective and mixed well-being theories.<sup>3</sup> This would make clear, for instance, that the critique of authors like Suissa (2009), Ecclestone (2012) and Cigman (2009, 2012) against well-being as an aim of education is not (necessarily) directed at well-being per se, but at the positive emotions theory. Ecclestone’s criticism, for instance, is a good example of this point. Her greatest concern is that aiming for well-being will lead to an increasing therapeutic ethos in schools. She warns that well-being has been shifted from being “a moral and social enterprise for ‘human flourishing’ to a psychological terrain” (2012, p. 476), which makes possible that moral and political debates are avoided. Philosophers of education like Kristjánsson, White, Brighouse and myself, who defend such practices in relation to their conception of flourishing, would fully agree.

### *Well-Being of Children When They Are Children*

The danger of thinking of well-being as an aim of education is that one might begin to perceive of childhood as a phase of life that is only instrumental to the well-being that one can obtain later in life. This danger does not seem to be present in current Western societies. Parents tend to invest a lot in their children’s childhood and aim to make their lives from early on as pleasant as possible. They also invest in their children’s development, making use of what Gheaus (2015) calls intrinsically valuable qualities of children, for instance, children’s superior ability to learn and their exceptional mental flexibility that gives them better imagination ability. But it would be wrong, according to Gheaus, to see childhood as instrumentally valuable (having value only in light of a stage that one needs to go through to become an adult). According to her childhood has intrinsic value that can be found in the essential (distinctive) characteristics of childhood. These are the just mentioned abilities, coming together in “the ability to conceive of change” (2015, p. 41). This justifies that the goods children need as children, i.e. the goods that “make an important and direct contribution to a good childhood” and that “have some developmental value for children” (2015, p. 36), are given to them.

I agree with Gheaus. However, the claim that children’s ‘childhood well-being’ needs to be fostered by adults is not unequivocal. What it means and implies is dependent on both the conception of well-being and the conception of childhood.

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<sup>3</sup> It is also an obligation of (empirical) researchers to clearly explicate their conception of well-being (e.g. Suissa 2009; Smith 2009).

While there might be an agreed (though quite general) concept of ‘childhood’, i.e. that children differ from adults, there have been and are various conceptions of childhood, i.e. socially constructed ideas about what is characteristic of children (Archard 2004). As Frijhoff in a historical overview of conceptions of childhood aptly notes, “as a historical category, ‘the child’ is always invention by others, its discoverers or inventors” (2012, p. 12) – children have not discovered themselves. Perceptions about the nature of childhood have changed throughout history, not only (or maybe even not primarily) on the basis of new scientific insights from biology and psychology for instance but on the normative inferences of these insights. Both ‘facts’ and values lead to beliefs about children: what they need, what they are able to do, the amount of freedom that is good for them and the influence they should have on (their own development in) families and schools and society at large (see, for instance, Graf 2015). Currently the views on what is characteristic of ‘the child’ vary from being vulnerable and in need of protection and guidance of adults to being able to make their own decisions and develop themselves. Children are regarded as being unspoiled by culture who should be given their own space and time to develop themselves or are seen as objects of civilisation who need adult control and guidance (Frijhoff 2012).

To give an example how conceptions of childhood play a role, I will use a standard account of the informed desire theory (without evaluating the theory itself). As noted, according to the informed desire theory, well-being requires that a person reflects on the desires she has in the light of her long-term interests. Children cannot serve their well-being in this sense when they are young. As young children are unable to reflect on their desires in light of their long-term interests, adults should make decisions for them with the best interests of children in mind and children have well-being when they follow the wise advice of these adults. This does not have to make children happy all the time, because certain desires will be fulfilled while others are not (for instance, not wanting to go to school, wanting to drink alcohol or smoke), given their long-term interest. Yet, educators who want to serve the well-being of their children will aim to make possible that the desires of children that are not detrimental to their long-term interests are satisfied (so they will be happy often). When children become older, their abilities to reflect on their interests improve, which means that the responsibility of adults should decrease and that the freedom of children to reflect on the preferences they have formed under the influence of their educators and to take independent decisions needs to increase.

This description will sound plausible to most people, because it is based on common sense assumptions about children’s (lack of) abilities and concomitant ideas about the child’s dependence on and relation to adults. And the majority of people defending the just mentioned highly divergent conceptions of childhood might agree, because of the qualification that the well-being of children requires the careful attention of adults to what children are able to decide for themselves, although there will be differences in the way they believe adults should interpret their observations and acts. This is a different matter in case of legislation or other more general measures with regard to the well-being of children. Policies and laws necessarily have to use a generalised conception of childhood and are therefore based on the

(scientific) perception of average children. And here we find the debates about the nature of childhood, the needs of children, the acknowledgement of children's competences: given the responsibility of the state with regard to the well-being of children, which protection, provision and possibilities for participation (the three P's of the Convention of the Rights of the Child) should be available to children?

Returning to the well-being theories. The well-being theory that (again) seems to receive the most profound critique is the positive emotions or hedonic theory that is finding its way in educational theory and practice. Following this theory, parents and teachers should enhance children's positive emotions and ensure that the negative emotions that children experience are minimised or outbalanced by the positive emotions. In *New Philosophies of Learning* (2009), a section is dedicated to these new educational theories (particularly positive psychology). According to Suissa such theories are anti-educational, because they use simplified formulae (for instance, what happiness is) and focus on skills to become happy instead of reflective thinking. Yet, reflective thinking is valuable to discover how complicated it actually is to say that someone is happy. The authors worry that aiming for the happiness of children leads to a curriculum that is too confined. Smith, for instance, fears that activities that are demanding and painstaking will be excluded, because they can have a negative influence on the happiness of children. Activities such as the close reading of world literature or solving challenging mathematical or logical puzzles can, however, be important for the development of children. Moreover, the focus on the happiness of children takes away attention from the things that we accomplish and in which we take pride (not in ourselves). All in all, according to Smith a focus on positive emotions "does no kind of justice to the variety of what we pursue, value and find worthwhile" (2009, p. 199).

The objective theories of well-being, however, could also be criticised. For, don't these theories lead to unjustifiable paternalism by restricting the freedom of children too much in light of their development into flourishing persons and is there not a danger that they lead to too demanding educational practices in aiming for optimal development which might lead to distress in children and loss of the feeling that they are loved for who they are (not what they achieve) (see Rosati 2006 for a defence of the latter)? These are real challenges for those theories, although it should be said that the authors I have presented as defenders of these theories take this potential point of critique seriously and stress the importance of childhood well-being too (see, for instance, White 2011).

## Policy, Governments and Society

The well-being of children during their childhood as well as their well-being in the future does not only depend on the efforts of their educators and themselves, but requires an environment in which they are able to thrive: a safe neighbourhood, caring communities, motivating leisure groups and a safe and just society. Moreover, peers, the media and the consumer industry potentially have more effect on children's

individual (conception of) well-being and their possibilities to live a life as they believe is best. However, I have to confine myself and will focus on the agent that should have the well-being of children in mind, i.e. the state.

Since a several years states increasingly express their concern for the well-being of its population. Against the dominance of economic values, it seems an improvement that governments have followed the example of Bhutan and are now not only interested in the gross national product but also in the Gross National Happiness of their country, i.e. the level of well-being of their citizens and their own contributions to citizens' well-being through their policies. Furthermore, national and international surveys, comparison between countries with regard to the state of the well-being of children and adults (see, for instance, Huppert and So 2013), appear in the media and academic publications. These reports do not only measure the level of positive emotions but also ask for respondents' evaluation about the extent to which objective aspects constitutive of well-being are present in their lives, i.e. autonomy, competence, engagement, meaning and purpose. As such, the reports are based on a mixed theory of well-being. Nevertheless, how should these outcomes be evaluated? – is, for instance, the fact that children in the Netherlands are the happiest in the world a good outcome or should we worry that certain challenging but educative things are missing like Smith suggested? The answer to this question not only requires a careful analysis of the data but of course also depends on the well-being theory one endorses.

Education for future well-being and the well-being of children requires an active role of the state. The state has a legal duty to ensure that children's welfare rights are met (given the CRC). However, what this means and what the policy implications should be is dependent on the conception of well-being. Even rather basic parental decisions, for instance, about how money is being spent in the family, what children eat, how much freedom children are given to venture into a city, a park or forest, are dependent on normative assumptions and therefore subject of discussion. Providing basic information about health and well-being of children and offering upbringing courses that further parenting skills to foster the well-being of their children might seem neutral with regard to conceptions of well-being and are therefore embraced by liberal states, but they are not. This is not to say that offering these courses or even forcing parents to take such courses could not be legitimated on the basis of the well-being of children. However, the conception of well-being underlying the information and courses needs to be justified. And maybe the state should do more. While positive emotions theory seems to have the advantage that it could lead to a relatively neutral state policy giving individuals freedom to live life as they believe to be the best, this may be detrimental to (future) flourishing of many children. For that reason the capability approach developed by Sen and Nussbaum, which is a more minimal account of objective well-being in the sense that it does not describe ideals of well-being or flourishing, but the "central requirements of a life with dignity" (Nussbaum 2006, p. 75), is defended as not only a better conception of well-being underlying state policy but also a more just one.

The state can also contribute to the flourishing of children through (the education in) schools. Funding schools that provide high-quality education to all children is



certainly conducive to the well-being of children. But there are other ways too: states can support schools to provide additional care for children from deprived areas, they can develop policy for the education of talented children and children who need additional support, and states can implement policy that promotes the well-being of all children instead of only those who belong to the wealthy segment or the majority population. The content and justification of the policies require reflection from the perspectives of the well-being theories described (as well as of course an elaboration of theories of justice). This is where the work of philosophers of education, of which I gave several examples, is of import.

Finally, the focus on well-being has been criticised for being too individualistic. It is argued that the general good of society and communities has suffered, which is an increasing worry of many Western states. This evaluation of course depends on the conception of well-being proposed. This is clearly untrue for neo-Aristotelian virtue ethicists; the idea that people can be said to be flourishing persons without being good to others and society is in their view a (conceptual) mistake. Moreover, the examples of most well-being theories (except unconditional hedonism) I have given in this chapter underline that parents and schools should also equip children to help others to live a life that is personally flourishing to phrase it in Reiss and White's terms. This is also true for the positive psychologists, although they do justify being moral on the grounds that it leads to the happiness of individuals. However, states do have to reflect on the conception of well-being underlying their policies and the effects on (young) citizens. Thus, there is still much work to be done in reflecting on conceptions of well-being, the implications for upbringing, education and state policy. Philosophers of education won't be out of interesting and challenging work in the near future. That is certainly conducive to their well-being.

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# Care and Justice



**Liz Jackson**

Is it more just to act based on compassionate care, or on the logical application of ethical principles? And which should be taught to young people in a society? Contemporary debates over issues related to care and justice in philosophy of education are rooted in the continuous examination of the roles of emotion and personal relationships in moral reasoning in the history of Western thought. The prioritization and positioning of care versus justice in activities of reasoning and relating to others have significant implications for moral education and related fields such as civic, social, religious, and emotional education, as well as for development of educational policy. Therefore, educators and ethicists have deliberated on care and justice at length in Western philosophy, as well as in Eastern and other international traditions.

This chapter explores the major debate over care and justice historically and today in philosophy of education. First the debate is situated in Western ethics, before turning to contemporary concerns and approaches within philosophy of education. I discuss accounts of justice with a restricted role or no role given to care, emotion, and relation very loosely as ‘liberal framings’, though space only affords for a limited review of some of the most noteworthy and significant elaborations stemming from the liberal or Kantian tradition of ethics and epistemology for contemporary ethical and educational theory. Then I move on to what I describe as ‘care theories’, though I again use this term simply as an umbrella for views that give a more significant role to care, emotion, relationality, and related concerns in ethics and educational philosophy, that offer an alternative to liberalist views. (There is not space here to give a more comprehensive account specifically of care theory.) The chapter then briefly considers international (non-western) approaches

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and analyses of relevance, particularly major Eastern traditions, as they intersect and contrast with Western views.

As this exploration demonstrates, the debate over care and justice in philosophy and in philosophy of education is not likely to be resolved to all parties' satisfaction any time soon; indeed, it is likely to remain or become more significant in the future, given the rising popularity of psychological approaches to emotional and moral education, alongside a renewed focus on global citizenship education in the last few decades and other modes of education for intercultural 'living together'. Rather than indicating a preference for one perspective over another in relation to these ethical and educational debates, this chapter aims primarily to lay groundwork for further examinations about the places of care and justice in educational theory.

### **Philosophical Precursors: Justice, Benevolence, and Passion**

Although some educational scholars emphasize the place of 'cold' logical rationalism in Western philosophy, the roles of emotions and relations in moral reasoning have continuously been considered and analyzed as complex by Western theorists. In one sense the history of Western ethics is one of delineating human behavior that is based inappropriately on passionate whims, irrational impulses, and undue self-interest from a more generalizable (and educative) guide to acting morally in society. Stoicism is one of the earliest traditions known for a concern with resisting action based on "passions" (emotional responses and impulses) or personal attachments (or fears) (Batzly 2014). However, the Stoics did observe the value of experiencing good feelings, such as warmth toward others, and they gave a role to emotions, if a limited one, in relation to appropriate rational judgment (Batzly 2014; Nussbaum 2009; Kupperman 1995).

Plato and Aristotle considered the roles of justice and benevolence in individual behavior within an approach that is now known as virtue ethics (Steutel and Carr 1999). In their writings (and in contemporary virtue ethics), benevolence and justice both are considered virtues. The manner in which one acts in accordance with their scalar stipulations (i.e., how to be appropriately just, benevolent, caring, compassionate, fair) is through applying *phronesis*, practical wisdom (Hursthouse and Pettigrove 2016). Moral behavior seems grounded in rationality in this approach, with the roles of compassion and kindness somewhat deemphasized in relation to justice. As *phronesis* is separated from practical skill (*techne*) in developing the independent or autonomous capacity for moral judgment (at least in the bulk of Aristotle's accounts), techniques of modeling and dialogue are considered pedagogies for cultivating *phronesis* and thus for the habituation of appropriate virtues of justice and benevolence (Carr and Steutel 1999).

The place of benevolence versus justice in ethics was also debated in the Enlightenment era, by thinkers such as David Hume and Immanuel Kant, who both identified how these virtues or moral principles could operate in tandem or be in conflict. For Hume, benevolence was regarded as more natural than justice as a

virtue, and he allowed that justice might be superseded by mercy in times of emergency (Hume 1751/1983; Wallace 1999). Good will and justice took priority over benevolence in much of Kant's writing, and Kant grappled continuously with the relationship between feelings (particularly those related to or influenced by dogmatic political and religious instruction) and reason within a just society (Blum 1980; Nussbaum 2001). In his early writings Kant was clearly influenced by sentimentalist approaches (including Hume's) and articulated how a kind of moral feeling was at the base of morality (1797/1996). He argued in relation that people should observe the situations of those who are disadvantaged around them in order to appropriately develop their orientations toward justice (Blum 1980). However, in much of Kant's later work he emphasized the dangers of being overly driven by sympathetic or benevolent feelings, even by what might otherwise indeed be appropriate moral feelings or senses, rather than what he identified as universalizable reason, which he ultimately saw as the proper foundation for moral feelings (for an overview, see Denis and Wilson 2016).

Kant's work on different formulations of the categorical imperative, principles to guide behavior which are justified only as they can be applied universally to all situations (according to the first imperative), became exemplary of deontology, as his imperatives were derived from logical analysis, apparently unswayed by emotions or relations, in order to determine what justice demands. Among Kant's formulations is that one should never use another as a means to achieve his or her own ends, but always treat others as ends in themselves (1788/1996). While this hardly excludes the possibility of care, this claim has a controversial legacy today due to its individualistic approach and basis in rationally derived duty. Analyses of the roles of relational feelings as helpful or detrimental for conceiving best actions and procedures of decision making for enhancing social justice have developed further in recent years.

## **Contemporary Analyses of Care and Justice in Ethics and Education**

### ***Liberal Framings***

Given Kant's influence particularly in the areas of deontological ethics and liberal political theory, Kant (or Kantianism) is frequently interpreted as emphasizing rationality over emotion, and individualizing ethics to the neglect of appreciating the roles of community or relationality (e.g., Noddings 2010). Kant's own writings are complex on these issues, as discussed above. However, a tendency toward rationalism and individualism is clear in much contemporary liberal theory, particularly John Rawls' (1993) *Political Liberalism*. This work laid out another well-known approach to devising ethical principles in a liberal society without relying on feeling or relation, which apparently aimed to adapt Kantian deontological ethics to the

context of the diverse modern nation-state. Under what Rawls termed the “original position”, a person attempts to devise principles of welfare, order, and justice in society while wearing a “veil of ignorance”, which entails being ignorant of one’s own position in society, in relation to other people and to its laws and principles (1993).

Similarly framing concerns with the role of care in human relationships and in the public sphere in terms of duty, Thomas Nagel (1970) articulated and defended benevolence in moral life in terms of “pure rational altruism”, which he regarded as a “rational requirement” to altruistic duty lacking emotional motivations such as benevolence, sympathy, love, or even “generalized affection for the human race” (p. 3). Inspired specifically by Kant (as Rawls also was) in this writing, Nagel emphasized in justifying his work the risks of sentimentality in valuing care and affection for others relationally, over duties toward regarding people as ends in themselves and otherwise aiming to deliberately enhance the positive functioning of society, overall.

There are many significant implications for philosophy of education in relation to such approaches, but of particular relevance to this chapter is that they imply that ethics and justice are not matters of interpersonal relations or attachments, but are ideally developed when seeing people as appropriately self-interested, reasonable individuals, operating autonomously within a public sphere. As Rawls writes in elaborating his view, feelings should not be “reasons in matters of...basic justice”, while what he identified and promoted as *political* virtues and conceptions “must be distinguished from the virtues...appropriate to roles in family life and to the relations between individuals” (1993, p. 190; p. 195). Such principles as are derived from neutrality and impartiality with regard to personal feelings and relations are those that Rawls (2001) claimed should also specifically guide young people’s moral education, according to *Justice as Fairness*. (These claims depart from Kant’s skepticism of the state or mainstream society’s role in developing young people’s conceptions of ethics and reason; Jackson (2007).)

Outside political philosophy, psychologist Lawrence Kohlberg (1981) drew an account elaborating Rawlsian points as a description of the ideally decreasing role of emotion in the development of human moral reasoning, posing basic impulses of fear and self-interest (his “level 1”) and a focus on relationships (“level 2”) as linear developmental precursors to young people’s development of “rational”, “universal ethical principles” (“level 3”) (Crittenden 1999). This notion of natural ethical developmental stages (though not all people would pass all of them, according to his view) became highly influential in thinking about moral development in education. A normative implication of this model (which Kohlberg described as Kantian-inspired) was that impartial rationality is ideal, and that educators and others should therefore make use of interaction and the environment to scaffold or guide youth through these steps (1981; Crittenden 1999). However, although Kohlberg referenced observational studies on cognition in drawing his claims (influenced as well by Jean Piaget’s work on cognitive development), empirical justifications for them, from his own or from other psychological studies, have been quite limited (Crittenden 1999).

These views have met with various criticisms, which will be examined in depth in the next section. However, this thread of ethical and educational thought remains prominent and continues to see significant development in philosophy of education. In particular, Eamonn Callan defends distinguishing and prioritizing rationality in matters of social justice over emergent alternative approaches that emphasize relational care, offering another liberal, individual-based view, in *Creating Citizens* (1997). In this text, Callan first discusses a case where a wife wants to learn to read, and her husband initially forbids her, but finally accepts her wish. Callan suggests here that whether the husband's decision is related to love or his wife's rights should make a difference in evaluating the case morally, as a "fundamental part of our self-conception is a worth we possess that does not depend on the affection of others" (pp. 80–81). He then interchanges this story with one of a slave's request of freedom from a slaveholder, to articulate that a priori rights and duties to protect them should come before caring in social justice, as to be freed out of love would remain degrading (Jackson 2014). Callan's work notably echoes Kantian concerns here, with regarding people as ends as themselves as a foundational ethical requirement over other values such as emotional care.

In sum, normative and descriptive cases have been drawn in historical and contemporary liberal frameworks to articulate matters of ethics and justice as separate from, and limited by, concerns with interpersonal and relational caring and feelings. By implication, education should be about political and rational principles and attitudes, rather than emotional or relational conceptions. The educational goals would be to enhance students as ideally impartial autonomous rational agents who apply objective principles, and to otherwise frame educational policy with reference to such universalizable political conceptions of justice (for more on this, see the chapter on Rawls in this handbook). The next section considers in detail critiques of such frameworks, and alternatively developed recent views that give a greater role to emotion, affection, and relationality, in what are sometimes known as 'care theories', in conceiving of social justice and ethics in education.

## *Care Theories*

Recently ethicists and educational theorists have posed alternative accounts of traditional interpretations of and conceptions within Western thinking about the relationship between justice and care. Relatedly, emergent theoretical framings of the relationship between justice and caring that markedly expand the role of care have influenced contemporary educational theory and practice in significant ways. To start with the former thread, Lawrence Blum (1980) and Martha Nussbaum (2001) read notably Kant differently from thinkers like Rawls and Nagel (and Blum responds directly to Nagel, and his understanding of Kant), to give a more significant place to feeling and interpersonal care in his ethical theorizing and conceiving of justice, while conceding that perhaps he was exaggerated in his concern regarding "dramatic and intense feeling for its own sake" (Blum 1980, p. 153). Nussbaum has



also defended the normative account of social justice offered by Stoicism (2001, 2009), arguing, as Joel Kupperman also has (1995), that most interpretations of the philosophy are overly stony, as Stoicism appreciates the place of emotional feelings such as of kindness and warm toward others in ethical reasoning.

Blum and Nussbaum also share an educational interest in identifying a role for emotion and care in conceptualizing the requirements of social justice, as both argue that when a person has positive feelings toward others, of care, concern, and affection, this can lead to benevolence in line with justice. As Blum writes, “a sympathetic, compassionate person is more likely to act to foster the good of others. This is part of what it means to be sympathetic and compassionate, insofar as these involve dispositions to have certain emotions, and these emotions involve a disposition to act for the sake of the other’s good” (1980, pp. 132–133). He further argues, in explicit contrast with Nagel (and contrary to Callan, as discussed previously), that feelings like sympathy enhance a totality of good that is given through altruistic acts, regardless of duty, or the consequences (or lack thereof) of such acts (1980). Blum references Kant in relation, recalling how Kant argued that one should learn about the experiences others face of disadvantage in society to develop compassion.

Nussbaum similarly defends compassion as a primary motivator of altruism, identifying love and care toward family as “indispensable...for an adult’s ability to do good in the wider world of adult social concern” (2001, p. 321). She also posits (2001) as one implication of her view that people should read multicultural literatures in this case, to develop their productive sense of human relation, empathy and compassion. She elaborates that the cultivation of these emotional experiences of the world are among various capabilities she regards as vital, within a larger framework she has developed for understanding what justice demands in relation to social policy and welfare (1995). Kathy Hytten (2008) has drawn on this work to elaborate compassionate global citizenship education as vital to help students appreciate and work to ameliorate the roots of social injustice rather than merely address their obvious symptoms through such acts as volunteering.

Nel Noddings has also articulated how from both empirical and normative perspectives it is intrinsically good to teach young people in ways that cultivate their capacity for happiness, as it links to justice and as happy people are unlikely to act cruelly rather than with benevolence toward others (2003). Her work developing care theory has also been ground breaking in philosophy of education, as a substantive alternative account of the role of emotions and relations to ethics and justice. This work began with the text originally titled *Caring: A Feminine Approach to Ethics and Moral Education* (1984), changed in 2013 to *Caring: A Relational Approach to Ethics and Moral Education*. In this text, Noddings argues in contrast to liberal framings that human relations of care, rather than ideals of individual agency and autonomous reasoning, should be seen as the foundations of justice.

Noddings’ work on care is partly inspired by Carol Gilligan’s feminist critique (1982) of Kohlberg’s theory of moral development as a descriptive account (Noddings 2010). According to Gilligan, Kohlberg’s theory excludes the experiences of women in moral thinking, which is characterized by care rather than by

separation and independence (1982). Picking up this thread, Noddings emphasizes how in the history of Western thought, ethics has often devalued women's experiences. To justify her view, she observes that Ancient Greeks and Stoics modeled virtue and wisdom with reference to warriors, while Kant dismissed women as moral agents in some writings due to the role of love and care in their activities (2010; p. 173; p. 109). Against this backdrop she articulates that relations of care and interdependence are fundamentally important to human development and flourishing despite being overlooked by philosophers (2002). In her terms, the "one-caring" and the "cared-for" play vital roles in a relationship with each other, recognizing and responding to each other reciprocally (Noddings 1984; for more, see also Verducci, this volume). Caring requires being attentive, responsive, and respectful in Noddings' view, which thus clearly positions emotion and relation as key to justice before any sense of individual agency, autonomy, and neutral or impartial action.

Many major educational implications derive from this perspective that contrast with those undergirded by liberal framings. First, people should learn to care for each other in education, because caring relations at home are foundational to living a good life (Noddings 1984, 2002, 2003). This would warrant changes to most contemporary curriculum, which give a fairly limited (and often hidden) role given to emotional life of students (Noddings 2003). Relatedly, schools should be caring places as institutions, where educators are seen as responsible not just for teaching content but also for caring for and developing caring relations with and alongside students (2002). This means educators should attend to young people's needs, emotional, psychological, and physical, as well as intellectual, in schools. Though Noddings signals that the caring interpersonal one-on-one relation should primarily undergird ethical thought (which echoes in Nussbaum's work, which also argues that compassion begins with direct relations, before branching cross-culturally), Noddings also suggests that "caring-about" distant others around the world may be the "foundation of justice" (1999; Jackson 2014).

In an era when educators have become increasingly concerned with the role of emotions and positive relationships in education, Noddings' relational care approach has been influential within and outside philosophy of education. Daniel Engster (2005) and Sigal Ben-Porath (2008) have further considered global dimensions of Noddings' view, exploring how the relational values of justice of attentiveness, responsiveness, and respectfulness can inform notions of international interrelation and interdependency. Such work thus has implications for curriculum and policy related to education for sustainable development and global citizenship education (Jackson 2014). Theories that further articulate relations in educational theory and in classrooms and interpersonal attention and recognition in student-teacher relationships also stem from a caring and relational, rather than liberal approach to social justice in education (e.g., Bingham, 2008).

Care theory approaches also intersect with and mutually reinforce recent work in psychology, educational psychology, and moral philosophy that articulates a link between justice and individual (relational) cultivation of positive feelings. Such work has considered how emotional dispositions, interpersonal and social feelings,

or virtues enhance people's sense of fulfillment and therefore their capacities for altruism and benevolence. Such feelings include gratitude (Jackson 2016), altruism and compassion, happiness, thankfulness, contentedness, fulfillment, and more. As Noddings (2003, 2010) concedes, the implications of this line of research, which has become popularized in the midst of a Western (particularly American, sometimes neoliberal) embrace of positive psychology (which focuses on good psychological states rather than problematic ones), are difficult to systematically evaluate: It is perhaps impossible to make generalizable causal assessments of the relationships between variables such as different feelings (given different conceptualizations of feelings in use) as they interact with each other in shaping behavior. Nonetheless, philosophers and psychologists continue to draw on each other's work to make descriptive and normative claims in this area regarding how good feelings and feeling good lead to being and doing good (Ahmed 2010).

In addition to critiques of care theory approaches that aim primarily to reassert and/or defend the aforementioned liberal framings (as discussed here, these typically argue that the individual and individual ends and impartiality should come before all else), other concerns with care and relational approaches have been raised. One thread of criticism examines care theory and relational approaches as descriptive accounts. As Nussbaum (2001) and Noddings (2003) both have conceded, developing young people's emotional and relational aspects does not necessarily lead to their becoming good people and serving just ends. People can care too much or inappropriately. Relatedly, one can have good feelings while acting unjustly (Noddings 2003; Carr et al. 2015). Thus, something like wisdom or independent evaluation remains important for cultivation of justice in individuals, even if feelings have a significant role. Some also argue that feelings cannot be controlled and therefore are difficult to teach, as the effectiveness of emotional education is a complex area to research. Noddings (2003, 2010) has considered these possible limitations and challenges and their implications for educational contexts substantively in her later work.

As normative accounts, concerns have been raised that care theory and other relational approaches that emphasize feelings in social justice education can risk inappropriately impacting feelings for instrumental means (Carr 2013). Such accounts suggest it may be immoral to teach for feelings, such as gratitude, to achieve external ends apart from the judgment or desires of individuals (Morgan et al. 2015; Jackson 2016). While this particular charge may find resonance with liberal views, the politics of educating feelings and of telling people how they should feel, purportedly for just ends (including 'one's own good'), has also been theorized from critical angles by Megan Boler and Sara Ahmed. In *Feeling Power* Boler (1999) observes how emotional education has been used over time in ways that may unjustly stifle some young people based on identity factors such as gender and social class. She suggests that such emotional training and related expectations regarding students' emotional expressions may not be in students' best interests or serve justice as they intend.

Ahmed examines the politics of affect in *The Cultural Politics of Emotion* (2004) and *The Promise of Happiness* (2010). Ahmed defends 'feminist killjoys' and 'melancholy migrants' in these works, as groups of people who are informally

socially punished for emotions of care related to injustice based on gender and culture, respectively. Ahmed articulates emotion as affect in her work, as feelings that circulate in communities through relationships. Because all are not equal and people do not share basic interests in terms of social policy in Ahmed's view, expectations that one should be happy and grateful and therefore neglect witnessing and focusing on (i.e., caring about) injustice function in communities to maintain injustice, and make those who are suffering from injustice internalize their sense of harm (Ahmed 2010). This work thus takes a critical view of how feelings and relations are educational, often to maintain injustice. Ahmed particularly objects to the notion that cultivating happiness in relations is for the best, from this view. Relatedly, Barbara Applebaum has suggested that women can care too much within gendered relations, and that any feminist account of care should not regard it as intrinsically good, but should be informed by an analysis of how gendered and other forms of domination can and do also occur in relationships (1998). Such works thus recognize the problems and limitations of relations and relational approaches to justice and education that can be obscured when only their positive potential is addressed.

Related to such criticisms, such notions of care as generally good, as described by work like that of Noddings (and related ideas within Nussbaum's capabilities approach), have been problematized for their distinctive Western cultural orientations, with some thinkers questioning their relevance or resemblance of the theories to the norms of emotional expression and appropriate social relations in other cultures and parts of the world (Noddings 1999; Kang 2006; Okin 2003; Jackson 2014, 2016). These criticisms reintroduce the question of universalizability of any foundational approach to conceptualizing justice, whether from virtue ethics, deontology, or relational accounts. The next section turns to international (non-western views) related to justice and care in education.

## **Non-western Views**

It is not possible to explore fully all of the major international and non-western views of care, justice, and education in the space of this chapter. However, some noteworthy recent work has considered convergences and points of contrast across major Western and non-western threads. This section begins with examining some of the work undertaken to identify relevant Eastern and Western ethical connections before discussing other noteworthy non-western trends.

### ***East-West Connections***

Among Eastern traditions of thought, Confucianism, which continues to have relevance in many Chinese cultures particularly in East Asia today, focuses on relationships as key to justice, in parallel with care theory approaches. Though sometimes known

for their focus on hierarchy (and now with Chinese societies' possible overuse of social networks, *guanxi*, in decision making), Confucian approaches to ethics share with virtue ethics a concern with situational analysis, dialogue, context, and evaluation of various significant values in making independent autonomous judgments about what is the right. (See Sen 1999, for a systematic treatment of the relationship between Confucianism and Western liberal thought.) Articulations of the importance of rationality and critical thinking can be found in works by Confucius and Mencius that focus on moderation in line with contemporary virtue ethics approaches (see Lam 2014; Cheng 2002; Shaw 2014). Criticality toward blindly accepting universal conceptions or principles put down by government institutions is also defended in some Confucian texts, which emphasize relationships stemming from family to community as more significant than abstract rules or social contracts in serving justice (Sen 1999; Shaw 2014).

One possible departure of Noddings' work on relation from Confucianism regards the latter's well-known focus on filial piety (also valued in Chinese Buddhism). Filial piety emphasizes youth's roles in caring for and respecting elders, while Noddings indicates reciprocity of the 'cared-for' and the 'one-caring' (in contrast to there being no role or agency of the 'cared-for'). However, these may be different emphases rather than contradictory approaches, as filial piety seems to assume care on the part of parents and elders. It is not, as is sometimes assumed, a matter of universal law or blind obedience to practice filial piety according to Confucianism, but rather it should be seen as a virtue or value to be considered within a situation. Furthermore, while Noddings' care requires attentiveness, responsiveness, and respect, filial piety (and *guanxi*) ideally incorporates critically reckoning with relations and context in the first instance. Thus, the value of filial piety and related concepts such as *guanxi* in Confucianism seems complementary to care approaches, as relationships of people to each other are held as foundational in both for guiding ethical social practice.

On the other hand, the emphasis on decreasing attachments and strong passions and desires for others in relations is shared cross-culturally in the philosophies of Stoicism and Buddhism. Buddhists are known for the aim of releasing one's desire for material goods and personal affections, in a way of life that emphasizes balance and a holistic sense of oneness with the metaphysical world. Kupperman (1995) relates the two philosophies explicitly in considering ideal conceptualizations and practices of altruism. He argues that neither Buddhism nor Stoicism are stony, cold philosophies, as they are sometimes portrayed. According to Kupperman, both approaches encourage and promote what he describes as a limited, partly emotional altruism, as he relates "*apatheia* with 'spiritual peace and well-being'", to "Buddhist discussion of 'the joy of quietness'" (1995, p. 127). Echoing with Nussbaum (2009) and Blum (1980), Kupperman identifies emotional care and attachment as inevitable, good parts of life and he sees them being incorporated appropriately into the epistemologies, ontologies, and methods of deriving goodness and justice of Stoics and Buddhists.

Peter Roberts also finds much resonance between Western works and Eastern philosophical traditions, particularly Taoism and Buddhism. In *Happiness, Hope,*

*and Despair* (2016) he observes parallels lessons on emotion, moral reason, and education within Hermann Hesse's *Siddhartha*, the Greek classic *The Oresteia*, and the philosophy of Simone Weil. As he notes, all three consider pain, pleasure, and desire as significant in education, regarding education as moral or spiritual cultivation rather than just basic curriculum. In each strand of thought, Roberts (2016) finds an emphasis on striving for focus and attention and enlightenment that is borne out of experiencing pain, loss, and joy, and learning to appreciate the significance of the world of people and things in relation to oneself. Cultivating peacefulness through experiencing the world around oneself and better understanding and appreciating one's relatedness to the world and others is thus seen as key across these traditions, as opposed to busying oneself with rather more small-minded wants and desires.

Other thinkers have considered how caring and moral feelings and affects are shared or contrast across educational contexts of East and West. SoYoung Kang (2006) has explored care theory comparatively across cultural categories of white, black, and Korean. In her analysis, she recommends that educators practice a multicultural form of care theory that recognizes and appreciates significant differences in expressions and relations of care across cultural communities, viewing their understandings of care as significantly different in everyday practice. Furthermore, she argues that intersectional identity markers should be considered, of race, class, gender, and more (as caring may look different based on gender relations in Korean culture, in her view), when it comes to developing caring relations in educational settings. Such comparisons of East-West reveal diversity within cultures as well as similarities across cultures, and the need for nuance in applying care and relational approaches as an educator.

### *Other Non-western Views*

Amartya Sen (1999) observes in comparing Western liberalism with Chinese political theories how both struggle with such issues as private versus public relations and the source of (ethical) authority as individual, community, or politically (nationally) based. Embedded in these debates is grappling over issues including the role of care and emotion in reasoning and decision making. A similar analysis might be undertaken with religious traditions, such as Islam and Christianity, which would reveal the ways that throughout their histories leading thinkers in each tradition pondered over emotional and familial attachment versus rationality and individualism in guiding behavior and creating conditions for justice. For instance, early Christianity history features much wrestling with the appropriate place of marriage and love for a good Christian, as personal attachments were often seen as dangerous distractions from leading a Christian life, as they often are seen today in Buddhism.

Another increasingly well-known non-western approach to social life is the southern African philosophy of *ubuntu*, which is known today for its principle of human interrelatedness as foundational to justice. Like *guanxi* it is being critically



reconsidered by some in southern African societies today, as it has been seen to enable overreliance on clannishness, tribalism, and nepotism in some cases. Yet its primary emphasis on the oneness and interdependency of humanity has gained global attention recently, after US Department of State Representative Elizabeth Bagley (2009) introduced the notion of “*Ubuntu* Diplomacy”, which she argued bridged Hillary Clinton’s “it takes a village to raise a child”, with Desmond Tutu’s statement that *ubuntu* “is not ‘I think therefore I am.’ It says rather: ‘I am human because I belong’”. Often framed as, “a person is a person through other people”, relations of people to each other are primary in *ubuntu* philosophy. In addition, it is often held that *ubuntu* reflects a communitarian spirit of southern Africa, in contrast to an individualistic liberal attitude in relation to social justice (Eze 2010). Arguments regarding how relations of care within communities may be key to justice can also be found in Native American philosophy and in much other Indigenous thought around the world. Exploring foundations and contemporary developments in these and other strands of international philosophies can contribute to new understandings of how care and justice are conceived and reconceived the world over.

## Conclusion: Looking Forward

The role of care in justice has been explored and debated across philosophical traditions for many centuries, and it is likely that it will be continuously explored in the future. As this debate pertains to the proper way of moral reasoning and ethical decision making, it is undoubtedly important for educational policy as well as curriculum in numerous ways. For instance, what social, noncontent based services and skills schools should provide students; whether and how to organize international educational exchanges and service learning trips; how to treat different students and young people at interpersonal and institutional levels; and what it means to be a global citizen or to educate for sustainable development in the future are all issues which must be decided (and reformed, continually, in various contexts...) with attention to whether or not and to what extent relations of care versus individual rights and autonomous judgment are cherished.

Additionally, curricula with moral and emotional components that reflect a caring approach are on the rise today across educational systems. Often informed by positive psychology, such curricula tend to unify and homogenize concerns internationally with student happiness and wellbeing, which are increasingly seen as important alternative indicators of social development and progress, in line with a capabilities orientation. While this particular trend is not very controversial today (as it is regarded as a way to address school-based bullying and violence in much of the West, and student mental health disorders and suicides in East Asia, as examples), it is based in a care theory approach to socialization and education. The limitations and variances of care theory approaches from individualist liberal priorities will likely be seen to merit critical consideration as such movements continue to unfold. (Emotional education, after all, has often been held suspect historically as a form of



indoctrination or brainstorming by many thinkers in the East and West, depending on the social context.)

Furthermore, how to examine and promote individuals' and communities' well-being raises questions about what it means to care and to be well across cultural contexts, as well as questions about in whose interest global curricula of care truly serve (relating the issue back to the nature of justice). As questions over the role of the state and other elites in education, and about what it means to be well, individually and among others are additional intersecting, perennial questions, we may continue to look backward as we consider new circumstances and revisit periodically the relationships of care and justice in education.

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# Theorizing Ability as Capability in Philosophy of Education



Ashley Taylor

## Introduction

This chapter traces ‘capability’ as a topic of educational concern and ongoing debate, exploring what is meant by the philosophical concept of ‘capability’ in the international lineage of educational philosophy. Its purpose is first to clarify and situate the meaning of ‘capability’ within historical and contemporary debates within educational philosophy, and, second, to explore the relationship between specific philosophical accounts of capability and the notions of educational equality and social justice in education.

The term ‘capability’ is conceptually rich and linked to considerations of opportunity, ability/disability, agency, and freedom; to be educationally capable is to have an educational opportunity, an educational ability, or an educational freedom. As I will discuss, capability can be distinguished from ‘capacity’, which tends to refer to an intrinsic state of bodies or minds, rather than a learned or acquired state. Beyond its more broad conceptual meaning, the term and concept of ‘capability’ has been used by philosophers of education to refer to a specific theoretical framework for thinking about educational justice and equality. Usually called the Capability/Capabilities Approach or Capability Theory, this framework developed out of the work of Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum, and has recently garnered considerable attention within the field of educational philosophy. At the same time, the concept of capability is understood more broadly in terms of the power or potential of individual students relative to the interaction of their individual capacities with educational environments, access, and opportunities. Literature within philosophy of education that considers capability in this latter, more general way looks at the role of educational institutions, structures, and practices as enabling and disabling social

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forms and considers the limiting effects of categories of difference related to individuals' perceived and assessed capacities. As I will discuss, these two areas of research are linked by the question of what forms of education enable students of varying abilities to develop the capabilities to live good lives.

## Historical Emergence of and Changes in the Topic as an Educational Concern

In a very basic way, 'capability', or the power or potential to do something, is a most fundamental concern of educators and educational theorists. Through schooling, students develop skills and abilities that enable them to pursue future educational, career, and life opportunities. Ability and capability are therefore linked as concepts through a complex relationship among individuals' bodies and minds and the schooling and social environment in which they develop. Whether a student develops the power to do something is dependent on a variety of factors, including their physical, cognitive, sensory, and psychological abilities at a given point in time, the resources available to them, the beliefs and attitudes of educators and society more broadly, and, certainly, the social arrangements of institutions.

In the field of education more generally, global changes in the legal and policy approach to special education and disability services have begun, albeit often slowly, to bring sustained attention to differences of ability – or disability – as a concept. It is not an overstatement that people understood as having disabilities have been ill-treated and largely forgotten by institutions of education and educational theorists for most of history. Throughout most of the twentieth century, people labelled with disabilities in North America and elsewhere were warehoused in institutions, historically referred to as training schools or asylums (Trent 1994). In addition to the intentions of many to keep individuals with disabilities "out of sight and out of mind", many educational scholars and authorities operated under the belief that individuals seen as having disabilities required separation and seclusion from broader society if they were to grow and develop (Danforth et al. 2006; Danforth 2009). This emphasis on separation finds its more recent extension in special education practices that segregate students labelled with disabilities from their presumed to be "normal" peers (Ferri and Connor 2006; Slee 2001).

The academic field of disability studies finds its roots in the disability rights movement of the United Kingdom, the United States, and Canada, and most centrally features the argument that models of disability that are based in medical and psychiatric epistemologies, and other 'deficit-based' knowledge paradigms, inadequately and harmfully describe the phenomenon and experience of disability and disablement. Disability Studies (DS) scholars posit that disability is a complex *social* phenomenon and ontological experience, and describe a variety of versions of what is called the "Social Model of Disability" (e.g. Barnes and Mercer 2003; Gallagher 2015; Wendell 1996). Working off of the distinction between deficit-based

and medical approaches to disability, the partner field of Disability Studies in Education (DSE) likewise situates disability within social – educational – processes and paradigms. Most centrally, DSE scholars regard traditional special education and psychological diagnostic and treatment practices as not only detrimental to the educational growth and experiences of students identified as disabled or who differ in some way from what is described as the norm, but also as constructive of the phenomenon and concept of disability itself (e.g. Adams and Meiners 2014; Brantlinger 2004; Connor and Gabel 2013; Erevelles et al. 2006; Ware 2004). In other words, they regard disability as emerging *from* educational processes, practices, and other institutional projects. Both DS and DSE seek to disrupt the centrality of normalcy and the sorting mechanisms and hierarchies of society that rely on normalcy. Rather than being regarded as a deficit, disability is here seen as a difference that can be welcomed, incorporated, and even celebrated within the classroom.

Alongside this growth of a field dedicated to the educational study of dis/ability, the concept of disability in particular has historically been either ignored as a field of study by educational philosophers, or treated as a straightforward concept having clear ethical implications for the field of education. The role of dis/ability in education has only recently emerged as a more centralized concern within philosophy of education, owing considerably to the increasingly influential work of DS and DSE scholars whom I discussed as well as changing international attitudes and legal policies surrounding ‘special education’. Those educational philosophers who do discuss disability specifically have focused most on ethical questions surrounding justice and equality for students labelled with disabilities or who experience learning difficulties in relation to physical, cognitive, psychological, or sensorial characteristics. Many of these scholars work from the tradition of analytic political philosophy (e.g. Ahlberg 2014; Cigman 2007; McCowan 2011). This work is often sympathetic to philosophical liberalism, even while it pushes against the challenges that liberalism poses for disabled lives (e.g. Reindal 2010; Vorhaus 2006). For these scholars, some of the primary questions include: What constitutes equality and equal educational conditions for individuals experiencing or understood as experiencing disabilities? What is owed to students with disabilities as a matter of justice? What educational arrangements best facilitate the learning of students with disabilities? The Capability Approach, which I will discuss in more detail below, emerges from this lineage, in particular as a response to existing views about the relationship between resources and substantive equality, and about the promise and adequacy of liberal theory in accounting for ability/disability.

Other educational philosophers are similarly interested in questions of justice, but often work beyond and outside of traditional analytic political philosophy and liberal theory. Many, including Julie Allan (2003, 2005, 2011), Scot Danforth (2001, 2008), Nirmala Erevelles (2000, 2002a, b, 2011), Deb Gallagher (1998, 2001, 2010), Tom Skrtic (1991, 1995), and Linda Ware (2001, 2002, 2008), work out of or in more direct alignment with the field and lineage of disability studies. Some focus specifically on ontological and epistemological questions surrounding ability and disability, while others conceptualize the relationship among justice, equality, and

the broader cultural, political, economic, and social forces of our particular historical era. Significant questions include: How do disabled subjects emerge through historical moments and technologies? How do transnational economic and political processes – such as capitalism, colonialism and racism, transnational migration – work to produce disability and disabled subjects? How does the field of traditional special education reinforce positivist and deficit-based responses to disability?

## **Predominant Approaches in Philosophy of Education**

The concept of Capability has tremendous international significance, both with respect to its philosophical or scholarly reach and with respect to the implications of that scholarship in international contexts. This is so whether one looks at literature considering capability as a broad conceptual matter and as a specific approach. Studying capability as a broad concept in educational philosophy requires being attentive to both the localized peculiarities and tensions of a particular time and place and attending to the role of broad global forces that shape educational opportunities and experiences. As I will discuss here and in the next section, these dimensions form both challenges to and promises of theories of capability.

The most sustained attention to ‘capability’ in philosophy of education has been through work on the Capability Approach (CA). Applications of CA to educational philosophy have not been confined to questions of ability and disability specifically, and yet rich debates have emerged from dialogue around ability and disability in the field, and the framework has clear implications for many of the questions raised by scholars of disability studies and offers interesting points of overlap. As a framework for evaluating justice, CA emerged as a response to a perceived limitation in liberal philosophical work on justice, notably the work of John Rawls. According to Amartya Sen (1979), Rawls’ account of the egalitarian distribution of resources in society neglected an important consideration of how individuals convert the resources they have into opportunities; that is, it neglected that mere access to resources is insufficient to empower individuals to benefit from those resources. Applying this critique to the context of education, some educational philosophers (see Hart 2009; Robeyns 2006; Unterhalter 2009) have argued that the focus on capability more adequately illustrates educational objectives relative to educational equality. Capability frameworks – in their various forms – have evolved philosophically and in their application to concrete educational (and other) problems. A number of philosophers have used (and challenged) CA in considering questions of educational justice for students with disabilities (Ben-Porath 2012; Hedge and MacKenzie 2012; Terzi 2008; Vorhaus 2013).

In his Tanner Lectures on Human Values of 1979 entitled ‘Equality of What?’ Sen argued that equality exists in the space of capability, or the power or freedom to pursue various beings and doings. Scholars of CA begin from the premise that equality is best measured with reference to what individuals can actually do and be with the materials/resources to which they have access, and the freedoms they have

to achieve their valued ends or goals in life. Educational philosopher Ingrid Robeyns (2005) defines CA as “a broad normative framework for the evaluation and assessment of individual well-being and social arrangements, the design of social policies, and proposals about social change in society” (p. 94). As an outcomes-based approach to equality and justice, CA is concerned with whether means – material conditions, access, resources (financial or otherwise), educational conditions, etc. – are present to allow individuals to achieve their desired ends. This focus on ends originates in two important emphases and underlying assumptions of the approach: that human diversity is an empirical fact relevant to the needs persons have and to their abilities to convert resources into advantage/well-being, and that freedom and the ability to choose are central to human dignity.

Regarding the first of these, when we acknowledge that humans have diverse bodies, mental abilities, inhabit a variety of natural environments and social/political contexts (central tenants of disability studies approaches, certainly), we begin to see how this diversity might be relevant to human differences in the way that we use the resources available to us. This ends-based approach involves considering not simply the resources to which we have access – and their quality and quantity – but importantly the process through which one converts these resources, both material and non-material, into individual advantage, a process we can call ‘conversion capacity’. Conversion factors are broad, and include one’s personal characteristics (physical condition, intelligence, metabolism, etc.), the environment one inhabits (climate, geographical location, architectural design, etc.), and the social conditions of one’s political community (public policies, social norms, discriminating practices, power relations, etc.) (see Sen 2009; Robeyns 2005). For example, a child with a physical disability who attends a well-resourced school might nevertheless face difficulty converting these into a valuable educational experience, whether because of the built environment within which they live, because of teachers’ or peers’ attitudes of disrespect, because of a lack of disability-specific knowledge on the part of educational professionals, or because of the child’s own physical limitations. In evaluating this child’s well-being, then, we must focus not only their resource wealth but the range of environmental and social conditions which they can actually access and utilize.

Another significant factor in evaluating equality and the conditions of social justice is a person’s freedom to pursue his, her, or their valued ends/life goals. The focus, then, is on what people are able to do and be, on their quality of life, and on the removal of obstacles to their freedom to live the kind of life they have reason to value (Robeyns 2005, p. 94). It might help to conceive of freedom in two ways: as the real *opportunity* that persons have to accomplish what they value (usually referred to in the literature simply as freedom) and as the *process* of that pursuit (usually referred to as agency freedom) (Deneulin and McGregor 2010). This is the difference, for example, between a man who lacks access to food and is starving and a man who fasts; while both lack sufficient nourishment, only the former lacks freedom and choice (Sen 2009, p. 237).

An important distinction within Capability Theory is between ‘capability’ and ‘functioning’, where the former is concerned with possibilities or opportunities



(freedom) and the latter is concerned with realized activities (achievements). This distinction is of particular importance in the application to education, as I will explain. Functionings are beings and doings such as being literate, being healthy, participating in one's community, voicing one's opinion, and so on (see Robeyns 2005). Goods help us realize our functionings but are not the same as functionings: having access to books *may* be necessary to developing literacy, but is not identical to the functioning of being literate. Further, functionings are constitutive of a person's being – good health, being happy, having self-respect, etc. – and are thus the objects of any assessment of well-being (Sen 1992, p. 39). The distinction between capability and functioning is significant within the framework because it highlights the central role of freedom; the value of one's functionings is measured in terms of one's capability to pursue those activities one wishes to pursue. However, there are some cases in which capability theorists have recognized that it is achieved functionings rather than capabilities that need to be evaluated in order to measure equality; this is most notable in the education of children, as I will discuss further below.

A number of aspects of CA dovetail with central considerations of disability justice emerging from disability studies and elsewhere in educational philosophy. As Lorella Terzi has discussed extensively (2005, 2008, 2010), CA aligns well with the social model of disability because it acknowledges and centralizes disability (or bodily impairment) as a central feature of human life. Further, ethical questions about the just distribution of educational resources are central to theoretical work in special education, inclusive education, disability studies, and disability justice (albeit ethical questions asked and answered differently within these different fields). CA promises to give clear and guiding answers to these questions. Because any version of CA considers the extent to which a person has access to tools she needs to pursue her valued ends, education emerges as a primary concern; education and social development are, of course, the most important arena in life in which the enabling conditions of future opportunity arise. Some, most notably Martha Nussbaum (2006), have posited threshold levels of capabilities that would guide our evaluations of whether equality in the space of capability is present. In one sense, applying CA to the context of education would seem a natural move: the framework guides our thinking about how to deal with children's physical, mental, and social differences, and offers us a way to evaluate our curricula and pedagogy in terms of its role in enabling the development of capabilities.

Lorella Terzi has provided the most comprehensive analysis of CA's application to education and disability thus far. Terzi evaluates CA in relation to existing research in special education, in the United Kingdom and the United States' disability educational rights legislation and in disability theory-informed inclusive education models. She suggests that CA can answer what she regards as unresolved philosophical problems underpinning arguments for inclusion. The problems, according to Terzi, arise because models of inclusive education that emerge from the social model of disability offer arguments that are "underspecified and often confused" (2008, p. 74). In particular, says Terzi, they "over-socialize" disability by emphasizing only the social and cultural modes through which disability is shaped

and ignore the lived reality of impairment (Terzi 2008, p. 58). According to Terzi, we need to specify clear principles of distribution that are defensible both theoretically and politically and that can inform policy decisions about education. It is important to note that, although Terzi's critique is directed towards the work of a number of influential disability studies scholars, it does not directly address the work of other scholars of disability studies in education whose contributions I referred to earlier. In fact, many of these scholars would likely agree with Terzi's critique of the social model's neglect of the lived reality of impairment (e.g. Connor and Gabel 2013; Erevelles 2011), although they would also likely diverge in their perspective on the implications of that critique for research and practice in disability theory and education.

Terzi argues that CA offers a way to define disability that pays attention to both its social and biological elements. In accordance with CA's emphasis on heterogeneity as a fact of human life, it is understood as a normal aspect of human life, arising out of the interaction between a person and his or her environment, including the built or physical world, social institutions, and social norms and expectations (Terzi 2010, pp. 165–166). Says Terzi: "When impairment interacts with circumstantial elements to determine functionings restrictions, it results in a disability. Disability, therefore, emerges from the interaction of personal and circumstantial factors, and relates to a limitation of capabilities, or a capability failure" (2008, p. 99). As an expected part of life, then, disability's presence does not suggest special treatment, but rather consideration consistent with that for all others. Educational rights for children with disabilities are not special rights, then, but duties of justice owed to all (Terzi 2010, p. 167). The capability approach *normalizes* disability. The distribution of educational entitlements to students with disabilities is supported by CA's prescription that societies have an obligation to secure "the social bases of adequate capability to pursue valued ends" (Terzi 2008, p. 100).

Says Terzi, "The capability approach suggests a conception of a fundamental educational entitlement in terms of the equal opportunities and access levels of educational functionings necessary to function and to participate effectively in society" (2008, p. 155). First, looking at capabilities involves looking at the freedoms or opportunities persons have to pursue those things that they value. Just educational arrangements would therefore involve the conditions necessary for children to develop their own conceptions of the good, their own valued ends. Educational conditions might be thought of as the basic enabling conditions that would include providing the 'transformational resources' necessary for persons to become effective participants in society and to form their life plans and goals. But enabling conditions for the development of adult capabilities might involve not just the opportunity to pursue functionings – one's *choice* of functionings – but rather the actual achievement of certain functionings. Recall that CA is centrally concerned with providing persons with the freedom to choose among a range of functionings according to their valued pursuits. Yet, in the case of children, as Nussbaum argues, it will be the achievement of certain functionings that will enable them to develop adult capabilities. It is for this reason that she defends compulsory education (as well as compulsory health care, for example): "Education is such a pivotal factor in opening

up a wide range of adult capabilities that making it compulsory in childhood is justified by the dramatic expansion of capabilities later in life” (Nussbaum 2011, p. 156). Terzi bases her own view of educational entitlements on this logic: the view “highlights the importance of the prospective educational achievements in terms of levels of functionings necessary to participate effectively in society. This implies therefore a threshold level of achieved functionings that educational institutions should promote and foster, set at the level necessary for effective participation in dominant social frameworks” (Terzi 2008, p. 156). While the emphasis on functionings rather than capabilities does appear *prima facie* to enable better educational standards and outcomes for young people, it is the subject of some controversy, as I will discuss in the next section.

## Current and Recurrent Debates

### *Global Differences and Valued Capabilities*

Among the main areas of ongoing tension and debate is whether a focus on capability can account for the existent range of cultural differences in civic and social values that exists globally; that is, how can capability theory be institutionalized and operationalized within local educational policy in a way that does not perpetuate imperialist injustices? This is of particular concern as Capability Theory is aimed at informing and transforming educational and human development contexts around the world.

In a move that has become a source of conflict between Sen and Nussbaum’s versions of CA, Sen argues that CA identifies a relevant space for evaluating capability and functioning, but is silent on how these are to be weighted or ranked within that space (1992, p. 46). For Sen, an indexing or weighting of capabilities is context-dependent – that is, it will vary by the particular cultural and social context in which equality is being evaluated (see DeCesare 2011 for discussion). Sen is opposed, therefore, to a general or “fixed forever” listing or ranking of capabilities, rather than to a list itself (2004, p. 80). What Sen hopes to safeguard in his defence of a context-specific list is not merely the cultural, political, or social context (which in fact may not be worth preserving) but rather the role of democratic decision-making, “the productive role of public discussion, social agitation, and open debates”, perhaps best expressed in terms of agency, that allows persons to make decisions that affect their lives (Sen 2004, p. 80). Thus, Sen does not see his avoidance of such weighting as a ‘theoretical difficulty’ but rather as a strength of his approach.

Nussbaum, however, does present a list of capabilities and sees this list as a starting point for debate, revision, and, importantly, specification of the capabilities relevant to a particular cultural or national context, with the understanding that decisions about which capabilities are valued to be based in what she calls an intuitive idea of human dignity. She claims that Sen’s refusal to list means that his capability theory lacks “bite” by not endorsing a list (Robeyns 2005, p. 106). In fact, this

disagreement between Sen and Nussbaum encompasses a problem for the approach generally: it raises the problem of the appropriateness or usefulness of a list and it raises the ‘indexing problem’, which is essentially about capability rankings or weightings relative to one another. For Sen, this is a question for democratic decision-making. For Nussbaum, her ten capabilities represent the bare social minimum for a just society and allow no “trade-offs” among the capabilities on her list; that is, a society that neglects one capability in the promotion of another is not a fully just society (2006, p. 75).

I have argued (Taylor 2011) that one way to understand the difference between Sen and Nussbaum’s positions is that they disagree not on listing as such, but rather on *when* to list. Where Sen charges Nussbaum as undervaluing cultural context and freedom (see Sen 2004), Nussbaum questions whether a localized capabilities list can be developed without prior understanding of what should be included. This raises a second problem or tension that persists for capability theorists regarding the process of democratic decision-making. What minimal conditions of fair representation would need to be in place for such localized list-making to justly take place? How do existing conditions of inequality affect the process of democratic decision-making and to what extent do these delegitimize any decisions made about which capabilities matter? These are certainly important and globally complex questions.

### *Individual Versus Structural*

Another area of debate within Capability Theory surrounds the question of whether CA is too individualistic, focusing too much on individuals and not enough on social groups and social structures. This problem relates to the first, as it connects with the question of how to avoid cultural imposition of values. Robeyns suggests that this critique consists in, variously, three possible charges: CA fails to see individuals as socially embedded and connected to others; CA doesn’t pay sufficient attention to groups; and CA doesn’t pay sufficient attention to social structures (2005, p. 107). Robeyns argues that the first charge is simply wrong because CA is concerned with ethical individualism, that is, that the proper focus of moral concern is the individual, but not that only individuals exist nor that individuals, *as* the proper focus of concern, exist as disconnected from social groups and structures (Robeyns 2005, pp. 107–108). CA evaluates the equality of individuals *as* socially embedded. All versions of Capability Theory place a great deal of emphasis on capability as relational – that is, as promoted within relationships among individuals and between individuals and their environments.

So, what about the other two possibilities? Severine Deneulin and J. Allister McGregor (2010) offer a comprehensive argument regarding the role of social groups, social structures, and social meanings in CA. These authors argue that CA’s account of individual freedoms and individual well-being fails to sufficiently account for the way that differences in social power influence our social meanings

which in turn affect the way that persons conceive of their own well-being and valued ends. They suggest that a viable CA – that is, one that could inform work in social policy and in practical application to social matters – would need to account for the ways that individual freedoms and individual well-being are *defined* and *realized* – constituted – through our relationships with others (Deneulin and McGregor 2010, p. 503). Where capability theorists, notably Sen, have argued that human beings are fundamentally inter-dependent and influenced by social and group meanings, Deneulin and McGregor suggest that we are in fact *co-constituted* by these norms and concepts (2010, p. 510). It is one thing, they say, to conceive of persons as socially embedded and dependent on one other; it is quite another to understand that our meanings themselves – how we develop an understanding of well-being, how we imagine and reason about our valued ends – are constituted through our often unequal relationships with others and with social structures. The latter has to do with power.

In what I see as an important aspect of their argument, Deneulin and McGregor consider the way that CA has dismissed the use of subjective assessments of quality of life or happiness in favour of objective assessments – whether people have access to and freedom to access conditions that promote health, education, political participation, and so on. As I discussed earlier, the emphasis on objective assessments is a central part of Sen’s earliest work on capabilities. This objectivist focus allows Capability proponents to reveal the problem of ‘adaptive preferences’, the way that persons adapt psychologically to dire life circumstances. Deneulin and McGregor argue that “This position on subjective evaluations flirts with the murky problem of the ‘false consciousness argument’” which has long been recognized within social theory and social sciences as simplifying people’s day-to-day interactions with their environments (2010, p. 506), and indeed has been used to dismiss individuals with disabilities’ accounts of their own quality of life (see Mackenzie and Scully 2007). However, if we are to acknowledge that such conditions of adaptation – to our social, political, and cultural conditions of existence – are a *constant* and *unavoidable* part of life, we might come to see how social meanings always play a part in what we desire, the values we pursue, and so on. The correct measure of analysis in considerations of social justice would then involve a view of the social meanings of a given society and the sorts of relations of power that persist. It is important that Deneulin and McGregor offer this critique so as to improve Capability Theory, rather than to reject it.

### ***The Relationship Between Capability and Resources***

An important area of contention surrounding Capability Theory in philosophy of education is the question of whether a focus on resources – including opportunities and access of those resources – or a focus on capability better attends to educational needs and educational contexts. These debates focus on two central questions: first, does the focus on capability underspecify the opportunities that are needed for

educational flourishing and second, does the focus on capability provide clear standards on how to approach questions of diversity that demand trade-offs in educational contexts.

In their chapter of the edited volume *Measuring Justice: Primary Goods and Capabilities* (2010), Harry Brighouse and Elaine Unterhalter argue that the Approach has much to contribute to thinking about educational policy and pedagogy, but ultimately claim that it requires the support of a Rawlsian framework of primary goods in order to guide reasoning about educational entitlements. A Rawlsian framework can be read as directing us towards a view of education as itself a primary social entitlement (a primary good) because it enables individuals' development of those skills, dispositions, and virtues that allow them to live good lives committed to justice (Brighouse and Unterhalter 2010, p. 203). According to these authors, justice would therefore require basic educational conditions adequate to the development and exercise of such educational results, that require more specification than CA provides. In practice, educators and policy makers are constantly making decisions about what children should learn, and this means that learning trade-offs always occur and a philosophical view of educational justice ought to provide guidance to these authorities. Consider the dilemma surrounding whether schools ought to provide to children from groups that face discrimination an education that provides them with the opportunities to participate in dominant social and economic frameworks, even when these frameworks, and the education to prepare them for participation, undermine their ability to participate in the shared cultural norms of their group (Brighouse and Unterhalter 2010, p. 202). Brighouse and Unterhalter use the example of Black Americans, but I think the example equally applies to Deaf children and children of Deaf parents. A standard is required to aid in making these decisions, and these authors see a Rawlsian-informed view of educational entitlements as more adequately providing that standard.

Another question that arises relative to the question of resources versus capabilities is the role or impact that restrictions to functionings that some students experience, notably students with disabilities, have on their educational experiences. According to Terzi, expectations should not change: children with functioning restrictions are still entitled to the same threshold level of functioning as other children (2008, p. 158). Okay, so how does that work? First, it means the provision of additional resources for children with disabilities must allow them to develop the same functionings as are required of non-labelled children, but does not necessitate the allocation of infinite resources to those with significant disabilities (Terzi 2008, p. 158). CA presents a normative framework that considers individuals' particular well-being as *relational*: that is, there are instances in which balancing of one person's needs in relation to others will involve setting a limit on the resources they receive (Terzi 2008, p. 158). If the allocation of resources to a child with a disability deprives others of the resources necessary for them to achieve levels of functioning to participate effectively in society, then it is unjustified. Further, because the question of distribution is one that governs not just what resources will be provided to students – educational materials, aides, assistive devices, etc. – but also the site in which education takes place, a framework of capability applied to the education of



children with disabilities would need to address the question of whether inclusion in all cases is appropriate. Inevitably, then, CA theorizing returns us to the apparently perennial question for scholars of disability in education: how to defend inclusive education and, indeed, how to avoid the kinds of segregationist patterns that have historically followed from the view that full inclusion detracts from the education of so-called normal or talented children.

### *Normalcy and Inclusion*

One of the hallmarks of disability advocacy, disability rights activism, and of the field of disability studies more broadly is a sustained critique of normalcy. Disability Studies scholar Rosemarie Garland-Thomson writes that “those bodies deemed inferior become spectacles of otherness while the unmarked are sheltered in the neutral space of normalcy” (1997, p. 8). Far too often, schools measure students’ levels of achievement or potential achievement based on a norm, whether it is through standardized assessments, peer comparison, developmental theory, or even informal decisions based on a child’s behaviour (Ferri and Connor 2006). While normalcy is embedded in schooling practice, disability theorists have long argued that this embeddedness is far from inevitable. While the Capability Approach is celebrated as normalizing a view of human diversity, even in relation to bodily limitations and impairments, the view nevertheless faces criticism as reinforcing normalcy, as I will explain.

As I have discussed, both Nussbaum and Terzi argue that in educational contexts it is frequently functionings (beings and doings) rather than capabilities (freedoms) that schools should seek to equalize. This is because the functionings that children acquire through schooling enable future opportunities. In the previous section I discussed the problem of trade-offs and indexing: how do educators decide which functionings are to be promoted and how are capabilities to be ranked relative to one another? However, two further problems arise, one related to normalcy and the other related to the construction of childhood versus adulthood: when are some functionings being promoted because they correspond to views about what is normal or developmentally appropriate, rather than what is most beneficial for the child?

Terzi argues that CA is able to acknowledge the “unusual and atypical” beings and doings (functionings) that disability might entail – the ways that people with disabilities perform tasks differently, move about differently, and so on (2010, p. 167). But, in writing this, Terzi is referring to adults and not children. Since our primary educational contexts are populated by children, I have elsewhere questioned how CA can respond to these diverse forms of functioning, especially as they are reflections of choice (Taylor 2012). Above, I discussed how both Terzi and Nussbaum, as well as Brighouse and Unterhalter, support certain achieved functionings as the goal of education because certain functionings enable the development of adult capabilities. Yet how does this defence of the compulsory development of particular functionings in children fare when we consider that in



most, if not all cases, education takes place within social and cultural contexts that have their own specific sets of norms regarding what is required for effective participation in political and social activities (see Taylor 2012). Certain functionings are quite likely to be valued – as they presently are – over others: for example, oral language is valued over sign-language and children are encouraged to develop the skills of oral language through auditory aids and lip-reading (see Hehir 2002). I have asked how educational contexts will resist this reflection of dominant – and perhaps not *necessary* – norms of functioning (Taylor 2012). In what ways will the emphasis on achieved functionings be a reflection of dominant norms and values?

A second worry concerning the promotion of normalcy has to do with the view of adulthood and childhood conceptualized through CA. While CA emphasizes choice and the freedom to pursue the functionings one has reason to value, in the case of children, it is certain achieved functionings that are promoted, rather than choice. As I have said, this is because children require certain functionings – in addition, perhaps, to a certain level of maturity gleaned through experience – to allow them to develop capabilities later in life. But children do value their own freedom and their freedom to choose and this is, in many ways, a central part of their experience of growing up: gaining more and more freedom, ideally, to pursue those things they value. Some children will value music and art over social and political knowledge. Some will value athletics over knowledge of the natural world. Of course we desire to encourage children to pursue many different values and often they do.

The case of individuals understood as having significant intellectual disabilities raises important further questions surrounding the distinction among childhood and adulthood that is implied within CA's application to educational contexts. Carolyn Baylies (2002), for example, has critiqued Nussbaum's view of individuals with significant cognitive disabilities as relying on a view of human normalcy that promotes particular competencies and functionings as being necessary for a properly human life. According to Baylies, Nussbaum thereby risks setting a problematic standard of normalcy: "Norms or base lines can be too easily and negligently constructed to exclude individuals on the basis of limitations or presumed deviations of physical or mental functionings" (Baylies 2002, p. 734). The worry, then, is that setting educational standards of achievement – even ones based in a view of what is required to live good lives – is itself embedded in normalcy. Consider how standards of effective participation in society may not allow for the full respect of the dignity of those with significant disabilities. Terzi herself asks this question: is focusing on particular educational entitlements – the functionings necessary for effective participation in society – promoting a normalized view of effective functioning (2008, p. 159)? The question here is the attention we would need to pay to the ability of children to choose to pursue the things that give their lives meaning. It's a big question, especially because adults – and especially parents – are all too aware of how this could go badly!

Concerns over social norms and the role of choice are also pertinent to the problem of educational efficiency. When will it be more educationally practical and efficient to 'correct' or 'normalize' things in the child – to insist upon the use of hearing aids, for example – than to support their desired functionings? Indeed, there

is research that indicates that the insistence on normative educational functionings – to the exclusion of alternative ones – can actually impede children’s academic growth (see Ashby 2010; Hehir 2002). These are tensions that remain and are being pursued by a range of scholars. For example, some are asking what can the Capability Approach learn from disability theory and disability research (see Baylies 2002; Burchardt 2004; Terzi 2008) that would challenge the emphasis on normalcy? What can a human or civil rights approach and Capability Approach learn from one another (see Ben-Porath 2012)? These questions productively challenge and advance philosophical work on capability in education.

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# Gender and the Philosophy of Education



Carrie Paechter

## Introduction

This chapter is about the relationship of the philosophy of gender to research in gender and education. While philosophy of education has largely ignored gender, work on gender and education, outside of mainstream philosophy of education, has taken the philosophy of gender very seriously. Butler's (1990, 2004) work, in particular, has been used as a theoretical framework for understanding children's and young people's behaviour in and beyond schools. This underpinning philosophical framework, however, has been little interrogated, by those using it, with respect to its origin in adult sexualities. In this chapter I raise some significant questions about how gender and education researchers, including myself, have used Butler's work on the performative nature of gender and her concept of the heterosexual matrix, in relation to children's constructions and performances of gender. I argue that by ignoring the ways in which Butler's framework is underpinned both by the idea of a heterosexual social contract and by questions of adult desire, gender and education researchers may unwittingly make more problematic children's gender expressions in school. While Butler's ideas about gender remain useful tools for researchers studying how children and young people perform gender, it is nevertheless important critically to examine their origins and to be aware of possible consequent effects, both on our thinking and on children themselves.

The concept of gender is of relatively recent origin (Repo 2016), and to fully discuss educational concerns in this area we need to start with those arising from perceived differences between the sexes. These included a long debate about the role and content of girls' education, based on an understanding of girls and young

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women as incapable of full rationality and, indeed, with the potential to be physically damaged by hard study (Dyhouse 1976, 1978).

Until the late twentieth century, males and females were considered, in the global North at least, to be significantly different in numerous ways, including their capacity for education. Central to this was a sexual dualism that treated males as the ultimate, eternal subject, with females positioned as a lesser Other (de Beauvoir 1949). Gatens (1991), for example, argues that, from the seventeenth century onwards, conceptions of human nature assumed a unitary and rational male subject whose thought could transform worldly contingencies, alongside a “shadow” female subject who was constrained by place, time, body and passion (Foucault 1978) and, because of this, positioned outside of civil society (Hekman 1990). While such a being had her uses, including allowing her male partner to retain some ties to nature (Rousseau 1762, 1979), she was not considered fully educable. Consequently, while debates about the appropriate education for boys (of different social classes) focused around what might be the best preparation for work and citizenship, those relating to girls emphasised their future roles as wives and mothers, ignoring not just their intellectual potential but the participation of many, especially working-class women, in the workforce. Even the nineteenth-century pioneers of middle-class girls’ education, inspired by the conviction that girls could do the same intellectual work as boys, and believing that women should aspire to a definite role in life, assumed that marriage and a vocation would be mutually exclusive (Summerfield 1987). Schooling for working-class girls at the same period was aimed at producing homemakers or competent domestic servants. Subsequent debates about the appropriate schooling for girls reflected these assumptions. In particular, there was a long-running debate in the nineteenth and first half of the twentieth century about whether there should be a specifically female curriculum. Central to this was the question of the importance of science and, to a lesser extent, mathematics, for girls, and there were significant attempts to construct a female form of science, “domestic science”, to replace physics and chemistry in girls’ schools (Hunt 1987).

Such approaches to girls’ education were underpinned by a deficit model in which girls were assumed to be intellectually unequal to males. This was supported by influential developmental schemas based on studies carried out only on boys. An example is that of Kohlberg, who, prioritising justice conceptions of ethics, argued that women were less capable than men of higher forms of moral judgement (Gilligan 1982; Hekman 1995). Such deficit approaches were also applied to differences in attainment, participation, and subject choice. For example, in the 1980s and 1990s there was considerable emphasis on girls’ relative lack of attainment in traditionally masculine domains such as mathematics and science, with the problem being firmly located in the girls rather than in the approaches or content of the subjects themselves (Paechter 1998). Subsequent concerns, now that girls in the West are equalling or outperforming boys in these subjects, are focused in a similar way on deficit models of particular groups of boys; in this case the position of Other is generally held by specific (and local) ethnic and social class groups.



Until the late twentieth century, these discussions all used the term ‘sex’ rather than gender, with an emphasis on ‘sex differences’, implying that these were generally innate. Although there was a Cartesian legacy of mind-body dualism, with educational discussion only considering the body in specific curriculum areas or in relation to the perceived dangers to girls’ bodies of too much intellectual exercise, after the Enlightenment, bodily formation was expected to correspond to, and, indeed, dictate, roles and behaviour (Laqueur 1990). The introduction, in the fourth quarter of the twentieth century, of ‘gender’ into discourses around the education of boys and girls both elucidated and complicated these discussions. While the emergence of gender as a conceptual framing for this work has allowed researchers to turn away from biological explanations and consider how schools might intervene to encourage students to make less stereotyped choices and assumptions about ability and attainment, it has also reinforced a lack of focus on the body that is in any case a feature of much of school life (Paechter 2004).

## Introducing ‘Gender’

The concept of gender was introduced by John Money in 1955 (Repo 2016), to support his justifications for operations on intersex babies (Money and Ehrhardt 1972). The key idea is that gender identity and its expression are culturally learned rather than innate and have the potential to be divorced from body morphology. The notion that one’s identity and social role could be different from one’s genetic makeup or bodily morphology allowed Money and his colleagues to argue that identity could be manipulated if the body were considered to be problematic, and, in particular, non-conforming. Gender was subsequently used by Robert Stoller as a concept to frame his work with what were then referred to as transsexuals (Stoller 1968), again, allowing the argument that a particular birth body was not necessarily linked to a particular identity. From Stoller the term was taken up by feminists, for whom it was an essential tool in the argument that biology is not destiny, and feminist educational researchers have been using it from the mid-1970s.

This shift from a discourse of ‘natural’ sex differences to one of ‘socially constructed’ genders broadly coincided with a wave of equalities legislation across the affluent countries of the world, including Title IX in the USA in 1972, the Sex Discrimination Act in the UK in 1975, and the Swedish Equal Opportunities Act in 1979. This meant that increasingly girls and boys were offered the same curriculum, and the focus moved from questions of the ‘suitability’ of different school subjects for male and female students to further concerns about differential take-up and attainment. The change in emphasis from sex to gender meant that the questions asked shifted from being about what should be in the curriculum for each gender to how boys and girls might be able to access a common curriculum equally. At the same time, however, the decoupling of identity from the body reinforced the invisibility of bodies in the school context. Laqueur (1990) argues that this tendency of the body to disappear is in any case a side effect of feminism’s embracing of gender,



due to the reinterpretation of bodily differences as themselves cultural. In the context of schooling, where the effacement of the body in all but a few specialised areas occurs as a result both of Enlightenment mind-body dualism and of fears about child and adolescent sexualities (Foucault 1978; Paechter 2006b), the move from a discourse of sex to one of gender further exacerbated this effect, with the result that research into gender and education has only recently begun to take children's bodies into account. Alongside this recent greater interest in children's embodiment within gender and education research has come another shift in focus. Although longstanding questions of differential attainment, uptake, etc. persist, multiply inflected by ethnicity and social class, research now also includes work on sexual violence, on children and heteronormativity, on non-traditional family forms, including LGBTQI+ and polyamorous parenting, and on trans children.

## Philosophical Approaches to Gender: Judith Butler

Since the fading from view of discussions around appropriate curricula for boys and girls, gender has not really been explicitly addressed within mainstream philosophy of education. While some work in gender theory (especially the work of Raewyn Connell 1987, 1995, 2002, 2010) has included consideration of children and young people, and while a few gender and education researchers actively consider and develop gender theory more generally (Francis 2001, 2010; Paechter 2006a, b, 2012; Francis and Paechter 2015), much of this work is sociological in approach; there is little work on gender taking place within the broader framework of philosophy of education.

Despite this, philosophy of gender, particularly the work of Judith Butler (Butler 1990, 1993, 2004), has had a profound influence on sociological research on gender in the context of education. Although in many ways these ideas have been very useful for analysing children's constructions of gender and how gendered power relations operate between boys and girls in classrooms and playgrounds, they have been relatively little interrogated in terms of the extent to which concepts derived from a consideration of adult lives can be applied to children. In particular, their underpinning by ideas about desire and conceptualisations of civil society, and their focus on participating adults, have not properly been considered.

Butler's key move in developing her theory of gender was to take the idea that gender is socially constructed to its logical conclusion. Butler's project is in many ways political: she wants to make it more possible for those people whose sense of their gendered selves does not fit into a normalised masculinity/femininity binary to be able to have what she terms 'livable lives'. To have a 'liveable life', for Butler, involves both some level of stability of identity and that this be recognisable as valid within wider society. As she suggests:

In the same way that a life for which no categories of living exist is not a livable life, so a life for which those categories constitute unlivable constraint is not an acceptable option. (Butler 2004: 8)

Thus, for Butler, the fundamental point of gender theory is to enable the widest possible range of readable and recognisable individuals:

What is most important is to cease legislating for all lives what is livable only for some, and similarly, to refrain from proscribing for all lives what is unlivable for some. (Butler 2004: 8)

Butler's work on gender must, then, be recognised as a political project. It is important to bear this in mind when considering its application within the field of education.

The central message of Butler's work on gender is that gender is not as we mostly experience it, something both constant and fundamental to ourselves and our identities, but an illusion of coherence brought about by performance. Gender is, therefore, not natural or innate, nor tied particularly closely to the body, but fundamentally performative. This is not obvious, however, because the political and discursive origin of gender identity has become displaced onto an illusionary psychological core. In order to preserve our sense of identity, of a constant, stable self, Butler argues, we as individuals have to perpetuate and regulate our performances of gender according to prevailing social norms. Much of her work is aimed at 'undoing' gender in order to undermine these norms and allow a much greater range of identity performances. This illusion of gender stability, perpetuated through performance, means that we are all, all the time, engaged in ritualistically displaying, for ourselves as well as for others, naturalised corporeal styles demonstrating our conformity to gender norms and thereby making ourselves recognisable to others:

As in other ritual social dramas, the action of gender requires a performance that is *repeated*. This repetition is at once a reenactment and reexperiencing of a set of meanings already socially established; and it is the mundane and ritualized form of their legitimation. (Butler 1990: 140)

While these stylised performances come together, she suggests, to give the impression, to ourselves and others, of a stable gender identity, a consistent self, this is in fact an illusion:

Gender ought not to be construed as a stable identity or locus of agency from which various acts follow; rather, gender is an identity tenuously constituted in time, instituted in an exterior space through a *stylized repetition of acts*. The effect of gender is produced through the stylization of the body and, hence, must be understood as the mundane way in which bodily gestures, movements, and styles of various kinds constitute the illusion of an abiding gendered self. (Butler 1990: 140)

It is important to recognise here that gender is performed by the body. Butler's early work in this area was criticised for ignoring embodiment, and certainly it seems to be the case that she does not fully recognise ways in which particular bodies constrain specific, and especially normative, performances. However, because gender is here treated as a matter of performance taking place through the body and as recognised by others, this makes embodiment in some ways fundamental to it. This is, however, not necessarily in the one-to-one correspondence assumed by some earlier conceptualisations of the sex/gender relation: a particular gender does not imply a particular body, nor vice versa.

There are some significant advantages to this way of thinking about gender, for researchers working on gender generally and for those focusing on children and educational contexts. The first is that it de-naturalises gender, and, in consequence, even conventional gendered behaviour. If gender is no longer understood as “a truth that is somehow there, interior to the body, as a core or as an internal essence” (Butler 2004: 212), then we will no longer require particular expressions or performances of gender to reflect this imagined core. Nor is it necessary for performances of masculinity and femininity to correspond to male and female bodies: conceptualising gender as performative is both the logical conclusion of a sex/gender split and a way of dealing with its effects. Butler (2004) argues that there is no need for feminine and masculine to belong to differently sexed bodies, and that opening up what is understood by these terms has the potential to make more lives livable.

Of course such possibilities remain more theoretical than in widespread practice. Francis (2008), for example, points out that researchers in gender and education usually continue to treat all of those with male bodies as masculine, all those with female bodies as feminine, and then to label stereotypically feminine behaviour from boys as a (usually subordinated) form of masculinity (Skelton and Francis 2002). She argues that one result of this is that gender researchers in this context tend to focus on gender-traditional behaviour: non-normative males are not seen as ‘doing femininity’ but rather as performing a failed masculinity. Masculinity and femininity have rarely, therefore, been fully separated out from sexed bodies in education-focused studies, despite the clear potential arising from Butler’s (and Halberstam’s 1998) work. Hegemonic forces naturalising gender difference and aligning it both with physical differences and with traditional enactments (Paechter 2007) make it hard in practice to take up the possibilities opened up by the conceptualisation of gender as performative.

These problems, however, reflect and draw attention to another of the significant advantages of Butler’s theory: that it illuminates the role of power relations in understanding or ‘reading’ gender. Butler argues that “to conflate the definition of gender with its normative expression is inadvertently to reconsolidate the power of the norm to constrain the definition of gender” (Butler 2004: 43). Indeed, such constraint is exemplified in the work of some of the early proponents of the sex/gender split, particularly Money and Ehrhardt (1972), who used the idea that gender was socially constructed to justify both invasive operations on intersex and other babies to align their bodies more closely with perceived norms, and also to insist that the parents of these children model extremely conventional gendered behaviour as part of the process of constructing “appropriate” identities and performances for them (Repo 2016). This insistence that babies’ bodies were surgically altered to bring them closer to an arbitrary physical norm, and then that their gender expression should be moulded to correspond to an arbitrary and parallel psychological norm, is a mobilisation of power/knowledge focused around the authority of the expert (Dreyfus 1982; Foucault 1963, 1979).

Butler’s understanding of gender, as being bound up with a broadly Foucaultian conception of power, suggests that an important political act is to subvert, resist, and

redeploy power, constituting power relations in new and more inclusive ways. One way in which treating gender as performative does this is, Butler argues, to equalise dominant and non-dominant gender norms (Butler 2004). From a normative perspective in which gender is stable and heterosexually focused, non-normative genderqueer forms are treated as copies or parodies of conventional masculinities and femininities. By treating even the latter as performances, as constantly and reciprocally constructed, these differences can be erased: normative forms become as contingent and negotiable as alternatives to these.

A final advantage of Butler's conception of gender as performative is its recognition of the reciprocal nature of gender. Butler argues that becoming gendered "is always, to a certain extent, becoming gendered *for others*" (Butler 2004: 25). This means that the performance of gender is a reciprocal relation between the performer and audience, and its meaning (including as normative or transgressive) will be interpreted in the relationship between them. If this is the case, it has effects in terms of who can count as being gendered in what ways (Paechter 2003). Halberstam (1998), for example, focuses on the ways in which bodies are read and the consequences of this for the legitimisation of gendered performances, suggesting that the power of the reader of the performance to assign gender is an integral part of 'authentic' identification. Francis (2008), however, argues that how an individual identifies has an impact on the way they produce their body, which, in turn, affects the attributions made by a spectator. In this way we are not powerless to affect how others recognise us: one can, for example perform masculinity more effectively if one develops one's muscles by working with weights, because of the association of masculinity with strength. This situation is, however, further complicated by Kessler and McKenna's (1978) work on how gender is attributed: they found, in experimental studies, that a male attribution functions as a default, with femaleness only attributed in the absence of all male cues. Thus, a body will be attributed as male in the presence of only a single male cue, even if it is accompanied by several female ones. This attributional bias has material effects, for example in the comparative experiences of transmen and transwomen. It is important when discussing gender that we do not neglect the gendered body as a lived corporeal experience, in which power relations impose sanctions on transgressors.

There are, nevertheless, unresolved tensions between the idea that gender is performative and the possibilities for people to have livable lives from the point of view of having their own identities legitimated and validated. While it is clear that there is a considerable role for others in the legitimisation of someone's gender through the acceptance of a 'convincing' performance, at the same time it seems simply unjust to give an individual no role at all in legitimating their own authenticity. In my own work I have addressed this by stressing the importance of performing the self, including gender, not just to others but also to oneself. This is particularly important in relation to children, who actively try out identities and performances through fantasy play, putting on and taking off roles like so many costumes (Paechter 2007) as they work out who they are and who they want to be.

A central element of Butler's conception of gender as performative is that performances are constructed and interpreted within and constrained by the 'heterosexual matrix'. She defines this as being

that grid of cultural intelligibility through which bodies, genders, and desires are naturalized...a discursive/epistemic model of gender intelligibility that assumes that for bodies to cohere and make sense there must be a stable sex expressed through a stable gender (masculine expresses male, feminine expresses female) that is oppositionally and hierarchically defined through the compulsory practice of heterosexuality. (Butler 1990: 151)

In addition to the presumption of a stable gender corresponding to a stable and underlying sex, what is important about this is the emphasis on the compulsory practice of heterosexuality. This idea comes, Butler tells us, both from the work of Wittig (1992), who argues that to live in society is inevitably to participate in a heterosexual social contract, and from that of Rich (1980), who points out that, even within feminist writing, heterosexuality is presumed to be the sexual preference for most women. Both these writers suggest that living as a lesbian provides a way of challenging these patriarchal structures. For Rich, this is because it challenges male rights to women. Wittig, on the other hand, argues that lesbians stand outside and refuse a social contract in which compulsory heterosexuality is implicated, with the radical and, as Butler points out, counterintuitive consequence that they are not women (or, indeed, men). Wittig argues that the assumption of heterosexuality is so fundamental to society that the social contract is, in effect, a heterosexual contract: "to live in society is to live in heterosexuality" (Wittig 1989/1992: 40). To stand outside of heterosexuality, therefore, is to repudiate or exclude oneself from the social contract.

Although her conception of the heterosexual matrix is founded in Wittig's work, Butler does nevertheless critique certain aspects of the latter. For example, she points out that it requires a radical distinction between straight and gay that Butler herself does not wish to draw, and notes that Wittig's conclusion, that the heterosexual contract can only be brought down by becoming lesbian or gay, "follows only if one understands all 'participation' in heterosexuality to be a repetition and consolidation of heterosexual oppression" (Butler 1990: 121). While Butler accepts that compulsory heterosexuality does operate with force and violence, she argues that this is not the only way that it operates, and that we can subvert its power in multiply resistant ways. She also points out that the heterosexual contract would have to be underpinned by explicit, rational, choices in the manner of the social contracts of Locke and Rousseau, but that power does not operate in this way: it "can be neither withdrawn or refused, but only redeployed" (Butler 1990: 124). Butler argues, indeed, that a better strategy for gay and lesbian practice would be to focus on "the subversive and parodic redeployment of power rather than on the impossible fantasy of its full-scale transcendence" (124). Finally, she notes that the construction of gay/lesbian identity through a radical exclusion from heterosexuality means that lesbianism ends up requiring heterosexuality in order to exist.

Nevertheless, Butler's concept of the heterosexual matrix is significantly derived from Wittig's ideas about the heterosexual contract. Indeed, it is notable that Butler

characterises Wittig's view of language in very similar terms to her own view of gender, saying that, for Wittig, "language... is a set of acts, repeated over time, that produce reality-effects that are eventually misperceived as "facts"" (Butler 1990: 115). This originary relationship between Wittig's heterosexual contract and Butler's heterosexual matrix needs to be borne in mind when we consider how Butler's work has been taken up by researchers in gender and education. An awareness of the implications of working with a concept that derives both from ideas about social contracts and from theoretical work on heterosexual and homosexual desire is important when we start applying such concepts to analyse how children behave in schools.

## **Gender, the Heterosexual Matrix, Children, and Schools**

The widespread takeup of Butler's work by researchers working on gender in the context of children and schooling has been little questioned. Indeed, it could be argued that the ideas that gender is performative in character, and that this performance takes place within the constraints of a heterosexual matrix, now form the dominant paradigm for thinking about children and gender, inside and outside schools. Research has mainly focused on exploring the multiplicity of children's performances of gender, finding explanations for why particular performances dominate or are subordinated in different contexts, and examining the power relations between individuals and groups with different performative styles. In particular, there has been a focus on categorising different types of performances, using the sexed body to label these as forms of masculinity or femininity. While this has been critiqued by Francis and Skelton both as too simplistic and as maintaining a problematic idea of the body as a fundamental differentiator (Francis 2008; Francis and Skelton 2008), the straightforward applicability, to children, of the heterosexual matrix, as a compulsory social contract, has not generally been questioned (Paechter 2015).

I want now to address two hitherto unacknowledged problems with the application of the heterosexual matrix to children and to their performances of gender. Both lie in the origins of the concept and make problematic its wholesale adoption by researchers working on gender with respect to children and schools (Paechter 2015). The first is the foundation of the concept itself in ideas about the social contract and participation in civil society; a contract and participation in which children are not usually fully included. The second arises from Butler's (1990, 2004) focus on desire in her discussions of the nature of the heterosexual matrix. While I would not at all want to argue here that children do not have sexual desires – there is considerable evidence (Friedrich et al. 1998; Renold 2005; Ryan 2000) that they do – this seems to be a relatively narrow way of conceiving of the way heterosexual forms are enmeshed within social processes, and one which, again, focuses primarily on adult experience.

The social contract, however conceived in detail, has usually been understood as a compact between adults (Prout 2005; Thomas 2012). Even if we follow Butler (1990) in suggesting that the heterosexual matrix does not follow the model of the explicitly chosen social contract of Locke and Rousseau, it is still the case that most common-sense approaches to the question of who is a full participant in civil society focus on adults (Larkins 2014; Lister 2007), or, at least, on individuals who are considered to have an adult, or near-adult, understanding of the world and the consequences of their decisions (Stoeklin 2013). Categorising, or naming, someone as a child (Bourdieu 1991) excludes that person from some or all aspects of the social contract, depending on their age, perceived maturity, and geographical location. For example, children in some jurisdictions are not allowed to participate in paid work until they reach a particular age; they may not be held criminally responsible for their actions or able to consent to sex. While the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child makes provision for their voices to be heard in decisions that concern them, this has the effect of simultaneously positioning the child as a citizen who has a right to express opinions and have these taken seriously, and as someone who does not have full citizenship rights (Paechter 2015).

The general position of children as individuals without full membership of the body politic implies that we cannot automatically assume that they are entirely part of the heterosexual matrix. If this is the case, then using the heterosexual matrix as an analytical frame for understanding children's gender performances is not straightforward and should not simply be taken for granted as an appropriate approach. Butler focuses on the position of adults who, without the constraints of the heterosexual matrix, might be assumed to have an unequivocal and straightforward claim to participate in society. She reminds us that "embodiment denotes a contested set of norms governing who will count as a viable subject within the sphere of politics" (Butler 2004: 28), arguing that we have to rework these norms in order to allow "the otherwise gendered" to have livable lives. This exclusion from political life, however, is already the case for children, which means, arguably, that they do not experience the heterosexual matrix in the same way as do adults. Children may experience it, indeed, as a potentially liberating construct, because it is so bound up with the adult world and participation in adult society. Considered this way, it is possible to argue that children's loyalty to, and investment in, some of the most traditional forms of the heterosexual matrix (Blaise 2005; Davies 1989, 2003; Martin 2011; Renold 2000, 2005) arises out of their desire to be full participants in the world of adults (Paechter 2015).

This is further complicated by the way Butler's consideration of the heterosexual matrix and related ideas is strongly bound up with a discussion of desire (Schippers 2007). When Butler talks of 'compulsory heterosexuality' she does not just mean a requirement to live, to perform one's gender according to particular outward and familial forms, but rather that desire itself is channelled in particular ways, not only towards specific subjects but with a limited set of (reproductive) purposes:

acts and gestures, articulated and enacted desires create the illusion of an interior and organizing gender core, an illusion discursively maintained for the purposes of the regulation of sexuality within the obligatory frame of reproductive sexuality. (Butler 1990: 136)



The performance of gender within the heterosexual matrix is thus, for Butler, intrinsically bound up with desire, with the question of who or what attracts us, and, furthermore, with a requirement that this desire be not only heterosexual but reproductive. While this suggests that resistance to the heterosexual matrix might also involve a heterosexual refusal of reproduction, Butler's seeming fascination with desire, and her extended discussion of it in the context of butch/femme relationships, does leave one wondering how asexual adults figure in her understanding of gender. Furthermore, the desires discussed are so clearly associated with adults that it is hard to see how children have a place in these conceptualisations at all. While children do, of course, have desires, including sexual desires, it is not necessarily the case that these always take the same forms as those of adults, which means that we cannot carry the notion of the heterosexual matrix straightforwardly over and apply it to children.

This is all further complicated by the use of the heterosexual matrix to analyse the behaviours and gender expressions of children and young people in schools. Schools are very particular contexts in which sexuality and bodies are simultaneously ever-present and denied (Foucault 1977, 1978; Paechter 2004, 2006b, 2011). They have a strongly dualistic approach in which the body is effaced in order to focus better on the training of the mind. To this end, children are subject to a variety of body disciplines: expected to wear uniforms; constrain their bodies into often inappropriate seating; deny their physical urges except at particular times and places. This is coupled with a discourse of childhood innocence in which pre-pubertal children are not considered to be sexual at all (Robinson 2008), followed by a contrasting discourse of adolescent rampantness in which (predominantly) male sexual urges are treated as constant and semi-irresistible and therefore in need of strong disciplinary surveillance and control. If we fail to recognise that the heterosexual matrix is not just about how we perform our gender, but, much more than that, how we perform genders that are intertwined with assumed desires, then we will not be aware that in investigating gender in schooling we are, inevitably, investing children and young people with unacknowledged forms of adult sexuality.

When gender researchers working in schools use the heterosexual matrix as an analytical framework, we have to take care that we both remember that it is children's bodies and desires with which we are dealing, and take into account that the heterosexual matrix may have different meanings for them than for adults. It is not clear that, for young children, at least, the heterosexual matrix is primarily associated with sexual desire. Instead, it is arguable that it is bound up with a different, more urgent, desire, to be considered fully part of adult society, even, one might say, to be seen as fully human. One thing we see repeatedly in children's play is their positioning of themselves as actors in adult roles and situations (Blaise 2005; Connolly 2004; Francis 1998; Marsh 2000; Martin 2011; Skelton 2001). In taking these roles children are, however imperfectly, performing adulthood, staking a claim to full participation in adult social and political life. In order to do this they have to engage with the forms required by the heterosexual matrix, and this engagement manifestly gives them pleasure. That does not mean, however, that this pleasure, this fulfilment of desire, is the same as that from which the concept of the

heterosexual matrix is derived. It is important when analysing children's play of this kind, for gender and education researchers to ensure that they do not assume that children's self-inscription into the heterosexual matrix has the same meanings as similar forms when they are enacted by adults. There is a danger, if we make this assumption, that we will unwittingly solidify children's participation in such adult-focused sexualities and gendered forms, potentially making it harder for them to take on more flexible identities should they wish to.

Researchers researching gender and education have found Butler's work in the philosophy of gender to be a significant source of ideas. It is, in many ways, a fertile explanatory framework for some of the things we see in schools. It is important, however, to be aware of its origins, and to critique some of its assumptions, particularly where they relate to adult participation in the body politic. While children are not entirely different from adults, we cannot assume that they are entirely like them, or subject their performances to adult constructions that fail to take into account children's own aspirations and desires.

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# Childrearing, Parenting, Upbringing: Philosophy of Education and the Experience of Raising a Child



Stefan Ramaekers

## Introduction

Hardly a day goes by without some kind of ‘parenting’<sup>1</sup> issue being reported on in one of the newspapers. Whether it’s a short report on the latest findings on a particular piece of scientific research,<sup>2</sup> a columnist’s (critical) take on trends in parenting,<sup>3</sup> a parent’s personal testimony about certain issues arising in their relationship with his or her children,<sup>4</sup> or a researcher criticizing the invasion of the parenting expert into the family,<sup>5</sup> there always seems to be something up for discussion in relation to parenting. What’s the best way to raise our children? What kind of parenting style is the best? Should parents adopt such a style anyway? Do parents actually need expert advice on how to raise their children, or are they best left to their own devices? What effect does this overwhelming presence of (different kinds of) advice have on parents? And so on. It’s hard to tell what exactly led to this quite remarkable presence of parenting issues in the media and, more interestingly perhaps, in the lives of parents and parents-to-be in postindustrial, Western societies, but it is hard to deny

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<sup>1</sup>I am using inverted commas here for reasons I will go into later in the chapter. For the sake of the comfort of reading I will not use inverted commas in most of the following uses of the word.

<sup>2</sup>For example on the long-term effects of involvement of fathers in early childrearing on their children’s wellbeing around age 8–9, cf. <http://bmjopen.bmj.com/content/6/11/e012034> (retrieved March 3, 2017).

<sup>3</sup>Cf., e.g., <https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2016/jul/30/attachment-parenting-best-way-raise-child-or-maternal-masochism> (retrieved March 3, 2017).

<sup>4</sup>Cf., e.g., <https://www.theguardian.com/lifeandstyle/2016/aug/01/undue-attachment-to-parenting-gurus> (retrieved March 3, 2017).

<sup>5</sup>Cf., e.g., <https://beta.trouw.nl/samenleving/breinexperts-vergallen-het-ouderschap~a6aab95/> (retrieved March 3, 2017).

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that a concern with parenting is now very much part of the order of the day, or at least much more so than a few decades ago. Clearly, experts and literature on child-care have been around for a long time (cf., e.g., Apple 2006, for more on this), but over the last few decades we have witnessed, at least in Western Europe, Britain, and the USA, a proliferation of advice, manuals, classes, literature, and television programs aimed at parents that more often than not go hand in hand with policy initiatives focused on families and parents. This increasing attention to parenting is also reflected in academic research and scholarship, as is shown, for example, in the notable rise in articles addressing issues related to it in recent decades.<sup>6</sup> Clearly, for whatever reason (or, perhaps, for many reasons) parenting seems to matter to us today.

But what exactly is it that we are talking about when we talk about parenting? And, more importantly for this chapter, in what sense is it addressed in contemporary philosophy of education?

Before continuing, it should be noted that ‘parenting’ is, in fact, a relatively new concept (cf., e.g., Smith (2010) for more on this). As I will try to make clear in this chapter, its emergence expresses an important change in our understanding of what it means to raise children. It is a characteristic feature of our current condition that, at least in Anglophone countries, we now address the ways parents (should) raise their children mainly, and explicitly, in terms of the concept of parenting. This cannot, in a sense quite obviously, be said of non-Anglophone Western European countries such as Germany, the Netherlands, and Flanders (the North part of Belgium) simply because there is no equivalent for the word ‘parenting’; indeed, the word is actually quite impossible to translate into languages such as Dutch and German. In these languages, the same ‘old’ words continue to be used (*opvoeden*; *grootbrengen*; *erziehen*). It should be noted, however, that the conceptual field expressed by these ‘old’ words has shifted (or, I would say, narrowed) in much the same ways as denoted by the shift to the predominant use of the concept of parenting to refer to what it means to bring up children. The essence of this shift, or this narrowing down, is this: the concept of parenting capturing only one, rather specific, feature (or set of features) of the experience of raising a child, or, put differently, of the process of upbringing. I will come back to this below.

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<sup>6</sup>Granted, the literature search I conducted and that forms the basis of this empirical observation was very minimalistic and limited. But nevertheless it is not uninteresting and is perhaps telling. I simply searched, in KU Leuven’s search engine (LIMO), for the word ‘parenting’ in the title of articles in peer-reviewed journals for three periods: 1988–1997, 1998–2007, 2008–2017, irrespective of discipline, research field, topic, or nature of the discussion (providing evidence of something, e.g., or a critique of the very discourse of ‘parenting’). The numbers of articles produced were, respectively: 896, 3.598, and 8.385 (search conducted March 3, 2017).

## Raising Children and Traditions of Educational Philosophy

Apart from a few recent exceptions within the field of philosophy of education (e.g., Smith 2010; Smeyers 2010; Ramaekers and Suissa 2012), upbringing and the parent-child relationship – c.q. the experience of raising a child – have received only marginal attention as a focus of educational-philosophical analysis *in their own right*. This relative absence of such analyses can be explained, in part, by the predominance of Anglophone schools of thought in philosophy of education. Theoretical reflection here has focused predominantly on the teacher-student relationship and schooling, the nature of teaching and learning, the nature of the school, the implications of new technologies for our conceptions of teaching, etc.

This is different from the Continental tradition of philosophy of education (*Allgemeine Pädagogik*, or *Allgemeine Erziehungswissenschaft*, or sometimes *Philosophische Pädagogik* in German, and *wijsgerige pedagogiek*, or sometimes *theoretische pedagogiek* in Dutch),<sup>7</sup> wherein theoretical reflection on upbringing and the role of parents has been part of the focus since its inception by Friedrich Schleiermacher (1768–1834) (see Thoomes 1989). In his (unpublished) lectures on education (or more precisely: *Erziehung*, in German, which actually covers a far broader area than invoked by the word education), Schleiermacher, who was about the first to *theorize* education/*Erziehung*, sees the changing of generations as the central issue in education/*Erziehung*. For him, the educational (*pädagogisch*) relationship is, first and foremost, an intergenerational relationship. The central questions to be addressed, therefore, are: What does the older generation intend to do with the younger generation? How is the older generation to introduce the new generation into today's world and to 'prepare' it for the world to come? What sense can be given to such introduction and 'preparation'? (Similar questions and concerns have been addressed, much later, by more widely read scholars such as Klaus Mollenhauer (2014) and Hannah Arendt (2006).) Interestingly, and relevant for my purpose, for Schleiermacher the pedagogical concerns of this intergenerational relationship were given shape in and by a fourfold institutional structure comprised of the state, the Church, school, and the family. Schleiermacher gives considerable attention to explaining what specific responsibilities each of the institutions should take upon itself and why, and what their shared concerns are vis-à-vis the new generation. I cannot go into that here. I merely want to point to the fact that it was quite evident that a theoretical/philosophical account of *Erziehung* would include the family as one of the pedagogical institutions that should assume some responsibility for introducing the younger generation into our world, and, hence, would also consider the relationship between parents and their children (and not only between teachers and students) as relevant in the context of such introduction. The family is as much of an intergenerational site as the school (albeit, obviously, with differences);

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<sup>7</sup>This Continental tradition is, undeniably, broader than indicated here.



that is, a place or space<sup>8</sup> where different generations come together. Parents may (quite obviously, perhaps) not pose the question of how to live together explicitly. But, rather, in a family, the very living together of different generations is concretely manifested on a daily (and nightly) basis.

In this chapter I cannot provide a more detailed historical overview of how the family has been dealt with as a pedagogical institution in the Continental tradition, and address different kinds of analyses and stances towards the family, e.g., how it has been criticized as perpetuating unjustified relationships of authority (cf., e.g., Horkheimer et al. 1987), or how it has been analyzed, from a Foucauldian perspective, as an instrument of governmentality (cf., e.g., Donzelot 1977). My point here only is that, in contrast to the Anglophone tradition in philosophy of education, upbringing and the parent-child relationship have been taken up in the Continental tradition (specifically Dutch and German tradition), for example, by well-known educational philosophers/theorists including Martinus Langeveld (1965, 1979)<sup>9</sup> and Klaus Mollenhauer (2014),<sup>10</sup> to name but two. Nevertheless, it is important to mention here that, in recent decades, Continental educational philosophy has also succumbed to (what I would like to call) the Anglicization of academia and scientific research, which is reflected in a narrowing down of the focus of its reflection and analysis to education as schooling.

### *Philosophy or ‘Pedagogiek/Pädagogik’?*

To further bring out what is at stake in these conceptual narrowings, there is an interesting conceptual distinction that is worth pointing to, which I will outline briefly here, not for the purpose of ‘explaining’ differences in the way upbringing and the family have been treated in traditions of educational-philosophical reflection, but rather in order to offer some conceptual clarification. In today’s internationalized context of academic research *wijsgerige pedagogiek/Algemeine Pädagogik* is translated as, and more or less treated as on a par with, philosophy of education. This is, to some extent, understandable, but not entirely correct. In *philosophy of education*, the central noun of the concept (or its ‘stem’) is *philosophy*, which makes it hard to see *philosophy of education* other than as a derivative of *philosophy*, as if secondary to it; or at least, it makes it seem very natural to think in that order of importance; first *philosophy*, second what it is a philosophy ‘of’

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<sup>8</sup>I realize that ‘site’, ‘space’, and ‘place’ may not mean the same thing. But I cannot go into that here. I can only say here that I am using these notions in fairly ordinary senses of the words. For nuanced accounts of these concepts, see the work of, e.g., Theodore Schatzki (1996, 2002).

<sup>9</sup>For an overview of the reception of his work, see Levering (2012); see also Ramaekers (2016) for a brief account of the main points of his position on the pedagogical relationship.

<sup>10</sup>For an overview of the reception of his work, see the special issue of *Phenomenology and Practice*, 2014, vol. 8.

(religion, science, law, education). Predominantly, though not exclusively, of course, the movement (or exercise) of thinking at work in philosophy of education starts from philosophy and moves towards education. (As said, this is not strictly so in all cases; I merely want to point out that the very language itself is expressive of a certain understanding of the discipline; for an account that is more nuanced, see, e.g., Ruitenberg 2009.) But in *wijsgerige pedagogiek* (and also in *Algemeine Pädagogik*), the pivotal noun is *pedagogiek*, and *wijsgerige* (or *philosophical*) is predicative of this noun. Put differently – and this is what marks the important difference between the two concepts that supposedly express the same academic work – the backbone of the discipline is not philosophy but *pedagogiek/Pädagogik*. This in itself is a concept that is difficult to translate into English. In its ancient Greek form, the first part of the word, ‘pedagogie’ (without the -k) can be taken apart in ‘agein’ and ‘pais’: ‘leading a child’. Originally, this referred to the process in which someone (usually a slave) would lead a child to school, but it has come to mean something broader than that, i.e., leading a child into adulthood, into autonomous personhood, a process or activity that comprises anything grownups do to help their children grow up to become responsible adult human beings. The -k at the end of the word adds a further, and important, layer of meaning. It denotes the Dutch *kunde*, which is usually translated as ‘craft’ (as in craftsmanship), meaning not so much a skillful knowing how but rather an insightful knowing why. *Pedagogiek* entails a reference to something that is ‘systematic’. It signifies a *logos*, a system of principles. *Pedagogiek*, then, as the *logos* or system of leading a child (helping to grow) into adulthood, is properly understood as the theory of (or behind) this leading of a child into adulthood.

### ***Parents as Pedagogical Figures***

In brief, it would be rather imprecise to lump together traditions in educational-philosophical thinking. From the outset there have been differences in focus, as expressed by the very designations of the disciplines. Within (the Continental tradition of) *wijsgerige pedagogiek/Algemeine Pädagogik*, theoretical reflection (informed by the issue of ‘leading a child into adulthood’) has traditionally covered more than the formal institutions of the school and the university and focused on more than issues of teaching and learning. It has also covered other traditional ‘pedagogical’ institutions, such as the family. Accordingly, it has not predominantly focused its reflection on the role of teachers in leading a child into adulthood but has also considered parents as important pedagogical figures. A good example of the specificity (and perhaps also narrow character) of the main points of attention in philosophical reflection in the Anglophone (and here mainly British) tradition in philosophy of education is the recent Virtual Special Issue of the *Journal of*

*Philosophy of Education*,<sup>11</sup> compiled to mark the occasion of the 50th anniversary of the journal. In the long list of topics it covers, only one title mentions parents (c.q. parental rights – which is, in itself, an interesting selection; see below). The focus predominantly is on education as schooling, which suggests, albeit implicitly of course, that it is only teachers who have a pedagogical responsibility for introducing children to a common world, as if parents are not (or perhaps: no longer?) also pedagogical figures.

## The Parent in Contemporary Philosophy of Education

If philosophical issues related to upbringing and the parent-child relationship are discussed in the research field of philosophy of education [sic] today, this is mainly taken up in indirect ways. By this I mean that what is not directly addressed (or hardly, at least) is the experience of raising a child, as part of the very process of upbringing (as distinct from parenting). Undeniably, ‘the parent’ has been dealt with in philosophy of education. But this tends to be done in relation to the institution of the school, or in relation to issues of schooling, e.g., in the context of its relation to home-schooling (e.g., Merry and Karsten 2010), or via a discussion of discourses of fatherhood/motherhood in relation to public schooling (e.g., Shuffelton 2014). The parent-child relationship has, of course, also been dealt with in philosophy of education but is frequently treated as a subcategory of moral relationships, or as an instance of a tension within political or moral theory, and hence is not considered as a relationship with its own unique ethical and philosophical significance. In other words, when philosophy focuses on parents at all (and it rarely does), it asks questions from *outside* the parent-child relationship. Examples of this are multiple: How do parents’ desires to do the best for their children balance a collective concern for social justice and equality (Brighouse and Swift 2009)? How do parents’ moral commitments to their children conflict with general moral duties (Jeske 2008)? How can the obligations arising from the nature of intimate relationships be accommodated into an account of the self (Helm 2010)? How tolerant should the (liberal) state be in accommodating parents’ wishes for their children’s upbringing? How can the value of autonomy be reconciled with parents’ right to pass on values (Noggle 2002)? Do parents have the right to induct their children into comprehensive doctrines (Clayton 2006)? Do families constitute the best arrangements for bringing up children (Brighouse and Swift 2014)? Do parents have rights over their children and, if so, what kind of rights are they, and on what grounds are they justified (Brighouse and McAvoy 2010)? To what extent is the unequal relationship between parents and children at odds with basic liberal values, and what are the proper limits of a parent’s authority over her children (Arjo 2017)? Do parents have to pursue optimal development and becoming an optimizer as educational ideals in

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<sup>11</sup> See [http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/\(ISSN\)1467-9752/homepage/the\\_journal\\_1966-2016.htm](http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/journal/10.1111/(ISSN)1467-9752/homepage/the_journal_1966-2016.htm) (retrieved March 8, 2017).

raising their children (De Ruyter 2012)? To what extent is it possible to simultaneously ascribe to parents a right to a religious upbringing of their children and a duty to avoid indoctrinating them (Hand 2002)? And so on.<sup>12</sup>

### ***‘Parenting’: Psychology and Sociology***

Clearly, these examples all address relevant issues. The fact that the experience of raising a child, as part of the very process of upbringing, has hardly been dealt with *directly*, taken together with the predominant tendency to focus on education (as schooling) and the teacher-pupil relationship, means that philosophy of education hardly had/has a voice in articulating a conceptual apparatus (or in contributing to such articulation) that could serve to critically analyze our current Western understanding of upbringing and the parent-child relationship and the recent shifts in this understanding. Today, our (Western) understanding of upbringing and the parent relationship is largely determined by (and restricted to) the conceptual tools provided by the research domains of developmental psychology, behavioral psychology, and, recently but importantly, neuropsychology. This predominance, evident in society more generally, is referred to as psychologization (De Vos 2012). It has been identified as a crucial and decisive factor in the reframing of upbringing as ‘parenting’ (Ramaekers and Suissa 2012), now widely acknowledged as a ‘turn to parenting’ (Lee et al. 2014; Daly 2013; Furedi 2001; Knijn and Hopman 2015). I will come back to this below, but here I will just note that, currently, the articulation of conceptual tools that could serve as a critical alternative to the dominant (re)framing of the experience of being a parent in terms of ‘parenting’ largely takes place within sociology and in specific fields such as governmentality studies.

In sociology, specifically in the UK, there exists a broad and well-elaborated field of critical-sociological studies of families, parents in diverse contexts, parenting policies, etc., from a variety of perspectives, such as feminism, race/ethnicity theory, and post-humanism.<sup>13</sup> The Centre for Parenting Culture Studies<sup>14</sup> has played a pivotal role in this development of a critique and a conceptual ‘toolbox’ and, thus, has contributed significantly to an understanding of recent parenting policies, the social and historical conditions within which these developed, and their effects on families, parents, and children. Focal points of analysis are the ideology of parental determinism, i.e., the idea that all kinds of antisocial behavior in children are directly linked to incompetent parenting; the normalizing of the idea that parents are in need of education; the uses of neuroscience in the context of parenting (so-called neuro-

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<sup>12</sup>I’m drawing here on earlier work that I have done with Judith Suissa (cf. Ramaekers and Suissa 2012, in particular pp. 112–113).

<sup>13</sup>See, e.g., the work by Edwards et al. (2015) on how particular cultural groups of parents are constructed and framed as ‘problems’ and ‘targets’ for policy intervention or the work by Daly on parenting support in England (Daly 2013; Daly and Brady 2015).

<sup>14</sup><https://blogs.kent.ac.uk/parentingculturestudies/>

parenting); the cultural construction of different kinds of parents in what is perceived to be a risk society, etc. These analyses share a concern with what is critically identified as a politicization of parenting, i.e., the use of parenting as a tool of social policy (cf. Furedi and Bristow 2008; Bristow 2009; Lee et al. 2014; Faircloth et al. 2013; MacVarish 2016; see also Richter and Andresen 2012). Further conceptual tools have been articulated by governmentality studies and critical discourse analyses inspired by Foucault, Fairclough, etc. Here parenting is investigated as a set of practices that is discursively mediated by the central features of neoliberalism, or today's advanced liberal society, which is understood to encourage very specific modes of self-understanding and primarily recasts parents as learning subjects. The analytical framework here characteristically exhibits a focus on specific forms of subjectivation, responsabilization, and disciplinarization. Parenting is studied here at the level of the discourses that shape the relations between parents and children, parents and schools, and parents and policy organizations (see, e.g., Knudsen and Andersen 2014; Dahlstedt and Fejes 2013; Struyve et al. 2014).

## **Upbringing and the Experience of Raising a Child: An Educational-Philosophical Account**

As stated, in philosophy of education, there have been few attempts to articulate an alternative to the current predominant way of thinking and speaking about upbringing in terms of 'parenting', to offer an account of how this positions parents in particular ways and renders their self-understanding in rather limited ways, and to show how this narrows down our understanding of upbringing. In the remainder of this chapter I will offer such an educational-philosophical account (albeit a much abridged one).<sup>15</sup>

### ***Workshop***

Above I referred to the reframing of upbringing in terms of 'parenting', something that is also more generally addressed as a 'turn to parenting'. There are several dimensions, or layers, to this reframing. One of these is a process of psychologization, referred to briefly above. Another dimension is the idea that parents are somehow in need of education; the predominant understanding of the parent-child relationship today is pervaded by a sense of the need for expertise in this area. Put differently, parents are expected to professionalize themselves in a certain sense,

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<sup>15</sup>This is largely based on previous work I have been doing together with Judith Suissa (Ramaekers and Suissa 2012) and Naomi Hodgson (Ramaekers and Hodgson 2017). For this account I have also benefited from the many discussions I had with two of my former PhD students, Luc Van den Berge and Philippe Noens.

which we can actually see at work in the very use of the verb ‘parenting’, i.e., parents ‘doing’ something. Taken together, these two phenomena – the predominance of the languages of the disciplines of psychology in conceptualizing the parent-child relationship and what parents should be doing, and the expectation of professionalization – amount to what I will identify here as the scientization of our very understanding of raising children. I will explain this further by means of an (explanation of an) example.

Some time ago I received an invitation (through one of the email lists I’m subscribed to) to an evening workshop, facilitated by a child psychologist and behavioral therapist. The workshop was in Dutch and was announced under the title *Omggaan met te mondige kinderen*. (I will discuss the translation of this in a few steps. Part of the point I’m trying to make is with how the word ‘mondig’ is used here, in Dutch; but part of the difficulty of explaining this is that this word is not easily translated in English.) The workshop is designed to target a certain ‘problem’ behavior in children, c.q. their being too outspoken, disrespectful, speaking when it’s impolite or uncivil to do so, and having a ‘loud mouth’. For the moment I will translate this title as ‘Managing children who have a loud mouth’, but I will qualify this below. Here’s (a translation of) how the content of this workshop is advertised:

Over the last few years children have become more and more [mondig]. This generates new challenges in raising them. What causes this ‘new behavior’ in our children? How can we manage this [mondigheid] in a good way and support them in becoming assertive but also respectful adults? – During this workshop An Coetsiers, child psychologist and behavioural therapists will provide handy hints for (grand)parents and other educators.<sup>16</sup>

I have deliberately left the words ‘mondig’ and ‘mondigheid’ untranslated. It would not be correct to have written it (in the translation) as ‘children have increasingly become more and more outspoken’ or ‘have increasingly become more and more loud-mouthed’. There is an ambiguity in the Dutch word ‘mondig(heid)’ that is important to draw attention to and that would be glossed over in translating it as ‘loud mouth’. More important than missing this ambiguity in this translation, however, is the observation that it is glossed over in the original Dutch version of the (content of the) workshop itself. This is indicative of the very shift from upbringing to parenting that I’m trying to bring out here.

## ***Mondigheid***

The concept of *Mondigheid* (or in German: *Mündigkeit*) as well as its opposite *onmondigheid* (*Unmündigkeit*) has had a particular relevance in our Western understanding of education and upbringing ever since Kant’s use of it in his seminal essay ‘What is Enlightenment’. The well-known opening sentences of this essay read:

<sup>16</sup><http://www.westhoek.be/nieuws/53084/omgaan-met-te-mondige-kinderen> (retrieved March 3, 2017).

Aufklärung ist der Ausgang des Menschen aus seiner selbstverschuldeten Unmündigkeit. Unmündigkeit ist das Unvermögen, sich seines Verstandes ohne Leitung eines anderen zu bedienen.

Though there are different translations of *Unmündigkeit* and *Mündigkeit*, ‘immaturity’ and ‘maturity’<sup>17</sup> seem to best capture what they express here. The Dutch and German entail the word ‘mouth’ (*mond/Mund*), which encapsulates the idea that being grownup, or being mature, means being able to speak responsibly, to make good use of one’s ability to speak. In French, this relation between adulthood and speaking is present in the Latin origin of *l’enfant*: *infans*, meaning ‘mute’ and ‘without eloquence’, and *infantia*, meaning ‘the inability to speak’, ‘lacking eloquence’. The points I want to draw attention to here are as follows. First, ever since Kant’s appeal that we leave our ‘self-inflicted immaturity’ and ‘have the courage to use our own intelligence’,<sup>18</sup> *mondigheid* has been part of our cultural heritage. It is set as a regulative ideal both for individual human beings and for society as a whole. Second, and importantly, since Kant, some form of *mondigheid* has been (part of) what it means to achieve a condition of adulthood, of being mature, and, as such, in our Western European history, it has become an intrinsic part of what it means to raise children. That is, *mondigheid* has been conceived as (one of) the goal(s) of raising children. Thus, raising children is about helping them to move from being *onmondig/unmündig* to becoming *mondig/mündig*, to become ‘able to speak’, to make free and public use of their reason. Maturity shows itself in a person’s commitment to engage in open and free debate, to expose herself to critique from fellow citizens, to enter into a relationship that pivots on the importance of presenting, rejecting, and accepting reasonable arguments. *Mondigheid* is, in short, part of the fabric of our understanding of education and upbringing. Thus, as the ability ‘to use one’s intelligence [*Verstand*, in German] without the guidance of another’, it is an educational goal worth preserving.

### *Scientization of Raising Children*

To return to the workshop I received an invitation for, the scientization of our understanding of raising children, the reframing of upbringing into parenting, can be seen to be manifested in the three following interconnected ways. First, I would like to draw attention to the very fact of the rendering of *mondigheid* in terms of behavior. It is remarkable, I find, to observe that such a rich notion – rich, that is, in pedagogical content – is reduced to the status of behavior in the stroke of a sentence. I would like to suggest that this is, in fact, inherent to what I called earlier, following De Vos, the psychologization of our understanding of raising children. In a more general

<sup>17</sup> [https://www.northampton.edu/Documents/Subsites/HaroldWeiss/Modern%20Philosophy/Kant\\_What\\_is\\_Enlightenment.pdf](https://www.northampton.edu/Documents/Subsites/HaroldWeiss/Modern%20Philosophy/Kant_What_is_Enlightenment.pdf)

<sup>18</sup> [https://www.northampton.edu/Documents/Subsites/HaroldWeiss/Modern%20Philosophy/Kant\\_What\\_is\\_Enlightenment.pdf](https://www.northampton.edu/Documents/Subsites/HaroldWeiss/Modern%20Philosophy/Kant_What_is_Enlightenment.pdf)



sense, psychologization refers to the observation that the ways we relate to and understand ourselves and others, and the ways we are present to ourselves, others, and the world, is determined by ‘psychological vocabulary and psychological explanatory schemes’ (De Vos 2012, p. 1; see also De Vos 2011). Psychologization captures the idea that “the psy-discourses are becoming increasingly hegemonic as they furnish the human being with particular signifiers and particular discursive schemes (assigning particular positions) with which to look upon itself and its world” (De Vos 2012, p. 2). In the example of the workshop, this does not so much show itself in a literal sense, that is, in the occurrence of characteristically psychological jargon, typified by the translation of ordinary human behavior into psychological terms (e.g., see how quickly a lively young child’s (usually a boy’s) behavior is called ‘hyperactive’ and how, after having been thus translated, it is treated as a symptom of one or another kind of disorder (in this case ADHD)). Rather, in the workshop invitation, it is manifest in the reduction of human action to behavior, a process that is expressive of the dominant paradigm of the disciplines of psychology, i.e., the paradigm of causal explanation. Accounts of who we are and what we do are no longer given by reference to our being immersed in a *Lebenswelt*, or full life-world (cf. De Vos 2012, p. 5). We (apparently) seem to have (been) emancipated from such ‘vague’, unscientific ways of rendering our existence and are now able to *explain* who we are and what we do by reference to what causally links antecedents and consequences. (“What causes this ‘new behavior’ in our children?”, the workshop description asks, tellingly.)

Second, it is a workshop [sic], in which educators can *learn* how to manage such behavior, in which they can learn, in short, how to ‘parent’. Put differently, there is knowledge available – ‘explanatory schemes’, to quote De Vos again (2012, p. 1) – and this knowledge is made available by an expert, whose ‘knowing’, to reiterate and link up to the previous point, pertains to causal connections between antecedents and consequences. What defines a good educator (parent, grandparent, etc.) is someone who (learns to) appropriate(s) that kind of knowledge and applies it accordingly; someone who professionalizes him or herself to a certain extent, who acts as the expert would act, or more correctly, who behaves as the expert would behave. Part of the reframing of upbringing as parenting is exactly this: the (now common) assumption that upbringing basically comes down to the right ways of managing children’s behavior – mostly understood in terms of challenges, problems, and milestones, etc. – and that strategies for such managing can be learned, and hence the challenges can be tackled, the problems can be solved, the milestones achieved.

