



GLOBAL FOREST
GOVERNANCE AND
CLIMATE CHANGE

Interrogating Representation,
Participation, and Decentralization

EMMANUEL O. NUESIRI (ED.)

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Editor

Global Forest Governance and Climate Change

Interrogating Representation,
Participation, and Decentralization

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Foreword

If you want to participate, please lend in a hand
do as we tell you and we'll tell you you can
if you listen look learn and do as we say
even democratization will be on its way.
We must protect forests from people like you
so that people with business will have business to do.

I wrote the above words in the 1990s while studying democratic decentralization in Senegal's forestry sector. While participation in forest management projects was meant to get local people to 'own' the projects and to shape them to their needs and aspirations, the projects all used participatory processes as a means of mobilization—a means to facilitate implementation of preconceived outside notions of forest management and use. Rather than being a means for empowering local people, participation was a means of facipulation—facilitated manipulation. Participation looked more like forced labor or *corvée* than voluntary engagement in a beneficial set of desired and locally relevant activities.

While participation is intended as a means of engaging and empowering local people, it is all too often a means to harness local people to labors of ostensibly 'scientific' (what I call *scientistical*) forest management—often for harvesting of forests, a perfectly legitimate objective,

but in the name of their conservation and protection. So, haven't we seen enough of participation and participatory processes? Isn't it time for substantive representation to evict participation, move in, and empower local people to negotiate to shape their own landscapes and to obtain their share of the wealth they produce. The 'wealth of the poor'—the great wealth of 'the bottom billion'—needs to remain the wealth of the poor. It is not a wealth to give as opportunity to the vultures of capitalism. They already extract from the rural world, leaving rural people with only a fraction of the wealth they generate by their labor and the resources around them.

Emancipation must be the new and primary procedural objective for international bodies that want to do good when implementing their operational objectives such as hectares under REDD+ (the UN program to reduce climate change by storing carbon in poor people's forests). The international community requires participation and Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC) as social protections under REDD+. This volume demonstrates the inadequacies and flaws in such 'protections'. REDD+ continues to grow its carbon sequestration aims—"regardless of crummies in tummies you know" (*The Lorax* Dr. Seuss). Carbon sequestration is important, but will never be worth the facipulated subordination of forest-dependent people. It does not justify imposition. It does not justify fascism—carbon fascism or any other kind.

We can only hope that this book is one of the last nails in the coffin of fictive social protections—those performed as spectacle rather than as substantive safeguards against domination and abuse. The means to represent and protect the interests of rural populations from international environment and development programs are legion. In forestry alone we have seen participatory, community-based, joint, co-managed, collaborative, community-driven, devolved and democratically decentralized interventions. And now we have FPIC. But, unfortunately, there is no longer any pretense that FPIC is a progressive protection since the day the World Bank played a sleight of hand by replacing the word Consent with Consultation—effectively saying 'we don't need consent; we have to consult you, and then we can impose our programs as we see fit'. If consent by the community *as a whole* is not required then there is no protection. If people cannot say no to interventions, they have no bar-

gaining position from which to reformulate them to their likings and needs. Rather than emancipation, they get ‘included’ to make the project look good and legitimate or just as labor—whether they like it or not.

Indeed, no social protection has teeth if the people being protected do not have substantive rights—starting with the right to say ‘no’ to the intervention; indeed, they need to be able to say ‘no’ to participation itself. No social protection has teeth if decision makers do not fully represent—that is are accountable to—the population concerned. And further, protections are toothless when they address so-called stakeholders who are identified at the convenience of the outside agency facilitating the process. The people holding the stakes in community-based affairs are the ‘citizens’—this means the people living in the jurisdiction of the public natural resources that are usually at stake in forest management and use programs. It does not mean the capitalist within an interest in razing the forest.

If a forest is under community jurisdiction then the timber merchant in the city and the forest service and the international environmental organizations or NGOs, regardless of the ‘stakes’ they think they hold, have zero say in FPIConsent—unless the community decides that they have a say and unless they convince the community to let them have a say. Outsiders may have an interest—the way a fox has an interest in a henhouse. But they do not and should not hold sway over community-forest use decisions. The typical ‘stakeholders’—merchants, foresters, environmentalists—cannot be trusted as the guardians of social wellbeing. Communities make decisions in the face of these outside interests—and communities should be able to negotiate with them. It is not for outsiders to decide what conditions are acceptable or to have a vote in local decisions. If communities have rights to a resource, they have rights to the resource.

Of course, there are many questions as to how rights are set and what decisions can competently be made locally to address multiple scales of interest, but if there is a decision at higher levels that a forest can be cut or that it must be reserved, then the community should be the one that decides who cuts and whether or not their labor will go into cutting or conservation. If a community forest is targeted for inclusion in REDD+, then it is the community that determines whether this is to happen and

under what terms. The drama is in the establishment of rights—for forests are often arbitrarily under national control or privatized to influential actors regardless of pre-existing historical claims or uses. These injustices in registered rights versus the claims are beyond any participatory process. They require serious higher-level deliberations that represent—in the most democratic sense—the community or other local claims.

FPIC/c processes are now the mode. Yet, for FPIC to constitute protection it must define its terms. The UN and World Bank do not state what ‘Free’ might mean in the context of programs like REDD+. Do communities have the freedom to engage or not engage? Do they have the freedom to question their governments or the forest service? Do they have the freedom to choose and challenge their leaders? Do they have freedom from threats, violence or retribution? Do they have freedom to choose alternative lives and livelihoods? Do they have the freedom, the right, to say ‘no’? The term ‘Prior’ needs some investigation as well. In Mozambique, it can mean as little as two days—this is a scandal since it is too short for any serious public review process. Indeed, six months may be too short for a community to grasp the problems and potentials of many forestry and environmental management programs. A reasonably long time is needed—and perhaps that period should be determined by communities. ‘Informed’, as we have seen, is reduced to educating communities in the beliefs of the intervening agencies—training rather than empowering people with new, pertinent and complete information and knowledge. In FPIC and participatory processes people are ‘informed’ of all the wonderful benefits REDD+ programs will bring. They do not inform them of how much profit carbon vending entrepreneurs are making, they do not inform them of the incomes of development agents, and they often fail to inform them of the nature and distribution of risks—risks that usually fall on the community.

And then there is ‘Consent’, where it is not deboned and reduced to consultation. Consent is the big-ticket item. Who consents? Who represents the community? Who can say ‘yes’ or ‘no’ on behalf of citizens—on behalf of the forest-dependent populations whose lives and livelihoods and historical uses and claims are usually ‘at stake’. Whither democracy? Despite most countries in Africa having elected local governments, they are rarely involved in forestry decisions. They are, as this volume shows,

circumvented for a variety of flimsy reasons: many view democracy as merely a jamboree of civil society organizations rather than as elected government. Alternatively, they circumvent elected authorities because democracy is too slow or local government is corrupt. It is true that democratic local governments are dysfunctional in much of the world. Does this mean international agencies should circumvent them? Should they just go into the local arena and operate as if these elected authorities do not exist. What if an African NGO came to Hoboken, New Jersey or Agrigento, Sicily and decided to improve a park. If they so much as went into a park and started digging to put in the pole for a basketball court or a slab on which to set a bench, they would find themselves in jail in minutes.

It does not matter if government is corrupt. You do not circumvent it. You work with it to improve it. You work with it in ways that establish checks and balances, accountabilities and transparency that make that government work for its people. You mobilize people to force representation. Corruption is not an excuse. Nor is slowness—a necessary characteristic of democracy. True dictatorship can be efficient. But it is not efficient in the long run as it veers away from investments and programs that serve the needs of the people. It is the obligation of international and national intervening agencies to support democratic process—even if (a) democracy gets them kicked out due to the word ‘no’, (b) democracy is slower than molasses and they cannot deliver the hectares under REDD+ or protection that their institutions would like to see, or (c) some of these institutions are corrupt and therefore working with them requires intensive work on transparency, accountability and guarantees. It is neocolonial hubris when international agencies circumvent government because it does not serve their objectives. This is not acceptable.

This circumvention of duly elected local authorities not only ignores the laws of most countries, but it delegitimizes effective representatives and misses the opportunity to strengthen this relatively new system of sub-national representation. Democracy is institutionalized participation. Work to institutionalize the values of emancipatory inclusion. Power asymmetries will not be overcome by recognition alone—more structural work is required to ensure that the rural poor are represented in decisions and that they retain a greater portion of the wealth they

generate. The many inequalities that protections are trying to address are part of larger histories and multi-scale structures of inequality that cannot be fought in the local arena alone. Representation is only one structural matter.

It is time to be angry about the abuses of rural communities, the structural violences that take place in the name of environmental protection, climate adaptation and mitigation, or development. This volume gives us some of the fodder for that anger. It helps us to sketch the outlines of a system that has gone awry, a system filled with well-intended operators whose intentions are still paving that age-old road. It is they who need training programs. Training in the actors, powers and accountability relations needed to support substantive democratic interventions. It is the intervening agencies that need to learn what democracy is and how to support it. If radically transformed into a progressive program that works with and through elected authorities with added guarantees that these interventions are seriously representative of local needs and aspirations, REDD+ could become a force for democracy, representation and justice in forestry and beyond. This volume helps show the way. Development agencies and practitioners, policy makers and representatives must read this—along with researchers and students of environmental policy and development.

19 December 2017

Jesse Ribot

Short Bio

Jesse Ribot is Professor of Geography, Anthropology, and Natural Resources and Environmental Studies at the University of Illinois, where he is affiliated with the Unit for Criticism and Interpretive Theory and the Women and Gender in Global Perspective program, and he directs the Social Dimensions of Environmental Policy (SDEP) program. Before 2008, he worked at the World Resources Institute, taught in the Urban Studies and Planning department at MIT and was a fellow at the Department of Politics of The New School for Social Research, Agrarian Studies at Yale University, the Center for the Critical Analysis of

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Series Editor Foreword

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Justin Taberham

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1

Global Forest Governance and Climate Change: Introduction and Overview

Emmanuel O. Nuesiri

Aim of This Book

Climate change is the most pressing problem facing the world today. The recent devastation experienced by small island states in the Caribbean and the USA, caused by hurricanes Harvey and Irma, has again stirred contentious debates about climate change and the fate of humanity.¹ This comes after US President Donald Trump's announcement that he is pulling out of the 2015 Paris Climate Change Agreement. The announcement was a significant victory for climate change deniers with strong ties to the president (Davenport & Lipton, 2017, June 3). Nevertheless the rest of the world (and some States in the USA) are moving ahead with the Paris Agreement (Geiling, 2017, July 12; Mohan, 2017, July 9). Article 5 of the Paris Agreement details the role of forests in the global response to climate change, through the reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation and the role of conservation, sustainable management

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of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation [REDD+]) mechanism (see Climate Focus, 2015; United Nations, 2015). The aim of this book is to assess whether REDD+ is indeed a viable global mechanism for addressing climate change, in which contexts and under what conditions.

The adoption of REDD+ is being supported globally by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), the United Nations REDD Programme (UN-REDD), and the World Bank through its Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) and the Forest Investment Program (FIP). However, REDD+ would lead to loss of livelihoods for many forest-dependent people because it would restrict their access to forests set aside for carbon sequestration (Accra Caucus, 2013; Roe, Streck, Pritchard, & Costenbader, 2013). To address this socio-economic problem, a number of social and environmental safeguards have been proposed by the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank, including the requirement that all REDD+ projects be implemented under the principle of securing the free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) of affected local people (UN-REDD, 2013). The UN-REDD goes as far as committing itself to strengthening local democracy as a social safeguard against elite capture of benefits packages for local people that may be affected by REDD+ (UN-REDD, 2008).

The implementation of these social safeguards including FPIC is based on the adoption of participatory processes inclusive of local people during consultations, design, implementation, and monitoring of REDD+ initiatives. The underlying assumption being that participation of local people in decision-making spaces about REDD+ will ensure equity and fairness in the distribution of costs and benefits associated with the adoption of REDD+ by developing country governments. This book sets out to interrogate this assumption through case studies that examine participatory forest governance processes in Africa, Asia, and Latin America. The chapters examine participatory processes associated with ongoing REDD+ adoption initiatives and also examine participatory processes associated with other types of forestry programmes such as Joint Forest Management in India. However, all the chapters interrogate the question of whether participation as currently practised in the case study countries

is sufficient for an inclusive REDD+ responsive to the interests of local forest-dependent people.

Theoretical Arguments: Inclusive and Complementary Political Representation

This book has come about partly as a result of research carried out by the Responsive Forest Governance Initiative (RFGI), a three-year research programme jointly executed by the University of Illinois Urban Champaign (U of I), the Council for Development of Social Science Research in Africa (CODESRIA) Dakar, Senegal, and the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN). The RFGI was funded by a grant from the Swedish International Development Agency (SIDA). Thus six of the nine chapters in this book (Chaps. 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, and 10) are in part informed by insights from RFGI research. The RFGI programme held that decision-making about forest resources should be inclusive of, and responsive to, the socio-economic interests of local people (Ece et al., 2017; Ribot, 2016). Responsiveness calls for participation that supports the presence of local people in decision-making, and supports decisions that ‘respond to and reflect local needs and aspirations’ (Ribot, 2017, p. 3). Representation that is responsive is fundamental to strong effective participatory processes, to legitimacy of decision-making, and to substantive democratic decentralization of forest governance in changing climate.

Inclusion of local people in forest governance does not end with getting local people to attend participatory forums. It is important to pay close attention to power dynamics and asymmetries among the different types of representatives in participatory processes in order to avoid what Cooke and Kothari (2001) term the tyranny of participation. It is often the case that local people are represented in participatory processes, by persons selected on the basis of their local livelihood, with the assumption that a farmer is best placed to speak for farmers and a woman is best placed to speak for women. This type of descriptive representation is indeed welcomed in cases where a group has experienced a long history of marginalization (Mansbridge, 1999; Pitkin, 1967), and the only way their interests

will feature in decision-making spaces is to have an individual that resembles the group present in decision-making spaces. However, descriptive representatives in many cases do not have a broad enough mandate to represent their communities; in addition they often lack experience of engagement in formal deliberative spaces, thus customary authorities and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) are often invited to also represent local people and communities in participatory processes.

Customary authorities and NGOs are symbolic representatives of local communities; they are able to legitimately stand and speak for local communities because they share similar 'beliefs, attitudes, assumptions' (Pitkin, 1967, p. 99). They also share similar aspirations with their constituents; likewise NGOs working to alleviate poverty share similar aspirations with poor local forest communities and on this basis can make a self-appointed representative claim on behalf of such communities (see Montanaro, 2017; Saward, 2010). Symbolic representatives include self-appointed agents like NGOs and celebrities, and also institutions like customary authorities appointed following cultural norms; these do not have legal obligations to be responsive and accountable to local communities as is the case with elected local representatives like mayors, local government chairpersons, and municipal councillors.

These elected local representatives are formally authorized by local people to speak and act on their behalf. They are obliged to be responsive to local communities they represent because of their constitutional recognition as the third tier of government with resources with which to provide public services to meet the needs of their electorate. When they are not responsive, they can be voted out, and they are also liable to legal prosecution for abuse of authority (Schedler, 1999). They are therefore the substantive representatives of local people. Substantive representation is viewed as morally superior to descriptive and symbolic representation for the formal checks it places on representatives (Pitkin, 1967), making it the preferred mechanism for representative democracy and democratic decentralization (Eaton & Connerley, 2010; Manin, Przeworski, & Stokes 1999; Rehfeld, 2011; Urbinati & Warren, 2008). Consequently, they are essential actors to be included in participatory processes that aim to be responsive to local socio-economic interests. However, elected local governments alone are insufficient to represent the varied interests of local communities.




Fig. 1.1 Inclusive and complementary political representation (Source: Author's adaptation based on Pitkin (1967), Young (2000), and Saward (2010))

Inclusive, strong, and responsive representation of local people in participatory processes is more likely when the three types of representatives complement one another (see Fig. 1.1) (Celis, Childs, Kantola, & Krook, 2008; Saward, 2010; Young, 2000). Local interests are varied and differentiated along lines of age, gender, wealth status, and race; this strengthens the case for inclusive complementary representation of local communities in participatory forums (Dovi, 2002, 2009; Mansbridge, 1999; Urbinati, 2000; Williams, 1998; Young, 2000). Inclusive representation strengthens participation, ensures legitimacy of decision-making, and is at the core of initiatives for democratic decentralization of forest resources management.

Chapter Summaries

The chapters of this book are arranged according to their continental location; the African cases come first, followed by the Asian cases, and then the Latin American cases. Following the introduction, Nuesiri in Chap. 2 assesses UN-REDD commitment to strengthen local democracy

as a safeguard against elite capture of REDD+ benefits for local people. He does this by examining local representation during the consultative process associated with the design of the Nigeria-REDD proposal. He finds that local representation was through selected individuals from local communities (descriptive representatives), and through customary authority and NGOs (symbolic representatives); elected local government authorities, the substantive representatives of local people were excluded from the consultative process. He also finds that the exclusion of elected local governments is linked to godfather politics in Nigeria, which enables state governors to unfairly subordinate local government authority and constrain their responsiveness to local needs. In approving the Nigeria-REDD proposal, the UN-REDD reinforced power asymmetries between political godfathers and elected local governments, consequently aiding the subversion of local democracy in Nigeria. He asserts that the UN-REDD would be fulfilling its democracy objectives and protecting local people from elite capture of Nigeria-REDD, if it engages substantively with elected local government authorities, following the benchmark set by the European Union Micro Projects Programme.

Samndong in Chap. 3 studies REDD+ in two pilot sites in Equateur province of the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC). He specifically interrogates community participation through information collected from household questionnaires, interviews, and focus group discussions. He found that community participation in REDD+ in DRC is mere 'tokenism'. The communities were consulted and informed about REDD+ but did not achieve managerial power and influence over the REDD+ project. The decision for the communities to join REDD+ was not democratic and the information provided during the free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) process was not sufficient for the communities to make informed decisions to join REDD+. Community participation in the REDD+ project does not go beyond labour supply in activities and attending meetings for per diems. The institutional arrangement to enable full and effective community participation is weak and excludes women. He argues that effective community participation might be difficult to achieve if social inequalities and local power relations are not acknowledged and addressed in DRC national REDD+ programme.

Mbeche in Chap. 4 examines institutional choice and substantive representation of local people in carbon forestry in Uganda. He notes that carbon forestry programmes are expected to build-in social safeguards to help ensure accountability, participation, transparency, and legitimacy in resource governance. These safeguards promise inclusion of marginalized groups and forest-dependent people in decision-making around resource governance—so that their interests can be represented. He queries to what extent this rhetoric of representation is reflected in the design and implementation of carbon forestry programmes in Uganda? He finds that despite espoused intentions of having an ‘inclusive’ involvement of communities and in particular local actors, all the three interventions he studied chose to work through experts or via institutions that required individuals to be members (such as community-based organizations, NGOs, etc.) if they were to benefit. He observes that the effect of these arrangements has been exclusion of the wider community, co-optation, contestation, conflict, unequal benefit sharing, lack of accountability, or selected institutions being accountable to donors as opposed to communities. He argues that mere articulation of social safeguards for forest governance are not sufficient—they have to be backed with conditions that make it necessary for broad public accountability and responsiveness to occur. He provides recommendations on how to broaden accountability and responsiveness in carbon forestry in Uganda.

Lord, in Chap. 5, interrogates displacement, power, and REDD+. She shows how top-down decision-making can undermine the legitimacy of REDD+ project. Donors assumed the long-standing experience of a conservation NGO, working in a remote, Tanzanian dry Miombo woodland, legitimized the symbolic representation of local people by that NGO, and therefore decided to implement a REDD+ project in the Miombo woodland through that NGO. Donors’ choice ended up reinforcing the historical exclusion of migratory pastoralists from forest governance, undermined substantive representation of local people by their elected village authorities, and worsened land tenure conflicts. The results of this study demonstrate, at a fine grain of detail, how forest conservation was locally contested through democratic decision-making in the village general assembly. The politically legitimate consensus decisions of the village assembly were subsequently overruled by the NGO

and project consultants, acting as their own fields of power and authority, unaccountable to the village assembly. Furthermore, REDD+ technical knowledge requirements and neoliberal rollback of the state influenced NGO choice of local actors to work with; this created unhealthy competition between implementing groups that undermined the legitimacy of the REDD+ project. This case study examines the politics of blame and responsibility in relation to climate mitigation, and highlights how power asymmetries does not only apply to the dominance of local elites and governments but likewise to the civil society experts and consultants that simplify the perceptions and expectations of local legitimate stakeholders in the application of evidence-based policy.

Akwah-Neba et al., in Chap. 6, examine the drivers of representation, which influences the quality of representation in participatory processes. They note that participation has been the principal focus for operationalizing inclusion in environmental conservation and development initiatives in the past 30 years, while representation through legitimately recognized individuals or institutions has been a key criteria of participation. They argue that while the quality of representation is principally evaluated by the relations of accountability between representatives and their constituency, it can also be evaluated by whether it is supply or demand driven. They posit that representation is supply driven when the stimulus is from society seeking to represent their interests, and demand driven when the stimulus is from governments and donors requiring representation in their projects. Focusing on civil society organizations in Cameroon, Ghana, Hungary, and Nepal, they use their conceptual lens to examine how the drivers of representation impact on the quality of public participation in forest conservation initiatives including REDD+. Based on their findings, they identify five key factors which can influence the quality of civil society organizations' representation of local communities.

Murthy et al., in Chap. 7, review the experience of participatory forest management in India, observing that the government is responding to the global climate change problem in several ways. India has a long-standing National Forest Policy (NFP) with a goal to bring 33% of its geographic area under tree cover. The country's National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) includes the holistic ecosystem conservation

plan termed the Green India Mission (GIM). It is Nationally Determined Contribution (NDC) for reductions in greenhouse gas emissions plans to sequester 2.5–3 billion tonnes of CO₂ equivalent by 2030 through forestry activities. The government is currently finalizing its REDD+ strategy, which includes forestry activities that contribute to achieving its NFP, GIM, and NDC targets. Murthy et al. note that the participation of local communities in REDD+ is integral to its success, but community participation in India's Joint Forest Management (JFM) programme shows has not been very successful. This is due to ineffective implementation and enforcement of laws, failure to ensure inclusive representation of local people, and inequity in the distribution of benefits. Thus, for successful REDD+ implementation in India, Murthy et al. recommend respect for environmental laws by powerful actors, especially government, stronger social and environmental safeguards, formulation of community-friendly and accountable forest benefits sharing mechanisms, and resolute government commitment to community participation in REDD+ in India.

Höhne et al., in Chap. 8, interrogate REDD+ and its effect on the reconfiguration of public authority in the forest sector in Indonesia and Brazil. They start from the observation that since the 1980s, most central governments have decentralized forest management to local governments and assume that financial incentives associated with initiatives like REDD+ could motivate central governments to attempt to recentralize forest management. Höhne et al. examine to what extent central governments have rebuilt capacity at the national level, imposed regulations from above, and taken up activities that interfere in forest management by local governments. They find that while REDD+ has not initiated large-scale recentralization in the forestry sector, it supports the reinforcement and pooling of REDD+-related competences at central government level. In Brazil, where sub-national states are at the forefront of REDD+ activities, this has resulted in regulatory struggles between the state governments and the central government; while in Indonesia, where the central government is at the forefront of REDD+ activities, the provincial governments have followed the central government's lead and the district governments have mostly abstained in the process.

Špirić, in Chap. 9, explores the legitimacy of Mexico's REDD+ readiness process. She examines the normative and organizational characteristics of the most important multi-stakeholder forums articulated to design the national REDD+ strategy, and how legitimate these forums are, according to their participants. The results show that there are two groups of actors with contrasting perceptions of the multi-stakeholders forums' legitimacy: the supporters and the detractors. The supporters consist of government, academia, and large international and national NGOs. These find the REDD+ decision-making process in Mexico all inclusive, and favour indirect representation of local people through NGOs. The detractors, mainly peasant and indigenous peoples' organizations, some national NGOs, and academics, consider that the Mexico's REDD+ process lacks transparency and representativeness and are demanding more direct participation of local people. In response to the detractors, the Mexican government plans to improve procedural legitimacy of the national REDD+ process by directly consulting local people representatives on the national REDD+ design.

Burga, in Chap. 10, investigates how communities in the Peruvian Amazon are engaging in REDD+ for access to potential economic benefits from carbon sales and land titling to secure tenure. Based on interviews in two villages, her study sheds light on what people actually gain or lose through their engagement with REDD+ and highlight the need for social protections to avoid negative effects on the most vulnerable. Burga shows how these communities are using existing governance structures and mechanisms for representation and participation in decision-making including negotiating benefit distribution in REDD+. She also shows that where representation is not democratic, there are real risks of REDD+ reproducing and worsening exclusion, inequality, and elite capture. Burga's study shows clearly that REDD+ initiatives that fail to support democratic representation end up legitimizing non-democratic practices, deepen inequalities in income distribution, and end up putting local people at risk of losing entitlements associated with citizenship and belonging in their communities.

Discussion: Towards Responsive Global Forest Governance Under a Changing Climate

What do the contributing authors to this book add to our understanding of global forest governance and climate change, as they interrogate representation, participation, and decentralization? Firstly, operationalizing participation is the primary mechanism through which governments, donors, international organizations, and NGOs seek to include local communities in decision-making spaces over forest resources. However, participation of local communities is still viewed as getting local community members, NGOs, and national governments into the same room for deliberations. Power asymmetries are still rife in forest governance, and this still manifests as non-local actors, including national governments, donors, and NGOs, holding stronger voice and influence over community members in participatory processes. Samndong (this volume) based on his research in DR Congo has labelled current participatory processes to include local people in governance of forest and climate change initiatives like REDD+ as mere tokenism, falling far short of empowering local people, especially women.

Secondly, forestry and climate change initiatives such as REDD+ are reinforcing these power asymmetries, and in some cases increasing these power asymmetries between non-local actors and local people. This has resulted in displacement of local people from forest areas in which they obtain livelihoods in Tanzania (Lord, this volume) and has also resulted in uncertainties over REDD+-related forest policy activities due to policy tug of war between national and sub-national governments in Brazil, and indirectly supported the strengthening of the central government in the forestry sector in Indonesia (Höhne et al., this volume). International organizations like the UN-REDD and World Bank which are supporting the adoption of REDD+ in developing countries are aware of these governance shortcomings, and more importantly local people and local authorities are fighting back against their subjection, as the Nigerian (Nuesiri, this volume), Tanzanian (Lord, this volume), Ugandan (Mbeche this volume), and Mexican (Špirić, this volume) case studies reveal.

What can be done about this? At the global level, Nuesiri (this volume) calls on the UN-REDD to learn from the European Union whose Micro Projects Programme in Nigeria substantively engaged with elected local government authorities to deliver social development projects in local communities. This is not an endorsement of the European Union engagement as best practice, but a pointer to an international organization that has taken local engagement seriously; their successes and failures will be fertile learning ground for the UN-REDD on how to improve local engagement. At the national level Murthy et al. (this volume), based on their India study, make recommendations that are relevant for developing country governments including respect for environmental laws by powerful actors, stronger social and environmental safeguards, community-friendly and accountable forest benefits sharing mechanisms, and resolute government commitment to community participation in REDD+.

Still on what can be done about ensuring responsive forest governance, Neba et al. (this volume), based on their multi-country study, provide a novel conceptual lens through which we can empirically interrogate representation such that we are able to intervene to improve the quality of representation. They ask that we interrogate the drivers of representation, whether it results from stimulus within society (supply-side representation) or results from stimulus from governments and donors (demand-side representation). This would enable a better understanding of the action of the local representative in participatory processes and guide the kind of intervention that is necessary to improve the quality of representation.

In addition, conceptual insights, based on a critical review of the theory of representation, reveal that no single type of representation (descriptive, symbolic, substantive) is sufficient to represent the varied interests of local people and communities. These different types of representation complement one another to yield inclusive representation. Having different types of representatives standing, speaking, and acting for local communities in participatory processes strengthens the quality of representation of local communities. Lastly, Lord (this volume) calls for a multidisciplinary and multi-scalar approach to the design and implementation of forest and climate change initiatives like REDD+. The multidisciplinary team must be committed to forest governance approaches that

are responsive to local needs, and therefore opened to REDD+ design and implementation based on knowledge co-production at the local. This would thus favour REDD+ projects with flexible adaptive management as opposed to projects with rigid technocratic guidelines and requirements as is the case at present

Conclusion

The aim of this book is to assess whether REDD+ is indeed a viable global mechanism for addressing climate change, in which contexts and under what conditions. Based on its case studies, it is obvious that governments in developing countries are expending a lot of resources to design national REDD+ programmes that will deliver verifiable carbon emissions, with the support of bilateral and multilateral donor organizations including the World Bank and the UN. The big sore point is whether international and national REDD+ initiatives are transferring the cost of addressing the climate change challenge to local people and communities in developing countries, who are least responsible for the climate change problem. This is an even bigger issue, when it is considered that the USA, a major polluter and contributor to the climate change problem, is unwilling to cooperate with the rest of the world in implementing the 2015 Paris Agreement on global strategies to mitigate and adapt to climate change.

The book shows that local people and local decision-makers (village community-based organizations and local authorities) are indeed finding that REDD+ is leading to a reconfiguration of national governance arrangements, which might further deepen the subjection of local people to the interests of powerful actors (governments and NGOs) at national and global levels. However, local people and authorities are contesting their subjection under new governance arrangements due to adoption of REDD+. What this top-down reconfiguration of governance and bottom-up contestation will bring about, is open to debate. This volume's major contribution is to call on researchers, policymakers at global and national levels, and non-state actors with powerful influence on decision-making, to choose inclusive and complementary representation of local

communities in participatory processes associated with the adoption of REDD+. Inclusive representation ensures that the varied and multiple interests of local people are represented in decision-making spaces; it also ensures that elected local representatives with a mandate to respond to local needs are part of REDD+ decision-making. Inclusive representation strengthens participation, ensures legitimacy of decision-making, and is at the core of initiatives for democratic decentralization of forest resources management.

Notes

1. See Knowles (2017, September 17) *Why Hurricanes Harvey and Irma won't lead to action on climate change*.

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2

Godfather Politics and Exclusionary Local Representation in REDD+: A Case Study of the Design of the UN-REDD-Supervised Nigeria-REDD Proposal

Emmanuel O. Nuesiri

Introduction

The ‘Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation with the added goals of Conserving and Enhancing Forest Carbon Stocks, and Sustainably Managing Forests’ (REDD+) is part of the mix of solutions to the global climate change crises (CIF, 2010; Corbera & Schroeder, 2011). The United Nations Collaborative Programme on Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation in Developing Countries (UN-REDD) is presently funding REDD+ readiness initiatives in developing countries (UN-REDD, 2014).

Many analysts fear that REDD+ would have a negative socio-economic impact on forest-dependent people (Accra Caucus, 2013; Roe, Streck, Pritchard, & Costenbader, 2013). To prevent this, the UN-REDD commits to strengthen local democratic processes as a safeguard against elite capture of REDD+ benefits for local people (UN-REDD, 2008). This chapter assesses the UN-REDD commitment to strengthen local

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democratic processes. It presents the findings of research examining local representation in both the UN-REDD international policy board and the US\$4 million UN-REDD-funded Nigeria-REDD+ programme (henceforth Nigeria-REDD). The Nigeria-REDD is implemented under the principle of securing the full prior and informed consent (FPIC) of affected local people (UN-REDD, 2013a).

In this study, political representation is defined as making present in decision-making via representatives the interests of groups who are physically absent (Pitkin, 1967; Rehfeld, 2006; Runciman, 2007). It is democratic when representatives are elected freely by the represented, and are responsive to the represented, and can be held to account for their actions by the represented (Manin, Przeworski, & Stokes, 1999). In contrast, it is undemocratic when choice, responsiveness, and downward accountability are absent. Undemocratic regimes could choose to be responsive to the governed; these types of regimes have been labelled by some theorists as 'good despotism' (Mill, 2004, p. 36) and by others as benevolent or benign dictatorships (Manin et al., 1999; Wintrobe, 1998).

Pitkin (1967) identifies three principal types of representation: descriptive, symbolic, and substantive.¹ Descriptive representation is when representatives are chosen because they resemble the group they are standing for (Pitkin, 1967), and/or considered 'typical of the larger class of persons whom they represent' (Mansbridge, 1999, p. 629). Symbolic representation is when representatives base their representative claims on the affective ties between representative and represented (Pitkin, 1967). Symbolic representatives legitimise their status through the use of imagery, objects, and discourses that inspire devotion and the allegiance of the represented (Lombardo & Meier, 2014; Wedeen, 1998). Symbolic representatives include customary authority, NGOs, and, in some instances, members of government (Baker, 2007; Blatter, 2009; Lombardo & Meier, 2014; Pitkin, 1967; Silveira, 2000).

Symbolic representation finds expression through symbolic political action, though symbolic politics is not limited to symbolic representatives. Edelman (1985) opines that symbolic politics is a tool for manipulating the public, but Brysk (1995) notes that it is also employed by civil society to influence decision-makers (see also Keck & Sikkink, 1999; Miller, 2012). Matten (2003) argues that governments subscribe to

symbolic environmental regulations so as to be seen as responsive to public environmental concerns, while avoiding to hurt the corporate sector. So it enacts policies that do not become law or that legitimise practices already adopted by industry and rolls out strong regulations with weak enforcement. Stavins (1998, p. 73) notes that this strategy works because 'voters have limited information, and so respond to gestures, while remaining relatively unaware of details.'

Substantive representation is when representatives act for and are accountable to the represented (Pitkin, 1967). It is morally superior to descriptive and symbolic representation for the checks it places on the actions of representatives (Pitkin, 1967). Substantive representation is viewed as meeting the requirements of social justice, making it the preferred operational mechanism behind representative democracy (Fraser, 2007; Grunebaum, 1981; Kateb, 1981; Manin et al., 1999; Mill, 2004; Rehfeld, 2011; Urbinati & Warren, 2008).

Saward (2006, 2008), building on Pitkin (1967), asserts that representation is based on claims-making. Elected and unelected representatives make claims about themselves, their constituency, and their relationship to their constituency. Saward (2006) maintains that representation relies on the claims-making performance of representatives, and thus elected and unelected representatives have equal legitimacy in political deliberations. Severs (2010) argue that Saward (2006, 2008) ignores the responsiveness-accountability relationship between elected representatives and their constituency. When this is taken into consideration, elected representatives can claim a higher moral standing compared to the unelected.

Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008) argue that legitimacy of unelected representatives such as NGOs is based on the discourses behind such representation; they refer to this type of representation as discursive representation. However, discourses draw their power from ideographs, that is, symbolic words and phrases that stir emotions towards an intentional outcome (Bourdieu, 1991; Kaufer & Carley, 1993; McGee, 1980). Discursive representation can thus be grouped into the broad category of symbolic representation (see Lombardo & Meier, 2014).

Montanaro (2012), building on the work of Saward (2006, 2008) and informed by the discursive emphasis of Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008),

presents a framework for empirically measuring the democratic legitimacy of unelected self-appointed representatives. She identifies nonelectoral mechanisms of authorisation and accountability that target constituencies could employ to ensure that self-appointed representatives are responsive to the needs of their target constituencies. These include publicly voicing their approval or disapproval of the representative, exhibiting free choice to remain loyal or to exit the representative's delineated constituency, and possessing the ability to financially support or to withhold financial support from the self-appointed representative. All of this presupposes that the representative is accessible and that there is a discursive relationship between representatives and represented.

Saward (2006, 2008), Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008), and Montanaro (2012) draw attention to the problem of representing constituencies that are not captured by electoral districting or do not fit within state boundaries. The climate change problem is a transboundary, and thus there is a plethora of non-state or unelected actors that claim to speak for affected groups. Saward (2006, 2008), Dryzek and Niemeyer (2008), and Montanaro (2012) argue for the legitimacy of the representative claims of these non-state actors in light of the fact that they provide representation for supranational constituencies. Montanaro (2012) maintains that these can still be held to the test of democratic legitimacy as there are nonelectoral forms of authorisation and accountability to ensure their responsiveness to their constituencies.

The major question behind this study then is *'how are local people's interest represented in the UN-REDD?' Is local representation descriptive, symbolic, substantive, or a mix with no preferential privileging of substantive over other forms of representation? To get at whose interests are advanced through representation in the UN-REDD and its funded programmes, a follow-through question behind this study is 'why do policy-makers choose to use the local representation forms that they use in the UN-REDD?'* The UN-REDD is an environmental regulations setting regime, on which local people have limited information. Would it therefore respond to local concerns about REDD+ through symbolic actions that may seem beneficial to local people but work to protect the interests of more powerful non-local actors?

The chapter is informed by Ribot, Chhatre, and Lankina (2008) choice and recognition framework, which examines policy from the viewpoint of interrogating how and why policymakers choose certain policy options and local institutions to engage with. By understanding their logic of choice, it is possible to understand why outcomes match or do not match policy objectives. This provides insights for decision-makers wishing to reform these policy processes. When policymakers make the choice of local institutions to transfer powers and implement these choices, it results in actual power transfer to real institutions. Those institutions that are chosen are 'recognized' (Ribot et al., 2008). Recognised institutions are empowered and legitimated in this process.

Ribot et al. (2008) maintain that when higher-level institutions work through democratic local institutions where they exist, there is likely to be congruence between the interests of local people and project outcomes; and when they work with unelected actors (customary authority, NGOs), there is likely to be lower congruence between local people's interests and project outcomes. The type of local institutions recognised has the potential to transform local governance arrangements in more democratic or more undemocratic directions.

This study involved literature review and field research from 14 July to 15 October 2012 and from 28 July to 25 September 2013. It included 125 interviews with members of local communities, Nigeria-REDD, UN-REDD, and local NGO staff. Interviews were in Cross River State, and in Abuja, Nigeria. There were five group meetings with personnel of local NGOs in Cross River State attended by 30 individuals in all. There was also a one-day field visit to Iko village in Akamkpa, Cross River State, to meet with the village traditional council. Iko's 140 km² community forest (Oyobo, Bisong, & Morakinyo, 2010) is part of the Nigeria-REDD forest landscape. The research included participant observation while attending a meeting of the Akamkpa Council of Chiefs for a question and answer session on REDD+. Results after the first field trip were presented to and reviewed by colleagues at the Cross River State Forestry Commission, International Union for Conservation of Nature (IUCN), Yaounde, Cameroon, and Center for International Forestry Research (CIFOR), Ouagadougou, Burkina Faso.

The next section of the chapter presents the context of the case study showing that Nigeria-REDD operates under a tenure system where land is primarily under the control of state governors, who are viewed as political godfathers. It also shows that forest management is largely influenced by NGOs and that the envisaged Nigeria-REDD institutional structure excludes local government authority but has multiple platforms that increase the likelihood of elite capture of REDD+ benefits. The third section examines local representation in the UN-REDD international policy board and finds that local representation is through symbolic representatives. The fourth section examines local representation during the participatory consultative process that led to Nigeria-REDD; it finds that local representation was through descriptive and symbolic representatives with substantive elected local governments left out. The fifth section discusses these findings and provides explanation as to why the UN-REDD opted for symbolic representation of the local. The sixth section concludes the chapter with a summary of its findings and recommendations to the UN-REDD on how to articulate an effective strategy towards strengthening local democratic governance as a social safeguard.

Political, Environmental, and Institutional Context of Case Study

Political and Environmental Context

In Nigeria, the offices of president, governors of the 36 states, and chairpersons of its 774 local governments are filled through periodic elections (Barkan, Gboyega, & Stevens, 2001; FGN, 1999). While the states and local governments collect tax, they also depend on financial allocations from the federal government, giving the federal government strong political influence over them (Adesopo, 2011; Barkan et al., 2001). Local government allocation is transferred through the state government, giving state governors political influence over local government decision-making (ARD, 2001; Diejomaoh & Eboh, 2012).

This constitutional arrangement allows the state governments to set up joint accounts with local governments. A bureaucrat in Calabar stated that *'the governor decides how the federal money gets used and the governor decides who gets the contracts and when to pay...it takes away the power of the local government chairmen'* (Local bureaucrat Calabar 2012). State governments administratively control the local governments through the Local Government Service Commission, which appoints and dismisses local government bureaucrats. Local government personnel are thus accountable to the state government and not to the elected local government chairperson (ARD, 2001; Barkan et al., 2001; CLGF, 2011b).

The Association of Local Government of Nigeria (ALGON) is pushing for local governments to have full control over their finances and administration (CLGF, 2011a; Iriekpen, 2013). This is near impossible, because the federal House of Representatives and the Senate have to pass a constitutional amendment, which then needs approval by all the houses of assembly across the 36 states in Nigeria (Iriekpen, 2013; Leadership, 2013, August 3).

The Nigeria Land Use Act of 1978 (FGN, 1978) places land under the authority of state governors. Local governments can allocate rural land not greater than 50 km² to a user. The governor does not need to consult with local government authorities if and when it needs land for public purposes like REDD+ (FGN, 1978). Governors do not also need the consent of customary authority, but they often consult chiefs before enclosing public land (Nuesiri, 2014; USAID, 2010). The powers of governors make them extremely influential in local democratic politics in Nigeria.

The first forest reserves in the country were created in 1917 (Usman & Adefalu, 2010). Staff shortages due to a refusal to train locals as foresters and lack of cooperation from local people led to high levels of illegal forest exploitation (Usman & Adefalu, 2010). In Cross River State, the first forest reserves were created in 1930 and were maintained after independence in 1960. Presently, there are 14 forest reserves in the state covering 2,800 km² or 13% of the state land surface area (Oyebo et al., 2010). There is also the federal government-managed Cross River National Park (CRNP) covering 2,955 km² or 18% of its land surface area. Community forest covers 1,632 km² or 7% of the land surface area. In all, forest covers

40% of Cross River State and makes up 50% of Nigeria's primary forest (Oyebo et al., 2010).

In the 1980s, the Nigerian Conservation Foundation with the support of the Worldwide Fund for Nature (WWF) lobbied the Nigerian government to create the CRNP to protect the critically endangered Cross River Gorilla (Harcourt, Stewart, & Inahoro, 1989). In 1990, WWF initiated a conservation and development project to win local support for the park. This project failed, as the EU stopped funding in 1994, in protest against the killing of the environmental activist Ken Saro-Wiwa by Nigeria's military government (Ite, 1996, 1997, 1998). This disappointed local communities, turning them against the park service, the state, and the federal governments. A number of expatriate and local staff who worked for the park project went on to create local NGOs when the project ended (Oyebo et al., 2010).

In 1999, the British government's Department for International Development (DFID) initiated a community forestry project in Cross River State (Oyebo et al., 2010). When this project ended in 2002, there were about 45 community forest groups in Cross River State. The forestry department in the state ministry of agriculture was upgraded to a forestry commission with the status of a state ministry, and the state had agreed to share timber royalty from forest reserves with adjacent local communities in a 50:50 split (Oyebo et al., 2010).

In 2008, the Cross River State governor banned logging and in 2011 appointed an expatriate to head the taskforce enforcing the ban (Pandrillus, 2013, November 25). This expatriate runs an NGO involved in biodiversity conservation in Cross River State. He and his team regularly encounter violent conflict with illegal loggers. This individual carries a firearm at all times and works with the state secret service to get the job done (Una, 2012, May 4).

Cross River State forest is a source of livelihood for local people but their elected representatives at the local government level are not substantively involved in the management of forests. Customary authorities exercise some *de facto* rights over forests, but the state governor can ignore customary authority. Cross River State forestry law recognises that local governments can play a role in forest management, so the forestry commission works with them to set up nurseries for trees that are then

distributed to farmers and schools for replanting (Oyebo et al., 2010). While the influence of NGOs and customary authority² on forest management in Cross River State has grown since the 1980s, the same cannot be said for local government authorities.

Institutional Actors Responsible for the Nigeria-REDD Programme

The UN-REDD Programme was launched in September 2008, and it is funded by the governments of Denmark, Japan, Luxembourg, Norway, Spain, and the EU (UN-REDD, 2013b). The UN-REDD is implemented by three UN agencies, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, collectively referred to as the management group (FME, 2011). The UN-REDD is administered through a secretariat in Geneva, Switzerland. The UNDP Nigeria Country Office (UNDP-NCO) coordinates the UN-REDD activities in Nigeria and monitors the Nigeria-REDD (FME, 2011).

The UNDP is responsible for administration and governance in the Nigeria-REDD. The UNDP staff that contributed to the design of Nigeria-REDD included the UN-REDD Africa coordinator based in Nairobi, Kenya, UNDP governance experts from the West Africa Regional Office Dakar, Oslo Governance Center, Norway, and UNDP New York. The UNEP working out of its Nairobi office provides technical support on forest conservation and management in the Nigeria-REDD, while the FAO through its country office in Nigeria brings in expertise on developing national accounting systems for greenhouse gas inventories (FME, 2011).

Nigeria applied to join the UN-REDD in December 2009 and its REDD readiness proposal was approved for funding in October 2011 (FME, 2011). Nigeria-REDD has national- and state-level components with Cross River State as pilot. At the national level, the REDD+ Secretariat is at the Ministry for Environment, which works with the national advisory council on REDD, the national technical REDD

committee, and the Nigeria-REDD steering committee that coordinates activities at national and state levels (FME, 2011). Lastly, there is the national civil society organisations' REDD forum to give voice to civil society.

At the state level, the Cross River State REDD team is in the forestry commission and works with the Cross River Climate Change Council; Cross River technical REDD committee; the national technical REDD committee; the Nigeria-REDD steering committee; the Climate Change Study Group at the University of Calabar; forest sector NGOs; customary authorities; and influential community members. This national and state level structure does not include elected local government. Its multiple deliberative platforms increases the likelihood of elite capture of REDD+ benefits, making the case for the UN-REDD to address the exclusion of elected local governments from Nigeria-REDD consultative process. The next section examines if the UN-REDD policy board exhibits a similar pattern or is more inclusive?

Representation in the UN-REDD

The 'All Affected' Principle and Representation in the UN-REDD

The UN-REDD acknowledges the need to safeguard local socio-economic interests in REDD+ (UN-REDD, 2008). In order to therefore reduce elite capture of REDD+ benefits, the UN-REDD commits to promote 'strong democratic processes in local institutions' (UN-REDD, 2008, p. 12). It defines democratic governance as 'democratic processes in which all people have a real voice' and that this requires 'fostering inclusive participation' and 'strengthening accountable and responsive institutions' (UN-REDD, 2012b, p. 9). The UN-REDD, however, makes clear that its social safeguards are voluntary (UN-REDD, 2012a).

How would the UN-REDD implement its democracy commitments? It claims that it will promote accountability, legitimacy, and responsiveness of institutions representing all its stakeholders; transparency of information to all stakeholders; and the full participation of all relevant

stakeholders in its activities, especially vulnerable and marginalised groups such as indigenous people and other forest-dependent people (UN-REDD, 2012b). The UN-REDD rhetoric speaks of working with institutions representing everyone (public, private, customary, local and national) with a claim to forests set aside for REDD+, thus subscribing to the all-affected principle in democratic theory (Dahl, 1989; Goodin, 2007).

However, as critics of the all-affected principle have pointed, though it is a foundational principle of democracy, the boundary-less nature of the term, 'all-affected,' means that it cannot be operationalised without objectively defining boundary conditions around 'all-affected' (Goodin, 2007; Schaffer, 2012). Given that the UN-REDD wishes to strengthen local democratic processes in order to reduce elite capture (UN-REDD, 2008), a boundary condition could be a preferential bias to strengthening the responsiveness-accountability relationship between elected local government authorities and local people. Opting to work with all-affected local institutions without clear boundary conditions, the UN-REDD would just not be able to measure and monitor if and how it is meeting up to its stated democratic objective.

NGOs as Local Representatives in the UN-REDD Policy Board

The UN-REDD is implemented by the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), the United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), and the Food and Agricultural Organization (FAO) of the United Nations, through a secretariat in Geneva, Switzerland. The secretariat is guided by directives received from the UN-REDD international policy board which meets twice a year to review the work of the secretariat, UN-REDD-funded developing country programs, and new applications for funding from member countries (UN-REDD, 2009).

The board consists of representatives of the UNDP, UNEP, and FAO; donors to the UN-REDD Multi-donor Trust Fund and UNDP Multi-Partner Trust Fund; and member countries. There are also observers from the UN Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) and

the World Bank. This ensures that the UN-REDD decisions are informed by discussions at the UNFCCC annual conferences and carbon forestry initiatives of the World Bank. In addition, the policy board has one civil society representative each from Africa, Asia, Latin America, and the developed world. The civil society representatives are elected to the board for two years by their peers through an online poll managed by the World Bank. The civil society representative for Africa as at time of carrying out this study was the Non-Governmental Organizations Coalition for the Environment (NGOCE) based in Calabar, Nigeria. There are also indigenous people's representatives from Africa, Asia, and Latin America elected into the policy board as observers through the regional indigenous peoples' caucuses of the UN Permanent Forum on Indigenous Issues. The representative for Africa at the time of this study was the Community Research and Development Services (CORDS) based in Tanzania.

Who represents the interests of local people in the policy board? The policy board has no representatives for locally elected authorities (UN-REDD, 2012a). The Nigeria representative is the national coordinator for Nigeria-REDD, an appointee of the Ministry of Environment in the federal government (UN-REDD, 2012a). NGOCE—the civil society representative for Africa in the policy board—was voted in by other NGOs in Africa, and it is responsive to these NGOs and not to local people. In addition, NGOs in Nigeria are often more concerned with economic survival than protecting the interests of local people, especially when this could lead to conflict with government (Fasakin, 2011; Smith, 2010). The other members of the policy board, the UN agencies, the World Bank, and representatives of UN-REDD member states, cannot speak for local people, as they have no direct relationship with local people.

Giving Local Government a Voice in the UN-REDD

There is a widely shared view that NGO presence in the UN system democratises and legitimises UN decisions in the eyes of the public (Commission on Global Governance, 1995; Friedman, Hochstetler, & Clark, 2005; Sadoun, 2007; Scholte, 2004; United Nations, 2004). Critics point out that while NGOs make useful contributions to UN deliberations, they

often have no mandate from local people to speak on their behalf; they also have significant democratic deficit in the way they are governed; and they are sometimes beholden to the interest of their donors including UN agencies (Hurdock, 1999; Price, 2003). NGO presence in the UN system thus leans towards serving the interest of the UN. The inclusion of NGOs in the UN-REDD policy board serves to legitimise the board's deliberations, directly contributing little that strengthens local democracy.