Taken together, the first and second points show that, in the dominant culture of parenting, what it means to raise children is reduced to how parental behaviors relate to, c.q. have an impact on, their children’s developmental outcomes. The main parental ‘task’ is, then, conceived as ensuring optimal conditions for their children’s growth and maintaining a firm grip on their children’s developmental progress and – recently, with the increasing intrusion of neuropsychology into our thinking about raising children – their brain maturation. Consequently, our understanding of what it means to raise children is confined to what can be located in behavioral terms in

the one-to-one-interactions between parent and child – interactions, that is, for which causal links can be shown. Raising children is, then, narrowed down to behavior regulation of both parent and child. As Mary Daly so eloquently puts it: “This is a landscape in which the parent becomes equivalent to a ‘parenter’ – someone who deploys learned skills centring on self and other forms of control” (Daly 2013, pp. 227–228).

This immediately leads into the third, and related, way in which the scientization of our understanding of raising children is manifested. Informed by the ‘psy-discourses’, as De Vos refers to them (cf. De Vos 2012), the parenting discourse implies not only that a causal logic is the only valid one in our speaking and thinking about upbringing, but also it assumes a particular *kind* of goal: upbringing should be understood as a linear-developmental story, the goal of which is (mostly implicitly) formulated as a desirable and achievable outcome that, furthermore, is posited and understood as an endpoint of something, an endpoint that it is presupposed that ‘we all know’, and anything parents do along the way is understood as effecting the next step and as taking us one step closer to reaching this endpoint. In the workshop invitation, this goal is formulated as ‘assertive and respectful adults’. Now, to be clear, I am not suggesting that there is something wrong with helping our children to become assertive and respectful adults. The point I am making is about the very framing of this goal: as an outcome of a process of managing behavior; as an optimal endpoint of raising our children; as a certain kind of state, the achievement of which parents can have under their control by doing certain things; and state, it is assumed, that we all know what it means and agree upon.

### *Closure Versus Open-Endedness*

Put somewhat laconically, one doesn’t have to be a philosopher to ask the pertinent question here: what do we mean by ‘assertive and respectful’? The parenting perspective on upbringing accounts for the aims and goals that parents have (or are prescribed to have) as if these can somehow be unproblematically captured in a neutral, descriptive language set apart from the values parents hold, and as if these are neatly separable from parents’ experiences as individuals within the shifting and dynamic context of their own lives. What such a framing bypasses is that when parents are helping their children in becoming assertive and respectful adults, an important part of that experience is, in fact, the experience that what ‘assertive’ and ‘respectful’ mean is not specifically predefined as something ‘external’, a state that can be reached by executing certain operations, but rather is shaped in the very relationship with their own child, while that relationship is (also) simultaneously situated in a broader societal context of meanings (or, put in a more philosophical way: embedded in (mostly tacit) agreements they enter as competent language users). Whatever goal is implied or posited, this always reflects certain values and normative assumptions about what constitutes being human, living well, living together in a particular society.

The parenting perspective on upbringing, however, suggests the possibility of ‘closure’ or ‘achievability’, whereby one can be deemed to have succeeded as a parent. In distinction to this, what I am seeking to articulate here is the experience of a certain kind of openness – no doubt, an openness that can lead parents to feeling insecure, or even an openness that is sometimes mistaken for ‘not knowing the right thing to do’ – with regard to, e.g., ‘assertive’ and ‘respectful’, both in terms of what these words specifically mean and how these meanings are exhibited in concrete doings and sayings and in relation to whether they could even be achieved at all.

My reading of the workshop is intended to bring out how so much of the experience of being a parent is not actually about ‘parenting’ at all, that is, if parenting is identified with exhibiting certain behaviors that lead to certain developmental outcomes. The hopes, aspirations, and aims we have as parents – the ideas we have about how we would like our children to be today, tomorrow, or at some indefinable time in the future – do not appear as fixed and desirable endpoints associated with potential approaches that, once identified and followed, can be reliably achieved. Rather, they confront us in varied, unpredictable, and subtly changing forms as a constitutive part of the experience of living as a human being who also happens to be the parent of another human being. When do we call something or someone assertive and respectful? What does my wanting my child to be assertive and respectful tell me about my own life? How do I accommodate my hope that she grows up to be an assertive and respectful adult with my other concerns about the complex dynamics of my family life? How do I reconcile instances of being not-quite-as-respectful myself with my pedagogical intentions, in the face of my children reproaching me on this issue? And even: why do we find it important that our children grow up to become assertive and respectful? For whom is not being assertive (enough), being disrespectful, etc. a problem, and why?

These are intrinsically open-ended questions. They also hint at a basic flaw in the ‘parenting’ account of upbringing: there is no straightforward, clearly defined point at which we can step back and assess the success or otherwise of our parenting. Even assuming that we can agree that what we want is assertive and respectful children, and even assuming that we can agree on what that actually means: at what point can we ever say we have achieved it? How can we ever say that our parenting has been ‘successful’? And what would criteria for such success be? Is it when the child reaches legal adulthood? When she leaves home?

This is not to deny that children, e.g., having a loud mouth (or being disrespectful, or etc.), might be a problem (for someone, at some time) or that parents have genuine concerns and insecurities about it. The point is that this cannot be ‘solved’ (in the sense of dissolved; made to disappear) by framing it in terms of a fixed behavioral endpoint that can be achieved by exhibiting a certain approach; it can only be ‘addressed’, by questions such as the ones raised above. Being a parent means being confronted (or being claimed) by (and having to deal with) such questions all the time or, even, by an infinite variety of similar questions that one could not possibly predict in advance; questions that themselves are thrown up by and derive their meaning from the experience of being a parent. In asking them, parents are also asking questions about their own life: its meaning, its value, and

its challenges. Raising children is, then, not just (or perhaps not so much) about behaviors parents are able to effectively encourage in their children but also (or perhaps predominantly) about the world we represent and in which we are raising our children. (I will come back to this in the next section.)

Yet, in the shift to ‘parenting’, this form of questioning is shut down; it is not just the answers but the questions that are given to us in advance. What the relevant questions are and what it is they need to ask and to be looking for are already defined for parents in advance. In the reframing as ‘parenting’, our understanding of raising children seems to be stripped of an evaluative dimension other than in terms of outcomes. There is no room for questions of meaning and value, for ambiguity and uncertainty. The entire purpose, in fact, is to remove ambiguity and uncertainty.

### ***Parental Responsibility***

The shift to ‘parenting’ has important implications for our understanding of a parent’s pedagogical responsibility. In brief, it leads to a narrow, instrumentalist understanding of what that responsibility is, which entails little regard, if any, for the idea of parents as representatives of a human world with values and valuations. In the remainder of this chapter, I will develop this somewhat by drawing on Arendt.

In her famous essay *Die Krise in der Erziehung*,<sup>19</sup> Arendt presents an idea of pedagogical responsibility that situates educators not only in relation to (their) children (and their development) but also in relation to the world they both (i.e., children and educators) belong to. Relationally, educators are to be situated ‘between’ child and world, maintaining a relationship of responsibility to both. For Arendt this is so because of the unique double way in which the child presents herself to the educator: as ‘a new human being’ and as ‘a becoming human being’ (2006, p. 182). In as far as the child is ‘a becoming human being’, basically as any human being is in a process of growing and becoming, the educator has to assume responsibility ‘for the life and development of the child’ (2006, p. 182). But what is unique about the way the child presents herself to her educators, and what differentiates the human species from other ‘animal forms of life’ (ibid.), is that the child also has to be conceived as ‘new’: ‘new’, that is, exactly “in relation to a world that was there before him, that will continue after his death, and in which he is to spend his life” (ibid.). Importantly, this newness is not to be mistaken for some kind of inborn uniqueness or essence, those things that supposedly make a child ‘unique’, ‘his qualities, gifts, talents, and shortcomings’ (1958, p. 179). Rather, this newness

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<sup>19</sup>The English translation of this as *The Crisis in Education* might be slightly misleading if ‘education’ is taken in a narrow sense, i.e., as pertaining to the formal processes of education as schooling. However, as already indicated above, *Erziehung* first and foremost applies to those informal processes, mostly within the family, by which parents bring up their children. It is important to keep in mind that Arendt speaks about this broader sense of ‘education’.

“is implicit in everything somebody says and does”, meaning: it is not somehow already ‘there’ (e.g., innate), or presupposed, but is to be understood as an inherent potentiality of human beings (i.e., beings capable of speech and action) and is thus something that is to be concretely manifested in speech and action (1958, p. 179). Put somewhat differently, human society is composed of uncountable sayings and doings. When growing up, gradually learning to speak and act, children most of the time ‘take over’ the sayings and doings their educators introduce them to, more or less continuing the ‘normal’ course of human affairs. But sometimes they do not; sometimes they say or do something that has the ‘character of startling unexpectedness’ (1958, p. 178). Of course, it can be argued that every future context in which words are uttered and deeds performed is new, and that, in a sense, everything children say and do is ‘new’. But this may not be exactly what Arendt intends here. There is a gradual difference at work, I suggest, that is important to keep in mind: a difference between, on the one hand, taking over sayings and doings in other (granted, always new) contexts, thereby possibly slightly modifying the sayings and doings as these have been taught or handed over, and, on the other hand, saying and doing something – something with the ‘character of startling unexpectedness’ – that can potentially interrupt, perhaps disrupt, the normal course of human affairs, something out of the ordinary.<sup>20</sup>

Whatever sense (or degree) of newness is involved, it is important to preserve it, as Arendt states, for it is only through renewal that the world can be saved from ruin (cf. 2006, p. 193). It is in relation to this newness of the child that the educator has to strike a delicate balance. The fact that the child presents herself to the educator as new in relation to the world positions the educator simultaneously vis-à-vis this newness and vis-à-vis the world she represents and introducing her child into. Educators cannot bypass the fact that ‘in relation to the young’ they stand “as representatives of a world for which they must assume responsibility even though they themselves did not make it, and even though they may, secretly or openly, wish it were other than it is” (2006, p. 186). Pedagogically, this translates into a responsibility for the existing world, something Arendt describes as a protective stance towards the world, “to keep it from being overrun and destroyed by the onslaught of the new that bursts upon it with each new generation” (ibid., p. 182). This role, and the responsibility that comes with it, imply, minimally, that parents show a willingness to represent the world, and that they have at least some idea of what it means to pass on something of value to the next generation. But the delicate nature of the balance shows itself exactly in the fact that this protective stance does not mean that educators should then also “dictate how [the world] will look” (ibid., p. 189), for this will “strike from the newcomers’ hands their own chance at the new”

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<sup>20</sup>For this distinction between kinds of newness I’m drawing on Arendt’s account of the new in terms of a miracle. ‘The new’, she says, ‘always happens against the overwhelming odds of statistical laws and their probability, which for all practical, everyday purposes amounts to certainty; the new therefore always appears in the guise of a miracle’ (1958, p. 178). If anything is to be understood as interrupting/disrupting the normal course of affairs, the likely candidate is something akin to a miracle.

(*ibid.*, p. 174). Pedagogically, this, in turn, translates as a responsibility for taking care of the newness of the child, of the “something that has never been before” (*ibid.*, p. 185), such “that this new thing comes to fruition in relation to the world as it is” (*ibid.*, p. 186). Children also, then, need to be protected from the world, meaning: ensuring the possibility that children can act and speak, that they can disclose/reveal ‘themselves’, ‘who’ they are, and thus (possibly) start something (a)new. Taken together these latter two responsibilities, i.e., for the child’s newness and for the existing world, in some balanced way, constitute what Arendt understands by the responsibility ‘for the continuance of the world’ (*ibid.*, p. 182).

Education (*Erziehung*) is, then, in an important sense much more than just a concern for a developing human being. It is also, perhaps first and foremost, this concern for the (continuance of the) world. But there is not much of this, if anything, to be found in the dominant culture of parenting, precisely because the importance of the parent as a representative of some community has been downplayed in favor of the narrow conception of the parent as, in Daly’s terms, ‘parenter’ (2013, pp. 227–228). The burden of parents’ responsibility is the burden of correct execution, of being perfect or good enough performers. In the current climate, the parent-child relationship has been confined to some separate area – an area where parents ‘do’ certain things with their children, ‘interact’ with them – as if that can be neatly cut off from other parts of a parent’s social and personal life. The net effect of this is that our understanding of parental responsibility is increasingly narrowed down to a concern for one’s child’s proper development, to a focus on ensuring the optimal developmental process of one’s child’s capabilities, talents, needs, etc., and to staying in control of that. It is, in Arendt’s terms, narrowed down to responsibility ‘for the life and development of the child’ (2006, p. 182), reducing childrearing to not much more than ‘just a function of life’ (*ibid.*), hence downplaying what makes us distinctly human. Parents are held responsible, that is, for creating a particular kind of child and for the management of a particular kind of pedagogical process. To put this a bit more pointedly: this may in fact no longer be responsibility (in the full sense of the word) at all but rather accountability. Parents are positioned in a very specific way, one in which they are required to be constantly vigilant and alert, as every new day will present new challenges, potential problems, milestones. And it is this state of vigilance and alertness, necessary for the production of end-products already defined for them in advance, for which they are held accountable.

To be clear, this is not to say that parents no longer represent anything. Rather, the point is this: parents are increasingly incapacitated when it comes to having even the possibility of asking the question of what could be meaningful to conserve and pass on, as the ‘ends’ of childrearing are already taken for granted within the very languages that have come to determine their conceptual outlook today. And in as far as they are so incapacitated, what is obfuscated, then, is an important part of what makes up the experience of being a parent as a human experience, i.e., the immensity and moral demandingness of their responsibility in relation to their child’s newness. For the existential burden – some may say anxiety – of having children and having to raise them is precisely the realization of the fact that one’s own speaking



and acting (as a parent) is not just about bringing about changes in the world,<sup>21</sup> but may or may not affect my child's own ability to insert herself into the world (by action and speech). If being a parent is to be more than 'parenting' – more, that is, than a preoccupation with the kind of 'product' a parent is supposed to deliver, or a preoccupation with maintaining the 'right' kind of relationship – then this must have something to do with preserving a sense of being *existentially* burdened. It must have something to do with seeing parents not as finding themselves in an already predefined relationship in which the positions that can be taken and what can be done by whom are already determined, but as finding themselves in a relationship with their children in which things can still start anew.

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<sup>21</sup> See B. Williams (1985) for an account of this (spec. p. 68).



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# The Body in Education



Joris Vlieghe

In this chapter I deal with a topic that only recently became a serious subject of study for educational theory and philosophy, viz. the human body. As a rule, the very fact that learning and teaching are events in which we are involved as bodies, i.e., as people made of ‘flesh and blood’, has been disregarded, if not repressed. If educationalists have paid attention to the physical dimension of human life at all, the body appeared in a stereotypical, negative way. That is, the body is regarded as an object of distrust that should be kept under control by installing harsh disciplinary measures. As of recently, however, a reevaluation of human corporeality seems to have occurred. Increasingly, corporeality is taken to be an important factor to take into account when theorizing education. As such the body has been (re)discovered by educational philosophers, even though in the day-to-day practice of learning and teaching it often remains forgotten.

In the first part I discuss the traditional view on the body within educational philosophy and theory. I go on showing, in the second and third sections, how a more positive attitude vis-à-vis corporeality has gradually emerged, and why it is of potential relevance for education. In the fourth section I return to the question why after all the body has been (and, very often, still is) neglected, suppressed or dealt with in a condescending way. Here, I discuss the most recent research on the body and education, and show how we can take an enduring debate in an entirely new direction. In the last part I zoom in on a case where education and the body are closely intertwined: physical education. The analysis I present here relates primarily to the Western educational and cultural context, and the examples and authors I discuss are to be situated against this background. However, corporeality is an educational issue all societies should deal with, and as such this chapter is more broadly applicable.

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## The Body Within the Traditional View on Education

According to a traditional account of education, there are good reasons to assume that the physical side of human existence has no (or only a negative) meaning. This is partly the result of an *intellectualist* view that has prevailed for a very long time. This can be seen, for instance, in the *liberal education* approach, which has been dominant in the Anglo-American world of educational philosophy. In the work of theorists such as Peters and Hirst, education is fundamentally about initiating the new generation into valuable domains of knowledge (and skills related to knowledge) (Hirst and Peters 1970). The criterion to define what is of value regards the possibility of extending, deepening, and refining one's knowledge – and to make connections with other fields of knowledge and science. In that respect, it is a worthwhile endeavor to impart scientific knowledge *about* the body, as it happens during a biology lesson, whereas the body *itself* has no specific educational significance. Learning how muscular tissue is composed, and teaching the biochemical and mechanical processes that explain why we can move our bodies is of educational relevance. We see something new and unexpected. And, we are challenged to relate these insights to Newtonian mechanics, to learn more about anatomy, to make comparisons with locomotion in other species, etc. However, what it means to experience our ability for movement, let alone improving on them (e.g., by excelling in long-distance running or rugby) is of no concern to education (Cf. Barrow 2008).

Obviously, even according to supporters of this view it is important to pay at least some attention to our bodies. After all, the body needs to move, to rest, and to be fed at appropriate times. But, this also means that the body only has a secondary and instrumental role to play. Granted that a healthy body is a necessary precondition for the well-functioning of the life of mind, corporeality still has no meaning in and of itself. Therefore, it makes no sense at all to speak about physical *education*. At most one could sustain that within educational contexts time is spent for physical *training*. In other words, even if it is sensible to pay attention to the physical side of human existence (in the educational realm as well as elsewhere, for example at work), there is *no specific educational reason* to pay attention to the body as such.

To another tradition which has informed continental philosophies of education and which defines education in terms of *Bildung* (Cf. Løvlie and Standish 2002), the body also has no, or only a secondary, meaning. To this view, education is first and foremost aimed at cultivating the properly humane, i.e., at letting flourish that what sets humans apart from the rest of nature. As far as we have bodies, there is nothing which distinguishes us substantially from plants and animals. Nonetheless, thanks to the development of the unique mental capacities we possess, we might elevate ourselves and transcend the order of nature. To the extent that we are physical beings, we are and will remain subject to the laws of nature which are beyond our control. The task of education is to set us free from this servitude and to turn us into truly *free* human creatures. A small example might clarify this.

The need to drink when the body is short of fluids, but also more culturally modeled desires such as hankering after lemonade to satisfy this urge, is caused by

biological and psychological mechanisms that are ingrained in human nature. When I feel thirsty and when the means for me to meet this need are at my disposal (e.g., because a vending machine is available and I have enough change), satisfying this need can hardly be called an act of human freedom. After all, it is not I who has chosen to have thirst in the first place, and the reasons why I prefer lemonade over water are not (necessarily) clear to me. On the contrary, it is only when I would choose not to consume lemonade (out of good reasons, for example, because I believe my money could be better spent to charitable goals or because I don't want to drink what commercials tell me to), that I demonstrate that I am truly a *free* human being: then I verify that I can go against the instincts my body has put me up with. My choice to resist bodily inclinations sets me apart from sheer biological and psychological necessity.

However, for this to be possible education is required. As Kant (1982, p. 11) puts it: humans are the only creatures that can and should be educated. From birth, we are already more than animals, and yet we do not come to full humanity automatically. So, the educator must assume that there exists something in every human being that is not fully subject to the order of nature and that this capacity can be brought to fruition as the result of the right education. More exactly, education should aim at developing the properly humane capacity for self-determination (Cf. Langeveld 1971). As a consequence, a large part of education consists of learning to master our bodies in view of an ideal that has nothing whatsoever to do with the body. Far from being a mere theoretical point of view, this account has underpinned for centuries the day-to-day educational practice, in which the body has been subject to sometimes extreme disciplinary and disciplinary measures (Cf. Rutschky 1997). I will come back in greater detail to this issue later.

## **Towards a More Positive View on the Body**

Since the second half of the last century, this dominant view on the role of the body has started to change fundamentally. This is, first, due to significant societal changes, and especially due to spectacular evolutions in medical science. As a result, our dependency on the realm of nature has changed forever. Hundred years ago, the average life expectancy in the West was about 55 years, breaking a leg brought about a lifelong lack of mobility, having a bad body odor often meant social isolation, and except for those who lived a celibate life pregnancy was an almost inescapable fate. With the exception of a certain death, we have more or less got control over the inconveniences and risks the body has put us up with, and for a majority of people in the Western world living a comfortable life in harmony with the body has become the rule (Juvin 2010).

Alongside these social and cultural changes, we have also come to a more accurate understanding of the processes that support what education is fundamentally about. Whereas the traditional account would argue that genuine education requires a break with the order of nature, it has become increasingly clear that the very

abilities of gaining knowledge and making sound judgments are at least partly rooted in our bodies. It is now generally accepted that neurological processes are a necessary condition for cognitive processes and that moral reasoning presupposes the proper functioning of certain brain areas. For instance, it has been shown that the malfunctioning of the ventromedial prefrontal cortex makes it impossible to respond swiftly and appropriately to moral dilemmas (Damasio 1999). However, it is not just our brains that are of crucial importance. For example, learning abstract concepts seems to be supported by a teacher's physical movements. This happens, for instance, when in order to explain that the heart functions as a complex pump-device, a biology teacher might illustrate this by using her two hands performing the widening and shrinking of the heart chambers (Poizzer-Ardenghi and Roth 2007).

A similar evolution took place within Western philosophy. For a long time, humans were believed to consist of two separate substances, body and mind – the so-called *dualist* account, which goes back to Plato, and which has become very influential especially since Descartes (1996). According to the latter, body and mind have nothing to do with each other. After all, one can grasp parts of the body, whereas the mind remains ungraspable. Also, like any material thing bodies can be split up into parts, whereas our consciousness is one and indivisible. On the basis of these and other arguments, the mind was considered not only as essentially different from the body but moreover as superior to it. This view is fully in line with what I have been calling the traditional view on education, i.e., the elevation of humankind above physical nature.

From many different theoretical perspectives, this long-standing and pernicious depreciation of the body has been heavily criticized. For instance, at the end of the nineteenth century, Freud already argued that large parts of our conscious life are determined by unconscious drives which aimed at bodily satisfaction. And, Nietzsche (1961) contended that the dualistic view of humankind is related to a deeply rooted hatred of and even disgust for our own physicality. Hence, a plea to remain 'faithful to the earth' and to affirm the bodily side of life to the full. During the twentieth century, this reappraisal of the body has been steadily intensified. It would be impossible to give a comprehensive overview of this evolution here, and so I only discuss some important milestones.

Within the Anglo-American world, Gilbert Ryle (1945) has drawn attention to the difference between knowing *that* and knowing *how*. With this distinction, he wants to show that many important things we learn are not a matter of pure knowledge. Much intelligent human behavior does not follow from a cognitive grasp of reality – for example, the knowledge of the rules one needs to take into account during a discussion. Rather, such behavior is dependent upon strongly embodied habits and sensibilities acquired during our education. A 'mindful' participant to a dialogue must know how to respond to others in a quasi-automatic way.

Another important school of thought that originated in the late nineteenth-century American context and that undoubtedly contributed to a reevaluation of the body is *pragmatism*. A basic creed of this movement is that the human capacity to have conscious representations of the world is not some super-natural and exceptional phenomenon that needs to be explained. It is just part of the world we live in.

As James (2007) argued, our cognitive faculties are the result of evolutionary processes, i.e., they are part of making our way in life – in the same sense that all animals have developed specific features in order to survive safely in their natural environment. As such, conscious phenomena should be understood as emerging from natural history and in relation to the context in which knowledge is used and applied. This also means that all knowledge is firmly *embodied*. Pragmatists are therefore strongly opposed to any form of body-mind dualism.

More recently, Lakoff and Johnson (1999) have developed an *embodied cognition paradigm*, which is based on the simple observation that in the practical day-to-day life there are no disembodied minds that are opposed to the mere material reality of the body and the rest of the world. Instead there are only interactions between organisms and the environment. ‘Body’ and ‘mind’ are then only convenient ‘short-hand’ descriptions of two aspects of those interactions. We are however mistaken to regard these descriptions for ontologically separate entities. According to Lakoff and Johnson, our thought is structured with the help of image schemas and conceptual metaphors which are based on recurring bodily experiences. Essential notions such as part and whole or the very idea that processes have beginnings and ends are not imaginable if we wouldn’t have bodies – bodies that have parts themselves and that can make journeys from point A to point B. This also means that pragmatists are not just making the trivial claim that there is no thinking without brains. Rather, our whole bodies are involved in embodied cognition.

Within continental philosophy, the most important theoretical contribution to giving the body its full due is to be found in *phenomenology*. In Husserl (1973) we already find a most helpful distinction between two fundamentally different ways of experiencing the bodily side of human life: there is the objective outsider’s perspective which makes the body appear as a *Körper* (a complex machine in the way Descartes defined it), which is opposed to the subjective insider’s experience of corporeality as *Leib* (the lived-through body). Very often the two are unrelated. The velocity measured by the chronometer is something altogether different from the directly lived swiftness (or slowness) while running on the beach. So, it could be argued that the traditional view which believed that the body could not possibly possess any intrinsic educational meaning is predicated on the erroneous idea that body is mere *Körper* (and therefore mere organic processes that belong to the order of biological necessity). More than anyone else, Merleau-Ponty (1962) has taken up the challenge of arguing that we *are* also *Leib* and of explaining why it is of the greatest importance to take this dimension into account.

He argues that the very possibility for the world to appear as a coherent and meaningful whole to our consciousness is dependent upon a primordial *bodily* engagement with things. Even in areas that seem completely disconnected from the corporeal side of our existence, e.g., in mathematics, the body cannot be let out of consideration. We count to ten because we have ten fingers. Even though there are good reasons to rely on an 8- or 16-part number system (as computers do), we prefer to work with a decimal system. This shows that even abstract activities such as mathematics are ultimately rooted in very practical and physical experiences (e.g., counting on one’s fingers) (Cf. Sheets-Johnstone 1990). More generally,

Merleau-Ponty (1962) maintains that our bodies, before we can start to think, already possess a pre-reflexive grasp of the world. My hand ‘knows’ where to find and grab my pen – without first having to make a mental picture of the desk I am sitting at. Moreover, the body *itself* found all meaningful connections with the world. The way in which the world appears to us is given shape by the characteristics of our being physically embedded in the world. So, for instance, for a toddler the upper side of the table has no meaning: for her it is nonexistent, as due to her small body size, it is a part she never encounters. Corollary, the physical constitution of the adult makes that for her the underside is normally no part of her world – unless of course she is looking for a way to get rid of chewing gum.

## The Educational Meaning of the Human Body

These shifts in the appreciation of the body are closely related to major developments in the world of education itself. Analogous changes are to be found in the work of progressive thinkers who advocated a shift from a teacher-centered to a child-centered approach. This already happened as early as the late eighteenth century with the rise of the so-called *Reformpädagogik* – which was a reaction to the above sketched tradition of *Bildung* in the German-speaking context (Benner and Kemper 2003). Central to this movement was the idea that education should respect the child in the entirety of its being, and therefore that natural and bodily inclinations (for instance towards play) should be taken as learning opportunities rather than as impediments to education. In the Anglophone world, and fully in line with the pragmatist turn in American philosophy, *experiential learning* gained a firm foothold during the twentieth century. For one of its major founders and spokespersons, John Dewey (1981), we should pay heed to the aesthetic, practical, and social dimensions of education. This is, in order to have genuine command over something, our knowledge and skill need to be based on lived experience of the world. People learn by actively doing things in the world, not by sitting still and passively soaking up what a teacher tells them about the world. Moreover, we only learn if we fully understand the practical relevance of the stuff that used to be buried in boring handbooks. Also, learning is never a solitary affair. It happens in the presence of other human beings. As such every educational situation is potentially one of cooperation. The basis of Dewey’s reformist (but by today also very commonplace) ideas is the ‘principle of continuity’: there exists a continuum between organic (bodily) activities and education. Higher cognitive abilities are based on the way the body perceives, moves, and manipulates objects. Also, it is thanks to our embodiment that we are essentially social creatures rather than solitary minds (as Descartes would have it).

More recently, but wholly in keeping with Dewey’s main intuitions, Richard Shusterman (2004) has developed a *somaesthetic* approach. For instance, he argues that aversive phenomena (such as the common abhorrence for mathematical formulae, but also xenophobic fears) are embodied habits that are caused by distressing events in our personal lives, and more exactly events that went together with tight



muscle contractions, and which gave rise to conditioned behavioral patterns of reacting in an inhibitory manner (e.g., to mathematical formulae or people with a different skin color). Educators, so Shusterman claims, should take this lesson, as it should be clear that more needs to be done than merely convincing that formulae are beautiful and that there is no objective reason to fear others because they look differently. Instead, we should offer students the opportunity to *fully* reflect on their feeling scared, which also involves an awareness of the bodily experiences of muscle constriction that go together with their fears. Only then can we retrain, step by step, more desirable habits of conduct.

Another important movement in which the body has been taken to have a major educational significance is the so-called *humanistic* approach to learning, which has its origin in the post-war client-centered psychology and which has found its strongest defender in Carl Rogers (Rogers and Freiberg 1994). Not unlike the *Bildung* tradition, Rogers starts from the idea that education should aim at the fullest possible development of the potential that sets us apart from the animals and that turns us into genuinely human beings (hence the name 'humanistic'). The key mistake, however, is to believe that the bodily side of life would stand in the way of this achievement. Instead, Rogers claims that the body possesses its own 'wisdom' and that we need to learn and trust it again. Education is indeed a matter of regaining something we lost: in the footsteps of Rousseau, Rogers holds that a lot of what goes wrong in modern Western culture directly follows from the suppression of our authentic, and more exactly our bodily human nature.

Obesity, to name just an example, is not so much caused by a lack of education (i.e., because one lacks discipline and cannot resist and rise above physical tendencies). On the contrary, it is brought about by a wrong-headed education. It is part of human nature to look after ourselves and to be concerned with fitness and agility. The fact that so many of us give in to noxious behavioral patterns is the result of having 'learned' that the consumption of large quantities of food equals a satisfied life. Therefore, the main task of the true educator is not merely to teach about the risks that come with an unhealthy diet and about the pitfalls of consumerist culture, but to restore contact with our innate orientation towards a good life, so as to develop more sound and natural standards of what counts in life. Likewise, we are born with an inclination towards seeking contact with other people, towards enjoying and sharing with them. In our society, this natural pro-social tendency gets repressed, again as the result of the existing educational system which promotes individual success and turns us into ruthless competitors (Ibidem). Spontaneous inclinations towards cooperation are suppressed and authentic human relationships are neutralized. This is a good reason for defending physical education in schools, as it offers opportunities for restoring an authentic connection with our bodies, but also for learning to work together. I return to this topic in the last part.

To conclude this section, I draw attention to two more recent perspectives within the humanities and the social sciences which have turned the body into a serious and central object of educational concern: *feminism* and *post-structuralism*. The basic idea informing the latter school of thought is that common ways of thinking and speaking are often based on sharp binary and hierarchical oppositions which, in the

end, are not defensible (Cf. Derrida 1992). The antagonism between mind and body (and the supposed superiority of the mind) is one of those. If we want to change the way our lives are ordered, we should blur these oppositions. Analogously, feminist scholars have shown that so-called essential differences between men and women have little to do with the body in a biological sense. Instead, they draw from our gender identifications, i.e., socially and culturally constructed ideas about being male and female. We come to assume these identifications as the result of an upbringing which prioritizes stereotypical representations of masculinity and femininity over many other possible ways of giving shape to our gender (Cf. Fraser 1989). Therefore, we need to critically deconstruct prevailing gender conventions and give new meanings to our gendered bodies. This would be a challenge for a truly critical education.

It should be noted, however, that these approaches have also met with the critique that they reduce the body to a pure effect of discourse, i.e., something which only exists thanks to our thinking and speaking about it (Cf. Carozzi 2005). Therefore, we lose sight of the body in its full physicality. Nonetheless, some post-structuralist thinkers such as Judith Butler (1993) have stressed the importance of interrupting dominant discourses on (gender) identities in a 'performative' way. This means that we publicly put on display that prevailing constructions of (gender) identity are without any ground. And, we do this by playing with the bodily routines that support these fixed identities (for instance, by gender parodies and cross-dressing). As such the theme of power and resistance has been raised, to which I turn now in greater detail.

## Corporeality, Power, and Resistance

The account I have been giving so far has not taken into consideration one very important observation: although there seems to be a growing awareness of the importance of the body in educational theory and philosophy, in the real-life world of education corporeality remains to be neglected or dealt with in a deprecatory way (Cf. Vlieghe 2014). This is an indication that there is going on more than just the preponderance of intellectualist and dualist prejudice. In order to come to a more accurate understanding of the problematic status of corporeality in educational practice, I turn to another approach which is based on the work of Michel Foucault, and which conceives of corporeality in terms of power, oppression, and resistance.

One of Foucault's central claims is that in the eighteenth century a significant shift took place in the way in which Western societies are organized (Foucault 2010). Before that time social order was based on the power sovereign rulers exerted over death. They could execute anyone arbitrarily. By inducing fear and obedience in this way, social order was ensured. However, all this changed with the rise of *biopolitics*: rather than reigning over death, social order is from now on secured thanks to the government over life. Instead of sacrificing life as a means of deterrence, every human life counts. Or, more exactly, every life should be made

maximally productive. Each individual should contribute to the optimal and smooth functioning of society. As a result, sophisticated control mechanisms meant to ensure optimal contribution of all to society originated. More exactly, the human body became a direct target of biopolitical government. This is because the body is visible and its performance is easy to measure. The body thus became the object of continuous observation, recording and reporting. This, in turn, allowed for large-scale comparative analyses. For the first time in history, the idea that there could exist such a thing as a 'normal' body came to mind. Hence, bodies that were exceptional were termed 'abnormal', i.e., they were seen as a problem and as a threat to the well-functioning of society.

Foucault has further shown how particular institutions such as hospitals, prisons, and especially schools have played a capital role in this exercise of power over life and body (Foucault 1978). At school, the body of young people is drilled to the extent that they are able to function optimally in a productivity-oriented society. The abnormal is detected, mapped, and rectified. All unproductive aspects of physical life are adjusted or get neutralized. The overactive body is tamed, whereas our lazy bodies are encouraged to take up useful work. Bodies that crave for sexual gratification are taught that there are more worthwhile things to do. And our whimsical bodies learn to adapt unassumingly to fixed arrangements such as timetables (Cf. Deacon 2006). At school, everything is put in place to ensure that spontaneous, yet unproductive bodily tendencies get suppressed. In essence, schooling comes down to an unyielding imposition of discipline – instead of being (primarily) concerned with transferring knowledge and skills or with the formation and flourishing of the human person (Cf. Rutschky 1997). The ultimate purpose of going to school is to learn to get up every morning at an early hour, to face wind and rain in order to get to a place where one is not allowed to eat or urinate when one feels the need to do so, and where one is willing to perform repetitive, yet pointless work in a meticulous way. As such 'docile bodies' are created, getting people ready to devote themselves to do productive, but not really engaging work when they reach adulthood.

Furthermore, the purpose of these disciplinary mechanisms consists of making external control over our bodies progressively redundant: schooling is most successful when students no longer need teachers to observe them all the time to sit still and to forgo the impulse to drink whenever they feel thirsty. That is, schooling fulfills its true aims when the disciplining function is internalized to such an extent that one comes to possess maximal *self-control* (Cf. Elias 1994). Not surprisingly, this objective is close to the goal set by the traditional account of education which I discussed at length in the first section – transcending the realm of mere nature to achieve true freedom (understood as the capacity for self-determination).

The traditional account and a biopolitical analysis of the true aims of education are opposed in that to the latter approach the ideal of self-determination through control over the body is a form of oppression. Nevertheless, there is an interesting parallel to be made between these two approaches, which also sets them most markedly apart from the body-centered views discussed in section 'Towards a More Positive View on the Body' and 'The Educational Meaning of the Human Body' (Cf. Vlieghe 2014). To these views – pragmatism, phenomenology, and humanism –

the body is supposed to be in and of itself a source of meaning and knowledge, a resource which can ensure cooperation and harmony between people, as well as the site where genuine freedom can be achieved. Over and against such a view, both the traditional and the biopolitical account of education hold that the body, rather than being intrinsically oriented towards the greater good, is a nuisance which is constantly at risk of interrupting the order of things. It could be claimed that the traditional view on the body in education takes the body more seriously than other views do: it accepts the body in its full 'bodiliness'. This is because it draws attention to the many aspects of the corporeal side of life that are not conducive to the greater good and the well-functioning of society. This is in stark contrast to the humanist, pragmatist, and phenomenological approaches which substitute the real bodies we have with a nonexistent body ideal, i.e., with the genderless body of angels that – as the theological tradition wants it – never get drunk, nor ever need to transpire or defecate (Agamben 2010).

Some authors have tried to give a positive reading to these unruly and nonproductive aspects of bodily life. Following Bataille (1991), it could be argued that there is always something to our bodies that can *never* be captured by any social order – 'rebellious flesh' to use here an expression coined by the Dutch philosopher Henk Oosterling (1989). Our bodies are the container of an ineradicable revolutionary force which, he argues, is the condition of possibility of all social change. I have argued elsewhere (Vlieghe 2014) that occasions during which we entirely coincide with the bodily side of existence, e.g., when we are taken by a fit of laughter or when we make the same (repetitive) movements at the same time (during the exercise of calisthenics), it is no longer possible to define what it means to be together in terms of fixed roles and positions: at those moments we affirm to be fully 'flesh', and this constitutes a moment of radical equality. All existing ways of identifying and positioning ourselves vis-à-vis others become utterly meaningless. These moments are of great importance for education, as they allow for an interruption of an established order of things, and moreover for a new beginning – in the sense that the future is open for unforeseeable ways of living together. Corporeality is thus not only a hotbed of resistance. It also possesses a community-building, democratizing and transformative potential. As Deleuze (1978) – following Spinoza here – suggests, we do not know what a body – or for that matter a collective of bodies – can do. Corporeality thus implies a danger to any societal order, and this might explain why the body has such a problematic status in the word of education as customarily conceived (i.e., as aimed at maintaining the world as it is).

## The Case of Physical Education

To conclude, I would like to zoom in on what is perhaps the clearest crossing point between education and the body: *physical education*. This subject is often not taken seriously. From its very introduction as a compulsory course in schools, physical education has been the object of suspicion. Moreover, it always had to be defended

against subjects that seemed to have far greater educational relevance, such as math, history, and languages (Cf. Vlieghe 2013). This is completely in line with the intellectualist account I discussed at the beginning of this chapter: from this perspective, it is far from clear *what might be educational about physical education*. This negative attitude has been reinforced by the fact that P.E. teachers mostly received a specialized instruction in the medical and biomechanical aspects of locomotion instead of being trained to become educators (Tinning 1997). This, of course, reinforces the dualist prejudice that the mind is substantially different and educationally far more important. Moreover, for many it is not clear why one would organize P.E. at school as oftentimes (and especially since the 1960s) the P.E. curriculum predominantly consists of doing sport. Today, P.E. and *sport education* are habitually seen as synonymous (Cf. Renson 1997). One might argue then that there are numerous (and very often much better) occasions for performing sport outside of school (Barrow 2008).

Together with the emancipation of the body as described in the second and third section, there have been many attempts to come up with an account of P.E. which takes it to be intrinsically worthwhile and to have a proper place within the walls of educational institutions. From a phenomenological point of view, it could be argued that the very term ‘physical’ education is itself a problem: it reduces the body to a mechanical device that needs maintenance (*Körper*), rather than that it would cultivate the lived-through body (*Leib*). As Carl Gordijn (1968) wants it, we should have *movement education* (and not physical education) in schools. And, as Margaret Whitehead (2001) has argued, we should even raise ‘physical literacy’ in our children. To understand this concept correctly, it is important not merely to define it in terms of specific abilities (e.g., running 100 m within a certain amount of time) but more generally (in the sense that alphabetic literacy is not merely about being able to read and write, but to have a whole world at one’s disposal which is lacking to the illiterate). The physical literate possesses a wide and adequate register of movements and gestures for responding to the world, and this contributes to her life quality and sense of self-worth. Furthermore, movement education could instill many important values, such as teamwork, fairness, honesty, courage, endurance, learning to cope with winning and losing in a sane way, but also learning to respond in a tactful way to weaknesses in others (Cf. Kirk 2006; Skillen 1998). As already noted, from a humanist perspective (which takes human being to be a bodily creature through and through), it could be added that physical education is of supreme importance because it can – or must – support the full flourishing of our human potential, and as such it will contribute to a happy life for all (Cf. Hellison 1995). However, this would require a particular P.E. curriculum which prioritizes collaborative activities over competitive ones.

Now, along the lines of the critical reading of schooling in terms of disciplinarization, as expanded on in the fourth section, it could be claimed that many activities that take place in contemporary P.E. are aimed at bringing the body under biopolitical control. It might be clear from history that P.E. has often served the purpose of preparing the bodies of the young for a military career: subjecting them to collective forms of drill (e.g., marching exercises and calisthenics), making them

all doing the same things at the same time and according to a rhythm imposed by the blow of the whistle, bodies were created that functioned mechanically and automatically. As such, people were drilled to blindly obey orders and to become mere instruments of warfare (or for industrial production for that matter) (Gleyse 1997). A lot has changed since the 1960s, with the substitution of sport and games for army-like training schemes. Nonetheless, it could be claimed that P.E. is still about instilling control over our bodies, be it in far less explicit ways: by engaging and striving to excel in sport youngsters are made responsible themselves for controlling their own body, in a sometimes scrupulous and no less harsh manner (Cf. Kirk 1998). External control has become fully internalized. Moreover, Jean-Marie Brohm (2006) argues that today sport has become the new opium of the masses. With this he means that many of us are brought to take an instrumental relation towards our bodies because we strive to be like the sport heroes that are ubiquitous in popular media – people that all possess a perfect, narcissistic body and that seem in full control over it. Therefore, if school sport is a mere copy of what youngsters see happening at the television screen, this is bound to stimulate them not to shun ruthless competition and to measure their own self esteem in relation to the super-human performances of sport celebrities.

Therefore, some maintain that we need a “socially critical physical education” (Tinning 1997), which aims at social and political transformation. This could happen by – among other things – raising consciousness regarding implicit power mechanisms behind certain forms of physical activity, and sport performance in particular. Or, it could be argued that physical education should be turned into a “moral practice” which stimulates respect for standards, authentic (rather than blind) reverence of successful sports(wo)men, and a sound appreciation for competition and striving towards excellence (Kirk 2006). Clearly, these suggestions have the benefit of explaining what is *educational* about P.E., but the risk is here that it is no longer clear what is *physical* about P.E. After all, one can easily (and maybe even more effectively) acquire the aforementioned values during a collaborative geography or history project, and one doesn’t need to be physically active in order to learn and see how an unjust and oppressive societal order is imposed.

Elsewhere I have argued that we might do a service to physical education by going against this tendency to justify it in terms that have nothing to do with the body itself. Instead, we could take P.E. literally, i.e., as a practice that is entirely and uniquely focused on the physical (Vlieghe 2013). In line with what I said earlier in regards with the transformative and democratizing dimension of being gathered as bodies, a case could be made for conceiving again of P.E. in terms of collective movement exercise (during which we fully affirm to be bodies). Even though, as I discussed, this type of activity can be exploited by belligerent and biopolitical regimes, the reverse argument could also be made: when a collective of bodies moves together in time (Cf. McNeill 1995), the possibility of a radical change is present. And, this is felt as a danger to the established order. Hence, the danger is averted by giving collective physical activity a clear (viz. belligerent or productive) destination. Again, at that moment physical education is no longer *physical* education in a literal sense.



This last illustration shows that human corporeality remains to have a problematic, if not unsettling quality to it. In spite of the many good arguments that have been developed to give the body its full due, and in spite of undoubtedly very well-intentioned initiatives to approach the body more positively in the world of education, it seems that a genuine appreciation for the body in its full bodiliness poses an ongoing challenge for future educational theory and practice.

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# Philosophical Issues in the Shaping of the School Curriculum



David Bridges

The school curriculum ought, on the face of it, to be a central pre-occupation for philosophers of education or indeed any other kind of educational scholar. This chapter addresses some of the central questions about the curriculum that have interested philosophers over the centuries: what precisely is ‘the school curriculum’ and where is it to be found, how described? How may what is of value (or educational value) to be determined? By whom? Further, how are we to conceive of the curriculum – as a process, by analogy with an industrial production line, perhaps, or a research site? These are the main questions that I shall begin to explore in this chapter.

## The Multi-layered Curriculum

An analytic philosopher is almost bound to observe some distinctions in terms of what exactly we are talking about when we talk of the school curriculum. I have already narrowed the discussion by referring to the *school* curriculum, because obviously there is a wider and significant sense in which life experience more generally provides a curriculum, a set of educational and learning experiences. Indeed there were serious debates in the 1960s and 1970s challenging the elision between education and schooling and urging the ‘de-schooling’ of society. (See, for example, Illich 1973.) Emile’s education involved a teacher but nothing like school attendance as we might recognise it (Rousseau 1762). I am going to focus on the *school* curriculum. But this short excursion out of school points nevertheless to another distinction which is often observed. The very institution of schooling carries

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messages about, for example custodianship, surveillance, compulsion and control that are largely independent of the any formal or declared statement of the curriculum that a school may offer.

Within the context of the school we may think of the curriculum as encompassing a number of different things, including:

1. The declared programme of study that is planned and most of which is likely to be assessed provided by the school. This typically is described in terms of a set of subjects (mathematics, language, biology, history, geography, etc.) that students will be obliged to study at particular stages or ones which they can choose as options. This may be described and prescribed of course in greater or lesser detail, though the more detailed specification is usually contained in syllabuses.
2. An extension of this declared programme to include other kinds of learning which a school deliberately and explicitly sets out to achieve, though it may do so outside as well as inside the programme of study indicated above. These things would typically include elements of interpersonal and social behaviour, moral education, education for citizenship, etc. – some of what is sometimes referred to as the pastoral curriculum (see Marland 1980 and, for more philosophical analysis, McLaughlin 1982).
3. What is taught and learned through the way in which schooling is conducted and the structures and taken-for-granted practices that are associated with it – learning which is unplanned, perhaps unintended, perhaps even contrary to the declared educational aims and principles of the school, but which is deeply embedded in the system, all of which is sometimes referred to as “the hidden curriculum” (a term reputedly coined by Phillip Jackson (1968), though the concept probably goes back to Dewey and has been a central focus of sociological analysis of schooling from Freire’s (1972) *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* to more recent analysis by Bourdieu and others). Thus, for many years (and no doubt still in certain respects) schools have reinforced gender and racial stereotypes, not as a matter of policy but because these were embedded and not examined critically. Authority structures in schools, discipline and punishment regimes, the balance between cooperativeness and competition in school activity, all that is contained in the notion of school ethos – all of these contribute to what is taught and what is learned.
4. Finally (for current purposes) we need to distinguish between the curriculum which is taught, i.e. the learning which the school intends, more or less explicitly, to take place and the curriculum which is actually learned, i.e. what individual children take from it, which may be something far removed from the intentions of the teachers, because children’s needs, interests, readiness to understand and motivation all enter into their selection from what is on offer, their construction of the meaning of what is on offer, their readiness to understand it and their motivation to remember it. Schools can attempt to influence the ways in which these factors enter into what is learned, but they cannot control all of them all of the time.

These last considerations have of course fed the development of some important educational ideas and practices. First, the attention to dynamics of the student's role in constructing their own educational experience and determining in the end what they learn has informed the notion of the child- or student-centred curriculum in the sense of one that (crudely speaking) is tailored to and developed out of the 'needs and interests' of the student (both contested concepts in the philosophy of education literature – see Dearden 1972 and Wilson 1974). Secondly the acknowledgement of the gap between what teachers intend their students to learn and what they do in fact learn has prompted attention to student voice in research (Rudduck 2002; Rudduck and Flutter 2004) and to classroom action research, interpreted as helping teachers more successfully to align intention and actuality (Elliott 2000).

It is clear from this short analytic excursion that the 'curriculum' can be interpreted as encompassing a wider and a narrower range of learning, intended and unintended. It would be my argument that, although most of the debate about, for example a national curriculum (and arguments about breadth and depth, options and compulsion) focus on curriculum in the narrow sense, schools have to take responsibility for very much more than this, for the actual *consequences* of their actions and the systems they set up and not just for the purity of their *intentions*. This responsibility implies an awareness of what is being taught outside as well as inside the formal curriculum and of what students are actually learning, intended or not.

Whether one takes a wider or narrower definition of the curriculum, however, it is immediately clear that one enters the domain of values and normativity, which has excited philosophical and wider attention throughout history.

### *Values and the Curriculum*

In so far as we ('we' in government, in local administrations, in schools or in the classroom) are deciding on and controlling the curriculum that our students will experience, we are inevitably involved in choices laden with all sorts of values. There are three main points of reference for these values:

*The Good Life* Centrally, what we are offering students is a set of experiences that will open up to them ways of living, activities, ways of looking at the world that they themselves may come to value for their own sake, or from which, at least, they might select what they would choose to engage in for their own sake. These may include forms of working life but are or should not be narrowly restricted. They might choose a life dedicated to family and kinship, to religious devotion, to political action of which work may or may not be a central part.

*The Good Society* The school inevitably represents a microcosm of a larger society and is the route through which young people are initiated into forms of social co-existence. But the school and the school curriculum is typically seen as having a function which goes beyond this, one of equipping the next generation to populate

or maintain what is seen as good in contemporary society or to help build a better society. To this end schools address (not without controversy) issues of education for citizenship; they are urged to encourage enterprise and entrepreneurship for economic competitiveness; they prepare students to take their place in a ‘democratic’ society; they learn patriotic values. One of the burdens that schools carry is the burden of expectation that they will achieve everything to which society aspires and solve almost any problem that society encounters – from an epidemic of obesity to a poor performance by the national cricket team (see Depaepe and Smeyers 2008 and other contributions to the same special issue of *Education Theory* on ‘Educationalisation’).

*The Good Person* Schools have a view of the sort of person that they seek to develop. Some settle for ‘a well rounded’ student; others aim not only to recruit but to produce ‘talented and gifted’ children. In the UK specialist ‘academies’ have been linked to particular areas of prowess, for example in mathematics or sport. Many will focus on moral character. In the history of education such teleological views of human nature and the kind of person that education is forming have featured prominently in philosophical writing. Castiglione sets out to educate the perfect courtier – and the perfect lady (Castiglione 1528). The Confucian concept of a sage offers an ideal model of humanity, a gentleman who can carry himself with grace, speak correctly and demonstrate integrity in all things. A ‘progressive’ educational tradition that has run through the likes of Comenius (1632) and Rousseau (1762) has however emphasised the child as a person of inherent goodness whose nature should guide education rather than some raw material that had to be turned into a pre-specified product.

These three points of reference are, of course, interdependent, and a comprehensive philosophy of education, such as that offered by Plato in the *Republic* (Richards 1966), will address all three and their educational consequences. Nor do they necessarily indicate the same curriculum for all (though perhaps they should). A hierarchical view of society has commonly been taken to justify a differentiated view of the curriculum for people destined for different places in the hierarchy. Plato’s *Republic* required three classes of people: guardians (or rulers), helpers (soldiers) and farmers and workers. He acknowledged that these would in most cases be born from families of their own class – but, with slight embarrassment, thought it necessary to propagate a myth about their different inherent qualities in order to reconcile them to their lots.

We will say, in the language of fiction: “You are without doubt all brothers, but the god who made you put gold into the makeup of those who may rightly be guardians, and into the helpers he put silver, but he put iron and brass into the farmers and the workmen”. (Plato’s *Republic*, Book III,415 in Richards 1966: 66)

And then he asks: “How might we get this fiction to be believed?” (Ibid).

Centuries later Cyril Burt came to his aid with a formally “scientific” analysis of human intelligence which appeared to justify the view that children had inherently different kinds of abilities (Burt 1933). Just as Plato used his myth to justify different

forms of education for different children, so did policy makers in the UK in the 1940s (not in the 1944 Education Act as is sometimes supposed but through subsequent regulations) use Burt's psychology to justify the development of a tripartite system of schooling with a tripartite differentiated curriculum – thus ensuring, as in Plato's Athens, the continuing social reproduction of inequality through education and the curriculum.

By contrast, there are arguments for a “common curriculum”, and philosophers of education have been prominent in defending this concept (see Halstead and Hayden 2008). These tend to rest on both an optimistic view of what all children can achieve (‘no child left behind’!) and what they all need to function effectively in society, along with a commitment to a certain kind of society which provides equality of opportunity and a common or shared foundation of educational experience as a basis for social solidarity.

So, my point is that these three reference points – to the good life, the good society and to the good person – underpin any selection of a curriculum including its differentiation. This observation invites three main forms of inquiry. One is historical: we can explore what values have been expressed through the curriculum over time. The second is sociological or anthropological: we can explore, comparatively perhaps, how different societies and cultures today express their values through the school curriculum (though any such exploration today would have to include the impact of the homogenising forces at work in the global economy). The third is philosophical: we can explore, among other things, the nature of arguments that connect the observation of the essentially normative character of decisions to a conclusion about what form a curriculum understood in these terms should take. In this context it seems appropriate to focus on the philosophical approach.

How might or should we respond the observation that curriculum decisions are essentially normative ones? Let me identify briefly three responses.

*Articulate a coherent case for certain societally framed values and their educational implications*

This is primarily what governments seek to do in establishing a national curriculum, though with lesser as well as greater articulacy and with lesser and greater coherence between their views of society and their views on education. It is not that society's current values are taken uncritically: there may be aspects of contemporary social values that people would prefer to lose. Rather such a logic starts from what is seen as the best in a community, sometimes in historic values that have been lost and should be reasserted (e.g. in societies emerging from a period of occupation, oppression or colonial rule), sometimes in the aspirations of a society for its future development (e.g. for greater harmony between different communities). These observations indicate, however, that the logic of the argument is not a simple move from an ‘is’ to an ‘ought’ (one that philosophers would in any case be quick to unpick): rather, a set of norms, values and aspirations are brought to bear on any description of ‘society’, and it is these that drive provide the impulse for the development of the curriculum.

The difficulty, then, is in elaborating and defending these values – wherever they come from. This is rendered more complicated in states (and this perhaps applies to most states these days) that accommodate multiple societies and cultures. What values should the school curriculum then reflect? The answer to that may be that if the different cultures are equally valued then they all need somehow to be reflected in the curriculum alongside a commitment to valuing and respecting diversity. Countries like Canada, Australia and New Zealand have struggled to reconcile their obligations and loyalties to tradition and to indigenous populations with their modernist aspirations in a global society. In Northern Australia these dual points of societal and cultural reference have been reconciled through what is referred to as the ‘both ways’ or ‘two ways’ curriculum. Harris (1990) defined two-way Aboriginal schooling as: “a strategy to help make the matter of choice real in both worlds; to provide opportunity for the primary Aboriginal identity to stay strong, though changing, and thus continue to be the source of inner strength and security necessary for dealing with the Western world”. He argued that “Aboriginal people today are increasingly interested both in being empowered in terms of the Western world and in retaining or rebuilding Aboriginal identity as a primary identity” (1990: 48). In some countries the different points of societal reference are most vividly expressed through the language curriculum. In Kazakhstan, for example reference to its Kazakh population and national identity, its ethnically Russian population and its desire to position itself in the English speaking international community has resulted in a tri-lingual policy under which the three languages are not only taught but also expected to become the media of instruction for different subjects in all schools (Mehisto et al. 2014). But this reflects a governmental vision of what is good and right for society, and it is by no means one shared by all sections of society, some of which would prefer to see a more whole-hearted focus on their own first language and the culture they identify with by ethnicity or choice.

In the extreme case the normative consensus collapses in the face of values that appear to threaten the very core of the society in which the curriculum is being played out. The UK has recently become alarmed by the way that some schools have apparently endorsed Muslim radicalism, which in some cases is committed to the downfall of the society in which it is located in favour of a different ideal of a society operating under *sharia* law. In this way the liberal premises accepting diversity and allowing (some) schools to follow their own curriculum have broken down, so now the UK government is taking steps to eradicate these “subversive elements” from the schools and to set normative boundaries around what can be taught (see HM Government’s 2011 *Prevent Strategy*).

So, one form of logic in the determination of the school curriculum is to start with the values that ‘society’ seeks to realise and reflect these in the school curriculum widely understood. This logic is, however, put under some strain if there is no very substantial consensus as to what the values and valued things should be. The philosophical question as to what is desirable is one which it is very difficult to resolve under these circumstances and it quickly turns into a political question as to who has the *de jure* authority or *de facto* power to make the decision. We shall



observe several times over how difficulty in answering the question ‘what values?’ leads us instead to the question ‘whose values?’.

*Retreat from affirming any particular set of values and throw the emphasis on individual choice*

A different line of argument has been employed by philosophers in response to the observation of the value-laden character of the school curriculum. A number of modern philosophers and philosophers of education have not felt very confident about taking a normative position on, for example what might constitute worthwhile activities or the good life and hence of constructing a curriculum on this basis.

John White, who has written more extensively about curriculum than any philosopher of education in recent times, began his first expedition into this territory (White 1973) by reviewing various philosophical attempts to show why some activities should be regarded as more worthwhile (and more educationally worthwhile) than others, but he failed to find any of them satisfactory. From this he concluded that: “Curriculum planning should not begin from substantive accounts of what the individual must value for its own sake, in the absence of any valid arguments for these. It must begin in agnosticism and subjectivity” (White 1973: 17). But where does such agnosticism leave us with respect to the curriculum?

One answer to this has been that we should allow young people to choose for themselves what they will study (perhaps even whether they study anything at all), and this (with certain limitations) has been the conclusion drawn – and acted upon – by radical educators such as A.S.Neill in his celebrated Summerhill School. Neill argued that “The function of the child is to live his own life, not the life that his anxious parents think he should live, nor a life according to the purpose of the educator who thinks he knows best” (Summerhill School 2016).

*Move from choice to enabling people to have choice and be choosers ... and hence to universalism*

However, the counter-argument to the idea of giving choice to children is that they are not equipped to exercise such choice in an informed and intelligent way. They need to be prepared for such choices. “We cannot give children freedom”, argued Bertrand Russell, “but we can give them a preparation for freedom; and this is what education should do” (Russell 1955). And this twist in the argument is precisely what White employed to justify a compulsory curriculum:

Non-interference ... may well harm the child by restricting his options. The least harmful course we can follow is to equip him, as far as possible, for the ideal situation – to let him determine for himself what the Good shall be for him. To do this we must ensure (a) that he knows about as many activities or ways of life as possible which he may want to choose for their own sake, and (b) that he is able to reflect on priorities among them from the point of view not only of the present moment but as far as possible of his life as a whole. (White 1973: 22)

Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum both employed a not dissimilar argument in their attempts to establish the desirability of certain “capabilities” – knowledge, skills and understanding that people needed to acquire wherever they were in order

to open up the possibilities for choosing and leading the life that they wanted for themselves (Sen 1982; Nussbaum 2000). For Sen these were described in fairly minimal terms; but Nussbaum filled out what she argued to be universal values in ways that have led some critics to question whether what is described is really, as it were, societally neutral, or whether it embodied a set of values and assumptions that was too closely associated with a western liberal democracy.

But is it entirely inappropriate that from a position somewhere (i.e. in our own societies) we may comment critically on what is happening in other societies in a way that suggests that this is inconsistent not only with the values underpinning our own society, but those that should underpin all societies? Is a curriculum or system of schooling that is transmitting, for example gender inequality, racist ideology, worship of political leaders, or violence against those of different faiths merely wrong from a position in a different society that abhors such values but all right in one in which such values are deeply embedded? Or is it simply wrong – full stop? In so far as countries worldwide subscribe to the principle (if not entirely the practice) of universal human rights, does this not give us some purchase on educational values and principles that are shared by – even if they do not actually transcend – different societies? Naïve epistemological and social relativism leads to the dark impasse of ‘post truth’ politics in which not mutual respect for each other’s values (a universalistic principle) but brutal power takes the place of reasonable, let alone rational discussion.

## Control of the Curriculum

I have argued that decisions about the content of the curriculum are inevitably normative in character and that, notwithstanding some attempts to appeal to principles of curriculum selection which transcend particular societies, decisions about what should be included in and what left out of the school curriculum in any particular case remain hotly contested. Such contestation helps to shift the question from one of *what* values should shape the school curriculum to one of *whose* values and where in society the power to determine the curriculum should lie. Again, we are faced with a question that lies clearly within the scope of social and political philosophy. Normative questions still confront us in only slightly different terms.

The options here are very wide-ranging. At one level, one might take the view that decisions about the school curriculum should be taken at national level, if not by government, then by an agency which stands in close proximity to government and is perhaps ultimately under its control. In the UK, for example, the late 1970s and the 1980s saw a movement away from what was close to a curriculum free for all to the development of a national curriculum managed initially through the national Qualifications and Curriculum Development Agency, but with close political attention.

In some contexts responsibility is taken down to school level. Since the 1960s, there has been extensive interest in the notion of school-based curriculum

development. This slightly begs the question, however, as to who speaks for the school: the head teacher and professional staff? the school governors? parents? students? What voice do all or any of these have in school level curriculum development? So what kinds of considerations might lead us to favour one of these centres of power over another?

One set of considerations might be to do with motivation. One might take the view, for example that teachers will work more enthusiastically and with greater commitment if they are teaching a curriculum which they have played a part in designing. This brings us, too, to ethical issues about the place of integrity in teaching and what might be held to be a moral obligation of the teacher to herself and to her pupils to teach only what she honestly believes to be of most value.

A second set of considerations is a pragmatic one associated with the increased social and geographical mobility of populations in some countries and the disruptive experience for children moving from one school to another when there is little consistency or continuity in the curriculum across a country.

A third set of considerations are to do with location of power in a particular society and the ambitions of the powerful. A central government that is trying to drive a country in a particular direction – consolidating national unity; promoting economic competitiveness; establishing peaceful inter-community relationships, etc. – will fairly naturally be drawn to the opportunity provided by a nationally defined curriculum to shape the thinking and values of the new generation. Sometimes the curriculum may be a *response* to the redistribution of power (so that in countries of the former Soviet Union attention shifts from Russian as the main language to a different national language that has previously been marginalised or suppressed); sometimes it is used to help *drive* a redistribution of power, for example by giving new place and new authority to indigenous cultures and languages.

However, the considerations indicated so far mainly invite examination from a psychological or sociological standpoint. The issue of who should control the curriculum becomes more clearly a philosophical matter when it gets linked to questions of people's rights. In practice most of the debate in these terms has focussed on the rights of parents and schools' accountability to this constituency.

There has been a certain amount of philosophical interest in more traditional arguments about parents' rights, paternalistic and non-paternalistic (e.g. Brighouse and Swift 2016), and some discussion by James Conroy (2010) and others of the extreme case of the exercise of parents' rights in the choice which in the context of their work is referred to as home schooling or 'education otherwise' (since the 1944 Education Act in the UK legislated that: "It shall be the duty of the parent of every child of compulsory school age to cause him to receive efficient full-time education suitable to his age, ability, and aptitude, either by regular attendance at school or otherwise").

Consideration of these rights became especially lively against a backdrop of neo-liberal policies associated, in particular, with the Reagan/Thatcher era. With this programme of 'reform' (evangelised across the world by the World Bank) came the construction of an educational market in which schools competed for 'customers' for the most part parents. In such a political climate schools were actively encouraged

to become more diverse in character (you cannot have a market economy if there is only one choice), to publish their results on assessments (like the performance of a company's shares) and to compete against each other for custom (i.e. students) (see Bridges and McLaughlin 1994). There was an important sense in which this ideological programme shifted the discourse from the idea of parents as partners in the education of their children and the development of their curriculum to one in which they were now customers choosing between what others had devised, except that in the UK, to begin with, there was not initially much choice since the same government was specifying in some detail the national curriculum that all schools should follow (see Bridges 2010 for an account of this changing relationship).

Most educational systems today provide for something of a mixture of national and local control of the curriculum, though systems tend to swing one way and then another in balancing these different forces. A lot hangs on the specificity, the granularity or otherwise of the requirements that come from the centre and the scope that this leaves for local, school level initiative and creativity. Recent developments in curriculum policy in Iceland, it has been argued, represent one of the most radical swings in the direction of school level control. Hafþís Ingvarsdóttir describes how six fundamental pillars have been developed which form the foundations for the educational policy: *literacy, sustainability, health, welfare, democracy and human rights, equality and creativity* (Aðalnámskrá/National Curriculum Guide for Upper Secondary Schools, 2011). Schools are given the freedom and power to design their own individual curriculum based on those guidelines. Apart from three defined core subjects individual schools can more or less decide which other subjects to offer and how many credits in each (Ingvarsdóttir 2015).

For philosophers, however, the main focus of discussion has been on the entitlement of the state to regulate the school curriculum, the rights of parents (including their proxy defence of the rights of children), and perhaps some consideration of the role of the teacher and his or her capacity not merely to 'deliver' a curriculum cooked by someone else, but to teach authentically and with integrity what they really believe to be of value.

### ***Knowledge and the Curriculum***

I have focussed so far on the ethical and social questions raised by consideration of the school curriculum, there is, however, another important thread to philosophical consideration of the curriculum and this is rooted in theory of knowledge. Education may not be limited to helping young people to know and understand things, but knowledge and understanding in some shape or form is typically at the core of any curriculum. This prompts not only the evaluative question, 'which knowledge or understanding is of most worth?', but also epistemological questions about the nature, organisation and structure of human understanding and what this might indicate with respect to the nature, organisation and structure of the curriculum.

A lot of questions about the curriculum require some view of what different kinds of knowledge and understanding there might be, a classification of knowledge or what Philip Phenix calls the “architectonics” – “the principles of ordering knowledge into systematic categories” (Phenix 1964:44). Talk of ‘a balanced curriculum’ presupposes a view of what and how many elements are being weighed against each other and their equivalence in terms of the scale of knowledge and understanding involved. Talk of ‘a general education’ implies, similarly, a view of the scope of different kinds of knowledge and understanding that might be encompassed in such generality. Talk of ‘interdisciplinarity’ or ‘curriculum integration’ presuppose some understanding of the different forms of knowledge that might be joined together in either of these ways. In any case, simply to talk about curriculum encompassing ‘knowledge and understanding’ is just too broad and unmanageable: we need to have some way of distinguishing different kinds of knowledge in order to determine what to include and what to leave out and in order to carve up the otherwise overwhelming task of teaching and its time-tabling.

Philosophers through the ages have sought to develop such classificatory systems – and apply them to the design of the curriculum. One structure that was especially influential and enduring (especially as students progressed into higher education) had its roots in Plato’s plans for education in the *Republic*, which evolved as the *Trivium* and *Quadrivium* of the middle ages, which in turn underpinned some of the thinking of the liberal arts tradition in American education where ‘the seven liberal arts’ remain an important point of reference. This provided not just a categorisation of knowledge but also a hierarchy. It took a number of slightly different forms but typically began, at an elementary level with gymnastics, music and ‘letters’; followed by the *Trivium* of grammar, logic and rhetoric; and then the *Quadrivium* of arithmetic, geometry, music and astronomy; from which some continued to the highest level and theology and philosophy.

One modern philosopher of education who provoked especially intense debate about the structure of knowledge and the curriculum was Paul Hirst (1974). Hirst argued that there were certain ‘forms of knowledge’ defined and distinguished by their tests for truth and central or key concepts (Bruner wrote of ‘great organising concepts’). The list of forms of knowledge had a striking resemblance to the list of core subjects to be found in a contemporary, if fairly traditional, school curriculum and was interpreted by some as providing a justification for a rather conservative curriculum based on these categories. There was energetic debate – especially with sociologists of knowledge in the London Institute of Education enthused by the recent publication of Michael Young’s 1971 *Knowledge and Control* – about the standing of these ‘forms’ of knowledge and the extent to which they were in some way necessary and a priori distinctions or, as it were, empirically observable contingent and socially evolved and evolving structures.

Hirst always argued that you could not draw a direct inference from an account of the structure of knowledge alone to a view of how a curriculum should be organised that sought to initiate students into such different ways of knowing. This last step would depend, in particular, on psychological insights into how children best learned such things. Philip Phenix, similarly, warned that “it is not to be assumed

that the architectonics of knowledge is necessarily the same as the architectonics of instruction” (Phenix 1964: 44). There will be a number of different considerations underpinning a list of ‘subjects’ that appear on a school timetable or in a description of the school curriculum, but these will *include* considerations to do with the scope and schematisation of knowledge and understanding.

For some – including some philosophers – categorisation of knowledge and understanding and its division into silos, or ‘little boxes’ as people used to say, became the problem rather than the solution. Knowledge and understanding was not properly conceived in these terms; rather it should be seen as unified, flowing seamlessly from one area to another. Such a view of knowledge and understanding was used to justify “an integrated curriculum” in which subject divisions were discarded; the “integrated day” in which conventional timed periods of instruction were discarded; and the “integrated classroom” through which children could move seamlessly in inquiry that might lead them from mathematics to art to history and via the classroom resources of books, visual aids and equipment on which they would need to draw (Kelly 1982; Bridges 2002).

Richard Pring was among the philosophers who explored the links between philosophical thought and such educational practices. He described one tradition of thought that ran from Hegel via Froebel into philosophy of education and classroom practice, but went on to give fuller attention to the influence of philosophical pragmatism and in particular the work of John Dewey (Pring 1971b).

I am not going to attempt to engage with these arguments here. My point is a more basic and simpler one, which is to illustrate the ways in which philosophically grounded theories of knowledge can shape, and indeed continue to shape, thinking about the school curriculum.

## *Principles of Curriculum Design*

I began by drawing some fairly basic distinctions between different notions of what, more precisely, we are referring to when we talk about the curriculum. Beyond these distinctions, however, there are interestingly different conceptions of a curriculum, each of which carries significant implications for how it might be implemented. While these have been formulated by people who would not necessarily define themselves as philosophers, they represent, nevertheless, philosophies of curriculum understood not so much in terms of aims and content but the character and standing of the prescription. There are many such conceptions or ‘models’, but in this space I shall simply contrast two highly influential but starkly different approaches.

Edward Thorndike’s major opus, *Educational Psychology* published in 1913, brought behaviourist psychology and scientific measurement to bear to programmes of instruction. His view of education and the curriculum reflected the industrial age from which it emanated and its processes of production:

Education is a form of human engineering and it will profit from measurements of human nature and achievement as mechanical and electrical engineering have profited by using the foot, pound, calorie, volt and ampere. (Thorndike 1913:1)

When Winslow Taylor’s scientific theory of management of production (Taylor 1911) was added to Thorndike’s behaviourist psychology, the curriculum became, as William Pinar et al. describe it: “the assembly line by which economically and socially useful citizens would be produced” (Pinar et al. 1995).

This conceptualisation of the curriculum continued to evolve through the twentieth century with contributions including Bobbitt’s (1918) approach to task analysis and was brought together in Ralph Tyler’s *Basic Principles of Curriculum and Instruction* (1949) described by Pinar et al. as “the single most influential curriculum text ever written” (Pinar et al. 1995:148). Basically, what Tyler offered was “a linear, administrative structure for curriculum development” (ibid) with four main steps:

1. The selection and definition of learning objectives
2. The selection and creation of learning experiences
3. The organisation of learning experiences to achieve the maximum effect
4. The evaluation of the curriculum with a view to subsequent revision

Key to the model in its subsequent development and implementation was the expression of what was to be learned in the form of learning objectives and, more particularly, these were to be described in terms of the behaviours that students might demonstrate at the end of the learning process. Benjamin Bloom stepped in at this point to offer an extremely influential “taxonomy of learning objectives” (Bloom 1956), which, notwithstanding pretty devastating critique by philosophers Hugh Sockett (1971) and Richard Pring (1971a) among others, re-surfaces to this day. I most recently re-encountered it in the context of planning for a new curriculum in Kazakhstan (Bridges 2014). Teaching and learning was then, as it were, backward engineered from these behaviours and processes and designed to take students through from the raw material of their current understanding to the end product. Because the end product was expressed in behavioural terms, it was a comparatively easy process then to ‘measure’ how successful the production process had been and to use this evidence to improve the process of production (i.e. teaching and learning).

This concept of the curriculum has been criticised on a number of grounds, most of them challenging some part or another of assimilation of educational processes with those of industrial production. These included the objections that:

- Important learning objectives cannot be expressed as behaviours’ – consequently...
- Not all important learning outcomes can be ‘measured’ in the way supposed in this model;
- What children learn from properly educational experience is – and should be – much less predictable and controllable than this model supposes, and by extension, therefore...



- Evaluating learning simply by reference to planned/ intended outcomes blinds one to other outcomes (desirable and undesirable) that may not have been intended.
- More fundamentally, there is something rather inappropriate and distasteful about conceiving of children and their education as elements of an industrial production line.

Of course, there has been much more to the debate than I have described here, but I hope that this is sufficient to illustrate, first, a distinctive concept of the curriculum, its design and operation, which is independent of questions of the scope of its actual content; and, secondly, the way important philosophical debates – in this case, debates about behaviourism and about the application of technocratic models in educational settings – enter into the question of how we should describe a curriculum.

One important response to the debate about behavioural objectives, etc. was provided by Lawrence Stenhouse (who, incidentally, acknowledged a debt to Richard Peters' philosophical writing about the process of education). Stenhouse was at the time directing a curriculum development project focussed on the teaching of controversial issues in schools, and this was in a context of 'raising the school leaving age' in the UK, so there was a new generation of students who were going to be obliged to stay on at school for an extra year until they were 16. The Humanities Curriculum Project (HCP) as it was called adopted an approach to learning which had (at least) three innovative features:

- Group discussion rather than instruction was to be the medium of learning
- This would be based on a rich range of resources to which students could refer
- The teacher would act as a procedurally neutral chair i.e. he or she would manage the social process of discussion but not seek to direct or lead students to any particular opinion on the matters under discussion.

(Schools Council/Nuffield Humanities Project 1970)

These proposals stimulated much and heated among teachers and philosophers (see, for example, the debate about the neutral teacher running through Elliott (1971), Bailey (1971) and Stenhouse (1972)), which I shall not enter here. My point is that Stenhouse's approach to curriculum development challenged existing models and especially the behavioural objectives model illustrated above. For a start, the 'learning outcomes' from a genuinely free and open discussion were quite unpredictable and likely to be different from student to student. Instead the curriculum designer had to be satisfied with 'aims' (e.g. developing students' understanding of the controversy), a characteristic of which is that they could be satisfied in a variety of different ways. This carried implications for the evaluation of the curriculum, which had to be open to unintended as well as intended effects and which had not only to observe students but to listen to them and their accounts of their learning.

But another and enduring contribution of Stenhouse to curriculum development and teaching was his insistence (often to the irritation of teachers) that he had ‘nothing to recommend’. This was not quite true, but, as Nigel Norris put it: “Curriculum development was, for Stenhouse, quintessentially an experiment and curricula were hypotheses to be tested by teachers in classrooms” (Norris 2008:5). The final arbiter in relation to the acceptability or otherwise of any curriculum development was the teacher, and this implied that the teacher had also to take responsibility for testing, researching and evaluating what actually happened in the classroom and what students were actually getting out of their experience. And this, of course gave impetus to the development of the idea of classroom action research, an element of the Humanities Curriculum Project carried forward as a philosophical as well as empirical research practice by John Elliott, who was one of its members (Elliott 1998).

So if one conception of the curriculum evoked an industrial production line, Stenhouse’s presents the curriculum and the classroom as a research site and one, moreover, in which philosophical reflection about aims, values and procedural principles has a place alongside empirical inquiry. I have no doubt in my mind which better reflects the spirit of a properly *educational* enterprise.

...

‘Curriculum’ is a huge area of educational inquiry and practice, and it is one that draws on philosophical considerations and raises philosophical questions at almost every turn. I have rehearsed primarily the kind of issues that have dominated philosophical inquiry over the last few decades, though my references to Plato, Rousseau, Dewey, etc. indicate that, perhaps the most important questions, especially fundamental questions about how and into what we should bring up the next generation of children, are recycled generation after generation.

Such questions will no doubt remain with us, but contemporary developments will no doubt contribute to the reframing of our answers, and these invite further philosophical consideration. The spectacular developments in the generation, storage, retrieval, management and communication of information of all sorts are already impacting (too slowly perhaps) on the kind of knowledge that young people need to acquire and the skills they will need to handle it: the epistemological bases of the curriculum are surely challenged. Globalisation and the mass movement of populations – and the reaction of populist administrations to these developments – must surely impact on the requirements for young people to acknowledge and accommodate their lives to a dramatic diversity of cultures and challenge traditional identities. And the development of massive industries supporting multimedia online resources for learning combined with easy access to these resources by young people wherever they may be must challenge the situatedness of a curriculum within the context of time bounded school attendance and the possibility of containing this curriculum within any pre-specified frame of reference. We can be assured, I think, that there will remain plenty of philosophical questions to be explored relating to the curriculum of the future.

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# The Practice of Educational Research



Alis Oancea

## Background: The Tensional Character of Educational Research

The history of educational research<sup>1</sup> (see e.g. Nisbet 1999, on Scotland; Condliffe Lagemann 2000, on the United States; Richardson 2002, on the United Kingdom; Jover and Rabazas 2009, on Spain) reveals complex and discontinuous relationships with state-funded educational provision, on the one hand, and with institutional arrangements for other areas of inquiry (in particular, the social sciences and the humanities), on the other. The effervescence around the study of education at the turn of the nineteenth century set out the scene for a hybrid, “go-between” field, tensioned by different disciplinary, practical and political interests and “whose emblematic figures are characterized by an astonishing ‘multipositionality’ – that is, simultaneously reformist, manager, expert and scientist” (Hoffstetter and Schneuwly 2004, p. 589). In the United Kingdom, Richardson (2002: 47) argued that the engagement of education researchers with the government had been fraught with political “hostilities”, compounded by internal “fissures” between different intellectual choices about what should count as educational research and what its purposes ought to be.

These complicated relationships are evidenced by the long history of controversy surrounding education research. Critical exchanges about educational research, in the United Kingdom (reviewed in Oancea 2005) and elsewhere, have centred around its quality and rigour, relevance and impact, organisation, ambition and resourcing.

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<sup>1</sup>I will use the term ‘educational’ throughout this chapter, but see it as an inclusive term, covering both research about education, and research for the advancement and critical challenge of educational activities, settings, relationships and modes of scholarship.

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Indeed, there are few aspects of educational research as a field of inquiry and as a university subject that have not been subjected to intense criticism. To some extent, this is a feature that education research shares with other social science and humanities disciplines, whose efforts to explore areas of human experience that are complex and indeterminate have been challenged in global higher education systems increasingly characterised by economic and labour-market indicators and by the effort to quantify research and learning as transactions between providers and consumers of knowledge. There are also more specific drivers for these debates, in particular the relationship between research and professional practice in education, as institutionalised in different forms of teacher education provision, and the malleability of school-based educational provision to government intervention and ideological reframing, which makes it a hot arena for political point scoring.

The United Kingdom is particularly rich in both criticisms of education research (see Oancea 2005) and inquiries into its state, conditions and prospects. The Strategic Forum for Research on Education (SFRE), a national initiative that reviewed educational research across the four countries of the United Kingdom through a combination of commissioned work and stakeholder consultative events, concluded in 2010 that the prospects for research in the four countries were shaped in distinctive ways by their educational, political, social and economic contexts. In England, the report of the Forum (Pollard and Oancea 2010) noted that the large scale of the system, combined with pressures to compete rather than collaborate and with changing political priorities, had created a context in which much of the “collective potential” for productive interactions between research, policy and practice was still “locked” (p. 44). Similar conclusions, although from different premises, applied to other parts of the United Kingdom – and their longer-term implications were yet to “become apparent” (p.17).

One outcome of the SFRE was to highlight the need for a more systematic effort to gather and interpret data that can support a more reflective and mature stage in the development of the field. A working group jointly commissioned by the British Educational Research Association and the Universities Council for Teacher Education (Christie et al. 2012) scrutinised some of the data available and concluded that a combination of demographic trends among education researchers, radical changes in the research funding system, and “destabilising” changes in the organisation of teacher education had created an “especially daunting environment” for educational research, particularly in English higher education institutions (p. 34). The “perfect storm” (p. 9) imagery favoured by the working group chimes with that of Furlong (2013), who noted that recent “seismic changes” in English university-based education research had led to a “particularly bleak” position of faculties and departments of education.

The impact of such changes, should the three reports mentioned above be correct in their judgment, may not have been fully apparent yet in the outcomes of the 2014 Research Excellence Framework (REF), the latest instalment in the quinquennial exercise for the assessment of research quality, impact and environment in UK higher education institutions. The sub-panel report for the field of education (REF 2015) praised the “considerable improvement in research quality” (p. 104) across

the field since the previous assessment in 2008, with 93% of activity judged as being of international standard and above. However, the panel also noted that this outcome had been achieved on the back of contraction in the size of the education submissions to the REF and of concentration of expertise in “small [disciplinary and methodological] pockets” (p. 105), thus showing an “increasingly selective” (p. 103) and “increasingly competitive arena” (p. 113) for educational research.

Oancea and Mills (2015a) looked at historical trends in research capacity and finding in English educational research and noted a consistent drop in both staff numbers and research income, particularly from national government sources. The drop was further highlighted by the comparison with the more stable patterns identified in other disciplines (Business and Psychology). Overall, the report described a field at a “critical juncture” and facing “a period of insecurity, uncertainty and restructuring” (Oancea and Mills 2015b, p. 27). An ongoing joint inquiry by the British Academy and Royal Society (Royal Society/British Academy 2016) builds on this work to explore the opportunities and challenges for education research to transform educational practice and policy, in a context of growing demand but shrinking capacity for research.

Although the national contexts vary, the trends and debates surrounding educational research in the United Kingdom echo those in other systems: they are a symptom of a historical moment more than a geographical pattern. For example, Foss Lindblad and Lindblad (2016) describe Swedish education research in terms of a changing system of expansion and contraction, characterised by increased competition for external resources, intensified research activities, multi-disciplinarity and fragmentation – all in tension with incentives to collaborate. In what they see as “harsher” conditions for academic work, they warn of the risk of “strategic over-adjustment in educational research relative to governing practices” (p. 8).

In Australia, a 2012 report by Seddon et al. used data from the first two rounds of Excellence in Research for Australia, the Australian exercise for the assessment of research quality, to explore “the topography of Australian educational research” (p. 1). The report was triggered by the outcomes of the first two exercises, in particular the overall judgment in 2010 that the performance of research in the field of education was “below world standard” (p.5). The study identified changes in the landscape and ecology of educational research over the past decade, including diversification of purposes, of “knowledge-building practices” (p. 4), and of the institutional organisation of research beyond its historical roots in teacher education-focused faculties in higher education institutions.

Jointly, tensions and controversies such as those outlined above keep educational research under constant questioning within the societal, institutional and disciplinary landscapes in which it is practiced today. What counts as research, and for whom? Is research anything more than a form of labour? What is the role of methodological theory? Is there enough family resemblance among the wide diversity of approaches to inquiry in, and for, education, to give meaning to the notion of ‘educational research’? Does research in education need to be distinctively ‘educational’ – and in what sense? Such questions have led me towards an argument for the consideration of educational research as a form of practice, outlined in the remainder of this chapter.



## Educational Research as Practice

One of the perennial disputes around the value and status of educational research centres on the notion of theory and how it relates to educational practice. These disputes have been particularly lively in the context of reforming teacher education provision. For example, a key aim of the Teacher Education Ministerial Advisory Group in Australia (TEMAG 2014) was to address “the apparent disconnection between theory and practice” (p. 30) that marred some programmes of pre-service teacher education, by identifying “better ways to integrate the theory and practice components of initial teacher education” (p. v). In England, the final report of the wide-ranging British Educational Research Association – Royal Society of Arts review of teacher education noted that “practice” would benefit from seeing research not merely “as a body of knowledge”, but as “a professional learning process” (Furlong 2014: 18). In Scotland, the well-received Donaldson (2011) review of teacher education had also argued that teacher education “require[d] a more integrated relationship between theory and practice, between the academic and the practitioner, between the provider of teacher education and the school”. The US Department of Education warned against practical training as merely an “add on semester after years of instruction in educational theory” (US DoE 2011, p. 7).

Even in the most thoughtfully phrased policy and guidance documents or position papers and reports on teacher education, the case for the key contribution of higher education to teacher education is often made purely in terms of their ability to co-site teacher education programmes and educational research. While there is clear merit to emphasising the importance of the nexus practice-theory, rather than simply positing teaching as a-theoretical, such arguments rest on questionable assumptions.

First, they see educational practice and theory as conceptually and ontologically distinct, as two separate realms, the gap between which needs to be bridged through the mediation work of teacher educators. There is a certain voluptuousness in the hot notion of practice as messy, low, particular, concrete, contingent and embodied action (Schön 1987), particularly when contrasted with a cool imagery of theory as orderly, high, universal, abstract, context-free and impersonal contemplation (O’Connor 1957; Suppes 1974). This contrast rehearses long-standing distinctions between *theoria* and *praxis*, but without the effort that Aristotle and his philosophical followers have put into connecting them together into an account of human rationality, action and flourishing. As Carr (1987: 620) puts it, this oppositional view can be shown to be untenable by breaking down each of its twin implications “that all practice is non-theoretical and all theory is non-practical”.

The oppositional view results in a topography of practice and theory as bounded institutionally: practice is what happens in transactions among teachers and learners, largely occurring in specialised educational institutions (schools, colleges, universities); whilst theory is the specialist work of researchers in centres, institutes and laboratories, many of which are higher education-based. As a consequence, transitional activities such as practitioner research or researcher development are

given an uncomfortable position, which oscillates between being dismissed as neither practical nor theoretical enough, and being hailed as the solution for research-informed educational practice. It doesn't take a lot of effort to see the problems with this division of labour, the potential circularity of definitions aside. Institutional topography is a very limiting device for differentiating between practice and theory and it breaks down easily in the face of the complex entanglements of both with policy and with the wider political, cultural and societal norms, values and ideals that frame their realisation. Despite the generous sentiment behind making a case for the value of research in teacher education in these terms, the 'bridging' (or 'complementarity') metaphor and its associated topography ends up being more divisive than unifying.

Second, even if theory and practice were discrete, many of these arguments make a further questionable assumption in equating educational research to theory and educational activity with practice (and in particular, with *praxis*). In doing so, they operate a double restriction. On the one hand, they elevate research to a realm of abstraction and generalisability shared in different ways by all areas of science and inquiry; but a consequence of this elevation is to limit the potential of research to be "educational" (Whitty 2006) in any way that is comparable to the "educational"-ness commonly attributed to rationally (including morally) defensible teaching activities – i.e., to be intrinsically conducive to growth of experience and to human flourishing (Elliott 2006: 169, describes it as "a form of democratic rationality"). Another consequence is to overlook the diversity of forms of educational research and their varying theoretical aims, from explanation, prediction, understanding or description, to emancipation, change, disruption or subversion, while also brushing over vast swathes of educational research that is deemed "theoretically innocent" (Stenhouse 1981: 110). On the other hand, these assumptions anchor practice exclusively in situational and embodied labour, guided by accepted social norms and technical prescription and by the substance of the other practices into which it helps initiate the learners, but not by systematic understanding of itself – the teacher as a sort of *paedagogus laborans*, to paraphrase Arendt. MacIntyre (in MacIntyre and Dunne 2002) goes as far as referring to teaching as a set of skills in the service of other socially established cooperative activities that, unlike teaching, would be better qualified to be recognised as practices because they have 'goods' or standards of excellence that are internal to that form of activity.

This second set of assumptions thus articulates the distinction between educational practice and educational research in cultural and pedagogical terms, rather than institutional. They imply that the key difference between research (as theory) and practice (as *praxis*) is in their relative epistemological and pedagogical purchase on understanding and enabling education. Unsurprisingly, this way of conceptualising educational practice opens it to challenges that the notion of 'evidence-based practice' is incapable to addressing, partly because the hard dualism theory/practice renders that notion itself artificial and epistemologically weak.

None of the assumptions noted above is particularly new, perhaps with the exception of the stronger policy investment in the notion of evidence-based practice in the last two decades. More recent work attempting to move the debate on includes that

by Biesta (2007), Higgins (2011), Oancea and Furlong (2007), and the contributors to Smeyers and Depaepe (2006), Bridges et al. (2009) or Heilbronn and Foreman-Peck (2015). For example, Biesta (2007, p. 295) notes that questioning and rethinking the relationship between education research and practice may be “an endemic feature of the field of education” and acknowledges that there are different ways in which research may contribute to practice, not only technologically, but also culturally. Higgins (2011) shares with Biesta a strongly sceptical take on notions of educational practice ‘based’ on evidence from intervention research, while arguing for reflective teaching practice and for a notion of education as an ongoing conversation among theorists, practitioners, and theorist/practitioners. Smeyers and Depaepe (2006) also worry about reducing the relationship between research and practice to that between an ‘evidence base’ and its application, while recognising that educational research itself is both a social and a discursive practice.

Such arguments suggest that rather than meander down dualistic paths, it may be more fruitful to start from an acceptance of the polyvalent character of both teaching and research. Both teaching and research join together the reasoned exercise of skill and the normative enactment of virtue, and as such are forms of practice, as well as being sites for the generation and circulation of explanatory knowledge and understanding, albeit realised distinctively in each. They thus meet at the synergy between *theoria*, *praxis* and *poiesis*. The practice of research, like that of teaching, consists of an array of human activities (Schatzki et al. 2001, p. 11) that involve the systematic flexing of thought and language, as well as the reflective use of tools to control the contingencies of everyday activity, and the exercise of virtues in ways that consider other practices and those involved with them. This is a point that has long been recognised in relation to scientific practice; the point of contention in relation to (laboratory) science is often not whether it is a form of practice at all, albeit with multiple component activities, but whether it hangs together as a single practice or as multiple culturally and sociologically definable practices.

### *The Systematic Flexing of Inquisitive Thought*

Key to research as practice are its **socially established purposes**, those of pursuing knowledge for both instrumental and non-instrumental reasons. The articulation of these purposes may vary, with many inclined to defend the value of research as the pursuit of knowledge for its own extension, while others are sanguine about the practical or policy relevance and applicability of research findings beyond the institutional environments of research itself. The language in which we routinely speak of research (in particular, of empirical research) is testament to the teleological understanding we share of it *qua* social practice: the researchers formulate ‘objectives’, ‘research questions’, and ‘hypotheses’, ‘collect’ ‘data’, employ ‘methods’ and ‘instruments’, generate ‘findings’, and achieve ‘impacts’. This language is culturally and historically framed and has become institutionalised in research governance and management rituals.

One of the most cited definitions of education research in Anglo-Saxon contexts is the “minimal” formulation proposed by Stenhouse (1981, pp. 103–111): research is systematic inquiry that is subject to both conscientious self-criticism and collegial critical discourse. This definition makes research a matter of both quest (for something) and question (of something and someone) – both terms sharing an etymological root with inquiry. It places specific demands on the **process** of research; it requires its practitioners to be systematic, that is, to use a strategy patiently and persistently in order to pursue the key drivers of curiosity and desire to understand and act. The expectation to be systematic is often taken in research methodology textbooks in a purely procedural sense, to mean planning and documenting in as much detail as possible the procedures for inquiry, anticipating the operational choices to be made and the decision paths and criteria, as well as applying these plans as consistently as possible across the different instances of research.

This interpretation may, however, be unduly restrictive: it may fit research synthesis and experimental designs, for example, better than it does ethnography or exploratory critical research. What seems to be more important across the different forms of research, above and beyond this thin procedural sense, is being systematic or ‘methodical’ as an epistemic disposition towards both task-at-hand (seeking and asking) and the subject matter: for example, putting sustained effort into clarifying initial beliefs, discarded alternatives, points for suspending judgment and pre-theoretic epistemic attitudes; making an active attempt to give due consideration to the multiple facets, elements and depths of a problem; considering different forms of testimony and evidence and the grounds for taking them on board with different levels of confidence; being meticulous in describing to others the paths taken and the reasons for making specific choices wherever a fork in the path became apparent to you, thus exposing your choices to judgments about whether they were reasonable or well-made in that particular situation. As epistemic disposition, being systematic is amenable to propositional formulation and doxastic justification, and open to epistemic evaluation.

Stenhouse also emphasises a “sceptical temper of mind sustained by critical principles” (1981, p. 103). His notion of conscientious self-criticism is both epistemic and ethical: it again points to a disposition that goes above methodological specifications to counter “temptations of interest” (p. 109), abuses of power and abstruseness of jargon. But research requires also a cultural community that can subject it to public criticism and scrutinise its empirical testing, forms of evidence, and argumentation. Following Gramsci (1967), Stenhouse places his faith in collegial criticism as a defence against dilettantism, prolixity, improvisation and declamation. For Ryle (1949, p. 41), the value of collegial checks resides not in any prior theoretical agreements about what counts as (good) research, but in the practically formative role of criticism and example. Others place that faith in collegial scrutiny informed by agreed principles or standards. Current debates around the quality and trustworthiness of peer review, for example, seem to have prompted increased efforts to articulate and agree not only demarcation criteria between research and other forms of scholarly and educational activities, but also criteria and rules by which to arrive at fine-grained judgments about the extent to which a particular

piece of research fits some **standard** of ‘good practice’ and ‘good’ output and outcome of research. It is easy in this aspiration to let the reasoned quest for consensus overshadow the intuition of value in diversity. This was one of the tensions that underpinned the work reported in Oancea and Furlong (2007, p. 16) and led us then to argue forcefully for a move away from “purely managerial and instrumental frameworks” towards “ongoing conversations about modes of knowledge and rationality”.

Looking back at MacIntyre’s (1981) notion of practice, a further feature of research (not only in education) transpires. A strong tradition of research, particular in the sciences, has seen it as an internally coherent self-regulating activity, driven by distinctive epistemic motivations and dispositions, and realising intrinsically worthwhile knowledge ‘goods’ that were internal to itself and in accordance with its own standards of excellence – in other words, as a practice in MacIntyre’s sense. This tradition is one of the sources of disquiet about educational research, a large part of which is externally (albeit not necessarily instrumentally) oriented. Smith (2003) responds to a similar challenge levelled at teaching by pointing to the purposiveness of all educational activity as a distinctive feature of its internal standards of excellence. The same argument can be applied to educational research: the suffix ‘-al’ is not a demarcation criterion to separate educative from non-educative inquiry, but a marker of a **hospitable attitude towards educative purposiveness** in research.

### *The Reflective Use of Tools*

The recent ascension of assessment technologies in the governance of research comes with a strong push to redefine its standards of excellence in the light of an externally determined notion of ‘performance’. The notion of research performance rests on the treatment of research not as a social practice in the sense outlined above, but as a form of labour (in a nod to this discourse, the term “research labour” is used in Seddon et al. 2012, p. 4, for example). Researcher *laborans* is expected to deliver a certain number of ‘outputs’ that are deemed to be over a ‘threshold’ of ‘quality’ determined through ‘metrics’ and ‘indicators’ such as the journal impact factor or the personal h-index (both widely seen as crude measures of academic popularity). In many systems, performance along these measures is linked to financial and other forms of reward (such as promotion, recognition or even permission to survive and practice in a resource-thirsty and competitive environment). Not only do technologies of performance of this kind incentivise the instrumentalisation of research practice in the service of externally defined objectives, but through the accretion of artificial indicators they also operate a rupture between internal and external standards of excellence in research practice. The various reports discussing the implications of assessment exercises for educational research, mentioned in the introduction to this chapter, often signal the problems of reconciling internal accounts of good practice (which, for example, can emphasise the nexus between research and

teaching in education faculties and department, the relationship with teacher education, and the professional exchanges with teachers) with the outcomes of an assessment process that combines publication ratings and a selection of environment and impact indicators but largely excludes the pedagogical value of research for an institution's own staff, students and graduates.

There is, however, an additional sense in which technique matters in educational research, which references the methods and instruments deployed in its conduct. The conclusions of research can be well or poorly grounded in the evidence considered, and strongly or weakly warranted by the inferences made from it (see Bridges et al. 2009). How that evidence was generated and used and how the inferences were drawn matters to both the level of confidence to be placed in these conclusions and claims, and the practical consequences of investing credence in them. There is thus an important technical core to educational research as a practice (both empirically and non-empirically) that deals with the **reasonableness, trustworthiness and rigour** of all its procedures, and with the refinement of the skills necessary to carry out and innovate these procedures. The researcher depends on her reflective mastery of these skills and on her knowledge of the rationales for carrying out specific procedures in order to control the contingencies of the particular situation in which she carries out her craft.

The account of research as practice I have offered so far has left open the question of the role of the theory of research – its philosophy, sociology and methodology. Ryle (1949) makes the observation that “efficient practice precedes the theory of it” (p. 31), rather than being its “client” (p. 30). By that token, **methodological theory** (and indeed other forms of theorization about research) has an iterative relationship with the practice it purports to summarise and systematise. As such, it is partly dependent on the pre-theoretical and a-theoretical elements of that practice, and partly on ongoing, live theorization of it. Induction into research practice, thus, is both a matter of methodological and philosophical training, and one of acculturation and practicing (in the mundane sense of repetition and exercise) through intelligent apprenticeship.

### *The Considerate Exercise of Virtues*

Stenhouse's definition of research places demands not only on the procedures for conducting inquiry, but also on the attitudes and qualities which its practitioners are expected to exhibit, including being open, transparent and humble (see Pring 2001). These qualities – or virtues – are the preamble of critical engagement with research, both internally, as deliberation relative to the standards of research as a practice, and externally, in conversation with others' purposive interpretations of it. The practice of research is thus **deliberative** and **conversational**.

But the exercise of epistemic (such as openness) and ethical (such as integrity) virtues is itself bounded by the normative context within which practices unfold and are recognised as such. Rather than being simply repetitive or routinized patterns of

behaviour, practices are **normative** (as both Wittgenstein 1953, and Heidegger 1963 may tell us); they involve the constant making of judgments and invoking of standards on the background of culturally grounded and temporally fluid forms of life. I mentioned above the controversies around the notion of ‘good research’: these controversies arise from the culturally grounded and changing character of the norms for correct (or not) research practice and for its appropriate (or inappropriate) appreciation that may be shared by research practitioners and their conversational partners within and outside their immediate scholarly communities. Thus normativity is constitutive of practices, as they play out and are interpreted and reinterpreted responsively *qua* practices, through consideration of not only internal norms, but those of other practices. What counts as an instance of research and what is valued as an instance of good research is a matter of interpretation by specific agents situated in particular cultural, temporal and political contexts.

Virtuous educational research practice is thus not only research that extends growth or enables human flourishing by sanctioning actions that accord with its internal standards of excellence. It is also research that is **considerate** of other practices – like teaching, learning, educational policy, other forms of inquiry – and of their norms of educative-ness. Being considerate of other practices is both a blessing and a curse: education research puts itself constantly at stake, and in so doing it creates the conditions for both keeping itself in healthy check, and inviting potentially destabilising controversy.

## Conclusions

In this chapter, I have sketched out a notion of educational research practice as an array of human activities which combines the *systematic flexing of inquisitive thought*, the *reflective use of tools*, and the *considerate exercise of virtues*. This notion of practice is intended to strike a balance across discussions of theory, methodology and action in education that have been divisive and restrictive for far too long, while acknowledging that it’s more of a case of equilibrium than one of ontic or conceptual unity. A key point about this notion of research practice is that it is not fixed. The internal standards and external cultural framings and social expectations for educational research and for its cognate practices, including educational practices, change over time and across space. The tools and instruments of research are also subject to change, for example through technological development but also through shifts in the ethical and political milieux within which these technologies are deployed. The normative fabric against which judgments are made and conversations are struck in research may also fold and fall in different ways. Although it’s fair to speak of ‘traditions’ given the history of educational research in different contexts, those traditions do not hold it captive.

As argued in this chapter, the socio-historical, disciplinary and political make-up of the field of educational research thus account for its tensional character, spanning: academic vs. professional aims; social scientific vs. humanistic epistemological



or ontological affinities; mono- vs. multi- disciplinary forms of organisation; and attributions of low vs. high professional status. These tensions may seem particularly marked within the ethos of contestation that characterises today's neoliberal democracies, but have surrounded the development of education as a field of study from its early days (Oancea 2014).

Many of the inquiries into the status and the future prospects for education research mentioned in this chapter end with a note of caution about the challenges facing the field in the medium term, such as: retrenchment, due to tighter and more concentrated funding and to the weakening of the traditional supply and demand relationships underpinning teacher education; fragmentation, due to the ascension of performance-based governing of research; and trivialisation, due to pressures towards politically defined relevance. But the scenarios of doom don't always take into account the notion that, as a practice, educational research is not static, but flexes and adapts itself to changing educational, societal and geopolitical circumstances; and it does so systematically, reflectively and considerately.

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# Rival Conceptions of Religious Education



John Tillson

## Introduction

In this chapter, religious education will be understood in the broadest sense as formative influence with respect to religious beliefs and attitudes on the one hand and beliefs about religion and attitudes towards it on the other. Religious education in this broadest of senses is ubiquitous, taking place in the home, in formal education (whether as part of a discrete school subject or diffused across the curriculum), and in the wider public arena (such as through media representations). It is important to note that influence of this sort can be systematic, ad hoc, aims-based, aimless, outcomes-focused, process-focused, incidental, intentional, unintentional, and much else besides. For the purpose of this chapter I will narrow the scope to a concern with the deliberate and sustained formative influence on children with respect to religions. Such influence could be anti-religious, pro-religious, or (so I will contend) neutral about the value of religion. For anyone at any time in which there exists at least one religion, it is possible for them to be influenced with respect to that religion. In this domain, the most general normative question is this: how ought children to be influenced with respect to religions? Call this the ‘Basic Question’.

We should distinguish between answers that can be given to the Basic Question on the one hand, and how answers are to become turned into policy on the other, call this the ‘Procedural Question’. The Procedural Question asks what decision-making methods we should have for deciding and establishing policy. For it is always possible that there is an ideal answer to the Basic Question that some magistrate knows, but that they might use illegitimate means to establish that answer as enforceable public policy. The sorts of answers to the Procedural Question that one ought to weigh up are forms of democratic decision making, and forms of deference to established experts. In this chapter we, for reasons of space restriction, must bracket the

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Procedural Question and instead discuss the forms that the Basic Question can take and the sorts of ways it might be answered. More fundamental still than the Basic Question is the question of what counts as a religion at all. Call this the 'Foundational Question'.

In order to give sense to the 'religion' part of 'religious education', the section of the chapter entitled 'What is a religion?' considers a variety of approaches to the Foundational Question. This includes surveying a variety of definitions, as well as doubts as to whether producing a definition is either possible or desirable. The section entitled, '[Religion as an international phenomenon](#)' discusses how religion, as understood on any of the definitions considered, must be regarded as an international phenomenon. The section entitled, '[The aims of religious education](#)' argues that while the Basic Question can be posed in any human society at any time, different issues are raised by the question for different kinds of societies. The sections entitled, '[The aims of religious education in homogenous theocracies](#)' and '[The aims of religious education in pluralist, liberal democracies](#)' consider the differences in the kinds of issues that arise in asking the question within homogenous theocracies on the one hand and those that arise in asking it within pluralist, liberal democracies on the other. The section entitled, '[Debatable aims of religious education](#)' begins by distinguishing between three kinds of debates regarding the Basic Question. The first concerns what sorts of religious education ought to be legally permissible and which if (any) ought to be legally impermissible. The second concerns what sorts of religious education (if any) are morally impermissible and which if (any) are morally obligatory. The third concerns what sort of religious education, if any, ought to be funded or provided by the State.

The rest of the chapter focuses on questions of moral entitlement. The section entitled, '[Debatable aims of religious education](#)' considers some answers to the basic question as the question arises in pluralist liberal democracies. The section entitled, '[The possibility of a religiously neutral upbringing and education](#)' turns to discuss the vexed question of whether religiously neutral upbringings are possible, defending the view that they are. The sections entitled, '[Against learning from, in favour of learning about religion](#)' and, '[Religious education without aims](#)' then return to the task of appraising answers to the Basic Question. '[Against learning from, in favour of learning about religion](#)' critically discusses the popular aim of 'learning from religion'. It is contended that taking religions to be a source of knowledge is too epistemically contentious to presuppose in any primary or secondary educational learning objective. Finally, after critically discussing an array of outcomes based on answers to the Basic Question, '[Religious education without aims](#)' considers the possibility that religious education need not aim at any particular outcomes. The chapter finishes with a summary of topics discussed and a short description of six additional topics of interest which could not be discussed for reasons of length.

## What Is a Religion?

How are we to discern between religion and non-religion? What makes for the appropriate subject matter, or object of study within religious education? Could Marxism, Maoism, Scientology, Spiritualism, or Jediism be included, for instance? At the start of Lecture II in *The Varieties of Religious Experience*, William James seems to suggest that an essentialist definition cannot, in principle, be provided to capture the range of phenomena that are claimed to be religious:

the very fact that there are so many [definitions] and [that they are] so different from one another is enough to prove that the word 'religion' cannot stand for any single principle or essence, but is rather a collective name [...] Let us not fall immediately into a one-sided view of our subject, but let us rather admit freely at the outset that we may very likely find no one essence, but many characters which may alternately be equally important in religion. (James 2008, p. 28)

Paradoxically, he follows this up with a quite promising essentialist definition at the start of Lecture III.<sup>1</sup> However, some contemporary philosophers, including David E. Cooper, Michael Hand, and Brian Leiter, have offered informative and plausible definitions of religions that I shall discuss below. Others have tried to argue that religion resists succinct and elegant definition and is best understood as a family resemblance concept in the way that Wittgenstein understood the concept of 'game'. Encouraging us to 'look and see' (2009, *PI* 66), Wittgenstein's *Philosophical Investigations* convinced many people that, on inspection, the concept of 'game' failed to have necessary and sufficient conditions of application (concluding that none existed when none were found). Applying this Wittgensteinian understanding, Peter Byrne, Benson Saler, and Ninian Smart have all attempted to give family resemblance analyses of 'Religion' (Smart 1973; Saler 1993; Byrne 1998, 1989). Partially sympathetic to their view, Timothy Fitzgerald conceded that any "essentialist definition of religion such as 'belief in God or gods'" must be "too parochially tied to Judaeo-Christian theistic origins of the word", and that a Wittgensteinian family resemblance analysis promises "a distinctive role for religion as a universally applicable analytical concept" (Fitzgerald 1996, p. 215). However, he objects that on such an analysis the concept of 'religion' "becomes so indefinite that the word ceases to pick out any distinctive aspect of human culture" (Ibid). He recommends that we do away with the term religion and look to other more universal anthropological categories. Wittgensteinian analysis would yield motley kinds, disjunctive definitions or tick lists (as mental health checklists do), but any such analysis would indicate that our concept had not locked onto a very basic or interesting phenomenon at all. However, we should indeed follow Wittgenstein's advice and 'look and see' whether a decent essentialist definition may be forthcoming before concluding that one does not exist. I will now survey some promising options but will not attempt or pretend to decide between them.

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<sup>1</sup> There he says: "Were one asked to characterize the life of religion in the broadest and most general terms possible, one might say that it consists of the belief that there is an unseen order, and that our supreme good lies in harmoniously adjusting ourselves thereto".

It has been suggested that we can select definitions ‘for specific purposes’ and vary them depending on the aims of our study. Such a strategy would amount to stipulating a definition. As Anil Gupta observes, such a strategy merely “imparts a meaning to the defined term, and involves no commitment that the assigned meaning agrees with prior uses (if any) of the term” (Gupta 2015). While one might quite innocuously baptise a previously unnamed concept, when used as an alternative to analysing some prior use of a word, stipulation looks suspect. It becomes a blatant misappropriation of a word and multiplies senses beyond necessity. One concept becomes proxy for another under the name of the original, risking intellectual oscillation between them, total conflation, or substitution to the neglect of the concept originally of interest. One does better to invent a term, rather than arrogate it from common usage, but then it is plain that one has neglected the concept that had originally been of interest. While we might provide an essentialist analysis of some concept which does act well as proxy for religion in one or other of its senses, it is more appropriate not to call it religion. Besides, we cannot be sure just how far it does become proxy for religion without an essential characterization of that concept.<sup>2</sup> Stipulation then is not a promising alternative to seeking out an essence of an interesting concept.

American philosopher and legal scholar, Brian Leiter defends a two-part definition of religion. On his view at least *some central beliefs* of a religion: (1) “Issue in categorical demands on action” (i.e. “demands that must be satisfied no matter what”) and (2) “are insulated from ordinary standards of evidence and rational justification” (Leiter 2014, pp. 33–34). While this has some plausibility, it has the questionable consequence that were the Nicene Creed to be experimentally confirmed to express true claims, then the forms of Christianity to which it is central could no longer be regarded as religions. Indeed, many philosophers regard their religious beliefs to be well supported without any deviation from ordinary standards of evidence and argument and without at all wanting to say that their beliefs were not religious (Plantinga 2011, Swinburne 1977, and Craig 1979). All the same, Leiter could contend that such philosophers manifestly do move beyond what ordinary standards of evidence and argument permit them to say, and allow that were they to prove their religious contentions, they would no longer be religious contentions, but simply part and parcel of the deliverances of rational enquiry.

For philosopher of education, Michael Hand, a religious person “must hold the [the god or] gods she believes in to have *some positive relevance to her life*” (e.g. that they be ‘worthy of worship’, ‘receptive to supplication’, or ‘moral authorities’; ‘any of them is sufficient’) (Hand 2006, pp. 98–99). We may immediately recall the familiar objection that while Buddhism appears to feature no deities, “to deny that Buddhism counts as a religion [...] would surely be a bizarre consequence” (Clack and Clack 1998, p. 3). However, Hand quite convincingly responds that firstly, “it is not unusual to hear people deny that Buddhism is a religion and describe it instead

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<sup>2</sup>I want to clarify now that by the ‘concept of religion’, I have in mind more a term, which may act as an umbrella for manifold concepts, one corresponding to each sense of the term religion should there be more than one sense of the term.



as a philosophy or a way of life, precisely because they take the crucial element of belief in a divine being to be missing” and secondly:

a great many Buddhists manifestly *do* believe in gods or something very like them. For schools of Buddhism in the Mahayana tradition, the heavens are richly populated with Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, ready to help human beings along the Eightfold Path to Enlightenment. (Hand 2006, p. 96)

Hand concludes that “Buddhism is a philosophy in some of its forms, and a religion in others” (Ibid). Persuasive as this might be, David E. Cooper also offers a powerful definition of religion. Cooper’s suggestion is that there are two necessary and (jointly) sufficient features:

The first is the conviction of the religious person that there has to be some, as it were, measure of human lives; something that our beliefs and values answer to beyond human practices and conventions ... The second aspect I think is this: you’ve got to think that what our lives are answerable to isn’t just part and parcel of the natural observable world ... For the religious person there’s got to be an element of mystery, of something beyond the natural world. (Cooper 2012)

Let us return to the Foundational Question as to how we are to discern between religion and non-religion. While some suggest that no essentialist definition can capture the range of phenomena that are claimed to be religious, in denying that religion has any particular nature, religious education practitioners make it rather hard to decide what if anything could appear within their section of the curriculum. Moreover, it would make the selection seem all the more susceptible to bias towards the interests of dominant groups. This would equally be true of the further alternative that religion is an unanalysable concept, as, for instance, Timothy Williamson takes the concept of ‘knowledge’ to be (Williamson 2000, p. 33). Some have tried to argue that religion is best understood as a family resemblance concept. However, as Fitzgerald observed, any such analysis “becomes so indefinite that the word ceases to pick out any distinctive aspect of human culture”. While it has been suggested that we can select definitions ‘for specific purposes’ and vary them depending on the aims of our study. However, such a strategy looks suspect, since it deploys concept A as a proxy for concept B under the name of concept B. It thereby risks intellectual oscillation, total conflation, or substitution to the neglect of the concept B. However, it seems that we do in fact have succinct and powerful analyses of ‘religion’. In light of these promising analyses, it seems that essentialism has been too briskly dismissed in recent years and rather than suffering a poverty of plausible options, essentialism boasts an embarrassment of riches. Insofar as the competing analyses have the same extension (worldly applications), but different intension (conceptual content), it is an interesting question as to which gets at the phenomena in the right way and so ought to be regarded as the true analysis.

## Religion as an International Phenomenon

So much for what religion is. I want now to emphasize its international prevalence. From this it follows that questions about the aims of religious education are (at least in principle) also ubiquitous. According to a report by the Pew Research Center on Religion and Public Life (2017), in 2015 the worldwide percentage of adherents by Religion, from largest to smallest, was as follows:

Christianity (31.2%); Islam (24.1%); Unaffiliated (16%); Hinduism (15.1%); Buddhism (6.9%); Folk religion, including African traditional religions, Chinese folk religions, Native American religions and Australian aboriginal religions (5.7%); Other religions, including the Baha'i faith, Jainism, Sikhism, Shintoism, Taoism, Tenrikyo, Wicca and Zoroastrianism (0.8%); Jews, or "people who self-identify as Jewish when asked about their religion on national censuses and large-scale surveys" (0.2%).<sup>3</sup>

There is almost no corner of the world untouched or unpopulated by religious people; during times of religious oppression, such as China's Cultural Revolution (1966–1976), religious belief and practice is, at most, pushed underground. Let us imagine that there was once a time in which there lived a group of people that had no religion, that had never heard of or been exposed to a religion, and that had never imagined that there could be such a thing. This imaginary society need not be homogenous – perhaps it could boast a plethora of diverse, non-religious life modes and belief sets. All the same, it seems reasonable to say that religious education is not an option for those people. Some would suggest that such a society, of human beings at any rate, is unimaginable, others that it is merely wildly unrealistic, and that wherever there are human beings so too will there be religion. It then seems to be a question for everyone at all times as to how children ought to be influenced with respect to religion.

## The Aims of Religious Education

Debates about the proper aims of religious education (for children) are questions about how (if at all) children ought to be influenced with respect to religion, that is to say, they are forms of the Basic Question. As I say, such questions are relevant internationally, and only fail to apply in the case of the hypothetical society that we considered above. We may recall the charges on which Socrates was put to death, namely, impiety and corrupting the youth: "you say that I do not myself believe in gods at all and that I teach this unbelief to other people" (Apology 26c, in Plato 1966). According to his accuser, Meletus, Socrates' alleged atheism was particularly pernicious because he was thought not content to keep it to himself. It

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<sup>3</sup>I wish to add that although the Pew Research Center on Religion and Public Life take the trouble to qualify the category of 'Jew' with the rider or "people who self-identify as Jewish when asked about their religion on national censuses and large-scale surveys", this rider is equally appropriate to many of the other categories with which respondents may have identified culturally rather than religiously (i.e. they lack religious beliefs, but participate in elements of the culture).

was a question for the Greeks, and one that they had answered: the Greek pantheon of Gods are to be believed in, belief in them is to be promoted among the youth, and disabusing the youth of their belief is punishable by death! While the same question (as to how (if at all) children ought to be influenced with respect to religion) can be posed in any human society at any time, different issues are raised by the question for different kinds of societies. We shall consider the issues raised by asking the question within homogenous theocracies, contrasting these with those raised by asking it within pluralist, liberal democracies.

### *The Aims of Religious Education in Homogenous Theocracies*

Consider a hypothetical maximally homogenous theocracy in which it is mandated that every citizen be initiated into the State endorsed religion by the family within the home, by teachers within formal education, and by society at large within the wider social experience. Suppose that alternative religions are not known to exist, but that permutations of the orthodox faith are readily imaginable, and indeed implied by the specifications of the orthodoxy, and by disciplinary measures: e.g. the stipulation that they believe in exactly *one* god, and the religious cum political law that apostasy be punished by death. What specific forms might questions about how (if at all) children ought to be influenced with respect to religion take in such a society? First let us specify someone to whom the question occurs: an individual parent. Suppose that while they privately regard the religion as false and socially damaging, they profess and demonstrate allegiance due to the harsh penalties for not doing so. They might think that no child ought to be initiated into the State's religion, but find that that this is a view which can have little to no impact on the society at large. However, more within their control in light of their views about the dominant religion, the parent might ask themselves another question: how ought I to influence my child with respect to this orthodox religion? While they might regret their child's being raised in such a context, they might worry that were they to convince their child that the religion is false, that would expose them to the risk of harsh punishment for non-belief. They might think that while the world would be a better place without that religion at all, in these non-ideal conditions, they had a moral obligation (motivated by a concern for their child's safety) to initiate their child into it.<sup>4</sup>

For a particular case, see Martin Scorsese's film, *Silence* (2016), and Shūsaku Endō's 1966 novel of the same name on which it is based on. Set in the late seventeenth century, the story concerns two Jesuits priests who, concerned for the soul of their spiritual mentor, travel to Nagasaki to investigate reports that he has renounced

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<sup>4</sup>Imagine they favoured an altogether rival religion professed in a text they happened upon and secreted away on their home, one which anticipated damnation for non-believers, the parent might then regard earthly punishment as preferable to eternal damnation and initiate their child into that faith. I hope that these stories strike the reader as realistic and they feel some sympathy with the imaginary parent in these situations, some variations of which undoubtedly have happened under various religiously oppressive reigns.

Catholicism. While attempting to nourish the faith of the Kakure Kirishitan or 'Hidden Christians' whom they meet on their journey, the missionaries discover the depth of sadistic and murderous intolerance with which their faith was treated by the reigning shogunate. They begin to question whether or not it is indeed acceptable for them to spread their faith to a populace who will be punished for their belief.

The Basic Question is waiting to be asked always and anywhere that at least one religion exists. In the cases discussed so far, one may reasonably think that at the level of societal structure, a wrong answers have been given to the Basic Question. Such circumstances as we have discussed warp the form the question takes and the sorts of answers that can be given. Were it the case that the orthodox religion were true and good, and in everyone's interests to believe, the policing of religious belief would still not seem satisfactory as we recall John Locke's reflection that:

Although the magistrate's opinion in religion be sound ... if I be not thoroughly persuaded thereof in my own mind, there will be no safety for me in following it. No way whatsoever that I shall walk in against the dictates of my conscience will ever bring me to the mansions of the blessed. (Locke 1966, p. 143)

Moreover, some argue, not only is the policing of religious belief not the job of the State, but there should be an even more exhaustive divide between Church (or religion more broadly) and State. In the case of the United States, the anti-establishment clause of the first amendment to the Constitution prohibits government, including taxpayer-funded public schools, from *establishing* religion:

Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof.

General motivations for such a law have to do with the justification of States and the uses to which they put their powers of influence and coercion. Consider, for instance, Locke's view of the State:

The commonwealth seems to me to be a society of men constituted only for the procuring, preserving, and advancing their own civil interests. Civil interests I call life, liberty, health, and indolency of body; and the possession of outward things, such as money, lands, houses, furniture, and the like. (Locke 1966, p. 128)

On Locke's view, it is the protection of these interests that justifies the State and its uses of coercion. Any extension beyond this remit would be unjustified.

### ***The Aims of Religious Education in Pluralist, Liberal Democracies***

In pluralist, liberal democracies things are not like they are in the hypothetical homogenous theocracy just discussed. Insofar as they are that way, it will be the exception rather than the rule, existing within isolated pockets of believing

communities.<sup>5</sup> Such societies counsel and enforce tolerance between faiths, perhaps for the familiar Rawlsian reason that, from behind a veil of ignorance, we would want to have the freedom to live in accord with our conscience even if that contradicts the conscience of others. According to political philosopher John Rawls, for societies to be justly ordered, the principles by which they are ordered must such as would be “chosen behind a veil of ignorance” wherein nobody would know what place they will come to occupy within the system that they design. By not knowing what place they will come to occupy, nobody could “design principles to favor his particular condition”, and so “the principles of justice are the result of a fair agreement or bargain” (Rawls 1999, p. 11). From behind a veil of ignorance, what Rawls also refers to as ‘the original position’, people would, Rawls argues, choose equal liberty of conscience to be among the principles by which society should be ordered for the reason that:

They cannot take chances with their liberty by permitting the dominant religious or moral doctrine to persecute or to suppress others if it wishes. Even granting (what may be questioned) that it is more probable than not that one will turn out to belong to the majority (if a majority exists), to gamble in this way would show that one did not take one’s religious or moral convictions seriously, or highly value the liberty to examine one’s beliefs. (Rawls 1999, p. 181)

Liberal democracies might also counsel tolerance for three now familiar reasons given by English political philosopher, John Stuart Mill in his classic Work, *On Liberty*. Firstly, nobody has a monopoly on truth, and, for all that one knows, those religions that one despises might have gotten things right after all. Secondly, the opinions one seeks to silence might have a slither of truth and the opinion in ascendancy might have a slither error and “it is only by the collision of adverse opinions that the remainder of the truth has any chance of being supplied” (Mill 2006, pp. 60–61). Thirdly, even where the opinion in ascendancy is the complete and undiluted truth, unless ‘vigorously and earnestly contested’, the majority of its subscribers will lose any sense of its meaning and rational grounds (Mill 2006, p. 61).

## Debatable Aims of Religious Education

Due to the promotion of religious toleration, the Basic Question becomes more widely accessible and more easily debated within liberal, pluralist democracies; societal level answers can be proposed without fear of persecution, accepted at one time, and later rejected in favour of another. In these circumstances, a wide range of ‘ought’ questions begin to unfold from the Basic Question. Let us consider three such further questions that open up to public contestation. First, what sorts of religious education ought to be legally permissible and which if (any) ought to be legally impermissible? Second, what sorts of religious education (if any) are

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<sup>5</sup>My thanks to Daniel Moulin-Stozek for this qualification.

morally impermissible and which if (any) are morally obligatory? Third, what sort of religious education, if any, ought to be funded or even provided by the State?

The question of what sorts of religious education might be morally impermissible and which might be morally obligatory seems to turn on the benefits and burdens of education, and how it compares with the benefits and burdens of alternative strategies. For instance, it might be very bad for children themselves not to know about the one true god, if one true god there be, and we might owe it to them to tell them so long the burdens of doing so are not too onerous, and it does not come at some more weighty opportunity cost. Alternatively, it might be good for society at large that they know about the one true god and so owe it to society to be told, if the burdens of being told are not too onerous. That is to say: religious education could constitute a private or a public good, or both.

But the question of what is morally best should be separated from the question of what should be rendered permissible or impermissible by law; and it is different again from the question of what sorts of education the State should provide for or provide. And so while something might be morally impermissible, it ought not necessarily become legally impermissible. And while something might be morally obligatory, it ought to not necessarily become legally obligatory. Indeed, something's being good does not imply that the State ought to provide it, or provide for its implementation. These questions of what the function of the State ought to be, and what the function of the law ought to be, is one that I will put to one side. Instead, I will choose, for reasons of space restriction, to focus on questions of moral entitlement, but since that bears on the answers to the others, I will sometimes have occasion to weave those in as well.

### ***Religious Initiation***

In pluralist, liberal democracies, adults are freer to speak their mind and to act in accordance with their conscience. Furthermore, the societies are less homogenous, and a wider range of religious and non-religious life modes are available options for people to avail of as their conscience dictates. However, even in such societies, parents and guardians are in a strong position to promote in their children those beliefs which they think are true and those modes of life which they think are best. Indeed, some regard part of the proper domain of this religious freedom of conscience the freedom to raise their children in their own faith. It is often thought that parents ought to have a choice about the character of the school that they send their child to, and ideally, to send their child to one that replicates the values and beliefs that are held in the home. Indeed, in this connection it is often complained that, in Ireland, 96% of State-funded schools are under church control. In this special case, for most parents there is little choice as to whether the school that they send their child to is of a religious character or not, or which if so.

Those who contend that parents ought to have a choice to send their child to a school that replicates the values and beliefs that are held in the home divide over

whether this is to be regarded as a claim right or a privilege right. A claim right to X entails having a claim over others to facilitate one's having X: perhaps through funding schools of a religious character with taxpayer money.<sup>6</sup> A privilege right consists in the absence of anyone's having a claim to prevent you from obtaining X, and does not entail that you have a claim over others to aid you in obtaining X. Others, however, have questioned whether parents really ought to avail of their power to raise their children to share their religious beliefs.<sup>7</sup> All the same, while they might regard parents as wrong to do so, they might regard any prohibition on the practice as practically unenforceable under present conditions, and indeed they might think that any attempt to break up families for breaking the prohibition would be a cure worse than the disease.