On the other hand, local government authorities have unions from the national to the global level, representing their interests to central governments and international organisations. These include the Association of Local Governments of Nigeria (ALGON), the Commonwealth Local Government Forum (CLGF), and the United Cities and Local Government (UCLG) (CLGF, 2011a, b; UCLG, 2013). These institutions could be included in the UN-REDD policy board as mechanisms for strengthening local democracy. Alternatively, the UN could create Galtung's (2000, p. 159) 'United Nations Local Authorities Assembly (UNLAA)' as a means of giving elected local government representatives a voice at the global level, while also building their capacity to be responsive and accountable to local people.

Given that NGOs are the representatives of the local in the UN-REDD policy board, would this be the case in the UN-REDD-supervised Nigeria-REDD programme? The next section of this chapter is a detailed examination of the Nigeria-REDD programme.

The Nigeria-REDD Programme

Local Actors Involved in the Design of Nigeria-REDD

The beginnings of the Nigeria-REDD programme can be traced to the June 2008 Cross River State Stakeholders Summit on the Environment hosted by the governor, Senator Liyel Imoke (CRS, 2008). The summit was used to assess how the state's forest resources could better contribute to revenue generation. Cross River State is seeking new sources of revenue because it lost its status as an oil-producing state when Nigeria ceded the Bakassi peninsula to Cameroon in 2008 (Konings, 2011) and

when its neighbor Akwa Ibom State successfully showed that oil wells in the boundary zone between both states were in Akwa Ibom territory (Government of Akwa Ibom State, 2012, July 23). The loss of its oil-producing state status translated to a loss of between 20% and 25% of its financial allocations from the federal government, which averaged US\$115 million³ per year for the period 1999–2008 (Olubusoye & Oyedotun, 2012).

The 2008 summit suggested that Cross River State ban logging and take up carbon forestry (CRS, 2008; Oyebo et al., 2010). The governor accepted the recommendations from the summit; he then went ahead and restructured the Cross River State Forestry Commission with Odigha Odigha as the chairperson (Filou, 2010, March 15). Odigha Odigha won the Goldman Environmental Prize in 2003 while he was the coordinator of NGOCE for his work against uncontrolled logging in Cross River State (Filou, 2010, March 15). This was the first time a chairperson for the forestry commission was appointed from the NGO sector. In October 2009, the governor, Senator Liyel Imoke, led a delegation from Cross River State to the Katoomba XV meeting in Ghana (Oyebo et al., 2010). Katoomba is a group set up by Forest Trends, an international NGO, to promote payment for environmental services schemes like REDD+ (Forest Trends, 2008). The governor shared his vision for a REDD initiative at Katoomba XV and invited expert consultants from Katoomba to come and work with the state forestry commission to draft a REDD project idea note (REDD PIN) for Cross River State (Oyebo et al., 2010).

In November 2009, Governor Imoke requested that the Nigeria Ministry of Environment apply to the UN-REDD for membership. In December 2009, he and a delegation from the forestry commission attended the UNFCCC conference of parties meeting in Copenhagen (COP 15), where he gave a presentation in which he requested for financial support for REDD in Nigeria (Oyebo et al., 2010). In January 2010, experts from Katoomba visited REDD pilot sites in Cross River State and produced a REDD PIN for Nigeria (FME, 2011). By March 2010, Nigeria's membership request to the UN-REDD was approved, and in October 2010, a UN-REDD mission visited Nigeria to contribute to the preparation of a Nigeria-REDD readiness proposal for submission to the UN-REDD policy board (FME, 2011).

On 18 February 2011, a draft REDD readiness proposal was presented to a participatory stakeholders' forum in Calabar chaired by Governor Imoke. It was attended by about 100 persons, including UN-REDD personnel. The draft document was submitted to the UN-REDD for consideration at its sixth policy board meeting in March 2011 (FME, 2011). The board requested for revisions in the document (FME, 2011), which were affected, and a second participatory stakeholders meeting was held in Calabar, in August 2011 to validate the revised document. The policy board approved the Nigeria-REDD readiness proposal at its seventh meeting in October 2011, granting Nigeria the sum of US\$4 million.

As stated earlier, there were two participatory consultative meetings in Calabar during the design phase of the Nigeria-REDD. Table 2.1 shows the institutions and groups who attended the first and second participatory consultative meetings in Calabar. What can we learn from Table 2.1? First, NGOs, which we have already noted as symbolic representatives of the locals, were prominently in attendance at the participatory consultative meetings. Secondly, local communities were represented by selected individuals and customary authority that are considered to be descriptively

Table 2.1 Participants at the Nigeria-REDD participatory consultative meetings

Institutions and groups	First meeting (2/18/11)	Second meeting (8/20/11)
Cross River State Forestry Commission	26	15
Local NGOs based in Cross River State	23	14
Participants from local communities (mainly Ekuri)	13	30
Media	8	2
Cross River State Governor's Office	6	0
International NGOs	6	1
Academics	6	4
Other Cross River State Government Agencies	5	0
Federal Ministry of Environment	2	0
National NGOs	2	0
Customary authority	2	6
Banks	2	1
Local Government Councils	0	0
Total	101	73

Source: FME (2011)

‘typical of the larger class of persons whom they represent’ (Mansbridge, 1999, p. 629). These descriptive representatives have no statutory mandate to report back to local communities, and there are no statutory sanction mechanisms if they choose to stand for personal rather than group interest. Thirdly, elected representatives were not in attendance at the consultative meetings. The meetings therefore gave room for symbolic and descriptive representatives but left out the substantive representatives of local people.

Why the Exclusion of Elected Local Government in Design of Nigeria-REDD

The participatory consultative meeting in Calabar to validate the Nigeria-REDD was organised by the Cross River State forestry commission and it decided on whom to invite to the meetings in Calabar. When asked why local governments were excluded, a REDD team member of the forestry commission said, ‘*We did not have enough money to invite all [relevant stakeholders]...to be at the participatory meetings in Calabar; when we start the REDD readiness phase we will surely have local government chairpersons join us*’ (CRSFC REDD team member 2012). A local government chairperson countered this by stating, ‘*We have imprest to come to Calabar at any time for official business and meetings that will benefit our people*’ (Local Government Chairperson Calabar 2013).

A consultant to the forestry commission added that: ‘*local government chairpersons are often not well informed and even if we invite them they will not show up. They are more interested in how much money they can make from projects than in developing their communities*’ (REDD consultant Calabar 2012). Participant observation at the Akamkpa Council of Chiefs meeting during field research show that customary authorities are also not well informed as a chief in attendance stated that: ‘*...we are waiting for REDD, it will make us very rich*’ (Chief A in Akamkpa Local Government 2012). In addition, some chiefs are against REDD, as another chief in the same meeting stated that: ‘*the forestry commission came and told us of REDD...my village sent them a message that we lost land to the national park, we don’t want the forests we have left to be part of REDD, so we are not part of REDD*’ (Chief B in Akamkpa Local

Government 2012). Nevertheless the forestry commission extended invitations to customary authority to attend the participatory consultative meetings.

Are customary authority comparatively better administrators? A youth leader in Iko village does not think so; this individual feels that both customary authority and local government authority are unresponsive to local people, stating that: '*CERCOPAN helps us a lot...they even pay rents to the traditional council for their research center in our forest but we don't know how the council uses that money...the local government chairman came here during elections, we voted for him against the candidate from Ekuri but he has forgotten about us*' (Iko youth 2012). CERCOPAN, the Centre for Education, Research and Conservation of Primates and Nature, is a local NGO based in Calabar with a field site in Iko (CERCOPAN, 2013).

Customary authority is viewed as mediators between the living and the ancestors; thus, gaining their support is important for politicians seeking local legitimacy (Ellis & Ter Haar, 2004; Kelsall, 2008; Nuesiri, 2012; Schatzberg, 2001). In return for their support, their *de facto* rights over land are recognised by the government. This is why CERCOPAN pays rents for using the 140 km² Iko forest to the Iko traditional council. It is in recognition of the chief's symbolic power that they were consulted during the design of the Nigeria-REDD.

Local NGOs have neither *de facto* nor *de jure* rights to land, so why were they invited to the participatory consultative meetings to validate the REDD readiness proposal and not local government authority? A staff of the forestry commission felt it is because '*...the leadership of the commission have come from the NGO sector so we have a very good working relationship with NGOs...the people trust the NGOs more than the government*' (Staff forestry commission 2012). Earlier in the chapter, it was shown that Odigha Odigha, the chairperson of the forestry commission, is a leading member of the NGO sector. In addition, a staff of an NGO working with the forestry commission stated that: '*We represent local communities, they know us, they trust us more than government...all we do, we do for local people...we know the local communities more than anyone else*' (NGO member of REDD design team 2012).

In approving Nigeria-REDD, the UN-REDD backed a national programme that limited the representation of local people to descriptive and symbolic representatives (customary authority and NGOs) while ignoring their local democratic and substantive representatives. NGOs and customary authority do have some relationship with local people, but they are not statutorily mandated to be responsive and accountable to local people like local government authorities in Nigeria. The next section examines the political culture that enables the capture and subordination of local government authorities in Cross River State.

'Godfatherism' and the Subordination of Local Government Authorities

'Godfatherism' is a term used in Nigeria to describe the strongman-dominated politics in the country (Albert, 2005; Animasawun, 2013; HRW, 2007; Onu & Biereenu-Nnabugwu, 2008; Orji & Uzodi, 2012). Onu and Biereenu-Nnabugwu (2008, p. 57) assert that 'politics is seen as a means of attaining wealth than as a process of service' and that godfatherism in Nigerian politics is 'behavior in which economically, politically, and socially well-placed individuals... influence political and economic processes' (see Joseph, 1987, 1996). They further state that godfatherism is a 'new way of describing political patronage and, by extension, paternalism'⁴ (Onu & Biereenu-Nnabugwu, 2008, p. 57). Political godfathers in Nigeria are a mix of public office holders and very wealthy individuals who prefer to be kingmakers rather than hold public office (Adetula, 2008; Animasawun, 2013).

In Cross River State, it is accepted that '*the party caucus and the governor nominate the candidates who stand for local government elections as chairpersons and councilors*' (ex-local government chairperson Calabar 2013). The party caucus is the senior leadership of the Cross River State chapter of the People's Democratic Party (PDP). The PDP is the dominant political party in Nigeria and in Cross River State. The governor is the head of the state chapter of the PDP and the '*the godfather over all the politicians in Cross River because he controls the budget and security apparatus in the state*' (senior civil servant Calabar 2013). The largest employer

and wealthiest actor in Cross River State is the state civil service, making the governor the most economically and politically powerful individual in the state.

In the build-up to the September 2013 local government elections in Cross River State, CrossRiver Watch (2013a) documents how PDP leaders in the state met in the governor's residence to agree on the party's nominees. This online publication goes on to state that the governor was 'superintending the selection of chairmanship candidates for the PDP in the various local government areas.' Opposition to the governor's preferences is crushed using judicial (CrossRiver Watch, 2013b) and extra-judicial means including fraud and violence (CrossRiver Watch, 2013c, d; TMG, 2003, 2007; Ugborgu, 2002, July 4). The immediate past governor of Cross River State, Donald Duke, asserts that governors are able to rig elections in their favour because they are successful in buying the allegiance of the officers of the electoral boards in their states (Omar, 2012; Sahara Reporters, 2010).

Once elected, the local government chairperson has to do bidding of the state governor. A sitting local government chairperson interviewed for this study (now out of office) said '*we cannot make important decisions independently, we follow what the governor wants, he told us not to be part of ALGON and we obeyed, if we make the governor angry, he can manipulate to remove any of us at any time*' (Local government chairperson Calabar 2013). ALGON, as stated earlier in this chapter, is the Association of Local Governments of Nigeria fighting for greater political autonomy of local government councils in Nigeria.

Why would a governor be interested in subordinating the local government authorities? According to the former local government chairperson interviewed, '*the governor and the party [PDP] leaders at the state and federal level cannot rig elections to maintain themselves in power if they don't have firm control of local politics. They need us to be their eyes, ears and muscle to control local politics. All election [local government, governorship, presidential] is won at the local level, so the party leaders always give us millions of naira to do the dirty work at the local level*' (ex-local government chairperson Calabar 2013). Political ambition at state and federal level is thus the motive behind the subordination of local government authorities (see Gboyega, 2003; Oladesu & Salaudeen, 2013, November 25).

This would partly explain why ALGON has not succeeded in amending the constitutional provisions discussed earlier in the chapter that allow governors to capture local government finances and administration (Leadership, 2013, August 3). The political subordination of local government authorities in Cross River State to the state governor led the Cross River State Forestry Commission, who answer directly to the governor, to exclude the local government authorities from the participatory forums to validate the Nigeria-REDD. In approving Nigeria-REDD without acknowledging the existence of this brazen capture of local democracy, the UN-REDD ignored its own rhetoric on strengthening local democracy as part of the solution towards preventing elite capture of REDD benefits (UN-REDD, 2008). It instead tacitly endorsed the clientelistic and prebendalist politics of the Nigerian nation (Joseph, 1987, 1996).

Nigeria-REDD: Strengthening the Status Quo and Stifling Local Democracy

The Nigeria-REDD programme is oblivious to the fact that it conducted its participatory consultative meeting in a manner which strengthened the status quo where local government is subordinated to the state government. To strengthen local democracy, Nigeria-REDD has to purposefully work with local government authority. Despite the weakness of local governments in Cross River State shown in this study, they remain the primary vehicle for the consolidation of democracy at the local level (Oviasuyi, Idada, & Isiraojie, 2010; Tonwe, 2012).

It may be tempting to view rule by NGOs at the local level as preferable to rule by elected local governments. This would, however, concentrate power in the hands of experts not accountable to the people. Additionally, NGOs in Nigeria, due to their concern for economic survival, have been co-opted into serving the interests of influential politicians and members of government (Fasakin, 2011; Routley, 2011; Smith, 2010). Strengthening local democracy in this context would involve acknowledging the structural constraints that keep local government weak and subordinate to the state government. Strengthening local

democracy would also include supporting the ongoing struggle for full local government autonomy by the association of local government authorities in Nigeria (ALGON) (CLGF, 2011a; Iriekpen, 2013).

NGOs, as discussed earlier in this chapter, are discursive symbolic representatives (Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2008; Pitkin, 1967). Marion and Oliver (2010, p. 477) maintain that symbolic politics ‘appease public concern without directly, formally, or substantively addressing the underlying problems.’ Symbols are used by political institutions to frame issues in ways that enhances political powers of social control (DeCanio, 2005; Wedeen, 1998). Political institutions use symbolic politics to manipulate the public for other substantive political ends (Blühdorn, 2007; Machimura, 1998; Sears, 1993). Is this what is happening in Cross River State, Nigeria-REDD and UN-REDD as they choose NGOs over local governments?

Why Did the UN-REDD Approve the Nigeria-REDD

The Nigeria-REDD was designed in a context where descriptive and symbolic representatives of local people were included in the participatory consultative process but their substantive representatives in local government institutions were excluded. The design process did not meet up with the UN-REDD rhetoric of strengthening local democratic processes in order to stave off elite capture of REDD benefits (UN-REDD, 2008).

When a UN-REDD official was asked why it approved the Nigeria-REDD readiness proposal that ignored local government authority during its design phase, a UN-REDD personnel responded that: ‘*UN-REDD cannot force countries to include the local level... there’s a stakeholder engagement aspect looking to include local marginalise people... this include the free prior and informed consent process and concerns for indigenous people... there is also the participatory governance assessment process... to produce governance data... success depends on how civil society actors would use it to hold government to account and how government would use it to do policy*’ (UN-REDD Staff 2012). The response that countries cannot be forced to include the local level in the design of REDD+ programmes

reiterates the UN-REDD position that its social safeguards are voluntary (UN-REDD, 2012a).

The response also shows that NGOs are viewed as instruments to ensure accountability of government in REDD programmes, reflecting UN thinking that NGO participation in UN projects fulfil the condition for democratic representation of local people in UN decision-making (Sadoun, 2007; United Nations, 2004). As shown earlier, the Cross River State government recognition of NGOs as partners in forest management has not led to strengthening of local democracy. To ensure downward accountability of government, it is necessary to engage with local democratic processes in local government institutions. NGOs as a civil society actor, can help shine light on undemocratic practices in local governments in order to hold them accountable, but not when it is a service provider competing to outdo and even replace local government authorities.

The individual interviewed above additionally stated that *'strengthening local democratic governance is not the main priority of donors'* (UN-REDD Staff 2012). This view supports the fact that REDD+ is a climate change mitigation initiative supported by donors because it is a cheaper option compared to restructuring their economies to achieve similar emissions reduction targets (Dyer, Counsell, & Cravatte, 2012; Eliasch, 2008; Norwegian Government, 2007, 2008). It is no surprise therefore that a higher percentage of REDD+ funds are spent on technical issues than on social safeguards (Dyer et al., 2012). Roe et al. (2013) note that safeguards are often viewed as burdensome transaction costs. The evidence here indicates that UN-REDD pay more attention to the interests of donors and client member governments than to the substantive interests of local people. This would explain why it approved the Nigeria-REDD with its shortcomings with respect to local representation.

Conclusion

The UN-REDD is a climate change governance regulations setting regime, for which local people have limited information. This leaves local forest-dependent people vulnerable to symbolic action from the UN-REDD

that may seem to protect local interests while advancing non-local interests. Thus, the major questions of this study were: 'how are local interests represented in the UN-REDD?' and 'why the choice of local representation model in the UN-REDD?' The study is informed by political representation theory (Pitkin, 1967).

The study finds that local representation in the UN-REDD policy board is through NGOs elected by other NGOs to represent NGO interests. This symbolic representation of the local people enables the board to claim legitimacy in its decision-making but does not give substantive leverage to local peoples' interests during board deliberations. Local people cannot demand responsiveness from these NGOs as they are not accountable to local people. These NGOs do not have decision-making powers; they advise the board, but the board is not accountable to them. The NGOs cannot sanction the board other than withdraw from its deliberations; in some respects, they can be viewed as subjects of the UN-REDD policy board.

The study also finds that the Nigeria-REDD had no place for its elected local government authority structures, the lowest tier of Nigeria's democratic governance system. Local government authorities in Nigeria, due in part to 'godfather' politics, are subordinated to state governors, who have unfairly robbed them of some of their political authority, contributing to subversion of local democracy in Nigeria. While local government authorities were excluded from the REDD+ process examined in this study, NGOs, customary authority, and influential individuals from concerned communities were involved in validating Nigeria-REDD. Local people were thus symbolically and descriptively represented during the design of Nigeria-REDD proposal, but their substantive local representatives were left out. In approving the Nigeria-REDD proposal without addressing this democratic deficit, the UN-REDD missed an opportunity to contribute to strengthening of local democracy in Nigeria.

Strong democratic local governments are essential for local people to have leverage in the adoption of initiatives like REDD+ that have far reaching effects on the management of public forest resources (Yilmaz, Beris, & Serrano-Berthet, 2008). NGOs and customary authority have a role to play in democratic local governance, but local government should be the arrowhead and these other institutions the tail enabling the arrow

to maintain a steady course to deliver responsive and accountable services to local people (Baiocchi, 2001; Koonings, 2004). The UN-REDD should encourage such local governance arrangement if it is fully committed to strengthen local democratic processes as a safeguard against elite capture of REDD benefits.

Given that the Nigeria-REDD programme is in its readiness phase, the UN-REDD can still initiate a course for Nigeria-REDD that would substantively strengthen local democratic processes. The recent decision of the EU to implement its micro-projects programme for community development by working closely with local government authorities in Nigeria, so as to build 'their capacity to give voice to citizens in the local policy-making processes,' is a step in the right direction in this respect (Olesen et al., 2010, p. 37). The UN-REDD would be fulfilling its democracy objectives and protecting local people from elite capture of Nigeria-REDD, if it takes substantive steps just as the EU has done, to recognise and work with elected local government authorities in the country.

Notes

1. It is worthy to note that Pitkin (1967) actually discussed four types of political representation—formal, descriptive, symbolic, and substantive; however, her discussion of formal representation was more of a critique of the limited Weberian understanding of representation as deriving from formal authorisation of an agent by the state to represent a constituency to the state or to represent the state to an audience.
2. The influence of customary authority on forestry matters in Cross River State is directly tied to their influence on land and their cultural role as the mediators between the world of the living and of the ancestors. The latter role as mediators with the ancestors gives customary authority a legitimacy that is envied by political leaders in government across Africa. As identity-based politics has grown stronger across Africa due in part to neoliberal political reforms across the continent, so has the political influence of customary authority grown stronger. It can thus be argued that respect for the views of customary authority by members of the government designing Nigeria-REDD is because political leaders see it as politi-

cally expedient to have a cordial relationship with chiefs. A wide-ranging review of the relationship between customary authority and governance in Africa by this author can be found in Nuesiri (2014). The realization that customary authority systems still have significant symbolic power in African societies has led some observers like Kelsall (2008) to suggest that development initiatives should be designed taking into consideration the traditional beliefs and values of Africans.

3. This is based on an exchange rate of 160.50 naira to US\$1, taking www.xe.com as at time of writing.
4. Joseph (1987, 1996) argues that the Nigerian political system is governed by the logic of clientelism and prebendalism; the godfather is patron to the client godchild, who is obliged to generously reward the godfather with state resources; thus political office holders, godfather, and/or godchild have a prebendal self-enriching relationship with the state, they seek political office for private gain.

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3

The Illusion of Participation: Tokenism in REDD+ Pilot Projects in the Democratic Republic of Congo

Raymond Achu Samndong

Introduction

In the last few decades, community participation in forest conservation and development interventions has witnessed a great surge in interests and adoption in project planning and implementation (Brosius, Tsing, & Zerner, 1998; Sandbrook, Nelson, Adams, & Agrawal, 2010). Increasing concern about the effectiveness of community participation has made it subject to strong critical analysis (Hickey & Mohan, 2004; Penderis, 2012). There is evidence that in some community participation exercises, community involvement is managed strategically, in order to avoid conflict and dissent and to exert control over local knowledge and actions (Brown, 2002; Cleaver, 1999; Cornwall, 2008). In many of these interventions, local peoples' voices were undermined in decision-making processes and planning, but their participation was used as legitimating

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instruments and to improve project efficiency and effectiveness (Baviskar, 2005; Cooke & Kothari, 2001; Mohanty, 2004).

The development of a social safeguard under the international climate regime known as Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation and Enhancing Carbon Stock in tropical forest (REDD+) reemphasized the importance of “full and effective participation” of local people in REDD+ implementation and the equitable distribution of benefits (UNFCCC, 2010). In view of this, the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) has developed social and environmental standards for REDD+ with the full and meaningful participation of a wide range of stakeholders within the country (Kipalu & Mukungu, 2013). As the country’s REDD+ strategy moves to its implementation phase with the initiation of many REDD+ pilot projects, it is critical to examine how this full and effective participation of local people is ensured in practice.

To help inform the policy debate and the implementation of future REDD+ initiatives in the DRC, this chapter examines the effectiveness of community participation in two REDD+ project pilot sites in Equateur province of the DRC. The chapter asks the following questions: (a) Who was involved in the launching of REDD+ in the pilot sites, and how? (b) How do local people perceive the commencement of REDD+ in their community? (c) What are the challenges in promoting meaningful local participation in the REDD+ process of the DRC? The chapter argues that full and effective participation of local people in DRC REDD+ programme is unlikely if barriers limiting the ability of forest communities to participate meaningfully in decision-making processes and benefit sharing are not recognized and addressed.

The chapter is divided into seven sections. Following this introduction, section “[Conceptualizing Community Participation: An Analytical Framework](#)” presents the theoretical framework employed. Section “[Geographical Context and Research Methods](#)” describes the context of community participation in forest governance in the DRC and its implication for the country’s REDD+ programme. Section “[Legal and Policy Framework of Community Participation in Forest Governance and REDD+ in the DRC](#)” provides geographical context and explains the research methods used for the study. Section “[Findings](#)” presents the findings about local peoples’ participation in the launch of REDD+ and their perception towards this process. Section “[Discussion](#)” discusses the findings in relation

to the challenges of ensuring meaningful local participation in REDD+ implementation in the DRC. Section “[Conclusion](#)” concludes the chapter with a summary and suggestion for policy action.

Conceptualizing Community Participation: An Analytical Framework

Local communities are not homogenous; they are populated with people of different social status and characterized by relations of power and privileges. Acknowledging this heterogeneity within a village or community, this chapter defines participation as “the involvement of a significant number of persons in situations or actions which enhance their well-being, e.g. their income, security or self-esteem” (Cohen & Uphoff, 1980:214). This definition emphasizes the role of social capital, capabilities, freedom and ability of ordinary people to manage conservation and development initiatives and to influence, implement and control activities that are essential to their well-being (Chambers, 1997; Sen, 1999). The key idea of community participation in interventions is inclusiveness—the inclusion of people in decision-making, formulating plans, controlling resources and implementing decisions over their own lives (Agarwal, 2001). Based on this key idea, there has been increasing emphasis on community participation in all forms of development and conservation interventions. This emphasis is now widely legitimized as an institutional imperative by governments, donor agencies and non-governmental organizations (NGOs) (Cornwall, 2008; Penderis, 2012).

Central to the idea of inclusion is who is to be included in decision-making and how to achieve this. These questions evoke relations of power that are embedded in the structures and between the actors involved in community participation processes in development and conservation interventions. To examine the issue of inclusion of local people in REDD+ implementation, the chapter draws on Amartya Sen’s (1999) framework of well-being, which is linked to three interacting and interdependent components—opportunity, security and empowerment. These components are crucial in understanding local peoples’ participation in REDD+ projects (Lawlor, Madeira, Blockhus, & Ganz, 2013).

Critical to our context is the security and empowerment components of the framework that emphasize the importance of human agency. Sen (1999) conceptualized human agency in terms of freedoms, capabilities and functioning, and argues that freedom of voice, choice and action is both the ends and the means of development. Capabilities are substantive freedoms or processes that allow freedom of action, such as freedom from hunger or ability to escape starvation. Functionings are the objectives one wishes to achieve, such as eating. Instrumental freedoms include political freedoms, security, and social and economic opportunities. These instrumental freedoms enhance the capabilities of each person to achieve their functionings (Sen, 1999). In this perspective, the freedom to participate in the decision-making process of REDD+ activities is understood as both a goal of development and a causal pathway for enhancing well-being (Lawlor et al., 2013).

In the context of this chapter, the inclusion of local people in REDD+ implementation is characterized using the Arnstein (1969) typology¹ of participation. Citizen control appears at the top of the ladder and non-participation at the bottom (Fig. 3.1). In between these two categories is what she called ‘tokenism’, in which she includes consultation, information and placation. She associated tokenism to participation promoted by




Fig. 3.1 Characterizing community participation in REDD+ implementation (Source: Adapted from Arnstein (1969))

development organizations where giving information and consultation as forms of participation are cloaked as empowerment.

Consultation is widely used as a means of legitimating already made decisions. She associates citizen power, which includes citizen control, delegated power and partnership, with empowerment and equity and in addition argues that participation at higher levels is empowering and fair to citizens who then have genuine control and influence in the decision-making processes. For empowerment and equity to occur, citizens must be able to exercise their agencies and influence the wider structural factors shaping the REDD+ interventions.

The operationalization of this framework gives rise to two main arguments in participation—efficiency and empowerment arguments. The efficiency argument views participation as an instrument in achieving better project outcomes, more effectively, with reduced cost, while external actors make the main decisions. The empowerment argument views participation as a process which enables the abilities and capabilities of individuals or groups to improve their own lives and facilitate social change to the advantage of the marginalized groups (Brown, 2002; Cleaver, 1999). These two dimensions of participation are neither clear-cut nor mutually exclusive but represent different purposes and approaches to promote community participation in development interventions (Cornwall, 2008). Therefore, in the context of REDD+, for empowerment to occur at the local level, communities must be able to exercise their agencies to control and influence REDD+ project decisions. The ability to control and influence decisions depends on the complex relations between actors' interests, power and institutions.

Geographical Context and Research Methods

The Woods Hole Research Center (WHRC), in collaboration with the DRC Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Development, manages the REDD+ pilot project in Equateur province known as *projet Zamba Malamu*.² The main objectives of the project are to (a) increase the capacity of provincial stakeholders for the development of REDD+ strategies and preparation for the management of carbon funds and (b) design and

implement community-based REDD+ pilot projects with potential for continued carbon financing. To achieve these objectives, WHRC signed partnership conventions with four regional actors in 2011 to operationalize the implementation of project activities in the two pilots.

The REDD+ pilot project is located in both Bikoro and Gemena territories in Equateur province of the DRC (see Fig. 3.2). Equateur province was divided into five new provinces in July 2015, following the national decentralization reform, but our analysis is based on the province political and governance structure before the division. The first pilot site is located in the Bikoro territory in the southwest of the old Equateur province, which is now the new Equateur province. Its dominant vegetation is equatorial swamp rainforest inundated year round, making road construction and maintenance difficult (Yamba, 2009). The second pilot site is located in the Gemena territory northwest of the old Equateur province, which is now the Sud-Ubangi province. Here the dominant vegetation is dense, humid, equatorial lowland rainforest that transits into evergreen savannah woodland and grasses in the north. The populations of both pilot sites rely heavily on the forest for their livelihoods, practising slash and burn shifting cultivation, extracting non-timber forest products, fishing, hunting and producing charcoal.

Bikoro territory is made up of two main ethnic groups—the Bantu and the Batwa Pygmies.³ The Bantu is divided into different tribal groups (the Mongo, Ntomba, Ekonda and other migrant groups). The Mongo is the major tribal group in the north of the territory, including the study area, while the Ntomba and Ekonda are the major tribal groups in the south of the territory. The Mongo tribal group is considered as the customary landowners (*ayant droit*). The Batwa Pygmies make up about 20% of the population in Bikoro territory, but are considered migrants or strangers in the study area, with limited rights to land and forest. The Gemena pilot area is made up of a dominant Bantu tribal group known as *Ngwaka* and other Bantu tribal groups from neighbouring territories.

Both pilot sites are governed by two authority structures—statutory and customary (see Samndong and Vatn, forthcoming). The two pilot sites are different in terms of their landscapes, economic activities, accessibility and external interventions. The Bikoro pilot site has experienced several interventions related to agricultural development, forest governance




Fig. 3.2 Map of the two pilots in Equateur province: (a) Bikoro territory, Buyal project village; (b) Gemena territory, Bokumu-Mokola project village (Source: Chapman (2016))

and conservation from different international and national NGOs. These interventions have established village organizations known as Peasant Development Organization (OPD) that combine informal and formal elements of collective action, in coordinating delivery of development-oriented agricultural services and other village development projects. The Gemena pilot site, for political reasons,⁴ has experienced very little of these interventions. The local people are organized around voluntary church organizations and grassroots mutual aid groups. These organizations are the few, self-sustaining voluntary organizations that the local people trust, compared to the customary and statutory authorities. The church organizations provide social services, including schools and healthcare and supports food security initiatives.

Field research was conducted from July to August 2014, July to August 2015, and July to August 2016. Information was obtained through household questionnaires, semi-structured interviews, focus group discussions and participant observations. In total, 151 households from the two pilot sites were surveyed; this included 75 households from Buya 1 village in Bikoro and 76 households from Bokumu-Mokola in Gemena. The questionnaire was structured to collect data on local people's knowledge about REDD+, their participation in REDD+ introduction, the establishment of a REDD+ village organization and the implementation of early REDD+ activities and their general perception of the REDD+ pilot project. Purposive and random samplings were used to select the respondents for the survey. The intention was to ensure that 70% of the survey sample covers people who participated in REDD+ meetings and activities and 30% to cover non-participants. Random selection was done based on a village household list and the list of attendance in REDD+ meetings and activities. This stratification was to ensure a good representation of the sample and good coverage of those involved in the REDD+ activities. The stratification also ensures that 'Batwa Pygmies' in the Bikoro pilot site were represented in the total sample.

In total, 72 in-depth interviews were conducted in French and Lingala with six different types of actors—including customary authorities, local administrative authorities, staff of the different intervening agencies, executive members of village associations, staff of the REDD+ pilot project and logging operators. The intention was to gather information on

the power and resources transferred to local institutional structures by intervening agencies, and to examine how these powers and resources have influenced how local institutional structures include local people decision-making processes, project implementation and benefit sharing.

To capture local people's insights into their inclusion or exclusion and their perception of the REDD+ introduction process, I organized focus group discussions in each pilot village. The focus groups considered issues related to access to power and resources. They provided information about local people's knowledge of REDD+, participation in REDD+ project activities, the distribution of benefits, their perception of REDD+, their interactions with the local authorities and with the REDD+ project organizer. The Batwa Pygmies in the Bikoro pilot village, who tend to be socially and economically marginalized by the Bantu, and women in both pilot project areas have their own separate focus groups so as to capture their insight as marginalized groups concerning the above issues. In all, five focus groups were organized in Bikoro—men, women, landowners, migrants and Batwa Pygmies, and four focus groups were organized in Gemena pilot village—men, women, landowners and migrants.

Legal and Policy Framework of Community Participation in Forest Governance and REDD+ in the DRC

Forest governance in the DRC has been centralized with emphasis to regulate industrial logging (Debroux et al., 2007; Fétiveau & Mpoyi, 2009). Land and forest ownership and utilization is defined by the 1973 Land Ordinance and the 2002 Forest Code. These two legal texts codified the state as the sole guardian of all land and forest resources with the authority to exclude and allocate rights to use to the local population and logging companies (Samndong & Nhantumbo, 2015). Despite the establishment of state ownership of all land in the DRC, significant portion of the forestland remains under the control of customary authority (Oyono & Nzuzi, 2006).

The Forest Code makes a provision for community forest management as a means to empower communities and encourage local participation in resource management. This provision was only enacted in August 2014 and the procedures and guidelines for implementation are still being worked out. In addition to this forestry legal framework, DRC embarked on a decentralization reform in 2006, with intentions to transfer power and fiscal resources to the regional and local levels, but this is proceeding slowly; at present, elected governments only exist at the provinces and are yet to be established at the territories and districts levels (Samndong & Nhantumbo, 2015).

Article 89 of the Forest Code makes provisions for local people to be involved in forest governance via the social agreement (*cabiers de charge*), with logging companies (Samndong & Nhantumbo, 2015). This agreement specifies actions to improve the social infrastructures of communities living around logging concessions and direct compensation to the clans with customary claims to the forestland. Guidelines for the negotiation of this social agreement lack clear description of the rights and obligation of the logging company, the state and the local population. The Forest Code gives customary authorities the right to negotiate this social agreement with the logging companies, on behalf of their local communities. The negotiations benefit only families and clans with customary claim to forestland (Samndong, 2015). In the absence of an institutional structure to negotiate and manage logging compensation from the social agreement, a ministerial text was enacted in 2010 for the creation of *Comité Local de Gestion* (CLG), known in English as Local Management Committee, to negotiate and manage compensations from logging concessions at the local level (Samndong & Nhantumbo, 2015). The 2010 regulation still recognizes customary authority as the main supervising authority for the CLG.

In the absence of a competent institutional structure at the local level, intervening NGOs partner with Peasants Development Associations (OPD), created based on the DRC law of association (*Loi de l'Association, N° 004 du 20 juillet 2001; décret de 1956 sur coopératives*), to implement rural development projects. In addition, the government has set up Agricultural and Rural Management Councils (CARGs), at the local level

as platforms for communities to participate in the design of local agricultural programmes (Samndong, 2015).

In the context of REDD+, the DRC has made huge progress in its national REDD+ strategy, including the adoption of social safeguard (Aquino & Guay, 2013; Fobissie, Alemagi, & Minang, 2014; Mpoyi, Nyamwoga, Kabamba, & Assembe-Mvondo, 2013). The national REDD+ strategy framework recognizes the right to Free, Prior and Informed Consent (FPIC). FPIC is a right enabling local communities to give or withhold their consent to any project which may affect their customarily owned land, their natural resources, their mode of living and their livelihoods (Kipalu & Mukungu, 2013). As the DRC REDD+ programme moves to the implementation phases with the initiation of many pilot projects, the national strategy framework provides no details on practical arrangements for its implementation at the local level (Aquino & Guay, 2013).

Civil society organizations are advocating for the development of an operational national guide for FPIC and community participation applicable to all kinds of projects related to the lands and the livelihoods of communities (Kipalu, Koné, Bouchra, Vig, & Loyombo, 2016). In the absence of decentralized governance structures, REDD+ pilot projects are working with communities to establish new REDD+ organizations known as Local Development Committees, *Comité Local de Développement* (CLD), recognized by administrative text⁵ to ensure collective choice arrangements that actively involve the majority of community members impacted by REDD+ projects.

Findings

Local Knowledge of REDD+

Across both pilots, the awareness of REDD+ was very high, 94.7% (N = 151). All the respondents in Gemena pilot site confirmed that they have heard about REDD+, while 89.3% of respondents in Bikoro pilot site (N = 75) confirmed that they have heard about REDD+. Table 3.1 shows

Table 3.1 Community knowledge about REDD+ in the pilot sites

Knowledge about REDD+	Bikoro % (N = 75)	Gemena % (N = 76)	Total % (N = 151)
Forest protection	41.3	55.3	48.3
Restrict forest use	8	1.3	4.6
Provide alternative livelihoods	21.3	28.9	25.2
Provide village development	8	6.6	7.3
Payment mechanism	0	5.3	2.6
I don't know	21.3	2.6	11.9

Source: Author

that a significant number of respondents (48.3%) understood REDD+ as a forest protection project, while 25.2% of the respondents in both pilot sites understood REDD+ as a project that will provide them with alternative livelihoods. Very few respondents in Table 3.1 (2.6%) understood REDD+ as a payment mechanism, while 11% of the respondents in both pilot sites had no knowledge about REDD+.

The local people's sources of information about REDD+ did not vary. All respondents in both pilot sites were informed about REDD+ by the project organizer (WHRC); some (39.5%) also got additional information about REDD+ from the media (radio). The local people's knowledge of the actors responsible for REDD+ in their communities varies significantly between the pilots. While 58.7% of the respondents in Bikoro indicated that WHRC is responsible for REDD+, 38.2% in Gemena noted that the REDD+ village organization is responsible for REDD+. Majority of the respondents (82.8%) in both pilots confirmed that their communities were consulted before the design of the REDD+ project activities. This consultation was based on the FPIC process in which village meetings and workshops were organized to explain the project and solicit inputs and consent of the local people.

Community Participation in the Introduction of REDD+

In total, 90.7% (N = 151) of the respondents reported that they participated in the meetings and workshops organized to introduce REDD+ in

the pilot villages (the FPIC process). The introduction process started with a village assembly meeting, followed by a workshop organized for two days. The workshops were designed to map out the local peoples' livelihoods, activities, constraints, coping strategies and village development challenges to identify project activities as alternative to reduce local pressure on the forests. According to the survey, 71.1% (N = 151) of respondents confirmed that the workshop was organized with selected mix groups of village members. More men participated in the village assembly meeting compared to women. This is because the men were the first to receive information about this meeting since they are often home during the day while the women are either in their farms or behind the home working. In addition, the village assembly meeting was organized during the day when most women have gone to their farm fields or forest.

In Gemena pilot site, the village general assembly meeting was held in front of the village church and the workshop in the village school. In Bikoro pilot site, both the village assembly meeting and workshop were held at a meeting ground located in the residence of the customary chief. In Bikoro, 28% (N = 75) of respondents were not happy with the meeting venue. The most important reason given against the venue was that it was a private place owned by the customary chief. Many Batwa Pygmies noted in the focus group discussions that they are often uncomfortable to voice their concerns in meetings held at the customary chief's residence. Some village members also noted that the customary chief often chased people away from his residence when there were visitors or some project meetings, except those invited. Nevertheless, 51% of respondents in both pilots reported that the meeting and workshop were very open to the concerns and views of the local people. Information from the focus groups confirms that meetings and workshops were free and open to the views of the local people. Many of the local people in Bikoro, who were not selected for the workshop, were angry for not being allowed to participate. In Gemena pilot site, only the customary landowners were selected to participate in the workshops.

The main information provided in the village assembly meeting was about the project objectives, activities and benefits to the communities. No information about the project risks, budget and design was provided

Table 3.2 Source of information about REDD+ in the pilot sites

Source of information	Bikoro % (N = 75)	Gemena % (N = 76)	Total % (N = 151)
WHRC	78.7	73.7	76.2
Customary authorities	42.7	31.6	37.1
Hearsay in village	74.7	47.4	60.9
Local state authority	0	0	0
Project intervening NGOs	12	2.6	7.3
Village organizations	9.3	0	4.6
Media (radio)	13.3	10.5	11.9
Research student	25.3	15.8	20.5

Source: Author

and no information was provided on how the project activities will be implemented and monitored at the village level. The information was provided in the meeting and workshop using oral presentation, diagrams and flip charts. In addition to WHRC that provided most of this information, some respondents also received information about the REDD+ project from other sources (see Table 3.2). Significant number of respondents (60.9%, N = 151) received information from hearsay (rumours) in the village, while 37.1% of respondents in both pilots received information from the village leaders (customary chiefs).

A significant number of respondents in both pilots trusted the information provided by the customary authority (66%) and WHRC (64.2%). In Gemena, 84% (N = 76) trusted the information provided by the customary authorities, while 48% (N = 75) of the respondents in the Bikoro pilot site trusted the information provided by the customary authorities. The customary authorities in the Gemena pilot have strong legitimacy since the communities are traditionally homogenous with a dominant ethnic group. The communities in Bikoro pilot are more heterogeneous with more migrants, increased presence of state agents and powerful external interests that have weakened the legitimacy of the customary authorities.

Very few respondents (16.1% N = 151) held that the duration of the meeting was not sufficient for local people to digest and understand the information provided. In total, 58.3% (N = 151) of respondents felt that the information provided was satisfactory for the local people to accept

Table 3.3 Respondents' classification of the information provided in the FPIC in the pilot sites

Classification of information	Bikoro % (N = 75)	Gemena % (N = 76)	Total % (N = 151)
Very poor	0	2.6	1.3
Poor	2.7	3.9	3.3
Satisfactory	34.7	81.6	58.3
Good	53.3	7.9	30.5
Very good	8	3.9	6

Source: Author

REDD+ pilot project, while 36.5% (N = 151) of respondents felt that the information was good or very good for the local people to accept the REDD+ pilot project (Table 3.3).

On the other hand, while a significant number of respondents felt that the information provided in the meeting and workshop was satisfactory, 16.1% of respondents in both pilot sites indicated that this information did not influence their views towards REDD+. In Gemena pilot site, 3.9% (N = 76) of respondents indicated that the information did not influence their views in favour of REDD+, while in Bikoro pilot site, 28.8% (N = 75) of respondents confirmed that the information did not influence their views in favour of REDD+. This is because the local people in Bikoro pilot site have experienced many conservation and development projects in the past with negative memories. Among those who indicated positive views towards REDD+ in both pilot sites (N = 125), 46.4% were convinced that REDD+ will provide alternative livelihoods, 36.8% were convinced that REDD+ for forest protection is good and 20% were convinced that REDD+ will provide the village with social services.

The men in their focus groups in both pilot sites confirmed that they understood the objectives and goals of the project based on the information provided in the meeting and workshop. One man in the men focus group in Bikoro pilot site noted that REDD+ project would provide them with local alternative livelihoods to avoid deforestation and protect the forest from carbon dioxide to regulate global climate. Other men in the focus groups confirmed this statement. Not all women in the women focus groups in both pilots understood the objectives and goals of the project.

In the women focus group in Gemena pilot site, the women who claimed to understand the project noted that the project was named ‘Zamba Malamu’, a new project that will reduce poverty in the village, protect the forest by helping them to do their agriculture in fallow land, improve their soil fertility in degraded land and provide them with farm inputs. In Bikoro pilot site, the women focus group reported that not all the local people were happy about the project. Some people believed that, based on their experience from previous projects, it would be difficult for this project to benefit all households in the village. Some were sceptical about the project and perceived it like previous development projects that have deceived them with empty promises without any benefits and concrete activities. The Batwa Pygmies in the Bikoro pilot site were also sceptical about the project, because they have been excluded in many past development projects in the village.

Although the local people confirmed that the information provided during the meeting and workshop motivated them to favour the REDD+ project, no meeting was organized for the local people to decide whether to join REDD+ or not. In Bikoro pilot site, 45.3% (N = 75) of the respondents confirmed that the customary authority made the decision for the village to join REDD+, while in Gemena pilot site, 60.5% (N = 76) of the respondents confirmed that WHRC made the decision for the village to join REDD+ (Table 3.4).

Table 3.4 Respondents’ response to who made the decision for the village to join REDD+ in the pilot sites

Decision to join REDD+	Bikoro % (N = 75)	Gemena % (N = 76)	Total % (N = 151)
Project organizer (WHRC)	33.3	60.5	47
Customary authority	44	27.6	35.8
Village general assembly	12	5.3	8.6
Local state authority	4	0	2
Village traditional council	1.3	0	0.7
Village organizations	5.3	0	2.6
Project intervening NGOs	0	6.6	3.3

Source: Author

Information gathered from the interviews and focus group discussions reveal that very little was discussed in the workshop concerning local peoples' access and use of forest in the project. There was rather more discussion on the local peoples' needs and interests which fitted well into the project expectations. For example, the women focus group in Bikoro pilot site noted that the most important question for them was how they should protect the forest when they live off the forest. Does it mean that they will not have access to the forest again? While the local needs and interests crowded the discussion, for the women in Bikoro pilot site, their main interests for the project are financial help, agricultural support, live-stock keeping and access to drinking water. For the Batwa Pygmies, access to land, equal distribution and inclusion were very important.

The local people confirmed in the focus groups that the REDD+ introduction process was recorded and all the documents are with WHRC. Although the local people were motivated to accept the project, no agreement was signed between the local people and the project organizer. The youths in Bikoro pilot site stated that after the workshop, they did request for an agreement from the project organizer. At the end of the workshop, some activities were discussed and planned to be implemented in the pilot villages as community benefits from the project.

In Bikoro pilot site, they include: village land use map, construction of a village school, construction of three water points to provide water to the local people and construction of a nursery for fruit trees to be distributed to the local people to support them in their agricultural production. In Gemena pilot site, they include: production of the village land use map, construction of water points in the village (wells) to provide the local people with drinking water and provision of agricultural inputs and training for local people on new farming techniques.

Community Participation in the Establishment of REDD+ Village Organization

According to the survey, 44% (N = 151) of respondents reported that the idea to establish the REDD+ village organization came from WHRC. Before the establishment of these organizations in both pilot sites, meetings were organized to inform the local people and to set up

Table 3.5 Respondents' motivation to participate in REDD+ village meetings in the pilot sites

Motivation to participate in meetings	Bikoro % (N = 75)	Gemena % (N = 76)	Total % (N = 151)
Information	45.3	64.5	55
Per diems	76	73.7	74.8
Keep self busy	12	5.3	8.6

Source: Author

the process. In Bikoro pilot site, 62.7% (N = 151) of respondents indicated that they were invited to participate in the meeting, while in Gemena pilot site, 96.1% (N = 76) the respondents reported that their participation was voluntary. Majority of the respondents (74.8%, N = 151) confirmed that they were motivated to participate in these meetings because of the per diems they receive for their participation (Table 3.5).

Information gathered from the interviews and focus group discussions confirmed that the idea to create these village organizations for the project came from the project organizer. The main objective for creating the organizations according to WHRC was to ensure effective information flow in the pilot villages to create awareness among village residents regarding the project and project activities. The organizations were also created to ensure that all the households in the village were included in the project activities and benefit streams.

In Bikoro, 37 groups were created using the list of household heads in the village. Each group then selected two members to represent them in the REDD+ village committee. This committee of 74 members then elected an executive of four members (president, vice president and two technical advisers) known as the REDD+ Focal Point of the village. The president of the executive committee is the chief of the village and all the REDD+ meetings are held at his residence. The vice president is a woman, a requisite for WHRC that a woman must be a member of the executive committee.

In Gemena, 36 groups were created from the list of household heads. Each group selected two members to represent them in the REDD+ village committee. This committee of 72 then elected the executive of four (president, vice president and two technical advisers) who act as the

REDD+ Focal Point of the village. The executive president is an indigenous landowner. There is no woman in the Gemena executive committee. It was not clear who supervised the creation of the Gemena REDD+ village organization, whether it was local people or WHRC.

The mechanism to establish the REDD+ village organization favoured men over women, as more than 80% of household heads who make up the organization are men. In addition, the objective for the establishment of REDD+ village organization was not very clear to the local people. From the survey, 54% (N = 151) of respondents reported that the organization was created to educate the local people about REDD+, 47.7% of respondents reported that it was established to implement REDD+ activities in the village, and 24.5% did not know the reason why this organization was established.

Information from interviews confirmed that the idea to elect either the village customary chief or an indigenous landowner to lead the organization came from the project organizer. According to WHRC, it was a way to 'harmonize' the new village organization with customary institutions to build local trust and legitimacy of the village REDD+ organizations. According to the survey, 51% (N = 151) of respondents indicated high or very high trust to the executive committee of the REDD+ village organization.

Community Participation in Early REDD+ Activities

No demonstration activity was introduced in the Gemena pilot site during field research for this study. This section therefore analyses community participation in the early REDD+ demonstration activities introduced in the Bikoro pilot site. Before these activities were implemented, a number of meetings were organized to inform the local people of the type of activities to be implemented in the village. The majority of the respondents (64%, N = 76) reported that they participated in these meetings. Those that did not participate complained that the information about these meetings was never circulated to all the households in the village.

According to information from the focus groups, many people only learned about these meetings and activities through informal discussion, hearsay and gossips. Many people noted in these focus groups that the customary chief has strong influence over the project since he controls all the information about the project in the village. He is in contact with the project team, the team always visits him and all project meetings are organized in his residence. So if some households were not informed of the meeting preceding the REDD+ demonstration activities, the chief has to be held accountable for this.

Among those who participated, 44% indicated they were invited while 18.7% reported they voluntarily participated. Among those that participated, 41.3% confirmed that they were motivated to participate by the per diem they receive in the meetings, while 30.7% were motivated to participate by the information they receive in the meetings. The majority of the respondents (62.7%, N = 75) indicated that they were involved in these activities. Their types of involvement also varied. While 56% of respondents indicated that they were involved as labourers, only 12% of the respondents were involved in the decision-making process for these activities.

Information collected from interviews and focus groups reveals that many demonstration activities are being implemented in the Bikoro pilot site, including: participatory land use mapping, construction of water points, manufacture of bricks for school construction, establishment of fruit trees nursery, introduction of Mukuna plant for soil enrichment, introduction of improved stoves, introduction of solar dryers for cassava and the establishment of lowland rice fields. The local people complained that many of these activities were not discussed in the FPIC process while those discussed are yet to be implemented or completed. In an interview with the project manager, he mentioned that the project has experienced funding delays to implement the activities discussed in the FPIC process. Due to this delay, the project organizer decided to experiment with different activities in the pilot site to keep the project active.

Local people also complained about their participation in these activities, for example, the water project implemented in 2014 by the project's local partner Bureau Diocésain du Développement (BDD). The three wells constructed were unable to provide water to the villagers during the

first dry season in 2014. BDD hired local technicians for the project and used low-quality materials for the construction. Local people complained of not being involved in budgeting for the designing of the well and also of not being involved in decisions about the hiring of local technicians and purchase of materials for construction. However, the village customary chief was involved in supervising and monitoring the activity.

A few of the villagers were hired to work as labourers for the well construction activity. These labourers complained that they were poorly paid and in a few cases, some claimed they were not paid. In the men focus group, a man reported that the tools provided by BDD were distributed to the customary chief and some selected village members. A number of them complained about using their own tools in the well construction activity without compensation. One woman in the women focus group confirmed that she was injured in the construction work and was not taken care of by BDD or the village authority. In the women focus group, they noted that the water project was very important to them since they are responsible in fetching water for the households but were unhappy that it was poorly implemented. Similar complaints were made about the brick production activity.

The fruit tree nursery establishment activity involved mainly the indigenous landowners as labourers. The migrant population, especially the Batwa Pygmies, felt reluctant to participate because they felt that the fruit tree nursery would not benefit them since they do not have customary rights to land in the village. In the case of the introduction of improved stoves, many villagers were interested, but soon realized that the stoves could not be adapted to their cooking habits. The improved stove requires big cooking pots and consumes more firewood than they expected, thus many of the local people that opted for the stoves have abandoned them and returned to their traditional cooking style. They state that the improved stoves maybe more useful for households with big cooking pots and to prepare food for parties or big ceremonies in the village.

The rice production activity is ongoing, but in the focus group discussions, some people noted that the rice field belongs to the customary chief, others said it is owned by the REDD+ project and still others claimed that it is owned by the project consultant. Many people in the village were upset that the customary chief consumed the first harvest

from the rice field without sharing it with village members. In addition, the local people noted that no open meeting was organized in the village to discuss the rice project. In an interview with the project consultant, he explained that WHRC had planned to train the local people on how to cultivate rice in the swamp forest to improve their food security and income. He further stated that the project organized a meeting in the village to inform the local people about the rice project. During this meeting, the WHRC project team asked for volunteers interested in cultivating rice in their swamp forests, but only a few opted for this, and the customary chief was the most enthusiastic.

Those who participated in the focus group meetings disagreed with the project consultant's version of events. They maintained strongly that no general meeting was organized in the village. Only the customary chief and a few village members were being consulted by the project consultant regarding planned activities. In addition, they noted that the project consultant did not speak Lingala (the local language of the population) and this limited his everyday interaction with the villagers. He discussed all the project activities only with the customary chief and the chief's friends and other helpers, thus the villagers were not well informed about project activities. This was made worse by the fact that the groups created to communicate the project activities in the village were not yet operational.

Discussion

Full and effective community participation advocated in REDD+ social safeguards is important to guarantee local legitimacy in REDD+ projects (Jagger et al., 2012). How this is translated into practice is very challenging (Chhatre et al., 2012; Ribot & Larson, 2012). The notion of community participation is not new in conservation and development interventions (Brown, 2002; Hulme & Adams, 2001). There are two major arguments behind the logic of community participation: the first sees participation as an instrument to improve project efficiency and the second argues that participation is important for empowering local people (Cleaver, 1999). While participation is often presented in policy documents as a process

necessary for empowering local people and facilitating social change, in practice, projects use participation for efficiency gains, deploying it as a coercive and manipulative tool cloaked within the rhetoric of empowerment (Clever, 2001).

To characterize community participation in the DRC REDD+ project, it is important to first assess the local institutional arrangements for project implementation. The main findings in this regard are that the REDD+ village organizations established by the project, to create local awareness and implement REDD+ activities in the pilot sites, are unable to ensure full and effective community participation in the REDD+ project.

First, the mechanism used to create these REDD+ village organizations excluded women because the membership was drawn from heads of households who are mainly men. Second, the organizations are still lacking the bylaws and internal regulations to function. Third, local people do not know what project activities these village organizations are created to facilitate and how they will do this.

The REDD+ project executor decided that customary authority and indigenous land owners are to lead the REDD+ village organizations in order to harmonize it with customary institutions. This is because there are no decentralized government structures in DRC. Where such decentralized local government structures exist like in Tanzania, they have been used to involve communities in REDD+ decision-making processes (Blomley et al., 2016; Mustalahti & Rakotonarivo, 2014). However, the absence of the REDD+ village organizations bylaws has enabled the customary chief in Bikoro pilot to capture and control the REDD+ activities.

The customary chief, as leader of the REDD+ village organization, controls all the information about the village REDD+ activities, organizes meetings about the project and invites his friends. Furthermore, the information about these meeting is not circulated to the entire village. Since downward accountability of customary authorities in the DRC is weak to non-existent (Nuesiri, 2012), chiefs exercise their authority in an autocratic manner. It comes as no surprise therefore that the village chief as president of the REDD+ village organization in Buya village is not accountable to the people. Furthermore, local people lack detailed infor-

mation about the project activities, so are not able to influence or demand accountability from the customary chief.

The activities introduced had predetermined objectives, specific timeframes and ways of engaging the villagers to manufacture success (see Baviskar, 2005; Mohanty, 2004). The local people were not included in deciding the activities to be implemented. The activities are linked to the project budget and timeframe, and local people are only consulted in identifying potential activities but not in deciding on how they are implemented. In this light, community participation can be interpreted as a means to achieve the project outcomes—an instrument to increase project efficiency. While participation can be a process of empowering and facilitating social change, the efficiency model of participation motivates the REDD+ project in this study.

This dimension of participation, as a means to achieve REDD+ project objectives rather than a transformative and empowering process, limits local people from influencing power relations and wider structural factors shaping their use of the forest. Local people are simply passive consumers of predetermined goals and objectives about forests, rather than makers and shapers of these goals and objectives (see Cornwall & Gaventa, 2000; Williams, 2004). Given the high level of poverty in the study area, participating in meetings to earn per diems and working as labourers in project activities provide financial relief to local people (especially the marginalized Batwa Pygmies), but their sense of inclusion in the project is very low.

The FPIC process in the study area also falls short of best practice. The information provided by the project organizer during the FPIC process was done using a conservation and development discourse (see Adger, Benjaminsen, Brown, & Svarstad, 2001). This was troubling to the local people because issues about land rights and user rights were not prioritized. The FPIC process created local awareness but did not convince them to give their consent to the REDD+ project. Local support for the project was based on trust they have for their leaders, who had consented to the project. The FPIC process was more of a consultation than a process of seeking local consent. A consent-seeking process requires well-informed decision-making by local people and a signing of an agreement of inten-

tion that motivates both partners to engage confidently in the REDD+ process (Mahanty & McDermott, 2013).

This study finds that the project organizer and the customary authorities made the decision for the village to join REDD+ without any vote or signed agreement from the local people. The FPIC process can be time consuming and costly (see Sunderlin et al., 2014). Thus REDD+ projects, wanting to avoid these costs, conduct a few days of consultation meetings, which end up providing only information that will motivate the local people to accept the project. This has been observed in this and other similar studies of REDD+ processes.

The findings from this study demonstrate that community participation in the DRC REDD+ project in Bikoro and Gemena can be characterized as tokenism, placation and consultation, based on Arnstein (1969) ladder of participation. Community members are informed, consulted or 'placated' with benefits such as per diems, labour wages and livelihood improvements, but never achieve managerial power and influence over the project. This is because the REDD+ pilot project is externally driven and the communities are not involved in setting the agenda and project timeframe, neither do they have control over the project budget and hiring of project staff. They are consulted in order to ensure effective execution of the project objectives.

Conclusion

This chapter has shown that despite repetitive rhetoric surrounding the value of community participation in REDD+ policy, programmes, and project documents, the transformative dimension of participation as empowerment is rarely achieved. Participation as empowerment is often undermined by relations of power, both among the actors and within the institutional spaces of participatory processes. This chapter has shown that the local institutional arrangement to enable full and effective community participation in REDD+ in Bikoro and Gemena REDD+ pilot projects in DRC is weak and structurally excludes women from participatory decision-making. The REDD+ village organizations created by the project executors lack bylaws and other functional regulations to guide

their operations. This, coupled with the lack of effective ways of disseminating information about the REDD+ project to the local population, limits local peoples' ability to demand accountability from the leaders of the REDD+ village organization. The leaders are only upwardly accountable to the project organizer who has empowered them with information and resources.

Furthermore, the FPIC process associated with the REDD+ project was not sufficient for local people to give their consent to the REDD+ project. Nevertheless, the local chief gave his consent to the REDD+ project organizers and his local subjects did not oppose him even when they were all not in agreement with him. Thus, the decision to join REDD+ was not participatory and was not democratic. The FPIC focused on conservation and development trade-offs, while issues of local interests like land rights and forest use rights were avoided. The control of information by the project organizer during the FPIC process was a mechanism to manipulate local people from opposing the REDD+ project to consenting to the project.

The REDD+ project was more concerned with efficiency in project execution than with empowering the local communities. Thus project goals, budget, timeframe, local partnerships and activities were externally decided without input from local people. The communities have little or no control over the project; their participation does not go beyond labour supply and attending meetings for per diems to help alleviate their financial needs.

Using the Arnstein (1969) typology of participation, community participation in the DRC REDD+ pilot projects in Bikoro district, Equateur province, is characterized as 'tokenism' in which the communities were consulted, informed but never achieved managerial power and influence over the REDD+ project. Full and effective participation of local people in REDD+ implementation as prescribed in the REDD+ social safeguards would be difficult to achieve in practice, if social inequalities and local power dynamics are not recognized and addressed. REDD+ like other interventions might further exacerbate these inequalities, adding insult to injury (Fraser & Olson, 2008, p. 69), already being suffered by vulnerable segments of local population in poor forest dependent communities.

Notes

1. Pretty (1995) and White (1996) offer further typologies of participation.
2. Zamba Malamu means the forest is good.
3. The Batwa is an ethnic group more commonly referred to as “Pygmy” in the region. They are also referred to as *Peuples Autochtones* (PA) in French, which means indigenous people.
4. The region has witnessed limited presidential supports under the Kabila administration because it is the stronghold of the opposition party Mouvement de Liberation de Congo (MLC) and a stronghold of the formal president Mobutu.
5. Loi organique n° 08/016 du 7 octobre 2008 portant composition, organisation et fonctionnement des entités territoriales décentralisées et leurs rapports avec l’Etat et les Provinces.

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4

Institutional Choice and Substantive Representation of Local People in Carbon Forestry in Uganda

Robert Mbeche

Introduction

Climate change mitigation and adaptation have become new global development paradigms (Angelsen et al., 2009). Thus, there has been a proliferation of climate change interventions, transferring funds from developed countries to developing countries to help mitigate emissions from developing countries' forests (Corbera & Schroeder, 2011; Larson, 2011). These include, but are not limited to, voluntary clean development mechanisms (CDMs), measures that make payments for ecosystem services (PESs) and, more recently, Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Degradation plus (REDD+).¹ Whereas there are numerous measures being undertaken to combat the effects of climate change around the world in various sectors, forests and land use more generally have become the centre of these efforts (Ribot, 2011). Henceforth, I refer to these measures as carbon forestry programmes.

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While carbon forestry programmes are primarily focussed on emission reductions, they are also expected to improve forest governance through a system of safeguards that will ensure accountability and responsiveness to forest-dependent communities (Pham, Di Gregorio, Carmenta, Brockhaus, & Le, 2014; UNFCCC, 2010). These safeguards promise inclusion and participation of marginalized groups and forest-dependent people in decision-making around resource governance so that their interests can be represented. To what extent is this rhetoric of representation reflected in the design and implementation of carbon forestry programmes in Uganda?

Multilateral and bilateral international development organizations, including the World Bank, and the UN-funding carbon forestry initiatives insist on participatory approaches that allow for local people to have inputs in decision-making. However, participation is not a magic bullet; critics have shown that participation could be coercive and oppressive (Cooke & Kothari, 2001) and could be functional and manipulative rather than responsive and empowering (Pretty, 1995). Thus there is a need to look beyond the rhetoric of representation and participation by these powerful international organizations and examine the operations of projects funded by these organizations in developing countries like Uganda.

This chapter therefore examines the choice of local institutions selected by three carbon forestry programmes for local partnership and the effects of these institutional choices on local representation. It shows that despite espoused intentions of having an 'inclusive' participatory involvement of communities and in particular local actors, all the three interventions presented here chose to work through experts or via institutions that required individuals to be members (community-based organizations [CBOs] and NGOs) if they were to benefit. The effect of these arrangements has been exclusion of the wider community, co-optation, contestation, conflict, unequal benefit sharing and lack of downward accountability of chosen institutions who are accountable to donors as opposed to local communities. Clearly, claims to safeguard the needs and aspirations of local people in forest decision-making through representation and participatory rhetoric are not sufficient—they have to be backed with mechanisms that make it possible for downward accountability and responsiveness to occur.

The chapter is informed by Ribot's (2007) choice and recognition framework. Institutional 'choice' is defined as the decisions made by intervening agencies (governments, donor agencies, NGOs etc.) about which local institutions they work with and therefore transfer authority or offer support. Choice gives recognition, which is a form of acknowledgement as a result of the choices made by government or by international agencies. Acknowledging an authority through enhanced powers and resources makes it more meaningful to the populace in the local arena and therefore legitimizes it over others that have not been recognized (Ribot, 2007). Institutional choices are therefore mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion (Ribot, Chhatre, & Lankina, 2008), but even more important is the fact that they (choices) have an implication on the nature of democratic outcomes (Blair, 2000; Houtzager & Gurza Lavallo, 2009; Larson, Marfo, Cronkleton, & Pulhin, 2010; Ribot et al., 2008). Specifically, the choices could impact on the direction of the selected partners' accountability, which can be upward to their donors and/or downward to the people, and how responsive they are to their needs.

Accountability and responsiveness are important for inclusive democratic decision-making. Following Manin, Przeworski, and Stokes (1999), democracy is defined by the accountability and responsiveness of leaders to the people. Accountability is defined as the rewards or sanctions in response to the leaders' actions, while responsiveness occurs when leaders are able to respond to the needs and aspirations of their people. Substantive representation, which is a core part of democracy, occurs when leaders are responsive to their people and the people under their jurisdiction are able to hold them to account (Manin et al., 1999).

This chapter draws on relevant literature and in particular on findings from fieldwork conducted between January 2012 and June 2013 in Uganda. The fieldwork included three case studies: the REDD+ Preparedness Proposal (a policy process) (Mbeche, 2015) and two projects, the Nile Basin CDM Reforestation Project (Ruta, 2015) and the Mt Elgon Regional Ecosystem Conservation Programme (MERECOP) (Nakangu, 2013). The three case studies combined different data collection methods that include key informant interviews, focus group discussions, document analysis and observations (Table 4.1).

Table 4.1 Case studies and methods

Case study	Methods	Reference for further details
Stakeholder participation in REDD+ Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP) development	Seventy-two key informant interviews Observation and opportunistic discussions in 16 high-level policy meetings and workshops Analysis of government documents relating to R-PP	Mbeche (2015, forthcoming)
The Nile Basin CDM Reforestation Project	Seventy-five key informant interviews Three focus group discussions Observations in meetings	Ruta (2015)
MERECF	Fifty key informant interviews Two Focus Group Discussions (FGDs)	Nakangu (2013)

The chapter is subdivided into five sections. Following the introduction, the next section is about the framework used to analyse substantive representation in carbon forestry. Section “[Political and Institutional Context for Carbon Forestry Implementation in Uganda](#)” presents the political and institutional context for carbon forestry implementation in Uganda, while section “[The Rhetoric Versus Practice in Carbon Forestry in Uganda](#)” analyses the extent to which the carbon forestry rhetoric is implemented. Section “[Conclusions](#)” presents the conclusions of the study.

Substantive Representation in Carbon Forestry

Following Pitkin (1967), substantive representation entails acting in another’s best interests and giving them a stake in the action itself. However, as Pitkin herself noted, the difficulty is being able to determine the interests of the represented in part because people’s interests are neither homogeneous nor static. To get out of this dilemma, Pitkin proposed that substantive representatives are chosen by and are accountable to the represented; thus, the represented are able to evaluate and consequently sanction their representatives (Pitkin, 1967).

Although Pitkin’s idea of representation suggested that it is not mandatory for the representatives to be mandated by the represented as long as their

interests are being met, other scholars (Houtzager & Gurza Lavalle, 2009; Manin et al., 1999; Pettit, 2010; Runciman, 2007; Severs, 2010) have argued that representation in public decision-making is not possible in the absence of a mandate² from constituents and institutional accountability mechanisms. As Runciman (2007) observes, “representation must entail some sense that actions are being performed not just on behalf of the represented (to promote their best interests) but also in the name of the represented (that is giving them a stake in the action itself)” (p. 96). He argues that the represented must be capable of asserting their stake through measures such as issuance of instructions or mandate, choosing process of appointing representatives or through objection (Runciman, 2007). Similarly, as Pettit (2010) observes, the representation process should happen, if not through the represented’s own initiative, at least with their knowledge.

Manin et al. (1999) suggest that elections provide the medium through which citizens delegate decision-making authority upwards to their representatives in the hope that they will be accountable and responsive to them. They define accountability as the rewards or sanctions in response to the leaders’ actions while responsiveness occurs when leaders are able to respond to the needs and aspirations of their people. Hirschman (1970) brings out three responses by which those represented may demand accountability and responsiveness. In the event of satisfaction with performance they can remain loyal or supportive of their representatives. In case of dissatisfaction, they may take second and third responses of voice or exit, respectively. Voice in this case refers to the expression of dissatisfaction in hope of inducing change, whereas exit is a more extreme form of expression in which those represented may opt out completely from participating in governance.

In international environmental governance policy discourse—including in carbon forestry programmes and REDD+—statements (verbal or written) regarding local representation in decision-making are wrapped in the language of ‘participation’ and ‘social safeguards’. ‘Inclusive participation’ or ‘broad representation’ of stakeholders is used frequently in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) documents (UNFCCC, 2010). The World Bank’s Learning Group on Participatory Development defines participation as “a process through which stakeholders influence and share control over development initiatives and the decisions and resources which affects them” (World Bank, 1996, p. 3).

But, does ‘participation’ as practised by the World Bank and other development actors respect the need for substantive local representation, particularly of marginalized groups? To answer this question, I assess whether representatives in REDD+ participatory processes in Uganda are downwardly accountable to those they claim to represent, and are acting with a legitimate mandate from them. In other words, are these representatives substantively acting for the interests of local people they represent? To do this, I assess who participates (who gets a seat at the table), how they participate (whether representatives have a voice) and why they participate (whether they have influence in decisions made). Substantive representation of forest-dependent populations increases the likelihood of the integration of citizens’ aspirations, needs and demands into decision-making processes.

Political and Institutional Context for Carbon Forestry Implementation in Uganda

Political Context

Uganda is a landlocked country located in Eastern Africa, covering an estimated 236,040 sq. km out of which 199,710 sq. km is land area and 36,330 sq. km is covered by water bodies (Republic of Uganda, 2011b). Uganda’s population is estimated at slightly over 38 million, growing annually at 3.2% (CIA, 2017). Over 68% of the households in Uganda depend on subsistence farming for their livelihoods (Republic of Uganda, 2009).

Uganda has a central government headed by the president (executive) working alongside the legislature and the judiciary. The country suffered instability and civil war since its independence in 1962 until 1986, when President Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) took office.³ The central government is responsible for national affairs and services; formulation of national policies and national standards; and monitoring the implementation of national policies and services. Administratively, the country is divided into four regions (Central, Western, Eastern and

Northern) (Fig. 4.1).⁴ The 1997 Local Governments Act (Republic of Uganda, 1997) also provides for devolved powers to local councils (LCs) made up of districts. The districts are further subdivided into counties, sub-counties, parishes and villages as administrative units.⁵ The Uganda constitution of 1995 also recognizes customary authority institutions, including those from ethnic groups keen to re-establish their monarchies,⁶ especially the Buganda, Bunyore and Toro (Barkan, 2011). Some of these pre-colonial kingdoms such as Buganda continue to exercise wide-ranging de facto and de jure powers over land and natural resources on their territories.




Fig. 4.1 Map of Uganda showing administrative regions and districts (Source: Government of Uganda. Available at <http://www.gou.go.ug/about-uganda/sector/maps-regions>)

Forestry Context

Forests in Uganda cover approximately 24% of the total land area (4.9 million ha), of which 19% (924,208 ha) are tropical forests, 81% woodlands and bush lands (3,974,102 ha) and 1% (35,066 ha) plantations (KESI, 2009; Republic of Uganda 2009).

Of the 4.9 million ha, 30% are in protected areas (PAs) (Forest Reserves, National Parks and Wildlife Reserves) and 70% are found on private land. PAs contain the country's permanent forest estate (PFE), which is 1.9 million ha. Of this, Central Forest Reserves (CFRs) cover 1,265,742 ha. According to the 1995 constitution, the PFEs are forests managed by the government on behalf of the people of Uganda. They are in the form of CFRs managed by the National Forestry Authority, NFA (1,270,797 ha), National Parks managed by the Uganda Wildlife Authority, UWA (731,000 ha), and Local Forest Reserves (LFRs) managed by Districts Forest Service, DFS (4997 ha) (National Forestry Authority, 2009).

Between 1990 and 2005, Uganda lost about 26% of its remaining forest cover, and deforestation continues today at a rate of 2.2% per year (an average of about 86,400 ha of forest). This is mostly due to subsistence farming and cutting for fuel wood (KESI, 2009; Nabanoga, Namaalwa, & Ssenyonjo, 2010), as well as increased demand for a variety of forestry resources with limited options for alternatives or substitutes, and weak human and institutional capacities to ensure sustainable forest management (Republic of Uganda, 2011a). As a result of high levels of deforestation, there have been a number of projects seeking to pay landowners to plant and maintain trees on their farms.⁷

Institutional Context

Under the current institutional arrangement, the Ministry of Water and Environment (MWE) formulates policies and coordinates all matters related to the environment through the National Environment Management Authority (NEMA). The Ministry's Forest Sector Support Department (FSSD) is responsible for ensuring the functioning of the DFS, which is essential for the management of LFRs and wildlife on private land. The NFA and UWA are responsible for the sustainable

Table 4.2 Summary of institutional mandates in relation to REDD+

Institution	Mandates under REDD+ and carbon forestry generally
Ministry of Water and Environment	Policy development, regulation, monitoring and reporting on the sector
National Forestry Authority	Focal point for REDD+ implementation and coordinating all other relevant stakeholders
Uganda Wildlife Authority	Management of national parks and monitoring of forestry resources within the parks
Local Governments	Management of local forest reserves and regulate management of community forests. Local Governments (LGs) will also be responsible for facilitating community participation in management of protected forest resources
Private sector	Forestry resources development and utilization and trade on forestry products
Communities and land owners	Forestry resources development, management and utilization

Source: Republic of Uganda (2011a)

management of Community Forest Reserves (owned by state but co-managed with local communities and UWA or NFA).

This is the context under which a REDD+ Readiness plan was developed by the Ugandan government in 2009–2012 with the World Bank's support through its Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF). REDD+ will be spearheaded by the MWE, and the policy aspects will be developed by the FSSD (Mbeche, [Forthcoming](#)). Implementation and coordination of all REDD+-related activities will be led by FSSD and NFA (see [Table 4.1](#) for details) (Republic of Uganda, 2011a). While the country was still at the REDD+ preparedness stage at the time of this study in 2013 (see Republic of Uganda, 2011b), there were nonetheless pilot REDD+ projects being implemented ([Table 4.2](#)).

The Rhetoric Versus Practice in Carbon Forestry in Uganda

In this section, I present the rhetoric and practice of representation in the three case studies in turn, starting with the R-PP development. In the subsequent section, I will reflect on the effect of these programmes on substantive representation of forest-dependent communities.

Representation Rhetoric in R-PP Development

In 2009, Uganda received US\$ 200,000 from the World Bank's FCPF to develop its REDD+ R-PP. To receive the REDD+ finance, the financiers (World Bank and UN-REDD) require that interested developing countries must prepare for REDD+ through a process that provides room for input from indigenous and forest-dependent peoples and to ensure that the projects are responsive to their needs. Thus, both the FCPF and UN-REDD insist on participatory consultative processes to give local people and their representatives the opportunity to influence decision-making about REDD+. Thus, a joint UN-REDD and FCPF guideline explicitly states that:

Representation of all stakeholders, including indigenous and forest dependent people through their own existing process (e.g. council of elders, headmen and tribal leaders) including through representatives chosen by themselves through their own processes...consultations should facilitate dialogue and exchange of information, and consensus building reflecting broad community support should emerge from the consultation. (FCPF & UN-REDD, 2010, p. 3)

This case study therefore assessed how various stakeholders were represented, in particular, local forest-dependent communities (Mbeche, 2015). Was there substantive representation that was both accountable and responsive to local forest-dependent communities, or was there just a theatre of representation without substance?

The Practice of Representation in R-PP Development

Two interrelated participatory processes were organized as part of Uganda's REDD+ R-PP development. They include the World Bank regional consultations and the Norwegian embassy-supported extended consultations. I will briefly present the practice of representation in these

participatory processes, interrogating the question of who was chosen as a representative of local communities and how the consultations were conducted.

The World Bank Consultations: 2010

The R-PP development grant agreement between the Bank and the government of Uganda (World Bank, 2009) required a comprehensive stakeholder consultation and with a specific focus on forest-dependent local communities. However, in practice, invitation and participation in the workshops organized by the REDD+ secretariat appeared to have privileged 'experts' from the central government, local government and NGOs.

Between May and June 2010, the REDD+ secretariat invited 154 participants to the four regional⁸ R-PP participatory consultation meetings to represent the 115 districts at the time with a population of over 24 million people. There were 36 participants in the Eastern region, 44 in the Central region, 38 in the Western region and 36 in the North of the country (Mbeche, 2015, [Forthcoming](#)). Although there were slight variations in the number of participants in each stakeholder group, overall there was a higher proportion from central government ministries and agencies (32%); local government forestry and environmental officers (28%); NGOs (12%); and private company representatives (10%). Interestingly, representatives of local forest-dependent people accounted for only 6% of the participants. There was an even lower number of locally elected district representatives (5%). A total of 7 locally elected district councillors (average of 2 per region) were invited out of 2372 elected councillors in the rural districts of Uganda (Republic of Uganda, 2011b). These elected councillors are statutorily required to be accountable and responsive to the populace in their rural constituencies.

The secretariat gave three reasons for inviting largely experts to represent forest-dependent people. First was that REDD+ was a highly technical process and that local people might not understand. This might explain why the secretariat invited over 80% of the participants from

‘expert’ groups. Second, the Bank had given the REDD+ secretariat a limited period of time to develop the R-PP and therefore it would have been practically and logistically impossible to include all stakeholders from the grassroots and third, the budget available was limited. Interestingly, out of the US\$ 200,000 provided for R-PP development, World Bank allocated US\$ 200,000 to consultants, while the actual costs of organizing the regional workshops was just over US\$ 33,000. A simple calculation would show that the budget utilized for stakeholder consultation was about a quarter of consultant costs and just over one-sixth of the total available budget. Clearly, the allocation of material resources appears to privilege ‘experts’ over the ‘locals’.

Perhaps due to the perception by the secretariat that REDD+ was a complex subject, over half of the allocated time at the participatory meeting was used to ‘teach’ the participants about REDD+, how it would work and why it was necessary for it to be supported. To ensure that participants had understood the content of the lectures, a question and answer session followed the lectures. Participants were then put into groups where they were tasked to reflect on the drivers of deforestation. Most of the participants were in agreement that the lectures were necessary before deliberations due to what they termed as the ‘technical’ nature of REDD+. Clearly, the criteria of inviting representatives and the way in which the participatory consultations were conducted appear to focus on delivery of outputs and not on deliberations and inputs from local representatives at the meeting. I will reflect on the implications of this process on representation later on in the chapter.

The Norwegian Embassy-Supported Extended Consultations

The World Bank-supported participatory consultations were found to be deficient in meeting the R-PP requirements for stakeholder consultation (FCPF, 2011; Republic of Uganda, 2011b). Thus the Norwegian embassy in Kampala accepted to provide support of US\$ 183,500 to carry out extended consultations to forest-dependent communities (NGU, 2010). The REDD+ secretariat contracted ten NGOs⁹ led by Environmental

Alert—a Kampala-based national NGO to facilitate extended consultations. Each of them was required to work in areas where they have ongoing projects. Interviews with officials from seven of the ten NGOs showed that they selected individuals to represent various interest groups, based on their knowledge of the communities, but also from areas experiencing high levels of deforestation. All the participating NGOs confirmed that they selected participants from communities adjacent to forest reserves and in areas where they run projects.

The facilitating NGOs thus selected 1690 representatives from community leaders to represent different interest groups, including indigenous people representatives (Batwa of Western Uganda and Benet of Mt Elgon, Eastern Uganda), fishermen, charcoal makers, cultural organizations and so on. The selection of representatives from areas with high levels of deforestation was not surprising. The objectives of the participatory consultations were to (i) generate information on drivers of deforestation and forest degradation, (ii) understand the effects of deforestation and degradation on peoples' livelihoods, (iii) identify ongoing actions to address these effects and (iv) generate new strategies to address the effects (Environmental Alert & National Forestry Authority, 2011). While the consultations were meant to be on REDD+, little was mentioned about it. Instead it was introduced as a solution to the problem of deforestation in Uganda and therefore participants were asked to reflect on drivers of deforestation, interventions addressing it and what their roles could be in the new intervention. This suggests that they were being co-opted into REDD+.

The costs and benefits of REDD+ were not discussed in these meetings. Withholding information on REDD+ on the basis that it is complex, like in this case, does not meet the REDD+ requirement of seeking and obtaining the Free Prior and Informed Consent of local communities before proceeding with REDD+ (FPIC) (Anderson, 2011). Withholding information is also likely to jeopardize future acceptance of REDD+ arrangements by local people and communities (Kowler, Tovar, Ravikumar, & Larson, 2014). While the extended participatory consultations were carried out to inform the R-PP, the results were included as an appendix to the document, suggesting that the process only helps meet the donors' expectations.

The Nile Basin Clean Development Mechanism Reforestation Project

Context of Case Study

The Nile Basin Reforestation project, a World Bank-funded biocarbon initiative in southwestern Uganda, worked with a state agency, the National Forest Authority (NFA), who in turn signed agreements with local Collaborative Forest Management (CFM) groups to plant trees on the deforested areas of the Rwoho CFR.¹⁰ Although there are many stakeholders in the area, the management of the reserve is the responsibility of the NFA. However, the National Forestry and Tree Planting Act, 8 (Republic of Uganda, 2003), requires that the NFA manages the reserves in close collaboration and consultations with the different stakeholders. CFM arrangements are presented in the Act as a mutually beneficial arrangement in which a local community or forest user group and a responsible body share roles, responsibilities and benefits in a forest reserve (Republic of Uganda, 2003).

The project was aimed to provide a new financing mechanism to overcome the current barriers to establish timber plantations in Uganda and to allow communities to benefit from the CDM (UNFCCC, 2005). Therefore the involvement of local communities formed part of the UNFCCC requirements. The CDM project document stated that these communities would be entitled and supported to grow trees within the project boundary and to earn carbon credits in the framework of the project activities. Consequently, the NFA, as the main project implementer, confirmed in a letter to the UNFCCC and the World Bank that the CDM project was developed and implemented with 'low-income communities'.¹¹

Local communities are involved in the project either as formal participants or as non-participants. Formal 'participants' collaborate through pre-existing or newly formed community associations in each of the five project areas, and 'non-participants' are involved through employment on the plantation. NFA's rhetoric as reflected in the Rwoho-Bagamba CFR management plan states that "it is the expressed policy of NFA that

no communities will be left out in the management of forest reserves be they natural or plantations” (National Forestry Authority, 2006, p. ii). By the time of conducting the study, NFA had signed collaborative agreements with five CBOs¹²—the largest of which was the Rwoho Environmental Conservation and Protection Association (RECPA). This case study (Ruta, 2015) therefore focuses on the extent to which the CFM arrangement between RECPA and NFA responds to the needs and aspirations of local communities.

The Practice of Representation in the NFA-RECPA Collaboration

RECPA started in 2003 as a group interested in tree planting. By the time of signing the carbon agreement in 2006, RECPA had 250 members based on a one-time payment of membership fees of 10,000/=UGX (US\$ 3.84) and annual subscription fees of 5000/=UGX (US\$ 1.9) (RECPA records 2011). Of importance, however, is that following the signing of the carbon agreement with NFA, the founding members insisted on a payment of UGX 200, 000 (US\$ 76.9) by each member that wanted to be part of the ‘carbon’ sub-group—justified on the grounds that the money would be used to hire labour to tend for the trees under the World Bank Carbon Project. It must be stated that the group has a number of livelihood activities, including tree planting outside CFRs, beekeeping and even basket making.

In an area where most community members live below US\$ 2 a day, it would be unrealistic to expect the less well-to-do members to be able to pay the fee to be part of the carbon sub-group. Attempts by the less well-to-do members to be allowed to pay ‘in kind’ by providing their labour were not allowed by the officials, most of who had already paid. The effect of this requirement was exclusion of those that were not able to pay the carbon fees from the project.

Despite using the rhetoric of participatory ‘collaboration’, NFA retained the powers to define the responsibilities and benefits under the project. For example, NFA defined their own responsibilities to include (and therefore benefits to community members) providing land to

community members under licence, free seedlings, transportation of seedlings and technical guidance on tree planting. On the other hand, according to an NFA manager in Rwoho, the community members were expected to protect the forest against illegal activities as well as to help protect the forest from fire.

There is a widespread consensus based on interviews with both NFA officials and local community members that the 'collaboration' between the local communities and NFA had not delivered the expected benefits to the communities. While a few members within the Rwoho community would benefit from land to grow trees for carbon credits, the rest of the local communities lost previously held benefits like cultivation and also grazing in the forest reserves. This coincided with the loss of the 40% revenue from sales of timber to local authorities where the forest is located. Prior to the passing of the Forestry Act in 2003, the revenues from timber were shared with the defunct Forestry Department, NFA's predecessor. But even for the RECPA members that were part of the carbon project, the benefits did not appear to be forthcoming. While the members expected to receive payments for carbon credits by 2012, no such payments had been made by June 2013 (Ruta, 2015).

In addition, NFA had not provided support towards tree maintenance as had envisaged. By the time of the study, most members had dropped out of the collaboration because of the perception that the NFA is using them to meet their conservation needs without sharing meaningful benefits to them. While the CFM did not clearly explain the financial benefits for local people, especially from timber, the most visible and valuable income earner, it was implied that local people would receive some benefits during harvesting. But only 85 of the 250 community members were included in the carbon project by virtue of their ability to buy shares. This means that only those that were able to purchase shares would benefit when the trees mature for harvesting in 20 years (by 2026). Consistent with this case study, Peskett, Schreckenber, and Brown (2011) observe that the ability to participate and the terms of participation in carbon projects are shaped by a number of factors, including rules of entry, social norms, perceptions and the assets and attributes of those affected.

However, benefits from mature trees are unlikely to materialize following a recent spate of fires that destroyed over 60 ha of NFA forests and

35 ha of RECPA forests in 2012. According to some community members and NFA staff, the main cause of fire was sabotage by local people for being refused access to forest resources, and accidental land clearing near the forest boundary, an activity mainly carried out by women especially in the dry season.¹³ Interviews with forest patrol men also confirm that fire incidences increase where there is perceived unfair treatment by the community such as arrests, payment of bribes and fines resulting from grazing goats and collecting firewood or water in the forest. Indeed the perception that NFA is driving the ‘protectionist’ agenda can be discerned from a senior NFA official who said, “We need these people to keep and protect our forests”. Another senior NFA official based in Rwoho said of CFM, “It is very critical...it provides labour, protects the forests, reduces conflicts and makes supervision cheap.”¹⁴ Thus there is a protectionist and an efficiency expectation on the part of the NFA.

At the local community level, RECPA officials say that they represent the whole community, yet as the above discussion shows, it is not the case. RECPA is also facing a lack of accountability and responsiveness to its wider membership (250 people) and the rest of the community. Since they were given the boundary land, access to firewood, pasture, water and their gardens under *taungya*¹⁵ has been severely restricted—continuously bringing community members (including RECPA members) in conflict with forest guards and patrol men employed by the NFA, RECPA and private planters. In a case in Kirungu village in Rwoho, a forest paramilitary officer (locally called local defence unit officers—LDUs) arrested a boy and charged him 50,000 shillings (US\$ 20) for grazing in the forest (Ruta, 2015). The local people confronted him publicly and threatened him with death until he yielded and released the goats he seized.

In another case, a forest guard confiscated goats but after protests and seeking the mediation of the local councillor, he yielded and released the goats. Internally, RECPA has not held any annual general meeting for three years (2010–2013) and there seems to be lack of interests in the functioning of RECPA from community members who are not members of the RECPA carbon sub-group. The founding members continued to be officials of the group, which they occupied by the time of field research in 2013.

Representation in the MERECP

Case Study Overview and Representation Rhetoric

Mt Elgon is an important transboundary ecosystem straddling between Kenya and Uganda. The ecosystem particularly on the Uganda side has experienced high levels of deforestation and degradation attributed to local communities' increased dependency on forest resources. Consequently, MERECP was implemented (2006–2013) with funding from the Norwegian Agency for Development Cooperation (NORAD) to provide incentives to conserve the forest but also support alternative livelihoods that would help in reducing the pressure on the ecosystem. The main objective of the project was to promote the sustainable use of shared resources, benefitting livelihoods, mitigating and adapting to anticipated climate change. It worked through three approaches: (i) direct grants of US\$ 10,000 to selected community groups to establish Community Revolving Funds (CRF); (ii) conferring 'user rights' and cash payments for planting and maintenance of trees on a degraded area of at least five ha per community group; and (iii) payments for avoided deforestation to a community group that undertakes activities that reduce deforestation (Nakangu, 2013).

These objectives suggest that the programme was designed with a clear recognition of the role of local communities in forest conservation and a desire to be responsive to the livelihood needs of local people by including them in project implementation. Community involvement and their substantive representation was the starting point of project initiatives to reduce deforestation and degradation. This new set of institutional arrangements invariably changed the benefits of various actors. How did this model work with regard to representation of members of the community groups and the rest of the community generally?

Practice of Representation in the MERECP Project

The MERECP project was implemented by the Lake Victoria Environment Commission (LVEC), an agency of the East African Commission due its

transboundary nature. The Lake Victoria Basin Commission (LVBC) selected the MWE—henceforth the Ministry—as a central-level agency to undertake the overall coordination and monitoring of the project at the national level. The ministry worked through the UWA to coordinate and monitor project activities on the ground. For its coordinating role, the Ministry received US\$ 30,000. At the local level, the five local governments, through the district environmental officers, were contracted to monitor project activities and for their role received US\$ 8700 each. Interestingly, the district councils made up of elected leaders were not aware of this agreement as they were signed by district environment officers who were MERECP focal persons. Sidestepping of locally elected leaders is not new in Uganda. An officer with the International Union for the Conservation of Nature (IUCN) working in the local area claimed that these leaders are often sidestepped because they ‘politicize’ the process hence slowing down project implementation. This is another instance of using project implementation efficiency arguments to justify ignoring local governance structures akin to what Pretty (1995) called ‘functional participation’.

MERECPs implementing agency the UWA chose to work with CBOs to undertake the project activities. In conjunction with their focal persons, UWA selected ten CBOs to carry out project activities. The criteria set out for CBO selection included those whose membership was drawn from households that are adjacent to National Park and Forest Reserve areas; registered with appropriate local authority bodies; that have opened and are operating a bank account; that are wide enough in their charter and mandate to allow undertaking of diverse income-generating activities (IGAs) and not restricted to a single sub-sector; and that are involved in land- or farm-based activities. In practice, however, it was mainly CBOs with existing relationships with the UWA that were selected.

Interrogating How the Project Was Implemented

This section of the chapter is based on an assessment of the operations of two CBOs selected by the UWA—Kapchebut Farmers CBO and Kwigate CBO—in Kapchorwa district of Mt Elgon in Uganda (Nakangu, 2013).

While both CBOs received US\$ 10,000 for setting up a revolving fund to support livelihoods of members, Kapchebut received an additional US\$ 10,000 for avoided deforestation, which is protection of intact natural forest patches which stand adjacent to the selected communities and settlements in the Mt Elgon area.

Kapchebut Farmers CBO

Kapchebut Farmers CBO was already existing for about five years prior to being chosen as a partner in the MERECP project. The group's leadership made most of the decisions regarding the projects that would be implemented with the US\$ 20,000 they received and the criteria for accessing the revolving fund loans. They purchased a coffee farm and a piece of land where they put up an office. The remaining money was loaned to 40 members—10 of whom were CBO officials. While most members received amounts ranging from US\$ 30 to US\$ 100, the 10 officials received amounts ranging from US\$ 200 to US\$ 600.

This skewed allocation of loans in favour of officials led to complaints and in fighting within the group that resulted into divisions and defection of some of its members. Some of the defectors formed a splinter group and decided to use the loans they had received from the mother group as their own revolving fund. A chairlady of the splinter group argued that the officials were lending money to businessmen and members of other communities contrary to what had been agreed on among group members. She also said that the Kapchebut officials kept changing payment terms that were prohibitive and punitive for them.

The accusations of mismanagement and counter-accusations between the group leaders and its members helped the community to understand that the project was meant to benefit them all. Hence the community members started to demand accountability from the CBO through their elected leaders. An attempt by the local parish council leadership to inspect both the accounts and activities of Kapchebut CBO was blocked by its leaders. Interestingly, while the LVBC had contracted the LCs to monitor the project activities, Kapchebut CBO

was not informed about this and it was not included in their agreement with UWA. It took the intervention of LVBC before the LC could play its role.

With regard to protecting the intact forest patches, the CBO members who had benefited from project funds regularly patrol park boundaries on behalf of UWA to deter entry. However, other community members that feel excluded have contested what they call benefits 'going to a small number of people'. These contestations have been reflected in threats to some group members, sabotaging project activities like destroying beehives in the park and tree seedlings planted as part of the reforestation programme. The Kapchebut group leaders eventually lodged a criminal case against the splinter group in the law court, accusing them of sabotage and refusal to repay their loans.

Kwigate CBO

Kwigate CBO had a total of 35 members by the time they received the US\$ 10,000 for setting up a revolving fund. The group members collectively decided to loan each other up to a maximum of US\$ 100. Initially, the group started off with a commitment to transparency by publicly posting loan allocations. Analysis of the records posted on the walls of the group offices showed that all the 35 members had benefited from a loan ranging from US\$ 30 to US\$ 200. Interestingly, the average loan for 26 ordinary members was US\$ 60 (UGX 200, 000) which was within the acceptable limit of US\$ 100. However, the average loan issued to each of the 9 officials was US\$ 200, with the chairman and loan officer getting a loan of US\$ 400 each.

Clearly, the CBO officials benefited disproportionately and way above the acceptable limit set by the group. Due to pressure from other community members to benefit from the revolving fund, the officials made a decision to give loans to non-group members. Based on information received from the group's treasurer, 65 non-members were loaned an average of US\$ 30. While the records of the members were clearly displayed on the wall, those of non-members were not displayed.

While the decision to issue loans to non-members showed some form of responsiveness to the wider community by Kwigate CBO, it appeared to benefit some group officials and not the entire group. There was a widespread belief among members that officials were not remitting interest repayments from non-members to the group. One official confirmed that the chairman and loan officer had advanced loans to some non-members without the authorization of the committee.

As a result of the perception that the groups officials were benefiting disproportionately, some members had decided to default on their repayments. This was despite the chairman saying that the loan defaults stood at only 10% of the grantees. This was compounded by the fact that information on loan repayment was not available to the public. In addition, many members spoken to perceived that the non-members were given loans at a higher interest rate determined by the officials without the knowledge of the other members.

In addition to advancing loans to members, the group also started a beekeeping project in the National Park. Neither the chairman nor the treasurer could confirm how much was spent constructing and setting up the 55 beehives at the National Park. When questioned about this, the chairman referred to the treasurer, who, when questioned, stated that he needed to check the records to know how much they had spent. Many members spoken to did not know how much their group spent on setting up the beekeeping project either. This unwillingness to disclose the amount of money spent on the group's flagship project and lack of information by members on the project suggest a lack of downward accountability.

Worse still, no income had been declared by the officials from the beekeeping project by September 2012, one and a half years after the project was started. The CBO chairman and treasurer blamed heavy rains for the failure to harvest any honey from the beehives—a reason many members were dissatisfied with. Due to the high level of dissatisfaction among the members, in August 2012, at the CBOs annual general meeting—the first in two years—the members decided to remove the chair and loans officer but, due to fear that they would not pay their loans, decided to give them less powerful executive positions.

Discussion: Effect of Choice and Recognition on Local Representation in Carbon Forestry

All the three cases show that when carbon forestry-based climate change mitigation interventions choose narrow membership-based institutions, the effects range from exclusion, co-optation, contestation, conflict, unequal benefit sharing and lack of downward accountability as chosen institutions become accountable to donors as opposed to local communities. These outcomes are discussed in detail below.

Exclusion of Large Numbers of Community Members and Marginalized Groups

Despite espoused intentions of having an ‘inclusive’ involvement of communities and in particular local actors, all the three interventions chose to work through experts or institutions requiring one to be a member (CBOs and NGOs). This excluded a majority of the ‘community’ members that were not members of these groups from decision-making and benefit sharing. For example, despite a claim in R-PP development for inclusive participation, the REDD+ preparation was dominated by ‘experts’ from central government ministries, NGOs and to some extent local government technical officers (Mbeche, 2015). The reason given for this was that with the technical nature of REDD+, it was necessary to utilize experts and organizations with technical expertise. In addition, the budget allocations appeared to privilege experts. For example, out of the available budget of US\$ 200,000, only one-sixth (US\$ 33,000) was used for stakeholder consultation, with the rest going to pay for consultants in R-PP preparation. Needless to say, these requirements excluded stakeholders that were considered to lack capacity. Technical arguments have been employed elsewhere to exclude local forest-dependent people with a negative impact on their representation in decision-making (Ayers, 2011).

This scenario was observed across all the three cases. In the CDM and MERECAP projects, for example, the intervening agents chose to

work with CFM and CBOs, respectively, as provided for in forestry and wildlife laws. However, decision-making in the CBOs was in the hands of only a few people; consequently, the majority local populace who are not members of the CBOs are excluded. In the CDM project, for example, the criteria to participate which included land ownership and payment of membership fees excluded women and other marginalized groups in the community. Similarly, elected local government authorities, the substantive representatives of local people and communities, are excluded in planning and implementation of carbon forestry programmes in Uganda. Even when they are involved, they are given subordinate roles to parallel but more privileged local actors (see also Nuesiri, 2016). The tendency to sacrifice local people's involvement in favour of project output and efficiency presents a critical challenge in designing locally accountable and responsive climate change mitigation programmes.

Co-optation, Contestation and Conflicts

In all the three case studies, there is clearly closer cooperation between project implementers and the leaders of the local institutions they chose as project partners. However, this cooperation appears to benefit just a few members within the chosen groups and the forestry agencies for effective delivery on their outputs—suggesting co-optation. In the MERECP project in Mt Elgon, for example, the selected CBOs now enjoy closer collaboration with the project implementers—the Lake Victoria Commission and more importantly the UWA. In addition to the grants received from the UWA, the CBO groups have increased access to the national park and some of them have been allowed to carry out beekeeping in the park. Some of the groups immediately adjacent to the park now regularly patrol the park to deter 'illegal' entry on behalf of UWA. Considering that the benefits from the revolving fund and deforestation avoidance are greater for the intervening conservation agency, and skewed in favour of the CBO officials, as opposed to the CBO members and wider community, this amounts to co-optation of CBO leaders by the intervening conservation agency.

Similarly, in the CDM case, CFM groups feel they were ‘misinformed’—the costs for tree maintenance are too high compared to benefits as a result of which some members have dropped out. In the R-PP development, large numbers of local people were included in the extended participatory consultations, but the focus of the consultations was to inform them about REDD+ and how they could be involved in effective REDD+ implementation (Mbeche, [Forthcoming](#)). Therefore, a participatory process which merely informs the local people about REDD+ and how they can contribute to implementation serves to co-opt them into the REDD+ project (Crook & Sverrisson, 2001). In addition, other community members that feel excluded have contested what they call benefits ‘going to a small number of people’. These contestations have been reflected in threats to some group members, sabotaging project activities and in some cases full-blown conflict between local communities.

Lack of Downward Accountability Mechanisms

Our cases reveal that the way in which institutions for partnership were selected meant that most of them accounted upwards to the intervening agents and less to the communities. For example, CBOs chosen in the MERECP project only accepted to be answerable to the project management office and not to the local government or to the members. Similarly, RECPA, the largest of the CFM groups in the CDM project in Rwoho, had not conducted an annual general meeting in three years (up to June 2013) and no executive meetings had taken place either. While reports were submitted to the funders in R-PP preparation, no feedback has been provided to communities—suggesting upward accountability. Moreover, allocation of resources for R-PP preparation privileged experts, suggesting a lack of responsiveness to the needs and aspirations of local forest-dependent communities.

Despite the lack of downward accountability and apparent high upward accountability, the CBO members and wider community members are employing certain mechanisms to bring CBO leaders and project implementers to account. A common mechanism is dropping out of the project or exit (Hirschman, 1970). Due to the perception that the CDM

project was less beneficial to them, a considerable number of farmers in the CDM project have also stopped investing in tree maintenance, evidenced by the fact that no new shares were being bought in the association and membership fees were not being paid. Exit as a mechanism of forcing accountability was also observed in the MERECP project.