These points notwithstanding, Eamonn Callan (1985) has contended that parents wrong their children by bringing them up within their own faith. For him the problem turns on the idea that initiation into a faith damages children's autonomy. More expansively, Matthew Clayton (2014) has contended that it is a moral wrong for parents to initiate children into any comprehensive doctrine whatever: that it would constitute a wrongful act of coercion similar to the wrongfulness done to citizens by States where they coerce faith (be it through threats or through persuasion). Just as States should take an anti-perfectionist stance in governance, and not recommend any contentious views as the right, the good and the true, so parents should take an anti-perfectionist approach to upbringing and not recommend any contentious views as the right, the good and the true.

Arguing in the opposite direction, Michael Hand and Terence McLaughlin have contended that parents do their children no wrong in so bringing them up, or at least no significant wrong (Hand 2002, 2004a; McLaughlin 1984, 1985, 1990). For McLaughlin, children's autonomy is not hindered by a religious upbringing since by observing (and practising) religion 'from the inside', so to speak, they are more informed about religion's nature and are thereby better able to decide whether to be religious or not. For Hand, families benefit from sharing a common religious identity, parents and children inclusive, and that children's rationality is in no way harmed as they believe on the strength of the perceived intellectual authority of the parents, which is easily overcome with maturation. Here the idea is that it is *permissible* for parents to bring initiate their children in their own faith. No religious beliefs are presupposed in their arguments, but they are at least judged to be at least ambiguous in their value: they are not judged to be unambiguously bad. Hand's arguments might appeal to the parent who does not want to indoctrinate their child or harm their powers of rationality; McLaughlin's might appeal to the parent who is concerned about damaging their child's autonomy. Here Hand and McLaughlin (respectively) argue that rationality and autonomy are compatible with a religious upbringing. Indeed, there may be limits on how free from influence children will

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<sup>6</sup>Here I understand the central case of a school of religious character to be a school which has a religious ethos, is run according to religious principles, and selects children of parents who subscribe to that ethos and which initiates children into its religious vision.

<sup>7</sup>Eamonn Callan (1985) and Matthew Clayton (2014) among them, as we shall see.



allow themselves to be. Michael Hand recounts an amusing conversation with his eldest son:

A month or so ago, Alex asked me what religion we belong to. I bristled at the implication that children should be seen as belonging to the religion their parents happen to subscribe to. So I gave him a lengthy lecture on the importance of coming to his own, independent view on religion as and when he'd been able to give the matter appropriately careful thought. He nodded sagely and asked:

"Well, what religion are you, Daddy?"

"I'm an agnostic", I replied, "which is someone who thinks there isn't enough evidence to say whether or not there's a God".

"OK", said Alex. "And what religion is Mummy?"

"Well", I said, "I think she's probably an agnostic too".

"I see", mused Alex. "In that case, Daddy, I've thought carefully about it and I've decided to be an agnostic".

From the outside, liberal perspective, liberal citizens would want to see that no harm comes from religious initiation, that it comes at no opportunity cost (such as being able to seek a lifestyle which better suits the individual concerned), and that any other claim rights of the child are not violated. Indeed, they are apt to regard damage to rational faculties and failure to develop into an autonomous being as high costs indeed.

It is a further question as to whether the goods of rationality and autonomy are compatible with religious schooling, as distinct from a religious upbringing in the home. Hand argues not since he regards teachers as failing to have the perceived intellectual authority of the parents in religious matters, and concludes that in the absence of any compelling reasons to accept that religious propositions as true, any attempt to initiate children into accepting them must be indoctrinatory (Hand 2003). However, Hand makes the strong claim that religious schools ought to be abolished for attempting to initiate children into religious beliefs, rather than simply that they should not be funded by the government, say. For a critical appraisal of Hand's arguments, see Groothuis (2004). In general, what these matters turn on are the relative strength of the interests of the child, the interests of the parent, and the interests of the State and the possibility of an objective standpoint from which to evaluate these, or at least that is what they turn on from the point of view of the interest theory of rights. These are questions we must to some extent bracket, but will return to later.

### *Religious Education and Truth*

We have discussed whether or not it is permissible for parents and schools to initiate children into religious faiths. One need not think that the religious initiation of children is morally permissible in order to think that religions' claims to truth should not be discussed with children in formal educational settings. It certainly seems an important question as to whether any religious belief set is true or any religion

represents the best way to live. For if what we want children to have is the truth and the best way to live, it would then seem that such a religion is precisely what we would want for them. Indeed, Michael Hand has offered what he calls the possibility of truth defence of religious education. Hand argues that a discrete, compulsory, non-directive subject focused on the critical examination and evaluation of religious beliefs should form part of pupils' education. The argument is this: some religious propositions (about God, salvation, life after death, and so on): (A) 'are sufficiently well supported by evidence and argument, as to merit serious consideration by reasonable people', (B) 'matter, in the sense of making some practical difference to people's lives', and (C) require 'a facility with distinctive kinds of evidence and argument' in order to evaluate their plausibility appropriately. Hand concludes that children are entitled to an education, enabling them to make rational judgments about the truth or falsity of these propositions (Hand 2004a, b). That is to say, the premises motivate a curriculum element whose aim is to enable children to make rational judgments about the truth or falsity of religious propositions, a curriculum being 'a planned programme of learning' (Hand 2010, p. 49).<sup>8</sup> It is reasonable to think that a planned programme of learning delivered by subject experts is precisely what would be required to enable one to make rational judgments about the truth or falsity of religious propositions. Andrew Wright has been particularly critical of all approaches to religious education which bracket the question of truth. For him, whatever else might be studied about religions, children ought to be brought to reflect critically on the rational credentials of religious truth claims, which could potentially have a transformative effect.

the dangers of raising [the human sciences] to the status of metadisciplines at the expense of more fundamental philosophical and theological investigative tools. (Wright 2004, p. 212)

This approach opens the way for a range of attitudes about religions to be considered by students, including those anti-religious attitudes of Freud, Marx, Feuerbach, and Hume. Some have gone further and suggested that some non-religious views ought to be considered in their own right alongside religious views.

Previously I have argued that were educators in England and Wales to take the name of the compulsory discrete school subject 'Religious Education' seriously, this would preclude studying non-religious views in their own right; for to extend the subject matter of religious education to religious and non-religious views would be to extend the subject matter to the absurdly panoramic scope of 'views'. All the same, I argued that religious views and *some* non-religious views ought to be taught alongside each other in variety of contexts: in ethics education, where a range of religious and non-religious answers to the question how ought one to live ought to

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<sup>8</sup>This formulation has the benefit of acknowledging the similarity of all courses of learning and the similarities between the sorts of ethical considerations that could motivate their existence, whether they be news programmes, programmes of learning for citizenship tests for immigrants, rehabilitation programmes for criminal offenders, or educational television series like Planet Earth (BBC 2006) and The World at War, written by Anthony Hughes (1973). It also acknowledges the variety of vehicles of provision which programmes of learning can be facilitated by.

be appraised; in social studies, where a range of religious and non-religious lifestyles represented in one's country ought to be learned about alongside one another as a part of citizenship education (Tillson 2011). One question of international significance concerns the range of religious and non-religious lifestyles and belief systems that curricula ought to encompass. Whether those expressed locally, nationally, or internationally. On the epistemic dimension of religious education discussed above, it would seem that those religions which are most credible are those which ought to receive the most attention, irrespective of where they are practised. On more social motives, there could be reason to set one's sights beyond one's local community to religions represented internationally. For instance, it could be studying ways of life very different from those lived locally could enrich students' understanding of humanity's possibilities. Before moving on to discuss whether a religiously neutral upbringing is a coherent possibility, I want to note that there are at least three anti-epistemic approaches to challenging Hand and Wright's argument. One is to argue with Pascal that we can have non-epistemic motivations to believe that something is true; another is to argue that, for instance, religious language is non-propositional anyway. While I leave these controversies safely to one side here, I would refer the readers to J. L. Mackie (1982) for a persuasive critical discussion of both approaches. A third is advanced by Matthew Clayton and David M. Stevens due to considerations of political morality. For them, "education policy must be regulated by principles that are acceptable to reasonable people" (forthcoming). 'Reasonable people' are those who are committed to social unity and to treating each other as free and equal. Since epistemic judgements about the truth or utility of religion are disputed by reasonable people (in this political sense of the term), no such judgements – not even the judgement that the matter of their truth is an open question – may form the basis of an educational aims or content.

## **The Possibility of a Religiously Neutral Upbringing and Education**

Bracketing the question of the normative value of religions (either truth value or social utility), we might undertake a disinterested survey of the various kinds and instances of religion and spirituality that have arisen throughout history, and across continents, considering how they emerged and developed and how they interacted with other social phenomena. However, some are wont to respond that there are no neutral forms of initiation (e.g. Cooling 2012; Hession 2015; and Thiessen 1993). Instead, they regard the failure to initiate children into a religious perspective as initiating them into a substantive, non-religious perspective. This objection can be posed equally against the different kinds of non-confessional educations advocated by myself, Hand, and Clayton and Stevens, and so each of us would need to respond to it no matter whose position was ultimately the most satisfactory. In order to respond, I must now discuss some terms that are often used as if they were interchangeable, but which ought to be distinguished. I have in mind the concepts of

neutrality, impartiality, objectivity, unbiasedness, and balance. What have these concepts to do with one another? First, we should distinguish between their being used to characterize (a) methods of inquiry, (b) the presentation of issues, and (c) the State of one's opinions or allegiances. Methods of inquiry are procedures which one uses to come to one's decisions. The presentation of issues is to be understood as, for instance, how journalists report on, or how teachers teach, topics, events, and disputes. The State of one's opinions or allegiances is made up of one's propositional and relational attitudes. Let us start by discussing the term 'neutrality' and which terms are in fact interchangeable with it.

### *The Nature of Neutrality*

The word 'neutrality' (as distinct from siding with a disputant or deciding on an issue) may be used to characterize one's opinions and allegiances but also how issues are presented – that is as to whether issues are taught 'directively' or 'non-directively' (Hand 2007, 2008). It is better, I think, to use the terms 'directive' and 'non-directive' to refer to how topics are taught than the term 'neutral', since those terms can only apply to how topics are taught. It is better, too, to reserve the term 'neutral' for characterizing the State of one's opinions, and that is the sense in which I shall discuss it beneath. This sense of term is interchangeable with 'non-partisan', which is to be contrasted with 'partisan'. It is also interchangeable with 'uncommitted', which is to be contrasted with 'committed'.

Some people claim that neutrality is impossible. However, I take neutrality to be a State of indecision between options, and it would be absurd to say that indecision were a decisive State. Hess and McAvoy claim that "[educational] aims are never neutral" (Hess and McAvoy 2014, p. 76). While it is true that aims, and people, cannot be neutral *tout court*, or neutral about everything, they can be neutral on particular matters, or neutral between other States. And, once this is admitted, it must be acknowledged that questions, aims, and people can be neutral on some matters (even while they cannot be neutral on all matters).<sup>9</sup>

Why might neutrality be unattainable? One might say 'whoever is not for us is against us' and conclude that someone neutral between, say, the allied and the axis forces, such as Switzerland, was thereby an enemy. But this is also absurd: an enemy opposes one's ends, rather than simply fails to support them. One might suggest that neutrality is a commitment in itself, that it is a position to be taken. In the case of Switzerland's role in the Second World War (or lack of it), we can reasonably say that Swiss State took a policy: that of refusing to take sides. In this case, they were committed to non-commitment to both the allied and axis forces. That is to say, their commitment was of a second-order kind. While this preserves the notion of neutral-

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<sup>9</sup>Consider the question 'in what sense, if any, does music have meaning?' That question itself is decided (or committed, or partisan) on the following matters, that there is a fact of the matter, that it is worthwhile to know, that music exists, and that meaning can be had in more than one sense.

ity, a second order of commitment is not required to understand the notion of neutrality. As an illustration of this, we may regard Burden's ass as being neutral on which bale of hay to eat from first, on account of simple indecision between those options, not because it prefers not to commit to either option. Whether due to a decisive refusal or a state of indecision, neutrality is clearly possible, meaning either a failure or refusal to take sides. We might thus say that there are two kinds of neutrality: decisive and indecisive neutrality. A refusal to take sides seems more specific to practical courses of action, or siding with disputants, than to resolving theoretical questions about whether or not a proposition is true. Indecisive neutrality seems equally applicable to siding with one or another disputant and coming to an intellectual decision.

Bearing these distinctions in mind, let us consider the question of the existence of God. The attitudinal options are often presented as being just three: God exists; God does not exist; I am unsure whether or not God exists.<sup>10</sup> One might allow that degrees of confidence can be had, but basically one must be a little inclined to bet for or against the existence of God, and where they are unable to decide which of the ontological options (namely of God's existence of non-existence) to bet on, they can be said to be *neutral*, non-committal, or non-partisan, between those options. Even still, some might doubt the practicality of non-directive teaching, especially if the teacher is not neutral between options themselves.

### ***The Possibility Non-promotional Commitment***

I contend that teachers (and parents) can have an opinion about something without either wanting or trying or acting so as to steer their pupils (or children) towards sharing that opinion. Indeed, one might even think that they ought not to steer children towards that opinion. Some people think that this is either impossible in practice because one cannot bracket all of one's opinions away (especially in framing issues for discussion), or they believe that it is undesirable to do so. These are the sorts of considerations cited in favour of promoting what it is that one believes to be true or good.

As argued above, we ought to concede that global neutrality is indeed impossible for rational agents. It is almost inconceivable that there should be a conscious person with no attitudes or beliefs. Nor do I think it is desirable that there should be. There are many beliefs and other kinds of attitudes which it is rational, and entirely proper, to have. However, it does not follow from having an attitude or belief that one should systematically promote it in others. It does not follow from having a

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<sup>10</sup>Actually there are other possibilities: one doesn't know that it is even an issue, or one fails to understand what the issue is that one might have an opinion about. Indeed, one might hold that question does not make sense. For instance, in any dispute about whether square circles might exist, I am tempted to say: the proposition is incoherent and could not be the sort of thing which could have evidence in favour of or against. These possibilities come one stage before neutrality.

belief that one must either withhold or disclose it. Indeed, it is often hard for pupils to tell where teachers sit on certain issues, partly because teachers are capable of playing roles, for example, playing devil's advocate.

A quite different worry is whether disclosure of this kind is even compatible with non-directive teaching, for, arguably, announcing one's views *just is* a form of steering. Sometimes, the teacher's disclosure seems equivalent to directive education; consider the teacher's endorsing views, or consider their asserting those views. In particular, consider their using universal and prescriptive language, such as 'we believe that' and 'it is true that' or 'certainly', or failing to qualify assertions, e.g. by not adding 'Muslims, like me, believe that' to the claims like 'There is no god but God. Muhammad is the messenger of God'. Alternatively, however, they could stress their own subjectivity in confessing/disclosing their personal views, namely, by stating: I believe that, or it seems to me that. One can also use less emphatic language: it seems that, or arguably, or one reason to think x is that. On topics that one aims to teach non-directively, when, if ever, should teachers withhold or disclose their views? At first blush, there is a tension between saying on the one hand "I don't want to steer belief" and on the other "I believe this". However, there is a difference between disclosing one's beliefs and promoting them.<sup>11</sup> Consider the difference between these expressions, 'I believe that there is no god but God', 'We believe that there is no god but God', (where the 'we' refers to the children in the class) and 'There is no god but God'. Call these 'I Frame', 'We Frame', and 'Open Frame' formulations. The I Frame formulation looks to be more of an assertion about the teacher's own belief set, the Open Frame formulation seems to be an assertion about the world (thereby putting an onus on the listener to accept their testimony). The We Frame formulation makes a statement about the students' belief set, and presumably of the normative sort, indicating to students that this is what they *should* believe (perhaps in virtue of their parentage, or where they go to school).

It is true that one's actions will sometimes reveal one's attitudes; training children to swim shows at least that I think it worth my while teaching swimming to children, and doing so unenthusiastically may reveal the opposite. It may also indicate that I value swimming itself and think that it's worth the children's time. However, it is often possible and desirable to withhold one's views and often possible and desirable to reveal one's views. Disclosing one's views need not entail any more than that; by simply disclosing them, for instance, one need not state one's reasons for belief and one need not defend one's view against objections, and certainly one need not allow one's view to become the focus of the class. To the extent that children neither opted in, nor can opt out of such a class, this could be reasonably described as forcing one's private views on pupils, especially to the extent that one denies children scope for dissent. Indeed, the privileged position of the teacher can in itself make dissent less easily voiced anyway. In the case of spending time doing something, it must be admitted that one cannot live and yet not spend time doing anything. In the case of doing worthwhile things, religiously committed educators must engage in activities which can be considered worthwhile from within their

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<sup>11</sup> I borrow the terms 'withholding' and 'disclosing' from Hess and McAvoy (2014).

religious outlook, but they need not initiate children into these activities, or encourage them to see them to accept religious justifications for those activities. In the case of belief about whether or not a proposition is true, one can be neutral; one can genuinely not have an opinion on the matter. That may amount to living as though there were a negative answer to the question, but that's not a reason to initiate children into a faith. There is still room for commitment without advocacy. To tease out the implications of this view, I now propose to critically discuss the aim of 'learning *from* religion', much emphasized in religious education literature, policy documents, and teaching materials.

## Against Learning *from*, in Favour of Learning *About* Religion

How can we make sense of the expressions 'learning *from*' and 'learning *about*'? We can learn *from* (among other things) our mistakes, the past, and other people. It seems that to learn 'from X' is to identify X as the *source* of our learning. We can learn *about* (among other things) books, other people, and the past. It seems that to 'learn about X' is to identify X as the *object* of our learning. Clearly in religious education, it is important to learn about religion; in fact, it would seem to be the very *raison d'être* of such a subject. It can comprehensibly be urged that to deserve the name of 'religious education', religion might not be the *object* of understanding at all, but perhaps the student, or the world in general should be. Instead, religion would be the source of knowledge, shedding light on the student, and upon the world in general. However, that presupposes religions to be a source of knowledge on these things, but that seems too epistemically contentious to presuppose in a learning objective. As to which sources we should learn about religion from, that seems to be a further (albeit very important matter), that in no way conflicts with what the subject matter of religious education is. One might reasonably suggest that children should learn about religion(s), from religion(s), on the grounds that each religion is *an* authority on itself. There is no guarantee that religions are the *best* authorities on themselves, but it seems reasonable to suggest that particular religions should be able to speak for themselves where they are the object of learning (even if they are not presumed to have the final word on themselves).<sup>12</sup>

When we speak of learning from religion in the sense of learning from a religious source, we still need to specify what lessons should be taught. It is not enough to say that children should learn from religion. It is important to specify *what it is* that children should learn from religion. Should the various religions teach children about the

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<sup>12</sup>Caution might sometimes be in order here: careful consideration would be required to decide whether it would be appropriate to allow violent, extremist religious outlooks to speak for themselves, since one may legitimately worry about the possibility of their having a corrupting influence. On the other hand, if it is important to understand those outlooks, it seems that hearing what they have to say for themselves is an important part of that. Furthermore, if one were reasonably confident that these views would be heard anyway, it might be well to subject them to critical scrutiny in the controlled environment of the classroom.



world as they see it, or should they merely teach children about how they see the world (together, perhaps, with what are their aspirations and practices)? For instance, should children learn from Christians that Christ died for their sins, or should they learn that Christians think that someone special was born (whom they call the Christ) who died for what they regard as mankind's sins? This latter option seems less contentious where it is admitted that the epistemic credentials of religion are less than intellectually compelling. During a public panel discussion entitled 'What Is the Place of Faith in Schools?',<sup>13</sup> Richard Dawkins contended that people have nothing to learn from religion(s). That is to say, according to Dawkins, any uniquely religious content is false. While you can learn kindness from religious sources, you can learn kindness from non-religious sources. While you can learn what Christians believe from Christians, you can learn this from non-Christian sources. While it is admitted that good and true things can be learned from religions, Dawkins contends that all of the teachings *specific* to each religion are false. If Jesus *did in fact* rise from the dead on the third day subsequent to his execution, *you could learn this* from Christianity, but (again, according to Dawkins) he did not, and so you cannot. On this view, it is a mistake to suppose that religions are to be learned *from* in the respects that they are unique. One need not hold that every religion's teachings are demonstrably false to share Dawkins' reservations. Instead, it is enough to hold that none of that content which is specific to religions is so well demonstrated that we may presume to promote its belief among children. It ought not to be an educational aim that children should come to assent to any specifically religious content (even if it may not be an educational failure if they did come to do so).

It may reasonably be objected to the foregoing line of argument that it is not only truths that one might think we stand to learn *from* religions, but also the value of cultural practices.<sup>14</sup> Many things can indeed be learned from religious exemplifications: focus from Tibetan monks or charity and selflessness from St. Elizabeth of Hungary who gave away all she possessed in order to serve the poor (New Advent). However, as with propositional content, it may always be objected that those lessons which may be learned from religions may equally be learned from non-religious exemplars, since focus and selflessness are hardly the preserve of the religious. The challenge for this line of response is to propose a lesson that can uncontentiously be learned by all, but that is best taught by religious examples. Meditation, in its various forms, as practised in various religions, is a particularly good example of cultural practice, the value of which might be thought, with relatively little contention, to be learned from religion. However, the reasons that might be offered for why it is valuable are liable to take a specifically religious and thereby epistemically contentious form. We have critically discussed an array of educational aims for religious education. In the next section I want to consider the possibility that religious education need not have any aims.

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<sup>13</sup> 22 February 2012, 'What's the Place of Faith in Schools?' Westminster Faith Debates, featuring James Conway, John Pritchard, Richard Dawkins, and Robert Jackson. AHRC/ESRC Religion & Society Programme.

<sup>14</sup> I thank an anonymous reviewer for bringing this line of objection to my attention.

## Religious Education Without Aims

David Aldridge distinguishes between *text* and *subject matter*. The term ‘text’ is understood very inclusively as ‘object of study presented to the student by the teacher’. It seems that Aldridge uses the term differently from how I have above: objects of study in his sense are more a stimulus than an object about which we students are to learn. In religious education, one may presume that the texts to be presented are for the most part religious texts, including, but by no means limited to, passages from scripture, places of worship, ceremonies, artworks, and music. For Aldridge, the *subject matter* of religious education is what emerges in the interaction between student, teacher, and text, so understood. In contrasting the views of prominent religious education theorists Robert Jackson and Andrew Wright, Aldridge observes that whereas Jackson would have the “student building an interpretation of religion (the whole) from an encounter with the parts (individuals, texts, communities)”, so that religion is itself the subject matter, for Wright, “the ‘subject matter’ of RE is not religions but the transcendent reality about which religious communities make truth claims” (Aldridge 2015, p. 183). Whereas religions constitute the subject matter for religious education for Jackson, they constitute the input material for Wright.

For Aldridge, “any attempt to fix in advance the subject matter for dialogue constrains the possibilities for that dialogue, and the ways in which truth might emerge” (Ibid, p. 185). Here Aldridge defends something like a ‘great texts curriculum’ in which a range of intrinsically worthy objects of study are presented to students, and free reign is given to the students to make of them what they will. The difference for Aldridge would be that the texts presented need not be intrinsically worthy of consideration. On Aldridge’s model, children are presented with a religious artefact, perhaps, and they are to make of it what they will. One might reasonably expect to constrain the sorts of things which children come away believing about the object of study. Indeed, in some cases it seems reasonable to give students both text and subject matter: to say ‘what we want you to think about today is ...’, or ‘what we want you to come away knowing today is ...’; specifying these aims in advance. The sort of model for how children ought to be influenced with respect to religions that Aldridge elaborates specifies the method, but does not specify the learning outcomes, and while it is not likely to be the whole of the picture, it plausibly ought to be considered part of it.

## Summary

This chapter’s aim has been to elucidate a number of important philosophical questions about religious education and consider a range of ways to answer. Equally important was the task of mapping these questions and answers onto one another as well as onto wider, political, moral, and philosophical debates. In particular the

chapter has aimed to elucidate the Basic and Foundational Questions. Any introduction of this sort will be necessarily selective with the thinkers that it draws on, the questions that it emphasizes, and the range of answers that it considers. For that reason no claim is made to have provided an exhaustive account of the field and relevant debates. In order to stimulate, rather than to persuade the reader, as well as to and to avoid a bland neutrality, I have developed a central line of argument showing how a range of considerations can come together to form a particular approach to the Basic Question. Some of the choices about what topics to exclude have been hard to make. I wish to mention six of the most salient to conclude.

*Student Choice:* Should formal religious education classes be compulsory, and, if not, should the optional aspect consist in children having the ability opt-out, or else the ability to opt-in? Predictably, whether participation or non-participation is the default option will make a big difference to the number of students studying it. This is not a special question for religious education: whether education should be in some sense student directed is much debated and very important topic quite generally. Eamonn Callan (1988) has argued that almost all of schooling ought ideally to be driven by student curiosity rather than by pre-decided school curricula and schemes of work. However, some think that there are special reasons to make religious education optional. For instance, they might argue that learners or their parents have a right to protect themselves or their children from what is being said in class where what is said might endanger their immortal souls. It is important to note the creeping in of parental claims over what their children should study in the last sentence, for if the curriculum content ought to be driven by student curiosity, that would mean it ought to be protected somewhat from parental preferences.

*Truth Versus Utility:* How are the reasonable aims of promoting social utility to be weighed with the tasks debating matters of truth? For instance, young earth creationists might object to having their views opened up to critical scrutiny. It might be thought that reflective discussion of the most cherished beliefs of students or of their parents, those beliefs which could be said to form a central part of their identity, might be a cause of social strife or might damage children's wellbeing by undermining their self-conceptions. For a discussion of these matters in the context of higher education, see Callan (2016), and for discussion in the context of schooling, see Cooper (2008).

*Devolution and Centralization:* At what level should decisions about education be made: the national, local, school, or teacher level? Among the kinds of costs and benefits to be weighed up here are the tendency for centralization to inhibit experimentation, the power of centralization to make quality assurance easier, and the double-edged sword that sees centralization ensure that bad decisions adversely affect more people on the one hand, but, equally, that good decisions affect more people on the other. Further considerations turn on the degree of autonomy that it is proper to extend to localities and schools with distinctive identities, histories, and missions or to individual educators themselves.

*Universality Versus Local Specificity:* Should the content of religious education be universal or local? That is to say, how far do religious education providers from disparate geographical locations have reason to converge in their aims, methods provision, and subject content? If they had a great reason to do so, then even though it might be proper to devolve decisions making away from the centre, it might still be the case that religious education offered in diverse setting ought to converge to a great degree.

A Discrete or Diffused Curriculum Presence: Finally, and some might have thought least philosophically, we can ask whether religious education should constitute a discrete curriculum subject, as in the UK, or should instead be diffused across the curriculum as in France. Kevin Williams argues that a danger in distributing religious education across the curriculum is that of failing to explain the momentous importance which religious faith plays in the lives of believers (Williams 2007).

A truly comprehensive philosophy of religious education will be composed of ethical, political, metaphysical, or theological and epistemological parts. It would offer answers to the foundational Question, the Basic Question, and the Procedural Question all identified in the introduction. It would also provide answers to the dilemmas sketched in this closing paragraph. Armed with the references listed beneath together with the map of the territory sketched above, you the reader should now be well placed to develop your own views on these fascinating and important questions.

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# Ecology and Environmental Education



Michael Bonnett

## A Backdrop: The Emergence of Environmental and Ecological Issues as Matters of Educational Concern

While there is a longstanding tradition of attending to the environment in the sense of the natural world in education in the West – for example in the ‘nature study’ that was once prominent in early years education – it was the rising sense of all not being well in this natural world that led to a more focussed and urgent attention being given. This paralleled the environmentalism that awoke in the 1940s (e.g. Leopald 1949) and burgeoned in the 1970s onwards where the extent of the disastrous impact of human action on the natural environment was becoming recognized, accompanied by foreboding concerning the implications of this for the future of humanity. The effects of large-scale anthropogenic environmental pollution (including climate change), depletion of natural resources, habitat destruction and species extinction, all were becoming only too apparent. As something that increasingly confronts citizens of the twenty-first century, it became clear that this situation was one that education needed to address. The term ‘environmental education’ appears first to have arisen in official language at a meeting of the International Union for Conservation of Nature and Natural Resources held in Paris in 1948.

What form such environmental education should take remains a matter of ongoing debate, but it soon became clear that the implications of responding to what became termed our ‘environmental crisis’ were very extensive, threatening to impinge not only on everyday lifestyles, but potentially on the economic bases of Western society and its political institutions. Antipathies between finite and rapidly diminishing natural resources and the idea of perpetual economic growth are not hard to discern, while one commentator (Ophuls 1977, p. 3) alerted us to a threat to

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the idea of liberal democracy resulting from so-called ecological imperatives that arise from the perceived seriousness and urgency of our environmental situation encouraging the establishment of an authoritarian technocracy. Resonances of this latter antipathy are reflected in the school context in a tension between an approach that focuses on modifying behaviour in ways that have been officially prescribed as environmentally friendly and a fear of bypassing students' personal understanding and critical evaluation of underlying issues (that might lead to a rejection of some of this behaviour) (Jensen and Schnack 1997). Clearly, serious pedagogic issues are raised here.

In tandem with the awakening concern over the state of the environment was the rise of the science of ecology. At its kernel ecology postulates and explores the biophysical interdependence of all living things as communities of organisms embedded in their environment. In turn, such local 'ecosystems' are considered to be nested in more general regional and global systems that ultimately constitute our planetary ecosystem or 'ecosphere'. Here, a holistic systems thinking approach to environmental issues is advocated – a central point being that the organism and its environment are often considered to be an integral system that constitutes an indissoluble ecological unit. Hence through the interactions of such units with each other within a shared environment with its numerous feedback systems, the conditions of the existence of each is ultimately a product of the interplay of all such units. Exploring what are taken to be the implications of such radical interdependencies for human attitudes and behaviour led to the rise of 'ecologism' and 'Deep green' perspectives that locate humanity firmly within these biophysical systems. These found general expression in, for example, the work of Arne Naess (1989) and James Lovelock (1979), and philosophical exposition in, for example, Freya Matthews (1994) and Paul Taylor (1986).

While the above account sketches the emergence of the topic as an educational concern in more recent times, it is worth noting that there were important historical antecedents for seeking to bring education into close relationship with the natural environment. In one sense the idea of environmental education goes back at least as far as Rousseau who in *Emile* advocates learning through direct observation and physical activity in nature in the early years of a child's life. Through such experiential (as opposed to abstract) learning nature becomes Emile's teacher. This more positive affiliation with nature in which pleasurable acquaintanceship, relatively unfettered curiosity and a sense of wonder feature strongly remains an important counterpoint to an environmental education that is focused on redressing anthropogenic ills in nature and that can emit a somewhat repressive ethos with its emphasis on self-restraint, and sometimes guilt (Louv 2010; Postma and Smeyers 2012).

This positive attitude is found in the long tradition of outdoors education that views engagement with the natural world as character-building in terms both of developing physical dexterity and aesthetic sensibility, and also the self-reliance required in dealing with the exigencies that occur unbidden in the natural environment. The ways in which late-modern culture tends existentially to distance itself from nature, and what he takes to be the moribund effects of this, are developed by Louv (2010) in his notion of 'nature deficit disorder'. This theme, that previously

had received powerful expression in the views of the Romantics, raises the issue of our relationship with nature as one of considerable educational significance. To recall Wordsworth's famous lines:

Getting and spending, we lay waste our powers,  
Little we see in nature that is ours,  
We have given our hearts away, a sordid boon!

Here, he articulates what he sees to be a diminution of human being that is occurring with an increasing preoccupation with the mercantile and the instrumental – both of which, arguably, have gained the ascendance in the thinking that informs many areas of public education since his time. David Orr (1994) makes the point that environmental concern raises not simply problems *in* education, but the problem *of* education – that is, conventional Western education that increasingly focuses on producing students who are effective operators in a global market economy premised on perpetual growth. For Orr, students so equipped, lacking ‘ecological literacy’, perpetuate – indeed render ever more rapacious – an economic system that is a heavy contributor to our current environmental predicament in terms of the strain placed on our planetary ecosystem. This then raises a general point concerning the character of the aims of environmental education: they are not necessarily such as to sit comfortably within or alongside existing taken for granted educational practice.

Reflecting the anthropocentrism implicit in conventional education, when large-scale environmental concerns arose, initially the educational response tended to be scientific and technocratic (Robottom 2005). The emphasis was placed on the dissemination of what was regarded as relevant scientific information and the modification of behaviour designed to serve long-term human self-interest, such as recycling and reduction of energy consumption. This top-down “environmentalism” (Elliott 1999) came to be contrasted with more democratic approaches that attempted to root environmental education in the everyday experience of students and their local communities.

A good example of this latter approach arose out of the ‘action research’ movement: the long-running OECD *Environment in Schools Initiative* that attempted an ‘ecologization’ of schools by placing environmental issues at the heart of the curriculum. The underlying aim was not the acquisition of pre-specified subject organized knowledge, but critically reflective environmental action framed in the context of students’ own life-worlds and understandings. In this context students became as much generators of knowledge as recipients. This approach was viewed by those involved as radically ‘transgressive’ in the way that it disrupted many boundaries that structure conventional education, such as those between childhood dependency and adult responsibility, knowledge users and knowledge producers, knowing and acting, facts and values. It was argued that the inherently complex, contextualized, frequently controversial, and often piece-meal occurrence of environmental issues in real-life situations precludes a traditional school curriculum and requires students to participate in shaping “the social and economic conditions of their existence in society” (Elliott 1999).

This highly dynamic model of environmental education provides a powerful example of the extent to which environmental education has the potential to impact upon conventional views of pupils, teachers and educational institutions.

Harking back to an earlier point concerning the significance of the idea of nature to the topic of environmental education, another important influence on the ways in which environmental issues became viewed, both generally and in the particular context of education, has been the rise of postmodernism and poststructuralism. Views emanating from these broad cultural/philosophical movements led to a fundamental questioning of traditional and scientific understandings of nature: its status as an external reality, a given, was heavily undermined by claims that, rather, nature is socially constructed. Hence, with regard to the burgeoning domain of socio-cultural studies, Ursula Heise observes:

More broadly, the basic goal of work in cultural studies for the last 20 years has been to analyze and, in most cases, to dismantle appeals to 'the natural' or the 'biological' by showing their groundedness in cultural practices rather than facts of nature. The thrust of this work, therefore, invariably leads to skepticism about the possibility of returning to nature as such, or of the possibility of places defined in terms of their natural characteristics that humans should relate to. (Heise 2008, p. 46)

This has radical implications for the character of environmental education both from the point of view of the significance of experience located in natural settings and the status of scientific ecology. In addition, issues arise from the cultural relativizing of the values that run through the identification of environmental problems and appropriate responses in international contexts.

Finally, there is another cluster of ideas concerning the scale and locus for considering environmental issues: ideas of the global, the local and 'place'. While not necessarily in conflict, the emphasis that each of these invites can produce significant tensions as when, for example, global 'solutions' that are based upon abstract international knowledge come up against local traditions based upon intimate acquaintanceship with a particular locale.

## **Indigenous Perspectives**

The account that I have given so far has reflected what might loosely be termed a Western perspective. In very general terms there are perhaps two alternative perspectives that should be acknowledged: 'Eastern' and those arising from indigenous cultures. With regard to the former, certainly it would be as wrong to assume a homogeneity of view as it would be to claim it in the case of the West, but there are examples where a distinctive orientation can be found: for example, Daosism's emphasis on a life that reflects the flow of nature in its creative spontaneity. Undoubtedly, there is much to be gained from an engagement with Eastern approaches. Heesoon Bai (2012) has drawn on Asian philosophies to develop an approach to moral aspects of environmental issues, and notions of 'mindfulness' have been employed to extend our understanding of perception of the natural world and what it has to offer (Pulkki et al. 2016). While such contributions are beginning

to make their presence felt in environmental education debate in the West, indigenous perspectives have long been acknowledged as offering a radical alternative that deserves attention.

An analysis of traditional ecological knowledge provided by Reid et al. (2002) notes that such knowledge has a number of salient features. It is the result of an historical continuity in resource use practices built up over generations living in close contact with natural systems. It is unique and local, having developed around the specific conditions of a group of people indigenous to a particular biogeographic area and therefore contrasts with the international knowledge generated by universities, multinational business corporations, etc. It is dynamic in nature, bearing the imprint of an ever-ongoing responding to the minutiae of local change and is integrative of the life of the community, forming the basis for natural resource management, agriculture, food preparation, health care, education and so forth. Importantly, it is handed down by cultural transmission, often orally and through ritual, thus reflecting the knowledge of the body as well as the mind. These features resonate with a recent “insider” description of North American indigenous cultures given by Four Arrows (2016), who adds an acceptance of life’s mysteries and learning from virtues claimed to be observable in nature, such as generosity and courage.

This account of the indigenous perspective is nicely illustrated by, but also in part extended by, the sub-Saharan African concept of *ukama*. Lesley Le Grange (2012) describes this concept as referring to a sense of relatedness to the entire cosmos and as embodying an inseparable oneness between both past, present and future generations and with the natural world. Here nurturing the self is inextricably bound up with both one’s social community and community with nature (often expressed in terms of identity and kinship) such that healing/development in one results in healing in all three dimensions, so suffering too is transversally witnessed in all three dimensions. On this view care for non-human nature is built into the notion of human dignity.

Overall, the high degree of identification with the local natural world and regarding it as a source not merely of material sustenance, but of wisdom and spiritual sustenance – and therefore as a key player in the process of education – is something that, arguably, needs to be reinstated in educational debate. As, also, is the importance placed on knowledge derived from first-hand experience and intimate acquaintanceship compared with that deduced from ‘objective’ abstract theory. One consequence of postmodernism is that we can no longer feel confident in simply dismissing without further reflection views that can be marginalized and made to look archaic by particular high-status ways of thinking in the West.

## **Environmental Education, Sustainability and the Philosophy of Education**

Approaches to understanding the topic in philosophy of education can be considered to have been structured in two ways: first, by some key orientating ideas that have permeated education with regard to the environment; second, by broad

philosophical perspectives or ‘methodologies’ adopted as ways of explicating and evaluating these ideas and for identifying the educational issues that they raise. In what follows I will outline the most influential ideas that have emanated from environmental concern in education, indicating the kinds of philosophical analysis to which they have been subject or that they have invited. I will give something of the history of the debates that have arisen and identify ongoing issues.

Perhaps the most longstanding environmental notion in education is that of not simply learning about the environment, but learning *through* and *in* the environment by direct observation and physical activity, that emanated from Rousseau. This received philosophical scrutiny in the long established topic of learning through free experience that constituted an important part of the larger debate over child-centred education that arose in the 1960s and 1970s. Robert Dearden’s analytic critique of the notion is a characteristic example of this kind of work. It sought to reveal the limitations of the approach in educational terms – for example, that experience unstructured by a teacher would be a chancy and inefficient way of achieving educational goals, and that the acquisition of abstract concepts, that by their very nature cannot simply be directly observed, would require a level of instruction (Dearden 1968, Ch. 6). Nonetheless, the value of relatively unfettered direct experience has continued to have its adherents in education. It remains an important element in the advocacy of the Forest School movement, wild pedagogy and outdoor learning in general (see, for example, Payne and Wattchow 2009; Jickling 2015). And certainly contemporary interest in embodied learning and criticisms of the Cartesian dualism that is taken to structure experience in terms of separated subject and object domains remains a legacy that has claimed the attention of philosophers of education (see Bai 2009; Barnacle 2009; Doddington and Hilton 2007).

However, with the previously mentioned narrowing of focus in environmental education onto what are perceived as environmental problems, without doubt, the ideas that have received most attention in the literature have been those of ‘sustainable development’ and ‘sustainability’. I consider each of these in turn.

The term “sustainable development” was first introduced in *The World Conservation Strategy* (IUCN et al. 1980) and perhaps received its most influential articulation with the publication in 1987 of the report of the World Commission on Environment and Development, *Our Common Future* (Brundtland Commission 1987). Here sustainable development was defined as “a development that meets the needs of the present generation without jeopardising the ability of future generations to meet their needs”. This definition was consolidated as an educational concern at the Earth Summit Conference held in Rio de Janeiro in 1992, attended by delegates from over 170 countries and whose centre-piece agreement was *Agenda 21* (UNCED 1992) which included the proposal to introduce ‘sustainable development’ into the educational programmes of signatory nations. Thus it found its way (at least notionally) into the core curriculum of many nations, giving rise to the idea of education for sustainable development. It was lent further impetus by the decision of the UN General Assembly in December 2002 to launch the Decade of Education for Sustainable Development 2005–14. The strong appeal of this notion derives from the appearance of combining two desiderata: development in the sense

of having more or better, and sustainability in the sense of maintaining what is valued (including this development). It is precisely this appearance that has received critical attention by philosophers of education.

For example, it has been argued that in the context of modern Western culture the attempt to meld the idea of sustainability with the idea of development results in an oxymoron (Shiva 1992; Bonnett 2002) that frequently serves to authenticate or veil practices that are far from 'green'. In the Western context, development frequently becomes equated with economic and material growth. Here, nature is viewed exclusively as a resource to be exploited and this instrumentalism is necessarily incompatible both with what is taken to be a core meaning of sustainability – preserving things in their own nature – and with living within nature's economy rather than one that is imposed and destructive of this (Shiva 1992). Amongst other things, it is claimed that it is precisely the attitude of focussing on anthropocentric values and what become ever expanding human 'needs' that lies at the heart of the Brundtland definition of sustainable development that has led to our current environmental predicament. With increasing technological power and the previously mentioned economic pressures characteristic of a free market system, there has developed an unprecedented aggressiveness towards the natural world (such as huge scale deforestation and the decapitation of mountains for coal extraction), which excludes the potentially moderating effect of being open to intrinsic values in nature. Helen Kopnina (2012) has explored how as the idea of sustainability becomes applied to an increasing range of anthropocentric desiderata there is a loss of focus on nature.

The nature, power and consequences of this anthropocentrism continue to receive attention in the philosophy of environmental education and are a matter to which I will return. For the moment, it is worth noting that it is frequently seen as representing the opposite pole to the influential eco- or bio-centrism espoused by 'deep green' theorists who place the integrity and value of the natural world (of which humanity is conceived to be one part) as the central consideration. This seeks to combat the great divide between humanity and the rest of nature that historically has dominated Western thinking – from the Greek and Judaic thought that saw nature as profane or put there to serve humankind, to the rationalism of Aquinas that elevated man above nature in the Great Chain of Being, and Descartes' radical separation of man from mechanical nature through his possession of an incorporeal mind. When nature is projected as a vast machine ultimately constituted of inert atomic particles whose motion is the result of a variety of external mechanical forces, it is set up for classical experimental science to extract its laws and "secrets" without restraint – for example, by highly interventionist and invasive experimental methods – especially when joined by an Enlightenment vision of unimpeded human progress (Merchant 1992).

In contrast to the interpretation of sustainability that occurs when it is recruited to the idea of sustainable development, 'sustainability' has re-emerged as a critical response to the domination of the latter in educational policy and practice. It has been argued that there is much to be gained if we move the focus from trying to formulate a grand policy implicit in the idea of sustainable development to attending to the qualities of a frame of mind – or way of being – that constitutes sustainability



as an outlook (Bonnett 2002; Postma 2006). Once established, this frame of mind would enable individuals to respond to environmental issues in a way that expresses a deeper sense of sustainability, as and when need arose in their everyday lives. This is taken to counter the aggressive anthropocentrism found in the most influential formulations of the policy approach and circumvents some serious epistemological and ethical problems inherent in the latter, such as the frequent inadequacy of our current state of knowledge to predict long-term outcomes in the context of the scale and complexity of natural systems, and the differing cultural and geographical perspectives on what the most pressing problems are and what would count as acceptable solutions. In addition, the idea of sustainability as a frame of mind has led to some interesting arguments that are taken to go to the heart of education as a whole because they raise issues concerning the character of human being, its relationship with nature, and the broad socio-cultural factors that shape and influence this. For some, the true character of the environmental crisis is not only – or even chiefly – material, but deeply spiritual (Ashley 2006; Bonnett 2007). It is a matter of how we conceive our relationship with the natural world and our place in the cosmos. Arguments of this kind have been taken to have fundamental implications for our understanding of education, pedagogy, and the character and culture of educational institutions.

Previously it was noted that the reality and authority of traditional ideas of nature have been heavily criticized from socio-cultural and poststructuralist perspectives. Far from being an underlying given, ‘nature’ is posited as socially constructed, culturally and historically variable, and ideological – frequently incorporating or authenticating suspect power relationships (Haraway 1991; Stables 2001). However, a number of counterarguments have arisen in response to this growing orthodoxy. From a phenomenological perspective, it has been pointed out that while our concepts of nature – in common with all other concepts – have been socially produced, we *experience* nature as something that precisely is *not* socially produced. Rather, it is quintessentially non-artefactual. In this sense, nature is transcendent and “self-arising” (Bonnett 2004; Crist 2008). Furthermore, it is claimed that phenomenological analysis reveals such self-arising nature to exhibit a number of key properties that include: otherness, epistemological mystery, integrity, agency, normativity and intrinsic value. Clearly, this portrayal of nature conflicts not only with poststructuralist accounts, but also with those of classical physical science, and debate over the plausibility of each continues. But if the phenomenological account of nature is taken seriously, a number of issues arise that have important educational implications. For example, if nature is conceived as transcendent and normative, if knowing it involves participating in the “being” – living presence – of things (Abram 1997; Bonnett 2015), this demands a modality of perception that is fully multi-sensory, bodied as well as cerebral, and open to an integrity and values that are intrinsic. It valorizes more directly engaged ways of being towards the world – ways that involve many potentialities for openness of our being as a whole. Hence environmental education informed by a concern for nature becomes something that should condition the idea of education itself. For example, it would involve attending to the development of the whole person as an embodied, sensual, emotional, willed, as



well as intellectual being. Education becomes ontological in the sense of having a concern for the nature of a person's being and what a person is becoming.

In addition, by exhibiting a concern for the pupil as a self that is always a self in relationship with its environment, some have seen this to raise afresh and in a forceful way the issue of "place": the importance of locale to the significance of action, our sense of identity and our sense of responsibility towards the environment (see, for example, Gruenewald 2009; Ontong and Le Grange 2014). It has been noted that nothing we do is unplaced. In this sense humans are always and already geographical beings (Casey 1997). This has led to an exploration of the application of notions of "cultural density" and "habitus" to natural and other learning environments (Waite 2013). In a recent discussion of place-conscious education, David Greenwood (2013) speaks of the need for a "decolonization" of places such that the often contestable nature of the dominant beliefs and motives that inform our perceptions of them can be revealed, enabling us to re-inhabit them in a deeper and more open manner.

Related to these issues is that of the significance for moral education of sensibility to normativity in our experience of nature. By affirming knowledge by acquaintance in which all the senses are in play including sensitivity to integrity, agency and values present in the natural world, such a position invites exploration of an idea of moral education that founds the idea of moral agency on that of poetic receptiveness. In doing this it intimates an enlarged sense of moral agency: one that is less pre-occupied with the model of an autonomous rational agent (e.g., Bowers 2012) and that seeks to sensitize us to possibilities of an enabling passivity on our part that properly recognizes the contribution of non-human agency to the character of the places in which we live. Clearly, this presents a radical challenge to the traditional conception of ethics that holds moral obligation to exist only within a social contract between rational agents.

Extending this theme, questions of the following kind arise: What responsibilities do we have to non-human nature? What responsibilities do we have to future generations? Regarding the first of these questions, recently Peter Kemp (2015) has argued that humans and animals are equal partners as corporeal beings but not as temporal beings, and that as humans alone *conceive* of love and care as a state of being they are responsible in a general sense for the welfare of animals. On the second question Dirk Willem Postma (2002) has explored a number of issues that arise for Rawlsian liberal morality from the impossibility of there being reciprocity with future generations, and also the difficulties that such anthropocentric theory has in properly comprehending environmental issues because of its focus on the private sphere.

In more general terms, these issues connect with work that has been done on the question of what constitutes being "green" and the creation of "green" citizens in a liberal democracy (see, for example, Bell 2004). C. A. Bowers (2002) has argued that there is a pressing need to address the socio-political consequences of current values and practices. He has developed the notion of an 'eco-justice' pedagogy that has three main foci: (a) to develop an awareness of the environmental racism and class discrimination involved in the way that the deleterious environmental impacts

fall disproportionately on ethnically and economically marginalized groups; (b) the recovery of non-commodified aspects of community through a reversal of an ever-increasing dependency on meeting life's daily needs through consumerism rather than through self-reliance within the family and within networks of mutual support within communities; (c) to develop a sense of responsibility towards future generations and a corresponding self-limitation by an expansion of non-consumptive relationships and opportunities to develop personal talents and to enrich the community. Bowers claims that central to this enterprise is the identification of root metaphors embedded in language that shape the way that we engage with the world: currently, metaphors that underlay the industrial revolution such as 'individual' and 'linear progress'. He argues that these systematically undermine the value of tradition and therefore the intergenerational knowledge and continuity that are necessary for ecological wisdom and are so central to indigenous perspectives. Also they conflict with the root metaphor underlying an eco-justice pedagogy which is 'ecology' and that 'foregrounds the relational and dependent nature of our existence as cultural and biological beings'.

This is one example of a broad concern for the curriculum and culture of schools that has been awakened by environmental issues (see, also Chapman 2007). Others include how understandings of nature that focus on the spontaneous being of natural things in their otherness have led to foregrounding dialogical learning/pedagogy and the idea of a curriculum of emergent engagements rather than one of pre-specified connections determined by academic disciplines (Foster 2002; Bonnett 2007). Somewhat in tension with this, Stables and Scott (2002) have defended a discipline-based approach to environmental education. They argue that it would be a mistake to attempt to conceive of environmental education as some holistic cross-disciplinary element, implying, as it would, that there is, some single totalizing environmental grand narrative to be conveyed. Here there is the danger of an eco-fascism that would subvert the integrity of the disciplines.

However, it has been claimed that the atomistic understanding encouraged by a traditional curriculum inevitably both externalizes relevant factors and lacks cognisance of the greater whole: it is unable to convey its organic nature. In his influential *Steps to an Ecology of Mind* Gregory Bateson (2000) argues that what is desperately required is a systemic wisdom that transcends the narrow purposive frameworks through which consciousness selectively samples events and processes. But how is the greater whole to be understood? What are the appropriate metaphors? Debate on this has considered numerous candidates that include: a created realm, a blind causal system governed by abstract laws, an energy or information system, a domain of dialogical encounters attended by mystery, Gaia. The helpfulness of any or some combination of these remains a matter of ongoing debate – as does the dilution of the boundary between self and other that some of these views expound (see, for example, Matthews 1994).

Yet in many ways, concerns are raised most powerfully for the culture of the school – for example if "success" is portrayed in terms of the values of market production and consumption, and the sense of community embraces only humankind (Bowers 1995). It seems clear that if we are to enable pupils to address the causes

of environmental problems rather than the symptoms, we must engage them in those kinds of enquiry that reveal the dominant underlying motives, metaphors and interpretations that are in play in society and invite them to participate in shaping practices that are informed by the understandings that emerge. Here the focus moves to an examination of the underlying versions of human flourishing and the good life that are implicit in the ethos of the school as a community and how they connect with life more generally.

## Conclusion: Emerging Issues

A number of the views considered in this chapter suggest that ultimately the topic of ecological and environmental education will require an examination of motives that are inherent in our most fundamental ways of thinking about ourselves and the world – that is to say it will involve *metaphysical* considerations. Some of the most significant concerns of this kind are briefly outlined below.

One important issue to arise is the disclosure of the extent of scientism in education and an examination of its impact both on our ability to think both about environmental issues and the nature of human being (Abbs 2003, Ch. 2). The incompatibilities of pre-specification, modularization and micro-management with free exploration of the environment and an emergent curriculum raise deep philosophical questions regarding the enervating influence of scientism in education. This influence has been understood as an expression of a growing “metaphysics of mastery” that seeks to set up everything to be on call for the exercise of the human will (Bonnett 2013).

Another radical line of argument is that because of the intentional, ecstatic, and therefore *environmental* nature of consciousness, there is an important sense in which human being is ineluctably involved in sustainability. Drawing on Martin Heidegger’s portrayal of reflective consciousness as the place where things *occur* – show up, are beheld – it follows that they show up most fully – are most themselves – when the receptivity of such consciousness is as open as possible. This is to say that it is the essence of consciousness to allow things to be, and in this sense to *sustain* them (Bonnett 2004). A frame of mind that enables things to presence in the richness of their manifold being (which includes their inherent otherness and mystery) is itself enriched and receives inspiration. Such allowance of things themselves was portrayed by Iris Murdoch (1959) as a form of love that lies at the heart of human flourishing. It seeks actively to listen for and discern the call of individuals in their otherness – which will include the difficult task in the age of the metaphysics of mastery of clearing an appropriate space for things to occur in this way. Considerations of this kind have led to an exploration of the character of educational institutions as places that promote deep cultural change through their location, architecture, culture and ethos (e.g. Blenkinsop 2012).

Overall, it is clear that pursuing the issues that are raised by environmental concern leads to broad issues of considerable educational importance. Perhaps one of

the most fundamental of these arises from the radical challenge to anthropocentrism implicit in much environmental debate and that has resulted in questioning the cluster of ideas that constitute the modernist humanism that has been so influential in educational thinking. Consider, for example, the high profile given to rational autonomy as an educational aim and the high status given to abstract disciplines that either objectify reality or instrumentalize it, or both. It has been claimed that we now live in a period of ‘post-ecologism’: a simulation in which beneath widespread green rhetoric, unsustainability is inherent and is tacitly accepted. Here “the discourse and policies of ecological modernisation and sustainable development function to simulate the possibility and desirability of environmental justice and integrity without genuinely aiming to address, let alone reverse, the fundamental unsustainability of late-modern society” (Bluhdorn 2002, p. 66). This covert attitude, consistent with the metaphysics of mastery, represents another reason for exploring the possibilities of a post-humanism in which non-anthropocentric impulses and a more intimate and attentive relationship with the natural world is valorized.

Finally, there is now a growing interest in the idea that philosophy of education itself needs to be “ecologized” (see, for example, Jickling and Stirling 2017; Affifi et al. 2017). Philosophical examination of environmental concern and environmental education discloses profound issues that invite us to review a range of ideas and assumptions about the nature of knowledge, learning and human well-being – and hence, education as a whole. In the light of this it is argued that the philosophy of education needs more fully to recognize the significance of ecological and environmental perspectives and their implications both for the topics that receive attention and the kinds of thinking used to address them.

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# Vocational Education



Gerard Lum

## Introduction

The subject of vocational education has increasingly come to engage the attention of philosophers of education in recent years. Yet there is a longstanding tradition – one which dates back to the philosophers of ancient Greece – of a disinterested attitude towards vocational education, an inclination to see it as devoid of the kind of philosophical implications which from Plato’s time have been associated with mainstream education. It has been said that Plato “refused to regard it as ‘real education’” (Lodge 1947, p. 249). Aristotle, not unlike Plato before him, afforded pride of place to *theoria*, knowledge deemed to be of intrinsic rather than extrinsic value and characterised precisely by its *lack* of practical application. As Aristotle put it, to know theory is to “know things that are remarkable, admirable, difficult, and divine, but *useless*” (*Nicomachean Ethics*, §1141b6, my italics). Indeed it could be said that this same disinterested stance was in evidence with the emergence of modern philosophy of education in the mid-1960s, there being a hint of it in R.S. Peters’ assertion – Peters was one of the originators of modern philosophy of education – that the concept of education is “philosophically interesting in ways in which engineering is not” (1977, p.139).<sup>1</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Peters overlooks the important sense in which we might distinguish engineering on the one hand, and learning to be an engineer on the other. As Peter Winch (1965) rightly notes (albeit in a rather different context) there is a fundamental difference between “an engineer studying the workings of a machine” and “an apprentice engineer who is studying what engineering, that is, the activity of engineering is all about” (p. 88). While there is a sense in which the former *might* be said to be philosophically uninteresting, the same could certainly not be said of the latter.

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In this chapter we will see that, to the contrary, the whole subject of vocational education is shot through with philosophical implications, profound questions about what it is a person must know in order to perform effectively in an occupation and the nature of the processes required in order to bring this about. My intention here is to map some of the key philosophical debates that have arisen in connection with vocational education in recent years: from dissensions provoked by new developments in vocational provision and assessment through to wide-ranging epistemological disputes about the nature of knowledge or expertise. While these debates are sometimes centred ostensibly on UK/European policy or practice, the issues raised are almost invariably of international relevance having implications for vocational and professional education in any context. In what follows I trace the evolution of recent thinking on these issues and point towards some possible resolutions. But we begin here with considerations arising from the way in which, in the middle of the last century, some philosophers of education came to adopt a distinctive yet ultimately highly questionable view of the vocational.

## Of Skills and Competencies

Around 50 years ago, analytic philosophers of education – so called because they saw their task as one of analysing ‘concepts’ – believed that one way of getting clearer about ‘the concept of education’ was to compare or contrast it with other concepts such as ‘skill’ and ‘training’, concepts ordinarily associated with vocational provision. While ‘education’ was portrayed as something rich and profoundly life-enhancing, notions such as ‘skill’ and ‘training’ were routinely depicted in such a way as to emphasise their epistemological and cognitive vacuity. The idea that “training” “lacks the wider cognitive implications of ‘education’” (Peters 1980, p. 94) was taken up by a good many analytic philosophers of education (see Lum 2009). Similarly with the concept of “skill” which was taken to imply that there is “very little to know ... it is largely a matter of knowing how rather than knowing that, of knack rather than understanding”, a kind of knowledge exemplified by such things as “riding bicycles, swimming or golf” (Peters 1980, p. 95; see also Peters 1966).

Of course, skilled engineers, builders, technicians and the like who have personally undergone extensive training might rightly balk at the suggestion that they possess mere ‘knack rather than understanding’. But such analyses were never meant to add to anyone’s understanding of vocational education; what they *were* intended to do was protect mainstream education from vocationalising tendencies. For Peters, and many other philosophers of education of the 1960s, being educated meant mastering “forms of thought and awareness which are not harnessed purely to utilitarian or vocational purposes” (1973, p. 9).<sup>2</sup>

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<sup>2</sup>Peters was by no means alone in his approach to such concepts; indeed there is evidence that he was quite influential on this score, with similar analyses to be found in the work of a good many other philosophers and educationalists from the 1960s through to the present day (see Lum 2009).

In hindsight the strategy of attempting to protect mainstream education by effectively disparaging the concepts ordinarily associated with vocational provision can be seen to have failed on a number of counts. The fact that we commonly refer to ‘vocational *education* and training’ automatically renders the education/training distinction less feasible as a means of differentiating general and vocational provision. Moreover, any threat to vocationalise the school curriculum comes not from the suggestion that schools should teach children the ‘knack’ of things like golf or cycling but from the idea that schools should prepare children for employment. And the suggestion that abilities of this kind are comparable to the abilities required for employment was manifestly implausible. Added to which, there were reasons to question the methods and ‘objectivity’ of these analyses, there being more than a suspicion that such ‘concepts’ were contrived in such a way as to bolster prior educational predilections and snobberies of social class.<sup>3</sup> Although certainly never having any *direct* influence on vocational policy or practice, it might be said that many of the assumptions implicit in these analyses were ultimately to have a bearing not merely, as we shall see, on vocational provision, but also on the wider educational enterprise. Today, mainstream education in the UK and many other countries is awash with “skills talk” (Blake et al. 1998, p. 56) with all manner of educational aims, from primary school to university, being styled as ‘skills’, seemingly because the term gives licence to assume a kind of endeavour that is more simplistic, straightforward or uncomplicated than it actually is.

Philosophical interest in vocational education and training (VET) *per se* can be traced to the 1980s when governments began to take a more significant role in shaping vocational policy and practice. The history of vocational preparation for a great many occupations throughout the twentieth century can be regarded as one of ever-increasing state or quasi-official involvement with a concomitant tendency towards standardization and bureaucratization. That which was previously tacit and passed informally from master/practitioner to apprentice/trainee became increasingly formalized and explicit. Early in the last century the American philosopher John Dewey aptly noted the modern “disposition to make explicit and deliberate vocational implications previously tacit” (1966, p. 313; c.f. Lewis 2013). With burgeoning official interest in such things as ‘occupational standards’, ‘benchmarking’ and national and international qualification frameworks, it was perhaps inevitable that increasing state involvement would ultimately raise fundamental questions about the precise nature of the skills, capabilities or knowledge at issue.

In the UK the 1980s saw the introduction of the ‘competence-based’ system of National and Scottish Vocational Qualifications (N/SVQ). The approach had an obvious political and instrumental appeal, centred as it was on the ‘competencies’ required for occupational performance. With the focus ostensibly on demonstrating competence, such things as the facility to pass exams or the kind of training a person had had could be regarded as being of little or no consequence – what mattered was

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<sup>3</sup>For a fuller account of the role of analytic philosophy of education and conceptual analysis in relation to theorising about the vocational see Lum (2009).

whether they could ‘do the job’. Indeed, since N/SVQs could be awarded to workers on the basis of competencies they already possessed, the approach seemed to offer a convenient remedy for the UK’s poor showing in international league tables of qualifications.

Although these developments provoked some critical attention, it was not until competence-based education and training (CBET) threatened to spread downwards into schools and upwards into Higher Education that the approach started to receive widespread philosophical attention. Initially, in the manner of analytic philosophy, critics focused on ‘the concept of competence’, thus somewhat naively vindicating CBET’s arrogation of the term and arguably misperceiving their substantive target (see Lum 1999). Criticism centred on the idea that the concept of competence was flawed, that the term suggested a mere sufficiency, a limited understanding and so on. Such interpretations were, of course, on all fours with the conceptual analyses of ‘training’ and ‘skill’ two decades earlier with their dismissive references to such things as ‘know how’ or ‘knack’. Often the implication was that while the concept of competence might be sufficient for vocational purposes, it was inappropriate in the context of schools or universities (c.f. Barnett 1994; Pring 1995). For some, it was the indeterminacy of the concept that was problematic, the fact that “competence” seemed to be an “El Dorado of a word with a wealth of meanings” (Norris 1991, p. 331). Others set about devising various competing concepts of competence with a view to demonstrating that it was the type of competence employed that was problematic (see Hodkinson 1992). In some quarters the welter of criticism was such that the very term ‘competence’ fell into disrepute – so much so that some of CBET’s chief proponents began to speak of ‘outcomes’ rather than ‘competencies’.<sup>4</sup> Importantly, there was nothing about CBET’s methodology which implied any special or unique connection with ‘competence’ other than the fact that it evidently involved attempting to specify the capabilities at issue in statement form. Indeed, given CBET’s preoccupation with constructing precise *statements* to specify requisite performances, “competence-based” might be said to be something of a misnomer, the approach perhaps being more accurately described as a “statement-based” approach (Lum 1999).<sup>5</sup>

Seen thus, the approach raised questions about the feasibility of capturing in sufficiently precise language the abilities at issue. Michael Polanyi, writing in the 1950s (see Polanyi 1962), famously had drawn attention to the fact that so much of

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<sup>4</sup>Compare, for example, Burke (1989) with Jessup (1991). One apparent advantage of the term ‘outcomes’ over ‘competencies’ is that ‘outcomes’ seems to lend itself more readily to non-vocational contexts.

<sup>5</sup>The first Director of the UK’s National Council for Vocational Qualifications, Gilbert Jessup, unwittingly provided a more exact characterisation of the so-called competence-based S/NVQs when he proclaimed that:

statements must accurately communicate their intent. ... a precision in the use of language in such statements will need to be established, approaching that of a science. The overall model stands or falls on how effectively we can state competence and attainment. (Jessup 1991, p. 134)

what we know is simply not amenable to being expressed in language, a point reiterated in his later *The Tacit Dimension*:

We know a person's face, and can recognize it among a thousand, indeed among a million. Yet we usually cannot tell how we recognize a face we know. So most of this knowledge cannot be put into words. (Polanyi 1983, p. 4)

Similarly, in the 1980s Donald Schön (1987, 1996) took up Polanyi's notion of 'tacit' or 'personal' knowledge to demonstrate its significance for 'reflective' professional practice. Whether or the extent to which such ineffability poses a problem for the competence/outcomes strategist is a moot point. It might be said that even if it is not possible to describe the knowledge or ability at issue, it is nonetheless possible to determine whether a person can or cannot do the thing in question. However, one apparent upshot of this is that it causes a shift of attention away from the person and their abilities towards ontologies more amenable to precise description. To take a typical example: a competence statement to the effect that an engineer should have the ability to 'maintain engineering assets' has an appropriate focus but is unhelpfully vacuous. Accordingly, sub-statements might be added by way of explicating, not the abilities required, but rather, the 'engineering assets' to be maintained – quite literally a list of machines, devices and equipment. How such a list could properly serve as an educational specification or convey what it is the engineer needs to know and understand is another matter (see Lum 2004).

When eventually philosophical attention turned to CBET's methodology two main strands of philosophical concern began to emerge: first, the complaint that the approach was unduly reductionistic and that something of the essence of occupational expertise was lost in the process of breaking a performance down into discrete competencies amenable to tick-box verification; and second, and perhaps more serious, the accusation that the approach was "intrinsically behaviouristic" (Hyland 1997, p. 492) and thus neglectful of knowledge and understanding.<sup>6</sup> There are perhaps two reasons why the charge of behaviourism failed to gain purchase. First, it might be said that *any* form of assessment must be based on behaviour or a performance of some kind – and as proponents of CBET are wont to point out, CBET is first and foremost a means of assessment. Second, there is arguably a basic sense in which a person who can produce the requisite performance *must* have the knowledge and understanding necessary for that performance. A common response from CBET's critics was to suggest that the knowledge and understanding required to perform in one context might not be sufficient to perform in a different context. But advocates of CBET needed only to adopt the strategy of testing competence across a range of contexts to leave critics with no apparent grounds for complaint. Certainly there is little evidence that these concerns did anything to deter the spread of CBET, although it is not without significance that in the UK many employers and awarding bodies have been reluctant to abandon traditional arrangements such as formal examinations and minimum requirements as regards the length of training programmes, etc., retaining such checks in parallel with competence-based assessment.

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<sup>6</sup>See Hyland (1994) for a comprehensive critical survey of the competence debate.

In recent work I have suggested that the presumed ontological opposition between outward behaviour and inner knowledge and understanding – a distinction made much of by CBET’s critics – is *not* the distinction that is substantively at issue and that the matter more properly turns on the kind of judgement employed when assessing a person’s capabilities. Elsewhere (see Lum 2012, 2013a) I have argued that our informal judgements about what other people know can be seen to be of essentially two distinct types. On the one hand, it will often suit our purposes to make simple judgements of *identity*, when we simply have an interest in whether a person can or cannot respond or perform in a specific way. On the other hand, we often employ what I have referred to as judgements of *significance* whereby we draw upon any or all available evidence, assigning significance to such evidence as we see fit by way of construing a ‘picture’ of a person and their capabilities.<sup>7</sup> It is significant that whenever it is imperative for us to have the fullest indication of what a person knows we instinctively adopt the latter form of judgement. Importantly, these two forms of judgement can often be at odds: a person might successfully respond or perform a pre-specified way, yet engender evidence which betrays their limited knowledge or understanding of the matters in hand. Conversely, they might fail to perform in the requisite manner but give every indication that they have the wherewithal to do so. Colloquially, we are prone to couch the matter in ontological terms, as a distinction between the ‘outer’ and the ‘inner’, between how a person behaves and what they ‘really’ know or understand. In fact it would be no exaggeration to say that this perceived opposition between behaviour/performance and knowledge/understanding has been a continual source of dispute over the past few decades. As traditionally conceived, it is a choice between either verifying ‘objectively’ that a person can perform in the requisite manner or indulging in ‘subjective’ and tentative inferences about inner knowledgeable states. But our manifest lack of access to other minds indicates that the operative distinction *cannot* be that of inner knowledge as against outward behaviour, but rather, a distinction relating to the two different stances that might be taken towards the *evidence* we have of a person’s abilities. Seen thus, the choice is between arrangements which confine the assessment process to pre-specified evidence and arrangements which facilitate drawing on the widest range of evidence so as to arrive at the best estimation of a person’s capabilities. One upshot of this is that it suggests a very different interpretation of the anxiety that is so often associated with the use of ‘behavioural outcomes’, an anxiety better understood as an implicit recognition that an assessor restricted to applying judgements of identity to pre-specified behaviours would, on being presented with the requisite behaviours, be duty-bound to attribute knowledge even in the face of countervailing evidence.

The design of any formal assessment process would seem to necessitate choosing between these two kinds of judgement and hence between two logically distinct modes of assessment – what I have dubbed as ‘prescriptive’ and ‘expansive’ modes, with the latter being such as to allow the assessor to take an expansive view of the

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<sup>7</sup> Donald Davidson (2001) has noted the important sense in which we are able to “assemble such material into a convincing picture of a mind” (p. 15).

evidence and thus provide the best estimation of what a person knows. The UK's system of N/SVQs, to the extent that it is centred on pre-specified behavioural outcomes, would seem to have the characteristic features of assessment in the prescriptive mode – which explains its limitations and the concerns of many critics (see Lum 2013a). In contrast, the purposely 'holistic' and 'integrated' conception of competence outlined by the Australian philosophers of education, Paul Hager and David Beckett, suggests a very different approach. With the emphasis on integrating "key tasks" with personal attributes such as "knowledge, skills, attitudes, values, etc." (Hager and Beckett 1995, p. 2), the integrated approach suggests the broader and more open-ended consideration of evidence characteristic of assessment in the expansive mode. Although a good many countries around the world today would claim to have 'competence-based' systems, it is at present a moot point as to which of these two approaches have been adopted in which countries.

The advent of the European Qualification Framework (EQF) has raised still further questions about the notion of competence and its role in vocational provision and assessment. Intended as a means by which qualifications in one country might be "translated" into their equivalents in other countries, the EQF has been described as a "competence framework" (Brockman et al. 2009, p. 788). Yet scrutiny of this framework has revealed wide variation in understandings and interpretations of 'competence', not only between different countries but also within them.<sup>8</sup> At one level such variations might be associated with differences in the occupational groupings of skills or different arrangements for VET provision. No two countries are identical in the latter respect: Germany, with its concern for curricular inputs is at the opposite end of the spectrum to the UK's now largely outcomes-based approach, with other European countries occupying positions variously inbetween.<sup>9</sup> Still more problematic, though, are the profound conceptual and linguistic difficulties:

The linguistic and conceptual situation is particularly confusing. First there is an intralinguistic complication: there are different and often disputed interpretations of what competence means in English. Second, superimposed on this, there is an interlinguistic complication: we cannot assume that the correlates of 'competence' in, for example, French (*compétence*) or German (*Kompetenz*) necessarily mean the same as all, some or any of the competing usages available in English. It cannot be assumed either that the same thing is understood by the word 'competence' in the translation of the EQF into each respective language or that 'competence' can be readily translated into its cognate in another European language because the realities to which the term refers are not the same. (Brockman et al. 2009, p. 788)

Of course such difficulties are by no means unique to 'competence' for much the same could be said of terms such as 'know how' and 'skill' and their respective cognates. Such differences not only point up the considerable difficulties involved in attempting to achieve parity between national qualification systems but throw into stark relief fundamentally divergent theoretical understandings of vocational knowledge and expertise.

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<sup>8</sup>For in-depth analysis of conceptual variations relating to VET in Europe see Brockman et al. (2008, 2009), Winch et al. (2009, 2011).

<sup>9</sup>See Clarke and Winch (eds.) (2007).

## A Question of Knowledge

One manifestation of this divergence in the Anglophone world is to be found in debates surrounding the distinction between ‘knowing how’ and ‘knowing that’ where the techniques of analytic/ linguistic philosophy continue to influence the framing of epistemological debates. The distinction, brought to prominence by Gilbert Ryle in the late 1940s, continues to divide the ‘intellectualists’ who argue that propositional knowledge is fundamental to expertise, from those who, like Ryle, regard ‘know how’ as foundational. Ryle’s purpose in *The Concept of Mind* was to debunk the ‘intellectualist legend’ according to which intelligent performance can ultimately be assimilated to knowing *that*, i.e. knowledge of propositions, rules, precepts and so on.

To do something thinking what one is doing is, according to this legend, always to do two things; namely, to consider certain appropriate propositions, or prescriptions, and to put into practice what these propositions or prescriptions enjoin. (Ryle 1949, p. 29)

On Ryle’s view, the idea that intelligent performance necessitates some prior mental manipulation of rules or precepts, that the agent “must preach to himself before he can practise” (*ibid.*) is patent nonsense. The intelligent operations of the expert chef, for example, are not preceded by a mental rehearsal of recipes and instructions. Indeed, it might be said that such prior resort to rules or precepts is a mark of the novice rather than the expert.<sup>10</sup> Suffice it to say then that, for Ryle, intelligence consists primarily in knowing how to do things. What has generally gone unremarked upon is the fact that although clearly influenced by Ryle’s use of the distinction many early analytic philosophers of education chose to *reverse* Ryle’s emphasis, choosing – as we have seen – to portray knowing *that* as the wellspring of intelligence, reducing knowing how to ‘knack rather than understanding’.

The dispute between intellectualists and anti-intellectualists has come on a pace in recent years and there is now a burgeoning literature on knowing how and knowing that, both in mainstream philosophy and in philosophy of education.<sup>11</sup> On one side, intellectualists such as Stanley and Williamson (2001; see also Stanley 2011) argue that know how ultimately comes down to knowing *that* such and such is the way to do something. Others, with Ryle, have been at pains to put the case for knowing how as distinct from knowing that. And it hasn’t gone unnoticed that Ryle’s formulation of the distinction with its apparent diminishment of the role of propositional knowledge is of a piece with CBET’s emphasis on performance at the expense of knowledge and understanding (see Hyland 1994; Winch 2009; Lum 2009). What is more to the point, however, is that there are perhaps reasons for scepticism about claims to the effect that one ostensible form of knowing should be regarded as temporally or causally prior to the other. Such claims usually can be seen to adopt one

<sup>10</sup> See Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1986). Important here is the question of the *kind* of rules at issue. In Lum (2009) three distinct kinds of rules are identified that have different roles in relation to occupational expertise.

<sup>11</sup> For a useful survey of the issues see Bengson and Moffett (eds.) (2011).



or both of two strategies: either appealing to the contingent facts of grammar or ordinary language use (c.f. Rumfitt 2003), or employing a kind of ontological sleight of hand whereby, depending on an author's purposes, a term such as 'ability' will be assumed to imply *either* an inner cerebral capacity, thereby privileging knowing how – *or* some manifest behaviour, which leaves the way open to prioritise knowing that as a state of mind.

In the context of VET the matter quickly extends to the notions of theory and practice: on one side the view that theory or propositional knowledge is the fountainhead of intelligent action, on the other, the view that practical ability is what matters and there is little point in learning "bucketfuls of facts" (Wolf 1989, p. 41).<sup>12</sup> Assumptions such as these can have profound implications for VET provision. In the UK the widespread implementation of competence-based strategies has meant that a good many occupations have seen a decided shift from 'off-the-job' to 'on-the-job' learning. More recently even the role of teaching has come to be regarded as requiring mainly practical as opposed to theoretical knowledge, potentially diminishing the place of formal teacher training. When a new Masters degree for teachers was mooted, a senior figure at the Institute of Education in London was reported as saying that the degree should be "practical" so as to avoid "filling their heads full of educational theory" (cited in Lipsett 2008). As we have seen, when the emphasis is in this direction inevitably there will be concerns that practitioners do not have the knowledge and understanding substantively required for practice.

Yet the shift might equally be in the opposition direction. Nurse education in the UK, which has undergone radical reform in the last two decades, is a case in point. Whereas previously trainee nurses would be attached to a hospital school and trained through an apprenticeship type system, today nursing is a degree-level profession and provision has moved out of the hospital ward into the university. Those in favour of such developments stress the fact that nurses today are involved in providing increasingly complex treatments – although the more cynical might harbour more than a suspicion that these changes are at least partly about positioning nursing as a 'profession' rather than just a vocation. Yet again there are concerns that provision falls short of providing what is required for effective practice, and much publicised scandals of hospitals failing to provide adequate patient care have added a sense of urgency to these concerns. It is not without significance that those who voice such concerns often find it difficult to say exactly what it is that is lacking. It has been said that the new generation of nurses are not sufficiently "street-wise" or able to deal with "difficult situations" (NHS Confederation cited in UKCC 1999, pp. 40–41). Some put the matter down to attitude: there is a worry that the new generation of nurses are "too posh to wash" (Hall 2004; c.f. Beer 2013), that nurses with degrees are averse to providing the basic care that patients need. As one commentator put it "Reforms in the 1990s were supposed to make nursing care better. Instead, there's a widely shared sense that this was how today's compassion deficit began. How did we come to this?" (Patterson 2012). Yet calls to abandon

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<sup>12</sup>Wolf borrows the phrase from the Higginson Report on the reform of 'A' levels.

university provision provoke understandable bafflement: “It is extraordinary that some may believe nurses are too well educated” (Beer 2013, p. 4).

The concepts of theory and practice have a particular resonance in nursing where there has long been a preoccupation with the notion of a “theory-practice gap”, something recognised as “an issue of concern for many years” (Hewison and Wildman 1996, p. 754) and frequently referred to in the nurse education literature. The issue is generally perceived to be one of closing the gap, a matter of “integrating theory in praxis” (Ekebergh et al. 2004, p. 622). I have suggested elsewhere (Lum 2007) that perhaps one reason for the persistence of this problem is that it can be seen to conflate two distinct issues. On one reading, to speak of a theory-practice gap is to make a claim about the sufficiency of provision, to suggest that what is taught falls short of what is needed in order to perform effectively in the workplace. There has been official concern that “newly-qualified nurses... do not possess the practice skills expected of them by employers” (UKCC 1999, p. 4). Yet note how an ambiguity in the use of the word ‘practice’ conveys an extra, rather different meaning: that what newly qualified nurses lack are specifically *practical* as opposed to theoretical capabilities, a point more evident still in the words of a theatre sister:

More clinical experience is required pre-registration than is currently being provided – there appears to be an over-emphasis on the academic area at the expense of clinical experience. A good nurse should be able to use her hands as well as her brain. (UKCC 1999, p. 39)

Again, a concern about the sufficiency and suitability of provision is intertwined with deep-seated assumptions about the kind of knowledge substantively at issue, couched variously in terms of academic-clinical, theory-practice, mind-body, thinking-doing, education-training and so on – precisely the kind of dualisms that were recognised by John Dewey a century ago as being so “deeply entangled ... with the whole subject of vocational education” (1966, p. 307). This epistemological bifurcation of things, the assumption that knowledge is of essentially two different kinds, can be traced back to ancient Greece and the Aristotelian notions of theoretical and practical reason; it has parallels in Descartes’ stark separation of mind and body in the seventeenth century, and comes to the fore again in the mid-twentieth century with the Rylean distinction of knowing how and knowing that.

## **Beyond Theory and Practice?**

If there is a case for rejecting this dichotomous view of knowledge, then at least some explanation is needed as to why this dual conception of knowledge persists in thinking about the vocational. I have suggested that one reason for this is that the distinctions of theory/practice and knowing how/knowing that can be seen to have a useful role in describing the “inputs” and “outputs” of learning, what I have called the antecedent and consequential conditions of knowledge (Lum 2007). It often suits our purposes to characterise modes of provision as either theoretical or practical – there is clearly a difference between learning from a textbook and learning by

means of a practical exercise. Similarly, the knowing how/knowing that distinction is useful when we want to convey the consequences of a person's learning and in so doing convey more clearly what it is they know. It allows us to distinguish someone who knows lots of facts about cycling from someone who knows how to ride a bicycle in a way that would not be clear if we said simply that they 'know about' or 'have knowledge of' cycling. Similarly, we sometimes talk about knowing 'the theory' or knowing 'the practice' of things. Our making this kind of distinction helps us to distinguish between knowing one thing and knowing another. Yet none of this, I want to suggest, entitles us to assume a corresponding *epistemological* distinction, to assume that we carry around in our heads two fundamentally different *kinds* of knowledge.

It is not without significance that many instances of knowing evade being categorised in this way. Opinion will be divided as to which category of knowledge would be implicated in, say, writing an essay, planning a project or solving a problem. And the same goes as regards categorising provision as either 'theoretical' or 'practical'. Often the most imaginative and effective teaching can be seen to employ strategies which straddle the theory-practice divide: 'theoretical' provision conceived so as to engage the learner actively in their own learning, and 'practical' provision designed to promote knowledge and understanding rather than perfunctory performance. But the more crucial thing here is the way in which our attachment to dichotomies of this kind leaves us utterly incapable of accounting for the very essence of occupational expertise. By way of example, consider the following far from uncommon scenario:

A factory production line is in full swing when suddenly the machines grind to a halt. Alarm bells ring and warning lights flash; a maintenance technician arrives and makes his way to one of a hundred electrical control panels each interconnected perhaps with several miles of cabling. He opens the control panel, takes a screwdriver from his pocket and makes a small adjustment to just one of several hundred components. Closing the control panel he presses some buttons and the production line bursts into life. The question is, how is it possible to account for what the technician knows? His performance did not require the conscious manipulation of propositions or facts – and neither did it require any particular physical dexterity. (Lum 2009, p. 56)

Here is a kind of expertise which would require a considerable educational investment, and yet it is simply not amenable to being couched in terms of theory and practice or knowing that and knowing how. Importantly, to persist in specifying knowledge in these terms is invariably to run the risk of those twin hazards of vocational curriculum design: theory that lacks relevance and practice devoid of understanding. Talk of closing 'the gap' between theory and practice is of no help here. And the difficulty is not remedied by seeking some mythical "golden mean" of theory and practice, some supposedly perfect proportion of theoretical and practical provision, still less by abandoning one form of provision in favour of the other (see Lum 2007, 2013b).

By way of an alternative to this dichotomous scheme of things we might conceive of the technician's expertise as being first and foremost about being able to make sense of a particular 'world' of meanings and involvements – meanings and involvements that are inextricably related to the priorities and purposes of a particu-

lar occupation. The technician's expertise consists in his being able to see and interpret things in appropriate ways such that he is able to make sense of and find his way around the world of machines and equipment in which he is required to operate. On this view, both the facility to act skilfully *and* the facility to manipulate facts, theories or explanations should properly be regarded as secondary to and derivative of this more fundamental understanding.

This way of thinking about occupational expertise is clearly at some remove from the kind of analyses which have preoccupied analytic philosophers for the last 50 years, yet it is very much in accord with the phenomenological and hermeneutic traditions of continental philosophy. Of particular significance on this score is the work of Martin Heidegger, in particular his 'analytic of everydayness' with its focus on *Dasein*, the 'there-being' of human existence, essentially constituted by the phenomenon of 'Being-in-the-world'. With Heidegger the focus shifts from epistemology to ontology, from what the expert knows, to what the expert *is*, or more properly, what a person becomes in the process of having a world of meanings revealed. There are today a small but growing number of philosophers of education concerned to explore the relevance of Heidegger's work in relation to occupational expertise and vocational education.<sup>13</sup> And these same philosophical traditions have also taken a hold in the context of, for example, nurse education where it has become almost *de rigueur* for qualitative researchers to reference such philosophical underpinnings by way of providing an 'interpretative' theoretical 'lens' through which to view qualitative data relating to the lived experiences of practitioners.<sup>14</sup>

## Conclusion

None of this is to say that future philosophical work on vocational education must confine itself to these particular philosophical traditions for it is possible to locate complementary strands of thought in a variety of theoretical perspectives. As I have demonstrated elsewhere (Lum 2009), there are substantial and significant parallels to be found in such diverse areas as social constructivism, philosophy of language and empirical research in psychology of perception – ways of thinking which similarly point towards a richer theoretical understanding of vocational knowledge and capability. Some philosophers have begun to open up fruitful lines of enquiry in relation to pragmatist thinking: variously drawing on Dewey's notion of the embodied knower to propose "an epistemology of the hand" (Brinkmann and Tanggaard 2013), or exploring how Rorty's neo-pragmatism with its notions of solidarity and edifying conversation "engages with workplace knowledge and learning" (Gibbs 2013a, b, p. 165).

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<sup>13</sup> See, for example, Standish (1997), Neilsen (2007) and Gibbs (2010, 2011).

<sup>14</sup> Particularly influential here is the work of Patricia Benner (1982, 1984, 1994). Although research in this area is certainly to be welcomed, there may be cause to question the integrity of the philosophical underpinnings of some nurse research (see Koch 1995).

Such work not only has the potential to provide a more coherent account of what it is to be skilled, competent or capable and thus point ultimately towards more viable modes of vocational provision and assessment, but at a time when the wider educational enterprise is under increasing political pressure to incorporate supposed 'employability skills' a clearer articulation of what it is that properly constitutes a *vocational* education could help to indicate more precisely what might be at stake in venturing to displace forms of education intended to serve other ends.

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# Knowledge (as a Contested Terrain)



Emma Williams

## Ways of Knowing

“It is uncontroversial, pre-philosophically, that education aims at the imparting of knowledge; students are educated in part so that they may come to *know* things” (Siegel 2010, p. 284). One does not have to be reading an international handbook on the philosophy of education to come by the claim that knowledge is an integral concept within education. What a philosophical discussion of this connection might distinctively call to attention, however, is the *contested* status of knowledge – the idea that there are many different ways in which we might be said to know, and many different things which we might be said to know about.<sup>1</sup>

Philosophers traditionally see knowledge as dividing into three main types: ‘knowing how’, ‘knowing that’ and ‘knowing by acquaintance’. The first two types have been the focus of a number of debates within the history of (the philosophy of) education. This chapter will begin with an outline of knowing how and knowing that, and follow this with an overview of some central debates pertaining to these conceptions. It will then critically reflect on the views about the nature of knowledge that such debates often implicitly – and sometimes explicitly – presuppose. Doing so will work to call into question too-stringent (and too-easy) conceptions of the distinction between the different ways of knowing. At the end of the chapter, a conception of the lesser-attended-to notion of knowing by acquaintance will be sketched.

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<sup>1</sup> That there are different forms and ways of knowing is somewhat masked by the English language, which only has a signal term for ‘knowledge’. In other languages, however, discernment between the different types of knowing can be more readily recognized. In German, for example, a different term is used to describe knowledge of a person (*Können*) to that which describes knowledge of facts (*Wissen*).

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In ways that build on existing work elsewhere in the philosophy of education, the purpose of this section will be to bring into view a richer account of knowing than often predominates in education today.

## Knowing That and Knowing How

Knowing that is usually defined as *propositional* knowledge: knowledge that such-and-such is the case. Propositional knowledge is typically consciously representable: it is explicit and articulated. It is articulated in declarative or assertive sentences ('propositions'), simple examples of which could include: 'Cows are herbivores'; 'The battle of Waterloo was fought on the 18th June 1815'; and 'The social structures of marriage is a theme of Austen's *Pride and Prejudice*'. It is worth registering the present-tense structure of propositions, as well as their (apparent) abstract and objective nature. What this means is that, as Charles Taylor has suggested, statements of propositional knowledge do not usually make reference to the speaker: when stating that something is thus and so, *my* situation is left "indeterminate" (Taylor 2013, p. 76). It is not surprising that this kind of knowledge is therefore sometimes equated with factual knowledge and knowledge of information. In philosophy, propositional knowledge is the main focus of the tradition of epistemology. We return to epistemology below.

In contrast with knowing that, knowing how is usually construed as *practical* knowledge. It is knowledge in the form of skill or ability. Knowledge of this kind might not be made explicit in assertive or declarative propositions – it is instead sometimes spoken of as being *tacit*. Procedural knowledge is said to be manifest in the use of a skill or the doing of an action. Thus, for example, riding a bike would be classed as a mode of knowing how, since to do this I do not need facility with certain propositions or concepts but rather need to possess the relevant skills or technical abilities. Other candidate examples of knowing how include playing musical instruments and speaking foreign languages. The concept of knowing how is sometimes related to the Ancient Greek conception of *techne*, which was considered to be the kind of knowledge demonstrated by craftsmanship or art. It is also related to the Aristotelian conception of *phronesis* (practical judgement). We return to the Aristotelian tradition below.

## Knowledge and Education

Questions pertaining to knowledge that and knowledge how have historically come about in education in connection with debates about the content and structure of the school curriculum. When examining what *kinds* of knowledge schools should be seeking to impart, a decisive matter has often been the *value* candidate forms of knowledge are seen to have. As David Carr has put it, "some philosophers have

thought that the obvious starting point for curriculum reflection is with questions about the epistemic status of this or that form of knowledge or skill” (2009, p. 281). The overview of knowledge and curriculum theory that Carr himself goes on to provide explores the position of “traditionalism” (p. 284). Generally speaking, this is the view that “knowledge affords insight into an order of reality that is not of our own making and that is therefore apt for discovery and appreciation ... via the grasp of objective (mind-independent) criteria of rational coherence and truth” (p. 284). For Carr, traditionalist conceptions have their philosophical heritage in Plato, and particularly in the Platonist idea(l) that the kind of knowledge it is educationally valuable to learn is that which promotes wisdom and does not have (mere) practical utility. For Plato, valuable knowledge makes us better: morally, socially and politically.

Carr suggests that such a view was refined and developed by the early proponents of a liberal education in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. An exemplar case in England was Matthew Arnold, who defined education as the “transmission of culture” – “culture being a pursuit of our total perfection by means of getting to know on all the matters which most concern us, the best which has been thought and said” (1963 [1869], p. 6). Arnold’s ideas at that time were influenced by the changes to society that had been brought about by the Industrial Revolution. Particularly, Arnold viewed England to be in a state of general moral decline on account of increasing fixations on wealth. His theories about education and culture were thus an attempt to bring values back into society; Arnold wanted to extend the cultural opportunities for the so-called working classes in order to make their lives more enriched. For better or worse, Arnold’s views have come to be associated with exalted notions of the ‘life of the mind’. Such views tend to posit knowledge as the intellectual pursuit of objective truths. Versions of this have been espoused in various ways throughout history, but they are perhaps most often associated with the Enlightenment, when a newfound faith came to be placed in the powers of human reason to uncover truths about the world – be they scientific, ethical or aesthetic.

Carr suggests that ‘epistemological traditionalism’ continued in education, albeit in new ways, during the curriculum debates of the 1960s and 1970s. In the Anglo-American world, this was a time in which philosophy of education was in its heyday. In the work of thinkers like Richard Peters, Paul Hirst and Robert Dearden, “epistemological concerns were seen to be of the first importance for curricular decision making” and “the pursuit of knowledge was [seen to be] for the good of the mind” (Davis and Williams 2003, p. 253). There is clearly some connection to the traditionalism exemplified by Arnold in such views, yet Peters, Hirst and Dearden also sought to restate the idea of a liberal education in a way that significantly *broadened* understandings of the kinds of knowledge that could contribute to the “determination of the good life” (p. 253). At this time, it became fashionable for theorists to propose accounts of different “realms of meaning” (Philip Phenix) or “forms of knowledge” (Paul Hirst). In this way, curriculum theories sought to do justice to the “diversity of the forms that human knowledge and understanding can take” (Hirst 1973, p. 260). Nevertheless, there was a question of whether such theses retained something of an *academic* slant: the different forms of knowledge were sometimes

portrayed in terms characteristic of the *propositional*. Indeed (although he later came to develop a broader conception of knowledge) Hirst himself suggested that all the logically unique forms of knowledge shared the “general character” of “being expressible in public symbolic forms with which are associated objective tests of some sort” (1971, p. 11). Underpinning the restated liberal conception of education, then, there seems to remain the idea that knowledge was the “rational grasp of an essentially objective order of truth or reality” (Carr 2009, p. 286). The problem with this, as Carr suggests, is that it appears to correspondingly *devalue* “more utilitarian practical or vocational forms of school learning that most pupils are likely to require for useful and responsible lives” (Carr 2009, p. 286). In other words, there is the worry that overly academic conceptions of knowledge retain a certain privilege for *theoretical* and *intellectual* pursuits – thus positioning the acquisition of certain content and information (such as a particular canon of texts and ideas) as the highest goal for education.

Despite such concerns attempts to revive more ‘traditionalist’ conceptions of the school curriculum have gained some credence in recent years. An exemplar case in America is the work of conservative educational theorist E.D. Hirsch. Hirsch argues that there is a core body of knowledge – which includes knowledge about particular concepts, sayings and literary works – about which ‘every American needs to know’.<sup>2</sup> For Hirsch, it is the duty of education to impart such knowledge in a highly organized, structured way, for without this we do a disservice to those who would otherwise not get access to the forms of cultural enrichment such knowledge can bring. Hirsch’s ideas were utilized by the educational policy of the 2008 Coalition government in England, and particularly by the (then) education minister Michael Gove. Gove proposed a “back to basics” approach to curriculum content, which would prioritize “hard facts” over “soft skills” (Abrams 2012) – thereby seemingly to hark back to a more traditionalist and authoritarian understanding of knowledge, in contrast with (what is suggested to be) the ‘dumbing down’ of educational content that had come as result of the ‘practical turn’.

## The Practical Turn

It is often claimed that, as well as aiming at the imparting of (propositional) knowledge, education should develop the skills and capabilities young people need to flourish as autonomous individuals in society. At least since the 1980s, this view has gained currency in the Western world, bringing with it a renewed interest in alternative forms of knowledge within education. Yet interest in ways of knowing which go beyond a traditionalist focus on knowing that itself has a long pedigree. In Europe, it can be traced back at least as far as the ‘negative schooling’ presented in Rousseau’s *Emile* and, in America, to the pragmatism of John Dewey. Dewey’s philosophy of

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<sup>2</sup> ‘Cultural Literacy: What Every American Needs to Know’ is the title of Hirsch’s well-known book, first published in 1988.

education has been variously drawn upon and interpreted, but perhaps one of his central aims was to elaborate a conception of education that would make a difference to our ordinary living and re-orientate us towards the *practical* – a term which in Dewey means something quite distinct from the notion of ‘practice’ often invoked in educational thinking today.<sup>3</sup> More generally, for Dewey, education should be thought about in terms of “growth” and the cultivation of “functional autonomous persons” who will “do by choice what in infancy they do by nature, which is to grow and adapt” (Riley and Welchman 2003, p. 106). Dewey’s thinking came to be associated with progressivist theories of education, which were at that time arguing for child-centred approaches to learning in America. In England, progressivist conceptions of education assumed particular significance in the 1960s with the publication of the Plowden Report. By the 1980s, conceptions of civic and vocational education were also gaining currency and, in connection with these, special interest in the notions of knowing how and practical knowledge has developed in educational theory, policy and practice.

One area in which the notion of knowing how has assumed a particular significance in educational practice is the sphere of Vocational Education and Training (VET). This is an especially interesting sector to consider given the cultural differences that appear to exist between the ways such educational provision is conceived. For example, Brockmann et al. (2000) have pointed out that Anglo-Saxon conceptions of VET are often centred on notions of skills and competencies, which are themselves rooted in craft-based understandings of apprenticeship. In other words, VET in England is modelled on a conception whereby an apprentice is expected to learn “certain task specific-skills on the job, with little theoretical underpinning” (Brockmann et al. 2000, p. 551). The National Vocational Qualification (NVQ) system – developed in England during the 1980s as an alternative pathway to the traditional academic curriculum – is a representative example of such an approach. NVQ courses typically focus on training individuals to acquire a set range of narrowly defined skills and competencies in practical activities that are directly required to carry out a task to a certain standard. Assessment is often observational: the assessor checks whether an individual can perform the set range of tasks against specified standards and criteria. There is little attention in the training period given to theoretical knowledge, or to civic or general education. As a result of this, something of a limited picture of VET is operative in Anglo-Saxon countries.

Yet as Brockmann et al. point out, in other European countries (such as the Netherlands and Germany), there is quite a different picture. Here, a much more holistic conception of VET is at work. In Germany, for example, VET programmes aim to prepare young people for *Beruf*: a dual system “combining work-based training underpinned by theoretical knowledge and general education” (Brockmann et al. 2008, p. 557). VET programmes are accordingly conceptualized as “an overall occupational capacity, as opposed to a bundle of knacks or skills specific to particular tasks” (Winch 2009, p. 99). Part of what is at stake in such programmes is a rich

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<sup>3</sup>I return to discuss differing conceptions of practice and practical knowledge later in this section, but in relation to Dewey on this topic see in particular Nako Saito (2006).

conception of the notions of skills and competence, which is itself underpinned by the cultural inheritance of these countries. For example, unlike the Anglo-Saxon term “skills” that connotes “mastery of a narrow range of tasks”, *Fertigkeiten* in German are “an integral part of a broad occupational field, importantly underpinned by theoretical knowledge” (Brockmann et al. 2008, p. 551).

Before reflecting on the significance of this further, it is worth considering two other areas in which conceptions of knowing how have come to gain currency in contemporary education. The first is in relation to the discourse of ‘transferrable skills’, which now seems to be a permanent fixture within descriptors of aims and learning outcomes for a wide range of educational courses at all levels. In England, this kind of ‘skills-talk’ proliferated in the schools context with the appearance of both the 2004 National Curriculum and the 2005 White Paper on ‘14–19 Education and Skills’. A particularly interesting aspect of this literature is its usage of the notion of “thinking skills” – a loosely defined concept, which was seen to encompass abilities that ranged from information-processing skills; reasoning skills; enquiry skills; creative thinking skills to evaluation skills (QCA 2004, p. 22–23). These forms of “active cognitive processing” were represented as making for “better learning” and thus as holding the key to raising standards of education in the UK (McGuinness 1999, p. 3). Yet concerns have also been raised about the way such discourse turns thinking into a kind of “technology”: “a means-end instrumentality” and a “series of techniques that can move us from one space to another” (Peters 2007, p. 352).

The second area worthy of reflection is what has happened to teacher education in recent years. Indeed, it has widely been recognized that teacher education in a number of countries has shifted towards the notion of ‘evidence-based practice’, which draws upon empirical and scientific evidence to produce a highly technical conception of ‘what-works’. Such a conception tends to go hand in glove with competency-based approaches to teaching and teacher training, understandings of which are not unlike those at play within the Anglo-Saxon VET sector. As Gert Biesta puts it, the way ideas of ‘competence’ tend to be implemented in teaching often lead to ‘an emphasis on performance, standards, measurement and control’, one example of which is the current vogue for constructing long, detailed lists of teacher ‘proficiencies’ and ‘competencies’. Yet this turns teacher education into an instrumental, “a tick box exercise” that is purely focused on establishing whether trainee teachers have managed to “achieve everything on the list” (2015, pp. 29–30).

What these discussions work to highlight is the way conceptions of practical knowledge and knowing how can easily become reductive if they are not handled with adequate care. In recent years, a range of work in the philosophy of education has served to highlight this problem and propose better alternatives. Literature in this field has drawn upon various philosophical sources and traditions. One notable approach has been to invoke Gilbert Ryle’s well-known treatment of the distinction between knowing how and knowing that in *Concept of Mind*. On a superficial reading, it might seem as though Ryle’s claim that knowing how is a logically distinct category from knowing that is in danger of leading us into a reductive (and behaviouristic) conception of knowing how – like the ones we have seen at work in certain

areas of educational practice. This perhaps explains why Ryle has been challenged from ‘intellectualists’ such as Stanley and Williamson (2001), who seek to claim, *pace* Ryle, that knowledge how is in fact only a sub-species of knowledge that. Yet there have been alternative readings of Ryle in the philosophy of education that suggest a more nuanced understanding of knowing how, which also avoid falling back into the “intellectualist legend” (see for example Winch 2010; Standish 1992; Williams 2016). What is particularly significant about these ‘anti-intellectualist’ arguments are that they work to put into question any easy distinction between what we call, on the one hand, ‘theoretical’ and what we call, on the other, ‘practical’ knowledge. Thus Christopher Winch, for example, seeks to argue for a conception of knowing how that recognizes the role of intelligence (broadly defined) within practical activity itself. This is an account that is attentive to the way that, as Winch puts it, “[t]hose who know how to do something do not ... just know how to practice a technique, they also know how to carry out the act that they wish to perform in the circumstances in which they have to perform it” (Winch 2010, p. 559).

The interesting question now becomes how precisely should we understand the kind of intelligence being invoked here: “the intelligence ... with which that technique is practiced” (Winch 2010, pp. 559–560). Winch follows a number of philosophers of education in turning to the notion of *judgement* within his discussion. As stated above, accounts in this direction have been developed through a number of different trajectories, but a prominent approach has been to draw upon the Aristotelian tradition. Gert Biesta, for example, has suggested that Aristotle’s conception of judgement can be utilized for providing a richer conception of a ‘good’ teacher (as opposed to a merely ‘competent’ teacher). In particular, Biesta suggests that teachers need two kinds of Aristotelean judgement: *poiesis* and *praxis*. *Poiesis*, Biesta claims, relates to the production or fabrication of things: for this we need “*techne*” or “knowledge of how to make things” (Biesta 2015, p. 39). *Praxis*, on the other hand, is the kind of judgement that pertains to human action and interaction. For this, we need *phronesis* (practical wisdom): judgement not (just) about *how* something is to be done but about “*what* is to be done” (p. 39). While Biesta claims good teachers require both kinds of judgement, he also suggests that *phronesis* has priority.<sup>4</sup>

Biesta is not alone in attributing a special significance to *phronesis*. Indeed, philosophers of education have explored the import of this notion in a number of illuminating ways (see for example Dunne 1993; Smith 1999). Rather than rehearse accounts that have more than adequately been made elsewhere, in the remainder of this chapter I should like to take an alternative route. This is one that builds on the tradition we have just been outlining – but rather than focusing on *phronesis* it invokes the notion of *knowing by acquaintance*. Sketching this will serve to offer a line of extension to existing debates in the field, and continue to put into question too-stringent (and too-easy) divisions between different kinds of knowledge.

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<sup>4</sup>Notably, however, Richard Smith has argued that the Aristotelian concepts of *techne* and *praxis* “do not translate into our language and world without bringing certain distortions with them” (1999, p. 327).



## Mediationism and Technicism

There is a big mistake operating in our culture, a kind of operative (mis)understanding of what it is to know, which has had dire effects on both theory and practice in a host of domains (Taylor 2013, p. 61)

To begin developing our account, it will be helpful to first say something more about the conception of knowledge it seeks to work *against*. This is the “operative (mis)understanding of what it is to know”, which Charles Taylor suggests in the above quotation has dire effects on our thinking. We should recognize at this point, then, that while attempts *have* been made to offer richer conceptions of knowledge, such attempts largely remain in the *margins* of educational thinking today. More reductive conceptions, such as those we have eluded to via our discussions of educational practice and policy in this chapter, still very much hold sway. This section seeks to bring out the implicit – and sometimes explicit – (mis)understandings of knowledge at work in such accounts, so as to open a way forward.

Following Taylor (2013), we might say that the misunderstanding can be traced back to two problematic topologies: ‘mediationalism’ and ‘technicism’.<sup>5</sup> Although these can be posited as *two* topologies, it is perhaps more accurate to say that the latter emerges out of the former. These started to take hold during the Early Modern period and via Descartes’ philosophy in particular. What we are talking about here pertains more specifically to Descartes’ *correspondence* theory of knowledge: the claim that I am said to know when the idea I have in my mind accurately reflects the reality that is independently out there. Taylor terms this a ‘mediational’ picture of knowledge: the view that human contact with the (*outer*) world is always and only *mediated* by something (that is *inner*). Now, for Descartes, the mediating element was *ideas* – mental representations. Of course, Descartes’ theories were widely refuted in the epistemological traditions that came after him, and it is rare today to find epistemologists speaking in terms of ‘mental representations’ or the specialized Cartesian notion of ‘ideas’. Instead, they often speak in terms of ‘beliefs’ that are expressible in ‘propositions’ (indeed, we characterized conceptions of knowing that in precisely such terms above). Crucially, however, Taylor suggests that the general topology of representationalism remains *intact*, despite these changes. This is because, for Taylor, the contemporary epistemologist’s notion of ideas or beliefs or sentences held true operate just like representations or depictions did in the Early Modern theories – *as the means through which we have knowledge of an outer, external world*.

A certain picture of the world, the human mind and the relation of mind to world is hereby allowed to continue, unchallenged. The world comes to be divested of meaning; there is an “objectification of the material” (Taylor 2013, p. 70). The mind, by contrast, is seen as something that is *disengaged* from the world (in Descartes of

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<sup>5</sup> It is not possible to give an exhaustive analysis of these typologies in the present chapter, for the background story here may be cast in many ways. In what follows, I will utilize Taylor’s discussion in his recent chapter on *Retrieving Realism* as a representative example of the way the development of these notions could be charted.

course the mind could be ontologically separated from the body). The relation between mind and world, meanwhile, comes to be construed as the detached, neutral grasp. To know the world, in other words, we need to adopt a ‘third person’ perspective, that is, to think like an outside observer. This enables us to see certain conditions in the world as giving rise to certain experiences in the mind. The flipside of this is the ‘first person’ perspective: one that focuses on the way things are subjectively *felt*. While these perspectives might have a role to play in other areas of human life (the creation of art perhaps), they should not have a place in the pursuit of knowledge. Hence a divide between the ‘emotional’ and the ‘rational’ aspects of the human being starts to take hold or, perhaps more accurately, a new construal of what is at stake in both reason and emotion begins to emerge (where reason is associated with clear, transparent thinking, while the emotional and affective states are vague and obscure).

Out of this mediational picture of mind and knowledge comes a further effect: ‘technicism’ as the newfound faith in methods and methodology as a means to knowledge. From the perspective of the external observer we can no longer rely on our vague or intuitive sense of something. Hence we need to locate formal and clearly formulated rules or procedures by which we can reach knowledge. For Descartes of course, this meant checking our inferences at each stage in the thought process to ensure that our beliefs are held together by an indubitable series of deductive links. This, the task of “geometrizing” thinking, works to construe rational thought as “the progress of the mind through a series of successive, self-evident steps” (Warner 1989, p. 11). It is a kind of thinking that acts in accordance with explicit and formal rules that can be publically observed and ratified. Such an approach proves unprecedentedly successful in its application within science, where such methods enable us to produce “law like explanations” with “predictive value” that allow us to know and control the world around us through the production and implementation of new technologies (Dunne and Pendlebury 2003, p. 196). And why not apply such methods outside the realm of science, too? That is, why not set about “searching for the same kind of regularities in human functioning – and hence the same basis for prediction and control – that had been found in the material universe” (p. 196)? Here emerges what Dunne and Pendlebury term the “triumph of technical reason”: the lure of “clearly formulated, publically agreed procedures” that confer objectivity, generalizability, replicability and accountability (pp. 195–196). If such terms are reminiscent of ideas we previously saw at work in the realms of VET, teacher education and discourses of ‘transferable skills’, this is not incidental. Indeed, the point being made here is that the pictures from educational practice are themselves a symptom of a more widespread topology, which begins in the mediational picture of knowledge, and extends into a technicism about human thinking, knowing and acting.

There is certainly more that could be said about all this. In particular, we might want to explore the ways that a number of philosophers of education have come to see notions of representationalism and technicism at work in contemporary educational policy and practice, and the instrumentalist conception of rationality that seems to predominate there (see, for example Blake et al. 2000, 2007). Such discussions are profound and complex. Yet instead of taking this route what I should

like explore in the remaining part of this chapter is the beginnings of a way *beyond* this picture. To do so, I want to return us to the notion of knowing by acquaintance.

## Knowing by Acquaintance

The conception of knowing by acquaintance offered here will be developed in relation to key tropes presented by the phenomenological philosopher Martin Heidegger. Heidegger's thinking is certainly not the only resource for such an account, but it does provide a helpful entry point for this chapter.<sup>6</sup> Indeed, the 'phenomenological turn' instigated by Edmund Husserl and developed in a particular direction by Heidegger was itself an attempt to move beyond the distortive assumptions about human beings' relation to the world that had been created by epistemologically driven philosophizing and the mediational picture of knowledge, as outlined above. Notably, to enact such a move, phenomenological philosophers seek to return philosophical attention to what is given in an experience *as it is given* – as Maurice Merleau-Ponty puts it, in phenomenology "all ... efforts are concentrated upon re-achieving a direct and primitive contact with the world, and endowing that contact with philosophical status" (Merleau-Ponty 1962, p. vii). But let us explore further.

Heidegger's phenomenological analyses lead him in *Being and Time* to draw a contrast between two ways in which human beings encounter things in the world: as *present-to-hand* (*Vorhandenheit*) and as *ready-to-hand* (*Zuhandenheit*) (Heidegger 2005 [1927] p. 97). While the former represents a contemplative, theoretical mode of understanding (like the detached observation of a thing as an object), the latter refers us to the ways we encounter things in our everyday dealings with the world. To give a straightforward illustration, when I am engaged in the task of hanging a picture-frame above my fireplace, the hammer I am using to drive the nail into the wall is encountered as *ready-to-hand*. When I pick up the hammer and use it, I do not for the most part think about the hammer, unless the head comes off or is loose or something goes wrong. To give another example, when I switch on the light in my living room, I don't think about where the switch is or how to do it. I just do it. Yet the same hammer and switch could also be viewed in abstraction from this activity – I could attend to its attributes or essence as an object, for example – and in doing so I would encounter the hammer as something *present-at-hand*. Usually, as I have suggested, this happens when something interrupts the everyday working of my relation with the hammer or a light switch. It might be tempting to read Heidegger's contrast here as simply a re-statement of the classical philosophical

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<sup>6</sup>The arguments I draw upon here presents one example of a tradition that works to move beyond classical conceptions of knowledge. There are other traditions that might be drawn into this discussion, such as feminist, post-structuralist, Indigenous, African critiques of dominant conceptions of the nature of knowledge. For discussion of these issues see for example Ruitenberg and Phillips (2012) *Education, Culture and Epistemological Diversity: Mapping a Disputed Terrain*. I explore the relation between phenomenology and post-structuralist thought in *The Ways we Think* (2016).

division between propositional and the practical types of knowledge. Yet to do so would be a mistake – for through this distinction Heidegger in fact works to challenge the very basis these conceptions of knowledge are built upon.

To explain this more fully, let us first reflect more on what is at stake in encountering something as *Zuhandenheit*. Heidegger suggests that, in this mode, things in the world show up for us as ‘equipment’ – as things that might be used ‘in order to ...’. Thus the hammer reveals itself to me as a tool that I might use to hammer this nail into the wall in order to hang up my picture. Yet we might want to ask: what makes it possible for things to show up for us like this in the first place? More particularly, how do I come to relate to a hammer as something that I can use ‘in-order-to’ drive a nail into a wall? Heidegger’s answer is that such an encounter presupposes a certain *familiarity* with the hammer. Put more fully, it presupposes familiarity with a matrix of involvements, cultural meanings and significances, which constitute the hammer’s being what it is. Moreover, I could not come to apprehend the hammer as a tool for driving a nail into a wall *without* these structures: they are a *precondition* for my being able to encounter the hammer as I do *in the first place*.

Crucially, what Heidegger is suggesting here is not supposed to be confined only to things like hammers. It is at this point that we start to see why Heidegger’s distinction takes us beyond the classical understandings of knowledge outlined above. For, by paying careful attention to the nature of *Zuhandenheit*, Heidegger works to reveal something about the conditions of possibility of human beings’ knowing and relating to the world *more generally*. Rather than seeing knowledge as what mediates a relation between what stands on the one hand as an (inner) subject and on the other as an (outer) world, then, Heidegger instead suggests that human knowing always already takes place from a position that is *engaged* and *involved* with the world. “We are” as Charles Taylor puts it “always and inevitably thinking within such taken-as-there frameworks” (Taylor 2013, p. 75); our thinking, as Heidegger himself puts it, takes place within a “background”.

Through his exploration of *Zuhandenheit* then, Heidegger not only works to reveal a way of relating to the world (an engaged state) that can be differentiated from *Vorhandenheit* (an abstract disengaged state). His discussion in fact *cuts deeper* – for it attempts to *reposition* human knowing in a way that serves to problematize too-stringent (and too-easy) divisions between practical and propositional types of knowledge. Indeed, Heidegger’s account of background is supposed to hold as much for our practical engagements with the world as for our *theoretical* modes of comportment. This is something that is easily overlooked by readings of Heidegger that tend to focus on *Zuhandenheit*, but miss the wider significance of this discussion for the very nature of our thinking and knowing the world in general. For following Heidegger’s discussion contemplative detachment itself comes to be understood as a certain kind of *praxis* – one that is determined by its own mood and circumspection. We can no longer maintain a strict separation between the theoretical and the practical then, for as Heidegger himself puts it, knowing as the contemplative grasp of the thing “has sense only on the basis of an *already-being-involved-with*”, and is thus itself “a *founded way of being-in-the-world*, a way which is always

possible only on the basis of a non-cognitive comportment” (Heidegger 1992 [1925], p. 162–164, emphasis in the original).

Of course, much more needs to be said about the nature of the non-cognitive comportment invoked by Heidegger here. Charles Taylor denotes it in terms of a “larger context of presumed contact with reality” (p. 76). Yet I wonder whether the notion of *knowing by acquaintance* might be instructive at precisely this point. This is not, notably, to hark back to the classical conception of knowledge by acquaintance proposed by Bertrand Russell – viz. “a direct cognitive relation to the object, *i.e.* when [the subject is] directly aware of the object itself” (Russell 1910, p. 108 as quoted in IEP 2016). Such a conception is still too focused on knowledge in its traditional *cognitive* and *propositional* form. What I am looking to invoke, more particularly, is a more general way of knowing the world that is itself a *precondition* for such propositional – and practical – modes of knowing.

How might such a conception of knowing by acquaintance be sketched? One illustration is to be found in Heidegger’s own later writings. In *What Is Called Thinking?* Heidegger explores the kind of knowledge modelled by a cabinetmaker’s apprentice.<sup>6</sup> Significantly, Heidegger suggests that such knowledge does not come from “facility in the use of tools”, or from theoretical knowledge about the forms of cabinets and their structure (Heidegger 2004 [1954], p. 14). While propositional knowledge and skills might well be necessary to becoming a cabinetmaker’s apprentice, they are certainly not *sufficient*. What they leave out, Heidegger claims, is a mode of “relatedness” to wood itself (p. 14). Now, such a notion need not be understood in any romanticized kind of way. Rather, it appeals to the way that structures of receptiveness and responsiveness to different kinds of woods, to its material and its shapes, are involved in the work of the craftsman. For the apprentice to learn such relatedness, it is a matter of learning, for example, what kinds of wood will work well for a TV cabinet, or what kinds of wood will work well for a kitchen cabinet, and so on. Yet all of this, crucially, is something that is learned *by way of the wood itself*. Put otherwise, because the wood already *lends itself* to use in particular ways, we learn what works well by being *attentive* to the way the wood shows itself. The knowledge we have here, then, is not in the form of a theoretical and disengaged grasp of some material. Neither is it a matter of implementing some generalized, technical procedure. It is, rather, a way of knowing that emerges through a co-dependent relation between the wood and myself. And such a relation could not take place without an experience – or what might better be called an ‘acquaintance’ – with wood and with the world of craftsmanship in general.

How might we see this account of knowing by acquaintance as working in educational practice? There are multiple ways, and yet there is a problem in that these are easily obscured by the ways in which we have grown accustomed to thinking about teaching and learning. The emphasis on transparency and on learning objectives being made explicit, and the encouragement of a self-conscious awareness of the processes of one’s own learning (with the supposed sophistication of metacognition and identification of learning-styles), all work to hide those more tacit and in

some respects sensuously direct aspects of educational experience; they make it impossible to recognize how fundamental these are. So let me provide three examples in order to illustrate the importance of knowing by acquaintance more convincingly. First, there is the logical point that some aspects of education – specifically, central aspects of aesthetic education – do not make sense without direct acquaintance with works of art. Students may well acquire knowledge of, say, Alice Walker's *The Colour Purple*, including knowledge of its plot and themes as well as of divergent lines of criticism, and also the competence to write about these things, and they may do this in a manner sufficient to enable them to write successful answers in the examination – without their ever having read the book! Yet it is a logical point that aesthetic appreciation requires direct experience of the art-work in question. So, in spite of their apparent success, they have not been aesthetically educated at all: they may in fact have been miseducated about what art and appreciation are. Second, it is strikingly the case that teachers of subjects such as engineering or hairdressing acquire a feel for the context within which they work and for the materials that they work with; one might say the same for the chemistry teacher, for whom familiarity with the laboratory, with its Bunsen burners and sinks, and with the Table of the Elements on the wall, is part of the way they understand themselves and their commitment to what they teach: it is in part this feel for the subject that they seek to inculcate in their students. Third, there is the moving story of a class of 10-year-old children who, on the return from their holiday, were asked to write a short piece about what they had been doing. One boy wrote in faltering bare sentences of the fact that during the holiday his grandmother had died, stating the simple facts of the visits of the doctor and the preparations for the funeral. The teacher's response had been: 'That's very sad. But no describing words'. Apart from the extraordinary insensitivity of this, the poverty of thought is manifested in the teacher's inability to see beyond the grid of expectations of learning outcomes. Good writing at Key Stage 2 must include describing words. Never mind the fact that the child had something to say.

It is not possible to go too much further with our discussion of this here. Yet even from these brief insights we have perhaps been able to glimpse a way that would move us beyond the mediationalist and technicist pictures of knowing examined above. Moreover, and in doing so, we can also come to see how making such a move would enable us to overcome reductive conceptions of knowing that and knowing how, which themselves produce too-stringent (and too-easy) understandings of our ways of knowing. Such conceptions continue at the expense of the possibilities of both our engaged and our cognitive ways of knowing the world. As we have seen in this chapter, certain traditions within contemporary philosophy of education have taken up the challenge of articulating ways of knowing that go beyond this. Such accounts need to resist narrow conceptions of practice as much as they need to combat over-intellectualized pictures of the cognitive. What we have proposed in this chapter is that this kind of richer picture might itself be sketched via the lesser-attended-to mode of knowing by acquaintance.



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# What Can We Learn from Learning Technologies? Technology, Digitization, and Education



Anna Kouppanou

## Introduction

The term *learning technology* suggests that there are particular technologies that allow learning, and which are used accordingly, whereas there are also technologies which are of no use to learning, teaching, or thinking for that matter. At first glance, this appears quite logical; tools are after all made for specific purposes and not all tools are designed to assist learning, while others, like the pencil or the book, are destined to do precisely that. However, we are at the same time incapable of denying that we know this much at least – namely, that some of the most foundational learning technologies, like the alphabet or the Internet, have not been developed or even used at their initial stages of development or adoption with any specific educational purpose in mind. In fact, we can infer the reverse – that is to say, that these technologies contributed to the formation of the possibilities for schooling and are at this point in time considered to be not simply indispensable for learning, but also an important formative factor for entire knowledge domains, methods of research, modalities of teaching and learning, whilst being themselves access points for the theoretical investigation of human thinking. Such a realization suggests that learning technologies, and technological artifacts on the whole, constitute something more than mere means, and it also points to the possibility that technologies condition human endeavors in unexpected ways; indeed, ways not intended by their human designers and producers. Such an insight is strangely and distortedly echoed in both technophobic and evangelistic interpretations of technology, but this does not mean that it lacks philosophical import. Indeed, this chapter aims to illuminate by means of a historical and critical discussion the ways that different schools of

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thought have tackle the question of technology by seeking to answer either the question ‘What is a technological thing?’ or ‘What does a technological thing do?’.

The aforesaid distinction might appear frivolous, but it does implicate Western philosophy’s own unfolding and, as a matter of fact, its shift from an anthropocentric view, which conceptualizes the human being as the center that controls and uses *everything*, to a more postmodern and anti-subjectivist theorization, which imagines the human being as merely one of the many contributing factors instantiating synergetic relationships with other things and forces and participating to the emergence of beings. This shift is not to be taken as a deterministic linear trajectory, since, as it would soon become clear via a special focus on the thought of German philosopher Martin Heidegger and French philosopher Bernard Stiegler, each theoretical position concerning technology can hardly be considered as a one-dimensional theorization. Similarly, the thought of these philosophers reflects each time these different perspectives of philosophy. On the basis, however, of the aforementioned shift, some very important questions having to do with the nature of the technological being, the human being, and their interaction would come to light. What’s more, the nature of the questions themselves suggests that any answer beyond the mere instrumental –‘technology is a means to an end’ paradigm – is bound to have deep implications for our conceptualizations of all the terms involved in such questioning and their respective relations. Still, we need to answer at least preliminarily one more question: ***Indeed, how are learning and education implicated in this discussion?*** As I will show, any investigation of technology moving beyond the instrumental paradigm reveals something important about the ontologies of technological artifacts, and these ontologies are characterized by their procedural relatedness to the human being. Technological things do something, and they often do it to the human beings that use them. This kind of influence is bound to have an effect on being and thinking, as it is quite evident from the educational literature responding to the various theoretical perspectives presented here. In view of this perspective, this chapter will also attempt to address the question: ‘What is learning and what is learning technology?’, by attending to the different tendencies of technology, and in fact technology’s current dominant trend of digitization, and by relating these characteristics to educational matters.

## Early Questionings of Technology

Platonic philosophy and the respective Aristotelian critical response to it have established a mainly dichotomous metaphysical system that understates the importance of technology in contrast to the natural world but also to the world of thinking. Plato’s belief in the realm of ideas, for example, allowed the prioritization of the ideal, the immaterial, and the universal, much to the demise of the sensuous, the particular, and the actual. Indeed, Plato’s *Allegory of the Cave* (2014) is based on the premise that things around us constitute derivative material copies of their respective original and universal originary *Ideas*. A tree, for example, is a copy of the

original idea of *tree-ness*, while things like statues and paintings are copies of copies, namely, representations and illusions of an originary essence. On the basis of this Platonic analogy, it appears that ancient Greek thought conceived *τέχνη* (*technē* – art, craftsmanship, or technology) in terms of imitating nature and in any case as something derivative.

Aristotle (2004), nonetheless, offers greater detail in his discussion of technology, since in the *Nicomachean Ethics* he discusses various types of knowing like *epistēmē* (contemplation or scientific thinking), *technē* (art or craftsmanship or production or technology), and *phronēsis* (practical wisdom) and makes the following judgment; namely, that

contemplation is both the highest form of activity (since the intellect is the highest thing in us, and the objects that it apprehends are the highest things that can be known), and also it is the most continuous, because we are more capable of continuous contemplation than we are of any practical activity. (X II77 20–25)

Aristotle (2004) then moves on to differentiate between *technē* and *epistēmē*, arguing that the former operates ‘in the sphere of the variable’, that is, ‘[w]hat can be otherwise’, since *technē* does not obey any eternal or essential rule, whereas epistemic knowing looks to uncover the eternal that is driven by ‘necessity’ (II4oa 2 and II4oa 23, footnote, I, p. 149). Aristotle adds that even though “[e]very art is concerned with bringing something into being” that which is brought into being “is capable either of being or of not being, and the cause of which is in the producer and not in the product” (II4 oa 11–14, p. 149).