In some cases, however, some members have used active non-institutional mechanisms to pressure the intervening agencies to be responsive. As already reported, some community members protesting their exclusion have set carbon forests on fire in the CDM project in Rwoho as well as opposing project activities in Mt Elgon. Since it might not be possible for non-members to sanction membership-based organizations such as CBOs and NGOs, even when their actions deserve sanctions, it is reasonable to argue that they (membership-based organizations) should not be allowed to take decisions or implement programmes that require leadership by locally elected and representative public institutions (Mbeche, 2015, [Forthcoming](#)). Rather, they can work with or through these locally elected and substantively representative public institutions.

Conclusions

REDD+ and other carbon forestry programmes promise inclusion of marginalized groups and forest-dependent people in decision-making around resource governance—so that their interests can be represented. This chapter sought to assess the extent to which this rhetoric of representation is reflected in the design and implementation of carbon forest programmes in Uganda. The study finds that despite espoused intentions of having an ‘inclusive’ involvement of communities and in particular local actors, all the three interventions that I present chose to work through experts or via institutions that required individuals to be members (such as CBOs, NGOs, etc.) if they were to benefit. Thus representation is performed through participation processes where nominated representatives have no legitimacy or power and institutions that are subject to citizen control are circumvented. The effect of these

arrangements has been exclusion of the wider community, co-optation, contestation, conflict, unequal benefit sharing, lack of accountability or selected institutions being accountable to donors as opposed to communities.

The analysis in this chapter suggests that the choices made by intervening agents in Uganda's carbon forestry programmes promote institutional pluralism. A plurality of parallel institutions such as CBOs and NGOs is chosen in favour of democratically elected local governments largely based on efficiency and delivery of outputs and not substantive representation of local groups as such. Without democratic local institutions, pluralism can enable the strongest groups to capture decisions. As the chapter shows, institutional mechanisms of holding these representatives were lacking. This is not surprising considering that they were not mandated by the represented and have therefore no obligation to account downwards to the forest-dependent people. Institutional mechanisms of accountability are necessary to ensure that the claims to representation made by representatives are not lost.

Overall, the chapter shows that participation is not sufficient to deliver representation unless mechanisms are put in place for them to do so. First, for substantive representation to occur, institutions that are subject to citizen control should be prioritized for partnership. By giving local government a clear oversight role for the allocation of public resources and decision-making, institutional arrangements can be structured to support local democratic governments. In addition, institutions that seek to represent local populations must have some sort of authorization and the represented have to retain some form of control over the representatives. This could be in the form of suitable constraints or explicit instructions to the representatives. In addition, commitments to representation must be matched with both financial and other resources. With regard to large-scale policy processes such as R-PP preparation, intervening agencies should put in place real-time independent assessments to ensure that participation permits representation. These findings indicate that introducing new institutional players in the local arena of forest governance would call for deliberate measures to increase accountability and responsiveness to the needs of forest-dependent people.

Notes

1. REDD+ is a market-based conservation mechanism involving the transfer of funds from developed countries to reward forest-based communities in developing countries for their conservation effort (Angelsen et al., 2009) while PES is a voluntary transaction where a buyer purchases a well-defined ecosystem service from a service provider (individuals, community groups, companies or government) on condition that the service provided can be verified (Engel, Pagiola, & Wunder, 2008). CDM works beyond forests and it allows industrialized countries with emission reduction targets to invest in projects (energy sector, waste management, transport, agriculture and forestry) in developing countries and to use the emission reductions yielded to comply with their climate protection targets (Ruta, 2015; UNFCCC, 2010).
2. Mandate is present when representatives (representatives) act under the explicit or implicit directions from the represented (Pettit, 2010) or when they have been authorized by the represented to act on their behalf (Pitkin, 1967).
3. From 1962 to 1986, when Museveni's National Resistance Movement (NRM) took over, Uganda had seven governments. However, it was Milton Obote (who served twice) and Idi Amin who served longest during this period. Other short-term presidents during this period include Lule, Binasisa, Paulo Muwanga and Tito Okello. President Museveni through his NRM has served since 1986, making him one of the longest serving heads of state in Africa. For details, see Oloka-Onyango and Barya (1997), Moncrieffe (2004) and Barkan (2011).
4. Uganda is subdivided into four administrative units called regions, which are further subdivided into districts—a total of 112 by 2012 (Western, 26; Northern, 30; Central, 24 and Eastern, 32).
5. Districts and their sub-units are local government authorities made of elected councillors.
6. Several traditional kingdoms were abolished during the regime of Milton Obote. For details of traditional authority systems in Uganda, see Mamdani (1996) and Moncrieffe (2004).
7. These include Albertine Rift Forest Carbon project in Western Uganda (KESI, 2009), Trees for Global Benefits project and EU-supported SawLog Grant Scheme (Republic of Uganda, 2011a).

8. Uganda is subdivided into 4 administrative units called regions, which are further subdivided into districts—a total of 112 by 2012 (Western, 26; Northern, 30; Central, 24 and Eastern, 32).
9. The NGOs selected included Environmental Alert, the International Union for Conservation of Nature, CARE-Uganda, Water Governance Institute, Tree Talk, ECOTRUST, NAPE, IPAC/TABORA, CODECA and ACODE. IUCN and CARE are international NGOs, while the rest are national NGOs.
10. Rwoho Central Reserve is one of the protected area forests managed by the National Forestry Authority. It covers an area of 9073 ha and has suffered deforestation in recent years.
11. Statement of declaration of low-income communities and individuals to UNFCC on 25 March 2008 by the executive director, NFA.
12. In addition to RECPA which was allocated 60 ha, other CBOs included (hectarage allocated in brackets) KAFODA (65.6 ha), SWAGEN (35.9 ha), KADA (22.7 ha) and BECA (22 ha). See Ruta (2015) for details.
13. In 2010, one woman got severely burnt in an attempt to put out a fire that started from her garden out of fear for impending repercussions in the Rwoho village.
14. Interviews with senior NFA official, Kampala, 2 May 2012.
15. A practice where young trees are tended in cultivated plots until they reach knee height.

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5

Displacement, Power and REDD+: A Forest History of Carbonized Exclusion

Emma Jane Lord

Introduction

Thirty-one peasant households lay scattered in a dry tropical woodland, in an isolated pocket of fertile land bordering a river, near the shores of an East African lake. The soil produced an abundant and varied harvest of crops and fruit, including palm oil, the most lucrative local crop. On 14 August 2012, after completion of the maize harvest, an armed troop entered the area. They were a mixed formation of District Natural Resource Officers, Park Rangers and police. They were guided by local men from a neighbouring village, working as Voluntary Forest Monitors (FM) for an international conservation non-governmental organization (NGO) in the nearest large town. On arrival at each household, they threatened and beat occupants, confiscated valuable possessions such as

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chickens and tools, and destroyed crops. They ordered peasants, at gunpoint, to set fire to their houses and harvest stores:

I was beaten there with my wife and my children also were beaten. Thereafter, they cut all the bananas, all the palm oils, they left nothing there. There inside, there were like ten bags of this rice paddy, they burnt everything, they burnt the maize, they burnt the house, then they had nothing left. (Leader of forest settlement—10 June 2014)

Men and women were severely beaten using sticks and a rubber inner tube. In one hamlet peasants were forced to eat soap. A ten-year-old boy suffered fatal internal injuries after being kicked below the navel:

Where I fell, after they struck me I shouted for the child to ‘come out, you will just get burned’, when the child heard that the house was on fire, because it was in the dry season so the child crawled outside then at the door he met just the boot from [Local forest monitor] under the navel and then that boot just broke the [internal organ] and he fell all the way to where I was. Then the child kept getting sick frequently and he died later in October after I couldn’t have some money for his treatment. (Evicted farmer, 5 July 2014)

Nine peasants were arrested and transported by vehicles to town. On a break in the journey, they were severely beaten by the roadside. Some sustained lasting physical deformation. In town they were imprisoned without medication.

The following day, in another geographically independent, highly fertile, remote patch of dry tropical woodland to the south, lay another set of 40 scattered households. Another set of FM from a different neighbouring village guided an armed troop of authorities. On arrival at each house they seized possessions and destroyed crops, palm and fruit trees, beat occupants, burned houses and harvest stores. In this location, chickens were burned inside their coops. Women and children were not beaten. Men were severely beaten leading to some instances of crippling. That night, peasants slept outside the burnt foundations of their houses, under the open sky. Unperceived coordinates stored inside handheld global

positioning system (GPS) devices of the local FM linked their locations to computers in the NGO's offices in town and overseas.

The empirical description of displacement opening this chapter reconstructs events of 14 August 2012, in Kasakati, referred to throughout this chapter as settlement 1 (S1) and 15 August 2012 in Mwashwa, settlement 2 (S2), in a remote part of rural Tanzania. These instances of crisis were rigorously triangulated from independently located peasants' accounts, collected during five months of fieldwork in 2014 across four villages. Focusing on displacement as a time-bound event visualizes violence as spectacular. Journalists typically represent violence near and far, criminal shootings, war and domestic violence as newsworthy forms of violence. From the 1960s, academic scholars have broadened understandings of the causation and agency of violent effects to include structural violence (Galtung, 1969).

Analysts have questioned how economic and political decisions leading to unintended violence, such as budget cuts in a hospital, can be any less ethically damaging than intentionally perpetrated violence (Tyner, 2016). Unspectacular violence at multiple scales, from post-traumatic stress to environmental contamination, highlights how violence enacted slowly over time decouples original causes from what Nixon (2011) calls 'slow violence'. Resource imperialism discounts the political agency, damages cultural practices of poor countries on the receiving end of exported waste and pollution from rich countries. These imperceptible forms of violence create complex and descriptive analytical categories. This is about how causality may not be directly and obviously connected to crisis events. Root cause analysis of vulnerability and security highlights the importance of access analysis to assets and social protections within their contexts (Ribot, 2014).

The spectacular description of beatings, burning and destruction opening this chapter was catalysed by multiple causal factors and agents. These events were not random and gratuitous but planned, with an unquantifiable degree of premeditation, on an out-of-sight continent. This chapter analyses the unspectacular, imperceptible, multiple causes traced from the single outcome of these displacement events, through the lens of access (Ribot & Peluso, 2003). This vulnerability analysis is not a case of climate adaptation but rather climate mitigation.

The empirical description of displacement opening this chapter was observed from a pilot project of the global mechanism ‘reducing emissions from deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries; and the role of conservation, sustainable management of forests and enhancement of forest carbon stocks in developing countries’ (REDD+). REDD+ developed as a global carbon offsetting scheme, aiming to simultaneously address the problems of deforestation and carbon mitigation. REDD+ has attracted an unprecedented level of investment in tropical forestry and evolved multiple objectives. The term ‘co-benefits’ distinguishes the objectives of REDD+ projects concerned with biodiversity conservation and community livelihoods from the objectives concerned with capturing carbon. At field level the outcomes of REDD+ are highly heterogeneous (Simonet, Karsenty, de Perthuis, Newton, & Schaap, 2014).

This chapter addresses the pilot project scale, working outwards from the micro level. This level of detail includes events within the forest boundary and outlying sub-villages, as opposed to primarily within village centres. Results are based on 66 in-depth interviews with peasants, pastoralists, local politicians, implementers of REDD+, NGO staff and academics, as well as participant observation, letters and local government records and project documents, collected during five months of fieldwork in 2014.

This case study shows empirically the consequences of political and technical processes associated with REDD+. Political processes in this regard have resulted in competition for rights, resources and benefits from forests—and in this case the benefits distributed from the REDD+ project. Results show power dynamics of recentralization taking place, and contestation from local people empowered during previous decentralization initiatives. This will demonstrate empirically in this chapter how REDD+, when introduced into a democratically decentralized context, can enact a recentralization of forest governance (Phelps, Webb, & Agrawal, 2010). Technical processes show how the majority of REDD+ funding has been channelled into contracted consultancy, privileging international scientific experts, national and regional developmental elites at the expense of forest livelihoods. This supports arguments that monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) processes and other activities, framed as technical, hold an overriding political

element (Gupta, Lovbrand, Turnhout, & Vijge, 2012). Therefore expertise has heightened existing patterns of elite capture and recentralized power towards international elites.

Literature review suggests that conservation and livelihood objectives of REDD+ are being addressed by policy designers (Turnhout et al., 2017). However, this is not conclusive from the published work available at this time. Dominant scientific and policy narratives have been shown to clash with local users' perspectives of forest histories (Leach, 2008). Focusing narrowly on carbon at the international policy level renders forest legible through quantification and standardization processes that Gupta et al. (2012) call a 'carbonization' of forest governance. This has raised concerns that a strong focus on performance-based payments, favoured in the original REDD+ negotiations, would simplify the complex aspects involved in implementing co-benefits on the ground. Livelihood provision and biodiversity conservation are considered valuable functions of tropical forests (Turnhout et al., 2017).

The analysis of this chapter highlights how in-depth readings of forest history reveal dynamic boundary conflicts that remain illegible to carbon's global gaze. To what extent are centralization processes related to technical dimensions of REDD? How do material and socially constructed causes produce forest carbon as a new commodity? What are the consequences for marginalized actors bearing the costs of REDD+, in contrast to elite actors capturing the benefits? Solutions to these inequities remain elusive. Lohmann (2009) raises issues of the lack of regulation and independent inspection within global carbon markets. The term 'carbon accountability' holds a double meaning in relation to REDD+; firstly, *taking nature into account* through the carbonization of forest governance. Secondly, *holding to account* those elite actors involved in REDD+ implementation as a normative imperative (Gupta et al., 2012).

Accountability implies answerability, invoking the politics of responsibility for outcomes. Solving such complex challenges is beyond the scope of this analysis. However these results shed some light on the processes involved in carbonized exclusion. This case thus contributes to further debate on the need to embed climate governance within its local context, to overcome exclusion challenges of the carbonization of REDD+.

Inequity in REDD+: Dislocating Citizens from Arenas of Debate

Contemporary scholarship in the field of tropical forestry has researched interdisciplinary lines of investigation. These include the human livelihood benefits derived from forests (Wunder, Angelsen, & Belcher, 2014), the effect of local and national institutional arrangements on forest conservation (Ostrom, 2007), forest-related outcomes of participation and decentralization of decision-making and more recently, trade-offs and synergies between carbon storage and livelihood benefits on forest commons (Chhatre & Agrawal, 2009). International policies separate geographically rural citizens from the forums of negotiation in which decision-making and agenda setting takes place. REDD+ as an international, multi-scalar, interdisciplinary policy provides an example of how international arenas of political representation become fragmented and complex (Gupta, Pistorius, & Vijge, 2016; Palmujoki, 2013).

Negotiated through the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), REDD+ gained momentum at the 15th annual UNFCCC Conference of the Parties (COP15) meeting in Copenhagen, 2009. As discussions over legally binding commitments to reduce carbon emissions reached an impasse, developed countries pledged their mitigation actions, including financial support through bilateral and multilateral programmes for REDD+ readiness and pilot activities (Pistorius, 2012). Carbon-focused aspects of REDD+ were conceptualized as the world's largest Payments of Ecosystems Services (PES) scheme (Gómez-Baggethun, De Groot, Lomas, & Montes, 2010; Wunder, 2005).

This stemmed from the assumption that economic approaches are the most appropriate to tackle unsustainable forest exploitation. Countries of the 'North' were suspicious that their money could be wasted in the 'South' due to apparently high levels of 'corruption', they generally perceived taking place in these countries. Investors considered it necessary to 'prove' the biophysical outcomes of their money through performance-driven MRV. Countries of the 'South' would be

responsible for deciding exactly how to implement REDD+, in order to retain sovereignty. Technical processes in this regard have resulted in capacity gaps issues between northern experts and their developing world contemporaries, and between forestry officials and local people (Larson, 2011).

Conservation specialists can, nevertheless, constitute another technical form of expertise. REDD+ has been criticized as an effectively top-down approach (Marino & Ribot, 2012; Ribot, 2011). Policy designs may appear 'neutral' or 'fair' and crafted through consultative 'participation'. Often this masks actual marginalization at field level of participative forestry projects, through deepening power asymmetries rooted in unequal access to capital, labour and credit (Ribot, 2011; Ribot & Oyono, 2005; Ribot & Peluso, 2003). Within attempted decentralization reforms that aim to increase equity, efficiency and democratization at the local level, power tends to gravitate back upwards, in other words, recentralize, towards the higher levels (Larson & Soto, 2008; Potete & Ribot, 2011; Ribot, Agrawal, & Larson, 2006). REDD+ was predicted by forestry experts to exacerbate existing power inequities, leading to elite capture and marginalization of forest-dependent communities (Ribot & Larson, 2012).

These patterns leave forest-based peasants particularly vulnerable in instances where their land tenure is insecure (Awono, Somorin, Atyi, & Levang, 2014; Bolin, Lawrence, & Leggett, 2013; Resosudarmo et al., 2014; Sunderlin et al., 2014). Compared with preceding forestry projects aiming to decentralize control over forest resources, it was feared that REDD+ would encourage recentralization, thus reversing historical trends (Phelps et al., 2010).

Recognizing such 'risks', REDD+ negotiators turned to the matter of addressing potential trade-offs for forest-fringe communities, through 'Safeguards'. Safeguards are 'a set of principles, rules and procedures put in place to achieve social and environmental goals', covering 'transparency, participation of stakeholders, protection of biodiversity and ecosystem services, respect for right of indigenous and local communities' (Roe, Streck, Pritchard, & Costenbader, 2013). At COP17 in Durban the decision was made for voluntary, as opposed to mandatory, reporting for

REDD+ safeguards. Critics claim that this is too lenient (Ribot & Larson, 2012).

REDD+ projects demonstrate safeguards through providing information on safeguard protections and activities implemented including a detailed list of criteria and indicators applied. However, these administrative checks take place after institutional choices of actor configurations have already taken place (Kashwan, 2014). Recognition of authority structures influences power distributions (Nuesiri, 2015; Ribot, Chhatre, & Lankina, 2008).

Developmental decentralization initiatives claim to empower democratically elected local democracies through decentralization investment. Although such initiatives often increase participation in the local management of natural resources, they rarely transfer power and resources to democratic local governments (Jusrut, 2015; Nuesiri, 2015; Ribot, 2008). Decentralization reform of natural resource management tends to introduce new and competing institutional arrangements—committees, customary chiefs, private bodies, NGOs and select civil society organizations that can be considered a ‘parallel’ authority in relation to elected local government (Ribot, 2008; Ribot et al., 2008). Local people have no leverage in negotiations between NGOs and other organizations involved in REDD+ (Nuesiri, 2015). Therefore the institutional context into which REDD+ is introduced is already far from optimal.

A growing body of literature documents the negative consequences of carbon mitigation projects, termed ‘fortress carbon’ (Leach & Scoones, 2015). These studies show how abstract incentives, in cases, translate into exclusionary processes from the perspective of marginal groups, reworking inequity, distribution of resources and property relations (Mahanty, Dressler, Milne, & Filer, 2013; Nel & Hill, 2013). Asiyambi (2016) argues emergent tenure complexities are immanent to the contested terrain and cannot be isolated from analysis unfolding across levels. The ‘carbonized exclusion’ they uncover with their case study shows the importance of assessing REDD+ projects in relation to their contexts. This case study adds to this body of literature on the exclusionary processes of forest conservation for carbon mitigation.

Carbonized Exclusion Through the Lens of Access-Based Causal Analysis

Access-based causal analysis traces the multiple causes of a single outcome, including contextually grounded, historical analysis of inequity (Ribot, 2014). Analysing cause invokes the politics of blame and responsibility. Moral obligations exist within many societies to provide shelter, employment and other basic provisions for every person. Ideologically speaking, failure to do so can be considered as the responsibility of all. How can these principals be translated to the globalization of climate as a universal concept? The solutions to the hardships experienced within the developing world—on account of increasingly varied and unpredictable climates—are not to be found within self-referential vaults of ‘big data’, vigilated by scientists. Rather, the socially embedded dynamics of inclusion and exclusion, privilege and marginalization underlie climate-induced crises leading to hunger and migration.

This chapter analyses the outcomes of REDD+ as a climate mitigation policy from within a contextually grounded, historically situated locality. Remote sensing technology can estimate global forest transition change rates from afar. Lidar sensing can quantify forest biomass to a high degree of accuracy by transmitting lasers from a plane. Yet the production of forest carbon in situ is difficult to predict, because at the policy design level this new commodity remains intangible (Mahanty, Milne, Dressler, & Filer, 2012). How are the social relations of forest carbon evolving? How does capital translate into action across territorial space?

These questions can be unpacked through positivist, constructivist or combined analytics. Carbon offsetting policies can become contradictory. Property rights are recognized through compensatory payments, whilst simultaneously requiring behaviour change for avoided deforestation (Mahanty et al., 2012). The assumption being made by international policymakers is that those actors receiving compensation for REDD+ and those bearing the costs are one and the same. This economic rationality is vastly over-simplistic and does not hold in a field context (Jusrut, 2015). Through the lens of access, this analysis intends to contribute to the question of how to bring accountability into climate mitigation

through REDD+, given the added complexity of forest carbon as a new commodity.

Commodity chain analysis theorizes access by following commodities from production, through a series of interlinked exchanges to final use (Ribot, 1998). Charcoal, as a concrete product, involves social interactions and negotiations over price. This renders the analysis partially constructivist, to complement positivist economic data. The relational aspects of carbon commodification are even more complex, as the intensive use of knowledge involved creates hierarchies of expertise. Access analysis explains how law is only one dimension amongst many access mechanisms that define ownership and use of resources and property (Ribot & Peluso, 2003). Whether legal or illegal, or extra-legal, access can be negotiated—controlled or maintained—through structural and relational access mechanisms: including knowledge, social identity, social relations, capital, labour and markets.

Introducing causality to access analysis raises questions of responsibility and blame. Ribot (2014) distinguishes the risk-hazards approach from the entitlements and livelihoods school and compares the two analytical lenses for the study of climate-related causes of vulnerability. In this case, unpacking causality, responsibility and blame in climate mitigation—as opposed to adaptation—relates to the question of carbon accountability in the sense of *holding to account* actors involved in REDD+ (Gupta et al., 2012).

Starting with a single outcome, described in the introduction of this case study, could lead to the question: ‘Why were the houses burnt?’ This could lead us to direct factors of capital, social identity and social relations. The district officers were paid for their involvement in the evictions (capital) whereas FM often worked voluntarily in exchange for training and status afforded by the position (social identity). The NGO could not legitimately implement projects involving the use of firearms without the involvement of the district, and the district rely on the local FM to guide them to remote forest households (negotiation through social relations). Elite actors have also contributed to this causal chain, masked behind bureaucratic processes. This includes the NGO, consultants, donors and even international experts involved in setting the agenda for REDD+. Who is responsible for the outcome and to which extent?

In order to include these actors in the analysis, it is necessary to ask another, more subtle question based on subsequent events. The following section introduces the context and actors involved in the case study. This will lead into our analytical question, according to a particular interpretation of events.

Political, Environmental and Institutional Context of the Case Study

The context of this case study reveals historical, biophysical, indirect and direct causal factors that have contributed to crisis events. REDD+ in Tanzania builds on the governance arrangements developed through Participatory Forest Management, using village-level political structures (Burgess et al., 2010). As a post-colonialist and post-socialist country, Tanzania's customary land tenure system has predominantly been replaced by state control. The clustered village structures formed during socialist structural adjustment policies of the 1970s facilitated decentralization of the forestry sector (Blomley et al., 2008). Participatory Forest Management operates through principles of defining and dividing land, assigning rights to forest benefits and responsibilities for protection. The village-level governmental structures and established legal frameworks supporting Participatory Forest Management in Tanzania are considered amongst the most highly advanced in Africa (Blomley & Iddi, 2009; Lund & Nielsen, 2005).

The seven REDD+ village populations vary from around 3000 to 9000, containing from 3 to 8 satellite sub-villages, with distances from the village centre varying up to half a day's walking distance (>15 km). These distances create patterns of trade-offs between land fertility, accessibility and proximity to services of health, education and administration. The village centre is the meeting place of the village assembly—the lowest legally recognized political body—formed of all the adults in a village. The assembly elects the village council of 15–20 representatives headed by the chairman, whose responsibilities include developing the infrastructural level of the village using resources assigned by the district

administration. The council is assisted by several non-elected village committees. Each village also has a Village Executive Officer (VEO) that is not elected but directly accountable to the District Executive Officer, who is in turn accountable to the President's Office (Lund & Nielsen, 2005).

A swift migration wave of the cattle-keeping tribe Sukuma has swelled in the study area over the last two years. Following traditional practices, young boys lead herds of several hundred cattle to roam through the forest as women establish more permanent settlements, mainly clearing into the far south-east side of the Masito forest, encouraged by politicians of the bordering district. The necessity of finding pasture makes pastoralists highly mobile. Both pastoralists and shifting cultivators seek out valley floors as the most fertile land. Sukuma typically keep their cows together in a large group that can easily include several hundred cattle. Drivers of migration included various factors ranging from inadequate pasture, drought, theft of cattle and eviction from protected areas. Furthermore, there was also movement resulting from family growth.

REDD+ was implemented by an international conservation NGO, with a history of development intervention in this study area. Their oldest area of operation, Gombe National Park, is situated on the lakeshore to the north of Kigoma and provides a retreat for international scientists and relatively wealthy eco-tourists. From the 1990s, this NGO moved into community-based work, in line with developmental discourses claiming to oppose 'fortress conservation' (Brockington, 2002). They adopted a strategy favoured by Integrated Conservation and Development Projects (ICDP), which aims to respond to local resistance to forest conservation by addressing community needs for improved infrastructure.

By 2014, the NGO expanded their operations to a network of 52 villages. Moving south along the lakeshore, then inland, their area of intervention increased to 800,000 ha of Miombo woodland, named Masito-Ugalla (22,000 ha of which is reserved), which they consider Tanzania's last refuge for wild chimpanzees. This was the land area in which REDD+ was implemented. By comparison to Gombe, Masito-Ugalla is seldom frequented by international NGO staff, scientists and tourists.

The strategy of the NGO, using formal boundaries for forest protection align with the approach of REDD+ to protect a clearly defined and measurable area. Both take a totalitarian approach to forest protection, for their respective goals of undisturbed chimpanzee habitat or quantifiable units of carbon storage. Within the study area, prior to REDD+, the first evictions took place from S1 around 2004. Although S1 village accepted assistance towards building a dispensary, the peasants of S1 had to be removed from their farms by force, indicating the ambiguous outcomes of the ICDP project towards the 'community'. Therefore evictions were already present, at a smaller scale, previously to REDD+.

The NGO implemented Participatory Forest Management from 2008, following the legally required steps (Blomley & Iddi, 2009). They facilitated Village Environmental Committees, introduced Land Use Planning to map village land according to individual and communal use, with management plans and by-laws. Military training and allowances were provided for four forest surveillance monitors from each village. At times FM were temporarily employed to assist District Land and Natural Resources Environmental Office (DLNREO) to patrol the reserves. Such cooperation between villagers and government authorities is defined as Joint Forest Management (JFM).

The REDD+ pilot project reversed the boundary demarcation process introduced in 2008. The infusion of capital available increased the scale and severity of the conflicts compared with previous projects.

Policy Formation and Local Governance for REDD+

Interventions within the study villages themselves combined aspects of the NGO's previous project designs of ICDP and Participatory Forest Management (PFM), as described by the concept of institutional bricolage (Cleaver, 2001). Three important features are of note. Firstly, the protected area was outside the boundaries of village land. The REDD+ principal of additionality required the protection of new areas. Secondly, the forest protection effort created institutions facilitating cooperation between all seven villages. Thirdly, interventions took place on a larger scale and with more

finance available than previously. The REDD+ project donors controlled technical outputs using a Project Design Document (PDD) with sequentially ordered stages, requiring much use of national- and international-level consultants to produce commissioned reports and deliver workshop training sessions.

The REDD+ Cancun agreement addressed social concerns in November 2010, after the initiation of Tanzanian pilot projects, safeguards were not created until the case study project was already underway. In this case, the REDD+ safeguards consisted of a two-week consultancy commission, producing a grid of specifically defined criteria and indicators to demonstrate the success of the pilot project in 'safeguarding' transparency, participation, rights, and biodiversity and ecosystem services. The written report effectively amounted to little more than a sophisticated box ticking exercise at field level. In order to meet the numerous technical requirements of REDD+, the donors recruited a technical specialist team for the pilot project; several members of this team were national government employees hired on a basis of temporary leave from Ministry of Natural Resources and Tourism (MNRT). This divided the working structure and the NGO's offices into two camps, and created much rivalry between the REDD+ specialist team and permanent NGO staff.

The incentive fund of US \$200,000 was used to fund village-level infrastructure, paid in two instalments. Ten per cent of this sum financed the creation and operation of an inter-village Community-Based Organization (CBO). Previous conservation projects had already created Village Environmental sub-Committees (VEC). This could be regarded as a form of elite capture because they selected the wealthier members of the village. The function of the CBO was firstly conservation education and secondly forest protection. The educational aspect was to receive training on governance and the principals of REDD+ and then to explain this information to the rest of the village through sub-village-level workshops. Other trainings were offered in order to replace charcoal making and other forest degrading activities with beekeeping, poultry management and agricultural activities. However, the livelihood training workshops were actually delivered predominantly to the members of the CBO. The villagers were required to pay out of pocket for the new hives, which

they could not afford. Furthermore even successful beekeeping groups maintain that they made only relatively minor returns.

The forest protection aspect of the CBO was to organize forest surveillance and patrols. Forest-related activities found taking place include logging for timber, charcoal production, hunting, fishing and unauthorized farming. Through the coordinating function of the CBO a network of actors emerged that was essentially an extension of the disciplinary arm of the NGO, within the internal space of the village (Neumann, 2001). Firstly, local informants were used to inform on forest activities, around five in every village, positioned by the CBO. Secondly, FM reported on animal sightings and human activities within the Masito forest itself, recording this information using GPS with a patrol record digitally uploaded to the NGO online database and paper report to the CBO headquarters. There were seven FM in each village: three under REDD+ and four under the conservation programme, who cooperated together. All FM received military training at an academy for national park rangers. However they were unauthorized to carry firearms.

Lastly, the main council of the CBO met every six months to organize joint patrols. These were large-scale and expensive operations, funded from the CBO account, where the FM were joined by more powerful actors authorized to carry firearms. This parallel authority undermined the political power of the democratically elected local chairman to represent the interests of the villagers and respond to their demands. This is the focus of the next section of the chapter.

Recognizing Parallel Authority and Technologies of Control

This section develops the storyline begun in the introductory section of the book chapter into an access-based causal analysis. This particular incident of evictions in S1, of 14 August 2012, ended with nine peasants being arrested and taken to court. In fact, after lengthy proceedings the prosecution was unable to supply any evidence. The case was dismissed the following year, allowing these nine peasants to return to their former area of cultivation in S1. Both the NGO and the district authorities,

when requested to prove their rights to the land on which they were implementing the project had been unable to do so. In fact, peasants were encouraged to file a counterclaim for compensation, but they however lacked the resources to do so. ‘Why were the nine peasants owed legal compensation?’

Unpacking the causality of these events from direct circumstances outwards can include underlying assumptions and beliefs of the actors involved, policy recommendations and responsibilities that were supposed to take place, and yet did not happen. The analysis is interpretative, since the counterclaim has never formally taken place. The peasants consider themselves owed compensation based upon advice received upon the dismissal of the first court case. Unpacking this chain of events can begin with the sub-question, ‘why were the nine peasants arrested?’

The area of S1, at the time of research, was in the process of being incorporated into the land of a neighbouring village, as the chairman of this village has consistently claimed the area to be occupied as part of his village since the supposedly participative Land Use Planning exercise of 2008. However, during implementation of REDD+, the actors involved in implementing the project, considered the NGO’s demarcated boundary to be legitimate:

We had spoken to them on many many issues. But they don't understand us. So that's why we were using this way to control them. They don't understand us. They need to, because according to our law, it's not better for anybody to go outside of his area. So at S1 was outside of our area. So why we go there to catch them? Was outside of our village. Outside of any village. According to our boundaries. (FM, Songambe village, 4 June 2014)

Institutions operate through diverse means, from formal laws and regulations to culturally embedded social norms (Clever, 2001). Forest protection discourses framed certain activities as illegal within a defined space. For example, peasants assigned a building plot by the social services committee could clear any trees on this land and use them for firewood or charcoal, the universal means of cooking fuel. However within village forests and the Masito forest itself, timber production, charcoal making unauthorized cultivation, cattle keeping, hunting and fishing were illegal.

Peasants contravening these rules were described as ‘invaders’, ‘poachers’, ‘environmental destroyers’ or ‘illegal immigrants’. Therefore their access restrictions were legitimized through social identity.

The perceptions of the FM towards evicted farmers are illustrated through the following account of the evictions. On this occasion, the poachers were apparently caught cutting trees all across the river line, for cultivation of the fertile area next to the river:

When the CBO needs the power, they invite us to go with them. I'm invited with them sometimes; we went to S1, outside of our mountain there. We saw the poachers there, which is a strong issue. The ones who destroy, the ones who are hunting; they had arrows. So they were hunting for animals and cultivating, they threatened to kill us. They failed because we had guns, but their intention was to kill us. That day, I remember it. It was a hard day for me because I was almost killed. (FM, Songambebe village, 4 June 2014)

This indicates how this FM has delegitimized the peasants through the creation of a sense of threat, in order to justify the use of violence. This is part of a JFM patrol. Therefore, actors involved in this patrol considered their actions appropriate through both legal means and informal norms of social identity as relational access mechanisms (Ribot & Peluso, 2003). The nine peasants were arrested because the FM and CBO believed in the legitimacy of the evictions. This leads the next sub-question, ‘why were the evictions authorized in S1?’

Access is also negotiated through social relations (Ribot & Peluso, 2003). The partnership between the NGO and local government authorities at the district level is an example of this process. In Tanzania, conservation NGOs often form such partnerships with the state, exchanging sovereignty for capital (Brockington & Igoe, 2006). This partnership has introduced parallel authority as demonstrated by the upwards accountability of the CBO, as opposed to downwardly accountability of the consensual village general assembly. In the eyes of the CBO, the district has final authority on border locations, even despite objections from the village chairman. In fact, the district government has the formal responsibility of resolving conflicts in the case of any disagreements. Therefore by cooperating with the district, the NGO and REDD+ team effectively

controlled definition of the forest area. This is clear from the response of the CBO chairman to the issue of uncertainty over boundaries:

if they could just bring the map, the district could just give the map so that we know that this area to be coordinated to this one, so that we can know that, that area outside is the one we supervise as CBO and this area that we supervise as the village area. (CBO chairman, 18 June 2014)

The REDD+ CBO main council was formed of 5 members from each village's VEC, amounting to 35 members. Furthermore, the village chairman, VEO and sub-village chairmen of all 7 villages are also entitled to attend CBO meetings as observers, increasing the total to 89 members. In effect, the CBO was a parallel institution to the village government because they responded to the international NGO (Ribot et al., 2008). The incentive structure provided by REDD+ exaggerated this power discrepancy, through the provision of capital.

Heavy use of consultancy heightened inequity because this distributed project benefits to knowledge elites and politicians. The REDD+ pilot used over 210 consultancy days, many hired from outside the study area. They qualified carbon reporting at local and national scales, predicted the effects of fire on carbon accounting, conducted a baseline assessment, reviewed the NGO's previous project literature, consulted key informants, reported on strengthened organizations and cumulative behaviour change, built the capacity of selected stakeholders and developed and conducted around 100 days of training workshops. Workshop training sessions are a typical feature of the Tanzanian development industry (Green, 2014). District officials also received a share, with compensated attendance allowances. Furthermore, provision of village-level infrastructure—schools and village offices as provided by REDD+—is the remit of the District government. Following the REDD+ project, they were able to upgrade their offices to new headquarters, creating a doubling of jobs for government officials. This demonstrates how economic incentives become politicized in the field.

Expertise was used to heighten authoritarian boundary control. This was revealed by the CBO secretary, who was present at the time of the demarcation of the REDD+ project boundaries:

No, what I saw, there were the maps of a long time ago from the district council. Because the maps were there and the maps use longitudinal and latitudinal. So we were just going there and using GPS, that means me, [REDD+ Project team member] was experienced using the GPS and the GPS were helping us in locating where the border was supposed to be, according to the maps that were already drawn. (CBO secretary, 18 June 2014)

The project had insisted on using an old definition of the boundary. As part of the participatory Land Use Planning in 2008, consensus was supposed to have been reached in the presence of the village chairman and other village representatives. The REDD+ boundary delimitation was not accepted by the farmers living in the area. However the FM believe that their version of the boundary is correct and lawful. This clearly indicates the power relations between the NGO, CBO and FM determining public domain in this land and how these relations are being contested. The use of technology heightens these inequities. Only experts have access and the knowledge to define the coordinates. As the REDD+ project team are only present within the study location for a very limited time, their decisions are essentially authoritarian.

Recentralizing Power of the Village Assembly

This section describes events that took place preceding the eviction of 2012. In August 2011, Songambebe village called an emergency meeting on account of escalating conflicts. First, the council met with the CBO and FM and agreed the FM must report to the village office before going on patrol, as they disapproved of their previous methods of operating independently of the council. Then the general village assembly moved to dissolve and annul their VEC, CBO and FM, denying the village council's attempt to broker peace and threatening to overthrow them if the decision was not implemented. Evicted farmers were advised to return to S1. Thus, after suffering hunger, and struggling to support themselves and their families through casual labour, they were relieved to return to their farms and plant their own crops again.

Upon receiving the minutes of the Songambele meeting, the district executive director wrote to the division officer and ward councillor requesting follow-up, stressing the seriousness of the situation:

In that meeting, citizens have dismissed all the members of all the environmental committees that are enacting the issues concerning environmental conservation (CBO, Forest monitors and Environmental Committee). This is not a thing to take lightly, but needs considerable follow-up, so as we can know the problem. (District Executive Director, 18 August 2011. District records, accessed 30 June 2014)

This demonstrates the presence of democratically decentralized political structures within this study context. The division officer responded with a balanced summary of the situation, taking into account views of leaders, selected farmers, FM and a wildlife officer. He forwarded the farmers' complaints, together with those from S2, to the CBO. The CBO discussed border disputes between leaders, farmers and even some of the FM, during a September 2011 meeting and requested clarification from the REDD+ project director on way forward.

Despite the efforts of the village assembly, FM resumed their operations in January 2012. Each village has a VEO that is not elected but directly accountable to the District Executive Officer, who is in turn accountable to the President's Office (Lund & Nielsen, 2005). In all cases the VEO was less supportive of evicted farmers than the village chairman. The VEO of Sunuka village was able to delegitimize the discretionary power of Songambele village on a technicality, because S1 had been divided from their village's land during the 2008 boundary demarcation. In May 2012, an FM patrol report requested a joint patrol in S1, this time via the village office in Sunuka. The VEO called farmers to provide individual statements, showing they had cultivated the area since 1995–1997 and originated mainly from Songambele village. On the grounds that the peasants of S1 were not from Sunuka, the VEO delegitimized the Land Use Planning claim of the chairman of his village for allowing access for farming in S1. The VEO authorized the evictions that took place on 14 August 2012. These processes explain why the evictions were taking place in the forested area of S1.

Democratic structures are not infallible in ensuring justice, even though they allow for negotiations and dialogues to take place. The reactions of the local leaders vary towards the evictions, although in all villages, the test payment aspect of REDD+ was enthusiastically accepted. The peasants in S2 were excluded by the majority of their nearest villages and underwent a long negotiation processes with the CBO. As the S2 peasants were offered few benefits in exchange for vacating their land, they opted to remain in place until the 2012 evictions. This illustrates the contradictory nature of the REDD+ compensation mechanism (Mahanty et al., 2012).

Expertise, Legal Plurality and Fragmentation of Forest Governance

This section traces the causal chain to the national level and the introduction of REDD+ in Tanzania. ‘Why did the District court dismiss the legal case?’ This explains the roots of the land tenure conflict and why the authoritarian strategy of the NGO was ultimately unsuccessful. Nevertheless, the nine farmers involved in the legal case cannot *hold them to account*. Furthermore, the prioritization of technical expertise within the project selection process for REDD+ in this study area has rendered the forest history invisible. This indicates an overemphasis on *accounting for carbon* at prior levels (Gupta et al., 2012).

Initially in Tanzania, only a minority of academics and consultants were aware of REDD+ through the privilege of having gained foreign university qualifications. To build government capacity, international development partners started sponsoring selected government ministers to international conferences and other training events. The first recipient of such REDD+ ‘capacity building’ initiatives was the MNRT:

We said, now, how do we start, because this thing is new and the Government is not very aware [...] let’s start, we start building the capacity within the ministry. Thereafter, maybe we go outside. If we go outside, without building the capacity within the institution, then people will ask a lot of questions, we will find that maybe ourselves, we don’t know. (Member of MNRT, 28 April 2014)

In early 2009, a corruption scandal led to the suspension of MNRT as a recipient of Norwegian REDD+ funding. Consequently, MNRT was responsible for a minority of the overall REDD+ budget (around 5%) (Kaijage & Kuhanwa, 2013). The government agency with formal responsibility for the forestry sector lost its major share of REDD+ funding. Since MNRT ministers had already received training for REDD+, some became employed as managers for the pilot projects on paid leave from their government office. This unofficial involvement, double role, of MNRT in REDD+ without formal recognition can be considered a form of neoliberal state rollback (Castree, 2010).

In March 2009, international donors launched REDD+ in Tanzania through the ‘nested approach’ (Pedroni, Dutschke, Streck, & Porrua, 2009) of simultaneously developing a national strategy, national forest monitoring programme and local pilot projects. Around 32% of the US \$90 million investment was assigned to 8 NGOs, shortlisted from 45 applicants to design the local-level pilot projects (Odgaard & Maganga, 2009). The Kigoma-based conservation NGO had longstanding experience of ‘community’-based work and they had an ability to mobilize technical input, including geographic information systems (GIS) mapping from their office in the United States. In this competitive bidding process, the history of eviction within the project villages was completely invisible. Using design features based on the ICDP model—already operational with questionable socio-economic and environmental success—they won a grant of US \$2.8 million to implement REDD+ in ‘Masito-Ugalla Ecosystem Pilot area’, a 70,000 ha area calculated to sequester 55,000 tonnes of CO₂.

At the local level, the results of this study show marginalization of pastoralists—which appears to be culturally ingrained through implicit norms—has translated into omission of their consideration within policy design and exclusion of their interests on the ground. Overall, this results in ‘leakage’, as they have simply relocated from the targeted forest area. In a few cases, pastoralists attempted to resolve their marginalization with appeals to political authorities on the far side of the forest. Although the pastoralists’ storyline has not been the main focus of this analysis, they were the targets of around 50% of evictions from the forest.

In order to meet the numerous technical requirements of REDD+, the donors recruited a technical specialist team for the pilot project; several members of this team were national government employees hired on a basis of temporary leave from MNRT. This divided the working structure and the NGO's offices into two camps, and created much rivalry between the REDD+ specialist team and permanent NGO staff. The MNRT members involved in the project were on temporary leave, they did not have jurisdiction over the general land on which the pilot project was implemented. The district court dismissed the legal case of the nine peasants because the funders did not formally acknowledge the role of MNRT in the implementation of REDD+. This leads back to the question of our analysis, 'why were the nine peasants owed legal compensation?'

Sovereignty rights of national governments have long caused dissonance within forestry governance negotiations (Dimitrov, 2005). Although REDD+ implementation is supposed to include governments at the national level, and many authors stress the need for governance improvement, scholars did not analyse comprehensively how these improvements were to take place at the national level (Corbera & Schroeder, 2011). The formal exclusion of MNRT from the REDD+ pilot projects illustrates the power of donors, as residual rights holders, to define the actor arrangements that best suited their purpose. Analysing causality of the case shows how no one involved has assumed responsibility for the outcome, resulting in the most qualified and best-suited actors capturing the benefits and marginalized groups paying the costs.

Conclusion

The access-based causal analysis employed in this case, has traced the process of carbonized exclusion from an instance of violent displacement outwards, to the donors responsible for authorizing and financing the REDD+ pilot project budget. Direct causes can be attributed to the actors immediately involved, whereas indirect socio-political factors are linked to actors authorizing these events and remote causes are the responsibility of decision-makers for policy design and funding. 'Why were the nine peasants owed legal compensation?'; according to their

interpretation of events? The nine peasants were arrested because the FM and CBO believed in the legitimacy of the joint patrols. The evictions were taking place because the parallel authority introduced by the institutional choice and economic incentives of REDD+, recentralized power towards an NGO with authoritarian conservation objectives. The district court dismissed the legal case because of neoliberal state rollback that excluded the legal land holders, MNRT from official involvement in the REDD+ pilot project. The majority of project funding went into consultancy fees for commissioned reports and workshop training sessions, with only 6.4% of US \$2.8 million budget used for infrastructure payments resulting in the construction of five schools and two village offices. Elitist use of expertise ends the causal chain of analysis.

This chapter highlights the lack of carbon accountability currently present within REDD+. The responsible actors for adverse socio-economic impacts, whether direct, indirect or remote, have not been held to account. These findings support the predictions of critical scholars of social inequities within forestry projects (Ribot, 2011; Ribot & Oyono, 2005; Ribot & Peluso, 2003). Furthermore, the contestations of the local people show how the foundations of empowerment were laid during the Participatory Forestry Management project implemented around 2007–2008. These dynamic processes demonstrate empirical patterns of decentralization and subsequently recentralization realized during REDD+, as predicted by forestry experts (Phelps et al., 2010). This recentralization can be linked to intensive use of expertise as argued by debates on carbonization of forest governance and REDD+ (Gupta et al., 2012; Turnhout et al., 2017). These results justify concerns that a strong focus on performance-based payments, favoured in the original REDD+ negotiations, would simplify the complex aspects involved in forest governance.

Solutions presented as technical within international policy debates are, in fact, politicized on the ground. In this case, conservation objectives were already authoritarian and REDD+ has heightened this trend, contradicting livelihood objectives of REDD+. Efficient and equitable channels of political and legal representation are needed, between rural citizens designated as the target group of REDD+ and international forums of negotiation—such as the UNFCCC—where decision-making

takes place. This cannot be achieved as long as performance-based, bio-physical forest monitoring is a central feature of REDD+ design.

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6

Examining the Supply and Demand of Effective Participation and Representation

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Introduction

Participation has been the mantra of inclusivity in development, conservation and management interventions for more than 30 years. It became a mainstay of development practice in the 1980s, which sought to have bottom-up, people-first approaches rather than top-down blueprints (Leal, 2007). The rationale of participation can be twofold: as a morally just way to give a voice to people who are affected by change or, alternatively, to serve organisations as an efficient mechanism likely to establish

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agreement over an issue (Pretty, 1995). The scope and quality of participation, including the extent of consideration of diverging voices, varies widely (Leach & Scoones, 2015). This creates a spectrum from non-participation to citizen control (Arnstein, 1969), including how groups engage in co-designing and learning as equals (Harder, Burford, & Hoover, 2013), and continuing into how people are represented in participatory processes.

Representatives may represent a constituency in several ways including symbolically or substantively (Pitkin, 1967). According to Pitkin, symbolic representatives speak for groups based on shared ideas, but often without a mandate; substantive representation occurs when a representative is accountable to their constituents for their actions. In this chapter, we focus on symbolic representation, typical of non-governmental organisations (NGOs) which advocate for constituencies, but may not be elected to do so.

Representation, through legitimately selected¹ individuals or collectivities, has been considered as a measure of participation. Quantitative measures—such as the number of representatives per constituency—and qualitative measures—such as the diversity, behaviour, attitudes, qualifications, knowledge and abilities of appointed representatives—are used to measure the quality of representation (Marfo, 2015; Mbeche, 2017; Nuesiri, 2016). The assumption that underpins representation as being effective is that mechanisms of accountability bind legitimately selected representatives to work and behave in ways to foster and defend the best interests of their constituencies (Ribot, 2016).

However, reality shows that the dynamics that take place during representation are characterised by a number of patterns. These dynamics, as well as the context of the participatory process, also influence the extent and effectiveness of accountability and responsiveness of representation. In this chapter, we consider that representation consists of the following elements in order to be effective: mechanisms of accountability to constituents, responsiveness by the organisation, powers to respond to constituents (financial, technical and logistical), and ways by which constituents can hold their representatives accountable (Ribot, 2016). Furthermore, we consider that representation by civil society can

be supply or demand driven. In the case of being supply driven, civil society seeks a role to represent a constituency or government agencies address participation and representation in fulfilment of development aid requirements and standards. In the case of demand driven, a donor or government may demand that constituencies be represented by civil society² or community members.

This chapter explores the supply and demand of representation in relation to civil society and asks, “What factors enable representation to be a mechanism of effective public participation in REDD+ and forest management?” Using studies from Cameroon, Ghana, Hungary and Nepal, we examine the dynamics of civil society representation, the extent to and conditions under which it fulfils its role as the mechanism through which the represented constituencies can participate in, contribute to and have influence on decision-making and change processes in the context of climate change mitigation (Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation [REDD+]) and natural resources management.

Methods

We selected four cases where representation by civil society was able to be examined through natural resource-based participatory processes in Africa, Asia and Europe such as natural resources management and conservation or through consultation on REDD+ as promoted under the United Nations Framework Convention for Climate Change (UNFCCC). REDD+ aims to establish mechanisms to incentivise long-term action to reducing greenhouse gas emissions from deforestation and forest degradation. In this framework, the UN-REDD Programme and the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) were created to support countries to start REDD+ readiness leading to the design and deployment of national strategies. Two of the country cases presented in this chapter discuss the consultation process around the FCPF-supported national REDD+ Readiness processes, which have stakeholder engagement requirements. The other two cases focus on organisations representing their constituencies on forest management.

All cases focused on the role of civil society and donors in stakeholder processes. For cases to be selected for this study, they had to have either grey or white literature available which addressed representation by civil society organisations or grassroots constituencies: mechanisms of accountability to constituents, degree of responsiveness by the organisation, powers to respond to constituents (financial, technical and logistical), and ways by which constituents can hold their representatives accountable. We analyse documents from a variety of sources, using a document analysis approach. Through this method we are able to describe a process over a longer time period and when documents are available through a variety of sources (e.g. websites, libraries). This approach proves to be an efficient and cost-effective way to collect “data” about a topic; by contrast there are limitations, including the lack of detail provided in such documents and the selection bias of publicly available documents which may reflect the story that publishers wish to tell (Bowen, 2009).

In this chapter, we are exploring the “system resonance” of understanding how the characteristics of stakeholder processes in one national context may inform those of others (Steinberg, 2015) and thus help us to understand the broader processes driving how representation is carried out. There are at least two main sources, supported by other diverse accounts per case study, to triangulate findings or to complete information gaps about the national context in which the stakeholder processes took place.

The cases were compared using the following questions: Which constituencies were being represented, by whom? Which parts were left out? How and by whom were the representatives selected? What arguments or characteristics are put forward in the cases illustrate whether the representation was effective and successful? What are the identified challenges and hurdles of the representation dynamics? What specific behaviours of the representatives were highlighted (i.e. Are they consulting their communities before attending events or forums where they play their representation role? Do they report back to the community, how?). Do representatives have the resources (e.g. financial, technical and logistical) that they need to fulfil their mandate? How does the constituency react to the representation (e.g. by disengagement, sanctions)?

The Supply and Demand of Participation and Representation

Supply and demand has been used as an organising framework to understand participation in social movements (Klandermans, 2004). Here, we use it to understand participation and representation by civil society in REDD+ and forest management. We focus on overseas development assistance (ODA), particularly the politics of participation emerging from the conditions that are required by donors and bilateral or multilateral development support agencies to ensure that participation and representation are fulfilled.

There are two characteristics of the demand side of participation and representation. First, there is a demand driven by ODA (see Case studies 1 and 2 in the following section). Political agency, including the mobilisation of civil society, is considered to be a key ingredient for policy efficiency in climate change arenas; this can extend to donors supporting civil society. This focus on participation by donors is a type of democratic environmentalism, which seeks to increase the number of actors which have a say in decision-making (Gilley, 2012). Civil society can help keep governments accountable (Burnell, 2012) and some donors support civil society in foreign countries (Carothers, 1999). This focus on civil society results in organisations created at the demand of donors (Chhatre, 2008; Manor, 2005). In addition to this focus on civil society, there are requirements imposed by donors to access support; participation and representation can be used by development agencies to build alliances and networks that will support and foster global, regional or national agendas agreed with governments (Lankina, 2008).

Second, there is a demand from the civil society organisations that push for the participation of the public in decision-making, invoking the right to take part in the design and implementation of policies that impact society (see Case studies 3 and 4). Often, but not always, this demand from civil society meets that of the donors and international agencies, and echoes favourably to their expectations and agendas. Thus the support from donors and the alliances they build with civil society create the environment for their increased participation in decision-making

while also framing the conditions under which this participation is seen as effective. These conditions may lead beneficiaries from civil society to cater to a donor's vision instead of freely representing their constituencies. A good example of supply driven representation is the creation of civil society in the Democratic Republic of Congo where people sought to represent themselves in the absence of the state (Giovannoni, Trefon, Banga, & Mwema, 2004), and so are supply driven. A counter example is where donors have requested the representation of civil society in REDD+ processes (e.g. Mbeche, 2017), an example of demand-driven representation.

The supply side of participation and representation is characterised by governments on the one hand who respond to the internal and external pressures for participation and representation, and the civil society organisations and advocacy networks, on the other hand, who self-organise or build alliances with donors and international organisations not only to demand for participation and representation but also to produce and supply it.

The interactions between the forces of demand and the process for production and supply of participation are key determinants of the outcomes of participation and representation, such as accountability and responsiveness. In consultation or dialogues, "deliberative governance" across a range of actors becomes key in responding to the needs of the people (Hyle, 2016). The four case studies presented in the following section show how the politics of participation and representation can either result in advancing an ODA agency's vision, or achieve some common ground to enable local constituencies to have a voice.

Case Studies

The case studies show that in the current global context dominated by the development aid agenda, that there is a variety of circumstances that preside over representation and participation of civil society in participatory processes. These circumstances vary from the dynamics geared by development assistance (Case studies 1 and 2) to decentralisation policies which may make participation a legal requirement, thus enabling civil

society demands for the right to have a voice in decision-making (Case studies 3 and 4).

The Demand for Participation

Case Study 1: REDD+ Consultation in Ghana

This case study is based on two accounts critically describing this REDD+ consultation process (Marfo, 2015; Satyal, 2017). Over the 2009–2010 period, researchers and practitioners report on eight participatory processes, which we believe account for the most significant spaces of participation during this time in relation to REDD+.

Ghana's key national policies which enable representation in decision-making including the 1994 and 2012 Forest and Wildlife Policies and the Republican Constitution itself. Following these documents and policies, the government of Ghana has said that it is transitioning to community-government collaboration for land management. These policies set up the framework within Ghana to design participatory initiatives. REDD+ was designed to be participatory in Ghana, but in practice this has proved difficult (Asiyanbi, Arhin, & Isyaku, 2017).

Ghana began to engage formally in REDD+ in 2008 when its Forestry Commission completed the Readiness Plan Idea Note (R-PIN). It became a REDD participant country of the FCPF in 2010. The next step was for Ghana to submit its Readiness Preparation Proposal (R-PP). The Ghanaian Forestry Commission received an R-PP Formulation grant of US \$200,000 from the FCPF in February 2009. As part of this grant, Ghana was required to consult with stakeholders following some clearly outlined stakeholder consultation guidelines, implementation of which resulted in a stakeholder consultation plan to be included as a component of the national REDD+ strategy. This plan specifically suggested that the consultation must be sensitive to the need for time, capacity building and information (Government of Ghana, 2010). The plan was considered by a leading Civil Society Organisation to be excellent in principle, but difficult to implement in practice (Marfo, 2015).

The FCPF required a wide consultation, including traditional authorities, civil society groups and other governmental agencies. Stakeholder consultation on the R-PP occurred between May 2009 and January 2010 during which eight consultation meetings were held, with visible efforts to ensure the participation of civil society. However, the resulting R-PP was examined by the FCPF which concluded that it did not fully meet standards on stakeholder consultation and participation (Technical Advisory Panel, 2009). Further consultation was required with traditional authorities and forest-dependent communities in 2010 to address these concerns. After two revisions, the R-PP was approved by the FCPF in January 2011.

In order to ensure representation, the Forestry Commission set up working groups, including the “Consultation and Participation Working Group” (CPWG), which designed the consultation process. This group was comprised of officials of the Forestry Commission and three NGOs who were understood to have experience in consultation processes. According to Satyal (2017), many interviewees indicated that during the consultation process, customary authorities, forest and local communities, women’s groups and the private sector were perceived to have been left out. However, civil society accounted for 70% of the stakeholders during the R-PP consultation process that followed (Marfo, 2015).

Representatives were not selected by consensus by their constituents, but rather were chosen for their knowledge, potentially rendering them illegitimate representatives. For example, during the consultation process, the chosen civil society representatives were selected to be a member of the National REDD Steering Committee (NRSC). According to Marfo (2015), two of the four members were selected because of their institutional position; the other members were chosen for their experience and knowledge, rather than through consensus by the groups they were deemed to represent. Furthermore, with a consultation across such a large region, having a representation of each group was difficult. There was often not enough time for the consultation to take place. Representatives were invited often at the last minute, making it difficult or impossible to attend a meeting and contribute effectively. One interviewee reported that the Forestry Commission was pressured by the World Bank to finalise the R-PIN and R-PP documents, resulting

in a rushed process (Satyal, 2017). The remaining portion of the US \$200,000 budget allocated by the FCPF was also insufficient to finance such a large, subnational consultation, as also noted in similar circumstances in Uganda (Mbeche, 2017).

According to the grant letter cited in Marfo (2015), 65% of the grant was to be allocated to consultants, leaving only 35% for the consultation process itself (e.g. US \$70,000). Furthermore, the time allowed for the consultation was too limited, something acknowledged by the FCPF (Technical Advisory Panel, 2009).

Accounting back to constituents was assumed to happen through existing structures (e.g. community resource management committees) and so no mechanisms to monitor accountability of representatives were created. Civil society representatives interviewed in Marfo (2015) indicated that there were no mechanisms or sanctions regarding feedback to constituents and that in most cases, they only consulted with a few colleagues. In one case, an informant indicated that he or she would only consult internally with a few people in his or her organisation. In some cases, this was due to logistical and financial constraints. It was argued in Marfo (2015) that the representatives did not have the finances or logistics required to participate in the process. It should be noted that this was the case for other multi-stakeholder platforms in Ghana (see Marfo, 2015 and citations therein). Marfo (2015, p. 22) notes that “commitment of resources beyond participation in dialogue makes a difference to democratic representation.”

In general, both studies (Marfo 2015; Satyal 2017) noted that there were complaints and contestations from civil society. According to Satyal (2017), this included blocking the approval of the R-PP and asking that the consultation process be given more time. Furthermore, many considered that the REDD+ consultation process was viewed by civil society to largely only inform them of decisions, whereas other processes, such as the Voluntary Partnership Agreement (VPA)³ process, civil society perceived its involvement as collaborative or empowering (Satyal, 2017). Many interviewees (Satyal, 2017) indicated that this was likely due to the time given for consultation, which most considered as insufficient for the REDD+ consultation. Some complained that civil society perspectives were not reflected in the final R-PP. Satyal (2017, p. 25) considers that

“Civil society participation in REDD+ is thus ad hoc and purpose-led, which is in contrast to long-term and on-going participation in VPA.”

Case Study 2: Mobilising Civil Society for REDD+ in Cameroon

This case study is based on an account describing this REDD+ consultation process (Satyal, 2017), two reports written by practitioners and civil society (PF-REDD+&CC, 2017; Programme d’Appui à la Société Civile, 2015) and supplemented by the experience of GAN and GW (authors George Akwah Neba and Gretchen Walters). This case examines the role of the *Plateforme Nationale de la Société Civile pour REDD et Changement Climatique* (National civil society platform for REDD and climate change, “CSO-REDD&CC Platform” hereafter) in the consultation process from 2010 to 2017. In Cameroon, there have been contradictory views on the role of civil society, seen both as being too compliant with government, but also as playing a critical interface and watchdog role on key issues such as corruption (Programme d’Appui à la Société Civile, 2015).

Cameroon’s REDD+ engagement formally started in 2008, and intensified from 2011 with the launching of the R-PP process. During the development of the R-PP, various civil society organisations were engaged in strongly contested REDD+ debates. At the beginning, two main civil society platforms or networks competed as the leading voices in representing the interests of local communities, including the Forest Platform that was formed during the VPA process and mainly led by segments of civil society organisations considered to be activists oriented and seen by government as confrontational, and the more politicised CSO platform that emerged from the Ministerial Conference on Humid Ecosystems of Central Africa (CEFDHAC—*Conférence sur les Ecosystèmes Humides d’Afrique Centrale*). The latter had a parliamentarian as a leader, and the boundaries between political motivations and civil society interests were blurred.

The CSO-REDD&CC Platform emerged as an integrated CSO platform to provide a credible dialogue interface with government, and is a network of about 70 national-level civil society organisations and over 400 community-based organisations in Cameroon (Satyal, 2017). In the

R-PP, this platform is seen officially as the interface between government and civil society (République du Cameroun, 2013), and is systematically relied on by government and the FCPF as the mechanism for ensuring the participation of the public in REDD+ consultations. This civil society platform became part of the REDD+ Steering Committee, a decision-making body composed of numerous stakeholders. At the creation of the platform, members elected a national leadership team of three persons. The elected leadership also became the *de facto* representatives or liaison persons of the platform with the government and other REDD+ stakeholders and fora at national and international levels, with the National Coordinator playing the major and dominant representation figure in the country and beyond.

The CSO-REDD&CC believed that their platform was a good vehicle through which to incorporate civil society views into the R-PP. This claim was based on the high number of organisations that are members, the scope (the establishment of regional branches in all ten administrative regions) and diversity (the platform included indigenous people and women organisations, as well as ideologically diverse set of organisations). To ensure that its positions, views and inputs adequately reflected the diversity of its members, the CSO-REDD&CC frequently organised national workshops attended by provincial and community-level representatives, to review, discuss and formulate inputs to draft REDD+ documents before submission by government to the FCPF, or to prepare position statements of the civil society regarding REDD+ policy matters.

However, some members of civil society claim that despite such participation, their input was “set aside” during some consultations, a position not accepted by the Technical Coordinator of REDD+ (Tsafack, 2017). A number of civil society organisations within the platform have argued that the REDD+ consultation in Cameroon did not incorporate the views of marginalised people, including indigenous peoples (Satyal, 2017). In spite of this criticism, the inputs provided by the CSO-REDD&CC and the position statements are accepted by the Cameroon government as reflecting the views of the majority of the civil society given its large membership and the scope of its representation.

In terms of challenges, some members of the platform indicated that it was susceptible to being “hijacked” by influential members of the leadership team (Satyal, 2017). Furthermore, in the national REDD+ steering committee, civil society organisations had only 1 seat out of 17, which is seen as not sufficient to give the platform strong influence over decision-making. Finally, according to Satyal (2017), some interviewees accused international NGOs of manipulation of the agenda and of being behind CSO positions rather than genuine national constituencies. In some cases, influential elites were interested in participating in the REDD+ participatory process to further their political career and so sought the help of powerful NGOs to support their ambition, but without success. A civil society organisation, which played an essential role in influencing policies and facilitating uptake of forest governance issues in parliament, became very involved with the political establishment. The leader ended up becoming a parliamentarian, and then strongly opposed the newly established CSO-REDD&CC because he was not selected as one of its national leaders.

Civil society found that the consultation on REDD+ was rushed and information about the participatory meetings was infrequent, often at the last minute, and inadequate (Satyal, 2017). According to an interviewee, although Cameroon adopted Free Prior Informed Consent as a guide to the consultation process, this was not implemented in practice (Satyal, 2017). Due to the lack of information about meetings and concepts, there was often not enough technical capacity among the CSO-REDD&CC Platform leaders to comprehensively engage in deliberations during REDD+ national steering committee meetings. Sometimes, documents were circulated in French only, which raised concerns by the Anglophone civil society, since this limited the understanding of the meetings. In a recent position note from the platform, bilingual documentation is cited as a key need to ensure effective REDD+ process in Cameroon (PF-REDD+&CC, 2017).

Furthermore, accounting back to constituents about the meetings was difficult. In a study on dialogue frameworks in Cameroon, it was noted that there was generally an “absence of restitution/feedback mechanisms for CSOs [civil society organisations] that participate in dialogue forums” (Programme d’Appui à la Société Civile, 2015, p. 39). These organisations

often cover large territories and often do not have the resources to travel regularly to their members to inform them of meeting outcomes. In a recent position note, the Platform notes that the absence of resources does not allow them to properly function (PF-REDD+&CC, 2017). However, despite all of this, the CSO-REDD&CC considers that their participation in the consultation process was high. This opinion was not shared by other platforms or NGOs.

The Supply of Participation

Case Study 3: Representing Private Forest Owners in Hungary

This case study is based on three accounts describing the role of one Forest Owner Organisation (Association of Hungarian Private Forest Owners: MEGOSZ) in Hungary and how it evolved in its role in representing private forest owners (Sarvašová et al., 2015; Weiss & Dragoi et al., 2012; Weiss, Gudurić, & Wolfslehner, 2012). Other research articles provide background.

Historically, lands in many Eastern European countries were managed collectively by local people. However, during the communist era, this radically changed to largely state ownership. After the fall of communism in 1989, ownership of the forest estate was restituted to local people through different processes in each country. This restitution has led to the rise of local collective forest owner organisations (Mendes et al., 2011). These private forests now constitute a large part of forest estates in Eastern Europe and their local collective members, in theory, should have a voice in influencing national forest policies. In reality, forest owners have limited ability to influence forest management on their lands at the national level (Bouriaud et al., 2013).

In Hungary, after the political and economic reforms in the 1990s, about 40% of the land was privatised whereby many new forests were established as undivided common properties, where forest management must be agreed with the forest owners, typically owning small parcels. These small parcels of forests are part of a fragmented forest estate where

the new owners often lack the technical expertise to manage these resources sustainably. The new forest owners were forced into joint management and the government created the Hungarian Chambers of Agriculture, where membership by these forest owners was mandated by law. Private forests are legally part of a national forest management system regulated by the State Forest Service, which has a powerful voice in formulating forest policy. However, with the creation of forest owner organisations, these local forest owners are now able to collaborate, obtain better access to technical experts and have their voice heard in national-level policymaking exercises. MEGOSZ was created in 1994 and has become one of the most active forests ownership organisations in the country, with strong participation and influence in the development of Hungarian national forest policy. MEGOSZ was created first and foremost to assist with the restitution of forest to private owners (Sarvašová et al., 2015).

MEGOSZ experiences little government involvement and operates at the subnational level. It went from having 27 members at its creation to 1400 members in 2012. Members include individuals, local representatives, other forest owner associations, cooperatives and business enterprises. Women comprise 10% of the membership, despite holding 44% of private forests in the country. MEGOSZ has a General Assembly and Board of Directors. MEGOSZ, in addition to their meetings, holds several public consultations per year throughout the country. MEGOSZ only represents its member's interests and has been able to influence national policy. It cooperates with senior government officials, takes part in legislation processes and is seen as a trusted collaborator by other organisations. It is further considered to be a trustworthy source of information and members and other partners are able to have regular updates through their website. Information sharing, good political representation and access to forests management expertise and market competitiveness are perceived by the members to be key aspects to being members in the organisation. Members have a sense of community, even though they do not yet have increased income from their forests.

MEGOSZ assists forest owners to manage their forests. Historically, there has been mistrust between people and the government, particularly in communal land practices, which sometimes deters farmers from joining

cooperatives (Sarvašová et al., 2015). Representatives were shown to be accountable to their constituents through information sharing and also for lobbying for their interest. This created trust between the members and their representatives. It is likely that MEGOSZ plays an important intermediary role in representing the interests of their members. The members interviewed were very positive about MEGOSZ, particularly in information sharing and representation (Weiss & Dragoi et al., 2012; Weiss, Gudurić, & Wolfslehner, 2012). However, despite its success at representing its members, MEGOSZ has financial constraints. Membership fees only pay for some costs, requiring funding from other sources (e.g. donors) and sometimes serious budgetary constraints (Sarvašová et al., 2015). Despite its development and large member base, MEGOSZ and similar organisations in Eastern Europe face the common challenges of gaining increased political support, while providing services and successfully influencing policy (Sarvašová et al., 2015).

Case Study 4: Participation and Representation in the Context of Decentralisation in Nepal

This case examines the role of The Federation of Community Forestry Users of Nepal (FECOFUN), a representative body of community forest user groups, in their capacity and ability to represent their constituent's interests in forest management. The background from this case is largely drawn from three research articles, the last of which focused on why FECOFUN is often chosen as a project partner by donors (Dahal & Chapagain, 2008; Ojha, 2011; Rutt & Lund, 2014).

Since the end of the civil war in Nepal in 2006, the government has made many strides in ensuring peace in a democratic setting. Following the Decentralisation Act of 1982 whereby all development interventions are required to work with user groups at the local level, many organisations and projects have sought to work through these forest user groups, of which there are now about 18,000. Despite the presence of elected local government officers (from village to district) and serving many roles, including forest management, these officials have struggled to move from controlling forest resources to extension work, as mandated by

newer forestry policies. The forest user groups are autonomous bodies recognised by the government which are able to manage forest resources in compliance with the law and benefit from forest resources, while contributing a portion of their proceeds back to forest management.

FECOFUN was founded as a non-profit member-based organisation in 1995, operating at both the subnational and national levels. Its main aims, among others, are to promote cooperation among forest user groups, coordinate with government agencies and NGOs, advocate and lobby for user groups rights, influence policy and strengthen local capacity (FECOFUN, 2012). It focuses on disadvantaged groups such as women and those in the lower castes. In 2008, approximately 5 million people were part of the Federation, making it the largest of its kind in Nepal, including federations in all 75 districts (Ojha, 2011). Its focus on marginalised people has helped increase the membership in their organisation. According to Rutt and Lund (2014), through donor support, FECOFUN was able to engage in REDD+ processes (e.g. capacity building, setting up payment arrangements), largely because donors believed that civil society had a rightful place in the design and implementation of climate change mitigation strategies.

The founders of FECOFUN were activists working with and for local people. Despite the concerns of donors, they have been able to continue this role within the organisation (Ojha, 2011). This approach enables local voices to be heard in national debates, creating a bridge between local people and the state. FECOFUN empowers local people with information on their rights to resources, enabling them to challenge the state on a number of different issues. As a result, in some cases, forests have been handed over by government to communities that fought for their rights (Ojha, 2011).

FECOFUN has a general assembly and an executive committee. Forest users groups are the main actors represented. As stated in the FECOFUN constitution, women must comprise at least 50% of all positions at each level within the organisation. Constituents include women and the Dalits (part of the “untouchables” caste), who have long suffered marginalisation in Nepal. However, in many forest user groups, these marginalised forest users still remain some of the least able to participate (Lund et al., 2014). Cultural taboos within the higher castes in Nepal discourage

women's participation in FECOFUN. This and other social barriers ensure that FECOFUN leadership still primarily comes from the higher castes, despite its membership being largely from the lower castes (Ojha, 2011).

Although FECOFUN attempts to be responsive to the interests of all of its members, and there have been many cases where this has resulted in positive outcomes, this is not always so. There are instances where local activists gain power through FECOFUN activities and then use this power for personal gain (Ojha, 2011). In other cases, when working with government officials or political party leaders, there can be a tendency to be upwardly accountable to these political and administrative leaders rather than to FECOFUN's constituents. At other times, political parties have tried to capture and use FECOFUN's power for their political agenda (Ojha, 2011).

Other problems have arisen with political alliances with local parties, potentially in reducing its representation of stakeholders (Rutt & Lund, 2014) and nepotism both in terms of distributing forest resources and exemption from paying fines after committing an infraction. Some consider the membership fees to be unaffordable for the poorest members. Because the state is often absent in localities in part due to the recent civil war (1996–2006), FECOFUN fills a gap in providing public services to local people. However, this puts them in competition with locally elected officials of the constituencies. FECOFUN is a preferred partner by many donors given their reach, capacity and stability (Rutt & Lund, 2014); their involvement in projects can also ensure an oversight of disbursement of project funds (Saito-Jensen, Rutt, & Chhetri, 2014). Because of their recognition by donors, they are frequently requested to attend meetings which then reduces their availability and capacity to effectively follow up on these issues (Ojha, 2011).

FECOFUN receives contributions from the forest user groups to finance their national-level activities. However, there is still a dependence on donor funds for some of its work, which has called their independence into question. As reported by Ojha (2011, p. 14), a FECOFUN leader admitted that, "we often have to accept the presentation of donors in our events as a condition of funding. We are aware that this is not going to help but sometimes have to accept such condition considering

the importance of funding to make our events successful.” At times the technical expertise has also been called into question by donors and when FECOFUN disagrees with them, some donors have threatened to pull their support.

Local communities seem to react positively to FECOFUN’s leadership, showing their approval by increasing their membership and regular participation in FECOFUN activities. However, it is not certain how the communities would react if and when FECOFUN compromises on its mission to serve local people.

Analysis

The Supply and Demand of Participation and Representation

In the cases presented there is a clear demand from donors for civil society participation in consultation processes. As shown in Case studies 1 and 2, representation can be a condition for gaining donor approval for qualification to the next steps of the REDD+ strategy design. This makes participation and representation a response to a requirement to fulfil agendas driven by external agencies whose goals and timeframes may not align with those of civil society, sometimes resulting in rushed processes. By contrast, Case studies 3 and 4 were supply driven civil society cases, where ownership of the process was high and there was long-term engagement with constituents and governments.

Civil society organisations and advocacy networks play an important role in supplying the demand for participation. They may mobilise into a network to respond to the demand for participation. Furthermore, lack of consultation with members can lead to elite capture within the platform itself, as illustrated by the perceptions of and criticisms to the CSO-REDD&CC Platform in Cameroon, whose leaders were accused by some of civil society constituencies to have hijacked the platform as a means for self-promotion with inadequate downward accountability to member organisations.

Frequently, civil society organisations enter into alliances with donors and international organisations to put pressure on governments to create space for inclusion and participation in decision-making. This provides opportunities for development aid agencies and international organisations to secure the support they need to promote their own agenda while providing some conditional support to civil society. Critics maintain that donor-funded civil society supply side representation is more responsive and accountable to donors than to the local constituency being represented (Programme d'Appui à la Société Civile, 2015).

The relationship between actors (including donors and international agencies) who conceive and initiate participatory processes for decision-making, and actors (including civil society organisations) who populate the participatory space as advocacy representatives of local people, is a determinant of outcomes from participatory processes. The relationship could be conflictual or collaborative (Hyle, 2016), and this will have a bearing on how responsive and accountable civil society representatives are to their local constituency.

When demand for inclusion of civil society representative in participatory processes is initiated by a donor, the relationship between both set of actors is likely to be collaborative; civil society representative is likely to be upwardly accountable and responsive to donor, as observed in part in the Ghana and Cameroon cases. When demand for inclusion is civil society driven, the relationship is likely to be conflictual; and civil society representative is likely to be downwardly accountable to local constituency, as observed in Hungary and Nepal.

What Factors Matter for Effective Participation and Representation?

One of the main questions formulated at the beginning of this chapter is “What factors enable representation to be a mechanism of effective public participation in REDD+ and forest management?” The case studies reviewed show that civil society organisations representation in participatory processes have been effective in various instances in contributing to and influencing policy, and a number of factors emerge as determinants of the its

effectiveness and long-term sustainability. Based on the cases presented, five factors emerge that are critical in order for participation and representation to fulfil the principles of accountability and responsiveness.

Access to Information

The ability of representatives to fulfil their mandate of representation of their constituencies is dependent upon the quantity and quality of information they have access to, as well as the format, media and language through which the information is presented. While designated representatives need information to be able to act and fulfil their representation mandate, constituencies that are being represented also need to be informed about outcomes, by their delegates.

In many cases, the access to information to inform constituents of the outcomes of processes wherein they were represented was critical. In a notable case, the Forest Owners Organisation in Hungary was highly supported by constituents in part because of the organisation's commitment to being a reliable source of information and to providing members with this information. By contrast, both in the case of Cameroon and Ghana, during the REDD+ consultation process, representatives from civil society that were invited to meetings often complained of being given last minute notice and not enough information and time to engage in the meetings substantially.

One of the characteristics of access to information is that those who receive it should be able to interpret it adequately in order to make informed decisions and contributions. Experience shows that information is often presented in an unfamiliar format and with technical and administrative jargon that are unfamiliar to many civil society members, making their participation in deliberations weak. This is the case particularly for community-based organisations from rural areas, and some indigenous peoples groups. In the case of Cameroon, civil society members of the two Anglophone provinces constantly complained that most information and working documents were presented to them in French, added to the complicated technical and administrative language and format, thus limiting their ability to adequately understand and interpret the information for effective deliberation.

Funding Autonomy

The cases highlighted a lack of financial capacity of civil society as an impediment to being accountable and responsive to the constituencies that they represent. Self-organised stakeholder action, in a systematic review of participation in conservation projects, was found to be more successful when decision-making was autonomous and when stakeholders were able to make strategic decisions about when to reach out to external actors, including for funding (Sterling et al., 2017). Often, civil society depends heavily on funding from donors, making it difficult for them to be autonomous (Baruah, Bobtoya, Mbile, & Walters, 2016; Hearn, 2007). In these cases, these organisations may not be truly “emancipated institutions” whereby their work and inputs are governed by a donor or other NGOs (Hearn, 2007; Oyono, 2015). Cases of such upward accountability were encountered in Nepal’s case, whereby FECOFUN representatives were seen as becoming more accountable to donors or political party leaders than to their constituents. Upward accountability is not unique to the Nepal case and can be seen in relationships influenced by donors, often at the expense of the people that an initiative is meant to benefit (see Karambiri, 2015).

Due to the lack of financial and logistical resources in the Cameroon and Ghana cases, even when representatives wanted to be accountable to their constituents, they just could not do so. It must be acknowledged that such accountability requires financial means and where constituents are in remote areas, being responsive and accountable has an even higher cost (see Mandondo, 2015; Turner, 2014).

Length of Time Since Establishment and Experience of a Civil Society Organisation

In the cases presented, the ability for a civil society network to be responsive appears to be linked to how long the network has been operational, whether it has established mechanisms to report back to its constituents, and if it has the means to do so. Long-term engagement is important for initiatives to be sustainable (Cetas & Yasué, 2017). Furthermore, organisations that are initiated from the ground up, operate at multiple levels and have ownership by their constituents are likely to be more

sustainable in the long term (Haller, Acciaioli, & Rist, 2016). In Nepal and Hungary, both organisations had been building their network for more than 20 years. In Cameroon, the CSO-REDD&CC Platform was established only in 2011, in response to the demand from donors and government for civil society participation in REDD+ consultation.

Although most of its member organisations and individual leaders have many years' experience, the CSO-REDD&CC Platform still encounters the problems of a young organisation that struggles with basic operations. Despite being led by highly recognised and technically competent individuals, the organisation is yet to secure financial and logistical means to be able to account to their constituents sufficiently. The only funding available to them was to attend or organise meetings, but not to then finance accounting back to their constituents. Furthermore, the CSO-REDD&CC Platform had not yet found the resources to support a permanent Secretariat as their common point of contact and to have regular communication and liaison with their members.

By contrast, both FECOFUN and MEGOSZ of Nepal and Hungary had established a membership fee mechanism which supported secretariat and information-sharing mechanisms. Without tested and trusted ways for a representative organisation to account back to their members, participatory processes, especially those on tight timelines, can frustrate constituents and representatives.

Satyel (2017, p. 33) notes that "wider participation depends on the process and the way these platforms have been organised, including the rules and criteria for membership, institutional and organisational structures of CSOs and platforms, internal accountability and selection process, etc. It is therefore necessary to ensure that independent civil society platforms are accessible to all relevant stakeholders and appropriate mechanisms are available for them to participate fully."

Capacity to Advocate for the Interests of the Represented Constituency

Using the representation functions as a stepping stone to fulfilling individual objectives is one source of complaints by constituents. Although self-promotion might be unavoidable when one engages in a civil society

movement, it becomes problematic when it betrays the expectations of the constituencies that gave a delegate the representation authority. In some cases, representatives may use the process to gain recognition as an individual (Honneth, 2012), to advance a particular self-interested political struggle (Thomassen, 2011), to access to and control funding (e.g. international funding) or for individual career motivations (Grindle & Thomas, 1989).

This behaviour may hinder their ability to represent their constituents. In the case of Cameroon and Nepal, there were instances where local elites tried to capture and manipulate the organisation towards achieving their political or economic interest, and to broaden the scope of their elite power and the span of their control of important collective assets. Such actions reduce the trust that constituents have in the leadership of an organisation and may reduce participation overall (see Wilson, 2016).

Discretionary Right to Say No to Interventions

In places where there is a history of collective agency, participation can be high, allowing communities to voice their concerns and have it result in concrete action, including rejecting development projects that do not correspond to community needs (de Wet, 2011; Kepe & Ntsebeza, 2011). As shown by the cases reviewed in this chapter, the lack of financial independence and of unconditional and long-term funding put civil society at times at the mercy of their donors. The development aid culture consciously or unconsciously requires recipients of donor funding to demonstrate allegiance and support to the goals pursued by aid agencies and development and environmental organisations operating in that framework. Thus, civil society faces difficulties when wanting to freely advance the interests and agendas of their constituents, particularly when they appear to be opposed or challenging to the interests of donors.

Often, civil society is inactive and ineffective without donor support. But instead of funding civil society as a matter of principle and to ensure that appropriate power balance and check-and-balance mechanisms are in place and functioning, donors consciously or unconsciously may manipulate the civil society to advance their development aid agenda.

In several cases, organisations were chosen by donors or governments as preferred partners because they were known entities (as is the case in Nepal and Ghana). However, the impact of this on lesser-known organisations could be that civil society representation remains captured by a few lead organisations. Consequently, smaller organisations will not be able to participate or develop new capacities (Satyal, 2017). A lack of recognition could weaken them further in representing their constituents' interests, as observed in cases in Central Africa (Oyono, 2015).

Finally, policy and governance conditions in a country are critical factors that determine the degree, scope and effectiveness of representation and participation. In countries with a rooted democratic culture and political support to multilevel democracy, devolution and power sharing, the above outlined factors for effective representation and participation are more easily deployed. They are more observable in the functioning of civil society and as the basis of the interactions between government, donors and civil society. In contrast, there will be more battles in less democratic and centralised governance systems to meet the basic conditions for representation and participation.

Conclusion

From the analysis of the cases here, it has been demonstrated that the representative function of civil society in participatory processes has both a supply and demand component influenced by donors, governments and civil society itself. The analysis further reveals five key factors which can enhance whether civil society can effectively represent its constituents interests in forests and climate change initiatives like REDD+, namely access to information, funding autonomy, length of time since establishment and experience of a civil society organisation, ability to advance the interests of the represented constituency, and the independence and their discretionary right to say no to interventions.

When examining the effectiveness of civil society organisations representative function in participatory processes, and the contribution it makes towards transforming policy and action, one must take into consideration the relationship between the initiator of the participatory process (often donors and governments) and the civil society organisations

that populate the participatory space. This will help ensure that expectations from civil society organisations representation in participatory processes are based on their observed capacities, abilities and relationships with other actors, and not in arbitrary criteria and wishful thinking that leads to disappointment and disillusionment for many involved in the process.

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Notes

1. Legitimacy here is defined as “Legitimacy is a generalized perception or assumption that the actions of an entity are desirable, proper, or appropriate within some socially constructed system of norms, values, beliefs, and definitions” (Suchman, 1995, p. 574). Furthermore, such legitimacy is seen in this chapter as stakeholders granting permission to organisations to perform work (Schiopoiu Burlea & Popa, 2013).
2. In this chapter, we use “civil society” to generally mean citizens, grassroots organisations and local communities who may be actors or beneficiaries of measures to foster participation and representation.
3. A VPA is a bilateral trade agreement of international law between a timber-producing country and the European Union with an aim to reduce illegal timber sales and improve forest management.

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7

Experience of Participatory Forest Management in India: Lessons for Governance and Institutional Arrangements Under REDD+

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Introduction

The concept of Participatory Forest Management (PFM) emerged in Sukhomajri in Haryana and Arabari in West Bengal during the 1970s and 1980s. But, protection of natural resources by communities has been documented in India by various observers (Bhattacharya, 1995; Gadgil & Guha, 1995; Malhotra & Poffenberger, 1989; Panda, Dabas, Varalakshmi, Shah, & Gupta, 1992; Poffenberger et al., 1996) in Northeast India (sacred groves), Central India (protection of sacred ponds, trees and landscapes), Western India (black buck protection by Bishnois in Rajasthan) and southern parts of India (protection of forests), much before its official implementation as Joint Forest Management (JFM) in India. The National Forest Policy of 1988 created space for

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community participation in forest management decision-making and this was given a legal sanction in the form of a Government Order of June 1990. India thus has close to three decades of experience of implementing PFM.

Furthermore, India is implementing the Green India Mission—one of the eight missions under the National Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC), with a target of enhancing carbon stocks for a forest area of 10 Mha over a period of ten years. The Green India Mission also aims to increase the conservation of ecosystem services and build resilience to climate change. In addition to these efforts, India is hosting nine Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) afforestation/reforestation (A/R) projects, making India home to one of the largest afforestation programmes in the world. Thus, there are multiple initiatives in India that aim for climate change mitigation through conserving and increasing forest carbon stocks.

Being a signatory to the 2015 Paris Agreement on Climate Change, India is committed to delivering the Nationally Determined Contributions (NDCs) it has submitted to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). India's NDC targets include the following:

- To reduce the emission intensity of its gross domestic product (GDP) by 33–35% by 2030 from 2005 levels;
- To achieve about 40% of cumulative electric power installed capacity from non-fossil fuel-based energy resources by 2030, through the transfer of technology and international finance; and
- To create an additional carbon sink of 2.5–3 billion tonnes of CO₂ equivalent through additional forest and tree cover by 2030.

India's NDC targets will contribute significantly to reducing deforestation and forest degradation, and to the enhancement of forest carbon stocks in the country.

Currently, the Government of India is in the process of developing its National Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation and Conservation (REDD+) Strategy. Its overarching objective is to facilitate the implementation of REDD+ in conformity

with Article 5 of the Paris Agreement, the Warsaw Framework for REDD+, the Cancun Agreement and the National Legislative Framework for Conservation and Improvement of Environment and Natural Resources. The National REDD+ Strategy is being formulated in a manner that is in consonance with the laws, acts and policies of allied sectors, which also simultaneously ensures alignment to the safeguards laid down by the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). These include recognition and adherence to rights of local communities, participation of all stakeholders and conservation of biodiversity of natural forests.

In this context, this chapter aims to critically examine and understand the role of local communities in forest management in India, implemented under various policies and programmes, including a few pilot REDD+ projects, and the emerging lessons for the formulation of India's REDD+ strategy.

Status of Forests and Forest Management in India

The area under forests in India as per the India State of Forest Report (FSI, 2015) is 70.17 Mha, which is 21.34% of the geographical area of the country. During the same period, the total forest and tree cover is reported to be 79.42 Mha. There is an increase of 3775 sq. km in the forest cover of the country as compared to the 2015 assessment. In the hilly and tribal districts of the country, there is a net increase of forest cover of 0.17 Mha and 0.05 Mha, respectively, as compared to the previous assessment. Most of the increase in forest cover is reported in the open forest category, mainly outside forest areas. The area under the open forest category has increased by 0.47 Mha and during the same period, an increase in area of 0.24 Mha is reported for the very dense forest category. The forest cover map of India is presented in Fig. 7.1.

The State of Forest Report (FSI, 2015) states that the growing stock has increased by 110.34 million cubic metres, as opposed to a decrease of 389.11 million cubic metres, reported during the previous assessment (FSI, 2013). Consequently, India's carbon sink has increased by 103 mil-




Fig. 7.1 Forest cover map of India (Source: ISFR (2015))

lion tons to 7044 million tons in 2015 as compared to 2013. While in many developing countries, forest cover has either remained static or has reduced, India has added around 3 Mha of forest and tree cover over the last decade.

Forest Management in India

Forest management in India has evolved over the decades and this section presents a timeline of the development of forest policies. In the pre-British period, the ownership of forests resided with the rulers of the various kingdoms across India. With few exceptions, access to forests was largely unrestricted throughout the pre-British period (Guha, 1983). The institutional framework was complemented by religious and symbolic functions of trees and forests (Pretzsch, 2005). The caste system also played a crucial role in forest management. At the village level, the use of natural resources was managed by a local community institution known as the *Panchayat*. Forestry in India can broadly be categorized in to pre- and post-Independence forestry. The former saw the formation of legislation pertaining to forest management for the first time in Indian history.

The Forest Policy of 1984 was essentially India's first dedicated forest policy, although it prioritized agriculture over forests (Kant & Cooke, 1999) and naturally, gave little importance to tribal communities. In fact, it favoured higher efficiency and greater, centralized control over people and resources (Buchy, 1996). The Indian Forest Act of 1927, similarly, focused on forest produce (and again, gave little focus to communities). Effectively, both alienated local forest communities. Figure 7.2 traces the evolution of some of the key forest policies in India.

Forestry Post-independence

Forests in India are governed by policies, which are formulated by the Government of India. Forests come under the 'Concurrent List', meaning that both state and central governments exercise authority over them, in different capacities. The National Forest Policy of 1952 was India's first post-Independence forest policy. It defines procedures to systematically and 'scientifically' exploit forests for timber and other products. Up until this point, the forest was looked upon as a commodity purely for exploitation purposes, with little consideration for communities, biodiversity and other aspects. It was in the period between 1950 and 1970 that

National Forest Policy of 1952	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Initiated to allow exclusive state control over forests and its management. • Declared that village communities should not be permitted to exercise their traditional rights over the forests at the expense of national interest.
Forest Conservation Act, 1980	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Enacted to regulate reduce or ban indiscriminate diversion of forestland for non-forestry purposes and, to regulate and control forestland use change.
Social Forestry (post-1980)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • The National Commission on Agriculture (1976) suggested setting up of a corporation to manage forests and to attract monetary assistance from various government and non-government sources. • Autonomous forest corporations were started and large-scale plantation activities began with initiation of the social forestry programme on non-forestry lands such as village commons, government wastelands and farmlands to reduce pressure on forests. • Peoples' participation was first experimented with the launch of social forestry programme.
The Forest Policy of 1988	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aims for maintaining one-third of the country's geographical area under forest and tree cover. • Calls for massive afforestation and social forestry programmes with people's participation for increasing the forest and tree cover.
Joint Forest Management (JFM) Resolution of 1990	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aims at recognition of rights of organized communities over a clearly defined degraded patch of the forest. • State level resolutions have legitimized JFM activities at all levels - from the State Forest Departments to the village communities.
Biological Biodiversity Act, 2002	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Provides for conservation of biological diversity, sustainable use of its components and fair and equitable sharing of benefits arising out of the use of biological resources knowledge.
National Environment Policy, 2006	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Guides action in developing regulatory reforms, programmes and projects for environmental conservation. • Emphasizes partnership of different stakeholders.
National Agroforestry Policy, 2014	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Aims at encouraging and expanding tree plantation in a complementary and integrated manner with crops and livestock. • Aimed to help protect and stabilize ecosystems, and promote resilient cropping and farming systems to minimize risks of extreme climatic events and help achieve India's target of increasing forest/tree cover.

Fig. 7.2 The evolution of key forest policies in India and their salient features

peoples' movements like the Chipko movement began, fuelled by excessive forest degradation and high conflict between authorities and local communities. In the 1970s, the concept of community participation in forest management slowly blossomed. In 1976, the National Commission on Agriculture (NCA) came into being. This was highly unsuccessful because the impoverished farmers preferred monetary plantations to subsistence living. In 1977, the concept of social forestry was born. Following this, the 1988 Forest Policy and JFM ordinance of 1990 completely reversed the NCA.

Emergence of Participatory Forestry in India

The first policy-level decision for people's involvement in forest protection and management was taken in the resolution passed in the meeting of the XXII Central Board of Forestry held in December 1987. The prime minister in his Chairman's Address stressed the need for effective people's participation in forest protection and management. This was reflected in the Resolution No. 25 which reads as under:

This meeting resolves that by 31.3.90 every village will have a plan for regeneration of forests and the restoration of ecological balance. This plan will be drawn up and implemented with full participation of village panchayats or other such bodies.

In 1988, the new Forest Policy that encompassed all the sustainable management approaches subsequently provided in the 1992 Rio 'Forest Principles' was adopted. The main objectives of this Policy are:

- Maintenance of environmental stability and restoration of ecological balance, soil and water conservation;
- Conservation of natural heritage and genetic resources;
- Increasing substantially forest/tree cover (33% of land mass and 66% in hills);
- Increasing productivity of forests to sustainably meet first local and then national needs;

- Creating a massive peoples' movement to increase and protect forest and tree cover; and
- Deriving economic benefit must be subordinated to these principal aims.

This initiated a process of reform at the policy and operational levels of forest management in collaboration with local stakeholders. The Ministry of Environment and Forests (MoEF), Government of India, issued detailed guidelines in June 1990 for people's involvement in forest conservation and management through appropriate village-level organizations. It also laid emphasis on the procedure of sharing of usufructs and a share of the net sale proceeds.

This new participatory management approach elevated the local people from receivers of some benefits from the forest area to the level of co-managers along with the forest personnel over a designated area of the forest. It aimed to ensure equitable benefit sharing of the usufruct as well as financial returns from timber harvest. It brought to focus the need for development of modified silvicultural systems and flexible management approach for ensuring local need-based and sustainable multi-product outputs from the previously degraded forest area and better non-timber forest product yield from good forest areas.

In 1999, MoEF initiated the National Forest Action Programme (NFAP) to cover a period of 20 years (4 Five-Year Plans from the Tenth Plan onwards), starting in 2002. It recommended an annual need-based target of 3 Mha for regeneration, plantations, agro and social forestry programmes in close collaboration with local people and stakeholders. It laid emphasis on livelihood-based forest resource management, development and use by local people that would lead to self-reliance and sustainability. The MoEF issued a supporting circular on 21 February 2002 for strengthening the JFM programme in the country. The key highlights of this include:

- Providing legal status through registration of JFM committees;
- Women constituting 50% of the membership of the general body and at least 33% of the executive committee;
- JFM covering good forest area; and

- The working plan having a JFM-overlapping working circle with flexible guidelines for preparation of JFM microplans.

In the year 2000–2001, MoEF initiated a pilot scheme of undertaking integrated village afforestation and eco-development activities under a new setup named Forest Development Agency (FDA) to gradually cover nearly 0.175 mHa, situated close to forests. The basic objectives of the scheme were:

- To urge the FDA to coordinate the activities of all JFM committees in any given forest division and provide technical, policy and marketing support;
- To arrest and reverse the trend of forest degradation through appropriate forestry development programmes;
- To provide sustainable, assured employment opportunities to tribal and other weaker sections of the society through forestry-related activities;
- To create durable community assets for socio-economic development;
- To ensure direct fund flow from Government of India forestry development schemes to agencies implementing microplans, that is, JFM committees; and
- To organize training for local stakeholders and forest staff for sustainable forest management, equitable sharing of benefits, conflict resolution and so on.

The FDA was a major policy reform for gradually ensuring full financial and administrative empowerment of the local JFM committees for managing their own natural resources. The JFM/FDA concept was thus a radical departure from the earlier 'command and control' approach of forest management that had been practised since 1865. The co-management approach recognized the dependence of local communities on forests and encouraged their involvement in ensuring sustainable natural resources. It also brought out the instrumentality of non-monetary incentive mechanisms, such as policy-level changes, local empowerment, awareness programmes and so forth, to the successful sustainable forest management.

The Feasibility and Significance of Community Involvement in Indian Forest Management

While PFM as a concept has great potential in a country such as India, which has many indigenous and tribal communities who have lived in close proximity to forests for generations, there have been certain notable setbacks and criticisms of its efficacy thus far. There is an active debate over whether it is suitable for India or not, with one side arguing that disparities in caste and economic status within village forest communities could seriously affect their ability to manage resources communally and another side arguing that the very fact that communally shared resources have existed in such communities for centuries is proof that such a system could work very well indeed. One major aspect throwing doubt to its potential in India is the erratic and rather halting pattern of implementation it has seen in many places. This has made it difficult to determine its suitability for certain contexts.

Another significant issue with PFM in India thus far has been the gender blindness of forest policies at large. Women in forest communities share a close relationship with the forest and are most affected by restrictions to its usage. Their work load increases as they are unable to access the resources they are accustomed to obtaining from it. Women's participation in the planning processes of JFM is also considerably low, less than 10% were found to have attended. Their vulnerability in society and lower access to nutrition make them more susceptible to the nutritional deficits that inevitably follow these restrictions (Thomson & Freudemberger, 1997).

Also, precise data on the conditions that make PFM has been hard to come by, particularly data regarding the nature of the factors that make it successful. These could be internal (community driven), but they could also be external (politically influenced) and until this connection is ascertained, meaningful action to implement it is challenging. Although the forest department and forest communities have (and continue to) worked together successfully in some areas, the factors behind this success, as already mentioned, are not clearly understood. There is a need for literature comprehensively synthesizing the available data in a manner that facilitates future projects and ensures their smooth and successful carrying out. In essence, indicators of PFM success have not been identified as yet Centre for International Forestry Research (CIFOR).

In terms of implementation, many PFM projects to date have ignored difficulties that communities tend to face in resolving governance and management issues. The institutional framework is often found to not fully support PFM activities. When they are modified to align with these activities, implementation is often not aligned with communities' aspirations. Although this is important, it is frequently overlooked in the planning and time-budgeting process. Policy and legal frameworks are either not sufficiently delved into or the forest department's willingness to carry out these activities is misjudged (CIFOR). Communities at times do not have sufficient and clear rights over forest produce. This lack of clarity translates into insufficient control over smaller aspects of management as well as a lack of clear-cut guidelines on what 'sustainability' constitutes (Lele, 2014).

Communities are often reluctant to invest resources in PFM activities because they lack confidence in their ability to access the benefits of these activities in the future. This cost of governance, both in terms of time and finance, hinders community participation at times. Some projects are such that their economic potential is either limited or can only be realized long term, either because they are extremely degraded lands that require considerable work or state management has been inadequate (Iddi, 2000). Heavy focus on degraded forest land tends to ignore public lands used by village communities. Confusion over rights and privileges exacerbates inequalities within villages (Lele, 2014).

There is often a conflict of stakeholder interests, between potential investors in sustainable forest management on the one hand and the income needs of the communities on the other hand (Iddi, 2000). This is aggravated by the fact that people often travel considerable distances to obtain permits to access forest products and sell them (Thomson & Freudenberg, 1997). Land tenure security and institutional sustainability tend to be problematic due to the funding-oriented nature of these projects (Lele, 2014). Put together, these factors can make for situations of uncertainty and confusion for forest communities who have been accustomed to meeting their subsistence requirements from easily accessible forest produce.

Another factor hindering the success of PFM is the lack of clarity in conditions for participation by third parties who could have a crucial role in facilitating PFM activities and acting as a bridge between governmental agencies and communities. Third parties such as NGOs often have

unclear roles in the PFM process, which makes it difficult for them to render meaningful support. This lack of clarity may also cause tensions between forest departments and communities (Iddi, 2000).

At the base of this argument is the fact that tribal and forest-dwelling communities contribute a significant percentage of India's population and have conventionally subsisted on forest resources for centuries. Out of necessity, various cultures of conservation have arisen that have permitted these communities to use forests for their needs while ensuring that they are not depleted and unable to provide for their future needs. These traditional systems of conservation and traditional knowledge as a whole stand to provide valuable guidance to conservation efforts in the future, as scientists and planners attempt to balance the demands of rapid development with India's climate goals. Moreover, without community participation, forest management activities are invariably doomed to failure. It is extremely important to ensure that the needs of the communities living in closest relationships to forests are taken care of and that a sense of ownership is instilled such that they too take interest in keeping up forest management efforts. For any of this to occur, the issues elucidated above must be addressed, particularly those pertaining to institutional shortcomings.