Such theorization of production has many different implications for the understanding of both the technological thing and the human being, since the former is presented as random, derivative, and inessential, whereas the latter is seen as the source of the artifact. In other words, the producer is responsible for the artifact’s production, which is accordingly thought in terms of the actualization of an idea. This idea has in any case preceded the existence of the artifact, the producer, and the material used for the production. The implications, however, are not exhausted here, since Heidegger (1977) argues that by singling out the human producer as the unique cause for production, Aristotle establishes the anthropocentrism that is characteristic of Western philosophy. In order to understand this reproach, we need to take into consideration that for Aristotle there are four types of causes of change, movement, or *genesis* (emergence, bringing forth). *Causa materialis* refers to the matter that is used in order to create something, *causa formalis* refers to the form that the matter needs to take, *causa finalis* denotes the end or the purpose for which the product was created, and *causa efficiens* points to the producer who receives the idea of the object in their mind and moves on to produce it. Heidegger, however, comments that the producer is neither the single nor the most important cause, since all four causes ‘belong-together’ and are ‘co-responsible’ for bringing something forth (p. 7). Nevertheless, Aristotle’s neglect of the other causes is translated into the metaphysical neglect of materiality, leading to the conceptualization of artifacts as neutral means that can be used at will and regardless of their own constitution. Webster F. Hood (1983) explains this in the following terms:

The goal of *technē*, its work or product –the article of clothing, the house, or whatever– which the activity of making posits as its object, is strictly instrumental to something else from which it receives its complete justification. And this “something” else is the use to which it is put –wearing the article of clothing, living in the house– for the sake of some activity that ultimately is its own end, namely moral or intellectual activity. Accordingly, technology is subordinate to practical wisdom, to moral and intellectual activities which are their own justification. (p. 349)

Like so, ancient Greek philosophy is solidified on a firm distinction between these different modes of knowing and accordingly distinguishes between its own modes of investigation, namely, ontology (what something is), epistemology (how we know), and ethics (what we should do). This kind of compartmentalization formed, in consequence, the type of questions philosophy could ask and the kind of divisions it forged. If, for example, tools are neutral beings, then there is no need to investigate them in connection to processes of knowing, learning, or ethical demeanor. The deeper consequence of this distinction for philosophy is, however, the fact that philosophy is instantiated as a field through its own juxtaposition to technology. Bernard Stiegler (1998) comments:

At the beginning of its history philosophy separates *tekhne* from *episteme*, a distinction that had not yet been made in Homeric times. The separation is determined by a political context, one in which the philosopher accuses the Sophist of instrumentalizing the *logos* as rhetoric and logography, that is, as both an instrument of power and a renunciation of knowledge (Châtelet 1965, p. 60–61). It is in the inheritance of this conflict –in which the philosophical *episteme* is pitched against the sophistic *tekhne*, whereby all technical knowledge is devalued– that the essence of technical entities in general is conceived... (p. 1)

The belief in the supposed neutral or even derivative nature of the technological artifacts, which can be used with no effects on the actions that involve them, is still distortedly reflected in common sense understandings of technology, since according to David Lewin (2013): ‘It would seem bizarre to imagine that devices could have subjectivity, desires, or could determine their own ends’. As a result, different discourses emanating from the field of educational technology present certain tools like the computers as “neutral means of accessing ‘information’ that will somehow automatically bring about learning” (p. 174). Other discourses, according to Neil Selwyn (2011), support that “the *de facto* role of the educational technologist is understood to be one of finding ways to make these technology-based improvements happen and –to coin a phrase often used in the field– to ‘harness the power of technology’” (p. 713). In this respect, the instrumental and neutral understanding of technology is maintained along with a belief in its essentially beneficial effects on learning and with a certain conviction about the technological conditioning of thinking.

Before moving on to the next section of this chapter, I need to add here that it would be misleading to assume that the ancient Greek theorization of technology is one-dimensional, since this first philosophy of technology affirms, on the one hand, that *technē* falls into the realm of imitation, representation, and illusion, but, on the other hand, Aristotle states in *Physics II.8* (Aristotle 1985) that “generally art in some cases completes what nature cannot bring to a finish, and in others imitates

nature” (199a9-199a19 p. 32). This small comment opens up the possibility of rethinking the boundaries of nature and technology while allowing us to think of imitation in distinction to representation. Indeed, in *Poetics*, Aristotle (1922) argues that “imitation [is] one instinct of our nature” that allows us to learn. Through the contemplation of resemblances and images (*εἰκόνας*), we can relate our experience to other things and thus find ourselves “learning or inferring” (III.IV.6). *Technē* is therefore conducive to contemplation and learning in general.

This is surely a step beyond the instrumental understanding of technology, and this differentiation is in a way also found in Plato’s *Phaedrus* (Plato 2014), in which text a contradictory discussion of writing is in place. Indeed, at the beginning of the dialogue, Socrates gives an instrumental account of writing by saying that its value depends on its use, but at some point he recounts the myth of the invention of writing that is quite distinct from this instrumental theorization. According to the myth, the Egyptian God Theuth presents writing to King Thamus arguing that his invention will be the cure for human memory. Thamus, in contrast, responds that writing is the exact opposite, since it will weaken memory by making people depend on it. Jacques Derrida (1981) notes, however, that Thamus remarks that writing is good for “*hypomnēsis* (re-memoration, recollection, consignation) and not for the *mnēmē* (living, knowing memory)” (p. 91). In this way, technology is referred to as representation and illusion, but is also considered as potentially harmful. Derrida, of course, undoes this distinction not only in this essay but throughout his deconstructive work by presenting the supplement (writing) as constitutive of that which is thought to be originary and self-affected – in this case, the human memory. Nonetheless, the distinction alone suggests that technology has an effect on thinking, and in what follows, this will be explicated further.

## Technology’s Reinvention and Philosophy’s Rebirth

Carl Mitcham (1994) notes that: “Technology, or the making and using of artifacts, is a largely unthinking activity. It emerges from unattended ideas and motives, while it produces and engages with unreflected-upon objects” (Mitcham 1994, p. 1). Martin Heidegger (2008), however, diving deep into this unreflective structure, accomplished one of the most reflective accounts of technological artifacts. Indeed, in *Being and Time*, Heidegger studied the way time presents itself to the human being and unveiled a structure of temporal relatedness that he called *care*, when referring to people, and *concern*, when referring to things, adding that: “Circumspective concern decides as to the closeness and farness of what is proximally ready-to-hand environmentally. Whatever this concern dwells alongside beforehand is what is closest...” (Heidegger 2008, pp. 141–142/107).

The ready-to-hand that Heidegger mentions refers to anything to which we relate nontheoretically in-order-to-do something. The doorknob, for example, is something always already in my hand. It is close. I use it in order to open the door, but I do not think how to use it or how to use my hand; the doorknob is always already in my

hand, and, similarly, I am always already out of the door and in my way to my car. The ready-to-hand contributes, in this way, to the constitution of my moving forward, both literally in space and metaphorically in time, while this enacted spatiotemporality is called *nearness*. Because of their ability to refer to something else, tools are constituted through the framework of the networks that they create. Tools are discovered in these networks laden with intentions, references, and significances. Therefore, Theodore Kiesel (1993) explains that: “The field of objects which yields the original sense of being is that of the *produced* object accessible in the course of usage” (p. 264). Tools constitute our *already-there*, namely, a milieu in which we find ourselves thrown. While using the word processor, for example, I am already conditioned to sit in a specific way, on a chair, near a desk, typing at a specific speed, articulating my thoughts with a specific rhythm, and choosing my actions according to the software’s limitations and affordances. These are mostly actions I perform without thinking or, better yet, I am conditioned to think and act in specific ways, which I do not need to choose. For this reason, Hannah Arendt (1998) asserts that: “The human condition comprehends more than the conditions under which life has been given to man. Men are conditioned beings because everything they come in contact with turns immediately into a condition of their existence” (p. 9).

The realization that the human existence is conditioned existence and indeed conditioned by technology led to the undoing of anthropocentrism and the deconstruction of all the derivative dichotomies that made up the Platonic metaphysical universe. A paradigmatic exposition of this discourse comes from Heidegger’s famous essay *The Question Concerning Technology*. In this essay, Heidegger (1977) argues that the “essence of technology is nothing technological” (p. 4). It is rather *Gestell* or Enframing, namely, a framework that conditions the way we think about the world or, to put this in different terms, the way the world is revealed to us. Existence is conditioned by technology’s way of thinking, and this increasingly becomes the only way we experience the world. Heidegger describes this as a phenomenon taking over every aspect of being, since: “Everywhere everything is ordered to stand by, to be immediately on hand, indeed to stand there just so that it may be on call for a further ordering” (p. 17).

Andrew Feenberg (2006) calls Heidegger’s approach substantive and indeed essentialist, since it ascribes a specific core to technology which he sees functioning as “an autonomous force separate from society, a kind of second nature impinging on social life” (p. vii). Such conceptualizations of technology are clearly opposed to any ideas concerning technology’s instrumental and neutral nature and, instead, see it as inherently good or bad. This is not completely true for Heidegger, since he, on the one hand, sees modern technology, with its exact computational and information systems, to be distinctly different from ancient Greek art and craftsmanship (*technē*), but on the other hand, he understands this essence as a revealing mode that implicates the human being in various ways. In any case, Heidegger departs from instrumentalism, which media theorist, Marshall McLuhan (2009), characterizes as a form of ‘somnambulism’, saying that:



Suppose we were to say, "Apple pie is in itself neither good nor bad; it is the way it is used that determines its value." Or, "The smallpox virus is in itself neither good or bad; it is the way it is used that determines its value." Again, "Firearms are in themselves neither good nor bad; it is the way they are used that determines their value." That is, if the slugs reach the right people firearms are good. If the TV tube fires the right ammunition at the right people it is good. (p. 11)

McLuhan, like Heidegger, believed that every great technological change introduces deep changes in human experience. Technology makes up a new reality that becomes the human being's new way of being. This reality cannot in any case be set under control by human will or be manipulated. Therefore, McLuhan argues that "the medium is the message", because it is the medium that shapes and controls the scale and form of human action (p. 9). In a certain respect, both Heidegger and McLuhan are right: specific changes of technology do at times have such immense implications for human life that they simply cannot be perceived via localized studies of individual technological instances, their respective uses and particular contents. For instance, we can say with certainty that the world changed with the industrial revolution; indeed, the need for the term *industrial revolution* suggests deep organizational transformations at the political, economic, and social realms that reveal new ways of being for users and citizens. To describe this phenomenon by a single focus on the steam engine, however, would not have been enough.

Similarly, a discussion delineating the great effects modern technology has both on teachers and learners can be traced in the literature of philosophy of education. These accounts offered by Paul Standish (1997) and Lynda Stone (2006), for example, describe modern technology's tendency to eliminate difference and to turn things and people into resources, by sketching images of assimilation, effected by ready-made curricula that simply do not address the needs of individual learners, and pictures of standardization relating to testing, teaching methodologies, and research approaches. These accounts, however, just like the philosophical perspectives from which they emanate, leave the specificity of each technological object, its content, and specific mechanisms unquestioned.

Grounding itself on the realization that technologies have effects on human life, essentialism ascribes a specific content to this conditioning principle, but ends up denying any specificity as to the way specific objects are designed, produced, and ultimately employed within complicated social and political systems. What's more, these conceptualizations of technology fail to capture the complicated relationship existing between technology, society, and politics – either at the individual or at the communal level – while they can even end up "transposing an inadequate concept of agency from human beings to technology itself" (Lewin 2006, p. 519). For this reason, Andrew Feenberg (2006) proposes a critical theory of technology that fuses elements from instrumentalism with elements from substantivism and takes into consideration insights from social constructivism. This last take sees "technology as a dimension of society rather than as an external force acting on it from an epistemological or metaphysical beyond" (p. 10). Feenberg thus asserts that technologies need to be understood as cultural artifacts, that is, as objects participating in a complicated process of design, production, and consumption,

during which different social actors come together, taking part in accommodating and antagonistic relationships. Social constructivism, however, has, according to Feenberg, overplayed the role of society, while disaggregating “the question of technology as to deprive it of philosophical significance. It has become a matter for specialized research” (p. 12). He therefore argues that:

The problem is to find a way of incorporating these recent advances in technology studies into a conception of technology’s essence rather than dismissing them, as philosophers tend to do as merely contingent social ‘influences’ on a reified technology ‘in itself’ conceived apart from society. The solution to this problem is a radical redefinition of technology that crosses the usual line between artifacts and social relations assumed by common sense and philosophers alike. (p. 201)

Feenberg’s own suggestion is a critical theory of technology that maintains an essentialist character, by admitting the dominant trends and ideologies of technology, but also by affirming technology’s multiplicity, as instantiated in various and particular artifacts, which are employed in various and specific environment. This variation, or to use Feenberg’s term, this ‘ambivalence’ of technology, is a remnant of instrumentalism, but it is also the very element that he sees allowing the opening up of the necessary space for political action, agency, and democratic participation. Feenberg therefore detects certain stages during design or production, at which technologies are ‘decontextualized’ and thus undetermined, and some other stages, at which technologies are fully determined. This take, however, suggests a certain easiness as to the ways societal and technological factors either disengage from each other or come together and, in consequence, creates the need for further investigation concerning the nature of the actual synergies taking place and, in fact, forming technology, economy, society, and politics. Such an investigation needs to unfold through a deconstructive lens that allows the incorporation of non-dichotomous thinking concerning human beings and technological artifacts and, indeed, human beings as artificial and artifacts as acting beings.

## **The Lives of Humans and Other Things**

As already pointed out, there is a need for a reconceptualization of both things and humans and, in fact, as to the ways they interact with each other at the individual and at the communal level. Such a reconceptualization of things takes us back to the realization that technology is an object of philosophical investigation but also an integral part of the ways we come to think about thinking, that is, of the specific ways through which philosophy conducts itself as theory. By this, I mean two things: First, that technology is part of the milieu in which humans live, and it therefore influences the way we think about this milieu. Second, that technology has often functioned as a metaphor of the way the world works. This phenomenon, however, does not simply mean that we project our understandings of technology

onto the world, but that the world often becomes a perceptible unity by way of our use or understanding of technologies. Such a case, if indeed true, complicates further the theorization of actual technologies, their design and production, but also the theorization of knowing, of the human mind, and of thinking (Friesen 2010; Kouppanou 2011; Kouppanou 2017). The diverse conceptualizations of the technological artifact and its effects on the conceptualizations of the human being are discussed next.

### ***The Thing That Things***

Any venture to describe the lives of things appears destined to have a poetic, metaphorical ring, inviting us not only to transcend theoretical traditions that maintain clear distinctions between concepts, but also to overcome the metaphysical language that mediates these concepts. Later Heidegger (1977) proceeded to such an account, arguing that: “The thing things. In thinging, it stays earth and sky, divinities and mortals” (p. 177). Because of space restrictions, we cannot let all the controversy surrounding this discussion unfold here, but I will attempt to relate this utterance to Heidegger’s earlier work and associate it with new theorizations of things and their role.

What Heidegger mentions as the *thinging of the thing* is an attempt to expound on the way things exist independently from human will and intention. The *thinging* is thus understood as a movement that allows the elements of earth, sky, divinities, and mortals, namely, what Heidegger calls the fourfold, to come close and to respond to each other. The fourfold is perhaps Heidegger’s most contested concept, but it does underline a new way of approaching things, which points back to his earlier notion of *nearness*. Things, Heidegger seems to assert, can be understood not as objects existing idly across active subjects but as processes that involve these subjects. A thing is a crossroad at which different forces meet and transformatively react to each other so that something new will emerge but in such ways as not to obliterate each element’s unique contribution. It appears then that Heidegger’s description of the fourfold could be a reinscription of the mutual co-responsibility and indebtedness of the four Aristotelian causes that take part in the creative process of bringing things forth. In this respect, the human being is not the creative origin or the Aristotelian efficient cause. On the contrary, the human being is but one of the forces participating in this process of emergence.<sup>1</sup>

An artifact toward which Heidegger turns in order to account for this new ontology of things is the common bridge, namely, “a thing of its own kind” that “gathers the fourfold in such a way that it allows a site for it” (Heidegger 1975a, p. 154). In fact, Heidegger explains that the bridge is a location and only such a thing can

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<sup>1</sup>This is echoed in various new materialist philosophies of individuation, often inspired by Gilbert Simondon (2012), purporting that the individual is not the origin of reality but rather that individuation is a process that allows human and nonhuman beings to individuate themselves.

“make space a site” (ibid.). This means that “[t]he location is not already there before the bridge is”, but, on the contrary, “a location comes into existence only by virtue of the bridge” (ibid.). In simpler words, we could say that a thing, especially a complicated aggregate of a thing like a bridge, establishes or allows the synergy of forces and therefore the emergence of new realities. A bridge changes our being in a certain space by allowing certain possibilities of connectedness and by prohibiting others, transforming in this way our being in space and time.

Similarly to Heidegger, Langdon Winner (1980) resorts to bridges in order to show how artifacts do things. In his essay *Do Artifacts Have Politics?*, he discusses a type of a highway bridge, built in several places in Long Island, which was too low for public buses. As a result, bridges prevented certain groups of people, who depended on public transportation, from frequenting specific parts of the city. Winner therefore argues that technology is affected by social relations and embodies ideologies that become part of the social reality that they help to create. His discussion, however, is more concerned with the way technology is socially determined, rather than with the way technological artifacts become loci for the interaction of forces, either by allowing or by preventing things to happen, and in this way, he disaggregates the technological artifact into a set of social relations and therefore equalizes it with the social realm. To say, however, that social relations are constructed does not also explain the ways through which these relations are constructed and mediated by technology.

Bruno Latour (1999), reacting to this type of constructivism, says: “Yes, society is constructed, but not socially constructed. Humans, for millions of years, have extended their social relations to other actants with which, with whom, they have swapped many properties, and with which, with whom, they form collectives” (p. 198). Delving deeper into the seemingly impermeable way *things thing* means to give accounts of the interactions taking place between the natural, the individual, the communal, and the technical realms of being and of all the ways these are entangled. Latour detects different symmetries between the human and the technical when discussing the networks constituted by these realms. Let us take, for example, the specific type of network that is constituted by a gun and a human being. In this case, Latour argues that both the human being and the gun are transformed when they come close, since the human being is transfigured into a being that can potentially fire a gun, and the gun is transformed into a potentially firing gun. He therefore argues that both the technical and the human being are capable of acting, concluding that: “It is neither people nor guns that kill. Responsibility for action must be shared among the various actants” (p. 180).

Such formulations complicate the notion of mediation, agency, and ethical responsibility. Still, one could object, paraphrasing Latour himself, that human beings make guns but guns do not make human beings. Why should responsibility be distributed? And, how is responsibility to be distributed to inherently messy domains that involve each other? The purpose of this chapter is not to solve these problems, but to point to the fact that revised ontological theses concerning technology have decisive effects on the epistemological and ethical realms. However, before addressing the connection of this phenomenon to education, I have

to note here that this critique has constructivist, materialist, and inventivist connotations,<sup>2</sup> which have indeed affected educational theory, by making researchers more aware of the role that technological objects play for the organization of daily teaching and learning practices, the construction of knowledge, the implementation of policies, and the conducting of research (Adams and Thompson 2011; Fenwick and Edwards 2011; Waltz 2004). It has also turned educational decision-making into an impossible task, since even if it is the case that artifacts have values and politics, decisions made by humans in education still need to serve the learners' interests and not technologies' conditioning effects.

### *This Being That Is Not Only Human*

Philosophies of technology, coming after Heidegger's disruptions of subjective ontologies and following Derrida's (1997) deconstructive critique of writing, have affirmed the interconnectedness and the mutual indebtedness that define the technological thing, the human being, and their interaction. Through the account of the fourfold, Heidegger presented the human as the being that interprets the world but is also interpreted by it, while Derrida's account of the supplement made any notion of origin inconceivable; the human being is a drifting being endlessly moving through the flows of signs, which themselves lead to other signs and never to an ultimate signified. French philosopher Bernard Stiegler (1998), engaging with the thought of both aforementioned philosophers, decisively disrupts the standard signification of the human (the who) and the thing (the what), asserting that: "The relation binding the 'who' and the 'what' is invention" (p. 134). Discussing then "[t]he invention of the human", he asserts that the genitive is in any case ambiguous, suggesting that if there is something like an invention via technics and if it is in fact understood to be originating from the human, then this process of inventing is producing the human and at the same time eternally postponing the possibility of origin, either for the technical or the human being (ibid.). In accordance with this perspective, human historicity does not constitute a developmental process that allows the unfolding of an essence but a technological contingency that produces different versions of humanity. The human results from an adjustment of this organism's organization taking place in correspondence to the organization of inorganic matter.

The implications of this reconceptualization of the human are indeed great, leading to the realization that the human being's constitution is accidental and dependent on its interactions with technology (Stiegler 1998). According to this notion, we can also move thus far as to infer that we have never been human in terms of self-contained, auto-affected, natural subjects that handle, manipulate, and control inert matter, but we are instead historical, posthuman, material, prosthetic, and

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<sup>2</sup>As De Boever et al. (2012) explain: "While constructivism focuses on the cultural construction of reality while remaining sceptical towards the claims of the natural sciences, inventivism seeks to think the natural processes involved in any and all constructions" (p. x).

enculturated beings. This realization allows Stiegler (1998) to wonder: “And if we already were no longer humans? For if nothing supports our saying that what is called the human is finished today, we may in any case set down as a principle that what begins must finish” (p. 136).

The end of the human is possible. It is after all a presupposition of its having no origin and no absolute beginning. Still, each formulation of posthumanity is determined by that which we think is most determinative of our being human. Katherine Hayles (1999), for example, presents how the presumed immateriality of our way of thinking led the first wave of cybernetics and the inaugural stage of the Artificial Intelligence program to assume that information was “a kind of bodiless fluid that could flow between different substrates without loss of meaning or form” (p. xi). In consequence, this allowed scientists like Hans Moravec to assert that the “human identity is essentially an informational pattern rather than an embodied enaction. The proposition can be demonstrated, he suggested, by downloading human consciousness into a computer, and he imagined a scenario designed to show that this was in principle possible” (p. xii). Such a perspective of the posthuman “privileges informational pattern over material instantiation”; it theorizes consciousness as an epiphenomenon and as a specific historical stage in evolution and considers the body as “the original prosthesis we all learn to manipulate, so that extending or replacing the body with other prostheses becomes a continuation of a process that began before we were born”. Finally, the posthuman, envisioned from this perspective, tolerates “no essential differences or absolute demarcations between bodily existence and computer simulation, cybernetic mechanism and biological organism, robot teleology and human goals” (pp. 2–3).

Different philosophies of technology and indeed different conceptualizations of the posthuman are continuously renegotiated according to that which we deem to be the human, the technical, and the potential emergences of their creative meetings. At times these different strands of thought appear to be settling on the deconstructive critique of subjectivity that foregrounds the distributed, versatile, and supplemented nature of cognition, but at others they seem to reflect the Platonic and Cartesian dualisms – still strong today – that refer to the immaterial realm of ideas or the disembodied consciousness that lives in isolation from material beings, attempting to reach them by miraculously transcending the big gap of their separated existence. In this respect, theories of the posthuman also serve an epistemological role by revealing our assumptions concerning the way we think and construct our theories of what we could be. This element of potential awareness is however present, to a greater or lesser extent, in all of our conceptualizations of human-technology interactions and also in theorizations of thinking, teaching, and learning.

Opinions, like Robert B. Kozma’s (1987), for example, that assert that “[t]o be effective, a tool for learning must closely parallel the learning process; and the computer, as an information processor, could hardly be better suited for this” tell us much more about technology’s influence on the conceptualization of thinking than on thinking itself (p. 22, cited in Friesen and Feenberg 2007). Indeed, according to Friesen (2010), “different technologies—such as the clock, camera, and the

computer—have provided powerful means specifically for understanding the mind” (p. 83). This phenomenon, which is called ‘tools to theories heuristic’ by Gerd Gigerenzer, refers to the fact that: “technologies which, at a given point and time in history, are widely used or are otherwise conspicuous have the tendency to inspire theories about the nature of the mind, memory, thinking, or learning” (p. 84). To be more specific, this implies that any technology, which is at some point widely used, has a certain effect on learning not simply because it affects its users, but also because it inspires a model of human learning, and this can result to this tool’s ferocious application in education, since it is believed to be able to procure and enhance learning. However, if we take into account that technological artifacts are themselves cultural products selectively incorporating values, ideologies, cognitive and social functions, and modes of synthesis that by no means exhaust the range of the human experience of being and thinking, then we can easily ascertain how this practice can end up creating circuits that lock teaching and learning in one-dimensional beliefs concerning the human being, the technological artifact, thinking, and education in general (Kouppanou 2017). In light of the co-inventive relation that exists between the human being and technology, we can also conclude that the decisions concerning the tools we use influence greatly the kind of human beings or educational, societal, and familial systems we aspire to co-invent. More than that, we can surmise that in the educational context the consideration of human learning has been marginalized in favor of the supposed urgent need for the incorporation of technologies that are purported to ameliorate the very learning which remains unquestioned. These inadequacies in questioning technology could easily explain why computers and hypermedia applications have failed their educational purposes (Dillon and Gabbard 1998). As a matter of fact, we can side with Jan Derry (2008) who argues that: “In the rush to achieve results too much has been taken for granted about the way in which students learn” (p. 507).

In view of this discussion, we can infer that the term *learning technology* is problematic, to say the least, because technologies always already impact the way we think and learn; indeed, to such a profound level that we could claim that all technologies have a learning component, either because we learn to use them through the interiorization of their modes of associations or by receiving and creatively projecting the kind of memories they selectively contain (Stiegler 1998). For this reason, these technologies will continue to have effects on us even when they are said to be serving educational purposes. However, this would also be true but perhaps in a lesser degree for technologies explicitly designed for educational purposes, since even if these technologies contain the memories, which are deemed appropriate for a specific educational goal, the modes of their synthesis will probably imitate the ones of prevailing technologies. Therefore, what is urgently needed is a constant and simultaneous investigation into the things that both the technological artifacts and the human beings can do and into the things that they aspire to be. In light of this, I turn now to digitization as a dominant characteristic of our current sociotechnological milieu.



## The Question of the Digital Thing

Digitization appears to have brought another shift in terms of technological change; indeed, one deeply seated in the tradition of disembodied information. Michael Eldred (2009), for example, supports the idea that digital things are immaterial, placeless, effortlessly duplicated, entities and that this “digital dissolution of beings” constitutes the consummation of the calculative tendency that Heidegger understood as the essence of modern technology (p. 9). Our daily dealings with digital technologies, however, tell a different story, indeed, one revealing that these interactions are quite similar with the ones we have with tangible technologies, affording us in fact the possibilities of meaningful engagements in the dwelling places that they create (Kouppanou and Standish 2013).

In order to understand the twofold nature of the digital tool, let us examine at this point the use of the Global Positioning System (GPS) by imagining someone travelling in an unknown land and having this tool at their disposal. At first glance, this type of travelling would appear quite different from the one that features a traveller using maps, notes, and bits and pieces of previous knowledge. This latter type of a traveller is the one who takes their time exploring, making mistakes *en route*, stopping, and asking for information. If we look closer, however, we can also see the GPS using traveller interacting with this tool as a ready-to-hand implement that allows nearness to other things and people, just like maps and notebooks allow. Still, it could be argued that interacting with digital maps is nothing but a disembodied kind of action, which unfolds in abstract, mathematical space, but of course this could also be said to be the case with the traveller who uses maps, road signs, and any other kind of spatial representation. Of course, soon another objection would emerge; indeed, one concerning the fact that the digital system of navigation turns the traveller into a positionless being and the travelling space into meaningless stretches of virtual extension. In fact, the GPS traveller sees themselves represented as a moving dot within this space, and in some specific way their experience is quite different from the respective ones allowed by older navigation and transportation systems. The traveller is currently a datum that is produced by the system itself. In some other way, however, travellers that do not use digital systems of navigation are also constricted by the limitations and affordances of public transportation systems and their constitutive elements, like the bridges of Long Island are thought to have done for certain groups of the population. What’s more, even if someone argues that there is a certain kind of limitation in terms of automation of thinking and travelling – the GPS using traveller need not make decisions for the route, they just need to choose the point of destination – it could also be argued that this has always been the case with public means of transportation and that as soon as the traveller reaches her destination, namely, this virtual space in which she imagined her future self to be, she will be free to openly engage with the meaningful possibilities this space has to offer, which are themselves possibilities formed by the new space’s specific constitution.

According to this analysis, the digital navigation system is quite similar to other processes of navigation and tools, since the GPS can be something ready-to-hand that is used unproblematically in order to formulate the user's spatiotemporality. It could even be added that the GPS elicits embodied responses from the user even though of a different type from the ones afforded by a map. A digital map requires, after all, tabbing and scrawling instead of turning pages and following lines. What's more, and perhaps even more importantly, this digital tool is connected with other places, tools, and people and is able to afford closeness through movement in networks. In this case, the GPS is found in a network constituted by satellite and information systems, selections of memories, systems of transportation, semiotics of travelling, and material spaces. Martin Heidegger (1975b, p. 165), however, saw this closeness as a type of "uniform distancelessness" that is able to bring things close but also to keep them afar by demolishing meaning and the possibility of differentiation (Heidegger 1975b, p. 165).

Bernard Stiegler has expressed similar concerns about modern media, dreading particularly the absolute postponement of *différance*, which he sees rooted on the technological realm, and furthermore attributes this possibility to modern media's specific selectivity of memories (Kouppanou 2015). This is because memory is quite important for Bernard Stiegler's (1998) understanding of the technological artifact, which he sees containing inscribed memories and therefore appropriately calls "mnemotechnics", that is, technics of *mnēmē* (memory) (p. 217). The memories found in technologies like books, films, and USBs constitute the milieu in which people find themselves and through which they envision who they are and who they want to be as individuals and communities. Institutions like the media industries, educational systems, and even families rely on this exterior support in order to create circuits in which their members individuate themselves by accessing these selected memories and by appropriating them as their own (see Stiegler 2010, 2011). This reliance on selectivity becomes the filter that recapitulates the past and forms the anticipation for the future, the attention through which we form our projects and alliances. Above all, this interconnectedness is understood in Stiegler as *mathēsis*, namely, a type of learning that is formative of the state of being human. Inventing the human is learning to be a certain human.

Yet, according to Stiegler's critique, media industries are currently dominating this process by choosing the memories being offered to users. This selectivity actually results to the formation of users, and in this light, media industries function antagonistically to educational systems in that they prioritize certain types of memories instead of others and form different types of attention from the ones necessitated by educational institutions (see Stiegler 2010). Along these lines, media products become learning technologies outside of schools, in the respect that they are part of children's situatedness and thus a configuring factor of their process of becoming individuals. Stiegler, for example, discusses Wikipedia in the following terms:

Everybody knows that Wikipedia changed completely the scene and the relationship between teachers and students. This is extremely important and needs to be studied. But the first question is the transformation of knowledge as such by the digital. For me the digital is a new kind of writing which is industrial, mediated by apparatuses and devices, working at the speed of light and using computation at a very high level, and this modifies completely the objects of physics, mathematics, linguistics, history, geography, all types of disciplines. For example, today our languages are completely transformed by automatic translation which is not really automatic but a type of built up translation. (Kouppanou and Stiegler 2016)

Stiegler (2002), however, also detects a pharmacological possibility in digitization, namely, its possibility to function curatively and not simply as a poison, arguing that the digital image, namely, “*l’image de synthèse*”, is a type of representation made of discrete elements, allowing thus the selection of memories and their respective reappropriation and resynthesis by the individual user (p. 148). For me, however, the turn toward the element of synthesis proposes something more substantial. It is in a way a call to revisit human synthesis and indeed understand human thinking, attention, and imagination better, and this is precisely what education should intend to do. In the next section, I clarify this point.

## Conclusions

The thoughtless incorporation of tools in learning contexts has in many cases failed the purposes education has set. The example of the application of the computational model of thinking in educational settings is a testament to this failure. In the case of digital technologies, however, things, both literally and metaphorically, appear to be different. These technologies rely on their networking, discrete, and synthesizing character, and this means that any philosophy attempting to understand them should not see them in isolation from other tools or from the human being. It rather needs to see them as digital bridges that bring distinct domains, different modes of knowing, and modalities of connectedness closer to each other and study the ecologies they create. Constructivist and cognitivist approaches to educational technology acknowledge the interaction of human and technology, but they continue to approach these elements dualistically, a brain and a machine working in similar terms but not truly responding to each other and forming each other. This is, however, what needs to be urgently addressed.

Heidegger’s and Stiegler’s philosophies can at times appear one-dimensional, the former attributing a singular way of revealing to modern technology, and the latter giving way too much emphasis on memory and selectivity. Technologies, however, are not mere keepers of memories but also ‘metaphoric machines’ that instantiate specific types of memory synthesis (Kouppanou 2016). In other words, technologies are exteriorized thinking processes, and we therefore need to return to basic questions concerning the situated, distributed, embodied nature of human thinking in order to really understand what it is that is happening to us and to technologies when we use them. Research in philosophy of education that returns to these

questions either by illuminating the embodied nature of all technology's usage (Mangen 2016; Vlieghe 2016) or technology's constitutive role for our subjectivities as users and learners is an appropriate response to this need (Burbules 2016; Fulford 2016; Hodgson 2016).

Digitization, despite some of its current effects on thinking, learning, and human formation in general, might offer us the possibility to reshape our social worlds, within the constraints of the classroom, and even allow the emergence of new educational spaces. This complicated interaction between technology and education appears at times to be unfolding on its own, but it is in fact demanding serious decisions concerning the future of the human being (Stiegler 2010). Indeed, if the human is something always in the making, then this making necessitates both an epistemological assessment concerning the modalities and modes of knowing and an ethical assessment concerning our possible (post)human future. If this role is not taken up by education, specific technologies, economic interests and agendas could end up making them and in fact essentializing the human and the technical being. However, the non-dualistic, materialistic framework we have discussed here denotes that: "The living thing is an individuation that has no choice but to *continue* its invention, or face dissolution" (Massumi et al. 2012, p. 30). This connotes that technologies used in educational contexts could indeed be learning technologies, but they are also technologies that contribute to the formation of the individual, and therefore should keep opening spaces for further, differential, and imaginative individuations rather than limiting them.

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# Philosophy for Children and Children for Philosophy: Possibilities and Problems



**Viktor Johansson**

When considering philosophy's relation to and engagement with childhood, one can see at least three strong trends. First, there is philosophical thinking about childhood, call it philosophy of childhood; second, there are questions about teaching philosophy to children or doing philosophy with children, call it philosophy for children; and third, there is children's own philosophizing. Of course, how we think about any one of these areas will affect our position on the other. Our views on childhood will have an impact on how we conceive of children's philosophizing, and, if we consider it to be philosophizing at all, their philosophizing can change our view of philosophy itself. In turn, acknowledging and attending to children's philosophizing can disrupt the way we think about childhood (philosophically). Likewise, attention to children's philosophizing can disrupt and affect the way we do philosophy with children or construct (adult) philosophy for children. The way we do, and think about doing, philosophy with children, however, is also a result of our understanding of, and discourses on, childhood. Conversely, our philosophical activities with children and our construction of philosophy for them can impact both how we understand childhood and children's philosophy, if for no other reason than because such activities in themselves raise questions about childhood, and unavoidably involve encounters with children's philosophical thinking.

When considering the contemporary possibilities and problems in the field of philosophy for children today – as a pedagogical practice, in terms of its scholarly position in philosophy of education, and wider scholarship on children's philosophizing – it is crucial to consider how our positions and thoughts in these areas relate to one another. This chapter begins by illustrating the role of children in

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philosophy, and how childhood may impact philosophy, by turning to the work of Stanley Cavell. In particular this chapter focuses on his idea of philosophy as a confrontation with our culture's criteria, but read in the light of Pierre Hadot's understanding of philosophy as a way of life. It goes on to consider how the philosophy for children movement has developed through three generations of thought and practice. To illustrate how these generations have emerged, the chapter surveys differing views of the use of picture books in children's philosophizing and philosophy. Going on from the third generation's criticism of how the philosophy for children movement's use of picture books has been insufficiently aware of its own assumptions, limits, and borders, the chapter concludes by showing that the critical moves from one generation to another in the field itself can be seen as a philosophical way of life, a way of life that involves philosophy for children confronting its own criteria, by emphasizing and questioning not only the boundaries of the content but also of the places where philosophy with children happens.

## Children in Philosophy and Thinking About Childhood

Since antiquity, philosophers have engaged with childhood in various ways. Many of Plato's dialogues are conversations with teenagers, for example. Philosophy, as Plato practised it, was clearly an educational practice, which prepared the young for certain kinds of life through dialogue and other exercises. However, Plato also advanced some of his main ideas by considering children's thinking, most famously in *Meno* where he expresses his views of innate knowledge by having Socrates give an example of a slave boy's innate ability for reasoning about geometry (Plato 2010: 82a–85d; see also Matthews 1998: 13–15). Similarly, John Locke starts to develop his own empiricist epistemology by considering children's growth to knowledge. His view of human understanding is based on the idea of the child as a blank slate that is filled by experience throughout the child's life (Locke 1975: II. i. §§ 2–24). We find similar turns to childhood in as differing philosophical writings as Rousseau's account of politics and contract theory in *Emile* (1979) and *The Social Contract* (2006), in John Stuart Mill's (1985) utilitarianism and account of morality and politics, in Agamben's (2007) history of experience and infancy, and Wittgenstein's (1953) examples of language games as a tool for philosophizing (see also Savickey 2011),<sup>1</sup> to name just a few examples.

In other, perhaps less discursive, forms of philosophizing, the figure of the child is given a slightly different role. For example, in Augustine and Rousseau's confessions as well as in Mill's autobiography, they (re)turn to childhood and show how their philosophy grew out of their lives and became part of their exercise in living. They turn philosophy towards their own childhoods in order to understand themselves.

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<sup>1</sup>For an overview and discussion of these and other philosophers' views on, and use of, children and childhood, see Turner and Matthews (Eds) Turner and Matthews 1998.

The contemporary philosopher Stanley Cavell gives several rich accounts of these roles of children in philosophy. In *The Claim of Reason* (1979) ideas about social contracts, meaning, and morality are all related to childhood. In his later works, these issues are turned towards his own life as a child and with children (Cavell 1994, 2010; Marrati 2011). Moreover, *The Claim of Reason* also illustrates how children speak back to philosophy by forcing adults to engage with their own culture's criteria. For example, at a pivotal point in the book, Cavell writes:

But if the child, little or big, asks me: Why do we eat animals? or Why are some people poor and other rich? or What is God? or Why do I have to go to school? or Do you love black people as much as white people? or Who owns the land? or Why is there anything at all? or How did God get here?, I may find my answers thin, I may feel run out of reasons without being willing to say "This is what I do" (what I say, what I sense, what I know), and honor that. (Cavell 1979: 125)

These are questions that children may implicitly or explicitly ask. They are difficult to answer. For Cavell, such questions involve a confrontation with our culture's criteria. Such confrontation invokes a philosophical examination of those criteria. Allowing children's questions to confront our culture, and being attentive to such confrontation, can become a form of philosophizing in the Socratic sense. To philosophize is to question oneself. As Pierre Hadot puts it, philosophy as an exercise of life emerges from "the feeling that we are not what we ought to be" and "this feeling comes from the fact that, in the person Socrates, we have encountered a personality which, by its mere presence, obliges those who approach it to question themselves" (Hadot 2002: 29–30). In Cavell's child's question, we meet such a Socratic figure. In a sense, it is an encounter with philosophy that brings adults to the limits of their ability to give reasons for their life in their own culture. Children's philosophical questions, then, become a form of 'education of grown-ups', moments to think again, or to think about what we have stopped thinking about, moments of remembering childhood (Cavell 1979: 125).

The questions raised by Cavell's child can confront our own culture because they put our social contract in the foreground. Cavell thinks Rousseau's social contract is something we discover. The child's questions can disclose the culture we have been initiated into and raise further questions of our consent to it. In this sense, the questions can remind adults of their own childhood. Learning to speak and act in a culture means accepting "what my 'elders' do as consequential" (Cavell 1979: 28). I give tacit consent to the social and cultural world I inherit. Still, it also means that my elders "have to accept, even applaud, what I say and do as what they say and do" (ibid.). The child's questioning of, or just wondering about, the conditions of our social contract is an encounter with the self-re-evaluation of philosophical criticism. Remembering and encountering childhood is, for Cavell, a way of doing philosophy.

In *The Claim of Reason*, Cavell later returns to childhood in order to investigate how words and thoughts acquire generality, that is, how we can use general terms such as 'bird', 'mother', 'love', and 'fight' to speak about, or do, particular things. The turn to childhood becomes a turn to what it means to learn a word. When we attend to childhood and children learning language, we realize that it is very difficult to tell when and what is learnt. When we teach words, children learn much more

than what is taught, and teaching does not always lead to learning (Cavell 1979: 171; cf. Kohan 2014: 39). They not only learn to use the word ‘love’ in appropriate ways that we accept but also just as much what love is (Cavell 1979: 177). Learning a word is becoming a part of a form of life. Encountering children learning language is, in this sense, a confrontation with moral and ontological questions.

These examples from Cavell show how thinking about childhood transforms how we think about philosophy. While these early examples are influenced by Cavell’s interactions with children (see, e.g. Cavell 1979: xxii), they become more alive in his later autobiographical work. There we find Cavell the philosopher examining his own life with children, but primarily his own childhood (see Cavell 1994, 2010). In a sense, Cavell’s encounters with childhood illustrate and bring to life the Socratic and perfectionist self-questioning aspect of his philosophy. Consider the following example from his account of his mother’s funeral:

When the rabbi at my mother’s graveside dismissed the company of several dozen people in attendance [...] Ben refused to leave as I took his hand. He insisted, “The coffin is still here.” I replied that since Rabbi Epstein had dismissed us he must have his reasons. Ben still would not be moved. He and I, and the rabbi, and two workmen standing aside holding shovels, were the only ones left by the grave. I glanced at the rabbi, who motioned to me to remain. “The child is right. The service is not over, but we have fallen into the custom of dispersing those in attendance as we lower the coffin and cover it with earth.” This admired and distinguished old man had begun walking around to us on the other side of the open grave, and pulling a shovel from the place it had been stabbed into a neat pile of soil, invited Ben to put his small hands on the shovel’s handle between the rabbi’s large hands. Thus enabled to assist one another in wielding the large implement, they repeatedly, as the coffin was lowered, together sent small clumpy showers of earth down surprisingly softly tapping upon the coffin’s lid in accompaniment to the rabbi’s completing the chanting of his canonical prayers. Afterward, as Ben and I held hands to walk over and rejoin the withdrawn gathering of participants, I was, I suppose undisguisedly, pent with uncomplicated yet mysterious elation at witnessing this inspired, lucid linking of generations before and beyond mine. (Cavell 2010: 467–68)

Like the questions in the first passage from Cavell’s work, Ben interrupts his father’s acceptance of the new conventions for the funeral. It is not only Ben’s words that push Cavell to encounter his self-understanding of the situation, however; Ben’s refusal to move pushes the philosopher to the limits of his ability to give reasons. He has to rethink the situation. In the enigmatic encounter, the dead mother and grandmother, Ben, Cavell, and Rabbi Epstein are creating a way to approach and live with the death of a beloved, a way to express respect and grief. They create their own grammar of burying, or grief, in their common response to the situation.

If philosophical questions push us to the limits of the criteria on which we base our reasons, then much work on these questions will consist in such creation of ways of living with them that are beyond our current ways of living. Philosophy becomes an untaken way of life (Cavell 1990: 61–62; Johansson 2014: 70–71). That is what childhood can do for philosophy, but also, as we shall see, what can happen when children are allowed to philosophize. Philosophy, or rather philosophy as a perpetual self-examination, becomes a way of living, and a way of living with children. As is emphasized throughout Walter Kohan’s work on philosophy with children, childhood speaks philosophically and to philosophy (Kohan 2014: 20, 41, 64).

## Looking Back at Philosophy For and With Children

Children have had a role in philosophy since antiquity. It is clear both that they have had a voice in philosophy and that philosophy at times has been investigating childhood. Just as the attention to the philosophy of childhood and philosophy of children has varied in different periods and among different philosophers, so too has the question of teaching philosophy to children. A large part of the activity of the four Athenian schools of philosophy – Epicureanism, Stoicism, Platonism, and Aristotelians – consisted in teaching their particular philosophical practice to younger generations. These schools developed exercises for the participants to cultivate themselves to live philosophical lives. Later, as the Roman Empire grew and formed its own institutions for educating the young, proponents of philosophy, such as Marcus Aurelius, created institutions for the public teaching of philosophy to the young, inspired by the schools in Athens that had made philosophy part of the official curricula and schooling of youth (Hadot 2002: 146–49). Moreover, as Lipman, Sharp, and Oscanyan remind us, “early philosophy was not for specialist, not for a technical elite or a monastic minority” (1980: xiii).

The ancient idea that philosophy, philosophical questions, and exercises are not limited to professors or an elite, but are a part of the everyday life of the common people, can be understood as the point of departure for our contemporary discussion about the role of philosophy in schools, philosophy in childhood, and considerations about children’s philosophizing. In the field of philosophy with and for children, these considerations have taken at least two directions. Beginning in the late 1960s, Matthew Lipman started to develop ways to do philosophy with children in schools that involved training teachers in methods to lead philosophical dialogues with children (Lipman 2003; Lipman et al. 1980). Inspired by Lipman, Gareth Matthews (1980, 1984, 1996) began to explore ways in which children think philosophically. Whereas Lipman’s focus was on doing philosophy with children in a school environment, Matthews’ was simply to show how and when children philosophize.

As Lipman and Matthews, together with Ann Sharp, began to think about what philosophy could be in childhood, and what doing philosophy with children could mean, they returned to the ancient idea of philosophy as an activity rather than seeing philosophy as theories about certain kinds of problems. Hence, they turned to the idea of children doing philosophy rather than learning theories to apply to particular problems. Of course, in Matthews we find plenty of examples of children having theories about knowledge, morality, life, death, and a range of other issues (Matthews 1980, 1984, 1996). Likewise, many of Lipman’s suggestions for how to do philosophy with children involve them discussing or developing their own theories. Still, as Hadot repeatedly points out about ancient philosophy, from the perspective of seeing philosophy as a way of life, a spiritual exercise, the theoretical discourse of philosophy will be in the service of exercising and living philosophy, of the activity of doing philosophy (Hadot 1995, 2002). Thus, we see that as Matthews and Lipman attend to children doing philosophy, our view of philosophy is transformed. We turn from the academic discourse of philosophy as theory, which

characterizes a lot of philosophy today, to something more akin to the ancient view of philosophy as an activity that transforms the subject through philosophical exercises (e.g. Hadot 2002: 4–6; Gregory 2012: 32).

Lipman et al. forcefully argue that incorporating philosophical inquiry in the school curriculum involves not only a turn in our conception of philosophy but also a change in how the curriculum and pedagogy are perceived. Matthews similarly shows how his turn to children's philosophy challenges both everyday and scholarly established views of childhood and children's ability to think (see, e.g. Matthews' responses to Piaget's developmental psychology in Matthews 1980: 37–55; 1984: 113–119; 1996: 31–67).

Although we can perhaps see the beginning of a rethinking of philosophy and childhood in the work and practices of Lipman and Matthews, there are problematic tendencies in how they, and in particular Lipman, develop programs of philosophy for children. For example, those inspired by Lipman and Matthews' early attempts to rethink what philosophy and childhood can be may wish for a more radical transformation of our cultural criteria for thinking about philosophy and childhood.

The limitations of what have been called the first generation of scholarship on philosophy for children (Vansieleghem and Kennedy 2012; Reed and Johnson 1999), of which Lipman and Matthews are representatives, can be exemplified by considering how literature and stories have been used to engage children in philosophy. Lipman wrote several novels and stories with accompanying instructional manuals to support teachers to engage in philosophical dialogues with children.<sup>2</sup> Let us consider how Lipman speaks of the role of literature in thinking and philosophy for children practices. The following are excerpts from his book *Thinking in Education*:

In philosophical literature fictional children can be offered to the live children in the classroom as a model of philosophical inquiry. Contrast this with the traditional elementary school pedagogy, which claims that the teacher serves as a model for the students. One can test this claim by considering the important philosophical tactic of questioning. The students may be inclined to presume that the teacher who questions wants answers, not further questions. It is likely, therefore, that many children prefer fictional children, as models, to live adults. (Lipman 2003: 96)

Literature can model practices of philosophical inquiry. When we read about philosophizing protagonists, we are shown examples of how to think, what questions to raise, what issues to inquire into: “We learn the procedure in literature; we practice it in life” (Lipman 2003: 134). Children can find models to emulate in literature. Moreover, Lipman thinks that literature can illustrate what concepts mean: “This is the value of literature: It provides a surrogate context that helps us figure out what the term in question is doing in that context” (Lipman 2003: 143). A classic example is that we can learn to think about jealousy, and even deepen our understanding of the concept of jealousy, by studying Shakespeare's *Othello*.<sup>3</sup> Great

<sup>2</sup>See, for example, Lipman (1982) and Lipman et al. (1984).

<sup>3</sup>See Gibson (2008: 84–101) for a discussion of the complexities involved in the claim that we can learn something about jealousy by studying fiction, which gives support to Lipman's assumption.

literature not only offers models and arenas for conceptual inquiry, “great literature ... [can also] interfuse critical and creative thinking with the tender passion ...” (2003: 261). For Lipman, it is a mistake to believe that thinking is distinct from emotion and passion. Using literature in philosophy with children helps us to overcome and counter tendencies to focus on thinking as a passionless “argumentation, with deduction and induction, with form, structure, and composition” (Lipman 2003: 261).

It is clear that, for Lipman, literature is used as a tool to create a context for philosophical inquiry with children. Whatever other values literature may have in Lipman’s philosophy for children program, it has a didactic end in providing the means to think philosophically. It is about the process of philosophical thinking, not the content (Lipman in Haynes and Murriss 2012: 56). Lipman has quite a determined view of what is trained in the philosophical dialogues that ensue from literature, however. Literature models philosophical inquiry and philosophical questioning by turning children’s attention away from the teacher as a model, towards literature and their own imagination. Thus, when meeting thinking in literature, children are provided with a model that calls them to think for themselves, rather than to think as the teacher does.

The second generation of philosophy for children follows Lipman’s idea of literature as a model only to a certain extent. As Joanna Haynes and Karin Murriss point out, Lipman’s good intentions to help the teacher to facilitate philosophical dialogues using literature by giving them meticulously constructed instruction manuals limit children’s ability to respond to the literature (Haynes and Murriss 2012: 57–58). The instruction manuals give the teacher a view of what philosophy can be, in order to ensure that philosophical dialogues actually take place. Thus, there is little room for children and childhood to actually speak back to philosophy and to transform philosophy, to attend to the social contracts of the particular dialogues in particular classrooms, or to the many other things that the children may be learning when exploring concepts. One might wonder what happens to all the questions that do not fit the mould of the manual’s picture of philosophy. This limitation of Lipman’s program may be due to his focus on philosophy as facilitating training in thinking rather than cultivating experiences of perplexity and interruption of established practices of thinking (Haynes and Murriss 2012: 57).

The alternative to Lipman’s program or, perhaps how it is further transformed by those who inherited it – the second generation – is an even closer attention to “what [children] can bring to academic philosophy as a discipline” (Haynes and Murriss 2012: 61). This means that doing philosophy with children involves an openness to go beyond adult assumptions about philosophy into a practice where both the child and the adult are perplexed by their encounter with the philosophy that can happen in the reading of literature. As Walter Kohan, also representing the second generation of thought, points out:

... to understand philosophical thought as a set of abilities or tools condemns it to the mirrored repetition of the same – if not of the same content, at least of the same model of thinking. Philosophical thinking is not an ability, but an event; not a tool, but an experience. (Kohan 2014: 40)



The first generation of philosophy for children emphasizes that philosophy is a pedagogical activity, but leaves little room for children to question and develop that activity themselves. Nevertheless, this further emphasis, in the second generation, on the open-ended nature of philosophy, and what children bring to it and take out of it, leaves the field open for further forms of critique. Whose philosophical encounters and experiences are we talking about here? If encountering philosophy in reading picture books leaves open what is experienced, learnt, and taught, how shall we deal with the truly disruptive experiences in literature, of racism, sexism, bigotry, cruelty, etc.?

I have followed Nancy Vansieleghem and David Kennedy (2012) as well as Ronald Reed and Tony Johnson (1999) in speaking about a first and second generation of philosophy for children. However, it is possible to discern a third generation of philosophy for children emerging. It consists of scholars and practitioners that are bringing new perspectives to the area that are distinct from earlier generations by their furthered critique of the field of philosophy for children. These thinkers and practitioners demonstrate ways in which both the scholarship and practice of philosophy with children, at least on occasion, have been racialized and have sidestepped hard questions of privilege, gender, and class in the practice of philosophy. To be clear, these are generations in lines of thinking about philosophy for children, not necessarily a generation of people in the field. Some scholars and practitioners can be thought of as moving between generations. For example, we see a turn towards post-humanist forms of engagement with philosophy for children in Karin Murriss' (2016) recent work that goes beyond first and second generational thought.

Darren Chetty's (2014) critique of Haynes and Murriss' (2012: 156) suggestion to use the picture books *Elmer* and *Tusk Tusk* can begin to illustrate this third generational move. Haynes and Murriss (2012) emphasize how literature, specifically picture books, can initiate philosophical dialogues about controversial issues. They warn against censoring books and subjects, and suggest that reading and discussion of literature, without too strong assumptions about philosophy, creates a questioning and philosophical environment. In contrast, and without denying such possibilities, Chetty argues that literature and picture books are just as able to establish as to challenge prejudice and cultural norms:

In *Elmer* and *Tusk Tusk*, the absence of culture, geography, power imbalances, indigenous and non-indigenous, religion, language diversity, history and racism leads to allegories of racism that have simplified to the point of falsifying. Indeed we could argue that the two books constitute a form of ideology, in the sense of being fables that conceal reality. Though it does not necessarily mean that this has been unnoticed, those who have advocated using these books have not made reference to how the books fail to depict racism as, for example, inequality or as the power to exclude. The limitations of these books as starting points for philosophical enquiry into racism should, I would argue, be a central consideration for all P4C practitioners. (Chetty 2014: 24)

Just as Haynes and Murriss identified limitations in Lipman's program, in both the choice of texts and how they are used to facilitate philosophical dialogue, Chetty shows that if we think about issues of race, specifically through the eyes of racial minorities, our choice and use of literature can also limit how we think about the



text (2014: 23). Nevertheless, Chetty acknowledges that even though *Elmer and Tusk Tusk* depict race from the perspective of a white author giving a white experience of a coloured person's experience of race, the story can be read against itself (2014: 25–26). This involves questioning the assumptions about race that the story is based on. This is a lot to expect from both the philosophizing children and their teachers. Even if we do not have an explicit manual for the discussion, we carry a tacit manual in our own prejudiced assumptions about what philosophizing about race and tolerance is. Living philosophically with race in philosophy for children practices, then, becomes a deeply challenging way to confront our cultural criteria.<sup>4</sup>

Chetty's criticism is an interesting illustration of the deeply disruptive power of doing philosophy with children that involves culturally problematic topics such as race, gender, religion, sexual orientation, or a range of politically problematic topics. The sensitivity of a topic is, of course, dependent on cultural contexts, but the awareness of how we present, or even avoid, such topics is crucial. It demands of the philosophy for children practitioner sensitivity not only to what understandings, assumptions, and prejudices the children bring into the conversation, but also to what understandings, assumptions, and prejudices the teachers carry and that emerge out of the material (e.g. picture books) used in the philosophical investigations. The third generation of philosophy for children authors are critical not only towards the programmatic tendencies of the first generation but also to how any form of philosophical engagement can carry problematic assumptions.

These examples of the different generations of thought in philosophy for children scholarship are given not primarily in order to criticize earlier generations. Rather, they illustrate growing tensions in the field and different ambitions and expectations of the field and the practice of philosophizing with children. If philosophy can be conceived as a way of living in confrontation with our culture's criteria, as Cavell (1979: 125) suggests, or a matter of remaining in the question, as Kohan (2014: 106) puts it, then such tensions, and the perpetual return to its own practices of thinking, are themselves a mark of how alive philosophy is in the philosophy for children discourse.

## **Becoming Philosophy for Children and Children for Philosophy**

If the criticism of the assumptions in philosophy for children practices and scholarship leads to confrontations with our cultural criteria, it also opens the way for further encounters between philosophy and childhood that make us see beyond the

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<sup>4</sup>It should be clear that the issue of race and privilege has been an important part of the philosophy for children movement for some time. Philosophy can be seen as an exercise in social, as well as individual, transformation as it raises issues and asks questions that are outside of the established tacit curricula of the privileged. For interesting examples, see the work in Brazil in Kohan (2014).

borders of what philosophy for children has been. Philosophy for children discourse has its own borders and criteria, and the third generation forces us to look further beyond them.

One way of looking at children's philosophizing beyond the influence of traditional philosophy for children is to consider where children's philosophy is happening. In almost all cultural contexts where we find something like, or directly influenced by, the philosophy for children movement, by and large the discourse is concerned with philosophy in school settings, i.e. in the classroom. There are good reasons for this. One of Lipman's main purposes was to give philosophy a place in pre-college formal educational institutions. From that initiative we today find organizations that promote philosophy in schools, such as SAPERE in the UK, the Federation of Australasian Philosophy in Schools Associations in Australia, or SOPHIA in the EU. In some parts of the world, philosophy has a place in the curriculum or as an extra-curricular activity, and in others the question of children's philosophy is not alive at all. We also find examples of how children's philosophical thinking is promoted without connecting it directly to the philosophy for children movement. The worldwide influence, primarily on early childhood education, from the educational endeavours in the Reggio Emilia municipality in Italy is a telling example of how the importance of children's philosophical thought has been emphasized without direct influence from the philosophy for children movement.<sup>5</sup> In Gareth Matthews' writings, however, we can already find plenty of examples of philosophy happening far from schools and classrooms, in encounters between parents and children by the kitchen table while reading together, in children's play, or in bedside conversation while getting children to sleep (see, e.g. Matthews 1980 especially chapter 2).

What happens when the place of philosophy changes? In schools or other institutions of education, philosophy easily becomes an instrument for training things like thinking skills or moral virtues. In fact, when philosophy for children is evaluated, the focus is often on the result of the, often programmatic, practice of introducing philosophy to children in schools (see, e.g. Trickey and Topping 2004; Gasparatou and Kampeza 2012). If we think of philosophy not as part of a curricular practice, with the goal of training children in particular skills (though it can certainly be that too), philosophy for children can promote for its own sake. Philosophy for children is interesting simply because children philosophize. Let me conclude by exemplifying this through Nancy Vansieleghem's philosophical experiments with children in Cambodia.

Rather than setting up dialogues in classrooms or educational settings, Vansieleghem took long walks with children. It was not just walking, however; it was walking between Angkor Wat and the homes of the children, in a place without apparent significance, a dry place of dust and garbage. Those conditions and the heat also made the walks exhausting, so eventually: "Less and less attention was paid to maintaining the usual forms of politeness, to keeping up appearances. The

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<sup>5</sup> There are examples of how both the Reggio Emilia and philosophy for children movements influence each other. See, e.g. Murris (2016).

growing exhaustion made everyone more honest, more direct and more quiet” (Vansieleghem 2012: 155). Moreover, the language they shared was a sort of ‘tourist language’ – the expressions of exchanges between tourists and locals. The significance of these circumstances is that here Nancy and the children are both lost. None of them know what to do or say in this situation. There are no experts or teachers. Some would say this is not an ideal situation for complex thought. But, it may be ideal for philosophy to begin. ‘What I am doing here?’ or ‘What are we doing?’ may express exactly the sickening wonder (*Thauma*) in which Socrates claims that philosophy begins (Plato 1928b: 155c–d). After a while, the walk became unbearable for the children, and they asked to go back to school, where they were asked to make self-portraits.

Drawing on Foucault (2005), Vansieleghem describes this philosophical experiment as a spiritual exercise, or *askesis*, preparing for *parrhesia* (2012: 165–166). That is, the walk is a repetitive, rhythmic activity without a specific method, goal, or purpose, without meaning, which “enables us to expose things as they are ... and not the way we think they are or wish them to be” (2012: 66). To speak in such a practice becomes a way to single oneself out. To affirm one’s self to one’s self by speaking and acting beyond established ways of speaking and acting.

Vansieleghem’s walking experiment can be read as showing a way in which these children speak back to philosophy. It is a reminder that philosophy, in a certain sense, is not taught, but is a way to live and move outside our cultural criteria, confronting and challenging them. Then, philosophy does not need a classroom, or a program, or established rhetoric, or a certain set of concepts. It does not need knowledge. Philosophy needs courage. The view of philosophy that emerges in experiments such as these is as a way of life that constantly challenges itself. This view of philosophy can also inform how we understand the movements in the philosophy for children discourse. They are movements arising from the discourse being challenged and provoked by children’s philosophizing and, thus, are a sign of its turn from and to itself. Thinking back to Cavell and his son, the question is not what children bring to academic philosophy, but what the particular child brings to the particular academic philosopher – Cavell’s son Ben to Stanley, for example. This shifts the emphasis to the importance of the philosophical experience in the encounter between the child and the adult. That is where philosophy happens; sometimes at a funeral, sometimes with a picture book, sometimes taking a seemingly pointless walk.

When we think of philosophy for children not as a particular discourse, but as something that can happen in our lives of and with children, as an encounter with the particular child provoking and being provoked by our cultural criteria, philosophy becomes, as Vansieleghem has put it, “a gift, as something exceptional, as something extraordinary” (2005: 33). This is a gift of thinking. It comes unexpectedly, as we are, or the child is, struck by a philosophical experience (Bøyum 2004), by the question we don’t even know how to begin to answer, by the expression of an idea we never heard of, by the child trying to find ways to express something never said before. Indeed, this requires what, in Reggio Emilia discourses, is called pedagogical listening. But to even start to listen to children’s philosophy requires a belief that

children have something to say, that they can speak philosophically. The philosophy for children movement can be seen as promoting such a faith in the child, and these different generations of scholarship can be read as continual attempts to renew that faith in the child's voice in philosophy: a faith in living philosophically with children.

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**Section IV**  
**New Areas and Developments**  
Contributing Editors:  
Kai Horsthemke, Dirk Willem Postma,  
and Claudia Ruitenberg

# Introduction: Section 4 – New Areas and Developments



**Kai Horsthemke**

The section *New Areas and Developments* presents essays on relatively new topics and concerns that have attracted the interest of philosophers of education in recent years, as well as novel approaches to philosophy of education. To date, emerging issues that have garnered considerable media attention, such as cyberbullying, school shootings, or radicalization, have been addressed predominantly from psychological and sociological perspectives. By contrast, the essays in this section focus on the philosophical questions that emerge from a study of these phenomena. Other topics, such as academic freedom or the question of non-human animals, are not exactly new but appear to be generating new work within philosophy of education. Finally, the increasing interdisciplinarity of academic departments and institutions, and of academic work generally, arguably requires that philosophers of education examine the boundaries of their field. A few of the essays in this section are concerned, explicitly or implicitly, with the need to address these boundaries and the connections with contiguous fields.

‘Educationalization’ refers to the general tendency to behave as if interpersonal problems could be solved by educational means. Educationalization trends present a tangle of social issues that range from debates about curricular mandates to the responsibilities of teachers for fostering democratic citizenship and environmental sustainability. Lynn Fendler presents historical and philosophical perspectives poised to highlight assumptions about educationalization that have become naturalized in practice.

There is an ongoing discussion about ‘learnification’, about the meaning and importance of the very notion of learning itself for the theory and practice of education. In contradistinction to Plato’s well-known philosophical cave parable, Jan Masschelein offers an educational cave story referring to the event of ‘school’. It is an exercise in educational thought to resist the actual learning discourses and

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policies not by criticizing them but, so Masschelein suggests, by trying to ‘repopulate the desert of our imagination’.

Naomi Hodgson explains the notion of the ‘entrepreneurial’ self in terms of how changes that have taken place at the level of government – for example, towards open competition, public participation, performance management based on outputs and feedback – require us to understand and conduct ourselves in particular ways. In recent years it has come to feature in the way we understand the purposes of education, and ourselves in relation to it (for example, as parents, citizens, and as researchers), in particular ways, and thus has become a focus of educational philosophy and theory.

Alexander Sidorkin examines the notion of cumulative versus non-cumulative knowledge as it applies to financial literacy. He contends that mass public education programs may have a tendency to curricularize knowledge, which means shifting knowledge from cumulative, descriptive kinds closer to non-cumulative or normative kinds. Moreover, he emphasizes the need to know not only how institutions operate in the real world but also the likely unintended consequences of the curricularization of knowledge.

In his discussion of the overlaps and distinctions between therapy, philosophy, and education, Paul Standish responds to concerns that education has become too concerned with students’ self-esteem and general mental well-being, to the detriment of more properly educational aims. He considers the ways in which therapy may become miseducative and, conversely, in which education can induce moral distress. He also asks what kinds of happiness education and therapy should foster and when these might be at odds with each other. These points are addressed in the light of historical shifts in the conceptualization of therapy, philosophy, and education and in the understanding of the relationship between these notions.

Until recently, little attention has been paid in the school classroom to creationism and almost none to intelligent design. However, creationism and intelligent design appear to be on the increase and there are indications that there are more countries in which schools are becoming battlegrounds over them. Michael Reiss contends that the ‘worldviews’ perspective on creationism indicates the difficulty of using the criterion of reason to decide whether an issue is controversial or not. It also suggests that standard ways of addressing the diversity of student views in a science classroom may be inadequate.

Education is a fertile ground for neuroscientific applications. However, at the academic level this has predominantly been addressed by cognitive psychology and the emerging field of neuroeducation. Although in its very early stages, there is now also a nascent interest by philosophers of education with respect to the intersections of neuroscience, education, and research. Clarence Joldersma provides a critical analysis of the kinds of philosophical questions and problems that can be posed with regard to the application of neuroscientific considerations to education, as well as of how philosophy of education might be enriched by engagement with neuroscientific research.

Terri Wilson foregrounds the philosophical concerns and tensions involved in the phenomenon of charter schools (USA), free schools (UK), and similar schools that

give students and parents greater choice within public school systems. Wilson focuses on the questions about the purposes, aims, and values raised by autonomous schools of choice along two broad dimensions: (1) rights, pluralism, and autonomy, and (2) democracy, justice, and equity. She concludes by sketching out implications for choice policy and practice, and some recommendations for employing philosophical frameworks in the analysis of these policies.

Zdenko Kodolja distinguishes between the freedom of the university as an institution and academic freedom, the freedom of academics to teach, research, publish, and otherwise make known their considered opinions. Such an understanding of academic freedom is now under challenge from a wide array of critics. In the last three or four decades, both academic freedom and university autonomy have also been considerably diminished in many countries through the implementation of neoliberal politics, one consequence of which has been the increased demands for administrative control and accountability of universities.

The notions of autonomy, authority, and public or community are of renewed interest in new, technology-enabled schooling and learning spaces. In *Social Media, Digital Technology, and Education* Heather Greenhalgh-Spencer draws attention to the ways in which these philosophical ideas emerge within personalized learning contexts.

Videogames have flourished economically and culturally in the first two decades of the twenty-first century, and their educative possibilities have concomitantly been both lauded and claimed to be elusive. Yet, a fairly scant literature to date examines videogames through philosophical lenses. In light of the increased attention paid to videogames in the past two decades in educational theory and research, Jennifer Jenson and Suzanne de Castell focus on fundamental ontological, epistemological, and ethical questions and problems related to video games and learning generally.

Children and young people can be regarded as fully functioning consumers. The intimate connection between children's lives and consumerism is reflected not only in how children spend their free time, but also in the educational environments provided for children and young people. In his contribution, Bruno Vanobbergen focuses on the various ways in which we write and talk about children as consumers, which arguably provides an insight into the various meanings of 'child', 'parent' and 'parenting', as well as children's subjectivity and rights.

Students, teachers, workers, bosses, spouses, and even countries often find themselves on one side or the other of a bullying relationship. This, however, poses the question what exactly bullying is and where it fits in the democratic landscape. Along with defining bullying, discussing its many motivations, and suggesting a path forward, Ron Jacobson also argues that bullying is but one iteration of the eternally contentious case of the 'other'.

The notion of 'trigger warnings' has been used in university discourse to refer to prefatory comments from instructors, warning students that texts and/or classroom discussions may be disturbing to some students. Ironically, trigger warnings are also offered to professors in classrooms where guns may be present. Both kinds of trigger have been viewed by some as at odds with free speech, and by others as necessary for genuinely free speech to prevail. Amy Shuffelton and Samantha Deane

contend that because the language commonly used has material consequences, democracy demands that instructors adopt new metaphors to describe the kinds of arguments that make classrooms places in which education can happen.

Policy makers in all Western and some non-Western countries are giving educational institutions a central position in their public safety agenda against extremism. Yet, whatever research in the field where 'intelligence' and 'security' meet 'education' has been carried out has tended to be preliminary and hypothetical. By analyzing and reconsidering the definition of radicalization for educational purposes, identifying the different dimensions of this growing research domain, and reflecting upon possible educational responses, Stijn Sieckelinck's chapter raises philosophical concerns pertaining to education against extremism.

Maria Victoria Costa argues that the most useful way to draw the distinction between patriotism and nationalism focuses on their respective objects of loyalty. Patriotism is loyalty to a country, whereas nationalism is loyalty to a people. The essay also introduces a number of alternative educational proposals that aim to avoid some of the difficulties faced by patriotic and nationalist strategies. These alternative proposals aim to encourage good citizenship while taking into account new challenges generated by the political, social, and economic conditions of an increasingly globalized world.

Fairly little has been produced on the ethical treatment and status of animals within philosophy of education, apart from the odd reference to humane education. By contrast, environmental education has received wide coverage, not only by philosophers but also by other social scientists, natural scientists, and politicians. Kai Horsthemke's contribution attempts, at least in part, to fill this gap. Among other things, it examines whether anti-racist and anti-sexist education logically entails anti-speciesist education.

Some of the views and analyses offered in this section respond to the standard expectations of a handbook of philosophy of education more tidily than others, that is, those chapters that are perhaps less concerned with providing an overview of the key ideas and arguments within a given topical field or focus area. Because the latter contributions express particular tendencies and personal orientations, they are more likely to be controversial, to stimulate debate about the relevant area and/or development. Either way, the questions and concerns raised and discussed in this section indicate how philosophy of education might be taken into rich new directions.

# Educationalization



Lynn Fendler

## The Concept of *Educationalization*

In 1997 educational historian Marc Depaepe introduced the term educationalization as a “key concept in understanding the basic processes in the history of Western education” (p. 1). In the process of puzzling out the complex relationships between education and their respective social contexts, Depaepe called upon the German concept of *Pädagogisierung* to capture an historical trend in which education was transformed from a medieval practice of spiritual devotion to a modern mechanism of social melioration. Educationalization began as a concept of historiography and has since been extrapolated into educational philosophy, sociology, and theory to highlight particular discursive trends pertaining to educational systems, educational policy, and educational research.

Depaepe (1997) characterizes educationalization as being commensurate with sociopolitical efforts toward civilization and normalization in modernity. In his analysis, educationalization is a concept that allows us to understand a pattern in the role of schooling relative to historical—social, political, cultural, linguistic, economic, and scientific—contexts. In particular, Depaepe describes educationalization as an “ongoing modernization process” (Depaepe 2012, p. 167) in which social problems were shifted away from economic, political, and ethical discursive frameworks and gradually absorbed into educational discursive frameworks.

The concept of educationalization can be clarified by contrasting it with other historical epistemes. Poverty, as a case example, has been understood differently in different historical eras. In feudal times, poverty was understood as a function of birthright; nobility were entitled, and commoners were not entitled, so education had no relevance to poverty. In the sixteenth century poverty could be understood in

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Calvinist theological terms; wealth was an indication of God's blessings for righteousness, and poverty an indication of God's disfavor with sinfulness. In that case, devotion to the Protestant ethic had more relevance to poverty than education had. Enlightenment thinkers tended to explain poverty as an early stage in the process of natural development toward civilization; poverty would be reduced as nations progressed toward civilization. The civilizing process may have included expansion of educational opportunities, but civilizing usually had more to do with organizing governments in a European rational and Western principled way than with educational processes. In modernity, it became possible to understand poverty in terms of agency, meritocracy, and individual effort; it became possible to imagine that one could deliberately work one's way out of poverty. During modernity, some degree of Enlightenment belief in the power of a rationally organized society persisted alongside beliefs in individual meritocracy, which forms the basis for modern institutionalization. When poverty is understood as a product of individual skills and capacities within a rationally organized society, then it is easy to see how education could be seen as a promising mechanism for addressing the problems of poverty. In addition, education has been regarded as a minimally coercive social mechanism that allows for individual autonomy, which is consistent with a modern worldview. As this example shows, when we take note of historical changes in the discourses of poverty, it is easier to grasp the particularities of the concept of educationalization as a pattern that describes historical changes in modern times.

Since Depaepe's (Depaepe 1997) historically elaborated theorization of educationalization, the concept has been deployed also by educational philosophers and sociologists to shed light on ways education has become a political hot-button issue. The issues associated with educationalization have been taken up by scholars from an array of diverse political positions who tend to believe that schools are not the appropriate mechanism for solving social problems. For example, right-wing think-tank contributor Charles Murray agrees that educationalization is a key concept for understanding modern social relations. Murray's position on race and intelligence is famously objectionable (Herrnstein and Murray 1994), and at the same time, Murray's statement about education shows that educationalizing trends are recognized not only by critical intellectuals but also by writers from conservative and neoliberal ideological positions:

Education is becoming the preferred method for diagnosing and attacking a wide range [of] problems in American life. The No Child Left Behind Act is one prominent example. Another is the recent volley of articles that blame rising income inequality on the increasing economic premium for advanced education. Crime, drugs, extramarital births, unemployment – you name the problem, and I will show you a stack of claims that education is to blame, or at least implicated. (Murray 2007, p. A21)

Educationalization as a concept has appeared in educational history, philosophy, and theory to call attention to historical shifts in the assumed purposes of schooling and educational policy in which education is assumed to be the vehicle by which social problems may be ameliorated. Educationalization is aligned with modern rationalization and scientification of society. The concept is used and understood similarly by theorists from a broad range of political perspectives who are critical of

trends that shift responsibility for social problems from governments onto educational systems.

## **Educationalization in History**

School systems around the world were expanded throughout the nineteenth century as a constituent element of modernization. The expansion of schooling occurred as an attempt to manage demographic shifts, industrialization, and sociocultural changes brought on by developments in travel, communication, technology, and infrastructure. Schools are now ubiquitous and schools belong to everybody. In this set of circumstances, governments and corporations have turned to schools as institutional mechanisms for advancing particular kinds of knowledge, skills, and dispositions. Different stakeholders advocate different purposes of education: corporations want skilled workers, cultural reformers want critical thinkers, social conservatives want self-regulated citizens, parents want happy children with opportunities for advancement, democratic political activists want equity and social transformation. As educational stakeholders proliferated, the purposes of education diversified accordingly and contributed to the growing acceptance of educationalization. This section is organized topically to introduce major themes in the history of educationalization.

### ***Educationalization in the Context of the Twin Agenda of Social Sciences***

The history of the social sciences makes apparent the twin agenda of scientific research in relation to social policy, including educational policy. From the rise of social sciences as a discipline in the late nineteenth century, there have been implicit and explicit debates about whether it was the proper role for social science research to provide scientifically neutral and objective facts or to identify and provide solutions for social problems (see, e.g., Furner 1975; Hatch 1988; Heilbron et al. 1998). The pattern established in the early days of the discipline is sustained to some degree in current debates that constitute educationalization trends: Should the aim of educational research be to generate neutral scientific information or to provide normative guidance for policymakers? When social sciences are understood as tools for solving social problems, the role of educational research in the social sciences is perceived not as disinterested scientific inquiry, but rather as purposeful engineering: applied problem solving that ought to address perceived problems in the functioning of schools.

Various stakeholders promote educational reforms with slogans such as No Child Left Behind, Race to the Top, and Learning Today for A Better Tomorrow. The ‘America COMPETES Act’ [*Creating Opportunities to Meaningfully Promote Excellence in Technology, Education, and Science*] is an example of educationalization insofar as it formalizes the assumption that education is the mechanism that will

serve to advance national agendas. The stated purpose of America COMPETES is: “To invest in innovation through research and development, and to improve the competitiveness of the United States” (American Innovation and Competitiveness Act, 114th Congress, 2015–2016). It was enacted in 2007 and reauthorized in 2011. These current educational policy reforms are instances of the social-meliorationist agenda of contemporary social sciences.

### *Educationalization and the Construction of the Child*

When school systems were established in the nineteenth century, and the institution of the school became more socially acceptable, children began to be seen as students and understood in terms of educational categories such as grade level, aptitude, and normalization. A historical context of educationalization circumscribes what it is possible to think about childhood and the child.

Depaepe and Smeyers (2008) argue that the processes of educationalization constructed a child in the manner of a “secularized Christianity” (p. 380). When education is held to be the mechanism for solving social problems, the purpose of education is to ‘save’ the child from antisocial behaviors and immoral dispositions. This educational mission of salvation has two major implications. First, the child is constructed in terms of dependency. The child is no longer seen as a pure or noble savage, but rather as a helpless entity without agency that must be trained in a way that will advance social development. Second, the child is constructed in terms of pathologies. Abnormal children are diagnosed and distinguished from normal children. Education then becomes the process of therapeutic intervention designed to rectify abnormalities and normalize children in accordance with conventions of a regulated citizenry (Foucault 1978).

In the course of educationalization, childhood has been constructed as a period of dependency and pathology. ‘The Child’ has been made into a target of intervention for purposes of rational and scientific advancement of civilization, which includes socialization, normalization, and moral correction.

### *‘Failing Schools’ Movement As an Instance of Educationalization*

In the twenty-first century, educationalization appears in popular discourse in the context of educational reform debates. For example, it is common for policymakers to portray schools as failing and to point to the failures of schools as the cause of social ills. Tomlinson (1997) argues that the Education Act of 1993 (UK) contributed to the codification of the idea of ‘failing schools’. The ‘Failing Schools’ movement is an expression of educationalization insofar as schools are held accountable for crime, poverty, and inequality (Tomlinson 1997).



In the United States, the idea of failing schools was brought to public attention in 1983 with the No Child Left Behind (NCLB) report. NCLB was followed by Race to the Top in 2009, both of which were designed to blame failing schools for poor performance on national and international test scores.

## **Why Is Educationalization So Widely Accepted?**

Multimedia education reporter Sarah Gonzalez (2016) reported the central debate about educationalization in the succinct question: “Do you fix education to cure poverty, or do you cure poverty to fix education?” (Paymon Rouhanifard quoted in Gonzalez 2016 online). In a theoretical sense, the relationship between educational achievement and poverty is that of chicken and egg. However, in practice, sociopolitical trends around the world have adopted a unidirectional and linear view of the relationship, namely, that we ought to fix education first in order to cure poverty. That linear framing of the problem—we should fix education to cure poverty—is the foundational assumption of the historical process of educationalization.

The cyclical chicken-and-egg relationship between education and poverty is one of the conundrums of educationalization. Another difficulty is that it has been proven time and again that education is a very weak institution, neither designed for nor capable of solving social problems. So if education is so notoriously ineffective for solving social problems, why would policymakers and commentators continue to expect schools to serve as the mechanism for solving social problems? This section offers five perspectives that may be relevant in considerations about why educationalization is so widely accepted in spite of its unsuitability to the task. In the face of consistent evidence to the contrary, why do societies continue to behave as if educational institutions had the potential to cure poverty, crime, chronic disease, inequality, and environmental pollution?

### ***Educationalization Makes Intractable Social Problems Seem Manageable***

Educationalization may seem acceptable because all other approaches seem impossible. As Tomlinson (1997) writes, “It has become easier to blame schools than to re-structure the economy” (p. 95). Poverty, social injustice, and environmental degradation are endlessly complex problems that have been articulated and interpreted from an array of competing ideological standpoints. One ideological standpoint is preordination; ideologies (religious or secular) that assume some degree of predetermination tend to adopt the stance that poverty and social inequalities are preordained (divinely or biologically) and indicative of salvation/survival or damnation/extinction. From that stance, it is not within human capacities to cure

poverty. Within the standpoint of predetermination, the purpose of educational institutions is to uphold and provide validation for the allegedly fore-ordained order of things. Another standpoint is meritocracy; ideologies that assume social status is earned tend to adopt the stance that poverty and social inequalities are logical consequences of individual effort and willpower. From that stance, the assumed approach to curing poverty is to provide incentives for productive participation in a capitalistic world order and disincentives for opting out of the production economy. A third standpoint is social welfare; ideologies that assume society's purpose is to provide basic human needs unconditionally for all people tend to assume that people are endowed from birth with inalienable rights. From that stance, the assumed approach to curing poverty is the creation of legislation and policy that redistributes resources more equitably. These various ideological stances are present to greater or lesser degrees in most modern societies; the stances are fundamental, intractable, irreconcilable, and impervious to modification by reason or argument. These competing agendas make it seem impossible that we would ever be able to solve social problems through social mechanisms. In contrast, educational institutions, which are already well established and pervasive, may appear as the most likely mechanisms with potential to solve social problems.

Because societies are comprised of stakeholders with incommensurate ideological stances, advocates from various perspectives tend to talk past one another, which thwarts communication and debate. At the same time, modernization entails the belief that human intervention can manage problems and improve society. If it is not possible to engage in debate across ideologies, then social problems appear to be intractable. However, even in the context of competing stakeholders, it is still possible to target educational systems as the most promising site for advancing one or another ideological stance. Educational systems are ubiquitous, the vast majority of people in the world are compelled to enroll in schools, and there is a widespread belief that everyone who has attended school is thereby qualified to determine how schooling might be improved. Such a diversity of viewpoints has yielded non-commensurable ways of thinking about causes of social problems; but regardless of one's ideological position, education systems are handy targets for criticism and reform (Funicello 1994).

Ladd (2012) argues that education policymakers tend to buy into educationalization practices because they do not have any influence over socioeconomic conditions:

The observation that low SES is highly predictive of poor educational outcomes by itself provides little guidance for education policymakers who have little or no control over the backgrounds of the students, at least in the aggregate, within a community. (p. 17)

Educationalization may appear to be the only, or at least the most promising, approach for addressing perennial social problems such as poverty, inequality, and environmental degradation, which have remained impervious to solution by other means.

## ***Educationalization Feels Like Doing Good***

Many people object to ways schools are run, and some argue that education should not take the form of schooling. Nevertheless, virtually everyone agrees that education is a good thing. Because education enjoys such a positive normative reputation, it is virtually impossible to find anyone who argues that we should abolish education, or that less education would be beneficial for people. To be educated is universally desirable. Therefore, to appeal to education systems as a means for social improvement feels like a beneficial act of goodwill that appeals to the broadest possible constituency. Whereas stakeholders from competing ideological positions may disagree about legislation or taxation, they are unlikely to disagree about the need for education. From that perspective, educationalization seems like a virtuous path toward progress, growth, and development.

Education feels like a good thing also because it is regarded as a means of empowerment. From the early days of the American Social Science Association (founded in 1865), education and social improvement have been conjoined. Cruikshank's (1999) work calls our attention to ways educationalization is a project of empowerment. She analyzes the ways empowerment works to produce citizens, which is widely advocated as a fundamental purpose of modern education. If we take her analysis and substitute *educators* for *citizens*, then we gain some critical purchase on the appeal of educationalization as a means of empowerment:

Like any discourse, the discourses of empowerment are learned, habitual, and material... It is quite natural to seek the cause of political problems in order to prescribe a cure. It is my hope that readers...will find it harder to pin a political problem on the lack of *education*. I hope that in its stead we will interrogate what there is in the will to empower, the technologies of *educationalization*, and arts of government by which the various kinds of *educational systems* we have are constituted. (Cruikshank 1999, p. 123; italicized words added in place of the original *citizen*, *citizenship*, and *citizens*)

Cruikshank (1999) sees empowerment as yet another kind of discipline: "I link the operationalization of social scientific knowledge to what Theresa Funciello calls 'the professionalization of being human' or what Foucault called 'bio-power'" (Cruikshank 1999, p. 20). From this point of view, the appeal of educationalizing trends becomes apparent. Educationalization is desirable because it is perceived to empower people and not to patronize them or enable helplessness.

## ***Educationalization Raises the Status and Profits of Education Professions***

Educationalization's widespread acceptance is also bolstered by the agendas and priorities of professionals in the broad field of education. Academic, corporate, foundation, and cultural educational institutions accrue status when education is regarded as the primary means by which social problems may be ameliorated.

For academic grant-funding applications, it is relatively easy to provide compelling warrant for an educational study when the rationale for that study is the potential reduction of endemic poverty, and not just the raising of standardized test scores. University researchers and teacher educators may be seen as highly qualified experts in the efforts to improve society when education is regarded as the primary means by which social problems might be solved. Academic educational professionals stand to gain in status in the historical context of educationalization. Hodgson (2010) argues that educational researchers, even in their attempts to analyze the term, have ironically contributed to the durability of the concept of educationalization:

The reduction to the sub-field of education policy sociology arguably represents the educationalisation of educational research itself. Educational research is governed – indeed governs itself – according to the dominant discourses of education policy, the field of education policy sociology representing the operationalisation of key concepts in pursuit of solutions. (Hodgson 2010, p. 139)

Not only university educational professionals' agendas but also educational corporations' agendas are advanced when education is perceived as the means to address social problems. Corporations that develop and market educational tests have profited enormously in the last decades by the increased reliance on educational mechanisms as the pathway to progress and social advancement. The 'Big Three' educational testing corporations—ETS, College Board, and ACT—have enjoyed record gains: "The Big 3 Testing Companies enjoy average profit margins that are 62% larger than the 5 largest American nonprofits" (Americans for Educational Testing Reform 2012, online). The educational testing industry has expanded greatly in the twenty-first century, and that expansion is supported by the widespread acceptance of educationalization trends.

A third group of education professionals includes governing bodies, elected and appointed government officers at national, state, local, and school-board levels. In the United States in 1979, the structure of national-level cabinets was reorganized. The Department of Health, Education, and Welfare was split into two different cabinets: the Department of Education and the Department of Health and Human Services. Beginning in 1980 then, the Department of Education was constituted separately from the Department of Health and Human Services. This reorganization of cabinet departments may have served to bolster educationalization trends by institutionalizing the separation of education from human services. As long as education is perceived as the crucial institution for addressing social problems, experts in the field of education—including government, policy, corporate, and academic professionals—stand to gain in status and financial advantage.

### *Educationalization Aligns with Neoliberal Social Policies*

It has been well established worldwide that student test scores are correlated with socioeconomic status: the poorer the school district, the lower the test scores (see, e.g., Ladd 2012). This correlation has been called "The Volvo Effect"

(Sacks 2000); if you count the number of Volvos in a neighborhood, you can predict with considerable accuracy the standardized test scores of that school district. When socioeconomic status is correlated with educational test scores, it is easy—if not accurate—to slip into an assumption of causality. In that case, it appears as if we might be able to raise people's standard of living if we can just prepare them educationally to attain high scores on standardized tests. This chain of reasoning (however faulty) is an example of the alignment of educationalization with neoliberal social policies insofar as the potential solution for social problems can be framed in terms of individual competitive efforts and success in terms of capitalistic performativity (Fendler 2008).

Simons and Masschelein (2008) analyze the ways educationalization is aligned with entrepreneurial imperatives of neoliberalism. To improve education is to advance employability and thereby to serve the interests of a neoliberal capitalistic productivity agenda. They argue that the purpose of education in modernity has been to cultivate adaptation to the entrepreneurial imperatives of a neoliberal society:

The entrepreneurial self experiences learning as the force to guarantee a momentary emancipation in environments through delivering useful competencies. Learning, therefore, is experienced as a force to deal with the 'mancipium' or the hold of the environment (such as limited resources or needs). Hence, for the entrepreneurial self, living and learning become indistinguishable. (Simons and Masschelein 2008, p. 409)

The policies and practices associated with educationalization align with neoliberal ideologies of individualism, productivity, competition, and capitalistic profit. The contrasting ideological stance—namely, that we should eliminate poverty to fix education—would be less compatible with neoliberalism insofar as eliminating poverty through political, economic, and legal action could be seen as social welfareism, which is anathema to conservative ideologies that subscribe to Protestant-ethic moral precepts. Within an episteme of educationalization, schooling becomes the work one does to earn basic rights and social services, which aligns with neoliberal worldviews.

## Critiques of Educationalization

For the most part, educationalization has intensified over the past century not as an explicit goal of policy or government, but rather as a gradual process of political, legal, and cultural developments. Many scholarly treatments of educationalization consist of non-normative historical descriptions. That is, histories are primarily descriptive accounts of the ways educationalization has operated across various social sectors. However, educationalization has also been the object of critique on the basis of its infantilizing effects, its impracticality, and its promotion of privatization agendas.

### ***Educationalization Is Patronizing and Infantilizing***

Gruber (2004) argues that educationalization has had the effect of making people more stupid [*dümmer*]. In other words, subjectivities are constructed differently depending on whether social problems are construed as political or educational. When social problems are construed as political and/or economic, the amelioration of those problems is accomplished through legislative and policy reform. However, when social problems are construed within discourses of education (i.e., educationalization), the amelioration of those problems is accomplished through pedagogical intervention. Schooling has been influenced by developmental psychology and child-centered pedagogy, which contribute to infantilization when they construct children as incomplete adults (see, e.g., De Winter 2003).

Similarly, Depaepe and Smeyers (2008) point out that educationalization can be regarded as working in opposition to freedom or emancipation:

educationalization could easily be read in oppositional terms, over against autonomy, liberation, and independence—due to increased dependence, tutelage, patronization, mothering, infantilization, pampering, and so on—it looks, also in this respect, rather similar to ‘medicalization’. (p. 382)

The educationalization of social problems has been critiqued for the degree to which it constructs educational subjects that are helpless and dependent, rather than emancipated and autonomous.

### ***Education Is a Weak Institution***

While politicians and popular media tend to blame failing schools for increases in social problems, most educationalists take the position that education is a weak institution. Schools have had relatively little effect—for better or worse—on the economy, culture, crime rate, social mobility, or quality of life. In spite of rhetoric to the contrary, historical analyses have repeatedly shown that schooling has not contributed significantly to one’s ability to climb the social ladder or escape from poverty. As Labaree (2008) wrote: “the effort to educationalize social problems in the United States has been enormously successful even though educationalization has been a failure at solving these problems” (p. 453).

Sociologist Tomlinson (1997) argues that educational institutions neither caused social problems nor are capable of fixing them: “Structural changes in the economy, not failing schools, have led to the need to ensure, for the first time in Britain, that all students are educated to higher levels than hitherto” (p. 95). Similarly, Boudon (1974) argues that increased access to education and improvements to education have not had the effect of reducing social inequality or decreasing poverty. In his chapter ‘What the Data Tell Us About Mobility’, Boudon remarks on the ironies of educationalization: “the lower classes *must* demand more education. In making such demands, however, they will only be preventing the reduction of the chances

of moving intergenerationally upward; their chances of achieving upward mobility will not become greater” (p. 183).

There is simply no research indicating that educationalization of social problems has been effective in meeting the challenges of poverty, social injustice, inequality, and environmental degradation. Education overall is a weak institution, ill equipped and incapable of accomplishing the tasks set for it by educationalization reformers.

### ***Educationalization Promotes Privatization***

When social problems such as poverty are regarded as educational issues, then the solution to those problems is educational improvement, often through school reform. The perceived need for school reform opens the door to market-based approaches, which appeal to conservative and neoliberal political orientations, and is the target of critique by most academics and educational researchers. Tomlinson (1997) critiques the privatization trends in education when she describes the 1992 and 1993 Education Acts in the United Kingdom:

The legislation concerning school failure and the creation of Education Associations was political in origin and was designed as a way of making more schools in urban Labour-controlled authorities become grant-maintained.... The new framework was ... a continuation of the policies for a diversity of schools set in train by the 1988 Education Act... This diversity was intended to remove control of schools and school admissions policy from local education authorities, as was open enrolment – the policy of allowing schools to expand and for parents to ‘shop around’ for the best schools. (Tomlinson 1997, pp. 85-86)

The educationalization of social problems can be aligned with school privatization trends; however, critics argue that the characterization of schools as failing is a product of educationalization, rather than the cause of social problems.

## **Implications of Educationalization**

Educationalization is a broad discursive social trend and as such is implicated in an array of social domains. In the history of education, educationalization has had influences in educational policy, teaching, and curriculum.

### ***Implications of Educationalization for Educational Policy***

Biesta (2009) uses the term “learnification” to describe the transformation of educational language into the language of learning:

This rise of what I have called the ‘new language of learning’ is manifest, for example, in the redefinition of teaching as the facilitation of learning and of education as the provision



of learning opportunities or learning experiences; it can be seen in the use of the word 'learner' instead of 'student' or 'pupil'; it is manifest in the transformation of adult education into adult learning, and in the replacement of 'permanent education' by 'lifelong learning.' 'Learning' has also become a favourite concept in policy documents. (Biesta 2009, p. 39)

For Biesta, the implication is that educational policy debates no longer question the purposes of education, but rather discuss education in the relatively technical terms of learning. This narrowing of focus for discourses of educational policy has had the ironic effect of further impoverishing educational institutions. Misguided efforts to justify education on the basis of measureable progress have had the effect of reducing the focus of educational policy to the most trivial of pursuits, namely, raising test scores.

In a parallel argument, Simons and Masschelein (2008) document the shift in educational policy language from functions to competencies. They highlight especially the alignment of educational policy with employability in the context of educationalization:

Competencies refer in fact to the intersection between schools (and learning) and the requirement of employability—that is, they represent employable learning results. From a managerial and educational/instructional viewpoint, not just professional labor but also life as such is regarded as a competency-based performance. (Simons and Masschelein 2008, p. 401)

The educationalization of social problems has had the effect of shifting the focus of educational policy away from broad ethical and philosophical value judgments and onto narrow, technical, and instrumental concerns such as how to raise scores on particular standardized tests for particular populations.

### *Implications of Educationalization for Teachers*

In the context of educationalization, when education is held to be responsible for solving social problems, teachers are seen as major players in efforts to reduce poverty and inequality in the world. Educationalization has had the effect of intensifying accountability measures for teachers. The culture of monitoring and assessment is apparent in the development of standards for teaching and teacher education, and in the increase of teacher evaluation instruments.

Current mechanisms for regulating teachers include the expectation that teachers will buy into educationalization assumptions by engaging in professional development to improve their teaching:

In order to guarantee the employability of teachers, the government has identified and disseminated a set of basic competencies. However, the government also stresses that in order to remain a professional, it is important for teachers to take care of their ongoing professional development. (Simons and Masschelein 2008, p. 402)

In conjunction with the “failing schools” movement (Tomlinson 1997), teachers have been subjected to heavier demands to improve their pupils’ test scores. In spite of the fact that socioeconomic status is the best predictor of student test scores, the context of educationalization tends to shift responsibility for student test scores from conditions of poverty and inequality to teachers and teaching methods.

### *Implications of Educationalization for School Curricula*

Just as the American Social Science Association combined purposes of intellectual inquiry and social reform, a Problem-Based Learning (PBL) approach to curriculum combines intellectual pursuits together with applied solutions to everyday problems. The combination of intellectual and practical domains is characteristic of professionalization trends. In this way, discourses of relevance, motivation, and utility combine with science (a conflation of science and engineering) to render a particular professionalized worldview, for better or worse. As a result, it has begun to make sense to look at the world in terms of problems to be solved. When we see the world in terms of problems to be solved, then knowledge pursuit must be justified in terms of applicability and utility. Applications for grant funding increasingly require an answer to the question ‘So what?’ which means ‘What good will this do us?’. Some scholars regard this applied professional approach to curriculum design as a helpful and effective approach; others regard applied professionalism as overly technical.

This current educationalizing trend of investigating the world in terms of problems to be solved may appear to be an expression of utilitarianism. However, the current version of utilitarian thinking has diverged dramatically from that of John Stuart Mill, and the difference signals an ethical quandary in education. Mill, for example, supported Comte’s distinction between the concrete and abstract sciences. For Mill scientific development meant a progression toward mathematics and away from social governance concerns. Mill explicitly argued against an approach to research that is oriented toward solving problems:

How few ... of the discoveries which have changed the face of the world, either were or could have been arrived at by investigations aiming directly at the object! Would the mariner’s compass ever have been found by direct efforts for the improvement of navigation? Should we have reached the electric telegraph by any amount of striving for a means of instantaneous communication, if Franklin had not identified electricity with lightning, and Ampère with magnetism? (Mill 1865/2005, online version)

Problem-Based Learning, then, illustrates a particular way educationalization works in research and schooling these days. Justified on the basis of its scientific relevance and professional utility, PBL represents a radical departure from earlier notions of science and utility. The PBL approach also circumscribes what counts as knowledge and reinforces the attitude that education ought to be about engineering: solving existing problems.

## Conclusion

Educationalization began as an historiographical concept that highlighted broad historical shifts in the role and purpose of education relative to more general social developments. Philosophers, theorists, and sociologists have used the concept both to describe larger social trends and to critique oppressive social technologies. There is no research that suggests educational systems are capable of addressing social problems, and yet the educationalization of social problems shows no signs of diminishing in intensity.

Educational sociologist and historian David Labaree (2008) argues that educationalization and its failure are understandable features of the inherent qualities of liberal democracies:

[E]ducation accomplishes what we want rather than what we say. We ask it to promote social equality, but we want it to do so in a way that does not threaten individual liberty or private interests. We ask it to promote individual opportunity, but we want it to do so in a way that does not threaten the integrity of the nation or the efficiency of the economy. As a result, the educational system is an abject failure in its ability to achieve any one of its primary social goals. It is also a failure in its ability to solve the social problems assigned to it, since these problems cannot be solved in a manner that simultaneously satisfies all three goals. (Labaree 2008, p. 456)

Historians, philosophers, sociologists, and educational theorists have recognized the educationalization of social problems as a feature of modernity. The persistent failure of educationalization to solve social problems is also widely recognized by researchers and policymakers. Nevertheless, the inherent contradictions of liberal democracies and the professional interests of educational researchers and policymakers seem to guarantee the continuation of the educationalization of social problems for the foreseeable future.

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# An Educational Cave Story (On Animals That Go to ‘School’)



Jan Masschelein

“...the eye was not always intended for contemplation...”

M. Foucault

Today, both at the level of educational discourses and of actual educational policies, it is all about ‘learning’. As a ‘learning-intensive society’, we have to look for ways to maximize the learning gains and investigate how we can do that efficiently and effectively (cf., e.g., Miller et al. 2008). Meanwhile, there are many voices that critically address this focus on learning. They question not only the implied capitalization and instrumentalization of learning but also the relevance of the very notion of learning itself for the theory and practice of education. Indeed, they reemphasize the notion of education itself, either by focusing on the aspect of ‘teaching’ or by reevaluating the notion of ‘study’ (Biesta 2013; Blacker 2013; Lewis 2013; Simons and Masschelein 2008). While very sympathetic to these critical voices, this essay rests on the conviction that in order to resist the learning discourses and policies and to reclaim the notion of education, it is worthwhile also to reconsider our understanding of ‘school’, thereby not reducing it immediately to a normalizing and/or functional institution. Instead we can approach it rather as a particular chronotope or time-space of an *animal educabile*: bringing people and world into each other’s company in a particular way while performing specific operations (suspension, profanation, attention formation, see further) and actually enabling education to happen. In other words: to reconsider ‘school’ implies trying to give the notion a different flavor. We began this attempt in *In Defence of the School. A Public Issue* (Masschelein and Simons 2013), and here the aim is to further this endeavor by

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offering an *educational cave story* that refers to the event of ‘school’ and the emergence of the pedagogue, a story that is distinguished from the famous and still very powerful *philosophical cave fable*. I am aware that we should not lose ourselves in oversimplified binary oppositions, such as between a ‘philosophical’ and an ‘educational’ view. Not only can each be understood in very different ways, but also the relation between them is intricate and complex (e.g., Kohan 2014; Larrosa 2011). My aim here, however, is not to engage in a ‘proper’ argumentative discourse or analysis, but rather to assume in some sense what Tyson Lewis has called the ‘fabulous character’ of educational thought,<sup>1</sup> its “precarious location between ... truth and fiction”, which it has to acknowledge if it is “to testify to the difficulties of education as practice without surefire answers” and to “reopen us to the experience of education” as one of indeterminate potentiality (Lewis 2012, pp. 340–341). Therefore, I hope the reader will not mistake what follows for a statement of ‘philosophical truth’ or a claim to a true history (e.g., of the school, the pedagogue) – even if I will relate to some philosophical arguments or historical ‘facts’ – nor for simply a fictitious story. It is fiction, for sure, but not falsity. It is not lying, as Rousseau states (and Lewis reminds us). It is fiction also in the sense that Jacques Rancière understands it: using common linguistic powers “in order to make objects visible and available to thinking” (Rancière 2000, p. 116). With this fable or story, combining narrative and image, then, I hope to contribute to an *educational* thinking of ‘school’ (and ‘pedagogue’). It is an exercise in educational thought to resist the actual learning discourses and policies, not by criticizing them but by trying to populate our educational imagination with a different cave story. One that might help us to approach and conceive of education and school, both theoretically and practically, in a slightly different way.

## The Philosophical Cave Story

Philosophy and education, including ‘philosophy of education’, have at least one clear connection to caves. Indeed, to the present day, Plato’s famous cave story is recalled and discussed time and again in various philosophy and education texts and courses.<sup>2</sup> Plato’s story offers a particular fabric of enlightenment, education, and liberation, including the image of ‘conversion’ as a (re)turn to the (sun)light. It continues to haunt not only our philosophical but also our educational imagination.

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<sup>1</sup>I deliberately don’t use ‘philosophy of education’ or ‘educational philosophy’. Both seem to imply that ‘philosophy’ is the central issue. Although I am very much ‘into’ philosophy, I want to emphasize education as the central issue. In German and Dutch, there exists also the notion of *Pädagogik* or *pedagogiek* which can be said to be ‘general’ (*allgemein*) or ‘philosophical’, general and philosophical being describing adjectives of *Pädagogik* or *pedagogiek* as (being the) substantive. I suggest to translate these notions as educational or pedagogical thought (not theory).

<sup>2</sup>In an ‘Excursus on the cave’, Hans Blumenberg (1993) recalls various other connections to the cave as metaphor or ‘real’ place, from Cicero to Montaigne, Bacon, Descartes, Jean Paul, and Nietzsche.

Notwithstanding the sometimes radical critiques that have been addressed at Plato’s claims, the powerful imagery of education as liberation from the darkness of the cave to discover, individually and with others, the freedom that may come if we travel into the light remains very attractive both to philosophers and/as educators (Burch 2011). This imagery includes the ‘duty to return’ to the cave precisely to liberate those captivated by the shadows. I propose to call Plato’s fable<sup>3</sup> the *philosophical* story of the cave, which affirms the role of philosophy and, especially, the necessity of the presence of the philosopher as master educator, without whom it would be impossible to get out of the cave. This liberating role of the philosopher is something that (s)he takes up as a heroic duty. As Heidegger (1933/2001) famously said in his commentary on Plato’s story: the philosopher who returns exposes him/herself to (the risk of) death.

In Plato’s fable, the cave is valued negatively. He is not thinking about historic or prehistoric cave dwellers. The cave is not a refuge, but a prison. The word ‘cave’ is in fact the summary of a concrete condition of limitation and insufficiency, the indication of a ‘fallen’, inauthentic, joyless, insufficient, unsatisfactory life.<sup>4</sup> For Plato, this condition is the normal or common one; the people in the cave are no ‘atopoi’, but are all people (Blumenberg 1993, p. 37). It is no ‘natural’ or unchangeable condition, however, but an effect of negative influences (decline or oppression or oblivion). It is precisely the ascending and converting movement, the movement of ‘paideia’, that is the true ‘nature’ of humans. This movement brings them to contemplation – a capacity that seems to be human’s ‘natural’ capacity<sup>5</sup> and true destination. Humans are creatures whose destination it is to be philosophers. Hence, Hannah Arendt called the allegory of the cave a “kind of concentrated biography of the *philosopher*” (Arendt 2005, p. 29).

From the story it is clear that ascending out of the cave requires an external force to break the chains and initiate the conversion. Everything refers to above and outside, and the philosopher’s descent into the cave is itself also forced and has the heroic objective of liberating the others. Fundamentally, the story offers a scene of impotence, of a lack and of necessary transcendence: humans’ legs and necks chained in darkness, “frozen, chained before a screen, without any possibility of doing anything or communicating with one another” (ibid., p. 31). They can only see

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<sup>3</sup>As Barberà (2010, p. 105) states: “the well-known image of the cave, εἰκὼν, reveals an astonishing and intriguing variety of interpretations of this image: ‘allegory’, ‘myth’, ‘fable’, ‘parable’, ‘simile’ and ‘comparison’, to cite but a few”. Since he emphasizes especially the element of creation of the ‘image’ besides the ‘narrative’, the notion of fable seems adequate. I will use both fable and story without going now into a discussion about their difference.

<sup>4</sup>For a more positive and rich analysis of the meaning of the cave in ancient Greece, see, e.g., Bachelard (1948).

<sup>5</sup>Compare: “Of this very thing, then”, I said, “there might be an art, an art of the speediest and most effective shifting or conversion of the soul, not an art of producing vision in it, but on the assumption that it possesses vision but does not rightly direct it and does not look where it should, an art of bringing this about”. Plato, Republic Book 7, 518d. Plato in 12 Volumes, Vols. 5 & 6 translated by Paul Shorey. Cambridge, MA, Harvard University Press; London, William Heinemann Ltd. 1969. <http://www.perseus.tufts.edu/hopper/text?doc=Perseus%3Atext%3A1999.01.0168%3Abook%3D7%3Apage%3D518>. Accessed 25 July 2017.



what is before them, unable to relate to each other, trapped in mere appearances. They are beings who, as philosophers or at the hand of the philosopher, have to (be) turn(ed) around and ascend to the light. The conversion is, then, a return to the world, out of which humans had fallen into the darkness of a disastrous condition. This philosophical cave story, told within the context of a search for the ideal, just state, is basically a story about the conversion of the soul as an enlightenment that maintains the transcendental sovereignty of Being and, in particular, that declares and affirms philosophy and the philosopher as what and who is needed to lead the human being from the darkness to the (sun)light (and back). One commentator wrote that Plato's story is an allegory, which, according to him, is one of the ways in which philosophy detaches itself from mythology (Verhoeven 1983). It implies, as we mentioned before, that Plato is not writing about another world, but rather elaborates a different way to look at this world that we all are living in (even if his way includes making a distinction between the world of the cave and the world of ideas).

In Stanley Cavell's inspiring reading of Plato's story, the cave "represent[s] primarily a familiar place from which to locate the full beginning of what we understand philosophy to aspire to be ... A perception of [the moral life] as moving from a sense and state of imprisonment to the liberation of oneself by the transforming effect of what can be called philosophy" (Cavell 2005, p. 317). He writes about "guiding [the self] to a path of enlightenment" (*ibid.*, p. 321). Although philosophy "does not speak first" (*ibid.*, p. 324) but rather responds, this response is "the gesture of descending", marking "the violence of mature judgment in assessing the life of others. ... We are, after all, telling them that they do not know what they are saying" (*ibid.*, p. 326). Cavell is adhering to the "idea of philosophical progress not as from false to true assertions, or from opinions to proven conclusions (say theses), or from doubt to certainty, but rather from darkness of confusion to enlightened understanding, or say from illusion to clarity, or from being at an intellectual loss to finding my feet with myself" (*ibid.*, p. 328). I do not intend to go into a discussion with Cavell, whose reading of the story is much richer and varied than I can render here,<sup>6</sup> but let me just point to the fact that Cavell seems to continue, at least to an important extent, the omnipresent philosophical story that assimilates the cave with an image of imprisonment, despair, ignorance, darkness, confusion, illusion, and intellectual loss. Cavell himself refers also to "the torment, the sickness, the strangeness, the exile, the

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<sup>6</sup>I am not able and do not intend to deal here with the mass of interpretations and readings of Plato's story (such as the recent wonderful one by Latour interpreting it as the staging of a tragedy-comedy; see Latour 2016). Let me just refer to the study by Bartlett (2011), which offers a very 'sophisticated' rereading of Plato's corpus, relying on Badiou, including the cave fable, and makes the strong claim that Plato's work is just about education and more specifically about 'education by Truth'. However, like many 'philosophers', he is forgetting or neglecting the relation between 'education' and 'school' and building his interpretation on the difference between opinion and truth (and between the philosopher concerned for Truth and the sophist concerned only with interests and profits). The cave story I will propose here suggests rather that education is not primarily about 'truth' and/or 'opinion' and that the sophists are not relevant for educational thinking because of their concern for 'interest', but maybe because they acknowledged first of all the human being as 'animal educabile', as an erring being without destination (and orientation). See Jaeger (1973/1933).

disappointment, the boredom, the restlessness” (ibid., p. 329) as a condition from which we don’t have to escape, but that we have to judge with regard to “the degree to which these conditions must be borne and maybe turned ... constructively, productively, socially” (ibid., p. 329). Philosophy, then, is related to a “sense of disappointment with the world” and “our entrapment in false necessities” (ibid., p. 328).

Let me, in contrast to this *philosophical* view, now propose a *pedagogical* or educational view that can open to an alternative cave story or fable, one that invites us to reconsider the way we conceive of education and philosophy, that questions the fabric of enlightenment, education, and liberation that constitutes Plato’s philosophical story. This educational fable does not justify and affirm the primary need for a ‘liberator’ or philosopher; it does not conceive of education as conversion, but rather entails some suggestions concerning the emergence of the *school* and the appearance of the *pedagogue* as the one who leads to school. This pedagogical fable of the cave is the story of the beings that enter the cave and leave traces on its walls, offering a scene of the education of the human being as a scene of potency and immanence. This fable is not about ‘enlightenment’ in the sense of moving (returning) from opinion to truth and/or from illusion to clarity, but about the light that enables the beginning of something while exploring, disclosing, and exposing the ‘world’ by imagining it, by making images (as inscriptions). It is the story of the beings that find themselves in this world of shadows in the company of the sketches, imprints, inscriptions that they have made themselves with their hands, that open up their lives, and also make them dream. This liberation, however, is not pointing to transcendence but to immanence, it is no conversion or return but an *erring* as I will now further elaborate in what could be called maybe also first of all a story about the emergence of ‘school’ or the fable of the ‘animal that goes to school’.

## The Pre-sent (Main-Tenant) of the Cave: The Gift of ‘World’

If we were to trace back the elements in this educational fable, we would have to point to a variety of (scientific) observations, reflections, comments, and interpretations related to the findings on and studies of all kinds of tracings (drawings, paintings) on cave walls around the world. Indeed, these have received attention not only from paleontologists, archeologists, anthropologists, and speleologists but also from novelists, artists, and ... philosophers. The story, therefore, knows many versions,<sup>7</sup> but the versions that interest me, here, are those that do not overlook the phenomenology of the cave, that is, the spatial and temporal experiences related to entering a

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<sup>7</sup> See, e.g., the reflections by George Bataille who maintains that it is precisely through these wall paintings, which were most of the time, but certainly not exclusively, paintings of animals (and, thus, not just of themselves), that ‘men’ emancipated from their animal nature (Bataille 1988, p. 262). Or the very influential comments of André Leroi-Gourhan who relates the paintings to the appropriation of the caves as religious sanctuaries and understands them first of all as spiritual symbols (e.g., Leroi-Gourhan 1965). This approach is very dominant today and very present in the work of one of the most famous French experts on Paleolithic art in general and cave paintings more particularly, Jean Clottes (see, e.g., 2008).

cave and dwelling in it as *particular milieu* or chronotope. Those that pay attention to the *gesture* of the act of tracing itself, as well as to the difference between the way in which a text and an image speak to us (because seeing is not the same as reading and listening, and an image can share without being a ‘message’, but simply by ‘facing’ us). These are versions that don’t reduce the caves *immediately* to established symbolic places and don’t trace the activities carried out within them *immediately* to cultural or religious practices and rules. The versions that interest me acknowledge the entering of the cave and the tracings themselves primarily as movements and gestures. Moreover, I am interested not only in the beautiful paintings of animals as being the beginning of art but also, and primarily, in the images of ‘hands’ (found in many caves all over the world and dating from a vast range of time periods)<sup>8</sup> and in the stripes, striations, dots, and spots, in the sketches, scratches, tracings, and drawings that often are not figurative and superposed. I will, in what follows, refer briefly to the writings of John Berger and Jean-Paul Jouary, but I will rely in particular on the work of Marie-José Mondzain, who elaborates the earlier, brief but very interesting ‘musings’ of Jean-Luc Nancy on the images of hands on cave walls.

Whereas Nancy refers almost exclusively to the traced hands found in the Cosquer cave discovered near Marseille in 1991, Mondzain bases her *fiction* mainly on the findings related to the discovery of the Chauvet cave in the French Ardèche region in 1994. This cave contains some of the oldest wall paintings yet discovered (dating from approximately 32,000 BC), paintings that are extremely well conserved and of an extraordinary beauty.<sup>9</sup> As she states it herself, Mondzain constructs a ‘phantasia’ (2007, p. 26), which is not telling the story of a return of humans to the light of eternal truth that is shining from behind them. The ‘human being’ of the Chauvet cave enters the cave instead of fleeing it and produces light with its own hands and on its own hands. These enlightened hands, according to Mondzain, will reveal their power or capacity to make an image, including precisely an image of the hands, an image of a being that becomes at once the spectator of the work of its hands, not simply as an object or tool, but as an image, thereby inaugurating the human gaze on the human being and on the world. As Max Horkheimer stated: “The facts which our senses present to us are socially preformed in two ways: through the historical character of the object perceived and through the historical character of the perceiving organ. Both are not simply natural; *they are shaped by human activity*, and yet the individual perceives himself as receptive and passive in the act of perception” (Horkheimer 1937/2002, p. 200, italics mine). This is echoed in

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<sup>8</sup>The recently initiated Spanish *HANDPAS* project is precisely focused on documenting and exhibiting the Paleolithic hand representations in Europe. See <http://handpas.eu/en/project/>. Accessed 25 July 2017.

<sup>9</sup>A beauty that is rendered in a fascinating way by Werner Herzog in a documentary called ‘The Cave of Forgotten Dreams’. The title resonates interestingly with another of his films, ‘Kaspar Hauser’, who is said to have been locked up in a cave (not unlike the prisoners in Plato’s cave) and to have had no dreams until some time after his release from the cave. It suggests that in order to have dreams, and that means also in order to have the possibility to relate to what happens and not just be absorbed by it or enclosed in it, we are in need of some kind of (re-)presentations. Equally interesting is that, in this movie, just before Kaspar is taken out of the cave, he learns to *draw/write* on a piece of white paper.

Foucault’s remark that “the eye was not always intended for contemplation” (Foucault 1984, p. 83). Nancy and Mondzain, then, suggest that human eyes were not from the outset destined for considering, thinking, and regarding. It is to these images, made by the hand in the cave, so this story goes, that we owe our having eyes that open themselves to the world in an incomparable way; it is to these images that we owe the experience of being able ‘to (be)hold’ ourselves and the world, making us into beings that (can) commence (anew). Or to state it differently: our capacity to regard (to look, but also to respect, consider) emerges out of our hands discovering the ability to make images. Looking at it in this way, we can further clarify the specific register of representation, the specific gesture of ‘monstration’ (which is the term used in the English translation of Nancy’s work for the French ‘monstration’, which refers to the act of exposing, displaying to the eyes of a public), and the specific experience that we would overlook if we related the images directly to religious or ritual practices that have to be ‘understood’.

Considering the painting of the hands on cave walls, Mondzain (2007, p. 21–58) distinguishes three acts, or operations, none of which is about return or conversion.<sup>10</sup> The first act is the being-becoming-human stretching its arm, which both leans on the wall and separates itself from it in the same movement: the measure of an arm that is indeed the first distancing of oneself from the plane on which a bond will be composed through contact. It is no longer as it is outside, in the sun, where its eyes can look much further than its hands can touch. Under the sun, its eyes are tools of its watching out, its foresight or providence; they measure a distance to be covered or installed (taken). Outside, its eyes have a distant horizon that it scrutinizes. The horizon is the experience of a gap that awakens a dream of mastery, provokes the desire for conquest, or inspires (paralyzing) awe. The horizon’s inaccessibility meets with the imaginary figures of transcendence. But in the cave, the horizon is no further than the modest proposition of an arm’s length. It is the immanence of a body-to-body or body-to-wall. The outstretched arm, the hand placed on the wall to maintain a distance. To maintain refers to the French ‘maintenue’, which comes back, as Mondzain and Nancy state, in the ‘main-tenant’, i.e., the French word for ‘now’ or ‘present’. This ‘maintaining’ is at once a meeting, an ‘entre-tien’ (‘holding between’) in the sense that the human being is holding itself – in French: ‘se tient’ – before the wall, which forms the plane and constitutes the horizon (without horizon) of the gaze and has its own stance (tenu(r)e or holding).

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<sup>10</sup>Hannah Arendt writes that the parable or the allegory of the cave “unfolds in three stages, each of them designated a turning point, a turning-about, and all three together form that ... turning about of the whole human being which for Plato is the very formation of the *philosopher*” (Arendt 2005, p. 29, italics mine). These three turnings are freeing from the fetters that chain the future philosopher, which Arendt calls the turn of the scientist who “turns around to find out how things are in themselves, regardless of the opinions held by the multitude”. He turns away from “their *doxai*, what and how things appear to them”, from their position. The second turning is when he is not satisfied with the fire in the cave and finds an exit from the cave and an access to “the ideas, the eternal essences of perishable things and of mortal men”, from where he “must return (the third stage) to the cave as his earthly home”, where he can no longer feel at home (Arendt 2005, pp. 29–30). As I will indicate, Mondzain also distinguishes three acts, but neither of them is to be conceived as a turning.

And what will arrive between them is ‘in the hands’ of the human being. The eye is subjugated to the order of the hands. This gesture of distancing and binding constitutes the first operation.

The second act concerns the pigments. On the cave walls, the hands create an image of themselves, presenting them to the eyes – not by shaping and folding them to tools, but either by directly immersing the hands in the paint, posing them on the wall, and pressing them for some time, creating what are called positive hands. Or, it is assumed, by taking the paint in the mouth and spitting it at the hand pressed against the wall, creating so-called negative hands. A new gesture thus emerges, that also literally marks a distance – the arm length’s – that is holding (in) the hand as a gesture of ‘monstration’, *showing* the hand at a distance. This gesture implies that the purpose and the use of the hand has changed; it performs neither acts of survival (fishing, hunting, agriculture) nor of making love, or of making objects or tools. The hand has ceased to be a hand that grasps, hews, carves, or even caresses, and the mouth has ceased to be a mouth that bites, tears, and swallows. The uses of the mouth and the hand are no longer the prehensile, possessive, feeding, or predatory, nor of caring and love, but rather establish a double movement of *reaching out*, with the hands and the mouth. The human being breathes on her hand, which holds nothing, but that ‘maintains’ that being in a relation with the wall. She inhales, exhales, she receives the paint and then passes it on.<sup>11</sup> The moment of expulsion, an exit of liquid, is the *mise-en-scène* that makes an outside on the wall into (a) ‘work’. As Nancy states, the French ‘maintenant’ means holding by/in the hand; but the hand is not a stable place, suggesting that it will be released, that the now is between holding and releasing or letting go (Nancy 2016): “The hand posed, pressed against the wall, grasps nothing. It is no longer a prehensile hand, but it is offered like the form of an impossible or abandoned grasp. A grasp that could as well let go. The grasp of a letting go: the letting go of form” (Nancy 1996, p. 72).

The third act is withdrawal. The hand has to withdraw. The body has to separate itself from its support. But it is not its hand, the one covered with pigments, that the human being is looking at. Rather, before its eyes an image appears, its image, which it can now see it as its hand is no longer there. This hand as image, so Mondzain states, has none of the powers that the maker of tools would recognize. In the suspension of its manual powers, however, the *image* indicates the capacity or potency of the gaze that ‘looks’ at it, regards it. It is a ‘work’, a making that indicates a foundational capacity of the subject to compose its first gaze in the trace of its withdrawal. To withdraw oneself is to produce one’s image and to give it to the gaze of the eyes, as a living trace, but separated from oneself. As Mondzain further explains, the human being had already seen its hand, but not its hand as resembling an image of oneself that keeps itself outside oneself on the unanimated wall. This hand, born out of the shadow, is now shadow itself. What comes to us from this

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<sup>11</sup> Let me make a side remark to refer to Tim Ingold indicating that it is “with our entire being – indissolubly body and soul – that we breathe”. He refers to Merleau-Ponty’s essay ‘Eye and Mind’, stating “there really is inspiration and expiration of Being” as the “essence of perception” (Ingold 2015, pp. 67–68).

interaction is the work of *a separation and a bond*, which this sign composes with that from which it separates itself. To see oneself is always to see oneself at and from a distance. In the cave, however, this seeing is not seeing oneself reflected in the mirroring surface of the water or the eye of the other.<sup>12</sup> The wall is a 'mirror' of the human being, though not a specular mirror, and this hand is the non-specular self-portrait of the human being. And the same goes for the world: it is given to the gaze of the eyes but is separated from itself, *at a distance*. To see the world is always to see it at and from a distance, but here the seeing is not that from the top of a mountain, from the tracks in the forest, or on the plain. It is seeing images on a wall.<sup>13</sup> Images of animals, images of the hands, produced *autonomously by the hands before the eyes*, as pre-sent, as a *prae-esse* that maintains a relation and, therefore, is also a possible inter-esse.

In this wonderful 'phantasia', as told by Mondzain and Nancy, the cave as a limited, walled space does not appear as a prison, offering a scene of impotence and transcendence. Instead it offers a scene of potency and immanence, of liberation, in a particular sense. Let me indicate some further characteristics of this site and scene.

First of all, the caves in which the paintings are made – often very far from the entrance and on difficult spots on the uneven walls – are not family homes. There are no traces of habitation. But they should also not be too readily seen as religious sanctuaries, which immediately give the painted images and the site itself a meaningful place within a cult. There is, indeed, as Nancy writes, no reason to lend the images

any other sense than *the sense without signification of the exposition* ...: not a lost sense, nor one that is distanced or deferred, but a sense given in the absence as in the most simple estranged simplicity of presence – *being* without being or without essence that founds it, causes it, justifies it, or sanctifies it. Being simply existing. ... its whole exercise is to exceed itself, not being itself anything but the absolute detachment or distancing of what has no foundation in the property of a presence .... Image, here, is not the convenient or inconvenient double of a thing in the world: it is the glory of that thing, its epiphany, its distinction from its own mass and its own appearance. The *image* praises the thing as *detached from the universe of things* ... (Nancy 1996, 72–73, first and last italics mine).

The cave is a site of separation, departure, distancing, and suspension. Departure from a world of daily living, separation from the eternal cycle of life and death, from the cycle of the changing seasons, from the variations of temperature and of the rhythm of day and night. A site of suspension: images of the hands, of humans, of animals, of objects. The hands no longer tools, the animals no longer prey or predator, removed from the cycle of reproduction and survival, 'naked' and beautiful. The image is not the concept horse or bison or hand, but an image that is made and that contains a profanation and is a (temporary) suspension of the 'horse' or 'bison' in its natural or social environment (released, presented, exposed), a suspension of the

<sup>12</sup>In the pupil of the eye as a little doll, as Plato suggests in the Alcibiades I. 133a.

<sup>13</sup>John Berger writes: "Traditional Chinese art looked at the earth from a Confucian mountain top; Japanese art looked closely around screens; Italian Renaissance art surveyed conquered nature through the window or door-frame of a palace" (John Berger, 'Past Present').



regular power of the hands. John Berger writes: “Step outside the cave and re-enter the wind-rush of time passing. Reassume names. Inside the cave everything is present and nameless” (Berger 2002). The images ‘show’ something and that means to set it aside “at a distance of presentation, to exit from pure presence” (Nancy 1996, p. 70), implying and offering the possibility for regarding and exploring new relationships to the self, others, and the world, *at a distance*. Not the kind of distance from a top of a mountain that evokes reverence for the greatness of the world or that sparks the imagining of conquest, but an *arm’s length* distance (at hand, within reach). The hand “opens a distance, that suspends the continuity and the cohesion of the universe, in order to open up a world” (ibid., p. 75).