Climate Change Actions in India

The Government of India has been implementing a range of climate-friendly measures to address climate change through its NAPCC, with the underlying framework of sustainable development.

National Action Plan for Climate Change (NAPCC)

The NAPCC resulted from a chain of events that began with the 4th Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change. This report came to the strong conclusion that climate change was undeniably in motion. As a direct result of this report, the Prime Minister's Council on Climate Change, in its first meeting in July 2007, decided

that the time was ripe to create a document at the national level to guide climate action in the coming years. Thus, the NAPCC was born as a response to this decision as well as to serve as an update to pre-existing climate change-relevant national programmes.

Eight missions come under the NAPCC (Government of India 2010), of which the National Mission for Sustaining the Himalayan Ecosystem, the National Mission for a Green India and the National Mission for Sustainable Agriculture emphasize increasing community participation and protecting traditional knowledge systems. Of these, the National Mission for a Green India deals particularly closely with the linkages between communities and forestry and forest conservation. It seeks to enhance ecosystem services, especially carbon sinks and forest cover. The prime minister's Green India campaign targets 6 Mha of afforestation and at increasing the current figure of 23% area under forest cover to 33%. Furthermore, it emphasizes the need for state-level JFM committees and forest departments to organize community action to reclaim degraded forest land.

State Action Plan on Climate Change

The State Action Plan on Climate Change (SAPCC) came about following a mandate by the central government in 2009, under the NAPCC. These plans are potentially powerful planning tools, as business-as-usual approaches to sustainable development are unlikely to be sufficient going forward. Also, state-level strategies for climate change provide opportunities to draw greater attention to climate change issues (Dubash & Jogesh, 2014, 29 November). They are meant to facilitate a more bottom-up, participatory approach to climate change adaptation and mitigation and build national resilience from the ground up. The importance of understanding local challenges before moving on to measurement and planning cannot be overstated. In the face of extreme climatic events, it is crucial that climate action plan strategies are developed in a holistic, context-specific manner.

The vulnerability of the region in question and the adaptation capacity of the stakeholders are of key importance here. Two kinds of adaptations may be distinguished—soft and hard. Soft adaptation would essentially necessi-

tate rounding up financial support to train local authorities, make on-the-ground assessments of adaptive capacity and determine best practices to improve adaptation. Hard adaptation on the other hand, involving the more challenging tasks of measuring adaptation through detailed vulnerability assessments, is more nuanced and difficult (Hallegatte and Dumas n.d.).

Regardless of the method adopted, the success of the SAPCCs is highly dependent on the ability of states to train local communities and stakeholders, for which a participatory approach to adaptation planning is crucial. Nineteen of 29 SAPCCs explicitly mention an intention to incorporate REDD+ and/or CDM principles into their action plans, while the remaining 10 do not. These SAPCCs show an intention to increase community participation in forest conservation efforts, and most stress on the need to involve all stakeholders (particularly local communities) in decision-making processes and improve general awareness on climate change issues.

Clean Development Mechanism

In December 1997, the Kyoto Protocol was adopted by parties to the UNFCCC, committing to internationally binding emission reduction targets. The CDM set into place a system of carbon credits to facilitate emission reduction in developing countries. It provides a method by which industrialized countries with emission reduction commitments may reach their reduction targets by obtaining Certified Emission Reductions (CERs) from developing countries. CER trading has been of great significance in the Compliance Carbon Market.

At the micro (local) level, there is some discontent regarding the level to which CDM projects are developed in a participatory and consultative manner. The Environment Impact Assessment process has received significant criticism for not considering the plight of affected citizens at the scoping state and instead, opting to debate these at public hearings. While certain policies have facilitated greater participation by local communities, there continues to be a stark gap between the power sector and the organizations able and willing to intercede on behalf of local interests (Mahalingam et al., 2006). Some, such as the Carbon Market Watch, do a lot of work pertaining to CDM monitoring despite their limited capacity to monitor the socio-ecological aspects of CDM planning. Their

limited capacity somewhat diminishes their accountability in the absence of a larger network of mechanisms to monitor projects (Phillips & Newell, 2013). At this juncture, the Government of India is all set to begin implementation of REDD+ and as a first step towards this (as discussed earlier), it is formulating a National REDD+ Strategy.

REDD+ Pilot Projects: Case Studies

In this section, pilot REDD+ projects implemented in India are discussed and the challenges and lessons learnt from such implementation is discussed.

(i) *The Khasi Hills PES/REDD+ Project*

The unique flora and fauna of this region together with a resurgence of old traditions (sacred groves, communal forests, oral histories and rituals) brought 62 villages and 10 indigenous governments by way of tribal village councils to actively address forest resource conservation and governance. The Sixth Schedule of the Constitution enables autonomy over land and forest resources to indigenous communities in northeast India which was found to be beneficial for forest carbon initiatives at the community scale initiated by the Community Forestry International (CFI). Challenges faced included a lack of documentation, lack of federal recognition and support to traditional institutions, privatization of community land and demographic and economic pressures such as expansion of agriculture and mining activities. REDD+, in this case, offered long-term management plans, generated income-generating activities and capacity building for effective management (see Poffenberger, 2012).

(ii) *The Mawphlang Pilot Project from 2005 to 2010*

An extension of the Khasi Hills Project, it demonstrated that continuous community engagement through the tribal councils produced desired outcomes—drivers and pressures were identified and corresponding micro-watershed plans were formulated (see Poffenberger, 2014). Community forests were surveyed by the local youth as the locals feared that mapping would pave the way for

encroachment by the Forest Department (FD). Thus, this autonomy (under the supervision of project coordinators) gave greater clarity on the bio-physical status of the mapped areas. Responses such as improved stoves were introduced which reduced wood consumption by 25–30%, open grazing gave way to rotational grazing shifts which allowed pastures to regenerate and comparable satellite images showed that there was no loss of sacred forests. Monitoring was done largely through annual photographs and walk-through investigations. Landsat imagery was also used. Incentives were given through Assisted Natural Regeneration and Payment for Ecosystem Services to the village Local Working Committee and Self-Help Groups approximately totalling US \$1000 each year. A forest carbon inventory was done on 40 plots in 2011 to create a baseline for the future.

The Khasi Hills Community REDD+ Project in the Umiam sub-watershed was initiated by CFI. The pilot project demonstrated the effectiveness of indigenous governance and Participatory Rural Appraisals (PRAs) in implementing REDD+ initiatives and transitioning to sustainable agriculture. The 30-year climate adaptation strategy encompassing 62 villages was approved by the Khasi Hills Autonomous District Council (DC). From 2011, community-based landscape maps were developed and management decisions were taken at over 80 meetings of participating communities. In March 2013, the project was registered under Plan Vivo standards. This was India's first project to be certified as such. In 2013, 21,805 tonnes of carbon credits were issued and by the end of the year, 5193 tonnes were sold at US \$6–7 per tonne by brokers, C Level of London and U and We of Stockholm.

(iii) *The Garo Hills REDD+ Project*

The local autonomous DC governs landscapes and people in this region with legal provisions under the Sixth Schedule of the Indian Constitution. The land in this region was increasingly under pressure as slash and burn shifting cultivation had reduced long rotation cycles from about 15–20 years to 1–5 years. Shifting cultivation is done under customary rights and the government exercises very little control on the land. The Wildlife Trust of India, in 2005, initiated a community-based Natural Resource Management (NRM) project to aid regeneration and create corridors for movement of wildlife (Areendran et al., 2013; Vijge & Gupta, 2014; Yadav, 2015).

Activities also included controlled grazing and patrolling to prevent illegal logging. In 2010, Wildlife Trust India and the World Land Trust (a UK-based NGO) initiated a possibility of earning income through carbon credits from forest carbon sequestration. A UK-based shipping company which initially signed a non-binding contract to fund the project till validation eventually pulled out due to conflicts over the time period in which outcomes could be obtained and carbon credits bought. The company was due to buy the carbon credits, once validated, in line with its corporate social responsibility goals.

(iv) *Valuing Forest Carbon in Madhya Pradesh*

A large portion of the Madhya Pradesh forest area (about 63%) is under the JFM regime and in 2005, there were 14,173 JFM committees managing 6 million ha of forest area (Gupta, 2013). Large forest tracts of the state are said to be sustainably managed and even received an ad-hoc dispensation of conservation funds from the 13th Finance Commission for the state. Three villages engaging in JFM have been identified to pursue compensation and rewards for conservation under REDD+. Assuming a uniform annual biomass increment, approximately 1.2 tonnes per hectare of annual CO₂ equivalent has been generated in the three villages between 2000 and 2010. Verma, Batra and Mehra (2013) evaluated the compensation as US\$120–600 to the JFM committees identified in the study. The authors opine that the state would need to develop robust monitoring and baseline datasets to actualize REDD+ datasets. It was also pointed out that the current JFM structures could be modified to formulate project activities and benefit sharing. Additionally, it was suggested that REDD+ committees should also have representatives from the local Joint Forest Management Communities (JFMCs) and government officials.

Discussion: Emergent Lessons Learnt, Challenges and Opportunities for REDD+ in India

Lessons from forestry programmes like JFM are crucial for developing localized REDD+ strategies. Empirical evidence on the success of JFM is mixed and varies from state to state (Bandi & Viswanathan, 2014). JFM, in its initial stages, failed to incorporate adequate representation of locals,

appropriate involvement through consultations and exploited tribal communities. An example of the consequences was the result of the Mass Tribal Organisations (MTOs) opposing a World Bank-funded JFM project in Madhya Pradesh in 1999 (Sarin, Singh, Sundar, & Bhogal, 2003).

On the other hand, Pandey (2013) cites the Rajgarh forest department JFM programme as an example of good governance since the officials took targeted measures and interventions to reduce socio-economic vulnerabilities of the communities involved. JFM in Andhra Pradesh has had mixed outcomes owing to insecurity of rights and unaccountable institutions (Behera & Engel, 2006). Prodyut Bhattacharya, Pradhan and Yadav (2010) note that JFM revived degraded forests and enabled flow of benefits like wages from forest livelihood activities, Non-Timber Forest Product (NTFP) and fodder but conclude that the latter phase of JFM has not been as successful.

In the Garo Hills, unavailability of land for small-scale farming and orchards was a significant driver of deforestation, and the absence of other alternatives poses a risk as locals may revert to shifting cultivation (Areendran et al., 2013). By far, the Khasi example is the closest to which any Indian project has come to establishing a voluntary carbon market through REDD+ (Vijge & Gupta, 2014). The success was largely on part of the community itself—the accrual of monetary benefits was seen as a co-benefit. Local village councils engage in consensus-based and democratic processes, and CFI has expressed concerns that governments seeking to step into this grassroots-level management may threaten these mechanisms (Poffenberger, 2014). However, this is specific to the Meghalaya region and might not reflect the thrust of REDD+ in a general Indian context. On the plus side, such community-based management can be aligned and integrated with broader biodiversity conservation goals and climate change mitigation (Prip & Wallbott, 2014).

Given these shortcomings and challenges in the implementation of participatory and JFM initiatives in India, there is a possibility for India to learn from these shortcomings and move forward to ensure that REDD+ design and implementation succeeds. We identify a number of issues that are most problematic and need to be addressed by the government with support from research institutions, NGOs and local communities. They include:

Intra-community and Inter-community Conflict

Richer villagers usually dominate JFMCs (Kumar, 2002), and certain poorer groups may be ineligible for benefits as they cannot contribute or participate (Conroy, Mishra, & Rai, 2002). There may be internal conflicts on equity and usufruct rights between groups, made even more complicated by overlapping jurisdictional boundary claims of adjacent villages (Conroy et al., 2002). Such conflicts highlight the tough challenge of working with local communities to prevent environmental damage (Pretty, 2003), underpinning the need for a pragmatic and inclusive approach to designing REDD+ initiatives that are realistic and achievable.

Gender Equality and Women Empowerment

While REDD+ currently does not secure land tenure rights, how will it empower women? Formal rules can entrap people in counter-productive social arrangements such as when the rights of women are compromised in JFM (Pretty, 2003). A study (Rishi, 2007) on attitudes of different stakeholders in 14 Village Forest Committees (VFCs) of Madhya Pradesh under JFM revealed that forest officials faced problems to ensure active participation of women because of inherent patriarchal practices, wherein women were prohibited from speaking in front of male villagers and outsiders. Conroy et al. (2002) found that although women were important stewards of forest resources and supported committee decisions, the extent of their participation in decision-making was almost negligible. India's REDD+ programme should ensure that gender equality and women empowerment are promoted.

Ineffective Implementation and Enforcement of Laws

There is a school of thought, which argues that ineffective implementation and enforcement of laws is principally to be blamed for forest loss in India and not population pressure. They further argue that the manipulation of legal instruments by the government in pursuit of economic gains

contributes to poor enforcement of environment laws (Satpathy, 2015). This reflects indecision in the government about prioritizing environmental health as the foundational basis of the well-being of society. India's REDD+ programme, and other climate change mitigation initiatives, is an opportunity for research institutions, NGOs and other social movements to seize the moment and pressure government to make more firm commitment to better environmental management and back this up by creating strong institutions to ensure effective implementation and enforcement of environmental laws.

Strong Environmental Safeguards for India's Biodiversity

Given that forests do not solely provide carbon storage services, REDD+ must not lead to a loss of India's biodiversity. Strong environmental safeguards and accountability will ensure that REDD+ in India does not lead to displacement of forest people and replacement of India's rich biodiverse forests with monocultures and industrial plantations.

Community Involvement in Monitoring, Reporting and Verification (MRV)

REDD+ requires national-level estimations of emissions backed by community-based monitoring that tracks local scenarios better and helps with ground 'truthing' satellite-obtained data. Collaborations for MRV purposes that mutually benefit communities as well as national agencies are essential for REDD+ to be effective. Community REDD+ MRV strategies must have a standard protocol for consistency, engage in extensive capacity building and training of locals, and have a robust setup for collecting and storing the locally monitored data (Pratihast, Herold, De Sy, Murdiyarto, & Skutsch, 2013). Danielsen et al. (2011) demonstrated that emissions are more likely to reduce more permanently with the empowerment rather than the alienation of local communities. Their study was based on a limited dataset but 'cautiously supported' the idea that locals

with a primary level of education could be trained to monitor and assess forest resources on par with trained experts. This could also ensure a fair share of carbon benefits to volunteering locals. Caution would be advised in case of overreporting or favouring certain positive outcomes and governments off-loading their monitoring costs to the poor.

Scientific Selection and Location of REDD+ Pilot Sites

REDD+ pilot sites at the sub-national level have been very few in India (Vijge & Gupta, 2014). However, there have been studies to identify more potential sites for REDD+. Selected sites must be chosen following scientific criteria to ensure that forest areas most in need of intervention become local pilot sites. Murthy and Sharma (2013) propose that since the Protected Area (PA) network consists of areas where extraction is banned or well regulated, they serve as potential sites for REDD+-related conservation activities. The authors also scientifically investigated the area availability and mitigation potential for REDD+ activities in the Northeastern states and found Arunachal Pradesh to be theoretically, the most favourable among them. In addition, Wani, Joshi, Singh and Shafi (2016) evaluated forest cover dynamics in Kashmir with relevance to REDD+ and found that the natural forests of the western Himalayan region could be a candidate for the Sustainable Management of Forest (SMF) component of REDD+. This region had faced deforestation due to years of political turmoil.

Lessons from CDM for Getting REDD+ Governance Right

India's experience with A/R activities under CDM provides a basis for learning on how to develop an effective REDD+ programme. It has been observed that there has been more opposition to the implementation of REDD+ due to local governance issues compared with CDM A/R projects. Aggarwal (2014) points to the fact that all A/R projects have been on private land in order to skip bureaucratic hurdles, but this has also contributed to very little public protest against CDM A/R projects. On the

other hand, these projects are small with limited marketability of credits (Bhullar, 2013) and have consequently limited benefits to society at large.

Formulate Innovative Forest Benefit Sharing Mechanisms for India

Sharma and Prasad Singh (2012) find that there are five major issues that are fundamental to the success of REDD+ for communities and they include: (i) appreciation of the concept of REDD+ by the communities; (ii) unequivocal mention of responsibilities and rights of communities in the REDD+ project documents; (iii) the opportunity in law to practise forest management for the purpose of REDD+; (iv) availability of community-based organizations for effective governance and participation of communities; and (v) well-defined sharing mechanisms for benefit sharing. On this last point, India has performed poorly.

Upadhyay (2003) expressed concerns over JFM in India because the benefits accrued by the community would be the sum left after deducting operational costs and secondly sharing would be of 'incremental' benefits over a baseline. However, the absence of such baselines and the numerous costs that can be included under 'operational costs' are arbitrary rather than scientific, and this subsequently reduces the compensation reaching communities.

A study (Chate & Ghate, 2013) comparing India and Nepal in terms of Community Forest Management (CFM) noted that community forests in Nepal have been of greater benefit to dependent communities than community forests in India, which are experiencing erosion and loss of species even though the sites considered had reasonable levels of autonomy. It concluded that explicit devolution in Nepal translated into better functioning of autonomous institutions than in India. In another comparative study between India, Tanzania and Mexico, it is observed that Tanzania and India both use ambiguous language in their policy document, and benefit sharing is seen from the point of view of tenure arrangements, though this favours forest administration, unlike the case of Mexico, which uses safeguards to protect the rights of forest communities (Kashwan, 2015).

Conclusion

In conclusion, we note that having an implementation framework that incorporates strong institutional and financial mechanisms (including strong benefit sharing mechanisms), to ensure effective participation of local communities in REDD+, is essential for the goal of halting deforestation, arresting forest degradation, enhancing forest conservation and SMF in India. This is also fundamental for realizing the goals of the Green India Mission, the NDC and the Government of India goal to ensure that 33% of geographic area of India is under forest and tree cover. REDD+ gives the Indian government an opportunity to get forest management right for climate change mitigation, forest conservation and poverty alleviation.

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8

REDD+ and the Reconfiguration of Public Authority in the Forest Sector: A Comparative Case Study of Indonesia and Brazil

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Introduction

In many countries of the Global South, forest reserves were nationalized under colonial rule and put under the authority of the colonial government (Arts, 2014, p. 18). After independence, forests continued to be owned, managed, and exploited by central governments until the 1970s (Andersson, Gibson, & Lehoucq, 2006, pp. 576, 578). Most colonial and post-colonial central governments were regarded as being bad

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managers of their forests. They did little to fight corruption, exploited natural resources, mostly neglected the monitoring of forest concessions, and lacked enforcement in remote forest areas. Since the 1980s, central governments have increasingly been confronted with pressures by local communities, conservationists, international donors, as well as fiscal problems. In reaction, they started to reform forest policy and law by initiating market approaches, introducing community-based forest management, and strengthening of public decentralization (Agrawal, 2012, p. 314; Arts, 2014, p. 18).

One particular political approach, the public decentralization of forestry, has led to a gradual shift of powers and resources from central to local governments. The aim of this policy was to decrease costs and to provide better services to local people as part of a broader move toward decentralizing public services (Andersson et al., 2006, p. 578). However, research has indicated that, in practice, central governments have restricted public forestry decentralization by limiting local government's ability to act on forest management (Ribot, Agrawal, & Larson, 2006).

More recently, the global carbon governance arrangement Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+) has started to impact forestry in countries of the Global South. This policy instrument primarily targets central governments through the support of bilateral and multilateral donors and the demand for national REDD+ preparation measures. There are concerns that REDD+ might contribute to a change of the previous forest governance patterns in partner countries in the Global South, which could lead to a recentralization of forestry (Agrawal, Nelson, Adams, & Sandbrook, 2010; Phelps, Webb, & Agrawal, 2010). While research has been conducted with regard to different REDD+ aspects, we contend that further systematic knowledge about the workings of REDD+ within national jurisdictions and especially with regard to its impact on public-administrative systems in countries of the Global South is still needed (see also Hickmann, Fuhr, Höhne, Lederer, & Stehle, 2017). While decentralization has often been used in the forest policy literature to not only describe the de-concentration and devolution of powers and resources to local governments but also to refer to the introduction and strengthening of community-based forest management (Andersson, Gibson, & Lehoucq, 2004), we follow the public policy

literature by concentrating on the former to grasp a better understanding of the shifts of public authority in the forest sector.

This chapter therefore opens the ‘black box’ of the nation-state and explores how and to what extent REDD+ triggered changes in the distribution of public authority in nation-states and their administrations on different governmental levels. Using decentralization as a proxy for the reconfiguration of authority, we investigate the impact of REDD+ on the forestry sector in federalized Brazil and decentralized Indonesia. Therefore, we scrutinize whether domestic REDD+ engagement of central governments has led to interference with local government jurisdictions and to what extent sub-national governments are seen as equal partners, subordinate implementers, or sidelined bodies of the domestic REDD+ process.

This chapter proceeds as follows. In section “[Setting the Scene: Conceptual and Analytical Framework](#)”, we outline our theoretical approach and our research design. In section “[REDD+: Reconfiguring Public Authority in the Forest Sector?](#)”, we portray REDD+ as the latest global carbon governance arrangement for the forestry sector and highlight the insights provided by the forest decentralization and management literature. In section “[REDD+ in Indonesia and Brazil](#)”, we present the empirical findings from our case studies. Finally, we compare the case study results and draw conclusions from the empirical analysis, before we highlight aspects that merit attention in future research.

Setting the Scene: Conceptual and Analytical Framework

Reconfiguration of Public Authority

As part of the debate about the emergence of the regime complex for climate change (Keohane & Victor, 2011; Van de Graaf & De Ville, 2013) and the increasing fragmentation in the realm of global climate governance (Biermann, Pattberg, & Zelli, 2010; Zelli, 2011; Zelli & van Asselt, 2013) through the growing number of global carbon governance

arrangements, several scholars (Andonova, Betsill, & Bulkeley, 2009; Bäckstrand, 2008; Bulkeley et al., 2014; Green, 2014; Hickmann, 2016; Pattberg, 2012) have stressed that this development leads to a “reconfiguration of political authority across multiple levels and between public and private actors” (Bulkeley, 2010, p. 231). For the purpose of this analysis, we distinguish two forms of the reconfiguration of political authority. First, shifts of authority can occur from public actors, such as governmental entities, to private actors, such as companies, indigenous peoples, and non-governmental organizations (NGOs). That kind of reconfiguration of authority is implicit in many of the abovementioned studies, which focus on governance outside the traditional governmental sphere. Second, such a reconfiguration of authority can also emerge among governmental levels and entities. Traditionally, the public policy literature has studied these authority shifts in the decentralization literature (Schneider, 2003).

The global carbon governance arrangement REDD+ is driven by a variety of actors working partially together, such as public authorities at different sectoral departments and governmental levels, various bi- and multilateral donors, non-profit certification schemes, NGOs and private corporations (Turnhout et al., 2017). REDD+ would be an excellent example to study both forms of authority reconfiguration. We could look on the effects of REDD+ on forest management by local communities, indigenous peoples, companies, and NGOs to study the shift from public to private authority. In this chapter, we concentrate on the reconfiguration of public authority to scrutinize whether former (often limited) public decentralization efforts are again reversed or even strengthened. Consequently, we ask, to what extent does REDD+ act as a game changer that generates a relocation of public authority?

We postulate that the type of global carbon governance arrangement and its specific modus operandi matters for the manner in which public policies are formulated and pursued within public-administrative systems. From the perspective of the nation-state, some global carbon governance arrangements work rather ‘top-down’ and others work ‘bottom-up’. While a bottom-up global governance arrangement may be directed toward the sub-national level (i.e. the local government), an international top-down governance arrangement may predominantly be

targeting the national level (i.e. the central government). Accordingly, we assume to observe changing patterns of public authority essentially through a varying degree of (de)centralization in the targeted policy field and conceive the changes in the distribution of competences and resources across governmental levels as an adequate proxy for operationalizing the supposed reconfiguration of public authority.

The research on public sector decentralization provides interesting insights when it comes to decision-making among different levels of government (e.g. Cheema & Rondinelli, 2007; Conyers, 1983; Pollit, 2005; Rondinelli, 1981; Rondinelli, McCullough, & Johnson, 1989; Smoke, 2015; Werlin, 1992). In this strand of literature, decentralization is generally conceived of as the devolution of decision-making responsibilities and expenditure authorities from central to regional and/or local governments (Campbell & Fuhr, 2004). The bulk of this research has highlighted that besides winning or losing authority, national, provincial, and local levels are also often required jointly to build up their capacity and interact closely with each other in order to provide effective and legitimate public services (Faguet, 2013; Fuhr, 2012; Shah, 2005).

For our analysis, we build upon rational choice assumptions. Scholars in this tradition have pointed out that public bodies are acting as self-interested actors that try to accomplish more resources and power (Sprinz & Vaahtoranta, 1994, p. 78). Therefore, they are adopting maximizing strategies (Ostrom & Ostrom, 1971) of their fixed set of preferences in a highly strategic way (Hall & Taylor, 1996). Confronted with the engagement in a global governance arrangement, they will try to increase the amount of income or power for their institution (Downs, 1957; Hickmann et al., 2017). Following this literature, we expect that the more financial resources are channeled via top-down governance arrangements and the more a certain country is entangled with the particular arrangement, the more likely national governments will act as regulators, coordinators, and monitoring institutions, with the potential effect that the central public administration is strengthened and former decentralization efforts to local governments are reversed.

We conceptualize REDD+ as such a 'top-down' global governance arrangement as the parties to the United Nations Framework Convention

on Climate Change (UNFCCC) defined a set of norms and rules for nation-states aspiring large-scale REDD+ implementation financial flows which primarily target the national level (e.g. National REDD+ Strategy, national monitoring, reporting, and verification system, forest reference/reference emission level, and national financial mechanism). We acknowledge that pilot REDD+ activities have also targeted the sub-national level without involving the national government (see e.g. Rutt & Lund, 2014). However, REDD+ implementation flows require a national approach which justifies a categorization of this governance arrangement as rather ‘top-down’.

Methods

We employed a qualitative methodological approach to investigate the changes in the composition of competences and resources in REDD+-related forest policymaking among central and sub-national governments in countries of the Global South. Using the period from 2005 to 2015, we allowed for inter-temporal as well as cross-country comparisons (Blatter & Haverland, 2012, pp. 44–45). We analyzed primary, secondary, and ‘gray’ literature and conducted semi-structured expert interviews with different stakeholders. Following the process-tracing method, we looked for points of significance over the observation period and checked them against alternative explanations.

We chose and compared countries that are among the largest greenhouse gas (GHG) emitters of the world, with large areas of rainforest, high deforestation rates, and significant REDD+ activities. Furthermore, we looked for countries where the national government was the REDD+ front-runner, and for those where sub-national governments have also been pioneering REDD+. By comparing these two cases, we prevent a bias toward a centralization or a decentralization tendency in forest policymaking. In an attempt to control for the existing degree of (de)centralization in the respective policy areas, we have only chosen countries with a similar base level of decentralization. Based on these considerations, this chapter focuses on Indonesia and Brazil.

REDD+: Reconfiguring Public Authority in the Forest Sector?

Over the last decades, forest governance has been characterized by increasing privatization, strengthening of community-based forest management, and devolution or de-concentration of powers and resources to local governments. However, in most countries, the central government has remained an important power in forest policymaking (Agrawal, 2012, p. 314; Arts, 2014, p. 18). As stated earlier, the following part focuses on the role of national and sub-national governments, and does not cover the role of local communities and indigenous peoples in forest governance as highlighted by scholars, such as E. Ostrom (1990), Dietz, Ostrom, and Stern (2003), and Agrawal (2012), who characterize community-based forest management as the assignment of property or management rights over forests to local communities by central governments.

Decentralization to Local Governments

The devolution of forestry powers from central to local governments was part of a broader decentralization agenda in the public sector of many countries of the Global South (Andersson et al., 2006, p. 578; Larson, 2003, p. 211). Similar to arguments put forward by proponents of community-based management, local governments are considered to have better time- and place-specific information about the local environment and are more accountable to local people. Such advantages would also result in more appropriate policies (Andersson et al., 2006, p. 578; Ribot et al., 2006, pp. 1865–1866). The decentralization to local governments could potentially strengthen and scale up community-based forest management as well (Larson, 2003, pp. 211–212; see Tacconi, 2007, pp. 340–341, 345 for a different perspective). However, scholars have argued that there is little evidence about the consequences of forestry decentralization: research has shown mixed results including no effects at all, positive effects, and effects depending on various variables (Andersson, Evans, Gibson, & Wright, 2014, p. 244).

To date, there is also little evidence about what makes forestry decentralization work (Andersson et al., 2006, p. 577, 2014). Ribot et al. (2006, p. 1866) argue that ‘better policies’ of local governments ultimately depend on features of a ‘democratic decentralization’ which would encompass both a downward accountability of local authorities to local people and discretionary powers for local governments. However, in practice, central governments often tend to undermine ‘democratic decentralization’. Instead of devolving powers and authority effectively, they prefer to cooperate with local institutions that simply respond to central government’s interests.¹ Consequently, Ribot et al. (2006, pp. 1864, 1865, 1867) and Larson (2003, p. 214) only rarely find examples of democratic decentralization.

Other research has revealed that empowered local governments invest resources into forestry activities when their politicians face political and economic incentives to do so and when they possess enough political and fiscal autonomy (Andersson et al., 2006, pp. 580, 587, 589, 590). Correspondingly, high community and local user engagement by municipal governments have been found to support the stabilization of the forest cover (Wright, Andersson, Gibson, & Evans, 2016, pp. 14959, 14961). Besides downward accountability, local capacity seems to be of critical importance as well. For example, K. Andersson et al. (2014, pp. 241, 245, 257) state that the capacity of local governments—which they define as the ability to generate revenues from local sources—is more important for reducing deforestation than the formal devolution of powers.

While most researchers claim that decentralization could enhance forest conservation, there are also arguments, which rather point toward opposing effects. Forestry decentralization could potentially foster deforestation as local people and governments seek direct benefits from resource exploitation. Moreover, a ‘decentralization of corruption’ might even accelerate industrial conversion of forests (Larson, 2003, pp. 221–223; Tacconi, 2007, pp. 341, 345). This holds particularly in situations when local governmental powers are seen as a temporary privilege that may be lost to central governments again. Then short-term interests could trump long-term concerns. Furthermore, local groups and governments may not have a better understanding of the management of local resources (Larson, 2003, p. 213). Decentralization might even lead

to more deforestation as conservation costs often exceed the local conservation benefits. These conservation benefits are often felt more outside of the local area, leading instead to demands by local voters for alternative land uses which provide higher incomes (Wright, Andersson, Gibson, & Evans, 2015, p. 327). Even proponents of the empowerment of local people in forest management have argued that in circumstances of high deforestation rates, rule setting by the central government might be more effective. Yet, inputs by local governments are still important, when there is a high variation of local conditions (Agrawal, 2012, pp. 325–326).

Recentralization of Forestry Through the Backdoor of REDD+?

In the context of the changing forest policy and law in the Global South, REDD+ emerged globally as a carbon governance arrangement, which started to impact domestic forest governance in the last decade. In early 2015, more than US \$9 billion were pledged for REDD+ activities although a smaller amount has actually been disbursed (Lee & Pistorius, 2015, p. 5). Bilateral donors (e.g. Norway) and multilateral donors (e.g. UN-REDD) provided REDD+ readiness funding and mainly focused on combating deforestation in countries like Brazil—where industrial conversion is the main driver—rather than on countries where fuel-wood logging by local user groups contributed to degradation (Brown, Seymour, & Peskett, 2008).

While local governments and voters may sometimes not be interested in forest conservation, research has shown that financial benefits to the municipal government—whether transferred from the central government or being directly earned—can motivate the local government to conserve forests. This can be seen as good news for REDD+ (Wright et al., 2015, pp. 326, 327, 340), although it is still difficult to assess the overall effects of REDD+ on reducing deforestation or degradation as large-scale implementation of REDD+ has not started yet. Nevertheless, over the last decade, REDD+ preparation activities have targeted forest institutions and policies of national and sub-national governments. What are the effects of REDD+ on the degree of forestry decentralization so far?

Scholars working on community-based forest management have recently initiated a debate, stressing that the increasing value of forests in the face of REDD+ participation might lead to a gradual recentralization of forestry. They believe that such a shift of rights and power from local communities to central governments will lead to deteriorating conditions of forests as central governments have not been able to manage forests sustainably in the past (Agrawal et al., 2010, pp. 330, 332; Phelps et al., 2010, p. 312).

For example, Phelps et al. (2010) are concerned that central governments do not want to risk losing the incoming capital flows by depending on local institutions for delivering REDD+. Rather, central governments would like to capture the money themselves (Agrawal et al., 2010, pp. 330, 332). Phelps et al. (2010, p. 312) support this claim by referring to experiences of the past when central governments reversed forestry decentralization when confronted with strong financial incentives. These scholars also argue that several other features point toward a rather central government approach to REDD+ in the future, such as measurement, reporting and verification issues, standardization, coordination necessities, project costs, and economies of scale advantages at the national level.

Wunder (2010, p. 336) questions such claims. He suspects that REDD+ could also lead to a decentralization of forestry as states would recognize that they cannot stop deforestation by a centralistic approach alone. Moreover, international REDD+ finance would be stopped in case governments do not deliver on the promised REDD+ outcomes and waste incoming REDD+ funds (see also Brown et al., 2008, p. 115). Toni (2011, pp. 68–69) also suspects that high levels of institutional capacities of sub-national governments for REDD+ might support decentralization, but cautions that low capacities might instead lead to forestry recentralization. In this context, Wunder (2010, p. 336) disagrees with the claim by Agrawal et al. (2010, p. 333) that small-scale bodies would have a hard time to participate in REDD+ as they lack the capital for it. He rather observes that many donors are actively pushing for decentralized REDD+ projects and approaches (Wunder, 2010). In general, it seems that REDD+ will require a targeted strengthening of forest governance at all administrative levels (Bond et al., 2009, p. 34; Brown et al., 2008, p. 114).

REDD+ in Indonesia and Brazil

In this section we turn to the empirical analysis and study of our two country cases. In each case, we start with a review of the developments in the forestry sector and then investigate the effects of REDD+ on the forestry sector.

Indonesia

Initial Situation in the Forestry Sector

Indonesia is a presidential republic with a three-tier political system that was decentralized through the Regional Governance Law of 1999. Its administrative structure is currently divided into 34 provinces and 504 districts (Lewis, 2015). In 2004 and 2014, further Regional Governance Laws were enacted which strengthened the role of the provinces and the position of the central government. From 1990 to 2015, Indonesia's forest cover declined from 65 to 50 percent (World Bank, 2016).

The Indonesian Constitution of 1945 determines that land and their natural resources shall be under state control. Based on the Forestry Law of 1967, the central government declared almost three quarters of Indonesia's territory as 'state forest' (Brockhaus, Obidzinski, Dermawan, Laumonier, & Luttrell, 2012). In conjunction with the decentralization process initiated in 1999, districts were granted the authority to manage their forest resources. Thereupon, a period of extensive logging began that was largely driven by district governments. It was not stopped through the Forestry Law of 1999 which authorized the Ministry of Forestry to manage state forests. At the time, local governments had for the first time the opportunity to gain a share of the revenue generated through resource exploitation. In combination with a lack of capacity, decentralized corruption, lack of downward accountability, and the uncertainty about a potential recentralization, decentralization of forestry has not reduced deforestation rates (Ribot et al., 2006, pp. 1873, 1874; Research Interviewee, 8 August 2016; Donor Interviewee, 5 August 2016).

In 2002, Government Regulation 34 tried to end the practice of logging and timber exploitation by transferring the authority for the issuance of logging permits from district governments to the Ministry of Forestry (Ardiansyah, Marthen, & Amalia, 2015; Indrarto et al., 2012). But districts continued to grant logging activities and even issued permits for plantations and for mining inside the area of state forests while not formally allowed to do so (Indrarto et al., 2012, pp. 22, 28).² The Regional Governance Law of 2004 strengthened the provinces, which are answerable to the president, alongside the already empowered districts by granting them responsibilities in land administration, spatial planning, and environment (Ardiansyah, Marthen, et al., 2015, pp. 6–8).

Introduction of REDD+

With the 2007 international climate change conference held in Bali and the leadership of the then-President Yudhoyono (in power from 2004 to 2014), climate policies started to gain momentum in Indonesia (Ardiansyah, Marthen, et al., 2015, p. 13). Driven by the president and the Ministry of National Development Planning, the discussions on the country's course of action and decision-making regarding climate-related issues were concentrated at the national level. The president established the National Council on Climate Change in 2008 and pledged in 2009 to reduce Indonesia's GHG emissions by 26 percent until 2020 compared to business-as-usual scenarios, and by 41 percent until 2020 when global support would be delivered (Brockhaus et al., 2012, p. 30; Indrarto et al., 2012). The president did not consult provinces or district governments before announcing this GHG reduction target in 2009. Back then, he was already planning to reach this target by cutting deforestation at a large scale (Yudhoyono, 2009).

The bold Indonesian GHG reduction target of between 26 and 41 percent presented at the Climate Change Conference in Copenhagen attracted Norway to approach the Indonesian President for a REDD+ deal (NGO Interviewee, 2 August 2016; Donor Interviewee, 12 August 2016). Norway then pledged up to US \$1 billion for verified emission reductions. Therefore, the Indonesian and the Norwegian governments

signed a Letter of Intent in May 2010. This document comprises the measures to be adopted by the Indonesian government to receive 20 percent of the money for preparation activities and 80 percent of the funds for verified emission reductions (Luttrell, Resosudarmo, Muharrom, Brockhaus, & Seymour, 2014, pp. 67–68). The Letter of Intent comprised concrete institutional and policy changes (see below). President Yudhoyono showed an interest to follow up on the elements of the Letter of Intent and put REDD+ at the top of the national agenda. Being attracted by the financial resources, he advanced Indonesia's REDD+ policy framework in accordance with the Letter of Intent through various presidential decrees (Agung, Galudra, Van Noordwijk, & Maryani, 2014; Resosudarmo, Ardiansyah, & Napitupulu, 2013).

Reconfiguration of Authority? The Central Government Level

In particular, President Yudhoyono followed the demand by Norway to establish an extra-governmental institution working on REDD+ issues. Norway insisted on the setting up of a new institution as it did not have much confidence in the Ministry of Forestry and wanted to influence the domestic process (Donor Interviewee, 3 August 2016; Indonesian Ministry Interviewee, 5 August 2016). President Yudhoyono created the REDD+ Task Force within the President's Office in 2010, which was later replaced by the REDD+ Agency in 2013. By assigning the task to lead the development of REDD+-related forest issues to this institution, he strengthened forestry authority at the national level (Resosudarmo et al., 2013, pp. 80–81). Here we can see the direct influence of the promised international funding to establish a new institution at the national level. The REDD+ Task Force further expanded the responsibilities of the central level with regard to Indonesia's REDD+ policy by presenting a National REDD+ Strategy in 2012. While the development of this strategy was an obligation of the Letter of Intent, it has not been adopted or implemented (Indonesian Ministry Interviewee, 5 August 2016; Donor Interviewee, 16 August 2016).

As the national institution with the responsibility for concept development and international representation of REDD+ activities in Indonesia,

the REDD+ Task Force advanced the domestic REDD+ framework by introducing several initiatives. However, it lacked budget, regulation and implementation powers, and bureaucratic knowledge which limited its role in the political-administrative system of Indonesia (Donor Interviewee, 10 August 2016; Indonesian Ministry Interviewee, 5 August 2016; Donor Interviewee, 16 August 2016; Research Interviewee, 8 August 2016). As a result of the comprehensive engagement of the REDD+ Task Force, a leadership struggle on REDD+ emerged mainly between the REDD+ Task Force, the Ministry of Forestry, and the Ministry of National Development Planning that weakened the advancement of REDD+ (Agung et al., 2014; Resosudarmo et al., 2013). This also led to few changes in the line ministries, while it at least triggered a “shake up of the Ministry of Forestry” (NGO Interviewee, 2 August 2016). Also, the financial mechanism for channeling REDD+ verified emission reduction payments, as agreed upon in the Letter of Intent, has not been set up (Donor Interviewee, 16 August 2016).

Overall, under President Yudhoyono we can see how an incentive of US \$1 billion contributed to the emergence of a new institutional structure for REDD+ (Donor Interviewee, 2 August 2016). As agreed upon in the Letter of Intent, the president declared in 2011 a two-year presidential moratorium on new forest licenses for areas outside and inside state forests, which has been renewed twice. This presidential instruction even interfered with sub-national affairs (Anderson, Kusters, McCarthy, & Obidzinski, 2016, p. 33; Ardiansyah, Melati, & Anjani, 2015, p. 117; Indrarto et al., 2012, p. 67). However, the following specifying Ministry of Forestry regulation abstained from such a centralistic approach, granting exemption status to permit types for areas outside of state forests. These areas fall under the authority of sub-national governments (Indrarto et al., 2012, p. 67).

In 2015, the newly appointed President Joko Widodo curbed the institutional turf war at the national level by dissolving the REDD+ Agency and by assigning its tasks to the new Ministry of Environment and Forestry (Anderson et al., 2016, p. 33). But, it has not impaired the prospects for international funding. Norway has since then continued to provide funding for preparation activities and the new Indonesian government has expressed its commitment to the continuation of the partnership. The new head of the

DG Climate of the Ministry of Environment and Forestry is also keen to advance REDD+ domestically (NGO Interviewee, 15 August 2016; Donor Interviewee, 16 August 2016). In addition, further REDD+-related competences and capacities have been built up in the sub-directorate on REDD+ in the Ministry of Environment and Forestry. Also, forest-related conflict resolution and community-based forest management, which have been part of the Letter of Intent, have been institutionally integrated in the new ministry (Research Interviewee, 1 August 2016; Research Interviewee, 8 August 2016).

Reconfiguration of Authority? The Provincial and District Government Levels

In order to be able to fulfill the commitment of the Letter of Intent, the Indonesian government had to advance REDD+ in one pilot province. However, the REDD+ Task Force selected one REDD+ pilot province and ten priority provinces in Papua, Sulawesi, Sumatra and Kalimantan (Ahmad, 2012). Some of these provinces set up provincial REDD+ task forces and developed provincial REDD+ strategies (Research Interviewee, 10 August 2016). The central government chose to have priority provinces out of pragmatic reasons as their number is lower than the amount of districts (Donor Interviewee, 2 August 2016), even though they were powerless in forestry issues as districts had more competences at the time (Research Interviewee, 8 August 2016).

The country report of the Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) acknowledges that “[n]ot all REDD+ institutions at sub-national level have been ready yet” (FCPF, 2016, p. 33). Some interviewees argued that capacities and financial resources have not much increased and remained in most cases rather low at the provincial level (Research Interviewee, 8 August 2016, Donor Interviewee, 5 August 2016). Others state that capacities have advanced with regard to the overall forest governance activities (Donor Interviewee, 16 August 2016).

The provincial REDD+ task forces had good working relations with the national REDD+ Agency. But, they have been in limbo since the

dismissal of the national REDD+ Agency and the integration of the agency's tasks in the Ministry of Environment and Forestry (Research Interviewee, 12 August 2016, Donor Interviewee, 16 August 2016). However, some provincial governments continue to be very active in the global Governors' Climate and Forest (GCF) Task Force and have committed themselves to reducing deforestation by 80 percent in 2020 (The Jakarta Post, 2015).

While the National REDD+ Strategy mentions that “[d]istricts also can establish REDD+ institutions” (Indonesian REDD+ Task Force, 2012, p. 8), they have been largely sidelined in Indonesia's REDD+ activities. This is surprising as districts had important forest management powers at the time (Indrarto et al., 2012). District and provinces have not been involved in most local REDD+ pilot projects. There are currently more than 40 local REDD+ demonstration activities in Indonesia. These projects have largely been advanced by international funders and NGOs and do not show any strong connection to the national REDD+ framework (Research Interviewee, 8 August 2016; Research Interviewee, 10 August 2016).

However, some demonstration activities have been noted at the provincial and district government level as well (FCPF, 2016, p. 13). Multilateral donors like the Forest Investment Program (FIP) and UN-REDD have also focused on strengthening local government's capacities in the REDD+ process. However, the Letter of Intent does not propose any strong role for district governments (Climate Investment Funds, 2012, p. 30; Norway & Indonesia, 2010; UN-REDD Programme, 2010, p. 6). Overall, the FCPF Country Report concludes a lack of coordination between the national- and the local-level REDD+ activities and a lack of understanding of REDD+ issues at sub-national levels (FCPF, 2016, pp. 16, 33).

A UN-REDD document concludes that Indonesia has adopted toward REDD+ a “national approach with sub-national implementation” (UN-REDD Programme, 2010, p. 9). Most of the activities were defined at the national level by national actors and donor agencies. While stakeholders had the opportunity to provide inputs, these submissions were

often not integrated in the REDD+ policy framework (Indrarto et al., 2012, p. 79).

Recentralization of Forestry Through REDD+?

In 2014, the Regional Governance Law took away forestry powers from districts and empowered the central and provincial governments. Observers qualified this power shift as a recentralization of forestry as provincial governments are answerable to the president (Donor Interviewee, 1 August 2016, Indonesian Ministry Interviewee, 5 August 2016). The new law thereby restricted the role of districts to managing grand forest parks only (Anderson et al., 2016, p. 31; Ardiansyah, Marthen, et al., 2015, pp. 7, 35). When being asked about the role of REDD+ in the decision of the central government to recentralize forestry, interviewees responded in three different ways.

The first group mentioned that the recentralization was the result of a larger struggle for authority over natural resources which happened independently from the REDD+ process (Indonesian Ministry Interviewee, 5 August 2016; Donor Interviewee, 1 August 2016; Donor Interviewee, 5 August 2016). The second group pointed out that REDD+ raised the awareness that districts had been issuing too many licenses, leading to the central government's desire to increase control over these issues (Research Interviewee, 1 August 2016). The third group underlined that the high forest destruction resulting out of the decentralization in 1999 had motivated the central government to take districts' powers away, which corresponds with the REDD+ goal of protecting forests (Donor Interviewee, 16 August 2016; NGO Interviewee, 15 August 2016).

The central government further strengthened provincial governments by assigning to them the task to establish Forest Management Units (FMUs) (Anderson et al., 2016, pp. 31, 37–38; Ardiansyah, Marthen, et al., 2015, pp. 7, 35). While being a target of forest bureaucrats for a long time, the REDD+ involvement of the country accelerated the setting up of FMUs (Donor Interviewee, 1 August 2016, Research Interviewee, 10 August 2016). The creation of FMUs is also mentioned

as a goal in the National REDD+ Strategy (Indonesian REDD+ Task Force, 2012, p. 36), and observers described these FMUs as important institutions for the implementation of REDD+ (Research Interviewee, 12 August 2016). However, REDD+ programs have not been built yet in FMUs due to the lack of resources and capacities (FCPF, 2016, p. 33). While being supported by donors like Deutsche Gesellschaft für Internationale Zusammenarbeit (GIZ), the FIP, and UN-REDD as decentralized approach to forest management, FMUs ended up being rather under the control of the central government after the enactment of the Regional Governance Law of 2014 (Climate Investment Funds, 2012, pp. 7, 11; UN-REDD Programme, 2010, p. 6). So we can see some potential influence of the REDD+ engagement of the country in the recentralization of forestry and at least a speeding up of the whole process.

Key Findings from the Case Study on Indonesia

In sum, the decentralization of forestry resulted in increased deforestation by district governments. Even shortly after decentralization, the Ministry of Forestry started to take some powers back. Thus, the motivation to recentralize forestry has been existent in Indonesia long before REDD+. Following financial incentives provided by Norway, national actors have introduced REDD+ and have increasingly made decisions about forests. District governments have largely been sidelined in the national REDD+ architecture and are mostly disconnected from REDD+ pilot projects. Donor agencies mostly envisioned a national approach to REDD+, which resulted primarily in investment at the national level, and to a lesser degree at the provincial government level. The president even partly interfered with sub-national entities when declaring the forest moratorium for areas inside and outside of state forests (Indrarto et al., 2012). There are also indications that REDD+ has to some extent supported the recentralization of the forest sector, as it contributed to the speeding up of the establishment of FMUs which were put under the supervision of the central government at provincial level (Bae, Kim, Fisher, Moeliono, & DeShazo, 2014).

Brazil

Initial Situation in the Forestry Sector

Brazil is a federal presidential republic comprising 26 federal states, one federal district, and over 5500 municipalities (De la Fontaine & Stehnen, 2016). Until the end of the military regime in 1984, forest management in Brazil was highly centralized (Banerjee, Macpherson, & Alavalapati, 2009; Hudson, 2012). With the reestablishment of democracy in 1988, Article 23 and 24 of the new Constitution assigned all levels of government with the concurrent competency to 'preserve the forests' (May, Millikan, & Gebara, 2011; Federative Republic of Brazil, 1988). The national level is consigned to establish 'general principles' and has supreme regulatory authority. State and municipal governments can formally legislate on forest management, as long as they conform to the national principles (Hudson, 2012; Federative Republic of Brazil, 1988). However, many municipalities in the Amazon are not able or eager to fulfill forest management functions due to a lack of incentives and capacity (Larson, Pacheco, Toni, & Vallejo, 2007; Toni, 2003). While state governments have gained profound autonomy in revenue generation and received the competence to distribute forest licenses since the early 1990s, their functions remained ill-defined (Gregersen, Contreras-Hermosilla, White, & Phillips, 2004).

Weak law enforcement and corruption in the distribution of land titles by state governments (Larson, 2003; Rajão, Azevedo, & Stabile, 2012) led to a peak in deforestation with an annual rate of about 29,000 square meters in 1995 (Instituto Nacional de Pesquisas Espaciais, 2008). In 1996, the national government amended the Forest Code which established the legal reserve rule obliging landowners in the Amazon to protect a share of 80 percent of their lands (Donor Interviewee, 16 May 2017; May, Gebara, de Barcellos, Rizek, & Millikan, 2016; Soares-Filho et al., 2014; Toni, 2003). Law No. 9985 of 2000 stipulated the participation of the municipalities in forest resource management and created a National System of Nature Conservation Units at the federal, state, and municipal level (Federative Republic of Brazil, 2000).