It is the place of another spatial and temporal experience, a particular chronotope or space-time milieu (including temperature, air, soil, smoke, smells, silence, sounds, darkness, etc.). It is a *real place* but also one without place in the regular order of places, a place without place. It exists in real time but out of regular time, a time outside time. Nancy calls it also ‘additional time’ (ibid., p. 74). Similarly, ‘place without place’ and ‘time outside time’ were phrasings used by Foucault to describe the heterotopia and the heterochronia (Foucault 1986). Within the *enclosed* singular space and the *dark* singular time of the cave, the human being becomes master of the light, master of day and night, since it has the charcoal torch that it enflamed with its own hands and that is throwing flickering light on the walls. As Mondzain suggests, the being that becomes human is not to be seen as fallen from the light of heaven and subjected to the powers of others or the Other, larger than itself and defining itself as impotent, incapable, and weak. It is rather a being that enters the cave to shape its own definition, at once creating itself and being created through the work of its own hands. Theology, she adds, prefers to make human beings come from the hand of a divine potter. The human of the cave fabricates its horizon and gives birth to itself by holding out its hands to an irreducible and vivifying strangeness: its own (hands). This ‘art’ as a making of images – which, as I suggest, is crucially also first of all a ‘trying’, ‘exercising’, ‘sketching’ that is not directed by a predefined end or projected accomplishment but always *erring* – *makes* the world visible or perceptible (i.e., makes it become apparent) in a new way. It makes ourselves perceptible in a new way: “... the monstration of ... self outside of self, the outside standing for self, and he being surprised in face of self” (Nancy 1996, p. 69).

This being transforms a relationship of force, where the ‘real’ crushed it, into a literally imaginary relationship through what we could call a spatialization as grammatization: making images, tracing sketches.<sup>14</sup> There is no longer only time for living and time for working and loving, there is now time for attention and contemplation too: “the staging of a scenography in which attention is focused on one set of dramatized inscriptions”, to displace the words of Bruno Latour (1986, p. 17).<sup>15</sup>

<sup>14</sup> See also the very illuminating remarks of Vilém Flusser (2011) on the removal from the world of objects through the act of image-making.

<sup>15</sup> Let me, in this context, briefly recall an early text of Bruno Latour (1986) on visualization and cognition, in which he points toward a thinking with eyes and hands and where he invites us to not



Here, the relationship in which the human is bound by the power of a specific reality transforms into a relationship that offers the possibility to relate to the self and to the world and to start interacting with that world. As Nancy states: "... the eye, which until then had done nothing but perceive things, discovers itself seeing. It sees this, that it sees. It sees that it sees *there*; it sees there where there is something of the world that shows itself" (Nancy 1996, p. 79). It offers this being the capacity for (re-)birth, to have the experience of (be)holding, of having at (the distance of the) hand, the experience of a 'main-tenant', of a now or 'pre-sent' that allows this being to become the cause of itself, to come to the world and enter with the world into a relationship. This being (be)holds itself in front of a rock wall, in the opacity of a face-to-face in confrontation with this wall as horizon (without horizon), massive, mute, and without gaze. Facing a wall onto which the being itself casts light; not sunlight or divine light but the light of the torch held in its hands. The wall as a "setting aside and the isolation of a zone that is neither a territory of life, nor a region of the universe, but a spacing in which to let come ... all the presence of the world" (ibid., p. 75). Present can also mean gift. This present, or now, is a gift, given: "I am given, *Es gibt* or *Es ist mir gegeben* ... it is given to me ... the opening of time that is not within time" (Nancy 2016, p. 2).

It is also important to mention that this being enters the cave *willingly* and that it has to find *the courage* to enter the cave (which is even darker than the darkest night, and so is uncomfortable, preventing any foresight). This being makes a *vital effort*, as the paintings are often very far from the entrance and in difficult to reach places. It is not moved by distortion or confusion; it enters the cave, *groping the way*, *thrilled*, out of *curiosity* and, as John Berger wrote after his exceptional visit into the Chauvet Cave in 2002, out of 'the need for *companionship*'. Thus, it is not looking first of all for truth but for *encounter*. Berger remarks that inside the cave there is a *balance between fear and a sense of protection*. In life, he says, most of the animals depicted on the walls were ferocious, but in the cave the relationship is that of '*respect, yes, a fraternal respect*' (Berger 2002). Moreover, the images on the wall inaugurate not only the human being as a monstator and spectator but also a community as a public of spectators: a contingent collection of whichever singularities happen to occupy the space of the cave, the chamber where the images are made on the wall. A community not constituted by shared identity or belonging (to a family, a tribe, a religious cult), but by a relation to something on the wall, by a presence in a particular place. A chamber potentially populated by whichever others happen to occupy the space, near or next to each other, as contact. The images have no pre-defined or definite addressee or response; they are the vestiges of human presence, and the collectivity of the spectators is not based on psychological identification with the producer of the images and his or her desires, but relies on being in contact as monstators and spectators of the world.

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relate the specificity of modern science to the existence of cultural differences or to the happy existence of special minds, but to explanations that take into account the hands and the inscriptions that they trace on flat surfaces creating an optical device (re-)presenting the world before the eyes.

## The End (Without End): On Animals That Go to ‘School’

Let me now give an additional twist or torsion to this cave fable starting from four observations. First, in his reflections on the cave paintings, Nancy also writes that the “traced figure is this very opening, the spacing by which man is brought into the world, and by which the world itself is a world: the event of all presence in its absolute strangeness. Thus, the painting that begins in the grottos ... is first of all the monstration of the commencement of being, *before* being the beginning of painting” (Nancy 1996, p. 70, italics mine). Second, in his book *Préhistoire de la beauté. Et l’art créa l’homme (The Prehistory of Beauty. And Art Created Men)*, which mainly focuses on cave paintings, Jean-Paul Jouary suggests that it was not already given (innate or acquired) human capacities (e.g., of imagination) that allowed the cave paintings to be made, but rather it was the evolving practices (and the accompanying technologies) that allowed such capacities to emerge and develop. He further elaborates the idea that it is not because we are human that we experience aesthetic pleasure or longing for it, but rather it is because we created (i.e., exercised!) that such feelings and perceptions could emerge and that we became and continue to become ‘human’. He adds that this art, or these exercises, ‘produced’ writing, numbering, mythologies, and several forms of knowledge (Jouary 2001/2012). Third, the gesture that most attracts the attention of Mondzain and Nancy is precisely that of making the image of the hands by pressing them to the wall, which is seen as the first gesture, and is art only in a very general sense. It is not yet (the art of) painting, but the gesture that children still make today. Fourth, the location, i.e., the particular chronotope, is of course crucial in various ways for this story of the being-becoming-human. If ‘art’ created ‘men’, as Jouary suggests, then the evolvement of this art became possible in this enclosed place without place, this dark time without time, where the lifeworld is displaced.<sup>16</sup>

From here, I think we can call this story, without forcing it too much, the educational cave story and we can give this location the name ‘school’. It has been often suggested that Plato’s cave is also the paradigm of the cinema. And investigators of the prehistoric cave paintings indicate that some have been made in such an ingenious way that in the flickering light of the torches they actually appear as moving images (Azéma 2011). But if we take into account the operations of separation, suspension, and profanation, the time outside time, the place without place, the creation of an attentive, regarding public, the physical conditions and technologies involved, together with the *exercises* of the hand and the eye, which are still unsure and do not know yet what it makes or sees (the sketches, the dots, the striations) so that the ‘human’ is forming itself in a vital effort based on curiosity (i.e., looking for company and not in the first place for ‘truth’) and courage (which is not for conflict, but for encounter and exploration), it seems that we can also suggest that she bears

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<sup>16</sup>There are of course very old wall paintings to be found outside caves (e.g., the famous Bradshaw paintings <http://www.bradshawfoundation.com/index.php>. Accessed 25 July 2017), but as Nancy states: “the painting that begins in the grottos (but also the grottos that painting invents) ...”.

witness to the event of school,<sup>17</sup> as the way in which a being without natural destination, without end, an erring being, is shaping herself and her *regarding* (in various senses, including considering, looking, gazing, concerning, being concerned, respecting, paying attention, relating to) of (the) world through technologies, exercises, and practices that she invents or uses, but that also, in turn, create that being and its ‘arts’, that open it up and expose it to a world that is given or presented to her.

The being-becoming-human/pupil is an animal that goes to ‘school’. That is, an animal that not only becomes initiated and socialized but also discovers at ‘school’ its potency to shape itself and the world, a being without natural or projected destiny (i.e., it is undefined). A being that experiences the ‘main-tenant’, the present that we could maybe also call, with Arendt, the ‘gap between past and future’, which is not awakening the dream of mastery, but the experience of being able to begin: the ‘commencement of being’, as Nancy wrote. A being that we can imagine to (begin to) exercise, to consider, to think, and maybe also to dream. It takes its relationship toward the world and itself into its own hands without this becoming a dominating, seizing, grasping, or exploitative act, but rather an act of regard. Experiencing the sharing of a world to which it can relate and about which it can speak, or by which it feels invited or even urged, provoked to speak. Experiencing a shared beginning with the world and the possibility of being part of a public of spectators and mon-strators that shares the place, shares the tracing exercises, shares the walls and what appears on them, shares the exposition, and has the possibility to communicate. The walls offer a space and create a milieu as a hole in regular time and environment.

The educational cave fable – and it is a fable, as was Plato’s according to his own words, a ‘phantasia’, to use Mondzain’s phrase, to populate our imagination – is not the biography of a being becoming philosopher in Plato’s sense, but maybe that of a being becoming an artist, in the very general sense that Jacques Rancière understands everybody to be an artisan, i.e., a handler (‘un manieur’) (Rancière 1987, p. 110) and that the Oxford Dictionary indicates as “a follower of a pursuit in which skill comes by study or practice”. This story does not call for a philosopher who leads the way out of the cave and into the light of a transcendent world and who tells us that we don’t know what we are seeing and saying. But the story does suggest that we could find some help from the *pedagogue*, who goes along the way *to* the cave and offers support in this effort (of the will) that demands a certain degree of courage, as the cave is not home and is always a bit uncomfortable. Recall that *pedagogue* was the ancient Greek name for the slaves who brought the children to school, taking them out of the house, the *oikos*, and out of society, the *polis*. And we can imagine the teacher as not only the one who projects images on to the wall but also the one who introduces or incites words, naming the world such that a world is made available to a being that is also made available to itself – available, that is, for contemplation, study, and exercise, for (self-)education. A teacher who, as Rancière states about the emancipating schoolmaster, stays at the door to make sure that one

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<sup>17</sup> Comparisons have often been made between caves and cinema, but surprisingly little between caves and classrooms, or if so, these were mostly in line with Plato’s fable of the cave as prison. Michel Serres’ (2015, pp. 202–209) reading is a notable exception.

does not avoid the effort and discipline necessary in order to be attentive to the world, to study, and exercise the hands and the eyes (Rancière 1987).

The educational fable is also about world-disclosure and world-renewal. This is conceived neither as a return nor as a conversion, but rather as a re-beginning that continues our erring without destination. As Michel Serres writes: taking up “the begetting and birthing of a child *anew*” (Serres 1997, p. 49, italics mine). Belonging, departing, and becoming. Education is not primarily dealing with truth and opinion; it is not so much about ignorance and illusion. Education is about the issue of ‘companionship’, being in company with others and with things (i.e., opening and disclosing the world), about enabling and exposing. The fable offers a different scenery of the (self-)education of the human being, affirming a belief in the absence of any pre-existing order and any human ‘nature’ or destination. It is not about ‘enlightenment’ by the sun, but about the little light that enables something to begin and that lets us attend to something in the dark (cave) that helps us to navigate, to make and find a way. According to Michel Serres, it is no longer the bright light of the sun, but the little lights of a starry night that offer a good image of what our ‘knowing’ and our existence are about. The bright light is, rather, more akin to a metaphor for ideology (Serres 2014, p. 319).

In line with Plato’s cave fable, there seems to be a philosophical approach to education that, in fact, starts from the experience of adults expressing “a disappointment with the world” (Cavell 2005, p. 3) and of conducting “a life that calls for transformation or reorienting it” (ibid., p. 11). Philosophy therein is conceived, as Cavell writes, as leading “the soul, imprisoned and distorted by confusion and darkness, into the freedom of the day” (ibid., p. 4). Cavell himself sees it clearly when he calls philosophy in this sense an “education of grown-ups” (Cavell 1999/1979). The educational cave story, however, which takes the cave *not* (or not only) as a metaphor but as a *real place*, offers a *pedagogical* approach to education that does not *start* from the (adult) experience of disappointment, confusion, or distortion, but from the (childish) experience of being able to commence, of being curious and attracted to enter the cave out of the joy – joy being the signature of the event *par excellence*<sup>18</sup> – of the exercise-production-discovery of a new degree of freedom *and* (attachment to) a new world. Maybe this is related to philosophy in the sense of exercise – *epimeleia* – and, for sure, Cavell turns also to this experience. But the important thing is that, as *starting point*, such exercise is all about the discovery, disclosure, company and care of world and not so much about the care of the self or the art of living.<sup>19</sup> And education is, at first, not about telling the others that they are wrong, “telling them that they do not know what they are saying” (ibid., p. 326), but rather presenting (the) ‘world’, outside and beside themselves, telling them that they should attend and try. That seems to be what is at stake for animals that go to school.

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<sup>18</sup> Cf.: “La joie, pourrait-on dire, est la signature de l’événement par excellence ... Joie du premier pas, même inquiet” (Stengers 2013, p. 142).

<sup>19</sup> As Arendt (2006, p. 192) states, “school is not about the art of living”.

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# The Entrepreneurial Self



Naomi Hodgson

## Introduction

We are used to being addressed as consumers, being encouraged to get the best value for money, to go online to search the best deal, to switch utility suppliers, and so on. There is a distinction to be drawn at the outset of this chapter, between the general shift to positioning citizens as consumers that has taken shape over recent decades and the particular mode of subjectivation described by the notion of the entrepreneurial self. It has become the norm not only to manage our economic or domestic affairs in this way but also to apply this logic to all areas of our lives – education, health, social life, exercise, raising children, political participation. This shift is evident in a language that is now taken for granted, of unleashing potential, of being the best *you* you can be, and so on. From the classroom to the boardroom, the kitchen to the bedroom, in our social and leisure time, today we are all called upon to invest in ourselves, or in our children, to ensure potential is realized, and no one is left behind. As will be shown in this chapter, the notion of the entrepreneurial self describes how changes that have taken place at the level of government – towards open competition, public participation, performance management based on outputs and feedback, for example – require us to understand and conduct ourselves in particular ways.

Entrepreneurship as such is not new, of course. It has long existed as a general term that refers to establishing new business, the initiative required, and the risks involved. It comes with connotations of having an eye for these things, being able to spot a gap in the market, and knowing how to fill it for maximum – if short-term – profit. In recent years it has come to feature in the way we understand the purposes of education, and ourselves in relation to it, in particular ways, and thus

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has become a focus of educational philosophy and theory. To be clear, however, the term entrepreneurial in the entrepreneurial self comes not, or not only, from critical educational and social theorists. It is the language of policy itself; we are explicitly addressed as needing to be entrepreneurial. As the abstract of the European Commission's Entrepreneurship Competence Framework (EntreComp) reads: "The development of the entrepreneurial capacity of European citizens and organizations is one of the key policy objectives for the EU and Member States" (Bacigalupo et al. 2016, p. 5).

EntreComp represents the latest effort by the European Commission to embed entrepreneurial skills and dispositions throughout education and training (e.g., see also the Strategy for Education and Training 2020 (OJEU 2009)), not only for the purpose of business development directly but also for personal development and social participation:

EntreComp defines entrepreneurship as a transversal competence, which applies to all spheres of life: from nurturing personal development, to actively participating in society, to (re)entering the job market as an employee or as a self-employed person, and also to starting up ventures (cultural, social or commercial).

It builds upon a broad definition of entrepreneurship that hinges on the creation of cultural, social or economic value. (Bacigalupo et al. 2016, p. 6)

The focus of this account of the entrepreneurial self is, in a similar vein to Ulrich Bröckling's (2015) account, to describe "not what those who are subjected to the regime and who constitute themselves as subjects via this subjugation in reality say and do, but rather a regime of subjectification. The question is not how much effective power is possessed by the imperative to be enterprising, but rather by which means the latter exercises this power" (Bröckling 2015, p. xiii).

The notion of the entrepreneurial self is closely related to the demands of late neoliberal capitalism. While the processes of deregulation, opening up of markets, and the changing role of government in line with privatization and, more recently, austerity are clearly visible in our educational institutions (and public services more generally), the notion of the entrepreneurial self draws attention to, provides a way to understand, not only the effect of such large-scale political changes on individuals but how 'the individual' him/herself is understood otherwise. A changed constitution of the state entails, then, new objects of governance, including the particular form of individuality it requires and produces.

Due to the relationship between the constitution of the entrepreneurial self and the prevailing mode of governance, this chapter will draw largely on educational-philosophical and related accounts derived from governmentality studies, following the work of Michel Foucault (Foucault 1991). While the examples derive from the European context, they will resonate, I hope, beyond this context.

The particular focus of this chapter is not, then, with the entrepreneur as a particular description of a career and the education required to achieve this or with the entrepreneurial self as an identity one might assume when pursuing such a career. Rather, the focus here is on the entrepreneurial self as a particular form of subjectivation (or subjectification, as Bröckling has it) operative today. That is, the notion

of the entrepreneurial self refers to particular discourses and practices according to which we are governed and govern ourselves. This self-understanding is constituted not only in and through formal educational institutions but also through many facets of our daily lives, as will be discussed. To illustrate this, we will draw attention to certain shifts in the way we speak about the individual, education, and the relationship between the individual and the state, indicative of shifts in the political rationality according to which late neoliberal societies are governed.

## From Government to Governance: Shifting Language

To contextualize changes in the relationship between individual and state that have taken place in late neoliberal societies over the past 30 years or so, two particular political shifts are important to note here, as they will frame the discussion that follows. The first is a general shift from government to governance (Rhodes 1997). As Femmy Thewissen summarizes this distinction:

‘Government’ is generally understood as the system by which traditional nation-states are governed, forming an integral aspect of representative democracy. ‘Governance’ can be described very roughly as “a new mode of governing that is distinct from the hierarchical control model, a more cooperative mode where state and non-state actors participate in mixed public/private networks” (Mayntz 2003, 27). (Thewissen 2015, p. 7)

As we will see below, the shift from government to governance involves purposeful reform of the hierarchical, bureaucratic model of modern nation-states, to a more devolved, participatory arrangement involving public, private, and voluntary sectors. Second, and commensurate with this, we have seen a shift from state as provider to state as facilitator (cf. Hodgson 2012). These two shifts can be described in spatial terms as a shift from a vertical organization, founded on hierarchy and authority, to a horizontal one, constituted by networks, audit, and feedback loops (cf. Rosenau 1995), referred to by Simons and Masschelein (2008) as ‘environmental’. What this means in practice will be illustrated with examples later in the chapter.

Thewissen has drawn attention to a further shift, hinted at in the quote above, from representative to participatory democracy (Thewissen 2015). Again, what this means in practice will be illustrated later. It is important to note at this stage, however, that these terms do not operate in their traditional political theoretical sense, but are reshaped by the accompanying shifts in governmental rationality. Such reshaping is evident in the policy examples given above: entrepreneurship is given a broad definition, not a purely commercial one; it is a set of competences we should all seek to be developing; doing so forms part of wider strategies not only of economic competitiveness but also the development of personal, cultural, and social domains. Indeed, as Thewissen notes, “‘governance’ puts our received understanding of politics, of political power, of society and of our role as citizens therein under strain” (Thewissen 2015, p. 8). There is more to it, then, than saying that words

mean different things than they used to; rather, the use of terms within the language of governance requires us to ask what they do mean, what they do, and what we do and who we are when we understand ourselves according to those terms.

In the discussion that follows of the constitutive discourses and practices of the entrepreneurial self, we will see how traditional terms such as citizenship, participation, agency, and so on have been recast by the shift from government to governance. The way in which this shift not only constitutes but also requires the entrepreneurial self will be outlined with reference to three examples, or three figures of the entrepreneurial self: the parent, the citizen, and the researcher. At the end of the chapter, we will turn to consider new aspects emerging in this constitution that ought to concern educational philosophers today and in the near future. First we will consider in more detail the changing mode of government, before moving on to look at how this reshapes the domain of education.

## **From Welfare to Responsibility: Changing Modes of Government**

The notion of the welfare state was subject to reform beginning in the late 1970s. The welfare state was subject to critique from a number of perspectives for, variously, its top-heavy bureaucracy, elitism, conservatism, gender imbalance, and so forth. But the rationale and impetus for reform came largely from those who can be loosely characterized as the New Right (Clarke et al. 2000, p. 3), who saw it as an impediment to the economy and as fostering a culture of dependency. As Tuschling and Engemann summarize this:

Especially in the realm of social welfare, new arrangements were sought where individual action is increasingly invoked to ideally foster both individual chances and collective good. The new modes of organization—frequently labelled as neoliberal—seek to relate the conduct of one's own life to the performance of the state. (Tuschling and Engemann 2006, p. 452)

Care for the 'collective good', then, no longer referred to universal welfare provided by state-centred, publicly-funded institutions but to individuals each taking responsibility for their own welfare – or, more accurately today, wellbeing – and being able to and actively wanting to choose how and whether to do so from a number of options facilitated by the state. This is evident in the changes of terminology. In the UK, for example, what was called Unemployment Benefit is now referred to as Jobseekers' Allowance. Thus, a source of support provided to those unfortunate to find themselves without or unable to work is reframed as a temporary provision permitted to those in the process of actively looking for work (and providing evidence of doing so). The New Right rhetoric created a stigma around those 'on benefits', seen to be getting money for nothing. The reformed system introduced responsibilities to be fulfilled in order to earn such rights.

The reforms introduced entailed two forms of ‘privatization’: introducing the market into public services and giving increased responsibility to the individual and the family for aspects of life previously taken care of by ‘the welfare state’ (Tuschling and Engemann 2006, p. 452). As Clarke et al. (2000) write:

In part, this was justified as the process of placing choice in the hands of ‘individuals and their families’ (e.g. in parental choice of schooling). In part, it was a means of making the family the site of responsibility for issues ranging from childhood delinquency to care for elderly or disabled kin. Together, these privatizing shifts both diminished the scale and significance of public provision and celebrated the value of the private (in both senses) over the public. (p. 3).

While these shifts have often been understood in terms of a rolling back of the state (see e.g. Hood et al. 1988), it is not accurate to suggest that there has been less government going on. Rather, these changes introduced a different form of government, characterized by what has been termed New Public Management: a shift away from the bureaucracy and hierarchy of traditional public services and the distinction between public and private towards a form of governing concerned with efficiency, outputs, quality, choice, and value. The alternative name for New Public Management was ‘entrepreneurial governance’, characterized by the following principles: promoting competition; empowering citizens, by shifting control from bureaucracy to communities; measuring performance based not on inputs but on outcomes; being driven by goals or ‘missions’ not by rules and regulations; redefining clients as customers and offering them choices; preventing problems before they emerge, rather than just offering services afterwards; earning, not just spending, money; decentralizing authority in favour of *participatory* management; and catalysing public, private, and voluntary sectors into action to solve their community’s problems (Osborne and Gaebler 1992, pp. 19–20 cited in Du Gay 2000, p. 63).

In Osborne and Gaebler’s account, the focus is on the reform of public services according to the model of the commercial enterprise. Such forms of privatization are often understood in terms of the consumerization of citizens; while this consumer disposition does form part of the entrepreneurial self, this understanding posits these reforms in terms of encroachment of the economic on the social. As Maarten Simons argues, however, “within this configuration of entrepreneurial government and self-government the distinction between the social and the economic (as two different domains, each requiring their own government) becomes obsolete” (Simons 2007, p. 110). The implications of Osborne and Gaebler’s characterization are that this mode of governance requires participation at multiple levels in order to function – empowering citizens, giving choice to customers, encouraging participation, spurring communities in to action, for example; an entrepreneurial mode of governance therefore requires an entrepreneurial disposition of those it seeks to govern. Not only consumption, then, but also investment. As Graham Burchell puts it, this entails the generalization of an ‘enterprise form’ to all forms of conduct, from that of governments, to organizations, to individuals (Burchell 1993, p. 275 cited in Du Gay 2000, p. 65).

In the shift away from management in terms of rules and regulations to output-based performance measures and goal-setting, two further significant developments

emerge: new forms of accountability and the decentralizing of responsibility. The increased emphasis on individual responsibility in governmental rationality in recent years has been referred to as ‘responsibilization’ (Rose 1999). The post-welfare state governs in terms of individual freedoms and choices and thus does not see its primary function as the provision of care, inclusion, and so on, but rather facilitates the environment in which choice, inclusion, and so on, and the audit of its quality, are possible. Such facilitation involves ensuring transparent measures of accountability in the form of, for example, league tables, benchmarks, and consumer reviews and scores, which are as prevalent today in the education, health, and care sectors as they are in the commercial sector.

These changes reshape not only how organizations and institutions function, then, but also how the roles and responsibilities of those working within them are understood. This is reflected in the call for ‘culture change’ in the UK civil service in the late 1990s, in the White Paper *Modernizing Government*. As the New Labour government sought to embed the new entrepreneurial mode of governance, criticizing the old, bureaucratic mode as ‘resistant to change’, it called for a thorough revision of “core competencies for staff and appraisal systems to reflect the qualities we seek” (Cabinet Office 1999 p. 56 cited in Du Gay 2000 p. 76) and “qualities of innovation, responsibility, responsiveness, creativity, and enterprise” (Cabinet Office 1999 p. 61 cited in Du Gay 2000 p. 76). Such qualities, and the redefinition of professions in terms of core competencies, would become characteristic of entrepreneurial governance and the focus of numerous education and training strategies and career development profiles.

## **Education and Governance: The Shift to the Learning Society**

We have seen so far the shift in political rationality to entrepreneurial governance, which ushered in the discourses and practices that have come to characterize late neoliberalism: facilitation of competition, and the means for communities, and the private and voluntary sectors to participate, to have choice, and to provide feedback. These shifts were also framed briefly in spatial terms: from the horizontal hierarchical structure of the bureaucratic institution to the vertical, networked, distributed structure of the governance environment.

In order to compete with and as knowledge economies, knowledge – in the form of high levels of graduate level education, innovation, intellectual property, data – and the transferrable skills that enable it to continually be put to use became the currency. Education, or learning, became central to strategies for societal development, illustrated by the establishment of, for example, the European Research Area (ERA) and the European Area of Higher Education (EHEA) as part of the Bologna Process within the European Union. Such formations drew on shared assets and traditions of member states – higher education – and then standardized particular aspects (e.g. length of courses, level of qualification, unit value of courses) in order to render these systems compatible, comparable, and competitive:

Building on our rich and diverse European cultural heritage, we are developing an EHEA [European Higher Education Area] based on institutional autonomy, academic freedom, equal opportunities and democratic principles that will facilitate mobility, increase employability and strengthen Europe's attractiveness and competitiveness. (Ministers responsible for Higher Education in the countries participating in the Bologna Process, London Communiqué, May 2007; p. 2)<sup>1</sup>

As the passage above indicates, the rationale is clearly economic, rather than educational. Education rather is the means by which to facilitate mobility, employability, competitiveness, and so on. Note that governance is referred to here in terms of facilitation: responsibility for the achievement of these goals lies with national governments, institutions, and the individuals that constitute the higher education sector. We will look in more detail at what this means for the figure of the researcher later in the chapter. As indicated earlier, then, the entrepreneurial disposition is required at all levels, from governments, to organizations, to individuals.

The development of the learning society refers not only to reform of traditional education sectors, such as universities, in line with entrepreneurial governance, however. The concern today is not with education per se but with learning. 'Lifelong learning' in particular became central to the understanding of the entrepreneurial self, as seen in the European Commission's report on Quality Indicators of Lifelong Learning:

Lifelong learning is an overarching strategy of European co-operation in education and training policies and for the individual. The lifelong learning approach is an essential policy strategy for the development of citizenship, social cohesion, employment and for individual fulfillment. (European Commission 2002, p. 4)<sup>2</sup>

As seen in relation to the Bologna Process above, learning here becomes central to the understanding of what is required for citizenship, cohesion, employment, and individual fulfillment. The shift of language from educational institutions to learning environments – a term applied to the classroom, the library, the museum, to 'virtual learning environments' and so on today – marks a shift from an understanding of education as a fixed linear trajectory that takes place in age-related institutions to a lifelong, permanent process of investment and review (cf. Simons and Masschelein 2008). While the identification of social problems as educational problems is not new (cf. Smeyers and Depaepe 2008), casting social, economic, and personal problems as learning problems requires a particular permanent, investing attitude towards oneself. As Simons and Masschelein put it: "A whole range of human activities, from childrearing, having sex, eating or communication to travelling or using free time, being a citizen and an employee, are regarded as competence based. It is therefore felt that they require a prior learning process" (Simons and Masschelein 2008, p. 191). The entrepreneurial self is a subject for whom learning appears "as a fundamental force to position and reposition oneself in society" (p. 200). In the current mode of governance, learning appears as a form of capital, which should be

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<sup>1</sup> <https://www.coe.int/t/dg4/highereducation/EHEA2010/London%20Communique%20-%2018-05-2007.pdf>

<sup>2</sup> [http://cordis.europa.eu/docs/publications/5663/56630421-6\\_en.pdf](http://cordis.europa.eu/docs/publications/5663/56630421-6_en.pdf)

managed and for which we should take responsibility (*ibid.*). This is not a matter of a top-down control of how we act, think, and feel but the conduct of our conduct (cf. Foucault 1991): we are governed in terms of our freedom to be self-determining individuals, not only able to, but invited to, choose our life course and to choose to change it in response to unstable conditions (cf. Barry et al. 1996).

Reformed, competitive, facilitating, post-national forms of governance such as the EU not only sought to become “the most competitive, dynamic knowledge economy in the world”<sup>3</sup> but also to address the democratic deficit associated with hierarchy and bureaucracy: accountability and transparency became central to the discourses and practices of governance, in the form of voice, choice, and participation and the evidencing of this through multiple league tables and feedback mechanisms. As Stewart Ranson describes this shift: “Since the late 1970s such regimes of public accountability have been strengthened systematically so that accountability is no longer merely an important instrument or component within the system, but constitutes the system itself” (2003, p. 459). This is tangible today in the practices of permanent review, audit, publication of results and leagues tables, open access to reports and data, and so on. Hence, governance of the learning society has become constituted by devices and “techniques that allow the alignment of governmental interventions with self-regulative capacities of individuals, simultaneously spawning and utilizing them” (Tuschling and Engemann 2006, p. 451). Put differently, this means that entrepreneurial governance requires the fostering of not only entrepreneurial skills and the knowledge that produces a highly educated workforce but also the disposition to engage with that knowledge and the world in particular ways: as lifelong learners, as participating citizens, as those who give feedback on the goods they buy and the services they access, and as those who respond and adapt productively to the feedback they receive. In this context, the entrepreneurial self appears as one who participates in the provision of feedback (completes online surveys, leaves reviews for companies she has used and places she has visited), checks reviews when making choices, seeks feedback herself (in her personal and professional activities), and responds to it by investing further in herself, identifying problems as learning needs and opportunities.

To illustrate the constitution of the entrepreneurial self in more detail, we turn now to consider the figures of the citizen, the parent, and the researcher. These terms are not new, of course, or even distinctive to the present time. But the specific discourses and practices according to which they are given shape today entail particular forms of responsibility, accountability, and investment. As Lawn (2003) writes:

Education and skills are indispensable to achieving economic success, civic responsibility and social cohesion. The relation between citizenship and lifelong learning, now bound together within the European lifelong learning area, is expressed in the metaphor of the passport. It is the passport which defines citizenship and signifies power...The passport to mobility and into active citizenship will be education and lifelong learning. (Lawn 2003, p. 332)

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<sup>3</sup>[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/uedocs/cms\\_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00100-r1.en0.htm](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/en/uedocs/cms_data/docs/pressdata/en/ec/00100-r1.en0.htm)



Thus learning, and individual responsibility for one's own learning and self-development, is now directly connected to the economic and social health of society. In the next section, we will consider in more detail how the idea of citizenship is reshaped by entrepreneurial governance and self-governance.

## **The Entrepreneurial Self: The Figure of the Citizen**

As indicated earlier, what was traditionally meant by citizenship, since the modern period, as legal rights and residence or birth in a sovereign territory, no longer accurately describes the way the relationship between individual and state has shifted in recent decades. As what it means to govern has undergone significant shifts in terms of privatization, accountability, participation, and so on, the object of that governing has also shifted. We have seen above how education and learning have become central to strategies of societal development: entrepreneurial governance requires entrepreneurial citizens. As indicated earlier, however, this is not only a matter of the encroachment of economics into social and political domains; these are not strictly separable. Furthermore, in the shift to entrepreneurial governance, the notion of what societal development is in the West has also been challenged. The traditional measure of GDP has been decreed no longer fit for purpose as a measure of societal success: beyond a certain point, more wealth does not make people happier (cf. Layard 2003). Wellbeing has become a new benchmark by which individuals are governed and govern themselves (see Layard 2006; Almunia 2007). This change in the object of government entails new measures of success and new aspects of ourselves in need of learning investment.

In the 'post-national' globalized context, citizenship became a renewed focus of attention for both policy and research due, as Claudia Ruitenberg notes, "to low voter turnouts and concerns about civic disengagement, increasing cultural diversity and concerns about social cohesion" (Ruitenberg 2015, p. 2). Following the creation of the European Union – and the new category of European citizenship – in 1992, the European Commission launched a number of initiatives to foster a sense of European identity among its citizens. But these, in many ways echoing the symbolic measures taken in the formation of nation-states, e.g. the flag, the currency, the anthem (Shore 2000), were insufficient to engender the shifts in orientation to state, work, education, ourselves, that the increasingly globalized, mobile, knowledge economy required. In seeking also to address the democratic deficit associated with bureaucratic government, accountability and transparency were central, including evidencing the active engagement of individuals as entrepreneurial, learning citizens (cf. Hodgson 2016a).

This understanding of citizenship as requiring an entrepreneurial attitude and as able to be quantified and measured as verifiable skills and competences is concretely illustrated by the development and use of Active Citizenship Competences

Indicators (Hoskins et al. 2006<sup>4</sup>) by the Centre for Research on Lifelong Learning (CRELL) at the Joint Research Centre of the European Commission. Active citizenship relates to a particular concern with participation as a central indicator of democratic citizenship. The CRELL report reads:

The research project on ‘Active Citizenship for Democracy,’ coordinated by the European Commission’s Centre for Research on Lifelong Learning (CRELL), has produced the following definition of ‘Active Citizenship for Democracy’ (Hoskins et al. 2006):

Participation in civil society, community and/or political life, characterised by mutual respect and non-violence and in accordance with human rights and democracy.

Active citizenship is partially overlapping with the concept of social values concentrating its interest mostly at meso- and micro-level. Thus, active citizenship is understood in the very broadest sense of the word ‘participation’ and is not restricted to the political dimension. It ranges from cultural and political to environmental activities, on local, regional, national, European and international levels. It includes new and less conventional forms of active citizenship, such as one-off issue politics and responsible consumption, as well as the more traditional forms of voting and membership in parties and NGOs. The limits of active citizenship are set by ethical boundaries. People’s activities should support the community and should not contravene principles of human rights and the rule of law. Participation in extremist groups that promote intolerance and violence should therefore not be included in this definition of active citizenship. (p. 11)

The definition developed is derived from social capital theory (p. 9) but this needed to be operationalized, that is, made measurable, in order to build the composite active indicator:

Towards this end we identified measurable and distinctive elements in the definition of active citizenship, which we designated ‘dimensions of active citizenship.’ The dimensions are: participation in Political Life, Civil Society, Community Life and the Values needed for active citizenship (recognition of the importance of human rights, democracy and intercultural understanding). (p. 11)

‘Political life’, here, refers to involvement with political parties in the form of participation, membership, donation, volunteering, or working and to voting in national or European parliamentary elections. ‘Civil society’ refers to political non-governmental participation, with sub-indicators relating to “protest, human rights organizations, environmental organizations and trade union organizations ... Protest includes activities such as signing a petition, taking part in a demonstration, boycotting products and ethical consumption” (p. 12). ‘Community life’ refers to “activities that are less overtly political and more orientated towards the community – ‘community-minded’ or ‘community-spirited’ activities” (p. 12). As with the previous two categories, degrees of participation are gauged in relation to ‘questions of participation, volunteering, membership and donating money’ (p. 12).

The rationale seen in this rendering of citizenship is not a standard, as such, but rather a way to benchmark the political wellbeing of countries, regions, cities, etc.

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<sup>4</sup>[https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/jrc-coin-measuring-active-citizenship-2006\\_en.pdf](https://ec.europa.eu/jrc/sites/jrcsh/files/jrc-coin-measuring-active-citizenship-2006_en.pdf)

What this understanding of active citizenship looks like in practice is illustrated by what was termed ‘the Big Society’ by David Cameron during his UK General Election campaign in 2010. Illustrative of the shift from government to governance, and from welfare to responsibility, the Big Society referred to the empowerment of communities to run local interests, such as post offices and libraries, through volunteering or philanthropy. Without evidence that local communities wanted these services and resources, whose future was threatened by a lack of profitability, their closure could be justified. Hence, we can see that the provision of public services such as these, as traditionally understood, is no longer assumed: individuals and communities must evidence demand for them and their willingness to participate in their maintenance. To participate in this way requires a particular attitude on the part of individuals, not only to be inclined to or able to take on such responsibilities but also to remain aware of the need to do so in today’s mode of governance.

There are two aspects here that are key to the notion of the entrepreneurial self as citizen: first, the very fact that citizenship is rendered in terms of observable, measurable activities and competencies and second, the activities that count as ‘active citizenship’. To be a citizen is no longer the starting point of political community but an investment of oneself into one’s community in specified ways. Political life, here, refers to positive contributions or, at the very least, voting. Protest, for example, is not political or governmental but part of ‘civil society’. The unit of measurement here is the individual; the degree of participation is a measure of individuals taking up of their democratic responsibility. Such a rendering of citizenship has been referred to as depoliticized. As Gert Biesta writes, the “strong emphasis on personal responsibility, on individual capacities and abilities, and on personal values, dispositions and attitudes ... runs the risk of depoliticizing citizenship by seeing it mainly as a personal and social phenomenon” (Biesta 2008, pp. 49–50; see also Ruitenberg 2015). Although it is individualized, however, it is not anti-social: our relations to others – participation in the community, being sociable, networking – form part of those aspects of herself with which the entrepreneurial self is concerned. As Masschelein and Simons (2002) note, “relations towards one’s friends and loved ones come to be seen as useful, indeed crucial – for personal happiness, for social effectiveness, for the well-being of nations” (p. 596).

The entrepreneurial self is a particular form of individuality, “something to be mapped, evaluated, described and documented in all its respects” (Masschelein and Simons 2002, p. 596). As citizens, then, this means investing ourselves into our communities as an investment in ourselves. Our positive relations with others are seen as assets, parts of our distinctive individuality. As noted earlier, then, citizenship rendered by entrepreneurial governance as ‘active citizenship’ marks a shift in our use of language: from something one is to something one does; something that is of value will lead to greater success, profit, quality, outcomes, and so on. We can see a further instance of such a shift when we consider the figure of the parent in terms of the entrepreneurial self.

## The Entrepreneurial Self: The Figure of the Parent

Research in a number of fields in recent years has drawn attention to the discursive shift that has taken place to addressing ‘parents’ and, more specifically, their practices of ‘parenting’ (cf. Hoffman 2008). This identifies, and responds to the fact, that to speak of ‘parenting’ is not just to rename ‘childrearing’ but to frame it as a specific set of practices and skills, to change what we do, how we relate to children, and how we understand ourselves (cf. Faircloth and Lee 2010). In critical parenting studies, the verb ‘parenting’ is seen to refer to a particular culture of discourses and practices (Lee et al. 2014). In line with the accounts of the learning society more generally, research on the discourses and practices of parenting from a governmentality perspective sees this shift to a focus on parents’ individual skills as a responsabilization of parents (Fejes and Dahlstedt 2013). However, this refers not only to giving or acknowledging responsibility to parents for their own children but a particular form of responsabilization, in the sense referred to above – simultaneously individualizing (or privatizing) and normalizing – that casts parenting as a matter of maximizing learning outcomes and competitive potential. Parents’ responsibility is made explicit, but at the same time what it means to be a parent is reframed.

Thus, in line with mode of subjectivation of the entrepreneurial learning society, there is no longer a ‘norm’ that sets the parameters of good and bad, normal and abnormal. The norm today is that we ought to invest in the learning outcomes of our child and seek appropriate expertise to maximize our skills and strategies for doing so. These discourses do not, or not only, address those children and their carers who are at risk, but have become normalized as a way of understanding the parent-child relationship (cf. Ramaekers and Suissa 2012). The shift to the discourse of parenting has been understood in terms of the shift from a normative account of how one should raise a child, based on an account of what is ‘normal’ (and therefore abnormal), to a more inclusive account that recognizes changes in family structures, cultural diversity, and moral liberalism. This ‘inclusive’ move to the term ‘parenting’ entails a reduction of the parent-child relationship and the process of raising children to a set of skills: an economized, instrumentalized set of investments in one’s child’s future and in our own success. Parents are positioned as needing to seek guidance from experts, which they can choose from a variety of approaches, and so as indicative of wider change in how individuals are governed (Vansieleghem 2010).

This is evident in this recent BBC News report from the UK on a new research project, with the headline “Parents in the north of England should learn from their pushier counterparts in the south to help their children get top grades, says the children’s tsar”.<sup>5</sup> The tsar is reported as saying:

As northern parents, we need to be aware of these inconsistencies and variations in secondary schools and push hard for our schools to show how they are improving and helping our children to achieve.

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<sup>5</sup> <http://www.bbc.co.uk/news/education-38207685>

One of the real drivers of improvements of schools in London has been the demand for good school results from parents and children. There is much we northern parents can learn about this parent power.

Ms Longfield told the newspaper that although the ‘tiger’ parents of London and the south-east had been mocked for their emphasis on extra homework and music lessons, there was something to be learned from the way they demanded more from teachers and schools for their children.

Leaving aside the socio-political history of the so-called north-south divide in England, the notable point here is that so accepted is it that the aim and purpose of parenting is to gain competitive advantage for one’s children, that ‘northern’ parents (here assumed to be a homogenous group) are seen as in need of intervention for not taking sufficient (active, evidenced, e.g. by exam results) responsibility for this. Parents who demand more are seen to be taking up their responsibility – and their right – to ensure the best outcomes for their children. Northern parents are called upon to ‘learn’ from this and to follow suit.

The idea of the tiger mother may be an extreme example, or at least one that is restricted to a particular middle-class milieu. But the fact that the notion of the tiger mother, as a style of parenting, has passed into our vernacular since the publication of Amy Chua’s 2012 *Battle Hymn of the Tiger Mother* points to the existence of a choice of parenting styles and a market place in which they are promoted (cf. Suissa 2013). Some sample book titles illustrate this: *Parenting Styles: The Ultimate Tips On Parenting Styles For Raising Children In The 21st Century By Applying Parenting With Purpose Driven Styles!* (Davis 2016); *Helicopters, Drill Sergeants and Consultants: Parenting Styles and the Messages They Send* (Fay 1995). More familiar examples might be Gina Ford’s *The New Contented Little Baby Book: The Secret to Calm and Confident Parenting* (2006) or William and Martha Sears’ *The Attachment Parenting Book* (2001).

What is new here is not that (new) parents need or seek advice, but that anxieties over doing our best or doing it right are directed towards particular forms of expertise and to finding solutions for everything from sleep problems, to tantrums, to eating, to brain development, illustrative of the ‘privatizations’ that Tuschling and Engemann (2006) articulate. All of these are natural sources of anxiety for any parent; and all are part of the complexity of raising children. But today we seek solutions for them, ones that optimize future outcomes, in ways that not only reposition parent and child in relationship to each other, but also reposition the parent as the traditional source of authority. The ways in which the self-understanding of parents is shaped according to their relationship to expertise and lay knowledge in this context are seen to produce a ‘proto-professionalism’ (Vandenbroeck et al. 2009). As the titles of these books suggest, the expertise in question here is drawn predominantly from psychology and, increasingly, from neuropsychology. This points to a shift that has been constitutive of the (self-)governance of the entrepreneurial subject: the general process of psychologization and the shift from psychologization to neuropsychologization (de Vos 2012, 2015). We will return to this at the end of the chapter.

## The Entrepreneurial Self: The Figure of the Researcher

Knowledge is now a commodity, the free movement of which is a measure of societal progress. In the university, as in government, there is an emphasis on efficiency and outputs over process and craft. The university today is no longer oriented to the highest development of the nation-state, as during the modern period, but rather to innovation and sustainability according to resources and demands in its immediate environment. Hence it requires a researcher who also understands herself in these terms. The skills and competencies of the excellent researcher have, therefore, been a focus for policy in recent years. It is now commonplace to find ‘doctoral schools’ or ‘doctoral training centres’ within universities, indicating the specific attention being given to the training needs and professional expectations of this level of education, and the need to make distinct and visible the presence of research within the institution.

The visibility of research, as a measure of the institution and the individual, is a requirement of research in general today, in the sense that it must be both discoverable by search engines and able to be evidenced, either quantitatively (number of publications, impact factor, Altmetric data, ‘star’ rating, in the case of the UK Research Excellence Framework) or qualitatively, in the form of ‘impact narratives’, a way of accounting for the social, economic, or cultural (i.e. not academic) impact of a department’s research. It is in this accountability as visibility that we see distinct aspects of the entrepreneurial self in the understanding of the researcher.

Writing on the impact of managerialism on the identity of university researchers, Jenny Ozga notes the ways in which entrepreneurial governance reshapes discourses and practices in the university. But she also notes:

it is possible that entrepreneurial modes of research act seductively on the researcher. The public process of bidding, the negotiation with significant others, the pleasure of being ‘chosen’ all give researchers the feeling of being close to power. There is elation in success against the odds, and the research production process is so demanding that it produces its own momentum and its own satisfactions. Indeed, research is an example of ‘just-in-time’ production process, where flexibility in response to rapidly changing specifications is absolutely necessary. The capacity to succeed under pressure is privileged, perhaps at the expense of independent judgement about the quality of the process or product. It is also surprisingly easy (and I speak from experience) to be drawn into ways of redefining the projects in ways that better suit the sponsor, and/or produce a result that may form the basis for a preferred course of action. (Ozga 1998, pp. 147-148)

An uncomfortable truth, perhaps, but one that reflects the way in which, as Tuschling and Engemann put it earlier, governmental strategies work on the “self-regulative capacities of individuals, simultaneously spawning and utilizing them” (Tuschling and Engemann 2006, p. 451).

The self-regulative capacities of the researcher (by definition, perhaps, highly motivated by success and meeting criteria) are concerned today with being excellent at activities beyond those traditionally associated with study or scholarship. In order to illustrate how the researcher is understood today, we will focus on the example of the Vitae Researcher Development Framework. This shows not only the skills and






Fig. 1 The Vitae Researcher Development Framework

qualities that constitute the excellent researcher but also the ways in which she is asked to work on these aspects of herself.

The Researcher Development Framework (RDF) identifies the ‘characteristics of the excellent researcher’, based on empirical data from interviews with researchers, and is designed “to enable researchers to identify the areas in the framework they want to develop further” (Vitae 2010).<sup>6</sup> It not only articulates very clearly the terms according to which the researcher understands herself but also provides the means by which to work on these particular aspects of herself. It has a visual form (see Fig. 1), but works digitally, as well as being supported by physical training and networking events.

<sup>6</sup> <https://www.vitae.ac.uk/researchers-professional-development/about-the-vitae-researcher-development-framework>



The RDF is developed by the organization Vitae, based in the UK, but is being trialled in a number of other countries. As Vitae describes the RDF:

The RDF is a professional development framework for planning, promoting and supporting the personal, professional and career development of researchers in higher education. It articulates the knowledge, behaviours and attributes of successful researchers and encourages them to realise their potential. (Vitae 2010, p. 1)

The characteristics of the excellent researcher are referred to as ‘descriptors’:

The descriptors are structured in four domains and twelve sub-domains, encompassing the knowledge, intellectual abilities, techniques and professional standards to do research, as well as the personal qualities, knowledge and skills to work with others and ensure the wider impact of research. (Vitae 2010, p. 2)

In addition to the standard academic requirements concerning subject knowledge, analytic skills, and an inquiring mind (Domain A: Knowledge and Intellectual Abilities), as well as governance and administrative knowledge and skills, such as copyright, research ethics, and managing research funds (Domain C: Research Governance and Organization), other aspects ordinarily associated with academic work, such as publication, are classified under Domain D: Engagement, Influence, and Impact, and aspects not distinctive to academic work are classified as essential to the excellent researcher, as in Domain B: Personal Effectiveness. The way in which the device functions also facilitates a further requirement of the researcher, not only to continually seek feedback and undertake ongoing professional development in response but also to make visible this attention to oneself.<sup>7</sup> As seen in the figures of the citizen and the parent, one’s active participation in pursuing these competences must be demonstrated. To not do so is read as evidence of a learning need or a lack of engagement, and thus as an individual problem and responsibility.

The RDF is aimed predominantly at researchers in universities where, as elsewhere, an individualized, responsabilized figure must participate in her own and her institution’s sustainability through maximization of research outputs and their value, and successful application for external research funds. As the descriptors of the four dimensions of the RDF and the way in which it is designed to be used as a form of permanent feedback indicate, to be entrepreneurial is built into the understanding of what it means to be a researcher: it is designed in a way that is constitutive of that very mode of subjectivation. Not only in the language that it uses – innovation, collaboration, responsiveness to change – but also in the practices these involve in order to ‘count’, to be measurable and visible, and, furthermore, in the way it can be used: digitally, enabling ongoing feedback, mobility, and personalization.

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<sup>7</sup>For further analysis of the figure of the researcher and the devices of self-assessment, see Hodgson 2016b, c).

## Contradictions and New Developments

There is a risk in accounts such as this, that the effects of a particular discourse appear totalizing. The purpose in the above has been to show the ways in which the entrepreneurial constitutes “a grammar of governing and self-governing” (Bröckling 2015, p. xiii), conducting our conduct in the direction of profit, success, improvement, competition, and so on, but that does not mean such a regime is without flaws or contradictions. We will briefly consider here, to borrow a phrase from Simons and Masschelein (2008), the ‘dark side’ of this focus on entrepreneurial self-investment, while also considering more recent aspects of it that require further attention within the field of educational philosophy.

The entrepreneurial self is an individual whose very individuality is a matter of monitoring and investment. Citizenship, parenting, learning, and research are all rendered in terms of skills and competences. The political dimensions of these, then, are sidelined. The demand for evidence, visibility, and transparency is focused on particular aspects of ourselves and our experience, such that other aspects – as we saw in the vignette on parenting – are hidden from view, not acknowledged, or are not included in what it means to be a good citizen, good parent, excellent researcher, and so on. For Simons and Masschelein, the ‘dark side’ of this entrepreneurial self-understanding is the permanently shifting benchmarks by which permanent monitoring and assessment takes place today. The entrepreneurial self is aware of her unique traits, characteristics, and skills; everyone is different, everyone has potential. But our exceptional natures are subject to permanent monitoring and assessment and judgement by shifting criteria. There are no longer standards by which norms are set, which constituted their own exclusions; today, benchmarks shift according to performance. Think, for example, of the researcher who is not successful in her funding application: it meets all of the explicit criteria; it is judged as exceptional on all counts by the reviewers. And yet it is not successful. There was a large volume of applications, and so additional criteria had to be used in order to make a decision; we cannot afford to fund all of the research. Which proposals offer the clearest outcomes? Which have the clearest methodology? Which are likely to have the greatest impact? Which applicants have a good track record of research? The application is, then, judged in relation to the others – not only against the explicit criteria – others whose research may be in a different field (perhaps one more likely to have measurable impact and a clear methodology, and so on.) As Simons and Masschelein put it:

In a sense, judiciary power and legislative power are being mixed up. Consequently, and drawing upon the ideas of Agamben (1997), within an environmental arrangement of time and space one is increasingly handed over to or at the mercy of sovereign power. This type of power does not make judgements based on criteria or rules that were formulated earlier on, but establishes these criteria and rules in the very act of judgement. (Simons and Masschelein 2008, p. 701)

The self-directed learner is seen as empowered by being encouraged to seize upon her individual strengths and characteristics; but the permanent yet shifting assessment by which that learning and development is judged always finds us wanting.

In governance terms, individualization is a matter of empowerment, of inclusion, as we see, for example, in individual learning, or healthcare, or exercise plans: they are specifically tailored for our needs. And in political philosophy, of course, autonomy and self-reliance are important political and educational ideals. But as we saw in relation to citizenship, the form of individualism of the entrepreneurial self denies important aspects of political community: what's in it for me rather than what principles do I want to defend for the sake of the polity or the next generation? Networking, socializing, and volunteering, as we saw in the definition of active citizenship indicators, become evidence of one's individual good citizenship, something one might put on a CV rather than do for its inherent value.

The increasing ubiquity of digital devices adds a further dimension to these processes of individualization. Today it is more accurate to speak of personalization: this points to the increasingly molecular level of information on the basis of which our choices and aspirations can be governed, facilitated by the data we generate in our use of digital devices. Educational philosophy is only beginning to take account of the ways in which 'data' have agency in themselves in the governance of education. As Ben Williamson writes, while digital systems have long been part of the background of policy-making and educational management (Williamson 2016, p. 5), there are pressing questions about how the algorithms, architectures, and the visualizations and feedback these provide reshape the very understanding of the individual, the personal, and what it means to educate and be educated. The agency of technological and material devices has gained increasing attention through the popularity of sociomaterialism in educational research (e.g. Fenwick and Landri 2014), but the agency of data itself is rarely acknowledged in the field (but see Decuyper et al. 2014).

The entrepreneurial self, then, is a form of individualization specific to this point in history, required by a form of neoliberal democracy constituted through inclusion, participation, competition, accountability, transparency, and so on. It is, however, a regime that is exclusive – of those unable to compete, of aspects of experience that are not visible, of the political dimensions of that experience, of a concern with process rather than outputs and goals, and of a sense of the human that can never be fully accounted for. It is constituted largely through knowledge derived from branches of psychology, predominantly today, positive psychology, behavioural economics (the interdisciplinary combination of behavioural psychology and economics, from which much of the research on happiness and wellbeing derives), and neuroscience. As we saw in the vignettes of the citizen, the parent, and the researcher, this narrows down considerably our sense of what these things are and so too the basis on which we make decisions on how to undertake these roles. In terms of the entrepreneurial self, these are things that we do – they are a matter of behaving in a particular way, evidencing particular skills, producing successful outputs (a community, a child, a peer-reviewed article) – not things that we are. The figure of the entrepreneurial self requires us to continually ask who we are, not only in terms of investigating the 'how' of power but also by articulating those aspects of our experience that constitute who we are but that are not visible or audible within entrepreneurial modes of accounting for ourselves.

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# Financial Literacy and the Curricularization of Knowledge



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## Are Financial Literacy Programs Effective?

Do financial literacy programs really affect people's behavior? Empirical evidence, insofar as it is at all compelling, tends to suggest a negative response to this question. For example, a meta-analysis of 137 papers (Fernandes et al. 2012) finds that “these interventions explain 0.1% of the variance in downstream financial behavior”. The World Bank is one of the global champions of the financial literacy programs. Ironically, its own researchers had to conclude that “financial literacy and capability interventions can have a positive impact in some areas (e.g., increasing savings) but not in others (e.g., reducing loan defaults) (Miller et al. 2015)”. ‘Can have’ is not necessarily a ringing endorsement, and the conclusion follows the meta-analysis of 188 papers on the subject. Yet, the World Bank member countries continue spending millions of dollars trying to affect how people make financial decisions.

This could have been a simple story of the foolish insistence on an ineffectual neo-liberal agenda. However, the story is much, much more interesting than that. The story may tell us something about the paradoxes and dangers of contemporary education as such; the kind of massive, state-organized education with the broad agenda for social change. It is also a story of what happens to knowledge once it becomes curricularized. Without a doubt, mass education has been one of the major achievements of the global civilization over the last century. As all such achievements, this one has costs beyond the staggering monetary one. In this chapter, I will show that one of the unintended consequences of expanding education is expansion of the domain occupied by normative, noncumulative knowledge that may, in certain circumstances, lead to the spread

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of the paranoid consciousness. The hope to encourage more rational behavior through expanding curriculum may be misplaced. It becomes more misplaced with the rapid advent of social media and democratization of reasoning.

Why do policymakers so desperately want to make people behave more rationally with their finances? One does not need to look too far to understand. All financial crises, including such devastating one as that of 2007–2008, can be explained, in part, by irrational behavior of consumers of financial services. In the developing world, many obstacles to economic growth can be traced to people's inability to make rational economic decisions on investment, savings, and current consumption. Americans save too little, borrow and spend too much. Chinese save too much, borrow and spend too little. Russians do not invest and refuse to take even the minimal risk with their money. If only people learned to be a little more rational, enlightened – the reasoning goes – all could have been different, and the global economy might have been spared the deep crises and enjoyed growth that is more robust.

Everyone involved understands the limits of financial education. After all, the investment bankers who invented and then sold the same derivatives repeatedly to different entities did not lack financial literacy skills. Quite the opposite, they are some of the most sophisticated financial minds. No one is calling for sending financial firms' executives to a re-education camp; governments prefer to regulate rather than educate them. Yet where it comes to the population at large, governments want to educate it into rational economic beings all the same, because even small changes can, in theory, lead to significant consequences. The consumer confidence index is considered one of the major indicators of the overall economic health. Nevertheless, it is what it sounds like – the mood of many people. It is so intangible that the temptation to manipulate it through the available social policy instruments is almost irresistible.

Behavioral economists tell us that humans tend to choose poorly, often against their own interest (Kahneman and Tversky 1979). *Homo economicus* is shown to be fictional. Financial literacy is an attempt to change that, and therefore, to superimpose a norm on reality. To be fair, a norm by definition does not coincide with reality; it describes where we ought to be, and therefore it cannot describe where we are. Also to be fair, any education is an attempt to make something out of people that they are naturally not. It is always an imposition of an ideal on human beings. Without such an aim, education does not have a reason to exist. The problem I want to address is not about the intent of the financial literacy programs and not even of its efficacy. It is a case of the expansion of normative knowledge through the means of curriculum, which in turn is a likely consequence of the mass education as an instrument of social policy.

## **The Noncumulative Knowledge: The Freewill Clause**

In his 2007 encyclical letter, Pope Benedict XVI (Ratzinger) has laid out an epistemological theory of ethical and scientific knowledge made distinct by the principle of cumulativeness.

Let us ask once again: what may we hope? And what may we not hope? First of all, we must acknowledge that incremental progress is possible only in the material sphere. Here, amid our growing knowledge of the structure of matter and in the light of ever more advanced inventions, we clearly see continuous progress towards an ever greater mastery of nature. Yet in the field of ethical awareness and moral decision-making, there is no similar possibility of accumulation for the simple reason that man's freedom is always new and he must always make his decisions anew. (Benedict XVI 2007, 24)

The distinction between cumulative and noncumulative knowledge was probably first made by C. Brinton (1984), who described the difference between scientific knowledge and that in arts, literature, and philosophy. Brinton reminds that humans have achieved greater control of the nonhuman environment, but have not done much of a progress on human behavior. However, Benedict XVI had first explicitly applied the notion of noncumulative knowledge to ethics and gave an explanation to the root cause of the noncumulativity of certain knowledge: freedom. The argument is as simple as it is convincing:

These decisions can never simply be made for us in advance by others—if that were the case, we would no longer be free. Freedom presupposes that in fundamental decisions, every person and every generation is a new beginning. Naturally, new generations can build on the knowledge and experience of those who went before, and they can draw upon the moral treasury of the whole of humanity. But they can also reject it, because it can never be self-evident in the same way as material inventions. The moral treasury of humanity is not readily at hand like tools that we use; it is present as an appeal to freedom and a possibility for it (Benedict XVI 2007, 24).

We are not free to reject the cumulative knowledge of science, because it has the implied reliance on verifiable evidence. However, with ethics, the free will is not bound by the rules of evidence; otherwise, there is no free will. In effect, all normative knowledge is noncumulative, while descriptive (positive) knowledge is cumulative. The distinction becomes useful to us for the analysis of financial literacy education. Let us pick it up from here, for neither Brinton nor Benedict XVI seems to elaborate on the concept of noncumulativity.

## Curricularization

Benedict drew the border between cumulative and noncumulative knowledge between material and ethical knowledge. It worked just fine for the purpose of his letter, but it is not enough for my purpose. I will show how the borders between the two kinds of knowledge can be redrawn and how curriculum can be the bridge that allows for crossing.

Let us consider criteria on which the World Bank ranks countries on financial knowledge:

1. Percent of adults with understanding of inflation
2. Percent of adults with understanding of simple interest
3. Percent of adults with understanding of compound interests

4. Percent of adults who can think in real monetary values (money illusion)
5. Percent of adults correctly calculating a simple division
6. Percent of adults with basic numeracy skills (to identify better bargains)

And are the criteria for behavior and attitudes:

1. Budgeting: Making a plan for spending money and keeping to the plan
2. Not overspending: Not spending money on nonessentials or nonaffordable item
3. Living within means: Not borrowing more than affordable or for essentials
4. Choosing financial products: Having chosen the financial product on his/her own
5. Attitude towards the future: Focusing on the future rather than on today
6. Nonimpulsiveness: Not being impulsive (The World Bank 2016)

What kinds of knowledge do these two lists represent? The first one is clearly descriptive and cumulative. Indeed, we know what inflation is, and there is little normativity about that knowledge. Inflation can be good for you if you are obtaining a mortgage. On one hand, a sudden jump in inflation rate can allow you to pay off your mortgage much sooner than otherwise would be possible. On the other hand, it can be bad for you if you are an investor. Before investing into a business, you would have to make sure its profits are higher than the inflation rates. We know that double-digit inflation is generally bad for country's development, because it deters investment, but very low inflation or deflation also deters investment. Those are all more or less descriptive and cumulative claims, which can be fine-tuned or even eventually disproven, but do not require an act of free will or an ethical choice to accept or reject.

However, in the second list we see the signs of implied normativity. The claims are not in the explicitly normative form yet, but normativity is easy to deduce. You *should* make a spending plan and stick to it, without splurging beyond your means. You *should* not borrow too much. You *should* think about your financial future. This is an example of the new quasi-morality, the new and expanding normativity. In the educational discourse one may find other instances of the same phenomenon: Thou shall eat healthy food, thou shall recycle and care for the environment. Thou shall be tolerant and accepting to people from other cultures and with disabilities. In some cases, the new commandments simply did not exist in the old religious and ethical systems, but in some cases they directly challenge and attempt to replace them. For example, Jesus has directly argued against financial literacy "Therefore I tell you, do not worry about your life, what you will eat or drink; or about your body, what you will wear" (Matthew 6:25–34). The Quran contains explicit prohibition against charging interest, which presents a problem for contemporary market economy. The conflict resulted in the entirely new ethical system of Islamic finance. Of course, in still other cases, the new commandments simply restate, expand, or reinterpret the old ones (tolerance is the prime example here). Together, they constitute the new canvas of normative claims, in complex relationship with each other.

It is very important to note that the two World Bank lists are not independent of one another. They are connected as means and ends. We teach people about inflation in hope that the descriptive knowledge *becomes* the normative, that people will

learn to choose financial services wisely because they understand what is inflation and can calculate simple and compound interest. The descriptive should lead to the normative, make the latter easier to accept. Of course, there is nothing automatic in transition from the former to the latter. One can calculate well and still take huge gambles. One can argue that any normative, noncumulative knowledge depends on certain descriptive, cumulative knowledge. For example, to choose not to harm other people, a child first learns that hitting or biting someone else hurts.

The distinction between the normative and the descriptive is not absolute, and the border is penetrable. For example, we may teach school kids to count to ten as a part of anger management program. It is an attempt to support the ethical knowledge (rejection of violence) with regular descriptive knowledge about a certain technique. Of course, a child still has the free will and can choose not to use the technique and resort to violence. Moreover, the lack of knowledge about the counting to ten technique can also limit the free will of the child, unable to cope with his or her emotions. Therefore, the distinction is not always clear, but the connection between the two kinds of knowledge does seem to exist. Cumulative knowledge is necessary, but not sufficient condition for noncumulative knowledge.

The practice of education is not homogenous in this respect: in some areas, we simply give people descriptive knowledge without a clear normative aim. For example, we teach someone to solve quadratic equations with only the broadest hope that it will help one to become a productive member of the society. However, in other areas, the normativity cannot be plausibly separated from descriptivity. For example, history curriculum is impossible to take out the patriotism vs. multiculturalism value divide. Financial literacy education seems to be a case where we actually have a choice – to keep it completely descriptive, and more or less stick to the first list, or expand it to include the second list. This makes it an interesting case. Financial literacy education is not as objective as math, and yet not as value-saturated as history. It is in between and can go either way.

In the pragmatic sense, we may not have much of a choice on the matter. Any expensive intervention needs to be evaluated. Such a condition makes the expansion of normativity almost inevitable, or at least, very difficult to resist. Could the World Bank simply stick to the first list of criteria? I theory yes, but in practice its member countries want evidence of real change in people's behavior. Otherwise, competing demands for funding will easily win the attention. The demands for accountability will make educators lean toward normativity, because descriptive knowledge itself does not change behavior. Only normative, noncumulative knowledge moves and motivates. If I am evaluated by how much people in my care change, I will definitely try to change those people. Therefore, I will tell them what I want them to do, and thus present a normative claim. Just presenting facts does not seem ever enough. As a clever educator, I can hide my real intentions really well. However, as long as I remain an educator, I have aims about my students, and denial of my aims is nothing but a sophisticated manipulation. In one way or another, I will have ethical or quasi-ethical commandments up my sleeve.

In general, epistemology is not independent of funding. This may sound odd, but it is simply an extension of pragmatist thinking. The ways of socially mediated

knowing have direct effect on truth claims. Much of epistemology has evolved from the model of an independently wealthy gentleman thinking, not burdened by the way social institutions and economies operate. In that mode of thinking, justified true belief may be perceived as not dependent on the availability of pecuniary resources. Yet embeddedness in massive (and therefore expensive) educational practices requires that the knowledge has impact. Cost drives accountability, and accountability, in turn, drives the drift toward normativity of knowledge. First, we try to measure whether education programs have effect. Next, we reshape programs in such a way that behavioral change becomes the direct aim of education.

The scope of this chapter does not allow developing a full argument on pragmatist epistemology in its interactions with the institutionalist thought. To get a sample of such an argument one may consider Shane Ralston's (2010) work. My position is very simple: institutions such as education do affect the characteristics of knowledge that is embedded in them. In our particular case, the institute of education seems to facilitate the drift of cumulative, descriptive knowledge toward noncumulative normative knowledge.

I will borrow a useful term 'curricularization' coined by Reijo Kupiainen. He describes a Finnish Children and Media Program that attempts to "map the required developments in children's media environment and to promote media education and media education projects. Most of these projects have been implemented outside school". He calls this "some kind of curricularization of leisure and everyday life" (Kupiainen 2010, 337). He pointed out only to the phenomenon of education 'seeping' into nonschool environments. I think, however, that the phenomenon is larger and includes the reverse flow of certain subject matters from noneducational to educational setting. Curricularization is shifting certain kinds of knowledge from the cumulative to noncumulative realm through the means of expanding curriculum.

## The Paradox of Cumulativity

When we pull knowledge from the descriptive into the normative, the intent is to increase its potency as a regulator of human behavior. Again, intervention programs seek to demonstrate their impact. However, the unintended effect is that with normativity knowledge also acquires another quality of noncumulativity. It triggers the free will clause and its acceptance becomes a matter of choice. In our attempts to increase the effect of such knowledge, we in fact *reduce* such effect. It is almost as if trying too hard in education has the opposite effect. It is one thing to teach someone about the differences between simple and compound interest and ignore how one uses this knowledge. It is quite another thing to teach someone to avoid high risks and put away some money for retirement. Suddenly, the knowledge loses all the potency of evidentiary support and becomes a matter of personal choice. Knowledge becomes belief. Beliefs may be strong because they can move us, but they are also always weak because we do not have to accept them.

Choice is a powerful instinct, with its own built-in immune system, capable of radical reframing of any question. Any direct or implied 'you should' statement is interpreted as an attack on one's freedom of choice. Once a claim is presented in a normative form, a person will measure it up not so much against the evidence, as against one's own desires and other beliefs.

In other words, normative claims will evoke an entirely different reference system, and make it overall less likely that the person will behave in accordance with the claim. It is also complicated with desires. How do we know what we want? Most people, especially young people do not know exactly what they want. We do not have access to knowledge about our desires independent of prior similar experiences. A young person presented with a choice through a normative claim has very little knowledge of oneself to go on. That creates a situation of random choices that lock a person into a position. Moreover, once I make a choice within certain system of beliefs, it will predict my future choices, because of the drive for the internal consistency.

For a Christian who takes Jesus' call for not caring about the future literally, any new claims encouraging him or her to save and to consider personal financial future will make very little impact. One danger of curricularization is the conflict with normativity in other domains. The broader an array of normative claims, the more likely they are to conflict with each other; this is simply a matter of probability.

However, the further problem is that shifting knowledge into the normative, non-cumulative domain has the domino effect on all the descriptive knowledge associated with that area of normative knowledge. In other words, noncumulativity is contagious. It devalues evidence all the way down. Consider the case of climate change denial. Presented with a normative claim (thou shall reduce emissions), a part of the population will inevitably reject it. In fact, it is clear that many climate change deniers dislike the stated or implied solutions much more than the facts supporting the claim. It is the slowing down of economic growth that they hate, not the statistics on weather patterns. The refusal to accept the choice at the end of reasoning provokes people to rationalize their refusal by questioning the beginning and the middle of the reasoning chain.

Where it is a matter of choice, the multiplicity of outcomes makes it inevitable. It is so not only because of the natural variations within the population. The very fact that you have chosen A makes me more likely to choose B, because I am a different person and I value my identity as distinct from yours. So, there will be a group of people who reject the notion of global warming, even to be different from those who accept it. To justify their choice, they have no choice but question the host of descriptive claims that support the normative one. In their eyes, the painstakingly accumulated descriptive knowledge of climate change will become invalidated. We make normative choices first and accumulate evidence to support them later. To invalidate evidence, one seeks new evidence of bias or conspiracy those who find and present the evidence on climate change. This is another example of the pragmatist and institutionalist thinking. Indeed, some epistemologists will argue that nothing like this should happen. If we have hard, verifiable fact, it would make the adoption of the justifiable belief easier. I am, however, trying to show the opposite:

the acceptance of belief is in reality an action independent of the evidentiary foundation. It, in turn, corrupts the evidentiary base. We philosophers may not wish it to be so, but if we wish to remain relevant, we have to acknowledge the reality. We must see how the paranoid consciousness is born and sustained.

## The Rise of the Paranoid Consciousness

In an influential *Harpers* essay, historian Richard Hofstadter (1964) paints a broad historical picture of what he calls ‘the paranoid style’ in American Politics. Apparently, it has been around for a long time, before the American Right has appropriated it. He cites the panic about Bavarian Illuminati, the anti-Masons, the anti-Catholics (and anti-Jesuits especially), the populists, the alarmists about Mormons, the White Citizens’ Councils, and Black Muslims. Hofstadter names three beliefs of the right-wing thought contemporary to him: in conspiracy culminating with the New Deal, in Communist infiltration into the American government, and in the network of agents in mass media, education, religion, undermining the American will to resist.

Today’s contemporary paranoid theories may be less grandiose; they are more fluid, and perhaps shallower but broader. Hofstadter described the fringes of American politics, but now the paranoid consciousness has moved toward the very center of it, capturing the highest office in the USA and threatening to do so in several European countries. It is happening, in part, because instead of one big, coherent conspiracy, we deal with many small, vague, incoherent, yet still clearly related to each other beliefs: that liberals are somehow out to weaken America, that Hillary Clinton has committed treason, that global warming is a Chinese hoax, that Obama is a Muslim born in Africa, that vaccination brings autism, that Orlando shooting was staged, that the Twin towers were blown up by FBI, etc. We have no objective way of measuring either the depth or the breadth of the paranoid thinking, but it is fairly obviously not in retreat. Why is that? We live in the most educated societies ever, with secondary education becoming universal, and higher education undergoing a new wave of massification. The populace has never been as educated, but it is no less paranoid.

What interests me in Hofstadter theory is the relationship between the paranoid consciousness and education. His own hypothesis is partly psychoanalytic and partly epistemological. I will not argue with the psychoanalytic part, but the epistemological argument is flawed. He claims “They see only the consequences of power—and this through distorting lenses—and have no chance to observe its actual machinery”. In other words, making politics more explicit and allowing more groups access to politics would help. That is obviously wrong, for many of the contemporary paranoiacs are in the legislative bodies or close to them. They know how politics is made.



Hofstadter believes the paranoid ‘resists enlightenment’, and that by implication, more enlightenment would help. But that claim clearly contradicts his own observation:

The higher paranoid scholarship is nothing if not coherent—in fact the paranoid mind is far more coherent than the real world. It is nothing if not scholarly in technique. McCarthy’s 96-page pamphlet, *McCarthyism*, contains no less than 313 footnote references, and Mr. Welch’s incredible assault on Eisenhower, *The Politician*, has one hundred pages of bibliography and notes. The entire right-wing movement of our time is a parade of experts, study groups, monographs, footnotes, and bibliographies. (Hofstadter 1964)

The paranoid mind is nothing if not enlightened. It analyzes commonly available claims, employs critical thinking, seeks evidence, evaluates it according its own standards, and makes own conclusions based on that evidence. In other words, the paranoid mind is exactly what we want an educated person to be. No, the paranoid is not uneducated. If you have a reason to doubt, please check any of the major conspiracy sites and forums. You will find there massive depositaries of evidence, of irrefutable arguments and unassailable logic. If you go bottom up, from basic facts to conclusions, these piles of evidence and argument are very weak. If you look from the tops down, from conclusions to evidence – they are very strong. To build these massive towers of paranoid knowledge, one needs educated authors and readers. Education, if not careful, may provide the building blocks for these towers.

I believe that the recent perceived widening of the paranoid consciousness across much of the world can at least partially be explained by the creeping curricularization of knowledge. Or, to put it differently, the large-scale public education agenda had led to appearance of many more quasi-ethical constructs, which in turn devalued the evidentiary, cumulative knowledge. While the populist backlash is obvious, its mechanisms are poorly understood. I think the epistemological mechanism of the paranoid consciousness is close to what I have described as the curricularization.

Education may trigger paranoid consciousness. Teaching people to look for evidence and apply critical thinking can actually make their conspiracy theories stronger and their paranoid beliefs firmer. Those who believe that the answer to the paranoid consciousness is simply more education may be mistaken. Education itself may be a partial culprit here, because its natural tendency is to curricularize knowledge unintentionally reduces the realm of cumulative knowledge. Specifically, financial literacy education may actually damage the cause of the rational financial behavior, because it presented its content as normative claims, and thus triggered resistance.

The consequences of paranoid consciousness are serious. They may not affect education itself that much, but in the political realm, these consequences wreak havoc. The always quite narrow field of mutually comprehensible rational political discourse may become even narrower. Representatives of different political parties become trained in rejecting the pillars of evidence, supporting normative claims significant for the other party. What used to be descriptive statements in need of further evidence are gradually becoming articles of faith. Consider, for example: ‘The government is too big’, or ‘We must cut taxes’, or ‘Education is a civil right’,

or 'Poverty can be reduced through education'. Fifty years ago these might have been simply hypotheses, mostly in the realm of the descriptive, cumulative knowledge. Now the same statements firmly belong to the realm of the normative, the noncumulative ethical knowledge. They no longer require support, and if evidence for or against them is presented, the opposing political side will turn on the conspiracy theory thinking to destroy the uncomfortable evidence. I could never imagine myself writing this, but here we go: education can be a threat to democracy. It is not the only, but an important, contributor to the curricularization of knowledge.

## The Curricularization Hygiene

Obviously, this does not mean that all education always produces the expansion of normative knowledge. It is this particular historical form of publicly funded, socially constructed education that tends to do that. Just because certain drug has side effects does not mean it should not be taken. Similarly, the many great public and private benefits of mass education are simply beyond doubt. The economic benefits of educated populace alone make the thought of reducing the scale of education unthinkable. However, it would be prudent to consider the down side.

Unfortunately, this is not the first time the humanity is making the error. All world religions have experienced the same or similar problem. They created large sets of normative knowledge in hope of influencing people's behavior. The larger the set, the more the free will clause, formulated by Benedict XVI, is applicable. They inadvertently have made knowledge more questionable, more arbitrary, and stopped its accumulation. As a consequence, all universalist religions first suffered endless splintering, and loss of relevance in significant parts of the developed world. The temptation of curricularization is difficult to resist.

What are possible ways of containing the curricularization of knowledge? The problem I point to is implicitly understood in the so-called social norms approach (Berkowitz 2004). Although somewhat controversial, the approach influences human behavior by presenting knowledge in strictly non-normative forms. For example, most university freshmen overestimate the percentage of their classmates that engage in binge drinking. The approach is simply to tell the objective truth: only a very small portion of other freshmen drink in binges. However, the approach simply does not work when the majority of the population is in error. For example, prior to 2008, a very large group of Americans thought that real estate markets could go only up, and bought houses and second houses at inflated rates and with unsustainable mortgages. Those who saw the danger of the situation could not resort to pointing out at the majority's behavior, because the majority was wrong. The social norms approach, even if it works, presents a limited solution. And it highlights another side of the same dilemma: the descriptive knowledge is not powerful enough to influence behavior.

No matter how tempting, education is a pretty poor instrument of public policy. It cannot nudge people's behavior in any meaningful sense. Let us consider the financial crisis of 2007–2008. As the reader might guess by now, I do not believe education could have prevented it. If someone before 2007 tried to do the financial literacy intervention with certain normative emphasis, it would trigger the noncumulative contagion and, potentially, the paranoid consciousness. "They are saying these things because they want to keep all the money to themselves". In other words, credibility of such a program would be damaged and unintended consequences result. No financial literacy program would have made any difference. To the contrary, it might have made it worse.

However, in the example above, an early intervention by regulators could possibly have deflated the housing bubble or at least soften its bursting. The US Federal Government could have tightened requirements for lending and limited the sales of derivatives. Of course, regulation is also an imperfect policy instrument, for if excessive, it tends to dampen development. The philosophical analysis of regulations is beyond the scope of this chapter, but one can intuit that regulatory regimes can also trigger the paranoid consciousness and have unintended effects.

With education, however, our best bet is, whenever possible, to specifically stop just short of normativity, even when it would jeopardize our ability to evaluate or increase effectiveness. As I argued above, the curricularization is an unintended consequence of accountability. I have nothing against accountability as such and consider it necessary for any publicly financed interventions. However, it would be foolish to ignore the systemic negative consequences. The only solution that presents itself is careful regulation of education itself, with an explicit prohibition of normative claims. School curriculum should be stocked with incomplete pyramids of knowledge, stopping short of ethical implications. The public interest is to protect the large area of cumulative knowledge and vigorously defend it against the expanding normativity that leads to devaluation of evidence. It is in public interest to keep the realm of noncumulative knowledge very small and contained, and prevent it from spreading.

Another implication is for pedagogy. In contemporary education, common are methods where students are asked to take a stand and defend their position. I myself used them for many years and found them engaging and productive. However, now I wonder if teaching students to withhold judgment is much more important. Perhaps, we can think of special efforts to teach young people to turn normative claims back into descriptive ones.

## Conclusion

The case of financial literacy demonstrates that massive public education programs may have a tendency to curricularize knowledge. When certain claims cross the border from cumulative, descriptive realm into the noncumulative, normative realm,

such claims become vulnerable to rejection, and may compromise large bodies of cumulative knowledge that support the normative claims. We should use the pragmatic and institutionalist epistemological thinking to prevent this from happening. We must know how institutions operate in the real world and what are the likely unintended consequences of the curricularization of knowledge.

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# Therapy



Paul Standish

In a world facing environmental despoliation, overcrowding, new forms of poverty, and political threats of diverse kinds, and at a time when, at an unprecedented pace, technology forces and shapes human social adaptation, there is the widespread sense of a new crisis in mental health. Older, more stable communities have been increasingly displaced by new social structures and forms of interaction, while specific developments have become the cause of a more general sense of social pathology – witness concern over such matters as the ‘Prozac generation’, the over-prescription of Ritalin, and so-called toxic childhood.<sup>1</sup> A part of the response to these changes can be seen in the burgeoning industry of counselling, psychotherapy, and positive psychology, while hopes of breakthroughs with the psychological problems that arise are raised by rapid advances in neuroscience. All this has been felt in socio-political reverberations especially through Western culture, seen in the emphasis on responsibility for lifestyle choices, in the preoccupation with happiness and wellbeing, and in the rapid development of confessional and reality television.

Such ways of thinking have influenced and become manifest in education in ways that are easy to discern. Classes in happiness or ‘mindfulness’ have been introduced in a range of contexts, from elite private and state schooling to military training, and these have been advanced with claims regarding both their instrumental and their intrinsic value. Notions of self-management have been apparent in approaches to classroom control, the organisation of study practices, and career planning, as well as with regard to the regulation and development of one’s emotional life. A new ‘science’ of parenting has arisen, such that what it is to be a parent is re-conceived and perhaps mis-conceived (see Ramaekers and Suissa 2012).

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<sup>1</sup> On the idea of the Prozac generation, see Elizabeth Wurtzel (1994) and Darian Leader (2008). On toxic childhood, see especially Sue Palmer (2006).

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Similarly, pedagogy has come to be shaped by technical-therapeutic principles and strategies, with a new emphasis on the structuring of learning according to students' 'learning styles', with changes in assessment practice, and with the reconstruction of concepts of success and failure – typically to emphasise students' positive achievement and to minimise the experience of failure. Even research now comes with a health warning: Frank Furedi gives the example of the “Vicarious (Secondary) Trauma Workshops for post-grads participating in the university's ‘Social Sciences Research and Skills Training’ programme” offered at Oxford University as a symptom of the wider medicalisation of the language and terms in which the university has come to understand itself (Furedi 2017). In these and other respects, educational practices have both been shaped by wider forces and themselves contributed to the perpetuation and intensification of therapeutic ideas of these kinds.

Against the groundswell of this change, however, it is sometimes objected that educational policy and practice have become too concerned with such matters as students' self-esteem and general psychological wellbeing, and that such preoccupations can subvert more truly educational aims. Indeed, this is sometimes capped with the thought that a more truly educational emphasis in the provision of schooling would avert those problems that therapy comes in to address; for sure, this would not prevent all such problems, but it would correct the cultural current that has, for so many, pathologised ordinary life. All this may seem a purely contemporary concern, but to raise this criticism is in effect to draw on a connection or contrast between education and therapy that has been there, in one way or another, for as long as human beings have reflected on their situation: on what it is to be educated and what it is to live well, contested as the former term undoubtedly is and with all the ambiguities that the latter phrase inevitably carries. Hence, there is every reason to proceed to a more directly philosophical engagement with these matters.

The questions that thereby arise are indeed compelling, and they have raised antagonisms in excess of what therapy's apparently benign image might lead one to expect. Thus, from the side of therapy, it might be asked: what is one to make of educational practices of a kind that cause moral distress, including the assimilationist practices of so much schooling? Conversely, as educators will sometimes wonder, when does therapy become, in fact, mis-educative – perhaps by encouraging a tranquilisation of experience rather than the bracing challenge that education and the quest for the good life require? When it comes to happiness also, it is quite likely that the parties to the discussion will differ over what it is exactly that happiness consists in. What kinds of happiness should education and therapy foster, and when might these be at odds with each other? Difficulties of definition abound here. Hence, the wisest course seems to be to identify and describe some of the particular influences and trends that have shaped practice and debate.

In 1981 in *After Virtue*, Alasdair MacIntyre identified 'the Therapist' as one of three archetypes of the modern age. The others were the Manager and the Aesthete. Of these two, the former is relatively easy to identify, possibly even more so now than was the case in the early 1980s, because the figure is a personification of what has come to be thought of as managerialism. This is a figure in whom instrumental reason predominates and whose moral philosophy, such as it is, will be uncompro-

misgivingly utilitarian. He – and in its classical incarnation it will most probably be ‘he’ – will be the ideal agent of performativity. The Manager, thus conceived, has surely become a dominant feature of our age. The Aesthete is at first sight a less familiar figure. This archetype is intended to suggest not the person of sophistication and discernment in matters of art, in the manner that is commonly associated with the term, but something strikingly different: it brings together ideas of a life dedicated to comfort and ease, pleasure, and material welfare. Such a conception of the good life is surely a hallmark of the neoliberal societies of today (notwithstanding the irony of the fact that ‘comfort and ease’ are at least in tension with the high-stress, relentless busyness of the lifestyles such societies demand). As an understandable expression of a naturalistic worldview, where the good is to be reckoned in terms of desire and satisfaction, this is a conception that has parted company with more exacting and, in a sense, nobler possibilities.

While both the Manager and the Aesthete warrant some explanation, the Therapist is impossible to miss. The past three decades have seen an unprecedented growth in explicitly therapeutic practice. A visit to the local bookstore will reveal shelves heavy with self-help guides of diverse kinds, while online evidence of such practices burgeons as never before. In similar fashion, a visit to a local school in many parts of the world will very likely show the growing influence of therapeutic preoccupations and techniques – with interventions to alleviate difficulties, whether to control problematic behaviour or to manage stress, as well as more proactive initiatives such as the provision of classes in happiness or mindfulness. The truth of that judgement has certainly been borne out in the rise, since the year of *After Virtue*'s publication, of therapeutic practices of various kinds. This can be seen in respect of the care of the body – from dietary practices to physical fitness regimes – and in the growth of holistic forms of medicine. It is evident at a more obviously psychological level in the increased attention given to the ‘management’ of the emotions and, above all, to happiness and wellbeing (cf. Goleman 1995; Layard 2005).

MacIntyre diagnosed the emergence of these three types in terms of a background of decline. The decline was in those structures of meaning sustained by communities and manifested most obviously, though by no means exclusively, in varieties of religious practice and belief. The opening of *After Virtue* sets out the book's major thesis, which is that we live in an age in which our moral vocabulary has become a mere shell of what it was because of the hollowing out of the substance of communities that gave it its former life. The consequent inauthenticity of the life that is then sustained in relation to these terms is a facet of the nihilism of the age, a nihilism that Nietzsche had diagnosed a hundred years earlier in terms of the old values having devalued themselves. While MacIntyre's response was to seek a revaluing and rebuilding of those earlier possibilities of community, Nietzsche's was expressed in the vision of the *Übermensch* (inadequately translated as ‘the Overman’) – in a sense, in a new vision of the human or, to phrase this in its most recent terms, of the post-human (Nietzsche 1961).

While there is no doubt that educational institutions have seen a rise in therapeutic practices, it is also the case that they have been encroached upon by managerialism. This can be seen in aspects of neoliberalism that have had impact on education in



many countries of the world. Evidence for this is to be found in three main respects (see Blake et al. 2000; Staddon and Standish 2012; Standish 1991, 2012). First, there is a culture of accountability that is reliant on high-stakes testing and the promotion of competition – within educational institutions, between them, and between countries. Second, there is the rise of performance measures, with the concomitant instrumentalisation of education. Third, there is the commitment to quality assurance with its concomitant aversion to risk. This manifests itself in a suppression of the exercise of judgement on the part of teachers and a tendency to micromanage educational processes. A significant aspect of this aversion is what might be called a denial of negative experience. In other words, an over-emphasis on achievement makes it impossible for students, as well as for those who teach them, to acknowledge ways in which things do not go well in the course of a human life; and this avoidance leads to a kind of repression. Certainly, there is reason to believe that such changes have inflicted stress on children: the experience of a child at school in a progressive, child-centred environment some decades ago was very different from that of the child in the achievement-driven, heavily-tested school environment today; and the strains do show. It is partly in response to these pressures that therapeutic interventions are introduced. Thus, in these respects, the school is a microcosm of the wider neoliberal culture. Such an account, however, which pitches the rise of managerialism and therapy as complementary responses to a loss of the sense of value in the modern world, certainly seems to reinforce the diagnosis offered by MacIntyre. The point can be given a more contemporary accentuation by saying that in neoliberal societies this incipient nihilism reaches a new low.

But why, we need to ask more directly, is this a problem for education? One answer is to be found in the trenchant critique provided in *The Dangerous Rise of Therapeutic Education* (2008) by Kathryn Ecclestone and Dennis Hayes. The authors, themselves drawing in some degree on the broader social critique advanced by Furedi (2004), claim that therapeutic education both reflects and exacerbates a profound crisis of meaning. Measures to address emotional literacy, inspired in part by the work of Daniel Goleman, as well as curriculum interventions to promote self-esteem, confidence-building, and stress-management, and to deal with the problems of bullying and harassment, have deflected education from schooling's proper concerns. They apply the label 'therapeutic education' to any activity that focuses on perceived emotional problems and aims to make educational content and learning processes more 'emotionally engaging', suggesting that this somewhat sentimental and partly tranquilising approach erodes faith in human potential, resilience, and capacity for autonomy. It replaces this faith with a cultural script that reinforces the sense of human beings as vulnerable and needing support so that 'appropriate' emotional responses can be engendered. That script has its characteristic lexicon of 'at-risk students', 'disaffected learners', 'fragile identities', and 'complex needs', with a growing catalogue of institutionalised classifications. This is a picture of human beings as diminished selves, in contrast with which a well-balanced self is posited. All this is an expression of cultural disillusionment with ideas about human potential, and it replaces real commitment to education with forms of social engineering.

Such a critique has much going for it, but it needs to be understood in relation to the problem of performativity. Performativity is manifested in part in terms of a concern with procedure over substance – itself a reflection of managerialist thinking (Standish 1999). The emptiness of this is sometimes not appreciated, partly because performativity can readily adopt a vocabulary of ‘standards’, where standards look like the hallmark of quality in education. But this is deeply deceptive. It is a further means by which educational policy and practice are deflected from their properly educational concerns, and, in a sense, it is an exemplification of the problem that MacIntyre diagnoses. In his Prologue to the 2007 edition of *After Virtue*, he writes:

My explanation was and is that the precepts that are thus uttered were once at home in, and intelligible in terms of, a context of practical beliefs and of supporting habits of thought, feeling, and action, a context that has since been lost, a context in which moral judgments were understood as governed by impersonal standards justified by a shared conception of the human good. (MacIntyre 2007, p. ix)

MacIntyre is writing explicitly about matters of morality, but morality and virtue are not to be understood in narrow terms. The good of education falls within their range. The questions of what it is to be educated and what it is to live well cannot otherwise be appropriately addressed. So the parallel to be drawn is that terms such as ‘standards’ and ‘quality’ have become shadows of what they once were. In MacIntyre’s terms, they have become hollow because they are no longer embedded in the kinds of contexts of practical belief and action that gave them meaning. In Nietzsche’s, as we saw, the higher values have devalued themselves: church attendance and expressions of belief had become a matter of keeping up bourgeois appearances, and this was why God was dead. Beyond these terms, however, it is also appropriate to acknowledge the particular forms that the dominance of risk-averse technical rationality takes where the culture of accountability prides itself on ‘data-rich’ practices sustained by computing (see Blake et al. 2000). This is a further channelling and perversion of the discursive force of these words.

In a number of texts, Paul Smeyers, Richard Smith, and Paul Standish have taken these matters on, while their *The Therapy of Education* (2006) turns explicitly to the confluence of these factors with new manifestations and new understandings of therapy and education. Similarly, Ruth Cigman and Andrew Davis’ collection *New Philosophies of Learning* (2009) takes up related topics and helps to cast light on specifically pedagogical developments. In a different idiom, the journalist Julie Burchill once remarked that counselling is the opposite of socialism,<sup>2</sup> a remark that might suggest that the culture of therapy has involved a new delineation of the public and the private, and in effect a privatisation of emotion – a privatisation that has more to do with a reduction of the public sphere than with a genuine respect for privacy, as confessional television shows such as *Oprah Winfrey* or *Dr Phil* make abundantly clear.

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<sup>2</sup>Burchill writes: “Counselling is the exact opposite of socialism; no wonder it started to be so eagerly proffered by every last agent of social control just at the same time as union rights were being destroyed” (Burchill 2001).

But the interweaving of therapy and philosophy has ancient roots, as is indicated most obviously in Socrates' expression 'care of the self', found especially in the *Alcibiades* and the *Apology*, where philosophy is understood fundamentally as a working on oneself. There are lines of thought that lead from this in the direction of stoicism and the steadying of desire and emotion. But other directions of thought – closer to Socrates' articulation of the idea – focus on the supreme importance of personal engagement, in forms of moral perfectionism that bring together the good of the person and the society in recognition of the fact that, as is said in *The Republic*, our city is a city of words. It goes without saying that, in the course of more than two millennia, the sense of the concepts of philosophy, therapy, and education, as well as of their mutual relationship, has shifted. An outstanding guide to these changes is provided by the late series of lectures that Michel Foucault gave at the Collège de France in 1981–1982 (Foucault 2005). His discussion in the course of these lectures is lengthy, detailed, and highly insightful, and it is impossible here to do justice to its complexity. But it will be worth attending to aspects of his discussion.

The Greek phrase, *epimeleia heautou*, around which Foucault's exploration revolves, is translated as 'the care of the self', and – with reference to Plato's *Alcibiades* in particular – he shows this to be "the justificatory framework, ground, and foundation for the imperative 'know yourself'" (*gnothi seauton*) (p. 8). This is to make connections from the start between subjectivity and the nature of access to the truth, in respect of not only self-knowledge but knowledge of things in general. Foucault phrases the central problem in pointedly first-person terms: "What is the price I have to pay for access to the truth, what fashioning of myself must I undertake, what modifications of being must I carry out to be able to have access to the truth?" (p. 189). He gives much attention to the problematic reflexivity of the ideas of self-knowledge and care of the self, where the self seems to occupy both subject and object positions, and this raises questions about both what the self is and what it is to know something. In the Greek literature, the self is to be understood as the soul, and the soul is seen less as some kind of ethereal substance than as a capacity and responsibility for action; but neither is the soul reducible to the body, for the "soul, the breath, is something that can be disturbed and over which the outside can exercise a hold" (p. 47). With regard to what we do and say, Foucault writes: "the subject of all these bodily, instrumental, and linguistic actions is the soul" (p. 55). But he immediately questions the idea of instrumentality here on the grounds that the subject that 'uses' that body is already embodied in and partly constituted by that body.

A further important factor here is that in Socrates' thinking this responsibility is tied to membership of the *polis*, the meaning of a human life being inevitably dependent in some significant degree upon its part in this wider society. Yet this is far from a recipe for conformism, as Socrates' own life and death demonstrate in a supreme way. In the writings of the post-Socratic philosophers and in those of the Roman world, there is, by contrast, a growing sense of the care of the self as something that may be separated from direct dependence on the concerns of the community. The 'therapy of desire', to borrow the phrase that is the title of Martha Nussbaum's celebrated book (Nussbaum 1994), invites thought of a life of something more like self-containment, through which one's responsibility would lead one to avoid the

mistakes that others make in various forms of excess and bad judgement: it would involve a kind of resistance against the pressures to be drawn into problems, or otherwise to distort oneself, that one faces from society or as a result of the excitation of unruly desires. What is achieved thereby is a kind of self-sufficiency, in the sense not of the independent autonomous person, an ideal more familiar today, but rather of someone whose self-containment is manifested in a kind of stillness or steadiness in themselves. One thing to notice is that such a relation to the self would not be narcissistic or purely egocentric in kind. Another, however, is that what is envisioned here is quite other than the self-renunciation that emerged with the advent of Christianity. It would enable one to find and to speak in one's own voice: the *parrhesia* that is thereby realised is a kind of frank speaking, where one is ready to expose oneself in conversation and dialogue, especially in circumstances of education.

With regard to the subject's relation to knowledge, it is worth considering also a change that comes especially with the modern world, for which it is convenient, although somewhat simplistic, to name the Cartesian revolution as a key turning point. For the pre-moderns, the knowing of something was not to be separated from the manner in which it was known: in other words, to come to know something was to be changed by it – not in the minimal and trivial sense that this was an increment to the existing sum of what one knew, but in that one was affected somehow in one's soul. In the modern period, with the new prominence and prowess of scientific knowledge, there is a severing of this relationship: in philosophy, this is exemplified by epistemology's focus on the calculus of truth conditions, while in popular experience, it is figured powerfully in the technology of the computer with its indifference to the data it processes. Now it is certainly true that the knower should care about 'getting it right' – that is, care about accuracy – but this is sometimes cast in terms of qualities such as independence, detachment, and 'objectivity', all of which tend to muffle or downgrade the significance of the ways that the learner is affected. This separation turns subject-object relations into a dichotomy understood in metaphysical terms, and this gains a hold on the way we think.

All this is crucial for education. In the pre-modern conception, as we saw, the self or soul was understood dynamically. The task was to find what you were about, and here the idea of an aim becomes pertinent. But this would not be an aim directed towards a fixed telos: it was rather a matter of finding out what it was that mattered to you, the principles according to which you might live. As in archery, such an aim was to be focused through a kind of steadying of thought where the siren voices of distraction were quietened and where you might attend to what it was that did matter; and, again as we saw, this would be a matter not of narcissistic self-regard but rather of attending to the way you saw the world and, that is, attending to the way that the world was. Foucault makes direct reference to the Japanese tradition of archery (*kyudo*), where the taking of aim involves a stilling and focusing in which the self is concentrated, body and soul (p. 222). The modern turn divides body and soul with the result that new therapies arise to put them back together again, but then with the danger that these therapies themselves become technical means to the overcoming of the problem, interventions whose very nature surreptitiously reinforces precisely the thing that they set out to correct.

The various lines of thought that have emerged in the present discussion can be brought together in terms of the relationships between the concepts in question – education, therapy, and philosophy – and different ways in which these relationships might be cast.

First, then, what happens if we see *education as therapy*? This may be to make the mistake of reducing education to the demands of socialisation, where the aim is acquiescence in the status quo. A way to understand this is to recognise therapy as a medicalised concept, where the aim is normal healthy functioning. Although there are differences of opinion about what constitutes normal healthy functioning, the differences here are relatively small in scale. Health is a contested topic, but it is far less a matter of controversy than what good education is. Differences do emerge where the stances of health professionals take an ideological turn, but for the most part there is tacit agreement about what constitutes normal healthy functioning. Understood on this model, then, education would seem to have ends that are relatively easily defined – in terms of fitness for society, conceived as a continuation of the status quo. One model here would be to take the natural child as standing in need of civilisation, a moulding of behaviour and character to fit existing roles. Another more sophisticated and more prevalent articulation of principles along these lines would be the identification of a clear and realisable conception of the good life, understood in terms of wellbeing. This would provide the substance of the good life, including good physical and psychological health, for which the child should be prepared.

Such ways of thinking have their attractions, but the main problem with them is that they may stand in the way of the realisation of fundamentally important aspects of human life and education. What may be more important is the adjustment of the learner to possibilities yet to come and as yet unforeseen. This is not just to ready the learner for the natural contingencies that they may in the future confront. Rather it is to recognise that they are agents of that future, with the capacity to shape it in original ways. As, in 1954, Hannah Arendt writes in ‘The Crisis in Education’, “Basically we are always educating for a world that is or is becoming out of joint, for this is the basic human situation, in which the world is created by mortal hands to serve mortals for a limited time as home” (Arendt 1977, p. 192). When she refers to the ‘natality’ of the child, she is stressing this newness that each child brings to the world. We do not know what the child will do or where their life will lead, other than that we know that it will be unique. This is not an added complication in the rearing of the young; it is the very means through which a new world can come into being, a new society be developed – and this will perforce be dynamic and ongoing in kind. To think this way is to conceive the aims of education as open – that is, as not reducible to tidy formulation in a manner that can simply be cashed in terms of a checklist for the good life and any tidy set of learning outcomes. It is to think of the aims of education more in terms of a steadying of experience in which what matters can come better into view, where the ways the student is affected by what they come to know are of paramount importance.

Second, what sense might there be in the idea of *philosophy as therapy*? Most obviously, this would be to endorse a line of thinking associated especially with the

later Wittgenstein, where the task is to dispel false theorisations and to resist the kinds of questions that might lead us into talking nonsense. Wittgenstein's images for this are compelling, and the following passage from the *Philosophical Investigations* is particularly instructive:

For the clarity that we are aiming at is indeed *complete* clarity. But this simply means that the philosophical problems should *completely* disappear.

The real discovery is the one that makes me capable of stopping doing philosophy when I want to. – The one that gives philosophy peace, so that it is no longer tormented by questions which bring *itself* in question. Instead we now demonstrate a method, by examples; and the series of examples can be broken off. – Problems are solved (difficulties eliminated), not a *single* problem.

There is not a philosophical method, though there are indeed methods, like different therapies. (Wittgenstein 1953, #133)

This explicit connection of philosophy with therapy is followed later in the text, and elsewhere in Wittgenstein's work, by many expressions that are peculiarly evocative of the difficulties in thinking that we get into – expressions that are themselves therapeutic in the release they provide from this. Thus, "What is your aim in philosophy? To shew the fly the way out of the fly-bottle" (#309). Or later the parenthetic comment: "(A whole cloud of philosophy condensed into a drop of grammar)" (p. 189).

Wittgenstein is critical of philosophy itself in that it has sometimes tied thinking up in theoretical knots, where those knots are harder to untie than they were to tie in the first place. And on the whole he is suspicious, notoriously so perhaps, of the 'young science' of psychology. In psychology, he writes, "The existence of the experimental makes us think we have the means of solving the problems which trouble us; though problem and method pass one another by" (p. 197). If this remark is taken in combination with those quoted above, it can readily be imagined that Wittgenstein would have been opposed to contemporary systematic approaches to curriculum planning and assessment, and to the conceptualisation of stages of development, as ideas that hold us captive (#115). In the face of such temptations of thought, Wittgenstein's advice is recurrently "don't think, but look!" (#66).

The so-called therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein takes the remarks above very much as its guide, combining these with the thought expressed in the earlier text, the *Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus*, that sometimes our thinking involves ascending a ladder but that the ladder can be kicked away once we have reached the top: this can be done because, from this new vantage point, we can now recognise that the questions we have been asking in making the ascent are in fact nonsensical (Wittgenstein 1922, 6.54). Therapeutic reading of Wittgenstein displays an aversion to any kind of questioning for which it is not clear what would count as an answer and, thus, a desire to expunge any inclination to run up against the limits of language. Yet there are aspects of Wittgenstein's writings that pull against this. Consider the following remarks, made by Wittgenstein in 1929:

I can very well think what Heidegger meant about Being and Angst. Man has the drive to run up against the boundaries of language. Think, for instance, of the astonishment that anything exists [*das etwas existiert*]. *This astonishment cannot be expressed in the form of*



*a question*, and there is also no answer to it. All that we can say can only, *a priori*, be nonsense. Nevertheless we run up against the boundaries of language. Kierkegaard also saw this running-up and similarly pointed it out (as running up against the paradox)... But the tendency to run up against *shows something*. The holy Augustine already knew this when he said: "What, you scoundrel, you would speak no nonsense? Go ahead and speak nonsense – it doesn't matter!" (Wittgenstein 1930, p. 68)

There is no doubt that his thinking changed in the decades that followed. Yet there is also reason to believe that he continued to hold to something like this. Why else, in his later writings, did he let the fly out of the fly-bottle only to let it back in again? Why does he lead the reader to a state of peace only to disturb that peace again, almost compulsively, so it seems? What seems likely is that there is in Wittgenstein a recognition of the fact that the human being has the tendency to call its own nature, its own circumstances, into question, and recurrently to be troubled by this, and that this is a tendency he continues to respect. This would be to take his later writings – with their multiple voices, parenthetical asides, and the dialogical play of pondering, faltering, and assertive remarks – as a dramatic expression of the human condition. If this is right, if, that is, this disturbance is part of the reality of the human condition, there is further reason to contest the over-systematised, risk-averse approach to the curriculum manifested in performativity and managerialism, as well as the over-determination found in some contemporary specifications of the aims and objectives of education.

Third, in what sense might we think of *therapy as education*? Stepping outside schools and other educational institutions, we can ask in what ways therapeutic practices might themselves be rightly understood as educational? Might it be that the best therapy involves a kind of education? To the extent that this is the case, it would suggest, amongst other things, that – across a wide range of cases – such therapeutic approaches as cognitive behavioural therapy and, for that matter, primarily drug-based treatment cannot be enough and that they may not be appropriate at all. It might suggest a need also not for looking into oneself but rather for turning outwards in a new way. This brings us back to what was said earlier about the idea of the care of the self in late antiquity: that it involved an attention to things in order to discover how one stood in relation to them, what mattered, and how this might affect one's life. All this was to be understood as dynamic, as to be realised in action; and, in the context of progressive awareness of one's aim or principle, one was to live in a steady orientation governed by this. One consequence of these thoughts is that the best therapy and the best prevention of illness may be provided by good education! It is in relation to such a thought that the present discussion will end.

Before this, however, it is worth considering one further pairing, a fourth, and this is to be found in the idea of *philosophy as education*. In the contemporary academy, the idea of philosophy as a science has considerable influence, and this is a conceptualisation that seems to legitimate a semi-technical approach across significant stretches of the discipline. It often generates the kind of theorisation that Wittgenstein came to disparage, and certainly there have been many leading philosophers who have been at odds with such a conception. But for present purposes, the contrast to be drawn is not to be achieved just by reclaiming the subject as one



of the humanities, especially at a time when the humanities have themselves sometimes been colonised by more technical methodologies and theoretical perspectives. The particular emphasis that is needed is on the importance of the subjectivity of the learner to what comes to be known, where this involves attention to what the content of study presents and acknowledgement of the necessity and importance of the learner's response. As we saw before, this is not only a matter of how much the learner has understood but of how far she is affected by what she has learned, how far this strengthens or refines her sense of what matters to her and why.

The present discussion has progressively intimated the importance of the humanities in education, as the prime, though by no means the exclusive, arena within which this outward-turning concern with what one learns and where one stands takes place. That this will be agonistic should be clear enough, as should the fact that it will involve negative experience. As we saw earlier, in a culture of achievement couched in reductive terms of assessment and dominated by performativity, there is a denial of such experience. This makes it impossible for students, as well as for those who teach them, to acknowledge ways in which things do not go well in the course of a human life. This effects a repression, the harmful consequences of which therapy is expected to address. But the pathology is not the preserve of just a few unfortunate individuals: it seeps into people's lives in ways that can pass unnoticed, hidden behind a veneer that is polished rather than scratched by the culture of transparency and student satisfaction.

Re-engagement with the humanities – taught in ways that open up possibilities for self-examination and struggle, as well as for a steady and growing confidence in where one is in relation to what one learns – offers the most obvious, though not the only, way in which education might be realised. It is through this also that its relations with philosophy and therapy might be better understood.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>3</sup> Suzy Harris is thanked for comments on a draft of this paper.

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# Creationism and Intelligent Design



Michael J. Reiss

## The Importance of Creationism and Intelligent Design for Schools

Creationism and intelligent design raise issues for education that are both conceptually interesting and practically important. These issues include how we arrive at reliable knowledge, what the aims of schooling are (or should be), and how schools should deal with controversial or sensitive issues.

Creationism exists in a number of different versions but, depending on the country, from as few as 5% to over 50% of adults reject the theory of evolution. Instead, they believe that the Earth came into existence as described by a literal (fundamentalist) reading of the early parts of the Bible, the Qu’ran or other scriptures and that the most that evolution has done is to change species into related species (Miller et al. 2006; Reiss 2011). For a creationist it is possible, for example, that the various species of squirrels had a common ancestor, but this is not the case for the various species of squirrels, gazelles and cats – still less for monkeys and humans, for birds and reptiles or for the blue whale and the banana (Reiss 2011).

Allied to creationism is the theory of intelligent design. While many of those who advocate intelligent design have been involved in the creationism movement, to the extent that the US courts have argued that the country’s First Amendment separation of religion and the State precludes its teaching in public schools (Moore 2007), intelligent design can claim to be a theory that simply critiques evolutionary biology rather than advocating or requiring religious faith. Those who promote intelligent design typically, but not always, come from a conservative faith-based position. However, in their arguments, they make no reference to the scriptures or a deity but argue that the intricacy of what we see in the natural world, including at a

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sub-cellular level, provides strong evidence for the existence of an intelligence behind this (e.g., Behe 1996; Dembski 1998; Johnson 1999). Natural selection, acting on its own from inorganic precursors, is held to be inadequate.

Until fairly recently, little attention has been paid in the school classroom or the philosophy of education literature to creationism and almost none to intelligent design. However, creationism and intelligent design appear to be on the increase, and there are indications that there are more countries in which schools are becoming battlegrounds for the issue. For example, while the USA has had several decades of legal battles about the place of creationism and (more recently) intelligent design in schools (Moore 2007), school-based conflicts over these issues are becoming more frequent in a range of other countries (Graebisch and Schiermeier 2006; Blancke et al. 2014). There was consternation in the UK science education community when, in December 2009, many secondary school and higher education libraries received a complimentary copy of the book by Stephen Meyer et al. titled *Explore Evolution*, which, in the words of its website, sets out:

to examine the scientific controversy about Darwin's theory, and in particular, the contemporary version of the theory known as neo-Darwinism. Whether you are a teacher, a student, or a parent, this book will help you understand what Darwin's theory of evolution is, why many scientists find it persuasive, and why other scientists question the theory or some key aspects of it.<sup>1</sup>

Such events have led to a growth in the educational literature examining creationism and/or intelligent design (Jones and Reiss 2007; Williams 2008; Laats and Siegel 2016).

The school classroom, of course, is not the only place where creationism and intelligent might be addressed. There are the beginnings of a literature on the way that natural history and other museums present the issue of evolution (Bennett 2004; Scott 2007; Trollinger and Trollinger 2016), and many of us also learn about evolution, creationism and intelligent design through radio and TV programmes, by reading popular science books and by other means. Nevertheless, there is a particular need to address the issue of whether, and if so how, schools might address the issue of creationism, particularly for the age range of students for whom education is mandatory.

## **Are Creationism and Intelligent Design Controversial Issues?**

It may seem somewhat surprising to ask if creationism and intelligent design are controversial issues given the furore that regularly surrounds them in many countries in the courts, in the media and in schools, but the answer is a useful one because there is a considerable literature on how controversial issues might be addressed in

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<sup>1</sup>[http://www.exploreevolution.com/about\\_the\\_book.php](http://www.exploreevolution.com/about_the_book.php)

education. Much of the recent academic literature in education on controversial issues hinges on the work of Robert Dearden (1981/1984).

After, somewhat uncontroversially, rejecting logical positivism as a basis for curriculum design, Dearden points out that “what is ‘controversial’ may itself be a matter of controversy” (Dearden 1981/1984: 85). He then goes on, as is well known, to propose an *epistemic* criterion of the controversial in which “a matter is controversial if contrary views can be held on it without those views being contrary to reason” (p. 86). He points out that several possible kinds of controversial issue may be distinguished: “cases where we simply have insufficient evidence to settle the matter, though in principle there is no reason why it should not be settled as more or better evidence becomes available” (*ibid.*); “where consideration-making criteria are agreed but the weight to be given them is not” (*ibid.*); “where there is no agreement even on the criteria as to what will count” (*ibid.*) and, finally, “where not just individual criteria but whole frameworks of understanding are different” (p. 87). This fourfold categorisation has been valuably extended with specific reference to the teaching of controversial issues in school science by Ralph Levinson (2006).

However, Dearden’s epistemic criterion of the controversial is not the only one. Indeed, standard works on the teaching of controversial issues (e.g., Wellington 1986; Claire and Holden 2007; Hess 2009) provide broader, often fuzzier, definitions. Here, for instance, is one from the opening chapter of *The Challenge of Teaching Controversial Issues*:

In general terms a controversial issue is one in which

- the subject/area is of topical interest
- there are conflicting values and opinions
- there are conflicting priorities and material interests
- emotions may become strongly aroused
- the subject/area is complex. (Claire and Holden 2007: 5–6)

There is, of course, a long tradition of writing in education on controversial issues and examining precisely what it is that makes an issue controversial (e.g., Stradling 1984; Bridges 1986; McLaughlin 2003). Michael Hand (2008) has defended and extended Dearden’s epistemic criterion. There is much in Hand’s position that is attractive. He argues that “What distinguishes teaching-as-settled from teaching-as-controversial (or directive from nondirective teaching) is not a pedagogical method or style, but the willingness of the teacher to endorse one view on a matter as the right one” (Hand 2008: 213) and points out that “The English word ‘controversial’ means simply ‘disputed’, and the existence of dispute is an unpromising criterion for what should be taught nondirectively” (p. 214). Hand then proceeds to critique curriculum materials, even guides, that take too broad a view of ‘controversy’. For example, he points out topics such as bullying and racism are frequently described as controversial which hardly fits with standard advice given in such material and guides that teachers should teach controversial issues in a balanced manner, giving equal weight to opposing views.

And yet I am not entirely persuaded by Hand's arguments (Reiss 2011). He relies on the premise that "that the central aim of education is to equip students with a capacity for, and inclination to, rational thought and action" (p. 218). This seems to me quite a narrow view. I cannot here review all the arguments as to the aims of education (cf. Marples 1999) but Hand seems to privilege rationality. With John White, I prefer an emphasis on human flourishing (Reiss and White 2013). In any event, unless one is prepared to define 'controversy' at a particular moment in time and place in space and for a particular audience, it is clear that any attempt simply to divide issues into 'controversial' and 'non-controversial' is unlikely to succeed for all but the most mundane points of possible contention: there are degrees of controversy and, as Hand and many others acknowledge, what is controversial for one group may not be controversial for another. Indeed, creationism provides a useful illustration of this point as it is controversial neither for scientists nor for creationists – though for opposing reasons.

The scientific understanding of biodiversity is far from complete but the narrative is a powerful one. By 3.5 billion years ago, probably earlier, life had evolved on Earth. By the time of the earliest fossils, life was unicellular and bacteria-like. Over the next three and a half billion years, the workings of natural selection, possibly aided by other mechanisms (genetic drift, etc.), eventually resulted in the ten million or so species, including our own, that we find today.

The scientific worldview is materialistic in the sense that it is neither idealistic nor admits of non-physical explanations (here, 'physical' includes such things as energy and the curvature of space as well as matter). There is much that remains unknown about evolution. How did the earliest self-replicating molecules arise? What caused membranes to exist? How key were the earliest physical conditions – temperature, the occurrence of water and so forth? But the scientific presumption is that these questions will either be answered by science or remain unknown. Although some scientists might (sometimes grudgingly) admit that science cannot disprove supernatural explanations, scientists do not employ such explanations in their work (the tiny handful of seeming exceptions only attest to the strength of the general rule).

Whereas there is only one mainstream scientific understanding of biodiversity, there are a considerable number of religious ones. Many religious believers are perfectly comfortable with the scientific understanding, either on its own or accompanied by a belief that evolution in some sense takes place within God's holding, whether or not God is presumed to have intervened or acted providentially at certain key points (e.g., the origin of life or the evolution of humans). But many other religious believers adopt a more creationist perspective or that of intelligent design (Reiss 2008a).

Most of the literature on creationism (and/or intelligent design) and evolutionary theory puts them in stark opposition. Evolution is consistently presented in creationist books and articles as illogical (e.g., natural selection cannot, on account of the second law of thermodynamics, create order out of disorder; mutations are always deleterious and so cannot lead to improvements), contradicted by the scientific evidence (e.g., the fossil record shows human footprints alongside animals supposed by

evolutionists to be long extinct; the fossil record does not provide evidence for transitional forms), the product of non-scientific reasoning (e.g., the early history of life would require life to arise from inorganic matter – a form of spontaneous generation rejected by science in the nineteenth century; radioactive dating makes assumptions about the constancy of natural processes over aeons of time, whereas we increasingly know of natural processes that affect the rate of radioactive decay), the product of those who ridicule the word of God, and a cause of a whole range of social evils (from eugenics, Marxism, Nazism and racism to juvenile delinquency) – e.g., Baker (2003), Parker (2006) and articles too many to mention in the journals and other publications of such organisations as Answers in Genesis, the Biblical Creation Society, the Creation Science Movement and the Institute for Creation Research.

By and large, creationism has received similarly short shrift from those who accept the theory of evolution. In a fairly early study, the philosopher of science Philip Kitcher argued that “in attacking the methods of evolutionary biology, Creationists are actually criticizing methods that are used throughout science” (Kitcher 1983: 4–5). Kitcher concluded that the flat-earth theory, the chemistry of the four elements, and mediaeval astrology “have just as much claim to rival current scientific views as Creationism does to challenge evolutionary biology” (p. 5).

Many scientists have defended evolutionary biology from creationism (Selkirk and Burows 1987; Good et al. 1992; Interacademy Panel on International Issues 2006). The main points that are frequently made are that evolutionary biology is good science since not all science consists of controlled experiments where the results can be collected within a short period of time; that creationism (including ‘scientific creationism’) isn’t really a science in that its ultimate authority is scriptural and theological rather than the evidence obtained from the natural world; and that an acceptance of evolution is fully compatible with a religious faith.

## Worldviews

In *World Views: From fragmentation to integration*, Diederik Aerts et al. (1994) write: “A world view is a coherent collection of concepts and theorems that must allow us to construct a global image of the world, and in this way to understand as many elements of our experience as possible” (p. 17). Of course, this does not mean that a worldview is correct; indeed, alternate worldviews are not infrequently incommensurate. In science education the notion of worldviews (whether one word or two) is increasingly being employed. For example, in the edited volume *Science, Worldviews and Education* (Matthews 2009), a number of philosophers, scientists and science educators use the thinking behind worldviews to explore a range of issues including whether science itself is a worldview and whether science can test supernatural worldviews.

I aim to explicate the notion of ‘worldviews’ in the context of creationism and intelligent design by considering the film *March of the Penguins* (Reiss 2009). *March of the Penguins* is a 2005 National Geographic feature film. It runs for



approximately 85 min and has been an exceptional success. It won an Academy Award in 2006 for Best Documentary Feature and has been the most financially successful nature film in American motion picture history. The reasons for its success are no doubt several: the photography is phenomenal; the emperor penguin's story is extraordinary; the adults are elegant; the chicks are irredeemably cute as they look fluffy, feebly wave their little wings and learn to walk; the way in which the birds survive the Antarctic winter is awesome; the plaintive cries of mothers who lose their chicks in snow storms are heartrending. But one perhaps unexpected reason is that the film has been a great success among the Christian right.

For example, if one enters “march of the penguins” Christian’ into Google, at the time of writing (24 April 2017) one finds 187,000 hits. Third of these is a review of the film by Mari Helms (n.d.) on [ChristianAnswers.Net](http://ChristianAnswers.Net), which describes itself as “a mega-site providing biblical answers to contemporary questions for all ages and nationalities with over 45-thousand files” (<http://christiananswers.net/>). After a fairly detailed summary of the subject matter of the film, the review goes on to discuss the lessons that the film has to teach about love, perseverance, the existence of God and friendship/commraderie (sic). An extended quotation from the review illustrates the presuppositions of the author:

‘March of the Penguins’ has lessons to teach about:

‘LOVE’: According to the film, the penguins take this tremendous journey for ‘love’ and to find a mate and reproduce. The dedication, cooperation, and affection are exemplary between the pair.

PERSEVERANCE: We could learn a lot about perseverance from Emperor penguins. I was quickly reminded of the [ant](#) in Proverbs 6:7–8 “It has no commander, overseer or ruler, yet it stores its provisions in summer and gathers its food at harvest.” No one is reminding these penguins what to do; they know what to do, and they do it. They are prepared, persistent and committed, much like we are called to be as [witnesses](#) for [Jesus Christ](#). 1 Peter 4:15 “Always be prepared to give an answer to everyone who asks you to give the reason for the hope that you have.”

The penguins endure treacherous conditions, yet they continue on their journey, focusing on what lies ahead (new life). It may be a bit of a stretch, but I thought of what we, as Christians have to endure to get what lies ahead for us ([eternal life](#)). Philippians 3:14 “I press on toward the goal to win the prize for which God has called me heavenward in Christ Jesus.”

THE EXISTENCE OF GOD: One year in the life of an Emperor penguin is a great indication of the existence and character of God. Romans 1:20 “For since the creation of the world God’s invisible qualities – his eternal power and divine nature – have been clearly seen, being understood from what has been made, so that men are without excuse.” He is absolutely perfect! Every detail has been taken into account, and every provision has been made. Witnessing all the love and care that He must have put into creating the penguins is small compared to what He put into creating us. Matthew 6:26 “Look at the birds of the air; they do not sow or reap or store away in barns, and yet your heavenly Father feeds them. Are you not much more valuable than they?” Leaving the theater, I was more in awe and in love with my [Creator](#). (Helms n.d.)

The reason for this long quotation is not to subject it to theological or scientific critique – which would be easy. Rather, the value of the quotation is that in the widely used fourfold framework of Ian Barbour (1990), who explores how science

and religion can be understood to relate, it manifests an integrated relationship (as opposed to one of conflict, of independence or of dialogue). The worldview is one in which it is straightforward to read from penguin behaviour to human behaviour though it is worth noting that the argument is neither entirely anthropomorphic (where non-human behaviour is interpreted as if it was the behaviour of humans) nor one in which the natural world is seen as *the* source of instruction as to how humans should behave. Rather, it is scripture that has primacy; the natural world is held up not so much as a model for us to imitate but as an illustration of how the natural world can manifest that which God wishes for humanity.

The ‘worldviews’ perspective on creationism is useful for two reasons: first it indicates the difficulty of using the criterion of ‘reason’ to decide whether an issue is controversial or not since, without embracing epistemological relativism, it highlights the importance of perspective in these matters – for many people, the position from which one can view dispassionately is so distant that one cannot from there see in much detail. Secondly, as I shall go on to argue, it suggests that standard ways of addressing the diversity of student views in a science classroom may be inadequate.

## **Dealing with Creationism and Intelligent Design in the Secondary Science Classroom**

Few countries have produced explicit guidance as to how schools might deal with the issues of creationism or intelligent design in the science classroom. Indeed, the government production of such guidance raises issues about the extent to which it is appropriate for the state to propose or even enforce a common view on such issues as opposed to allowing decisions to be made at more local levels, whether by school boards, parents, teachers or others.

One country that has produced such guidance is England. In the summer of 2007, after months of behind-the-scenes meetings and discussions, the then DCSF (Department of Children, Schools and Families) Guidance on Creationism and Intelligent Design received Ministerial approval and was published (DCSF 2007). The Guidance points out that the use of the word ‘theory’ in science (as in ‘the theory of evolution’) can mislead those not familiar with science as a subject discipline because it is different from the everyday meaning (i.e., of being little more than an idea). In science the word indicates that there is a substantial amount of supporting evidence, underpinned by principles and explanations accepted by the international scientific community. The Guidance goes on to state: “Creationism and intelligent design are sometimes claimed to be scientific theories. This is not the case as they have no underpinning scientific principles, or explanations, and are not accepted by the science community as a whole” (DCSF 2007). The Guidance then goes on to say:

Creationism and intelligent design are not part of the science National Curriculum programmes of study and should not be taught as science. However, there is a real difference between teaching ‘x’ and teaching *about* ‘x’. Any questions about creationism and intelligent design which arise in science lessons, for example as a result of media coverage, could provide the opportunity to explain or explore why they are not considered to be scientific theories and, in the right context, why evolution is considered to be a scientific theory. (DCSF 2007)

This seems to me a key point and one that is independent of country, whether or not a country permits the teaching of religion (as in the UK) or does not (as in France, Turkey and the USA). Many scientists, and some science educators, fear that consideration of creationism or intelligent design in a science classroom legitimises them. For example, the excellent book *Science, Evolution, and Creationism* published by the US National Academy of Sciences and Institute of Medicine asserts “The ideas offered by intelligent design creationists are not the products of scientific reasoning. Discussing these ideas in science classes would not be appropriate given their lack of scientific support” (National Academy of Sciences and Institute of Medicine 2008: 52).