However, central government institutions, such as the Brazilian environmental agency Brazilian Institute of the Environment and Natural Resources (IBAMA), still continue to act in a logic of centralized forest governance (Hirakuri, 2003; Hudson, 2012). Furthermore, capacity was augmented in the Ministry of Environment and the IBAMA, and forest law regulations were enforced nationally (Held, Roger, & Nag, 2012). At the same time, all nine Amazon states set up institutional forums for environmental policies (May et al., 2011). Some ambitious state governments developed own forest management plans, environmental licensing systems, law enforcement, and land tenure regularization (May et al., 2016). Other states are still characterized by low capacity, weak law enforcement, elite capture of funds, and lack of transparency (May et al., 2011). Between 2004 and 2007, deforestation decreased by about 59 percent. However, the rate increased again in 2013 (Research Interviewee, 10 May 2017), partly due to governmental coordination problems which led to weak law implementation and enforcement (S. Bauch, Sills, & Pattanayak, 2012; Fatorelli, Gebara, May, Zhang, & Di Gregorio, 2015; Hudson, 2012; May et al., 2016).

Introduction of REDD+

Unlike in Indonesia, the REDD+ process in Brazil was not solely started in a top-down manner by the central government but was also shaped by bottom-up activities from state governments (Research Interviewee, 9 February 2017). Since the adoption of the Bali Road Map in 2007, the governments of Amazon states have initiated sub-national demonstration activities incorporating REDD+ concepts in the absence of a national approach on REDD+. They also have joined up with other provinces worldwide in the GCF Task Force to increase their influence on REDD+ issues (Governors' Climate and Forests Task Force, 2014; West, 2016).

At the Conference of the Parties (COP) 12 in 2006 in Nairobi, Brazil proposed for the first time its intention to create a global fund to finance deforestation reduction but without wanting to participate in REDD (Research Interviewee, 17 May 2017, Viola & Franchini, 2014). In 2008, at the COP 14 in Poznan, Brazil's President Lula announced the target to

reduce deforestation by 70 percent until the end of 2017 (Tollefson, 2008). Earlier in 2008, Brazil had established the Amazon Fund, which is not a national REDD+ fund, but has the purpose to raise “donations for non-reimbursable investments in efforts to prevent, monitor and combat deforestation, as well as to promote the preservation and sustainable use in the Brazilian Amazon” (Amazon Fund, 2016). It was calling for US \$21 billion from donors to finance measures to reduce deforestation. As a reaction, Norway pledged a capital stock of US \$1 billion to the Amazon Fund, hoping to incentivize Brazil and inspire other donors to follow suit (Donor Interviewee, 18 May 2017; Tollefson, 2009). But with the exception of Germany pledging US \$28 million, no other country followed. The federal government recommended that any funding for REDD+ programs carried out by the Amazon states should be channeled through the Amazon Fund, showing the central government’s interest to control external funds from the beginning (Corbera, Estrada, May, Navarro, & Pacheco, 2011).

In 2009, the National Law on Climate Change was approved. It established the national climate change policy and set emission reduction targets, mainly through reducing deforestation by 80 percent in the Amazon by 2020 (Federative Republic of Brazil, 2010; Inoué, 2012; La Rovere, Pereira Jr., Burle Schmidt Dubeux, & Wills, 2014; Nepstadt et al., 2014). Beside the interest of President Lula to win the national elections against the Green Party in 2009, the pressure exerted by several Amazon state governments in the run-up to the COP 15 had an impact on the reformulation of Brazil’s position as well (Research Interviewee, 17 May 2017, Viola & Franchini, 2014). In July 2009, their governments had created the Amazon Forum to push the national government to change its international position regarding the role of markets in REDD+ in order to attract international funding (Viola, 2013).

With respect to results-based compensation for avoiding deforestation, the Brazilian central government has been opposed to the inclusion of forest protection into the global climate regime since the Kyoto Protocol. It has argued that such a move would allow Annex I countries to disengage from their responsibility to reduce emissions and interfere with Brazil’s national sovereignty (Corbera et al., 2011). Brazil is neither participating in the FCPF (FCPF, 2016) nor is it engaged in

UN-REDD. Rather, the country prefers to define and decide on own pathways to forest protection and objects to participate in a carbon market (Corbera et al., 2011).

Reconfiguration of Authority? The Central Government Level

The Amazon Fund was established at the national level with the Brazilian Development Bank (BNDES). The Amazon Fund Guidance Committee that develops project guidelines and monitors results consists of three blocks, each of them holding one vote in committee decisions. The first block consists of the Ministry of the Environment, the BNDES, and six other federal ministries. The second block consists of the nine Amazon states' governments, and the third block of six confederative organizations representing the civil society (Amazon Fund, 2017).

Starting in 2010, the national REDD+ strategy was formulated over a period of five years (Federative Republic of Brazil, 2015b). The process was, for example, prolonged by tensions between the different levels of government over the kind of finance and control (Fatorelli et al., 2015; Federative Republic of Brazil, 2015b; Jagger et al., 2014). Under the auspices of the Ministry of Environment, input was collected from a broad range of (sub)governmental and non-state actors (May et al., 2016). However, the final version of the strategy was launched in an ad-hoc initiative by Brazil's government at the COP 21 in Paris without further consultations of stakeholders (Research Interviewee, 17 May 2017).

The final strategy from 2015 created the following governance structure: The national REDD+ Committee, launched afterward, coordinates, oversees, and monitors the implementation of the strategy. It consists of eight ministries, and further invited members: two state governments, one municipal government, and two civil society members. This nicely shows the effort of the central government to control REDD+ activities in the country by providing the largest share of membership to its own administrations.

Instead of creating novel systems for monitoring and implementation of REDD+, the government of Brazil mainly enforces its existing efficient structure of policies, regulations, and institutions to reduce deforestation, mostly located at the national level. For monitoring deforestation rates and establishing baselines, satellite images are collected by the National Institute for Space Research. Only the REDD+ Safeguards Information System is a new structure but will as well be implemented by the Ministry of Environment (Federative Republic of Brazil, 2015b). Within the ministry, the unit working on REDD+ besides other issues consists of less than ten staff members (Brazilian Ministry Interviewee, 16 May 2017).

Reconfiguration of Authority? The State and Local Government Level

Since the adoption of the Bali Road Map in 2007, the governments of Amazon states have initiated sub-national projects incorporating REDD+ concepts in the absence of a national legislation on REDD+ (Governors' Climate and Forests Task Force, 2014; West, 2016). The Amazon member states of the GCF Task Force launched their own REDD+ strategies at the COP 15 in Copenhagen in 2009. Some of them had already developed own systems of REDD+ regulation and implementation in response to current and future international funding (Governors' Climate and Forests Task Force, 2014; May et al., 2016). The state of Acre, for example, is very advanced in its climate change and REDD+ legislation. In 2010, it created a State System of Incentives for Environmental Services with REDD+ as the centerpiece (Duchelle, 2014).

Within the Amazon Fund, the states of the Amazon play a substantive role in the governance structure: all nine states of the Brazilian Amazon hold seats on the fund's guidance committee. However, only those states with deforestation prevention and control plans in place have voting rights on guidelines and priorities (Amazon Fund, 2016). For example, the German contribution to the Amazon Fund was used to finance the state government of Acre in its REDD+ preparation activities (REDD Early Movers, Donor Interviewees 16 and 17 May 2017).

During the drafting of the National REDD+ Strategy in 2014, the state governments proposed to distribute 20 percent of REDD+ funds to the federal government and 80 percent among Amazonian state governments and non-state actors. Contrary to their central government, they also pleaded for the introduction of a market-based mechanism, leading to major debates among both governmental tiers due to their respective interests to capture and control external funding (Governors' Climate and Forests Task Force, 2014).

Concerning the role of municipalities in Brazil's REDD+ approach, several sub-national and national initiatives have attempted to increase their participation in REDD+ projects. For example, in 2011, the national Program to Support Environmental Conservation (Bolsa Verde) was initiated as a payment for environmental services program for the rural population and to strengthen the capacity of local governments (May et al., 2016). Similar mechanisms have been implemented by the governments of the States of Amazonas and Para. However, in national REDD+ institutions and processes, municipalities play a negligible role. In the National REDD+ Committee, they are represented with only one member and do not participate in the guidance committee of the Amazon fund (Federative Republic of Brazil, 2015a).

Recentralization of Forestry Through REDD+?

Contrary to the Indonesian case, since 2006, a series of laws and projects have been rolled out that strengthen forest management functions at the sub-national level in environmental control, licensing, and revenue generation. Besides the national-level institution IBAMA, the Brazilian Forest Service was created in 2006 to establish decentralized structures of forest management. Furthermore, a central Brazilian National Forest Inventory was established to provide an official presence in previously weakly governed areas at the local level (Bauch, Sills, Rodriguez, McGinley, & Cubbage, 2009; Fearnside, 2016). However, the intensification of the monitoring and management system at the central level can be interpreted as a REDD+ preparation activity, which aims to obtain reliable information on reductions of deforestation rates.

With the funds being made available through donor pledges to the Amazon Fund, the national government is largely strengthening its control over forests by concentrating the monitoring, evaluation, and management of funds in institutions at the central level. However, projects at the state and local level have received the largest share of funds until now (Amazon Fund, 2017).

During the drafting of the REDD+ strategy and the resulting policy vacuum, Amazon state governments began to implement REDD+ eligible projects and established funding arrangements with external actors. In spite of these efforts, the final REDD+ strategy cannot be considered as a victory for Brazil's federal states. Further dispute between the states and the national government will probably be caused by the rejection of Brazil's national government to use international offsetting mechanisms (Di Gregorio et al., 2016; Federative Republic of Brazil, 2015a). Brazil's national government is still refusing to participate in carbon markets, while the state governments want to access carbon-trading systems such as the Californian to receive additional funds for the efforts to reduce deforestation (Fatorelli et al., 2015; Jagger et al., 2014).

Key Findings from the Case Study on Brazil

Overall, the legal and institutional landscapes in Brazil's forestry sector are highly fragmented (Pinto & De Oliveira, 2008). Legal amendments were passed to initiate the decentralization of forest management to the state and municipal level. While forest management functions largely reside with federal states, the central government refuses to entitle them with far-reaching competences in the distribution of REDD+ funds. Key functions such as monitoring, reporting, and verification remain with the national government to secure a transparent and effective use of resources and measurable and comparable progress in reducing deforestation (Research Interviewee 12 May 2017). At the same time, state governments have been pushing for further decentralization of powers and REDD+ funds to capture international funding. They joined up for this purpose with other regional governments in the GCF Task Force.

All in all, the developments do not indicate for a clear trend of recentralization. Instead we see a more complex image. In Brazil, we find a situation in which strongly centralized top-down command and control mechanisms meet a formally decentralized forest management system in consolidation. In this context, state governments urged for increasing autonomy and began implementing REDD+ projects while the federal government lacked a clear strategy.

Comparison and Conclusion

Building upon the conceptual assumption that the participation in REDD+ will likely lead to more centralized forest policymaking, we provided insights from case studies in Brazil and Indonesia (see Table 8.1). In a nutshell, we find that REDD+ has apparently strengthened competences of the central government, but it has not led as a causal factor to the recentralization of forestry in both countries. Brazil's degree of forestry decentralization has largely not been reversed over the observation period. On the contrary, Indonesia has experienced a significant recentralization. While this process in Indonesia has apparently been accelerated by the REDD+ involvement of the country, it did not trigger it initially.

In Brazil, federal states were front-runners and continue to be very active in REDD+ activities. On the contrary, provincial governments in Indonesia have only been reacting to the central government's initiatives and remain rather weak in the overall REDD+ preparation process. In the case of Brazil, we find major authority struggles between the national government and some federal states with regard to competences on REDD+. Similar authority struggles in Indonesia have not been identified, probably due to the constitutional framework of the country which makes provincial governments less powerful. Furthermore, we find little evidence for a role of local governments in the overall REDD+ preparation process of the two countries studied.

Following a rational choice approach, we expected to observe, in the face of current or future large-scale financial REDD+ flows, that central governments aspire to act as REDD+ regulators, coordinators, and monitoring institutions which would lead to an increasing recentralization of

Table 8.1 Summary of empirical results

	Indonesia	Brazil
Initial situation in forest decentralization	Decentralized forestry to district governments Some limited role of provincial governments Some competences at the Ministry of Forestry	Partially decentralized forestry to state governments and municipal governments Some competences at the national executive agency IBAMA
Introduction of REDD+	President Yudhoyono introduced REDD+ in a top-down manner National approach with sub-national implementation	Presidential directives in reaction to pressures from the states Both top-down and bottom-up influences
External actors	Norway pledged up to US \$1 billion in 2010 FCPF, FIP, and UN-REDD	Norway pledged up to US \$1 billion in 2008 No FCPF, FIP, or UN-REDD
Central government Changes	REDD+ Task Force in 2010 REDD+ Agency in 2013 DG Climate and sub-directorate on REDD+ in the Ministry of Environment and Forestry with buildup of capacities REDD Strategy in 2012 Forest moratorium in 2011	REDD+ Committee in 2016 Ten people working on REDD+ in Ministry of Environment REDD+ Strategy in 2015 Amazon Fund
Provincial/state government changes	One Pilot Province and ten Priority Provinces Provincial REDD+ Strategy, targets, and pilot projects Provincial REDD+ Task Force, but not much change in capacity and resources Seven members in the GCF Task Force	Nine states of the Brazilian Amazon hold seats on the guidance committee of the Amazon Fund State REDD+ Strategy and REDD+ pilot projects US state governments directly engaged with Brazilian Amazon state governments for carbon trading Eight members in the GCF Task Force

(continued)

Table 8.1 (continued)

	Indonesia	Brazil
Local government changes	Largely sidelined in national REDD+ framework Largely disconnected from REDD+ pilot projects	Not important in national REDD+ process Amazon fund projects are targeting local governments
Recentralization through REDD+	REDD+ did not initiate recentralization in 2014, but led to a strengthening of REDD+-related competences at the central government level REDD+ accelerated the setting up of FMUs at provincial level which act as hands of the central government after recentralization of forestry in 2014	REDD+ supported strengthening of monitoring and command and control functions at the central government level Major authority struggles between the central government and state governments about REDD+ fund distribution and carbon trading

Source: Own compilation

forestry due to the incentives provided for national actors. We did not find any signs that REDD+ directly initiated a recentralization. However, there is evidence that this mechanism incentivized governmental actors at the provincial and national government level to increase their activities and powers regarding monitoring, distribution of financial benefits, and control powers. In both countries, especially the respective central government stands out in their ambition to control domestic REDD+ activities. However, these financial incentives have not been strong enough, as we did not find support for the assumption that REDD+ directly initiated a recentralization. But this is also not very surprising as large-scale financial funds for REDD+ implementation have not yet been flowing and do not bear good prospects for the future. Nevertheless, our conceptual framework helped us delineate some shifts of public authority in REDD+-related forest policymaking.

Forest governance scholars, such as Agrawal et al. (2010) and Phelps et al. (2010), were right when they predicted an important role for

the central government in REDD+ preparation and implementation activities. However, at the time, they overemphasized the importance of REDD+, as they were still assuming large-scale financial flows from global carbon markets which have not occurred so far and are rather unlikely to come. However, Wunder (2010) was also right when he emphasized that the central government would also need sub-national REDD+ activities for the successful implementation of REDD+. While it seems that Bond et al. (2009) and Brown et al. (2008) are correct when emphasizing the necessity to build up capacities at all governmental levels for successfully implementing REDD+, our two case study countries tell us that not all governmental levels are equally invested in the REDD+ process. Federalized systems, such as Brazil, might see substantially more empowerment of state governments than decentralized systems, such as Indonesia, may see for provincial or even district governments. In both countries, the central government remains an influential and powerful actor, even when struggles over competences between levels of government are delaying the advancement of REDD+, as in the case of Brazil.

Further studies are warranted in other large rainforest nations to investigate the shift of public authority between governmental levels through the REDD+ participation. In addition, scholars should explore the shift of authority among public and private actors. Hereby, it would be especially interesting to scrutinize to what extent community-based forest management and indigenous rights have been strengthened or weakened through the REDD+ involvement of a country.

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Notes

1. Ribot et al. (2006) argue that local governments still lack revenue powers, access to information, and sufficient funding. Additionally, they face more control by the central government, are constrained by the territory attributed to them, and face ambiguous regulations. Downward accountability is largely missing as powers were devolved to NGOs, customary authorities, local administrative bodies of the central government or private organizations.
2. Since the Estate Crops Law 18 of 2004 and the Law on Mineral and Coal Mining in 2009, sub-national governments have only had the right to issue estate crop permits and mining permits outside state forests.

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9

Evolution of the Mexico's REDD+ Readiness Process Through the Lens of Legitimacy

Jovanka Špirić

Introduction

Reducing Emissions from Deforestation and Forest Degradation (REDD+), plus the conservation, sustainable management of forests, and enhancement of forest carbon stocks can be considered a project of environmental governance because it is intended to align the views of multiple stakeholders on how the problem of deforestation and forest degradation in developing countries should be framed and addressed (Corbera & Schroeder, 2011; de la Plaza Esteban, Visseren-Hamakers, & Jong, 2014; Thompson, Baruah, & Carr, 2011). Given REDD+'s climate mitigation goal and its additional environmental (e.g., biodiversity conservation and provision of other ecosystem services) and social (e.g., poverty reduction and rural development) objectives, REDD+ governance involves a variety of actors with vested interests in land-use and land-use

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change (Angelsen, 2008; Lederer, 2012). These range from individual landowners and local communities to national governments, international organisations, non-governmental organisations (NGOs), private logging companies, and industries interested in offsetting their carbon emissions (Thompson et al., 2011; Vatn & Vedeld, 2011).

The inclusion of multiple actors provides an opportunity to share and mediate across different interests and knowledge and therefore improve governance *legitimacy*, which is the perceived fairness of decision-making procedure and of final decisions made. The inclusion of different knowledge and expertise should help address REDD+ technical design and procedural issues and eventually result in higher REDD+ governance *effectiveness*—targeting of deforestation and forest degradation drivers; *efficiency*—delivering of results under the lowest costs; and *equity*¹—distributing costs and benefits fairly across different stakeholders (Angelsen et al., 2009; Cronkleton, Bray, & Medina, 2011; Doherty & Schroeder, 2011; McDermott, Coad, Helfgott, & Schroeder, 2012; Ribot & Larson, 2012; Thompson et al., 2011; Vatn & Vedeld, 2011).

REDD+'s foundational principles can be found in the “Warsaw Framework for REDD+” document that is result of the decade-long United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change’s negotiations (UNFCCC, 2013). These negotiations involve national governments and international organisations, as well as a variety of other stakeholders such as international research institutions, NGOs, but also self-organised indigenous and local communities alliances (Hiraldo & Tanner, 2011; Long, 2013; Osborne, Bellante, & vonHedemann, 2014; Schroeder, 2010). Given that REDD+ will ultimately be implemented at the national level (UNFCCC, 2009), the extent to which non-state actors will be involved in REDD+ would depend on the design of country’s REDD+ governance (Lyster, 2011).

National REDD+ governance refers to all institutional arrangements, policies, and processes aimed at the effective implementation of REDD+ and include (1) planning and decision-making processes (e.g., REDD+ readiness multi-stakeholder forums); (2) policy, legal, institutional, and regulatory frameworks (e.g., land-use policies, environmental and forestry laws and regulations, REDD+ funding architecture); and (3) institutional arrangements for implementation, enforcement, and compliance

(e.g., REDD+ benefit-sharing mechanisms; monitoring, reporting, and verification (MRV) systems; and social and environmental safeguards) (Biermann et al., 2009, 2010; Corbera & Schroeder, 2011; Costenbader, 2011; Vatn & Angelsen, 2009; Vatn & Vedeld, 2011).

The future success of REDD+, from a legitimacy point of view, hinges on national governments' willingness and ability to recognise and endorse as equally important non-state actors' views (Vatn & Vedeld, 2011). A process of REDD+ governance could be considered legitimate if all relevant actors were recognised and equally involved in decision-making (input or procedural legitimacy) and if they would consent to the decisions taken and their subsequent implementation (output legitimacy) (Adger et al., 2003; Angelsen et al., 2009; Bäckstrand, 2006; Paavola, 2003; Thompson et al., 2011). Federal governments should follow a set of conventions, norms, and laws that define the rules for the interaction of national actors (Vatn & Vedeld, 2011). Furthermore, governments should take into account relevant international obligations such as the Cancun Agreement's social safeguards that officially recognise and indicate the importance of full and effective participation and respect for the knowledge and rights of indigenous peoples and local communities in REDD+ (UNFCCC, 2010).

The multi-stakeholder forums are a constitutive element of REDD+ readiness governance geared towards enhancing its legitimacy (Tamm Hallström & Boström, 2010; Warner, 2006). Some authors argue that such multi-stakeholder processes should help balance "bottom-up" and "top-down" policy approaches, for example, responding to local communities' needs and demands while helping in the design of national institutions (Noor et al., 2010). Furthermore, some have critically argued that the multi-stakeholder nature of environmental governance could deepen inequalities by providing advantage to the privileged actors while increasing marginalisation of the disadvantaged (Boedeltje & Cornips, 2004; Edmunds & Wollenberg, 2001; Noor et al., 2010; Warner, 2007). In addition, the inclusion of a wide range of interests and views on a particular environmental governance process may lead to discrepancies resulting in time- and resource-consuming processes and ultimately compromise reaching consensus (Angelsen et al., 2009; Bernstein, 2004; Holmes & Scoones, 2000; Löfbrand, Rindeljäll, & Nordqvist, 2009).

Many developing countries have organised multi-stakeholder forums to involve variety of stakeholders in the REDD+ readiness discussion and thus improve its legitimacy, such as REDD+ roundtables in Peru (Che Piu & García, 2011) and the provincial REDD+ working group in Indonesia (UN-REDD, 2011). This chapter takes a case study approach to analyse the legitimacy of REDD+ readiness process in Mexico, which has been organised through several multi-stakeholder forums at various scales.

The chapter proceeds by introducing the analytical framework to explore procedural legitimacy before outlining the REDD+ history and governance structure in Mexico. The results of empirical analysis have shown that there are two broad groups of actors with contrasting perceptions of the multi-stakeholders forums' legitimacy: the *supporters* and the *detractors*. The chapter concludes by reflecting on the Mexican government plans to improve procedural legitimacy of the national REDD+ governance by more directly including representatives of local people in the REDD+ decision-making processes.

Procedural Legitimacy Criteria and Indicators

The legitimacy of any environmental decision-making process is based on the *recognition* of stakeholders' diversity (Paavola, 2003). The convenor should recognise all *stakeholders*, that is, actors who are affected by, alongside actors with vested interests in REDD+, and invite them to take part in the decision-making process. Lack of stakeholders' recognition could be due to inequitable political and institutional structures (Fraser, 1997; Young, 1990). Social characteristics, such as class, ethnicity, gender, culture, historic marginalisation, or prior injustice by social oppression, also influence the legitimacy of the decision-making processes (Fraser, 1997; Young, 1990). When all recognised actors are brought to the discussion, a decision-making process can be considered inclusive (Parkinson, 2006). Thus *inclusiveness* is the second criterion to assess procedural legitimacy.

If some actors are recognised but not invited to participate in REDD+ readiness, they could be considered as deliberately excluded (Hemmati, 2002). The inclusiveness of the process depends in turn on

its normative characteristics also. Namely, the process could be opened to all (non-restrictive) or only to certain stakeholders groups (restrictive) (Hemmati, 2002). In addition, actors may face a variety of motivational difficulties to participate (Parkinson, 2006). Some of such difficulties are lack of information on REDD+, lack of time and money to follow the process, disbelief in fairness and benefits from the process, distrust in convenor, or simply lack of interest in deforestation and forest degradation (Ghai & Vivian, 1992; Mathbor, 2008; Owens & Drifill, 2008; Warner, 2006; Yosie & Herbst, 1998). Thus, certain actors may purposefully be self-excluded, while some others may decide to quit the process along the way, for example, when the process fails to accomplish their expectations, a reaction known as stakeholder burnout (Yosie & Herbst, 1998). People should be able to voluntarily decide if they want to participate and to develop a sense of ownership of the process (Beisheim & Dingwerth, 2008; Hemmati, 2002; Parkinson, 2006).

Inclusiveness can be further fostered by targeting social actors less likely to engage on their own, such as women or economically disadvantaged or unorganised groups. Engagement can be encouraged in passive (e.g., supply information on the issues) or active (e.g., provide capacity building and financial support) ways (Fung, 2006; Hemmati, 2002; Owens & Drifill, 2008; Yosie & Herbst, 1998). Therefore, it is not only important to include a variety of perspectives in a stakeholder dialogue but also to include marginal perspectives, that is, views that are not often heard in the dominant discussion and that could be crucially important to some stakeholders (Cuppen, 2012).

The third main criterion to assess procedural legitimacy is *representativeness* or the balanced representation of various stakeholder groups in terms of social characteristics including race, gender, age, religion, ethnicity, expertise, and discourse, among others (Bäckstrand, 2006; Dryzek & Niemeyer, 2008; Hemmati, 2002). Such balance strongly depends on how participants are selected. For example, a non-restrictive process may suffer from a lack of involvement of groups that face structural barriers to participate (Boedeltje & Cornips, 2004; Hemmati, 2002).

In turn, *representation* is the fourth procedural legitimacy criterion, and it relates to the degree to which participants in decision-making

represent the social characteristics, interests, and views of the larger population they belong to (Young, 2000). Representation is at the basis of representative democracy and it is particularly important in case of larger stakeholders groups, including local communities. Given that not all members of local communities can be physically present in a given participatory forum, they should have their voices heard through representatives (Parkinson, 2006). Representatives could include both democratically elected public officials and non-elected actors appointed or invited to the decision-making forum. However, it is crucially to governance legitimacy that the representatives are accountable to their supporters (Hemmati, 2002; Parkinson, 2006; Saward, 2003). Representatives' characteristics, including level of competence, communication skills, positive attitudes towards understanding others, and commitment to the process, are all indicators of decision-making process representation (Beisheim & Dingwerth, 2008; Boedeltje & Cornips, 2004; Parkinson, 2006).

The fifth criterion to analyse procedural legitimacy in governance is *transparency*. A multi-stakeholder process is considered transparent if there is open communication among all actors and if all decisions and the reasoning behind them are well documented, timely and easily accessible, and presented in a language understood by all (Hemmati, 2002; Jarvis & Sovacool, 2011). If all actors in the process are assigned clear rights and responsibilities for their decisions and actions, and if they render accounts to one another, the process could be considered as respecting the sixth criterion—*accountability* (Jarvis & Sovacool, 2011). When all actors act transparently and according to their rights and responsibilities, none of the stakeholder groups, in principle, could dominate the process, which should increase the level of actors' trust and agreement (Beisheim & Dingwerth, 2008; Vatn & Vedeld, 2011).

The seventh criterion to analyse procedural legitimacy is *meaningful participation*. High level of meaningful participation should involve respect for the principle of fairness or reciprocity, that is, that different communicative styles, knowledge, and experiences are seen as equal and receive the same opportunity to be heard and influence the outcome of the process. Such different knowledge systems are scientific research results and local and indigenous communities' knowledge and world-views (Boedeltje & Cornips, 2004; Parkinson, 2006). Before engaging in

decision-making, however, the process should guarantee that *deliberation*, the eighth criterion, is fulfilled, that is, all ideas are put forward, discussions are exhausted, and certain levels of understanding between stakeholders are reached (Fung, 2006; Hemmati, 2002; Parkinson, 2006).

Table 9.1 summarises the criteria and related indicators discussed above. It shows the variables to analyse cross-scale multi-stakeholder processes that are useful to assess the degree of perceived legitimacy of a national REDD+ decision-making process.

In the analysis presented in this chapter, perceived legitimacy or legitimacy in the *sociological sense* was used to make assertions about governance legitimacy based on participants' acceptance and justification of the institutions, procedures or authority, and on their satisfaction with the content of resulting policies and the obtained result. However, legitimacy can also be used in the *normative sense*; this is when the legitimacy

Table 9.1 Criteria and indicators of procedural legitimacy

Criteria	Indicators
Recognition	Stakeholders recognised and invited Political and institutional hierarchies, discrimination based on social characteristics, and social oppression
Inclusiveness	Deliberately excluded actors Motivational difficulties, self-excluded actors, and stakeholder burnout Passive and active targeting
Representativeness	Balance of different stakeholder groups
Representation	Representatives selection process Representatives characteristics and accountability
Transparency	Open feedback communication Language barriers and access divide
Accountability	Clear roles and responsibilities Procedure for rendering accounts Dominant actor Level of trust
Meaningful participation	Decision-making procedures Fairness and reciprocity
Deliberation	Discussion exhaustion Level of understanding between stakeholders

Source: Author

of a governance process is evaluated based on a set of standards (e.g., law) (Bäckstrand, 2006; Boedeltje & Cornips, 2004; Buchanan & Keohane, 2006; Cashore, 2002; Steffek, 2003; Steffek & Hahn, 2010). Actors might use different logics to legitimate or not legitimate a governance process: the *pragmatic logic* is associated with self-interest and economic benefits; the *moral logic* is associated with the moral suasion to perceive governance process as “the right thing to do”; and the *cognitive logic* is associated with the fact that certain types of governance have become an accepted and understandable practice (Cashore, 2002). The next section provides a history of REDD+ and its related governance structure in Mexico.

REDD+ in Mexico

Mexico was the first country to join the World Bank’s Forest Carbon Partnership Facility (FCPF) in 2008. Since 2010, the government have been developing the national REDD+ strategy (ENAREDD+ using its Spanish acronym²), a public policy planning document containing guidelines for the design of policies and activities which should contribute to the achieving of REDD+ objectives. In total, five ENAREDD+ drafts have been produced between 2011 and 2014 (duration of the research period). According to the latest ENAREDD+ draft from November 2014, sustainable rural development should be regarded as the guiding principle of REDD+ in Mexico, while REDD+ activities in the country should be informed by a landscape approach³ (CONAFOR, 2014). In 2013, as part of the requirements under the FCPF Carbon Fund, the National Forest Commission (CONAFOR) elaborated the Mexico’s Emission Reductions Program Idea Note (ER-PIN) document which advocates for a jurisdictional approach⁴ for REDD+ benefit-sharing (CONAFOR, 2013). Only forest owners, independent of their gender, race, ethnicity, religious belief, or socio-economic status, will be able to benefit from REDD+ in Mexico (CONAFOR, 2013, 2014).

Since 2010, Mexico’s government has been implementing the CONAFOR’s existing programmes along with the newly launched ‘special programmes’ in REDD+ priority regions (CONAFOR, 2010).

Several local REDD+ pilot projects promoted by national non-governmental organisations (NGOs) have also been implemented across the country (CCMSS, 2011; PRONATURA, 2015; U'yool'che, 2011).

Mexico was also the first country to reform its environmental laws to facilitate REDD+ design and implementation in 2012 (LGDFS 2012; LGEEPA, 2012). An important milestone in this regard is the development of Mexico's REDD+ safeguards. Namely, in addition to the Cancun Agreements' safeguards intended to address procedural legitimacy, the ENAREDD+ includes a set of principles to govern Mexico's REDD+ decision-making, so called 'country safeguards' that are based on international and national laws. For example, country safeguards state firm commitments to fulfil the requirement of free, prior, and informed consent (FPIC) of local and indigenous communities and to respect territorial, cultural, social, and gender equity in REDD+ development (CONAFOR, 2014).

Back in 2005, the Mexican government established the Inter-ministerial Commission on Climate Change (CICC) as a means to coordinate different actors and social sectors relevant to climate policy. In 2009, this commission created the working group for REDD+, known as GT-REDD+, which involves government's forestry, environment, agriculture (SAGARPA), and social development (SEDESOL) agencies (CONAFOR, 2011). The national Technical Advisory Committee for REDD+ (CTC-REDD+, hereafter CTC) is the first multi-stakeholder forum established by CONAFOR in 2010 to discuss REDD+ design issues and play a formal advisory role to the GT-REDD+. A year later, several sub-national advisory committees were established to identify main REDD+ related concerns and foster participation in REDD+ policy development in priority regions, including the states of Jalisco, Oaxaca, Chiapas, Yucatán, Campeche, and Quintana Roo (CONAFOR, 2015). In 2013, another consultative forum for multi-stakeholder discussions on REDD+, the working group on the national REDD+ strategy (GT-ENAREDD+) was founded under the National Forest Council (CONAF) (CONAF, 2013). Since, these multi-stakeholder forums are the central objects of analytical enquiry in this chapter, the following sections will address in more detail their main normative and organisational features.

The data for the analysis of actors' perceptions of the REDD+ readiness process were collected during two periods of fieldwork (June–August 2011 and September 2013–February 2014). Research methods included 41 face-to-face semi-structured interviews with national NGOs (16 interviews), federal government (10), academic institutions (6), international NGOs (3), state governments (3), and representatives from the local communities of *La Mancolona* and *Xmaben* in Campeche (2). The selected local communities were located in REDD+ development priority region, their representatives participated in the state-level REDD+ events and were part of a larger scientific project in which the author has been involved (CONSERVCOM)⁵. In addition, stakeholders' perceptions of REDD+ readiness legitimacy were captured by analysing notices, agendas, and minutes from multi-stakeholders REDD+ forums and participating in REDD+ events and meetings⁶.

Normative and Organisational Characteristics of Mexico's REDD+ Multi-stakeholder Forums

REDD+'s Technical Advisory Committee

Mexico's REDD+'s Technical Advisory Committee (CTC) has been informally operating since 2008 as a subgroup of the Technical Advisory Committee for Payment for Ecosystem Services Programme (CTC-PSA). In 2010, with support from CONAFOR, the Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources (SEMARNAT), and a group of civil society organisations, CTC was officially established as a space for open dialogue on REDD+ between the government and the civil society (CTC, 2010). The process leading to the CTC establishment was legislatively supported by: (1) Article 159 of the General Law of Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection, which regulates the establishment of consultative bodies for evaluating and monitoring environmental policies (LGEEPA, 2012), and (2) Article 13 of the National Development Law on Activities of Civil Society Organisations, which encourages federal ministries to promote the participation of the civil sector through consultative bodies (LFFAROSC, 2012).

The aim of the CTC is “to support the construction of an effective, efficient and participatory mechanism for the design and implementation of ENAREDD+, to ensure its transparency and to maximise economic, environmental and social benefits” (CONAFOR, 2010). The CTC gives recommendations to CONAFOR, which may either accept or refuse them, and is expected to provide information on the reasons for its decision (CTC, 2010).

The CTC constitutes a non-restrictive participatory forum that, theoretically, seeks for all sectors' balanced participation through members' accreditation (CTC, 2010). Initially, the CTC had 60 accredited members including representatives of government at the federal (18 members) and state (2) levels; national (15) and international (5) civil society organisations (CSOs)⁷; academia (7); and the private sector (7) (CTC, 2010). All accredited members participate in the CTC plenary, the highest decision-making authority of this forum. CTC's guests or observers, such as international development and financial organisations (7), can also attend plenary meetings but cannot vote (CTC, 2010). The CTC's activities are organised in Thematic Working Groups on particular ENAREDD+ design issues in which all participants hold voice and vote (CTC, 2010). The CTC is coordinated by a president (NGO representative, Mexican Civil Council for Sustainable Forestry—CCMSS) and a technical secretary (CONAFOR representative) (CTC, 2010).

Decisions should be taken by consensus when possible, or by voting, in which case 75% of votes represent the majority (CTC, 2010, Article 20). The decisions should be made with quorum, namely with the presence of the president, the technical secretary, and at least 51% of registered members (CTC, 2010, Article 19). When an agreement cannot be reached through such procedure, the CTC should inform the Inter-ministerial Commission on Climate Change's working group on REDD+ about all existing views (CTC, 2010).

ENAREDD+'s Working Group of the National Forestry Council

The ENAREDD+'s Working Group (GT-ENAREDD+) of the National Forestry Council (CONAF) was established in July 2013, following a

request made by a group of peasant and indigenous peoples' organisations (CONAF, 2014; LGDFS 2012, Article 156). The decisions and suggestions made by GT-ENAREDD+ should be approved by the CONAF's plenary which comprises two representatives from each of the following sectors: NGOs (9 accredited members), government (8), peasants organisations (6), private and communal forest industries (5), indigenous organisations (3), academia (3), and professional organisations (3), such as forestry services providers⁸ (CONAF, 2010). In CONAF's decision-making procedures, each sector has only one vote and non-attendance to meetings is sanctioned (CONAF, 2010). GT-ENAREDD+ includes participation of the representatives of all named sectors and has so far provided comments on the ENAREDD+ drafts and the ER-PIN document.

Besides the specialised working groups of informal and temporal character, and the formal and permanent Technical Support Committees working on specific issues (e.g., legislation, inspection and forest monitoring, technical forestry services), CONAF works with a decentralised network of 32 State Forest Councils, which are also likely to be included in regional and local consultations about the design and implementation of the REDD+ national strategy (CONAF, 2013).

REDD+'s State-Based Technical Advisory Committees

Since 2011, CONAFOR and six state governments⁹ have promoted the establishment of state-based Technical Advisory Committees or sub-national CTCs. Sub-national CTCs operate in parallel with the CTC and aim to identify REDD+ regional and state priorities, to foster local people's participation in ENAREDD+ development, and to elaborate state-level REDD+ strategies in the priority regions (CONAFOR, 2011, 2013).

This chapter exclusively focuses on the functioning and development of the CTC-Campeche, where the two local communities included in this research are located. Given that sub-national CTCs work according to their own internal regulations (CTC, 2010) and that this study investigates the forums' legitimacy as perceived by participants, findings

regarding the CTC-Campeche legitimacy cannot be generalised. Results, however, could be considered indicative of the impact that the perceived legitimacy of sub-national CTCs may have on the overall legitimacy of the country's REDD+ readiness process.

The CTC-Campeche started as a non-restrictive participatory forum but later introduced a rule of balanced representation of accredited members of five main productive sectors (agriculture, livestock, forestry, bee-keeping, and hunting and fishing) and a gender balance. The representatives hold both voice and vote and have been recruited from the Municipal Council for Sustainable Rural Development (COMUNDERS) in the four municipalities with potential for REDD+ activities (Calakmul, Hopelchen, Escarcega, and Candelaria). The CTC-Campeche's president and vice-president (CSO representatives) and the secretary (representative of the Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Use, Campeche—SMAAS) convene meetings every two months, rotating among the above-mentioned four municipalities, in order to facilitate the participation of actors at the municipality level.

Representatives of the federal government, NGOs, academia, and local communities can also participate in the CTC-Campeche discussions organised through working groups but cannot vote. Decisions are made based on the majority (75%) of votes and with quorum (51% of accredited members). The documents produced by the committee (so far only meeting minutes and internal regulations) should be made available to the general public through the SMAAS's webpage and the COMUNDERS's venues and sent as hard copies to local communities (Arriagada, 2014). However, there are still no formal mechanisms of an information dissemination and communication strategy.

Information Sharing Between Multi-stakeholders Forums

Being designed as multi-stakeholder forums, the CTC, the sub-national CTCs, and the GT-ENAREDD+ aim to improve procedural legitimacy of the REDD+ readiness process. Namely, these forums should provide

the REDD+ working group led by SEMARNAT with comments from the civil society on the ENAREDD+ drafts, ER-PIN and other REDD+ readiness documents. Despite such common aim, the CTC and the GT-ENAREDD+ work completely independent of each other and are only linked through CONAFOR representatives who attend both forums.

In theory, the CTC should coordinate and maintain formal communication with the states' CTCs. However, as the CTC-Campeche example suggests, the information exchange between these two forums is informal and predominantly occurs through the CTC's president and the CTC-Campeche's technical secretary. Through SMAAS, the state CTC also interacts with CONAFOR's federal and state offices as well as with other participants in the Campeche forest council. In turn, the state forest councils should have a representative in CONAF's sessions. However, there is no record of whether the Campeche state forestry council had been represented in the GT-ENAREDD+ discussion to date (see Fig. 9.1).

The Perceived Legitimacy of Mexico's REDD+ Multi-stakeholders Forums

This section evaluates the legitimacy of REDD+ readiness in Mexico based firstly, on the stakeholders' views about the functioning of CTC and GT-ENAREDD+ as multi-stakeholder forums operating at the national level, and secondly, on CTC-Campeche exemplifying sub-national level REDD+ forums. Drawing on the analysis of interviews conducted with participating actors at national and state levels, two broad groups with contrasting perceptions about the procedural legitimacy of the CTC, namely the *CTC supporters* and the *CTC detractors* (see Table 9.2), and another two groups with contrasting perceptions about the procedural legitimacy of the CTC-Campeche, namely the *CTC-Campeche supporters* and the *CTC-Campeche detractors*, were identified (see Table 9.3).




Fig. 9.1 Information flow among the main multi-stakeholders forums at national and state levels of Campeche's REDD+ readiness process. *Thick and thin arrows* are used to distinguish among formal and informal information flows, respectively. SEMARNAT, Ministry of Environment and Natural Resources; CONAFOR, National Forest Commission; SMAAS, Ministry of Environment and Sustainable Use, Campeche (Source: Author)

The CTC-REDD+ as a Legitimate Decision-Making Forum

The *CTC supporters* are REDD+ stakeholders who consider the CTC as a legitimate forum and include representatives of the government,

Table 9.2 Summary of supporters' and detractors' perceptions on the CTC procedural legitimacy criteria (✓ – met; ✗ – not met)

Criterion	CTC supporters (Government, large international and national NGOs, academia, and consultancies)	CTC detractors (Peasant and indigenous peoples' organisations)
Recognition	✓ Representatives of all sectors are present	✓ All important actors are recognised
Inclusiveness	✓ Non-restrictive participation Missing governmental agencies from land-use and financial sectors or private actors Lack of local communities' participation intrinsic to environmental decision-making- to be improved through state CTCs	✗ Government targeted local communities supportive of its proposal in ENAREDD+ design Missing high profile representatives of SAGARPA and SEDESOL
Representativeness	✓ Not important because of the consultative nature of the forum	✗ Self-selection resulted in underrepresentation of local organisations and communities
Representation	✓ Favour indirect representation of local people for avoiding false expectations	✗ Lack of accredited membership
Transparency	✓ Information available on-line and document circulated even among nonparticipants	✗ Lack of reasoning of final decisions in the official CONAFOR's feedback
Accountability	✓ Agenda agreed among CONAFOR and presiding CSOs Sessions are observed by WB, FAO, and US-AID	✗ Lack of reasoning of final decisions in the official CONAFOR's feedback

(continued)

Table 9.2 (continued)

Criterion	CTC supporters (Government, large international and national NGOs, academia, and consultancies)	CTC detractors (Peasant and indigenous peoples' organisations)
Deliberation	✓ Major understanding and minimisation of ideological differences	✓ Improved understanding among participants
Meaningful participation	✓ Recommendations included in the ENAREDD+ draft	× Recommendations not included in the ENAREDD+ draft Used by government to legitimate its public policies
Procedural legitimacy	Legitimate	Illegitimate
Main criteria for (not) granting legitimacy	Inclusiveness and deliberation	Lack of representativeness and transparency

Source: Author

international NGOs, large national NGOs, academia, and consultancies sectors. In their view, the CTC legitimacy is predominantly built on inclusiveness, which is, in turn, achieved through its non-restrictive approach to participation. There are, however, nuances in stakeholders' perceptions. For example, NGO CCMSS considers that even though a large number of participants would be desirable, the inclusion of more participants could jeopardise the quality of discussion. In contrast, other stakeholders mentioned that the legitimacy of the CTC process might be possibly reduced because some relevant actors, including land-use sectors governmental agencies, and financial sectors or private actors, are missing.

More importantly, members of this group consider the absence of local communities as inherently unavoidable in environmental decision-making, and they justify their views on the grounds that the CTC does not have the resources to support direct inclusion of local people. In the words of CCMSS's representative, the criterion of representativeness is irrelevant for granting legitimacy to the CTC because it is "informal, no consensus is sought, but all opinions are passed to government to

Table 9.3 Summary of the supporters' and detractors' perceptions on the CTC-Campeche procedural legitimacy criteria (✓ – met; × – not met)

Criterion		CTC-Campeche supporters (Government, international and large national NGOs)		CTC-Campeche detractors (Local communities, peasant and indigenous peoples' organisations, national NGOs, and academia)
Recognition	✓	All important actors are recognised	×	Not all important actors are recognised
Inclusiveness	✓	All participants have voice, only representatives vote	×	Low and irregular participation by local communities
Representativeness	✓	Representatives of main productive sectors	×	Low gender-, sectors-, and municipalities- balance
Representation	✓	Representatives recruited from COMUNDERS	×	Government select only those representatives with sufficient funds
Transparency	✓	Information available online Planned dissemination of hardcopies of documents	×	Lack of dissemination of information Terminology hard to understand by local people and organisations
Accountability	✓	Representatives accountable to local producers through COMUNDERS	×	Power accumulated with the state environmental agency
Deliberation	✓	Only internal rules document have been discussed	×	Discussion could not advance due to discontinuity in participation

(continued)

Table 9.3 (continued)

Criterion	CTC-Campeche supporters (Government, international and large national NGOs)	CTC-Campeche detractors (Local communities, peasant and indigenous peoples' organisations, national NGOs, and academia)
Meaningful participation	✓ Manageable discussions organised in working groups	× Used by government to legitimate its public policies Participants cannot make input on the proposals
Procedural legitimacy	Legitimate	Illegitimate
Main criteria for (not) granting legitimacy	Representativeness	Lack of internal rule application and meaningful participation

Source: Author

choose among them” (interview, 31 January 2014). Instead, they favour indirect representation of local people mainly through national NGOs that have a role in presenting ‘processed’ REDD+ related information to local people. According to CONAFOR, this would help avoid creating false expectations about REDD+ and raise local legitimacy in the design and implementation phases. Furthermore, large national NGOs consider that the inclusion of local people in REDD+ readiness would be improved through state-based CTCs.

However, some organisations are concerned with the fact that some CSOs (members of *CTC detractors*, as it is explained below) left the process. Given that the CTC was established to facilitate dialogue between government and civil society, the fact that some stakeholders left it is perceived as a procedural weakness. Still, they are keen to stress that it is wrong to put excessive expectations on the CTC as a decision-making forum: “some people would like the CTC to be a decision-making space, but it is not! The CTC is just an advisory group. It holds no executive power” (interview CCMSS, 31 January 2014). Some representatives of this group also support decision-making or voting without quorum, under the argument that obtaining quorum might take time.

The stakeholders in the *supporters*' group also consider the CTC legitimate because it is transparent, that is, all information is available online, and the draft documents have been circulated for comments, even among non-participants. In this opinion the CTC is also accountable because the agenda is developed in consultation with CONAFOR and the presiding NGO and because the large international financial and development organisations (e.g., World Bank—WB; Food and Agriculture Organisation—FAO; and United States Agency for International Development—USAID) observed the forum's sessions. For *supporters*, CTC's discussions allow actors to communicate, explain, and exchange their views and ideas on REDD+, which in turn leads to major understandings and minimises ideological differences.

As the National Institute of Ecology and Climate Change's representative suggests, the fact that some important topics, such as carbon ownership, are still under discussion only proves the deliberative nature of the CTC. Beyond inclusiveness, national NGOs in this group also consider the CTC a legitimate forum because all its recommendations have so far been considered in ENAREDD+ design. In the words of a government representative:

CTC is a space of joint exploration and exchange of information and points of view on different REDD+ issues. In that process we are equal, and we try to be transparent particularly in the moments of decision, at least we try to disseminate the final document and ask for comments. ... The actors [other sectors] have been actively participating because they saw we [CONAFOR] did not only send someone just to take notes, but we are really looking for ideas that could help us make a serious use of the CTC input. (Interview CONAFOR, 21 June 2011)

The CTC-REDD+ as an Illegitimate Decision-Making Forum

CTC's legitimacy, however, has also been subject to numerous criticisms from the *CTC detractors*, which involve peasant and indigenous peoples' organisations. According to these stakeholders, the CTC's non-restrictive approach to participation at the beginning of the process allowed for a

broad involvement of non-governmental actors. However, such approach had a detrimental effect on the CTC's representativeness. Namely, self-selection resulted in the overrepresentation of wealthier individuals and organisations active at the national level, while local communities and their organisations were underrepresented. The CTC decision-making procedure has been functioning under 'one vote per participant'. The members of this group found this rule worrisome and have suggested 'one vote per sector' instead. They also advocated going back to membership accreditation based on demonstrated competence and experience in REDD+ related activities, as initially indicated in the council's internal rules.

CTC detractors also emphasised that the only time the government attempted to include more local people was by targeting local communities supportive of its proposal for ENAREDD+ design. They have also criticised the lack of active participation by the ministries of agriculture (SAGARPA) and of social development (SEDESOL), the most important agencies dealing with rural development policies and programmes in Mexico.

Another critical reason to consider CTC an illegitimate forum was its lack of influence on the ENAREDD+ design, and particularly the lack of official feedback by CONAFOR. It is argued that even if the CTC enabled a better understanding of REDD+ readiness among participants, in practice the government used this forum to legitimate its ongoing land-use and conservation policies, neglecting the discussion of some important issues such as carbon rights. As described by the Mexican Campesino Forest Producers Network's (RedMocaf) representative: "The culmination of the CTC informality was when they [CONAFOR] tried to pass an ENAREDD+ draft that did not resolve some fundamental issues such as carbon property" (interview, 24 January 2014). Furthermore, peasant and indigenous peoples' organisations believed that the state-based CTCs suffered from the same informality and low participation of local communities.

For all these reasons, the stakeholders included in this group left the CTC in 2013 to establish GT-ENAREDD+ within CONAF. These actors considered CONAF more legitimate than the CTC and believed that participation in this alternative forum would result in a larger impact on the ENAREDD+ design. They thought so because CONAF used a one vote per sector rule, had accredited membership, and was legally

legitimate, which would force the government to take CONAF's opinion into account. As the RedMocaf's representative nicely depicted: "Through CONAF we are trying to give more seriousness to REDD+ and to get clearer compromises by the government" (interview, 24 January 2014).

The Legitimacy of the CTC-Campeche

Two groups with distinguishable perceptions over the legitimacy of the CTC-Campeche were identified. The *CTC-Campeche supporters* perceived it to be a legitimate forum for discussing REDD+ that includes state environmental authorities, international NGOs, and large national NGOs. These actors argue that the criterion of representativeness has been respected and that the votes are cast only by accredited members representing each invited socio-economic sector. In such a way, the number of votes is limited, which keeps the decision-making procedure easy and clear-cut. According to this group, this procedure does not restrict the inclusiveness of the forum, given that other stakeholders such as local communities, municipal authorities, and academia are also allowed to express their opinion in the plenary and working groups. The use of working groups in the state CTC deliberations makes the discussion among numerous participants manageable. In the words of the state government representative:

Not all representatives of around 70 communities from the municipality of Calakmul could participate in the CTC-Campeche, as it would not be possible to reach an agreement between so many participants. [Due to the accredited membership] the local authorities, who have participated in earlier meetings, may continue to participate, having voice but not vote. (Interview SMAAS, 14 February 2014)

For this group, special attention should be given to disseminating and communicating the CTC-Campeche's documents among local people as this would increase transparency and would help overcome the existing information divide.

The CTC-Campeche has also been subject to numerous criticisms. The *CTC-Campeche detractors* encompass local communities, peasant and indigenous peoples' organisations, national NGOs representatives,

and academia. According to these stakeholders, local communities' participation in CTC-Campeche is low or irregular, and the process suffers from informality. Furthermore, the process suffers from low gender-, sectors-, and municipalities-balance. As the representative of a small local CSO mentioned:

Initially, anyone could participate in the meetings as criteria for participation were not really defined. The problem is that there was a high turnover and no continuity in participation, so the discussion could not move forward. People cannot participate in all meetings due to attendance related costs and this made the government select only those municipality representatives with sufficient funds. (Interview Union of Indigenous Beekeepers from Chenes region, 11 January 2014)

Since the internal rules for local community participation have not been respected (despite what is claimed by *CTC-Campeche supporters*), the CTC-Campeche still more or less operates under a non-restrictive approach to participation. To overcome these procedural shortcomings, *CTC-Campeche detractors* suggest bringing REDD+ discussions to the COMUNDERS's agenda.

Furthermore, *detractors* consider that the CTC-Campeche is not transparent. Namely, information on REDD+ exists, but there is no dissemination of such information by the government, which in turn complicates the ability of local people to understand complex REDD+ terminology. There are complaints that the CTC-Campeche lacks decision-making power, as the state environmental agency remains in full control of policy development. It is also argued that the CTC-Campeche is highly politicised and only used by government to legitimate ongoing land-use policies and to promote private economic interests.

Discussion and Conclusions

Explaining Actors' Legitimacy Perceptions

The results presented in the previous section revealed two contested perceptions on the legitimacy of the national and sub-national REDD+

readiness forums. Such contrasting perceptions are primarily based on stakeholders' views on the forums' normative characteristics, namely on their roles and powers in REDD+ decision-making. *CTC supporters* grant legitimacy to the CTC—as an advisory rule-making space—, and to CONAFOR—as a leading authority—in REDD+ readiness process. In contrast, *CTC detractors* are genuinely unsatisfied with the CTC's consultative role in REDD+ readiness, mostly because its counsels were not necessarily taken into account by CONAFOR in the design of the country's REDD+ strategy.

In line with their understanding of CTC role in the context of REDD+ readiness, these two groups differ in the importance they attribute to criteria of inclusiveness and representativeness. *CTC supporters* consider inclusiveness the most important criterion to guarantee procedural legitimacy because it allows all views to be represented (Hemmati, 2002). In turn, *CTC detractors* consider inclusiveness without representativeness detrimental to the forum's legitimacy because it deepens existing inequalities between wealthier national NGOs and disadvantaged local CSOs (Edmunds & Wollenberg, 2001; Noor et al., 2010; Warner, 2007). The reason why *CTC detractors* advocate for representativeness as the most important criterion is rooted in their aspiration to give a more prominent role to the CTC in REDD+ decision-making. Such different weights given to inclusiveness and representativeness are also exemplified by their differing views on the issue of local people's representation in REDD+ readiness. Namely, *CTC supporters* consider that their non-governmental members adequately represent local voices, while *CTC detractors* call for more direct participation of local people in the REDD+ readiness.

The analysis suggests that the perceptions of REDD+ process legitimacy is relational, implying that it largely depends on the actors' characteristics, sectorial affiliation, and role in REDD+ readiness (Hatanaka & Konefal, 2013). Namely, *CTC supporters* include the representatives of government and NGOs developing REDD+ pilots and carbon forestry projects which have strategically positioned themselves to benefit from REDD+. *CTC detractors* include peasant and indigenous peoples' organisations, which organise dialogue on REDD+ with civil society and local people, and portray themselves as defenders of local communities' interests and rights (Bushley & Khatri, 2011; Vatn & Vedeld, 2011).

Consequently, it could be concluded that the *supporters'* group grant the CTC with legitimacy led by a pragmatic logic or, in other words, by their self-interest that is in this case to profit economically from the process (Cashore, 2002). In contrast, *CTC detractors'* stance could be explained by a moral logic, they feel ethically responsible to speak on behalf of local communities, and a cognitive logic, they consider the experience of the CONAF—which involves more actors and has more power in REDD+ decision-making—a more relevant and desirable forum than CTC (Cashore, 2002). Therefore, the degree to which different actors perceive governance as legitimate or illegitimate depends on different personal or organisational interpretations and demands for legitimacy (Beisheim & Dingwerth, 2008; Huckel, 2005; Tamm Hallström & Boström, 2010).

Both groups, however, acknowledge that the participation and consultation processes articulated by the CTC have improved the REDD+ readiness process compared to its early phase but also to the previous decision-making processes in Mexico (see Brown, Adger, Boyd, Corbera, & Shackley, 2004). Even the *detractors'* group considered the CTC a legitimate forum in the early days.

In an attempt to respond to the CTC's shortcomings, in particular to the representativeness criterion, the government established the sub-national CTCs. The analysis of the normative characteristics of CTC-Campeche reveals that this forum does explicitly consider the accredited members' representations of the main productive sectors, however—according to the *CTC-Campeche's detractors*—such criterion has been poorly enforced. Therefore, the CTC decentralisation has failed to accomplish the *detractors'* expectations in terms of normative and procedural characteristics, which resulted in their burnout (Hemmati, 2002; Yosie & Herbst, 1998). This supports the statement that the legitimacy of a multi-stakeholder forum is a dynamic state that must be constantly created and recreated among participants (Parkinson, 2006; Tamm Hallström & Boström, 2010).

Stakeholders' burnout due to the lack of effective public and community participation in REDD+ policymaking is not unique to Mexico. For example, in 2012 a group of national NGOs suspended their engagement with the REDD+ coordination process in Democratic

Republic of Congo (Forest Peoples Programme, 2012), and an indigenous peoples' coordinating body withdrew from the Panama's UN-REDD planning body in 2013 (Lang, 2013). However, while in these countries the resignation could be understood as 'a political move' to delegitimise the entire national REDD+ process (Hatanaka & Konefal, 2013), the Mexican case is different. Even though the *detractors*' reaction indirectly contributed to delegitimise the CTC in front of other peasant and rural organisations, the *CTC detractors* in Mexico did not tend to leave the REDD+ readiness process entirely, given that they continued participating through CONAF (Špirić, Corbera, Reyes-García, & Porter-Bolland, 2016).

The original expectation was that governmental and non-governmental sectors would have opposed perceptions regarding the legitimacy of the REDD+ readiness process. However, the results suggest the existence of converging views between one part of the NGO sector and the government on what the REDD+ multi-stakeholder process in Mexico offers, while another part of the NGO sector demands procedural reforms. The fact that the *CTC supporters* include representatives of the NGO sector was actually one of the main reasons why the government did not develop practical solutions to attain the CTC procedural legitimacy among the *CTC detractors*.

In turn, given the significant variation in participants' interests and perspectives on inclusiveness and representativeness, and the fact that such criteria seem to stand in a trade-off relation, one could also conclude that there might not be a perfectly legitimate governance process as not all legitimacy criteria can be accomplished at once (Boedeltje & Cornips, 2004; Parkinson, 2006). This means that the participants of multi-stakeholders forums for REDD+ have to pragmatically accept that there might always be some legitimacy deficit attached to REDD+ participatory processes' design. Nevertheless, the first strategic step towards increasing the level of legitimacy in the REDD+ readiness process is overcoming the current inertia in normative, organisational, and operational characteristics of such forums, which in turn largely depends on the government's will as a convenor.

Increasing Importance of Representation in Further Evolution of the REDD+ Readiness Process in Mexico

The findings suggested that although Mexico is approaching the REDD+ implementation phase, it continues to suffer from a legitimacy deficit in the decision-making processes. The research further showed that such perceived lack of legitimacy had led to the emergence of new consultative forums at national and sub-national levels, which might over time weaken rather than strengthen the process. Namely, the existence of a variety of forums at the same level of governance could result in stakeholders' division, thus potentially limiting the quality of deliberation on REDD+ design. However, the most relevant fact undermining REDD+ readiness legitimacy in Mexico is the poor representation of local and indigenous peoples' views in the formal forums. This is particularly troubling given that rural communities own the majority of forests and agricultural land in the country (Corbera, Estrada, May, Navarro, & Pacheco, 2011; De Ita, 2008; FAO, 2010).

Therefore, the Mexican government should promote the decentralisation and coordination of the REDD+ design process to increase participation, democratic quality of representation, and institutionalisation of the ideas promoted by the non-state actors. This will result in a higher degree of legitimacy of REDD+ governance. The REDD+ decision-making forums should be assigned with clear roles and responsibilities as well as their coordination and communication should be improved, both across and between scales, in order to prevent the government from prioritising the views and inputs from the CTC over those from the CONAF or the state-based CTCs (Špirić et al., 2016).

Indeed, the government of Mexico organised the countrywide 'national REDD+ strategy consultation process' in 2015 and 2016 that aimed to ensure the full and effective participation of local actors in the REDD+ design process. The protocol for the consultation with local indigenous communities was elaborated by the Consultative Council of the National Commission for Indigenous Development (CDI) consisting of representatives of local indigenous communities' organisations and traditional authorities (CONAFOR, 2015). In addition, the so called

‘investment plan’ as part of the REDD+ Emission Reduction Program implementation should be designed following a participatory process involving each local community and ‘local implementing agents’ (probably large national and international NGOs that have high operational and technical capacity) (CONAFOR, 2013).

Unsurprisingly, the legitimacy of the ‘REDD+ strategy consultation process’ has been criticised by some *CTC detractors*, who believe that the protocol elaborated by the CDI’s Consultative Council will be insufficient to protect local indigenous communities rights. Moreover, the same actors argue that such protocol lacks inter—(different indigenous groups) and intra—(women, elderly, landless) community representativeness and representation. The legitimacy of the ‘investment plan’ elaboration process is being challenged over the issue of intra-communal representation also. Therefore, the representation of local people in Mexico’s REDD+ readiness process deserves further scrutiny.

Notes

1. The scholarly literature distinguishes between three analytical domains to understand fairness in REDD+: procedural, contextual, and distributive equity. *Procedural equity* includes equal participation of all relevant stakeholders in REDD+ readiness and implementation. *Contextual equity* includes issues of recognition of tenure and other rights, as well as the recognition of knowledge and institutions of indigenous and local communities, and equal rights regardless of social conditions to participate and benefit from REDD+. *Distributive equity* includes issues of fairness of benefit-sharing mechanism across REDD+ stakeholders (Di Gregorio et al., 2013). It is referred here only to distributive equity, because other two domains are contained in definition of legitimacy that is in focus in this chapter.
2. Similar naming/referencing conventions will appear throughout this document for the names of other forums and organisations that were originally in Spanish.
3. Landscape approach promotes an idea of integrated management of the individual and interconnected land-use and land-use change activities by

- a group of local communities in a particular territorial unit, such as biological corridors or watersheds (McCall, 2016; Pacheco et al., 2010).
4. Jurisdictional or sub-national approaches to REDD+ have been officially accepted as interim measures towards a full national approach (UNFCCC, 2009, 2013).
 5. http://ddd.uab.cat/pub/butcoodesfas/butcoodesfas_a2011m9/index.html
 6. The Commission for State Development Planning—Quintana Roo, 17 and 28 June 2011; U'yool'che's REDD+ workshop with local communities, 9 and 10 July 2011; The Nature Conservancy's deforestation workshop, 10 and 11 July 2011; U'yool'che's workshop on the community's protected area, 12 July 2011; Universidad Nacional Autónoma de México's roundtable on the Law on Ecological Equilibrium and Environmental Protection, 20 July 2011; Consejo Mexicano de Silvicultura Sostenible's REDD+ workshop, 9 August 2011; Aliance Sian Ka'an-Calakmul's REDD+ workshop, 16 August 2011; El Consejo Regional Indígena y Popular de Xpujil's meeting, 29 November 2013; and the state of Campeche environmental agency's working meeting on REDD+ with CONAFOR, 14 February 2014.
 7. CSOs include peasant, indigenous peoples, and forest producers' groups and organisations.
 8. To become or continue to be CONAF members, representatives should demonstrate their credibility and experience in national forestry issues in a public call organised every two years (CONAF, 2010).
 9. The states of Jalisco, Oaxaca, Chiapas, Yucatán, Campeche, and Quintana Roo.

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10

When REDD+ Fails to Support Democratic Representation: Legitimizing Non-Democratic Practices in the Amazon

Carol M. Burga

Introduction

Although REDD+ planning processes are well underway in many countries, the democracy, institutional, livelihood, and equity effects of REDD+ interventions remain uncertain. REDD+ implies the creation of a broad set of policies that “will affect the entire set of rights and institutions” of local forest-dependent communities (Ribot, 2010). REDD+ will engender changes in forest and land tenure rights, local representation, distributional equity, access to resources, and the ability to benefit from forest use (Ribot, 2010). Supporters of REDD+ acknowledge that it alone is not enough to solve the underlying reasons of environmental degradation and poverty. Still, they have high expectations that it will improve sustainable forest management and provide individuals and

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communities with opportunities of generating income through the trade of forest products, ecotourism, and participation in carbon markets. Conversely, researchers and indigenous rights advocates have raised concerns about REDD+'s effects on society and institutions. Recent research indicates that REDD+ outcomes include elite capture, loss of access to land, and exclusion from decision-making (Preskett et al., 2008 in Anderson & Zerriffi, 2014).

Peru has been advancing REDD+ preparations since 2008, and by 2012 there were 41 pilot projects underway (Piu & Menton, 2014). At the time pilot projects were launched, the Peruvian government was still preparing formal REDD+ and monitoring, reporting and verification (MRV) strategies (Piu & Menton, 2014), and there were no regulations for Free Prior Informed Consent (FPIC). The FPIC law was passed in Peru 2011 and implemented in 2013 for state-led projects. FPIC principle provides a community with the right to give, or withhold, its consent to projects that may affect them. Without consent, the legitimacy and legality of projects come under threat. Without FPIC, communities are at risk of being co-opted into initiatives without having full knowledge of the implications. By 2016 there were 25 completed consultation processes involving oil extraction, mining, the creation of natural protected areas, and regulations for the new forestry law (O'Diana & Vega, 2016). None of them were for REDD+ since all existing initiatives were private.

Initially, regional and local level indigenous organizations led by the Interethnic Association for the Development of the Peruvian Amazon (AIDESEP) had a radically anti-REDD+ standpoint. AIDESEP feared that REDD+ would exclude communities from decision-making, take away their land rights, and exacerbate poverty by weakening access to resources (Llanos & Feather, 2011). Over time, discussions over social safeguards eased the skepticism and provided hope for indigenous communities, that REDD+ would respect people's rights (Llanos & Feather, 2011).

The literature on REDD+ emphasizes that local and indigenous people's participation and representation in REDD+ processes is essential in order to avoid potential negative effects it may have on their rights and livelihoods (Angelsen et al., 2009). Inclusion and participation in new policies promotes trust and acceptance by different actors involved, reducing the risks of conflict or failure of REDD+ projects (Forsyth,

2009). Following Przeworski, Stokes, and Manin (1999), I adopt the concept of “democratic representation” as a conceptual framework, which is understood through responsiveness and accountability. Responsiveness is visible in the adoption of policies that reflect the needs and aspirations of the public; it is enabled through the empowerment of authorities (Ribot, 2004). Decision-making powers, information, and financial and other physical resources are essential in the translation of demands into action. Accountability is the ability of people to sanction their leaders in response to or in anticipation of their actions (Agrawal & Ribot, 1999; Ribot, 2004).

It is only when leaders can be held to account by their constituents that representation is democratic. Local authorities are a mechanism of representation if they bring knowledge, needs, and aspirations of the local people into public decision-making processes that are translated into policy (Ribot, 2004). In a democratic system, accountability is visible through the presence and use of mechanisms such as elections, public meetings, and public reporting (Ribot, 2004). Protest, sabotage, and many others are ways of signaling and disciplining leaders (Ribot, 2004). Cumulatively, these mechanisms help ensure that policy outcomes are consistent with the public interest.

This chapter examines local representation and changes in rules and institutions associated with the introduction of REDD+ projects. It focuses on two indigenous communities, *Bélgica* and *Infierno*, in the Amazon Region of Madre de Dios, Peru. Between 2010 and 2013 both were engaged in preparatory activities for REDD+ led by the Association for Research and Integral Development (AIDER), a non-profit organization based in Lima and with a branch office in Puerto Maldonado, that provides technical assistance to native communities for sustainable forest management and REDD+ projects. Prior to the arrival of REDD+, both communities had previously developed sustainable forest management and ecotourism projects (Llanos & Feather, 2011; Pollini, 2009). Their past experiences, and moreover their particular institutions and modes of representation, shaped in different ways the new processes of negotiation, the design of new benefit sharing mechanisms, the role of communal authorities in the process, the modification of land use rules, and rules for social order for REDD+.

One of the main findings of this study is that in sites where representation is weak or not democratic, and where existing systems already drive exclusion, inequality, and elite capture, even an apolitical intervention—one that does not aim to challenge the status quo by for instance working with existing authorities, can deepen inequalities. Finally, the study sheds light on the need for the development of social protections, if such inequalities are to be relieved and if REDD+ is to be a vehicle for positive change for the most vulnerable.

I used ethnographic data gathered through 58 interviews in July and August 2012 with community members and authorities, project developers, government authorities, researchers, practitioners, and indigenous leaders directly and indirectly involved in REDD+ in Peru to compare and analyze representation mechanisms employed in the process, and the rules and institutions that were created, adapted or changed as a result of the interventions by project developers (Burga, 2014). I use primary and secondary sources to document the context in which REDD+ arrived and how it was shaped by past experiences and present realities in both communities.

Indigenous Peoples Representation in Peru

The Law of Native Communities of 1974 defines tribal peoples as “indigenous peoples” and their settlements as “native communities”. The law gave them the right to hold collective titles and have communal governing bodies to enable a direct interface with state and non-state actors, and to facilitate community governance (Alexiades, 1999). Since the 1970s, several formal institutions were created to assist land titling and political representation; however, these have been changed, eliminated, and reinvented according to the political objectives of the different administrations in power (Abanto, 2011; Pinedo & Summers, 2001). Today, there are still hundreds of communities that lack titles. Processes of land claiming and titling are extremely onerous and can take several years, depending on the political will of the national authorities. Close to 35 years of institutional flux have curtailed the development of stable political institutions to represent indigenous peoples’ interests. In the process,

indigenous organizations—civil society organizations generally funded by international non-governmental organizations (NGOs)—emerged as alternatives for voicing concerns on indigenous rights and land titling (Chirif, 2012). Today, AIDSESEP represents 65 regional and local organizations grouping 1500 indigenous communities nationwide.

Native communities are under the jurisdiction of district municipalities (elected local governments) that are in turn part of regional governments that are over-arched by the national government. The functions of municipalities include the control over birth records, identification cards, provision of basic services, and infrastructure. Municipalities conduct participatory budgeting sessions for the allocation of resources according to local preferences. Municipalities do not hold powers related to land use and are largely not capable of representing local peoples to higher authorities in these matters (Ravikumar et al., 2015). Regional governments hold powers over land titling and the control of forestry activities. However, key powers on land use are managed by the agricultural, forestry, mining, and environmental sectors at the national level, sometimes with overlapping functions (Ravikumar et al., 2015). Given that the large majority of communities are remote and impoverished, communicating with the sectors is especially difficult. This institutional setup makes it almost impossible for elected officials to be responsive to people's needs and for communities to hold authorities accountable for their actions in matters involving tenure, land use, and interventions such as REDD+.

Given these governance flaws, indigenous organizations and indigenous rights advocates raised concerns about the potential negative impacts of REDD+ such as the restriction or prohibition of traditional practices, exclusion from access to land and forests, disadvantageous benefit sharing mechanisms, among others (Espinoza, Pacuri, & Cunachi, 2013; Llanos & Feather, 2011). In response to this, since 2012, AIDSESEP developed a framework for "Indigenous REDD+", demanding the central government the respect of international conventions adopted by Peru, the recognition of collective territories, the design of adequate benefit sharing mechanisms, the implementation of national regulations for payments for environmental services, and FPIC. AIDSESEP saw the lack of regulation for REDD+ as a window for unscrupulous organizations or

individuals to abuse and exploit rural and indigenous peoples, or for “neutral” interventions to deepen existing inequalities.

Bélgica Community, FSC Certified Timber, and REDD+

Bélgica is inhabited by 20 families of the Yine tribe (85 inhabitants approximately). It is located in the district of Iñapari, in the region of Madre de Dios, on Peru's eastern border with Brazil. The land title granted in 2002 extends over 53,394 hectares. Families rely on subsistence agriculture, fishing, commercial hunting, cattle ranching, logging, and rubber tapping (ADECOMP, 2011). Ever since Bélgica was titled, its inhabitants engaged with increasing intensity in legal and illegal logging, contracting with companies, and entrepreneurs from nearby cities (Pollini, 2009).

Membership in the commune is a key criterion for access to resources. Comuneros need to be born in Bélgica, be the children of other comuneros, come from another indigenous village, and come as spouses and comply with special requirements. In that case, they need to resign from membership of their original community, give proof that they have no criminal record, and be approved by 80% of the community members. Comuneros have access to a piece of land and are responsible for respecting community rules, maintaining peace, collaborating in collective work, and attending to meetings.

Bélgica's primary governance structures are an Assembly and a Council. The Assembly is composed of 32 comuneros and makes rules, elects council authorities, manages and controls natural resources, and takes care of cultural matters. It holds bimonthly meetings to which comuneros' attendance is mandatory. Decisions are made with 50% + one vote of the attendees. The Council is composed of five otherwise unpaid comuneros selected by the Assembly once every two years. The Council consists of a Chief, a Secretary, a Treasurer, and two members at large. It governs and represents Bélgica in public actions and negotiations with companies, banks, and government and non-government institutions. The

powers are established by the Assembly. First, the Chief—who has always been male—is entitled to sign contracts, agreements, and preparatory documents with the authorization of the Assembly and holds discretionary powers. According to the respondents, in *Bélgica* rules for social order and the use of land and natural resources are collectively agreed upon and enforced by the Chief. Second, the Secretary keeps manual records in the minute book and every document that belongs to the community. Third and last, the Treasurer keeps the books and manages the funds. The Treasurer and the Chief are in charge of the distribution and management of all benefits received from economic activities related to the exploitation of natural resources in *Bélgica*.

The community also works with a Legal Adviser and a Facilitator (both non-indigenous) who provide assistance and advice in regards to projects and contracts for natural resources extraction since 2009. The Legal Adviser is a voluntary position. He represents *Bélgica* in negotiations with companies and when facing or making lawsuits. The Facilitator, on the other hand, is hired and receives a monthly pay and is in everyday contact with the community, working side by side with the Chief. He is present in every community meeting when matters such as contracts, rules, conflicts, and business ideas are discussed. According to the majority of respondents, the Facilitator greatly influences the Council's and the Chief's actions, community decisions, as well as the creation and enforcement of rules. Some respondents were suspicious of corruption and considered that the Facilitator pushed his own agenda through the chief.

Bélgica attends the participatory budget meetings at the Municipality of *Iñapari* yearly. These meetings are critical as they determine the annual allocation of state funds to the communities. However, *Bélgica*'s requests for maintenance of their road, access to drinking water and sewage, and electricity have remained unattended mainly because municipalities lack sufficient funds to serve all populations and prioritize more populated areas around the country.

The community is also affiliated to *Federación Nativa de Madre de Dios* (*FENAMAD*), the regional indigenous federation that had an important role in *Bélgica*'s recognition and titling process. However, by the time of fieldwork their relationship was rather distant. *Comuneros* explained that

since FENAMAD's board members are mostly Harakmbut, the federation prefers to support Harakmbut communities.

First Attempt at REDD+ and FSC Certification, 2008–2011

By the time of fieldwork in 2012, Bélgica community had made two attempts to engage in REDD+. The first one was led by Asesorandes, a Peruvian financial broker, back in 2008–2011. The second was led by the NGO AIDER in 2011–2013 (AIDER, 2011a), and was in progress during fieldwork for this study.

The idea of a REDD+ project and the contact with Asesorandes in 2008 were both brought by a local entrepreneur who served as Bélgica's Facilitator (2008–2009). Bélgica made a first attempt at implementing a sustainable forest management system by combining a Reduced Impact Logging (RIL) program and REDD+ in partnership with Asesorandes (Brotto, 2009). Negotiations between Bélgica and Asesorandes for REDD+ were quick, with consent for the preparatory phase easily granted by the community in a voluntary process. However, according to community members, the baseline studies for REDD+ took longer than expected due to Asesorandes' budget and logistic constraints, undermining the relationship between both parties.

However, Asesorandes' intervention did manage to achieve certification by Forest Stewardship Council (FSC). FSC certification allowed Bélgica to establish a contract with Maderyja, a Chinese private company that harvests timber for hardwood flooring for export. Ever since, Bélgica receives royalties that are used to pay community's common expenses and to make direct monthly payments to the households.

In 2011, after fulfilling the conditions for the validation of social and carbon data, Asesorandes and the Bélgica community were ready to sign a contract to establish their REDD+ partnership for ten years (FONAM, 2012). Unexpectedly, the community declined to sign the contract. According to the Chief and some other respondents, the proposed Benefit Sharing Arrangement (BSA) favored the company at their expense. As the Chief puts it: *"In the beginning we were told that it was going to be 20%*

for Asesorandes and 80% for the community. That sounded great. But, when I went to Lima to sign the contract I realized it would be the opposite: 20% for the community and 80% for them. I got very upset, I argued with them and walked away.” Thus, the first attempt of engaging in REDD+ failed.

All respondents explained that their contract with Maderyja increased people’s income from timber sales and enhanced changes in the local life style. Comuneros began to have more access to purchased foods and goods from the nearest market such as gas stoves, pots, TVs, cellphones, motorcycles, and fuel. The community enjoyed an electric generator that provided electricity during the evenings and a 4 × 4 pickup truck. All these items are uncommon in most indigenous communities and are evidence of Bélgica’s relative wealth. However, similar to most communities in Peru, education and healthcare services remain limited.

Authorities and comuneros also reported that swidden fallow became restrained in order to avoid forest fires and to reserve larger areas of forest for timber extraction and carbon sequestration. Some respondents stated that the changes were suggested by Asesorandes and adopted by the Council. Comuneros strongly believed this change in practices was positive and would help them get higher payments from timber and REDD+. Nonetheless, a rural appraisal by Asesorandes (Pollini, 2009) mentions these restrictions that were already reducing comuneros’ ability to locally grow essential products for auto-consumption. During fieldwork, several interviewees confirmed that since their income began to grow, they dedicate less to farming and are more dependent on purchased foods from nearby cities.

Second Attempt at REDD+, 2011–2013

By the end of 2011, Bélgica made a second attempt to engage in REDD+, this time through AIDER. A voluntary consent process was quick and included only—as comuneros say—“two or three” meetings in which AIDER explained to the comuneros the different project activities. Bélgica’s main motivation for engaging in REDD+ were the payments, which were expected to help fulfill collective and household needs, although possible amounts were not discussed. Comuneros wanted to

improve the medical post and the local school. Benefits would be used to complement local government's deficient service delivery. At the household level, revenues would allow families to pay for their children's high school education in the city and for gas, clothing, and food.

Comuneros stated that the Chief had an important role in decision-making for REDD+ by presenting ideas in favor or against the project in the meetings. Comuneros agreed that they trusted the Chief's criterion. In the face of the arrival of REDD+, and greatly influenced by the opinion of the Facilitator, comuneros were discussing the possibility of declaring him permanent Chief to ensure the stability and continuity of REDD+. Comuneros consider that the "good results" the community is obtaining from the projects—referring to timber royalties and the possibility of income from REDD+—are a result of the Chief's excellent managerial skills.

The general population's participation in the project is limited to attending to meetings and workshops where AIDER instructs them about carbon sequestration projects, climate change, and forest management. Comuneros approve or disapprove actions proposed by the NGO, which are often explained in simple terms by the chief and the Facilitator. Men and women attend the meetings to comply with community rules, to avoid fines imposed over the absentees and to secure access to future payments from REDD+. However, some comuneros stated that they do not fully understand technical details and they largely rely on the chief's criterion and mostly follow his recommendations.

Preparation for REDD+ has caused further changes in land use rules in the community. In 2012, land allocations were reduced to one or two hectares per comunero, swidden fallow cultivation was prohibited, and cattle ranching was restricted. According to AIDER, restrictions were imposed by the Council and not by the NGO.

Although the type of benefit distribution arrangement for REDD+ had not yet been discussed by the time of fieldwork, interviewees revealed that they would prefer to maintain the current arrangement that is in place for certified timber extraction, which consists of collective payments to the community and direct payments to households. AIDER, however, preferred collective payments, but recognized that the community will ultimately decide which type of arrangement they will adopt.

The arrangement creates different scales of payments based on people's civil status, age, gender, and the burden of holding public responsibilities. The payments scale was suggested by the Chief and the Facilitator, and collectively approved in community meetings. The distribution of benefits is directly governed by the Council—with strong involvement of the Chief—following rules and operating at scales that are only verbally stated.

Bélgica receives royalties (\$192,000 for 2012) that are used to pay for the community's expenses, the Facilitator's salary, and one direct monthly payment for the heads of households. Table 10.1 shows that the Facilitator receives the highest payments, equal to four times the salary of a Council member. The second scale is composed by the members of the Council, followed by males holding less responsibilities and privileges in the community. Divorced mothers and widows (heads of household) are the only women entitled to payments, while 12 single adult women do not enjoy this privilege for they depend either on their husbands or parents. There

Table 10.1 Benefit sharing arrangement for certified timber extraction in Bélgica community (as of July 2012)

Category/status	Number of people	Monthly income in US dollars	Equivalent percentage of community income
Hired employee			
<i>Facilitator (non-indigenous)</i>	1	2320	14.5%
Community members receiving royalties			
Member of the Council (all male)	3	600	3.75%
Male head of household with public office	3	560	3.50%
Male head of household	9	480	3.00%
Divorced mother or widow	2	400	2.50%
Single male	4	200	1.25%
Community members NOT receiving royalties			
Single and married women	12	0	0%

are some exceptions—made by the Chief—to the rule of one payment per household. For instance, the case of two single brothers, relatives of a member of the Council, living in one household and receiving separate payments. Percentages shown in Table 10.1 were calculated from household's interviews, as there are no official expense reports made by the Treasurer.

While the majority of the respondents mentioned that they have no access to information on the community's expenses, only a small number of them feel disturbed by the Council's lack of transparency and suspect that the money is being embezzled. However, there are no official complaints or claims by community members to have the treasury disclose the reports.

In sum, this arrangement lacks transparency, tends to be exclusionary, and tends to respond to capricious exceptions to the rules. Women are almost completely excluded from benefits, while the highest benefits remain in the hands of those actors holding political power. The BSA in place reveals a case of elite capture—by the Facilitator and the Council in particular—that could be perpetuated in case the arrangement is replicated for the distribution of benefits from REDD+.

Being a comunero since the advent of REDD+ has become a privileged but fragile status to maintain. Regulations of the “proper behavior” of the comuneros specially made for REDD+ are included in a “Statement” prepared by the Chief, the Legal Adviser, and the Facilitator. If they fail to behave “properly”, community members must renounce their status as comuneros and cease receiving income from the timber sales and REDD+. The text reads as follows:

In the case that I fail to behave properly inside and outside the community and to provide labor and support for the good development of these two activities (certified timber extraction and REDD+), I authorize the Assembly to exclude me from the register of inhabitants of this community and from receiving any type of income, either from timber sales or the REDD+ project. I will therefore peacefully accept this penalty and will not interpose any demand against the community. (Extracted from the modified community statute in July 2012)

The justification is that the buyers of the carbon credits will want to make sure that the benefits from REDD+ will be invested in improving

the community's quality of life. Although new rules may seem to foster group cohesion and collective action for REDD+ to succeed, during the interviews a small group of respondents said they were induced, convinced, and forced by the ruling authorities to accept these severe sanctions.

“Proper behavior” means attending and participating in the Assembly meetings, not drinking alcohol, and participating in providing labor to the community. Alcohol consumption is considered by the authorities to be inappropriate behavior and a persistent problem ever since they started receiving royalties from timber. All the comuneros agree with this rule because they have been informed by the Facilitator and the Chief that otherwise they will not meet what they call “the social aspect” of the requirements for REDD+, losing the opportunity of receiving the benefits.

Failing to “provide support” to projects is severely punished with drastic implications on citizenship and belonging to Bélgica. Comuneros must participate in the workshops, meetings, fieldwork, and any type of work within the projects when required and cannot stay away from the community for more than two months without authorization from the Council; otherwise they will lose right to community membership. The return or incorporation of new comuneros is also restricted. Since 2012, new or returning people can become comuneros, but never receive royalties, in a way to discourage immigration and avoid the free-rider problem. The rule also helps limit the number of beneficiaries to keep the shares high.

Even though national laws state their respect for customary rules and guarantee that human rights are protected, the types of restrictions that are being imposed in Bélgica clearly reduce people's freedom and constitute human rights violations. Moreover, the new rules and the attempt for imposing the permanent election of the current Chief were unknown by the state authorities and the indigenous federations. When prompted about their knowledge of this situation, AIDER officials stated that they did not recommend to the community the creation of such rules. However, they said that it is their policy to not interfere with their internal decisions. According to AIDER staff, Bélgica's social organization is favorable for the development of projects. They consider the community

to be well organized and highly cooperative which facilitates project activities. They also believe that in the case comuneros feel that rules are abusive, they should complain to their federation, to Vice Ministry of Intercultural Affairs, and to the Ombudsman.

Infierno Community, Ecotourism, and REDD+

Infierno is located in the province of Tambopata and is 45 minutes by road from Puerto Maldonado, the Region Capital. With a territory much smaller than Bélgica, 9558 hectares, Infierno is home to 180 families (approximately 900 inhabitants). Their main subsistence and commercial activities are agriculture, forest gathering, fishing, hunting, timber harvesting, and ecotourism. Comuneros are from three different ethnic groups: the Ese'Eja (indigenous), Ribereño (non-indigenous founding members of Infierno), and Andean (migrants coming from the Andes since the 1980s). Even though Infierno was recognized as Native Community back in 1976, the registration of the title—the last step for clearing tenure—was still pending by the time of fieldwork in 2012 (AIDER, 2011b). The title was finally issued in 2013 with the help of AIDER during their preparation for REDD+.

Infierno is ruled by the Assembly and the Council. The Assembly holds monthly ordinary meetings. Attendance at the meetings is mandatory for all community members. Decisions are reached by voting. The elected Council has the power of allocating land to the comuneros and enforcing local rules. Of all the communal authorities, only the Chief receives a salary. In the event of proved lack of transparency, corruption, or unresponsiveness, the Assembly can dismiss elected authorities.

Infierno is affiliated to FENAMAD since 1982. FENAMAD was instrumental in helping Infierno being legally recognized as a native community. However, today their relationship is distant. According to informants in Infierno the organization does not always align to the community's interests and in the past has interfered during the negotiation of some important projects.

Comuneros are entitled to access to the common resources, land (30 ha per family for farming before preparation for REDD+, 15 ha

after), and to participate in communal enterprises. Comuneros maintain land rights only if they work the land. Immigrants are required to write a request to the Assembly and be under trial for one year to be granted admission to the community. Rules for social order and for the use of land and resources gradually changed in response to the growth of the population, the increasing demand for land, and requirements imposed by new projects.

Infierno is under the jurisdiction of the Municipality of Tahuamanu. Similar to Bélgica, their requests in the participatory budget meetings are mostly unheard mainly because of the municipality's permanent insufficiency of funds. Conversely, Infierno has constant communication with the Regional Government to require technical assistance for agricultural production, to complete the process of land titling of the community, or to obtain permits for small-scale timber extraction and concessions over non-timber forest products.

Infierno Ecotourism Project, 1996: Present

In 1996, Infierno established a partnership with Rainforest Expeditions (RFE) to develop a long-term ecotourism project. RFE and the community (154 families) formed a joint venture called the Ke'eway Association and signed a 20-year contract to build Posada Amazonas, an ecotourism lodge. The contract specified a benefit sharing arrangement with a ratio of 60:40 favoring the community. The agreement established the active participation of the community in the lodge's development and management.

The process of obtaining consent for the project faced intense skepticism and the opposition of indigenous rights advocates and some comuneros. A group of local Ese Eja leaders visited every family to personally explain the terms and the implications of the project. Simultaneously, the association created the Management Committee to help the information campaign and to act as a bridge between the company and the community. Together they obtained Infierno's consent for the project (Stronza & Durham, 2008). The lodge, Posada Amazonas, began operating in 1998 and during 16 years it has been a commercial

success (Stronza, 2009). The profits and shares per year per family have increased over time; from \$150 in 2000 and \$805 in 2007 (Stronza, 2009), up to \$1800 in 2011 (AIDER, 2012).

The distribution of profits from the lodge is fair and transparent, according to several members of the association. A portion of the community's 60% share is channeled to a fund for covering medical emergencies, and education loans for higher education, which are paid back once the students enter the job market. The 70–80% of that portion is distributed among 154 heads of household each year. Comuneros who are not members of the association do not benefit at all.

Infierno's experience in the ecotourism business is extremely relevant as it set the standards for consultation and consent processes of future projects—like REDD+—and became a model of successful management of a communal enterprise. This project incentivized the community to organize and plan the management of common-pool resources (Stronza, 2009). The communal organization became stronger and sophisticated, as it sought to increase efficiency at the same time that it took ownership of the project.

The ecotourism project introduced a new governance body into the community: the Management Committee, which is composed by five appointed. It is accountable to the 154 families (80% of the total families in Infierno) and reports to the Assembly on the association's finances, changes in infrastructure, human resources, and administration on a monthly basis. The general perception on the work of this committee is generally positive. Today it is known as the Projects Management Committee as it is in charge of the management of small projects in Infierno. The Committee influences decision-making in several communal affairs involving common-pool resources. Currently, it is getting involved in the supervision of REDD+ activities.

The ecotourism project introduced rules for the use of local resources and established limits in hunting and tree-felling to ensure conservation and to protect the communal business. Due to the fact that the success of the ecotourism project was attracting more immigrants to Infierno, authorities established that new comuneros are not granted the right to be members of communal enterprises anymore, thus are not entitled to

revenue. Otherwise, revenues would become too small to be significant to the members.

Infierno's Preparatory Activities for REDD+: 2009–2013

Between 2009 and 2013, the community was involved in preparatory activities for REDD+ that were also led by the NGO AIDER. Despite their efforts for conservation, Infierno was experiencing an accelerated process of deforestation due to population growth, road network expansion, illegal logging, and agricultural expansion. The Peru-Brazil Inter-Oceanic Highway attracts settlers along the route, who are penetrating into the boundaries of Infierno. Moreover, some comuneros illegally extract timber and others lease land to papaya tenant farmers—despite it being limited or prohibited. Last, until the arrival of REDD+ Infierno's tenure was not clear. All these problems represent a threat to Infierno's lands and ecotourism business.

In 2008, the International Tropical Timber Organizations (ITTO) invited Infierno to participate in a feasibility study to evaluate its potential to enter a REDD+ scheme (ITTO, 2009). Along with national government officials, ITTO presented the project idea to the Assembly of Infierno. After some meetings and debates, the community gave consent for the realization of feasibility studies and later for the preparatory activities for REDD+.

According to the interviews, and listed in order of priority, Infierno's had three main motivations for consenting to REDD+: (1) clear tenure, (2) benefits from carbon sales, and (3) tackling deforestation drivers. All these motivations were discussed by the Assembly in several meetings, and during meetings with the project proponents. The Council represented the Assembly's views in the negotiation process and development of project activities, and the Project Management Committee (from the ecotourism project) became involved in the analysis of the technical aspects of the project.

REDD+ had a rough start and the way Infierno reacted to this situation speaks of the community's strong sense of agency. ITTO selected the AIDER to be the project developer without consulting the community.

Infierno's Assembly questioned the decision and demanded that the community should have a voice in every decision that is made. Later, the community made its own evaluation of AIDER's project proposal in public meetings. Comuneros were disappointed that one third of the budget would go to cover the wages of the NGO staff, while not even one community member would be hired. The Assembly demanded to make adjustments in the budget to include the hiring of local comuneros and the purchase of computers and the construction of a communal house as a condition for granting entry to the NGO. ITTO and AIDER agreed to these changes and the project was launched for two years. It is noteworthy that local demands for hiring local labor were not reflected in the final agreement, thus having an effect on the level of interest and participation of comuneros in project activities.

During the development of preparatory activities the Council closely supervised AIDER'S actions. Even after consent was granted the community was still not fully informed of many aspects of REDD+ and attendance to meetings was somewhat low. The Assembly demanded changes in the communication strategy as community members prefer to be informed in person, household per household, following the model of consultation used in the ecotourism project.

Comuneros argue that the project does not allow for their active participation, as project activities are designed in such way that they remain passive recipients of information and training. Additionally, the possibilities of the local people to be hired during the implementation phase are non-existent, having an impact on their interest in the project. This situation has been discussed in meetings between representatives of the community and the NGO, but at the time of the study, the negotiations had not yielded any result. Comuneros' experience in ecotourism taught them that community's active participation yields to better results and to the ownership of the project, so they are very critical of the way AIDER is conducting the REDD+ project.

In Infierno, there are varying views in regard to REDD+. Supporters of REDD+ are mostly authorities and comuneros who have landholdings with important extensions of well-preserved forest. They expect that this project will finally help them to register the land title that has been pending for so many years. According to a member of the Council: *“even if we*

do not end up selling any carbon, at least the preparatory activities of the project will have secured our land". Members of the Council consider that REDD+ does not pose threats of any sort, as REDD+ detractors believe, and instead it represents an opportunity for future income.

There is another group that opposes REDD+. These are the papaya tenant farmers, illegal loggers, local merchants, and local indigenous leaders. They dislike REDD+ because it goes against their business as usual practices and because the imposition of rules will directly affect their livelihoods. A local logger said: "*I ask myself if it is really worth it not to touch the forest while I wait on REDD+'s money, missing the opportunity of getting some cash for crops and timber now? I have been observing this process and I see that in three years we have achieved nothing*".

Finally, a wide sector of the population is still forming an opinion about REDD+ and, in general, is tired of the constant presence of NGOs and researchers. Comuneros are convinced that to different degrees they do not completely understand how REDD+ works, how the benefits will flow and be distributed, and how it will be managed in the future. They argue that knowledge is mostly concentrated in the local authorities, but even among them there are different degrees of understandings.

The benefit sharing mechanism was being informally discussed by the time of fieldwork. Comuneros believe they should adopt same arrangement in place of the ecotourism project: direct and indirect payments to the community and households. Others worried about the equity in the distribution of the benefits and the time it will take to receive the payments. Since regulations for benefit sharing arrangements are non-existent in Peru, the NGO was to design a proposal for benefit sharing in compliance with international standards.

Finally, preparation for REDD+ promoted certain changes in land use decisions at the community level. Comuneros are now only allowed to clear up to ten hectares of forest within their farms. This does not seem a problem for subsistence farmers—who on average do not work more than 4 hectares of land in a year within their 30 to 15 hectares plots. However, it does represent a problem to those who use larger extensions for market-oriented agriculture and logging. The population and the authorities agree that enforcing already existing rules for the use of the forest and increasing the territory's surveillance will help reduce deforestation.

Discussion and Conclusions

Bélgica and Infierno have different historical backgrounds, ethnic compositions, and governance experiences. As such, the REDD+ projects in these sites produced different outcomes, even though they were carried out by the same project developer, in the same region, under the same laws. Yet, the experiences of Bélgica and Infierno also illustrate how REDD+'s preparatory activities can exacerbate exclusions and produce critical changes in representation, rules, and institutions.

Both cases show pre-existing failures in democratic representation expressed as a disconnection between elected officials at the local and regional levels, authorities at the village level, indigenous organizations, and the constituency. The lack of representation at the local and regional levels, as well as at the indigenous federations and civil society forums enhances the risk of negative outcomes from project interventions. Implementing organizations often overlook local governance issues that lead to abuse and exploitation of people who may end up losing important assets and freedoms. The case of Bélgica illustrates this very well. Its lack of interaction with the federation and the local government keeps the community members isolated and unable to benefit from information, advice and assistance. They are left alone to enter negotiations with project proponents and follow the advice of their communal authorities and facilitators that have their own agenda. Under these conditions, REDD+ would only reinforce exclusion and inequality.

Failures in democratic representation become particularly evident and problematic for REDD+. The two immediate upper levels of government above community Councils do not have any responsibility or involvement in REDD+. Local governments do not engage at any stage of the process. The role of regional governments is limited to that of promotion of carbon sequestration projects and do not hold any control or supervisory role at any stage of the development of REDD+ projects. Thus, there is a lack of formal representation in REDD+ processes of consultation, decision-making and implementation, and communities are left to deal directly with project proponents (private companies or NGOs).

Communities go through unrigorous consultation and information processes before giving consent for REDD+, which leads to inaccurate understandings and expectations from the projects. This study demonstrates that communities make decisions in very quick processes without receiving detailed information through means that are adequate to them. In the case of Infierno comuneros are asking for better communication strategies; they demand having one-to-one discussions with project proponents so that they can make sense of what the project really is about and what to expect. Of course, this is a challenge for project proponents who usually work under a budget and stretch time frames. The lack of regulations for FPIC has even worse consequences in the case of less empowered populations, like in the case of Bélgica. The general lack of information about people's rights in the face of REDD+ projects can draw them to make decisions and accept agreements that may end up restricting their freedoms and put their assets at risk.

People engage in REDD+ mainly for the opportunities it provides for securing tenure and bringing additional economic benefits to communities. First, having clear tenure for indigenous communities is a top priority. In Peru there are still hundreds of communities that lack titles and depend on the political will of the national authorities to promote (or not) titling processes. Secure land tenure is critical to successful REDD+ programs because overlapping claims to forest resources often create insecurity and conflict and limit their effectiveness at reducing deforestation and emissions.

In the case of Infierno, the preparatory activities were an opportunity to finally complete the registration of their title and secure the land once for all even if REDD+ does not work in the future. In the case of Bélgica, where land tenure is not a worry, comuneros are interested in REDD+ because of the revenues that will complement the income they obtain from certified timber sales. All comuneros are very optimistic that they will soon engage in REDD+ and sell carbon credits that will provide direct payments to the families. They expect that the payments will help improve household economies, as well as community's infrastructure such as health and education services. It is still to be seen whether securing land tenure will help to ensure carbon capture in the long term and whether carbon payments will provide communities with significant benefits.

The neutral intervention of the NGO can deepen inequalities if it does not systematically counter these inequalities. One key finding from this investigation is the choice of project developers not to get involved in local governance matters in a way of not compromising the timely development of projects and not interfering with community decisions. Social assessments are done rapidly, local political issues are not analyzed, reports are made under already established formats, and are seen by project staff as requirements. These are often done by non-experts who lack the skills to reflect on issues of power, exclusion, and inequalities that are present in communities, and—if not addressed—may help to intensify and perpetuate them. For instance, in the case of Bélgica, the social assessment documents did not make reference to the excessive power of the Facilitator and the ruling authorities as they were seen as allies to the project. The report did not make reference to the extreme restrictions on social behavior that were taking place by the time of fieldwork, even though the NGO had been working in the community for more than one year. These cases show that NGOs and project developers need to be proactive so that REDD+ can succeed in reducing inequality, increasing local development, and reducing resistance or sabotage to REDD+.

REDD+ interventions are producing changes in forest use and rules for social behavior in communities that can have negative impacts on people's lives, which demonstrates the need for the implementation of social protection. In terms of rules for forest use, REDD+ project proponents tend to convince populations that traditional slash-and-burn practices should be avoided, that the size of the plots should be reduced in order to contribute to the reduction of emissions. Restrictions on traditional practices pose future risks for food security for populations such as Bélgica, where there has been a dramatic reduction in cultivation and an increased dependence from economic resources to buy overpriced goods in the city. In other cases, like in Infierno, the new rules for forest use do not affect livelihoods as the limits imposed to clearing leave enough room for the population to continue with their legal and usual activities. Rules only restrict activities that are causing damage to the community's forests like the cultivation of papaya for commercial purposes and illegal timber extraction.

The implementation of long-term projects like REDD+ can influence changes in the rules for social order to regulate who has access and rights to benefits. There are restrictions imposed on the incorporation of new community members who may be interested in joining the community only for the benefits. This can have serious implications in small societies like Bélgica, where almost all the population is related by blood and marriages with outsiders is necessary. Rules for maintaining the status of comunero can become extremely severe even if they are claimed to be “collectively and freely” agreed upon. Rules can turn abusive where there is reduced information and conscience about human rights, where power is captured by authoritarian figures, and where there is little space for contestation. This is strongly evident in the case of Bélgica where comuneros can lose citizenship and assets if failing to support the project activities and disobey rules created by the authorities in power.

When this research took place, communities had not yet achieved the culmination of the feasibility stage, which is the culmination and validation of the Project Document Design. In order to continue analyzing the effects of REDD+ in these communities, it would be necessary to study participation and representation during the implementation phase, when communities are finally able to generate carbon credits and are enabled for further monitoring and credit certification sessions.

The cases of Bélgica and Infierno are useful for illustrating the conditions under which REDD+ projects are taking place in indigenous communities. Communities are under great risk in countries like Peru where private companies and organizations are not statutorily mandated to carry out consultations if they wish to start REDD+ projects in these sites. Risk is enhanced by the lack of involvement of different levels of government during the processes by which populations are informed and provide consent. Implementing organizations may overlook local governance issues that lead to abuse and exploitation of people in communities who may end up losing important assets and freedoms. The development and implementation of social protections by government and other non-state actors is essential to not only avoiding potential negative effects on people’s well-being but also support the generation of benefits for them.

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