As I have argued (Reiss 2008b), I agree with the first sentence of this quotation but disagree with the second. Just because something lacks scientific support doesn’t seem to me a sufficient reason to omit it from a science lesson. When I was taught physics at school, and taught it extremely well in my view, what I remember finding so impressive was that we could discuss almost anything providing we were prepared to defend our thinking in a way that admitted objective evidence and reasoned argument. Nancy Brickhouse and Will Letts (Brickhouse and Letts 1998) have argued that one of the central problems in science education is that science is often taught ‘dogmatically’. With particular reference to creationism they write:

Should student beliefs about creationism be addressed in the science curriculum? Is the dictum stated in the California’s *Science Frameworks* (California Department of Education 1990) that any student who brings up the matter of creationism is to be referred to a family member or member of the clergy a reasonable policy? We think not. Although we do not believe that what people call ‘creationist science’ is good science (nor do scientists), to place a gag order on teachers about the subject entirely seems counterproductive. Particularly in parts of the country where there are significant numbers of conservative religious people, ignoring students’ views about creationism because they do not quality as good science is insensitive at best. (Brickhouse and Letts 1998: 227)

More recently, Thomas Nagel (2008) has argued that so-called scientific reasons for excluding intelligent design (ID) from science lessons do not stand up to critical scrutiny (cf. Koperski 2008). With reference to the USA he concludes:

I understand the attitude that ID is just the latest manifestation of the fundamentalist threat, and that you have to stand and fight them here or you will end up having to fight for the right to teach evolution at all. However, I believe that both intellectually and constitutionally the line does not have to be drawn at this point, and that a noncommittal discussion of some of the issues would be preferable. (Nagel 2008: 205)

## Dealing with Creationism and Intelligent Design Elsewhere in the Curriculum

Of course, science lessons are not the only place where teaching about creationism and intelligent design might take place in the curriculum. One might also expect them to be addressed in religious education (RE) lessons, for countries that have such lessons. In England, the DCSF and QCA (Qualifications and Curriculum Authority) published a non-statutory national framework for RE and associated teaching units that include a unit asking “How can we answer questions about creation and origins?” (QCA 2006). The unit focuses on creation and the origins of the universe and human life, as well as the relationships between religion and science. A carefully written 23-page guide was produced. Along with its non-evaluative stance towards the various positions, what strikes me as a science educator is the high expectations of students it has. For example, in answer to the question “Is the universe designed? Who could have designed it?”, it is suggested that teachers of 13–14-year-olds should:

Give the pupils opportunities to explore, through a website, DVD or written text (see ‘Resources’), a range of different answers to these questions, including answers given by members of different faiths. These answers should include the views of creationists, evolutionists, advocates of intelligent design and philosophers of religion, such as Anselm, Thomas Aquinas, Blaise Pascal and Francis Bacon. (QCA 2006: 16)

We can note that this non-evaluative stance towards the various positions has taken place in a context where, since the late 1950s in England and Wales, advocates of religious education in schools have abandoned a form of religious education where the inculcation of Christianity was a central aim and in which Christianity was often presumed to be the sole framework within which life found meaning and moral direction. Nowadays a more pluralist vision is preferred (e.g., Jackson 2004) in which students are enabled to develop, clarify and refine their own views about matters religious. This is very different to the position in science where the presumption, whether implicit or stated, is nearly always that the scientific understanding of the world is either a valid one or the valid one.

Finally, I should note that the distinction between science lessons and religious education lessons, while it may hold at secondary level with subject-specific teaching rather breaks down at primary level where a pupil generally has the same teacher for most or all lessons. From an epistemological point of view this is both the strength and potential weakness of primary teaching. Teaching in the primary school has the potential to make links between subjects with greater ease than is generally the case at secondary school, precisely because the one teacher is responsible for such a diversity of subjects. At the same time, a primary teacher is unlikely to know each subject in as much depth as a secondary specialist, and therefore there is a greater likelihood that subject-specific differences may be elided. This suggests that it may be particularly important for primary teachers to be explicit as to whether they are helping their pupils to understand an issue from the perspective of science, of history, of religion or whatever.

## Discussion

Whatever the subject matter and age range of a class, and the country in which a teacher is teaching, there is much to be said for a teacher bearing in mind that for some students, evolution, creationism and intelligent design are likely to be sensitive issues. Rather less has been written in the philosophy of education literature about sensitive issues than about controversial ones. Death, sexuality, drugs policy and animal experimentation are examples of issues that are sensitive for many students, and many teachers are used to dealing respectfully with students when dealing with sensitive issues.

An advantage of shifting the discourse from controversy to sensitivity is that one shifts the focus from epistemology to pedagogy. One can be sensitive with someone in respect of an issue without implying that one shares the same perspective (or worldview) as the person to whom one is being respectful and considerate; different notions of respect are discussed by Rosenblith and Bindewald (2014) who “make a case for an approach to civic education in the public schools that is rooted in engagement” (p. 596). Explicitly accepting the teaching of evolution as controversial is difficult for many science teachers as the distinction between this and evolution as controversial is a fine one, and many science teachers are likely to see it as selling out to creationists (cf. Hermann 2008).

Of course, my suggestion that teaching in this field be considered akin to the teaching of traditional sensitive issues does not absolve teachers and relevant others such as curriculum designers and textbook authors (Williams 2008), whatever their specialisms, from having as good a knowledge of the issues as they can. Mary Midgley (2007) points out that there is much to be said in initial teacher education for bringing “together lecturers in science and in religious studies in pairs – of course after adequate training – and let them jointly teach classes that combine both sets of trainee teachers together” (p. 42). In my experience such joint teaching, though expensive and sometimes difficult to organise, can work well, so long as there is sufficient mutual trust between the lecturers.

In a school science lesson when teaching evolution there is much therefore to be said for allowing students to raise any doubts they have and doing one’s best in such circumstances to have a genuine scientific discussion about the issues raised. The word ‘genuine’ does not mean that creationism or intelligent design deserve equal time with evolution, nor does it mean that a science teacher should present creationism or intelligent design as valid alternative to the theory of evolution. It is perfectly appropriate for a science teacher to critique arguments for creationism or intelligent design that purport to be scientific. However, in certain classes, depending on the comfort of the teacher in dealing with such issues and the make-up of the student body, it can be appropriate to deal with these issues. If questions about the validity of evolution or issues about creationism and intelligent design arise during science lessons, they can be used to illustrate a number of aspects of how science works and how scientific knowledge is built up over time, while always being open to the possibility of refutation and change.

Having said that, teaching about evolution, creationism or intelligent design, in whatever lesson, is often not straightforward. Some students get very heated; others remain silent even if they disagree profoundly with what is said. We need to seriously and respectfully consider the concerns of students who do not accept the theory of evolution while still introducing them to it. There is much to be said for aiming to get students to understand rather than necessarily to believe or accept the theory of evolution (Smith and Siegel 2004; Reiss 2008b). While it is unlikely that even respectful teaching will help students who have a conflict between science and their religious beliefs to resolve the conflict, good science teaching can help students to manage it – and to learn more science (cf. Long 2011).

Creationism can profitably be seen not as a simple misconception that careful science teaching can correct, as careful science teaching might hope to persuade a student that an object continues at uniform velocity unless acted on by a net force, or that most of the mass of a plant comes from air. Rather, a student who believes in creationism can be seen as inhabiting a non-scientific worldview, that is a very different way of seeing the world.

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# Philosophical Questions and Opportunities at the Intersection of Neuroscience, Education, and Research



Clarence W. Joldersma

Neuroscience is a popular solution to a host of social problems, perhaps constituting a “neuromania” (Legrenzi et al. 2011). Education is an especially fertile ground for neuroscientific applications, for there are many who envision finally putting education on a firm scientific footing, a vision that has not been realized up to now. Neuroscience has all the trappings for such a footing: rivalled perhaps only by genetics, it has an immense authority in the popular imaginary, with flashy presentations in the media where alluring images of brains are used to point out crucial differences in everyday behaviors and traits. Previously, discoveries about how the brain operated were limited to what could be found through brain damage studies such as lesions and localized trauma, which typically brought to light very particular disabilities, a kind of subtractive approach. These were usually interpreted as evidence for correlations between local brain areas, particular mental functions, and visible abilities. However, noninvasive techniques to study the brain in action have given us many possibilities of going beyond those earlier limitations. These techniques, which typically involve producing brain images, go by a variety of acronyms including PET, SPECT, MRI, and fMRI. Recent improvements in such techniques have made neuroscience alluring not only for the general public but also for educators. It is very tempting to assume that the noninvasive approaches to localized brain functions give us direct access to particular mental activities, including learning.

Neuroscience’s popularity and authority combine to give it great cachet in its application to educational research and practice, a field that often struggles with issues of legitimacy and expertise. There are many books for the K-12 teachers by popular enthusiasts (e.g. Jensen 2008; Wolfe 2010), which spell out “brain-based” teaching methods and learning strategies, ardently suggesting that neuroscience will

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finally give educators effective teaching approaches. There are also more nuanced, scholarly books advocating neuroscience-based educational practices (e.g. Geake 2009; Sousa 2010), whose assumption, likewise, is that education ought to use evidence-based methods. Philosophers of education have noted that these approaches are typically rooted in cognitive science, and thus already interpret education as applied psychology (Smeyers 2016b). Understanding education as applied psychology can easily incorporate neuroscience and thus would have a natural propensity to view education as an application of neuroscientific discoveries. On this model, education amounts to an applied science, which might be called evidence-based learning (Carew and Magsamen 2010). Perhaps in part because of its continuation of the psychological model, neuroeducation does not typically address philosophical issues around the intersections between neuroscience and education.

This gives philosophers opportunity to develop thoughtful, incisive appraisals of neuroscience in its connection to educational research and practice. Jan Slaby has suggested that neuroscience can be doubly fascinating for philosophers, for on the one hand the brain is the zone where “matter meets mind” (subjectivity, consciousness, learning, memory, agency) while on the other the brain is one of the “last true frontiers of science” (with possibilities of novel discoveries and breakthrough technologies) (Slaby 2015). This is particularly true for educational philosophers. Certainly the topics of memory, learning and agency are central in education, and could profit from continued philosophical attention. Indeed, there is now a nascent interest by philosophers of education in the intersection of neuroscience and education (e.g. Joldersma 2016c). This chapter surveys the current work in this area by philosophers of education, and suggests directions for further research. The survey includes ongoing philosophical critique of the ways that neuroscience is positioned and applied in education, while also incorporating scholarship that asks new philosophical questions at this intersection.

## **Philosophy of Education’s Critique of Neuroscience and Neuroeducation**

Although some philosophers of education might be leery of engaging with empirical research in their scholarship, there is often something to be gained in interacting with empirical studies. There are already numerous examples of philosophers of education engaging with, and *doing*, empirical research (Wilson and Santoro 2015). This includes for example Amy Shuffelton’s arguments against a certain conception of poverty and cultural interventions (Shuffelton 2013) and Walter Feinberg’s research in faith-based and public schools addressing religious belief in a democracy (Feinberg 2006; Feinberg and Layton 2014). Conceptualizing the engagement with empirical research has varied, including seeing it at a *midpoint* on a continuum (Golding 2015) or a *fusion* between the philosophical and empirical investigations (Hansen et al. 2015). However, perhaps more fruitful for understanding philosophy’s

engagement with neuroscience is Claudia Ruitenberg's suggestion that "other educational research can provide philosophy of education with phenomena—and knowledge of phenomena—to think *about*, to ask questions *about*" (2014, p. 90). This takes us beyond a mere fusion or a location on a continuum, to a particular *reason* for the engagement. Gert Biesta and Michael Peters argue that a central task of philosophy of education is to "expose and criticise often hidden assumptions and dynamics that are often presented and understood by researchers and policy makers as benign and as orientated towards the improvement of education..." (Biesta and Peters 2015, pp. 620–621). Ruitenberg's suggestion gives this task another content area for such questions, namely, phenomena outside of philosophy of education as such. These philosophical questions can bring to the foreground ways such assumptions and dynamics might play out. Philosophy of education thus has the unique task of asking *philosophical* questions about the empirical research around the nexus of neuroscience, education, and research.

### ***Questioning Frameworks for Simplistic Claims, Neuromyths, and Commercializations***

Educational philosophers are well positioned to ask philosophical questions of neuroscience, both as a science and in its so-called application to education. As a science, neuroscience's findings are illuminated through certain concepts (e.g. levels of explanation, neuron doctrine, cause-effect, appearance-reality, subjective-objective, computational model), highlighting particular dimensions while hiding others from view, thus creating potential distortions in our understandings even as it reveals other truths. This gives philosophers of education something substantive to question, highlighting problematic conceptualizations and simplistic applications, including how uncritical assumptions create problems in neuroscience's application to education. In this section I examine some of the ways in which philosophy of education has developed critiques of neuroscience, including its application to education, and I suggest directions for further work.

One area is that of misleading and simplistic claims about neuroscience for education. There is already much helpful educational literature involving warnings about this, typically tackling the misleading nature of neuromyths and the exaggerated claims of brain-based commercial products. Neuromyths are claims about the efficacy of ways of learning or teaching that are, at best, *loosely* based on neuroscientific research and evidence about the way the brain is involved (Pasquinelli 2012; Tardif et al. 2015). Although often debunked, neuromyths remain a central issue in neuroscience and education, and likely will not be going away soon; for example, a recent study showed that teachers believed in about half of the popular neuromyths (Dekker et al. 2012; see also Willis 2015). Geake (2008) lists examples, including "we use only 10% of our brains", the idea of multiple intelligences, the idea of general brain exercises; the existence of "left- and right-brain learners", that there

are “visual, auditory, kinaesthetic (VAK) learning styles”, and “drinking water enhances learning”, Dekker et al. list several more neuromyths, including “children are less attentive after consuming sugary drinks”, “fatty acid supplements have a positive effect on academic achievement”, “exercises that rehearse co-ordination of motor-perception skills can improve literary skills”, “short bouts of co-ordination exercises can improve integration of left and right hemispheric brain function”, “there are critical periods in childhood after which certain things can no longer be learned”, “extended rehearsal of some mental processes can change the shape and structure of some parts of the brain” (2012, p. 4). Beyond neuromyths, there are also a host of commercial products that claim the attention of educators. Brain-training products and organizations such as *LearingRx*, *CogMed*, and *Lumosity* often use computer-based activities to achieve brain improvement and enhancement. They typically legitimize their claims with appeals to brain plasticity research, suggesting that their activities enhance strategic neurological pathways for cognitive functions such as attention and memory (see Hurley 2012). Some commercial curricula and teaching guides are geared specifically toward educators, including *Brain Targeted Teaching*, *Fast ForWord*®, and *MindUP* (Busso and Pollack 2015). Fortunately, there is also good scholarship showing that employing neuromyths and using these commercial products are problematic for practitioners; ‘exploding’ the myths and deflating the claims is good public service by educational theorists, and this work needs to continue.

There is evidence, however, that in deflating the claims about commercial products or refuting neuromyths, educational researchers often continue to tacitly accept problematic frameworks, including the idea that evidence-based practice should shape educational conversations (Carew and Magsamen 2010; Davies 1999). Philosophers of education have taken a variety of approaches in bringing further this critique, particularly around neuroscience’s application to education. For example, Ansari has examined the ethics around how the current hype around neuroscience influences educators, including the neuromyths teachers might embrace in their enthusiasm for neuroscience’s authority (Ansari 2015). Davis has criticized the propriety of an evidence-based model for education in the first place (Davis 2004; see also Biesta 2007). He suggests that neurophysiology does not have the requisite authority about learning, for the latter involves value-laden claims in ways that the former cannot adjudicate. Maxwell and Racine have explored the ethics of aligning moral education with cognitive psychology and neuroscience (Maxwell and Racine 2016). And Boyles argues for what he calls “neuropragmatism” to counter the “commercialism” of neuroscience’s application to education precisely because it “is currently largely divorced from philosophy and history” (2016, p. 74). In his critique of commercialization, Boyles brings to light that education is more than a technical problem of ‘engineering’, but rather always also involves normative visions of purposes and end goals. These approaches show how philosophers of education go beyond mere critique of the excessive claims by neuroscience-based commercial products, moving the conversation philosophically, to the ethical and conceptual.

## ***Questioning Neuroimaging Technologies and the Medicalization of Learning***

But philosophical questions are also asked in areas beyond the low-hanging fruit of neuromyths, commercial products, and evidence-based practices. For example, the explosion of neuroscientific knowledge involves the development of noninvasive ways of studying the brain. Some neuroscience literature suggests that despite the clear color-coded pictures of brain scans, techniques such as fMRI give results that are at best incomplete (Zatorre et al. 2012). Philosophically, the advent of such techniques has opened up a line of questions that might be termed *technical*, focusing on the status of the claims made on the basis of these techniques, whether that be about what they claim to tell us about the brain's functioning or about the mind and human behavior (Dumit 2011; Manzotti and Moderato 2010; Poldrack 2000; Raz 2011). Smeyers has questioned the assumption of "visible proof" that brain pictures supposedly provide (Smeyers 2016a). More generally, Joldersma has argued that technical criticisms "raise important methodological questions about the scientific project of localization required to confidently draw conclusions about neural correlations between mind and brain..." (2016a, p. 162). The technical or methodological problem here is that in order to get the neural correlation thesis off the ground, the technologies for localizing brain activity need to be unambiguous. There is still debate over whether or not these technologies have yielded the required accuracy (Hanson and Bunzl 2010). Philosophically, however, the technological issues of localization have exacerbated the problem of conflating correlation and causation. Smeyers has suggested that the correlations themselves are plausible only when we gloss over the actual differences between individual brains, "which often vary greatly" (2016b, p. 40). Moreover, as Maxwell and Racine point out, a "significant portion of [this research] is also animal-based..." (2016, p. 64), which requires the assumption of basic similarity to humans for strong cross-over conclusions. Although techniques such as fMRIs are clearly useful in studying the brain, they have often led to overhasty conclusions and applications, temptations that philosophers caution ought to be resisted. Through a critique of neuroscience's technological issues, educational philosophers can rightly question the educational importance of the techniques backing the correlation claims.

Correlation claims are central in neuroscience-based diagnosis of learning deficits, the latest approach to a long history of medicalizing student behavior and abilities (Petrina 2006). By 'medicalization' I mean using the binary of normal and pathological to label students on various dimensions, where the pathological then invites interventions toward restoring normalcy. Neuroscience's standard mode of operation is finding mind-brain correlations, neural correlates as they are often called (Chalmers 2000). This is something that fits hand in glove with the medicalization of behavior (Conrad 2008) and is reflected in education (Tröhler 2015). The unstated assumption here is that differences are medical deficits in normal behavior, for example, shyness becomes an anxiety disorder, wandering attention becomes ADHD. Resistance to authority becomes ODD (oppositional defiant disorder). The

correlation of behavioral differences with brain variances then interprets the neurological distinctions as the source of the behavioral deficits. When what is assumed to be the source of the pathology is discoverable in the brain's structures and functions, it then invites possible micro-interventions at the neuronal level (Schrag 2011). One central philosophical question about the medicalization metaphor is its underlying categorical schema. In previous work I have pointed out that the labels of medicalized deficits such as ADHD and dyslexia are imported into the discovery of neurological differences, which in turn are then used as evidence-based advice for educational interventions (Joldersma 2013). In turn, this approach assumes a one-to-one correspondence between micro-level localized brain processes and macro-level global educational behavior. A philosophical critique of this schema uncovers how neuroscience continues "to categorize learners using apparent neurological differences" (Busso and Pollack 2015, p. 6) while smuggling normative valuations into those judgments through extra-scientific metaphors such as "deficits". That is, philosophy of education attends to the conceptualization of the critique by drawing attention to problematic underlying assumptions of the medical model seemingly inherent in neuroscience. This is especially important in its engagement with neuroscience because many of the current labels for different learners are couched in the authority and popularity of neuroscience.

### *Technological Interventions for Self-Enhancement*

The medicalization issue points to an equally important matter that philosophers of education need to address. As Slaby and others have argued, the medical frame is merely one side of a discourse that has been ensnared by neuroscience. The other dimension involves what Slaby calls "technological self-optimization" (Slaby 2015, p. 20), namely, an anticipatory optimistic future that promises human life progress if not perfection. Medicalization is merely the reverse side of this visionary framework, for it sets, by means of neuroscientific expertise, the demands we as society feel authorized to place on individuals—for example, about what each of us has a duty to do with respect to brain development, maintenance and repair, if not enhancement (Joldersma 2016b). Embedded in the idea of technological self-optimization are problematic concepts of human life, salvation, and utopia. Paul Smeyers has called these theorists the "believers" for whom "the sky is the limit" (Smeyers 2016b). Emma Williams and Paul Standish point out that hidden in this optimism is a problematic fusion of neurobiological accounts of the brain with psychological accounts of the mind (Williams and Standish 2016). As the neuroscientific optimists incur greater inroads into educational practice, more of these sorts of philosophical critiques are necessary.

There are now neuroscientific technologies which no longer merely record brain events, but which are aimed at *interventions* in the brain processes. Although societies have long used neuropharmaceuticals to intervene in what was considered pathological behavior, the new interventions seem more powerful and in need of greater



philosophical scrutiny. For example, an emerging cluster of techniques is called “optogenetics”, methods that combine genetics and optics to control particular events inside specific (living) cells (Pastrana 2011). In particular, the technique inserts genetic material into cells that allow it to be responsive to light stimulation, and this is used as a way to stimulate those particular cells with targeted light. According to one of its main developers, although it is presently not yet ready for application to human brains, this set of techniques will at some point have “potentially near-complete powers for mapping, recording the dynamics of, and controlling the dynamics of neural circuits” (Boyden 2015, p. 1201). Optogenetic technologies, designed to deliberately intervene in local brain events, are now being looked at to improve, for example, cognition (Kantak and Wettstein 2015). Another technique of noninvasive (or quasi-noninvasive) direct intervention in brain functioning, which has already been used with human subjects, including ones deemed nonpathological, is transcranial direct-current stimulation (tDCS). This has been put forward as “a non-invasive tool to guide neuroplasticity and modulate cortical function by tonic stimulation with weak direct currents” (Nitsche et al. 2008, p. 220). This technology intervenes in the brain’s plasticity (as it interacts with the environment) by means of weak electrical currents applied to the scalp through electrodes placed in strategic locations. Depending on where on the scalp the current is delivered, the method is meant to enhance performances of a variety of cognitive tasks of particular interest to educators, including language, mathematics, attention, and memory. Indeed, this method is beginning to be thought of as a low-cost, portable way to help educators: “A major goal of educational efforts is to develop techniques for enhancement of learning and to promote better retention. tDCS has the potential to help in such efforts” (Coffman et al. 2014, p. 899).

Neurologically based intervention techniques into educational behaviors such as learning give rise to a number of philosophical issues, including particularly moral or ethical ones. Are such interventions ethically permissible? Albeit in a slightly different context, Maxwell and Racine have pointed out the ethical issues around the risks of experimental (including imaging) techniques used at the interface between neuroscience and education (Maxwell and Racine 2012), a critique that could be extended to address direct interventions. But further, such interventions give rise to questions concerning the ethical stance involved in believing that technological enhancement of learning is a moral good. What view of normalcy is involved? What is the understanding of the learner’s agency and responsibility that is being harmonized with the good of interventions such as these? Philosophers of education have not yet addressed these questions directly or explicitly. But they could well build on Smeyers’ skepticism that a description or explanation “in terms of neurological concepts and theories does not in itself warrant an *educational* surplus value” (Smeyers 2016b, p. 41). And they could build on Davis’ analysis that there is an inherently ambiguous understanding of the taxonomies used to label learners, distinguishing normal from pathological (Davis 2008). Just changing a brain-state and effecting some behavioral change is not yet educational. To warrant calling it an educational enhancement requires going beyond the factual into the normative, beyond the technical into the realm of judgment. Philosophers of education are in a good position to evaluate the ‘good news’

about the neurological enhancement of learning. Their role can be to help educators sort out the ethical stances they might take toward ‘artificial’ interventions in learning. And central to philosophy of education is connecting such judgments to normative visions of education.

Intervention techniques, medicalizations, and correlation claims call forth philosophical concerns about the *model of learning* that often is assumed. Philosophically, the concept of learning in neuroscience is typically reduced to a brain process associated with, at best, a narrow understanding of knowledge acquisition, including skills such as word decoding or number manipulation. Kraft turns this into a more general question about the propriety of neuroscience’s domination over education, suggesting that it reveals a deficit in educational theorizing itself (Kraft 2012). Standish, similarly, uses Wittgenstein to uncover hidden but problematic assumptions about the relations between mind and body (Standish 2012). When asking questions about neuroscience’s research on learning, philosophers of education can go beyond the typical criticism that neuroscience narrows or reduces learning, to questioning the validity of framing educative learning as primarily a brain activity. By asking philosophical questions about neuroscience’s view of learning, philosophers of education are in a good position to connect this to a critique of the “learning culture” of current schooling more generally, what Biesta (2009) calls “learnification”. And this does not yet address the critique that “learning is not education” (Burbules 2013), something that brings into focus the larger philosophical, normative question of the purpose of education.

### ***Problematic Concepts of Science***

Issues around interventions and localization technologies also lead to a set of philosophical questions concerning neuroscience’s concept of *science*. There is a strong sense that, at least in its practice, neuroscience centrally involves using cellular and molecular neuroscience to explain psychological behavior (Bickle 2003b, 2013). This practice has strong affinities to a long-standing positivist interpretation of science (Misawa 2013; Phillips and Burbules 2000). Philosophers of education have begun to ask what this interpretation imports into its application to education. Schwandt has opened this conversation by outlining possible “deleterious consequences” of science-based educational research (Schwandt 2005). More recently, Smeyers has questioned the model of research in which basic neurofacts are taken to have straightforward applications to teaching methods. He argues that this approach has never really departed from logical empiricism “characterized by the invariance of perception, meaning, and methodology” (Smeyers 2016b, p. 34). This scholarship is a promising start, but indicates that more work can be done in identifying problematic positivist understandings in neuroscience, especially as read by educators. In this regard, philosophers can open up interpretive space by helping education understand the scientific character of neuroscience as a hermeneutic activity, importing framing metaphors and concepts into its conclusions (Hartmann 2011).

This philosophical questioning begins to create elbow room to engage with the scientific character of neuroeducational research and practice. For example, Williams and Standish suggest that the metonymic language used in neuroscience concerning the brain “is made to stand for the whole in some *reified sense*” (2016, p. 20). They argue that the metaphors in neuroscience are so deeply embedded that we often no longer recognize their metaphorical character. Understanding neuroscience’s model of science as deeply hermeneutical creates room for broader questions about the status of its empirical research, precisely for the sake of education. This is an important service that philosophy of education provides, for a critical voice about science itself is nowhere more necessary than in neuroscience research, especially as it is employed toward the improvement of education. Neuroscience as a *science* is itself not without its own tacit assumptions, which deserve to be scrutinized. It has smuggled into its account concepts that come from elsewhere but seem to arise from neuroscience itself, including metaphors such as “information”, “computation”, “plasticity”, and “representation” (see also Borck 2011). The authority and popularity of neuroscience subsequently gives added authority to those imported notions, shielding them from further scrutiny. This means not only questioning particular problematic hidden assumptions in the research itself, but also exposing its preconceptions of what constitutes educational improvement, including what is meant by the term ‘education’. Asking questions about the assumptions of what counts as educational improvement draws attention to the way knowledge and concepts of neuroscience circulate, including how they are translated into education and, in turn, how these new ideas in education are legitimated. Central to philosophy of education’s role with respect to neuroscience is to reveal the way its concepts circulate—with an eye particularly to their translations into education and legitimations for the its practice. By problematizing neuroscience in this manner, it will help enable the re-democratization of the discussion of what is good education, one that cannot be answered by scientific discoveries (Biesta 2010).

A compounding philosophical issue in the science of neuroscience is the question of *reductionism*. For neuroscience, especially cognitive neuroscience, its stock method of analysis typically leads to some form or other of reductionism (Bickle 2003a, 2006; Soom 2011). There are of course many ways to parse out reductionism. Conventionally, in philosophy of science, it has meant the reduction of a theory in one domain to a theory in another—say, a theory in chemistry reduced to a more fundamental one, in physics. The assumption in the reduction is that the ‘higher’ theory is explained, with no remainder, by the ‘lower’ theory. Reduction typically is framed with a levels conceptualization, where a lower level provides simultaneously an explanatory (epistemological) and a causal (ontological) account of the higher level, without remainder. This opens the door for mapping manifest (observed, experienced) phenomena onto unobserved (theoretical, scientific) constructs. This form of reduction is prevalent in the neuroeducation field, often using the language of neural correlates (Aziz-Zadeh et al. 2013; Dehaene et al. 2010; Hruby and Goswami 2011; Kobayashi et al. 2007). In general, the idea is that mental states, construed as mental representations, are correlated with equivalent physical (neural) states.

This then allows physical properties of brains to be taken as both causing and explaining mental representations, reducing the latter to the former.

A central philosophical question arises: Is ‘levels’ the right metaphor? There are, as noted earlier, a number of theorists who use this metaphor in thinking about neuroscience, mind, and education (Bruer 1997; Gazzaniga 2010; Willingham and Lloyd 2007). The ‘level’ metaphor has some strengths, for it helps avoid particular errors. If, for example, mental representations exist on one level (the mind, say), but not the level below it (the brain, say, or the neuron), then it is a mistake of levels to insist that mental representations are in the brain, or that they can be observed via brain imaging. As noted earlier, Williams and Standish argue that neuroscience has pulled us into a category mistake with respect to learning: learning is not a neuronal activity of the brain, but a cognitive human activity—that we shouldn’t talk about what the brain does when we mean something a person does—a version of the mereological fallacy (2016, p. 19). They argue that the reason for this confusion is because neuroscientists and neuroeducators draw on a historical reductionist conception of consciousness. Similarly, Maxwell and Racine tease apart levels of evidence, suggesting that philosophically, some applications of neuroscience to educational practices such as child-rearing have not respected the difference of levels of evidence (2016, p. 62). These are helpful philosophical analyses of reductionism via the idea of levels. However, more philosophical work developing critiques of the idea of levels itself remains to be done. This includes examining the almost inevitable hierarchical implications, the conceptual problem of isolating levels, the reification of entities indexed to levels, and the simplification of causal structures into linear (bottom up) ones.

### *Political Questions*

A final set of philosophical questions might be clustered around what can be called the *political*. Importantly, philosophy of education’s critique of neuroscience, especially in the area of education, can show the limits of conceptualizing the student as an autonomous, liberal subject, and of taking the purpose of education to be about developing individual autonomy. Thompson takes up this challenge, arguing that a future direction of philosophy of education is understanding the limits of the concept of subjectivity. Attending to one such limit, what she calls “normalization in education”, reveals how “[t]he figure of the autonomous pupil is layered with various power constellations: the promise of an autonomous learning process, the perspective of a successful future, the hope of a successful school experience etc.” (2015, p. 657). This limit reveals that the subjectification of the self involves not merely normalizing students with respect to a problematic autonomy but instead more questionably with respect to an enterprising self. Joldersma (2016b) extends this critique, suggesting that neuroscience can be and has been coopted by neoliberalism’s interpretation of an ethic of self-responsibility. These political questions of neuroeducation deserve further exploration by philosophers of education.

## Neuroscience's Possible Impact on Philosophy of Education

Engagement with neuroscience also has the potential for transforming philosophy of education itself. Despite rich critical lenses employed by most philosophers of education, the not-unexpected relative insularity of its disciplinary conversations means that these might harbor unexamined and sedimented ‘commonsense’ concepts and ways of understanding. A standing danger with philosophy of education—and indeed, any discipline—is that it tends to preserve large swaths of its own preferred language and concepts as it goes about its business. It is thus never bad for philosophy of education to have its familiar ideas and patterns disturbed and opened up for examination, “disrupting the complacent belief that one understands one’s own thoughts and the language in which one formulates one’s thoughts” (Ruitenber [2009](#), p. 426). Ruitenber calls this *translation*, and argues that it can be used as a “philosophical method”, one that dislocates the native language through a process of defamiliarization, a distancing which “deliberately and noticeably insinuates itself between the reader and the text, in order to disrupt the apparent familiarity of that text” ([2009](#), p. 433). I am suggesting that engagement with the neuroscience literature can fruitfully be thought of as one such realm of translation, allowing the ‘foreign language’ of neuroscience to insinuate itself between philosophers of education and their familiar concepts and understandings. This process of distancing and defamiliarization from certain conceptions of (say) mind, consciousness, cognition, emotion, or embodiment could lead to novel understandings of these philosophical concepts. This dimension of the intersection of neuroscience and philosophy of education reveals the possibility of going beyond the critical, toward a mutual interaction in which philosophy of education itself shifts ground.

### *Cultural Differences, Plasticity*

One example involves discussions around educating students to appreciate cultural difference (Warnick [2012](#); Yacek [2014](#)), including aesthetic judgment in globally cross-cultural contexts to do so (Nakamura [2009](#); White [2015](#)). Dhillon has argued that neuroscience can help in understanding a new way into making judgments about artworks that belong to an unfamiliar culture, precisely “when we cannot rely on learned conventions to help engage these artworks” ([2016](#), p. 130). She suggests that neuroscience can help make explicit the cognitive structures all humans share, which helps her answer questions about aesthetic properties and aesthetic judgments. In particular, she offers that neuroscience can help us answer the question of the relation between aesthetic properties of an artwork and its underlying (constituent) non-aesthetic properties of (say) line, shape, and color. Her philosophical purpose is to theorize how the presentation of “artworks of unfamiliar cultures should create aesthetic possibilities for educating students towards the global democratic ethos that is required of us today” ([2016](#), p. 131). What neuroscience offers, she

suggests, is a novel understanding of how visual neuro-processing are shared across cultural differences, something that opens up space for appreciating culturally unfamiliar pieces as works of art. Although this is not a substitution of science for philosophy, Dhillon uses neuroscience to open up new philosophical paths.

Another way that philosophers of education have used neuroscience to unsettle the familiar is by borrowing from its conceptualizations. For example, a central discovery in neuroscience is that the brain's plasticity is not limited to early childhood, but endures (Huttenlocher 2009). In this, neuroscience takes plasticity as the brain's ability to change in response to its interactions with its surroundings throughout the course of our life spans. Malabou has made conceptual use of this idea but pushes it philosophically beyond the conventional idea of mere flexibility toward a more radical philosophical meaning (Malabou 2009, 2012). She argues for a notion of plasticity that is not merely an adaptation to our existing surroundings, but more radically, that plasticity involves the freedom to intervene in our circumstances. Bojesen, acknowledging Dewey's use of the term plasticity, uses Malabou to argue that philosophers of education need develop ideas of "educational plasticity" and "the plastic subject" to develop new lines of educational philosophy (Bojesen 2015). Ulmer does just that by taking Malabou's concept to be a "new materialist methodology", using it to reconceptualize policy discourses, including how educational policies are formed and altered (Ulmer 2015). Lewis takes this a step further, using Malabou's idea of plasticity to interrupt the ideas of flexibility, adaptation, and efficiency with the notions of ruptures, events, and explosions. He suggests that this will allow us to more explicitly recognize "the fragility and precariousness of educational life", an indeterminacy that "holds open a promise" in which "an alternative notion of the self can burst into presence without warning" (Lewis 2016, p. 153). This, he offers, takes us beyond Dewey's progressivist understanding of plasticity as a condition for the continuity of growth, by emphasizing contingency, rupture, and risk in educationally formative experiences.

### *Dynamic Open Systems*

A third example is how the model of dynamic open systems can help educational philosophers situate their engagement with neuroscience. The word 'system' connotes both a model (say, a mathematical construct) and a collection of elements that relate to each other in a way that allows them to stand out in a stable fashion as a kind of whole distinct from its surrounding environment—for example, a lake ecosystem. The words 'open' and 'dynamic' indicate that the system does not remain static, but has much internal movement and environmental exchanges as it maintains its overall stability—for example, water enters and also leaves the lake, but it remains more or less stable in water volume and chemical composition. These changes are often described as nonlinear, indicating that when internal changes occur, the result (the whole) is not directly proportional to sum of what went into the process (the elements); rather something novel emerges. The main take-away is that



the system's behavior is neither merely random nor predictable. Rather, the changing behavior of the system seems at once to be unstable and yet something overall is enduring, a form of "metastability" (E. Thompson 2010, p. 40). Metastability is the endurance of a novel pattern of overall behavior that remains stable even though the internal dynamics that constitute it continuously change. Thompson suggests that metastability is necessary "for self-organization and adaptive behavior" (2010, p. 40). This model is a positive alternative to the reductionism of conventional neuroscience, and thus provides a way forward from the search for neural correlates, suggesting that not only the brain, but also the embodied organism's interaction with its environment, might be modeled as a dynamic open system. Philosophers of education are beginning to make philosophical use of this model.

For example, Gallagher uses the dynamic systems model to argue against what he calls "neural hermeneutics", the idea that we can identify brain mechanisms to "understand one another" socially (2016, p. 177), something that he says is associated with "theory of mind" approaches of social cognition. For his alternative he draws on the conclusions of a variety of neuroscience studies that show "cultural variations in brain mechanisms" (2016, p. 181) including perceptual experiences, emotional responses, face processing. This empirical evidence does philosophical work, allowing him to conclude that it undermines the theory of mind approaches, because it shows that social cognition is not "entirely in the brain or inside the head" (2016, p. 181). For his positive alternative Gallagher draws on enactivism, something that "understands the brain as an integrated part of a larger dynamic system that includes body and (both physical and social) environment" (2016, p. 182). Out of this dynamic systems model develops what he calls enactive hermeneutics, an understanding of the face-to-face interactions in terms of "participatory sense making", something that he believes is constitutive of education (2016, p. 188), and "natural pedagogy", an idea that "certain interactive aspects of communicative practices lead to conceptual learning" (2016, p. 185). Gallagher's enactivist approach is informed by the neuroscience which situates the brain in a larger explanatory unit. His conclusion is that, contrary to the theory of mind claims of neural hermeneutics, large-scale patterns of educational behavior cannot be predicted from the neural elements from which they arise. He can draw this conclusion effectively because it is informed by neuroscience, namely, those theorists who model the brain-body-environment as an open dynamic system.

Another example of using open dynamic systems for a "disruption of complacent beliefs" revolves around the implications of neuroscience for agency, free will, and moral development (Bayne and Pacherie 2015; Levy 2015). As Murphy and Brown (2009) smartly ask: did our neurons make us do it? Sankey and Kim provide an example of taking up this task, engaging the question "how free is conscious free will" (2016, p. 114). They employ a dynamic systems model of neuroscience, which allows them to question the hard determinism of conventional neuroscience while using the neuroscientific idea of self-organization to ground moral values in new ways, namely, in our embodiment. In particular, they argue that "moral development is emergent and self-organizing"; they see this as "a potentially new paradigm in moral education", challenging the Kohlbergian tradition of moral development



(2016, p. 117). This is a good example of using insights of neuroscience to disrupt certain “received views” of moral development and what it means to be a responsible self, to argue for another way that our moral values emerge, given our embodiment (see also Fenwick 2009). This example suggests that conceptual models such as dynamic systems can unsettle traditional ways of understanding moral values and serves for educational settings. More generally, neuroscience has the possibility for unsettling familiar language in philosophy of education, opening up new lines of thought and research.

## Conclusion

The area of neuroscience is a fairly recent area of scholarship for philosophy of education. However, as this chapter shows, there are already many lines of inquiry that have opened up as philosophers of education turn to neuroscience. One broad line is a set of philosophical critiques, ranging from simplistic applications to examining the science itself. Another broad line is a set of philosophical inspirations, ranging from drawing on novel understandings of neural plasticity to philosophical appropriations of dynamic open systems. What these lines also show is that much more can be done. Addressing neuroscience, especially in its application to education, will fruitfully involve philosophers of education for some time to come.

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# Charter Schools, Free Schools, and School Choice



Terri S. Wilson

## Introduction

This chapter focuses on the philosophical questions and tensions involved in school choice reforms that give students and parents greater flexibility and choice in education. Choice reforms remain diverse, but often emphasize creating and expanding semi-autonomous and independently run public schools. These schools, termed ‘charter schools’ in US contexts and ‘free schools’ in the UK, exist in a variety of forms in many different countries. I offer a brief overview of some of the shared features and commitments of these semi-autonomous public schools, with attention to their different policy contexts. In my analysis, I focus on the distinctly philosophical questions raised by reform efforts that have expanded freedom of choice for parents and families. These reforms – while diverse – often reshape commonly understood definitions between public and private education. In doing so, these reforms create new opportunities and liberties for certain communities and families; they also raise questions about the privatization of interests in public education and the effect of such policies on goals of equity, inclusion, and justice.

Here, while many researchers have focused on assembling important evidence about the practical *consequences* and *effects* of school choice, evidence alone cannot resolve normative debates about the appropriate *purposes*, *aims*, and *values* raised by new autonomous schools of choice. This chapter reviews these philosophical questions along two broad dimensions: (1) rights, pluralism, and autonomy and (2) equity, justice and democratic participation. While I focus on philosophical scholarship in reviewing these three broad areas, I also point to the importance and relevance of empirical research in considering many of these claims. For example, careful empirical research on the causes and consequences of segregation in choice

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policies can be used to inform philosophical debates about the democratic value of shared experiences or the claims that choice policies make to serve the ends of equity. I conclude the chapter by sketching out some recommendations for employing philosophical frameworks in the analysis of these policies.

## Market-Oriented Reforms and Rationales

Over the last three decades, market-oriented education reforms have introduced choice and competition into public school systems worldwide.<sup>1</sup> These reforms are broad and diverse. At one part of the spectrum, choice reforms include voucher programs that allow public funding to be used by families to attend private schools. Chile, for example, decentralized their educational system in 1980, creating a voucher subsidy to encourage private school providers to enter the market and compete for students (Parry 1997). While many other countries rely extensively on private providers for public education, a variety of educational reforms have focused on expanding choice *within* the public school sector, the focus of this chapter. In this section, I briefly review the development of and rationale for these reforms, focusing on policies that have expanded autonomous schools of choice.

### *Autonomous Schools in International Perspective*

Public school choice is also diverse, but many reforms have focused on developing new, independent schools of choice, creating quasi-markets in education where parents and students are able to choose among diverse educational options. Such semi-autonomous public schools are termed ‘charter schools’ in the United States and Alberta, Canada; ‘academies’ and ‘free schools’ in the United Kingdom; ‘independent schools’ (*fristående skolor*, *friskola*, or *friskolelagen*) in Sweden, Denmark, and Norway; and ‘partnership schools’ in New Zealand.<sup>2</sup> While the development of autonomous schools varies across these contexts, such schools share a few common features: the devolution of authority (and often funding) to schools, some independence from government regulation, the development of diverse school providers, and the promotion of parental choice among schools (Whitty et al. 1998).

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<sup>1</sup>A review of the 34 members of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) estimates that two-thirds of these countries allow a certain degree of school choice (Musset 2012).

<sup>2</sup>This is not an exhaustive list. Other countries (i.e., Chile, Colombia, Germany) have related policies that offer public funding for private schools. Sweden relies on voucher-like funding to support attendance at *fristående skolor*; Western Australia has recently introduced a charter-like system of schools called the Independent Public School (IPS) Initiative; many other countries (i.e., South Africa, the Czech Republic, China) have also experimented with choice provisions. I’ve focused my review on the choice systems that have prioritized the development of *autonomous public schools of choice*.



Most prevalent in the United States, charter schools exchange increased autonomy for increased accountability. While exempt from many state and local regulations, charter schools are responsible for meeting the academic and other goals specified in a ‘charter’, or contract, with their school authorizer. First established in 1991, charter school legislation now exists in 44 states and the District of Columbia, and more than 6900 charter schools enroll over 3 million children nationwide (National Alliance for Public Charter Schools 2017). Legislation and implementation vary widely, however; certain states have authorized smaller numbers of schools, while other states account for larger percentages, typically with less oversight and more diverse authorizer pathways. In Canada, only one province (Alberta) has established charter schools, but the country has a long tradition of supporting separate Catholic and Protestant school systems, federally funded schools for Aboriginal students, as well as French immersion programs (Bosetti and Gereluk 2016).

In England and Wales, national legislation introduced market-oriented education reforms in the 1980s. Schools were incentivized to compete for pupils (and the funding that followed them), and could also elect to become “grant maintained”, with more autonomy over operations and admissions (West 2014). From there, the government directly funded independently run ‘city technology colleges’ (CTCs) and, starting in 1997, ‘academies’, which were externally sponsored and directly funded schools of choice. Choice was expanded with the 2010 Academies Act, which allowed existing public schools to convert to academy status and also created a new category of “free schools” (Walford 2014). Such schools can be newly created by petitions from diverse groups, including parents, community organizations, faith groups, non-profits, businesses, and universities. Like in the United States, free schools and academies have some degree of operational autonomy over admissions, staffing, and curriculum. As of January 2015, 2.7 million students were enrolled in academies throughout England (Drake 2015).

In a similar way, New Zealand devolved considerable operational authority and financial control from a centralized school system to school-specific boards of trustees in 1989. Two years later, more sweeping policy changes did away with enrollment zones, allowing parents to seek admission to any public school (Fiske and Ladd 2003). These ‘Tomorrow’s Schools’ reforms established a system of autonomous and self-governing schools, with widespread choice and competition between schools. In addition to these reforms, in 2012, New Zealand launched a new model of ‘partnership schools’ or *kura hourua* that have more autonomy and focus on disadvantaged communities. Eight schools are currently in operation, with more slated to open in coming years.

Choice has been a longstanding feature of many Scandinavian countries, although reforms in the last 25 years have expanded its reach and prominence. In Sweden, 1991 education legislation established a voucher program that allowed existing independent schools to receive some public funding; in 1996, independent schools were granted comparable funding to other public schools and were no longer allowed to charge additional fees (West 2014). Schools can be run by private and non-profit organizations, including community and religious groups, but must also follow the national curriculum. These schools now make up a sizable part of the Swedish

educational system, particularly in urban and suburban areas. As of 2014, 17% of compulsory schools (Grades 1–9) and 50% of upper secondary schools (Grades 10–12) were independent (Swedish Institute 2015). While less widespread, Norway's Private Education Act (1985) provides state support (at approximately 85%) for private schools, many of which are religious in character or focus on specific curricula. As of 2014, 7% of primary/lower secondary schools (Grades 1–10) and 20% of upper secondary schools (Grades 11–12 and pre-college) in Norway are private (Statistics Norway 2014). Denmark also has a long tradition of supporting private schools, which receive a substantial government subsidy (80–85% of costs). In the 2008–2009 school year, approximately 13% of Danish children in Grades PK-10 attended a private school.

### *Rationales for Market-Oriented Reforms*

While varying across these different contexts, autonomous schools of choice share a variety of overlapping and, at times, conflicting ideas. The market-oriented reforms that have taken hold over the last three decades have developed alongside the broad global changes often categorized as 'neoliberalism'. Although diverse, neoliberalism advances individual and entrepreneurial freedoms within a framework that protects private property, free trade, market processes, and the interests of capital (Harvey 2005). In this framework, many states have pursued the privatization of public goods and services, including education. These reforms are grounded in economic theories that see competition and choice as potential levers of school improvement. In this theoretical model, schools, when asked to compete for students and funding, have built-in incentives to improve their performance. Parents are empowered to choose the 'best' schools, which puts consumer pressure on all schools to improve. As Lubienski (2003) summarizes, "By drawing from market-style institutional forms, choice positions education as a private good to be provided by schools acting more like private organizations and to be pursued by consumers maximizing their individual preferences" (p. 483).

This account of choice has largely been shaped by the insights of rational choice theory. One of the primary assumptions of rational choice is that individuals have and act according to preferences. In this model, several conditions need to be in place for choice to work as planned. Parents must have preferences about education and gather information about available schools, make trade-offs between the different attributes of these schools (e.g., test scores versus proximity), and choose the school that best fits their preferences (Hamilton and Guin 2005). Certain proponents of choice stress that parents must be able to evaluate and choose 'better' schools or schools that do well on standard measures of academic performance.<sup>3</sup> This assumption has been the subject of dispute, as research has found that parents – while often naming academic

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<sup>3</sup>For a discussion about the centrality of academic quality in choice, see Schneider et al. 2002.

quality as a criterion – actually make choices for other reasons, including demographics and the perceived prestige of the school (Schneider and Buckley 2002).

Other proponents of choice are less concerned that parents will be able to critically evaluate school success; here, choice is good in itself. This rationale prioritizes the creation of diverse school options as an important and independent goal. Some families may be drawn to a Waldorf school, for example, while others may prefer an arts academy, or a school that emphasizes a particular religion or language. In this account, parents are also positioned as consumers who choose schools that best match their diverse interests and preferences. Schools, in turn, have incentives not only to be *better* than other schools but to *differentiate* themselves from the competition and “find their niche – a specialized segment of the market to which they can appeal and attract support” (Chubb and Moe 1990, p. 55). Instead of a ‘one size fits all’ approach, choice policies offer different educational products to meet the distinct needs, preferences, and interests of families.

Here, market-oriented rationales merge with arguments prioritizing expanded choice as a value in itself, grounded in the rights of parents to choose and direct their children’s education. These arguments also overlap with claims that certain communities should be able to democratically establish schools that recognize group identities and support distinctive cultures. Still other arguments link parental choice to school improvement, but not through competitive effects. The very act of choosing – in effect, investing in a particular school community – builds schools around shared commitments and values. Drawing on studies of Catholic schools (e.g., Bryk et al. 1993), some proponents see choice as an important vehicle for parent and community involvement. These diverse arguments underscore, as Ladd (2003) argues, that choice reforms are not merely the outcome of neoliberal ideology, but combine, in sometimes unclear ways, a “number of different philosophical strands that converged on similar policy recommendations related to self-governance of schools and parental choice” (10).

This very diversity underscores the importance of studying the various, overlapping – and at times conflicting – philosophical arguments for choice. Understanding choice involves more than considering if choice ‘works’. School choice raises philosophical questions about the *purposes*, *aims*, and *values* of these reforms. In the next sections, I review these philosophical questions along two broad dimensions: (1) rights, pluralism and autonomy; and (2) justice, equity and democratic participation.<sup>4</sup>

## Rights, Pluralism, and Autonomy

First, how can we understand the rights of families to choose schools organized around their own interests, needs, and ethical convictions? What are the values and claims that justify and support such choices? What limitations should be placed

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<sup>4</sup>While focused on international contexts and autonomous schools of choice, certain parts of these next sections are updated from literature I reviewed in a previous chapter (Wilson 2012).

upon such choices? The rights of parents to exit public education (in favor of private alternatives or homeschooling) have been recognized in many countries, although their limits have been debated. Indeed, philosophers have long considered questions about the proper scope of state and family authority over the provision of education. Here, philosophy can pose crucial *normative* questions about choice. For example, how should the interests of families in guiding their children's education be balanced against the prospective rights of children? And how should these rights be balanced against other public aims of education, including concerns of equal opportunity?

### ***Parental Rights***

As noted earlier, certain rationales for school choice emphasize the *rights* of families to send their children to schools of their choice or alternatives to state-sponsored schools (Merry and Karsten 2010). While originally focused on parents' rights to choose independent and, in some cases, religious schools, these rights-based claims have also been used to justify the expansion of charter schools and other autonomous schools of choice. These claims (with important limits) have also been upheld by legal decisions in various countries. In the United States, the 1925 *Pierce v. Society of Sisters* decision recognized the rights of parents to educate their children as a form of liberty protected under US Constitution. Other international cases have affirmed parents' rights to direct their children's education. For example, the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) holds that states must respect the rights of parents to direct their children's education in accordance with religious and philosophical convictions, but that children also have an independent right to receive an education (Bergström 2010). This precedent has been applied to cases focused on the education of Roma children, as well as the provision of single-sex schools (Poulter 1987).

Parents' rights, across these contexts, have been understood in terms of the right to *exit* state-sponsored schools and also with the right to *hold* private beliefs that may conflict with public schooling. These private beliefs imply the existence of different views of what constitutes a flourishing life, ones that may come into conflict with the curriculum and practices of state-sponsored schools. Galston (2002) has conceptualized these rights as a form of "expressive liberty", defined as "a robust though rebuttable presumption in favor of individuals and groups leading their lives as they see fit, within a broad range of legitimate variation, in accordance with their own understanding of what gives life meaning and value" (p. 3). His argument promotes deference to the rights of parents to lead lives, and raise children, as they see fit with minimal intrusion from the state (Galston 1991).

## ***Pluralism and Recognition***

While the basic rights of parents to ‘opt out’ of public schools are well recognized, advocates also see school choice as a means of recognizing and supporting diverse ethical, cultural, and religious identities. Autonomous schools, in aiming to increase the diversity and range of schools available to families, also draw on philosophical arguments about pluralism and recognition. Galston’s (2002) ideal of “expressive liberty”, for example, while emphasizing parents’ rights, understands difference as an inevitable feature of democratic life. Extending this argument, McConnell (2001) holds that parents should be able to choose among a wide variety of different schools, public and private, which reflect their values and convictions. Such parental preferences should be granted wide latitude, constrained only by minimal civic goals and standards of educational quality. Moving beyond a focus on parents’ rights, McConnell (2001) contends that widespread choice is best positioned to protect liberalism, amid the challenges of cultural, religious, and ideological differences.

In contrast, Macedo (2003) argues that pluralism does not provide an adequate justification for the public funding of private schools. While supportive of educational accommodation to pluralism, Macedo distinguishes between nonpublic values and the public goods created through political deliberation (2003). Although there is a place for many nonpublic values pursued by diverse pluralist communities – the desire to teach children distinctly religious views, for example – these values do not have to be publicly supported. Feinberg (2006) makes a similar argument, seeing private schools as dependent upon a larger system of public education, which reproduces “the understandings and dispositions needed to secure the political climate where all deeply held religious ideals can be expressed” (p. 214).

Reich (2002) also sees pluralism as an inescapable dimension of any liberal society. He maintains that school choice offers a potential vehicle for *accommodating* pluralist preferences within common ideals, rather than seeking to *assimilate* them to any one particular ideal. Here, Reich distinguishes between the ‘structure’ and the ‘substance’ of a common school ideal, seeing that many policy structures, public and private, could uphold common educational values and goals. Such common goals include, at a minimum, learning basic norms of citizenship and securing the future autonomy of students.

## ***Autonomy***

Debates about the limitations of pluralism often turn on the concept of autonomy. Autonomy implies that individuals have the ability to engage in critical self-reflection about their values and commitments, as well as an ability to choose among particular life options, qualities Gutmann (1999) terms reasoned self-rule. As Brighouse (2003) argues, autonomy must be considered differently in the cases of education, where children are in the process of *developing* a capacity for reflective choice. In various

ways, philosophers have noted that children – not just parents and the state – have an independent interest in education: an interest in becoming autonomous.

While there is broad (although not universal) agreement about the value of autonomy, theorists take different positions on what it means, what it requires, and why it should be considered a legitimate goal of education in a liberal democracy.<sup>5</sup> Reich (2002) advances a “minimalist conception” of autonomy, understanding autonomous persons as “self-determining, in charge of their own lives, able to make significant choices from a range of meaningful options about how their lives will unfold” (Reich 2002, 100). Autonomy entails the ability to freely consent to one’s political system of governance and – especially important for schools of choice – the ability to criticize and potentially even exit one’s current community (Reich 2007). Reich is critical of extreme views on both sides: those who reject reasonable pluralist approaches to school choice and those who defend overly expansive versions of choice that would be incapable of securing student autonomy. While supportive of many forms of school choice, Reich (2007) is critical of homeschooling and some religious schools that might prevent students from reflecting on – and potentially choosing to exit – the ethical worldviews of their parents, community, or cultural group.

Callan (1997) also privileges autonomy. Less focused on the requirements of critical self-examination, he advocates for educational experiences that might sufficiently protect children from conditions of ‘ethical servility’. Autonomy is a legitimate goal, in this sense, because it protects a child from subordinating herself to another’s values and goals. From another perspective, Brighouse (1998) calls for ‘autonomy-facilitating’ rather than ‘autonomy-promoting’ education. The distinction is between education that *enables* children “to make better rather than worse choices about how to live their lives” and an education that *ensures* “students employ autonomy in their lives” (Brighouse 1998, 734). In effect, education should provide children with the tools of rational reflection without imposing the normative goal that they should become autonomous. Applied to school choice, this view might support schools that facilitated *opportunities* for students to practice self-reflection, but not ones that *required* such practices.

Many accounts of autonomy view an ability to *choose* a particular tradition as a key part of leading a flourishing life.<sup>6</sup> Making such a choice depends on critical reflection into one’s values, traditions, and beliefs (Burt 2003). Yet, as Warnick (2012) notes, this understanding of autonomy often requires actual *interaction* with different ways of life, including alternate cultural and religious traditions. The requirement to engage diversity often promotes calls for some form of common educational goals or interactions across difference that may only be possible in diverse and integrated schools.

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<sup>5</sup>Other theorists have disputed the priority and dominance of autonomy in liberal accounts of education. See, for example, the discussion in Swaine (2012) and Hand (2006).

<sup>6</sup>Suissa (2010) critiques this view as unrealistic; in her view, the assumption that families hold a ‘comprehensive conception of the good’ relies on a reductive view of the shifting and multi-faceted values held by actual families.

## Justice, Equity, Democracy

To this extent, other philosophical questions focus on issues of democratic participation and difference. Here, the focus shifts to the *outcomes* of choice. Does choice – as a policy lever – lead to more equitable, just, and democratic outcomes? How do choice plans contribute to, or perhaps work against, equality of opportunity in education? I turn to these questions in this section.

### *Equity and Justice*

Many rationales for expanding school choice invoke concerns of equity and equality. Proponents argue that parents, regardless of income or residence, should have an equal opportunity to choose the schools their children attend. Critics, in turn, have focused attention on the inequitable outcomes of choice, for example, in the sense that some parents are better positioned to take advantage of choice than others. The outcomes of students who remain in district or state schools, and for public education as a whole, also tend to be inequitable. Here, debates about equity often draw on philosophical considerations of justice.

Several philosophers have considered the expansion of autonomous schools of choice against concepts of justice. Brighthouse (2000) contends that choice might be arranged to meet the demands of justice and equity. Justice, for Brighthouse, requires that “children’s prospects...should not be entirely dependent on their own talents and the resources and prudence of their parents” (2004, p. 617). While not arguing for ‘full privatization’, Brighthouse nevertheless advocates for choice systems – like highly regulated voucher programs – that might serve the goals of social justice. From a different perspective, Ben-Porath (2010) draws on notions of justice to develop an argument for ‘structured paternalism’. She argues that the government should structure choices to balance the greatest possible freedom of choice with the greatest possible equality of opportunity. In this vein, Ben-Porath endorses a system of universal choice that would provide all parents with the information and support necessary to make informed choices.

Other philosophers have been more critical about the potential for choice to secure equality of opportunity. Drawing on empirical evidence about the sorting and segregating effects of school choice, a number of scholars have pointed to the anti-egalitarian principles woven into choice proposals. Howe (2007), for instance, argues that school choice has failed to serve egalitarian aims and, moreover, that this goal is unrealistic, given the prevailing political dynamics and systemic inequality in the US context. Similarly, Colburn (2012) maintains that market-based reforms make key assumptions about consumer behavior that are bound to disadvantage children who have parents who are less skilled choosers. Drawing on research on parents’ choice processes, Ben-Porath (2009) endorses school choice as a ‘bounded ideal’, one that needs to be attentive to the different challenges some families encounter in exercising choice, as well as the advantages of other families.



Brighthouse, Howe, and other theorists in the liberal tradition generally use a concept of distributive justice, often understood as access to material goods. However, Knight Abowitz (2001) draws on the work of critical theorist Nancy Fraser (2014) to emphasize that justice involves issues of recognition and participation as well as distribution. Knight Abowitz has advanced a concept of ‘democratic justice’ to evaluate school choice. This concept emphasizes four principles: parity of participation, recognition of difference, redistribution of resources, and representation in decision-making (Knight Abowitz and Karaba 2010). These alternate perspectives turn attention to the link between justice and democratic participation.

### *Democratic Participation*

A number of scholars have pointed to the potential opportunities created by school choice, particularly for marginalized communities (Galston 2002; Merry 2011; Wilson 2016). Here, autonomous schools are “instruments of civil society as well as places of teaching and learning” that offer parents and community groups ways to make education relevant to particular communities (Finn et al. 2000, p. 221). Others have cautioned that school choice – in appealing to particular groups and identities – contributes to widespread patterns of segregation and the dissolution of a “common school ideal”, as families pursue increasingly separate and disparate forms of education (Pring 2007). This view emphasizes the role that public education might play in facilitating meaningful interactions – and the creation of common loyalties – across lines of difference (Gutmann 1999).

In Gutmann’s (1999) account, public schools secure their legitimacy as public institutions by serving as sites of democratic deliberation and participation. Public schools need to be more than just publicly accessible and publicly financed; they must be democratically controlled and operated. Democratic control, however, can be defined in a myriad of ways: as increased parental engagement, decentralized decision-making, or accountability to some public authority. For some scholars, interaction with others, particularly across lines of difference, is a necessary part of what makes a school public. Macedo (2003) argues that this interaction is crucial for the development of civic cooperation and mutual respect. In a similar sense, McLaughlin (2003) contends that common schools in liberal and multicultural democracies face particular ‘burdens and dilemmas’, to help children negotiate difference in productive and sensitive ways. The ‘common school’ as an integrated space of substantive interaction across lines of difference has been an elusive goal, difficult to realize in policy or practice. In this sense, Pring (2007) emphasizes that the common school acts as a kind of moral ideal: “the fight for the common school was essentially a moral one in terms of achieving greater social justice and equality, respect for persons and preparation for citizenship within a democratic order” (p. 504).

While supportive of this ideal, Brighthouse (2007) contends that the goal of a common school should not displace the central normative goal of education: developing

autonomous citizens who have equal opportunities to participate in civic, social, and economic life. Integration across lines of class and race is an admirable goal, but secondary to securing equality of educational outcomes. Proponents of choice have made a parallel argument in defending the academic outcomes of autonomous schools that almost exclusively serve low-income students of color. For instance, in many “no excuses” charter schools, the relentless focus on educational *outcomes* overrides other goals (Golann 2015).

Still others have more sharply contested integration as an educational goal. Michael Merry (2011), for example, holds that the ends of ‘civic virtue’ and ‘self-respect’ are not dependent on integration, but may be better fostered under conditions of segregation. He argues that the culturally affirming education provided in voluntarily segregated schools may help marginalized students in resisting the discrimination they face in other social spaces (Merry 2005). Knight Abowitz has highlighted the potential for charter schools to serve as ‘counterpublic spaces’ that might allow communities a space to organize education around their own interests and identities. Extending this concept, Wilson (2016) described the public qualities of a potentially ‘counterpublic’ school serving Somali immigrant families; she calls for greater attention to democratic practices within such autonomous schools.

## **Integrating Philosophical Questions with Empirical Evidence**

Many of the philosophical questions and concepts reviewed in this chapter are necessarily connected to empirical evidence about the outcomes of school choice proposals. For example, research on the causes and consequences of sorting and segregation in autonomous schools can valuably inform philosophical debates about the link between choice and equality of opportunity, as well as the democratic experiences made possible in these schools. Yet, while research has assembled important evidence about the *consequences* and *effects* of choice policies, evidence alone cannot resolve normative debates about the appropriate *purposes*, *aims*, and *values* of school choice. Here, philosophical analysis plays a different role than empirical evidence, even though the two are necessarily connected. Working with well-crafted empirical research, philosophy can help to illustrate the *significance* of evidence for claims of justice, democracy, and other aims.

For example, consider the growing body of research demonstrating that charter schools increase segregation by race and class. While there may be evidence of sorting and segregation in charter schools, scholars might draw different conclusions about the significance of this evidence. More empirical research, while certainly necessary, cannot, at least by itself, determine which conclusions to support. However, as empirical research examines links between different choice policies and patterns of segregation, philosophical analysis can ask other questions to help further clarify the values and claims involved. For example, is this sorting an acceptable form of pluralism, as communities create schools around their own ethical

convictions? How might choice policies – even ones that contribute to segregation – reflect an appropriate balance between the rights of parents to choose schools and the need to protect the interests of parents and children who lack access to such choices? In both cases, what values, principles, and criteria do we use in making such judgments?

Such efforts, however, also require that philosophers immerse themselves in the available empirical evidence and political contexts of choice. As Howe (2007) contends, philosophers who engage in policy debates should be “required to take stances in light of the available empirical evidence and the political environment in which the evidence is embedded” (p. 259). A long tradition has emphasized the inseparability of philosophical questions from contexts of educational policy and practice (Ben-Porath 2009; Levinson 1999; Moses 2002; Ruitenberg 2014; Wilson and Santoro 2015). The rapidly expanding, often ideologically driven, development of school choice calls out for a careful integration of empirical research and philosophical analysis. Autonomous schools of choice have created powerful opportunities for many communities, but will continue to raise difficult normative questions related to rights, recognition, and justice.

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# Academic Freedom, the University, and Public Accountability



Zdenko Kodelja

The term ‘academic freedom’ is ambiguous. It is used to denote two different – although connected – things: freedom of the institution and freedom of the individual person. In both cases, we are dealing with freedom, but they are two different sorts of freedom. One is the freedom of the university as an institution, which in modern democratic and liberal societies is most frequently understood as the (relative) independence of the university from the state and economic powers like corporations,<sup>1</sup> and the other is the freedom of the university professors (and other university teachers), their freedom to research, teach, and publish (Diekema 2000, p. 85). Some authors extend the right to academic freedom also to students and teachers in schools,<sup>2</sup> but such an extension is unacceptable for those who claim that

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<sup>1</sup>The term ‘academic freedom’ is used in this sense mostly in Great Britain, while in the United States “it almost invariably refers to the freedom of the individual professor” (*Dictionary of the History of Ideas*. 2003, p. 10).

<sup>2</sup>This idea that the “freedom of the professor to teach is merely one side of the coin of academic freedom, the other side being the freedom of the student to learn”, is German in origin. During the half century preceding the First World War, a close affinity between freedom to teach (*Lehrfreiheit*) and freedom to learn (*Lernfreiheit*) was recognized. In this context, the students’ freedom to learn means that students are free to pursue their own course of study, taking whatever courses they like at whatever university they choose (*Dictionary of the History of Ideas*, p. 11). However, although the term ‘academic freedom’ is here used to denote both indicated freedoms, it is obvious that freedom of the university professor to teach and freedom of students to learn (to choose their courses) are two different kinds of freedom. R. Standler also claims that “it is important to recognize that students do *not* have academic freedom in either Germany or the USA. Students are on campus to learn, *not* to create new knowledge. Even in the case of graduate students who are doing research for their dissertations, the topic and methods are approved and periodically reviewed by professors, which is a level of supervision that would be inappropriate for a professor’s research. Students are *not* colleagues of professors” (Standler 2000). According to Standler, academic free-

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academic freedom applies only to university professors or, in other words, to academics and scholars. In any case, there is no doubt that academic freedom applies to university professors. Therefore, for the purpose of this chapter, I can say that there are two different kinds of academic freedom: the *individual academic freedom* which protects university professors, and the *institutional academic freedom* which mostly protects universities (Standler 2000; Diekema 2000, pp. 85–86). In order to avoid possible misunderstandings provoked by using the term ‘academic freedom’ to mean two different concepts, I will use this term only for denoting individual academic freedom—that is, the freedom of university professors—and the term ‘university autonomy’ for denoting institutional academic freedom. In the first part of this chapter, I am going to justify this terminological distinction by presenting some conceptual differences between university autonomy and academic freedom.

## Academic Freedom and University Autonomy

Conrad Russell describes the essential characteristics of the traditional understanding of academic freedom as the freedom of university professors to search for truth, to question received knowledge, and to put forward “new ideas and controversial or unpopular opinions without placing themselves in jeopardy. It is the freedom to follow a line of research where it leads, regardless of the consequences, and the corresponding freedom to teach the truth as we see it, with suitable acknowledgment of views which differ from our own” (Russell 1993, p. 18). Anthony Diekema also defines academic freedom as an important right of university professors which protects them, within the university, “from all of those forces, both internal and external, which tend to prevent them from” their duty “to attain truth, to teach truth, and to publish truth to the fullest extent of their intellectual powers” (Diekema 2000, p. 85).<sup>3</sup> A similar definition of academic freedom – although not explicitly related to

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dom applies only to university professors. Since it applies only to academics, it does not apply either to students or to teachers in elementary and high schools (*ibid.*), albeit in the USA, academic freedom has sometimes been claimed by high school teachers and students. However, in Germany it is “possible for a school teacher, and even conceivably a school student, to assert *Wissenschaftsfreiheit* (scientific rather than academic freedom). For that right can be claimed by anyone engaged in serious scholarly research and study; it is not confined to academic staff working in universities or other higher education institutions. But it has rarely been claimed outside the context of higher education” (Barendt 2010, pp. 13–14).

<sup>3</sup>Since such interpretations of academic freedom usually include the classical conceptions of truth – as it is defined in the correspondence, coherence, verificationist, or pragmatist theories of truth – they might be problematic for those who favor so-called minimalist (Wright, Putnam, Horwich) or deflationist conceptions of truth (Tarski, Rorty, Nietzsche, Heidegger) and consequently reject the idea of truth as ‘substantive’ metaphysical notion (Engel 2002). Academic freedom understood as a ‘disinterested search for truth’ seems to be problematic also for the defenders of postmodernist views who, like Foucault, think that behind the talk about the disinterested search for truth “lies a will to power, an ideological bias that hides other aims that are all but disinterested” (*ibid.*, p. 2), as well as “that the traditional idea that there could be one true story about the word is not only wrong but obnoxious” (*ibid.*).



the controversial idea of truth – can be found in the UNESCO *Recommendation Concerning the Status of Higher-Education Teaching Personnel*, where it is defined as “the right, without constriction by prescribed doctrine, to freedom of teaching and discussion, freedom in carrying out research and disseminating and publishing the results thereof, freedom to express freely their opinion about the institution or system in which they work, freedom from institutional censorship and freedom to participate in professional or representative academic bodies. All higher-education teaching personnel should have the right to fulfil their functions without discrimination of any kind and without fear of repression by the state or any other source” (UNESCO 1997, point 27).

On the other hand, Diekema defines university autonomy as the right of universities which protects “their corporate autonomy, that is, their freedom from interference by external forces” – such as political authorities, pressure groups, or any other entity which has power in the society – in the affairs of the university as an institution (Diekema 2000, p. 86). University autonomy is here understood as a negative freedom or, in other words, as a relative independence that universities as institutions should have in relation to the state and other external forces. Defined in this way, university autonomy clearly differs from academic freedom which protects freedom of individual professors and not the university as an institution, from external and also internal forces. However, this difference is less clear if we take into consideration the important legal judgment of the US Supreme Court, which gives to universities the freedom to determine for themselves “on academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it should be taught, and who may be admitted to study” (ibid., p. 86).<sup>4</sup> The reason for this lack of clarity lies in the fact that it is not indicated who should, within a university, determine these four freedoms: the university as an institution or university professors? It seems that at least the freedom to determine how something should be taught, if not also the freedom to determine what may be taught, should be included in academic freedom. Such an inclusion would be in accordance with the UNESCO *Recommendation*, where it is stated that university professors “have the right to teach without any interference” and that they “should not be forced to instruct against their own best knowledge and conscience or be forced to use curricula and methods contrary to national and international human rights standards”.<sup>5</sup>

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<sup>4</sup>This formulation of university autonomy has had an impact also on the understanding of this autonomy outside the USA. Moreover, it was directly included in the Statement on Academic Freedom, Ch. 3.

<sup>5</sup>“Higher-education teaching personnel have the right to teach without any interference, subject to accepted professional principles including professional responsibility and intellectual rigour with regard to standards and methods of teaching. Higher-education teaching personnel should not be forced to instruct against their own best knowledge and conscience or be forced to use curricula and methods contrary to national and international human rights standards. Higher-education teaching personnel should play a significant role in determining the curriculum” (UNESCO 1997, point 28). However, the widely accepted claim that university professors should not be forced to teach against their conscience is open to question. An example which shows that this claim is not as unproblematic as it seems to be at first glance is the case of a university professor who argues

An additional argument in favor of the thesis that university autonomy and academic freedom are two different, although connected, forms of freedom can be given on the basis of one of the widely accepted definitions of university autonomy which is stated in the previously mentioned UNESCO *Recommendation*. The autonomy of the university is there defined as “that degree of self-governance necessary for effective decision making by institutions of higher education regarding their academic work, standards, management and related activities consistent with systems of public accountability, especially in respect of funding provided by the state, and respect for academic freedom and human rights” (UNESCO 1997, point 17). In addition, it is stated also that university autonomy is “the institutional form of academic freedom and a necessary precondition to guarantee the proper fulfilment of the tasks entrusted to the” university professors and the universities.<sup>6</sup>

If university autonomy is a necessary condition for academic freedom, it is clear that it cannot be the same as academic freedom.<sup>7</sup> But despite the previously mentioned arguments against the identification of academic freedom with university autonomy, there are some interpretations of academic freedom according to which academic freedom is, in essence, the same as university autonomy.<sup>8</sup> However, if we

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that the requirement of following a human rights code which gives a specific right to the students violates his rights to freedom of conscience, academic freedom, and freedom of speech. It is well known that Jordan Peterson, a professor at the University of Toronto, generated international controversy in 2016 with his public refusal to use gender-neutral pronouns (like ‘they’ or ‘ze’ and ‘zir’, instead of ‘she’ or ‘he’) when referring to transgendered students, in the name of his right to freedom of speech. The critics claim that his rights to academic freedom and free speech are not unlimited and that his refusal is contrary to the rights of those students (guaranteed by Canadian human rights legislation) to equal treatment without discrimination based on their gender identity or expression. On the other hand, his supporters argue that forcing university professors to speak in a particular way does not mean only the infringement of their right to freedom of speech but also to force them to act against their conscience. Since no one should be forced to act contrary to his conscience or be prevented from acting according to his conscience, it follows that also the university professors should have the freedom to act according to their conscience although legal obligations demand otherwise. Therefore, these opposing interpretations (based on good reasons for mutually exclusive alternatives) show that the discussed problem presents a moral dilemma which cannot be resolved without the violation of either the rights of university professors or those of transgendered students.

<sup>6</sup>“Autonomy is the institutional form of academic freedom and a necessary precondition to guarantee the proper fulfilment of the functions entrusted to higher-education teaching personnel and institutions” (UNESCO 1997, point 18).

<sup>7</sup>Finally, academic freedom is not to be identified with university autonomy. Universities are autonomous to the extent that they can set their internal policies with independence from outside influence. Whether they respect academic freedom depends on the character of the policies they set. In practice, university autonomy stands in the same ambiguous relation to academic freedom as national sovereignty stands with respect to human rights: sometimes it protects it from a hostile external environment; sometimes it merely facilitates internal assaults (Green 2003, p. 385).

<sup>8</sup>Such an interpretation is, for instance, included in the argument used in response to the criticism that the draft of the Slovene *Higher Education and Research and Development Activities Act* (2007) reduces the autonomy of the state universities. For, the official argument has been that the draft act does not reduce university autonomy because it guarantees the autonomy of university professors, which is, in essence, *the same as institutional autonomy*. Just the opposite interpreta-

reduce the university autonomy to academic freedom, we lose precisely that which is supposed to ensure academic freedom. This reduction would be problematic even if academic freedom could be secured without university autonomy, on condition that it is true what UNESCO's definition of university autonomy includes, namely, that university autonomy is a necessary precondition for the fulfillment of the role which a university has in addition to that of ensuring academic freedom (UNESCO 1997, point 18).

Furthermore, the assertion that university autonomy is a necessary condition for academic freedom also allows us to point out that it is not sufficient. Medieval universities, for instance, had substantial autonomy,<sup>9</sup> but academic freedom of their professors was very limited. "The scholar was free to teach and write only within the framework of an accepted doctrine, and was always liable to charges of heresy and subversion. Even if he had felt subjectively free, having been in agreement with basic tenets of the existing religious and social order, he was not objectively so, since he could not go beyond those limits" (Ben-David and Collins 1966, p. 222). Academic freedom of university professors was at that time, as well as later on, limited also regarding their conduct of research. Even though some university professors think that their (our) main task as researchers "is to do research for its own sake" (Rescher 1965, pp. 261–276) there is no doubt that the conduct of research is limited by the available financial resources,<sup>10</sup> as well as by the legal requirements and the norms of research ethics.<sup>11</sup>

However, in spite of such examples which confirm the thesis that even a high level of university autonomy is not enough for guaranteeing academic freedom of their professors, university autonomy is still often justifiably defended on the grounds that university autonomy is a necessary condition for academic freedom. For this reason, university autonomy is in some countries such a highly appreciated value that it is guaranteed by their constitutions. However, if we look at these legal formulations of university autonomy more closely, we can see that at least in some

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tion of academic freedom, which reduces academic freedom to university autonomy, we can find in the decision of the Federal Court in [Virginia](#) when it "ruled that professors have no academic freedom; *all* academic freedom resides with the university".

<sup>9</sup>The result of the fight of the medieval universities for their independence was that they became to a considerable extent autonomous institutions, that is, legally self-governing corporations, protected by royal charters or papal bulls. They had the freedom to appoint their own professors, control admissions, and establish their own organization of study and standards for graduation (Le Goff 1985, pp. 73–133).

<sup>10</sup>Academic research cannot be unlimited because it mostly depends on money which "plays a crucial role in deciding whether a particular problem will be studied, who will study it, how it will be studied, and even whether the results will be published" (Shamoo and Resnik 2009, pp. 5–6). Especially when research is financed by private funds, "the main reason for investing money in research" is "the prospect of profit" (*ibid.*, p. 6) and not to do research for its own sake.

<sup>11</sup>Among the principles for ethical conduct in research are, for instance, honesty, objectivity, openness, trust, confidentiality, respect for research subjects, social responsibility, and so on (*ibid.*, p. 28–29). Such ethical principles not only restrict academic freedom but also protect it because they prove to the public that research – conducted in accordance with ethical principles – is trustworthy and accountable.

of them it is not defined as something which has value in itself, but only as having predominantly an instrumental value. This means that university autonomy is not understood as an aim, but rather as a means for achieving academic freedom, which is itself protected by the constitutions of some of these countries.

On the other hand, also academic freedom as an end is sometimes understood as a means to an even higher end, that is, the *search for truth*.<sup>12</sup> This is not surprising at all if we take into consideration that “the conventional justification of academic freedom”, as Ronald Dworkin stresses, “treats academic freedom as instrumental in the discovery of truth. According to this view”, he says, “a system of independent academic institutions and scholars who are independent within them provides the best chance of collectively reaching the truth about a wide range of matters, from science to art to politics. We have a better chance of discovering what is true,” those who support this view declare, “if we leave our academics and their institutions free from external control to the greatest degree possible” (Dworkin 1996, p. 185).<sup>13</sup>

Dworkin sees in this conventional defense of academic freedom the influence of the argument, “that truth emerges best from a marketplace of ideas from which no opinion is excluded”, used by John Stuart Mill in his well-known defense of freedom of speech.<sup>14</sup> Although Dworkin admits that the search for truth in the university can be more successful when university professors are “free from either political control or the dominion of commerce”, he argues that this conventional defense of academic freedom as necessary for the search for truth is not enough. He is persuaded that the defense of academic freedom should not be based only on epistemological grounds, but also on ethical ones. He sees the ethical grounds in the ideal of ethical individualism which supports academic freedom “not just as a wise

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<sup>12</sup>Nevertheless, the free search for truth as the aim of academic freedom is mostly related to the research that university professors do simply because a new truth must be discovered first, and only after that can it be published or involved in teaching. Moreover, university professors can publish texts which do not include new truths and their teaching is quite often nothing more than the transmission of certain old and widely accepted truths. In this context, the search for truth has been understood neither as a search for a religious, revealed truth nor “for an ultimate truth for all time, but a contestable truth that could be countered and superseded when new and better knowledge was proposed” (Williams 2016, p. 14).

<sup>13</sup>But such an understanding of academic freedom (which presupposes the idea that freedom of university professors is a necessary condition for discovering objective truth) is now under challenge because “the very possibility of objective truth is itself under challenge” from the postmodernist, relativist and other critics (Dworkin 1996, p. 183). One of the consequences of these critics was “the collapse of truth within humanities and social science disciplines”, which began a few decades ago and “had a devastating and enduring impact upon the pursuit and transmission of knowledge and the meaning and purpose of academic freedom” (Williams 2016, p. 46).

<sup>14</sup>Mill’s main arguments for preserving freedom of speech can be summarized as: (1) If any opinion is suppressed, the suppressed opinion might be true. To deny this is the same as assuming our own infallibility. (2) Even if the suppressed opinion is false, it may contain an element of truth. Since the general opinion is rarely if ever the whole truth, the only way of finding the missing true element, which can supply the whole truth, is to permit the false opinions to be heard. (3) Even if the prevailing opinion is the whole truth, if it is not permitted to be questioned, it will be the prejudice, that is, a belief without a rational ground (Mill 1985, pp. 115–116).

environment for academic discovery, but as encouragement of and protection for the primacy of individual conviction” (Dworkin 1996, pp. 187–188).

This ethical justification of academic freedom shows ethical importance of academic freedom, but it does not deny the value of epistemological justification for academic freedom, which is widely considered to be a right: a right of university professors to freedom of research, teaching, and publishing. In the second part of this chapter, I am going to limit my short and incomplete analysis to two topics which are directly connected to one of these three constitutive elements of academic freedom, that is, to freedom of university professors to publish. The first topic is freedom to publish as a special right; the second can be illustrated with two questions: What can university professors say and what should they say in a public debate?

## Academic Freedom and the Right to Publish

I have already mentioned that the freedom of university professors to publish is usually considered to be a right. Since this right is obviously related to a well-known general right to free speech, which is one of the basic human rights, it seems that academic freedom is “just the application of that more general right to the special case of academic institutions” (ibid., p. 184). However, according to Dworkin such an interpretation “would obscure much that is special about academic freedom” (ibid.). Academic freedom, for instance, does not apply to everyone. It applies only to certain people and certain contexts, that is, to university professors in universities. Free speech, on the contrary, is a moral right – and in many countries also a legal right – that everyone has. Everyone is entitled to freedom of speech, including university professors, but they are, in contrast with other people, also subject to greater restrictions and entitled to “further protections associated with their roles” (Green 2003, p. 385). Academic freedom is therefore “a matter of *special rights*, not general rights” (ibid.). Or more precisely, it is, as says Leslie Green, “a matter of role-related special rights”, that is, the rights which only those who act in particular roles possess. In this sense, parents have a special right to guide and discipline their children, “police to arrest, judges to decide, parliamentarians to legislate, and so forth” (ibid., p. 386). Since the academic role of university professors is to do research, to teach and publish, they have a special right to academic freedom. Their right to publish has been traditionally understood as a right to full freedom in the publication of the results discovered by study and research (*Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure* 1940, Art. 1).<sup>15</sup> As such, this right is much more

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<sup>15</sup>University professors “should be free to publish the results of research and scholarship in books, journals and databases of their own choice and under their own names, provided they are the authors or co-authors of the above scholarly works” (UNESCO 1997, point 12).

limited than their right to freedom of speech that they have as citizens.<sup>16</sup> But the question is whether the limit to the freedom of expression of university professors when participating in public debate should be “over and above what applies to all citizens?” (Van Parijs 2004, p. 6). Although many academics agree that they should not be more restricted on what they can say in public debate than they are as citizens, it seems that they accept special obligations that are imposed on them because of their special position in society. The reason for such an assumption lies, for instance, in the 1940 *Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure*, accepted by the American Association of University Professors and the Association of American Colleges, where it is stated that university professors “are citizens, members of a learned profession, and officers of an educational institution. When they speak or write as citizens, they should be free from institutional censorship or discipline, but their special position in the community imposes special obligations. As scholars and educational officers, they should remember that the public may judge their profession and their institution by their utterances. Hence they should at all times be accurate, should exercise appropriate restraint, should show respect for the opinions of others, and should make every effort to indicate that they are not speaking for the institution” (*Statement of Principles on Academic Freedom and Tenure* 1940, Art. 3).

## Academic Freedom and Academic Duty

To say that university professors have a right to publish is to say that they have *no duty not* to publish. This means that they, as holders of this right, are free to do something in the sense of nonforbiddance. In this case, it is not important if university professors are able to do what they are free to do. The only important thing is that they are not disallowed to publish and publicly express their views. But despite this clear definition of this right as a liberty right, it remains unclear whether or not this right means only that university professors have no duty not to publish, or it also means that he has no duty to publish. The real question here is not – as it might seem at a first glance – whether university professors have a right not to publish at all and being in spite of this fact a professor at the university. For, the answer to this question is already known at least in developed, contemporary, and more and more competitive societies and universities where all university professors are more or less in a situation which can be well described with the famous slogan: publish or perish! Therefore, the right question is rather if university professors are free in a sense of

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<sup>16</sup>The *Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms*, for example, stipulates that the exercise of the right to freedom of expression “may be subject to such formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary in a democratic society, in the interest of national security, territorial integrity or public safety, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, for the protection of the reputation or rights of others, for preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence, or for maintaining the authority and impartiality of the judiciary” (Art. 10.2).



having discretion over whether to publish or not such things that they believe to be important and true and, at the same time, would have undesirable consequences for them if they were published.<sup>17</sup> The answer is yes, if we ask whether they can decide to publish them or not. They are certainly free to choose what to do. But on the other hand, the answer might be just the opposite, namely, that university professors in such a case are not really free to choose to publish them or not, if the point in question were the following: Should the wish to avoid such undesirable consequences for university professors have priority over their moral duty to tell the truth?

The answer, given by Philippe Van Parijs, is negative. “Many research results, when thrown into the public debate, may have undesirable consequences”, he says, “but this is a small cost to pay for the benefit of being able to trust that, whenever academics speak out, they utter statements they genuinely believe to be true, rather than statements the uttering of which they believe will have good consequences for themselves, their audience or whatever other group. The painful truths, those which politicians and journalists” would not like to be topics in public debate, “are precisely those which academics have a special responsibility to state and emphasize” (Van Parijs 2004, p. 9).

University professors have, therefore, a special responsibility, a special moral duty which Van Parijs explains by using a comparison with the duty that doctors have. “In the same way as a doctor has a duty to act when he sees a person collapsing in the street, (...), an academic who, owing to his specific competence, is particularly well placed to detect and assess the first sign of a major danger, has a duty to speak out. Whether about the side effects of using asbestos in buildings or about the loss of biodiversity, whether about the swelling of the public debt or about the consolidation of urban ghettos, academics can legitimately be criticized for not making the effort and taking the time to warn decision makers and the general public before it is too late” (ibid., p. 10). Even more, he is persuaded that it is not enough that academics do their duty to speak out only when they assess the first sight of a major danger. They should intervene in public also when they think that they “can usefully contribute, by pointing to crucial facts which may otherwise go unnoticed or by explaining relevant connections which may otherwise be given inadequate attention, or in any other way that may help avoid errors and confusions” (ibid., p. 9). However, even this is not enough. For, according to Van Parijs, they

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<sup>17</sup>The answer to this question can be either negative or affirmative, depending on the chosen ethical approach. For a nonconsequentialist, who thinks that it is wrong in itself to not tell the truth (not publish something that a professor believes to be true and important for academics or the general public), the answer is negative. For a consequentialist, who thinks that professors should not publish such things if this has better consequences than there would be if they published them, the answer is affirmative. However, if a greater harm is done by not publishing, then professors, who in spite of this greater harm do not publish them (because this has better consequences for themselves), should be judged as blameworthy. In this case, greater harm implies greater blame and vice versa. On the other hand, professors may be regarded as worthy of more blame for not publishing when the gravity of the harmful consequences that would befall the professors if they published is lesser. In this case, a lesser risk of harm implies greater blame. Therefore, professors are blameworthy in proportion to the gravity of the harm that is done by their acts.



must always, when they intervene, whether to ward off major disasters or for any minor purpose, say nothing but what they believe to be the truth (*ibid.*).<sup>18</sup> And the opposite, it is morally unacceptable and shameful for scholars to say anything they do not believe – or refrain from saying what they do believe – because of benefits they may thereby be able to get or penalties they may thereby be able to avoid. Van Parijs admits that doing so in extreme cases is excusable,<sup>19</sup> but nevertheless harmful to the dignity of the status that scholars have. On the contrary, those scholars “who are willing to put at risk some of the comforts of their status”, some attractive “contracts or promotion prospects, or even their very career, because” they feel “the duty to publicly express, deserve” in his opinion “more than our respect”, they deserve “our admiration and our praise” even if “only few of us agree with the content of what is being asserted” (*ibid.*, pp. 10–11).<sup>20</sup>

Indeed, such scholars really deserve our respect, admiration, and praise, especially if they – as it is supposed in the context of the previously described understanding of the duty to speak out in public debate – do not limit their interventions to their area of expertise. For, in such cases, academic freedom does not protect university professors. It is supposed that they are in such cases – when they publish or publicly express their opinions which are not seen as the results of their research – protected as citizens who have a right to freedom of speech. But, unfortunately, this is not always true. One of the most famous cases, which proves that it is so, is the case of Bertrand Russell, who lost his job at Trinity College, Cambridge, in 1916 for his anti-war protests and then again in 1940 at The City College of New York, where he was teaching mathematical logic, for his views on marriage, contraception, and morals (Russell 1993, p. 24).

It seems, therefore, that academics who feel a duty to publicly express their views in order to protest injustice or other wrongs sometimes cannot do their moral duty without engaging in civil disobedience<sup>21</sup> and suffering the consequences of

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<sup>18</sup>Dworkin also emphasizes that university professors have a moral duty to discover and tell what they believe to be the truth. In his opinion, “scholars exist for that, and only for that” (Dworkin 1996, p. 190).

<sup>19</sup>For him such cases are those “in which a person’s life prospects or a whole family’s material or physical security are at stake” (*ibid.*, p. 11). But these extreme cases are the exceptions that prove the rule: professors ought to tell only what they believe to be the truth when they intervene in public. This is their moral duty. Looking from the deontological or nonconsequentialist perspective, they should not lie (say something they do not believe) because this is morally wrong in itself, and not just wrong because it has bad consequences (the harm done to the dignity of the status that professors have).

<sup>20</sup>Nevertheless, if such acts surpass what academic duty requires, then they should be treated as supererogatory acts, that is, as acts that it would be good to do, but not wrong not to do. In this case, university professors are free to do such acts or to omit them. Consequently, professors are praiseworthy for committing these acts but not blameworthy for not committing them.

<sup>21</sup>Rawls defines disobedience as “a public, nonviolent, conscientious yet political act contrary to law usually done with the aim of bringing about a change in the law or policies of the government” (Rawls 1971, p. 364).

breaking the law.<sup>22</sup> This is of course a high price that only very few academics are prepared to pay. However, such a duty transcends what is ordinarily understood as a responsibility of university professors or, in other words, their accountability.

## Public Accountability

Public accountability of professors and universities is normally seen as the other side of their academic freedom. However, the question is: to whom are they accountable and how is their accountability to be discharged? It is generally accepted that professors and universities are accountable to their students and funding bodies (public or private) for the effective and excellent conduct of their teaching and research activities, and for the efficient and proper use of the financial resources at their disposal. On the other hand, during the last three or four decades, university accountability has been widely seen as the replacement of the supposedly diminishing trust in the university by the objective assessment of its performance. As a result of the impact of the prevalent neoliberal policies in many countries, “the quest for greater accountability has increased” and, according to Onora O’Neill, this “new accountability culture” – “which is promoted as the way to reduce untrustworthiness” of universities – “aims at ever more perfect administrative control” of universities (O’Neill 2007, pp. 45–46). The performance of universities and their professors “is monitored and subjected to quality control and quality assurance. The idea of *audit* has been exported from its original financial context to cover more detailed scrutiny of non-financial processes and systems. Performance indicators are used to measure adequate and inadequate performance”. This new accountability “has often displaced or marginalized older systems of accountability. In the universities, external examiners lost influence as centrally planned teaching quality assessment was imposed, [...] universities are judged and funded by their rankings in league tables of performance indicators. Managerial accountability for achieving targets is also imposed on” universities “although they are given little institutional freedom. Universities are

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<sup>22</sup> Much more controversial are those cases when university professors in the name of academic freedom – which in some countries, such as the USA, covers one part of a wider freedom of speech that all citizens enjoy – use hate speech that insults or offends members of some racial, ethnic, and religious groups or publish “particularly controversial or unacceptable opinions, say, on the intelligence of different ethnic groups or on the Holocaust” (Barendt 2010, p. 13). The problem is that although such misuse of freedom of speech seems to be morally unacceptable, it is not clear whether universities are entitled to discipline such “professors because they regard their speech” (articles in newspapers, blogs, etc.) – on issues of public concern outside their scientific disciplines and expertise – “as irresponsible and as damaging to university reputation or standing in the community” (ibid., p. 295). On the other hand, inside the university, universities are obligated to guarantee freedom of speech ‘within the law’, while “they can forbid a meeting if it is clear that the speaker is going to incite crime, infringe public order legislation, use threatening (or other) language intended or likely to cause racial or religious hatred, or in some other way to break the law” (ibid., 282).

supposedly still autonomous, but they have little choice but to cut or close departments with a lower research rating who lose their funding” (ibid., pp. 47–48).<sup>23</sup>

However, the claim that trust should be replaced by accountability is unconvincing because – as O’Neill stresses – “we cannot have *any* form of accountability without *some* forms of trust. Those who recommend the increased oversight, monitoring of standards, recording of performance outcomes, sanctioning of poor performance and tighter contractual relations required by various contemporary forms of accountability have not miraculously discovered forms of accountability that work without trust. Rather they invite us to trust both certain complex, indeed arcane, processes of monitoring, inspecting and controlling that are introduced in the name of accountability, and those who impose them” (O’Neill 2013, p. 10). Therefore, the question which remains is whether we have good reasons to trust the systems of accountability provided by the external institutions such as national quality assurance agencies.

## Concluding Remarks

Academic freedom and autonomy of universities are still treated as ideals. As such, they are stressed also in the *Magna Charta Universitatum Europaeum*, adopted by university rectors in Bologna in 1988. However, in the last three or four decades, both of them have been considerably diminished in many countries because of the implementation of some measures inspired by neoliberal ideas. In Europe, this process – which is now going on in many countries – started in the UK when the Thatcher government decided to put increasing emphasis on the responsibilities of universities to contribute to national economic and social progress and on their accountability to the public. The other side of this increased importance of the instrumental value of knowledge is the diminished importance of the pursuit of knowledge for its own sake. On the other hand, as a result of neoliberal politics, the quest for greater accountability has increased and, according to O’Neill, this new accountability culture – which is promoted as the way to reduce the perceived untrustworthiness of universities and other public institutions – aims at ever more perfect administrative control of universities. This claim for greater accountability of universities shows that although universities are recognized as autonomous institutions, they are not seen as trustworthy, that is, as institutions that are trusted to be able and willing to assure the expected quality and efficiency of higher education by themselves. Consequently, quality assurance agencies at national and European level have been established. Nevertheless, it seems to me that their establishment – which was supposed to improve the trust in universities – significantly contributes to the decline of university authority and autonomy even if it improves the quality and efficiency of universities.

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<sup>23</sup>Cf. O. O’Neill 2015, pp. 109–117.

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# Social Media, Digital Technology, and Education: Personalized Learning and Questions of Autonomy, Authority, and Public/Community



Heather Greenhalgh-Spencer

Recent innovations in the use of digital technology in the classroom have given rise to multiple philosophical questions about the purposes of education, the nature of teaching and learning, and relationships between students, teachers, and the world. Multiple philosophers of education have examined questions that are increasingly salient with the rise of digital technology in the schools: questions around networking, the social self, autonomy, authority, and change (Standish and Blake 2000). There are many philosophical standpoints from which to analyze these technological changes. Posthumanist philosophers have foregrounded the ways that digital technology calls attention to new understandings of what counts as human, and the ways that these new understandings of human-nonhuman relationships open up new spaces for teaching and learning. Ferrando (2013) argues that digital technology invokes the metaphor of the transhuman; she further calls attention to the ways that transhumanism offers new metaphors of pedagogical relationships. Scharff (2013), likewise, call attention to the ways that new media and new technologies reframe our understanding of humanity, theories of mind, and relationships with nonhumans. New media and digital technology draw new lines around and new purposes for education and democratic citizenship (McCarthy et al. 2011). New philosophies of technology also invite us to consider ecosophy and the connections between consumption, technological use, and our impact on the planet (Greenhalgh 2014). There are philosophers who have called attention to the ways that digital technology may (Taylor 2016) or may not (Farber and Metro-Roland 2014) create a new understanding of ‘presence’ in the classroom.

Philosophic inquiry into the connections between digital technology and education often relies on the idea that everyone has equal access to digital technology; and as some philosophers have noted, this is not the case. While access to the internet is,

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increasingly, a global phenomenon, there are many philosophers who remind us that access to the internet and use of social media—for anything, including educational ends—are uneven (Greenhalgh-Spencer 2015; Tomalty 2017; Akamai 2016). There are countries with high-speed access to the internet and pervasive use of social media sites. There are other countries where use of sites like Facebook is ‘a luxury’ (Wyche et al. 2013). There are many philosophical standpoints from which to negotiate the intersection of digital technology and schooling.

For the sake of space, in this chapter I foreground three key philosophical concepts: *autonomy*, *authority*, and the notion of *a public* or *community*. In order to give concrete examples of how these philosophical questions play out, I use *personalized learning* (PL) as an example where digital technology and social media interact with the practices of schooling and the changing landscape of ideologies, policies, and practices of education. PL makes a good case study for the exploration of autonomy, authority, and community because PL represents itself (in some ways, brands itself) as a method of learning that exists within a school policy landscape that relies on the authority of standardized tests, and yet PL fosters a practice that is meant to generate more autonomy for students and a greater sense of community embeddedness. Thus, I draw attention to the ways that autonomy, authority, and public/community emerge within PL contexts.

I acknowledge, up front, that the PL examples I use in this chapter come from Europe, the UK, Australia, and the USA. Context matters; it should be noted that my examples come from places where most schools have access to high-speed internet (even if not all of the students in the school have access to high-speed internet at home). I also acknowledge that the practice of PL—like any educational practice—is uneven. I have intentionally tried to find examples of the ‘best cases’ of PL in practice; and I largely take the practice of PL ‘at its word’—so to speak—in order to dive into the philosophical questions that emerge when a pedagogical practice is trying to create autonomy and community in a schooling system that is driven by authority. I begin the chapter by defining PL and describing three key components of PL: data-driven instruction, student agency, and the use of social media sites (SMS) to create social connections. I then flesh out some of the questions that a philosophical orientation opens regarding autonomy, authority, and privacy in PL contexts.

## What Is Personalized Learning?

Personalized learning (PL) is a new model of teaching and learning that attempts to disrupt traditional models of schooling. It has gained in popularity as both media outlets and monetary investors have rushed to proclaim PL as a ‘disruptive innovation’ that will change the face of education. Multiple news outlets have reported on the turn to PL in education. A news story from *CNN* (Simon 2016) reported that PL would become the learning of the future. A report by the European Commission (2016) touted PL as a modality of learning that would facilitate learning for *all*. A

report by Britain's Undersecretary of State for Schools (2014) argued for the increase of PL in Britain's schools. The Gates Foundation (2010) has promoted PL as a way to allow students to be more engaged in their own learning and to learn concepts in both greater depth and breadth. In fact, the Gates Foundation (2016) has given millions of dollars to the development of PL as a pedagogical strategy. Mark Zuckerberg, the founder of Facebook, has also given over 100 million USD to promote PL on a global scale (Cutler 2015).

While PL can mean different things to different people (Redding 2013; Zmuda et al. 2015), it is often described as a type of learning where students take 'ownership' of their own learning. Students use digital and social technology to be autonomous learners and to connect with classmates and community members—forging both community-based and global connections—in order to accomplish student-initiated learning goals. Teachers use the data that is generated through online and computer-based student (inter)actions, as well as standardized and mandated assessments, in order to develop personalized learning plans for each student. Learning becomes more data-driven as teachers harvest the data generated through the use of digital technology in order to create instruction that is targeted to the needs of each student. The primary goal of PL is to create autonomous learners who drive their own learning, set their own goals, work at their own pace, and use their own interests to guide personalized education pathways. It is important to note that PL practitioners and researchers situate PL within a context of neoliberal schooling policy. PL is trying to find balance between the political supremacy of standardized tests and accountability movements while also providing student-centered and even student-driven models of teaching and learning.

PL is facilitated by three key foci: data-driven instruction (DDI), student agency, and the use of social media sites (SMS) to create connections to a global public or community. In order to flesh out the ways that autonomy, authority, and privacy become meaningful in PL, it is important to flesh out these PL practices more fully.

## What Is DDI?

Data-driven instruction (DDI) involves the active use of multiple data sources, by both teacher and student, in order to facilitate decisions about student strengths, student weaknesses, and future pathways toward learning. The literature on DDI tends to focus on the use of quantitative and validated measures as sources of data. For example, Gregory and Kuzmich (2014) argue for DDI that includes the use of state-mandated tests (ITEST, PARCC, STAAR), nationally validated tests (NWEA MAP), and other cross-validated measures. In addition to these tests, teachers should also use district level tests, curriculum-based formative and summative assessments, and even daily quizzes. Data-driven instruction is a practice, a philosophy, and a 'mindset' (Gregory and Kuzmich 2014). DDI acquiesces to the neoliberal push for quantitative measures of achievement—achievement defined as high scores on standardized tests. However, DDI is also the backbone—the



authority—by which students can make their own decisions. So, for example, a student can use the data to advocate for herself/himself in order to find learning pathways that are more interesting to the student.

In addition to written exams and evaluations, there is a strong focus on the use of data gathered from computer programs that students use for learning. Koedinger et al. (2013) argue for the use of software programs that generate rich data on each student. Many learning programs gather information not only on how many questions a student gets right or wrong but also on how much time a student took to come up with an answer and how many ‘attempts’ a student needed before she/he got the answer correct. Intelligent learning systems adapt to the needs of the student, track concept mastery, and also track where there was a pause, interpreted as a student hesitating (Koedinger et al. 2013). This allows the teacher to infer things like whether or not a student is struggling with a given concept and can even be used to infer things like the level of student ‘grit’ or perseverance.

In PL contexts, both teachers and students discuss the data and then use the data to create personalized pathways toward ‘mastery’. Students and teachers come up with a plan that will allow the student to name areas of weakness and then create goals and work flows that are aimed at improving those areas of weakness. At these personal conferences, a teacher and student will also talk about student’s strengths and then set goals and work flows that will enable the student to go beyond the traditional curriculum in ways that are interesting and meaningful to the student. Student data informs student and teacher choices; this requires a high level of data literacy—particularly for the teacher—but for the student as well.

Mandinach and Jackson (2012) argue that DDI necessitates a high degree of data literacy. It is imperative for teachers to know the strengths, weaknesses, and affordances of each data source so that a rich picture of the student’s needs is created. For example, it becomes important for teachers to understand what the NWEA MAP test can tell you about a student and what it cannot tell you. PL teachers must use learning analytics tools. These tools allow teachers to “make use of data in their courses to monitor and predict student performance” (Dietz-Uhler and Hurn 2013). In fact, there are DDI scholars who see enormous potential in harnessing the power of all of these data streams in order to facilitate educational data mining (EDM) that would allow for better analysis on individual, school, district, state, and national levels (Romero and Ventura 2013).

In many ways, the quantitative data that is gathered as part of DDI tends to conflate ‘learning’ with competency or achievement on tests or quizzes. This form of data fits neatly within neoliberal discourses around what counts as learning and the purposes of schooling as a measure of accountability toward the specific skills. However, this is not the only form of data collection. Most PL teachers also talk about ‘data’ that is collected from their personal interviews with students, observations about students, conversations with students’ family members, and student ‘learning journals’. There are qualitative components to DDI as well. The choice to refer to these personal conversations as ‘data’ validates neoliberal discourses—plays the game of neoliberalism—while also creating space for these personal interactions to ‘count’ as one of the necessary practices of schooling.

DDI and data literacy form only part of the equation of PL. Student agency is also imperative in PL contexts: the idea that students should drive their own learning.

## What Is Student Agency?

For many PL scholars (e.g., Lindgren and McDaniel 2012), student agency is even more important than data-driven instruction and data literacy. Student agency involves both knowledge and choice, as well as ‘ownership’ of the learning process. Students must be informed about where they stand vis-à-vis the school standards; they must also be informed about the various and multiple pathways toward using what they know and taking it beyond traditional schooling expectations. As Wise (2014) points out, this means that both students and teachers must be trained to read and analyze data. Students are taught to use data to set goals, reflect on their progress, and become an informed partner—with their teacher—in the learning process. Student data literacy becomes a necessary component of informed choice, but the data is meant to be in service to empowering the student to actively guide his/her own education.

If we take PL at its intention, then PL allows the student to have the authority to guide their own learning, to make choices about when, how, and what they learn. The data, and the ability to point to the data as ‘evidence’ of why a student is making specific choices, provides the student with an authoritative voice. The student speaks in the language of data, competency, and accountability and yet leverages that language to create more autonomy for herself/himself. To a certain extent, this choice is limited as even many PL schools are required to comply with state-mandated tests and expectations. However, there are some PL schools that have negotiated a cessation of school accountability measures. In those schools, students can push against school standards and expectations; they can question what counts as knowledge and why. Students have a far wider degree of autonomy. One of the issues, though, is that these schools are only given a cessation of accountability for a time. The schools need to ‘prove’ that their unorthodox measures are leading to educational gains. Yet, the accepted ‘proof’ of success is still performance on standardized tests. There is a mismatch between the aims of the more autonomous PL schools and the accountability culture that only accepts quantitative data and test achievement as a measure of success.

Student agency can take many forms in practice. It can involve personal interviews with the teacher about current and future goals. It can involve the keeping of a goal journal where the student takes a moment each day to review previous goals, track progress, and set new goals—with or without the teacher’s help. It can include students correcting their own tests or assignments and then using that information to decide what they need to do for the rest of the week. The teacher and student work together to define important projects, and the student exercises agency over how those projects are to be accomplished. Students keep track of their own progress on

various projects or assignments. In many classes, students may also be required to post their progress on a class data board. This allows the student to see what progress they have made toward meeting their goals. It also allows them to see how they compare to others in the classroom.

The idea behind ‘student agency’ is to create an empowered student who can interact with the teacher and others in the class, but who can also be responsible for their own learning both inside and outside of the classroom. The goal is to create a student who knows how to learn, knows how to find challenges, and knows how to move beyond the constraints of a curriculum focused on getting everyone in the class to a minimal level of competency. This is, admittedly, a limited definition of agency. However, advocacy for any form of student agency in the school pushes against the neoliberal discourses of accountability through standardization and quantitative data from state-mandated tests. As a student in the PL classroom, you work with the teacher to decide whether to go back and relearn difficult concepts or whether to move onto creating your own project that will allow you to apply what you have learned or move on to some other concept entirely. You take assessments when you feel ready. You explore the questions that are intriguing to you. As long as your choices are supported by data—your data—you can choose how, when, where, and what to learn.

Data is a key component of student agency. Quantification of the self (the quantified self) becomes indispensable to the empowerment of the student agent. There are many who argue that the move toward data is a move toward neo-Taylorism and neoliberalism (Moore and Robinson 2016). While I resonate with the argument that the move toward the quantified self is a move toward neo-Taylorism, the reality is more complex than that. Quantification of the self not only has the potential to turn humans into datafied objects, it also has the potential to allow students to speak back and counter traditional voices of authority. Discourses of neoliberalism are connected to discourses of quantification of human capacity. When the student has the ability to leverage this language in order to create more agency and choice, the student is ‘playing’ the game of neoliberalism, while also opening pathways toward greater student autonomy. Students speak using the language of neoliberalism to advocate for more choice and agency in where, how, when, and what they learn. Students become agents—more fully subjects—because they feel empowered to give voice to what they want and need. They give voice to these wants and needs using the very language (quantification) that tends to concretize the traditional power relationships and, in this way, disrupt traditional power relationships. The goal behind arming students with the ability to understand and track their own data is to empower the student to speak back to the teacher and the school system and to make choices on their own.

In addition to DDI and student agency, the use of social media sites (SMS) to facilitate connections to local and global communities, and to promote public engagement, is also key to PL.

## How Are SMS Used in PL Contexts?

Social media sites (SMS), such as Facebook, Twitter, Pinterest, Instagram, etc., are commonly used in PL contexts because PL advocates both for the creation of outward connections and the development of twenty-first-century skills (Beetham and Sharpe 2013; Ravenscroft et al. 2012). Multiple PL scholars (e.g., Mao 2014; Dabbagh and Kitsantas 2012) argue that students must learn how to use SMS so that students can better drive their own learning, find their own knowledge, and connect with others on both a community and global level. The use of SMS involves several different practices in PL contexts.

For many PL students, the use of SMS is part of their ‘individualized pathways’ toward learning goals. Students must find knowledge that is relevant to group projects or personalized assignments; and students use SMS to find experts who might be willing to help them with knowledge needed to complete learning projects. Students reach out to members of their community, parents’ colleagues, teachers’ colleagues, and even people they’ve seen on TED Talks or other online presentations to gather information that is necessary for completion of assignments. PL instructors guide students on how to use SMS to create connections both with people they know and people with whom they are only marginally connected. This practice provides students with multiple opportunities to use SMS to make connections with the adult world. PL teachers see this as a chance to foster ‘networking’ and communication skills. PL teachers also see this practice as a chance to guide students toward the ability to find information for themselves using online search engines, as well as digital connections to others. Some PL classes guide students toward group projects with students in another class, and SMS are used to facilitate group work. Finally, PL teachers often require the use of SMS because they see this as a chance to help students develop ‘twenty-first-century skills’ like the ability to competently navigate online spaces. While PL focuses inherently on the individual, and personalized goals and learning pathways, it is also common to make sure that students are still connected to the idea of a community—a public. Furthermore, PL advocates for the idea that learning happens both inside and outside of the classroom. SMS promote the idea that learning is ubiquitous, that learning happens in the classroom, in the museum, in the home, in the street, and SMS are there to document and facilitate the learning that happens regardless of location.

Thus, SMS fulfill four requirements of the PL experience: they enable students to find out information for themselves by connecting to and conversing with experts outside of the classroom, they enable students to engage with others (other classmates, community members, global citizens) on meaningful projects, they facilitate the development of twenty-first-century skills, and they facilitate the practice of ubiquitous learning and ubiquitous documentation of that learning.

Key PL practices—DDI, student agency, and SMS usage—are meant to guide toward better learning. Approaching PL from the stance of a philosopher opens up multiple questions about the learning process, including: how does PL facilitate

autonomy? What counts as autonomy, and why does autonomy matter in a PL classroom environment? How much autonomy is possible within schooling spaces that are shaped by public and policy notions of accountability and authority?

## Potential Questions of Autonomy

There are multiple ways to think about autonomy and how definitions of autonomy intersect with PL. For the sake of space, I will highlight two key philosophical arguments around autonomy: that autonomy is necessary for human flourishing and that autonomy requires informed and voluntary action. I start with the assumption that autonomy, flourishing, and voluntary action will look different within the context of children in school rather than adults in the public sphere. Nevertheless, these concepts are useful for thinking about current technology-in-schooling practices such as PL.

Concomitant with PL's goal of facilitating student agency and autonomy, there are multiple philosophers who argue for autonomy as necessary for the development of human capacity and human flourishing. Benson (2013) argues that autonomy is absolutely necessary for a good education, in both the sense of creating a good human life (moral, ethical) and fostering a good human experience (flourishing). Benson (2013) writes: "autonomy is not a method of learning, but an attribute of the learner's approach to the learning process", and he argues this autonomous approach to learning is necessary for deeper understanding to occur (p. 2). Brighouse (2003) foregrounds the ways that schooling is necessary *because* it enables the process of becoming an autonomous person. Mill, too, believes that autonomy is the highest goal because it is the primary promoter of a good life and a good society. Mill (1859/1966) writes: "the free development of individuality is one of the leading essentials of well-being; that it is not only a co-ordinate element with all that is designated by the terms civilization, instruction, education, culture, but is itself a necessary part and condition of all those things" (3.2). Mill (1859/1966) further argues: "The human faculties of perception, judgment, discriminative feeling, mental activity, and even moral preference, are exercised only in making a choice" (3.3).

PL is embedded in the belief that it is through autonomy, individuality, and agency that students are able to become more fully themselves, that they are able to live the good life and 'practice' for continuing to live the good life into adulthood. While PL practitioners would likely find themselves in agreement with the philosophies of Mill and others, in practice, the facilitation of autonomy is a difficult process. PL schools are often still required to take state and district mandated standardized tests. What should a PL teacher do if a student—by using their own autonomy—refuses to learn the concepts necessary for passing the mandated tests? Questions of autonomy in PL classrooms also come up due to the fact that these classrooms are full of kids, full of children whose minds, senses of self, comprehension of goods, and practices of discipline are still very much in development. PL teachers are constantly faced with the question: what does agency look like for a child? Does student agency look different for the child in kindergarten versus the child in 11th grade? Is *student*

agency a different concept and practice than ‘agency’ writ large? In other words, is there something about being a student that automatically leads to a curtailment of agency and autonomy, and is that a good thing? Is there a difference between agency and autonomy, especially as it is practiced in the classroom?

These PL questions are echoed in the ways that other philosophers have addressed the concept of autonomy. Christman (2018) argues that autonomy is “the independence of one’s deliberation and choice from manipulation by others, and the capacity to rule oneself”. Autonomy necessitates both knowledge and voluntariness: “competency conditions and authenticity conditions” (Christman 2018). Therefore, to be autonomous, a person must have the knowledge to competently make a choice and the voluntary (non-coerced) capacity to proceed with that choice. Feinberg (1982), likewise, contends that autonomy necessitates both the competence to make informed choices and the ‘sovereign authority’ to proceed with those choices. Feinberg specifically notes that when we force a person—against his/her will—into a new state of being or place, even if that is better for them in the long run, we violate that person’s autonomy and undermine his/her status as a person. The concepts of informed choice and sovereign authority to proceed with that choice, even if it is not in the best interest of the self, come into play within the PL classroom.

As mentioned before, PL necessitates that both teacher and student have access to student data. The teacher is supposed to act as a guide and facilitator, but, theoretically, it is up to the student—as an agent and ‘owner’ of his or her own educational pathways—to make choices about how to learn. Collection of and conversations around data are meant to fulfill the requirements of autonomy: that the student is informed and competent to make a decision and that the student is allowed to make voluntary (non-coerced) decisions about his/her learning pathways. Ideally, students would meet with their teachers, go over the data, and discuss how the data guides toward the need for improvement in certain areas. Then, with the help of the teacher, the student would decide how she/he might best learn those concepts or how she/he might best improve those areas of weakness. The question arises, however: who determines whether or not the student is informed and competent enough to make decisions? If autonomy not only requires voluntariness but competence, what is the process for determining competence? Furthermore, because the data is meant to reflect weaknesses as determined by assessments that are aligned with school ‘standards’, are the students’ decisions about their personalized learning pathways truly voluntary? Is there coercion—even unintended coercion—in the fact that students are exposed to both teachers and data that reflect back to the student the mandated standards of the school? In PL schools, students are meant to use their own data to decide when, how, and what to learn; but these choices are shaped by data that guides toward achievement of school standards. The data itself guides toward certain conclusions and actions. Given this, are students truly experiencing voluntariness when they use their data to guide learning choices?

A philosophical lens on PL also opens multiple questions around authority. How does PL disrupt notions of authority in the classroom? How do traditional modes of authority still reproduce themselves in PL contexts? How do new media facilitate and disrupt authority in the classroom?

## Potential Questions of Authority

There are multiple philosophical conceptions of authority. Kierkegaard (1992) argues that authority involves a subjective assent to dogma, truth, ideology, or practice. Authority involves a dispositional response from a believer in acquiescence to authority. It is the conformity of one's person to the beliefs and practices of the authority figure. Authority guides both beliefs and actions. On the other hand, Bingham (2009) argues that authority is relational, that it is a flow of power and practice that is bound up in a circuitry of context. Gadamer and Bernasconi (1986) also add to an understanding of authority by parsing the difference between authoritative and authoritarian: 'authoritative' is authority that is earned through knowledge and ability; 'authoritarian' is a person or institution that demands obedience and that works toward domination. In truth, all of those concepts of authority are at play in the modern classroom. In the traditional classroom space, authority is modeled and practiced in every aspect of the classroom. The teacher often stands at the front of the class. Desks and workspaces are oriented so that students can see the teacher and so that students can be seen by the teacher. The teacher is seen as the referent of knowledge, the final arbiter of what counts as truth. The teacher corrects the work; and the teacher assigns grades. Even in PL contexts, it is the teacher who assigns grades that go on report cards. Hopefully, the teacher has also gained knowledge and skills that create a sense of trust in the students. Authority is also relational in that the sense of authority is created within the context of a classroom environment where the teacher is perceived as being the one in charge. However, there are also several aspects on PL that create spaces of contestation of traditional classroom authority models. In some ways, PL pushes against traditional models of having the teacher in charge.

One of the primary ways that PL enables students to challenge traditional classroom authority models is through the use of SMS to connect with outside experts. While Mao (2014) argues that SMS are often used in classroom spaces to simply negotiate group work, Castells (2015) and Selwyn (2012) show that SMS can also be used to connect with information that exists outside of the traditional space: outside of the teacher, outside of the accepted textbooks, outside of the standardized curriculum. Blaschke (2012) further contends that SMS-facilitated self-directed learning and self-created knowledge challenge the traditional classroom space where teachers are considered to be the purveyors of knowledge or the 'knowers'. In PL contexts, students use SMS to contact people in their community, to contact people in specific knowledge communities, and to research information needed for their own knowledge-building projects. Because PL actively facilitates going beyond the traditional curriculum, textbooks and teachers are not seen as the ultimate authority.

Another way that PL contexts challenge traditional authority models in the classroom is through the mandate that students understand their own data and use their own data to guide learning goals. When students and teachers meet, they talk together about what the data—often gathered both from tests and student interac-



tions with computers—shows that the student needs. Teachers talk with the students about their needs. But students are also expected to speak back to the teacher and articulate the ways that they see their own needs and their own data. The quantification of the self—enabled through large-scale online data collection around student performance—enables the student to become an authority on what she/he needs in order to meet learning goals.

Analyzing PL from a philosophical standpoint opens many questions about authority. What happens if an outside person or an outside website provides information that differs from the established curriculum or the knowledge of the teacher? Who, then, counts as the ultimate authority? Are students given the space to decide who or what to believe? Also, because PL focuses on creating student agency and providing students with the tools to articulate their own learning needs, the student is considered an authority on their own learning. However, what happens if the student's understanding of their own learning needs conflicts with the ways that teachers see the student's learning needs? Whose voice takes precedent?

There are also multiple questions around the creation of a public or community that arise when PL is examined from a philosophical standpoint.

## Potential Questions of Public/Community

Roberts (2015) defines 'public' and 'community' as overlapping concepts that have similarities and differences. The idea of a 'public' invokes a political community, whereas 'community' invokes a group of people that are bound together by some commonality. The community can be based on geography, location, nationality, race, gender, and multiple other identity positionalities. The community can also be based on commonalities of desire or interest. A public, on the other hand, has distinctively political or 'power-oriented' connotations. There are many ways that PL both facilitates and challenges the creation of a public or the creation of community.

PL students use SMS to facilitate group work, to collaborate with community members, to contact outside experts, and to move beyond the standardized curriculum. These students often use SMS to create 'community' in the sense that students are interacting with people who have shared interests, shared goals, and a shared location. However, PL students may also choose to create learning goals and group projects focused on political action or policy change. For example, I have seen PL students involved in projects that promote conservation. These students used SMS to gain information about conservation issues and also to promote public education around these issues and even to organize boycotts and political action to promote conservation. In this way, students were using SMS to invoke or create a 'public' devoted to policy change and action around conservation issues. As multiple scholars have noted (Castells 2015; Xenos et al. 2014; Gil de Zúñiga et al. 2012; Dahlgren 2013), political action and a policy-oriented 'public' can be created online and have

real effects on material contexts. PL students have the opportunity to participate in both ‘communities’ and ‘publics’ as they work with others on various projects.

There are also ways that PL is in tension with, or complicates, the creation of community and a public. Essentially, PL is focused on the individual student. DDI, the use of SMS, group projects, and the concentration on student agency are all meant to enable the student to guide his/her own learning. The examples given above, of students working with other classmates, other community members, and outside experts, in the service of knowledge creation or political action, are all activities that are primarily meant to enhance the experiences of individual students. The development of the individual student is the principal goal. The co-development of the individual student and the creation of a community are facilitated through SMS and the collective work on a common project. In many ways, these community projects or the use of SMS to tap the community for expertise provides a showcase for the complicated ways that autonomy and individualism are intertwined with the creation of a community on digital platforms. The use of these platforms, and the goal of working with the community on these projects, opens philosophical questions around autonomy, community, and pedagogical practice. Should more time be given to group discussions and projects that allow for diversity of opinion and experiences, creation of communities of practice, and democratic discussion? Should more time be allowed for students to work on their own, finding their own pathways toward deeper learning and more critical questions? How much time does one give to group work versus more individualized work? Which wins out: the autodidact or the group work model? In what ways does the use of SMS facilitate the development of self and autonomy as embedded within a community? Analyzing PL from a philosophical standpoint opens many questions about creation of community/public and the ways that community creation can be in tension with personalized learning models.

## Conclusion

Digital technologies—such as SMS, web-based learning programs, and computer-enabled data collection—are changing the face of schools. PL is only one example of new models of education that are emerging from and reliant upon digital technologies. These technologies are giving rise to new questions and negotiations of educational practice: How does digital technology create the possibility of connection? How does it facilitate isolation? How does digital technology create a public and facilitate public interaction? How does it facilitate autonomy? How can digital technologies enable challenge to traditional authority, and how do they enable surveillance and concentration of traditional power? These are questions that need continual philosophical analysis as digital technology increasingly becomes a normalized facet of interaction in the school.

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# Videogames and Learning: Ethics, Ontology and Epistemology



Jennifer Jenson and Suzanne de Castell

## Introduction

Videogames have flourished economically and culturally in the first two decades of the twenty-first century and their educative possibilities have concomitantly been both lauded and elusive. Yet a relatively scant literature to date examines videogames through philosophical lenses, including but not limited fundamental questions of ethics, ontology, and epistemology. This chapter seeks to address that important omission in light of the increased attention paid to videogames in the past two decades in educational theory and research. It focuses on ethical, ontological, and epistemological questions and problems related to video games and learning generally.

Much of this work begins with reference to theories of play elaborated in the mid-twentieth century by Dutch historian Johan Huizinga (1949/1980) and French philosopher Roger Caillois (1961/2001). Their ludological approaches have been used to elucidate whether and how videogames can be considered ‘play’, and have formed a base for discussions of play and its relationship to learning. For Huizinga, play is something that does not have to be purposeful, it does not need to happen in the service of learning something, nor is it connected necessarily to real life. Play is something that is, in his words, ‘free’ and contained within a ‘magic circle’ that places play outside of everyday pursuits and concerns and is bound by rules and structures agreed upon in advance. Playing within the magic circle means playing within a rule structure, and agreeing to abide by those rules for the duration of the play session or game.

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Caillois (1961/2001) also argues that play is central to human culture, that it is voluntary and it is removed from daily activities and pursuits. He creates a typology for play, arguing that it can be distilled into four types of games: competition (*agôn*), chance (*alea*), role-play (*mimicry*), balance/vertigo (*ilinx*). He argues that these game types can and do intersect and that they each can be measured depending on the particular game for more or less *paidia* (play) or *ludus* (game). *Paidia* is spontaneous, free-form play, like play that occurs on a playground, emergent and changeable, while *ludus* is rule-bound play, such as playing a game of chess. Caillois' typological discussion is significant in so far as it provides a framework from which one form of play can be measured and talked about as opposed to another.

Game studies typically trace its roots from these early historical and anthropological theories of the social and cultural role of play. To set the scene in for considering the significance and use of videogames for education more specifically, we first tackle questions about, and identify claims and evidence for, game-based learning, including some of the fundamental problems, questions and gaps that render much of the empirical work on games and learning ultimately inconclusive. To address these theoretical and methodological weaknesses, we then turn to a consideration of the specifically *philosophical* questions and issues raised by the phenomenon of digital games and gaming, and conclude with suggestions about the potential contributions to this field of philosophical investigations capable of taking the measure of the rich and varied mediascape of digital games and gaming.

## Videogames and Education

What, then, have been the arguments for and against using videogames for education? What empirical evidence has there been for or against videogames as learning tools? What is being presupposed with respect to pedagogical and educative values of learning through games?

The main lines of argument about videogames and their educational potentials include claims about minimizing the consequences of failure, improving problem solving, supporting interest in history and culture, developing leadership skills, improving spatial reasoning, creating communities and 'affinity' groups, and enriching subject-based learning (math, science, history, literacy). An illustrative recent study used the OECD's (Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development's) 2012 Program for International Student Assessment data from over 12,000 Australian school students, and found that students who played online games regularly (almost daily) scored 15 points above average in maths and reading tests and 17 points above average in science. The researcher, Alberto Posso (2016), explained in an interview about the study that "When you play online games you're solving puzzles to move to the next level and that involves using some of the general knowledge and skills in maths, reading and science" (Gibbs 2016). Students' engagement with social media, by contrast, resulted in 4% lower average scores, and a rate of decline that correlated with the increased frequency of social networking

usage. The researchers are careful to point out that these correlations do not prove that the critical variable was videogame play: it's possible, for instance, that students who excel in math, science, and literacy are more likely to play videogames. Still reports of this kind, which find gains in conventional assessments of school subject-matter learning, fuel popular enthusiasm about their potential as educational media.

There are two significant reviews of games and learning that arrive at somewhat different conclusions that are worthy of a brief overview. The first, by Michael F. Young et al. (2012) reviewed over 300 articles on games and learning. They found that games that focused on language learning, history, and physicality (like dancing games) were related to more positive learning gains, while math and science games were less effective. Their review did not include anything on whether playing games promotes or stifles creativity. Similarly, there is no mention in the review of whether games can promote logical thinking. They conclude that: "Many educationally interesting games exist, yet evidence for their impact on student achievement is slim" (p. 1). The second review, somewhat in contrast, does find evidence that for "near and far transfer" from games when integrated in classrooms (Tobias and Fletcher 2012, p. 233). These reviews concentrated on the question of transfer – can learning in games be transferred to understandings outside the game? The overall answer seems to be "sometimes" (Connolly et al. 2012).

One part of the reason for this might be that game-based learning, as we have elsewhere argued (de Castell et al. 2014), is not as yet a fully formed area of study and much of the work in the area is justly characterized as both a-theoretical and empirically ungrounded. One early theorist of the value of play and its importance in the design of instructional environments is Lloyd P. Reiber (1996), who argued that "seriously playing", in an environment designed to support learning, is a worthy educational endeavor and one that recognizes and capitalizes on play's significant cognitive contributions to learning. Reiber, an educational technologist and instructional designer, contends that 'serious play' can scaffold, motivate, and support learning, especially in well-designed educationally meaningful environments.

Far more widely read than Reiber's pioneering work is one of the most often cited populist advocates of gameplay for learning, Marc Prensky, author of one of the earliest books on the topic, *Digital Game Based Learning* (2001). His argument is that the new generation of learners, that is the "21st century learner", will learn much through playing games, and will demand that learning be "fun" (2001, p. 4). His fundamental claim is that learning occurs through playing (digital) games, and that fun is an essential component of both games and learning. Games, he argues, support this new type of learner and they do so through their mechanics, rule-structures, and other ways of keeping the player engaged and having fun. Prensky's 'theory' in 2001 was that digital games were poised to revolutionize learning, driven by a generation of learners who would demand a different kind of education, in part at least through playing digital games.

James Paul Gee takes a different tact. Games – and his work refers primarily to commercial games, not necessarily educational games – are, he argues, very good examples of how to support learning. Using a semiotic analytical framework, his



highly influential and oft-cited book, *What Video Games Have to Teach Us About Learning and Literacy* (2007), argues that “good” video games are “good for learning” in that they use design principles well supported by learning sciences research. Games, Gee contends, are extremely good at helping players learn. He writes: “Video games don’t just carry the potential to replicate a sophisticated scientific way of thinking. They actually externalize the way in which the human mind works and thinks in a better fashion than any other technology we have” (Gee 2007, p. 200). For Gee, games are good learning environments because players are able to play through and ‘learn’ their complex systems and that learning to play a game involves players in critical thinking, strategic decision-making, the acquisition of new ‘semiotic domains’, including for some games, technical registers involving the learning of formal scientific concepts. Gee outlines 36 learning principles, including, for example, identity development, risk-taking, systems thinking, practice, and transfer of skills that he argues ‘good’ games deploy, describing how such games help players learn. It perhaps goes without saying that, from a philosophical standpoint this argument is perilously tautological if by ‘good’ Gee means ‘good for learning’. The concept of “goodness” is notoriously complex and, arguably, “essentially contested” (Gallie 1955), from which it follows that other ways in which a game might be judged to be “good” need not necessarily lead to learning.

For Gee and Prensky like the much earlier work by Seymour Papert who also aligned his learning philosophy, constructionism, with the power of play and its relation to learning, games are very good at combining both play and learning. This early theorizing, however, has not yet been empirically substantiated. Not that empirical evidence is necessary for theoretical adequacy or even polemical effectiveness, but game-based learning and its enthusiastic early embrace has now two decades later, at least had to check its claims in the light of there being very little evidence to demonstrate that the learning that results from play is learning that is either educationally significant or transferrable to other contexts. Indeed, what players seem to learn from playing games is most often bound to mastery of the game itself, such that a game’s successful players might well be very unsuccessful learners of anything beyond it.

Jonas Linderoth, one of the critics of approaches taken by Gee and Prensky, argues that games are very good at making players *think* that they are learning. Using an ecological psychology framework that examines how players perceive and act on affordances in an environment, he takes games as a specific case, arguing that “Learning in a game situation becomes first and foremost a question of becoming capable of perceiving affordances and developing skills that are necessary in order to utilize these affordances” (Linderoth 2012, p. 49). Linderoth argues that what games do best is to help players progress through the game by mobilizing in-game affordances such as, for example, making objects glow to distinguish them as the correct ones players must seek out to interact with in order to progress through the game. He argues that this ‘highlight’ affordance means the player doesn’t even have to be familiar with the particular game environment, just the conventionalized affordance of highlighting. He concludes that games do not necessarily demand the same kinds of skills or knowledge that, say, reading a musical score would, and that “per-

haps some good video games offer a pleasure that comes from a continuous *illusion of learning*” (2012, p. 59).

In the next section, we highlight four concepts that are commonly used to describe how game-based learning is actualized through gameplay in order to show some of the theoretical underpinnings of learning through games.

## Game-Based Learning in Action: Four Concepts

The four concepts that we have chosen to illustrate here that are used in support of game-based learning are: immersion, interactivity, fidelity (how much a game is like a real-world experience), and gamification. The first, immersion, is often mentioned in reviews and descriptions of games, especially in describing player attention. It most typically refers to a player’s level of involvement in a game – the more involved, the more attention paid to the game, the greater the possibilities for learning, or so this argument goes. Immersion is said to be a characteristic of the state of “flow”, a theoretical construct developed by Mihaly Csikszentmihalyi (1990), according to which a person can become so involved in a deliberate effort that they lose all sense of time and, indeed, any sense of how much effort might be involved in the task. Games, it has been argued, are very good at producing this effect on players and harnessing ‘flow’ for learning has been a common research goal.

Interactivity is something that games are particularly good at – a player acts (clicks a point on the screen, normally) and the game/game world reacts, based on game rules and artificial intelligence algorithms. For a learner, this means they are continually receiving feedback from the game: they can be rewarded and punished, they can get lucky and advance on little to no skill, and they can fail and replay without consequences. Thus, games have the possibility to provide persistent feedback, and scaffold players from beginner levels to more advanced play through interactive engagement with players. In that respect, games are seen by many to be ideal learning environments as they can support multiple skill levels and provide ongoing scaffolding and ‘just in time’ assistance, a kind of ‘holy grail’ for educators.

Fidelity, more than immersion or interactivity, has been a problematic concept for proponents of game-based learning. There is by now a well-established and effective deployment of high-fidelity simulations for a range of skills, notably flight training, and the use of simulations for military strategy goes back a lot further than the advent of digital games. ‘Fidelity’ is a complex concept, in important ways. Technological advancements in high-definition three-dimensional displays increasingly accurately enable fidelity in representing playable physical realities. Yet fidelity of that kind, however realistic, may not always engage the player in a simulation of performative context and activity. Good simulations need not always *look* like what they are simulating, and yet may *be* like it. Fidelity can mean adhering in graphical quality, and/or in rule structure, and/or in controllers (like plastic guitars and drums) to the real world in such a way that transfer of skills is possible. One example is the ongoing concern that playing first person shooter games supports

real-world shooting skills. While largely unproven as a general argument, digital games' fidelity to a type of interaction, in this case shooting, has been a basis for alarmist discourse about the media effects produced as a result of playing games in particular, games that feature violence and aggression.

Little help is given, however, to understanding the specific ways games might support learning from arguments against playing videogames that engage the problem through a 'media effects' discourse, that adopt a reductive, single-factor conception of causation, then conflate correlation with causation in order to derive conclusions about, for example, playing violent videogames leading to violent real-world behaviors. Other claims for fidelity are, potentially, more educationally significant. Music games, for instance, karaoke games like *SingStar*, show players graphically how close they are to being in tune and keeping up with the song's rhythm. So it is not surprising that some studies (de Castell et al. 2014) report games of that kind have supported greater awareness of pitch, and others have demonstrated that rhythm games like those with plastic drums in *Rock Band* or even tap-the-rhythm tablet games increase rhythmic accuracy. The really interesting question here, though, is whether players are learning, for instance, about 'pitch', or 'rhythm', or mastering a set of skill requirements of a specific game, and our calling these 'pitch' and 'rhythm' presumes a transfer of learning beyond the game that may not in fact happen. Does the expert player of *DanceDanceRevolution* actually become a better dancer? Or even 'improve physical dexterity'? This debate about the importance of 'fidelity' to game-based learning is of considerable importance to educators. It seems a common-sense likelihood, however, that the closer a player comes (is taken) to enacting performances that imitate the accomplishment aimed at – so, not necessarily just skilled at pointing and clicking – the greater the likelihood that game-based learning will issue in 'real-world' abilities. As gestural interfaces for digital gameplay evolve, the range of transferable skills that might be developed through gameplay may surely grow apace.

Finally, gamifying educational experiences, whether through digital or analogue tools has gained significant traction over the past 10 years or more. Gamification refers to the use of game-like structures and rule systems that support persistence in a learning task. This can take the form of quests, reward structures, points and other accounting systems, and badges, among other devices. Purdue University, for example, uses badges to track student progress and extracurricular activities in an effort to support student engagement and improve institutional rates of student retention ([www.itap.purdue.edu/studio/passport](http://www.itap.purdue.edu/studio/passport)). While certainly motivating for some learners, badges and other game-like mechanics can be meaningless at best, and a powerful distraction from learning at worst. Ian Bogost (2011) has referred to gamification devices as "exploitationware", insofar as often those badges or quests have very little to do with learning, but can have much more to do with tracking, surveillance, and even marketing. Gamification is most pointedly directed at keeping students engaged in the performance of predetermined and routinized activities to which learning becomes a secondary consideration.

Game-based learning and 'serious' play can, we argue, reveal some of the ways in which cognitive theories, especially those regarding intrinsic and extrinsic moti-

vation, are instrumentalized. The collection of badges for instance, for all but the rare badge aficionado who might be collecting badges ‘for their own sake’ can really only support those who are extrinsically motivated by, for instance, public recognition for acquiring the most, or the rarest badges. Gamification’s interactivity, while massively appealing to some players, is simply an extrinsic reward system for predefined tasks accomplished, nevertheless its popularity is evidenced most recently in the avidity with which millions of people are currently engaged in the collection of Pokemon via the Pokemon Go mobile game.

Accumulation, however, is not learning, nor are there educational or even the most basic of learning goals explicitly supported in much that is currently being gamified. Enough has by now been written and said about the importance of intrinsic motivation, of learning ‘for its own sake’ and not for extrinsic ends, such as the public recognition or monetary rewards that might accrue from access to jobs requiring educational credentials, to make it highly likely that, in the study of game-based learning, gamification and interactivity have less to offer to educational theory and research than immersion and fidelity. It is worth asking, too, how the student as player is constructed in ‘gamified’ educational settings, and whether game-based learning activities which are not voluntary can be considered ‘play’ at all. Notwithstanding such theoretical arguments as these, it must be acknowledged that support for the ‘gamification’ of education is widespread, enthusiastic, and growing.

It is evident that the significance of digital gaming for education is only beginning to be understood, and beneath the conceptual complexities and empirical challenges of advancing knowledge in this field lie several quite fundamental philosophical questions. Most games and learning research is explicitly positivist, looking for learning outcomes without changing the question about what *counts* as knowledge in games. Other studies are more critical and exploratory, attempting to document what learners (and teachers) think they know better or differently from playing. We do know that studies to date of games and learning rarely result in measurable transference to concepts and practices outside the game. This transfer of training problem, however, needs to be approached through the recognition that changes in media result in changes in what and how we know, with the implication that we may not always recognize ‘transfer’ when we see it. In the next three sections, we consider some of those fundamental philosophical questions related to videogames and education, including ethical considerations, ontological matters, and epistemological shifts.

## Philosophical Investigation Levels Up: Ethics and Games

Ethical inquiries that appear peculiar to digital gaming have focused on games, on player ethics and playing as ethical practice, violence, addiction and on ethics in design and the ethical responsibilities of game designers.

There is a small but steadily growing literature on the ethics of videogames, with Miguel Sicart’s *The Ethics of Computer Games* (2009) being at this time probably

the most comprehensive philosophical treatment. Sicart argues that computer games are 'ethical objects', and its players are ethical agents for whom ethical thinking is integral to play. Refusing the perspective typical of moral panic literatures that seek causal connections between playing certain kinds of videogames, most notoriously violent ones, and player 'desensitization' to violence leading to ignoring or even engaging in violent real-world behaviors, Sicart argues that far from being "passive moral creatures, exposed to unethical content: computer game players reflect, relate, and create with an ethical mind" (2009, p. 4). He goes on to argue, counter-intuitively on the face of it that "Manhunt, a game banned in several countries, is a rich ethical experience if played by mature players. On the other hand, a game like *Knights of the Old Republic 3* which allegedly allows players to take moral choices and play by them, is an example of unethical game design" (Sicart 2009, p. 4). It is, he contends, as ethical subjects that we experience computer games as moral objects.

With respect to violent video games, violent video game effects literature has successfully demonstrated that there is a causal link between playing violent video games and the inducement and reinforcement of aggressive feelings and behaviors. Most of this work is quantitative, experimental, and lab based. Work by Barlett et al. (2009) in a review of violence effects literature and video games divides the wide range of literature available on the topic into three categories: aggressive cognition, aggressive behavior, and prosocial behavior. Aggressive cognition studies have demonstrated that there is indeed a relationship between violent video game playing and "aggressive priming, activation of aggressive scripts and knowledge structures and a hostile attribution bias compared to non-violent video game exposure" (Barlett et al. 2009, p. 382). For example, a lab-based study sought to examine violence desensitization and its potential increase in aggressive behavior. It set out lab-based sequential tasks where participants were asked to play a violent or nonviolent video game and brain activity was measured, and then aggression was measured by how often they chose to "attack" an opponent with noise blasts (Engelhardt et al. 2011). The study found that violence desensitization leads to greater aggression, and claims a causal link between playing video games and violent actions.

On the second point, and related to the above, aggressive behavior has been measured using a variety of methods and aggressive thoughts and actions (Anderson and Bushman 2010; Carnagey et al. 2007). Willoughby et al. (2012) are even more convincing on the point, stating: "Each violent video game episode may reinforce the notion that aggression is an effective and appropriate way to deal with conflict and anger" (p. 2).

And finally in terms of prosocial behavior, which includes empathy and the helping or rewarding of others, researchers have also demonstrated a decrease in prosocial behavior on the part of players with exposure to violent video games (Anderson et al. 2010; Funk et al. 2004; Bushman and Anderson 2009). Anderson et al.'s (2010) metareview on violence and videogames reviewed studies that included those that examined videogames and prosocial behaviors, which in the literature they reviewed was demonstrated through the donation of jelly beans or money and/or helping someone, including self-reports of helping behaviors. They found that regardless of

research design or analyses, video games correlated positively with lower prosocial behaviors in players regardless of time spent playing the game and/or sex of player.

A considerably different treatment of ethics and digital gaming is Mary Flanagan and Helen Nussenbaum's, *Values at Play in Digital Games* (2014) which interrogates, from the standpoint of "values-conscious design", not so much the "ethics of games", but, "ethics at play". Their design-informed approach speaks particularly to how games function as social technologies and they offer an approach to game design practices that amounts to a kind of critical pedagogy, a curriculum for ethical inquiry and critical reflection embedded in a game-based approach to moral education. Their approach is useful in so far as it reorients game design and design considerations as fundamentally ethical choices that are being made. Those choices impact how we play and how our play affects us, as the above literature on violence demonstrates.

Illustrating how design practices offer new ways of interrogating ethics and digital gameplay, the classic example must surely be Gonzalo Frasca's game 'September 12th' (2003), described in the *New York Times* as "An Op-Ed composed not of words but of actions". In a technically and graphically simple Pacman-like 2D interface, terrorists, civilians, and US soldiers try to blow one another up, conveys through its 'tit for tat' mechanics the futility of America's 'war on terror' powerfully conveying that fighting back only prolongs war, and that the only way to 'win' is to stop playing – to discontinue 'engagement'. This is a very good example of a game that is attempting to teach ethics.

These approaches resist the literal-mindedness of popular 'panic literatures' that address ethics and values in relation to videogames, gaming, and game culture, and provide instead detailed and well-grounded considerations of how games as socio-technical devices engage their players with both familiar and unprecedented ethical situations, conditions, and dilemmas. Far more prevalent, however, are games that do not consider how their designed experiences impact player behavior and choice.

## Up Next: What's in a Game?

Ontologically speaking, we again encounter both quite traditional philosophical questions, and some more recent emergents from this specific medium. One paradigmatically ontological question that arises about play in virtual environments pivots on the concept of the 'real'. From studies of avatars and player identities, to 'media effects' research and 'game addiction' studies, to the rise of 'virtual' currencies, the seemingly very real consequences of playing in virtual worlds call into question how 'being' might now be apprehended and understood. A fascinating and prodigious body of work has addressed the real/virtual distinction, at least as far back as John Austin's (1962) classic analysis of the concepts "real/unreal" in *How to Do Things with Words*.

Another familiar ontological question in digital game studies concerns the very idea of a 'game', and recalls in particular, Wittgenstein's refusal to accept that there



is anything ‘games’ have in common, so that the question of what a ‘game’ is cannot be answered insofar as ‘game’ is undefinable. To this argument, an eloquent response has been Canadian philosopher Bernard Suits’ analysis in *The Grasshopper: Games, Life and Utopia* (1978), in which he early on tackles this Wittgensteinian commonplace. “Don’t say”, contended Wittgenstein in the Investigations, “that there must be something common or they would not be called ‘games’ – but *look and see* whether there is anything common to all” (in Suits 1978, p. 21). Suits counters that “This is unexceptionable advice. Unfortunately Wittgenstein himself did not follow it. He looked, to be sure, but because he had decided beforehand that games are undefinable, his look was fleeting, and he saw very little” (p. 21). Suits then embarks of a deeper and more extensive examination of games, inviting the reader to “defer judgement as to whether all games have something in common pending completion of such an inspection” (p. 21). Suits’ examination, which argues, interestingly, for the *intrinsic worth* of game playing, adopts the discursive form of a Socratic dialogue between, among other characters, the grasshopper in the leading role of one who, like Socrates, confronts his own death and yet refuses any means of evading it. Suits’ own efforts to “look and see” find just the kind of common feature Wittgenstein did not, specifically that “playing a game is *a voluntary attempt to overcome unnecessary obstacles*” (p. 54) So far, so good. It is, however, in his further elucidation of this persuasive conceptualization that difficulties arise: “To play a game” Suits explains more fully, “is to attempt to achieve a specific state of affairs [preludory goal], using only means permitted by rules [lusory means], where the rules prohibit use of more efficient in favour of less efficient means [constitutive rules], and where the rules are accepted just because they make possible such activity [lusory attitude]” (p. 55). This decomposition of Suits’ shorter formulation appears to subject his position, arguably unnecessarily, to objections that this definition is tautological, defining a game by reference to its ludic (literally ‘game-like’) features, then defining the ludic by reference to itself, ‘the lusory’. Whether or not such a criticism is more of a pedantic technicality than a philosophically compelling refutation is something that can perhaps be debated, but Suits’ philosophical contribution to understanding what makes something a game is not.

However, it still gets us only part way towards addressing the more recently emergent philosophical question of *videogame* ontology. That further question is illuminatingly discussed in a rather more contemporary essay, ‘Defining the Videogame’ (2015) by Veli-Matti Karhulahti, which takes up both the Socratic form of Suits’ investigation, and his main characters, Grasshopper and Scepticus. Videogames, contends Karhulahti, are ontologically distinct from games more generally insofar as they are computational artifacts that evaluate player performance. Karhulahti elaborates the point, quoting from a dissertation by Sara Iversen (2010) that “...the only radically novel [things] about computer games in comparison with analogue games are their ever-increasing ability to handle vast amounts of information extremely quickly and the machine’s position as referee as well as definer and executer of mechanisms” (p. 33) and goes on to explain that “it is the videogame artifact that [is] consider[ed] as the evaluating judge” (Karhulahti 2015, n.p.).



There are of course artifacts that evaluate their users' performance that we wouldn't call videogames, and this Karhulahti illustrates by reference to computational artifacts that evaluate player performance that are not games but instances of "gamification": using "game design elements in non-game contexts" (Deterding et al. 2011). Gamified artifacts such as cars that measure fuel consumption and provide thrifty drivers with trophies borrow ludic elements from games but are not themselves games. Interestingly, here again we find ourselves perilously close to tautological definition, a predicament from which Karhulahti seeks to escape by (again) privileging the very process of definition, with its requirement for a 'look and see' approach to analysis which recognizes that something can fit within different, even contradictory discursive categories. Arguing that the specific rhetorical processes by which definitions are accomplished significantly and substantively remediate the definitions that can be accomplished by their means, Karhulahti concludes, provocatively, with the suggestion that "scholars might soon persuade each other via videogames".

The ways games function as rhetorical devices, notably in education, advertising, and politics, is elucidated by game designer and media scholar Ian Bogost. He argues in *Persuasive Games* (2007) that videogames' core computational affordances for running algorithmically driven processes and manipulating rule-based symbolic systems constitute a new and distinctive "*procedural rhetoric*" that can be highly effective in building and conveying arguments, and in persuading players. Such studies in game rhetoric can help us to discern how that medium is shaping its own discourse/s. And if we really do 'look and see' what videogames are and can do, we will need to acknowledge that digital games, as a medium, can bypass linguistic articulation altogether, and yet be highly effective programs for communication and experience. Games are inhospitable to propositional knowledge encoded in language and text. This means that designing and using games for learning entails a re-mediation of curriculum and pedagogy. The important and largely overlooked point here is that changing media, from writing and speaking and blackboards and books to digital game forms and functions, requires us to break new epistemological ground.

## Final Level: Ludic Epistemology

Both our intellectual tools, and paradigmatically, our *epistemological* investigations, need re-tooling to tackle new and emerging kinds of questions that digital gaming raises about alternative ways to explore philosophical ideas and practices.

To recognize the ways media shape what we can see and say by their means invites a consideration of the epistemic implications and consequences of the specific medium through which and within which what we call 'knowledge' is understood, undertaken, and accomplished. In game studies, this means formulating and learning to work with a '*ludic epistemology*', a theory of knowledge for digital

game-based learning. So, does knowledge look like when it is encoded in the form of a game, and learning takes the form of play?

In narrative structures, in characters, both playable and not, in its landscapes and soundscapes, its social networks, rules and activities, gameplay afford players skills, knowledge and understanding in forms, *tied to and enacted through all aspects of the game*, that do not invariably transfer to what has become widely recognized as ‘learning outcomes’.

Many years ago in his philosophical treatise *The Concept of Mind*, Gilbert Ryle (1949) recounted the story of a visitor to Oxford who had asked his host to show him the university. His host took him to the science lab, the lecture theater, the library, the cafeteria, the student lounge, the soccer field, the bookstore, and the president’s office. At the end of several hours of touring, the visitor thanked his host but politely insisted he wanted to see the university. “You’ve shown me the playing fields the classrooms the library, all that, but where is the university?” An instructive story for our purposes. Because of course there is *no* university apart from these separate things, and all of these things are ‘the university’.

Similarly, there is no ‘educational content’ in digital games that can be teased apart from its different characters, their different goals, activities, and roles, the kinds of conflicts arising between and among them, the quests and challenges encountered in navigating its virtual environments, and the like. This programmed assembly of interactive procedures offers the player perspectives and experiences in which knowledge is just one player on a very crowded field, and facts play at best a supporting role. Games thus call upon an epistemology very different from that through which curricular knowledge (lesson, test, and textbook) has been understood, changing in turn what knowledge as meaningful ‘content’ in play can mean.

In the context of gaming, the mobilization of players’ attention and intelligence through interactive game play can encompass the acquisition of motor and perceptual skills, the completion of increasingly complex interlinked tasks, the learning and systematic pursuit of game-based narrative structures, the internalization and enactment of affect, and a range of other attendant forms and conditions of learning. It is unlikely, however, that learning that is expressed in these terms will be either sought or recognized in educational assessments of player learning.

## Conclusion

In conclusion, although little is gained by looking to digital gameplay for traditional curriculum-based learning outcomes, considerable learning that is of value can be and is being supported through the medium of digital games. The persisting challenge is seeing this: instead of presuming we know what to look for, how do we find new ways to ‘look and see’ the scope and depth of what this medium can do? The key, we think, to better understanding games through a philosophical lens is to consider what games do from the standpoint of ethics, ontology, and epistemology. There are, of course, other considerations from an educational standpoint including

whether or not playing games actively harms players either because of violent content leading to aggression or because play can be additive for some players. There are of course many other important philosophical perspectives that could well be discussed in relation to video games that we have not had the space to discuss including aesthetics, subjectivity, objectivity, and power, but we have attempted to characterize what we view are the ones most relevant to education.

Ian Bogost's (2011) *How to Do Things with Videogames* demonstrates the range and variety of uses of videogames, proposing an approach he terms "media micro-ecology", an approach to detailing the many and varied uses for which the medium of the digital game is highly effective. A more explicitly philosophical contribution to understanding the specific forms through which even esoteric philosophical knowledge and understanding can be realized through gameplay, Liam Mitchell's (2016) essay, "The Political and Ethical Force of *Bastion*, or, Gameplay and the Love of Fate", provides a carefully detailed account of how and why playing *Bastion* advances – through its mechanics – an argument about contemporary society and an ethical and political position that enable its player to experience choice as it is expressed in Nietzsche's theory of eternal recurrence. As to how games accomplish this, Mitchell explains that "Videogames... bind players by way of algorithms established by digital technology as well as by social convention, and they thereby require players to establish a relationship to these algorithms that is often, and by necessity, unconscious and indirect rather than deliberate. More or less opaque, these coded procedures for carrying out player commands govern player action, and the power that players feel derives in part from their ability to master these algorithms... achieving an intuitive relation to a particular set of rules" (2016, n.p.). Arguing that games can "create worlds in which players live out experiences that contravene control and calculability", he goes on to show how, in *Bastion*, players are confronted with the complexities and challenges of Nietzsche's vision of the world by placing its players "into an experiential position wherein ... lack of choice seems like a wonderful thing. It teaches the player the love of fate". Theoretically and methodologically innovative studies of this kind advance, we suggest, precisely the sorts of 'looking and seeing' that will most productively inform a philosophically adequate grasp of what digital gameplay is, how and why it matters, and what it can offer to education.

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# Children as Consumers



**Bruno Vanobbergen**

According to a survey carried out in 2013 “three hundred thousand children between the ages of 12 and 15 work in the Netherlands” (Lieten and de Vos 2013). They do so not because it is pleasant or educational, it would seem, but because they ‘need’ money to buy a mobile phone or tablet. Children want to fit in at school and so possessions such as a smart phone are vital. They want to behave like autonomous consumers. But a smartphone is expensive; some parents cannot or do not want to pay for it and so the children decide that they will have to work. “So, they willingly give up their childhood for restricted freedom”, explain the researchers Kristoffel Lieten and Sarah de Vos.

This trend fits into the broader picture of the lives of many children and youth in economically developed countries. Children and youth have become fully functioning consumers and their lives are inherently connected to this (Cook 2008; Buckingham 2011). This is reflected in how children spend their free time, but also in the educational environments for children and young people (Pugh 2009; Marshall 2010; Pyvry 2016). There are a multitude of items ‘on the market’ and they all try very hard to appeal to children. This discourse has also become embedded in education, where policies frequently refer to children as ‘clients’ of the education system. Parents also play a role in this (Vincent and Maxwell 2016; Cairns et al. 2013). Children and their parents increasingly share the same environment. They use the same tools, they want the same sport shoes, they play the same games and they watch the same TV shows. Simultaneously, it is important to see how parents are addressed within this context in relation to shaping their children’s upbringing. Making children happy is an important constant in this setting, whereby the happiness of children involves far more than just having a tablet or smartphone. It also concerns the domains of care, health and safety. In 1993, in her book *Sold Separately*,

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Ellen Seiter explained how the commercialisation of children's environment was embedded in many settings that are important for children and their upbringing.

It is worth noting that, despite the broad social focus on the commercialisation of children's environment, there is very little educational literature on this topic. Some research has been conducted on how children become consumers (Rozendaal et al. 2008). There are studies that focus on the impact of children on the buying behaviour of their parents (for example, van der Schors et al. 2014). And there has been sociological research into the increasing social inequality in relation to the "consumer childhoods" phenomenon (Lareau 2003; Vincent and Maxwell 2016). The educational literature on this topic, however, tends to be guidance literature, and typically presents upbringing and education as diametrically opposed to consumption (Buijzen 2010). Raising children seems to encompass a battle 'against commerce'.

In this contribution, I will not focus on the issue of whether the commercialisation of the children's world is good or bad. Neither will I focus on issues such as the appropriate age for children to have a smartphone? I will, however, concentrate on the various ways in which we write and talk about the child as a consumer. An analysis of this discourse should provide an insight into the various meanings that are attributed to children and childhood. How children are seen, what people expect of them and how people identify with children is largely dependent upon the times and space in which we live. Culture plays an important role in all of this, but so does the socio-economic context, for example. The life of a 13-year-old girl from a white middle-class environment is likely different from that of a 13-year-old girl in the Roma culture. Being a child in a working class setting today is completely different from being a working-class child 100 years ago. This seems to be obvious but is often forgotten. We systematically talk about 'the child' or 'children' and assume that a child follows his/her 'nature'. However, the discourse about children and childhood is always related with how we talk about parents and what we expect from them. In the second part of this contribution, I will focus on the meaning of the discourse on the consumer child for the relationship between childhood and parenthood. Building upon Heinz Hengst's concept of the liquidation of childhood, I will elaborate some thoughts on today's child's subjectivity and the place of children's rights within this discussion.

A theoretical concept that could help us approach and analyse being a child and childhood in a more contextualised manner is 'generationing', developed within the broader paradigm of the *sociology of childhood*. According to Alanen (1999) 'generationing' refers to processes through which some individuals are constructed as 'children' while others become 'adults', having consequences for the activities and identities of inhabitants of each category as well as for their interrelationships. The concept of 'generationing' shows us how our take on being a child goes hand-in-hand with our view of being an adult. Expectations about children are not separate from expectations with respect to parents, for example.



## Can Children Still Be Children?

'Can children still be children?' is the question that is often asked because of the changing world of children. The issue as to whether children still have sufficient time and space to genuinely be 'children' was first investigated at the beginning of the 1980s. Neil Postman, a leading American communication scientist, was extremely concerned about the increasing influence of television on children's lives at that time. Television provided an entire world in which children were offered answers to questions they had never asked. Postman (1983) was talking about disappearing childhoods. According to him, safety and innocence, terms that had long been used as metaphors for a happy childhood, were being displaced by violence, aggression and sexuality. In addition, the television threatened the classic educational relationship. It was parents' responsibility to gradually guide children through their lives. Parents were the gatekeepers to the world and gradually opened specific doors. With the breakthrough of television, followed today by the internet and social media, the gates have been removed and children are quickly exposed to the world.

Postman's position can still be seen today. A fine example is the bestseller *Toxic Childhood: How the Modern World Is Damaging Our Children and What We Can Do About It* (2006) by the English author Sue Palmer. Palmer suggests that children today are becoming less happy. This, according to Palmer, is expressed in current childhood issues, from eating disorders, to ADHD and autism, to the depression suffered by many children. Children also experience many more opportunities to form relationships with others. Much of this contact is 'fake' and so children learn from an early age to compete for other people's attention. Children seem to be vulnerable victims of an ongoing media and consumption culture. The result is a society that is primarily characterised by a moral and cultural decline. To fight this decline, Palmer published *Detoxing Childhood: What Parents Need to Know to Raise Happy, Successful Children* (2007), in which she referred, among other things, to the importance of 'real food' and 'real play' for the development of children.

However, the idea that children can no longer be children not only links into the mediatisation of their world; the range and complexity of leisure time activities has also led to concerns about the pressure and commotion within children's lives. Throughout their childhoods, children are urged to achieve success as early as possible. The high-profile book *Slow Kids* by Carl Honoré (2009) suggested that today's children are constantly suffering from choice stress. The range of activities and options is so huge that children are overwhelmed by too much choice. According to Honoré, this type of upbringing equates to product development and we must return to the 'basics', e.g. simple playtime in the sandbox.

## Happiness as the Cement for Raising Children Within a Commercial World<sup>1</sup>

Today, we can identify a strong commercialisation of emotions, particularly the anxiety and uncertainty of parenting. A happy childhood, it is assumed, is a safe childhood. Parents are advised about the best internet filter, play areas need to fulfil a huge list of European standards and children are not allowed out in traffic without a helmet and high-visibility vest. To support us in ensuring the safe upbringing of our children, all sorts of gadgets and applications have been developed. There is the American Mamabear and the Dutch Wheresapp, for example. The options are endless: from checking the Facebook page of your precious son or daughter, to checking that they are at school. This concerns GPS tracking tools that show you, on a map where your child is located at that very moment. Parents can also set a 'safe zone'. When the child leaves the safe zone, the parent is sent a 'red alert'.

What is clear from the previous comments on the changing world of the child is that there is a focus on the child's happiness. Both Postman and Palmer see the commercialisation of children's worlds as a threat to happy childhoods. However, research on the history of childhood and education also shows how this very commercialisation played an important role in the creation of the idea of a happy childhood.

Various authors have indicated how, in industrial societies at the end of the nineteenth century, the focus on the importance of a happy childhood gradually increased (Stearns 2010). Happiness is thus a characteristic that is not naturally connected to childhood, but that became regarded as vitally important for childhood, at a specific moment in time. Traditional societies made no direct link between childhood and happiness. This does not mean that, in earlier societies, parents were not concerned about their children or wanted them to be unhappy. It does, however, mean that there was no concept of happiness that was linked to childhood. Childhood was not necessarily perceived as a happy time. At the beginning of the twentieth century, happiness, much like nutrition, became a vital concept for ensuring that children developed into normal adults. Three social developments played a central role in this: (1) the breakthrough of the commercial (children's) industry, (2) the professionalisation of parenting and (3) the declining infant mortality rate.

### *'You Gotta Smile to Be Happy'*

Stearns (2001) identified the development of the European consumer society in the eighteenth century, but it is difficult to pinpoint exactly when this began. Consumer societies have developed gradually. There do seem, however, to be a few key

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<sup>1</sup> Some parts of this paragraph are translations of an earlier publication on the history of happiness and childhood: Vanobbergen, B. (2012). De gelukkige jeugd: realiteit of mythe? In: S. Vandamme (Ed). *Geluk: Drang of Dwang?* (pp. 25–40). Gent: Academia Press.

moments. An influential wave of consumption began around 1850 and continued until around 1920. At that moment, European society demonstrated all the characteristics of our current consumer society. Middle-class parents in the first decades of the twentieth century were, for example, increasingly organising and designing their homes with the happiness of their children in mind. Playrooms emerged and large groups of parents were persuaded that the happiness of their offspring was only possible if new items could be purchased on a regular basis. One of the most cited historians for this period is Viviana Zelizer. Zelizer (1985, 112) suggests that children have gradually disappeared from the labour process but without losing their economic significance. “Children were removed from the market between 1870 and 1930 in large part because it had become more economically efficient to educate them than to hire them. (...) As children became increasingly defined as exclusively emotional and moral assets, their economic roles were not eliminated but transformed; child labor was replaced by child work and child wages with a weekly allowance”. Children no longer work as such but are expected to work on their own development at school. They are no longer paid but many do receive pocket-money to take their first steps as consumers. The sentimental value of children and childhood became centralised. A child was expected to provide love, a smile and emotional fulfilment, not money or labour. Children and childhood were represented in strongly romanticised and sentimental terms, such as innocence, and in need of help in a harsh world.

### *‘Making the Child as Happy as Possible’*

The focus on children’s happiness and the corresponding sentimentalisation of childhood led to a fault-line between childhood and adulthood, whereby children were associated with specific needs and requirements. This, in turn, led to a change in emphasis with respect to behaviour towards children: it is no longer about control but about caring for the child. The consequence of this was the emergence of a whole series of specialities and specialists whose role it was to support parents, teachers and schools. Manuals for ordinary parents on raising ordinary children were now given titles such as “*Hoe opvoedingsfouten te vermijden*” (*How to Avoid Parenting Mistakes*) or “*Opvoedingsmoeilijkheden van iederen dag*” (*Everyday Parenting Problems*) (Bakker et al. 2010, 331). There was a huge focus on small issues such as children’s bed-wetting or not wanting to eat. Parents had to learn to fathom the emotions of their children and focus on their children’s subconscious processes.

In the context of the professionalisation of parenting, it is interesting to see how children’s happiness also became linked to their health. Grains and soup, but also medicines, for example, are directly linked to ensuring a happy childhood. Together with the image of the naturally happy child, there is the concept of the understanding, loving mother. Warm-heartedness and tenderness form the key traits that should shape the mother’s relationship with her children. My own research into guidance literature in women’s magazine from the second half of the twentieth century shows

an especially interesting field of tension when it comes to children's happiness (Vanobbergen 2007). On the one hand, there is the cherished notion that the child is inherently good and happy and that the most important task of the parent is to maintain this happiness. In the article 'Is the Atmosphere in Your Family Kind-Hearted or cold?' from the *Rijk der Vrouw (Woman's Realm)* from 9 July 1969, we read:

In a kind-hearted atmosphere, the child is happy and if there are any upbringing blunders (and these are faced by all parents!), they are accommodated and compensated for by the general atmosphere that pervades the family; true love can resolve all sorts of problems.

On the other hand, the call for tenderness and love in the family is clearly linked to finger-pointing towards those parents who equate unconditional love with a *laissez faire* parenting style. Some of the titles of articles from *Rosita* don't beat around the bush: "Mother Was to Blame for Betty's Laziness" (3 January 1966), "Martha Always Got Her Own Way with Mother" (15 February 1966) and "Bad Eaters Are Made, Not Born" (22 March 1966). Mothers must be sensitive and loving but must combine this with their role of leader down the pathway to life. The article 'Lieve wildemannen' (Sweet savages) from *Ons Volk* from 24 April 1970 ends with the recommendation:

Our ancestors said, 'No roses without thorns', and this is very true. It takes greater courage to refuse a slice of ham after a meal or insist on the use of a bib, than to give in to these whims based on various pretexts, the first of which is laziness.

An article from *Mimosa* from 31 July 1966 summarises this duality:

There are many parents, who can be called modern in the good sense of the word, who do not recoil, where necessary and required, from maintaining order and discipline in the family. (...) Raising children requires love and understanding in the first instance but also requires a firm, corrective hand from time to time.

### ***Declining Infant Mortality Rate***

Until around 1900 in Belgium, the infant mortality rate fluctuated at around 150 to 250 per thousand newborns (Devos 2005). In other words, around one in five babies died before their first birthday. Between 1900 and 1925, this figure rapidly declined. In this period, the infant mortality rate decreased to around half. In the Netherlands, we see comparable figures (Treffers 2008). In 1880, around 200 per 1000 infants died; in 1925, this had decreased to around 50 per 1000. The bacteriological revolution, under the pioneering efforts of Louis Pasteur, had created a solution to the issue of contaminated cow's milk, i.e. sterilisation. The focus on private hygiene (washing, food) and public hygiene (the provision of sewage systems, improvements to drinking water standards and the construction of healthy labourer's homes) played a vital role in reducing the infant mortality rate. In combination with the previous factors, the declining infant mortality rate also drew greater focus towards the needs of the individual child (Stearns 2010).

## A New Claim on the Child(hood)?

Research on the history of childhood and education shows how the breakthrough of a child-based world that was heavily shaped by commercial industry, fitted into the broader ‘educationalization’ of the children’s world. “Educationalization” refers to the overall orientation or trend towards thinking about education as the focal point for addressing or solving larger human problems (Smeyers and Depaepe 2008). It is described as a sub-process of the modernisation of society, but it also has negative connotations, such as increased dependence, patronisation and pampering. But what led to child rearing and ‘commerce’ growing apart, when they had been so closely intertwined in the early days? Key to understanding this is the script theory of Heinz Hengst (2000).

Hengst distinguishes three competing ‘childhood scripts’. The first is the bourgeois ‘childhood script’, developed and controlled by the adult middle-class. This script is supported by those who could be referred to as representatives of the broad, educational project (parents, teachers, children’s carers, schools, etc.). It is the shelter or blanket that we provide to the world of children to protect them from as many threats as we can. The second script is that of the child. It assumes that children all share a social fate: surviving a world developed by adults, within which children are confronted only with cultural material that guarantees a hopeful future. The third script is the script of market-focussed thinking. This is created when children form part of the consumer society and is best expressed in the slogan “sell to the decision-makers” (Hengst 2000, 18).

According to Hengst, the expansion of the consumer society has led to children’s culture becoming less ‘childlike’, in the sense that they have been freed from the classic upbringing and development discourse. Parents, teachers and psychologists may put up resistance, but nowadays there are very few arguments against this loss of control over upbringing. Oelkers (2002) suggests that the development towards our consumer society fulfils the classical pedagogical leitmotiv of putting the child in the centre in an ironic way. Whereas educators have never succeeded in the full realisation of a child-focussed upbringing, today we are faced with a commercial culture that is entirely focussed on children. However, according to Oelkers, rather than an emancipation process, this concerns a new type of claim on childhood even if it is perhaps less explicit than previously. The children’s world, as created by the market, is presented as a world for and by children, but in reality, is a world that is completely created by adults.

Hengst (2001) prefers to talk in terms of a ‘liquidation of childhood’. Modernity was characterised by a childhood in which the centrality of labour has been replaced by play, learning and development. The disappearance of this type of childhood refers to the disappearance of qualitative differences in the experiences of the various generations. “Liquidation does not mean that childhood is converging with or dissolving into adulthood but that its form is changing in such a way that the relations between generations can no longer be adequately described with the paradigms of modernity” (Hengst 2001, 13). Increasingly, value is attached to

non-educational domains in daily life, while just one of the cornerstones of modernity corresponds to defining children and youngsters based on strong, educational criteria. Hengst thus puts out a call for children's current activities to be reviewed from the perspective of this emancipation. This means, among other things, that we must be bold enough to position children's learning in other situations. The monopoly of learning at school has not only been substantially challenged by commercial culture, it has also been attacked. Children's commercial culture has, itself, become an important learning platform.

## A Liquidation of Childhood?

Hengst's claim about the so-called liquidation of childhood and his conclusion that relations between generations no longer can be adequately described with the paradigms of modernity raise important educational questions. First, this discussion affects our idea about the child's subjectivity. For a long time, the condition of childhood has been regarded as an unformed adult subjectivity. Locke for example defended the idea that the child needs to be understood as lacking that which defines an adult, for instance reason or physical independence. Against this way of thinking, there is the recognition that childhood appears as a form of subjectivity in itself. "The child is not so much an adult which is yet to be, as something different from the adult which requires acknowledgement as such" (Archard 2015, 13). It was Rousseau who initiated the grounds for this alternative subjectivity. He was one of the first authors who pointed to the importance of a permanent re-evaluation of childhood and its place in and significance for adult self-understanding (Kennedy 2002; Archard 2015). It was the Romantics who discovered 'child' as an alternative subjectivity and prophet of unfinished being. The Romantics succeeded in breaking the concept of a static and autonomous subject of the Enlightenment, but could only present the new subject as a prophetic and utopian figure. Freud and especially Jung will work this further out by putting the 'adult-child' contradiction in a dialectical relation. This results in a form of adult subjectivity that is informed by child subjectivity.

Childhood development is about constructing boundaries, both within the self and with the other. The adult who takes up the task of constant reconstruction of these boundaries, based on ongoing experience and belief, puts herself again in the position of a child: of beginning again, of not possessing all the information, "of encountering the world and the other as not completely known, as unfinished" (Kennedy 2002, 165). The re-evaluation of childhood and its place in and significance for adult self-understanding is a crucial dimension within educational thinking. Therefore, we need an educational stance that reflects this re-evaluation. In putting childhood and adulthood in dialogue, a kind of education can appear that devotes itself to the broad cultural emergence of the subject-in-process. Childhood can't be interpreted in terms of static and natural. The question is not if childhood is disappearing, nor if adulthood is disappearing. The question is how to keep the valuable dialogue between childhood and adulthood alive.

In today's dialogue between childhood and adulthood, it is inevitable to pay attention to children's rights, as these have influenced intensively our actual views about parenthood and child rearing. It is impossible to elaborate all relevant issues. I will focus on one that is strongly related with the discussion on children as consumers: the child's autonomy. The image of the autonomous child is often put forward by the corporate world (Seiter 1993; Pilcher 2013). At the same time, it is one of the most important concepts in the plea of those who strongly defend the image of the child as right-holder.

## **The Autonomous Child: Where Children's Rights and the Corporate World Meet?**

It is important to notice that in the debate on the rights of the child up until now the emphasis is on the rights that children *have* (Roose and De Bie 2007). Supported by for example the academic paradigm of the sociology of childhood, mainstream children's rights movements consider children as social actors, as active agents and autonomous, independent human beings in constructing their lives (James and Prout 1997; Jenks 2005). This idea is also reflected in the research on children as consumers. Research by Pilcher (2013), for example into how children deal with (their) clothing, shows that children are not simply 'followers' of the clothing industry, but make choices on a very active basis and thus play a defining role in their 'me-making'.

For many parents in Western societies this focus on the child's autonomy and independency often feels strange and problematic. It results in feelings of uncertainty about their educational role. In this, the corporate world is often seen as a concurrent rather than a partner. The corporate world, via a strategy of *othering*, has placed children and adults in separate worlds, whereby the adult world appears to be a *Dystopia* and the children's world a *Utopia*. "School education, teachers and parents are outside this utopia. They are, at least in part, the real from which escape is sought" (Kenway and Bullen 2001, 73). For children, today's 'commercial world' is a form of resistance; a reference to forbidden domains. Children delight in what their parents rejected: the obscene, macabre and grotesque. Commercial children's culture represents the opportunity to escape from reality. Children are given a reflected image in which their needs and requirements can be realised and problems resolved via consumption. Consumer culture shows children what they can expect when they become adults: a place where play has had to make way for work, mutuality for tyranny and spontaneity for monotony (Fiske 1996).

Several authors point out risks of a rights tradition emphasising individuality and autonomy. Mortier (2002) for example stresses that the emphasis on people as autonomous individuals ignores the fact that they often do not act autonomously. It also ignores the fact that it is a fiction to believe that the recognition of rights will lead to autonomy. Failure to recognise that both autonomy, in this sense, and the



idea of legal status as a pathway to this autonomy are fictions creates a possible dichotomy between ‘citizens’ and ‘non-citizens’ on the one hand and between the ‘rights of children’ and ‘the rights of parents’ on the other hand.

The complexity of human rights in light of children requires us to move beyond modernity’s morally autonomous individual. As long as rights are grounded in free, equal or autonomous individuality, children will be pushed to the outer edges of the social circle. As John Wall (2010) indicates, human rights need to be imagined as more than mere expressions of individual liberties or entitlements. Human rights ultimately derive their meaning and purpose from their capacity to expand the diversity and inclusiveness of human relations. In this interpretation, children’s rights and human rights are rights that are to be shaped in a participative way, a process during which parents and children themselves participate in the definition and the content of these rights (Roose and De Bie 2007). Building upon this starting point, Mullin (2014) develops an interesting view on how the autonomy of the child fits well with some forms of paternalism by the parents. If we treat children as morally important only because their welfare has intrinsic value, and override their attempts to pursue goals driven by what matters to them, then we fail to fully respect them and their autonomy. However, if we disregard the features that threaten their ability to recognise what matters to them, or to pursue their goals, we also fail to respect them.

## In Conclusion

The commercial world is neither an addition to the world of children nor an infringement on it. It simply forms an integral part of children’s world. It is important to chart and analyse how the various positions within this debate develop and how certain views of children and their parents are regarded as ‘desirable’. Next, there is the importance of questioning these views. One possible way to do so is analysing often used concepts such as the child’s subjectivity, the autonomy of the child or the best interest of the child from an educational perspective. Looking at the discussions on a consumerist childhood out of an educational framework makes it possible to illuminate that these discussions are less new or provocative than often thought. With this contribution, we have tried to provide impetus in this regard.

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# Democratically Undemocratic: The Case of School Bullying



Ronald B. Jacobson

Is the United States a bully? This was the question posed to me as a presenter at a philosophy of education conference in Toronto not long ago. In my talk I did not mention the political landscape or, for that matter, the United States. But, the truth of the matter is that students, teachers, workers, bosses, spouses, and, yes, even countries often find themselves on one side or the other of the bullying equation. But, what is bullying and where does it fit in the democratic landscape? Along with defining bullying, discussing its many motivations, and suggesting a path forward, in this chapter I will also argue that bullying is but one iteration of the eternally contentious case of the ‘other’. I will begin my exploration precisely on this topic.

## Democratically Undemocratic

Adam Phillips in the preface of his book *Equals* writes, “If the best thing we do is look after each other, then the worst thing we do is pretend to look after each other when in fact we are doing something else” (2002, p. xi). Phillips goes on to outline our work of altruism (e.g., a counselor working to help a counselee) and how such altruism often becomes centered in something else, i.e., our own pleasure or self-interest. “One of the many disturbing things about psychoanalysis – as a description of who we are, and as a kind of help”, Phillips continues, “is that it shows us why it is often so difficult to tell these things apart” (2002, p. xi). Here, using a psychoanalytic philosophical lens, Phillips unearths the complexity involved in equal and unequal relations, arguing that even in our most democratic moments our actions are often steeped in undemocratic intensions.

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For example, it is curious to me that the United States, often asserting itself as a champion for democracy around the world, still consistently discusses policy from the stance of self-interest. In fact, when the United States responds militarily around the world, it often justifies those actions to the American people as actions that are ‘important to US interests’. In other words, the United States, and any country for that matter, may espouse democracy around the world, but often justifies its actions to its own constituencies based on the fact that it furthers their own self-interests in the region. Phillips might argue that while America claims to act democratically, it may also be ‘doing something else’. I do not intend here to paint the United States in a bad light (is the United States a bully?), but only to give example to Phillip’s contention. From Phillip’s point of view, all of us are involved in this process of altruism tainted with self-interest all the time.

Robert Coles in *The Secular Mind* goes a step further, arguing that the human condition is fundamentally situated in the narcissism of insecurity. “In the biblical chapters that follow the expulsion of Adam and Eve from the Lord’s terrain”, Coles argues,

much is made of the consequent and subsequent physical hardship, pain ... But there was, too, the subjectivity that this new life brought: human beings as exiles, as wanderers, as people paying (forever, it seemed) a price for an act of disobedience, a severe transgression that carried with it the death penalty. That inner state was, right off, marked by self-preoccupation – another first, that of a necessary narcissism as a requirement for a creature suddenly at the mercy of the elements, and with a fixed span of time available. ... We are left to fend for ourselves, and to do so with apprehension either a constant presence or around any corner (1999, p. 13).

Whether one adheres to the biblical narrative or not, Coles contends here that human existence is marked by apprehension; i.e., threats are around every corner as we compete with those around us (as individuals or as countries) for the limited resources of land, materials, access, and even prestige. Hence, as we aspire to democratic processes, from Cole’s perspective those moves are always imbued with apprehension of the ‘other’. We look to the other, but we worry about ourselves. Hence, Phillips’ claim: “If the best thing we do is look after each other, then the worst thing we do is pretend to look after each other when in fact we are doing something else” (2002, p. xi). In this chapter I will argue that bullying is situated within this larger phenomenon of self-interest or, perhaps better, self-preservation. But, I will also argue that in a bully’s attempt to use bullying to create security, she actually eclipses the self she is trying to save. I begin with a general overview of bullying.

## Definitions and Motivations

Reviewing the current empirical research, we can define bullying in this way: “bullying is proactive, it is repeated over time, it is targeted upon a victim, and it may involve verbal abuse, physical abuse, or subtle relational disruption. It is disruptive

to the learning environment and to the victim's well-being and involves elements of asymmetric power focused on securing some objective (whether tangible – e.g., lunch money; or intangible – e.g., social status). Bullying is also dyadic (between individuals), as well as enmeshed in peer relations” (Jacobson 2013, p. 14).

In terms of bullying prevalence within schools, a fairly reliable rule of thumb would be that about 30% of P-12 (i.e., preschool through twelfth grade) students are involved in bullying (either as a bully, victim, or both) in any given time period. Internationally about 8.5% of boys 11, 13, and 15 are involved in bullying (bully, victim, both) in Sweden (Craig et al. 2009). This rises to 45% in Lithuania (the United States is about 22%) (Craig et al. 2009). The same study finds about 5% of 11-, 13-, and 15-year-old girls are involved in bullying (bully, victim, both) in Sweden, with 35%, again in Lithuania (the United States is about 17%) (Craig et al. 2009). Of course, these numbers change depending on the target. For example, 44% of kids with autism are victimized in bullying, and those with autism are also found to have higher odds of bullying (Montes and Halterman 2007). A 2004 study finds that 81% of all males and 72% of all females experienced bullying in one form or another during their K-12 schooling years (Holt and Keyes 2004).

The literature raises several potential motivations for bullying behavior (Jacobson 2013, pp. 34–39). Some research suggests that individual misunderstanding is at the heart of bullying. This misunderstanding is conceptualized in two ways. First, we imagine such misunderstanding situated in the notion that the bully is not aware of or does not understand the policy, rules, or definitions of bullying activities. A second site of misunderstanding involves empathy. Empathy, or an awareness of the “thoughts, feelings, and intentions of another”, has been linked by some to “inhibit or, at least, mitigate [bullying] aggression” (Kaukiainen et al. 1999, 83). Linked to empathy is the corollary of perspective-taking (i.e., the ability to see life from the perspective of another, to understand the way another sees, feels, experiences something) (Farley 1999).

Another motivational possibility involves the notion that school bullying is centered in individual skill deficiency. On the one hand, victims are depicted as potential targets because they lack friends (Espelage and Swearer 2004; Juvonen and Graham 2001, 80, 338) and, more foundationally, the skills to develop and maintain such friendships. Victims also are seen to have low self-esteem/self-regard (Olweus 1993, 33; Juvonen and Graham 2001, 78). Some victims are also targeted, it seems, because they are reactively aggressive, i.e., because they lack anger management skills (Olweus 1993, 33; Juvonen and Graham 2001, 306). Additionally, victims are often seen as passive (Olweus 1993, 32; Juvonen and Graham 2001, 77, 306) or as anxiety ridden (Swearer et al. 2004, 69). On the other hand, the bully is also depicted as one who may struggle with outbursts of anger and aggression (Olweus 1993, 35). Some portray bullies as individuals lacking in social skills or social intelligence (Sheridan et al. 2004, 245–257). Additionally, the literature indicates that the bully may lack cohesive relationships in the home (Olweus 1993).

A third motivational possibility raised within the literature involves individual delinquency, prompting punitive and rehabilitative anti-bullying approaches. Here, the bully is depicted in some measure as a trouble-maker, a malformed individual, a

'bad egg'. This is not necessarily meant to disparage the bully, but to underline the desire of the bully intent on causing harm to another. Bullies seem to take pleasure in the tears of their victim.

Finally, school bullying is also depicted as centered in environmental or ecological norming, prompting whole school approaches. Research links bullying activities with a lack of parental closeness (Kasen et al. 2004, 200) or inappropriate parental modeling (O'Connor et al. 1980 in Rigby 2002, 152). The literature also indicates that peer ecologies deeply shape and motivate bullying activities (Duncan 2004, 232, 240; Juvonen and Graham 2001, 83–86; Hoover and Oliver 1996, 5). Some also argue that how the larger culture views bullying or aggression (Rodkin 2004, 101), teacher attitudes (Holt and Keyes 2004, 122–124; Espelage and Swearer 2003, 378), and school relational climate (Holt and Keyes 2004, 124–125) all may motivate bullying activity in some measure.

Embedded within most of these motivations is a notion of the unintentional bully. In other words, it is skill deficiency, the inability to control aggression, a misunderstanding of the rules, not understanding fully the fact that bullying activities hurt the victim, and family norming that are at the heart of bullying activity. Yet, by definition, bullying is intentional and repeated, far from accidental. Instead of a phenomenon that is situated in poor social skills, I would assert that the intentional nature of bullying means that it is aimed toward some sort of satisfaction.

## **The Self-Interest of Bullying**

Research raises another possible motivation, status acquisition through dominance. I would like to consider this notion in more depth, seeking to understand a more foundational element in the bullying encounter. To do so, I will begin with a bullying incident that took place on a public school campus not long ago. Jake was a popular sixth-grader at a local public school: Southside K-8. Jake had attended Southside since kindergarten. He had plenty of friends and admirers, made good grades, excelled in music and sports, and had adequate social skills. Jake was also a bully. Matthew, one of Jake's classmates, was an unremarkable sixth-grader at Southside. Matthew had also attended this school since kindergarten and, up until his sixth-grade year, had cultivated good friendships and adequate grades. Matthew was sensitive and typically non-aggressive. In the fall of his sixth-grade year, Jake and a group of classmates began to target Matthew in the daily bump game. This targeting was informal at first, Jake, Sammy, and Jeff seeking to always eliminate Matthew first from the game. The targeting escalated as this group of boys encouraged others to join in the exclusion until the entire bump crowd (from 20 to 30 children) was seeking exclusively to knock Matthew out, purposefully missing shots to keep their friends in. In the end, the bullies gained a sense of status with many of these 30 children who would roar wildly as Matthew, again the first to be eliminated and deeply humiliated, would walk away in tears. This targeting of Matthew soon moved beyond the bump game to other parts of his day. Matthew,



though he did not understand why, had become a pariah not only with the trio, but with a significant population of the school as well. Matthew finally transferred to a new school, thus freeing himself from the abuse he experienced at Southside. The next year, in the absence of Matthew, the trio simply picked a new target – Trent. In the late spring of his sixth-grade year, one of the school staff asked Jake why he continued to persist in his activities, knowing that he was risking reprimand and expulsion. His casual response is telling: “because I like to make him cry” (Jacobson 2013).

This scenario is not unlike many bullying encounters, but it raises an interesting question: What is the satisfaction of Matthew’s tears? What is it that felt good to Jake (his ‘I like’) when humiliating Matthew? Pellegrini and Long argue that bullying “is a specific form of aggression and one that is used deliberately to secure resources” (2004, 109). What might these resources be? Pellegrini et al. continue: “Bullying seems to be used as a way in which boys [and I would argue girls as well] gain and maintain dominance status with peers” (2004, 110). Rachel Simmons, referencing the findings of Michael Thompson et al. (2001) and colleagues, asserts that “every child wants three things out of life: connection, recognition, and power. The desire for connection”, she continues, “propels children into friendship, while the need for recognition and power ignites competition and conflict” (2002, 9). Malecki and Demaray contend that “students’ bullying behavior may actually increase (or at least not reduce) their peer support” (2004, 221). In other words, the bully may be, in part, seeking to establish his own status within the peer community by casting the ‘other’ as illegitimate. Anthony Pellegrini offers helpful insight here:

Harassment is often public when perpetrators use it to display dominance over their peers. This sort of public display is especially evident during early adolescence, a time when social status is in a state of flux because of rapid physical changes and changes in social groups. (2001, 129)

Some would simply argue that Jake must have had a problem with Matthew; i.e., that more generally the bully doesn’t like the autistic or gay student he targets. This would make sense, and certainly may be the case in some situations, but why then are most bullying encounters public encounters? Research reveals that most bullying is witnessed by others. “Pepler and Craig reported that peers are present in 85% of bullying episodes” (cited in Sutton and Smith 1999, 97–98). If Jake simply didn’t like Matthew, he could corner him in the bathroom and take out his displeasure on him. But, instead, Jake chooses a public arena in which to target Matthew. And, further, the next year Jake simply chose a new target to publically humiliate, Trent. This bullying, witnessed by others, often raises the bully’s status in the eyes of many within his or her peer group. The bully regularly employs ‘associates’, somewhat under her control, who gang up on the victim. Bullying, then, becomes a public power move, leaving the perpetrator more securely ‘inside’ and the victim more clearly ‘outside’. This is not to say that bullying does not take place privately, but even then it rarely stays private. Stories of bullying are shared by the bully with friends and, like in the case of Matthew, it isn’t long before others are brought into the dynamic. Everyone involved knows who is in control and who is powerless.

The literature more precisely envisions a number of nuances regarding status as an aim of bullying. Status often allows one to construct lines of inclusion, i.e., who is in and who is out (Simmons 2002; Brown 2003; Juvonen and Graham 2001, 225–226). Dominance, often associated with status, is depicted as a primary goal of bullying (Rigby 2002, 150; Pellegrini and Long 2004, 109–110). Such attempts at dominance are seen to become more sophisticated – perhaps more politically appropriate or simply more effective – as one grows older (Hawley 1999 in Rigby 2002, 150). High social status is often sought by the bully (Rodkin 2004, 94), offering certain benefits to the bully with peers (Pellegrini and Long 2004, 108–111) – especially as one negotiates group inclusion (Pellegrini and Long 2004, 112) – and offers the bully a certain amount of attention (Juvonen and Graham 2001, 224–225) and attractiveness (Espelage and Swearer 2003, 376). Likewise, for the victim higher status becomes a buffer *against* victimization (Juvonen and Graham 2001, 346), while low status becomes a pathway *to* victimization (Juvonen and Graham 2001, 270).

On this view, bullying becomes less about putting someone in their place or an accidental bump in the hallway; it becomes an intentional tool to garner public status, a sought-after resource often in short supply. On this view, Jake didn't have a problem with Matthew; in fact, Matthew was incidental. Instead, Jake was performing for the 20 to 30 classmates watching the drama unfold. Here Jake is working to establish his own status in the eyes of his peers. His project was to 'be someone' in their eyes. He certainly is dominating Matthew, but he is at the same time doing something else. Matthew's public tears are satisfying because in them an exchange is taking place between Jake and the watching world. What might that exchange entail? The satisfaction of Matthew's tears is found in the fact that they were proof that Jake was 'someone' in the eyes of others. He was higher, more powerful in this public display. Jake is fighting for his life (with apprehension around every corner), i.e., his 'place' with his peers and within the greater population of Southside K-8. And, in fact, status is always status *with* others. Jake needs the crowd to 'be someone'. Trying to fix the relationship between Matthew and Jake often misses the point. The real exchange is between Jake and the watching world. This is about Jake's self-interest, about his own survival.

## Identity, the 'Other', and Listening

Jessica Benjamin, in her work *The Bonds of Love* (1988) seeks to better understand how dominance operates in male/female relationships. More precisely Benjamin is interested in what domination and submission 'give' to the participants. From a psychoanalytic philosophical perspective, Benjamin contends that humans maintain a basic need to recognize and be recognized. Here, she argues toward the importance of reciprocity in human interaction, a balance between assertion and recognition. This process, Benjamin contends, is an important pathway of identity

construction. In other words, Benjamin argues that we need the other to gain a sense of ourselves.

For example, let's imagine that I am the main performer, a guitar player, in a live concert viewed by tens of thousands of concert-goers. Let's further imagine that I spend 20 min performing the guitar solo of the century. At the end of the solo, complete with fire and smoke and all the energy and skill one human can muster, imagine that the crowd is completely silent. Certainly this could be because they are left in awe and are speechless as a result of my performance. But, more likely their silence indicates their disapproval of my solo. What, then, is my imagined conclusion? Simply, I am a terrible guitar player or, at best, the solo I just performed was unimpressive. Why would I come to that conclusion? Because I need the crowd to cheer for my solo. Their applause affirms my ability and my performance. Benjamin contends that this reciprocity (which is often termed 'object usage' in the psychoanalytic literature) is a fundamental element in identity construction. I assert on the audience (i.e., play a guitar solo) and they assert back (i.e., applause). This back and forth is not simply a mirroring of activity (i.e., active listening) – i.e., I don't need the audience to pull out guitars and play back to me – but, instead, it is a sign that my efforts have affected another, reflecting back to me the validity of my efforts. I need the crowd to cheer wildly or to buy my CDs, then I conclude that I am a good musician.

Benjamin argues that this reciprocity happens moment by moment, allowing us to build a sense of who we are. Here we think of a parent's interest and love toward a child (I am interesting and lovable), a teacher's affirmation of the learning of a student (I am smart), the responsiveness of a pet to our approach (I am a dog person), etc. Jake performed for the crowd, and their cheers and pats on the back at the elimination of Matthew affirmed his status (I am somebody here), his place to stand in the eyes of his peers. The satisfaction that Jake felt was based in his perception that he 'was someone' on campus, a perception that was gained through the roar of the crowd.

Let's push this a bit. Earlier I noted that research indicates that misunderstanding can be a motivator for bullying behavior, either a misunderstanding of the rules or what actually constitutes bullying activity or a misunderstanding of the fact that bullying actually hurts the victim (i.e., a lack of empathy or perspective-taking). Hans-Georg Gadamer in his work *Truth and Method* (1996) deepens the notion of understanding, arguing that all understanding is actually self-understanding. On this view the bully doesn't fundamentally misunderstand the rules or her victim; instead insight into their own experience is eclipsed.

Gadamer argues that our history positions us toward new experiences with certain expectations or prejudices toward understanding in certain ways, that "the prejudices of the individual ...constitute the historical reality of his being" (1996, 277). "Hence", Gadamer contends,

the most basic of all hermeneutic preconditions remains one's own fore-understanding, which comes from being concerned with the same subject. ...Thus the meaning of 'belonging' – i.e., the element of tradition in our historical-hermeneutical activity – is fulfilled in the commonality of fundamental, enabling prejudices (1996, 295).

You and I *belong* together because we are affected by history, the same history which has affected that which we are trying to understand. Without this belonging, the Other is so ‘other’ as to surpass any expectations toward it. Yet, tradition, while making new understanding possible, also can preclude it.

The prejudices and fore-meanings that occupy the interpreter’s consciousness are not at his free disposal. He cannot separate in advance the productive prejudices that enable understanding from the *prejudices that hinder* it and lead to misunderstandings. (Gadamer 1996, 295 emphasis mine)

Hindering prejudices are prejudices, affected by history, which we stick to, which we do not allow to be challenged.

Thus, according to Gadamer openness is fundamental to all human understanding. “We cannot stick blindly to our own fore-meaning [i.e., prejudices] about the thing if we want to understand the meaning of another” (1996, 268). If our prejudices can make us deaf, causing us to stick to our fore-meaning, then how do such hidden prejudices come to light? Gadamer contends that they do so “in the experience of being pulled up short by the text [of an Other]. Either it [i.e., the Other] does not yield any meaning or its meaning is not compatible with what we had expected” (1996, 268). In this difference, a question is raised (e.g., have I not understood this correctly?). Openness to the ‘truth’ of an Other (i.e., that the Other might have something valid to say, even if it confronts the way we have always understood something), then, allows the alterity of new experience to bring to light our prejudices. A question does not initially assert an answer, instead it puts something in jeopardy. “To ask a question”, Gadamer contends, “means to bring into the open. The openness of what is in question consists in the fact that the answer is not settled” (1996, 363).

Openness means being ‘positioned’ toward an Other, open to them really saying something to us, even something against us, because we know our understanding of a subject is always limited. Hence, understanding is not something to be mastered. Gadamer argues that ‘being experienced’ does not consist in the fact that someone already knows everything and knows better than anyone else. Rather, “the experienced person proves to be, on the contrary, someone who is radically undogmatic; who, because of the many experiences he has had and the knowledge he has drawn from them, is particularly well equipped to have new experiences and to learn from them” (1996, 355). Openness means that our understanding is always in question, that in fact, *we* are in question. The openness (grounded in our finitude) necessary for hermeneutic understanding moves from the mastery of a technique to a way of being in the world. Openness means relinquishing control of the Other, listening to them because we understand that *our* understanding is always limited.

Gadamer argues that a question not only puts some topic in jeopardy but, as I have alluded above, that we ourselves are put at risk (our prejudices revealed) by the question that challenges our present understanding. A true question brings our prejudices to light. We are confronted with the fact that we may have not understood correctly. The ‘insight’ offered by hermeneutic understanding not only sheds light on the subject we are trying to understand but upon ourselves as well.

Insight is more than the knowledge of this or that situation. It always involves an escape from something that had deceived us and held us captive. Thus insight always involves an element of self-knowledge and constitutes a necessary side of what we called experience in the proper sense. (Gadamer 1996, 356)

In this, prejudices are brought to light by the question raised by something which was other than we expected. Patricia Altenbernd Johnson argues that for Gadamer, “understanding always involves a degree of risk”. “We risk our very existence”, she continues, “...Understanding is entering into play where we are not in control of the movement, but rather are changed by the play” (2000, 71). New understanding turns us back on *ourselves*, revealing our own knowledge and assumptions. We are put at risk. Thus understanding with an Other reveals our own historicity (granting us further self-understanding). Gadamer argues that it is “only through others [that] we gain true knowledge of ourselves” (1979, 107).

Hence, for Gadamer all learning is self-learning and we get stuck when we stop listening. In other words, understanding is reciprocal, requiring the give and take of listening and speaking. Remember, Benjamin from a different perspective ties identity construction to this kind of reciprocity, noting that we get stuck when the conversation becomes unidirectional. Remember, the guitar player needs applause. But, according to Gadamer we stop listening precisely because the other puts us at risk. Our fear, according to Phillips, is that we will become Democratic and, in that space of reciprocity with the other, we are called to surrender our own self-preservation. Bullying, dominating another, secures our place; we take matters into our own hands. But, without reciprocity, the ‘sense of self’ we hope to be confirmed by others becomes stuck. It is in the act of risking our self that we open ourselves up to risk as well as confirmation. One last point is important to consider here.

## Schools and the Fabric of Bullying

Michel Foucault in his anthropologic philosophical work *Discipline and Punish* (1995) raises the notion of disciplinary training, and more specifically *dividing practices*. Foucault argues that dividing practices are used in a variety of settings (e.g., military training, athletic training, etc.) and certainly rear their head in school motivational culture. In short, Foucault argues that in such systems we often create the ideal subject (e.g., warrior, student), creating grids of value based on how close to the ideal students find themselves. According to Foucault, the use of dividing practices,

Measures in quantitative terms and hierarchizes in terms of value the abilities, the level, the ‘nature’ of individuals. It introduces through this ‘value-giving’ measure, the constraining of a conformity that must be achieved. ...The perpetual penalty that traverses all points and supervises every instant in the disciplinary intuitions compares, differentiates, hierarchizes, homogenizes, excludes. In short, it normalizes. (Foucault 1995, 182–183)

An example will be helpful here. Let's imagine a high school AP Physics teacher, wanting her students to work hard for the 'love of science', tells everyone at the beginning of the semester that they will automatically receive an 'A' in the course. What will the likely result be? Many students will conclude: "If I already have an 'A', then I really don't need to do the homework (it will make no difference) and I won't study for the weekly quizzes and unit tests (they don't matter)". In fact, a friend of mine did just this with his high school advanced band students. Up to that point, grades were based on the practice time each student spent working with their instrument. My friend wanted students to practice 'for the love of music'. What resulted? Students practiced less. If the grade was already in hand (everyone would get an 'A'), the motivation to practice was diminished. I am not arguing here for or against letter grades, but only mean to make the point that schools often use grades to motivate.

But, let's extend this example. In our AP Physics course, if everyone is promised an automatic 'A', who will be ecstatic? Likely those students who struggle with physics will be pleased. But, who will be upset? Likely, the parents of students who tend to do well in science. Why? Because if everyone receives an 'A', there is no differentiation between their student and everyone else. And it is that differentiation (i.e., my score compared to the average – national or otherwise) that qualifies me for a stronger college. Strong students (compared to others) get into Harvard. And Harvard graduates make more money and have more opportunities than community college grads (or so the story goes). It is exactly the space of comparison between students that Foucault highlights; this space creates the impetus for motivation. This space moves students to seek to close the gap between themselves and the next closest competitor. Foucault doesn't necessarily disparage competition, but highlights the value that we extend to those ranked higher. "For the marks that once indicated status, privilege, and affiliation", Foucault argues,

were increasingly replaced – or at least supplemented – by a whole range of degrees of normality indicating membership of a homogeneous social body, but also playing a part in classification, hierarchization, and the distribution of rank. In a sense, the power of normalization imposes homogeneity; but it individualizes by making it possible to measure gaps, to determine levels, to fix specialities and to render the differences useful by fitting them on to another. (1995 184).

And, remember, Foucault argues that these grids of comparison, used to motivate, introduce a 'value-giving' measure, measuring the gaps between students, gaps that translate into opportunity. Does the system work? We seldom see students seeking to write the worst paper or run the slowest in a race. Instead, we celebrate those who are the fastest, the smartest, the prettiest, the funniest, etc. Those at the top, those who dominate, are celebrated. Interestingly, for a time our US national slogan for education was 'Race to the Top', exemplifying how integral the notion of Foucault's dividing practices are in the culture of P-12 schooling. Extrapolating, one could argue that Jake, rather than a delinquent, had simply taken the narrative of schooling seriously. Public domination of a classmate, besting him in the eyes of others, garners status and accolades. Bullying, the public domination of another, works in schools because it is of the same fabric as school motivational culture

itself. Why don't students cry, fail, or lose to be someone on campus? Because that is not the narrative that we have spun, at least in the majority of our training cultures.

## Living in an Insecure World

In his consideration of the one who humiliates another, Phillips asks, "It is a question, as it often is, of anticipated catastrophe; what, we must ask, is the imagined devastation that will occur if the mocker doesn't mock? If he isn't laughing at his victim", Phillips continues,

If he stops arranging his humiliation, what does he fear might happen? What might they do together? The so-called psychological answer might be, he will see too much of himself, too much about himself, in his chosen victim. The political answer would be, he would turn democratic. What mockery reveals, in other words, is the emotional terror of democracy. That what is always being ridiculed is our wish to be together, our secret affinity for each other. (2002, pp. 43–44)

It is only through our reciprocal interactions with the other that we are able to develop a sense of self or, as Gadamer would put it, that we find self-understanding. But, here Phillips also reminds us that our 'wish to be together' coincides with the terror we feel toward those around us as we compete for scarce resources. Hence, as we long for democratic, reciprocal exchanges, at the same time we resist them because of our own work of self-preservation. Hence, like the United States, we seek to live democratic lives undemocratically. Bullying isn't special, it is simply another case in our complicated battle with the other for self-survival. It is seated in our eternal human need to be someone in the eyes of the other, the very other that serves as a daily threat. What would it mean to not be afraid of those around us? This is the question at the heart of mitigating bullying activities in schools, in the work place, in the world around us. What would it mean to lay aside the need to perform in order to be valued?

I have contended above that bullying is often centered in our own insecurity. Bullying here represents a scramble for resources. What would it mean to create educational systems that do not pit competitors against each other, deeming those at the top more acceptable than those at the bottom? How might we shift schools from systems of knowledge comparison (who knows the most) to growth (are all making progress)? Bullying, and the insecurity that roots it, prevents us from the very reciprocal encounters that hold promise for human growth (i.e., identity through encounters). Might it be that schools and organizations may need to target the cultures of relationships within them more intentionally rather than focusing so singly on the bottom line or on learning standards? I don't mean 'teaching proper relational skills' but paying attention to the cultural milieus that shape those relationships. What would it mean to create schools and organizations where the fear of the other, especially as it becomes tied to status (i.e., being someone in that community), might dissipate? How might we move from our partisan certainty and, thus,



our opposition to the other toward a more Gadamerian ‘openness’, working to mitigate the ‘threat’ of the other, helping our students/employees to move from control of the other (think/be like me) to a desire to understand the other (inquiry)? This is cultural work. Re-storying schools and communities – who counts and who doesn’t and why – and the narratives that operate subtly, but so powerfully under the radar. Unearthing those stories, working collaboratively to create new narratives of motivation and value will be necessary. Of course, at the heart of those narratives is a realization that even as we espouse democratic encounters, we are always doing something else at the same time. Until we take this aspect of interaction seriously, we will struggle to stem bullying, as we have for generations.

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# Study War No More: Trigger Warnings and Guns in the Classroom



Amy Shuffelton and Samantha Deane

On college campuses in the United States, trigger warnings are under fire. To begin the 2016 academic year, the University of Chicago told the class of 2020 that: “our commitment to academic freedom means that we do not support so called ‘trigger warnings,’ we do not cancel invited speakers because their topics might prove controversial, and we do not condone the creation of intellectual ‘safe spaces’ where individuals can retreat from ideas and perspectives at odds with their own” (Schaper 2016). The letter grounds this rejection of trigger warnings in the belief that freedom of expression is an intellectual, personal, and communal good that is at odds with, and ultimately trumps, the personal need for safe harbors. Although the University of Chicago was probably the most prestigious university bluntly to disavow trigger warnings, it has not been the only university to weigh in. In 2015 the president of Oklahoma Wesleyan University proudly responded in an open letter to a student who claimed he felt victimized by a reading from the Bible. “Oklahoma Wesleyan is not a safe space, but rather a place to learn: to learn that life isn’t about you, but about others”, Dr. Piper (2015) stated. “This is not a day care. This is a university”.

Concurrently, at the University of Houston, the faculty was warned about how to deal with a different kind of trigger. As the *Washington Post* (Moyer 2015) put it, “eye-raising *bullet* points advised faculty not to ‘make provocative statements’ or ‘cute signs’ about the new campus carry law, and to ‘only meet ‘that student’ in controlled circumstances’”. The context for this warning was a new concealed carry law, Texas SB11, which went into effect on August 1, 2016, and gave students the right to carry guns in the classroom. For those unfamiliar with gun regulations in the United States, ‘concealed carry’ is the practice of carrying a concealed weapon in public. It is legal in all 50 states, with some states requiring a permit, some states

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not, though often gun carriers are subject to restrictions. Concealed carry, for instance, may be prohibited in bars, in churches, in government buildings, or on college campuses. SB11 denies Texas public universities the right to impose such a restriction, although private universities maintain that right – and continue to exercise it. Significantly, the University of Houston trigger warnings came from a working group of faculty members constituted by the faculty senate, not from university administration. In contrast to the letters from administrators mentioned above, which loftily tell staff and students that the classroom is still a space for provocative discussion, the faculty-created presentation takes into account the real dangers that faculty members and students face in classrooms when guns are present. It is hardly surprising that a University of Texas emeritus economics professor chose to quit his job, refusing to work in a climate of triggers, in an era of seemingly endless mass shootings (Larimer 2015). In a disturbing bit of symbolism, the SB11 law went into effect on the 50th anniversary of the University of Texas “clock tower massacre”, arguably the first modern day mass school shooting (Frosch 2016).

In comparing these instances of trigger warnings, and warnings about warnings, across university campuses, we question what these very different kinds of ‘trigger’ have in common and why, if they are different, we use language that lumps provocative course material together with weapons. There are some straightforward differences and commonalities between the kind of ‘trigger warning’ implied by the University of Chicago letter and the kind in the University of Houston presentation to faculty. When a faculty member offers a trigger warning about, for instance, the unsettling rape scene in Toni Morrison’s *Beloved*, he or she does so with the aim of warning students who might be, or know someone who is, a rape survivor. The scene, proponents of trigger warnings argue, can *trigger* painful flashbacks and emotional anguish. Language, this implies, functions like a kind of weapon, with the ability to inflict harm just as a gun does. Alternately, suppose a faculty member teaching Toni Morrison’s *Beloved* avoids the kind of challenging conversations about racial and sexual violence that at best lead to transformative learning, lest a gun-toting student take offense. In this case, the instructor also does so with the aim of preventing harm, but the protection is extended to those whose complicity with ongoing racial and sexual injustice makes violence against women and racial minorities possible. Trigger warnings, in their University of Houston sense, have the side-effect of protecting students from the painful exploration of disconcerting stories and histories. They protect privileged students from confronting in a college classroom the possibility that they bear ethical and/or political responsibility for sexual, racial, imperial, and other kinds of violence. Freedom to carry guns in the classroom therefore has exactly the effect that the University of Chicago worried about: creating classrooms in which ‘individuals can retreat from ideas and perspectives at odds with their own’.

The linguistic connection between troubling discourse and a gun is significant but problematic. The phrase ‘trigger warning’ is intended to signal a controversial topic and thus an intellectually, ethically, and perhaps personally challenging conversation. But given the material omnipresence of guns in the United States, where there are currently thought to be as many guns as people, it inevitably also implies

literal guns in classrooms. Even in states other than Texas, where guns can still be barred from classrooms, students and faculty are constantly aware of the possibility of gun violence. Although the prevalence of gun metaphors in Americans' speech might be thought of as an *effect* of guns' prevalence, we argue in this chapter that it has *consequences* as well, and that treating ideas as falling into the same category as guns does education a disservice. A long-standing tenet of law and morals holds that it is legitimate to use force in one's own self-defense. Traditionally, self-defensive force was only legitimate when retreat was impossible, but under the 'stand your ground' laws that now hold in many states, it is legal to use force without retreat so long as one *believes* oneself to be under threat. If a Toni Morrison novel is understood to be the equivalent of a gun, an angry student could too easily perceive himself as having the right to shoot back with a real weapon. Note that we are not suggesting that it would in fact be morally or legally acceptable for him to do so, not least because we find 'stand your ground' laws unjustifiable, certainly when it comes to guns and also when it comes to conversations. Rather, we mean to emphasize that metaphors guide our reasoning and our actions. It is thus not outlandish to suggest that for universities to treat disturbing ideas and gun violence as categorically similar has emotional and cognitive effects that can have material effects as well.

There are important differences between these two kinds of trigger warning, but that distinction is obfuscated when universities adopt the language of guns to describe pedagogical practices. By way of shorthand and to keep the different kinds of 'trigger' distinct, in the rest of this chapter we shall refer to them as idea-warnings and gun-warnings. Good teachers have been issuing idea-warnings about upcoming course topics for as long as it has been considered good practice for teachers to take a student's individual, personal characteristics into account. Anytime a professor offers a preface to assignments, readings, or conversations, he or she is telling the students what to look out for, where potentially tricky topics or controversial issues might arise, and where students might face emotional as well as intellectual obstacles to engaging with the material. This is advisable, and good teachers do this regularly. However, these prefaces became formalized 'trigger warnings' only when the generation of students who grew up aware that there could be guns in their schools reached college. Use of gun metaphors to describe pedagogy has the effect – unintended, but still problematic – of stripping the prefaces of their educational framing and inviting in guns, or so we argue. But guns have no place in classrooms. There are better metaphors for the interaction between reader and text, and for the classroom discourse that follows it, than armed combat.

## **Guns in the Classroom**

It could be said that guns entered the modern classroom in 1974 when Anthony Barbaro built a sniper's nest in his high school's third floor classroom – killing three and wounding 11. However, from 1974 to 1991, a span of 17 years, only one

other incident can be classified as a school shooting. This stands in stark contrast to the 7-year stretch between 1992 and 1999, when at least 11 mass school shootings occurred. Newman et al. (2004) call such shootings “rampage” school shootings. They distinguish these from other school-site violent incidents – e.g. a gang feud that leads to homicide on a school campus, or a teacher shooting himself in his foot by accident – from which they seem qualitatively different. For Newman et al. (2004), a “rampage” indicates a shooting that takes place in a school; has multiple victims, some of whom are symbolic; and has one or more shooters who were or are students of the school. Jonathan Fast (2008) uses similar criteria. He too notes that the shooting must occur on school grounds, but notes that the shooters must be adolescents and the victims must number at least two, excluding the shooter who may or may not die by committing suicide (p. 15). Prior to 1992, such shootings were anomalies, so infrequent and random that they did not warrant special interrogation as a distinct or especially interesting problem. Rather, they were generic, if also tragic, episodes of school disasters, which in and of themselves are not historically new.

The inaugural date of the gun’s entrance into the classroom is of little consequence, but the problem of rampage school shootings and the subsequent significance of guns in schools reached a historically significant turning point in the 1990s. Following the proliferation of mass school shootings by students or former students in that decade, school administrators were forced to craft new policies surrounding firearms on school grounds, while federal and state legislators across the nation dealt with various gun safety proposals. In the wake of intense public concern about deranged teenagers with guns, the ‘fact’ that 135,000 guns were brought into American schools every day has been widely cited. That this number is entirely unsupported is of little consequence (Cornell 2006, p. 61). After extensive research on the origins of this number, Cornell notes that it appears to have been inferred from survey data about students who reported bringing a gun to school sometime during the year combined with the average number American school children.

Guns had become part of the imaginary landscape of the American school, and they are increasingly part of the actual landscape. In a 2015 symposium in *Educational Theory*, philosophers of education discussed the educational implications of this trend. Shuffelton (2015a) Warnick et al. (2015) considers why angry adolescents might choose *schools* as sites of violence, pointing to schools’ importance in the imaginary landscape of adolescent social life. Schools are at once the sites where young people hope to find love and friendship and where they sometimes fail to do so. In schools, children and youth are subjected to adult discipline, making schools seem, to some, like appropriate places for the use of unrestrained power. Not all angry adolescents turn to guns, of course, and other articles in that issue, especially Amy Shuffelton’s article on masculinity and honor (2015b), Aislinn O’Donnell’s article on shame (2015), Harvey Shapiro’s article on Agamben and violence as a ‘state of exception’ (2015), and an article co-authored by Gabriel Keehn and Deron Boyles (2015), consider the dynamics of interpersonal relationships and school shootings. Jane O’Dea (2015) considers the effect of watching media violence, and Dianne Gereluk (2015) considers policy implications. Harvey



Shapiro's forthcoming *Handbook of Violence in Education* (2017) will explore school shootings and other school violence.

Across the country, 800 gun bills were introduced following the Columbine High School shooting, with a mix of success and failure, while on the federal level, Congress has passed only one gun-safety law between the Columbine shooting and the Newtown Connecticut school shooting (Fuller 2014). The 2007 law aimed at updating the national background database came on the heels of the Virginia Tech shooting, which simultaneously ignited intense conversations about campus conceal and carry (Debrabander 2015).

Meanwhile, the National Rifle Association (NRA), which had traditionally been a network of hunting enthusiasts, shifted its focus to politics. Under the leadership of Wayne LaPierre, it became a right-wing powerhouse, using guns as a means to mobilize conservative voters in support of a radical new interpretation of the US Constitution's Second Amendment, which addresses the right to bear arms. Fear of violent crime, which as a political discourse in the United States has long associations with racial tension and particularly with White fear of Black power, became a kind of "dog whistle", a call to the American right wing to support right-leaning candidates (Lopez 2014). The NRA has blown this whistle for the past several decades. It endorses politicians who support increasingly permissive gun laws and undermines politicians who support any restrictions. Even with the vast majority of US voters expressing their approval for gun law reforms following the Newtown Connecticut massacre, modest reforms could not pass in the United States Congress, due to the number of Republican senators who were unwilling to risk NRA sanction. As rampage shootings have increased in frequency, the government has loosened gun restrictions. Further entrenching the difficulty of reining in the proliferation of guns was the 2008 Supreme Court case *District of Columbia v Heller*, which reinterpreted the Second Amendment as affirming an *individual* right to bear arms. *Heller* necessitated revisions of gun laws across the United States, ending years of restrictions on concealed carry in places like Washington DC and Chicago, where guns were not being used for hunting.

Campus concealed carry is part of this shift. As Firmin DeBrabander (2015) writes in his recent book *Do Guns Make Us Free?: Democracy and the Armed Society* (a question to which his answer is, unequivocally, no), "after the Newtown shootings, LaPierre unveiled the NRA's master solution: the National School Shield, which called for placing police officers or armed guard in every school in America, or banning that arming teaching and school staff" (pp. 158–159). The NRA's answer to gun violence, in other words, is more guns. In this view, armed students are not the threat in this world but the protection, the last bastion between the unarmed professor and the 'active shooter'. Yet, as DeBrabander notes, the extent to which "we make schools forbidding places" (p. 173) moderates the kind of citizens we seek to cultivate. Pointing to the physical reconstruction of schools into fortress like structures in the wake of rampage school gun violence, DeBrabander argues that the building and staffing of the fortress/school happens as a response to rampage events but follows the NRA's logic. Insofar as those with guns are viewed as armed peacekeepers, any plans to secure life (and education) sans guns court disaster. The



problem with the NRA's logic, as DeBrabander points out, is that it rests on the assumption that anyone who carries a gun will necessarily be a *peacekeeper* – which, in fact, educators and citizens have every reason to doubt.

## Language Mediates Reality

Given the ways in which idea-warnings and guns in classrooms align with progressive and conservative political positions, those who favor the first sort generally despise the second, and vice versa, although some dislike trigger warnings of both sorts. For those who favor one but not the other, it can seem obvious that the two 'triggers' have nothing in common, and that only a precious over-concern with language enables us to make the connection. As George Lakoff and Mark Johnson (1980) point out in *Metaphors We Live By*, however, "metaphor is pervasive in everyday life, not just in language but in thought and action. Our ordinary conceptual system, in terms of which we both think and act, is fundamentally metaphorical in nature" (p. 3). The example they use to clarify "what it could mean for a concept to be metaphorical and for such a concept to structure an everyday activity" is, coincidentally, of acute relevance to this piece: Argument is war. As they explain, the 'argument as war' metaphor means, "We can actually win or lose arguments. We see the person we are arguing with as an opponent. We attack his positions and defend our own." Etcetera. Yet there are other metaphors a culture could use for argument – argument as dance, for instance. In such a culture, arguers might be understood as "participants in performance, and the goal is to perform in a balanced and aesthetically pleasing way" (p. 5). When the metaphor changes, so does the structure of everyday activities.

Richard Rorty (1991) echoes Lakoff and Johnson but adds to their ideas the imperative of social and political progress. Rorty asks that we "think of human minds as webs of beliefs and desires, of sentential attitudes – webs which continually reweave themselves so as to accommodate new sentential attitudes" (p. 93). Beliefs, for Rorty, are expressed as modes of action, or habits, and insofar as beliefs are habits they require little to no reweaving of our web. Following Dewey, Rorty believes that inquiry is prompted when our beliefs/habits make us rethink our web and that at the point of inquiry we weave in new habits. Rorty argues that at some point in this process, the inquirer recontextualizes to such an extent that it may be appropriate to consider the context of her beliefs as a new context (p. 94). New contexts are endless and can be precipitated by any number of things but they generally fall into two kinds. The inquirer might gain a new set of 'attitudes' toward the existing language shaping her web. For someone who as a matter of habit used the metaphor 'argument is war', this might mean changing her attitudes towards these argument/wars – expecting safe space to be provided for noncombatants, for instance, or limits to the use of force, or (in the case of supporters of Texas SB11) the addition of armed 'peacekeepers' to the classroom. A second possibility, for Rorty, is that the inquirer's web will be so thoroughly reconstructed that entirely

new habits will be put in place. The ‘argument is war’ metaphor might be replaced by argument is dance, or – who knows? The new metaphor may be yet undiscovered. Rorty describes the first recontextualization as akin to translation, the second as learning a whole new language.

The temptation to seek a single, universal language – free speech rights, for instance – thus misses the point. If all human languages have an innate structure, and our language’s structure leads us to treat argument as war, then triggers are in the classroom whether we like it or not. If, however, one takes a pragmatic approach, the triggers are only there for as long as we remain in the habit of bringing them in. A gun-warning offered in the context of Texas’ campus carry law is a part of a conversation with distinct linguistic rules. As the faculty senate members who issued the gun-warning clearly perceive, one of those rules is that classroom debates are like wars, and following SB11, that means that real guns will be present and possibly used. When the University of Chicago administrators refuse to issue ‘trigger warnings’, they are, in effect, translating when they should instead be using a new language. Rather than imagine a new language – one suited for pedagogy instead of for battle – the University of Chicago Dean of Students who wrote the letter invites students to think about their learning in terms unsuited to the debate. The University of Chicago cannot make classrooms spaces for “fostering the free exchange of ideas” while simultaneously “building a campus that welcomes people of all backgrounds” so long as classrooms feel, to some students, like war zones (Grieve 2016). Disparaging ‘safe spaces’ as a zone to which students will not be allowed to ‘retreat’, the letter celebrates free speech but leaves no room for reimagining classrooms as places where swords are beaten into ploughshares, where students will study war no more. Like the title of this piece, ‘study war no more’ references an American spiritual, part of the rich tradition of Black music and picked up by opponents of the American war in Vietnam. It continues to be widely sung by folk musicians; those wanting to hear it can find many versions on line.

## **John Dewey: Communication, Democracy, and Pedagogy**

Framed in terms of the liberal rationale of rights, the different camps can seem irreconcilably at odds, with free speech pitted against the right to psychological and bodily security. For pragmatists, philosophical analysis should be able to move past this kind of either/or. While Lakoff and Johnson and Rorty illuminate the importance to this project of language, especially metaphor, John Dewey provides a political and educational impetus for carrying out the task of differentiating guns from ideas.

Dewey defines democracy as ‘a mode of associated living’, and, as he explains in *The Public and Its Problems*, this ‘association’ cannot be the association of the herd, in which individuals live peaceably side-by-side. Democracy involves the creation of common meanings through communication. As he stresses in *Democracy and Education*, it is not incidental that the root of common, communication, and

community is the same. As Dewey (1954) sees it, “democracy is a name for a life of free and enriching communication... It will have its consummation when free social inquiry is indissolubly wedded to the art of full and moving communication” (p. 184). The interdependence of the herd is transmuted into democracy when “participation in activities and sharing in results are additive concerns” (p. 152), for which communication is a necessary condition.

Because communication brings the public of a democracy into being, the specific language citizens use shapes the political alternatives available to us. Rorty adds to Dewey’s key insights a richer appreciation of how language ‘speaks us’ just as much as we speak language. Dewey also recognized, however, that language “controls sentiment and thought” (p. 142), and that humans can, therefore, only work toward achieving democracy insofar as their communication promotes individuals’ growth. As Dewey states, “the characteristic of the public as a state springs from the fact that all modes of associated behavior may have extensive consequences which involve others beyond those directly engaged in them” (p. 27). The capacity to work with others, an interest in others, an openness to new ideas, and a willingness to trust others to take up peaceful projects of community building, these are the keys to ‘moving communication’.

For Dewey the classroom is a unique space to cultivate both individual growth and a democratic public. In fact, the realization of democracy depends on how effectively democratic modes of association are practiced in schools. In his 1899 essay, *The School and Society*, Dewey (2007) argues, “When the school introduces and trains each child of society into membership within such a little community, saturating him with the spirit of service, and providing him with the instruments of effective self-direction, we shall have the deepest and best guarantee of a larger society which is worthy, lovely, and harmonious” (p. 44). In later work, especially *Democracy and Education*, Dewey stresses that the classroom is not just a preparation for democratic life but democratic life itself. The capacity to communicate and the willingness to see the other as a worthy conversation partner are democratic habits that take root in school. This was perhaps, Dewey’s, single most important observation: that democracy *is* education, and education *is* democracy.

How, then, does a teacher foster communicative abilities – and thereby foster a democratic ethos of association, especially given students who have very different life experiences? The first step is that the teacher must come to know the life experience of her students. “He [the teacher] must survey the capacities and needs of the particular set of individuals with whom he is dealing and must at the same time arrange the conditions which provide the subject-matter or content for experiences that satisfy these needs and develop these capacities” (Dewey 1997, p. 58). Further, Dewey’s account of experiential education is situated on the assumption that when we take experience into account, education is based in and seen to be a social process, and once education becomes a social process the teacher becomes a member of the group, rather than an external boss. The other students in the classroom are as much a piece of an individual’s learning experience as is the textbook, the classroom architecture and design, the teacher. And when education is seen as a social

process, all members of the community are responsible for the creation of common meanings through communication. To create a classroom environment in which such communication can happen, the teacher may often need to provide prefatory information, including idea-warnings, letting students know what hazards and challenges texts may present, what they will want to look for and look out for. This is good pedagogy, and there is no need to expand the reach of guns through use of ‘argument is war’ metaphors such as ‘trigger warning’. The creation of such an environment fosters the free exchange of ideas better than any declaration of individual rights does.

## Conclusion

Insofar as guns infiltrate our language, they shape our world. When a pedagogical preface turns into a ‘trigger warning’, it serves to warn students that the topic is dangerous *and* that they might want to arm themselves before they enter the classroom. In a context where material guns are available, this metaphor remakes the classroom profoundly. Trigger warnings are an invitation to view ideas as threats, and therefore to decide whether to retreat or stand one’s ground, as they sink ideas into the same category as guns. A pedagogical preface, on the other hand, can say to students, “you will read a challenging article, but here are some ways *you* might want to read this article. Here is what you might want to keep in mind. Perhaps this is not bedtime reading”. A pedagogical preface can tell students they have an ethical responsibility to their classroom community, and it does not demand that they go it alone. Rather, a good pedagogical preface will take stock of students’ potential needs and experiences – perhaps even recommending they seek a means to process or think through difficult material. As Dewey reminds us, good teaching demands the inculcation of habits for communication, cooperation, and accommodation. Pedagogical prefaces are aspects of ethically responsive and democratic pedagogy. They light the way for the transformation of conflict into politics, but we should not call them ‘trigger warnings’.

If we are going to study war no more in university classrooms, what new metaphors might we turn to instead? Although Lakoff and Johnson mention, ‘argument is dance’ as an alternative, they acknowledge that this metaphor is so far from ‘argument is war’ that *we*, who rely on that metaphor, might well not recognize arguments structured as dances as *arguments* at all. And in a democracy, arguments are worth having. Fortunately, however, our language already offers us alternatives to war. According to Rorty, the inquirers who are good democratic citizens are the sorts of people who welcome the opportunity to reweave our own webs. Conversation as reweaving makes us spiders, then, house-builders and fabric-makers. Henry David Thoreau offers yet another metaphor, one closer to the ancient ideal of turning the weapons of war into agricultural tools.

“In *The Senses of Walden*, Stanley Cavell reads a phrase from *Walden* – “After hoeing, or perhaps reading and writing, in the forenoon” – as establishing an analogy between these activities” (Fulford 2016, p. 525). Amanda Fulford (2016) plumbs this metaphor in “Learning to Write: Plowing and Hoeing, Laboring and Essaying”, as follows:

For Thoreau, hoeing is not plowing (the systematic lifting and turning of the soil in a regular pattern). Nor is it furrowing (the forming of regular trenches in the soil to prepare it for sowing)...Hoeing is also not (in the agricultural sense) the same as harrowing – the systematic breaking up and smoothing out of the soil to make a finer finish that makes undertaking subsequent tasks easier. Yet there is a paradox here: hoeing *is* harrowing when thought of in relation to our words. For Cavell, the effect of our words is harrowing in that we are disturbed by them... (pp. 526–527)

Fulford’s argument, like Cavell’s, is about written language. Insofar as her focus is how student authors can find their own voices, though, in the face of pedagogies that encourage standardized modes of expression, her essay touches on exactly the concern shared by defenders of free speech and defenders of students’ psychological and bodily security: students’ ability to express themselves, including the aspects of their deeper selves at odds with the smooth surface that social conventions demand. Proponents and opponents of trigger warnings *qua* idea warnings can agree that students’ encounters with texts, their discovery of the ashes of chronicled nations, their articulations of their own understandings, and their encounters with their fellow students’ articulations, involve a kind of hoeing, an uncovering and tearing out, that is often harrowing. In Fulford’s words, “the act of writing is one of cutting and dividing words, of exposing ideas so that readers are themselves exposed to the cutting characteristics of words” (p. 526). “The ashes of chronicled nations” (p. 526) is a deliberate misquote of another Thoreauvian reference to hoeing, cited by Fulford. Thoreau writes of uncovering with his hoe “the ashes of unchronicled nations”, which implies the discovery of unknown tales. In the context of a colonized territory, e.g., Concord Massachusetts and the rest of the American continent, in which farmers working the soil have regularly turned up the artifacts of Indian nations, this also has a double meaning. It is the chronicles of subordinated peoples that are often harrowing for students to read.

To move from a metaphor of argument as war to argument as agricultural labor, then, does not mean that classrooms will evade difficult subjects or that disagreement will be silenced. Proponents of vigorous argument and defenders of students’ safety alike have reasons to prefer this shift. ‘Hoe warnings’, or perhaps ‘harrow warnings’, does not have quite the same ring as ‘trigger warnings’, which is perhaps exactly as it should be, since pedagogical prefaces are nothing to fear, supportive of democracy and simply good teaching. We are not naive enough to think that this word change will bring an end to the use of guns in classrooms, as only effective regulations and their enforcement can do that. Because the metaphors speakers use shape their actions, however, we do have grounds to believe that shifting the terms will at least not invite guns where they do not belong.

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# Towards a Pedagogy of the Radicalised



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Radicalisation, contrary to what many citizens believe, does not always produce violent action. But, even where it does not result into terrorism, radicalisation may destroy (often young) lives, bring families to despair, and leave professionals behind in defeat. Hence it is not only a security issue but also a socialisation issue *par excellence*: it usually refers to young people in full development, looking for their place in the societal order. This chapter intends to demonstrate how, judged from a pedagogical perspective, radicalisation should not be understood one-dimensionally. The process of radicalisation can be considered both a (response to a) crisis in upbringing and an opportunity to grow political consciousness. Where black-and-white thinking is typical to the radical mind-set, it is a challenge for radicalisation researchers not to limit their analyses to similar black-and-white viewpoints.

This chapter presents some insights from 10 years of educational research into youth radicalisation, a largely underrepresented field in social and particularly educational research. A remarkable dearth, as open democracies inherently bear the possibility of producing political and religious radicalisation. Historically, miscellaneous ideologies have been labelled radical, of which the most discussed are: ultra-right-wing nationalism, animal right activism, left-wing anarchism, and Islamist Jihadism. A common element in all these narratives, one could say, is the refusal to live by the laws of constitutional democracy. Whereas all these strands have been subject to academic investigation in the past, the recent series of painful revolutions in the Middle East (euphemistically called the Arab Spring) brought unprecedented momentum into those parts of the world that many young citizens in our countries – by birth and/or identification with the underdog (see below) – feel affinity with. The alleged interference of the Western powers (either assumed or proven) gave an enormous sweep to the already disgruntled youths looking for a way to alter the course of their lives, by resisting the Western neo-colonial,

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neo-liberal, and secular world design. This accumulation of local and global dynamics resulted into the (among radicals highly anticipated) establishment of an ‘Islamic State’, catering mainly for Muslims who feel like their religion is under threat, yet evolved into a fascistic society with its own territory and legislation, cleansing it from every presence or reference to other worldviews, religions, or traditions.

Confronted with previously unknown high numbers of youth leaving home to wage the violent Jihad in the Levant, policy makers in all Western countries are giving educational institutions a central position in their public safety agenda against extremism (see, for example, Radicalisation Awareness Network 2015). This agenda causes all kinds of practical and philosophical complications. By analysing and reconsidering the definition of radicalisation for educational purposes, identifying the different dimensions of this growing landscape, and reflecting upon possible educational responses, this chapter draws out the philosophical questions of educating against extremism and explores whether we are in need of a pedagogy<sup>1</sup> of radicalisation.

## A Contested Concept

As noted above, the recent sequence of civil uprisings in the Arab world and its echoes in the heads and actions of Western youth, predominantly with a migrant background, have attracted a hitherto unseen amount of interest in youth radicalisation by scholars and practitioners alike. Among professionals and officials, the concept of radicalisation is usually understood as a process by which an individual or group comes to adopt increasingly extreme political, social, or religious ideals and aspirations that reject or undermine the status quo (Wilner and Dubouloz 2009). Radicalisation is, more specifically, understood by many as the process in which a person becomes increasingly hateful towards a part of society and anyone who defends the status quo.

However, from a philosophical point of view, the concept of radicalisation is problematic. This can be illustrated by considering the differences between the definitions of the Secret Services of the Netherlands and the United Kingdom (see also Borum 2011). The principal difference concerns the use of the term ‘terrorism’. In the UK version, radicalisation is considered to be a direct route to (support for) terrorism, whereas in the Dutch version, terrorism is one of the means or strategies that could eventually be used by someone who is currently going through a process of radicalisation. This difference in definitions relates to the difference between radicalisation that funnels and results in violence on the one hand, and radicalisation that, although usually very annoying or unpleasant for its direct environment,

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<sup>1</sup> Unlike its use on the European continent, the term ‘pedagogical’ in English has a narrower, classroom-bound meaning. The Dutch equivalent *pedagogisch* or German *pädagogisch* has its roots in the continental philosophical tradition, and refers to the entire business of rearing children – educational, cognitive, social, emotional – in family, school, and society (De Winter 2012).

remains non-violent in character on the other hand. Bartlett and Miller (2012) defend an elaborate view of the difference between violent and non-violent extremism, that it is not what people say or think, but whether they commit violent acts that counts. This difference is very important, since only a minority of individuals with radical opinions turns to terror (Dearey 2009; Bartlett and Birdwell 2010). Nevertheless, even if not all radicalisation leads to extremist actions or terror, all terrorism appears to be caused by a form of radicalisation. The link between the concepts of radicalisation and terrorism is therefore logical and invites caution at the same time.

While, from a professional perspective, the need for insights and tools to counter radicalisation is legitimate and tangible, from a philosophical perspective we should be wary of using the concept of radicalisation too easily. The term is derived from the Latin word *radix* or root. Radicalisation in this etymological sense, then, is the movement of someone going back to the roots. But this needs not result into violence. Several researchers have warned against a too facile use of the term radicalisation. The process we call radicalisation is, according to Mandel (2009) “relative, evaluative and subjective” (pp. 101–113). He suggests that becoming radical is not merely a matter of being extreme in one’s views, and must always be in comparison with something, such as the law or tradition. Another implication is that, according to Sedgwick (2010), the concept of radicalisation focuses on individuals, and to a lesser extent on the group and ideology, omitting the wider circumstances and possible root causes. In Kundnani’s (2014) analysis of the concept, the notion of radicalisation is seen as having undergone a multitude of remarkable transformations since its birth, mainly in the direction of practical usefulness in order to prevent violent extremism (pp. 14–35). A particular powerful critique is that the young people we call at risk of so-called radicalisation actually are not going back to their roots; instead they break with every existing tradition to cultivate a version of Islam that is free of any cultural embedment. Olivier Roy (2014) finds in the modern disconnection between faith communities and sociocultural identities a fertile ground for fundamentalism. His book cover reads: “Instead of freeing the world from religion, secularization has encouraged a kind of holy ignorance to take root, an anti-intellectualism that promises immediate, emotional access to the sacred and positions itself in direct opposition to contemporary pagan culture”. Many radical youth are found at the margins of their religious and ethnic communities. Often, parents are unaware and may be fearful of their offspring’s ideas. This observation is important as it may indicate that Jihadis who turn to extremism should not be called ‘radical’, as they are not reinterpreting a lost tradition, no matter how hard they try to reclaim a lost Prophet’s tradition in their propaganda.

Is there any alternative term we can use? Hannah Arendt argues that “evil is always extreme, but never radical – it lacks the requisite depth” (1963). In the same vein, Paulo Freire, in his preface to his seminal work *Pedagogy of the Oppressed* (1970) makes a pivotal distinction between the radical and the “sectarian”: “On one side, there is radicalisation. Radicalisation, nourished by a critical spirit, is always creative... [it] criticizes and thereby liberates. On the other side, there is sectarianism. Sectarianism, fed by fanaticism, is always castrating... [it] mythicizes and

thereby alienates (p. 37). The pedagogy of the oppressed... is a task for radicals; it cannot be carried out by sectarians” (p. 39). From this it follows that young Jihadist actions fit more within a scheme of sectarianism than radicalism. These critiques show that, whereas the concept of radicalisation is practically relevant, it is not entirely without problems. It is even, in Gallie’s (1956) words, essentially contested, which is probably a positive label in this context, as radicalisation is closely related with the political sphere in which difference is to be upheld.

Having analysed the concept of radicalisation, is there a way to reconsider the definition for educational purposes? Where we might benefit from using the term ‘sectarianism’ instead of ‘radicalism’ from a philosophical point of view, the following definition may inform professionals’ practical decision-making. According to a recent study, radicalisation was said to call for pedagogical response:

when a child or adolescent starts to develop strong political or religious ideas and agency that are so fundamentally at odds with the educational environment or mainstream expectations that the pedagogical or educational relationship is increasingly put at stake. (Adapted from Sieckelink et al. 2015)

This definition was constructed in an attempt to be more attentive to the meaning experienced by actors in an educational environment (youth and teachers alike), and puts the pedagogical relationship at the heart of the concept. On the one hand, it certainly adds a pedagogical flavour to the aforementioned, more security-oriented, definitions. On the other, it probably would not work for security purposes. Again, this shows that defining radicalisation is context related and deserves on-going discussion.

## Typologies and Journeys

The question ‘who are the radicals?’ puzzles researchers to this day. For decades, there was an almost general consensus that terrorists are ‘normal’ persons. Notably Silke (2008) in his forensic research found no pathogenic, pathological profile that sets the very few people who engage into terrorism apart from the general public who refrain from it. His findings can be seen as an empirical corroboration of Arendt’s ‘Banality of Evil’-thesis, developed by the latter following the trials of Nazi-official Eichmann.

Recently, this consensus has come under pressure. Weenink (2015) concludes, based on a study of Dutch police files, that more than half of the foreign fighters who left to fight in Syria or Iraq suffer from what he calls ‘psycho-social’ disorders. At least 20% show severe behavioural disorders or have been diagnosed with schizophrenia, autism, or psychosis. However, methodologically, it remains unclear to what extent these individuals can be labelled as such, given the fact that the researcher was not allowed to see their medical files. The biggest problem with this paradigm, however, is that the criminal behaviour is assumed as an indication of individual psychopathology which makes every rebellious behaviour a sign of

psychosocial disorder. This study risks putting the cart before the horse by suggesting that mad acts are produced by mad minds, drawing from a simple causality scheme to explain complex deviant behaviour.

Nevertheless, more and more researchers see this work as an invitation to attack Silke's claim of normalcy by looking into the pathological character of the radical subjects. As yet, this discussion is far from settled. If we were to build a profile of the Jihadi, we would soon find out that the diversity is larger than commonly expected. New realities emerge very quick and are almost unpredictable. Before the Islamic State was declared, the motivation of the leadership figures had a well-founded, even ethical character. The escalation of the Middle East conflict into a civil war, however, seems to have brought a shift in recruitment: more individuals were joining and more emphasis was put on adventurism and violence. The intensification of the military struggle seems to have brought a shift in the type of youngster who travel abroad to join the fight. Youth with a criminal past discover a new market for their delinquent lifestyle in the Caliphate. Or as one of our informants entrusted in an informal conversation: "Actually there are two types of conversions today: You convert to Islam or you can turn to jihad". The first requires study, dedication, and patience; the latter a deep-seated discontent, desire for violence, and a rogue state in development. Of course, we already knew that ideals do not always turn out positively, especially in the minds of young people, who are known for wanting to die or kill for the wrong causes. But seizing the violent Jihad as the next chapter in an already battered life that is dominated by crime, drugs, and a lack of prospects seems to have little to do with striving for a better world. The hardening of the battle in the Levant may have changed the nature of extremism itself. In the kaleidoscope of risk factors for violent extremism (Ranstorp 2016), geo-political and ideological or religious factors dominate the debate, but there are other relevant factors, such as psychological factors, social factors, and group dynamics.

A fuller analysis requires us to consider the material conditions and predicaments, as well as spiritual and moral questions underlying the motives for joining radical environments. Most importantly, as radicalising youth are in adolescence, which is naturally a phase of big transitions, a credible typology starts from this dynamic reality, rather than from static categories. Grouped by their prevailing "leitmotiv", a recent ethnographic study (Sieckelinck and De Winter 2015) reports the following "journeys":

1. Being pushed out: pushed away from problems in the family and/or neighbourhood, a polarised environment, experienced lack of emotional support. Pushed towards a surrogate family, towards authority figures with ideals that seem to give an answer to tensions and insecurities. Eventually, de-radicalisation is set into motion because the person has had enough of the hatred, the negativism, and the common violence in such movements.
2. Being pulled towards: pulled towards the magnetic force of extremist movements. Growing up in a warm and stable family context. Intelligent, ambitious youngsters, with a strong emotional response to injustice. A desire for depth, meaning and a clear goal in life. Because the family cannot meet this specific

need, these persons break away and find a new destination in the radical movement. Ultimately, de-radicalisation is often triggered by boredom or sudden insight into the hypocrisy of the extremist organisation.

3. **Passionate personalities:** certain youngsters are drawn to special and extreme challenge, of whatever nature. Family and social environment cannot fulfil their powerful desires for which they will go to extremes. For example, such individuals are known to have memorised religious or ideological books word by word. In the end, de-radicalisation starts with dissatisfaction about the simplified content of these studies and of the extremist ideal.

What connects these three journeys is a derailed quest for identity. In very different ways, every 'radical' is in an obsessive search for meaning: what is my role in life, where do I belong, what does really matter to me? Where the societal debate over ethnic, religious, and political identity is intensified, the search for identity development can more easily derail among young people. Radical groups may provide what the family context or larger society cannot provide in this sense: a clear sense of identity, a clear purpose, and a sense of belonging. These three journeys (see also Sieckelink et al. 2017) may allow us to think beyond homogeneous checklists as forms of risk assessment. In addition, they convincingly demonstrate that if researchers don't take the dynamics and differences into account, they risk making the same mistake as the former-radical research subjects once did: pinning people down on one of the many aspects of their complex identities. Youth identities are in flux.

In his study of social movements, the sociologist Manuel Castells (1997/2010) distinguishes three types of identities that are directly connected with the meaning we give to and gain from being in the world: legitimating identity, resistance identity, and project identity. The first identity is built with blocks of established institutions; the second withdraws into the trenches and enters opposition to the status quo; the third criticises the institutions in order to participate in better institutions. Already in the 1990s Castells designated violent jihadists as a prototype of the resistance identity. These groups manage to reach young people who are disappointed by the institutions (which often have problems with this group) and take them into a 'perfect storm' by the combination of global Internet mobilisation and the promise that they offer the only global alternative worldview and revolutionary, though politically ultra-conservative, practice.

## Security Versus Socialisation

Research at the intersection of Education and Security Studies is extremely scarce and what is out there is preliminary and hypothetical. When radicalisation first appeared on the international policy and research agendas, it was almost exclusively understood as a security issue, demanding more specialised judicious and criminological expertise (San et al. 2013; Glees and Pope 2005). Nowadays policy makers

and researchers consider the social domain more and more important in countering violent extremism (Veenkamp and Zeigler 2015). Therefore, the recent impact of political and religious radicalisation on our societies has generated a search for effective preventative interventions in the social and educational domain. A well-known example is the Prevent Strategy in the UK (gov.uk 2011), which explicitly includes teachers in the duty “in the exercise of their functions to have ‘due regard to the need to prevent people from being drawn into terrorism’”.

But what can be expected from teachers and youth professionals? Security and Intelligence services have a well-defined role: by approaching young people with radical ideas as at least suspect and – since anti-terrorism legislation was passed unequivocally – even as guilty before charges, they track down youngsters as villains who dare to show any active sympathy with a radical political or religious discourse that may hamper the democratic status quo. In a reaction to the tendency of approaching young Jihad sympathisers as criminals, an important group of scholars has explored an – until then – overlooked dimension in times of ‘war on terror’: the victimisation of young people leaving for jihad. Illustrative are the well-received publications by Weine et al. (2009) and Weine (2012).

Pedagogically speaking, judging adolescents for their subversive views or activities is highly contested, as young persons, to successfully negotiate the transition from childhood to the adult world, have to perform an array of developmental tasks in which the status quo is never sacred (Erikson 1968; Sieckelinck and de Ruyter 2009). Many young people explore modes of engaging with radical and alternative perspectives when grappling with identity issues. While adolescents already face many transitions in various domains of life (friendships, identity, and in their families), “a crucial time of flux follows when they begin to take a view on international events and on their own socio-political identity” (Bhui et al. 2012). This developmental dimension somewhat corrects the static nature of both the victim- and the villain-approach. What’s more is that not only the villain-perspective, but the victim-perspective as well is deeply problematic for educationalists as it overlooks the fact that the people involved are active agents themselves. People construct, maintain, and transform their identities actively. The portrayal of radical youth as vulnerable city children brainwashed by malign recruiters or the frequently found reference to “bumping into the wrong friends” somewhat dismisses this active dimension (see also the promising subculture approach on this issue, e.g., PISOIU 2015).

While intelligence investigators look primarily for suspects, teachers aim to educate and transform their students. Although there may be an overlap somewhere, these goals are clearly distinctive. The difference is best illustrated by the way both domains approach radical youth. Intelligence and security services cannot but approach them as suspect and dangerous, whereas educational institutions approach their students at least as worthy of education, which in Biesta’s view (2015) consists in socialisation, qualification, and individuation. In this light, society’s inclination to come after these young people with a repressive agenda from the first indicator on appears problematic if not all available educational cards have been played. This reflex characterises what Ben-Porath (2006) has called a belligerent



society, in which education is reduced to an instrument for public safety. A thriving democracy, Ben-Porath argues, requires expansive education, in particular when public safety is at issue.

When landscapes of security, intelligence, and education start to shift, this may reduce educational possibilities to counter radicalisation unless a feasible educational outlook is developed that can inspire professionals, citizens, and families to deal with the early stages of possible radicalisation, not based on suspicion but based on empathy and trust. This outlook is very welcome as educational professionals are increasingly confronted with radicalisation-related challenges. Educational institutions are expected to signal deviant behaviour of pupils and arrange follow-up trajectories in case someone is flagged. Moreover, schools feel an obligation to respond to highly media covered extremist events and reassure their pupils in the wake of attacks or in enduring conflict. Third, teachers are frequently confronted with pupils' polarised opinions and conspiracies about collective identities and global politics. This may indicate a looming democratic deficit which is about to present an ever bigger challenge to schools and societies.

## **Towards a Pedagogy of the Radical<sup>2</sup>**

Now that the questions regarding definition, typologies, and the socialisation dimension are presented, one may ask: what educational strategy is defensible? From the arguments in the last section it follows that the goal of our education cannot be that students will learn to keep quiet on issues that seem important to them. Osler (2009) convincingly argues that we need to recognise these pupils as “emergent cosmopolitan citizens living in an age of globalization and human rights” (p. 65). When students practice hate speech, they are better approached not as villains or victims (Sieckelink et al. 2015) but as political agents in spiritual and educational need. As Miller (2013) puts it, young people (and perhaps some of their teachers) may be attracted to radicalism and they may hold extreme views but this is the very stuff of [Religious] Education: “To fail to address such issues in a way that will lead to dialogue, disagreement, investigation, analysis and criticism is to fail those young people and to fail to promote their moral development” (2013, p. 197). Above all, in a societal context of increasing polarisation and populism from all sides of the political spectrum, it is misleading to suggest a merely organisational response or a technocratic correction will bring any sustainable solutions.

The term ‘pedagogy’ is often interpreted as a ‘teaching’ method rather than a philosophy or a social theory. The educational outlook on radicalisation that so many practitioners are in need of, though, cannot be limited to a method or a set of tools, but requires a true pedagogy of radicalisation. As the Greek roots of the word

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<sup>2</sup>An important share of this section is based on an analysis of personal conversations with David Kenning, extremism-consultant to various governmental organisations. All inaccuracies are the author's responsibility.

‘pedagogy’ illustrate, education is inherently directive and must always be transformative. In other words, what these practitioners seem deprived of is a philosophical anthropology: a theory of human nature, or a socially informed vision of the kind of mind-set we are dealing with here. This pedagogy allows us to approach these youth in the classroom as emerging political agents who may adopt an extreme ideology to escape from their everyday life world in which they run considerable risk of ending up victim or villain, with often little in between. This reality is the real fuel of fascist projects such as the Islamic State. Unlike the intelligence and security perspective, an educational outlook allows youth, through extensive educational interaction, to probe identities that differ from the expectations and demands by the mainstream environment.

Awareness programmes are often developed to warn children against dangers for their development or the community, but education can go further than instruction about vulnerabilities. Looking at radicalisation from a less anxious point of view, it would be an interesting challenge to include youth’s daily experiences, conflicts, and emotions in the programmes. Of course, one can speak with them in idealistic terms about what is evil about war or the violation of human rights, but if there is no room to discuss their own feelings or the hate or fear of certain others, education loses its credibility. Teaching resilience against extremism can go hand in hand with teaching peaceful resistance. Issues such as the rapid multiculturalisation of neighbourhoods, the bio-industrial footprint on the planet, or lethal drone attacks without trial require negotiation, and classroom disagreement on these matters should not be considered a failure but may even indicate that the shared process of *negotiation and compromise* has yielded a win-win outcome. Neglect of this dimension may result in a highly undesirable situation in which adolescents either fall into a kind of nihilism, cynicism, or stupefaction, or else they embrace radical extremism. It is much more sensible, just as Davies (2008) argues, to provide room for youth’s own narratives, perspectives, emotions, and ideals. Naturally, this will sometimes lead to conflict, but the important difference from emotions and hostilities that are released on the streets or the internet – or worse, that fester away under the surface – is that they can be used in an educational context as a basis for constructive (i.e. controlled) expression of peaceful fighting (Mouffe 2005; Achterhuis and Koning 2015) in an atmosphere of “positive” conflict (De Winter 2012).

From a pedagogical point of view, the problematisation of radical behaviour by medicalising and criminalising individuals is expected to be unproductive and possibly counter-productive. Any pedagogical response to radicalisation is unlikely to succeed if it merely aims at de-radicalisation; it may work better as a vessel for ‘re-radicalisation’. Instead of trying to de-radicalise their students, teachers may have more impact when redirecting the need for combat (or ‘Jihad’) into a different direction by employing three strategies on three different levels: mental, relational, and behavioural. Firstly, on the mental level, professionals may want to take strong views and obsessions serious in personal conversations and work on elements of it, piecemeal fashion, through dissolution: What is behind the mind-set? Breaking down in pieces everything that feeds one’s uncertainty or discomfort (this conversation is not about ideology or radicalisation or religious arguments, but about feelings and dig-

nity. Arab poetry could help with reaching this deeper level). Secondly, on the relational level, the teacher takes alienation, disenfranchisement, and victimisation serious through deflection: Who is the enemy? Many are angry at their father, seeking his attention and despising his way of life altogether (Sieckelink and De Winter 2015). This very anger is then directed at the West, again seeking attention and despising its culture and power at the same time. The strategy aims to bring the direction of one's combat in a ricochet: which party deserves the anger? Thirdly, on the behavioural level, it is important to recognise the need for risk taking so that it does not escalate into recklessness, via a strategy of displacement: How can someone make an impact on the world otherwise? Awareness programmes should go hand in hand with exercises and activities that help students acquire peaceful protesting skills. The re-radicalisation strategy can be seen as a way to respect the sense of agency so vital in radical biographies by reframing this initial question: how can I prove myself/my value? In Freire's terms: to build on a future in which my actions matter.

In this process, it proves unnecessary and counter-productive tying the superiority of British or Western values to this pedagogy of radicalisation. The radical mind-set will be hardly impressed by a focus on the nation state or on the democratic state. What may have impact is a focus on the youth's own state of mind by trying to understand what meanings of the world are central in the developing mind. Conspiracy theories, for example, are often the cornerstones of one's identity. Kicking against them may not yield the desired result. Helping youth to self-reflect on them will have more effect. The rise of the radical mind-set calls for solutions in which the adolescent's decision-making processes are central and brought in relation with existing power structures. Interventions against extremism will have little effect unless this problematic mind-set, nourished by the youth's struggles underneath the shell of the 'radical identity', is sufficiently addressed. If necessary, students' minds may benefit from co-creating a 'counter-culture of semi-darkness' where resistance against expectations, definitions, and power is allowed and identities can be explored freely, instead of complying with the high standards for clear and constructive British or European citizenship.

Finally, research suggests that parents are only very rarely a direct cause of radicalisation, just as they are almost never a direct trigger for de-radicalisation. Nevertheless, the family – together with other 'educators' like school, youth-work, church, or mosque – can and must play an important role in the youth's search for identity and a place in society. It is in precisely this area of identity development that a major hiatus occurs. It is worth looking into the strength and pitfalls of authoritative coalitions between parents, schools, and others involved. Many radical youth initially express a clear need for recognition and authority. In fact, they want to be recognised by authorities. Instead their experience is that these very authorities stigmatised them. This leads to deep feelings of indignation and humiliation and subsequently to a mode of defiance and vengeance. The forces feeding these latter feelings are often too powerful and complex for individual parents and teachers to handle. Together, adults in the youth's life may offer the space of recognition and moral authority that these youngsters need to successfully perform their rites of passage (Mahdi et al. 1998; Grimes 2000) from childhood to adulthood.

## Conclusion

Julia Kristeva speaks of “the challenge posed by adolescence as a problem for international politics and individual psyches alike” (Kristeva 2013). And indeed, in an era of social media, global connectedness, and polarisation between groups in society, there is a constant battle going on for the hearts and minds of our children and youth. We, educators, risk to lose this battle to some alternatives out there (offline, but particularly online).

The popularity of radicalisation research has generated a host of studies that are mainly motivated by two questions: what causes radicalisation and how can it be countered? However, a continuously contested concept, radicalisation remains an elusive notion. Methodologically, due to a dearth of empirical qualitative fieldwork, the meanings young people themselves attribute to ‘radicalisation’ are largely unaccounted for. Moreover, there is reason to question the value of this research until the definition of the problem is taken into consideration. How is radicalisation linked with societal tendencies such as secularisation, neo-liberalism, and globalisation that have great impact on youth’s lives? Unless these fundamental issues are addressed, the value of radicalisation research, no matter how booming, is questionable.

Although studies on terrorism have been piling up, we still lack a pedagogy of radicalisation. There is a clear and urgent need for more educational/pedagogical insights on these matters in a time when in Europe as in the United States, in primary and secondary schools and at universities, by the Far/Alt Right and Islamic Fundamentalists, but also leftist and rightist single issue groups, the political polarisation in our societies is almost visibly growing. Hence radicalisation ought not to be considered a problem in itself or (even worse) the domain of Islam, but is better regarded as a phenomenon that shows that we have not succeeded in offering every youth in our polarising societies what they need. Extremism has roots in a context of identity politics over issues such as religion and multiculturalism and in some families or neighbourhoods, children will lack the safety net that helps them overcome critical life events. Both conditions may interfere dramatically with the adolescent’s moral development, as explained above.

While extremism studies will always be connected to public safety issues, this chapter shows the problems with approaching radicalisation from a security perspective only. Underneath the apparently impenetrable coat of the radical identity are universal needs that involve navigating the transition from childhood to adulthood. Radicalisation emerges as a coping mechanism, as a way to explore the world, as means of resistance, as a manner to ban existential uncertainties, as a way to be guided, as a mode to acquire answers, as a stronghold in difficult times, and as an opportunity in which a firm sense of self can be established.

In many opinions on this issue, pundits and scholars either stress ideology or psychology, thereby failing to acknowledge that in the real life stories of radicalised youth, there is no space between both, which is exactly why the experience of radicalisation is so strong and transformative. A pedagogical perspective demonstrates

this interconnectedness of psychological mechanisms and ideological narratives. Therefore a pedagogical contribution to understanding and dealing with issues of radicalisation and extremism will have to negotiate precisely this complex developmental reality through a perspective in which hope and radical imagination are kept alive.

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# Patriotism and Nationalism



M. Victoria Costa

## Introduction

Proposals for civic education often include among their central goals the cultivation of patriotic or nationalistic ideals and feelings (Galston 1991, 241–256; Tamir 1992; Callan 1997, 100–131). These proposals understand patriotism and nationalism as sets of beliefs, attachments, and dispositions to act in support of one’s political community. Sometimes the terms “patriotism” and “nationalism” are used interchangeably, expressing the tacit assumption that countries are (or ideally ought to be) nation-states (Ben-Porath 2012). At other times, the term ‘patriotism’ is used to refer to a morally preferable form of attachment to a political community (for example, one that is inclusive and respectful of the basic rights of individuals and groups), while ‘nationalism’ is used to refer to intolerant, exclusionist, or violence-prone forms of identification. However, it is also possible – and seems better – to distinguish between patriotism and nationalism on the basis of their objects. This not only marks a genuine distinction, but it also permits a more careful examination of the question of whether either form of identification is morally desirable instead of giving an answer by stipulation. Among other advantages, the object-oriented strategy takes into account the attachments of transnational peoples, such as Kurds, Basques, and indigenous peoples in the Americas. This aids the discussion of certain political issues that have become more salient since the fall of the Soviet Union and the end of the cold war.

Patriotism has as its object an institutionalized political community such as a country, and it includes special concern with fellow citizens who already share specific legal and political institutions. In contrast, nationalism has as its object a group of people who share a certain sense of common identity. National identities

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are typically grounded in a belief in a shared history, an attachment to a homeland, and an aspiration to self-government (Moore 2009). Although some national identities are constructed on the basis of narrow ethnic and religious affiliations, others are more inclusive and culturally pluralistic. Moreover, the content of particular national identities can change significantly over time, becoming more – or less – politicized. One reason that the distinction between patriotism and nationalism is usefully drawn in terms of their respective objects is that many countries contain more than one nation within their borders, and some nations extend into more than one state. As a consequence, the targets of patriotic and nationalist civic education do not always coincide.

When national groups have a stable history of peaceful coexistence within the shared political institutions of a single country, it might be feasible to design multicultural educational programs that combine the cultivation of a patriotic sense of belonging to the multinational political community with the study and recognition of national groups within society.<sup>1</sup> Such programs of multicultural education often include the study of processes of immigration and the contributions that immigrants have made to the wider society. However, the difficulties faced by recent immigrants to integrate and to feel at home in their new country are different from those of national minorities that are deeply rooted in the territory but aspire to some form of collective self-government – such as the Maori people in New Zealand, or indigenous peoples in Canada. As a consequence, the kinds of policies that can be implemented to respond to the particular needs and demands of minority nations and immigrants are quite different as well, even if they are often discussed under the general label of multiculturalism (Kymlicka 2001). There are of course significant differences among immigrant groups themselves that affect their prospects for successful integration in their new country (Hochschild and Cropper 2010). A variety of factors impact the extent to which immigrants can feel at home and welcomed, such as whether they are confronted with racism, or other forms of prejudice, as it is the case for immigrants of Muslim origin in many Western societies in light of ‘security concerns’ in recent decades. Although civic education programs could certainly aim at discouraging prejudices and stereotypes, emphasis on patriotic or nationalistic forms of identification may actually get in the way of facilitating immigrants’ integration by reinforcing their perception as ‘outsiders’. On the other hand, it might be possible to appeal to a real or aspirational national or patriotic virtue of inclusion and acceptance in order to combat such tendencies.

When societies are deeply divided along national lines, the goals of patriotic and nationalist education can come into sharp conflict (Spinner-Halev 2003). In such a situation, the state is often perceived as representing the majority nation, and one source of disputes is precisely which political community should be the primary focus of children’s loyalty. Even moderate educational programs aiming to create a thin sense of identification with existing political institutions may backfire, and be

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<sup>1</sup> However, programs of multinational civic education face a number of challenges in their efforts to shape desirable forms of nested identities. For a discussion of these issues in the context of Canada see McDonough (2003).

perceived as assimilationist by national minorities. This seems hard to avoid, since schools face choices regarding the language(s) of instruction, which official holidays to celebrate, and how to teach children about the history and symbols of the country and its regions. Educational practices tend to better reflect and enable the self-understandings of members of the national majority in a territory or region, as against those of others. As a result, when members of national minorities are territorially concentrated, they may expect to have their own separate schools and to be able to teach their history and culture to new generations in order to maintain a separate identity.

## **Arguments for the Cultivation of Patriotic and Nationalist Attachments**

There are two general types of normative arguments that have been developed in support of patriotic and nationalist approaches to civic education, which can be labeled ‘non-instrumental’ and ‘instrumental’, respectively. Non-instrumental arguments try to make a case for the intrinsic value of the relevant beliefs, attachments, and dispositions to support one’s political community. One non-instrumental strategy takes these ties to be constitutive of individuals’ identities and therefore to be central to the flourishing of those individuals and the communities to which they belong (MacIntyre 1995; Miller 1995; Hurka 1997). However, instrumental arguments are more common. These arguments take the value of patriotism and nationalism to be dependent on their contribution to the achievement of other political goods, such as countering social fragmentation, promoting solidarity and social justice, or encouraging democratic participation (Moore 2001b; Callan 2002).

### ***Non-instrumental Arguments***

Although there are variations in the details of non-instrumental arguments that support cultivating attachments and loyalty to country and/or nation, all such arguments begin with the claim that individuals typically have strong feelings of identification with their political communities, and that one result of having these feelings is that their well-being is perceived to be tied to the prosperity of their communities. These bonds and attachments are described as intrinsically valuable, and therefore something that parents would wish to transmit to their children. These same attachments are also considered to be the source of obligations to support one’s political community and fellow members. Making use of an analogy with family relationships and friendships, some advocates of patriotic and nationalist partiality – Thomas Hurka (1997) and David Miller (1995), for example – argue that there are important goods internal to political relationships, and that special obligations can be derived

from them. Given that individuals' subjective feelings of identification and the corresponding sense of obligation can vary in many ways – both interpersonally and intrapersonally – Miller (1995, 65–73) adds that the more precise content of these obligations is to be determined by public debates among members of the political community. The result is a view according to which subjective feelings tie individuals to their political community, but it is the community as a whole that establishes the particular obligations owed by members. For Miller, these obligations count as legitimate provided that their content is established in open and democratic ways: that is, as a result of collective self-determination. This way of solving the problem of the content of national obligations is dependent on the existence of democratic mechanisms, so it better explains the ties and obligations that hold among members of nations that already have their own political institutions.

A more extreme version of the non-instrumental argument has been proposed by Alasdair MacIntyre (1995), whose views continue to shape much of the contemporary debate on the morality of patriotism and nationalism. According to MacIntyre, one's relationship to one's political community is central to acquiring moral knowledge, moral motivation, and genuine self-understanding. MacIntyre claims that we always learn morality in the context of a particular community, in the sense that the moral rules and norms we are taught have a precise content as part of the way of life and specific institutions of our community. MacIntyre thinks that most individuals will come to understand their own lives as embedded in the history and traditions of their political communities, and will develop a sense of what they owe to others that is shaped by such communal ties. He claims that if the relations individuals have to their political community are severed, they will lose their grasp on authentic standards for moral and political judgment. So for MacIntyre the question of whether one should be loyal to one's nation or one's country does not seem to be open to discussion. Despite its obvious conservatism, this account still makes some room for limited forms of rational criticism of the current practices of one's political community. An individual's allegiance is to 'the political project of the nation', and the current government and leaders may fail to represent what others take to be the core values of this project.

While these types of claims continue to be central to the non-instrument arguments of patriotic and nationalist partiality, they have received a variety of criticisms (Moore 2001a, 25–51; Kodelja 2011; Primoratz 2015). One initial point worth making about these arguments is that they rely on a particularistic ethics that attempts to ground obligations to the political community directly in the relationship between the community and its members: a relationship that is supported by strong feelings of attachment and identification. One may simply find such a theory of the source of obligation implausible. Moreover, if – as is typically the case – individuals are involved in a variety of valuable relationships, and have multiple and overlapping identifications with communities and groups, advocates of patriotic and nationalistic partiality must at least provide additional reasons for giving special weight to these attachments (when they exist) at the expense of all the others. This is necessary if they want to defend the claim that these attachments should become central to educational practices and be transmitted to new generations. Further, and

as was mentioned earlier, patriotic and nationalist attachments do not always coincide, and may pull in different directions, leaving open the question of which should take priority. Moreover, many contemporary societies contain immigrant groups that maintain strong ties to their native countries, and they also typically contain groups with cosmopolitan attitudes and commitments, who may reject patriotic and nationalist educational programs on the basis of their own moral and political attachments and convictions (Furia 2005). So it seems difficult – to put it mildly – to design educational programs that can fairly accommodate the resulting variety of loyalties, attachments, and identifications. This is a serious problem for those who employ the non-instrumental argument precisely because it is something like an internal criticism.

Here is another criticism of the non-instrumental argument, at least as MacIntyre presents it. The undeniable fact that people can live good lives in societies that are multinational and multicultural – and that they can live good lives even if they migrate from one society to another – raises serious doubts about his account of moral learning and moral judgment (Waldron 2003). Even if many children first learn moral and social norms in the context of small communities that are relatively homogeneous, they are able to incorporate and navigate a wider variety of norms as they grow up. It is also possible to critically revise some of the norms one has learned growing up, and to decide not to follow them as an adult, without necessarily at any point losing one's standards for moral and political evaluation. As Waldron (2003) points out, people are capable of developing strategies for cooperatively interacting with those who come from very different cultural backgrounds. Indeed, one might argue that civic education should actually encourage such interactions. In any case, as a consequence of these cooperative interactions, people are capable of learning new norms or transforming old ones. In fact, most human lives are not lived within one single monolithic or 'pure' culture. Even when people live in the same place all their lives, their cultural practices embody heterogeneous fragments taken from a variety of cultural sources, constantly subject to transformation and adaptation. For this reason, even the distinction between global and local cultural phenomena is hard to maintain.

### *Instrumental Arguments*

A second general type of argument in defense of patriotic or nationalist policies of civic education depends on the claim that shared identification with the political community is instrumental in producing significant benefits. It is worth pointing out that this sort of argument favors nationalist projects when the nation has its own political institutions – that is, when 'nation' is understood as the people of a whole country – but it is not very accommodating of the aspirations of national groups that lack their own political institutions and live side by side with other groups within the same country. One reason for this is that feelings of identification and attachment are expected to provide the ties that bind the citizens of a country together in ways that

facilitate the functioning of existing institutions, helping to secure common goods such as justice and democracy. And in the absence of an overarching shared identity, the argument favors its creation, that is, some sort of project of (multi) nation-building. But such projects are often resisted both by national majorities and minorities.<sup>2</sup>

One version of the instrumental argument claims that a shared identity creates bonds of affection and solidarity that aid in the implementation of policies of distributive justice (Miller 1995; Callan 2004). On this view, feelings of emotional identification with the political community and fellow citizens are valuable because they encourage cooperation on common projects and make participants more willing to make sacrifices for the common good or for the welfare of others. In this way, if civic education succeeds in encouraging such feelings, citizens would be more likely to support policies that secure access to education, health care, and other social benefits for the worst off members of their society. The problem with these claims is that they do not seem to have sufficient empirical support. There does not seem to be any clear correlation between widespread patriotic or unified nationalist feelings on the one hand, and well-functioning welfare institutions on the other. For example, citizens of the United States are, arguably, more unified by feelings of national belonging than are citizens of Canada or the United Kingdom, but the American welfare state is much less developed than the Canadian or the British one. As Margaret Moore (2001b) has persuasively argued, redistributive welfare policies depend on the existence of large bureaucratic institutions that mediate between citizens' feelings and public policy. Once established, such policies seem to work independently of national feelings that might or might not support them. On the other hand, as Moore points out, when there are persistent feelings of hostility or indifference towards national minorities or immigrants in a society, redistributive policies that benefit them may be hard to sustain in the long run.

Another version of the instrumental argument claims that a shared political identity helps representative institutions to function more effectively and encourages democratic participation. Advocates of this line of argument claim that a shared identity facilitates debates about the common good by reducing distrust among the parties (Miller 1995, 90–98). When there are different national groups with antagonistic identities, genuine democratic dialogue is very difficult if not impossible. Moreover, under such circumstances members of national minorities are often discouraged from participation as they feel that the interests of their groups are not adequately represented in the political process when they consistently find themselves on the losing side of debates. However, all that these considerations actually license us to conclude is that national divisions often pose serious challenges to democratic mechanisms. They do not license the conclusion that civic education, oriented to creating a shared identity, is the most promising way to overcome these

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<sup>2</sup>Regarding difficulties in cultivating a sense of shared identity in schools in deeply divided societies, see Spinner-Halev (2003). Among the examples he discusses are India and Israel, and the associated divisions between Hindu and Muslim populations, and Jewish and Palestinian populations.

challenges. In fact, there are other policies that seem to be more appropriate: for example, reforms in representative institutions that facilitate power sharing in government (Moore 2001b).<sup>3</sup> At most, civic education would have to work alongside other policies to overcome national divisions. Even if educational programs could try to encourage a sense of belonging together, they would also have to recognize minority nations and accommodate reasonable demands for distinctive forms of education. Historical and sociological studies of nationalist movements might indirectly teach competence in assessing the reasonability of nationalist demands. But, if they are to satisfy this educational goal, such studies would need to be careful to avoid taking sides on the question of whether nationalist attachments are valuable (McDonough and Cormier 2013).

Of course, in societies without deep national divisions, it might well be true that nurturing and maintaining patriotic feelings in schools would improve the quantity and quality of democratic participation, and would facilitate implementing redistributive policies. But, even if true, this would support only a more restricted version of the argument. Moreover, given the complexity of social phenomena, the empirical evidence in its favor appears inconclusive. In light of this, critics of patriotic civic education point out that merely having the potential to produce valuable consequences is not enough. Rather, if we are to evaluate the instrumental argument seriously, we must take into account the kinds of dispositions that actual educational projects generate in different societies, and make an overall assessment not only of the benefits it produces, but also the costs (Brighouse 2003). The costs of civic education may turn out to be significant, if they produce extreme forms of patriotism that numb citizens' critical capacities to evaluate their countries' foreign policies (Brighouse 2003; Costa 2011a; Kodelja 2011).

## The Need for a Sense of Belonging

As the preceding discussion has shown, one common assumption made by advocates of patriotic civic education is that a having a sense of belonging together contributes to the well-functioning of social institutions and the well-being of individual citizens. What such theorists seem to assume, without arguing for it explicitly or even recognizing that argument is needed, is that having a sense of belonging crucially depends on experiencing specifically patriotic feelings of attachment and identification. Their assumption seems to be that social stability is under serious threat unless

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<sup>3</sup>But while a variety of accommodations can help mitigate conflicts among national groups, it may also encourage feelings of separateness or indifference between them. Often national groups are interested in learning about the cultures and languages of other societies, but not about those of their own neighbors. This need not be the result of any hostility, but of the view that, say, learning English as a second language will increase their children's opportunities in the future. See Kymlicka (2003).

citizens share some common political identity that functions to counter the fragmentary tendencies of pluralism and multiculturalism.

The assumptions just described might go some distance in explaining the common tendency in many countries of giving a patriotic orientation to courses that cover the history and governmental institutions of their society, especially in primary and secondary schools. Patriotic emphasis in civic education is often a response to recent political events, such as armed conflicts or re-drawing of borders. For example, this was the case with newly formed countries in Eastern Europe post 1995 (Bromley 2009).<sup>4</sup> However, advocates of patriotic civic education disagree about how best to achieve patriotic goals. A moralizing and sentimental approach is very common in practice, especially regarding the teaching of history, but very few theorists openly defend it. The problem with a moralizing history is that, even if it successfully manages to transmit an inspiring picture of the country and its people, it invariably also involves a distortion of the truth about past events. A well-known advocate of this approach – despite the required distortion – is William Galston (1991). He argues that loyal identification with one's country is best encouraged by presenting "a pantheon of heroes who confer legitimacy on central institutions and are worthy of emulation" (1991, 244). Galston is concerned that a more critical and truthful approach would undermine "structures of unexamined but socially central belief" (1991, 242). However, one drawback of making use of 'noble lies' to encourage patriotism is that students may continue believing in such fictions when they grow up, even against evidence to the contrary. These false beliefs may undermine their civic capacities to critically assess policies adopted by their country or proposed by their political candidates and leaders. Fictions are often more comforting than the actual facts and may make it easier to maintain loyalty to one's beloved country. If this type of sentimental civic education succeeds in its goals, then, as Callan (1997, 100–131) has pointed out, it may also encourage self-deception by leading people to filter complex political events in ways that allow them to maintain their belief in the bland and uplifting stories they are comfortable with. And there is also the risk that a sentimental civic education will not succeed in the first place; a sentimental presentation of the past may well fail to persuade students, since they are often exposed to less sanitized versions of the past in the media, in the family, and in other social settings.

Objections to Galston's simplifying and distorting form of civic education do not apply to other educational attempts to inculcate patriotism. In fact, Callan argues that teachers should be truthful in their civic lessons, discussing past and present injustices while also encouraging students to seek out what is best in their country's traditions. The alternative patriotic approach Callan recommends attempts to strike a delicate balance between cultivating loyalty and preserving the capacities and motivations required to support just causes. When patriots with a sense of justice are confronted by serious injustices perpetrated by their own country or compatriots, their patriotism could then provide the motivating force to struggle to right those

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<sup>4</sup>But there is a significant trend towards incorporating universalistic values in civic education, emphasizing international cooperation, tolerance, and respect for human rights (Bromley 2009).



injustices (Callan 2011). However, a loyalty oriented by a concern for justice presupposes that the object of loyalty has morally valuable features. As a result there is a significant tension between loving one's country deeply and appreciating that it has serious moral flaws. When patriots who are inspired by a sense of justice discover that their country is complicit in severe injustices, they might feel prompted to fight injustice, but they might just as easily give up their patriotic loyalty (Costa 2011b).

## Beyond Shared Identities

Many disputes about the desirability of patriotic forms of civic education reflect the difficulties involved in the joint projects of inculcating loyalty to the existing political community, teaching history and social sciences rigorously, and encouraging critical reflection about the functioning of social institutions. These difficulties might be avoided by giving up on patriotic civic education and looking instead for some other way to create a sense of belonging together.

One alternative proposal to create a sense of belonging together is inspired by the work of John Rawls (1993) and focuses on achieving consensus on political principles of justice and democracy. Consensus on principles of political morality could be the source of social unity, insofar as these principles are capable of accommodating a plurality of reasonable values and forms of collective identification. According to Rawls (1993, 5–6), to be just a society must guarantee a set of basic rights and liberties to all of its members, including the right to vote and to run for office. It should also implement policies that secure equality of opportunity, as well as redistributive policies that improve the life prospects of its worst off members. However, advocates of a 'Rawlsian' civic education are not necessarily committed to the view that schools should teach these particular substantive principles. This would amount to teaching a political ideology that many citizens might reasonably reject. Rather, schools might teach respect for basic rights and liberties and might advocate democratic procedures for decision-making: ideas that are more likely to gain widespread support because they can be seen as embodied in the constitution and the legal and political system (Costa 2011a). Whatever the precise content of these principles, if members of society could converge on accepting them, then it seems that they do not need to think of themselves as a single people with a shared past. Rather, they could think of their shared institutions and public culture as embodying these binding principles. Moreover, it would be possible to study the history of these institutions, and the public culture, in ways that acknowledge the grievances and perspectives of different groups, while also providing some hope that the gap between the political ideals embodied in these institutions and their actual workings can be reduced over time.

The principle-based strategy for civic education has received a number of criticisms. One common criticism is that placing this sort of emphasis on a set of political principles as a focus for unification may have unwanted exclusionary

effects. Such a policy would place an undue burden on members of society who do not explicitly endorse the political principles accepted by the majority, even if they have demonstrated that they are good citizens, capable of interacting with others in tolerant and respectful ways (Williams 2003, 219–223). Contrary to the principle-based strategy, Andrew Mason (2000, 115–147) argues that all that civic education really ought to cultivate is a sense of belonging to the political community. And to have such a sense of belonging, all that need be true is that that citizens feel at home in their political community. For Mason, for a person to feel at home in the institutions of a polity is for her to be able to find her way around in that polity and to experience participation in its institutions as natural. One difficulty with this proposal is that such a sense of belonging cannot be the result of indoctrination, but must stem from an inclusive form of education that also equips students with the critical capacities, political virtues and knowledge that are necessary for good citizenship. Mason thinks that programs of multicultural education that recognize the variety of cultures and affiliations of members of society and encourage their mutual valuing may help create this sense of belonging, if they work together with other policies supporting integration. One advantage of this proposal is that it could allow different groups to interpret the values embodied in their shared institutions in different ways.

Melissa Williams (2003) expresses similar concerns about forms of civic education that are designed in order to create a shared identity or a consensus on political principles. As an alternative, she proposes that we design civic education around the idea of ‘citizenship as shared fate’. This is the idea that we are in webs of relationships with others, and that we share our lives with others, whether we voluntarily choose such relationships or not. Given our interdependency, she argues that we need to find ways of living together that can be justified in reciprocal ways, and that this involves cultivating a number of political virtues (Williams 2003, 233–235). Even in an increasingly interconnected world, Williams admits that the (multi) nation-state remains a central site for civic activity. Following Williams’ account, Sigal Ben-Porath argues that encouraging students to see each other as sharing a common fate might contribute to the functioning of the existing democratic institutions of their country by equipping them with dispositions to deliberate together and find mutually acceptable solutions to common problems (Ben-Porath 2012). However, Ben-Porath’s assumption that the task of civic education is to cultivate a sense of shared fate only among fellow citizens overlooks a key element of Williams’ proposal that makes it more responsive to the conditions of an increasingly globalized world. This is the idea that significant relationships and interactions among people do not stop at the borders of countries, and that political virtues are also necessary to evaluate and shape these interactions in fair and legitimate ways. Many social, economic, and political relationships that have enormous impacts on people’s lives fail to have boundaries that coincide with those of the state. For these reasons, students should be encouraged to reflect on the fact that they share the world with others and that interdependencies create responsibilities to cooperate and to respond in morally acceptable ways to problems that cross political boundaries, such as environmental disasters, humanitarian crises, global epidemics, or inter-

national crime. Critical reflection could also be extended to the ways in which one's political behavior and consumer choices might aggravate these problems. Good citizens may (or may not) have deep feelings of attachment to and identification with their countries, and they may (or may not) welcome the development of international and transnational political institutions. But they must be aware of their civic obligations, and the ways in which their decisions affect not only their local community, but also people who live in other parts of the globe (Costa 2016).

## Conclusion

This chapter has examined the question of whether the cultivation of patriotic and nationalist ideals and attachments should have a central place in programs of civic education. It argued that the most useful way to draw the distinction between patriotism and nationalism focuses on their respective objects of loyalty; patriotism is loyalty to a country while nationalism is loyalty to a people. This way of distinguishing between patriotism and nationalism formed the background for the discussion of a variety of arguments for cultivating patriotic and nationalist political attachments in schools. Among other things, the background distinction highlighted the fact that such arguments tend to better account for the aspirations of groups that already have their own political institutions. The chapter also examined an assumption common to these programs of civic education: that a shared identity grounded in patriotic or unified nationalist feelings is crucial for citizens to have a sense of belonging that supports the flourishing of more just and democratic institutions. It discussed the difficulties involved in teaching patriotic or nationalist loyalty in ways that do not distort past and present events. It also examined a number of alternative ways to encourage a sense of belonging that do not privilege patriotic or nationalist ties at the expense of others forms of political attachment, given the existence of multiple identifications and loyalties, some of which transcend political borders. More crucially, given that social, political, and economic relationships and interdependencies do not stop at borders, well informed and competent citizens need to be disposed to examine them from a point of view that acknowledges political affiliations but does not privilege them at the expense of the rights and interests of others.

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# Non-human Animals



Kai Horsthemke

## Introduction

Most of our contact with non-human animals occurs, directly or indirectly on a daily basis, when we eat them, when we wear products that have been made of their skin, fur and bones, and when we use commodities that have been tested on them in laboratories and/or that contain products of animal origin. We keep them as pets, status symbols, and aids or tools in our work. Less frequently, we seek out their presence in circuses, zoos and game parks, and use them for recreational purposes: we ride and race them, fish and hunt them. Some of us also study them, both in artificial (laboratory) and natural settings – to learn more about them and about ourselves.

Conflicts of interests, then, commonly occur in situations where animals are utilized for human ends and benefits. Relevant theories that defend this exclusively instrumental view of non-humans and that grant animals at best moral object status, theories like so-called indirect duty views<sup>1</sup> and contractarianism (with its idea of ‘justice-as-reciprocity’), are loosely subsumable under the label of (moral or ethical) anthropocentrism, or ‘human-centred ethics’. As I have shown elsewhere (Horsthemke 2010: 135–158), they prove to be vulnerable either to the so-called argument from marginal cases or to the argument from speciesism, or both. The former states that any account designed to exclude animals from the realm of (directly) morally considerable beings will also exclude certain human beings (like young children and people with cognitive disabilities, senile dementia, and the like).

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<sup>1</sup>Theories of ‘indirect duty’ essentially deny that we can have any direct duties to non-human animals. To speak of our ‘duties to’ them is to acknowledge in the main our responsibility to God, in respect of his creation, and/or to other human beings, i.e. not to hurt their feelings or affront their sensibilities. I return to this issue in my discussion of Aquinas and Kant.

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The latter holds that excluding animals simply on the basis of their not being human is an irrational prejudice not unlike that involved in sexism and racism (see also Horsthemke 2015: 125–146).

It is widely accepted among animal psychologists, ethologists and students of animal behaviour in general that we are only beginning to recognize the vast reservoir of shared properties and similarities between ‘us’ and ‘them’, not to mention the many superior characteristics and capabilities possessed by non-human animals. Differences between humans and non-humans are differences in degree, not in kind. Other animals, too, are conscious individuals, many possessing even conative and cognitive abilities. Like humans, they have biological as well as conative interests and a life that can be better or worse for them; they can be harmed and benefited; and they deserve to be treated and given consideration in accordance with their particular characteristics.

Questions about the conative and cognitive life, as well as the status and treatment of other-than-animals have been receiving *systematic* consideration by philosophers for close to 50 years. Since the publication of *Animals, men, and morals*, edited by Roslind Godlovitch, Stanley Godlovitch and John Harris (1971), which also contained the first exposition of Richard Ryder’s term ‘speciesism’ (the analogy being with sexism and racism) and which was famously described by Peter Singer as “a manifesto for an Animal Liberation movement” in his review for *The New York Review of Books* (Singer 1973), a wealth of philosophical, scientific and other literature has been published on the theme of systematic discrimination against non-human animals. Courses on comparative psychology, animal ethics and animal rights have been introduced in the undergraduate and postgraduate curricula of a substantial number of universities worldwide. It is all the more puzzling, then, that it is only in recent years that these issues have been addressed within philosophy of education, the focus being mainly on the eating of animals.<sup>2</sup> By contrast, environmental education has for many years received wide coverage, not only by philosophers but also by other social scientists, natural scientists and politicians.

This chapter is part of the growing body of literature on animal-related education. It examines how empirical evidence (psychological, medical and statistical) for the purported links between animal abuse and human violence bears on education. The chapter’s chief normative focus is both on the moral implications of a psycho-physical continuum between humans and non-humans and on the promise of theriocentric (animal-centred, as opposed to anthropocentric) education. Does anti-racist and anti-sexist education logically entail anti-speciesist education? Similarly, is there a necessary link between human rights education and animal rights education? In drawing attention to these questions, the chapter presents an account of moral education as both education in matters of social justice and education in ‘moral feeling’, cultivation of (appropriate) moral sentiments. Given most children’s natural interest in, and feeling for, animals (see Wilson 1984; Myers 1998), this should arguably be easier than is commonly assumed. However, as I will

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<sup>2</sup> See, for example, Rowe (2009, 2012), Rice (2013a, b) and Rice and Rud (eds.) (2016).

argue, it does require considerable effort and commitment on the part of educators, parents and teachers alike.

## Animal Abuse and Human Violence

According to sociologist Margaret Mead, “One of the most dangerous things that can happen to a child is to kill or torture an animal and get away with it” (quoted in Clifton 1991: 45). Many philosophers have discussed the link between animal abuse and violence towards people. The ‘tradition’ and intellectual history of this concern notably encompasses the views of Thomas Aquinas and Immanuel Kant. Aquinas argues that, since animals can be treated cruelly, cruelty to them is to be condemned for two reasons. Firstly, it may lead to cruelty to human beings, and secondly, it may not only hurt the feelings of other human beings, but it may also not be in the general interest of those who profit from the animals, and for whose sake the animals exist. God, after all, cares for non-rational creatures for the sake of rational creatures (Aquinas 1976: 56–9, 118–21). Kant offers two inversions of the Thomist argument: “Tender feelings towards dumb animals develop humane feelings towards mankind”, and “If (a man) is not to stifle his human feelings, he must practice kindness towards animals, for he who is cruel to animals becomes hard also in his dealing with men” (Kant 1976: 122, 123). For a long time, however, it proved difficult to establish logical and empirical grounds for inferring that kindness to animals necessarily entails kindness to humans, or that cruelty to animals will lead to cruelty to human beings.<sup>3</sup> It is only in recent years that, on the basis of psychological, medical and statistical research, an impressive body of evidence has accumulated in support of what for a long time had been little more than an interesting hypothesis. Recent findings indicate that inmates serving terms in prison for abusive and violent crimes often have histories of abuse towards animals when they were young (see Linzey 2009 *passim*).

One response has been the demand for new and improved legislation (see Schaffner 2009; Robertson 2009), which would include longer prison terms and higher fines, as well as a mandatory psychiatric evaluation and treatment for anyone convicted of mistreating animals.<sup>4</sup> Two major worries remain, however. While new and improved legislation should no doubt be welcomed, the question remains how powerful any law can be in the absence of legal rights of individual animals. The

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<sup>3</sup>I wish to note at this juncture that appeals to kindness and injunctions against cruelty constitute a basis neither for morality nor for moral education. Most importantly, embodying as they do reference to agents’ mental states, motives or intentions, they fail to account for our positive and negative duties. At most, such appeals and injunctions characterize a virtue ethic’s identification of ‘rightness’ and ‘wrongness’, respectively, without these necessarily translating into action.

<sup>4</sup>There is a persistent worry that the punishment meted out in response to the abuse and torture of animals is either applied inconsistently or does not even begin to fit the crime, or both. The argument runs that large-scale animal abuse remains legal – pertaining especially to the food, biomedical and clothing industries.



vast majority of animals in the vast majority of countries lack *locus standi*, legal standing – so any piece of legislation will lack an important component when interpreted by judges or juries. In contrast, human rights abuses are in principle dealt with successfully, because of the legal acknowledgement and bindingness of human rights, nationally and internationally. My second worry is that, laudable as considerations of just desert, deterrence and rehabilitation projects may be, any such punishment necessarily involves combating the symptoms rather than the underlying disease. This is where deontological and/or consequentialist reasons and principles need to be supplemented by virtue-ethical considerations, fellow-feeling, compassion and care. Children do not develop into good adults, i.e. morally decent individuals, merely through a series of proscriptions or threats of punishment – quite the contrary. It is desirable neither that they are guided solely by their feelings or emotions nor that they are guided exclusively by their intellect. Feelings on their own are not a trustworthy guide because they change, often quickly and radically. Yet, to expect children to rely on their intellects alone would be to treat them as intellectual robots. The idea of mass-producing intellectual robots acting solely on principle or on the basis of cost-benefit analyses, and who dismiss the *rational* significance of feeling and caring, is not an attractive one.

In the next section I examine the complementarity of social justice and moral sentiments in moral education.

## Capabilities, Moral Sentiments and Social Justice

In *Frontiers of justice* (Nussbaum 2006) Martha Nussbaum takes up three urgent problems of social justice not (or only insufficiently) addressed by current (notably Kantian and Rawlsian) theory, problems that are nonetheless of immediate concern in everyday practical life. She seeks to establish a theory of social justice that will accommodate not only those with mental and physical disabilities and foreign nationals but also non-human animals. In proposing a capabilities approach to questions of social justice and moral entitlement, Nussbaum provides a list of capabilities that give “important precision and supplementation” to rights – or rather, to use her preferred notion, to entitlements shared by humans and non-humans (Nussbaum 2006: 284–285). Apart from my concerns in the latter regard,<sup>5</sup> I do not believe that all the capabilities listed by Nussbaum are basic. Some clearly are (like ‘life’), but most appear to be derived from more basic capabilities, e.g. for well-being, flourishing and the like. Nonetheless, her list (which also includes “bodily health”, “bodily integrity”, “senses, imagination, and thought”, “emotions”, “practical reason”, “affiliation”, “other species”, “play” and “control over one’s environment”; Nussbaum 2006: 393–400; see also Nussbaum 2004: 314–317) is useful in that it

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<sup>5</sup>In section 7.1 of my book *The Moral Status and Rights of Animals* I argue that rights share certain features with entitlements, claims, etc., but that they cannot be viewed as synonymous with any of these (Horsthemke 2010).

gives content or substance to the rights humans and animals might reasonably be said to share.<sup>6</sup>

Especially pertinent to present concerns are Nussbaum's thoughts on moral education, and on the educational significance of moral sentiments in particular. She points out that any theory or tradition that "derives [ethical and] political principles [solely] from the idea of mutual advantage, without assuming that human beings have deep and motivationally powerful ties to others" (Nussbaum 2006: 408) may *appear* to have a distinct advantage over theories that emphasize more or less extensive benevolence.

The capabilities approach demands a great deal from human beings. ... The solution to our three unresolved problems [i.e., extending principles of social justice to those with mental and physical impairments, foreign nationals and non-human animals] requires people to have very great sympathy and benevolence, and to sustain these sentiments over time. (Nussbaum 2006: 409)

This raises the question whether any such approach is at all realistic. Nussbaum responds by noting a substantial "defect in the classical theorists' treatment of the moral sentiments: their lack of attention to cultural variation and the role of education" (Nussbaum 2006: 410). With the exception of Rousseau, all "seem to hold that the repertoire of sentiments of which a group of citizens is capable is pretty well fixed" (Nussbaum 2006: 410). By contrast, Nussbaum emphasizes "the malleability of moral sentiments, their susceptibility to cultivation through education, ... sentiments that will support radical social change in the direction of justice and equal dignity" (Nussbaum 2006: 410, 411).

This account of moral sentiments provides a natural and attractive account of moral *motivation* – as contrasted with accounts of principled *requirement* or *duty*. It also takes care of the supposed requirement of *impartiality*. Some moral sentiments and virtues (like love and friendship) are *partial*; others (like honesty and beneficence towards others in general) are not. What is needed is not strict impartiality but an understanding of the nature of the different moral sentiments and virtues and how they relate to one another.

In my view, in order to effect any *lasting* changes, also in terms of legislation regarding the treatment of animals and environmental policy in general, moral education needs to incorporate more than reasons and principles associated with a deontological orientation or rights ethic.<sup>7</sup> It needs to include considerations of kindness, empathy, sympathy/compassion, empathy, feelings of kinship – indeed –

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<sup>6</sup>What remains unclear, however, is how Nussbaum's verdict that "research using animals remains crucial to medical advances, both for humans and for other animals" (Nussbaum 2006: 403) is to be squared with her capabilities approach. While she emphasizes, in this context, "the dignity of animals and our own culpability toward them" (Nussbaum 2006: 405), her verdict is based not only on a factual error (see Horsthemke 2010, section 3.7) but also appears to be normatively inconsistent.

<sup>7</sup>While no philosophical work on animals would be complete without mentioning Peter Singer's essential contribution (Singer 1975), I do not think his utilitarian position affords animals the necessary protection and consideration. Most starkly, it is at best silent on the killing of non-humans, provided that this occurs painlessly (see Horsthemke 2010: 186–206).

appeals to *human* benefits (whether individual or collective), etc. That is, if moral rules and principles are to be useful and motivationally effective in our lives, they need to affiliate with rule- and “principle-independent (positive) human emotions” and virtues, like care, empathy and sympathy/compassion (Slote 2013: 30; see also Beetz 2009). There is a possible compromise between the rule- and principle-based considerations of, for example, a rights-based ethic and a care conception, which will avoid relativism as well as nurture social and environmental literacy and responsibility. It will consist in the adoption of a rights and duty orientation as the basis, without denying the importance of a care conception. After all, children are not made moral individuals by appealing first to their intellect and only thereafter, if at all, to their feelings. As Amy Gutmann has observed: “To cultivate in children the character that *feels* the force of right *reason* is an essential purpose of education in any society” (Gutmann 1987: 43; emphasis added). An affective capacity for morality provides the ‘raw material’ for fostering rational self-determination and the use of reason for making choices and decisions. Just as society can be responsible for “nature-deficit disorder” in children (Louv 2005), it can achieve the opposite, through both the elicitation of care and compassion as well as the education in moral reasoning, and inculcation of principles and skills. Just as “children have to recognize [or be made to feel] that their parents – or parental substitutes – *love* them” (Slote 2013: 30; emphasis in original), they have to realize that what is wrong for others to do to them is wrong for them to do to others. This appears to be the essence of the idea that there is no substitute for a direct concern for others as the basis of morality. Children must learn to cultivate their empathic and ‘sympathetic imaginations’. This is not easy, as Richard Hare has cautioned: “And it will not be brought about by rational discussion alone” (Hare 1992: 125). Thus, the ethical significance of feelings is not questioned. What *is* doubtful, however (and this is where I disagree with virtue ethicists and care ethicists in particular), is that the motives and ethical beliefs underlying the practice of virtues, care, recognition of responsibilities, etc. differ from culture to culture, *and* that such empathic and sympathetic imagination, caring, etc. can actually provide a sound moral basis, i.e. a guarantee or consistent prescription, for right action. Empathy and compassion might be seen as the heart of a comprehensive social justice movement, but rights are, or rather *should be*, its backbone.

### **Children and Other Animals: A Brief Digression into the Terrain of Developmental Psychology**

For every horror story involving the torture and death of animals at the hands of children and teenagers, there are arguably multiple success stories and often heart-warming accounts of symbiosis, rescue operations and reunification involving young humans and animals. Given most children’s natural interest in, and feeling for, animals (as I document below), moral education as *both* education in matters of

social justice *and* education in ‘moral feeling’, cultivation of (appropriate) moral sentiments should be easier than is commonly assumed. However, it does require some effort and commitment on the part of educators, parents and teachers alike.

Edward O. Wilson has referred to “biophilia” as “the innate tendency to focus on life and life-like processes” (Wilson 1984: 1):

From infancy we concentrate happily on ourselves and other organisms. We learn to distinguish life from the inanimate ... (p. 1) Life of any kind is infinitely more interesting than almost any conceivable variety of inanimate matter. (p. 84) ... the urge to affiliate with other forms of life is to some degree innate, hence deserves to be called biophilia. The evidence for the proposition is not in a formal scientific sense: the subject has not been studied enough in the scientific manner of hypothesis, deduction, and experimentation to let us be certain about it one way or the other. The biophilic tendency is nevertheless so clearly evinced in daily life and widely distributed as to deserve serious attention. It unfolds in the predictable fantasies and responses of individuals from early childhood onward. It cascades into repetitive patterns of culture across most or all societies, a consistency often noted in the literature of anthropology. These processes appear to be part of the programs of the brain. (p. 85; see also Kahn *passim*)

When Wilson first articulated these opinions, they might have struck many as fanciful, romantic and somewhat devoid of scholarly rigour. Yet, an increasing number of researchers and educators are now studying the interrelationship between children and animals (see Finger 1994; Krueger and Krueger 2005; Louv 2005; Melson *passim*; Myers *passim*). More recently, Gail Melson and Peter Kahn have argued that a biocentric approach, informed by the concept of biophilia, to the study of children’s perceptual, emotional, cognitive and social development would enrich our understanding of children’s relationships, play, fears and sense of self, as well as their and our grasp of what it is to be human (Melson 2001; Kahn 1997; Kahn 1999). Most children are curious naturalists, “folkbiologists” (see Hatano and Inagaki 1999; Inagaki and Hatano 2004): they have a core domain knowledge of “living things” (Melson 2001). They intuitively perceive, categorize and think about biological phenomena. Kayoko Inagaki and Giyoo Hatano have established that children understand, classify and explain living systems as unique in terms of “vitalistic causality”, a form of construal in which the primary causal concept is “life force” (Inagaki and Hatano 2004). The question remains, of course, whether children’s acquisition of ‘folkbiological knowledge’ occurs in the same way across cultures.

Kahn has conducted extensive cross-cultural research involving children, teenagers and their parents, in order to determine their moral reasoning about the natural world, their views on non-human animals and environmental degradation (Kahn 1997, 2002; Kahn and Friedman 1995). Perhaps unsurprisingly, he discovered two main trends in environmental moral reasoning, namely what he refers to as anthropocentric (or human-centred) and biocentric (life-centred) reasoning. The former concerns effects of maltreatment of non-humans, pollution, etc. on human beings, and human interests and benefits (such as the value of environmental literacy); the latter, unlike the former, ascribes intrinsic value to the natural (human and non-human) world. Interestingly, Kahn appears to suggest that while there is little evidence of substantial differences in cognitive understanding and moral reasoning

across cultures,<sup>8</sup> there are major differences across generations. He labels this phenomenon “environmental generational amnesia” (Kahn 2002: 93, 105ff.), a phenomenon that refers to each successive generation’s perception of the natural context of its childhood experience as the norm against which to judge or on which to act.

An additional problem, which is arguably not ‘cultural’ but rather manifest in the ‘urban’-‘rural’ divide, concerns what Richard Louv has characterized as ‘nature deficit disorder’ in children and young adults. There has over the last few decades been a marked tendency in children in urban industrial contexts towards an increasingly sedentary life, to spend much of their leisure time with television, computers, play stations, mobile phones and other technological gadgetry, rather than in immediately interpersonal<sup>9</sup> and outdoor activities. The net results have been not only high rates of child obesity, over-prescription of anti-depressants to children and young adults and the prevalence of ADHD (attention deficit and hyperactivity disorder), but also a kind of alienation from nature. The solution suggested by Louv and others (to spend more time with animals and in natural settings) is at once obvious and simple but at the same time difficult to achieve. After all, natural outdoor play spaces are diminishing, and parental unavailability (due to work commitments) or general inability to monitor their children’s movements is frequently matched only by parents’ fears about violent crime, their children’s exposure to drugs and alcohol – hence their preference to keep their children in safe, controlled domestic environments. Yet, even in the absence of natural play settings or personal contact with non-human animals, children and teenagers’ natural interest (both cognitive and affective) in living organisms, notably animals, may be harnessed educationally (and developmentally), through the use of picture-books, fictional and non-fictional texts,<sup>10</sup> films, visits to parks, animal sanctuaries, rescue shelters and the like, followed by exercises in personal reflection and analysis, and group discussions.

Gene Myers’s (Myers 1998, 2007) main objective is to impress on readers “how animals can become significant in development, particularly in the development of a sense of self” (Myers 2007: viii). The notion of self and the significance of caring are central to Myers’s book: animals are characterized as catalysts for the development of morality, a theory of mind, a sense of self that has life-long implications, and for the learning about the nature of life – what it means to be alive. Animals provide a vibrant sense of aliveness and vitality. The natural bond between them and children, and animals’ qualities that they share with human beings and that differ from humans’, are important factors in the child’s development of a concept of self and what it means to be human. Children are profoundly concerned with and

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<sup>8</sup> Kahn suggests “that similar manifestations of nature occur across diverse locations and that such similarities help explain children’s similar environmental moral constructions” (Kahn 2002: 105).

<sup>9</sup> I use the term ‘interpersonal’ to include both human beings and companion animals. Whether or not (some) animals are ‘persons’ could be the topic of classroom discussion; see below.

<sup>10</sup> On the use of books, see Melson (2001); Krueger and Krueger (2005). Obviously, one ought to distinguish between children’s anthropomorphic projections of their own instinctual drives and children’s identification with non-human animals as an indication of a deeper, trans-species connection.

connected to animals, and Myers and others consider this an important feature in children's moral development. To be truly human and humane, the verdict is, we may need animals around us and in our lives.

Like Myers and others, Melson argues that "children's ties to animals seem to have slipped below the radar screen of almost all scholars of child development" (Melson 2001: 12). She examines not only the therapeutic power of the presence of companion animals for emotionally and physically handicapped children but also the ways in which zoo and farm animals, and even certain television characters, become confidants or teachers for children – and sometimes, tragically, their victims (see especially chapter 7 in Melson 2001). Quoting G. Stanley Hall, from his 1904 text *Adolescence*, she

can almost believe that, "[i]f pedagogy is ever to become adequate to the needs of the soul, the time will come when animals will play a far larger educational role than has yet been conceived, that they will be curriculized, will acquire a new and higher humanistic or culture value in the future comparable with their utility in the past". (Hall; quoted in Melson 2001: 179)

## Moral Education, Young People and Animals

According to Paul Waldau, there is

an important area of dispute over animal issues that arise in children's lives. The principal way that many children encounter other animals in their schools is on their lunch plate. (Waldau 2011: 151)

"Whether or not it is right for human beings to eat animals is an issue about which many young people have strong convictions; and it is one that in one way or another involves us all in our everyday lives" (Standish 2009: 31). In the article from which this observation is taken Paul Standish is "imagining a course based on extracts" from J.M. Coetzee's novel *The Lives of Animals* (Coetzee 1999), whose prominent dialogical form and subject matter and the "reflections" by prominent thinkers in related fields<sup>11</sup> that follow the text "make it a rich potential resource for moral education ... for teenage students or older people" (Standish 2009: 31). The central issue (concerning the moral permissibility of factory-farming animals and slaughtering them for human consumption) could lead to more in-depth, critical and philosophical discussion:

- Are there morally relevant differences and similarities between humans and non-humans? What are they? Are they differences 'in kind' or 'in degree'?
- Are all human beings 'persons'? Are (some) animals 'persons'?
- Is anthropocentrism an extension of androcentrism and ethnocentrism?

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<sup>11</sup>Marjorie Garber, Peter Singer, Wendy Doniger and Barbara Smuts are the respondents. Amy Gutmann is the author of the introduction to Coetzee's novel.

- Is discrimination against animals (speciesism) relevantly like sexual and racial discrimination (sexism and racism)?
- What about ‘the dog in the lifeboat’<sup>12</sup>?
- Is it morally permissible to use animals in biomedical research, for clothing purposes, and to keep them in circuses and in zoos?

Waldau distinguishes between “the education that zoos claim as the result of their exhibition of captive animals”, “the more immediate, hands-on education one derives from spending considerable time in the field with animals in their environment”, and institutional or “formal education” that is “premised primarily” on the study of texts, “classroom discussions, and controlled experiments at the laboratory bench” (Waldau 2011: 143). The institution of zoos offers an opportunity for classroom discussion, not least because of the frequent claims regarding their educational benefit or value. While many children arguably benefit from visits to zoos, the ‘overriding’ educational value is rendered somewhat questionable in that captive animals commonly exhibit stereotyped behaviour or develop certain neurotic habits and pathological traits, which renders inferior the information about ‘wildlife’ in zoos to that garnered through proper wildlife studies.<sup>13</sup>

“A particularly complex topic at [secondary] level is known as ‘dissection choice’ ...” (Waldau 2011: 151). Dissection of various living beings, ranging from worms via frogs to small mammals, has been a traditional activity in biology classes. Students frequently refuse to participate in this activity on the grounds of conscience, and this has led to substantial educational and legal disputes over the right of children to make such choices (pp. 151–152). The two main arguments against dissection choice are (1) that such choice undermines science; and (2) that the existence of a law permitting students to choose is commercially harmful. The first argument fails because not every student will end up doing science. Moreover, a student’s refusal in no way threatens “the curiosity required for geology, anthropology, physics, or even many of the biological sciences pursued at the molecular level” (p. 152). In fact, forcing students against their better (moral) judgement to engage in activities like dissection is likely to turn them off science and therefore, in turn, to undermine the image of science. As Waldau reports, the second type of argument is “odd ... from one vantage point – in the US, for example, those states with the most bio-technology research (California and New York) have had dissection choice laws in place for a number of years” (p. 152). The argument in favour of dissection choice holds that such choice raises significant issues that have a direct bearing on students’ moral (intellectual and emotional) development. Choice-based legislation encourages critical engagement and interrogation of scientific (and other) practices and fosters in students a sense of responsibility for their own choices

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<sup>12</sup>This question refers to the following thought experiment: if a lifeboat can only accommodate four individuals, but there are four humans and a large dog, then who should be sacrificed? I found myself in a less extreme lifeboat situation, following the sinking of the *Achille Lauro* in late 1994, and it was not at all like the scenarios famously constructed by analytical philosophers. Nonetheless, these imagined situations do get us to test our moral intuitions.

<sup>13</sup>See Horsthemke 2010: 59–63.



and actions. For Waldau, “dissection choice offers an important educational opportunity” (p. 153). Lobbying against the right of children to opt out of dissection is not only anti-democratic but also pedagogically dubious, because “it is entirely possible that denying students at this level the chance to make decisions about morally charged matters harms [their] moral development” (p. 153).

In higher education especially, according to Waldau, “animal science” constitutes the bastion of anthropocentrism and is seen to be pursued by “those students whose thinking is not childlike or frivolous” (pp. 154). By contrast, “the field of ‘animal studies’ [draws] insights from many different disciplines, including history, literature, law, religion, geography, anthropology, sociology, philosophy” (p. 156), art, psychology, ethology, etc., and would therefore “create interdisciplinary possibilities that go beyond the limitations of the dualistic ‘arts (humanities) and sciences’ mentality that now dominates ‘modern’ higher education” (p. 158).

Moral education, it has been established, has both an intellectual and an affective or virtue dimension. If “resourced” in the ways suggested by Standish and Waldau, it “not only fosters virtues but in actual practice sustains the prospering of human imagination” (Waldau 2011: xiv). In the classroom, “as in life, inquiring beyond the species line prompts healthy, communicative forms of thinking and rationality” (p. xiv).

## The Possibility and Promise of Animal Rights Education

The possibility of animal rights education is clearly contingent on the possibility of animals having (moral) rights – or in principle being ascribable such rights. In a fairly trivial sense, talk of animal rights conveys the idea that animals matter morally, that humans have certain responsibilities in this regard, that animals should not be made to suffer gratuitously, and so on (cf. Waldau 2011: xiii-xiv, 157<sup>14</sup>). In a more controversial and philosophically challenging sense, ‘animal rights’ leads into deep deontological territory. Not only is rights language held to be meta-ethically and normatively defensible and preferable to competing moral considerations,<sup>15</sup> but non-human animals are also claimed to be among the sorts of beings to whom one can meaningfully attribute rights. Rights can be taken to exist not only in law, but are correctly seen also as binding moral precepts that do not depend on legal

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<sup>14</sup>Paul Waldau states that “[m]any people today understand “animal rights”, however one defines it, to be a path of caring” (Waldau 2011: xiv), an understanding he appears to share. He suggests that “animal studies” can move towards a “kind of ‘animal rights’ approach in that it opens up education to the historic and cultural values of compassion and connection with the more-than-human world” (p. 157). I consider the connection between rights and care (compassion, etc.) to be desirable – but it is certainly not a necessary connection, as many mistakenly assume.

<sup>15</sup>A review of non-anthropocentric accounts that – in principle – accommodate animals in the requisite fashion indicates why appeals to kindness, theriophilia, reverence for life, sympathy, and the principle of utility fail either as compelling moral theories or as efficient action-guides, or both (see Horsthemke 2010: 170–229).

institution for their validity. An interest model of rights (as opposed to a choice conception) advocates protection of all those who have interests and a welfare, and guarantees the pursuit of non-threatening interests, by means of (equal) rights. At the level of basic moral rights, all right-holders (human and non-human) have the same rights, for example subsistence-rights, liberty-rights and welfare-rights. Non-basic moral rights are not necessarily shared by moral agents and moral recipients – indeed, not even by all agents. Although rights confer prohibitions and restrictions, with regard to agency, they are not absolute. It is permissible to override them in situations where right-holders cannot reasonably be called ‘non-threatening’ or ‘innocent’. On the other hand, the obligation to provide assistance and duties of beneficence obtain only if such assistance and beneficence do not themselves involve violation of rights (see Horsthemke 2010, Part II).

Some educators, such as those in the natural science professions, “have been reluctant to embrace animal rights”,<sup>16</sup> while others, such as those in the humanities and social science professions,

have taken leading roles in the modern animal rights movement ... Overall, though, the larger education system has only slowly become aware of the importance of learning about animals and their moral significance. (Waldau 2011: 144)

Waldau points out that “virtually all of education about animals leaves modern people poorly informed about other animals” and clinging to the idea of a “customary division between humans and animals” (p. 145). He continues: “The deeper educational message [even in so-called ‘humane education’] is that non-human animals are rightfully subordinated to humans, who alone are the really important beings” (p. 148). Kahn, Myers, Standish and Waldau have provided some useful tools for beginning to challenge the educational status quo. A focus on ‘animal rights’ may bring this challenge into an even sharper relief.

The promise of animal rights education, in turn, depends on the possibility of animal rights education. If animals were not among the sorts of beings who could meaningfully be said to possess rights, and if animal rights education were logically impossible (other than in a considerably more diluted or trivial sense), then it would make little sense to speak of the ‘promise’ of animal rights education. On the other hand, if animal rights education is pedagogically and philosophically meaningful, then this arguably involves substantial rethinking of extant educational curricula. The issue of ‘promise’, then, could be addressed equally in terms of human (especially children’s) interests and in terms of non-human benefits and interests. That non-human animals would benefit from an increasingly enlightened attitude on the part of human beings is not in doubt. I contend further that animal rights education harbours substantial benefits for human beings, in terms of contributing to our moral (intellectual and emotional) development.

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<sup>16</sup>In the USA, for example, students applying to veterinary schools are typically reluctant to use the phrase “animal rights” in their application, as this would in many instances diminish their chances of being offered admission (see Waldau 2011: 159).

## By Way of a Brief Conclusion

If there is evidence to show that people who maltreated non-human animals as children more often than not grow up to be abusive adults (even serial killers), then perhaps children who grow up caring for (i.e. in a climate of compassionate fellowship with) animals will, more often than not, develop into caring, compassionate adults. Clearly, the empirical evidence for this is considerably more difficult (if not impossible) to supply than in the case of abusive children who later become serial killers. But perhaps the very least one can say is that exposing children to the needs and interests of non-humans is very likely not only to benefit the animals in question but also to promote in children an attitude of empathy, responsibility and respect – which is bound to make them better people.

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## **Section V**

# **Discussion**

# Philosophy of Education



Nicholas C. Burbules

The field now called ‘philosophy of education’ has been, during several periods of Western philosophy, simply a part of mainstream philosophy. The concept of Socratic dialogue, central to the writings of Plato, is a clearly pedagogical notion. In *Meno*, *Phaedo*, and other dialogues, the philosopher plays the role of ‘midwife’, engaging others in a dynamic of question and response designed to prompt *anamnesis* or ‘recollection’ of latent understandings. This method of instruction is inseparable from the Platonic theory of knowledge; one might say it is a theory of knowing, in practice.

Similarly, the *Republic’s* design of an ideal society fundamentally depends on a theory of education. The class structure of Plato’s ideal society is created (and rationalized) by an educational theory based on the ideas of in-built potential and meritocracy. One might go even further and say the overall design of the Republic grows out of this educational theory. The process of education ensures that people are selected and trained for the roles society needs from them, *and* the roles in which they will be most successful and self-fulfilled (of course, in Plato these educational processes are partly dependent on manipulation and the ‘myth of the metals’).

In the early modern era, Rousseau’s *Emile* outlined a theory of upbringing based on ideas of radical freedom, child-centered pedagogy, learning through discovery, and a rough developmental theory that all became influential on progressive learning theories of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries. But it is no accident that this book came out the same year as Rousseau’s *The Social Contract*. One way to read *Emile* is as a parallel to the central concept of the ‘general will’ in *The Social Contract*, and its key dilemma: how to ensure that the (descriptive) general will – what people by and large actually want – is congruent with the (prescriptive) general will – what is actually good for people and what they *should* want. For the tutor

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in *Emile*, the process of instruction is intended to create a perception of free choice by the student, but choice which the tutor shapes in order to be certain that those choices reflect the student's interests. This process sometimes involves (again) deception and manipulation, because the outlines of the student's environment, within which the student makes apparently 'free' choices, are all designed by the tutor. On a related point, the Rousseauian ideas of *amour de soi* and *amour propre* represent two kinds of self-love: the first grounded in natural needs and desires, the second ('pride') in social comparisons, which is in that respect potentially dangerous. These principles are essential to Rousseau's political psychology; *Emile* is the text where he tries to explain how the formation of these forms of self-love can be fostered in ways that drive authentic and not socially shaped choices (self-valuing pride, for example, that does not become vanity, envy, or conceit).

More recently, the later work of Ludwig Wittgenstein can be seen to rely centrally on educational concepts. In the *Philosophical Investigations* and other texts he continually returns to the question of *how we learn X*: how we learn language (or language games, as he calls them), how we learn to follow rules, how we learn our way around a city – or, across a range of human practices that we seek to master, '*how we learn to go on*'. He shows this preoccupation through a range of cases, examples, and thought experiments that ask the reader to imagine and work through questions in their own minds. While not a Socratic dialogue, there is something dialogical about these texts because they call forth an active engagement and response by the reader (and, indeed, Wittgenstein often articulates an imagined question, objection, counterexample, or response and then replies to it). I and other colleagues have argued that this educational dimension, especially in his later work, is essential to understanding Wittgenstein's broader philosophical project.<sup>1</sup> Wittgenstein, who worked for a while as a primary school teacher in rural Austria (as well as his university teaching at Cambridge), also offers numerous reflections – and self-criticisms – of his own efforts as a teacher.

These examples are meant to illustrate an important strand in Western philosophy in which philosophy of education is not a derivative, secondary, or 'applied' branch of philosophy, but one central to philosophical thought itself.<sup>2</sup> Whether in ethics, epistemology, political philosophy, or philosophy of language, there are substantial examples of philosophical views in which education and attendant concepts of teaching and learning have been inseparable dimensions of mainstream philosophical concerns – first, as essential aspects of how those mainstream concepts are conceived, and second as indispensable components of how certain philosophical aims or ideals are to be achieved.<sup>3</sup>

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<sup>1</sup>Michael A Peters, Nicholas C. Burbules, and Paul Smeyers, *Showing and Doing: Wittgenstein as a Pedagogical Philosopher* (Boulder, Colorado: Paradigm Publishing, 2008). Revised and reissued with a new Preface and Postscript (2010).

<sup>2</sup>Another example, concerning education in John Locke's theory, is Nazar, Hina. "Locke, Education, and 'Disciplinary Liberalism'." *The Review of Politics* 79, no. 2 (2017): 215–238.

<sup>3</sup>This account is partly inspired by Jim Giarelli's distinction of philosophy of education, philosophy and education, and philosophy as education, though I frame the issues slightly differently than he



Something changed during the early and mid-twentieth century. John Dewey and others became termed ‘philosophers of education’ (ironically, because there is no better example of the centrality of education to other philosophical concepts and theories than Dewey). Professional associations, journals, and graduate programs began to appear across the United States, and in other countries.<sup>4</sup> Courses dealing with philosophy of education moved from philosophy departments to colleges and departments of education. With these structural and organizational changes also came significant shifts in status. Philosophy of education came to be defined, and often defined itself, as part of the professional development and socialization of practitioners, and sometimes as an avenue of influence over policymakers, more than as an independent branch of academic inquiry. Very few philosophers of education in schools of education had cross-appointments in philosophy departments, and even fewer had their primary appointments in those departments. Within universities professional schools are often viewed as lower status academically. At the same time, in order to secure legitimacy within schools of education, philosophers of education had to defend the relevance and utility of their work for the fields of practice and policy. (A personal anecdote: in my very first department meeting as a new professor I introduced myself as ‘a philosopher who studies educational issues’, and was bluntly told by a senior colleague that I belonged in a philosophy department, not an education school.)

With these structural and organizational changes, then, a different conception of philosophy of education as an ‘applied’ branch of philosophy came to the fore. Philosophers of education may be philosophers, but they labor in the vineyards of practical problems: they bring other philosophical ideas in epistemology or ethics or political philosophy (work done by ‘real’ philosophers, like John Rawls) to shed light on educational problems. In engagement with those philosophical theories they might make marginal contributions to the ideas contained in the masterworks, but this is an offshoot of the effort to ‘apply’ them to issues of practice and policy: elaborations of those ideas, but hardly significant, original philosophical contributions themselves. Dewey, for example, who spent his entire career in philosophy departments, is rarely taught in philosophy departments any more. Richard Rorty, more recently, was once taken seriously as a ‘real’ philosopher but was scorned by many once he started working on Dewey and pragmatism; when he moved to Stanford, late in his career, he could not secure a primary appointment in the philosophy department and ended up in comparative literature instead.

A related idea was that philosophy provided certain general tools or methods that could be applied to educational problems: *analytical* tools that sought to clarify, distinguish, and subdivide educational concepts and terminology (different kinds of ‘teaching’, for example, that might be used interchangeably in casual discourse, but which are fruitfully distinguished from one another); or *critical* tools that sought to

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did. James Giarelli, “Philosophy, Education, and Public Practice,” in *Philosophy of Education 1990*, ed. David Ericson (Normal, Ill.: Philosophy of Education Society, 1991).

<sup>4</sup>Nicholas C. Burbules, “Continuity and diversity in philosophy of education: An introduction.” *Educational Theory*, Vol. 41 No. 3 (1991): 257–263.

diagnose flawed arguments, empty slogans, or sloppy, misleading rhetoric. On this account, philosophy was like a referee who called out violations of conceptual rules, but did not interfere substantively in educational debates – *what* to teach was a matter of democratic public policy, *how* to teach a matter for empirical research. Philosophers *qua* philosophers had no special authority in trying to resolve such questions. (A similar metaphor was the philosopher as groundskeeper, clearing and tending the soil but not deciding what to plant there.)

As a result, philosophy of education as it became a professionalized subdiscipline struggled between these two worlds: unable to secure status and boundary acceptance as a serious part of academic philosophy, while simultaneously needing to establish its value within professional schools concerned mostly with the preparation of educational practitioners. The idea of an ‘applied’ branch of philosophy attempted to address both concerns: on the one hand, by reassuring philosophical colleagues that philosophy of education drew its core concepts and theories from the philosophical canon; and on the other hand by reassuring educational colleagues that the work was relevant and useful. The problem was that work that strengthened the link with one side typically suffered at the other: this dialectic of legitimacy was rarely productive in both domains, and individual philosophers of education, based on their talents, interests, and opportunities, invariably gravitated toward one pole or the other. This often created tensions within the philosophy of education community over who was a ‘real philosopher’: rivalries reinforced by competition between different graduate programs, professional societies, and journals.

During the last part of the twentieth century, these sorts of arguments became overlaid with another set of changes: a rapid diversification of the field, especially by gender, and partly by ethnicity and race; and the rise of theories, for example Foucault, that came to be broadly termed ‘postmodern’, which explicitly problematized and challenged just these standards of disciplinary status and boundary drawing as manifestations of power and exclusion of diverse communities seeking access to the field. As more diverse participants entered programs of study, attended and presented at conferences, and published in the journals of the field, they also brought with them new literatures and areas of interest that were (one might say) more theoretical than philosophical – feminism, psychoanalysis, critical race theory, queer theory – and which, *as part of their investigations*, questioned or challenged disciplinary methods and standards from the standpoint of whose voices, issues, and perspectives they privilege or exclude. In short, a set of demographic and generational changes reinforced, and was reinforced by, a set of theoretical shifts. The canon of philosophical literature and the faculties of most philosophy departments are dominated by white men – and this was taken as *prima facie* evidence that the problems of the field were similarly biased and partial. When it was said, as it was said, that these critical trends further diluted the philosophical credibility of the field of philosophy of education, this criticism was itself reflected back through a mirror that portrayed it as yet another strategy of exclusion and silencing of these new voices. The very touchpoints of the philosophical canon were themselves under attack for neglecting issues of power and difference.

As a field ‘in-between’, as I have described it, this applied conception of philosophy of education was also influenced by changes on the side of the profession. The same issues of diversity, changing identities, and inclusion/exclusion were at work in critical studies of education. The 1980s and after brought a growing awareness of how far schools were from the avenues of opportunity they believed themselves to be, for many students. Inequality came to be seen as the normal condition of schooling, and not as an unfortunate aberration. If philosophy of education was going to be seen as relevant and responsive to these concerns, it was going to have to change its orientation, from what had been an often idealistic and prescriptive approach (what education can be) to a more critical one (against what education is). Choices had to be made between an orientation stressing meritocracy or excellence to one addressing the processes of disadvantaging students; from one that sought to establish the potential grounds of legitimate inequality to one emphasizing the need to reduce inequality; from one seeking to identify common or shared educational aims to a perspective emphasizing difference, conflict, and sometimes incommensurability, in such aims. Added to this, the severity of concerns over disadvantaging and inequality gave an even greater urgency to the demand for relevance, for making a difference in addressing educational conditions of injustice and harm. This combination of factors tended to pull the pendulum further away from seeking philosophical legitimacy as a priority; more participants saw their academic and professional work as an extension of their social and political commitments to transform schools – or, in many cases, they did not see any difference between the two to begin with.

In particular, the conception of the philosopher of education as an impartial referee or groundskeeper was challenged: the very idea of impartiality or ‘a view from nowhere’ was seen as an effort to mask the substantive commitments that philosophers actually do have behind a pretense of neutrality. It was a central claim of critical theories based on identity, positionality, and the critique of power that all views are a view from someone, and from somewhere; and that the claim of impartiality is in its effects simply a reinforcement of the authority of traditionally dominant groups who might think that their standpoint is neutral or universally valid, but who are in fact simply reasserting their own presuppositions and authority. By definition these can be very difficult to recognize ‘from the inside’, and so it takes the critical assessments from those not of the dominant groups to identify this bias and partiality. Demanding that those others frame their arguments and justifications within the dominant conventions of philosophy, therefore, can be just another effort at ‘normalizing’ them and stripping them of their critical force.

This position, however, runs into a couple of difficulties itself. One is that the critique of dominant perspectives only carries weight if the arguments, the evidence, and the principled positions about inclusion and exclusion can be comprehended by the dominant groups, and can be persuasive with them. This suggests a standpoint that is comprehensible to all parties: if not a ‘view from nowhere’, then at least a position that all parties can recognize and accept – or that is, if you will, translatable across perspectives. The alternative would be a position of radical incommensurability, in which the dominant perspective cannot understand or appreciate the

critique – which seems to defeat the purpose of offering it. (It also just seems empirically and experientially false – these criticisms can be and often are heard, understood, and responded to. The very possibility of disagreement and critique rests upon comprehensibility.)

The other difficulty is with what a theoretical orientation based on identity, positionality, and the critique of power has to offer the practical activities of schooling. Foucault himself identifies schools as disciplining institutions; power is ubiquitous, there is no escaping it. But the common stance toward practitioner preparation, school reform, and policy is essentially meliorist, especially within education schools. One's critique can be savage, but schools of education are not the places of revolution. There seems to be something uneasy about combining the urge toward 'relevance' (and its attendant political realism) with the content of many theoretical critiques. And it is hard to imagine that this is the platform on which to rest the future vitality and survival of the field of philosophy of education as a professional discipline.

Two tensions, then, run throughout this account. One is the relation of philosophy of education to the wider discipline of philosophy, and how to balance academic credibility and status with practical impact and relevance. The other is the relation of a field that is increasingly shifting toward the critique of professional practice and policy, to survival within academic institutions that may support such work as intellectually valid, even illuminating, but whose overall priorities are about reforming and improving educational institutions, not overthrowing them. As universities cope with their own financial difficulties and are forced to make strategic choices within an overall culture of performance management, what is the case for philosophy of education today?

In seeking a basis for the future of philosophy of education, three interrelated trends seem worth nothing. First, there is a return to the question of philosophy of education as central to philosophy, not simply as a derivative subdiscipline. Current discussions of 'non-ideal theories' pose certain questions to philosophical ideals: What is their value if they are not practically attainable? At what point is it relevant to philosophical inquiry to ask *whether* and *how* they might be attainable? These are, in many cases educational questions.<sup>5</sup>

On the Platonic model, philosophy helps us identify ideals that are acontextual, ahistorical, and conceived in the abstract; in the *Republic* Plato compares this with creating a statue and polishing it to the highest degree of perfection imaginable. These ideals establish the timeless standards against which we judge our human aspirations toward truth, justice, and beauty. Of course, as imperfect creatures we can only ever partially achieve these ideals, but the reality of imperfection does nothing to change or challenge the nature of the ideal itself. We just need to work to continue to try to approximate the ideal ever more closely. Philosophy, on this view, functions to identify these ideals, and to guide and inspire us in the endeavor toward them.

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<sup>5</sup>This section is excerpted and adapted from Nicholas C. Burbules, "Non-ideal theory and the philosophy of education," *Philosophical Studies in Education* Vol. 46 (2015): 25–35.

With non-ideal theory, it is not just a matter of recognizing that we can never fully attain our ideals; rather, we need ways of thinking about how to choose and act in a context that is intrinsically limited. It makes a great deal of difference whether one regards non-ideal theory as stating that our actual achievements in pursuing justice are partial, provisional, and bounded by what is possible – but nevertheless always directed toward the eventual achievement of the ideal – or whether one regards ideals as *heuristics* that help us operationalize goals in the real circumstances that confront us. This difference is crucial. The first regards the relation of non-ideal and ideal theory as an exercise in short-term vs. long-term perspective-taking: for example, in adopting transitional policies that are not ideally just as a way of achieving future outcomes that may be more just. The second reframes the difference as a metaphysical distinction between the realm of Platonic ideals and the realm of human practice.

If one thinks of an ideal only as a framework for thinking, judging, planning, and acting in the real world of practice, then we can ask which kinds of ideals are fruitful and generative, and which are hegemonic and inhibitive. ‘Fruitful’ here means both helpful in guiding our thinking and practical choices in actual situations that concern us, as well as helpful in allowing us to clarify, better understand, and sometimes modify the ideal itself. In short, ideals should help us not only by guiding action, but also in creating occasions for reflecting on those ideals. Non-ideal theory grows out of this process, not as a gradual approximation of the ideal, but as a series of reflections on why it is an ideal and why it is not possible to achieve it. It seems that no context exemplifies this dynamic quite as clearly as education, in which critical reflection and thought about the end-goals is also a part of those end-goals.

This analysis of the non-ideal also pertains to many critical theories of education; here too a certain utopianism can prevail, challenging dimensions of the status quo without a reflection on the actual, practical alternatives that are possible. There seems to be, ironically, a reluctance to subject certain ‘social justice’ education ideals to the same critical scrutiny that their advocates project upon conventional policies and practices. In pluralistic societies, no position can be shielded from question – but more to the point here, a critical philosophy of education that simply promulgates ideal types against which to judge and criticize the messy and imperfect achievements of practice is simply a new kind of Platonism.

There is something more here than the recognition that life is imperfect. The relation of ideal to non-ideal theory is also about rethinking, and sometimes challenging, aspects of ideal theories when they put us out of touch with contexts of actual practice. Our ideals provide concepts and principles that should inform human judgment and action, not models that we should try to emulate. This is a way of thinking about philosophy of education: being able to keep in sight both the ideals that guide us and the particularities of a situation that resist or belie those ideals. We should not give ourselves up merely to a kind of situational opportunism, or even worse to the vulgarities of ‘whatever works’. Ideals don’t become irrelevant. But at the same time we recognize that our ideal theories are not roadmaps; they are heuristics that *gain* purchase and meaning as they are rethought in the context of practice, and which will inevitably need to be rethought and reinterpreted as a result.

On a related theme, the question of philosophical inquiry as a ‘view from nowhere’ versus an entirely positional (and in this sense relativistic) standpoint theory can be reframed. I and others have written about *situated* philosophy of education.<sup>6</sup> This perspective starts, again, with the idea of a practice. The activity of philosophizing is one such practice. A practice is a socially established, cooperative human activity that has normative standards that govern its activity, and that is adapted to local contexts and innovations over time. All practices, in this sense, are situated – that is, they are carried out by particular people, under particular conditions of place and time, in particular ways that are deemed ‘proper’ by the norms of the practice itself. Sometimes, though not always, practices are situated in formal institutional contexts that are designed to support and sustain those practices. But whether through such formal mechanisms or not, practices must contain within them, as part of their operations and norms, processes for initiating and orienting new practitioners into the practice – they need to be self-reproducing, if they are to continue over time. This persistence of a practice, even as some of the particular activities of the practice might evolve and change, is itself a constitutive element in a practice (hence not all human activities, therefore, are practices, because not all activities are intended to be repeated or sustained).

This conception of practice is useful because it embeds the ideas of education and reproduction into the conception of a practice itself. Indeed, the normative structures of a practice need to be understood not only as the regulative principles that facilitate the conduct of the practice in a particular place and time, but also as the conditions that allow that practice to be taught, learned, and mastered by new participants in the future. Without those, a practice will die out. Considering philosophy as a situated practice, then, focuses immediate attention on how people do philosophy, and the ways in which it is done by particular people, under particular conditions of place and time, and in particular ways that are deemed ‘proper’ by the norms of the practice itself. This framework clarifies both the nonarbitrary elements that provide continuity to the practice of philosophy, as well as the contingent manner in which those elements are interpreted and applied in real-world contexts.

‘Situated philosophy’, then, is philosophy carried out under four broad conditions:

- (a) It is conducted with a self-critical awareness of its status as a human practice, and recognizing how the conditions of that practice facilitate and constrain the content of work that is done.
- (b) It realizes that it is a practice always carried out by particular people, under particular conditions of place and time, in particular prototypical ways that are deemed ‘proper’ by the norms of the practice itself.
- (c) It considers the conditions of reproducing itself as a practice, not as extraneous considerations, but as integral to and constitutive of the nature of its practice.
- (d) It maintains a keen awareness of the social effects of what is said and written under its auspices.

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<sup>6</sup>This section is excerpted and adapted from Nicholas C. Burbules and Kathleen Knight Abowitz, “A situated philosophy of education.” *Philosophy of Education Society Yearbook*, 2008, Ron Glass, ed. (Urbana, Illinois: Philosophy of Education Society, 2009), pp. 268–276.



Situated philosophy is decidedly not the view from nowhere. It is, and recognizes itself to be, a practice always carried out by real, ordinary people in all their imperfections and circumstances. At the same time, the completely historicized view of philosophy as merely the conventions of belief and value favored by particular groups of people who have the institutionalized power and authority to impose their views on others cannot be maintained (for one thing, it is self-contradictory, since its own claim is apparently not a merely contingent one). Furthermore, not all practices can be sustained over time; and the very persistence of a practice shows that its activities and regulative norms are not merely contingent and arbitrary – it must be effective at addressing important and existentially recurrent human problems and concerns.

While philosophy is certainly implicated in a broader network of social effects, it cannot be understood merely as the sum total of those effects. The continuity of philosophy and its manifest success in attracting and socializing generation after generation into its activities shows that its beliefs and norms are, while not transcendental or universal, certainly generalizable over a very broad range of participants, contexts, and concerns.

When we focus on the reproductive processes by which we train, initiate, and socialize new participants into the practice of philosophy, education comes back into philosophy in a fundamental way. Philosophy of education can illuminate the significant educational dimensions underlying major philosophical problems. Moral philosophy cannot be simply an examination of what it is right or wrong to do, without asking whether and how it is possible to actually foster the development of people who will think and act that way. Epistemology cannot be simply the examination of truth conditions or criteria of warrant, understood entirely apart from considerations of how people learn to interpret and apply those standards; or whether, as research increasingly is showing, there are severe limits on people's capacity to actually do this. Critical thinking cannot be simply a set of analytical skills and tools, but is also a set of emotional conditions and dispositions toward enacting them. Political liberalism cannot be simply a set of abstract principles and ideals, but the actually achieved areas of overlapping consensus that enable citizens to pursue and achieve them. This way of thinking about philosophy, as I discussed at the beginning, is grounded in quite ancient understandings and traditions.

Another radical implication of this account is to change the dynamic of philosophy, philosophy of education, and the concerns of educational research, policy, and practice. This shift reinforces a certain kind of philosophical honesty. Rather than preaching to educators about what they can and should be doing in their work, without fully appreciating the impediments and very real risks such activities would subject them to in institutions and society as they exist today, philosophers of education cannot separate their utopian ideals from a consideration of the conditions of practice that might conceivably sustain them. There is, and must be, a certain recalcitrance to practice (this is what sustains it as a practice) and we need to understand why this is so; we cannot simply make things up as we might wish they should be.

And this leads to a final implication. Rather than assuming the vocabulary of 'applying' philosophical tools to educational problems, perhaps we ought to invert the order of things, beginning with concrete and richly detailed case studies and



examples, and drawing philosophical insights from the analysis of those particulars. The subtlety of those analyses comes not from philosophical cleverness alone, but from the far deeper subtlety and complexity of the world as we find it – perhaps especially the world of education and the endlessly difficult formal and informal settings in which we try to help young people gain the knowledge and capabilities of becoming successful adults.

This perspective relates to a renewed interest in casuistry, and the centrality of *cases* to philosophical thinking and to education directed toward promoting philosophical thinking. Ever since the publication of Jonsen and Toulmin's *The Abuse of Casuistry*, there has been a reappraisal of the benefits of case-based reasoning.<sup>7</sup> Jonsen compares this with the process of medical diagnosis: drawing from the experience of observing a range of similar cases, the skilled practitioner assesses the key factors of a novel case. Principles play a role in this process, but are not simply 'applied' to the case; the practitioner has to make judgments about where, how much, and in what respects the present case is similar to precedents. This kind of analysis relates to legal judgment and ethical decision-making as well. But then we might ask what constitutes a good case. Meira Levinson and Jacob Fay explain the pedagogical role of "richly described, realistic accounts of complex ethical dilemmas that arise within practice or policy contexts, on which protagonists must decide among courses of action, none of which is self-evident as the right one to take".<sup>8</sup> Working through complex cases, they say, fosters the development of that kind of practical reasoning (*phronesis*) that constitutes a marriage of theory and practice. They argue explicitly that practical ethical judgment can best be fostered through this case-based method.

One way to think about what constitutes a good case is to consider a relatively poor one. Let me recount one example, though well-known from basic ethics courses: the trolley car dilemma:

There is a runaway trolley barreling down the railway tracks. Ahead, on the tracks, there are five people tied up and unable to move. The trolley is headed straight for them. You are standing some distance off in the train yard, next to a lever. If you pull this lever, the trolley will switch to a different set of tracks. However, you notice that there is one person on the side track. You have two options: (1) Do nothing, and the trolley kills the five people on the main track. (2) Pull the lever, diverting the trolley onto the side track where it will kill one person. Which is the most ethical choice?<sup>9</sup>

There are several things that make this a poor ethical case. It is extremely thin on details. For example, who is the one person? A stranger? An infant? My mother? Albert Einstein? Would these factors affect my judgment? Should they? Such questions can only be broached when there is enough rich detail and context provided to make this look like an actual human choice. This leads to another problem: it is

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<sup>7</sup>Albert R. Jonsen and Stephen Toulmin. *The abuse of casuistry: A history of moral reasoning*. Univ of California Press, 1988.

<sup>8</sup>Meira Levinson and Jacob Fay. *Dilemmas of Educational Ethics: Cases and Commentaries*. Harvard Education Press. 8 Story Street First Floor, Cambridge, MA 02138, 2016: pp. 3–4.

<sup>9</sup>[https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trolley\\_problem](https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Trolley_problem) [Accessed January 17, 2017].

artificial, contrived in such a way as to force an either/or choice in a manner that is very rarely the case in real life. Is there a third option? Why not? Furthermore, who am I in this case? Myself, with all my particularities and relationships, or an abstract agent? What if I know that I will have horrible nightmares, no matter what I choose, because either way I will be culpable in the death of innocent people? Is that a relevant factor, for me, that might not apply to a more cold-hearted agent? In addition, the case conflates the choice of action versus inaction: it suggests that even though I had nothing to do with creating the trolley accident I will be ethically responsible for the death of five people if I do nothing. But choosing not to get involved in a tragic scenario is not the same as actively choosing a course of action that directly and intentionally kills someone. Finally, the framing of the story seems to want to force a utilitarian analysis; it prejudices the question of what kind of moral reasoning is applicable to the case. Good cases would be exactly opposite to each of these features; they would be richly detailed, realistic, contextualized as to circumstance, sensitive to the particulars of personal agency, complex in the available choices and potential consequences, and ambiguous in not prejudging the theories or concepts through which one ought to think about those choices. As a result, such situations would not frame ethical decisions as simple either/or choices.

These considerations of non-ideal theory, situated thinking, and case-based methodology outline a way of thinking about philosophy of education that undoes some of the antinomies discussed previously. They argue that philosophy of education is not a derivative subdiscipline of philosophy nor a domain for the secondary application of philosophy theories or methods, but an area of original inquiry that sheds light on important philosophical questions, understood at the level of potential human achievements and not just as ideals. They argue that philosophy of education is strengthened through an appreciation of actual educational institutions, policies and practices, because these are indispensable dimensions of how and where actual educational progress can be made. And even where these examinations might be critical, they are critical within a perspective that is self-critical as well – in other words, avoiding self-righteousness and realistically assessing the shortcomings of our own ideals, understood not as blueprints but as heuristics to stimulate new conversations with the actors within institutions, policies and practice, honest conversations – and not as pronouncements buttressed by philosophical theories and jargon. One of the ways to keep philosophical reflections about education honest is by emphasizing case-based methods: working from the particulars of complex, realistic problems (or, even, real problems) to extract the philosophically important and interesting dimensions of how we should think about and try to cope with those problems – problems that may not be amenable to philosophical ‘solutions’, but which require instead philosophical insight and patience in order to grapple with them. This is another aspect of case-based methods: thinking of problems not as straightforwardly solvable, but as steps in an ongoing process of improving our understandings and capabilities (sometimes through error and correction). For philosophical problems, ethics for instance, this brings questions of learning and development back to the fore.

Philosophy of education can contribute to such reflections, and benefit from them.

# Political Literacy: The State and Education



Roland Reichenbach

## Preliminary Notes

Isaiah Berlin (1909–1997), a decisive anti-Platonist, wrote in the epilogue of his *Personal Impressions* (2001): “My interest in ideas, my belief in their strenuous and at times ominous power, and my conviction that humans who fail to grasp these ideas correctly will feel threatened even more seriously by the uncontrollable terror of nature or even by their own institutions. World events reinforce all of this anew every day” (pp. 372f.).

Those who want to implement ideas on education consistently (these days through competence orientation) will be directed and monitored by national government. Good old liberalism with its cultural niches, loopholes, and fallow soil must be left behind. Current education’s utopias are mostly all-embracing and focusing on administrative issues. And those who implement them tread confidently. The only thing that disturbs them a bit at times is human nature or even the world itself. Yet this will be overcome (one states): “There is always something here on Earth to hinder ideals to be realized. Since one obviously needs to remove this obstacle from humanity’s path, it follows that no sacrifice can be too great in approaching the goal” (Berlin 2001, p. 373).

The chapter is structured in two parts. The first part – merely as an example – traces a few ideas on the connection between state and education from antiquity to the present day. This should illustrate the fundamental public divergence of notions on policy issues involving the meaning of education and the state’s role in educating its citizenry. The second part discusses the commonly evoked (but seldom critically questioned) importance of education within a democratic form of state.

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## Some Ideas on the Relationship Between State and Education

“Even a people of devils would need the state”.<sup>1</sup> The clue of liberal legitimation of the state can be seen in mutual partial renunciation of freedom by its citizens (Höffe 1988, p. 77). This accomplishment by an electorate should help ensure fulfillment of the public’s core self-interests. First of all, the idea of assuring freedom by partial renouncing is of political significance, but it also has ethical as well as educational implications: the role and tasks of the state is at stake. Hereby implicit assumptions about the nature of human beings and human life play a crucial role: What can be expected from individuals and social groups when it comes to practice freedom and education and self-transformation? What is the responsibility of the state in this respect?

In what follows, at first, a few historic perspectives on these topics are briefly discussed, exemplified by philosophers and intellectuals (namely Plato, Wilhelm von Humboldt, Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel, Basil Bernstein, and Isaiah Berlin). It may be true de facto that these names play also no important role in today’s educational discourses, nevertheless, they should because they are still most interesting interlocutors.

### *The Just State and Good Education*

The ‘sociology’ of Plato’s ideal *State* seems to be quite simple. There are three ‘social classes’, namely (1) peasants/workmen, (2) soldiers/guardians – and very few – (3) philosophers. The latter are supposed to practice political power in a morally legitimate way. Plato, in the seventh book of his utopia, proposes the ‘ideal’ program of education. It is remarkable that this program, at least in the first stages, at the elementary level (lasting until the age of 20) includes all children (also girls).<sup>2</sup> The curricular focus of fundamental education is placed on art education and physical training.

After the first stage, allocation of all young ‘citizen’ to three social classes is achieved by means of quasi-‘psycho-metric’ criteria, the possible features of the ‘soul’ correspond to one’s social class. If this ‘allocation idea’ disturbs today’s readers, they can recall that ‘talent’ and ‘skill’ are spoken of in a rather loose and naturalistic manner contemporaneously. The Platonic society and educational utopia only serve as precursors of the less questionable idea of meeting individual traits and functions of a socially desirable society and form of state.

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<sup>1</sup> This is the translated title of an article written by Otfried Höffe (1988) in which he makes reference to a quotation of Immanuel Kant’s *Zum ewigen Frieden* (Kant 1984, p. 31).

<sup>2</sup> 2500 years later we share the view of an institutionalized education for all children and youth, even if this true utopia has not yet become a reality for all children. The ‘No Child Left Behind’ Act initiated by US President George W. Bush in 2002 had a prominent precursor on the right to education in Plato – a right that should be guaranteed by the state.

Sir Karl Popper belongs among the most vehement of Plato's critics. In *The Open Society and Its Enemies*, he warned urgently of 'the spell of Plato' and rejects this social utopia as totalitarian.<sup>3</sup> Obviously Plato's *State* is fundamentally *anti-liberal*. The crux of platonic anthropology is precisely that the 'normal' human beings cannot practice their freedom without harming themselves or others in the short or long term. Plato must have thought little of the acts of his democratic contemporaries. These not only concerned the Peloponnesian War's 27-year duration, which he had to witness as the Athenian citizenry conducted it in a truly inept manner, but also the execution of his teacher, Socrates (Carr and Hartnett 1996, p. 30).<sup>4</sup>

Plato's criticism of democracy applies less to the democratic form of state itself as to the danger of a related sudden change into tyranny. The unsatiable desire for freedom led to disobedience against authorities, to abuse of laws, and finally to no leadership being tolerated (Plato 1992, 563d).

In this extreme form, satisfying special interests and corruption blossom in particular. The rich and powerful assume leadership roles in the demos. They do indeed donate part of their accumulated wealth to the class lacking property. As a rule, though, this only serves their self-interest (Plato 1992, 565a). In the class war that results from it, the demos accept a strong hand. A new leader, who fights militarily against the conditions and thus becomes ever more tyrannical (*incidentally*: we are still in ancient Athens here and not in today's Ankara...). According to Plato, democracy will eventually harm the populous itself.

The allegory of the cave stands for the necessity to have a political and moral establishment without which a state cannot be led justly. However, this elite must be educated to protect itself, because whoever risks leading people out of the cave of simple opinions into the light of truth risks being killed by the mob that he wants to "enlighten" (see 492bd, 494a, 499d-500a, 517a).

One can criticize Plato's 'story' as a basis to legitimize elitist education and training, but one can also read it as a warning and commandment to be careful – as an insight that democratic policy is fragile and can tumble over. It is "no natural talent of humanity" (Meyer 1994, p. 17) and cannot only be lost "gambling" but also "against one's will" (p. 35).

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<sup>3</sup>Karl Popper (2003). *Die offene Gesellschaft und ihre Feinde*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck (original 1945). The first volume was entitled *Der Zauber Platons*.

<sup>4</sup>During Plato's year of birth (428 BC) Pericles had already been dead 1 year, and the period of peace and cultural enlightenment (the age of Pericles, 448–431 BC) belonged to the past. Athenian democracy was repealed repeatedly by pro-Spartan conservative powers but replaced by democracy each time. It was a time of demagoguery, of war, but also of Socrates, who was 38 years old at the outbreak of war and later its inner circle including Plato's – from 408 BC until Socrates execution in 399 BC.

## *To One Person the State Is Nearly Nothing; to the Other It Is Almost Everything...*

In his 1792 *Ideen zu einem Versuch die Gränzen der Wirksamkeit des Staates zu bestimmen* (the Spheres and Duties of Government, first published with the original German spelling in 1851), Wilhelm von Humboldt (1767–1835) turned against a comprehensive power of the state. The criticism is not directed simply against Plato's utopia but against the "police and welfare state" within Prussia's "enlightened absolutism" (see Lischewski 2014, p. 175).

Humboldt argued for a liberal state under law with the primary task of guaranteeing the individual right of freedom. It should *not* have become involved with 'training human beings'. State interventions in education and the classroom are, in Humboldt's opinion, only legitimate in an emergency. This radical position of Humboldt's hardly supported by representatives of political liberalism (except, for instance, in the USA) is based on the idea of a person's true purpose of a person. To him, this means the highest and best proportioned training of one's strength and transforming it into a whole.

The 'powers' of the ego are spontaneous: the human being was self-activated from the outset: the 'I' usurps the world in order to strengthen itself and impress its character on the world.

Especially the latter has the added function of *resilience* in this interplay as well as the polar tension between 'I' and the world in which the 'I' processes itself and becomes stronger as a result. Humboldt uses the training idea to study the importance of language as a medium which couples the 'I' and the world.

Within the framework of engaging 'school plans' for Königsberg and Lithuania (1809 and 1810), Humboldt formulated the two major goals of institutionalized training: *individual bodily strength* and *general human training*. Interesting but surely problematical here is the role of the state: On the one hand, training is indispensable as the true human goal for the liberal order. Yet, on the other hand, the state should be denied the power "to promote training by building up regulation and financing of a public school system" (Giesinger 2016, p. 30). However, according to Giesinger, this raises the question whether certain social groups would be excluded and also remain uninsured without state regulation to establish Humboldt's training ideal in reality (*ibid.*).

While Plato had much trust in the state and finally only the (just) state, Humboldt seems to view it instead as a necessary evil. In a certain sense he expresses an apolitical position that is blamed for his classical training ideal: the world 'only' serves Humboldt in the final analysis as an occasion and material of forming an increasingly grandiose 'I'. Outside of self-training, it appears to give human beings no further tasks. Yet premature criticism may be aimed in the wrong direction here too. This 'solipsism' recalls 'constructivism', the widespread but qualitatively wanting notion, and the talk related to it. Each child, it insisted, builds his or her 'own world', and the school was obligated to support this process. Yet the development of 'personal worlds' is not a mandate of the state. If it has a task at all in training issues, then it must rather be directed toward insuring a world for *everyone*.

The notion of the state as viewed by Georg Wilhelm Friedrich Hegel (1770–1831) is also shaped by his ideas of training people, yet its consequence – especially the role of the state – stands diametrically opposed to that of Humboldt. Hegel understands training in the *Phenomenology of Spirit/Phänomenologie des Geistes* (1986/1807) as alienation (*‘Entfremdung’*), renunciation (*‘Enttäusserung’*), and extinguishing of the natural self (*‘Aufheben des natürlichen Selbst’*). Training is the effort to overcome unformed ‘natural subjectivity’. This refers to forms of vanity, arbitrariness, and cravings, which are only transcended by the (training) process of “uplift of the objective spirit” or “Hinaufheben des objektiven Geistes” in the public at large (see Lischewski *loc. Cit.*, p. 194).

One could formulate this contemporarily: Training is the (subjective) acquisition of objectified culture. It claims the ego’s preparedness to sub-ject (*‘unterwerfen’*) itself – as a subject – to symbolic classifications (language, grammar, logic, technical knowledge, etc.) – and thus obtains as a person a reflected position within the moral community. The ‘System’ of morality is classified by Hegel in three segments: family, society, and nation. The task of the school consists in negotiating between the family and the community. Teaching is oriented toward *specific topics of expertise*, which helps release the child from its emotional and ‘merely’ subjective bond to the family. Teaching methods and acquisition of knowledge that are arranged, let us say, from the top and outside, lead to *‘alienation by training’*. Yet increasing acquisition of cultural assets eventually brings one to *reconciliation* between the self and the community, between subjective and objective spirits at a higher level.

The state needs to support this process, because (for Hegel) it embodies the degree of ‘objective spirit’ itself. One must know: behind the objective spirit hides an *‘absolute spirit’* – ultimately a seemingly pantheistic image of God that is in no case personalized.

This absolute spirit prevails without recognizing itself and hence uses humanity and its training processes as a means of achieving this self-awareness. The so-called ruse of reason should not be taken as an offense by the absolute spirit, because we owe it great deal....

But the fact that the state should embody ‘the actually reasonable’ was naturally criticized afterwards for glorifying the state and naïvely approving of the factua. Yet one can also oversimplify Hegel:

*First*, the dialectic of the training process – alienation and reconciliation – is indeed imbedded differently in semantics today, but should be considered as a standard construct in training theory. *Secondly*, Hegel sees the development and strengthening of his reflected self-consciousness as a right shared by *all* humanity, which *thirdly*, should be guaranteed by the state for this reason particularly – and *fourthly* – by a curriculum that must orient itself to culture and science without granting particular preferences to some groups or rulers. Whether or not this glorifies the state, Hegel recognizes in an anti-indoctrinaire moment the idea of institutionalized training guaranteed by the state (which, by the way, he also touches upon in terms of its disappointing sides).



## Broadly Based State-Decreed Pedagogy

It occurs to me that precisely liberal societies today seem to believe in the power of institutionalized training in such a platonic way (and so in part did Humboldt and Hegel). This applies even if a refined spiritual superstructure can hardly be detected any longer. Educators should arrange things. The state should regulate, monitor, and certify the educational system and with it formal training. At the same time, the economic framework of the discussion on competence serves as the basis for its justification.

A recent OECD document is entitled *'Equipped for Life? Most Important Results of the Programme for the International Assessment of Adult Competencies'* (PIAAC or PISA for adults). At a prominent point it mentions: "Skills have essential impacts on the life opportunities of each person: Skills can change lives, create prosperity, and promote social inclusion. Without the right skills, people are pushed to the edges of society. Without such skills, technical progress cannot bring about economic growth. Industry and states will not be competitive in today's increasingly interlinked and complex world. In an increasingly complex world, can they no longer keep pace in the competition? The premise of drawing on the greatest possible uses from investment in skills and qualifications is reliable information on skills needed in the job market and a workforce trained to supply them. Further assumptions include political measures guaranteeing that skills are used effectively to create better jobs, so that living conditions improve overall. In order to support these goals the OECD has begun to measure the skills of the adult population...".<sup>5</sup> Now adults get involved too. Plato would have rejoiced.

Basil Bernstein (1924–2000) was one of the first solid critics of the broad-based debate on skills.<sup>6</sup> He sees the reason for its "success" in (1) this debate's "universal democracy" for "All are inherently competent and all possess common procedures" (Bernstein 2000, p. 56); (2) it comes across as sympathetic today to introduce learning human beings as active and creative designers of an important world above all. Thus the suspicion is effectively disarmed from arguing a behaviorist perspective known to be notably less interested in the subject (for how can one be against creativity and individual activity?). Add to this (3) the friendly idea of self-regulating development and self-regulating learning (since any other learning is suspicious). And finally (4) it has become impossible to defend against the terminological reductionism of competence and emancipation.

Transforming the comprehension of training, which has become virulent here, can be viewed as a shift in focus or the ideal of training as a cultural asset and expertise for the model of education as a skill and human capital (see Münch 2009). Münch sees the root cause of this movement as the shift of symbolic power away from 'national educational elites' to 'knowledge elitists organized as transnational entities'. The "Pedagogy", Bernstein (2001, p. 379f.) says, citing Sertl (2004, p. 26)

<sup>5</sup>[https://www.oecd.org/berlin/SkillsOutlook\\_2013\\_GER.pdf](https://www.oecd.org/berlin/SkillsOutlook_2013_GER.pdf) (downloaded on 11 March 2017).

<sup>6</sup>For instance, *Pedagogy, Symbolic Control, and Identity* (Bernstein 2000).

“is like an invasion affecting all sectors of life, even in the more intimate (...), and there is no escape from this general pedagogy trend in modern societies”.

And he adds in another report: “Pedagogy is the focus of my theory to the extent that pedagogical modalities are crucial realizations of symbolic control, and thus of the process of cultural production and reproduction. Symbolic control, through its pedagogical modalities, attempts to shape and distribute forms of consciousness, identity and desires” (Bernstein and Solomon 1999, p. 267). At the end of the twentieth century, Bernstein insisted that he could only still make out a “totally pedagogized society”: “The labor world is being transformed pedagogically into lifelong learning, and this delivers both the key and the TPS [*Totally Pedagogized Society*] legitimization. It is not difficult to understand how management of ‘short-termism’ (that’s to say the short time span within which skills, tasks, and entire job sectors change constantly, vanish, or are replaced by new ones, where life experiences lack the basics of stable future expectations and the related anchorage as well as management of ‘short-termism’ translates into socialization for the TPS via lifelong learning” (Bernstein 2001, p. 365, transl. by Sertl 2004, p. 20).

The shift of social and state responsibilities in education – that is, the issue of how state and management in the pedagogized society are to be viewed – is interesting: “A key characteristic of the TPS is that it is state-driven and state-funded. The weak state of the global economy requires a strong state in the pedagogical field. This was not the case when competence models held dominant positions in the pedagogic field” (Bonal and Rambla 2003, p. 180). In the training sector, *liberal* societies count on the state central monitoring. This involuntary Platonism is ironic: while the market follows its own laws, complex regulation systems in the training sector replace a long lost cosmology.

## Democracy and Education: Cult of Incompetence?

The good reputation of democracy is young. Only after World War II could it create such a good name over a broad stretch of thought and life that it was also connoted morally positive, resulting in *criticism* of democracy becoming suspect (see Sartori 1992; Schmidt 1995). During the twentieth century’s pre-war and interbellum years in Europe, it would still have been possible to criticize the democratic dimension of mutual coexistence and joint decision-making in an elitist manner, perhaps as a “cult of incompetents” (Faguet 1911). It produced an egalitarian culture of dilettantes and increasingly threatened “true education” (see Kassner 1910). But democracy had been linked to the terror of political tyranny for the white hope even in educational and training thought, although the close contact between democracy and education had been postulated earlier – with John Dewey (1916) leading the way.

However, the notion that ‘good’ education has to be *democratic* is a politicized twist of pedagogical thought that is anything else than obvious. Why shouldn’t the German attribute ‘*volksherrschaflich*’ function as a quality trait of education

processes? Hannah Arendt had decisively rejected the idea that education qualified *as* democracy or *for* democracy. “Already educated” must always be assumed in politics, and those who “want to educate adults actually want to patronize them and prevent political action” (Arendt 1994, p. 258). She believed that emotional development suffers damage if children are exposed too early to the glaring “light of public relations” (p. 268).

What at first seems to be a romantic argument, according to Arendt, is in point of act an insight into the meaning of a clear distinction between pedagogical and political thought. Indeed it does not coincide with the border between youth and adulthood but correlates to it. “Treating children as if they were adults” is just as *apolitical* as wanting to educate adults (see Arendt *loc. cit.*, p. 276).

From time to time the ‘good’ reputation of democracy restricts the ability to assure oneself of the seriousness of the presumptions, ‘costs’, and ambivalence of this form of state and lifestyle. Such skepticism still nurtures the old criticism of democracy that has only proved this form of government – entirely Aristotelian – due to lack of a better alternative (Aristoteles 1981). The high demands and expectations toward democracy or democratic life today reflect conceptions of state citizenship, political, and democratic education and training. The mature *citoyen* (in contrast to a mere *bourgeois*) a member of the community who commits himself to the general welfare and takes part in public life (or in other terms, a political person engaging on moral or ethical grounds as a moral subject) should represent the goal of education and training.

“Under democratic conditions”, wrote democracy theorist Giovanni Sartori (1992, p. 11), “it will at least be observed that false points of view send a democracy in the wrong direction”. Doubt about the propriety and use of idealism in political pedagogy is appropriate. Ironically, in view of democratically elected figures such as Berlusconi, Erdoğan, or Trump, Plato’s criticism of democracy no longer comes across – temporarily in any event – so unsympathetically, as Popper seeks to present it (Popper 1945), even if it no longer seems really “magical”.<sup>7</sup> Yet Obama still had better prerequisites than Trump to become a philosopher king. Trump is a suitable template for a (platonic) dystopia of democracy.

Despite all the evidence and doubts, the word for “active participation” in political training is connoted as especially positive (see Steutel and Spiecker 2002): participation is politically and morally welcome, one seems to know here, and therefore it must also be a task of public schools.<sup>8</sup> The related pedagogy is called: ‘getting the students involved’. So-called active participation is so important that questions about the *goals* and *means* of being active only interest in second place. Yet active

<sup>7</sup> Karl Popper (2003). *Die offene Gesellschaft und ihre Feinde*. Tübingen: Mohr Siebeck (original 1945). The first volume bears the title *Der Zauber Platons* (The Open Society and Its Enemies).

<sup>8</sup> Prominent examples for empirical studies with this outlook were/still may be the BLK programme ‘Live and Learn Democracy’ (see Diedrich et al. 2004), the IEA Civic Education Study (see Torney-Purta et al. 2001), the participation study ‘*mit*Wirkung’ financed by the Bertelsmann Foundation (Fatke and Schneider 2005), the Sachsen-Anhalt study (see Krüger et al. 2002), repeated youth studies by Shell Germany (e.g. 2002), and many others.

participation was also a sacrosanct notion in the Hitler youth movement and its feminine counterpart, the *Bund Deutscher Mädel* (Flessau 1979). It also emerged later in the Free German Youth (*Freien Deutschen Jugend*). Thus participation certainly must not have been sacred in and of itself. In contrast to this, *rights* of political participation and simultaneous *rights to keep one's distance* must each be held in high esteem by modern society (see Reichenbach 2001, pp. 166–171).

### *Is Participation 'Good'?*

The pedagogical credo of participation was widespread and remains so in the German-speaking countries and the USA (Edelstein and Fauser 2001; Himmelmann 2005). Consequently, *political training* is no longer distinguished analytically from *democratic education* or *moral training*. And the school too is not further separated from *democratic education* or *moral training*. The school – with a pedagogical reform impetus – is glorified as the *Polis* (see von Hentig 1996) and described by John Dewey as an *embryonic society*.<sup>9</sup> Both metaphors are important and misleading, because a *Polis* only exists among free peers,<sup>10</sup> and the school is not a mini-society but rather part of society, and the schools not a mini-society but rather part of society.<sup>11</sup> According to Dewey, the important achievements of *progressive education* were seen in part as purely antithetical to idealism in the Kantian tradition. Kant's thinking on political training had left an especially notable impression in Germany (Himmelmann 2005).

One way or another, 'politics' managed to establish itself as a school subject in Germany. An important historical premise could be located in the "re-education effort which the young West Germany wanted to invest in for a new democratic orientation of the education effort with the Western allies after 1945" (Sanders 2005, p. 16). So far, one searches in vain for an equivalent for the *Bundeszentrale für politische Bildung* (1963)<sup>12</sup> in most countries (also in Europe).<sup>13</sup> The fact that political education should be a concern of mandatory public schools builds no consensus at all in various European countries or groups of states. Where this is the case due to critical historic transformations – perhaps Germany, France, Spain, or Greece (Mickel 2005, p. 650) – political training is obviously very

<sup>9</sup> John Dewey (1956). *The School and Society*, Chicago: University of Chicago Press (original 1915).l

<sup>10</sup> As Arendt (1996) put it: Between people who do not rule, command, or obey each other.

<sup>11</sup> The presentation of the schools as *Polis* is most *schmalz* or bombastic, but in any case it's not entirely honest. Therefore, the *Polis* has little to do with institutionalized education or training. But the fact that there is an extracurricular 'school life' that can be politically idealized is perfectly obvious.

<sup>12</sup> Founded in 1952 and named the 'Bundeszentrale für Heimatdienst'.

<sup>13</sup> There is also neither a European Union political training course nor one on the EU (Mickel 2005, p. 636), although the importance of intellectual orientations for the EU's unity and coherency is naturally recognized.

widely comprehended – ultimately not ‘only’ as national citizen training but also as ‘social’ or ‘moral’ training. Then the school also has the task of promoting assumptions of individual skills for participating in civil society – and this is equated with political training.

### *Going to the Toilet*

Such a broad understanding of ‘politics’ loses its political character, although it may appear pedagogically attractive. Actually this expresses an amalgam of very differently accentuated democratic theories, and the differences would be relevant in understanding the potential and limitations of political training in the schools. If one reduces the three essential paradigms of modern democratic theory (liberalism, republicanism, and deliberation) to each one’s central mechanism for securing the political community, it can be claimed that liberal positions mainly emphasize use of political and legal *institutions*, republican positions stress the meaning of citizen *virtues* that make a community coherent and capable of empathy, whereas deliberative positions reduce ultimately to *procedures* that serve (the ideals of) an argumentative consensus (see Schaal und Heidenreich 2006, p. 192). These are points of stress: institutions, virtues, and discussion procedures that naturally are neither mutually exclusive in terminology nor in fact.

In contrast to liberal perspectives, republican and deliberative positions stress the importance of *democratic forms of participation* (Gerhart 2006). Political participation can be viewed as taking part, producing, and maintaining a public sphere. Its complement or opposite is withdrawal into the sphere of privacy or intimacy. Habermas’ *Structural Change in Public Affairs/Strukturwandel der Öffentlichkeit* (1990/1962) or even Sennett’s *Fall of Public Man* (1974)<sup>14</sup> at the latest diagnosed the blurring borders between these two spheres and especially criticized in ‘privatizing the political sphere’. For example, Benjamin Barber’s critique compares the secret ballot cast in voting machine cubicles with a line waiting to use the toilet:

Our primary electoral act, voting, is (...) like using a public toilet: we wait in line with a crowd in order to close ourselves up in a small compartment where we can relieve ourselves in solitude and in privacy of our burden, pull a lever, and then, yielding to the next in line, go silently home. Because our vote is secret – ‘private’ – we do not need to explain or justify it to others (or, indeed, to ourselves) in a fashion that would require us to think publicly or politically. (Barber 2003, p. 188)

Going to the toilet stands for a private understanding of democracy and a type of loss of democratic consciousness. There is no coercion for accountability at the site of political decision-making; each and everyone may harm the common good at his or her will. The public affair transforms itself into a private decision-making moment

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<sup>14</sup>Richard Sennett: *Zerfall und Ende des öffentlichen Lebens oder Die Tyrannei der Intimität* (1986) [The Fall of Public Man]. Frankfurt am Main: Fischer.

of weighing how to maximize the individual's opportunity instead of improving society (see Schaal and Heidenreich 2006, p. 166).

'Strong' communitarian and participatory democracy must be challenge in regard to both the utopia of a long-living and 'lively debating community' and concerning the suggested symmetry and community ideal. The *kratic* and *kratological* momentum (Hösle 1997, p. 95)<sup>15</sup> – that is, the power motive of all politics – finds little mention here. Even the *pseudo-participation* analysis by Pateman (1970), into which each firm practice of participation threatens to fall, is unnoticeable. Rulers and the ruled are often identical here. Pabst (2003, pp. 9–33) has referred to the misleading interpretation by which *democracy* – even from the derivation of its name – means popular *rule* and was presented in such a manner: yet the Greek *kratein* means 'exercise power' and not 'to have authority' – in contrast to *archein* (as in 'oligarchy'), which means 'to rule'.

If anything, the *demos* possesses power in a democracy (over the government or the governing), but the people don't rule. *Democratic* knowledge – in the sense of political training – would also be viewed as knowledge of power, and skilled democrats would be secularly oriented as *cratologists* (power experts, so to speak). Politically informed people would not only know about the power of people but would also know specific power practices – ways to exercise their 'power skills'. Political training might be more attractive overall if it would also be represented and understood as power theory – admittedly politics would attract even more hesitant people with questionable motives. Emergence and vanishing of individual desires for civil society participation may underlie simple cycles of *Engagement and Disappointment* (see Albert O. Hirschman 1984<sup>16</sup>) that cannot be guided either politically or pedagogically (nor should they be).

## *Lies and Deception*

Political training directed toward the general welfare alone – however highly motivated – possesses the problem of weighing the meaning of power in practice and strategy too little and/or too one-sidedly by considering only its negative aspects. Yet the pursuit of *particular* interests is the central motive that leads to political action, even if one tries (or should try) to create clarity about common interests in the discussion. Pursuing particular interests usually requires that they remain secret. But lies and deception belong among the ingredients of politics. For the community theorists of politics, political participation without lies and deception as well as

<sup>15</sup>Vittorio Hösle (1997). *Moral und Politik* (Morality and Politics). Munich: Beck.

<sup>16</sup>Albert O. Hirschman (1984). *Engagement und Enttäuschung, Über das Schwanken der Bürger zwischen Privatwohl und Gemeinschaftswohl*, Frankfurt a.M.: Suhrkamp (American original 1982: *Commitment and disappointment: About the swaying of citizens between private and common good*).

collective decision-making without strategy and deviousness not only seems imperative but also possible (see Meyer 1994).

Hannah Arendt's estimates on this are just the opposite. She writes in *Wahrheit und Politik* (2006): "Nobody has ever doubted that honesty in politics is scarce. Nobody has ever thought truthfulness to be a political virtue" (p. 9). Nevertheless, the issue is and naturally remains virulent. How then could the truth survive at all if it has proved to be so powerless in the *public* world. Political discussions concern facts and opinions. One can debate opinions, but not facts, one would presume.

Beside mathematical, scientific, and philosophical truths, Arendt refers to the politically important and underestimated *factual* truths without knowledge and recognition of which securing so-called freedom of opinion turns into a farce (p. 23). Factual information inspires political thought and keeps it within limits (ibid.) Thus it is central for political discussion to know, for example, if it is recognized as a fact that an Armenian genocide occurred – or if one can say (and may just as easily) that the Armenians had attacked eastern Turkey. Since facts (ideally) are not negotiable, "[they] stand outside all conventions and all voluntary accords", and thus the exchange of opinion about them contributes "not in the least to their establishment" (Arendt 2006, p. 27). While one may quarrel with unwelcome opinions, discarding them or making compromises with them, according to Arendt, it's precisely the "unwelcome facts (...) that are of an immovable stubbornness that can be shaken by nothing other than smooth lies" (ibid.) 'Post-factual politics' and Trump's coinage of the term 'alternative facts' indicate a loss of recognized reality, which hopefully sounds creepy to even than the ingrained constructivists who exist there today.

### *The Political Apathetics*

Given an idealized and morally loaded understanding of politics, political apathy comes across today lamentable in general. Apathy, the condition of lethargy and indifference, represents no flattering diagnosis in a world of activist interventionism. Yet it concerns a morally suggestive diagnosis: As if politically inactive people would *generally* be inactive and as if political activity *in general* would be welcome. As if – to repeat – it does not depend particularly on *whoever* is politically active with which goals and *which politically active resources*. In contrast to other 'apathies', political apathy is a lack of training: Those who lack interest in sports, the fine arts, or nature would hardly be classed as 'apathetic'. But the sector of apathy represents a universe, while it can only deal with activity and always being well-informed in order to cope with a relatively small sphere of individual human life. The *normative surplus of determination* in modern life – 'too many shoulds' – also forces people to draw a line relentlessly on some more noble tasks and become 'apathetic' in, let us say, a zone-specific sense. It remains impossible to interest and commit oneself intensively to everything of importance at the same time, no matter how desirable this might seem.



Those who criticize political apathy seriously in democracies – aside from important exceptions – cannot distinguish basically between *being politically educated* and *being compatible with democracy und fitting behavior*. Thus this also means between *political training* and *democratic education in the broadest sense*. Complaints related to that lack of differentiation (claiming that schools undertake too little for political training) may be justified in the strictest sense. However, it is too dramatic, since most schools of the Western European type may long since have been labeled ‘democratic’ *in many regards*: types of behavior and skills are encouraged, challenged, and drilled into them without which the democratic ethos could only exist with difficulty. Apart from this, an anti-dogmatic moment inhabits the scientific orientation of the academic content. But the fact that the school could *never be merely democratic* (and should not be either) is a moment that signifies the limitation of all political school training.

### *Educated Spectators*

More important than the question of how many citizens are actively engaged in politics as a rule seems to be the issue if society as a whole generally behaves in ways that support the democratic ethos or is at least compatible with it. It is assumed that this ethos is also shared by the so-called silent majority – that is the apathetic ‘normal’ people – who strive for and perhaps even realize a halfway meaningful and honorable life and coexistence. From this viewpoint, it is naturally still important to know if a *political culture* exists that deserves this name. More fundamental is the question if the “passive” majority cultivates connections in its worldly life of *culturally argumentative strategies* in every realm that could also be “resolved” by the most *nonpolitical* of all communicative forms – namely by instructions, orders, and compulsion (Meyer 1994). This could be identified as a *democratic ethos*.

In contrast to this, political training is a bit like aesthetic training or training in the natural sciences – that is, it is not to be expected from the majority in developed form or expression. It has indeed been customary to view political training as the interplay of political *know-how*, political *interest*, and political *action* or as the interplay of political *know-how*, political skills, and attitudes, positions, or orientations.

In respect to political *training* in a *narrower* and scholastic sense, one ultimately must assert from the perspective of critical terminology the primacy of the *knowledge aspect*. Admittedly this fails to fit in with the new training world, but it remains more convincing. This involves knowledge about (1) political institutions, their function, and the meaning to democracy; (2) political procedures and strategies; (3) political traditions, ideas, and utopias; (4) political actors, parties, and personalities; (5) general and specific political debates, for example, political topics, and finally knowledge of the differences between other forms of understanding and practices (which might be called the ‘highest’ form of political knowledge).

Children and youth can be *educated* and *socialized* into democratically suitable or democratically conforming behavior. This means (or should mean) acquiring a democratic ethos in the mainly down-to-earth arenas due to the manner in which adults communicate with children and with each other on problem-solving and overcoming conflicts, seeking consensus but also being able to cope with dissent. But this training happens *in no sense automatically* or even in a *political* sense, although the democratic ethos sometimes seems to be the soil in and out of which the political training drives toward blossoming in a narrower sense.

That said, it is precisely the *lack* of this soil – namely the scandalous *lack* of democratic procedures and participation rights – which politicizes people, whether young or old. And that is what probably drives people to official and informal politics (see Reichenbach and Breit 2005).

Political *interest* quite often coexists very well with political *inactivity* – especially among the millions of ‘spectators’ who form large observation posts – sometimes quite nearby, sometimes far from the political arenas. They may outnumber the relatively small crowd of political ‘gladiators’ by hundreds, thousands, or tens of thousands,<sup>17</sup> but they usually have hardly any chance for direct and well-rounded participation *inside* the arenas. The spectators – in contrast to the gladiators – don’t get their hands dirty (or don’t have to). Most of them know better, and that’s fine.

Spectators supposedly have the overview. They can offer differentiated comment. They can also provide primitive commentary at the taverns. Yet – in regard to politics – they are at least the reflected splendor of the *bios theoretikos* or even the *vita contemplativa* if not its expression.

By contrast, those who perform as gladiators amid the *vita activa* – as Arendt (1996) notes – cannot know ultimately how well or how effectively he conducts himself. He has no overview. He lacks intermissions to reflect quietly upon what he will do next. He is thrown from one decisive situation into another and must always act as if he knows exactly how to react. Naturally he is very well informed about what move to make in some cases (but not always) and is forced to make decisions nevertheless.

Discussions are long, but life is short, to borrow a formulation from Marquard (1981). And whoever wants to succeed in life itself – as a *man or woman of action* – must take a stand from a miserable position over and over again. On the other hand, spectators (whether anarchists, early Christians, socialists, or conservatives) may delight in their possibly fitting commentary, even if it has no practical impact. He risks nothing and loses nothing. His hands aren’t dirty, but – to recall Jean-Paul Sartre’s play on words in *Les main sales* – he has no hands to get dirty either.

If all goes well, the spectators are politically trained citizens who have the necessary know-how about how to react – or should have it. It is not of *primary* importance if they are actively engaged. Important is that they continue to observe and comment. ‘Being active’ means nothing in reference to political training or even being educated, for even a dangerous idiot can be active. If the uneducated heads are

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<sup>17</sup> Lester Milbrath (1977) distinguished between *gladiators*, *onlookers*, and *apathetics* in regard to *political* participation by the citizenry.

active (It would be naïve to believe there are only a few of them), the democratic ethos will be tested dramatically, in part for its suitability. It will therefore be better for all that those who have no grasp of politics not to worry about it too much either.

This view – already formulated in Plato’s *Alcibiades* (1996) – may not fit into the *political* and *educational correctness* of today’s pedagogical democracy entreaty. Yet that doesn’t improve the idea either (calling for modern societies to train as many people as they can to be politically active). Where we find only gladiators and no spectators or even any apathetics – that is where the activist utopia would become a reality, chaos would be perfection: there would be no corrections (e.g., recall votes), no oversight, and hardly any intelligent commentary, since they could only develop in the *vita contemplativa*. In short: only thanks to the spectators in particular can the democratic ethos be realized even in the political arena.

It’s probably not political training in the school which motivates the question ‘On which side do you stand?’ But political training in the school can help grasp the meaning of the question, to recognize the need to answer it, and finally to respond to it.

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